115th CONGRESS Printed for the use of the 

1st Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Sea Rescues: Saving Refugees and 

Migrants on the Mediterranean 

DECEMBER 12, 2017 

Briefing of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington: 2018 
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Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

234 Ford House Office Building 

Washington, DC 20515 

202–225–1901 

csce@mail.house.gov 

http://www.csce.gov 

@HelsinkiComm 

Legislative Branch Commissioners 

HOUSE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, NEW JERSEY

Co-Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, FLORIDA

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, ALABAMA

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, TEXAS

STEVE COHEN, TENNESSEE

RICHARD HUDSON, NORTH CAROLINA

RANDY HULTGREN, ILLINOIS

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, TEXAS

GWEN MOORE, WISCONSIN

SENATE 

ROGER WICKER, MISSISSIPPI, 

Chairman 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. MARYLAND

JOHN BOOZMAN, ARKANSAS

CORY GARDNER, COLORADO

MARCO RUBIO, FLORIDA

JEANNE SHAHEEN, NEW HAMPSHIRE

THOM TILLIS, NORTH CAROLINA

TOM UDALL, NEW MEXICO

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, RHODE ISLAND

Executive Branch Commissioners 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

[II]
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ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 

Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 

1, 1975, by the leaders of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. As of 

January 1, 1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. 

The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings of the participating States’ permanent representatives are held. In addition, specialized seminars and 

meetings are convened in various locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior 

Officials, Ministers and Heads of State or Government. 

Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the fields of military 

security, economic and environmental cooperation, and human rights and humanitarian 

concerns, the Organization is primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage 

and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The Organization deploys 

numerous missions and field activities located in Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. The website of the OSCE is: <www.osce.org>. 

ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as the Helsinki 

Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to monitor and encourage 

compliance by the participating States with their OSCE commitments, with a particular 

emphasis on human rights. 

The Commission consists of nine members from the United States Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member each from the Departments of 

State, Defense and Commerce. The positions of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the 

Senate and House every two years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff 

assists the Commissioners in their work. 

In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening hearings, issuing reports that 

reflect the views of Members of the Commission and/or its staff, and providing details 

about the activities of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating 

States. 

The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of U.S. policy 

regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the Commission have regular contact with 

parliamentarians, government officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and private individuals from participating States. The website of the Commission 

is: <www.csce.gov>. 

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Sea Rescues: Saving Refugees and 

Migrants on the Mediterranean 

DECEMBER 12, 2017 

Page 

PARTICIPANTS 

Nathaniel Hurd, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe ........... 1 

Catherine Flumiani, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Italy to the United States .................... 3 

Michalis Stamatis, First Secretary and Consul, Embassy of Greece to the United States ...... 5 

Ludwig Blaurock, Political and Military Counselor, European Union Delegation to the 

United States ............................................................................................................................... 7 

Laura Thompson, Deputy Director General, International Organization for Migration .......... 10 

John Murray, Marine Director, International Chamber of Shipping (via videoconference) ..... 13 

[IV]
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Sea Rescues: Saving Refugees and 

Migrants on the Mediterranean 

December 12, 2017 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

Washington, DC 

The briefing was held at 2:41 p.m. in Room 188, Russell Senate Office Building, 

Washington, DC, Nathaniel Hurd, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Panelists present: Nathaniel Hurd, Policy Advisor, Commission for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe; Catherine Flumiani, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Italy to the 

United States; Michalis Stamatis, First Secretary and Consul, Embassy of Greece to the 

United States; Ludwig Blaurock, Political and Military Counselor, European Union Delegation to the United States; Laura Thompson, Deputy Director General, International 

Organization for Migration; and John Murray, Marine Director, International Chamber of 

Shipping (via videoconference). 

Mr. HURD. Good afternoon. On behalf of the chairman of the Helsinki Commission, 

Senator Roger Wicker, and the co-chairman, Congressman Chris Smith, welcome to this 

briefing on ‘‘Sea Rescues: Saving Refugees and Migrants on the Mediterranean.’’ My name 

is Nathaniel Hurd, and I’m a policy advisor at the Helsinki Commission. 

Since the refugee and migrants crisis started in Europe in 2015, there have been 

many stories about suffering, death, and debates about policy. Almost 12,000 of these 

people on the move have died or gone missing on the Mediterranean. Many of the debates 

within and between European countries and institutions remain unresolved. But there is 

another story that must be told more often and more clearly. It is the story of lives saved 

on the sea. 

Our panelists today include representatives from the governments of Italy and 

Greece, and from the shipping industry. Together, they represent ship crews that have 

rescued more than 379,000 refugees and migrants. That is almost half the population of 

Washington, D.C., in which we are holding this briefing. 

Too often, we focus on the villains. Today we will focus on the heroes. Like all heroes, 

they are imperfect because they are human. We will discuss struggles, challenges, mistakes, critiques, and recommendations for improvement. But we also commend those who 

have rescued strangers, sometimes at the risk of their own lives. 
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Before I introduce the panelists, just a few brief words about the format of this 

briefing. After introducing all the panelists one by one, I will ask each one of them a 

series of questions. They’ll hold their answers until I’ve completed asking my questions 

of all the panelists. They will then answer. Then we’ll open up the discussion to those 

of you in the audience and those of you that are watching online. Just a reminder to our 

Facebook viewers, you can post a question, and one of my colleagues will ask it on your 

behalf into the microphone. 

Now to our panel. Catherine Flumiani is the Minister Counselor for consular and 

social affairs at the Embassy of Italy to the United States. She arrived in Washington, 

D.C. in August of 2016. Ms. Flumiani is a native of Varese in Italy, and graduated from 

the Universita` Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano with a degree of political science. Her 

areas of expertise include the Middle East and North Africa, the United Nations, and 

transatlantic relations. In 1997, she took her first overseas diplomatic post in Amman, 

Jordan. Later, Ms. Flumiani was posted to the Italian embassy in Berlin, and in Brussels 

to the Italian Permanent Mission to the North Atlantic Council of NATO. Her latest 

assignment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation in Rome was 

as head of the United Nations Office. Welcome. 

Michalis Stamatis is the First Secretary and Consul of the Embassy of Greece to the 

United States. Mr. Stamatis is a career diplomat, and joined the embassy in 2016. Prior 

to Washington, D.C. he also served as consul at the Consulate General of Greece in 

Ukraine, and as deputy head of mission and consul at the Embassy of Greece in Abu 

Dhabi. His previous postings at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens also 

include the Office of the Spokesperson of the ministry, the Diplomatic Cabinet of the minister, and the Directorate of EU Integration and Economic and Monetary Union. Mr. 

Stamatis studied political science and political administration at the National University 

of Athens. He continued with a Master’s degree in international studies at the same 

university, while working at the Greek think tank EKEM, the Hellenic Centre for European Studies. He speaks Greek, English, and French. Mr. Stamatis has served as reserve 

officer in the 2nd Parachutist Battalion in Athens, and is now ranked as a reserve lieutenant of the Hellenic Army. Welcome. 

Ludwig Blaurock, to my left, is the counselor for political and military affairs in the 

Political, Security, and Development Section at the Delegation of the European Union to 

the United States. Mr. Blaurock joined the EU Delegation to the U.S. in September 2015, 

after serving in various positions in the German foreign service. Most recently, he was 

consul at the German Embassy in Tel Aviv, where he led the consulate, and additionally 

was responsible for human rights and other issues in the Israeli-Palestinian context. 

From 2009 to mid-2012, Mr. Blaurock was political counselor in the Federal Chancellery in Germany, in Berlin, where he was assigned to the Security Policy and Disarmament Division that also included relations with the United States and Western European countries. From 2008 to 2009, he served as desk officer at the NATO and Security 

Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, where he was responsible for NATO 

enlargement and partnerships. Prior to joining the German Foreign Service, Mr. Blaurock 

worked as a management consultant at McKinsey and served his military service in the 

German Air Force. A native of Bonn in Germany, he completed his legal studies at the 

Universities of Mannheim, Sevilla, and Passau. As a McCloy Fellow, he earned a Master’s 

in public policy from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Welcome. 
3 

Laura Thompson is the deputy director general of the International Organization for 

Migration, more often known as IOM. She is responsible for assisting the director general 

in administering and managing the organization; conducing political dialogue; and 

building IOM relationships with governments, U.N. agencies, civil society, and the private 

sector, as well as defining policies, strategies, and prioritizing action. Prior to this position, Ms. Thompson was the ambassador and permanent representative of Costa Rica to 

the U.N. and other international organizations in Geneva. She also served at the Permanent Mission to the U.N. in Geneva in a prior occasion, and at the Delegation to 

UNESCO. In addition to her diplomatic experience, Ambassador Thompson has held posts 

as a legal officer in two U.N. organizations. Ambassador Thompson obtained a Master’s 

degree in international relations with a specialization in international law from the Graduate Institute for International Studies of Geneva, and holds a degree in law from the 

University of Costa Rica. She has also completed executive education at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and INSEAD. In addition to Spanish, 

which is her mother tongue, Ambassador Thompson is fluent in English, French, and 

Greek, and has a basic knowledge of Italian and Portuguese. 

Before introducing our final speaker, who is John Murray, the marine director of the 

International Chamber of Shipping [ICS], just a quick story of how Mr. Murray came to 

be on this panel. In December of 2015, I was in Rome for meetings. I met with a priest, 

Father Bruno Ciceri, who has been very involved in migration and in particular mariner 

issues for many decades, and it was he who told me that at the time the merchant shipping industry had rescued about as many people as some of the national navies. Now, 

that has since shifted as the navies have scaled up, but it was then that I first learned 

of the critical role that the merchant shipping industry has played in the response to this 

crisis. 

As I noted, John Murray is the marine director of the International Chamber of Shipping. A master mariner, he joined ICS following previous careers at sea, including on oil 

and chemical tankers, and as a maritime college lecturer. Mr. Murray is responsible for 

the output of ICS on marine technical matters. The principal role of ICS is to represent 

the views of ship owners worldwide, including at the International Maritime Organization 

and in other international bodies. Mr. Murray has led ICS involvement in a number of 

initiatives, and is responsible for several of the industry best practice guidelines that ICS 

produces, either independently or in association with others. He led development of the 

industry-supported guidance ‘‘Large Scale Rescue Operations at Sea,’’ which is widely 

acknowledged, in conjunction with other ICS-led publications, as the principal industry 

guidance on the approach to be taken and practical operational advice regarding largescale rescue operations. Mr. Murray represents ICS at the EU Shared Awareness and 

Deconfliction in the Mediterranean—also known as SHADE MED—meetings, and has represented the ICS and industry position in numerous meetings, principally at IMO but also 

in other fora. 

A very distinguished panel. 

Minister Counselor, please. 

Ms. FLUMIANI. Thank you, Nathaniel. I am particularly glad to participate in today’s 

briefing organized by the U.S. Helsinki Commission on a topic in which Italy is at the 

forefront: to save human lives in the Mediterranean. Addressing the migration crisis in 

the region is a priority for the Italian Government, which spares no effort to foster 
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cooperation and synergies with its European partners and all international actors 

involved. 

