NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SERGIO C., Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.C., 

A.C., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 17-0134 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400JD20140562 

 S1400JD20140561 

The Honorable Mark W. Reeves, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Office of the Legal Defender, Yuma

By Terri L. Capozzi 

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Tucson

By Laura J. Huff

Counsel for Appellee DCS

FILED 11-7-2017
SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Margaret H. Downie (retired)

joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Sergio G. ("Father") timely appeals the superior court's order 

terminating his parental rights to M.C. and A.C. based on 15 months' timein-care. Because Father has shown no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 M.C. and A.C. were born in 2003 and 2005, respectively. As 

young children, they lived with their mother and, frequently, with their 

maternal grandmother ("Grandmother"). Except for the first two months of 

M.C.'s life, neither child lived with Father, who was incarcerated from 2005 

to 2008 and then moved to San Diego. Father had a limited relationship 

with the children and saw them only a few times per year for birthdays and 

holidays.

¶3 In December 2014, the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") 

filed a dependency petition alleging the children's mother was unable to 

parent because of neglect and incarceration.1 As to Father, DCS alleged 

neglect due to substance abuse, anger issues, and a history of domestic 

violence. After Father refused DCS's request that he participate in a drug 

test and admitted that he had used methamphetamine the preceding 

month, DCS placed the children with Grandmother.

¶4 DCS then offered services to Father, including random 

urinalysis testing, a substance abuse assessment and treatment, domestic 

violence and anger management counseling, parent aide, parenting 

education, and supervised visits with the children. In particular, DCS 

referred Father to Vista Hill Foundation in San Diego for substance abuse, 

domestic violence, and behavioral health services, but he failed to complete 

the intake process and was closed out of services in June 2015. Father did 

 

1 The court later terminated the mother's parental rights, and she is 

not a party to this appeal.
SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

3 

not contact DCS during this period, despite DCS's and Vista Hill's efforts to 

reach him. He also failed to appear at the initial dependency hearing in 

March 2015 when the superior court found the children dependent as to 

Father and adopted a case plan of family reunification.

¶5 In July 2015, Father appeared at a court hearing and claimed 

that DCS had not referred him for any services. In response to DCS's 

assertion that it had been trying to reach Father, he offered DCS updated 

contact information. DCS then referred Father again for substance abuse 

assessment and treatment, domestic violence and anger management 

classes, parenting classes, and supervised visitation. Father claimed to be 

attending Narcotics Anonymous classes in San Diego but never provided 

any documentation to verify his participation. He also did not request a 

visit with the children until late September 2015 and then ended that visit, 

which occurred in October 2015, early.

¶6 From October 2015 until March 2016, Father contacted DCS 

only once (to ask for his attorney's information), did not engage in services, 

and did not visit the children. In December 2015, the superior court 

approved a change of the case plan to reunification concurrent with 

severance and adoption.

¶7 In March 2016, Father appeared at a court hearing, asked for 

visitation and services, and provided a negative drug sample. Later that 

month, DCS referred Father to AmeriPsych for parent-aide services and the 

McAlister Institute for substance abuse education, parenting classes, 

counseling and drug testing. He also began visiting with the children twice 

per month.

¶8 In April 2016, at DCS's request and over Father's objection, the 

superior court changed the case plan to severance and adoption. By that 

time, the children had been in care for 16 months. DCS's motion to 

terminate alleged, as to Father: (1) abandonment, (2) nine-months' time-incare, and (3) 15-months' time-in-care. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. ("A.R.S.") 

§ 8-533(B)(1), B(8)(a), (B)(8)(c).

¶9 From April 2016 through December 2016, Father continued 

his visits with the children and completed his services at McAlister, 

although he missed some appointments and tested positive for alcohol use 

in June 2016. Father also sought additional counseling services from 

another provider. 
SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

4 

¶10 After a three-day evidentiary hearing, the superior court 

granted the motion to terminate on all three grounds, also finding 

termination was in the children's best interests. Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶11 To terminate parental rights, a court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence at least one statutory ground articulated in A.R.S. 

