[Cite as State v. Hentrich, 2019-Ohio-5174.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsBRANDY HENTRICH 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin;, J. 

: Hon. Earle E. Wise, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2019 CA 00009 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Fairfield County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 

2017CR743 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 9, 2019 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

ROBERT WITT JAMES ANZELMO 

Fairfield County Prosecutor 446 Howland Drive 

239 West Main Street Gahanna, OH 43230 

Suite 101 

Lancaster, OH 43130 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 2 

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Brandy Hentrich [“Hentrich”] appeals her conviction 

and sentence after a negotiated guilty plea in the Fairfield County Court of Common 

Pleas. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} Hentrich was indicted on: (1) aggravated trafficking in drugs, a first degree 

felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.03; (2) aggravated possession of drugs, a second degree 

felony, in violation of R.C. 2925.11; (3) possession of hashish, a third degree felony, in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11; (4) possession of cocaine, a fifth degree felony, in violation of 

R.C. 2925.11; (5) selling, purchasing, distributing or delivering dangerous drugs, a fifth 

degree felony, in violation of R.C. 4729.51; (6) illegal use or possession of drug 

paraphernalia, a fourth degree misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2925.14; (7) possession 

of marijuana, a minor misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 2925.11; and (8) illegal use or 

possession of marijuana drug paraphernalia, a minor misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 

2925.141. 

{¶3} Hentrich agreed to plead guilty to the charges in exchange for the defense 

and prosecution jointly recommending a sentence of five years in prison. The parties 

agreed to merge the aggravated trafficking of drugs offense into the aggravated 

possession of drugs offense. The prosecution also agreed not to object to Hentrich being 

granted judicial release. 

{¶4} Hentrich pleaded guilty, and the trial court merged the aggravated trafficking 

of drugs offense into the aggravated possession of drugs offense. The court ordered 

Hentrich to serve a total of five years in prison for the offenses. Lastly, the court ordered 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 3 

Hentrich to serve the five-year prison sentence consecutive to any sentence imposed on 

Hentrich violating the conditions of her intervention in lieu of conviction matter in a 

separate case. 

Assignments of Error 

{¶5} Hentrich raises two Assignments of Error, 

{¶6} “I. BRANDY HENTRICH DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND 

VOLUNTARILY PLEAD GUILTY, IN VIOLATION OF HER DUE PROCESS RIGHTS 

UNDER THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND SECTION SIXTEEN, ARTICLE ONE OF THE OHIO 

CONSTITUTION. 

{¶7} “II. HENTRICH RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 

IN VIOLATION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.” 

I. 

{¶8} In her First Assignment of Error, Hentrich argues that the trial court failed to 

inform her that judicial release would not be considered, her attorney told her she would 

receive concurrent sentences, the trial court failed to make sure that she understood the 

nature of the charges against her, and her attorney pressured her into pleading guilty. 

[Appellant’s Brief at 3-5]. Hentrich contends, therefore, her plea was not knowing, 

intelligent and voluntary. 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 

{¶9} The entry of a plea of guilty is a grave decision by an accused to dispense 

with a trial and allow the state to obtain a conviction without following the otherwise difficult 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 4 

process of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Machibroda v. United States, 

368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473(1962). A plea of guilty constitutes a complete 

admission of guilt. Crim. R. 11 (B) (1). “By entering a plea of guilty, the accused is not 

simply stating that he did the discreet acts described in the indictment; he is admitting 

guilt of a substantive crime.” United v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570, 109 S.Ct. 757, 762, 102 

L.Ed.2d 927(1989). 

{¶10} Crim. R. 11 requires guilty pleas to be made knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily. Although literal compliance with Crim. R. 11 is preferred, the trial court need 

only "substantially comply" with the rule when dealing with the non-constitutional 

elements of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 475, 423 N.E.2d 

115(1981), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163(1977). In State v. 

Griggs, the Ohio Supreme Court noted the following test for determining substantial 

compliance with Crim.R. 11: 

 Though failure to adequately inform a defendant of his constitutional 

rights would invalidate a guilty plea under a presumption that it was entered 

involuntarily and unknowingly, failure to comply with non-constitutional 

rights will not invalidate a plea unless the defendant thereby suffered 

prejudice.[State v. Nero (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 106,] 108, 564 N.E.2d 474. 