In such context, we are glad that migration flows are prominently moving up the 

agenda of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as Italy will chair 

the organization in 2018. It will therefore not come as a surprise that migration and the 

prevention and repression of illegal trafficking of human beings will be among the priorities of the 2018 Italian Presidency of the OSCE starting January 1st. This year’s Mediterranean OSCE Conference, which took place in Palermo in October, already had as its 

focus the migration and refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. Although OSCE does not 

have any coast guard or naval operational goal, Italy’s aim is to ensure that the wide 

array of OSCE programs in the different areas—political, security, economic—can fully 

contribute to addressing the root causes and consequences of migration flows through the 

Mediterranean. 

2017 has been a turning point in terms of number of migrants and refugees reaching 

Italy. From January to November, over 117,000 persons arrived, a decrease of 36 percent 

compared to the same period in 2016. Though 90 percent of the totality came through 

Libya, the share of arrival via that country has steadily dropped in the last months, while 

illegal smugglers are increasingly exploring alternative routes. 

Italian authorities cooperate closely with the relevant Libyan authorities, and 

particularly with the Libyan Coast Guard from the Ministry of Defense, to enhance their 

capacities in a vast array of operations: patrolling, search-and-rescue [SAR] operations at 

sea, managing of immigration flows in maritime and terrestrial borders. As Italy is one 

of the few countries with an operating embassy in Tripoli, we work closely with the 

Libyan Presidency Council and the Government of National Accord to help strengthen 

national institutions and encourage the gradual assumption of responsibility on the most 

pressing, challenging issues, such as managing the migration phenomenon and the fight 

against human trafficking. 

Italy works to help reaffirm the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial 

integrity, and national unity of Libya, as well as noninterference in domestic affairs. At 

Libya’s behest, we also work to strengthen the institutional apparatus dedicated to fight 

criminal networks, both along the coast and in the south. At the same time, we give new 

importance to social aspects and development, and the full respect of human rights. 

Our bilateral engagement nestles within the broader European dimension. In particular, training activities for the Libyan Coast Guard personnel has been carried out in 

coordination with the EU naval operation EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, under the command 

of an Italian officer, Admiral Enrico Credendino, and the EU Border Assistance Mission 

in Libya, EUBAM, as our capacity building is complementary to them. Moreover, the 

training we deliver has been aimed, and still indeed is aimed, at returning some patrol 

vessels to legitimate Libyan authorities, and ensuring that Libyans can make the best use 

of the device at their disposal for search-and-rescue operations at sea. 

Italy’s continuing to do its share in patrolling and rescue operations. In 2017, from 

January 1st to November 30, the Italian units conducted 1,400 search-and-rescue events 

related to migration, intercepting 1,240 units, both at sea and ashore. In total, 112,000 

migrants were rescued while trying to reach Italian shores. Thirty-two percent were rescued by Italian naval units belonging to the Italian Coast Guard, the navy, the Guardia 

di Finanza—which is our financial police—and the Carabinieri. Merchant ships also 

participated in such efforts, and have rescued over 11,000 people, almost 10 percent of 
5 

total rescues this year. The Italian Navy also participates to EUNAVFOR MED Sophia, 

currently with one frigate and one helicopter. 

In conducting such operations, Italy strictly abides by the obligation of the law of the 

sea, including as provided by the International Convention of Safety of Life at Sea, 

London 1974; the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Hamburg 

1979; and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay 1982; all 

of which require commanding officers of ships at sea and state to, I quote, ‘‘render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost,’’ end of quote. 

The Italian Coast Guard is one of the Italian Navy corps, and performs mainly 

civilian tasks, including utilizing to the safety of navigation and search-and-rescue operations. In this regard, Italy ratified the International Maritime Organization [IMO] 

Search and Rescue Convention of Hamburg 1979. Accordingly, the Italian Coast Guard 

General Command was appointed as national authority in charge of coordinating sea 

rescue services. 

Alerts from migrants in distress are received in various ways: incoming telephone 

calls from boats using a satellite mobile phone, or incoming calls from a person ashore 

in Africa or Europe reporting the presence of a unit in distress and its possible position, 

or reports by another unit in the area. Coast Guard naval units are generally equipped 

with paramedic personnel able to carry out the first medical screening of the rescued 

people. If a person needs urgent medical attention, a MEDEVAC is arranged to take him 

or her to the nearest medical structure able to respond to the emergency. 

Rescued people undergo a first solo interview aimed at gathering their main data— 

name, age, nationality—as well as clues to the actual condition of the trafficking victim: 

clear evidence of torture, young females without family, children, youngsters of both genders without family. People considered to be at risk undergo a second and deeper solo 

interview aimed at confirming the above, or if necessary gathering more data. The result 

of the interviews are transmitted to the police authorities ashore before arrival in port. 

People rescued during a SAR operation coordinated by the Italian Coast Guard are 

disembarked in a place of safety, as defined by the IMO Safety of Life at Sea and SAR 

Convention, and by the Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea issued 

by the IMO in 1978. If the place of safety is on Italian territory, the decision is taken 

in accordance with the evaluation of the competent branch of the Ministry of Interior in 

charge of managing migrants after disembarkation at the end of SAR operation. 

Thank you very much, and I am ready for your questions. 

Mr. STAMATIS. Thank you, Nathaniel, and the Helsinki Commission, for organizing 

this briefing. I think it’s important to raise awareness for this important issue. 

Greece, situated at the external borders of the EU and the Schengen area, has found 

itself at the frontline of an unprecedented migrant and refugee crisis. Migratory flows 

have been increasing exponentially since 2012, and the situation became even more critical in 2015. On that year, as you can see on map number one, the number of refugees 

and migrants in Greece exceed 800,000 people, which was a twentyfold increase compared 

to 2014. Overall, about 1 million people—almost 10 percent of Greece’s population— 

transited through Greece in 2015 and 2016, mainly coming from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and heading mainly towards the countries of Northern Europe. 

Due to the closure of the Balkan route on February 2016, more than 62,000 people 

are now stranded in Greece. At the same time, arrivals seem to be picking up again, with 
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a considerable increase of 40 percent over the last six months despite the implementation 

of the EU–Turkey statement. Therefore, the problem continues to exist, creating extreme 

pressure on the islands of the eastern Aegean and the five Registration and Identification 

Centers, or hotspots as we say, operating there, in most cases beyond their capacity. 

Now, as you can see on map number two, geography is crucial to understand the difficulties in managing the migrant or refugee flows in this part of Europe. Greece’s borders 

with Turkey are mainly at the sea, and this complicates every effort to control the flows. 

Fences cannot be built on maritime borders, while according to international law, 

‘‘refoulement’’—also known as ‘‘pushback’’—is prohibited. At the same time, there is an 

obligation by international law to rescue people in distress at sea. 

In reality, smugglers rely heavily on the provisions of international law and searchand-rescue operations, turning them into a distinct tactical advantage. These dangerous 

crossings on unseaworthy and overloaded vessels have the main purpose of being detected 

and then rescued. 

In their efforts to reach the Greek coastline, passengers sometimes deliberately sink 

their boats upon sight of a Hellenic Coast Guard patrol vessel in order to force its crewmembers to recover them and bring them ashore. This practice endangers the lives of all 

persons onboard, even the Hellenic Coast Guard’s officers, as they must recover a large 

number of people in literally no time and often in adverse weather condition prevailing 

at sea. 

Geographic proximity is another facilitating factor for illegal crossings. The distance 

from the Turkish shores to the Greek islands on the eastern Aegean Sea can be as close 

as five miles, and can be crossed in just a few minutes. Just to give you an idea of it, 

this is the exact distance between Staten Island and Lower Manhattan. When the Hellenic Coast Guard detect suspicious movements inside the Turkish territorial waters, it 

immediately transmits early warning information to the Turkish Coast Guard authorities 

to assume control and rescue responsibility in their area of jurisdiction. In practice, however, once refugees and migrants have set sail from the Turkish shores, it is almost certain that they will manage to enter Europe. 

Another crucial element is that the number of daily sea crossings fluctuates significantly throughout the year. Even when the situation seems to be under control, it can 

always change rapidly and drastically. Continuous vigilance is needed, placing additional 

strain to the search-and-rescue resources. 

The Hellenic Coast Guard has to operate under extremely dense time frames and 

adverse conditions. In order to address the migratory pressure, the Hellenic Coast Guard 

has redeployed its resources, engaging a larger number of its operational means on the 

region. Operations are coordinated by the Joint Rescue Coordination Center, based in 

Piraeus. This is the single national operations center for the coordination of such incidents 

within the Hellenic Search and Rescue Region, which is the ATHINAI FIR. Upon detection, the Hellenic Coast Guard immediately renders assistance on a nondiscriminatory 

basis, in accordance with national and international maritime law, such as the United 

Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and in the spirit, of course, of the centuryold Greek seamanship tradition. 

One of the core objectives of the search-and-rescue operations of the Hellenic Coast 

Guard is to save lives at sea. Since 2015, the Hellenic Coast Guard has rescued more than 

200,000 people in more than 5,000 incidents in the eastern Aegean Sea alone. After the 
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EU–Turkey statement of March 2016, the number of incidents has been considerably 

reduced. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard still continues facing disproportionate migratory 

flows in the eastern Aegean. In 2017 only, approximately 30,000 people were rescued in 

more than 500 incidents. The number of dead and missing persons at the Aegean Sea 

exceeded 1,000 in the year between March 2015 and March 2016, but has been dropped 

significantly, to 129 people, since then. 

Breaking the business model of smugglers and traffickers is also a high priority for 

the Hellenic Coast Guard. Over the last few years, the Coast Guard has carried out 

extended operations, resulting to the arrest of a significant number of traffickers, in total 

3,600 for the period between 2015 and 2017. 

It is important to understand, as you can also see on map number three in front of 

you, that in order to effectively perform these tasks, the Coast Guard must maintain 

increased surveillance activities along an extended line of Europe’s southeastern external 

maritime borders. In this regard, additional assets and personnel are deployed on a 

rotating basis, while measures are also taken to increase the search-and-rescue capabilities in terms of human resources and operational assets. Undoubtedly, though, this situation has put immense strain on the human resources of the Hellenic Coast Guard and 

has stretched the operational fleet to its limits. 

Other players contributing to these efforts are the Hellenic Armed Forces, the NATO 

activity at the north of the island of Lesvos, the United Nations High Commissioner for 

the Refugees [UNHCR], the International Maritime Organization, the Europol, and of 

course the EU Border and Coast Guard. The Joint EU Operation Poseidon has provided 

additional assistance in terms of human resources, operational assets, as well as technical 

equipment from the participating member states, under the coordination of FRONTEX. 

Turkey is undoubtedly another key player. It should be acknowledged that Turkey 

has made great efforts to manage the flows, while hosting a large number of refugees 

itself. It is, however, imperative to step up its cooperation in the fight against smugglers 

and increase its efforts to control the flows, with the ultimate goal of bringing them to 

a halt. 

If there is one lesson deriving from the experience so far for the refugee crisis, on 

how to deal with it, it is that no country or organization alone can deal with such a 

reality. The only way forward is through cooperation and coordination among various 

countries and organizations and institutions in the spirit of solidarity and burden-sharing, 

and with the understanding that this is a global issue that requires a global solution. If 

we fail to acknowledge this, we are basically doing nothing more than ignoring the realities on the ground, while choosing to disregard the magnitude and the complexity of the 

refugees and migrant crisis itself. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BLAUROCK. Thank you very much. Thank you to the Helsinki Commission for 

hosting us and inviting us today to this important topic. Thanks to the colleagues. 

As we’ve heard, the migration challenge that we’ve faced in Europe over the past 

couple of years has really been unprecedented, and we’re quite proud of the efforts that 

we’ve been doing together with our member states to confront this challenge. 

At the center of that effort has always been to honor our values and our commitments under international law to save lives and to provide dignified treatment to human 

beings that are at peril and at risk. In the Mediterranean, the European Union efforts, 
8 

together with our member states and other international partners, have allowed the 

rescue of more than 230,000 people in 2016 alone, and over 70,000 in 2017. However, we 

need to be clear that this effort is much wider and more comprehensive, and that we 

cannot only look at the Mediterranean alone. 

In Libya and Niger, high numbers of people are stranded, and the European Union 

is trying to assist together with such organizations as UNHCR and IOM to return voluntarily these people to their countries of origin. So far this year we are counting about 

12,000 of these returns, and we’re trying to double that number in the months to come. 

In a January partnership effort with other countries—mainly host countries, countries of origin, and countries of transit—we’ve developed a partnership framework to work 

with these countries to really fight the root causes of migration, because that’s where the 

effort has to be focused on. But it’s also in the Mediterranean to save lives and to fight 

the business model of human smugglers and human traffickers. 

When it comes to the root causes, I just would like to recall, and without going into 

too much detail, that the European Union, together with its member states, is the main 

donor and provider of humanitarian and development assistance worldwide—in fact, the 

biggest worldwide. Out of the Valletta Summit in December 2015, only of that effort, since 

then about 2 billion euros have been provided in projects to transit and host countries, 

and countries of origin, to fight that, and another 4 billion have been made available by 

the European Commission in the External Investment Plan. We hope to leverage that sum 

by tenfold until 2020 by further partner investments and private-sector investments. 

As I said, the fight has to be comprehensive and looking at the whole picture, not 

only in the Mediterranean. So, along the transit routes and the countries of origin, the 

European Union has been strongly engaged. We have a strong and comprehensive effort 

through the Sahel, which is one of our key focus areas. Niger is one of the key countries 

there, where we have a civilian mission supporting Nigerian capacity building, the European Conference on Antennas and Propagation [EUCAP] Sahel, with an important element in Agadez, which is one of the main transit points to cross through the very perilous 

crossings through the Sahel desert. 

We’re engaged as European Union, together with member states, in Mali with a 

civilian mission that parallels EUCAP Sahel in Niger, which is EUCAP Sahel in Mali. 

We have a European military training mission to capacitate the Malian armed forces to 

stabilize the country. 

I could keep enunciating and listing other efforts that we have just to give an idea 

that it is really a comprehensive effort of what we need to do and the long-lasting effort 

that we need to be engaged in. 

More precisely, on the topic that we are dealing here today—and it was mentioned 

before by my colleagues from Italy and Greece—the European Union has a couple of 

important operations in the Mediterranean to face the migratory pressure and save lives 

at sea. I will not repeat the numbers that have been cited and the migratory picture that 

we see. Although in 2017 the trend seems to be lowering, we’re still at extraordinary 

levels of flows into Europe. 

The Central Mediterranean route coming out of Libya is the main transit route. This 

year we’ve seen about 117,000 people crossing from Libya into Italy, basically. In that 

area, we have the European Naval Mission EUNAVFOR MED Sophia that is operating 

in international waters outside and off the coast of Libya since 2015. It is a mission that 
9 

is not primarily designed to save lives at sea, although in practice that’s one of the main 

tasks that they fulfill. The main mission of that operation is to disrupt the business model 

of human smuggling and human trafficking. It has additional tasks that have been very 

prominent, very important, mainly training the Libyan national Coast Guard to provide 

support. 

In that capacity, we are quite content to see that some first efforts have been made. 

We have trained about 200 Libyan Coast Guard members. They have been on ships and 

started to patrol their own territorial waters, which are indeed the most dangerous waters 

because that’s where most people actually died in the crossing. They’re on patrol boats 

that have been provided, vitally, for that purpose, so it’s a hand-in-hand effort here. We’re 

proud to say that they have actually rescued 18,000 people this year only, from basically 

nothing in the years before. 

Other parts of the mission of EUNAVFOR Sophia also to help implement the United 

Nations Security Council weapons embargo against Libya, and to gather and collect data 

on illegal export of oil from Libya. So it’s a kind of comprehensive mission that 

EUNAVFOR Sophia is engaged on, and we’ve seen some efforts and some success in what 

they’ve been doing. But clearly, it’s an effort that needs to be sustained for a longer 

period. 

Regionally, behind that, we have the efforts that the European Union is stepping up 

to support our member states, Italy and Greece, mainly through the European Coast 

Guard and Border Agency, or FRONTEX as it’s better known. Two missions are there, 

two important national authorities. One in Italy is Triton, and one in Greece which is 

Poseidon. Both of them supporting member states, national authorities, and working 

under their authority to support those navies and coast guards, saving lives but also doing 

other important work such as cross-border crime, and other coast guard activities such 

as looking at illegal fishing and pollution of maritime waters in a comprehensive manner 

as well. 

To give you some data points on those, currently for Operation Triton in Italy, there’s 

about 300 European officials supporting Italian authorities with seven vessels and aircraft, two helicopters, and mobile offices. The main effort is at sea, but also some landbased support. To give you some data points, they have been participating in 2017 only, 

from February to November, participating in helping saving 21,000 people out of the seas. 

They seized 25 tons of drugs, detected seven incidents of pollution, arrested 253 suspected 

smugglers, and seized about a million illegally smuggled cigarettes. 

For the operation that FRONTEX is supporting in Greece, which is called Poseidon, 

in this year alone or at this current state there is about 800 guest officers that are 

working under FRONTEX to support the Greek national authorities. They have been 

participating in saving more than 11,000 people in the Aegean. In terms of the assets 

deployed, there’s 13 vessels, two helicopters, and 60 patrol cars, with about 800 personnel 

that have been participating in seizing 5.5 tons of drugs, arresting more than 290 smugglers or suspected smugglers, seizing 42 million cigarettes illegally passing, and falsified 

documents. So really a comprehensive mission. 

Also to mention, and that’s the third route after the Central Mediterranean route, 

which is the main transit route that we’ve been seeing, the Eastern Med route, we should 

not forget there’s also the Western Mediterranean route—people crossing over into Spain 

and the Spanish enclaves—or exclaves on the African continent, where FRONTEX also 

has support missions to the Spanish national authorities with the names at sea for Hera, 
10 

Indalo, and Minerva. Those have been operating also for several years. Currently, about 

a hundred FRONTEX officers are supporting that. 

To give you some data points on that, for only the period of May until end of 

November—so, fairly short period—they’ve arrested about 100 suspected smugglers, 

seized 68.5 tons of drugs—so a very high number of drugs, because the Western Mediterranean route has also traditionally been sort of a high drug-trafficking route as well— 

detected four illegal fishing incidents, and equally seized a high number of illegal cigarettes and other tobacco products, about 60 million pieces alone. 

It is a comprehensive security effort, but in the core of it is really saving lives at sea. 

We will not see that decrease, really, although we have sort of a positive tendency, unless 

we keep working on transit routes, on the root causes, on countries of origin, because 

that’s really where the effort has to lie. We are very proud—as I said earlier, very proud 

of the efforts of the officers and marine men and women who are working at sea, saving 

lives. It’s something we can be proud of. But we need to be conscious that this has a 

palliating effect on what’s happening. It’s really addressing the symptoms, but not the 

root causes. It’s a fight that we need to keep working together and jointly. As my Greek 

colleague said earlier, it is something that we need to do in full solidarity and in full 

vision of the complexity of the task as a global challenge that we all face, and not something to be left to individual member states that are the most effected by the state of 

geography. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. 

Ambassador Thompson. 

Amb. THOMPSON. Thank you very much for inviting us to participate in this. The colleagues before have made my life a little bit easier because you have provided already 

a lot of the information that I was also going to provide. 

I would like to start by saying that, indeed, the movements in the Mediterranean continue to be extremely important, but are much less than it was before. I think that’s an 

important element. We have accounted for 163,979 arrivals in Europe by sea during 2017, 

as of 26 November. Certainly, Italy remains to be the main entry point at this point, 

somewhere around 116[,000] migrants. Greece second has gone down and it comes up 

again. Interesting, Spain is going up substantially. Cyprus, also, in the last year has 

become a little bit more important. 

So we are about 30 percent less than the year before, in comparison. However, the 

number of dead remain quite important, and we’re talking about 3,033 that we have 

accounted for. So we realize that there is a clear pattern that exists, that is the percentage in the Central Mediterranean, basically; that is, the percentage of dead remains the 

same, despite the differences in the numbers in the last two years. It has stabilized at 

approximately 2.4 [percent] of the total of arrivals, and this is the amount of people that 

we find and that we count and that the newspapers and the different entities know about. 

So, obviously, these numbers might be much bigger, but we don’t learn. 

We continue to promote the idea of and the premise of the most immediate action 

by all stakeholders that are around and that should help to reduce the loss of lives as 

much as possible in these mixed flows of migrants—economic migrants, asylum-seekers, 

people that are searching for different reasons to come to Europe—and, obviously, regardless of their status. 
11 

We have been very happy with a lot of the actions that have been taken, and the 

colleagues before just mentioned different operations that are taking place in the Mediterranean. I think the real heroes there are the different coast guards of the different 

countries, including Turkey as you mentioned, because they have done also very important work. 

The other countries in the south of the Mediterranean have also taken actions, and 

they are not as prominent as the one arriving. The coast guard in Libya have made also 

a big effort in trying to enhance their own capacity, but at the same time I think we all 

have made a big effort to enhance their capacity by equipping them better, but also 

training them in a way that they do better rescue operations, but also more humane ways 

of dealing with people immediately after. 

NGOs have been an extremely important element in complex operations, I would say, 

but they have rescued a lot of people and provided a lot of the support to the vulnerable 

cases. 

Certainly, the commercial vessels have played a very important role. I know that it’s 

not an easy task, particularly in the Mediterranean—it’s a very busy route all the time, 

but they have played a very important role. I have some figures here, but I will leave 

the gentleman that is in the screen to provide that to you because I think he’s going probably to focus on that. We know, also, that for commercial vessels, it is a little bit more 

difficult because of the economic cost they have, the fact that they are not equipped in 

order to do it, and certainly their reliability that they not necessarily are always ready 

to assist. But they have been a very important actor in this process. 