§ 8-533(B) and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the child's best interests. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 

279, 288, ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249, 

¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court "is in the best position to weigh the 

evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve 

disputed facts[,]" this court will affirm an order terminating parental rights 

if reasonable evidence supports it. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 223 

Ariz. 86, 93, ¶ 18 (App. 2009) (citation omitted). 

¶12 Under the 15 months' time-in-care ground, DCS was required 

to prove that (1) DCS made diligent efforts to provide appropriate 

reunification services, (2) Father was unable to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the children to be in out-of-home placement, and (3) a 

substantial likelihood existed that Father would not be capable of exercising 

proper and effective parental care and control in the near future. A.R.S. § 

8-533(8)(c). Father challenges only the superior court's finding that DCS 

made a diligent effort to provide appropriate reunification services.2

¶13 DCS satisfies the requirement that it made a diligent effort to 

provide appropriate reunification services if it provides the parent with 

"time and opportunity to participate in programs designed to help [him] 

become an effective parent." Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 

Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994). However, DCS is not required to provide "every 

conceivable service or to ensure that a parent participates in each service it 

offers." Id.

 

2 Father also argues DCS did not prove abandonment or that he 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the children to be in out-of-home care for nine months. Because 

we affirm on the basis of the 15 months' time-in-care statutory ground, we 

do not address those arguments. See Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 

Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 3 (App. 2002) (appellate court "need not address claims 

pertaining to the other grounds" if sufficient evidence supports any one 

ground upon which the superior court terminated parental rights).
SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

5 

¶14 DCS offered substantial evidence that it provided appropriate 

reunification services to Father over an extended period. DCS promptly 

referred Father to services after it took the children into care, but he failed 

to participate. When Father requested services in July 2015, DCS again 

made appropriate referrals. Although there was some delay in setting up 

services for Father, he also was out of contact with DCS during that time 

and not visiting the children. Once Father re-engaged in March 2016, DCS 

immediately established services for him in San Diego. On this record, the 

superior court properly concluded that DCS made the required "diligent 

effort to provide appropriate reunification services." A.R.S. § 8-533(8).

¶15 Father also challenges the superior court's finding that 

severance was in the children's best interests. The best interests assessment 

focuses on how "the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by 

the continuation of the relationship." James S. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 193 

Ariz. 351, 356, ¶ 18 (App. 1998). The best interests requirement may be met 

if the child is adoptable or the existing placement is meeting the child's 

needs. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 

2004). 

¶16 The superior court found termination was in the children's 

best interests because they would benefit from the stability of severance and 

adoption. Father concedes that it is not in the children's best interests to 

live with him in San Diego, but argues that rather than severing his parental 

rights, the court should have granted Grandmother a permanent 

guardianship.

¶17 At the time of termination, the children had lived almost their 

entire lives with Grandmother, and Yuma was the only home they had 

known. Although the children visited with Father throughout their lives, 

they did not bond with him, and he was never their day-to-day parent. 

Both children expressed that they wanted Grandmother to adopt them and 

desired no further involvement with DCS and the court. The superior court 

considered these specific circumstances in determining that the children

would benefit from the stability of an adoption by Grandmother rather than 

a permanent guardianship. The court also found that the children's 

emotional and mental health would be negatively affected if the court 

ordered a permanent guardianship. On this record, we find no error.

¶18 We also reject Father's argument that severance and adoption 

was not in the children's best interests because Grandmother will harm the 

children by exposing them to their mother. The evidence showed that 

Grandmother allowed the children to see their mother when they asked to 
SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.

Decision of the Court

6 

do so, but Grandmother was careful to limit the contact and only allowed 

visits if mother was sober. There is no reason to believe that Grandmother

would allow the children inappropriate contact with their mother in the 

future. Moreover, the record does not support Father's argument that 

Grandmother interfered with his relationship with the children during the 

dependency.3

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court's order 

terminating Father's parental rights.

 

3 We decline to consider Father's assertion that Grandmother restricted 

his visitation, since the severance ruling, in retaliation for this appeal. See

GM Dev. Corp. v. Cty. Am. Mortg. Corp., 165 Ariz. 1, 4 (App. 1990) (appellate 

court will not consider evidence not first presented to trial court).