The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been 

made.’ Id. Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the 

totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant’s] plea and determine 

whether he subjectively understood [the effect of his plea]. See, State v. 

Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509 at ¶ 19-20. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 5 

103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51, ¶12. 

ISSUE FOR APPEAL 

Whether Hentrich’s plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. 

{¶11} In the case at bar, neither the Crim.R. 11(C) and (F) plea agreement signed 

by Hentrich and her attorney, nor the trial judge promised Hentrich that she would be 

granted judicial release. Waiver Upon Plea of Guilty or No Contest, filed May 30, 2018. 

[Docket Entry Number 36]. That entry further provides: 

NO PROMISES OR THREATS HAVE BEEN MADE TO ME BY 

ANYONE TO INDUCE ME TO ENTER A PLEA OR PLEAS OF GUILTY OR 

NO CONTEST TO THE OFFENSES SET FORTH ABOVE. IN 

PARTICULAR, MY ATTORNEY, THE PROSECUTOR ASSIGNED TO MY 

CASE, AND THE JUDGE, WHO IS PRESIDING OVER THE MATTER, 

HAVE NOT MADE ANY PROMISES TO ME AS TO WHAT SENTENCE 

THE COURT WILL IMPOSE IF I ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NO 

CONTEST TO THE OFFENSE(S) SET FORTH ABOVE. 

{¶12} The plea agreement was signed by Hentrich, her attorney and the

prosecutor on May 29, 2018. 

{¶13} During the Change of Plea/Sentencing hearing the following exchange 

occurred: 

[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, the only other thing I would add is, 

as part of the plea agreement, the State agrees not to object to the filing of 

a motion for judicial release at the earliest opportunity, provided that the 

Defendant has a satisfactory institutional summary report. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 6 

THE COURT: Counsel, could you approach on that matter? 

(Thereupon, a side-bar discussion was held, outside the hearing of 

the jury, as follows:) 

THE COURT: I’d certainly be willing to listen to anything more that 

you have to say about that, but from what I see here on this PSI, I’m not 

inclined – let me tell you that I would not be inclined to grant judicial release. 

This was a considerable amount of drugs that was involved here.

So just so that you’ll be aware. 

[Defense Counsel]: Could I have a few minutes to discuss that with 

my client? 

THE COURT: Yes. 

(Thereupon, the discussion was concluded and the proceedings 

continued as follows: ) 

(Pause in proceedings.) 

[Defense Counsel]: Thank you, Your Honor. We’re prepared to 

proceed. 

Plea / Sentence, filed Apr. 29, 2019 at 4-5. Before accepting Hentrich’s plea, the trial 

court informed her, 

Ms. Hentrich, you've heard what's been stated here today by Mr.

Walker on behalf of the State of Ohio concerning the State's sentencing 

recommendation and your attorney's comments. Do you understand the 

State's recommendation? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 7 

THE COURT: And do you understand as well, that while the Court 

listens to those recommendations, and will listen to anything that you have 

to say concerning sentencing, that the Court is not legally obligated or 

required to follow those sentencing recommendations? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Have you had enough time and opportunity to meet 

with your attorney? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

Plea/Sentence, filed Apr. 29, 2019 at 7-8. 

{¶14} In the case at bar, the trial judge gave Hentrich several opportunities to ask 

questions or bring any concerns to his attention. She did not. Hentrich did not file a 

motion in the trial court seeking to withdraw her negotiated guilty plea. We find Hentrich’s 

suggestion that she did not understand her rights, or that his plea was involuntary to be 

unsupported by the record. 

This Court may not consider facts not contained in the trial court record. 

{¶15} Hentrich’s arguments concerning her trial attorney contain no citation to the 

trial court record. 

{¶16} In State v. Hooks, 92 Ohio St.3d 83, 2001-Ohio-150, 748 N.E.2d 528(2001), 

the Supreme Court noted, “a reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it 

that was not a part of the trial court's proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the 

basis of the new matter. See, State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402, 377 N.E.2d 500(1978).” 

It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual assertions in 

the brief.” Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 4th Dist. No. 411, 1980 WL 350992 (Feb. 28, 1980), 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 8 

citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio App. 55, 59, 201 N.E.2d 

227(1963). New material and factual assertions contained in any brief in this court may 

not be considered. See, North v. Beightler, 112 Ohio St.3d 122, 2006-Ohio-6515, 858 

N.E.2d 386, ¶7, quoting Dzina v. Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006-Ohio-1195, 843 

N.E.2d 1202, ¶16. 