We still consider that mainstream human rights and protecting vulnerable migrants 

at all the stages of these search-and-rescue operations is extremely important, regardless 

of the legal status of the migrants and/or the conditions that have brought them. It’s certainly an obligation of all governments, and I think that the majority of the efforts that 

have been done through these years have that as a very important basis. 

Post-embarkation and reception assistance is one of the most difficult part, and I 

think is where we find certainly a lot of problems in Libya. We are at a point in Libya 

where we—and when I say we, I’m talking about the common efforts that the European 

Union, IOM, and other institutions also have done in order to build their capacity with 

this in a certain way contradiction—that we save people or they save people at the sea, 

and then bring them back to the shore and put them very often in detention centers that 

have terrible conditions, and where people can even die at land instead of having died 

at sea. So there are some contradictions in the whole effort, but I think we are very clear 

that this needs to continue, and what we need to do is to try to enhance the capacity of 

Libyan authorities to deal with the people at land as well as other countries are trying 

to do. Certainly, it’s one of the issues that remains, I would say, one of the present important challenges. 

What we see as very important in this post-embarkation, or disembarkation, and 

reception assistance is basically to have an approach that is rights based, but also vulnerability sensitive. We know perfectly well that there are a lot of different vulnerabilities 

among the people that are in those boats. We have children. We have victims of trafficking, victims of torture, people with specific needs or protection needs or specific 

vulnerabilities. It’s certainly not easy to create a system that addresses all those things. 

Mainstreaming human rights into those strategies and operations must be, obviously, 
12 

foreseen by everybody. The cooperation between countries of origin, transit, and destination are extremely important and not always present. So that’s another element. 

Capacity building, coordination, and partnerships continue to be a large part of our 

focus there, not only with the member states and with Libya. We are doing this work with 

UNHCR. As I said, the Libyan Coast Guard plays a very important role in this. Basically, 

we try to work also with NGOs to build their own capacity as well. 

Just to conclude, I think there are two elements. The colleague from the European 

Union mentioned this. It is, by doing all this, we are dealing with the consequences. We 

have to be very clear that, despite the fact that we are putting a lot of efforts—and each 

one of the actors in this table and others that are not represented here have made big 

efforts, invested a lot of capacity, resources, and people and time in doing this—we are 

still only dealing with the consequences, and not totally successfully dealing with them. 

So, basically, we have to remember that a large number of the people that are crossing 

the Mediterranean today are crossing because of the instability in Libya. 

Libya used to be one of the major destination countries for migrant workers, and still 

a lot of the people that cross the Mediterranean, according to what we have found, they 

cross the Mediterranean after spending some time in Libya and not being able to find the 

jobs that they thought that they were going to find and the possibility that they thought 

that they were going to achieve. So stability in Libya is a key factor in trying to respond 

to a lot of this. 

A lot of the efforts that we are doing with the support of the European Union, and 

different member states of the European Union, are to try to work on preventing irregular 

immigration in the Sahel region. We are hoping that this is going to provide some results 

in the mid-term and long run. 

As long as the situation in Syria continues to be the same, Greece will continue to 

be at risk of another flow. We need to continue investing in trying to support the governments that are around Syria because they are the ones that are keeping or having the 

biggest burden into all this. 

So I think there are two main questions that we need to reflect upon, to conclude. 

First of all, how can we enhance comprehensive regional or state-led responses to rescue? 

That is a big question. How we can strengthen the NGO support to SAR operations to 

ensure that the NGOs can deliver their lifesaving services, but in full accordance with 

international, EU, and applicable national laws? 

These two questions are linked to our short- and long-term ambitions with regard to 

eliminating this perilous Mediterranean crossing. That is, in the short run, how can we 

create safe and secure maritime space grounded in a rights-based approach and strong, 

multi-stakeholder cooperation SAR operations? 

In the long run, it is clear for us that the most effective way to reduce this is to set 

up regular and safe avenues for immigration. Therefore, which regular avenues can be 

made available to workers at all skill levels, students, family members, entrepreneurs? 

Which kind of transparent, time-bound, and effective migration policies need to be in 

place? Because there continue to be a lot of irregular immigration because there are still 

jobs that exist, for which people don’t have regular ways to get there. We need not only 

to optimize the status-determination procedures, but also to really design pathways that 

allow European societies to make the most of migrant contributions to their own welfare. 

Thank you. 
13 

Mr. HURD. Thank you, Ambassador Thompson. 

Director Murray, thank you again for joining us long distance and late at night. 

Please. 

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you very much. Good afternoon to you. 

Particularly at sea, we live in a world defined by regulation, convention, and codes. 

Notwithstanding formalized regulation, it’s long been a tradition with shipping and seafarers that every effort is made to rescue anyone who is distress at sea. This mutual selfhelp principle has been in place for centuries, and underpins the humanitarian approach 

of seafarers to their fellow man. 

The natural humanity of seafarers to provide assistance has, however, been formalized in two maritime conventions: firstly, the United Nations Convention on the Law of 

the Sea, or UNCLOS; and also, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. 

So both of these instruments require that the master of a ship which is in a position to 

do so, on receiving information from any source that people are in distress at sea, 

responds to obligations that include proceeding promptly to assistance, and to offer assistance regardless of the nationality or status of such persons, or the circumstances in which 

they are found. It may be noted from these rules that the ship rendering assistance does 

so without consideration of race, color, or other characteristics of the people in distress. 

Furthermore, onboard, other than the most basic checks on immediate health of welfare 

considerations, no assessment of those rescued should take place or be asked for by any 

authority. Assessment or categorization of people rescued may only proceed when rescued 

personnel have been disembarked to a place of safety. 

During the first half of 2016, the IOM recorded over 205,000 migrants reaching 

Europe via the Mediterranean, with over 2,500 recorded deaths. Up to June of this year, 

a far smaller number crossed the Med, yet the number of recorded deaths was over 1,600. 

It’s clear, therefore, that throughout 2017, migration across the Mediterranean has continued to be a tragic reality. 

The number of people actually rescued by merchant ships over the past few years: 

in 2015, over 16,000; 2016, nearly 14,000; and in 2017, to the middle of November, 11,000. 

The actual percentage of those rescued by merchant ships is slowly increasing, which is 

perhaps a story of concern. 

Rescue has been carried out by most types of internationally trading ships, including 

tankers—oil, chemical, and even gas—as well as by container ships and bulk carriers. On 

all of these ships types, there are matters of particular concern with safety concerns on 

tankers particularly being paramount. However, issues on container ships and bulk carriers are also significant, and the design and construction of many ships frequently render 

them not suitable to both conduct large-scale rescues and support large numbers of rescued people. 

This unsuitable nature has several aspects, such as: the recovery from water facilities 

is generic and not intended for large-scale rescue operations; many ships have a high 

freeboard, which is the distance from the waterline to the deck; many ships have little 

maneuverability and a lack of safe space of survivors; also, there will be a lack of 

resources—food, medical, and accommodation; the ship’s personnel are sufficient to 

operate a ship, but it’s not specified specifically trained to handle a large number of survivors; safety concerns, rescued person may be exposed to risks or may themselves pose 

a risk for the safety of the ship. One of the concerns of the industry is the ongoing psycho-
14 

logical burden on ordinary seafarers who may be called upon to carry out rescues, and 

so experience the trauma that comes with that process. 

Ships associated with the offshore exploration industry also have participated in rescuing distressed people, as have passenger ships, which are also bound by the same moral 

code and legal responsibilities that apply to all ships. In this case, however, coordinators 

generally do not call on passenger ships unless other alternatives are not available. 

Some ships will operate perhaps with less than 20 crew members, while others will 

have a requirement for considerably more. In general available accommodation will be 

limited to reflect the compliment required by the flag State’s manning certificate. Also 

consequently, there is usually very limited additional accommodation or other facilities 

available for use by rescued personnel, who may frequently significantly outnumber the 

ship’s own compliment. The difference in numbers between the ship’s crew and the rescued personnel can lead to security concerns. 

ICS has produced guidelines for large-scale rescue operations at sea, copies of which, 

I understand, are available in your room today, and may also be freely downloaded from 

the ICS website. The guidelines are widely supported by the industry, and have been 

particularly welcomed by those administrations significantly involved with migration 

across the Mediterranean. If anybody wants later to ask any questions in detail about 

these guidelines, I can answer those as a separate point. 

The commitments on ships to carry out rescue at sea place a corresponding obligation 

on administrations to arrange the prompt disembarkation of those rescued to a place of 

safety. No matter how well intentioned the ship is, it is not considered to be a place of 

safety, which, as we’ve already heard this evening, is defined itself in international law. 

Such law also can preclude a ship from returning those rescued to a place where they 

believe them to be in danger. It might also be noted that a very real danger can exist 

for a ship’s master and crew dealing with overwhelming numbers of rescued persons if 

the ship is ordered to return to a port where they do not want to go. 

Fortunately, the authorities in the Mediterranean have acted in an exemplary 

manner. Italy in particular is to be applauded for its commitment to disembarking rescued 

people in a place of safety where medical and other support services can work alongside 

those who categorize disembarking persons. 

It’s important to recognize that merchant ships do not rescue migrants, refugees, 

smugglers, or traffickers. When called upon, ships rescue people who are in distress and 

transport them to a place of safety. Ships should not be asked or expected to categorize 

rescued people, and cannot do this other than in the most rudimentary way consistent 

with the limited capacity on these ships. This process will seek to keep family groups 

together but separate obviously vulnerable individuals, including women and children, 

from inappropriate contact where this can be achieved. 

In the event that individuals are identified as posing a current threat to the ship, 

its master and crew, this will be communicated to outside agencies, with guidance and 

assistance being sought wherever possible. On disembarkation, any possessions that have 

given rise to concern will be handed to the authorities. Once again, whenever possible the 

owner of property that is giving cause for concern will be identified. 

The industry, and ICS in particular, has both instigated and participated in a range 

of activities and interaction with governments and international agencies. These engagements include at the U.N., IOM, UNHCR, and various NGOs involved in rescue oper-
15 

ations, as well as governments of countries affected by the migration crisis. ICS participates in a variety of processes coordinated particularly by the EU and Operation Sophia, 

which utilizes various resources, including military assets, in support of its broader 

protection remit. 

ICS also participates in the SHADE MED process, an interagency coordinated under 

Operation Sophia that you already heard about, coordinating also the efforts of the Allied 

Maritime Command, MARCOM, which separately operates Operation Sea Guardian in the 

Mediterranean. The Shade Med process seeks to de-conflict different operations in the 

Mediterranean, has developed proposals and an outline mechanism to both gather useful 

information from the industry, and in turn provide relevant information to shipping when 

and where this is required. Providing the prompt disembarkation of rescued people, there 

is frequently little outside assistance that the ship will require, and will always do so 

when the transfer of survivors to a more suitable vessel or other assistance may be seen 

to be appropriate following contact with the relevant authorities. 

My final point deals with the fact that there is a cost associated with carrying out 

rescue, financial cost, and that is considerable. It affects part of the industry disproportionately. However, the shipping industry has resisted the suggestion that it should be 

compensated for participating in rescue operations. To do so would risk institutionalizing 

or formalizing the role of ships and the shipping industry in a matter that does remain 

the responsibility of governments. 

Thank you for now. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. 

I’ll ask a series of questions. Again, if you could just wait to answer until I’ve asked 

the questions of all the speakers. 

I’ll start with Minister Counselor Flumiani. You mentioned the collaboration and 

cooperation between the Italian authorities and the Libyan Coast Guard. I’m wondering, 

in the view of the Italian Government, what are the current strengths and weaknesses 

of the Libyan Coast Guard, as it stands right now? Secondly, how is Italy monitoring the 

compliance of the Libyan Coast Guard with international human rights law and humanitarian law, specifically as it regards to sea rescue? So that’s one basket of questions. 

Another issue that has been somewhat contentious has been the NGO code of conduct. I’ll give a little bit of background on that, and then ask a series of questions. 

Our colleagues from IOM have reported that of the 117,000 refugees and migrants 

rescued on the Mediterranean so far in 2017, ships from nongovernmental organizations, 

or NGOs, have rescued about 38 percent of them, a fairly large percentage. In early 

August of this year, the Italian Government issued a code of conduct for these NGOs that 

are conducting sea rescues. Some of the NGOs agreed to it and others rejected it. Since 

the code of conduct was instituted, there has reportedly been a significant decrease in the 

number of NGO boat patrols in the Central Mediterranean. At the same time, the number 

of refugee and migrant boats arriving in Italy has also reportedly increased, from about 

4,000 in August to 6,000 in September. 

So just two basic questions. In the view of the Italian Government, what was missing 

from international maritime law that made the code of conduct for NGOs necessary? What 

precipitated it? The second question is: Did the Italian Government consider extending the 

code of conduct to commercial ships, fishermen, or other vessels in the—in the Central 

Mediterranean? 
16 

Two other very quick baskets of questions, the first focusing on human trafficking. 

Are Italian Coast Guard, naval, and other official personnel who participate in the kind 

of search-and-rescue operations we’ve been discussing trained to detect human smugglers 

and traffickers aboard ships? In the event that they actually suspect that someone aboard 

one of these ships is a human smuggler or trafficker, what are they supposed to do? What 

is the protocol? 

The last questions have to do with the commercial shipping industry. What is the 

Italian Government’s evaluation of its engagement and cooperation with the shipping 

industry, specifically on search and rescues? Are there ways in which you think this can 

and should be strengthened? 

On to my Greek colleague, starting with the area of human smuggling and trafficking, a similar line of questions. Are Hellenic Coast Guard personnel trained to detect 

human smugglers and traffickers aboard ships? 

You noted that more than 3,600 human smugglers and traffickers have been arrested 

by the Hellenic Coast Guard since 2015. What’s happened to them? Where are they? Have 

they been prosecuted? What’s the status of the prosecutions? 

Then, also, you made, I think, a very critical point that sometimes passengers on 

boats will intentionally sink boats in order to prompt rescue. When this has been done 

by people who are engaged in criminal activity, like human smugglers or traffickers, are 

there additional legal penalties for the intentional sinking of boats? Because, of course, 

the sinking of a boat endangers the lives of everybody aboard. 

Shifting to your neighbor, I was very struck by your words about the cooperation 

between Turkey and Greece, especially against a long history of frequent conflict and challenge. That was very striking. I’m wondering, are there ways in which the Greek-Turkish 

cooperation on detection, search and rescues, and flows of boats can be strengthened? 

On the shipping industry, shipping has been at the heart of Greece since antiquity. 

The Greek shipping industry is one of the foremost in the world, and you even have a 

ministry dedicated specifically to shipping. What is your government’s evaluation of its 

engagement and cooperation with the shipping industry, specifically regarding search and 

rescues in the Mediterranean? Are there ways that this engagement and cooperation 

should be strengthened? 

Shifting to my EU colleague—yes—Italy and Greece have obviously borne an incredibly heavy load as frontline states. The vast majority of refugees and migrants have 

arrived on their shores. So I wonder, to what extent are the EU and its member states 

discussing the possibility of having boats carrying refugees and migrants disembark at 

other EU ports to help lessen the burden on frontline countries, particularly Italy and 

Greece? What would be needed in order to make this happen? Have any member states— 

specific member states—you can name them if you want; if you can’t, understood—but 

have any member states shown a willingness to open their ports? 

On the topic of restrictions on inflatable boats, in July the EU foreign ministers 

approved restrictions on the supply of inflatable boats and outboard motors to Libya. 

What effect has this had on refugee and migrant flows from Libya? Have the kind of vessels refugees and migrants are using changed? What’s been the humanitarian impact? 

Other than destroying the boats themselves, have the EU and its member states considered pursuing legal action against companies responsible for exporting these boats? 
17 

To piggyback on your comments about EU engagement with the Libyan Coast Guard, 

similar line of questions. What are the current strengths and weaknesses of the Libyan 

Coast Guard? How is the EU monitoring their compliance with international human 

rights and humanitarian law? 

On the topic of human smuggling and trafficking, when suspected human smugglers 

and traffickers are detected and arrested during the conduct of an EU operation, what’s 

done with them? Similarly, where do they go? Criminal prosecution? Et cetera. 

Ambassador Thompson, in October your colleague who’s with us here today, Chief of 

Mission Dall’Oglio, made a brief reference to the resources and training available to 

navies, coast guards, et cetera to conduct these kind of search-and-rescue operations. In 

the view of IOM, are the national and multinational search-and-rescue operations adequately trained and resourced? If not, what can and should be done to ensure they are 

adequately trained and resourced? 

Secondly, what is IOM’s assessment of the Italian code of conduct for NGOs involved 

in sea rescues that I alluded to earlier? Does IOM have any recommendations related to 

this code of conduct? 

You also alluded to Libya. Same question: In the view of IOM, what are the strengths 

and weaknesses of the Libyan Coast Guard? What are they doing to ensure compliance 

with international human rights and humanitarian law related to sea rescues? 

Institutionally, does IOM have recommendations on how national, multinational, and 

commercial entities participating in sea rescues can improve their response, specifically 

to human smuggling and human trafficking? 

Finally, Director Murray, I’m going to start with a scenario and ask two questions 

related to that, and then move on to several other sets of questions. Suppose a merchant 

ship has rescued refugees and migrants at sea. Human smugglers, traffickers, and perhaps other criminals are among the rescued. They fear the refugees and migrants will 

reveal their identity, and are willing to threaten, attack, and even kill refugees and 

migrants to prevent this identification. In a scenario like that, what is the protocol for 

the master and crew of the merchant ship if they conclude these individuals are an immediate threat to the refugees and the migrants? You spoke earlier about measures they’re 

supposed to take if there’s a perceived threat to the crew of the ship, but I’m wondering 

if there’s a perception of threat to the refugees and migrants themselves. At what point 

and how do merchant ships communicate to the relevant authorities that there may be 

human smugglers, traffickers, or other criminals aboard a rescue ship? 

Moving on to just an assessment of the performance of merchant ships, I think it’s 

unquestionable that merchant ships have responded in quite an extraordinary way. But, 

as IOM and others have noted, merchant ships do not always respond positively when 

called on to collaborate in rescue operations. They’ve also noted that commercial vessels 

are often not equipped—and I think you alluded to this as well—often not equipped for 

search-and-rescue operations. What are reasons a merchant ship might not adequately 

respond to a call to participate in a search-and-rescue operation? 

Another line of questions. It is inevitable that merchant ships will continue to be 

called on to rescue people in distress and transport them to a place of safety. The shipping 

industry has resisted compensation for doing so, as you’ve noted. What kind of support 

can and should governments and multinational entities like the European Union provide 
18 

to the shipping industry to strengthen their search-and-rescue operations of merchant 

ships—that is, support that does not drift into the realm of compensation? 

Before, during, and after search-and-rescue operations, how would you evaluate the 

engagement and cooperation between the shipping industry and frontline states like Italy 

and Greece, and entities like the EU? Finally, how can this engagement and cooperation 

be strengthened? 

We’ll start with Minister Counselor Flumiani. 

Ms. FLUMIANI. Thank you, Nathaniel, for this very extensive round of questions. 

[Laughs.] I will try to do my best, and some of them I will group because they are quite 

similar. 

So, as I mentioned, supporting the Libyan institutions and their capacity building is 

our priority. We have been working very hard on this for quite a long time now, and this 

is key in order to enable the Libyan authorities to handle what is happening in their 

country and in their area of responsibilities at sea. 

What we are doing is, both bilaterally and with the EU, is upgrading their technical 

training, their technical ability to handle search and rescue, to handle patrolling at sea. 

We are training the personnel. In this training, human rights respect component is 

included, because this is important. They are people at sea. They have not been doing this 

a long time. So when we train them, we include this kind of element, which is essential, 

in our view. Of course, how can you do your work if you don’t have the necessary assets? 

We are helping with the repairing basically and the keeping running their naval units. 

We will do more in the next months to come. 

You mentioned also the code of conduct for the NGOs. This was, indeed, a very 

important piece of work which was done by our ministry of interior, together with the colleagues of the EU and the Commission especially, in order to give a framework of agreed 

procedure to NGOs, which are not subject to the Italian law, because they are international NGOs. As merchant ships, for instance, which are Italian flagged, they are subject to the law and to the international convention, which Italy has adhered to. So it is 

covered, if I could say. But different is the situation of international NGOs, which were 

operating at the time—sometimes I understand also within the Libyan maritime borders. 

So this was a big issue of discussion. You will have seen a lot of debate on the media 

concerning their intervention. 

So we agreed with them, and actually a large number of them, to have a set of agreed 

rules. The agreed rules, I will just point to a couple of them which are important, are 

all in the frame of the conventions I mentioned before. But the first rule is that they will 

not operate in the Libyan international waters, thank you. Also, that in case that the 

Italian authorities, they would want to inspect or go on board, they would be able to do 

so. I want to say something about the coordination that our Maritime Center of Coordination is doing with all the operations. So they would also agree to have a very constant 

communication with our coordination center, and to inform whether they have a sense 

that there is some illicit trafficking or maybe smugglers on board of their ship. 

So better communication, clear procedures, and the result is that the code of conduct 

was accepted by a large number of them. Actually, it coincided, their acceptance, with the 

diminishing of the flow from Libya. So our data is that in the summer, the flow of arrivals 

from Libya started to decrease and so, also, the burden on NGOs as well. I want to— 

just to conclude my short answer by saying that our personnel on board of our naval 
19 

units—especially the coast guard—they are very sensitive about the need to establish 

whether they are victims of human trafficking and persons responsible of such traffics. 

That this is why there is this system of interview, and the second interview, really to 

identify persons at risk and criminals on board before reaching the port of disembarkation. So that the authorities at the port of disembarkation can be informed and they can 

act accordingly. 

Mr. HURD. Just on the engagement, and cooperation with the shipping industry, I’m 

wondering the view of the Italian Government. How has that been going? 

Ms. FLUMIANI. Yes. My knowledge is, as I mentioned, that they are playing a very 

important role, but that they are part of our daily coordination to our Maritime Coordination Center. 

Mr. STAMATIS. Thank you, Nathaniel. So, a couple of hard questions from you. Let’s 

start with the first one, which is the traffickers and how the whole procedure goes with 

them. I’ve been speaking with offices from the maritime ministry in Athens. They were 

actually explaining to me what the procedure is. It’s quite easy, actually, for them to 

understand who the trafficker is on the boat, because it’s usually the one who is driving 

the boat. It’s usually a guy who is quite separated from the rest, refugees and migrants. 

It’s easy to distinct them. That’s why I actually want to say. 

As soon as they rescue the whole people from the boat, which is on sea, they take 

them on shore. The trafficker is immediately arrested and then prosecuted. There is a 

minimum penalty of 10 years in jail. So this is how it proceeds. In cases also that there 

is a more specific danger for the life of people on the boat—for example, in adverse 

weather conditions or when they sink the boat or when they are trying to do maneuvers 

and they avoid the coast guard patrol vessels, this punishment of 10 years in jail can be 

actually increased even more, because of the danger they are putting on other people’s 

lives. 

But it’s important, I think, to say that apart from arresting the smugglers and the 

traffickers, we are also putting a lot of effort in trying to prevent the consequences of the 

victims of human trafficking. So what we are doing now in Greece and the islands mainly, 

of the Eastern Aegean, is that we’re trying to create a network where other officers will 

participate, specialists for the labor market and so on. So when they see a case that’s suspicious of being a victim of trafficking, they immediately report it to that center so action 

is being taken for the protection of the victims. So I would say that there’s quite a lot 

of job being done in that specific area. 

On the second question, about the Turkey and Greece cooperation and the coast 

guard’s cooperation in practical terms, I would say that actually this was one of the main 

challenges, especially at the beginning of the crisis in 2015. We all know that Turkey has 

sometimes publicly contested the search and rescue area of its country. So this has created some tensions. The situation has been much better, actually, after the NATO involvement, the NATO activity on the north of Lesvos, which is actually facilitating through 

surveillance and information sharing with both coast guards. It’s also getting better after 

the EU–Turkey statement, because it actually has made it more important for us to 

cooperate. 

In general terms, though, the cooperation is going very well, in practical terms. There 

is an exchange of information of people who are crossing the borders. There is also a regular exchange of visit between the commandants of the two coast guards. There is also 
20 

actually now an everyday communication. Each side is trying to communicate data and 

information and then—on crossings and so on. We just try to share more information and 

try to upgrade our cooperation on that field. Recently, also Greece has hosted an attache ́

at the embassy of Greece in Ankara, which is actually specialized for this cooperation 

between the two coast guards. 

Steps are also being taken in this regard in order to facilitate the cooperation 

between the two coast guards. There are confidence-building measures, and these things 

are going really well. I would like to say, though, that there is what I call the comparison 

trap. We tend to compare the reality today with what was happening in 2015. But 2015 

was an exceptional year, when the flows was extremely high, at their peak almost 800,000 

people. When we measure our progress with that year it’s always a big progress. So it’s 

obvious that 97 percent of flows have been—is the reduction, actually. But if we compare 

the flows to previous years, like 2014, for example, it’s still higher. 

So I would say that there is room for improvement of the cooperation. This is especially in terms of preventing the boats and the vessels from crossing the borders. As I 

said, the distance is very, very small. It’s five miles in most cases. It means very short 

notice. But I think that a lot of things could be done from the Turkish side in order to 

prevent the boats from getting too long of their distance, of their shores, actually, and 

entering the Greek search and rescue area. 

On the third question, about the shipping industry in Greece, actually the Greek seamanship tradition is very well known. So cooperation with Greek ships that actually are 

operating in the area of the Aegean is really important. The prompt assistance that is 

provided by these ships is an essential part, actually, of the coast guard, the search and 

rescue operations. There is a constant exchange of information in this regard. The global 

merchant shipping has proved to be instrumental too for this operation. Merchant ships 

have, indeed, in numerous cases performed either detection or recovery. So the whole 

sense of this cooperation between the Greek merchant industry and the Hellenic Maritime 

Ministry is that it’s actually an excellent cooperation and they really try and to help a 

lot. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. 

Councilman Blaurock. 

Mr. BLAUROCK. OK, thank you very much. I’ll try to take the questions in the order 

you posed them. 

The first question, I believe, was about the disembarkation of rescued individuals to 

other countries of the European Union, other than Italy or Greece. I think, first, we need 

to distinguish between the types of operations that we have, because for those operations 

that FRONTEX is sponsoring and facilitating, those are actually happening under the 

authority and supporting of the national authorities of our member states. If they are 

acting under the authority of Italy or Greece inside their territorial waters, or inside their 

search and rescue areas, it’s automatic and legally there’s no question where those people 

rescued should be disembarked upon. A different question is for Operation Sophia, 

because it’s operating in international waters. So there, that discussion has come up. 

Another two points. Maybe one is that when the Operation Sophia was launched, 

Italy was graciously offering to take upon itself the responsibility to disembark people 

that the operation would rescue, but also those that the operation would pick up as suspected smugglers. That has been sort of incorporated in the mandate of the mission since 
21 

its inception. There has been some discussion about burden sharing in that sense, in 

terms of where to disembark people. But I think there’s a couple of factors that have not 

pushed that discussion very much forward. They have as much to do with practicality as 

with legal issues. The practicality is just geography, the distance. The distance of a ship 

that would pick up refugees or migrants on the central Mediterranean route to divert it 

to other shores would just make it a much longer journey, taking the ship away from the 

operation, lag time coming back. 

So these are issues to be thinking of. The other question, of course, is reception 

capacity of member states, of—[inaudible]—that there’s the destination. More importantly, 

or also importantly, is the legal question—not so much for the migrants and refugees, but 

the question about what to do with those that are suspected of smuggling. There is a 

question of legal finish here, because not all European Union member states actually have 

in their criminal codes a provision to prosecute somebody who is a smugger in international waters. Italy has that provision in its statutes. Most other member states don’t. 

So you wouldn’t have any legal basis to prosecute a smuggler. 

Of course, then, diverting flows and sort of saying, Well, we’re taking the bulk of the 

people to a different shore, but the one or two people who we suspect to be the smuggler 

we’ll divert to somewhere else, is creating complexities that in that type of operation, I 

think, we’re not looking forward to. But, of course, overall the question of burden sharing 

is a political discussion that’s ongoing within the European Union. As you know, the 

Commission has tabled sort of an overhaul encompassing proposal about overhauling the 

European asylum system as a whole, where the question of sharing the burden and voluntary quarters or not-so-voluntary quarters is a key question one. But that’s a question 

for dealing with the refugees once they’re on shore, not so much from the maritime parts. 

To the question of the restrictions, that in July 2017 the Council issued for member 

states to be allowed to prohibit the sale, supply, or whatever facilitation of basically 

rubber boats and small outboard motors. I have to disappoint you that I don’t have any 

sort of data points to say how effective that has been. Although, I should I say a couple 

of things about what the environment of that is, and why there was a belief that that 

is necessary. 

Overall, and that’s mainly talking to the effects of Operation Sophia, but also about 

other coast guards and navies operations on the central Mediterranean route, the types 

of boat that have been used has changed over time. We’ve seen initially the boats were 

much bigger, were wooden fisher boats, much larger capacity per sort of transit. Those 

boats have basically been disappearing from the waters. Just simply in effect because one 

part was that boats that have been intercepted have been disposed of. Operation Sophia 

has disposed over 500 boats over the time of this period. So just the supply of those boats, 

they were just a scare commodity. 

So it has shifted very much to smaller rubber dinghies, initially those that could 

locally be sourced. Then we saw the operation has detected that there’s some flow from 

smaller boats being sourced from the eastern and western shores outside of Libya, coming 

through there. They also detected that some of the boats appeared to have been fabricated 

outside the area basically for the purpose of transporting smuggling, because those rubber 

dinghies, fairly large in size—so, for high capacities of people, but not very seaworthy, not 

very study. Those were not boats that were designed to be put on anything else than for 

that specific purpose. 
22 

So there was a necessity to have a legal tool to prohibit that, or at least to have European member states being able to prevent that if those products came through their countries of transit, and to have that possibility. We hope that there’s a deterrent effect on 

that. Otherwise, as I say, we don’t have any data points to say that now that it’s—we 

should recall, the decision was only made five months ago, to really see if that had an 

additional effect on things. 

On your third question, about the Libyan Coast Guard, I think we need to be realistic 

about where the Libyan Coast Guard—and we’re talking mainly about the coast guard 

that is a military coast guard, and the then there’s a civilian coast guard as well, they 

are sort of different institutes—the military coast guard, which is the one Sophia is 

dealing with in training, which has been the most capable, in relative terms, out of Libya 

have basically nothing. There was no operations room, there were no patrol vessels, there 

were no crews. So we started from basically a clean slate, restarting to build it up. 

Compared to that, it is actually a success story—a very modest one, we agree—but 

it is a success story. There’s about 200 officers trained. There’s a couple of rows of patrols 

going out. The main needs really are technical equipment—such easy things as radar 

equipment, communications equipment for the ops center room that sits in Tripoli to 

communicate with patrol boats out at sea, the patrol boats by themselves, and simply 

training for the crews so that they have more capacity on sea. 

We’re into that effort. The European Union is doing that. We’re pursing more 

training capabilities. But it is a sort of a slow process ongoing. We’ve had support from 

member state, mainly Italy, providing some patrol boats. There’s a list of equipment 

requested. Finally, the military, the Libyan national coast guard, has provided the European Union to ask for equipment, and specific equipment, what they need. We’re looking 

into that, what we can provide. Hopefully that will develop. They will be strong. 

I recall the coast guard has had some effect. They have actually saved 18,000 people 

out of their territorial waters this year, which is quite a lot. The baseline last year was 

a couple of dozen. So there is a real effect there. It’s also had an effect of deterrence to 

have boats not start from the Libyan water, because suddenly there are Libyan Coast 

Guard boats out in the waters. People will not start when they see the boats, so there 

has been some positive success here. 

In terms of the monitoring, of course that’s a key question. It’s a task that for 

EUNAVFOR MED Sophia was not initially in its mandate. It has been added to the mandate to see if the Libyan Coast Guard complies with international norms, and how it goes 

actually when its operating on the waters. I should say, and Catherine had said it before, 

within the training there’s a clear module on international human rights and how to treat 

people. We’re actually very pleased that we’re partnering with IUM and UNHCR. We’re 

doing those modules inside the EU, under the EU framework for those crews. 

But the monitoring is key. We have, unfortunately, seen some instances where the 

Libyan Coast Guard has not exactly behaved up to the standards that we trained them. 

So it is key to do that. There are some practical hindrances. Our mission officials cannot 

stay permanently in Tripoli in the ops room. We’re not allowed to do that for security reasons. So that’s sort of day visits to see and monitor these things. Out at sea, the 

EUNAVFOR MED Sophia cannot be and cannot operate in the territorial waters of Libya. 

Our ships and vessels have to stay outside the territorial waters, and have to monitor 

from afar. That is also creating some kind of limitation. 
23 

We’re trying to sort of compensate for that for the last force generation conference; 

for instance, we specifically asked member states to provide some air surveillance tools, 

UAVs, basically, to be able to sort of do some monitoring from the air. That has been 

granted. So we’re looking to really closely follow up to make sure that whatever’s happening out on sea with the Libyan Coast Guard is really applying to the standards we 

would hope and hold them to. That was the third question, I believe. 

The last question was what happens to smugglers. It’s very similar to what the colleagues explained. The officers on board will do a first screening of all the people and all 

the individuals that they pick up from the waters. Usually, as was said before, not so difficult to point out who the smuggler is, if there’s a smuggler on board. Oftentimes, nowadays, actually there’s no smuggler on board anymore because the ships are just set out 

at sea sort of free to be picked up by international vessels, NGOs, merchants, or naval 

forces, or coast guard forces. Oftentimes those who have been smuggled actually will point 

out to the crews who the people arranging things are. 

If people have been violent or involved in human trafficking, they’re oftentimes on 

shore, not on the boat, of course. That is also recorded on all those records I passed onto 

the Italian authorities, who will then prosecute and go further. Actually that works very 

fine. I should also point out that EUNAVFOR MED Sophia is part of a sort of partnership 

framework in which it operates. This community, again, that details with international 

criminal organizations, Europol, Interpol, ICC, so that there’s a full sort of picture and 

awareness throughout Europe of what’s happening out there. 

Mr. HURD. Thank you. 

Ambassador Thompson. 

Amb. THOMPSON. Thank you. 

First of all, let me start by saying that I am certainly not an expert on SAR operations. [Laughs.] But I would say, as long as people continue dying in the Mediterranean, 

more resources are needed. I don’t know if all of the colleagues here represented—and I 

certainly said that there are a lot of heroes in this process. But certainly, for me, as long 

as there are still an important number of debt, there are more resources and more 

training that is required. So I would say that they are adequately resourced and trained. 

I think it’s a very complex operation. I have been on one of those vessels. It’s certainly a very complex operation, that requires not only the right equipment—and the colleagues before we talking about equipment—but also the capacity of the people, the 

capacity of the people to really assist the ones that they rescue, to identify needs that 

very often are extremely urgent to address, and then to be able to screen those—the 

people, not only the smugglers, and try to identify them, but also the different 

vulnerabilities of the people that are there. 

So I think we will continue to provide training, as much as possible. We will continue 

to work with the EU, the member states, in order to try to enhance that. I think as long 

as we—as I said before, as long as we don’t address the causes and we continue 

addressing the consequences, the resources will never be enough, because we will continue 

to have people crossing all the time, and in difficult conditions. 

With regard to the Italian code of conduct, I really am not, as I said, an expert on 

this. We have seen the impact that it has had, that there are still NGOs that have continued to actively participate and do SAR operations. I understand—on a more personal 

basis, I understand the logic of needing to put some logic into—some standards in the way 
24 

that NGOs work. But certainly, we think that whatever comes to diminishing the capacity 

or the possibility of having more actors playing, as long as people continue dying, it’s 

impossible—it’s important to look at and see whether those can be diminished as—the 

conditions can be diminished, keeping in mind that there has to be some standards that 

have to be applied, and that NGOs have to ensure that those standards are applied. 

With regard to Libya, I think—yes, I agree with the colleague from the European 

Union that the progress is substantive. Indeed, there was nothing before. When we’re 

talking about the equipment, we’re talking about the boats, the ships. So not only that, 

but everything else that you require within the boat in order to do these rescue operations. But mainly, I think is the shift in the logic of a more humanitarian type of 

approach, rather than a police approach. We have been working in doing that. We have 

trained a lot of people. 

I will insist that, regardless of whether we manage to create perfect rescue operations 

in Libya, and a coast guard that is fully equipped and capable of addressing all the issues, 

as long as we don’t address what is going to happen disembarkation we continue to 

have—to create, I would say, a vicious cycle of potential vulnerabilities and exploitation 

of people. So we cannot have this contradiction of rescuing people at sea and bringing 

them into the detention centers where they are going to be in terrible conditions, and they 

might have even more important risks. 

So I think that continues to be an important—and we are working also on that, with 

the support of the European Union. We are working in trying to address the situation 

of the people in the detention centers. We are working in trying to raise awareness of the 

Libyan authorities on the possibilities to have alternative ways to detention that can give 

also protection to the people. We are working on creating standard operating procedures 

for the Libyan authorities when the people are disembarked, on how to screen the people, 

how to address those. But still, is work in progress. We need to do much more. 

With regard to your final question, that’s probably one of the most difficult questions—how to improve response to human trafficking and the smuggling. I would say, first 

of all, we have to make a big difference between the two. People used to try to put them 

together, and these are two different type of activities and two different, I would say, 

crimes, and that need to be addressed in a totally different way. IOM has been working 

on preventing human trafficking for as long, I think, as the organization exists. We have 

made—us, and a lot of other international organizations, national organizations, governments, a big effort, particularly I would say in the last 15, 20 years. We have made a 

lot of progress. I’m talking about human trafficking. 

We have made a lot of progress in creating laws almost everywhere in the world that 

punish human trafficking as a crime, that look at the victim in a different way, that 

create some protection possibilities for the victims. We have built the capacity of thousands of officials, of judges, of prosecutors, of NGOs, of everybody. We have worked with 

everybody on this. We have not managed to stop the crime. I think a very important element that we have started to address in the last years, and it’s relatively new, is actually 

the demand. 

This is why human trafficking happens, and what it is for. Is it labor trafficking? It 

is it for sexual exploitation? What we need to try to address more and more is the demand 

of these services and goods that are provided or produced by the victims. We have started 

in the last two or three years to work very much with the private sector on that, and 

to raise awareness of the people of all of us, as consumers, of what is important, to raise 
25 

awareness, to look at the products that you’re buying and seeing what the supply chain 

that those products are, in order to be assured that not in the main company but in the 

supply chain of the company that there are not trafficked people working on that. So I 

think it’s a shift in the logic that can bring a little bit more results, because honestly up 

to now we haven’t been very successful. 

With regards to smuggling, it’s a different, and also very difficult, type of response. 

It’s true that as long as there are—and we continue to see on this—that as long as there 

are jobs that are available in the regular and the black market, and people that are 

willing to take the risk to move in irregular ways to countries and suffer all the potential 

exploitation and abuses and the dangers that it implies, because they are desperate in 

their home countries, because they don’t have any other possibilities, we will continue to 

have smugglers, and we will continue to have people that are willing to pay others to help 

them cross. 

The reality is that if we don’t open regular channels of migration, we will continue 

to have this. Obviously, situations like the one we have today that are mixed migration 

flows—refugees, asylum-seekers, people looking for reunification of their families, migrant 

workers—and the crisis that exists around the Mediterranean region, the Sahel situation—all these make a lot of potential clients available there. We will not be able to limit 

the number of smugglers and the potential people using smugglers if we don’t address 

root causes. 

Mr. HURD. Director Murray. 

It’s frozen—John, can you hear me? 

While we’re sorting that out, are there any questions from members of the audience? 

Yes, if you could please come to the microphone and if you could identify yourself and 

if you have an affiliation if you could identify that as well, please. 

QUESTIONER. Yes, hi. Thanks a lot for this panel. My name is Izza Leghtas. I work 

at Refugees International as a senior advocate on Europe. 

This is an issue that I’ve worked on lots, so I have a couple of questions. First of 

all, regarding search and rescue, members of the panel have repeated many times how 

important and crucial this is. My question is why, then, isn’t proactive search and rescue 

a part of the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED. This is something that we’ve recommended, 

obviously. There are search-and-rescue activities that happen by EUNAVFOR MED in the 

Mediterranean, but this happens while there’s a border control operation or fighting 

smuggling. So why hasn’t that sort of been put in place, given that actually the rate of 

deaths has gone up, right? Because the number of arrivals has gone up over the past year 

compared to last year. 

My second question—Mrs. Thompson, you alluded to this—is the question about what 

happens after people who are being brought to Libya. Basically, the support that the EU 

and the Italian Government have been providing to the Libyan Coast Guard has led 

indeed to an increase in the number of people who were brought back to Libyan territory. 

But has it been well documented by us and by others the horrendous conditions happening in official detention centers run by the Department of Combatting Irregular Migration under the authority of the government of national unity. So what is the EU and the 

Italian Government doing as part of sort of responsibility and due diligence to make sure 

that the abuses—that people who are basically returned as a result of this cooperation 
26 

and support are no longer exposed to abuses of torture, rape, executions, forced labor that 

occur and have been well documented in these centers? 

Thank you. 

Mr. HURD. Before you answer those questions, Director Murray, can you hear me 

now? 

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, and apologies for this. It keeps dropping out, therefore the question I heard but perhaps if I missed something could you please remind me. 

Mr. HURD. Did you hear the questions that I asked you as I was doing my round 

of questions? 

Mr. MURRAY. I heard some of them and then it dropped out in the middle. So if I 

give you some answers and perhaps repeat the question. 

Mr. HURD. Sure, great. 

Mr. MURRAY. I think to put the questions in order, perhaps, the equipment onboard 

ships is generic in that all ships are required to have a capacity to rescue in the water. 

IMO doesn’t specify how many people. When the regulation was developed, it was 

intended to mean that if a ship came across another ship, for example, that had difficulty, 

or people were in the water from another ship, it would have some recognized capability 

of rescuing those people. That is often using existing ship’s equipment, and only if there’s 

nothing onboard the ship that could be reasonably used have some specific equipment. 

But the average ship is certainly not designed to recover large numbers of people, 

which although this equipment that I allude to, there’s a requirement to train with it. 

A typical ship’s crew can range from below 20 to quite a significant number more than 

that. But 20-odd people would not be representative of many ships. The average rescue 

of survivors onto merchant ships number over a hundred people. Don’t forget, when the 

ship has rescued people onboard, it’s still got to function as a ship. So those 20-odd people 

are doing their normal work—i.e., keeping the ship safe—and that has to be the primary 

job, navigating and all the other activities onboard, and then trying—[off mic]—the people 

who have been rescued, plus the physically difficult effort of actually rescuing people. 

So then I think the question was, what about the people who might be troublesome 

onboard the ship? Well, in the guidelines that I made reference to, Section 6 of that deals 

with the management of rescued persons, and the guidance with segregating people so 

far as possible without categorizing them beyond the basic means. 

But other people have said it’s fairly obvious who’s who. Ships can’t write lists of who 

people are and what their backgrounds are. But, so far as the ship can, it can keep family 

groups together, it can keep vulnerable people to the best of their abilities, and provide 

food, water, accommodation, shelter to the people who are most in need of shelter. But 

all of that is current with the safety of the ship, which is the master’s primary duty. 

The communications systems that we have, there are long-established methods which 

work very well with the majority of ship—[off mic]—the Italian, RCC, MRCC, but also 

Greek and other ones as well. That’s the communication that we have in place—[off 

mic]—and it operates very well. Although, with Operation Sophia, there are proposals to 

further develop the communication protocols—we’re losing it again. It’ll come back again 

in a moment, or reestablish contact. 

Can you hear me? 

Mr. HURD. We can. 
27 

Mr. MURRAY. It didn’t take too long that time. 

So the positive of Operation Sophia would be that there be a voluntary reporting area 

in the Mediterranean that ships would provide some information, which is very similar 

to information that is put into the automatic reporting system, that it would help to verify 

the ship with the Operation Sophia resources. Then a ship might be asked specific 

information which would help the authorities to—[off mic]—that, although we have some 

questions. Because there’s a limit to what the ship might reasonably be asked to do. 

One of the questions that you had was that some ships are reported not to respond 

to distress calls, and I have heard of a small number of reports of that. I don’t know that 

it’s been quantified, but it’s one of those things of trying to prove a negative. It’s not— 

the information doesn’t really reach us about that. Clearly, as I’ve said, there is a strong 

tradition in the shipping industry of giving assistance, and it would be regrettable—[off 

mic]—very good reasons for—[off mic]—and ships were systematically and indeed the law. 

Having said that—[off mic]—UNCLOS recognize that there are reasons why a ship 

might not render assistance in that if—I mean, I’m paraphrasing the regulations exactly— 

in effect, if it’s unreasonable or not actually possible for the ship for whatever reason to 

render assistance, then it should identify that and why the reason is. But if a ship doesn’t 

participate and the details of the ship are known then the flag state the ship is registered 

with should be informed of that, and that lack of cooperation, lack of support should be 

then investigated. 

What we are doing to follow up and try to—because I think behind a lot of your questions was how could things work better in the future. Well, having recently returned from 

the last SHADE MED meeting in Rome, one of the things that we are investigating is 

to run a workshop with various participants in that SHADE MED process which would 

maintain the momentum of the SHADE MED meetings with developing networks of 

people. We’ve already heard about the anti-crime agencies—Interpol, et cetera—and there 

are marine versions of those—less formal, but Maritime Anti-Corruption Network—so 

there are other groups who we feel could benefit from liaison where they seek to work 

with the SHADE MED organizers in a meeting hopefully the first part of next year. 

One other thing—we’ve talked about different reporting systems and mechanisms, 

and it is very important for shipping we fully understand the different jurisdictions that 

exist between the EU, NATO, and various individual countries. For shipping to contribute 

effectively and efficiently, there’s a much-used phrase that is a ‘‘one-stop shop.’’ But it 

really is important, and that’s where the value of the RCC/MRCC comes in and—[off mic]. 

But a ship going about its business, say, engaged, has to participate in distress-related 

work, has a single point of impact rather than being expected to know and to understand 

the differences between different people’s jurisdictions, arbitrary lines in the water, et 

cetera. So the ability to talk to a single point of contact that may well then lead onto other 

contacts is important. 

I have slightly made a mistake there. When I said about other activities, one of the 

things we’re very keen on is to avoid the suggestion of financial compensation for the reasons that I’ve said. But one of the things that does cause difficulty is when ships have— 

on a small number of occasions, have been asked to stand by and report on a developing 

situation rather than actually engaging a distress or a rescue. So a ship should engage 

in a SAR activity, but should not be asked to become an extended arm of one of the various agencies that’s involved. So standing by, reporting on a developing situation is not 

something that should be asked of a merchant ship. 
28 

And I apologize if I missed other questions, but I think they were during the time 

that it dropped out. Either that, or my wonderful memory has—[off mic]—and I missed 

a question. So, if I have missed a question, please, ask again. 

Mr. HURD. Will do. Thank you. 

If you could answer the question from the audience, please. 

Mr. BLAUROCK. Sure. Thank you very much for your questions. 

Towards your first question about the mandate of Operation Sophia, first of all, it 

is true that the FRONTEX-facilitated and -supported missions have search and rescue as 

part—explicitly as their mandate because those are Coast Guard operations. For Operation Sophia, we have to recall it’s a military mission, so search and rescue is not sort 

of part of their typical set of operations. It was consciously decided that their main task 

was to sort of build a situational awareness picture of the business model of smuggling 

and human trafficking, and then to try to disrupt that model and go at it that way. 

I believe part of why that was the case is, first of all, because that’s sort of the 

approach of—like, an active approach to take. De facto it also, of course, means that you 

track very closely where the different routes are, where sort of boats are taking off from, 

and you recall that and so you’re following that. So de facto you’re actually doing pretty 

much the same thing, but it’s sort of a fine line to tread. 

There’s also an element of not wanting to be a pull factor out there. If it’s known 

that you’re part of an active mission to seek out sort of boats in the Mediterranean, you 

have the chances that that will sort of be counterbalanced by another part. 

Also, you have to recall that Operation Sophia has an operational plan that you’re 

probably aware. We’re currently in the phase two alpha still, which, according to our plan, 

is operating within territorial waters, not within territorial waters of Libya. So the Operation Sophia can only stay in international waters, and only upon concrete incidents of 

safety of lives at sea can they enter Libyan territorial waters at all. So there’s a practical 

and legal limit to what they could do, because it’s actually inside Libyan territorial waters 

that most deaths occur, because that’s sort of the most dangerous piece of it. 

Finally, another partner to recall, Operation Sophia is of course part of the international effort to save lives at sea. In part of that effort, they are coordinated by the 

Italian-run Maritime Rescue and Coordination Center, which are the ones who have taken 

over the responsibility for that piece of Mediterranean that should be taken care of by 

Libya, which they can’t do because of lack of capabilities. So they’re part of that effort. 

Then, part of their situational awareness picture that they’re building, they’re in constant contact with that center, and they will allow that center to coordinate what ship 

and what vessel is best placed to do an individual rescue operation. That’s a more effective 

and efficient method of doing things, we believe at least, than asking for active SAR operations, as you suggested. 

As to the second question, the situation in Libya on the shore—and Laura has repeatedly reminded us how dire that is, and how important it is and crucial it is to address 

it—I believe the European Union member states are trying to do that, and with a renewed 

urgency now to do so, and that’s really twofold. 

One part of it is really to try to ease the situation and better the situation inside 

the camps for those people. There’s a line of effort, I believe about 90 million, that the 

European Union is putting towards that aim, mainly channeling through IOM and 

UNHCR, to better the living conditions and practical conditions of people in the— 
29 

[inaudible]. There’s a political discourse also with the Libyan Government to decriminalize 

illegal migration, because you have to remember that illegal migration in Libya is a crime. 

So, of course, when you pick up people, what is done? They are put in detention. Trying 

to find alternatives to that is another important, more political side of the discussion. 

Then there’s also the question about easing the burden to the Libyan state. That has 

to do with finding those people in most need, who are in the most dire situation in those 

camps, and try to repatriate them to their countries of origin. That’s a decision that’s been 

taken, if you followed it closely, at the African Union-European Union summit at the end 

of the month of last month, 29th and 30th of November in Abidjan. They created for the 

first time an African Union-European Union-U.N. joint task force to facilitate and really 

speed up assisted voluntary returns out of Libya, with a target, I believe, of 15,000 people 

by next February. It’s a steep target. It’s an ambitious one, but it also speaks to the necessity and urgency of the cause. 

Mr. HURD. Ambassador Thompson, I believe there were several questions for you. 

Amb. THOMPSON. Yes, well, I will repeat a lot of what Ludwig said already, so I don’t 

want to do that. 

I think the third element besides alternatives to the tension and bettering the conditions on the tension is really to build the capacity of the Libyan authorities, to understand 

that there are specific vulnerabilities and needs that people have, and that they have to 

be able to not only identify them but address them. I would say is its working purpose. 

A lot of the problems that I think we have in Libya is to try to convince authorities 

that we also care about them, OK? It’s not only about migrants that are crossing the 

country. So with the support of the European Union, we are putting a lot of effort also 

to do community stabilization programs, particularly in the areas where the migrant flows 

in the south of the country, in order to really—because the Libyans have also big problems. They have a large number of displaced people, some of which are going to the places 

or have gone to the places where the migrants enter, others that have left from that. So 

there is a mix of needs that need to be addressed, and we have also to show to the 

Libyans that we also support them and we support their needs and bring the different 

government and the different militias into this. So it’s also a political work. 

I think the other part that we are also trying to do more and more is to try to prevent 

people arriving to Libya. Part of this is not only the work that we are doing in Niger and 

in Agadez, but also in other regions that we are trying to replicate a little bit the success 

stories that we have had in Niger, trying to prevent people, particularly those that we 

see that they are going there in order to cross the Mediterranean, trying to inform people 

better and prevent them from doing already the risky trip from Niger to the north of 

Libya. At the end of the day, what we need is to again try to convince people that the 

risks that they face are much bigger than the opportunities that they have. I think that 

that’s a very important message. 

To conclude, I would say the providing assisted voluntary return for those that want 

to return is extremely important. We have done it up to a certain level now, and now 

there is a bigger commitment also from African-origin countries to do that because of the 

terrible news that has been distributed everywhere. I think we really need to take action, 

all of us. It’s a common responsibility and a shared responsibility. Countries of origin I 

think have come to the conclusion that they also need to play a role in all this. 
30 

Mr. BLAUROCK. If I just might add and underline this last part. I mean, I spoke about 

the comprehensive integrated approach we’re trying to do with transit countries, origin 

countries, but I think one of the most hopeful news that we’ve seen out of the African 

Union-European Union summit was just what you said here. The African Union as an 

institution and countries of origin for the first time have really stepped up and recognized 

their responsibility and their role and their ownership of that issue as well, and not sort 

of asked us to do these things but really actively said we’ll be part of that and we’ll 

partner with you in a very active manner. I think this joint task force that I alluded to 

earlier is a first concrete measure in that. Certainly, it’s only a very first step, but it’s 

a sea change in the mindset, I think, of partner countries as well. I think that is sort 

of at least a cause for hope, even though we recognize there’s still a very steep and long 

challenge ahead of us. 

Mr. HURD. On that note, I’d like to thank our panelists for a very rich discussion, 

and your endurance as well. I would also like to thank my colleagues Stacy, Ruben, 

Jordan, and others for helping to put together this briefing. Thank you. [Applause.] 

[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the briefing ended.] 

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