{¶17} It is also a longstanding rule “that the record cannot be enlarged by factual 

assertions in the brief.” See, Dissolution of Doty v. Doty, 4th Dist. No. 411, 1980 WL 

350992 (Feb. 28, 1980), citing Scioto Bank v. Columbus Union Stock Yards, 120 Ohio 

App. 55, 59, 201 N.E.2d 227(1963). Therefore, Hentrich’s new arguments may not be 

considered. See, North v. Beightler, 112 Ohio St.3d 122, 2006–Ohio–6515, 858 N.E.2d 

386, ¶ 7, quoting Dzina v. Celebrezze, 108 Ohio St.3d 385, 2006–Ohio–1195, 843 N.E.2d 

1202, ¶ 16. 

{¶18} App.R.16(A)(7) states that appellant shall include in his brief "[a]n argument 

containing the contentions of the appellant with respect to each assignment of error 

presented for review and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the 

authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies. The argument may 

be preceded by a summary.” [Emphasis added]. 

{¶19} Because Hentrich fails to properly reference portions of the record 

supporting her claim that she was pressured or promised something by her trial attorney 

Hentrich cannot demonstrate the claimed error. See Daniels v. Santic, 11th Dist. Geauga 

No. 2004-G-2570, 2005-Ohio-1101, ¶ 13-15. See, also, App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7); 

Graham v. City of Findlay Police Dept. 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5–01–32, 2002–Ohio–1215 

(stating, "[t]his court is not obliged to search the record for some evidence of claimed 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 9 

error. * * * Rather, an appellant must tell the appellate court specifically where the trial 

court's alleged errors may be located in the transcript"); State ex rel. Physicians Commt. 

for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-

Ohio-903, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Petro v. Gold, 166 Ohio App.3d 371, 2006-Ohio-943(10th 

Dist.), ¶ 94, appeal not allowed, 110 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2006-Ohio-3862, reconsideration 

denied, 111 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2006- Ohio-5083; Porter v. Keefe, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-02-

018, 2003-Ohio-7267, ¶109-113. 

Whether the trial court ensured that Hentrich understood the nature of the charges 

against her. 

{¶20} A written waiver of constitutional rights is presumed to have been voluntary, 

knowing, and intelligent. State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 

N.E.2d 266, ¶25. Further, the trial court conducted a lengthy inquiry concerning each of 

Hentrich’s s constitutional rights during the change of plea hearing on May 29, 2018. 

{¶21} In State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754, the Supreme Court of 

Ohio addressed the issue of whether guilty pleas coupled with claims of innocence should 

be accepted without factual basis for the plea. Id. at 387. In addressing that issue, the 

Court noted, 

Contrary to appellant’s assertion, however, Crim.R. 11 does not

require the trial court to establish a factual basis for the plea before its 

acceptance. See State v. Ricks (1976), 48 Ohio App.2d 128, 2 O.O.3d 104, 

356 N.E.2d 312. See, also, Roddy v. Black (C.A. 6, 1975), 516 F.2d 1380, 

1385, certiorari denied (1975), 423 U.S. 917, 96 S.Ct. 226, 46 L.Ed.2d 147. 

Hawk v. Berkemer (C.A. 6, 1979), 610 F.2d 445, 447, 18 O.O.3d 396, 398, 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 10 

fn. 2; King v. Perini (N.D.Ohio 1976), 431 F.Supp. 481, 483, fn. 2 

32 Ohio St.3d at 387, 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987). 

{¶22} We reviewed the transcript of the hearing at which the trial court conducted 

the plea colloquy required by Crim.R. 11 and determined that the court substantially 

complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). 

The record supports that an extensive colloquy occurred, and that the trial court accepted 

Hentrich’s plea and properly proceeded to sentencing. 

{¶23} Hentrich’s First Assignment of Error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶24} In her Second Assignment of Error, Hentrich contends that she received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Hentrich argues that her attorney failed to 

inform her that the judge would not consider judicial release, told her she would receive 

concurrent sentences, pressured her to plead guilty and failed to object to the trial court’s 

failure to go over the indictment or read the facts before entering her plea. [Appellant’s 

Brief at 5-6]. 

STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 

{¶25} To obtain a reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance of 

counsel, the defendant must prove (1) that counsel's performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 

defendant resulting in an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome of the proceeding. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 

693(1984). A defendant's failure to satisfy one prong of the Strickland test negates a 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 11 

court's need to consider the other. Strickland at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 

699; State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378, 2000-Ohio-448, 721 N.E.2d 52 (2000). 

{¶26} In light of “the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel [and] the 

range of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant,” the 

performance inquiry necessarily turns on “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable 

considering all the circumstances.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689,104 

S.Ct. at 2064. At all points, “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly 

deferential.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 at 689,104 S.Ct. at 2064. 

{¶27} The United States Supreme Court discussed the prejudice prong of the 

Strickland test, 

 With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate “a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., at 

694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had some 

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id., at 693, 104 S.Ct. 

2052. Counsel’s errors must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of 

a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

 “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. 

Kentucky, 559 U.S. ––––, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 

(2010). An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape 

rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so 

the Strickland standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest “intrusive
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 12 

post-trial inquiry” threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the 

right to counsel is meant to serve. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689–690, 104 

S.Ct. 2052. Even under de novo review, the standard for judging counsel’s 

representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a later reviewing court, the 

attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of materials outside the 

record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 

judge. It is “all too tempting” to “second-guess counsel’s assistance after 

conviction or adverse sentence.” Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Bell 

v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); 

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 

(1993). The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to 

incompetence under “prevailing professional norms,” not whether it 

deviated from best practices or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., 

at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104-105, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011). 

Judicial release. 

{¶28} The record reflects that defense counsel was informed at sidebar that the 

trial court would not grant judicial release. Defense counsel asked for time to speak to 

his client. The trial court granted him an opportunity to confer with Hentrich. Thereafter 

the trial court informed Hentrich that the trial court was not bound to accept or follow the 

negotiated plea agreement. 

{¶29} In the case at bar, the trial judge gave Hentrich several opportunities to ask 

questions or bring any concerns to his attention. She did not. Hentrich did not file a 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 13 

motion in the trial court seeking to withdraw her negotiated guilty plea. We find Hentrich’s 

suggestion that she did not understand that judicial release would not be granted to not 

be supported by the trial court record. 

Discussions not contained in the trial court record. 

{¶30} As we have discussed in our disposition of Hentrich’s First Assignment of 

Error, Hentrich’s arguments concerning her trial attorney contain no citation to the trial 

court record. 

{¶31} Because Hentrich fails to properly reference portions of the record 

supporting her claim that she was pressured or promised something by her trial attorney 

Hentrich cannot demonstrate the claimed error. See Daniels v. Santic, 11th Dist. Geauga 

No. 2004-G-2570, 2005-Ohio-1101, ¶ 13-15. See, also, App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7); 

Graham v. City of Findlay Police Dept. 3rd Dist. Hancock No. 5–01–32, 2002–Ohio–1215 

(stating, "[t]his court is not obliged to search the record for some evidence of claimed 

error. * * * Rather, an appellant must tell the appellate court specifically where the trial 

court's alleged errors may be located in the transcript"); State ex rel. Physicians Commt. 

for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 2006-

Ohio-903, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Petro v. Gold, 166 Ohio App.3d 371, 2006-Ohio-943(10th 

Dist.), ¶ 94, appeal not allowed, 110 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2006-Ohio-3862, reconsideration 

denied, 111 Ohio St.3d 1418, 2006- Ohio-5083; Porter v. Keefe, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-02-

018, 2003-Ohio-7267, ¶109-113. 

Trial counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s failure to go over the indictment 

or read the facts before entering her plea. 

{¶32} As we discussed in our disposition of Hentrich’s First Assignment of Error, 
Fairfield County, Case No. 2019 CA 00009 14 

we reviewed the transcript of the hearing at which the trial court conducted the plea 

colloquy required by Crim.R. 11 and determined that the court substantially complied 

with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) and strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). The record 

supports that an extensive colloquy occurred, and that the trial court accepted Hentrich’s 

plea and properly proceeded to sentencing. Crim.R. 11 does not require the trial court to 

establish a factual basis for the plea before its acceptance. 

{¶33} Accordingly, Hentrich has failed in her burden to demonstrate that the 

proceedings were unreliable or that there was a fundamentally unfair outcome of the 

proceeding 

{¶34} Hentrich’s Second Assignment of Error is overruled. 

{¶35} For the forgoing reasons, the judgment of the Fairfield County Court of 

Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Baldwin, J., and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur