Staff Ride Handbook for the

Overland Campaign, Virginia,

4 May to 15 June 1864:

A Study in Operational-Level 

Command

Dr. Curtis S. King

Dr. William Glenn Robertson

LTC Steven E. Clay

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Cover photo: “General Grant and Staff at Massaponax Church,” O’Sullivan, 

Gardner Stereo, #730, 21 May 1864. (A rare, unposed Civil War photograph of 

a general and his staff at work. In this photograph, Lieutenant General Grant 

is standing, looking over the shoulder of and partially blocking Major General 

Meade.)
Staff Ride Handbook for the

Overland Campaign, Virginia,

4 May to 15 June 1864:

A Study in Operational-Level 

Command

Dr. Curtis S. King

Dr. William Glenn Robertson

LTC Steven E. Clay

Combat Studies Institute Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

King, Curtis S., 1959–

Staff ride handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 May to 15 june 

1864 / Curtis S. King, William Glenn Robertson, Steven E. Clay.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Overland Campaign, Va., 1864 2. Staff rides—Virginia. I. Robertson, William 

Glenn, 1944– II. Clay, Steven E., 1957– III. Title. 

E476.52.K56 2006

973.7’36--dc22

 2005034277


Contents

Page

Illustrations ..............................................................................................v

Foreword .................................................................................................ix

Acknowledgments ...................................................................................xi

Introduction........................................................................................... xiii

I. Civil War Armies ................................................................................1

Introduction ........................................................................................1

Organization .......................................................................................1

 The US Army in 1861 ....................................................................1

 Raising the Armies.........................................................................2

 The Leaders....................................................................................6

 Civil War Staffs..............................................................................7

 The Armies in the Overland Campaign..........................................8

Weapons ............................................................................................11

 Infantry.........................................................................................11

 Cavalry.........................................................................................14

 Field Artillery...............................................................................15

 Weapons in the Overland Campaign............................................17

Tactics ...............................................................................................19

 Tactical Doctrine in 1861.............................................................19

 Early War Tactics.........................................................................21

 Later War Tactics..........................................................................23

 Summary of Tactics......................................................................26

 Tactics in the Overland Campaign...............................................26

Logistics Support ..............................................................................28

 Logistics in the Overland Campaign ...........................................31

Engineer Support ..............................................................................33

 Engineers in the Overland Campaign .........................................35

Communications Support .................................................................36

 Communications in the Overland Campaign ..............................37

Medical Support ...............................................................................38

 Medical Support in the Overland Campaign ...............................39

II. The Overland Campaign: An Overview ..........................................41

Introduction ......................................................................................41

The Wilderness .................................................................................49

Spotsylvania .....................................................................................58

North Anna .......................................................................................68

Yellow Tavern ...................................................................................75
ii

Page

Cold Harbor ......................................................................................79

Crossing the James ...........................................................................86

III.Suggested Routes and Stands ...........................................................91

Introduction ......................................................................................91

Overland Campaign Staff Ride Stands..............................................92

	 Modifications to the Three-Day Staff Ride ......................................93

	 Overland Campaign Three-Day Staff Ride ......................................96

Day 1, Wilderness to Spotsylvania (4–9 May 1864) ........................97

 Stand 1, Campaign Overview (Events up to 4 May 1864) .......100

 Stand 2, Germanna Ford (4–5 May 1864) ................................108

 Stand 3, Wilderness Tavern (4–5 May 1864) ............................111

 Stand 4, Saunders’ Field (5 May 1864) .....................................116

 Stand 5, Higgerson’s Field (Farm) (5 May 1864) .....................122

 Stand 6, Intersection of Brock and Plank Roads 

 (5 May 1864) .......................................................................125

 Stand 7, Tapp Farm (“Lee to the rear!”) (6 May 1864) ............130

 Stand 8, Burning Breastworks (6 May 1864) ...........................137

 Stand 9, Gordon’s Attack (6 May 1864) ...................................142

 Stand 10, Wilderness Summary and Next Movements 

 (7–8 May 1864) ..................................................................... 145

 Stand 11, Todd’s Tavern (7–8 May 1864) .................................150

	 	 Stand 12, Corbin’s Bridge (drive-by) (8 May 1864) .................154

 Stand 13, Laurel Hill I (8 May 1864) ........................................156

 Stand 14, Laurel Hill II (8 May 1864) ......................................160

 Stand 15, Sedgwick’s Death (9 May 1864) ...............................163

Day 2, Spotsylvania to North Anna (9–24 May 1864) ...................166

 Stand 1, Po River and 10 May Attacks (9–10 May 1864) ........171

 Stand 2, Upton’s Attack (10 May 1864) ...................................177

 Stand 3, East Angle (Confederate View) (12 May 1864) ..........184

 Stand 4, Landrum Ridge (Union View, II Corps) 

 (11–12 May 1864) ..............................................................189

 Stand 5, Angle I (Breakthrough) (12 May 1864) ......................195

 Stand 6, McCoull House (Confederate Reactions) 

 (12 May 1864)......................................................................198 

 Stand 7, Confederate Works (12 May 1864) .............................201

 Stand 8, Angle II (Face of Battle) (12 May 1864) ....................205

 Stand 9, Lee’s Last Line (13–18 May 1864) .............................211

 Stand 10, Harris Farm and Spotsylvania Summary 

 (19–21 May 1864) ...............................................................215
iii

Page

 Stand 11, Massaponax Church (20–22 May 1864) ...................224

 Stand 12, Motley House and Guinea (Guiney’s) Station 

 (21–22 May 1864) ...............................................................227

	 	 Stand 13, Madison’s Ordinary (drive-by) (21–22 May 1864) ..231

 Stand 14, New Bethel Church (22 May 1864) ..........................233

 Stand 15, Milford Station (Bowling Green) (21–23 May 

 1864) ....................................................................................... 237

 Stand 16, Mount Carmel Church (23–24 May 1864) ...............241

 Stand 17, Hanover Junction and Doswell (23–24 May 1864) ..246

 Stand 18, Jericho Mills (May 1864) ..........................................251

 Stand 19, Ox Ford Mills (Ledlie’s Attack) (24 May 1864) .......255

 Stand 20, North Anna Summary (May 1864) ...........................262

Day 3, North Anna to Petersburg (11 May–15 June 1864) ............266

 Stand 1, Yellow Tavern I (11 May 1864) ..................................268

 Stand 2, Yellow Tavern II (Stuart’s Death) 

 (11–12 May 1864) ...............................................................274

 Stand 3, Atlee’s Station (28–29 May 1864) ..............................278

 Stand 4, Haw’s Shop (28 May 1864) ........................................282

	 	 Stand 5, Bethesda Church (drive-by) (30 May–2 June 1864) .... 287

 Stand 6, Cold Harbor I (31 May–2 June 1864) .........................293

 Stand 7, Cold Harbor II (Confederate Positions) 

 (3 June 1864) .......................................................................301

 Stand 8, Cold Harbor III (Union Positions) (3 June 1864) .......303

 Stand 9, Cold Harbor IV (Next 10 Days) (3–12 June 1864) .....309

 Stand 10, Cold Harbor to the James River (12–13 June 

 1864) ...................................................................................317

 Stand 11, Riddell’s Shop (13 June 1864) ..................................320

 Stand 12, Wilcox’s Landing (13–14 June 1864) .......................324

IV. Integration Phase ............................................................................329

V. Support ...........................................................................................333

Appendix A, Order of Battle, Wilderness ............................................337

Appendix B, Order of Battle, Spotsylvania .........................................357

Appendix C, Order of Battle, Cold Harbor ..........................................377

Appendix D, Biographies of Primary Participants ..............................401

Appendix E, Historical Maps of the Area ............................................425

Bibliography ........................................................................................463

About the Authors ................................................................................469

Page

Illustrations

Figures

1. Regimental line of battle from march column .................................22

2. Union regiments massed to attack at Spotsylvania Courthouse ......24

3. The parapet and the ditch ..............................................................202

4. The trench and breastwork ............................................................203

Tables

1. Federal and Confederate Organized Forces ......................................6

2. Typical Staffs .....................................................................................8

3. Artillery Available to Both Sides at the Start of the Overland 

Campaign .........................................................................................18

4. Sample of Federal Logistics Data ...................................................31

5. Casualties of the Campaign .............................................................40

Stand Maps

Day 1

1. Day 1 Overview (1 of 3) ..................................................................97

2. Day 1 Overview (2 of 3) ..................................................................98

3. Day 1 Overview (3 of 3) ..................................................................99

4. Day 1 Stand 1 ................................................................................100

5. Day 1 Stand 2 ................................................................................108

6. Day 1 Stand 3 ................................................................................111

7.	 Day 1 Stand 3 (Showing War-Time Roads) ...................................112

8. Day 1 Stand 4 ................................................................................116

9. Day 1 Stand 5 ................................................................................122

10. Day 1 Stand 6 ................................................................................125

11. Day 1 Stand 7 ................................................................................130

12. Day 1 Stand 8 ................................................................................137

13. Day 1 Stand 9 ................................................................................142

14. Day 1 Stand 10 ..............................................................................145 

15. Day 1 Stand 11 ..............................................................................150

16. Day 1 Stand 12 ..............................................................................154

17. Day 1 Stand 13 ..............................................................................156

18. Day 1 Stand 14 ..............................................................................160

19. Day 1 Stand 15 ..............................................................................163

Day 2

20. Day 2 Overview (1 of 5) ................................................................166

21. Day 2 Overview (2 of 5) ................................................................167
vi

Page

22. Day 2 Overview (3 of 5) ................................................................168

23. Day 2 Overview (4 of 5) ................................................................169

24. Day 2 Overview (5 of 5) ................................................................170

25. Day 2 Stand 1 ................................................................................171

26. Day 2 Stand 2 ................................................................................177

27. Day 2 Stand 3 ................................................................................184

28. Day 2 Stand 4 ................................................................................189

29. Day 2 Stand 5 ................................................................................195

30. Day 2 Stand 6 ................................................................................198 

31. Day 2 Stand 7 ................................................................................201

32. Day 2 Stand 8 ................................................................................205

33. Day 2 Stand 9 ................................................................................211

34. Day 2 Stand 10 ..............................................................................215

35. Day 2 Stand 11 ..............................................................................224

36. Day 2 Stand 12 ..............................................................................227

37. Day 2 Stand 13 ..............................................................................231

38. Day 2 Stand 14 ..............................................................................233

39. Day 2 Stand 15 (1 of 2) .................................................................237

40. Day 2 Stand 15 (2 of 2) .................................................................238

41. Day 2 Stand 16 (1 of 2) .................................................................241 

42. Day 2 Stand 16 (2 of 2) .................................................................242

43. Day 2 Stand 17 ..............................................................................246

44. Day 2 Stand 18 ..............................................................................251

45. Day 2 Stand 19 ..............................................................................255

46. Day 2 Stand 20 ..............................................................................262

Day 3

47. Day 3 Overview (1 of 2) ................................................................266

48. Day 3 Overview (2 of 2) ................................................................267

49. Day 3 Stand 1 ................................................................................268

50. Day 3 Stand 2 ................................................................................274

51. Day 3 Stand 3 ................................................................................278

52. Day 3 Stand 4 ................................................................................282

53. Day 3 Stand 5 ................................................................................287

54. Day 3 Stand 6 (1 of 2) ...................................................................293

55. Day 3 Stand 6 (2 of 2) ...................................................................294

56. Day 3 Stand 7 ................................................................................301

57. Day 3 Stand 8 ................................................................................303

58. Day 3 Stand 9 ................................................................................309

59. Day 3 Stand 10 ..............................................................................317
vii

Page

60. Day 3 Stand 11 (1 of 2) .................................................................320

61. Day 3 Stand 11 (2 of 2) .................................................................321

62. Day 3 Stand 12 (1 of 2) .................................................................324

63. Day 3 Stand 12 (2 of 2) .................................................................325

Historical Maps (Appendix E)

Operational Maps

64. Movements into the Wilderness: 4 May 1864 ...............................426

65. Movement to Battle in the Wilderness: 5 May 1864 .....................427

66. Movement from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania: 

7–8 May 1864.................................................................................428

67. Movements to Yellow Tavern, 8–11 May 1864 .............................429

68. Movement from Spotsylvania to the North Anna: 

21 May 1864 ..................................................................................430

69. Movement from Spotsylvania to the North Anna: Evening 

21–22 May 1864 ............................................................................431

70. Movement from Spotsylvania to the North Anna: Evening

22–23 May 1864 ............................................................................432

71. Movement from the North Anna to Cold Harbor, 27 May 1864 ...433

72. Movement from the North Anna to Cold Harbor, 28 May 1864 ...434

73. Movement to Cold Harbor: Union Probes, 29 May 1864 .............435

74. Movement from Cold Harbor to the James River,

12–14 June 1864 ............................................................................436

Tactical Maps

75. Wilderness: Saunders’ Field and Higgerson Farm,

5 May 1864, 1300 to 1500 hours ..................................................437

76. Wilderness: Brock Road and Orange Plank Road Intersection,

5 May 1864, 1300 to 1500 hours ..................................................438

77. Wilderness: Situation at the Opening of Hancock’s Attack,

6 May 1864, 0500 hours ...............................................................439

78. Wilderness: Longstreet Halts Hancock’s Attack,

6 May 1864, 0600 to 0830 hours ..................................................440

79. Wilderness: Longstreet Turns Hancock’s Flank,

6 May 1864, 1100 hours ...............................................................441

80. Wilderness: Lee Assaults the Brock Road Position

6 May 1864, 1700 hours ...............................................................442

81. Wilderness: Gordon’s Attack, 6 May 1864, Evening ...................443

82. Spotsylvania: Warren’s Initial Attack, Laurel Hill, 8 May 1864,

0830 hours .....................................................................................444
viii

Page

83. Spotsylvania: Movements on the Po and Ni, 10 May 1864 ...........445

84. Spotsylvania: Upton’s Attack, Mule Shoe, 10 May 1864, 

1800 hours .....................................................................................446

85. Spotsylvania: II Corps Assault, Mule Shoe, 12 May 1864, 

0430 hours .....................................................................................447

86. Spotsylvania: Confederate Response, Mule Shoe, 

12 May 1864, 0445 to 0700 hours .................................................448

87. Spotsylvania: Reinforcements Arrive, Mule Shoe, 

12 May 1864, 0730–1000 hours ....................................................449

88. Spotsylvania: Grant Shifts Left and Lee Counters,

13–14 May 1864.............................................................................450

89. Spotsylvania: Grant Shifts Right and Attacks, 17–18 May 1864...451

90. Yellow Tavern, 11 May 1864, 0800 to 1400 hours .......................452

91. Yellow Tavern, 11 May 1864, 1400 to 1900 hours .......................453

92. North Anna: Jericho Mills, 23 May 1864, 1800 to 1830 hours......454

93. North Anna: Lee’s Inverted “V” and Ledlie’s Attack,

24 May 1864, 1800 hours...............................................................455

94. Haw’s Shop: Both Sides Deploy, 28 May 1864, 1100 to 

1400 hours .....................................................................................456

95. Haw’s Shop: Final Union Attack, 28 May 1864, 

1600 to 1800 hours ........................................................................457

96. Cold Harbor: Bethesda Church, 30 May 1864, 1800 hours ..........458

97. Cold Harbor: Sheridan Holds, 1 June 1864, Morning ...................459

98. Cold Harbor: Wright and Smith Attack, 1 June 1864, Evening ....460

99. Cold Harbor: Both Sides Shift Forces, 2 June 1864 ......................461

100. Cold Harbor: Union Assault Positions, 3 June 1864, Morning ....462
ix

Foreword

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, Virginia, 4 

May to 15 June 1864, is the tenth study in the Combat Studies Institute’s 

(CSI) Staff Ride Handbook series. This handbook, prepared by Dr. Curtis 

S. King, Dr. William Glenn Robertson, and LTC Steven E. Clay, analyzes 

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant’s 1864 Overland Campaign from the 

crossing of the Rapidan River on 4 May to the initiation of the crossing of 

the James River on 15 June. Unlike many of CSI’s previous handbooks, 

this handbook focuses on the operational level of war. Even so, it provides 

a heavy dose of tactical analysis, thereby making this ride a superb tool for 

developing Army leaders at almost all levels. Designed to be completed 

in three days, this staff ride is flexible enough to allow units to conduct a 

one-day or two-day ride that will still enable soldiers to gain a full range 

of insights offered by the study of this important campaign. In developing their plan for conducting an Overland Campaign staff ride, unit commanders are encouraged to consider analyzing the wide range of military 

problems associated with warfighting that this study offers. This campaign 

provides a host of issues to be examined, to include logistics, intelligence, 

psychological operations, use of reconnaissance (or lack thereof), deception, leadership, engineering, campaign planning, soldier initiative, and 

many other areas relevant to the modern military professional. Each of 

these issues, and others also analyzed herein, are as germane to us today 

as they were 150 years ago. Modern military professionals, for whom this 

handbook was written, will find a great deal to ponder and analyze when 

studying this campaign. CSI—The Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

xi

Acknowledgments

We wish to acknowledge the help of many people that made the 

publication of this work possible and thank them for their efforts. First, 

we thank Ms. Betty Weigand, Combat Studies Institute editor, who 

diligently and good-naturedly combed the drafts of the text and remarkably 

improved the writing to include minimizing the inevitable incongruities in 

a manuscript that originated with three different authors. We also wish to 

thank Lieutenant Colonel William Bassett (US Army Retired), who made 

the initial trips to Virginia and was a true contributor to the origin of the 

Overland Campaign staff ride. In addition, we would like to thank all of 

the members of the Staff Ride Team for their support and help in this 

project. Likewise, we express our gratitude to all of the personnel involved 

in researching, interpreting, and preserving the various battlefields 

included in the ride. This group includes the members of the National Park 

Service (NPS), specifically from the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania 

National Military Park and the Richmond National Battlefield system of 

parks (Cold Harbor Battlefield). In addition to these tremendously helpful 

professionals, the workers at several local historical parks provided great 

assistance. These include the Hanover County Parks and Recreation 

Department (HCP&RD) as well as the Memorial Foundation of the 

Germanna Colonies in Virginia and the CSX railroad employees at the 

Railroad Station at Hanover Junction. Finally, we offer a special thanks 

to the family of Mr. and Mrs. Burton Douglas of Virginia. Mr. and Mrs. 

Douglas were kind and generous supporters of our efforts to research the 

fights at Bethesda Church and, with their passing, the Douglas children 

and their spouses continue to offer their kind support. 

On a personal note, Dr. King offers heartfelt thanks to his parents, 

George and Cecelia King, who have always supported his career as a 

writer and historian with encouragement and patience.

xiii

Introduction

As a vehicle for the education of the military professional, the staff ride 

has long proven its efficacy. Analysis of a battle or a campaign through an 

examination of the actual terrain is a concept deeply rooted in military 

study. In Europe after the Wars of German Unification, the elder von Moltke 

ingrained staff rides into the training of German general staff officers by 

posing daunting questions to his cadets during rides of battlefields on which 

he had achieved his greatest triumphs. In the United States, Captain Arthur 

L. Wagner made an initial proposal for a staff ride, and Major Eben Swift 

brought the concept to fruition at the General Service and Staff School (the 

forerunner of the Command and General Staff College [CGSC]) in 1906. 

The essential elements of Wagner and Swift’s staff ride concept included a 

detailed classroom study of a campaign followed by an in-depth visit to the 

sites associated with that campaign. Later pioneers of the staff ride added 

an integration phase in order to mesh the classroom and field study phases 

for further insights into the military profession. Thus, the classroom, field, 

and integration phases are the cornerstones of the modern staff ride.

Today, the US Army considers the staff ride an essential aspect of 

historical education for the modern military professional throughout 

its system of schools and a crucial facet of the continuing professional 

development of its officers and noncommissioned officers in line units. 

The CGSC, the Army War College, and institutions throughout the Army 

school system conduct staff rides with the extensive resources necessary to 

execute fully the preliminary study, field study, and integration methodology. 

Units outside of the schoolhouse environment can also benefit extensively 

from staff rides, but they often find resources, particularly time, to be more 

restricted. That is where the staff ride handbook comes in. The handbook 

is a tool that is particularly useful for the line unit in preparing for a staff 

ride. It provides background to the campaign, a suggested list of sites to 

visit (called “stands”), material for discussion at the stands, and advice 

for logistics support of the staff ride. The intent of this handbook is not to 

replace the detailed study needed for the ride, but it does provide a starting 

point that should make the unit’s preparation easier.

This handbook is one in a series of works from the Combat Studies 

Institute (CSI) designed to facilitate the conduct of staff rides throughout 

the Armed Forces of the United States. The foundational document of this 

series is The Staff Ride by Dr. William Glenn Robertson (Washington, 

DC: Center of Military History Publication 70-21, 1987). The Staff Ride

describes the staff ride methodology in detail and gives hints that will 

assist in building any staff ride. Other published handbooks focus on 
xiv

particular battles and campaigns and include works on Chickamauga, 

Cowpens, Shiloh, and Vicksburg among others. (CSI staff ride handbooks 

can be obtained from the CSI website: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/ 

staff_ride/index.asp.) All of these publications are outstanding tools for 

the military professional (and for that matter, anybody) interested in 

the detailed study of battles and campaigns. This work on the Overland 

Campaign has borrowed liberally from all of its predecessors, particularly 

in the sections on the raising, equipping, and tactics of the Union and 

Confederate armies, and the authors are grateful for the excellent efforts 

of the authors of earlier handbooks.

Although there is a considerable connection among all staff ride 

handbooks, the Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign, 

Virginia, 4 May to 15 June 1864, has some significant differences from 

other handbooks. First, the struggle between Grant and Lee in the spring 

of 1864 was a campaign and not just a single battle. As such, a staff ride 

for the Overland Campaign is an operational-level staff ride and thus a 

departure from the more common tactical staff rides conducted on most 

battlefields. Like Vicksburg, the Overland Campaign consisted of multiple 

engagements with complex unit movements over considerable distances 

and over an extended period of time. These factors create unique challenges 

and opportunities.

One of these unique aspects is the nature of the “ride” itself. In 

short, the Overland Campaign requires more vehicular travel and less 

walking than most staff rides. This offers a great opportunity to explore 

the routes of march of units on both sides and insights into the thoughts 

of both commanders. On a more practical note, the students will spend 

considerable time in vehicles. The key is to make this time fruitful by 

having operational maps that show the routes of each corps and to orient 

the students when they arrive at each stand. In addition, it is beneficial for 

the students to use the operational maps to analyze the corps movements 

while they are en route from stand to stand.

Another challenge for this staff ride is to relate each of the major 

battles within the campaign. The students must come away with a sense 

of connection between the battles—a feeling that each engagement had 

an effect on the next battle, even if unintended. The Overland Campaign 

consisted of six key actions: the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, 

Yellow Tavern, Cold Harbor, and crossing the James River. There are 

numerous stands at these sites; but more importantly, there are stands 

between each major clash that often lack dramatic battle actions, but are 

just as crucial to understanding and linking the campaign. 
xv

Finally, one should emphasize some tactical details at appropriate times 

throughout the ride without becoming overly focused on small unit actions. 

For the most part, the staff ride leaders will concentrate at the corps and 

division level. Even so, there are numerous lessons at the tactical level—

concepts about leadership, doctrine, and the face of battle—that should also 

emerge from the staff ride. For example, Upton’s attack at Spotsylvania 

offers a classic view into one man’s struggle to break a tactical deadlock 

with imaginative techniques. Similarly, the ride should include the pathos 

of battle; for example, the stand at Cold Harbor should include the story 

of the Union soldiers—fully expecting to die—pinning identification tags 

to their backs. This scene gives a needed feel for the tragedy of war. In 

short, staff ride leaders must choose a limited number of tactical details and 

human-interest stories (vignettes) to illustrate key points, even though this 

is essentially an operational staff ride. Of course, the staff ride leaders must 

ultimately tailor the stands to support their goals and the goals of the staff 

ride audience.

These challenges coupled with the opportunity to present the time 

and space considerations of an operational campaign call for a careful 

selection of stands. This handbook is structured for a three-day ride with 

over 40 stands. Staff ride leaders may have to modify the stands to fit their 

schedules, but they should always attempt to keep a sense of connection 

between stands so that students do not lose the context of the campaign. On 

the other hand, due to time constraints, units may choose to execute only 

one or two day rides. This handbook is designed to allow staff ride leaders 

to pick selected stands that perhaps focus on only one or two battles as time 

permits.

In addition, staff ride leaders must give the students a chance to conduct 

research and prepare before actually visiting the campaign locations. The 

extent of student preparation will depend on available time. At one end 

of the spectrum, students might have ample time to explore numerous 

secondary sources and even delve into the most critical primary source, The 

War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 

and Confederate Armies (United States War Department, Washington, DC: 

US Government Printing Office, 1880-1901 [hereafter referred to as OR]). 

On the other hand, if students have less time to devote to research, Bruce 

Catton’s Grant Takes Command (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1969) and 

Douglas Southall Freeman’s volume 3 of Lee’s Lieutenants (New York, NY: 

C. Scribner’s Sons, 1942-44) provide broad overviews of the campaign.

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Overland Campaign provides a 

systematic approach to the analysis of this key Civil War campaign. Part I 
xvi

describes the organization of the Union and Confederate Armies, detailing 

their weapons, tactics, logistics, engineer, communications, and medical 

support.

Part II consists of a campaign overview, which establishes the context 

for the individual actions to be studied in the field.

Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit in order to 

obtain a concrete view of the campaign in its several phases. For each 

stand, there is a set of travel directions, an orientation to the battle site, a 

discussion of the action that occurred there, vignettes by participants in the 

campaign, and suggested analysis questions and topics for discussion.

Part IV discusses the final phase of the staff ride, the integration phase. 

In this phase, students integrate the classroom portion of the staff ride with 

the field phase and seek to provide relevant lessons for the modern military 

professional.

Part V provides practical information on conducting a staff ride in the 

Overland Campaign area, including sources of assistance and logistical 

considerations.

Appendixes A, B, and C outline the order of battle for the forces included 

in the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and Cold Harbor battles, respectively. 

Appendix D provides biographical sketches of key participants, and 

appendix E provides historical maps of the area. An annotated bibliography 

suggests sources for preliminary study.

In sum, the Overland Campaign is a magnificent example of great 

commanders locked in a classic struggle, as well as testimony to the 

grim ordeal of total war and the price paid by the common soldier. The 

lessons that may be learned from this complex struggle encompass much 

of the vast panoply of warfare and can provide an unmatched tool for the 

education of the modern military professional.


I. Civil War Armies

Introduction

This section of the handbook is designed to give the staff ride leader 

and students background into the organization and tactics of Civil War 

armies. This brief survey is by no means exhaustive, but it should give 

enough material for the students to have a better understanding of the capabilities of the forces that fought the Overland Campaign. Understanding 

these capabilities should give insight into the reasoning behind the decisions made by commanders on both sides. Please note that much of the 

material in this section is borrowed from other CSI staff ride handbooks 

with modifications to focus specifically on the structure and tactics of units 

in the 1864 Overland Campaign. 

Organization

The US Army in 1861

The Regular Army of the United States on the eve of the Civil War was 

essentially a frontier constabulary whose 16,000 officers and men were 

organized into 198 companies scattered across the nation at 79 different 

posts. In 1861, this Army was under the command of Brevet Lieutenant 

General Winfield Scott, the 75‐year‐old hero of the Mexican‐American 

War. His position as general in chief was traditional, not statutory, because 

secretaries of war since 1821 had designated a general to be in charge of 

the field forces without formal congressional approval. During the course 

of the war, Lincoln would appoint other generals in chief with little success until finally appointing Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant to the 

position prior to the Overland Campaign.

The field forces were controlled through a series of geographic departments whose commanders reported directly to the general in chief. This 

department system, frequently modified, would be used by both sides 

throughout the Civil War for administering regions under Army control.

Army administration was handled by a system of bureaus whose 

senior officers were, by 1860, in the twilight of long careers in their technical fields. Six of the 10 bureau chiefs were over 70 years old. These 

bureaus, modeled after the British system, answered directly to the War 

Department and were not subject to the orders of the general in chief. The 

bureaus reflected many of today’s combat support and combat service support branches; however, there was no operational planning or intelligence 

staff. American commanders before the Civil War had never required such 

a structure.
This system provided suitable civilian control and administrative support to the small field army prior to 1861. Ultimately, the bureau system 

would respond sufficiently, if not always efficiently, to the mass mobilization required over the next four years. Indeed, it would remain essentially 

intact until the early 20th century. The Confederate government, forced to 

create an army and support organization from scratch, established a parallel structure to that of the US Army. In fact, many important figures in 

Confederate bureaus had served in the prewar Federal bureaus.

Raising the Armies

With the outbreak of war in April 1861, both sides faced the monumental task of organizing and equipping armies that far exceeded the prewar structure in size and complexity. The Federals maintained control of 

the Regular Army, and the Confederates initially created a Regular force, 

though in reality it was mostly on paper. Almost immediately, the North 

lost many of its officers to the South, including some of exceptional quality. Of 1,108 Regular Army officers serving as of 1 January 1861, 270 ultimately resigned to join the South. Only a few hundred of 15,135 enlisted 

men, however, left the ranks.

The federal government had two basic options for the use of the Regular 

Army. The government could divide the Regulars into training and leadership cadre for newly formed volunteer regiments or retain them in “pure” 

units to provide a reliable nucleus for the Federal Army in coming battles. 

For the most part, the government opted to keep the Regulars together. 

During the course of the war, battle losses and disease thinned the ranks of 

Regulars, and officials could never recruit sufficient replacements in the 

face of stiff competition from the states that were forming volunteer regiments. By November 1864, many Regular units had been so depleted that 

they were withdrawn from front-line service, although some Regular regiments fought with the Army of the Potomac in the Overland Campaign. In 

any case, the war was fought primarily with volunteer officers and men, 

the vast majority who started the war with no previous military training 

or experience. However, by 1864, both the Army of the Potomac and the 

Army of Northern Virginia were largely experienced forces that made up 

for a lack of formal training with three years of hard combat experience.

Neither side had difficulty in recruiting the numbers initially required 

to fill the expanding ranks. In April 1861, President Abraham Lincoln 

called for 75,000 men from the states’ militias for a three‐month period. 

This figure probably represented Lincoln’s informed guess as to how many 

troops would be needed to quell the rebellion quickly. Almost 92,000 men 

responded, as the states recruited their “organized” but untrained militia 
companies. At the First Battle of Bull Run in July 1861, these ill‐trained 

and poorly equipped soldiers generally fought much better than they were 

led. Later, as the war began to require more manpower, the federal government set enlistment quotas through various “calls,” which local districts 

struggled to fill. Similarly, the Confederate Congress authorized the acceptance of 100,000 one‐year volunteers in March 1861. One‐third of these 

men were under arms within a month. The Southern spirit of voluntarism 

was so strong that possibly twice that number could have been enlisted, 

but sufficient arms and equipment were not then available.

As the war continued and casualty lists grew, the glory of volunteering 

faded, and both sides ultimately resorted to conscription to help fill the 

ranks. The Confederates enacted the first conscription law in American 

history in April 1862, followed by the federal government’s own law in 

March 1863. Throughout these first experiments in American conscription, 

both sides administered the programs in less than a fair and efficient way. 

Conscription laws tended to exempt wealthier citizens, and initially, 

draftees could hire substitutes or pay commutation fees. As a result, the 

average conscript maintained poor health, capability, and morale. Many 

eligible men, particularly in the South, enlisted to avoid the onus of being 

considered a conscript. Still, conscription or the threat of conscription 

ultimately helped provide a large quantity of soldiers.

Conscription was never a popular program, and the North, in particular, tried several approaches to limit conscription requirements. These 

efforts included offering lucrative bounties, fees paid to induce volunteers 

to fill required quotas. In addition, the Federals offered a series of reenlistment bonuses, including money, 30‐day furloughs, and the opportunity for 

veteran regiments to maintain their colors and be designated as “veteran” 

volunteer infantry regiments. The Federals also created an Invalid Corps 

(later renamed the Veteran Reserve Corps) of men unfit for front-line 

service who performed essential rear area duties. In addition, the Union 

recruited almost 179,000 African-Americans, mostly in federally organized volunteer regiments. In the South, recruiting or conscripting slaves 

was so politically sensitive that it was not attempted until March 1865, far 

too late to influence the war.

Whatever the faults of the manpower mobilization, it was an impressive 

achievement, particularly as a first effort on that scale. Various enlistment 

figures exist, but the best estimates are that approximately two million 

men enlisted in the Federal Army from 1861 to 1865. Of that number, one 

million were under arms at the end of the war. Because the Confederate 

records are incomplete or lost, estimates of their enlistments vary from 
600,000 to over 1.5 million. Most likely, between 750,000 and 800,000 men 

served the Confederacy during the war, with peak strength never exceeding 

460,000 men.

The unit structure into which the expanding armies were organized 

was generally the same for Federals and Confederates, reflecting the common roots of both armies. The Federals began the war with a Regular 

Army organized into an essentially Napoleonic, musket-equipped structure. Both sides used a variant of the old Regular Army structure for newly 

formed volunteer regiments. The Federal War Department established a 

volunteer infantry regimental organization with a strength that could range 

from 866 to 1,046 (varying in authorized strength by up to 180 infantry 

privates). The Confederate Congress fixed its 10‐company infantry regiment at 1,045 men. Combat strength in battle, however, was always much 

lower (especially by the time of the Overland Campaign) because of casualties, sickness, leaves, details, desertions, and straggling.

The battery remained the basic artillery unit, although battalion and 

larger formal groupings of artillery emerged later in the war in the eastern theater. Four understrength Regular artillery regiments existed in the 

US Army at the start of the war and one Regular regiment was added in 

1861, for a total of 60 batteries. Nevertheless, most batteries were volunteer organizations. For the first years of the war and part way into the 

Overland Campaign, a Federal battery usually consisted of six guns and 

had an authorized strength of 80 to 156 men. A battery of six 12‐pound 

Napoleons could include 130 horses. If organized as “horse” or flying 

artillery, cannoneers were provided individual mounts, and more horses 

than men could be assigned to the battery. After the battle of Spotsylvania 

in 1864, most of the Army of the Potomac’s artillery was reorganized 

into four-gun batteries. Their Confederate counterparts, plagued by limited ordnance and available manpower, usually operated throughout the 

war with a four-gun battery, often with guns of mixed types and calibers. 

Confederate batteries seldom reached their initially authorized manning 

level of 80 soldiers.

Prewar Federal mounted units were organized into five Regular regiments (two dragoon, two cavalry, and one mounted rifle), and one Regular 

cavalry regiment was added in May 1861. Although the term “troop” was 

officially introduced in 1862, most cavalrymen continued to use the more 

familiar term “company” to describe their units throughout the war. The 

Federals grouped two companies or troops into squadrons, with four to six 

squadrons comprising a regiment. Confederate cavalry units, organized in 

the prewar model, were authorized 10 76-man companies per regiment. 
Some volunteer cavalry units on both sides also formed into smaller cavalry battalions. Later in the war, both sides began to merge their cavalry 

regiments and brigades into division and corps organizations.

For both sides, the infantry unit structure above regimental level 

was similar to today’s structure, with a brigade controlling three to five 

regiments and a division controlling two or more brigades. Federal brigades generally contained regiments from more than one state, while 

Confederate brigades often consisted of regiments from the same state. In 

the Confederate Army, a brigadier general usually commanded a brigade, 

and a major general commanded a division. The Federal Army, with no 

rank higher than major general until 1864, often had colonels commanding brigades, brigadier generals commanding divisions, and major generals commanding corps and armies. Grant received the revived rank of 

lieutenant general in 1864, placing him with clear authority over all of the 

Federal armies, but rank squabbles between the major generals appeared 

within the Union command structure throughout the Overland Campaign. 

The large numbers of organizations formed, as shown in table 1, are 

a reflection of the politics of the time. The War Department in 1861 considered making recruitment a Federal responsibility, but this proposal 

seemed to be an unnecessary expense for the short war initially envisioned. 

Therefore, the responsibility for recruiting remained with the states, and 

on both sides state governors continually encouraged local constituents 

to form new volunteer regiments. This practice served to strengthen support for local, state, and national politicians and provided an opportunity 

for glory and high rank for ambitious men. Although such local recruiting created regiments with strong bonds among the men, it also hindered 

filling the ranks of existing regiments with new replacements. As the war 

progressed, the Confederates attempted to funnel replacements into units 

from their same state or region, but the Federals continued to create new 

regiments. Existing Federal regiments detailed men back home to recruit 

replacements, but these efforts could never successfully compete for men 

joining new local regiments. The newly formed regiments thus had no 

seasoned veterans to train the recruits, and the battle-tested regiments lost 

men faster than they could recruit replacements. Many regiments on both 

sides (particularly for the North) were reduced to combat ineffectiveness 

as the war progressed. Seasoned regiments were often disbanded or consolidated, usually against the wishes of the men assigned.
*Legions were a form of a combined arms team, with artillery, 

cavalry, and infantry units. They were approximately the strength of 

a large regiment. Long before the end of the war, legions lost their 

combined arms organization.

The Leaders

Because the organization, equipment, tactics, and training of the 

Confederate and Federal armies were similar, the performance of units in 

battle often depended on the quality and performance of their individual 

leaders. Both sides sought ways to find this leadership for their armies. The 

respective central governments appointed the general officers. At the start 

of the war, most, but certainly not all, of the more senior officers had West 

Point or other military school experience. In 1861, Lincoln appointed 126 

general officers, of which 82 were or had been professionally trained officers. Jefferson Davis appointed 89, of which 44 had received professional 

training. The rest were political appointees, but of these only 16 Federal 

and 7 Confederate generals lacked military experience.

Of the lower ranking volunteer officers who comprised the bulk of the 

leadership for both armies, state governors normally appointed colonels 

(regimental commanders). States also appointed other field grade officers, 

although many were initially elected within their units. Company grade 

officers were usually elected by their men. This long‐established militia 

tradition, which seldom made military leadership and capability a primary 

consideration, was largely an extension of states’ rights and sustained 

political patronage in both the Union and the Confederacy.

Much has been made of the West Point backgrounds of the men who 

ultimately dominated the senior leadership positions of both armies, but 

Federal Confederate

Infantry 19 regular regiments

2,125 volunteer regiments

60 separate battalions

351 separate companies

642 volunteer regiments

163 separate battalions

62 separate companies

9 legions*

Artillery 5 regular regiments

61 volunteer regiments

17 volunteer battalions

408 separate batteries

16 volunteer regiments

25 volunteer battalions

227 separate batteries

Cavalry 6 regular regiments

266 volunteer regiments

45 battalions

78 separate companies

137 volunteer regiments

143 separate battalions

101 separate companies

1 legion*

Table 1. Federal and Confederate Organized Forces
the graduates of military colleges were not prepared by such institutions to 

command divisions, corps, or armies. Moreover, though many leaders had 

some combat experience from the Mexican War era, very few had experience above the company or battery level in the peacetime years prior 

to 1861. As a result, the war was not initially conducted at any level by 

“professional officers” in today’s terminology. Leaders became more professional through experience and at the cost of thousands of lives. General 

William T. Sherman would later note that the war did not enter its “professional stage” until 1863. By the time of the Overland Campaign, many 

officers, though varying in skill, were at least comfortable at commanding 

their formations.

Civil War Staffs

In the Civil War, as today, the success of large military organizations 

and their commanders often depended on the effectiveness of the commanders’ staffs. Modern staff procedures have evolved only gradually with the 

increasing complexity of military operations. This evolution was far from 

complete in 1861, and throughout the war, commanders personally handled many vital staff functions, most notably operations and intelligence. 

The nature of American warfare up to the mid-19th century did not seem to 

overwhelm the capabilities of single commanders. However, as the Civil 

War progressed the armies grew larger and the war effort became a more 

complex undertaking and demanded larger staffs. Both sides only partially 

adjusted to the new demands, and bad staff work hindered operations for 

both the Union and Confederate forces in the Overland Campaign.

Civil War staffs were divided into a “general staff” and a “staff corps.” 

This terminology, defined by Winfield Scott in 1855, differs from modern 

definitions of the terms. Table 2 lists typical staff positions at army level, 

although most key functions were also represented at corps and division 

level. Except for the chief of staff and aides-de-camp, who were considered personal staff and would often depart when a commander was reassigned, staffs mainly contained representatives of the various bureaus, 

with logistical areas being best represented. Later in the war, some truly 

effective staffs began to emerge, but this was the result of the increased 

experience of the officers serving in those positions rather than a comprehensive development of standard staff procedures or guidelines.

Major General George B. McClellan, when he appointed his 

father‐in‐law, was the first to officially use the title “chief of staff.” 

Even though many senior commanders had a chief of staff, this position 

was not used in any uniform way and seldom did the man in this role 

achieve the central coordinating authority of the chief of staff in a modern 
headquarters. This position, along with most other staff positions, was 

used as an individual commander saw fit, making staff responsibilities 

somewhat different under each commander. This inadequate use of the 

chief of staff was among the most important shortcomings of staffs during 

the Civil War. An equally important weakness was the lack of any formal 

operations or intelligence staff. Liaison procedures were also ill defined, 

and various staff officers or soldiers performed this function with little 

formal guidance. Miscommunication or lack of knowledge of friendly 

units proved disastrous time after time in the war’s campaigns.

The Armies in the Overland Campaign

The forces in the Overland Campaign evolved through several organizational changes over the course of the two-month struggle. The details 

of these changes are covered in the campaign overview and in the appendixes. Some key aspects of these organizations are summarized below.

On the Union side, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, in addition 

to being the commander of all of the Union forces arrayed against the 

Confederacy, commanded all Union forces in the eastern theater of operations that fought in the Overland Campaign. His main force was Major 

General George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac, which initially consisted of three infantry corps and one cavalry corps. An additional infantry 

corps, the IX Corps under Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, began 

the campaign as a separate corps reporting directly to Grant, but was later 

assigned to the Army of the Potomac. Major General Franz Sigel commanded a Union army in the Shenandoah Valley that had only an indirect role in the Overland Campaign. On the other hand, Major General 

Benjamin F. Butler’s Army of the James was more directly involved in the 

campaign. His army consisted of two infantry corps and about a division’s 

Table 2. Typical Staffs

General Staff Staff Corps

Chief of staff (personal staff)

Aides (personal staff)

Assistant adjutant general

Assistant inspector general

Engineer

Ordnance

Quartermaster

Subsistence

Medical

Pay

Signal

Provost marshal

Chief of artillery
worth of cavalry troops. Later in the campaign, at Cold Harbor, one of 

Butler’s corps, the XVIII under Major General William F. Smith, was temporarily attached to the Army of the Potomac. The initial strength of the 

Army of the Potomac and the IX Corps at the beginning of the Overland 

Campaign was slightly under 120,000 men.

There are some factors affecting the strength, quality, and organization 

of the Union forces that should be noted. First, just prior to the campaign, 

the Army of the Potomac had abolished two of its infantry corps (the I 

and III Corps, both of which had been decimated at Gettysburg) and consolidated their subordinate units into the remaining three corps (II, V, and 

VI). This definitely streamlined the Army’s command and control, but it 

also meant that some divisions and brigades were not accustomed to their 

new corps’ methods and procedures at the start of the campaign. Second, 

soldiers in a large number of the Federal regiments were approaching the 

expiration dates of their enlistments just as the campaign was set to begin 

in May 1864. Most of the troops in these regiments had enlisted for three 

years in 1861, and they represented the most experienced fighters in the 

Army. A surprisingly large number of these soldiers reenlisted (over 50 

percent), but there was still a large turnover and much disruption as many 

of the regiments that reenlisted returned to their home states for furloughs 

and to recruit replacements. Finally, the Union did tap a new source for soldiers in 1864: the “heavy artillery” regiments. These were units designed 

to man the heavy artillery in the fortifications around Washington, DC. 

Grant decided to strip many of these regiments from the forts and use 

them as infantry in the 1864 campaign, and he employed these forces more 

extensively as his losses accumulated. The heavy artillery regiments had a 

slightly different structure than the traditional infantry regiments, and they 

had not suffered battle casualties; thus, they often still possessed about 

1,200 soldiers in a regiment. This was as large as a veteran Union brigade 

in 1864.

On the Confederate side, there was no overall commander in chief 

or even a theater commander with authority similar to that of Grant. 

Officially, only President Jefferson Davis had the authority to coordinate 

separate Confederate armies and military districts. However, the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee, had 

considerable influence over affairs in the entire eastern theater due to the 

immense respect he had earned from Davis and other Confederate leaders. 

Lee’s army consisted of three infantry corps and a cavalry corps. One of 

these corps (Lieutenant General James Longstreet’s I Corps) had been on 

detached duty just prior to the opening of the campaign and would not join 

the rest of Lee’s army until the second day of the battle of the Wilderness 
10

(6 June). Additional Confederate forces in the theater included Major 

General John C. Breckinridge’s small army in the Shenandoah Valley 

and General P.G.T. Beauregard’s forces protecting Richmond, southern 

Virginia, and northern North Carolina. In the course of the campaign, Lee 

received some reinforcements from both Breckinridge and Beauregard. 

The Army of Northern Virginia (including Longstreet’s I Corps) began the 

campaign with about 64,000 soldiers.

Although plagued by an overall shortage in numbers, Lee had fewer 

worries about the organization and quality of his manpower. Most of his 

soldiers had enlisted for the duration of the war, thus his army lost few regiments due to expired terms of service. Also, thanks to its better replacement system, Confederate regiments were usually closer to a consistent 

strength of 350 to 600 men instead of the wild disparity of their Union 

counterparts (as low as 150 soldiers in the decimated veteran regiments 

and as much as 1,200 in the heavy artillery regiments). Overall, Lee could 

count on the quality and consistency of his units, and he did not have to 

endure the turmoil of troop turnover and organizational changes that hindered Grant’s forces.

As for staffs, on the Union side Grant maintained a surprisingly small 

staff for a commander in chief. His personal chief of staff was Major 

General John A. Rawlins, a capable officer who generally produced 

concise and well-crafted orders. In addition, he was Grant’s alter ego, a 

trusted friend who took it upon himself to keep Grant sober. In fact, recent 

scholarship indicates that Grant’s drinking was far less of a problem than 

formerly indicated, and there were certainly no drinking difficulties during the Overland Campaign. The rest of Grant’s small staff consisted of a 

coterie of friends who had earned Grant’s trust from their common service 

in the western theater campaigns. In general, this staff performed well, 

although a few glaring mistakes would come back to haunt the Union 

effort. Of course, one of the major reasons Grant could afford to keep such 

a small staff in the field was that the chief of staff for the Union armies, 

Major General Henry W. Halleck, remained in Washington with a large 

staff that handled Grant’s administrative duties as general in chief. In fact, 

Halleck was a superb staff officer who tactfully navigated the political seas 

of Washington and gave Grant the freedom to accompany the Army of the 

Potomac in the field.

In contrast to Grant’s field staff, Meade had a huge staff that Grant 

once jokingly described as fitting for an Imperial Roman Emperor. Meade’s 

chief of staff was Major General Andrew A. Humphreys, an extremely 

capable officer who only reluctantly agreed to leave field command to 
11

serve on the army’s staff. Humphreys has received some criticism for not 

pushing the Army of the Potomac through the Wilderness on 4 May; but 

for most of the campaign, his orders were solid and his movement plan for 

the crossing of the James River was outstanding. Another excellent officer 

on the army staff was the chief of artillery, Major General Henry J. Hunt. 

Recognized as one of the war’s foremost experts on artillery, Hunt had a 

more active role in operational matters than most artillery chiefs who usually just performed administrative duties. The rest of Meade’s staff was of 

mixed quality. In addition, the poor caliber of Union maps coupled with 

some mediocre young officers who were used as guides repeatedly led to 

misdirected movements and lost time.

Compared to Meade’s large headquarters, Lee maintained a smaller 

group of trusted subordinates for his staff. Lee did not have a chief of staff, 

thus much of the responsibility for writing his orders fell on the shoulders of a few personal aides and secretaries, especially Lieutenant Colonel 

Charles Marshall. Lee employed several young officers, such as Lieutenant 

Colonel Walter Taylor and Colonel Charles S. Venable, as aides, and had 

great faith in these men to transmit his orders to subordinates. However, 

the lack of a true staff to ease his workload probably took its toll on Lee 

who was ill and physically exhausted by the time of the North Anna battles 

at the end of May. Other than his young aides, Lee had several other staff 

officers of mixed quality. His chief of artillery, Brigadier General William 

N. Pendleton, was mediocre at best, and the Army commander usually 

relegated his chief of artillery to strictly administrative duties. On the other 

hand, Major General Martin Luther (M.L.) Smith, Lee’s chief engineer, 

played an active and generally positive role throughout the campaign.

Weapons

Infantry

During the 1850’s, in a technological revolution of major proportions, 

the rifle musket began to replace the relatively inaccurate smoothbore 

musket in ever-increasing numbers, both in Europe and America. This process, accelerated by the Civil War, ensured that the rifled shoulder weapon 

would be the basic weapon used by infantrymen in both the Federal and 

Confederate armies.

The standard and most common shoulder weapon used in the American 

Civil War was the Springfield .58‐caliber rifle musket, models 1855, 1861, 

and 1863. In 1855, the US Army adopted this weapon to replace the 

.69‐caliber smoothbore musket and the .54‐caliber rifle. In appearance, the 

rifle musket was similar to the smoothbore musket. Both were single‐shot 
12

muzzleloaders, but the rifled bore of the new weapon substantially increased 

its range and accuracy. The rifling system chosen by the United States was 

designed by Claude Minié, a French Army officer. Whereas earlier rifles 

fired a round nonexpanding ball, the Minié system used a hollow‐based 

cylindro‐conoidal projectile slightly smaller than the bore that dropped 

easily into the barrel. When the powder charge was ignited by a fulminate 

of mercury percussion cap, the released powder gases expanded the base 

of the bullet into the rifled grooves, giving the projectile a ballistic spin.

The model 1855 Springfield rifle musket was the first regulation arm 

to use the hollow‐base .58‐caliber minie bullet. The slightly modified 

model 1861 was the principal infantry weapon of the Civil War, although 

two subsequent models in 1863 were produced in about equal quantities. 

The model 1861 was 56 inches long overall, had a 40‐inch barrel, and 

weighed 9 pounds 2 ounces with its bayonet. The 21‐inch socket bayonet 

consisted of an 18‐inch triangular blade and 3‐inch socket. The Springfield 

had a rear sight graduated to 500 yards. The maximum effective range of 

this weapon was approximately 500 yards, although it had killing power 

at 1,000 yards. The round could penetrate 11 inches of white-pine board 

at 200 yards and 31⁄4 inches at 1,000 yards, with a penetration of 1 inch 

considered the equivalent of disabling a human being. Although the new 

weapons had increased accuracy and effectiveness, the soldiers’ vision 

was still obscured by the clouds of smoke produced by the rifle musket’s 

black powder propellant.

To load a muzzle‐loading rifle, the soldier took a paper cartridge in 

hand and tore the end of the paper with his teeth. Next, he poured the 

powder down the barrel and placed the bullet in the muzzle. Then, using a 

metal ramrod, he pushed the bullet firmly down the barrel until seated. He 

then cocked the hammer and placed the percussion cap on the cone or nipple, which, when struck by the hammer, ignited the gunpowder. The average rate of fire was three rounds per minute. A well‐trained soldier could 

possibly load and fire four times per minute, but in the confusion of battle, 

the rate of fire was probably slower, two to three rounds per minute.

In addition to the Springfields, over 100 types of muskets, rifles, rifle 

muskets, and rifled muskets—ranging up to .79 caliber—were used during 

the American Civil War. The numerous American-made weapons were 

supplemented early in the conflict by a wide variety of imported models. 

The best, most popular, and most common of the foreign weapons was the 

British .577‐caliber Enfield rifle, model 1853, which was 54 inches long (with 

a 39‐inch barrel), weighed 8.7 pounds (9.2 with the bayonet), could be fitted 

with a socket bayonet with an 18-inch blade, and had a rear sight graduated 
13

to 800 yards. The Enfield design was produced in a variety of forms, both 

long and short barreled, by several British manufacturers and at least one 

American company. Of all the foreign designs, the Enfield most closely 

resembled the Springfield in characteristics and capabilities. The United States 

purchased over 436,000 Enfield‐pattern weapons during the war. Statistics 

on Confederate purchases are more difficult to ascertain, but a report dated 

February 1863 indicated that 70,980 long Enfields and 9,715 short Enfields 

had been delivered by that time, with another 23,000 awaiting delivery.

While the quality of imported weapons varied, experts considered the 

Enfields and the Austrian Lorenz rifle muskets to be very good. However, 

some foreign governments and manufacturers took advantage of the huge 

initial demand for weapons by dumping their obsolete weapons on the 

American market. This practice was especially prevalent with some of 

the older smoothbore muskets and converted flintlocks. The greatest challenge, however, lay in maintaining these weapons and supplying ammunition and replacement parts for calibers ranging from .44 to .79. The 

quality of the imported weapons eventually improved as the procedures, 

standards, and astuteness of the purchasers improved. For the most part, 

the European suppliers provided needed weapons, and the newer foreign 

weapons were highly regarded.

Breechloaders and repeating rifles were available by 1861 and were 

initially purchased in limited quantities, often by individual soldiers. 

Generally, however, these types of rifles were not issued to troops in large 

numbers because of technical problems (poor breech seals, faulty ammunition), fear by the Ordnance Department that the troops would waste 

ammunition, and the cost of rifle production. The most famous of the 

breechloaders was the single-shot Sharps, produced in both carbine and 

rifle models. The model 1859 rifle was .52-caliber, 471⁄8 inches long, and 

weighed 83⁄4 pounds, while the carbine was .52-caliber, 391⁄8 inches long, 

and weighed 73⁄4 pounds. Both weapons used a linen cartridge and a pellet primer feed mechanism. Most Sharps carbines were issued to Federal 

cavalry units.

The best known of the repeaters was probably the seven‐shot .52-caliber 

Spencer, which came in both rifle and carbine models. The rifle was 47inches long and weighed 10 pounds, while the carbine was 39-inches long 

and weighed 81⁄4 pounds. The Spencer was also the first weapon adopted 

by the US Army that fired a metallic rim‐fire, self‐contained cartridge. 

Soldiers loaded rounds through an opening in the butt of the stock, which 

fed into the chamber through a tubular magazine by the action of the trigger 

guard. The hammer still had to be cocked manually before each shot.
14

The Henry rifle was, in some ways, even better than either the Sharps 

or the Spencer. Although never adopted by the US Army in any quantity, 

it was purchased privately by soldiers during the war. The Henry was a 

16‐shot, .44‐caliber rimfire cartridge repeater. It was 431⁄2 inches long and 

weighed 91⁄4 pounds. The tubular magazine located directly beneath the 

barrel had a 15‐round capacity with an additional round in the chamber. Of 

the approximately 13,500 Henrys produced, probably 10,000 saw limited 

service. The government purchased only 1,731.

The Colt repeating rifle, model 1855 (or revolving carbine), also was 

available to Civil War soldiers in limited numbers. The weapon was produced in several lengths and calibers, the lengths varying from 32 to 421⁄2 

inches, while its calibers were .36, .44, and .56. The .36 and .44 calibers 

were made to chamber six shots, while the .56-caliber was made to chamber five shots. The Colt Firearms Company was also the primary supplier 

of revolvers (the standard sidearm for cavalry troops and officers), the 

.44‐caliber Army revolver and the .36‐caliber Navy revolver being the 

most popular (over 146,000 purchased). This was because they were simple, relatively sturdy, and reliable.

Cavalry

Initially armed with sabers and pistols (and in one case, lances), 

Federal cavalry troops quickly added the breech-loading carbine to their 

inventory of weapons. Troops preferred the easier-handling carbines to 

rifles and the breechloaders to awkward muzzleloaders. Of the single‐shot 

breech-loading carbines that saw extensive use during the Civil War, 

the Hall .52-caliber accounted for approximately 20,000 in 1861. The 

Hall was quickly replaced by a variety of more state-of-the-art carbines, 

including the Merrill .54-caliber (14,495), Maynard .52-caliber (20,002), 

Gallager .53-caliber (22,728), Smith .52-caliber (30,062), Burnside .56caliber (55,567), and Sharps .54-caliber (80,512). The next step in the 

evolutionary process was the repeating carbine, the favorite by 1864 (and 

commonly distributed by 1865) being the Spencer .52‐caliber seven‐shot 

repeater (94,194).

Because of the South’s limited industrial capacity, Confederate 

cavalrymen had a more difficult time arming themselves. Nevertheless, 

they too embraced the firepower revolution, choosing shotguns and 

muzzle-loading carbines as well as multiple sets of revolvers as their 

primary weapons. In addition, Confederate cavalrymen made extensive 

use of battlefield salvage by recovering Federal weapons. However, the 

South’s difficulties in producing the metallic‐rimmed cartridges required 

by many of these recovered weapons limited their usefulness.
15

Field Artillery

In 1841, the US Army selected bronze as the standard material for 

fieldpieces and at the same time adopted a new system of field artillery. 

The 1841 field artillery system consisted entirely of smoothbore muzzleloaders: 6‐ and 12‐pound guns; 12‐, 24‐, and 32‐pound howitzers; and 

12-pound mountain howitzers. A pre-Civil War battery usually consisted 

of six fieldpieces—four guns and two howitzers. A 6‐pound battery contained four 6-pound guns and two 12-pound howitzers, while a 12-pound 

battery had four 12-pound guns and two 24-pound howitzers. The guns 

fired solid shot, shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds, while 

howitzers fired shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds (artillery ammunition is described below).

The 6‐pound gun (effective range 1,523 yards) was the primary fieldpiece used from the time of the Mexican War until the Civil War. By 1861, 

however, the 1841 artillery system based on the 6-pounder was obsolete. 

In 1857, a new and more versatile fieldpiece, the 12‐pound gun‐howitzer 

(Napoleon), model 1857, appeared on the scene. Designed as a multipurpose piece to replace existing guns and howitzers, the Napoleon fired canister and shell, like the 12-pound howitzer, and solid shot comparable in 

range to the 12-pound gun. The Napoleon was a bronze, muzzle-loading 

smoothbore with an effective range of 1,619 yards (see table 3 for a comparison of artillery data). Served by a nine‐man crew, the piece could fire 

at a sustained rate of two aimed shots per minute. Like almost all smoothbore artillery, the Napoleon fired “fixed” ammunition—the projectile and 

powder were bound together with metal bands.

Another new development in field artillery was the introduction of 

rifling. Although rifled guns provided greater range and accuracy, smoothbores were generally more reliable and faster to load. Rifled ammunition 

was semifixed, so the charge and the projectile had to be loaded separately. 

In addition, the canister load of the rifle did not perform as well as that of 

the smoothbore. Initially, some smoothbores were rifled on the James pattern, but they soon proved unsatisfactory because the bronze rifling eroded 

too easily. Therefore, most rifled artillery was either wrought iron or cast 

iron with a wrought-iron reinforcing band.

The most commonly used rifled guns were the 10‐pound Parrott and 

the Rodman, or 3‐inch ordnance rifle. The Parrott rifle was a cast‐iron 

piece, easily identified by the wrought‐iron band reinforcing the breech. 

The 10-pound Parrott was made in two models: model 1861 had a 2.9-inch 

rifled bore with three lands and grooves and a slight muzzle swell, while 

model 1863 had a 3‐inch bore and no muzzle swell. The Rodman or 
16

ordnance rifle was a long‐tubed, wrought‐iron piece that had a 3‐inch bore 

with seven lands and grooves. Ordnance rifles were sturdier and considered 

superior in accuracy and reliability to the 10-pound Parrott.

A new weapon that made its first appearance in the war during the 

Overland Campaign was the 24-pound Coehorn mortar. Used exclusively 

by the North, the Coehorn fired a projectile in a high arcing trajectory and 

was ideal for lobbing shells into trenches in siege warfare. The Coehorn 

was used briefly during the fighting at the “bloody angle” at Spotsylvania 

and later in the trench lines at Cold Harbor.

By 1860, the ammunition for field artillery consisted of four general 

types for both smoothbores and rifles: solid shot, shell, case, and canister. Solid shot was a round cast‐iron projectile for smoothbores and an 

elongated projectile, known as a bolt, for rifled guns. Solid shot, with its 

smashing or battering effect, was used in a counterbattery role or against 

buildings and massed formations. The conical-shaped bolt lacked the 

effectiveness of the cannonball because it tended to bury itself on impact 

instead of bounding along the ground like a bowling ball.

Shell, also known as common or explosive shell, whether spherical or 

conical, was a hollow projectile filled with an explosive charge of black 

powder that was detonated by a fuse. Shell was designed to break into 

jagged pieces, producing an antipersonnel effect, but the low‐order detonation seldom produced more than three to five fragments. In addition to 

its casualty-producing effects, shell had a psychological impact when it 

exploded over the heads of troops. It was also used against field fortifications and in a counterbattery role. Case or case shot for both smoothbore and rifled guns was a hollow projectile with thinner walls than shell. 

The projectile was filled with round lead or iron balls set in a matrix of 

sulfur that surrounded a small bursting charge. Case was primarily used 

in an antipersonnel role. This type of round had been invented by Henry 

Shrapnel, a British artillery officer, hence the term “shrapnel.”

Last, there was canister, probably the most effective round and the 

round of choice at close range (400 yards or less) against massed troops. 

Canister was essentially a tin can filled with iron balls packed in sawdust 

with no internal bursting charge. When fired, the can disintegrated, and 

the balls followed their own paths to the target. The canister round for the 

12‐pound Napoleon consisted of 27 11⁄2‐inch iron balls packed inside an 

elongated tin cylinder. At extremely close ranges, men often loaded double 

charges of canister. By 1861, canister had replaced grapeshot in the ammunition chests of field batteries (grapeshot balls were larger than canister, 

and thus fewer could be fired per round).
17

Weapons in the Overland Campaign

The variety of weapons available to both armies during the Civil War 

is reflected in the battles of the Overland Campaign. To a limited extent, 

the Army of Northern Virginia’s infantry had more uniformity in its small 

arms than the Army of the Potomac. In fact, some regiments of the famous 

Pennsylvania Reserves Brigade were still equipped with smoothbore muskets. In any case, both armies relied heavily on the Springfield and Enfield, 

which were the most common weapons used (although almost every other 

type of Civil War small arms could be found in the campaign).

The variety of weapons and calibers of ammunition required on the 

battlefield by each army presented sustainment challenges that ranged from 

production and procurement to supplying soldiers in the field. Amazingly, 

operations were not often affected by the need to resupply a diverse mixture of ammunition types.

The Army of the Potomac (including the IX Corps) started the campaign with 58 batteries of artillery. Of these, 42 were six-gun batteries, 

while the other 16 batteries were of the four-gun type. The Federals went 

to a four-gun battery system after the battle of Spotsylvania. Also at this 

time, the Army of the Potomac’s Artillery Reserve was disbanded except 

for the ammunition train. The Reserve’s batteries went to the corps-level 

reserve artillery brigades. The Army of Northern Virginia totaled 56 artillery batteries. The vast majority of these (42) were four-gun batteries. The 

rest of the mix included one six-gun battery, three five-gun, five three-gun, 

four two-gun, and a lone one-gun battery. (Refer to table 3 for the major 

types of artillery available to the two armies at the start of the campaign.)

The effectiveness of artillery during the campaign was mixed. In the 

Wilderness, the rugged terrain and the dense vegetation reduced the effectiveness of artillery fire. Specifically, the Federals’ advantage in numbers 

of longer‐range rifled guns was negated by the lack of good fields of fire. 

The more open ground at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor allowed for better use of artillery. However, the increasing use of entrenchments on both 

sides tended to relegate artillery to a defensive role.

The Confederates tended to keep their batteries decentralized, usually 

attached to the infantry brigades within the divisions to which they were 

assigned. Lee’s army did not have an artillery reserve. The Union tended 

to centralize their artillery, even after disbanding the army-level reserve. 

This often meant keeping reserve batteries at corps-level, other batteries 

in division reserves, and occasionally assigning batteries to brigades as 

needed.
18

In the Overland Campaign, the Confederate cavalry had an advantage 

over its Union counterpart in reconnaissance and screening missions. This 

was largely due to personalities and the mission focus of the two sides, 

rather than to any organizational or tactical differences between them. The 

Army of the Potomac’s cavalry corps was commanded by Major General 

Philip H. Sheridan, who clashed with the Army commander, Meade, 

over the role of the cavalry. After the opening of the Spotsylvania fight, 

Sheridan got his wish and conducted a large raid toward Richmond. Stuart 

countered with part of his force, but the remaining Confederate cavalry 

kept Lee well informed while the Federals were almost blind. Stuart was 

killed at the battle of Yellow Tavern, but his eventual replacement, Major 

General Wade Hampton, filled in admirably. Later in the war, Sheridan 

would make better use of the cavalry as a striking force, but he never really 

mastered its reconnaissance role.

Table 3. Artillery Available to Both Sides at the Start of the Overland Campaign

Type Bore

Diameter

(inches)

Tube

Weight

(pounds)

Tube

Length

(inches)

Carriage

Weight

(pounds)

Range at

5° Elevation

(yards)

Army of the

Potomac

(with IX

Corps)

Army of

Northern

Virginia

Smooth-bore

12-lb howitzer 4.62 788 53 900 1,072 0 6

12-lb gun-howitzer

Napoleon

4.62 1,227 66 1,128 1,619 138 94

24-lb howitzer 5.82 1,318 65 1,128 1,322 0 4

Rifles

10-lb Parrott

(1863)

3.0 890 74 900 1,850 24 48

20-lb Parrott 3.67 890 78 900 2,000 6 12

3-inch ordnance-rifle

Rodman

3.0 816 69 900 1,830 148 32

Special

24-lb Coehorn

Mortars

5.82 164 16.32 132 at 45°

elevation

1,200

8 0
19

Tactics

Tactical Doctrine in 1861

The Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican War were the major influences 

on American military thinking at the beginning of the Civil War. American 

military leaders knew of the Napoleonic driven theories of Jomini, while 

tactical doctrine reflected the lessons learned in Mexico (1846‐48). 

However, these tactical lessons were misleading, because in Mexico relatively small armies fought only seven pitched battles. In addition, these 

battles were so small that almost all the tactical lessons learned during 

the war focused at the regimental, battery, and squadron levels. Future 

Civil War leaders had learned very little about brigade, division, and corps 

maneuvers in Mexico, yet these units were standard fighting elements of 

both armies in 1861‐65.

The US Army’s experience in Mexico validated many Napoleonic 

principles—particularly that of the offensive. In Mexico, tactics did not 

differ greatly from those of the early 19th century. Infantry marched in 

columns and deployed into lines to fight. Once deployed, an infantry regiment might send one or two companies forward as skirmishers, as security 

against surprise, or to soften the enemy’s line. After identifying the enemy’s position, a regiment advanced in closely ordered lines to within 100 

yards. There it delivered a devastating volley, followed by a charge with 

bayonets. Both sides attempted to use this basic tactic in the first battles of 

the Civil War with tragic results.

In Mexico, American armies employed artillery and cavalry in both 

offensive and defensive battle situations. In the offense, artillery moved as 

near to the enemy lines as possible—normally just outside musket range—

in order to blow gaps in the enemy’s line that the infantry might exploit 

with a determined charge. In the defense, artillery blasted advancing enemy 

lines with canister and withdrew if the enemy attack got within musket 

range. Cavalry guarded the army’s flanks and rear but held itself ready to 

charge if enemy infantry became disorganized or began to withdraw.

These tactics worked perfectly well with the weapons technology of 

the Napoleonic and Mexican Wars. The infantry musket was accurate up to 

100 yards, but ineffective against even massed targets beyond that range. 

Rifles were specialized weapons with excellent accuracy and range but 

slow to load and, therefore, not usually issued to line troops. Smoothbore 

cannon had a range up to 1 mile with solid shot, but were most effective 

against infantry when firing canister at ranges under 400 yards (and even 

better at 200 yards or less). Artillerists worked their guns without much 
20

fear of infantry muskets, which had a limited range. Cavalry continued to 

use sabers and lances as shock weapons.

American troops took the tactical offensive in most Mexican War battles with great success, and they suffered fairly light losses. Unfortunately, 

similar tactics proved to be obsolete in the Civil War in part because of 

the innovation of the rifle musket. This new weapon greatly increased the 

infantry’s range and accuracy and loaded as fast as a musket. By the beginning of the Civil War, rifle muskets were available in moderate numbers. 

It was the weapon of choice in both the Union and Confederate armies 

during the war; by 1864, the vast majority of infantry troops on both sides 

had rifle muskets of good quality.

Official tactical doctrine prior to the beginning of the Civil War did not 

clearly recognize the potential of the new rifle musket. Prior to 1855, the 

most influential tactical guide was General Winfield Scott’s three‐volume 

work, Infantry Tactics (1835), based on French tactical models of the 

Napoleonic Wars. It stressed close-order, linear formations in two or 

three ranks advancing at “quick time” of 110 steps (86 yards) per minute. 

In 1855, to accompany the introduction of the new rifle musket, Major 

William J. Hardee published a two‐volume tactical manual, Rifle and 

Light Infantry Tactics. Hardee’s work contained few significant revisions 

of Scott’s manual. His major innovation was to increase the speed of the 

advance to a “double‐quick time” of 165 steps (151 yards) per minute. 

If, as suggested, Hardee introduced his manual as a response to the rifle 

musket, then he failed to appreciate the weapon’s full impact on combined 

arms tactics and the essential shift that the rifle musket made in favor of 

the defense. Hardee’s Rifle and Light Infantry Tactics was the standard 

infantry manual used by both sides at the outbreak of war in 1861.

If Scott’s and Hardee’s works lagged behind technological innovations, 

at least the infantry had manuals to establish a doctrinal basis for 

training. Cavalry and artillery fell even further behind in recognizing 

the potential tactical shift in favor of rifle‐armed infantry. The cavalry’s 

manual, published in 1841, was based on French sources that focused 

on close-order offensive tactics. It favored the traditional cavalry attack 

in two ranks of horsemen armed with sabers or lances. The manual took 

no notice of the rifle musket’s potential, nor did it give much attention 

to dismounted operations. Similarly, the artillery had a basic drill book 

delineating individual crew actions, but it had no tactical manual. Like 

cavalrymen, artillerymen showed no concern for the potential tactical 

changes that the rifle musket implied.
21

Early War Tactics

In the battles of 1861 and 1862, both sides employed the tactics 

proven in Mexico and found that the tactical offensive could still occasionally be successful—but only at a great cost in casualties. Men wielding 

rifled weapons in the defense generally ripped incoming frontal assaults to 

shreds, and if the attackers paused to exchange fire, the slaughter was even 

greater. Rifles also increased the relative number of defenders that could 

engage an attacking formation, since flanking units now engaged assaulting troops with a murderous enfilading fire. Defenders usually crippled the 

first assault line before a second line of attackers could come forward in 

support. This caused successive attacking lines to intermingle with survivors to their front, thereby destroying formations, command, and control. 

Although both sides occasionally used the bayonet throughout the war, 

they quickly discovered that rifle musket fire made successful bayonet 

attacks almost impossible.

As the infantry troops found the bayonet charge to be of little value 

against rifle muskets, cavalry and artillery troops made troubling discoveries of their own. Cavalry troops learned that the old-style saber charge did 

not work against infantry armed with rifle muskets. Cavalry troops, however, continued their traditional intelligence gathering and screening roles 

and often found their place as the “eyes and ears” of the army. Artillery 

troops, on their part, found that they could not maneuver in the offense to 

canister range as they had in Mexico, because the rifle musket was accurate beyond that distance. Worse yet, at ranges where gunners were safe 

from rifle fire, artillery shot and shell were far less effective than canister 

at close range. Ironically, rifled cannon did not give the equivalent boost 

to artillery effectiveness that the rifle‐musket gave to the infantry. The 

increased range of cannons proved no real advantage in the broken and 

wooded terrain over which so many Civil War battles were fought.

There are several possible reasons why Civil War commanders 

continued to employ the tactical offensive long after it was clear that the 

defense was superior. Most commanders believed the offensive was the 

decisive form of battle. This lesson came straight from the Napoleonic 

wars and the Mexican‐American War. Commanders who chose the tactical 

offensive usually retained the initiative over defenders. Similarly, the 

tactical defensive depended heavily on the enemy choosing to attack at 

a point convenient to the defender and continuing to attack until badly 

defeated. Although this situation occurred often in the Civil War, a prudent 

commander could hardly count on it for victory. Consequently, few 
22

Figure 1. Regimental line of battle from march column.

Regiments were the basic maneuver units at the beginning of the

Civil War. The regimental line of battle was two men deep, with

officers and file closers immediately behind. A regiment carried its

own and the national colors near its center to mark its direction and

alignment. One or more companies deployed to the front as skirmishers.

Regiments attacked in this formation, often in concert with other

regiments of the same brigade on its flanks, front, and/or rear. Command

and control were most critical at this level of battle. A regimental

attack might enjoy success, however temporary, but when several

regiments attacked simultaneously under the firm control of a brigade

or divisional commander, results could be more decisive.

The route of march by companies in column.

Companies wheel into line of battle.

One company is skirmishers.

Direction of March

1 2

3

Companies march by their flanks until

near the position the regiment will occupy.

One company deploys as skirmishers.

S

K

I

R

M

I

S

H

E

R

S

commanders chose to exploit the defensive form of battle if they had the 

option to attack.

The offensive may have been the decisive form of battle, but it was 

very hard to coordinate and even harder to control. (For the procedure in 

moving a regiment into line of battle from march column, see figure 1.) The 

better generals often tried to attack the enemy’s flanks and rear, but seldom 

achieved success because of the difficulty involved. Not only did the commander have to identify the enemy’s flank or rear correctly, he also had to 

move his force into position to attack and then do so in conjunction with 

attacks made by other friendly units. Command and control of the type 

required to conduct these attacks was quite beyond the ability of most Civil 

War commanders. Therefore, Civil War armies repeatedly attacked each 

other frontally, with resulting high casualties, because that was the easiest 

way to conduct offensive operations. When attacking frontally, a commander had to choose between attacking on a broad front or a narrow front. 
23

Attacking on a broad front rarely succeeded except against weak and 

scattered defenders. Attacking on a narrow front promised greater success but required immediate reinforcement to continue the attack and 

achieve decisive results. As the war dragged on, experiments with attacking forces on narrow fronts against specific objectives were attempted 

(Upton at Spotsylvania), but no single offensive doctrine emerged as a key 

to success.

Later War Tactics

Poor training may have contributed to high casualty rates early in the 

war, but casualties remained high and even increased long after the armies 

became experienced. Continued high casualty rates resulted because tactical developments failed to adapt to the new weapons technology. Few 

commanders understood how the rifle musket strengthened the tactical 

defensive. However, some commanders made offensive innovations that 

met with varying success. When an increase in the pace of advance did 

not overcome defending firepower (as Hardee suggested it would), some 

units tried advancing in more open order. But this sort of formation lacked 

the appropriate mass to assault and carry prepared positions and created 

command and control problems beyond the ability of Civil War leaders to 

resolve. 

Late in the war, when the difficulty of attacking field fortifications 

under heavy fire became apparent, other tactical expedients were employed. 

Attacking solidly entrenched defenders often required whole brigades and 

divisions moving in dense masses to rapidly cover intervening ground, 

seize the objective, and prepare for the inevitable counterattack. Seldom 

successful against alert and prepared defenses, these attacks were generally 

accompanied by tremendous casualties and foreshadowed the massed 

infantry assaults of World War I. Sometimes, large formations attempted 

mass charges over short distances without halting to fire. This tactic 

enjoyed limited success at the Spotsylvania Courthouse in May 1864, but 

generally failed to break a prepared enemy. At Spotsylvania, a Union taskorganized division (under Colonel Emory Upton) attacked and captured 

an exposed portion of the Confederate line. The attack succeeded in part 

because the Union troops crossed the intervening ground very quickly and 

without stopping to fire their rifles. Once inside the Confederate defenses, 

the Union troops attempted to exploit their success by continuing their 

advance, but loss of command and control made them little better than 

a mob. Counterattacking Confederate units, in conventional formations, 

eventually forced the Federals to relinquish much of the ground gained 

(see figure 2).
24

As the war dragged on, tactical maneuver focused more on larger formations: brigade, division, and corps. In most of the major battles fought 

after 1861, brigades were employed as the primary maneuver formations. 

But brigade maneuver was at the upper limit of command and control 

for most Civil War commanders at the beginning of the war. Brigades 

might be able to retain coherent formations if the terrain were suitably 

open, but often brigade attacks degenerated into a series of poorly coordinated regimental lunges through broken and wooded terrain. Thus, brigade commanders were often on the main battle line trying to influence 

regimental fights. Typically, defending brigades stood in line of battle and 

blazed away at attackers as rapidly as possible. Volley fire usually did not 

continue beyond the first round. Most of the time, soldiers fired as soon 

as they were ready, and it was common for two soldiers to work together, 

one loading for the other to fire. Brigades were generally invulnerable to 

attacks on their front if units to the left and right held their ground.

Two or more brigades comprised a division. When a division attacked, 

its brigades often advanced in sequence, from left to right or vice versa—

depending on terrain, suspected enemy location, and number of brigades 

Figure 2. Union regiments massed to attack at Spotsylvania Courthouse.

Upton

Confederate

lines
25

available to attack. At times, divisions attacked with two or more brigades 

leading, followed by one or more brigades ready to reinforce the lead brigades or maneuver to the flanks. Two or more divisions comprised a corps 

that might conduct an attack as part of a larger plan controlled by the army 

commander. More often, groups of divisions attacked under the control of 

a corps‐level commander. Division and corps commanders generally took 

a position to the rear of the main line in order to control the flow of reinforcements into the battle, but they often rode forward into the battle lines 

to influence the action personally.

Of the three basic branches, cavalry made the greatest adaptation during the war. It learned to use its horses for mobility, then dismount and 

fight on foot like infantry. Cavalry regained a useful battlefield role by 

employing this tactic, especially after repeating and breech‐loading rifles 

gave it the firepower to contend with enemy infantry. Still the most effective role for the cavalry was in reconnaissance and security in overall support of the main armies’ operations. On the other hand, many cavalry leaders were enamored with using their troops in large-scale raids, often as a 

pretext for seeking out the enemy’s cavalry for a decisive battle. In many 

cases, raids failed to produce either desired result: a decisive defeat of the 

enemy cavalry or significant destruction of enemy supply and transportation systems. During the Overland Campaign, Sheridan attempted a raid 

that ultimately led to the Battle of Yellow Tavern and, by chance, the death 

of Jeb Stuart. However, this raid effectively left the Army of the Potomac 

blind for two weeks during the campaign.

Artillery found that it could add its firepower to the rifle musket and tip 

the balance even more in favor of the tactical defensive, but artillery never 

regained the importance to offensive maneuver that it held in Mexico. If 

artillery had developed an indirect firing system, as it did prior to World 

War I, it might have been able to contribute more to offensive tactics. Still, 

both sides employed artillery effectively in defensive situations throughout the war.

The most significant tactical innovation in the Civil War was the 

widespread use of field fortifications after armies realized the tactical 

offensive’s heavy cost. It did not take long for the deadly firepower of 

the rifle musket to convince soldiers to entrench every time they halted. 

Eventually, armies dug complete trenches within an hour of halting in a 

position. Within 24 hours, armies could create defensive works that were 

nearly impregnable to frontal assaults. The Overland Campaign, probably 

more than any other campaign in the Civil War, demonstrated the efficacy 

of field entrenchments. Both sides, particularly the numerically inferior 
26

Confederates, made extensive use of entrenchments at every battle in the 

campaign. In this respect, the development of field fortifications during the 

American Civil War was a clear forerunner of the kind of trench warfare 

that came to dominate World War I. 

Summary of Tactics

In the Civil War, the tactical defense dominated the tactical offense 

because assault formations proved inferior to the defender’s firepower. 

The rifle musket, in its many forms, provided this firepower and caused 

the following specific alterations in tactics during the war:

• It required the attacker, in his initial dispositions, to deploy farther 

away from the defender, thereby increasing the distance over 

which the attacker had to pass.

• It increased the number of defenders who could engage attackers 

(with the addition of effective enfilading fire).

• It generally reduced the density of both attacking and defending 

formations, although in the 1864 campaigns, there was some 

experimentation of narrower and denser attacking formations to 

try to penetrate entrenched lines.

• It created a shift of emphasis in infantry battles toward firefights 

rather than shock attacks.

• It caused battles to last longer, because units could not close with 

each other for decisive shock action.

• It encouraged the widespread use of field fortifications. The habitual 

use of field fortifications by armies was a major innovation, but it 

further hindered the tactical offensive.

• It forced cavalry to the battlefield’s fringes until cavalrymen 

acquired equivalent weapons and tactics, although cavalry still 

performed essential reconnaissance missions.

• It forced artillery to abandon its basic offensive maneuver—that 

of moving forward to within canister range of defending infantry.

Tactics in the Overland Campaign

By May 1864, Civil War battle tactics had evolved to the point 

that brigades were the basic maneuver units (as opposed to individual 

regiments). Often, division commanders had some skill at using their 

brigades in a coordinated fashion, but it was still difficult to bring entire 

corps into unified action. Thus, both sides fought the tactical battles of the 

campaign by maneuvering brigades and divisions in combat. However, 

when conducting operational movements, both sides often moved at 

corps level with each corps having its own route (or occasionally, two 

corps following each other on the same route). Tactical battlefield fighting 
27

and the operational maneuvering between battles required tremendous 

coordination and synchronization, which the Civil War command system 

all too often failed to provide. Further, the terrain in Virginia, while not as 

rugged as much of the ground in the western theater, contained some heavily 

wooded areas such as the Wilderness, roads that could alternate between 

mud and dust, and numerous rivers, all of which made maneuver difficult. 

Much of the tactical confusion in the campaign’s battles resulted from the 

difficulty of maneuvering large bodies of troops through difficult terrain 

with a command system that depended mainly on voice commands.

One trend that was common in the Overland Campaign was the tendency of the Union forces to attack in more narrow formations than the 

Confederate forces. Often, Union brigades advanced with half of their 

regiments in the front line and half in a second line. The division would in 

turn have two of its brigades forward with one or two behind. This allowed 

many Union offensives to bring fresh units into their attacks, but it often 

prevented the Northerners from using their numbers for an overwhelming 

initial assault, as their units were committed piecemeal. The Confederate 

brigades often put all of their regiments on line, which occasionally allowed 

them to overlap a Union flank. Did these formations reflect evolving doctrinal ideas? Were they responses to the restrictive nature of the terrain? 

Did commanders choose these methods to improve their ability to control 

their units? Perhaps the answers lie in the personalities, experiences, and 

abilities of the commanders on both sides. In any case, as the Overland 

Campaign wore on, the Confederates were forced to rely on the defense, 

and in most cases, extensive entrenchments allowed them to deploy regiments on a relatively thin line, with divisions putting two or three brigades 

forward and one in reserve (as at Cold Harbor).

At the tactical-level and, to a degree the operational-level, certain patterns emerged over the course of the campaign. First, the Confederates 

were usually short on manpower and were forced to rely more and more on 

the tactical defense and use of entrenchments. The Southerners launched 

two very successful attacks in the Wilderness, but for the remainder of the 

campaign, they generally stayed on the tactical defense. The Union forces 

were almost constantly on the attack, and they struggled, often in vain, 

to find a solution to the seemingly impenetrable Confederate defensive 

positions. Many Union attacks, in particular the tragic assaults at Cold 

Harbor on 3 June, were costly failures against the Southern defenders. On 

the other hand, attacks by Upton at Spotsylvania and by Hancock at both 

the Wilderness and Spotsylvania achieved some measure of success, but 

could not achieve a decisive victory. In each case, even when the Federals 

made an initial breakthrough, they found it nearly impossible to maintain 
28

enough command and control of their forces to sustain their momentum.

This tactical stalemate forced the Union forces to seek an operational 

solution to the dominance of the defense. Thus emerged the outstanding 

operational characteristic of the Overland Campaign—Grant’s attempts 

to maneuver around Lee’s flanks and force a battle in a position favorable to the Union. Generally, Grant attempted to turn Lee’s right flank, 

which would place Union forces between Lee and Richmond. In these 

conditions, the Federals might be able to fight the Confederates in a sort 

of “meeting engagement” outside of entrenchments, or perhaps even 

force Lee into attacking the Union troops in their own prepared positions. 

The major engagements in the campaign resulted from these operational 

moves, but in almost every case, Lee was able to maneuver his troops into 

position before the Union forces arrived. In several cases, bad Federal 

staff work, or just plain bad luck, also hindered the Union moves. In one 

case—the crossing of the James—the Union forces performed their flanking maneuver superbly and actually “stole a march” on Lee. Yet, bungled 

Union assaults squandered this success at Petersburg from 15 to 18 June.

In sum, the Overland Campaign was like many other Civil War campaigns in terms of tactics. Attacks were often piecemeal, frontal, and uncoordinated, and they generally failed to dislodge defenders. On the other 

hand, the lack of a single decisive battle forced both Grant and Lee to think 

more in terms of a sustained campaign, and the series of their maneuvers 

and battles fought over the Virginia landscape might even be considered 

an early example of what modern military theorists call “the operational 

art.” The balance of two such skillful and determined opponents fighting 

in the conditions of 1864 was bound to lead to horrific casualties until one 

side or the other was exhausted.

Logistics Support

Victory on Civil War battlefields seldom hinged on the quality or 

quantity of tactical logistics. At the operational and strategic levels, however, logistical capabilities and concerns always shaped the plans and 

sometimes the outcomes of campaigns. As the war lengthened, the logistical advantage shifted inexorably to the North. The Federals controlled 

the majority of the financial and industrial resources of the nation. With 

their ability to import any needed materials, they ultimately created the 

best‐supplied army the world had yet seen. Despite suffering from shortages of raw materials, the Confederates generated adequate ordnance but 

faltered gradually in their ability to acquire other war materiel. The food 

supply for Southern armies was often on the verge of collapse, largely 

because limitations of the transportation network were compounded by 
29

political‐military mismanagement. Still, the state of supply within field 

armies on both sides depended more on the caliber of the people managing resources than on the constraints of available materiel. In Lee’s case, 

the Army of Northern Virginia managed to scrape by in 1864, although 

the need for forage and food sometimes forced Lee to disperse units to 

gather supplies. The situation grew worse throughout the year, but did not 

become critical until after the loss of the Shenandoah Valley added to the 

gradual decay of the Army during the siege at Petersburg.

One of the most pressing needs at the start of the war was for sufficient infantry and artillery weapons. With most of the government arsenals 

and private manufacturing capability located in the North, the Federals 

ultimately produced sufficient modern firearms for their armies, but the 

Confederates also accumulated adequate quantities—either from battlefield captures or through the blockade. In addition, exceptional management within the Confederate Ordnance Bureau led to the creation of a 

series of arsenals throughout the South that produced sufficient quantities 

of munitions and weapons.

The Northern manufacturing capability could have permitted the 

Federals eventually to produce and outfit their forces with repeating arms, 

the best of which had been patented before 1861. Initially, however, the 

North’s conservative Ordnance Bureau would not risk switching to a new, 

unproven standard weapon that could lead to soldiers wasting huge quantities of ammunition in the midst of an expanding war. By 1864, after 

the retirement of Chief of Ordnance James Ripley and with President 

Lincoln’s urging, Federal cavalry received seven‐shot Spencer repeating 

carbines, which greatly increased battle capabilities.

Both sides initially relied on the states and local districts to provide 

some equipment, supplies, animals, and foodstuffs. As the war progressed, 

more centralized control over production and purchasing emerged under 

both governments. Still, embezzlement and fraud were common problems 

for both sides throughout the war. The North, with its preponderance of 

railroads and developed waterways, had ample supply and adequate distribution systems. The South’s major supply problem was subsistence. 

Arguably, the South produced enough food during the war to provide 

for both military and civilian needs, but mismanagement, parochial local 

interests, and the relatively underdeveloped transportation network often 

created havoc with distribution.

In both armies, the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Subsistence, and Medical 

Bureaus procured and distributed equipment, food, and supplies. The 

items for which these bureaus were responsible are similar to the classes 
30

of supply used today. Some needs overlapped, such as the Quartermaster 

Bureau’s procurement of wagons for medical ambulances, but conflicts 

of interest usually were manageable. Department and army commanders 

requested needed resources directly from the bureaus, and bureau chiefs 

wielded considerable power as they parceled out occasionally limited 

resources.

Typically, materiel flowed from the factory to base depots as directed 

by the responsible bureaus. Supplies were then shipped to advanced depots, 

generally a city on a major transportation artery safely within the rear 

area of a department. During campaigns, the armies established temporary advance depots served by rail or river transportation—Grant’s forces 

made particularly heavy use of resupply from the navy in the Overland 

Campaign. From these points, wagons carried the supplies forward to the 

field units. This principle is somewhat similar to the modern theater sustainment organization.

The management of this logistics system was complex and crucial. A 

corps wagon train, if drawn by standard six-mule teams, would be spread 

out from five to eight miles, based on the difficulty of terrain, weather, and 

road conditions. The wagons, which were capable of hauling 4,000 pounds 

in optimal conditions, could carry only half that load in mountainous terrain. Sustenance for the animals was a major restriction, because each 

animal required up to 26 pounds of hay and grain a day to stay healthy 

and productive. Bulky and hard to handle, this forage was a major consideration in campaign planning. Wagons delivering supplies more than one 

day’s distance from the depot could be forced to carry excessive amounts 

of animal forage. If full animal forage was to be carried, the required number of wagons to support a corps increased dramatically with each subsequent day’s distance from the forward depot. Another problem was the 

herds of beef that often accompanied the trains or were appropriated en 

route. This provided fresh (though tough) meat for the troops, but slowed 

and complicated movement.

The bulk-supply problems were alleviated somewhat by the practice 

of foraging, which, in the proper season, supplied much of the food for 

animals and men on both sides. Foraging was practiced with and without command sanction, wherever an army went, and it became command policy during Ulysses S. Grant’s Vicksburg campaign and William 

T. Sherman’s Atlanta campaign. Foraging was less prevalent in the east, 

especially by 1864, for the simple reason that northeastern Virginia had 

already been picked clean by three years of war.

Both sides based their supply requirements on pre-war regulations and 
31

wartime improvisation. Table 4 is a list of typical requirements.

Logistics in the Overland Campaign

Logistics played a crucial role in the Overland Campaign in a variety of ways. First, the overall lack of resources for the Southern forces 

(coupled with manpower shortages) constrained the Confederate options 

and helped to keep Lee on the defense for most of the campaign. Second, 

Grant made extensive use of the Federal Navy’s dominance of the sea and 

rivers to skillfully shift his bases to secured ports as he made his flanking moves to the south. In fact, the tempo of Grant’s moves was largely 

determined by the location and availability of his next base. Finally, Lee’s 

forces relied almost totally on the railroads for their supplies, and thus 

crucial rail nodes like Hanover Junction and Petersburg were critical locations that Lee had to defend and Grant wanted to take.

Table 4. Sample of Federal Logistics Data

Item Packing Weight (lbs)

Bulk ammunition:

.58 caliber, expanding ball (500-

grain bullet)

12-pound Napoleon canister

(14.8 lb per round)

1,000 rounds per case

8 rounds per box

98

161

“Marching” ration (per man per

day):

1 lb hard bread (hardtack)

3/4 lb salt pork or 1/4 lb fresh

meat

1 oz coffee

3 oz sugar and salt

2

Forage (per horse per day):

14 lbs hay and 12 lbs grain 26 (23 for mules)

Personal equipment:

Includes rifle, bayonet, 60 rounds

of ammunition, haversack, 3

days’ rations, blanket, shelter

half, canteen, personal items

50 to 60
32

Looking first at the Northern perspective, supplies for the eastern theater came from all parts of the North across an extensive and effective rail 

net that eventually funneled to Baltimore and Washington, DC. The supplies then had to be transported from these major ports and railheads to the 

armies in the field. At the start of the Overland Campaign, Grant’s main 

forces (the Army of the Potomac and the IX Corps) received their logistics support from the port of Alexandria (across the Potomac River from 

Washington). The Orange and Alexandria railroad connected the Union 

camps at Brandy Station with the supply base at Alexandria. In their initial 

move into the Wilderness, the Union forces needed an extensive wagon 

train to carry the minimum requirements expressed in the supply regulations (see table 4). The army’s animals alone needed 477 tons of forage 

each day. Grant tried to cut back on nonessential items and decreed a rigorous reduction in wagons, but he still ended up with 4,300 wagons and 835 

ambulances at the start of the campaign.

After the Battle of the Wilderness, Grant decided to continue to the 

south in part driven by the desire to cut Lee’s army from its rail supply lines: 

the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac (coming from Richmond), 

and the Virginia Central which brought supplies from the Shenandoah. In 

order to make this move, the Federals shifted their base to Aquia Landing 

and Belle Plain on the Potomac River. These ports were securely positioned behind the moving Union forces and connected by a short rail line 

to a forward position at Fredericksburg.

After Spotsylvania, Grant again shifted to the south and southeast, 

all the time hoping to get astride the railroads that were Lee’s lifeline. In 

particular, the fighting on the North Anna centered on the Federal attempt 

to seize Hanover Junction where the Virginia Central Railroad met the 

Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac line. In these moves, first to the 

North Anna, then further south to Cold Harbor, the Union forces deftly 

executed two more base changes: first to Port Royal on the Rappahannock 

River and then to White House on the Pamunkey River (which in turn 

flows into the York River). There was no rail line from Port Royal to 

the army, but the distance from the port to the troops was a relatively 

short wagon haul for the trains. At White House, the same base used by 

McClellan in the Peninsula Campaign in 1862, the Union forces could use 

the Richmond and York River Railroad to bring supplies from the port 

closer to the front lines at Cold Harbor.

Grant’s final move in the campaign brought him to Petersburg, south 

of the James River. This final flanking movement was clearly aimed at 

the five rail lines that converged at Petersburg. For this final move, he had 
33

the advantage of shifting his base to City Point, a port on the James that 

was already in Union hands and had been supporting Butler’s Army of the 

James in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign. During the siege at Petersburg, 

City Point would become one of the busiest ports in the world—a testimony to the ample resources and logistical might of the North.

In sum, even if Grant’s central objective was Lee’s army, his geographic goals were shaped by the Southerners’ own rail supply lines. At 

the same time, he made good use of sea lines of communications to keep 

his own forces well supplied and skillfully shifted his base with each new 

flanking movement.

On the Southern side, Lee’s logistical problems were at once simpler 

in concept but more difficult in execution. Lee’s resupply system was relatively straightforward. The Army of Northern Virginia received a large 

amount of foodstuffs and forage from the Shenandoah Valley. Most of 

these supplies came via the Virginia Central Railroad. The remainder 

of his supplies came from the Deep South along several rail lines that 

converged at Petersburg. Then the supplies moved from Petersburg, 

through Richmond and Hanover Junction to Lee’s army in the field on the 

Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad. Lee did not have to 

worry about shifting bases; he simply needed to protect these rail lines to 

keep his army supplied.

The difficulty for Lee was that the South was constantly strapped for 

resources, and the Army of Northern Virginia received just enough supplies to keep up its operations. Occasionally this affected Lee’s planning as 

when he was forced to keep a large part of his cavalry dispersed prior to the 

Wilderness to gather forage. Also, the Confederate commander’s logistical 

weaknesses, when added to his manpower shortages, may have discouraged him from taking a more offensive approach after the Wilderness. On 

the other hand, while the Confederates never enjoyed the logistical plenty 

of their Union counterparts, Lee’s army was never faced with starvation or 

a shortage of arms and ammunition during the Overland Campaign.

Engineer Support

Engineers on both sides performed many tasks essential to every campaign. Engineers trained at West Point were at a premium; thus, many civil 

engineers, commissioned as volunteers, supplemented the work being 

done by engineer officers. The Confederates, in particular, relied on civilian expertise because many of their trained engineer officers sought line 

duties. State or even local civil engineers planned and supervised much of 

the work done on local fortifications.
34

In the prewar US Army, the Corps of Engineers contained a handful 

of staff officers and one company of trained engineer troops. This cadre 

expanded to a four-company Regular engineer battalion. Congress also created a single company of topographic engineers, which joined the Regular 

battalion when the engineer bureaus merged in 1863. In addition, several 

volunteer pioneer regiments, some containing up to 2,000 men, supported 

the various field armies. The Confederate Corps of Engineers, formed as a 

small staff and one company of sappers, miners, and pontoniers in 1861, 

grew more slowly and generally relied on details and contract labor rather 

than established units with trained engineers and craftsmen.

Engineer missions for both sides included construction of fortifications; 

repair and construction of roads, bridges, and, in some cases, railroads; 

demolition; limited construction of obstacles; and construction or reduction 

of siege works. The Federal Topographic Engineers, a separate prewar 

bureau, performed reconnaissance and produced maps. The Confederates, 

however, never separated these functions in creating their Corps of 

Engineers. Experience during the first year of the war convinced the 

Federals that all engineer functions should be merged under a single corps 

because qualified engineer officers tended to perform all related functions. 

As a result, the Federals also merged the Topographic Engineers into their 

Corps of Engineers in March 1863.

Bridging assets included wagon-mounted pontoon trains that carried 

either wooden or canvas-covered pontoon boats. Using this equipment, 

trained engineer troops could bridge even large rivers in a matter of hours. 

The most remarkable pontoon bridge of the war was the 2,200-foot-long 

bridge built by the Army of the Potomac engineers in 1864 over the James 

River at the culmination of the Overland Campaign. It was one of over 

three dozen pontoon bridges built in support of campaigns in the east that 

year. In 1862, the Confederates began developing pontoon trains after they 

had observed their effectiveness.

Both sides in every campaign of the war traveled over roads and 

bridges built or repaired by their engineers. Federal engineers also helped 

clear waterways by dredging, removing trees, or digging canals. Fixed 

fortifications laid out under engineer supervision played critical roles in 

the Vicksburg campaign and in actions around Richmond and Petersburg. 

Engineers also supervised the siege works attempting to reduce those 

fortifications.

While the Federal engineer effort expanded in both men and materiel 

as the war progressed, the Confederate efforts continued to be hampered 

by major problems. The relatively small number of organized engineer 
35

units available forced Confederate engineers to rely heavily on details or 

contract labor. Finding adequate manpower, however, was often difficult 

because of competing demands for it. Local slave owners were reluctant 

to provide labor details when slave labor was crucial to their economic 

survival. Despite congressional authorization to conscript 20,000 slaves 

as a labor force, state and local opposition continually hindered efforts 

to draft slave labor. Another related problem concerned the value of 

Confederate currency. Engineer efforts required huge sums for men and 

materiel, yet initial authorizations were small, and although congressional 

appropriations grew later in the war, inflation greatly reduced effective 

purchasing power. A final problem was the simple shortage of iron 

resources, which severely limited the Confederates’ ability to increase 

railroad mileage or even produce iron tools.

In 1861, maps for both sides were also in short supply; for many areas 

in the interior, maps were nonexistent. As the war progressed, the Federals 

developed a highly sophisticated mapping capability. Federal topographic 

engineers performed personal reconnaissance to develop base maps, reproduce them by several processes, and distribute them to field commanders. 

Photography, lithographic presses, and eventually photochemical processes 

gave the Federals the ability to reproduce maps quickly. Western armies, 

which usually operated far from base cities, carried equipment in their 

army headquarters to reproduce maps during campaigns. By 1864, annual 

map production exceeded 21,000 copies. Confederate topographic work 

never approached the Federal effort in quantity. Confederate topographers 

initially used tracing paper to reproduce maps. Not until 1864 did the use 

of photographic methods become widespread in the South. However, the 

South had a large advantage in the quality of its maps in the eastern theater 

in the 1864 campaign. In particular, the Confederates were fighting on 

their own terrain (Virginia) where many officers knew the ground. In addition, prior to the war, Virginia had produced county maps of the state that 

proved to be a great advantage for Lee’s army.

Engineers in the Overland Campaign

Engineers on both sides played a significant role in several of the 

engagements of the Overland Campaign. In the Wilderness, Lee’s chief 

engineer, Major General Martin L. Smith, conducted a reconnaissance that 

discovered an unfinished railroad bed on the open Union left flank on 6 

May. He also plotted the route for the path cut by the Confederates for 

Major General Richard H. Anderson’s move to Spotsylvania. On a less 

positive note, Smith also laid out the trace of the vulnerable Mule Shoe 

line at Spotsylvania (although, in Smith’s defense, he did urge the heavy 
36

use of artillery to reinforce the exposed position). Note that engineers on 

both sides usually laid out the trace of field fortifications, but the infantry 

had to do the actual construction.

On the Union side, their engineer’s role in the tactical battles was sometimes less beneficial. On several occasions—for example, Barlow’s night 

march for the attack on the Mule Shoe at Spotsylvania and the II Corps 

move on the night of 1 June at Cold Harbor—guides were totally inadequate for the task. They were usually totally ignorant of the ground and 

even led Union units down incorrect routes. It did not help that Meade’s 

staff engineers often provided the guides and corps commanders with poor 

maps (or none at all).

On the other hand, the Federal engineers performed essential missions 

in upgrading roads, railroads, and supply depots, as well as bridging 

numerous rivers to include the magnificent pontoon bridge on the James 

River. The Federal rail system in occupied Virginia, which had been 

superbly organized by Brigadier General Herman Haupt in 1862-63, was 

a model of successful improvisation. The Confederates did not have the 

extensive resources of their Northern opponents, and usually, being on the 

defense, they did not construct as many railroads and bridges. However, 

the Southerners became masters at restoring broken rail lines after Union 

raids; for example, they repaired the Virginia Central to full operations 

within two weeks after Sheridan’s raid in May.

Communications Support

Communications systems used during the Civil War consisted of 

line-of-sight signaling, telegraphic systems, and various forms of the 

time-honored courier methods. The telegraph mainly offered viable 

strategic and operational communications, line-of-sight signaling provided 

operational and limited tactical possibilities, and couriers were most 

heavily used for tactical communications.

The Federal Signal Corps was in its infancy during the Civil War. 

Major Albert C. Myer was appointed the first signal chief in 1860; his 

organization grew slowly and became officially recognized as the Signal 

Corps in March 1863 and achieved bureau status by November of that 

year. Throughout the war, the Signal Corps remained small—its maximum strength reaching just 1,500 officers and men, most of whom were 

on detached service with the corps. Myer also indirectly influenced the 

formation of the Confederate Signal Service. Among the men who assisted 

Myer in his prewar testing of his wigwag signaling system (Myer’s wigwag system, patented in 1858, used five separate numbered movements 

of a single flag) was Lieutenant E.P. Alexander. Alexander used wigwag 
37

signals to the Confederates’ advantage during the First Battle of Bull Run 

and later organized the Confederate Signal Corps. Officially established 

in April 1862, the Confederate Signal Corps was attached to the Adjutant 

and Inspector General Department. It attained the same size as its Federal 

counterpart, with nearly 1,500 men ultimately being detailed for service.

Myer also fought hard to develop a Federal field telegraph service. This 

field service utilized the Beardslee device, a magneto‐powered machine 

operated by turning a wheel to a specific point, which sent an electrical 

impulse that keyed the machine at the other end to the same letter. Although 

less reliable than the standard Morse code telegraph key, the Beardslee 

could be used by an operator with only several hours’ training and did not 

require bulky batteries for a power source. Myer’s field telegraph units 

carried equipment on wagons that enabled its operators to establish lines 

between field headquarters. The insulated wire used could also be hooked 

into existing trunk lines, thus offering the potential to extend the reach of 

the civilian telegraph network. Control over the existing fixed telegraph 

system, however, remained with the US Military Telegraph Service. Myer 

lost his struggle to keep the field telegraph service under the Signal Corps 

when Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton relieved Myer as the signal chief 

in November 1863 and placed all telegraph activity under the Military 

Telegraph Service.

Although the Confederate Signal Corps’ visual communications 

capabilities were roughly equal to that of the Federals, Confederate 

field telegraph operations remained too limited to be of operational 

significance. The Confederates’ existing telegraph lines provided strategic 

communications capabilities similar to those of the Federals, but the lack 

of resources and factories in the South for producing wire precluded their 

extending the prewar telegraph networks.

The courier system, using mounted staff officers or detailed soldiers to 

deliver orders and messages, was the most viable tactical communications 

option short of commanders meeting face to face. Although often effective, 

this system was fraught with difficulties, as couriers were captured, killed, 

or delayed en route to their destinations; commanders misinterpreted or 

ignored messages; and situations changed by the time a message was 

delivered. The weaknesses of the courier system, though often not critical, 

did tend to compound other errors or misjudgments during campaigns.

Communications in the Overland Campaign

On the Northern side, Grant had almost constant telegraphic communication with Halleck in Washington, which gave him a relatively good 

measure of strategic control over Union armies in other theaters of the 
38

war. Within the eastern theater, Grant could communicate with Sigel in the 

Valley and Butler on the Virginia Peninsula via his telegraph connections 

to Washington.

Grant’s communications with the Army of the Potomac and the initially separate IX Corps were affected more by the awkward Union command relationship than the technical means of communication. For the 

most part, Grant and Meade both relied heavily on couriers with some flag 

signaling. Initially, Grant, with his small staff and few aides, attempted to 

issue only broad orders to Meade and allow the army commander to execute tactical control. At the same time, Grant had to issue orders directly to 

the IX Corps (at least until late May) to coordinate Burnside’s moves with 

the Army of the Potomac. On several occasions, Grant bypassed Meade 

and confusing or duplicate orders resulted.

Lee also relied heavily on couriers at the tactical level, and his streamlined command structure minimized confusion over orders. Lee did 

use flag signals, especially at the beginning of the campaign at Clark’s 

Mountain. The Union forces occasionally intercepted these signals, but 

they gained only a minor advantage from this. At a higher level, Lee 

had solid telegraph contact with his political leadership in Richmond. 

Indirectly, through the capital, he remained in contact with Breckinridge 

in the Valley and Beauregard in North Carolina (and later at Bermuda 

Hundred and Petersburg).

Medical Support

Federal and Confederate medical systems followed a similar pattern. 

Surgeons general and medical directors for both sides had served many 

years in the prewar Medical Department, but were hindered by an initial 

lack of administrative experience in handling large numbers of casualties 

(see table 5), as well as the state of medical science in the mid-19th century. Administrative procedures improved with experience, but throughout 

the war the simple lack of knowledge about the true causes of disease and 

infection led to many more deaths than direct battlefield action.

After the disaster at the Battle of First Bull Run, the Federal Medical 

Department established an evacuation and treatment system developed 

by Surgeon Jonathan Letterman. At the heart of the system were three 

precepts: consolidation of field hospitals at division level, decentralization of medical supplies down to regimental level, and centralization of 

medical control of ambulances at all levels. A battle casualty evacuated 

from the front line normally received treatment at a regimental holding 

area immediately to the rear. From this point, wagons or ambulances carried wounded men to a division field hospital, normally within a mile of 
39

the battle lines. Seriously wounded men could then be further evacuated 

by wagon, rail, or watercraft to general hospitals located usually in towns 

along lines of communication in the armies’ rear areas.

Although the Confederate system followed the same general principles, their field hospitals were often consolidated at brigade rather than 

division level. A second difference lay in the established span of control 

of medical activities. Unlike their Federal counterparts who had control 

over all medical activities within an army area, a Confederate army medical director had no control of activities beyond his own brigade or division field hospitals. A separate medical director for general hospitals was 

responsible for evacuation and control. In practice, both sets of medical 

directors resolved potential problems through close cooperation. By 1863, 

the Confederacy had also introduced rear area “wayside hospitals,” which 

were intended to handle convalescents en route home on furloughs.

Procedures, medical techniques, and medical problems for both sides 

were virtually identical. Commanders discouraged soldiers from leaving the battle lines to escort wounded back to the rear, but such practice 

was common, especially in less-disciplined units. The established technique for casualty evacuation was to detail men for litter and ambulance 

duty. Both armies used bandsmen, among others, for this task. Casualties 

would move or be assisted back from the battle line, where litter bearers evacuated them to field hospitals using ambulances or supply wagons. 

Ambulances were specially designed two- or four-wheel carts with springs 

to limit jolts, but rough roads made even short trips agonizing for wounded 

men. Brigade and division surgeons staffed consolidated field hospitals. 

Hospital site considerations were the availability of water, potential buildings to supplement the hospital tents, and security from enemy cannon 

and rifle fire. The majority of operations performed at field hospitals in the 

aftermath of battle were amputations. Approximately 70 percent of Civil 

War wounds occurred in the extremities, and the soft lead Minie ball shattered any bones it hit. Amputation was the best technique then available 

to limit the chance of serious infection. The Federals were generally well 

supplied with chloroform, morphine, and other drugs, though shortages 

did occur on the battlefield. Confederate surgeons were often short of critical drugs and medical supplies.

Medical Support in the Overland Campaign

By 1864, almost all Union forces generally conformed to the Letterman 

medical system. The Federals had long established considerable hospitals 

in the Washington area, and their command of the sea greatly aided in evacuation to these facilities. Even so, the unprecedented number of sustained 
40

casualties in May and the first half of June put considerable strain on the 

Union efforts. After the bloody fights at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, 

the Federals established an extensive field hospital and evacuation center 

at Fredericksburg, probably the largest of its kind in the war.

The Confederates were able to take advantage of protected rail lines to 

evacuate most of their casualties to Richmond. Their bigger problem was 

a lack of trained surgeons and medical supplies. The Southern medical 

facilities were meager compared to their Union counterparts and barely 

adequate for needs of the campaign.

Table 5. Casualties of the Campaign

UnioUnionUnUnion Confederate *

Wilderness

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

2,246

12,037

3,383

17,666 11,400

Spotsylvania

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

2,725

13,416

2,258

18,399 12,000

North Anna

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

591

2,734

661

3,986 2,500

Cold Harbor

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

64

337

224

625 400

Total**

Killed

Wounded

Missing

1,845

Sheridan’s Raid

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

Grand Total

13,587

48,274

71,495 32,000

9,634

1,816

9,077

12,738 3,400

Union

The Campaign

UnioUnionUnUnion Confederate *

Wilderness

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

2,246

12,037

3,383

17,666 11,400

Spotsylvania

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

2,725

13,416

2,258

18,399 12,000

North Anna

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

591

2,734

661

3,986 2,500

Cold Harbor

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

64

337

224

625 400

Total**

Killed

Wounded

Missing

1,845

Sheridan’s Raid

Killed

Wounded

Missing

Total

Grand Total

13,587

48,274

71,495 32,000

9,634

1,816

9,077

12,738 3,400

Union

The Campaign

*Confederate numbers are often rough estimates in part because Confederate 

records were more difficult to maintain and many were lost in the last year of the 

war.

**Includes additional losses from engagements outside of the major battles.
41

II. The Overland Campaign: An Overview

Introduction

The Overland Campaign was one of the most crucial campaigns of the 

American Civil War. It was a key part of Lieutenant General Ulysses S. 

Grant’s overall plan to defeat the Confederacy in 1864. Grant’s strategic 

concept was to have all available Union forces advance simultaneously 

in all theaters, thus using the North’s superior manpower and material 

resources to full advantage. In the western theater, as part of Grant’s overall plan, Major General William T. Sherman’s forces were to advance on 

Atlanta and defeat Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of 

Tennessee. In addition, Major General Nathaniel P. Banks directed Union 

forces to advance from Louisiana and take Mobile, Alabama.

In the eastern theater, Grant initially toyed with the idea of landing a major Union force on the Atlantic coast near the Virginia–North 

Carolina border where it could advance inland and cut Richmond off 

from the rest of the Confederacy. By February 1864, he had discarded 

this idea and developed a more conventional plan. His concept called for 

the three major eastern armies (and a separate corps) to conduct mutually 

supporting advances. Major General Franz Sigel’s forces were to move 

south through the Shenandoah Valley, defeat Confederate forces located 

there, and remove this great “bread basket” as a supply source for the 

Confederacy. Major General Benjamin F. Butler’s Army of the James was 

to advance up the Virginia Peninsula, between the James and York Rivers, 

toward Richmond. Depending on the Confederate response, Butler might 

even take the Southern capital, while at a minimum it was hoped that he 

would divert significant Confederate forces.

The major Union effort in the east fell, as expected, on Major General 

George G. Meade’s Army of the Potomac, which was to engage General 

Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Grant’s instructions to Meade 

were direct: “Lee’s Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, 

there you will go also” (OR, series I, volume XXXIII, 828). Grant’s orders 

to Meade were a departure from previous Union plans that focused on 

taking Richmond. The Confederate capital might be a geographic goal, 

but the true objective of Meade’s army in the Overland Campaign was the 

destruction of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia.

Grant’s plan and his position as general in chief of the Union armies 

made for some unusual command relationships. In modern colloquial 

terms, Grant was “wearing three hats.” First, he was general in chief and 

thus gave strategic direction to all Union armies to include those in the 
42

west (Sherman and Banks). Second, Grant was a theater commander trying to coordinate Butler’s, Sigel’s, and Meade’s forces in order to defeat 

Lee and capture Richmond. Finally, Grant decided to travel with the Army 

of the Potomac, and although he often tried to work through Meade, Grant 

sometimes acted as the tactical commander of the army. His mere presence 

often hindered Meade’s independence.

Grant’s decision to travel with Meade’s army may seem unusual, and 

it has come under some criticism from many historians. Certainly, Grant’s 

close proximity to Meade made for some friction and often left Meade 

feeling more like a messenger than an army commander. In fact, before the 

campaign had even begun, Meade offered to step down and allow Grant 

to pick one of his western generals as a new army commander. Grant was 

impressed with Meade’s honesty and devotion to service, and he decided 

to keep Meade in command. In addition to an awkward command relationship with Meade, Grant’s location with the Army of the Potomac may have 

caused the general in chief to neglect some of his strategic and theater 

duties. There was not much of a problem with giving the capable Sherman 

considerable independence, but Grant seemed to lose control of Banks, 

Butler, and Sigel while he was engrossed in the details of the Overland 

Campaign.

Grant could have opted to stay in Washington and focus on his strategic duties; however, there were several arguments against this course. 

First, Grant wanted to avoid becoming enmeshed in the political infighting 

of Washington and the tedious details of administration. To this end, the 

former general in chief, Henry W. Halleck, assumed the duties of chief 

of staff of the Union armies and remained in Washington where his considerable administrative talents freed Grant to concentrate on operations. 

Second, a significant force in the upcoming campaign against Lee, Major 

General Ambrose E. Burnside’s IX Corps, was independent from Meade’s 

command, and Grant would need to coordinate this corps’ movements with 

those of the Army of the Potomac. This strange quirk in command arose 

because Burnside was senior to Meade (by date of rank) and technically 

could not be Meade’s subordinate. Later in the campaign, after several 

embarrassing episodes, Burnside readily agreed to be Meade’s subordinate, but at least initially, Grant wanted to avoid any conflict over dates 

of rank. Finally, Grant was a fighter and more comfortable near the front. 

In any case, students can find fertile ground for debate over Grant’s command structure and headquarters location.

The main Union force for the Overland Campaign, the Army of the 

Potomac, had undergone extensive reorganization since its last major battle 
43

at Gettysburg. Two of the smaller corps, XI and XII, were transferred to 

the western theater where they joined the Army of the Cumberland. Two 

other corps, I and III, had been decimated at Gettysburg. These corps were 

disbanded and their subordinate units were distributed among the remaining 

infantry corps of the Army of the Potomac. This left Meade with three 

infantry corps, II, V, and VI, and his cavalry corps. The reorganization 

caused some hard feelings among the soldiers from the former I and III 

Corps, who had considerable pride in their old units. However, the change 

was probably for the better because it made each remaining corps stronger 

and reduced Meade’s span of control to an optimal level.

Major General George G. Meade had a good combat record from brigade to corps command throughout almost all of this army’s major campaigns, and he had performed solidly as army commander at Gettysburg. 

He had begun his career as an engineer and seemed more at ease in a set 

piece battle rather than in a fluid battle of maneuver. Meade tended to be 

a cautious leader, but he also had an irascible nature and potent temper 

that caused him to lash at subordinates who were slow to execute orders. 

Meade did his best to work with Grant, but as the campaign wore on, 

Meade became more frustrated with the awkward command relationship 

as well as the performance of his corps commanders. His irritation reached 

a high point at Cold Harbor, but to his credit Meade worked through the 

difficulties and made a significant contribution to the final Union victory 

in 1865.

The Union corps commanders presented a diverse group of fascinating characters with an uneven level of skills. The II Corps commander was 

Major General Winfield S. Hancock, who had gained lasting fame for his 

brilliant performance at Gettysburg. Hancock was handsome, dashing, and 

probably the most aggressive and skillful of the Union corps commanders. 

Unfortunately, he had suffered a painful wound in the thigh at Gettysburg, 

and although the wound had partially healed, it would occasionally bleed 

and impair Hancock’s performance. Later in the war, Hancock would have 

to leave command to recover. Despite the occasional health problems, 

Hancock was Meade’s most reliable corps commander.

The V Corps commander, Major General Gouverneur K. Warren, was 

perhaps the most enigmatic of the Union leaders in this campaign. He had 

commanded at brigade and division level earlier in the war. For much of 

1863, Warren had been a staff officer, and it was as Meade’s chief engineer 

that Warren earned fame for saving Little Round Top at Gettysburg. After 

that battle, Warren temporarily commanded the II Corps while Hancock 

recovered from his wound. After Hancock’s return, Warren got his own 
44

command, the V Corps. For a time, Warren was one of Meade’s favorite 

generals, but as the Overland Campaign progressed, the V Corps commander lost favor with Meade. Warren was intelligent, but unpredictable. 

His personal courage was unquestionable, but he could be alternately too 

rash or too cautious in any situation. One major problem was that Warren 

had the habit of questioning orders and making suggestions with a smug 

air that infuriated superiors and their staffs.

Major General John Sedgwick, the Union VI Corps commander, had 

a reputation as one of the best commanders in the army. He was certainly 

loved by his soldiers who called him “Uncle John,” but his operational 

performance was, in reality, less than spectacular. He had commanded 

from brigade to division in the Army of the Potomac’s early campaigns 

with a modestly successful record. A corps commander at Fredericksburg, 

he later admirably extracted his forces from a vulnerable position at Salem 

Church in the Chancellorsville Campaign. His corps was the army’s reserve 

at Gettysburg and saw little action. Calm and good-natured, Sedgwick was 

not brilliant, but he maintained his composure in difficult situations.

The Union IX Corps commander was Major General Ambrose E. 

Burnside, one of the more fascinating figures of the war, even if not a 

particularly skilled general. Ironically, Burnside had once commanded the 

Army of the Potomac (when Meade was a division commander); but after 

his defeat at Fredericksburg, Burnside was removed as army commander 

and returned to his old command, the IX Corps. In 1863, Burnside and 

his corps were transferred to eastern Tennessee where he waged one of 

his best campaigns of the war near Knoxville. Burnside was a genial man 

who recognized his own limitations (he had never really wanted army 

command). Unfortunately, those limitations were many, and the IX Corps 

always seemed to be late in movement and lacking coordination in its 

attacks. As mentioned earlier, Burnside’s IX Corps started the Overland 

Campaign directly under Grant’s command and not under Meade’s command. The corps’ initial mission was to guard the Army of the Potomac’s 

supply line, but once the campaign started the IX Corps fought as part of 

the army, despite the awkward command arrangement.

Although Grant did not bring many of his fellow western officers to 

his new command, he did appoint one westerner, Major General Philip 

H. Sheridan, to a significant command within the Army of the Potomac. 

This short and fiery, but bull-headed, general took command of the Union 

army’s cavalry corps. It did not take long for Sheridan and Meade to clash 

over the cavalry’s role in the Overland Campaign, and because of a bitter 

argument just prior to Spotsylvania, Sheridan and the vast majority of the 
45

Union cavalry departed on a raid that culminated in the battle at Yellow 

Tavern. The value of this raid is debatable, and Sheridan seems to have 

had little skill at the reconnaissance and screening missions that were key 

purposes of Civil War cavalry forces. Later in the war, Sheridan’s aggressiveness would help the North in the Shenandoah Valley and at the battle 

of Five Forks, but his performance in the Overland Campaign was mixed 

at best.

From the Confederate perspective, the Overland Campaign was part 

of a defensive strategy that was more the result of necessity than of choice. 

Although not explicitly articulated, the Southern strategy seemed to be 

to exhaust the will of the people of the North with the hope that Lincoln 

would lose the presidential election in the fall of 1864. Part of the reason 

for the lack of a unified Confederate strategy was that President Jefferson 

Davis refused to appoint a commander in chief and retained that role for 

himself. Thus, all Confederate armies reported directly to Davis; and the 

Confederate President did not issue an overall strategic plan for 1864. 

Even within the eastern theater, there was no unified command system to 

coordinate the efforts of Lee’s army with the forces under Major General 

John C. Breckinridge in the Shenandoah Valley and General P.G.T. 

Beauregard’s forces protecting Richmond, southern Virginia, and northern 

North Carolina. Even so, Davis’ respect for Lee’s abilities and opinions 

was such that the Army of Northern Virginia’s commander often indirectly provided coordination for all Southern efforts in Virginia through 

his advice to the Confederate president.

Of course, the main force for operations in the east was Lee’s army. 

Having been defeated in his two attempts to invade the North, Lee was 

now committed to a strategic defense intent on wearing down the North’s 

will to fight. However, the ever-aggressive Lee had no intention of remaining passive. He intended to launch tactical (and perhaps, even operational) 

attacks when such opportunities presented themselves. Lee retained the 

same structure for his army that had been used at Gettysburg—three 

infantry corps and a cavalry corps, though some of his brigades were on 

detached service elsewhere in Virginia when the campaign began.

Lieutenant General James Longstreet, Lee’s “warhorse,” commanded the I Corps. Longstreet remains a controversial figure to this day. 

Historians have made much of the disagreements between Longstreet and 

Lee at Gettysburg, and scholars seem to fall into extremes of criticism 

or praise when assessing Longstreet’s skills as a commander. Certainly 

Longstreet made his share of mistakes in the war, but he was still one of 

the South’s best corps commanders. More importantly, he and Lee had a 
46

mutual respect that made him Lee’s most trusted subordinate at the time of 

the Overland Campaign (it was only after the war, and after Lee’s death, 

that Longstreet’s writings would ignite bitter recriminations about their 

relationship). After Gettysburg, Longstreet and most of his corps had been 

sent west and had fought in the Chickamauga Campaign and at Knoxville. 

The corps returned to Virginia early in 1864, but two divisions were spread 

out to the west and south of Lee’s main army in order to gather supplies 

and Pickett’s division was on detached duty in southern Virginia.

The Army of Northern Virginia’s II Corps was commanded by 

Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell. This had been Stonewall Jackson’s 

corps prior to his death at Chancellorsville, and Ewell had been Jackson’s 

most trusted subordinate. Ewell had been a capable brigade and division 

commander, and his personal courage was unquestioned—he had lost a 

leg at the battle of Groveton. However, Ewell’s judgment had come under 

a cloud after his conduct of the fights at Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill 

during Gettysburg. While Ewell may have been treated too harshly for his 

performance at Gettysburg, his abilities as a corps commander were still in 

doubt. As the stress of the Overland Campaign taxed him, Ewell seemed to 

wear down both mentally and physically.

The last of the Confederate infantry corps commanders was Lieutenant 

General Ambrose Powell (A.P.) Hill. Like Ewell, Hill had a successful career as a brigade and division commander prior to Gettysburg. 

Unfortunately, Hill also showed a spotty performance as a corps commander at Gettysburg. Hill had serious health problems, which some historians attribute to venereal disease that Hill may have contracted as a 

cadet at West Point. In any case, Hill was in and out of command on several occasions in the last 18 months of the war, often incapacitated by his 

physical problems. Worse yet, even when in command, Hill was often ill 

and unable to exercise vigorous leadership.

Lee’s cavalry corps commander was the famous and dashing Major 

General J.E.B. “Jeb” Stuart. Stuart, like Longstreet, was a trusted subordinate for Lee. Despite errors in the Gettysburg Campaign, Stuart remained 

one of the best cavalry commanders on either side in the war. Although 

cavalry raids gained the most glamour for many commanders, Stuart primarily excelled at providing Lee with accurate and timely intelligence. The 

young cavalry commander continued to fulfill that role in the Overland 

Campaign until his death at Yellow Tavern.

As the start of the campaign approached, the two armies eyed each 

other over terrain that had seen much battle since 1861. Although Virginia 

was more cultivated and populated than the rough terrain of the western 
47

theater, it was still relatively difficult country for the maneuver of armies. 

The terrain was somewhat flat to the east, but cut by many waterways and 

sometimes difficult to traverse due to marshes. Further west, the ground 

had gentle hills with a few key heights such as Clark Mountain that offered 

dominating points of observation. Much of the ground was forested, but 

there was usually little undergrowth among the trees, with the notable 

exception of the area near the old Chancellorsville battlefield known as 

the Wilderness. Richmond was a significant city, and both Petersburg and 

Fredericksburg were moderately-sized towns, but most other inhabited 

areas were little more than small villages. The roads were relatively extensive by American standards, but nothing like the network of macadamized 

roads in Europe. Most were simply dirt tracks subject to choking amounts 

of dust in the heat and likely to become quagmires in the rain. The rivers 

mostly ran from the northwest to the southeast where they emptied into 

the Atlantic Ocean. This path meant that the rivers acted as natural barriers to the northern advance and good lines of defense for Lee’s army. 

However, the Union control of the sea meant that they could use the rivers as resupply routes (or lines of communication) as long as the northern 

force remained moderately close to the sea.

The major river separating the Union and Confederate armies in May 

1864 was the Rapidan, a tributary of the Rappahannock River. Ewell’s II 

Corps was spread over various locations south of the river watching many 

of the crossings. Hill’s corps was concentrated near Orange Courthouse 

(Lee’s headquarters). As mentioned earlier, Longstreet’s corps was much 

further south and west, gathering supplies near Gordonsville. Stuart’s cavalry watched the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers from Ewell’s right 

flank to Fredericksburg.

The Union army was positioned in camps near Brandy Station and 

Culpeper. From this position, Grant and Meade faced two options: the 

Army of the Potomac could move west, around Lee’s left flank, or it could 

move east and southeast, around Lee’s right. A move to the west offered 

the initial advantage of avoiding the tangled terrain of the Wilderness and 

an indirect approach that had not been tried much in the eastern theater, 

but the army would have to rely on vulnerable railroad and wagon haul 

capacity for resupply. Such a movement also provided Lee the best opportunity to intercept and cut Grant’s supply lines. The other alternative, a 

move to the southeast, took advantage of Union resupply from the sea, 

but it covered the same ground that had been the scene of Union failures 

at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. A potentially greater problem to 

this approach was that the Union army would have to pass through the 

Wilderness before reaching open ground further south. After considering 
48

these choices, Grant opted for the southeastern approach around Lee’s 

right. He felt that the supply difficulties of the western alternative were 

simply too great and would not allow for a longer, sustained campaign. 

Even if he could not defeat Lee’s army in one swift blow, an advance to the 

southeast allowed for continuous operations that would keep unremitting 

pressure on the Confederate forces.

While Grant finalized his plans for a move by his left flank (the 

Confederate right), Lee attempted to counter his opponent’s move. On 2 

May, Lee and most of his ranking officers ascended Clark’s Mountain, a 

700-foot high promontory that offered a dominating view of the Rapidan 

crossing sites. Looking at the terrain, familiar to him as a native Virginian 

and particularly well known after several years of war, Lee pointed 

toward two key fords on the Rapidan, Germanna Ford and Ely’s Ford, and 

presciently predicted that the Federals would cross at those locations. The 

Confederate commander correctly foresaw the next Union move, but he 

still had to craft a proper response.

The importance of the Wilderness in the plans of both commanders 

is a subject of considerable debate. Some scholars argue that Grant never 

wanted battle in the Wilderness (where his advantage in numbers, particularly artillery, would be lessened), and he hoped to get through the 

tangled ground to open terrain before starting a major battle. On the other 

hand, Grant, and even the more cautious Meade, did not hesitate to engage 

the Confederates in the Wilderness once initial contact was made. On the 

Confederate side, Lee faced his own dilemma. He knew the advantages 

of bringing the Union army to battle within the Wilderness, but he did not 

want to bring on a general engagement before he had a chance to reunite 

Longstreet’s corps with the rest of the army. His orders to Ewell reflected 

this initial concern and urged the II Corps commander to exercise caution. 

Both Lee and Grant had mixed feelings about fighting in the Wilderness, 

but neither intended to back down. The result was, in modern terms, a 

meeting engagement in which both commanders found themselves exercising less control over the battle than they would have preferred.

Meade’s chief of staff, Major General Andrew A. Humphreys, who 

hoped that by starting the Army of the Potomac’s movement at midnight 

on 4 May it might be able to get through the Wilderness before Lee could 

respond, developed the details of the Union advance. Warren’s V Corps was 

to be the first Union unit to reach the Rapidan. It would cross at Germanna 

Ford and then proceed south on Germanna Plank Road. Roughly midway 

through the Wilderness, Warren was to cross from Germanna Plank Road 

to Brock Road and other smaller trails, which led to open country south 
49

of the Wilderness. Behind the V Corps came Sedgwick’s VI Corps, also 

designated to cross at Germanna Ford. Hancock’s II Corps had a different 

route. They were to cross at Ely’s Ford (east of Germanna Ford) and move 

roughly parallel to the V Corps past Chancellorsville, and then turn west 

to Todd’s Tavern and continue on Catharpin Road. This would place the II 

Corps on the Union army’s far southern (left) flank.

Humphreys’ plan was well crafted but perhaps too ambitious. The 

problem was not the Army of the Potomac’s infantry corps, it was the 

artillery and trains. All three corps made good progress for most of 4 May. 

However, the massive number of artillery pieces, supply wagons, ambulances, horses, and a herd of cattle were simply too much to get across the 

two fords in one day. By early afternoon, Hancock and Warren were forced 

to halt, Hancock near the Chancellor house and Warren near Wilderness 

Tavern at the intersection of the Germanna Plank Road and Orange 

Turnpike. This meant that the Union army was not clear of the Wilderness 

and faced the prospect of spending all of 5 May trying to move through 

the entangled area.

On the evening of 4 May, Lee, though correctly anticipating the Union 

moves, was still not sure if he wanted to bring on a major battle with 

Longstreet’s arrival time so uncertain. He had Ewell’s corps advancing 

from west to east on Orange Turnpike and Hill’s corps moving in the same 

direction on Orange Plank Road (basically parallel to Ewell). Both sides, 

somewhat unintentionally, were set on a collision course for 5 May, and 

the outcome of the battle would depend on how they reacted after the 

initial contact.

The Wilderness

The Union forces got an early start on the morning of 5 May, and 

Hancock’s II Corps, unimpeded by any Confederates, made good progress 

to Todd’s Tavern. Warren was more cautious. He knew that as he advanced 

south, his right flank could be vulnerable to a Confederate attack. Thus, 

the V Corps commander decided to deploy Brigadier General Charles 

Griffin’s division on Orange Turnpike to block any Confederate move 

while Warren’s other divisions began their move south. His units had not 

moved far before Griffin reported contact with Ewell at about 0700. The 

Union high command’s reaction was quick. Meade told Warren to attack at 

once with his entire corps. The army commander sent word to Grant who 

confirmed the order to attack. Meade ordered Hancock’s corps to rejoin 

the main Union forces by marching north on Brock Road from Todd’s 

Tavern. He also instructed Sedgwick to support Warren’s right. At the 

same time, Grant urged Burnside to cross the Rapidan and support the 
50

Army of the Potomac’s offensive. Grant and Meade showed few signs of 

trying to avoid battle in the Wilderness, and their rapid reaction to the presence of the Confederate army indicated a strong desire to grapple with the 

Army of Northern Virginia no matter what the terrain. Meade and Grant 

established their respective headquarters (separate but only several hundred yards apart) near the Wilderness Tavern, close to the key crossroads 

of the Orange Turnpike and Germanna Plank Road.

The Union forces were going into battle with limited knowledge of the 

enemy location and strength. Intercepted messages from the Confederate 

flag station on Clark Mountain gave some clue that Lee was approaching, 

but there were few details because of the poor use of Northern cavalry. 

Both Meade and Sheridan should share blame for this. Meade had relegated a large part of the cavalry to guarding the army’s trains instead of 

using them in a more valuable reconnaissance and screening role. Even so, 

Sheridan made poor use of the remaining force. There was no Union cavalry covering Warren’s move on Orange Turnpike, and Brigadier General 

James Wilson’s cavalry division wandered into a fruitless battle well south 

of Orange Plank Road, leaving this important thoroughfare covered by 

only a single cavalry regiment.

In the meantime, Lee also became aware of an impending battle, but 

he wanted Ewell to halt his progress to give time for Hill to move up on 

the Confederate right along Orange Plank Road. Ewell deployed Major 

General Edward Johnson’s division to the north of the road and Major 

General Robert E. Rodes’ division to the south. Major General Jubal 

A. Early’s division was astride the road in a reserve position to the rear 

(west) of Johnson and Rodes. The Southerners also began to construct 

earthworks.

Warren, unsure of the size and location of the Confederates to his 

front, attempted to comply with Meade’s instructions for an offensive. 

However, the tangled terrain was taking its toll on the Union plan. While 

Griffin was deployed on the Orange Turnpike, Warren’s other divisions 

had to be recalled from their march further south. These divisions found 

movement through the tangled terrain to be a nightmare. Unable to see 

more than several yards in any direction, commanders found it nearly 

impossible to deploy on line and to maintain contact with neighboring 

units. Brigadier General James S. Wadsworth’s division groped north 

through the woods to try to link up with Griffin’s left. As Wadsworth 

shifted north, an even larger gap developed between his unit and Brigadier 

General Samuel W. Crawford’s division. In reality, Crawford was poised 

in a perfect position that threatened a void between Ewell’s and Hill’s 
51

Confederate corps. However, in the dense woods, Crawford had no way of 

knowing this. He and Warren agreed to shift his division to the north and 

close on Wadsworth’s flank. The final V Corps division, under Brigadier 

General John C. Robinson, was positioned in reserve behind Griffin and 

Wadsworth and did not participate in the day’s fighting.

The net effect of the slowed movement was that as noon approached, 

the V Corps was still hours away from getting all units on line. Warren 

faced a dilemma. He was already way behind time in complying with 

Meade’s order to attack, but he also was unprepared to assault with forces 

other than Griffin’s division and part of Wadsworth’s division. The corps 

commander decided to attack with his available forces and hope that his 

other units could join the battle as they arrived.

The resulting struggle swayed back and forth over Saunders’ Field 

on both sides of the Orange Turnpike. The Union advance achieved some 

local, temporary successes, but the attacks, as could be anticipated, were 

piecemeal. Griffin moved forward and succeeded in routing one of the 

Confederate brigades. Part of Early’s division counterattacked and threw 

back the Union advance. Both sides then continued a steady fire while they 

entrenched at opposite ends of Saunders’ Field. Meanwhile, further to the 

south, Wadsworth’s division advanced across Higgerson’s Field. However, 

a timely counterattack from Brigadier General John B. Gordon’s brigade 

of Early’s division blunted the Union attack, penetrated a gap between the 

brigades of Wadsworth’s division, and sent it fleeing to the rear. Union 

reinforcements plugged the gap, and by late afternoon, both sides had settled into a stalemate. The bloody impasse did not mollify Griffin who rode 

back to Meade’s headquarters and complained about the lack of support 

for his attack. Toward the afternoon, the fighting on the turnpike settled 

into a lull.

By the end of the day’s fighting on the northern part of the battlefield, there had been some shifts in unit locations. On the Confederate side, 

Ewell’s positions were relatively unchanged, except that the majority of 

Early’s division was in the front lines instead of the reserve. On the Union 

side, there were some significant changes. First, the VI Corps arrived, and 

Sedgwick’s lead division under Brigadier General George W. Getty moved 

south to hold the Brock Road and Orange Plank Road intersection (more 

on this later). Another VI Corps division, led by Brigadier General Horatio 

G. Wright, deployed on Griffin’s right. Wright attempted an evening attack, 

but it was too late in the day to have any effect. The final VI Corps division, 

commanded by Brigadier General James B. Ricketts, arrived in the gathering dusk and did not attack. In addition, Warren seemed to lose his earlier 
52

aggressiveness, and he did not renew the V Corps’ attacks. Finally, during 

the confused afternoon fighting, Wadsworth’s division—after its earlier 

setbacks—wandered through the woods for some time before it deployed 

further south near Orange Plank Road. Fortuitously, this unit now threatened the left flank of A.P. Hill’s Confederate forces. Wadsworth’s division, 

ready to work in cooperation with Hancock’s forces, was poised to contribute to the fighting to the south the next day (6 May).

While the battle between Ewell and Warren raged on the turnpike, 

Hill’s advance up Orange Plank Road triggered an equally vicious struggle 

on 5 May. For a few critical moments, Hill’s objective, the intersection of 

Brock and Orange Plank Roads, assumed decisive importance. Although 

the Union forces eventually outnumbered the Confederate forces, the 

Federals began the battle on 5 May with Hancock’s corps far to the south 

of the main Union forces, and this meant that the Union forces were vulnerable to potential defeat in detail. Once Grant and Meade had determined 

to fight in the Wilderness, they needed to pull Hancock’s troops back to 

the north and consolidate the army. Thus, the Northerners needed to hold 

the Brock and Plank Road intersection—the critical link between Warren’s 

and Sedgwick’s forces in the north and Hancock’s forces to the south.

The most immediate unit available for this vital mission was George 

Getty’s division of the VI Corps. Getty’s men gained some critical time 

thanks to the delaying action of the 5th New York Cavalry, but time was 

still short. In one of the more dramatic moments of the battle, Getty and 

his staff bluffed the Confederates into halting just short of the intersection 

before deploying the division and holding the important location.

Soon after barely escaping disaster, the Union forces were able to 

turn their attention to launching an offensive with the arrival of the II 

Corps. Hancock personally arrived on the scene at the head of his corps, 

and he planned to use his own troops along with Getty’s to defeat Hill’s 

Confederates. However, the Union II Corps commander faced the same 

problems as Warren in trying to coordinate an attack in the heavy thickets. 

In addition, a confusing exchange of orders between Hancock and Meade 

contributed to a long delay in the deployment of the II Corps. Eventually, 

Getty—like Griffin earlier—advanced with little initial support. Additional 

Union units came into the battle in piecemeal fashion.

For the Confederates, the situation was hardly better. Hill was advancing down a narrow road, and although Major General Henry “Harry” 

Heth’s division delayed Hancock’s attack, Major General Cadmus M. 

Wilcox’s division was stacked behind Heth in march formation. Hill 

needed to get Wilcox into the battle, but wondered if he should deploy this 
53

division to the north or south of Heth’s units. Lee was nearby, and both he 

and Hill decided to send Wilcox to the north, which would help to close 

the gap between Hill and Ewell. This was probably the best move, but 

Union reinforcements forced the Confederates to remain on the defensive. 

Late on the afternoon of 5 May, Lee examined the overall situation. Ewell 

was holding his own against Union forces on the turnpike, but Hill, with 

only two divisions, was barely holding on the Plank Road. Even with the 

advantage of fighting in the Wilderness terrain, Lee knew he would be 

hard pressed to hold long enough for Longstreet’s arrival.

Fortunately for Lee, the uncoordinated arrival of Union forces precluded a combined attack. Getty moved first, virtually alone, while 

Hancock tried to deploy his own corps on both sides of Getty’s division. In 

the confusion, only one brigade of Union troops, under Brigadier General 

Alexander Hays (part of Major General David B. Birney’s division) was 

able to get on Getty’s right. Hays was killed during the assault—a sad 

personal blow to Grant who had known Hays before the war. Another part 

of Birney’s division arrived on Getty’s left in bits and pieces. Brigadier 

General Gershom Mott’s division eventually came up on Birney’s left 

(south), but his two brigades performed poorly, and Hancock was forced 

to rally them near Brock Road. Still, the Union forces were gathering 

momentum and the net result was that the Confederates fell back under 

pressure, but they were not routed. By late evening, Hancock had all of his 

own corps on hand, along with several other attached units, and the Union 

army planned for a major assault the next day.

The night was horrible for both sides while they planned for the next 

day’s battle. Fires started in the dry timber, and the flames often crept up 

to the wounded—many of whom could not move. Many suffocated or 

burned to death. Some of the wounded suffered even more when their 

cartridges were set off by the heat and exploded beside their bodies. Many 

soldiers, both North and South, remembered this as one of the worst nights 

of the war.

Despite the agony of the soldiers and the almost ceaseless cries for 

help from the wounded, the generals had to plan for the next day. Grant 

and Meade hoped to crush Lee’s right on Orange Plank Road before 

Longstreet could arrive. Toward that purpose, Hancock was given control 

of a powerful strike force consisting of his own corps, Getty’s division 

from the VI Corps, and Wadsworth’s division from the V Corps. Meade 

and Grant also directed Warren and Sedgwick to attack Ewell in order to 

keep him from reinforcing Hill to the south. Grant even promised to use 

part of Burnside’s IX Corps to help Hancock’s attack. The general in chief 
54

hoped to start the attack at 0400 because he wanted to keep Lee from seizing the initiative. However, there was no way the Union forces could be 

ready by that time. Grant agreed to delay the attack until 0500.

Lee did not harbor any offensive hopes for the morning. His forces, 

outnumbered on 5 May, had fought well, but he needed Longstreet’s corps 

to improve the odds against the Federals. Thus, Lee planned to hold his 

defensive positions until Longstreet’s arrival. After that, he might be able 

to take advantage of an offensive opportunity. Lee’s III Corps commander, 

Hill, seemed content to let troops sleep in place for the night, despite objections from his division commanders. Thus, the Confederate troops were ill 

disposed to receive Hancock’s attack on the morning of 6 May. The tired 

Confederate soldiers were allowed to sleep, thus they did not build breastworks or straighten their awkward front line.

Hancock started his attack promptly at 0500 on 6 May. Heth’s and 

Wilcox’s troops, unentrenched and poorly positioned to receive the 

Union attack, were forced to retreat. The Union attack was helped by 

Wadsworth’s division, which flanked Heth’s division from the north. Even 

so, the Confederates did not panic. The Southerners pulled back slowly, 

delaying the Northern units every step of the way. At one point, Lee chided 

Brigadier General Samuel McGowen (Wilcox’s division) for his brigade’s 

retreat, but McGowen replied that his troops were ready to reform and 

continue the fight; in fact, the South Carolinians were able to turn and 

resume their resistance.

The Union offensive, though steadily successful, was not achieving 

rapid, decisive results. Perhaps part of the problem was Hancock’s plan 

of attack. The II Corps commander had given Birney tactical control of 

the offensive but had piled Union units—one behind the other—in three 

lines close to Orange Plank Road. Perhaps, in the dense forests of the 

Wilderness, Hancock might have felt that a deep and more compact Union 

attack would be easier to control. This formation gave the Union forces 

depth to their attack and an ability to move fresh units into the front line as 

the lead units became exhausted. However, it also meant that the superior 

Union numbers could only be applied gradually—not in an overwhelming simultaneous attack. In addition, Hancock worried about Longstreet’s 

arrival and an attack on his southern flank. He directed Brigadier General 

John Gibbon to guard against this threat. In another unusual command 

arrangement, Gibbon gave up most of his division to Birney for the Union 

attack, but he took command of Brigadier General Francis C. Barlow’s 

entire division and the corps artillery reserve on Brock Road for his mission of preventing a Confederate flank attack from the south.
55

Whatever the possible faults of Hancock’s dispositions (always easier 

to see with the benefit of historian’s hindsight), the II Corps commander’s 

attack pressed forward with a seemingly inexorable progress, and Hancock 

himself was in grand form. Living up to his sobriquet, “Hancock the 

Superb,” he urged his troops forward in what appeared to be a war-winning 

assault. The Union forces pushed Hill’s corps back and soon approached 

an open area known as Tapp Farm. If the Union troops could seize this 

position, they would be squarely on Lee’s right flank and in a position 

to separate Ewell and Hill from Longstreet. Lee was so worried that he 

ordered the Confederate trains to evacuate their position near Parker’s 

Store. The Confederates faced complete defeat unless Longstreet’s corps 

could arrive in time.

At this moment of crisis, Southern reinforcements arrived with no 

time to spare. The battle that ensued was initially confusing, but ultimately 

successful for the Southerners. First, Confederate artillery bought time 

for the Southern defense. The dense Wilderness terrain often negated the 

effect of artillery, but the open ground at Tapp Farm provided just enough 

of a clearing for the big guns to have an affect. Lieutenant Colonel William 

T. Poague had part of his artillery battalion positioned on the west side of 

the field, and his guns unleashed several volleys that staggered the Union 

advance. Poague’s artillery could not defeat the Federals by themselves, 

but they forced the Union troops to pause and reform.

Taking advantage of this valuable delay, Longstreet deployed his arriving troops for a counterattack on both sides of Orange Plank Road. First, 

Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw’s division turned south of the road 

and set up a defensive line. Then Major General Charles W. Field’s division arrived, its lead brigade, under Brigadier General George T. “Tige” 

Anderson, following Kershaw’s men to the south. However, Longstreet 

diverted the rest of Field’s division into battle north of the road. The famed 

Texas Brigade, under Brigadier General John Gregg, led their attack. In 

one of the more celebrated incidents of the war, Lee rushed forward personally to lead the brigade’s attack until the soldiers finally convinced 

their commander to move to the rear. The Texans’ attack, though certainly 

heroic, was not decisive. Like Poague’s artillery assault, Gregg’s attack 

gained time, but did not repulse the Union advance. A less well-known 

but equally courageous attack by Brigadier General Henry L. Benning’s 

Georgia Brigade also suffered heavy casualties and stunned the Federals 

without completely halting their offensive. In the end, additional brigades 

from Field’s division, particularly troops from Brigadier General Evander 

McIver Law’s Alabama Brigade and the counterattack of Kershaw’s 
56

division south of Plank Road, brought the Union attack to a standstill. 

Longstreet’s timely arrival brought a pause to the battlefield as both sides 

now looked for other ways to renew their attacks.

On the Union side, slow movements and confusion over orders 

thwarted attempts to renew their attack. Grant and Meade hoped to rejuvenate the Federal advance on Plank Road, and they designated General 

Thomas G. Stevenson’s division of Burnside’s corps as reinforcements for 

Hancock. However, the IX Corps was taking a long time to get into position. Stevenson’s troops did not arrive until evening, just in time to repulse 

a Confederate assault but too late to launch an offensive. Burnside’s other 

units took up positions between Hancock’s and Warren’s forces but contributed little to the fighting. While waiting for these promised reinforcements, Hancock ordered Brigadier General John Gibbon to bring up the II 

Corps units on Brock Road (Barlow’s division) to support a new attack by 

the Union left. Gibbon, normally a thorough professional, denied that he 

ever saw these orders despite the fact that some staff officers contradicted 

his claims. Whatever the case, more than a division’s worth of Union soldiers remained on Brock Road and out of the battle.

The Confederate efforts to reform for an attack fared considerably better. Longstreet sent Lee’s chief engineer, Major General Martin Luther 

(M.L.) Smith, on a reconnaissance to search for any weak spots on the 

Union left (southern) flank. Smith found an unfinished railroad bed (the 

track had never been laid) that passed south of the Union line. It was perfect for a flank attack. It gave the Confederates a path for an approach 

march, and it offered some open ground on which to deploy units perpendicular to the Federal flank. In an unusual move, Longstreet put a junior, 

but trusted, staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel, in charge 

of coordinating the attack. Sorrel had to pull together units from a mix 

of different commands that included brigades from both of Longstreet’s 

divisions as well as forces from Major General Richard H. Anderson’s 

division of Hill’s corps.

The Southern attack began at about 1100 and achieved a major success. As Hancock himself later recalled, the Confederate assault rolled 

up his left flank “like a wet blanket” (James Longstreet, From Manassas 

to Appomattox, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1960, 568). 

Union units began to fall back, from left to right, as Longstreet’s attack 

hit each unit on the flank. A few Union units disintegrated, but for the 

most part, much like their Confederate counterparts earlier in the day, the 

Federal troops withdrew in relatively good order. The flanking position 

of the Confederate attack had given them a great advantage over the front 
57

rank units in the Union column, but after reaching the Plank Road, the 

Southern attackers needed to be sorted and reoriented to the east. As if this 

were not difficult enough, Longstreet fell wounded just as the Southerners 

attempted to reorganize for the new assault. In a tragic touch of irony, 

Longstreet was hit not far from the location of Stonewall Jackson’s wounding a year before at Chancellorsville. Like Jackson, Longstreet was shot 

by his own troops in the confusion of battle. Though the wounds were 

severe, Longstreet survived but he would not return to command until 

after the Overland Campaign.

With his most trusted corps commander out of action, Lee decided to 

take personal control of the action on the Confederate right flank. It took 

several hours for Lee to shuffle his units and prepare for a new assault. 

During that time, Hancock rallied the retreating Union units and placed 

them along Brock Road. The Federals had earlier built breastworks on the 

western edge of the road, and they awaited the Southern attack in their 

prepared positions. Shortly after 1630, the Southerners launched their 

attack. Lee had opted to try to penetrate the Union line just south of the 

Brock and Plank Road intersection rather than attempting another attack 

on the Union southern flank, which was still protected by Gibbon’s and 

Barlow’s forces. The Confederate attack was aided by fires that touched 

off the Union breastworks and a wind that pushed smoke into the eyes 

of the Northern soldiers. Mott’s division fell back, but a timely counterattack spearheaded by Colonel Samuel S. Carroll’s brigade blunted the 

Confederate attack and restored the line. As night approached, the fighting 

stopped on the southern end of the battlefield. Both sides had gained some 

momentary successes, but neither could claim decisive victory. 

As darkness crept over the battlefield, Lee found still one more opportunity to attack. One reason for this new opening was the relative passivity of Warren’s V Corps and Burnside’s slowness during much of 6 May. 

Another Union problem was lax dispositions by Sedgwick’s corps on the 

Union right flank. In any case, away from the heavy fighting on the southern flank that dominated much of the day’s struggle, the Confederates 

launched a late evening attack on the Union right that achieved considerable success. This attack was spearheaded by Brigadier General John B. 

Gordon’s troops of Ewell’s corps, and it smashed two ill-prepared brigades 

of the VI Corps. Nonetheless, Sedgwick did not panic, and the Federals 

formed a new line.

For all intents and purposes, Gordon’s attack ended the battle of 

the Wilderness. Grant and Lee had launched attacks on both flanks of 

the armies, but none of these offensives had brought decisive victory. 
58

Tactically, the Confederates had proven skillful and exacted considerable 

Union casualties. By the end of 6 May, Lee had established a solid defensive line that discouraged further Federal attacks. Yet, the Northern forces 

were not defeated. From an operational perspective, Grant and Meade had 

only fought their first battle of the campaign. Certainly, the Federals would 

have welcomed a clear victory, but with that result denied, the Union leadership planned its next move. Much has been made of Grant’s decision to 

continue the campaign after horrible losses in the Wilderness, and Grant 

deserves praise for continuing the advance. The Union general in chief 

was determined to apply pressure until the Confederates broke. He saw 

the campaign as a series of battles that would crush Lee’s army. Perhaps 

the Union troops saw the same grim, but inevitable, logic as they cheered 

Grant on the night of 6 May.

Spotsylvania

The new Union plan called for a move around Lee’s right (southern) 

flank to the small town of Spotsylvania, location of the county courthouse. 

If the Union forces could take this road junction, they would turn the 

Confederate flank and be in a position to separate the Southern army 

from Richmond. This in turn could force Lee to battle in open ground, 

and perhaps even force Lee to attack the more numerous Union forces in 

prepared positions.

While both sides buried the dead and tended to the wounded on 7 May, 

the Union forces prepared for their move. The plan called for Warren to 

pull out of the front line, pass behind Hancock’s corps, and take the lead in 

the advance to the south. This was the normal process for most Civil War 

armies—the majority of units would hold the front line in contact with 

the enemy while part of the force moved safely behind the lines from one 

flank to another.

Another standard element of large-scale army movements was to 

have cavalry lead the way, protect the advancing infantry, and clear roads 

to the objective. This operation was no different as Sheridan’s cavalry 

was supposed to push past the intersection of the Brock and Catharpin 

Roads—near Todd’s Tavern—all the way to Corbin’s Bridge. Holding the 

crossroads at Todd’s Tavern would keep a clear path for Warren’s corps, 

while advancing to Corbin’s Bridge would have the additional benefit of 

blocking a Confederate move to Spotsylvania.

Unfortunately for the North, the plan was not executed as intended. 

Initially, all seemed well as two divisions of Union cavalry seized Todd’s 

Tavern and Corbin’s Bridge and advanced south on Brock Road toward 

Spotsylvania late in the evening of 7 May. Then, inexplicably, both 
59

divisions pulled back from their advanced positions and encamped at 

Todd’s Tavern. Warren’s infantry found Sheridan’s cavalrymen asleep and 

blocking the road, which caused a delay in the V Corps’ advance. Late 

that night, Meade arrived at Todd’s Tavern and saw that the Union cavalry 

was not fulfilling its mission, whereupon he issued orders directly to the 

two divisions to retake their former positions. Meade was probably right 

to correct Sheridan’s poor orders to the Union cavalry divisions, but the 

headstrong Sheridan seized on the opportunity to complain about Meade’s 

interference. Both Union leaders engaged in a heated shouting match at 

the Army of the Potomac’s headquarters later that evening. In the end, 

the Union suffered in two ways from this sad episode. First, the Federal 

advance was delayed by just enough time to enable the Confederates to get 

to Spotsylvania before the Northerners. Second, Sheridan—with Grant’s 

approval—launched his cavalry in a raid against Richmond that took the 

Federal cavalry away from the Army of the Potomac.

Sheridan’s raid, which ultimately led to the battle of Yellow Tavern, 

is a subject that warrants examination. The origins of the raid stemmed 

from the dispute between Sheridan and Meade, and Grant may have given 

final approval for the venture simply to avoid further conflict between his 

two hot-tempered subordinates. In addition, the Army of the Potomac’s 

leadership struggled with defining the proper role for its cavalry. Meade 

sometimes wasted much of his cavalry in guarding the army’s trains. 

Sheridan dreamed of using the cavalry as a strike force that would bring 

the Confederate horsemen to battle and decisive defeat. Neither Union 

leader seemed to grasp the need to use the cavalry, in cooperation with the 

movements of the infantry, for essential reconnaissance and security roles. 

In the end, Grant gave Sheridan permission for his raid, and Sheridan was 

allowed to take all three of his cavalry divisions for the mission. Even if 

the objective of defeating the Confederate cavalry had some merit, sending 

all of the Union cavalry was a mistake. Stuart took only two divisions in 

pursuit; therefore, for the next several weeks, Lee had superior intelligence 

from his remaining cavalry while the Army of the Potomac was virtually 

blind.

While the Union forces were encountering delays in their move to 

Spotsylvania, Lee planned his response. As was to occur on several occasions in the campaign, Lee demonstrated superior instinct and intellect 

in countering the Union thrusts. On 7 May, the Confederate commander 

received reports that the Union right flank had pulled back from Germanna 

Ford. He correctly interpreted this move as a Union change of base (the 

Federal supply base was shifting from the old Brandy Station camps to a 

new location at Belle Plain and Aquia Landing). Still, Lee could not be 
60

sure if this meant that Grant would pull back to Fredericksburg to lick his 

wounds, or if the Union commander would continue his offensive south 

to Spotsylvania. As a precaution, Lee ordered his artillery chief, Brigadier 

General William N. Pendleton, to cut a path through the woods behind 

the Confederate lines that emptied near Corbin’s Bridge just in case the 

Southerners needed to move quickly to Spotsylvania. Later on 7 May, Lee 

received reports indicating that the Union artillery reserve was moving 

to the south, and the Confederate commander correctly concluded that 

Spotsylvania was Grant’s new objective. Lee ordered the I Corps, now 

under the command of Major General R.H. Anderson, to use the newly cut 

trail in the woods to move toward the courthouse.

Although Lee’s logic and anticipation were extraordinary, the Confederates were also helped by some good luck in the race to Spotsylvania. 

Lee’s orders to Anderson gave the new I Corps commander discretion to 

rest his troops before moving. However, due to fires raging through much 

of the Wilderness area, Anderson could not find a good bivouac site for his 

troops, and he decided to march all night to the vicinity of Spotsylvania.

The combination of Lee’s skill, Anderson’s fortunate decision, and 

Union delays decided the race for Spotsylvania. Stalled repeatedly while 

trying to push down Brock Road, Warren’s troops moved early on the 

morning of 8 May toward the courthouse. In front of Warren’s infantry, Union cavalry under Brigadier General James Wilson (in their last 

action before embarking on Sheridan’s raid) fought with Confederate cavalry under Brigadier General Thomas Rosser and Lee’s nephew, Major 

General Fitzhugh Lee. Both sides’ cavalry commanders called for infantry 

support. Anderson’s men arrived first, by minutes, and they relieved the 

Confederate cavalry from their positions on Laurel Hill. Warren’s leading 

division under Brigadier General John Robinson, believing that it was only 

facing Southern cavalry, attacked in piecemeal fashion near Alsop Farm 

and Laurel Hill. The first two Union brigades received a bloody repulse, 

and Robinson fell with a painful wound. The battle kept expanding as 

Warren fed more troops into the fight as they arrived. The V Corps commander had been criticized for waiting too long to gather his forces for an 

attack in the Wilderness, and perhaps smarting from these suggestions, he 

was committing his troops as soon as they reached the battlefield. In any 

case, the Confederate reinforcements always seemed to be just ahead of 

the Union troops, and the V Corps suffered several costly rebuffs.

Later in the afternoon, Sedgwick’s corps arrived on Warren’s left and 

Meade ordered a combined assault. This attack was also blunted as Ewell’s 

Confederate corps arrived just in time to cover Anderson’s right flank. The 
61

Federal attack was hindered by arguments over seniority and Meade’s failure to force cooperation between Warren and Sedgwick. By late evening 

on 8 May, the Union forces were stalled in front of Spotsylvania, and both 

sides began to dig entrenchments to protect their positions.

On 9 May, both armies brought up the rest of their forces. Hancock’s 

corps arrived on Warren’s right near the Po River. This gave Meade all 

three of his corps on line just north and west of Spotsylvania. In the meantime, Burnside’s IX Corps was moving further to the east in an attempt 

to flank the entrenched Confederate lines. On the Confederate side, 

Anderson was in place on Laurel Hill and solidly entrenched. Ewell’s II 

Corps was on Anderson’s right. They had occupied a position outlined by 

Lee’s engineer, M.L. Smith, that took advantage of some high ground but 

put the troops into a salient that was soon dubbed the “Mule Shoe.” The 

Confederate III Corps, now led by Jubal Early (Hill was sick), positioned 

itself on Ewell’s right. By nightfall on 9 May, the Confederates were well 

established in fortified positions.

While the Union leadership pondered its options, they suffered the 

loss of one of their most popular generals. The VI Corps commander, John 

Sedgwick, was killed by a sniper on 9 May while urging his men to ignore 

the Confederate fire. Sedgwick, though not a tactical genius, was a steady 

commander who was much beloved by his troops and respected by officers on both sides. Major General Horatio G. Wright, the senior VI Corps 

division commander, took over command of the corps.

Also on 9 May, a series of maneuvers and relatively small battles set 

the stage for major engagements at Spotsylvania over the next few days. 

First, Burnside’s IX Corps, which had marched on roads to the east and 

parallel to the Army of the Potomac, slowly approached the Confederate 

lines on their far right flank. This presented an opportunity for the Union 

forces to turn the Confederate entrenchments. Second, in a rare change in 

the Union pattern of movement, Hancock crossed the Po River and threatened Lee’s left flank—rather than the usual move to the Confederate right. 

This move initially caught Lee off guard, but once alerted, the Southern 

commander reacted with characteristic vigor and sent Heth’s division in 

a long, rapid march further to the west that threatened Hancock’s right 

flank. These multiple flanking moves put both sides in a unique position. 

Hancock threatened part of Lee’s flank, but he in turn was threatened by 

Heth. The II Corps outnumbered Heth’s lone division, but a bend in the 

Po River meant that Hancock’s own divisions were separated into three 

parts by the water course (this situation—a river dividing the Union forces 

into three parts—would be repeated at the North Anna River later in the 
62

campaign). In the end, Hancock felt that he was in the weaker position and 

recommended a withdrawal back across the Po.

Grant and Meade agreed, and Grant developed a plan that might 

still take advantage of Hancock’s move. The Union general in chief reasoned that if Lee had shifted forces to face Hancock, the remainder of the 

Confederate lines must be thin and vulnerable to an attack. Grant directed 

Meade to have Hancock recross the Po (except for one division to act as 

bait to keep Lee distracted) and join with Warren and Wright in a combined assault on 10 May. In addition, Burnside was directed to advance 

to a position, known locally as “Gate,” on the Confederate right (eastern) 

flank and act as the anvil against which the II, V, and VI Corps would hammer the Army of Northern Virginia from the western flank. In retrospect, 

perhaps Hancock, Meade, and Grant gave up too soon on the Union move 

across the Po River, but Grant’s new plan certainly seemed to offer success if all Union actions could be coordinated. The grand attack was set to 

begin at 1700 on all fronts.

Sadly for the Federals, the events of 10 May were a tragicomedy of 

disjointed actions that thwarted any possibility of success. Hancock’s 

corps did not receive its orders until late in the evening, and it took time 

to get back across the Po. One of his divisions (under Mott) was sent to 

cover the gap between the VI and IX Corps, and two others (Gibbon and 

Birney) did not get into position until well after the appointed attack time. 

The final division, under Barlow, almost dangled too long in its vulnerable 

position on the south side of the Po, until the young division commander 

finally extricated his exposed brigades later that evening.

The situation with the IX Corps was not much better. Part of the problem was a poor map that incorrectly marked the location of the mysterious “Gate.” Also, Burnside showed little energy and less initiative. One 

account claimed that the IX Corps commander spent a large part of the 

day drinking with friends and telling stories at his temporary headquarters. 

Burnside was not drunk, but he seemed more concerned with exchanging tales than pushing his troops. Ever so slowly, his lead division under 

Major General Orlando Wilcox advanced down Fredericksburg Road and 

threatened the Confederate right and rear. At this time, there was nothing 

but some Southern cavalry and a scratch infantry force barring the Federal 

path. Yet, Wilcox grew cautious and pulled back to a defensive position. 

Although he considerably outnumbered the Confederates to his front, the 

Union division commander sent messages back to IX Corps headquarters 

stating that he would be hard-pressed just to hold his current position. 
63

In the end, the IX Corps contributed virtually nothing to the 10 May 

Union offensive.

Perhaps the most tragic story of the 10 May attack involved the V 

Corps. Warren requested permission to open his attack at 1600, an hour 

earlier than the planned combined assault (perhaps the V Corps commander 

was still smarting from the repulses of 8 May and attempting to regain 

his reputation). Amazingly, Meade agreed to this change in schedule. The 

resulting attacks on the old ground at Laurel Hill were a sad repeat of the 

slaughter on this field from two days earlier. Warren displayed exceptional 

personal courage—even grabbing a regimental flag to rally broken Union 

troops—but the effort was futile. In some cases, the Federal troops made 

only a perfunctory advance, going only so far as to reassure themselves 

that the Confederate positions were still unassailable. This was one of the 

first cases of increasingly frequent examples of veteran troops showing a 

reluctance to assault prepared defensive positions. Even so, the V Corps 

suffered 3,000 casualties in a sad and doomed attack.

With Warren’s mistimed attack, Burnside’s sluggish movements, and 

Hancock’s entanglements on the Po, the Union plan for a grand, combined assault on 10 May was a shambles. The only measure of success 

came on the VI Corps front, but even this effort revealed flaws in planning 

and execution. This attack was one of the more famous tactical actions 

of the Civil War—an assault by Colonel, soon to be Brigadier General, 

Emory Upton on the Confederate lines on the western side of the Mule 

Shoe. On the positive side, Upton’s attack showed extensive planning and 

reconnaissance work at the lower levels of command. The new VI Corps 

commander, Wright, tasked one of his division commanders, Brigadier 

General David Russell, to prepare for an assault in support of the Union 

efforts for 10 May. Russell selected Upton to lead the attack with a picked 

group of regiments that included part of Upton’s brigade and units from 

other VI Corps’ brigades. Upton conducted a reconnaissance that included 

bringing forward all of his regimental commanders to see the actual terrain for the attack—a Civil War rarity. Upton arranged his 12 regiments 

into a dense formation: three regiments across the front and four regiments 

deep. He also instructed the troops not to stop to exchange fire with the 

Confederates, and he gave each of the four “waves” of the attack specific 

instructions for their roles after their initial breakthrough.

Upton’s attack stepped off at 1800 and initially achieved remarkable 

success. The Union soldiers surprised the Confederates of Brigadier 

General George Doles’ brigade, and without stopping to fire a shot, the 
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Federals poured over the Southern trenches. However, several factors 

combined to defeat Upton’s attack. First, the Confederates displayed 

uncanny resiliency and reacted rapidly to the breakthrough by bringing 

up substantial reinforcements to close the breach. Second, despite Upton’s 

best intentions, his attacking force lost cohesion once the penetration had 

been made—it was nearly impossible to maintain command and control 

in such conditions. Finally, the planned support for Upton, an attack by 

Mott’s division of the II Corps, started an hour before Upton and was 

easily repulsed. While Mott’s performance was weak, he does not deserve 

sole blame for the failure to support Upton. In particular, one must wonder 

why Wright, who was supposed to be planning a massive assault for 10 

May, ultimately attacked with only 12 of his own regiments and relied on 

Mott’s attached units to help. In any case, Upton’s men did not receive 

reinforcements and were forced to retreat back to their original positions.

Although Upton had eventually been repulsed, his initial breakthrough 

seemed to offer some hope for a future penetration of the Confederate 

lines. Wright reported Upton’s success to Meade and Grant, and one postwar account alleges that Grant told his army commander: “A brigade 

today—we’ll try a corps tomorrow” (Lumen H. Tenney, War Diary of 

Lumen Harris Tenney 1861-1865, Cleveland, OH: Evangelical Publishing 

House, 1914, 115). In fact, it would take two days to get ready for this 

new assault, and it is not clear if the Union leadership had really grasped 

the reasons behind Upton’s success—the tactics, the terrain, the formations, the preparation, and the luck. It appears more likely that Grant was 

convinced that Lee’s line must be vulnerable somewhere between Wright 

and Burnside, and that a massive Union attack could achieve even greater 

results than Upton’s unsupported effort whatever the tactics.

Regardless of the reasons behind Grant’s thought process, the general in chief developed a characteristically aggressive plan on 11 May. He 

wanted to wait until that evening, move Hancock’s II Corps from its position on the Union right to a position between Wright and Burnside under 

the cover of darkness, and have it launch an early morning attack on 12 

May.

The Confederate position earmarked for the Union assault was the very 

tip of the Mule Shoe, a large bulge in the Confederate lines occupied by 

Ewell’s II Corps. Lee’s chief engineer, M.L. Smith, had laid out this position when Ewell’s corps arrived late on 8 May. The Confederate leaders 

have received considerable criticism for occupying a salient—a position 

that is naturally vulnerable to converging fire on three sides. However, the 

Southerners were not blind to their dilemma. Smith, Lee, and Ewell agreed 
65

to position a powerful group of artillery in the salient that would help to 

offset the position’s weaknesses. Perhaps a more valid criticism is that the 

main reason posited for the odd shape of the Confederate lines—the need 

to hold the higher ground in the apex of the Mule Shoe—seems flawed. 

The ground in the salient was certainly beneficial, but there were other 

positions further to the rear that offered good, defensible terrain. Whatever 

the historians’ arguments, Ewell’s position in the Mule Shoe was made 

even weaker on the night of 11 May by a decision to move the Confederate 

artillery out of salient. Lee made this decision based on reports that the 

Union forces might be pulling back to Fredericksburg. (Hancock’s retreat 

back across the Po and the movement of the Union wagon train toward 

Fredericksburg momentarily gave Lee hope that Grant was retreating and 

vulnerable to an attack.) The Confederate commander wanted his artillery 

to be ready to join in a pursuit, and Ewell pulled his artillery out of the 

Mule Shoe in preparation for such a move.

Benefiting from this stroke of good fortune, the Union forces prepared 

for their 12 May attack. Although Grant and Meade developed a good 

concept on paper, the actual execution of the II Corps move to its attack 

positions revealed serious weaknesses in Federal planning and staff work. 

Union reconnaissance efforts were clumsy, their maps were useless (or 

nonexistent), and guides sent to help the II Corps units had no idea of the 

terrain to their front. After a dark and wet march, Barlow’s leading division of the II Corps arrived near the Brown house in the early morning of 

12 May. Soon, all of Hancock’s divisions moved into position, tired and 

drenched, and with little information about the Confederate positions.

Despite the poor reconnaissance and staff work, the II Corps benefited from several factors, including old-fashioned good luck. Hancock’s 

troops were some of the best in the Army of the Potomac, and despite 

their difficult march, they were primed for the attack. Also, in some ways 

Grant’s assumptions were confirmedLee did not suspect an attack on the 

Mule Shoe at this timeand the withdrawal of the Confederate artillery 

reflected this. Additionally, the Union II Corps’ night march, warts and all, 

had achieved some measure of surprise. As for luck, a thick fog blanketed 

the terrain between the Union attackers and the Confederate positions on 

the morning of 12 May and helped conceal the Union movements.

One other factor that may or may not have helped the Union attack 

was their tactics. Some historians have implied that the II Corps assault 

mirrored Upton’s methods and succeeded because of these tactics. There 

might be some truth to this claim. Barlow’s division adopted a dense 

formation that resembled Upton’s more narrow thrust. On the other hand, 
66

Birney’s division (on Barlow’s right) deployed in conventional formations 

with both brigades’ regiments on line. Perhaps it was not formations that 

mattered as much as the instruction to advance without firing until they 

reached the Confederate trenches (another aspect of Upton’s attack).

In the end, whether it was formations, tactics, operational surprise, 

Confederate mistakes, or luck, the Union attack achieved an incredible 

initial success. Both Barlow, near the “East Angle,” and Birney, on 

Barlow’s right, poured over the Confederate lines. Gibbon’s division sent 

two brigades to Barlow’s left, and Mott’s troops pitched in to fill a gap 

between Birney and Barlow. The Union army had struggled so hard on 

many occasions to break Confederate entrenched lines, and now—with 

seeming ease—they had smashed the tip of the Mule Shoe. The better part 

of a Confederate division was captured to include Major General Edward 

“Allegheny” Johnson and Brigadier General George H. “Maryland” Steuart. 

Staff officers at Meade’s headquarters rejoiced at the news, but there were 

signs of trouble. Union soldiers advancing down the trench lines on the east 

and west sides of the salient made some gains, but Confederate resistance 

stiffened and the breach could not be widened. In the meantime, Union 

troops rushed pell-mell down the center of the breach in a disorganized 

mass. Union reinforcements were actually counterproductive, as all unit 

structure was lost when the Federals simply pushed more men forward.

Despite the seeming disaster, the Confederate reaction was violent and 

timely. Lee had already felt that he might need a new position across the 

base of the Mule Shoe, and his engineers had reconnoitered a new line. 

The Southern commander put the broken remnants of Johnson’s division 

to work, building the earthworks on this new line. Still, Lee needed time 

to construct the position, and he turned to Gordon’s division for a counterattack to throw the Northerners back and gain time. Rushing past the 

McCoull house, Gordon’s troops smashed into the disorganized Federal 

mass coming down the center of the salient. As he had in the Wilderness 

battle, Lee rushed forward to lead the attack, but was then urged back 

by his own soldiers. Perhaps inspired by their army commander, the 

Confederates sent the Union soldiers reeling back to the Mule Shoe positions. The Southern troops were able to regain their trench lines near the 

west angle of the Mule Shoe, but the Federal troops held their original 

breakthrough point at the east angle.

The initial Federal success, followed by the partially effective 

Confederate counterattack, set the stage for one of the most horrific 

engagements of the Civil War. The II Corps held its captured trenches near 

the east angle and fought a grim battle at that location. Even as this fight 

raged under a torrential rainstorm, the Union VI Corps came into battle on 
67

the II Corps right and took positions near the west angle—better known as 

the “Bloody Angle.” The fight at this location was unlike almost any other 

in the war. The Confederates had recaptured their trenches, but the Union 

force refused to move back from these lines. Essentially, the Southerners 

were on one side of the log breastworks while the Union soldiers were on 

the other. Men fired through the openings in the logs, held loaded weapons 

above their heads firing over the tops of the barricades, and even pitched 

rifles with bayonets like javelins into the enemy positions. One Union 

soldier said that it was a savagery “surpassing all former experiences” 

(Thomas W. Hyde, Following the Greek Cross; or Memories of the Sixth 

Army Corps, Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894, 200). 

Late on the night of 12 May, the Confederates finally withdrew to their 

new defensive positions. The Union forces were too exhausted to interfere. The next day, several observers were revolted by the carnage that 

they observed at Bloody Angle.

The net result of the Union attack was decidedly mixed. The Federals 

had pierced the Mule Shoe, taken significant prisoners, and basically 

destroyed a Confederate division. Yet, they had paid a heavy cost in their 

own casualties and failed to achieve a decisive victory. For the next several days, Grant and Meade endeavored to shift further to their left in an 

effort to turn the Confederate flank. On May 13, Warren’s V Corps moved 

from its position on the Union right behind the Federal lines to a new location on the Union left. Late that same evening, Wright’s VI Corps shifted 

its position to the Union far left flank. Grant had hoped that he might 

turn the Confederate flank, but 48 hours of unremitting rain thwarted any 

attempt to launch an attack that might surprise the Confederates. As the 

rain died down, Grant reasoned that Lee had shifted his forces east to 

counter the Union moves. He decided to have Wright countermarch back 

from the Union left to its original positions on the right in order to launch 

an attack in combination with the II Corps. This Federal attack on the 

morning of 18 May was a complete failure. The Union forces had almost 

none of the advantages of their 12 May attack on the Mule Shoe (no early 

morning fog, no missing Confederate artillery, and no vulnerable bulge in 

the Confederate lines), and the Federals suffered over 2,000 casualties in 

this futile assault.

This attack was not the final act at Spotsylvania, as the Confederates 

made one last offensive on this bloody battlefield. After the 18 May 

repulse, Grant and Meade planned for another operational shift to their 

left (southeastern) flank. Later that evening, Wright and Hancock were 

pulled out of the line in preparation for this move. Lee correctly sensed 

this move; he hoped this would leave the Union right flank vulnerable to 
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an attack that might even sever the Federal supply line to Fredericksburg. 

On 19 May, the Confederate commander ordered Ewell to use part of his 

decimated II Corps for a reconnaissance in force (to borrow the modern 

military terminology) and probe the Union positions. Ewell decided to use 

almost his entire corps in a major attack, but the Southerners ran into a 

stout defense at Harris Farm (not far from Gate, the position that Burnside 

had occupied early in the Spotsylvania battle). The Union line was held by 

a brigade of heavy artillery regiments, under Brigadier General Robert O. 

Tyler, that had just arrived from the Washington fortifications. The green 

Union troops displayed remarkable courage as both sides exchanged volleys at point-blank range. The new Union regiments took extensive casualties, but they also bloodied Ewell’s veterans. In the end, this tactical 

stalemate showed that the Union forces were not vulnerable to an attack 

on their right flank.

As the battles near Spotsylvania—some of the most fierce fighting of 

the war—came to a close, Grant continued to plan for his next move further to the south. As in the Wilderness, Union casualties were heavier than 

Confederate losses, but this did not dissuade Grant from continuing the 

operational offensive. In fact, the Army of Northern Virginia, ever deadly 

in the defense and in local counterattacks, seemed to have lost its ability 

to deliver a decisive offensive after the bloodletting of the first few weeks 

of the campaign. Grant now planned for a move to take the key rail link at 

Hanover Junction and push the Confederates to the brink of annihilation.

North Anna

The newest Union maneuver required the Federals to disengage from 

the Southern army and make a movement further than the earlier, relatively 

short jump from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania. There is some measure 

of controversy over this move; some historians claim that Grant’s move 

was designed to bait Lee into attacking a seemingly lone and unsupported 

Union corps, which would in turn present an opportunity for the rest of the 

Union forces to catch Lee in the open. This claim is questionable and, in 

any case, moot. Lee made an extensive examination of the ground between 

Spotsylvania and the North Anna River and never contemplated attacking 

the II Corps. Lee was more concerned with explaining to the Davis administration his decision to abandon the ground between Spotsylvania and the 

North Anna.

On 20 May, Hancock’s corps took the lead in the Union advance, 

which followed multiple routes to the east of the Southern forces. The 

next day, Warren and Burnside began their moves while Wright’s VI Corps 

held a position at Spotsylvania to cover the other corps. By the end of 
69

21 May, the VI Corps was also on the march. As the Union forces went 

into motion, Grant and Meade temporarily co-located their headquarters 

at Massaponax Church. Their staffs were busy sorting out the complex 

timing and routes of march, and some of this activity was captured in 

famous photographs of the Union leadership gathered around the pews of 

the church that had been pulled outside to the front lawn. The staffs were 

also busy planning another shift in the Union base of supplies from Belle 

Plain on the Potomac to Port Royal on the Rappahannock.

Initially, all of the Union corps followed the same path to Guinea Station 

(also called Guiney’s Station on some Civil War era maps). Then Hancock 

moved further to the east on a path that took him to Milford Station and 

Bowling Green on the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad. 

Warren’s corps moved closest to the Confederates on Telegraph Road, the 

major high-speed route from Fredericksburg to Hanover Junction. Burnside 

took a path between Warren’s and Hancock’s Union corps and Wright followed Warren on Telegraph Road. For a short time, Grant positioned his 

headquarters at the Motley house near Guinea Station. While at this location, Grant left one of his ever-present cigars on a porch chair, which soon 

caught fire. The flames were soon extinguished, but Mr. Motley chastised 

the Federal commander, and he soon retreated to Guinea Station to avoid 

the Motleys’ wrath. This new headquarters was close to the house where 

Stonewall Jackson had died in 1863, just one year earlier.

As the Union forces continued their movements, Lee tried to anticipate the Federal objectives and react appropriately. After Ewell’s failed 

attack on the Union heavy artillery regiments, Lee knew that the Federals 

were not retreating and not vulnerable to an attack on their right flank. He 

examined the terrain and the reports of Union movements to his south and 

east, and he analyzed potential defensive positions between Spotsylvania 

and Hanover Junction. He did not want to give up too much ground, but 

there were very few, if any, defensible positions before the North Anna 

River. In the end, the Southern commander decided to pull back to the 

North Anna line. He informed Richmond of his decision and set his corps 

in motion. Hill’s corps moved on a route west of the main Confederate 

forces. Ewell and Anderson moved down Telegraph Road. They were just 

ahead of the Federals on this very same road, and the opposing units barely 

missed colliding at an obscure location known as Madison’s Ordinary. 

Without Sheridan’s cavalry, the Northerners marched blindly to the south 

and never realized that the Confederates were nearby. The Confederates, 

better informed by their cavalry, pressed south, just barely ahead of the 

Union forces on Telegraph Road.
70

Burnside’s IX Corps moved on its route between Warren and Hancock 

without opposition throughout 21 and 22 May. Early in the march, Burnside 

set up his headquarters at Bethel Church. After departing Guinea Station, 

Grant and Meade stopped at Bethel Church to confer with Burnside before 

moving further south to set up their headquarters for the North Anna 

battle.

In the meantime, Hancock advanced on the Union army’s most eastern 

route and arrived late on 21 May at Milford Station. Hancock was fortunate that he had the only available Union cavalry under his control—an 

ad hoc collection of various small units under the temporary command 

of Brigadier General Alfred Torbert. The Federal troops fought a sharp 

engagement with Confederate cavalry and cleared the path for Hancock’s 

advance. In addition, the Union soldiers captured some prisoners from the 

trains at the station who indicated that Pickett’s division was being sent by 

rail from Richmond to reinforce Lee. After taking the station, and holding 

the position for a day, Hancock’s corps veered back to the southwest and 

continued its advance. Roughly following the rail line, the II Corps moved 

toward the bridge on the North Anna near Chesterfield.

All of the Union corps was converging on the North Anna by 23 

May, but they were one step behind the Confederates who were setting up 

defensive positions on the river line. Both Grant and Meade were unsure 

of Lee’s intentions as they established their headquarters at Mount Carmel 

Church on Telegraph Road several miles north of the North Anna. Both 

staffs were co-located, as they had been on many occasions, and they 

placed wooden planks across the church pews on which they spread their 

maps and set to work. On the surface, Grant, Meade, and their respective 

staffs continued to function relatively well despite the awkward command 

relationship. However, Meade’s nerves were wearing thin, and the period 

from the battles on the North Anna through Cold Harbor was probably the 

low point in the relationship between the general in chief and his army 

commander. Grant never showed outward signs of irritation, but he certainly must have felt frustration over the Army of the Potomac’s sluggish 

movements and Lee’s skillful countermoves. Meade also kept his feelings 

private, but his letters to his wife showed a growing exasperation over 

newspaper reports that gave all credit to Grant (and blamed all mistakes 

on Meade). He also took a certain satisfaction in noting that Grant was 

beginning to realize that Lee was a difficult opponent who was not like 

some of the mediocre leaders that Grant had opposed in the western theater. Despite these grumblings, Grant and Meade worked through their 

problems and showed a remarkable degree of professionalism considering 

the difficulties of their situation.
71

The Confederate command situation was also strained as battle loomed 

on the North Anna. Both A.P. Hill and Dick Ewell were ill and seemed 

incapable of exercising any initiative. R.H. Anderson was healthy, but 

still inexperienced. Lee was on horseback for the better part of two days 

before arriving at his new headquarters at Hanover Junction. As evidenced 

by his repeated attempts to lead counterattacks in the Wilderness and at 

Spotsylvania, Lee felt compelled to intervene personally into the tactical 

aspects of the campaign. Without Jackson and Longstreet, Lee was ruining 

his health while closely supervising his corps commanders. The physically 

demanding ride to Hanover Junction added to his exhaustion, and by 23 

May, Lee was seriously ill.

In addition, Lee had hoped to gain some time to rest his troops on 

the North Anna. However, although Lee had correctly anticipated the 

path of the Union advance, he failed to account for Grant’s determination to push rapidly across the river. In fact, Lee’s forces moved at a relatively leisurely pace, and they barely arrived on the North Anna ahead 

of the Federals. His troops occupied positions both north and south of 

the river, but had little time to prepare their defenses. One piece of good 

news for the Confederates was the arrival of Breckinridge’s division from 

the Shenandoah Valley. Breckinridge had repulsed Sigel’s advance in the 

Valley, and while the Union forces pulled back to lick their wounds, Lee 

was able to get Breckinridge and part of his force transferred to the Army 

of Northern Virginia.

After the various moves of Union and Confederate units, Warren’s V 

Corps approached the North Anna on 23 May. Grant pressed Meade to get 

Warren across the river as soon as possible. The V Corps soldiers pushed 

across a ford at Jericho Mills later that afternoon. At 1600, Hancock attacked 

a Confederate redoubt under Colonel John Henegan (from Kershaw’s division of Anderson’s I Corps) north of the river that blocked the direct route 

on Telegraph Road to Hanover Junction. After a short fight, the Federals 

occupied the north bank at Chesterfield Bridge, and Hancock was poised 

to cross the river and press the Southern right flank.

In the meantime, Warren’s corps fought a series of sharp engagements 

after crossing Jericho Mills that included several tactical setbacks for the 

North, but ultimately secured a position for the Union forces south of the 

river. During this fight, some old and normally reliable Union units (the 

Iron Brigade and Pennsylvania Bucktails) were forced to retreat when 

Wilcox’s division (Hill’s III Corps) struck them with a sharp counterattack. 

However, Hill failed to bring up Heth’s division in time to support Wilcox’s 

attack, and the Union V Corps’ Regulars backed by artillery under Colonel 

Charles Wainwright forced the Confederates to retreat. During this seesaw 
72

fight, Maryland troops, fighting on the Union side, rushed across a bridge, 

and after pushing retreating fellow Federals into the water, the Marylanders 

helped to throw back Wilcox’s assaults. Union soldiers were now securely 

positioned across the North Anna on Lee’s left and Union forces were 

ready to press across the Chesterfield Bridge on Lee’s right. By the end of 

23 May, Lee knew that he could no longer defend along the length of the 

North Anna River itself, and he searched for a new alternative to defend 

his position.

On the evening of 23 May, Lee held a meeting at his headquarters near 

Hanover Junction to discuss his options with staff and subordinate commanders. Lee conducted the meeting superbly. First, he directed arriving 

forces (Pickett’s, Rodes’ and Gordon’s divisions) to a central position on 

the Virginia Central Railroad where they could be deployed to either flank 

as needed. Then, he asked for opinions as to whether the Army of Northern 

Virginia should withdraw or defend its current positions. Everyone agreed 

that Hanover Junction was too crucial to abandon, and thus withdrawal 

was out of the question. But with his flanks threatened, Lee knew that 

he could not regain the river line, and he asked his officers to suggest 

alternate positions. The Confederate engineers were divided on their opinions of potential positions for the Southern right flank at the Chesterfield 

Bridge. One option was to continue to hold on the banks of the river and 

contest the Federal crossing. Another choice was to pull slightly south of 

the river to some high ground at the Fox house. The final option was for 

the Confederates to pull further away from the river to a swampy area 

south and west of the Fox house.

Lee listened to the suggestions and developed a brilliant plan. Hill’s 

corps would adjust its line on the Confederate left occupying a naturally 

strong position between the North Anna and Little Rivers. On the right 

flank, Lee opted to pull back to the defensible swampy terrain south of 

the Fox house. Kershaw and Field’s divisions (from Anderson’s corps), 

Breckinridge’s independent division, and Rodes’ division (from Ewell’s 

corps) were to occupy this line. Early’s and Gordon’s divisions (from Ewell’s 

corps), as well as Pickett’s division (Anderson’s corps), were designated 

as a reserve and positioned in a central location in the Confederate rear. 

Only the Confederate center (Mahone’s division) remained on the North 

Anna. Thus, the Southern line formed an inverted “V” with the tip in an 

almost impregnable position on the riverbank. Lee ordered the troops on 

both sides of the “V” to entrench their positions as extensively as possible, 

but his intentions were anything but defensive. Instead, Lee fortified his 

positions to minimize the number of troops in the front lines, thus keeping 

a large number of units in reserve. He hoped that the Union forces would 
73

take the bait and advance across the river on one or both of the flanks. If this 

happened, Grant’s forces would be split, and Union reinforcements going 

from one flank to another would have to cross the North Anna twice. With 

his large reserve and advantage of interior lines, Lee could then launch an 

attack on either flank and destroy the Union forces in detail.

Lee had created an excellent plan, and his mind was as sharp as ever. 

However, after two days of riding and the late night meeting, the Confederate 

commander’s health had reached the breaking point. He had a fever and 

was exhausted. His bad health showed early in the morning when he set 

out to inspect the Southern positions. After placing Breckinridge’s division, Lee rode over to Hill’s positions. Uncharacteristically, Lee snapped 

at Hill over the III Corps commander’s performance in yesterday’s battle: 

“Why did you not do as Jackson would have done—thrown your whole 

force upon these people and driven them back?” (As quoted by Rhea, To 

the North Anna River, p. 326 from a letter, Jedediah Hotchkiss to Henry 

Alexander White, January 12, 1897, in Hotchkiss Collection, Library of 

Congress.) This loss of temper was a clear sign of his poor health and 

fatigue, and an ominous sign that Lee’s brilliant planning might come to 

naught.

On the Union side, the Federal leadership began to evince a growing 

sense of optimism even though the overall picture on the North Anna was 

still unclear. At their headquarters at Mount Carmel Church, Grant and 

Meade ordered Warren to take advantage of his crossing at Jericho Mills 

and press the Confederate left flank. Wright was to cross the river with 

his VI Corps and support Warren. At 0700, the Union leaders interviewed 

two slaves who had left the Doswell Farm (near the far end of Lee’s right 

flank). The slaves stated that their owner had left the area and that the 

entire Confederate army was in retreat. This piece of news—even though 

false—encouraged Grant and Meade who ordered Hancock to accelerate 

his crossing at Chesterfield Bridge. They reasoned that if the Confederates 

were abandoning the river line and Hanover Junction, the Federals might 

have a chance to crush the Southerners while they were in the process of 

moving.

At about 0800 on 24 May, Hancock crossed the North Anna. Gibbon’s 

division crossed on a makeshift pontoon bridge just east of Telegraph Road 

while Birney’s division took Chesterfield Bridge itself. Within an hour, the 

II Corps had taken the Fox house and its surrounding high ground. In the 

meantime, on the other Union flank Warren groped slowly to the south. On 

both flanks, the Union forces had not faced any serious Confederate opposition (this was because they had not yet stumbled on the main Southern 

positions), and their reports to the Union headquarters encouraged Grant 
74

and Meade to push their offensive even harder. They ordered Burnside, 

whose IX Corps was positioned between Hancock and Warren, to get 

across the North Anna, seize Ox Ford, and link the two Union flanks. The 

Union leaders believed that all of Lee’s army was in retreat, so they did not 

anticipate that Burnside would face much of a problem. 

Burnside attempted to comply with these instructions. His first plan 

called for two regiments to take the ford with the help of massed IX Corps 

artillery on the north bank. By 1000, these regiments were in position on 

a small island in the North Anna across from Ox Ford awaiting a bugle 

call to signal the attack. However, at the last minute, Burnside canceled 

the attack. This was certainly a wise decision; Mahone’s Confederates 

were firmly entrenched on a bluff on the other side of the river and would 

have easily repulsed the attack with significant casualties to the Union 

regiments.

Burnside now decided on a different plan. Earlier in the morning, Crawford’s division of the V Corps had moved south of the river 

and uncovered a crossing site at Quarles’ Mill. Burnside directed Major 

General Thomas L. Crittenden’s division to cross at this site and to advance 

along the southern bank of the river, thus flanking the Confederates at 

Ox Ford. The IX Corps commander, like Grant and Meade, assumed that 

the tough Confederate defense at Ox Ford was merely a covering position for the Confederate withdrawal, and he believed that the Southerners 

would retreat without a major assault. Crittenden understood Burnside’s 

intent, and he directed his leading brigade under Brigadier General James 

H. Ledlie to cross at Quarles’ Mill and move slowly down the riverbank 

to cover the crossing of the rest of the division. Ledlie’s men began their 

crossing at 1400.

Unfortunately for the Union, Crittenden was at best a mediocre commander and Ledlie was an incompetent drunk. Crittenden, who had earlier 

been removed from corps command in the western theater for his poor performance at Chickamauga, showed little energy as he sluggishly moved his 

division across the river (by 1800, he still had not brought his last brigade 

over the North Anna). Ledlie, clearly intoxicated, ignored Crittenden’s 

orders not to attack the entrenched Confederates. The result was a disastrous charge by Ledlie’s brigade against Mahone’s and Brigadier General 

Edward A. Perry’s fortified lines. Canister and rifle fire raked the Federal 

attackers as they advanced across open ground. Union losses were heavy 

without having any effect on the Southern defenses. This sad and unnecessary episode alerted Union commanders to the fact that the Southerners 

still held Ox Ford in strength.
75

By the time of Ledlie’s debacle, the Union forces had advanced into 

the vulnerable position that Lee had so desired. The V and VI Corps on the 

west were separated from the IX Corps by the North Anna, and likewise, 

the river bend cut between the IX Corps and the II Corps on the east. Lee 

seemed to sense this, but his health failed him at this opportune moment. 

The Confederate commander, confined to his bed and nearly delirious from 

fever, shouted, “We must strike them a blow—we must never let them 

pass us again—we must strike them a blow” (Charles S. Venable, “The 

Campaign from the Wilderness to Petersburg,” in Southern Historical 

Society Papers [hereafter referred to as SHSP], volume 14, Richmond, 

VA: 1873, 535). As pugnacious as ever, Lee was too ill to lead the attack 

himself, nor would he trust his subordinate commanders to carry out the 

operation on their own. 

Late on the evening of 24 May, Grant and Meade realized the vulnerable position of their forces. They stopped all attacks and ordered their 

troops to entrench. In addition, they directed the construction of additional 

bridges on the North Anna so that the separated corps could move reinforcements more rapidly to each other. By midday on 25 May, the Union 

army, although still in an awkward position, was better prepared to resist a 

Confederate attack. The Union command waited one more day in position 

before withdrawing to the north side of the river on 26 May and setting a 

new plan in motion.

Unlike the earlier struggles in the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, the 

fighting on the North Anna was relatively light and casualties were mercifully low. Even so, the results were similar: the Union forces had begun 

with a move around Lee’s right flank that forced Lee to give ground, but 

the skillful Confederate commander had reacted fast enough to achieve 

a tactical stalemate. Lee had even created a superb opportunity to launch 

a major Southern attack, but due to his illness and the lack of experience 

and initiative in his subordinate commanders, this assault never occurred. 

Even so, Grant continued to retain the strategic and operational initiative. 

Grant remained determined in his objective and flexible in his methods. 

However, because of Lee’s inability to launch an attack, the Union commander came away from the North Anna with the mistaken impression 

that the Confederates were worn out and on the verge of collapse. This 

incorrect view of the Southern army’s morale may have factored into the 

tragic Union assault at Cold Harbor that occurred one week later.

Yellow Tavern 

During the struggle on the North Anna River, Sheridan’s cavalry 

returned from its long raid that had begun with the argument between 
76

Meade and Sheridan at Todd’s Tavern during the march to Spotsylvania. It 

is useful to go back and trace Sheridan’s raid and Stuart’s response, which 

ultimately led to the cavalry battle at Yellow Tavern, because the raid had 

a significant impact on the movements of both armies and on the course of 

the Overland Campaign.

As mentioned earlier, Meade and Sheridan had engaged in a shouting 

match on the night of 8 May after Sheridan’s cavalry had failed to clear the 

road to Spotsylvania for the Union infantry. Meade informed Grant of the 

argument, probably hoping that the general in chief would side with the 

army commander and chastise the fiery—and insubordinate—Sheridan. 

However, when Meade told Grant that Sheridan boasted that he could 

whip Jeb Stuart if given the chance for independent operations, Grant 

seemed intrigued. He asked Meade, “Did Sheridan say that?” And then 

added, “Well, he generally knows what he is talking about. Let him start 

right out and do it” (Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant, New York, 

NY: Century Publishing, 1897, 29).

With this casual comment, Grant set Sheridan’s cavalry in motion, but 

the general in chief’s decision revealed several flaws. First, Grant never 

resolved the conflict between Meade and Sheridan. Some historians have 

proposed that Grant may have intended avoiding command conflict by 

separating Sheridan from Meade. Whether or not this was the case, the 

festering relationship between the army commander and his cavalry leader 

could not be fixed with a temporary separation of the generals and would 

only worsen when Sheridan returned. Second, the departure of the Union 

cavalry left Grant and Meade without adequate reconnaissance capability. This error was compounded when Sheridan asked for, and received, 

permission to take all three of his divisions on the raid. Stuart, gradually reacting to Sheridan’s move, left three brigades of his cavalry with 

Lee’s army. Thus for the next two weeks, Grant and Meade were virtually 

“blind,” while Lee remained well informed of his opponent’s locations.

Sheridan set out on the morning of 9 May. His command consisted 

of three divisions totaling 10,000 horsemen with 32 guns. All told, his 

advancing column was 13 miles long as it marched. The Northern cavalry 

began traveling to the northwest to loop around the infantry forces locked 

in combat at Spotsylvania. Then the Union troops turned southwest toward 

the North Anna River and Richmond. Sheridan deliberately maintained a 

slow pace because his main intent was to draw Stuart into battle.

Stuart detected Sheridan’s move almost immediately, and on 9 May, 

he sent a brigade to harass the Union column from the rear. Later in the 

day, he devised a plan for stopping Sheridan. He sent another brigade to 
77

pursue the Federals and placed both Confederate brigades under Major 

General Fitzhugh Lee. Stuart took one brigade under his personal command and attempted to move on a parallel path that would allow him to 

block Sheridan’s route. Although heavily outnumbered, Stuart hoped to 

catch the Union forces in a vulnerable position while crossing the North 

Anna.

Stuart’s troops arrived too late to catch the Federals crossing the river. 

Most of the Union cavalry was across the North Anna by 10 May, and they 

destroyed the Confederate supply depot on the Virginia Central Railroad at 

Beaver Dam Station. In fact, Southern guards detected Sheridan’s approach 

and set fire to most of the supplies before the Federals had arrived. The 

Confederates lost three weeks’ worth of rations for the Army of Northern 

Virginia. Brigadier General Wesley Merritt’s Union division pushed 10 

miles south of Beaver Dam Station, destroying railroad tracks (which the 

Confederates later repaired without much difficulty), burning rolling stock 

(which was more harmful to the Southerners), and liberating 378 Federal 

prisoners.

Also on 10 May, Stuart changed his plans. He notified Jefferson Davis’ 

military advisor, General Braxton Bragg, of Sheridan’s approach toward 

Richmond. Stuart wanted Bragg to use the Richmond garrison, positioned 

in the city’s fortifications, to assist in blocking the Union cavalry. He then 

joined Fitzhugh Lee’s two brigades and rode to the east of the Union force 

in an effort to join the garrison in repulsing the Union cavalry. This left 

one Confederate brigade following Sheridan’s force. If Stuart’s blocking 

force could engage the Union cavalry and keep them distracted, the trailing Southern brigade might be able to hit Sheridan’s rear and inflict a 

major defeat on the Union force.

After some hard riding, Stuart’s blocking force reached the outskirts 

of Richmond ahead of the Union cavalry on the morning of 11 May. The 

Confederate cavalry commander decided to deploy his troops forward of 

the Richmond fortifications to try and buy more time for Bragg to concentrate the units from the garrison on the north side of the capital. Stuart 

selected a position at the point where Telegraph and Mountain Roads 

joined Brook Turnpike, a major artery into Richmond and Sheridan’s most 

likely approach route. Near an abandoned inn called Yellow Tavern, the 

Confederates adopted an unusual L-shaped formation with one leg jutting toward the approaching Union column. It appears that Stuart hoped 

to catch the Federals in an ambush where one leg of the “L” could catch 

Sheridan’s force in the flank as it moved down Brook Turnpike.

Merritt’s Union division was the first to approach Stuart’s position. 
78

Rather than advancing into Stuart’s trap, Merritt deployed his brigades 

against the advanced leg of the Confederate “L.” After about an hour of 

fighting, Merritt forced the Confederate left flank back, but the Southerners 

established a new position that repulsed the Federals. As the afternoon 

approached, Sheridan waited for Brigadier General James H. Wilson’s 

division to arrive before launching a new assault, and a lull descended on 

the battlefield.

During this time, Stuart gained confidence in his chances for the 

upcoming fight. After the morning’s struggle, the Confederate position 

had become a straight line that was strongly posted on some high ground 

near Yellow Tavern. In addition, Stuart received word that 4,000 men from 

the Richmond garrison were on the way and that the Confederate brigade 

trailing Sheridan’s column had pushed back the Union rear guard. The 

Confederate commander believed that he might yet trap Sheridan between 

two Southern forces and decisively defeat the Federals with the help of the 

Richmond reinforcements.

Stuart’s hopes, however, were not to be realized. First, the Union rear 

guard, Brigadier General David M. Gregg’s division, turned on the pursuing 

Confederate brigade and routed it near Allen’s Station. More significantly, 

Sheridan launched a late afternoon attack that overwhelmed Stuart’s line 

at Yellow Tavern. The Union attack was spearheaded by Brigadier General 

George A. Custer’s brigade, which took a battery of Confederate artillery 

near the center of the Southern line. On Custer’s left, part of Wilson’s division overlapped Stuart’s right flank, while one of his brigades penetrated 

the Confederate center.

Stuart personally led a mounted countercharge with his meager 

reserves. In the resulting melee, a Union soldier, Private John A. Huff 

of the 5th Michigan Cavalry Regiment, who had lost his horse and was 

fighting on foot, managed to get right next to Stuart and fire his pistol 

into Stuart’s side. Several Southern soldiers managed to move the severely 

wounded Stuart to a calmer mount and escort him out of the battle. After 

turning command over to Fitzhugh Lee, Stuart transferred to an ambulance, which took him to a physician’s house in Richmond. Stuart died on 

the evening of 12 May.

Meanwhile at Yellow Tavern, Fitzhugh Lee was unable to restore the 

Confederate line, and the Southern cavalry retreated, leaving open the 

Brook Turnpike. It appeared that Sheridan could enter the capital, but 

Bragg’s troops were starting to file into the Richmond entrenchments in 

front of Sheridan, and the fortifications were formidable. In addition, the 

Union cavalry leader recognized that even if he entered the capital, he 
79

could only stay for a short time. Rather than risk being trapped in the city, 

Sheridan decided to skirt Richmond and travel east where he could link up 

with Butler’s Army of the James.

The Federal cavalry set out on 12 May and soon reached Meadow 

Bridge on the Chickahominy River. Sheridan wanted to get his troops to the 

north side of the river and use the Chickahominy to shield his movement 

from Confederate attacks to his flank as he moved. A Southern detachment had partially damaged the bridge, and the Union column was delayed 

while they made repairs. Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry and Bragg’s (Richmond) 

infantry harassed the Federals, but Sheridan managed to get all three divisions across the river by the evening of 12 May. The Federal march continued uneventfully on 13 May. The next day, the Union cavalry recrossed 

the Chickahominy at Bottom’s Bridge, and by the end of the day, they had 

reached Butler’s army at Haxall’s Landing on the James River.

The value of Sheridan’s foray remains a point of historical debate. The 

Federals lost 625 men, but they had inflicted losses on Southerners that 

included taking 300 Confederate prisoners while liberating almost 400 

Union prisoners. Sheridan’s men had destroyed a considerable amount 

of Confederate supplies, and most spectacularly of all, they had killed 

Jeb Stuart. Even so, some of these successes were of limited utility. The 

Confederates took some time to replace their lost rations, but they repaired 

the destroyed rail lines quickly. In addition, the loss of Stuart, while tragic, 

was not as detrimental as might be thought because his eventual replacement, Major General Wade Hampton, was also an outstanding cavalry 

leader. Finally, whatever the benefits of the raid, Sheridan made a mistake 

by taking all of his divisions and leaving Grant and Meade only a handful 

of cavalry for reconnaissance and screening duties.

After resting and refitting for four days at Haxall’s Landing, Sheridan’s 

force set out to the north to rejoin Meade’s army. Slowed by heavy rains, 

the Union cavalry stopped south of the swollen Pamunkey River at a small 

port called White House. His forces repaired a destroyed railroad bridge 

and crossed the Pamunkey on 22 and 23 May. The Union troops continued north to King William Courthouse before rejoining the Army of the 

Potomac on the North Anna on 24 May.

Cold Harbor

After the actions on the North Anna, and with Sheridan’s cavalry back 

from its raid, Grant and Meade made plans for their next move. Once 

again, the Union leaders decided to sidle to the southeast in an attempt 

to turn Lee’s right flank. The new move required another shift in base, 

this time from Port Royal on the Rappahannock River to White House 
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Landing on the Pamunkey River. The Federal supply services and navy 

skillfully conducted the change of base while the Union army made its 

move. In addition, the Union command arrangements improved when 

Grant finally placed Burnside’s IX Corps officially under Meade’s command in the Army of the Potomac on 24 May. Despite the excellent logistics support and better command structure, the Union army was clearly 

showing signs of exhaustion after several weeks of constant marching and 

fighting. Soldiers and staff officers were becoming weary and finding it 

increasingly more difficult to execute Grant’s aggressive plans.

The Federals began their move early on 27 May. The Union army traveled in two columns: the V and IX Corps on the southern route and the II 

and VI Corps moving parallel and slightly to the north. Using the Pamunkey 

River to guard their flank, the leading Union forces advanced to a crossing 

point at the small village of Hanovertown. On 28 May, led by Sheridan’s 

cavalry, the V and IX Corps crossed the Pamunkey at Hanovertown and 

edged south toward Totopotomoy Creek in order to reestablish contact 

with Lee’s forces. The VI and II Corps crossed at Huntley’s Crossing, 

several miles northwest of Hanovertown.

Lee detected the Union move away from the North Anna; he correctly 

foresaw Grant’s move to the southeast, but was not sure how far the Union 

forces intended to move. He decided to shift his forces to a position centered on Atlee’s Station, located on the Virginia Central Railroad. Hill’s III 

Corps moved to a position north of Atlee’s Station, while Breckinridge’s 

division moved to Hill’s right, just north and east of the station. Both commands were protected by Totopotomoy Creek. Curving to the south, the 

Confederate line was continued by Anderson’s corps and then Ewell’s 

corps (now commanded by Early due to Ewell’s illness) on the far right 

covering Shady Grove Church Road and Mechanicsville Turnpike (also 

called the Old Church Road). The Confederate lines near Atlee’s Station 

put the Southern forces in an excellent position to counter either a short 

Union flanking movement or a deeper move down the Pamunkey.

While repositioning his forces, Lee took several other actions. He 

placed Ewell on an indefinite medical leave, thus giving permanent command of the II Corps to Jubal Early. Ewell’s physical condition and his 

performance had been spotty in the Overland Campaign, and, despite 

Ewell’s claim of fitness, Lee used the health issue to remove Ewell from 

command as tactfully as possible. In addition, Lee met with Beauregard 

at the former’s headquarters at Atlee’s Station on 29 May. There is no 

record of their conversation, but Lee probably used the opportunity to ask 

Beauregard for reinforcements. Beauregard had only about 12,000 men in 
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the Petersburg and Richmond area, and it appears that for the moment he 

told Lee he could spare no men. After the meeting, Lee continued to press 

vigorously for reinforcements, and on 30 May Beauregard relented, sending Major General Robert F. Hoke’s division to join Lee.

As Confederate infantry marched to their new positions, Lee ordered 

cavalry under Major General Wade Hampton to probe the Federals and 

determine their intent. On 28 May, Hampton advanced with two brigades 

toward a small crossroads called Haw’s Shop. At midmorning, Hampton’s 

force collided with the Union’s 2d Cavalry Division under Major General 

David Gregg. The battle seesawed back and forth for several hours until 

the arrival of Custer’s Michigan brigade, which launched an attack that 

drove Hampton’s cavalry from the field. During the conflict, Private John 

Huff of the 5th Michigan Cavalry, the man credited for killing Stuart at 

Yellow Tavern, was killed. Tactically, the conflict was a Union victory; 

however, the Federal cavalry did not follow up their victory, and they 

failed to obtain detailed information on the Confederate positions. After 

the battle, Hancock’s II Corps relieved the Union cavalry, which was 

then repositioned on the Union left flank and rested the next day. On the 

other hand, Hampton had taken some Union prisoners who revealed the 

locations of the advancing Northern infantry.

On 29 May, Grant and Meade ordered their infantry corps to advance 

toward the suspected Southern positions with one division in front as a 

reconnaissance in force. As the Federals approached Totopotomoy Creek, 

they found the Confederates entrenched and well positioned to repel an 

attack. The Northerners paused as they approached their foes; this delay 

presented an opportunity for a Southern offensive. The Totopotomoy 

split the advancing Union forces into two parts and left them vulnerable. 

Wright’s and Hancock’s corps were north of the Creek, while Burnside’s 

corps and Warren’s corps were to the south.

On 30 May, Early launched Major General Robert Rodes’ division 

against the Union left flank at Bethesda Church. The initial assault routed 

part of Brigadier General Samuel Crawford’s V Corps division. Rodes, 

however, was unsupported, and the V Corps artillery reserve forced his 

division to stop. During the pause, Warren brought up reinforcements that 

stabilized the Union line. Early ordered a renewed assault with Brigadier 

General Stephen D. Ramseur’s division in the lead, but the Federals, now 

ready to receive an attack, easily repulsed Ramseur’s soldiers who suffered heavily. Early later blamed Anderson for not supporting the II Corps 

attack, but Early’s own assaults were also not well coordinated. In any 

case, the Federal left flank remained secure.
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During the fighting at Bethesda Church, Grant and Meade had ordered 

Wright and Hancock to probe Lee’s positions to see if they were vulnerable 

to attack. The Union command thought that the Confederates might have 

a weak spot in their thinly stretched lines, especially if they had shifted 

reinforcements to Early’s corps for his attack. For the next two days, there 

was some moderate fighting, but the Union corps commanders concluded 

that the entrenched Southern lines could not be taken. The awkward 

position of the Union army astride the Totopotomoy and swampy terrain 

in front of Wright’s VI Corps added to the arguments against assaulting the 

Confederates, forcing Grant to search for alternatives.

One encouraging piece of news for the Army of the Potomac was that 

it was about to receive significant reinforcements before its next battle—

the XVIII Corps under Major General William F. “Baldy” Smith. Smith’s 

force came from Butler’s Army of the James, which was located on a peninsula, called Bermuda Hundred, formed by the James and Appomattox 

Rivers about midway between Petersburg and Richmond. Grant’s original 

plan for the Virginia theater had anticipated a significant role for Butler’s 

force, which was supposed to advance on Richmond while Meade’s 

army engaged Lee’s forces. Beauregard’s Confederates halted the Union 

advance at Bermuda Hundred, and Butler has ever since been criticized for 

a lackluster effort. While Butler certainly made mistakes, his efforts were 

hindered by two factors. First, Grant’s initial plan foresaw the Army of 

the Potomac linking up with Butler’s forces near Richmond 10 days after 

the start of the campaign. Butler was in position at that time (14–15 May), 

but Meade’s army was still enmeshed in the fighting at Spotsylvania, 

throwing off the Union timetable. Second, Butler was ill served by his 

two corps commanders who disliked both each other and Butler. One of 

those commanders was Smith. Known as “Baldy” in the prewar Regular 

Army, Smith was a favorite of Grant’s due to Smith’s engineering work 

during the Chattanooga Campaign. However, since joining the Army of 

the James, Smith had actively conspired to discredit Butler and get his 

corps transferred away from Butler’s command. Whatever his methods, 

Smith got his wish.

On 28 May, Smith’s troops boarded transports at City Point on the 

James to begin a move by sea designed to bring his corps to the support of 

the Army of the Potomac. In reality, Smith did not command his organic 

corps; due to the positioning of various units at Bermuda Hundred, Smith 

had to leave behind part of his own corps while receiving other crossattached units in compensation. Smith’s composite corps (still labeled 

the XVIII Corps) sailed down the James to the Atlantic and then back up 
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the Pamunkey River. Late on the morning of 30 May, the XVIII Corps 

began to arrive at White House on the Pamunkey. As Smith’s troops disembarked, Grant set his sights on a new target. The Union commander 

directed another move around Lee’s right flank to the small crossroads of 

Cold Harbor.

Cold Harbor was a key intersection where five roads met. In fact, 

this road junction was actually known as Old Cold Harbor; there was an 

abandoned inn called New Cold Harbor about one mile to the west of 

the road junction. In any case, the Union forces needed to possess Old 

Cold Harbor (hereafter, Cold Harbor) in order to control the roads that 

led around Lee’s flank. Sheridan’s cavalry advanced toward Cold Harbor 

on 31 May. Wright’s VI Corps began a move from the Union right flank, 

behind the entire Federal army, to where it could join with Smith’s XVIII 

Corps to give infantry support for Sheridan’s cavalry on 1 June.

Late in the afternoon of 31 May, Sheridan’s cavalry drove Fitzhugh 

Lee’s troops from Cold Harbor. However, that evening Sheridan grew 

nervous when he received word that Confederate reinforcements from 

Richmond (Hoke’s division) would arrive at Cold Harbor the next morning. The Union commander informed Meade of his concerns and began 

to pull back. Meade replied with a vigorous order to hold Cold Harbor 

at all costs until the arrival of Wright’s VI Corps. The Union cavalry reoccupied its positions and constructed hasty earthworks in anticipation of 

a Confederate attack. Hoke’s men, soon joined by Kershaw’s division of 

Anderson’s corps, launched several attacks on the morning of 1 June, but 

Sheridan’s men stopped the Southern infantry with surprising ease. The 

firepower of the Federal cavalry’s repeating rifles and single shot breechloaders wreaked havoc on the advancing Confederates. Wright’s men 

arrived at about 1000, and both sides began to dig in.

Although Cold Harbor was safely in Union hands, their victory was 

incomplete. The Federals needed to drive Hoke’s and Anderson’s men 

from their positions blocking the road to Richmond, and then Grant would 

be between Lee’s main force and the capital. Wright’s men were tired after 

their all-night march, but they were ready to attack in the early afternoon. 

However, they needed Smith’s corps to add weight to the attack in order 

to achieve a sufficient advantage over the Confederates, but the XVIII 

Corps was delayed. The problem was caused by an error in Union staff 

work, which mistakenly sent Smith’s corps to New Castle Ferry on the 

Pamunkey instead of Cold Harbor. Smith finally received corrected orders 

on the morning of 1 June, and after a hard march on dusty roads, the XVIII 

Corps arrived on the VI Corps’ right flank.
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By late afternoon, the Federals were ready to launch their combined 

assault. The Confederates had thrown up some abatis, but they did not 

have enough time to build extensive earthworks. The two Union corps 

pushed the Southerners back in several places and achieved a significant 

breakthrough on the Confederate right. Anderson plugged the gap with his 

only reserve brigade, and the exhausted Federals were halted as night fell. 

The attack had cost the VI and XVIII Corps 2,200 troops, but they had 

inflicted similar casualties on their opponents and had taken 750 prisoners. 

Nevertheless, the limited Union success had not decisively defeated Lee’s 

forces blocking the road to Richmond.

Grant and Meade realized they had gained an advantage on 1 June, 

and they hoped to turn that into a decisive victory with a morning attack 

on 2 June. They directed Hancock’s II Corps to make a night march to 

the far left of the Union position and join the VI and XVIII Corps in a 

combined assault. The plan looked promising, but the exhausted Union 

subordinate leaders, staff officers, and soldiers were simply not up to rapid 

and complex maneuvers after a month of constant action. Smith reported 

that his men were ill positioned after their attacks, and that it would take 

time to reposition them during the night and to bring up a fresh supply of 

ammunition from the corps trains that were still positioned on roads well 

to his rear. Worse yet, Hancock’s corps started late, took a wrong road on 

the advice of guides from Meade’s headquarters, and ended up marching 

several extra miles before doubling back to get on the correct road. After 

an all-night march in choking dust, the lead element had barely reached 

Cold Harbor on the morning of 2 June, while the rest of the corps with 

trains and artillery were strung out for several miles on the march route. 

The Union forces were clearly not ready to launch an attack on the morning of 2 June.

The Union commanders initially postponed the attack to the afternoon 

of 2 June. However, after reconsidering the status of his troops, Grant 

decided to postpone the assault to the morning of 3 June. It seems that 

Grant may have also felt that while Lee could have shifted some reinforcements to Cold Harbor, the Union troops and leaders would benefit from 

the extra time to prepare a well-coordinated attack. Whatever the Union 

commander’s intent, the decision to attack proved disastrous.

The delay in the Union assault gave the Confederates an opportunity 

to transfer reinforcements to their threatened flank, and perhaps more 

importantly, it gave them time to improve their entrenchments. Early on 

2 June, Breckinridge’s command was positioned on Hoke’s right, and 

later that day, part of Hill’s corps moved from the far left of the Southern 
85

position to the right of Breckinridge. All along the line, the Southerners 

perfected their positions, digging better trenches and sighting their lines 

at angles to bring advancing Union troops under devastating flanking fire. 

In Kershaw’s sector, where Smith’s troops had made some headway near 

a ravine on 1 June, Brigadier General Evander M. Law repositioned his 

division to cover the ravine and rake any Federal assault with cannon and 

musket fire. The Confederates were so confident of their fieldworks that 

Anderson and Hill pulled troops out of the line to create extensive reserves 

that could block any Union penetrations.

Unfortunately for the Northern soldiers, their leadership’s preparation 

was much less thorough than the preparation of their Southern opponents. 

Although Grant had become more heavily involved in the Army of the 

Potomac’s tactics during the course of the campaign, he decided to give 

Meade complete tactical control of the assault (this included Smith’s XVIII 

Corps, which had been temporarily attached to Meade’s army). Meade 

issued vague instructions that did little more than give a start time for the 

attack. Smith offered to coordinate his attack with Wright, but the VI Corps 

commander gave a hazy reply; Hancock did not communicate directly with 

either of the other corps commanders. Except for some effort in the XVIII 

Corps area, the Union leaders failed to conduct reconnaissance.

The Union assault on 3 June was a costly failure. The only attack to 

achieve a modicum of success was on Hancock’s front. In this area, some of 

Breckinridge’s Confederate troops had to abandon their forward trenches, 

which had become flooded on the night of 2 June. Barlow’s Union division found the opening and breached the Confederate line. However, the 

remainder of the II Corps did not advance at the same time, and Hill was 

able to use part of his reserve to throw the Federals back. Smith’s corps 

advanced courageously—they had endured biting comments as “soft” 

soldiers from the Army of the Potomac’s veterans and seemed anxious 

to prove themselves. Even so, the XVIII Corps was trapped in a murderous crossfire and suffered extensive casualties without penetrating the 

Southern lines. Between the II and XVIII Corps, Wright’s VI Corps made 

only a token advance. Although the attacks were a dismal failure, reports 

of Barlow’s minor success encouraged Meade to order renewed assaults. 

The corps commanders recognized the futility of these orders and merely 

intensified their skirmish firing before Meade finally called off the assaults 

later in the morning. Union casualties for the 3 June attacks were probably 

as high as 7,000 killed and wounded.

The bloody repulse of 3 June was the last major assault in the Cold 

Harbor area. For the next 10 days, both sides continued to dig and improve 
86

their fieldworks while Grant worked out a new plan. Although both sides 

had used entrenchments extensively so far in the Overland Campaign, the 

pause at Cold Harbor gave the armies time to build extensive trench lines 

to a depth and complexity not seen before in the war. Almost every tree in 

the area was soon cut down, and the landscape began to resemble that of 

a World War I battlefield. Although there were no major assaults, snipers 

and artillery on both sides made life miserable for the soldiers.

On the Confederate side, Lee felt secure in his defensive position, but 

he was not sure what Grant would do next. He chafed at the stalemate, 

and on two occasions the Confederate commander even ordered attacks 

on the Union lines. The first of these turned into a light probe by Early’s 

corps; the second was canceled at the last moment when Anderson convinced Lee that the Federal position was too strong. In the meantime, on 

6 June Lee sent Breckinridge’s division back to the Shenandoah Valley to 

counter a new advance by the Union forces under Major General David 

Hunter (Hunter had replaced Sigel after the latter’s failed Valley offensive 

in May). Other than these few actions, Lee’s army could do little more 

than keep a watchful eye on the Union forces.

Crossing the James

As the trench lines grew more extensive at Cold Harbor, Grant pondered 

his next move. So far in the Overland Campaign, the Federals had suffered 

staggering losses, and although they had inflicted considerable casualties 

on Lee’s troops, they had not destroyed the Confederate army. Grant had 

retained the initiative and forced Lee back to the outskirts of Richmond; 

but ironically, the current Union proximity to the Confederate capital and 

the geography of the region restricted Grant’s options. Lee’s army was 

entrenched with its flanks protected by the Pamunkey and Totopotomoy 

Rivers to the north and the Chickahominy River to the south. If Grant 

wanted to make another short “hook” around Lee’s right, the Union forces 

would need to cross the Chickahominy, but they would not be moving any 

closer to Richmond. Worse yet, even if they could cross the river without 

interference from Lee, the Federal forces would be in even more restricted 

terrain between the Chickahominy and James Rivers.

Faced with these problems, Grant made a bold choice. He decided to 

disengage completely from the Confederates at Cold Harbor, make a deep 

flanking march across the James River, and seize Petersburg. Petersburg, 

situated on the Appomattox River, was a key rail hub where several lines 

joined before continuing on to Richmond. By taking the city, Grant would 

cut many of the main supply routes for both the capital and Lee’s army. 

There was a strong possibility that such a move would force Lee into open 
87

battle to restore these supply lines. However, Grant’s plan was also risky. 

It involved another shift of bases and a river crossing of unprecedented 

proportions. If Lee discovered the move at any time, he could strike the 

widely separated Union corps and destroy them in detail. The Federals 

needed to deceive Lee and move quickly to make the maneuver work.

Preparations for the move began on 6 June when Grant sent two of his 

aides, Lieutenant Colonel Horace Porter and Lieutenant Colonel Cyrus 

B. Comstock, to find a crossing site on the James. The next day, Sheridan 

took two of his three cavalry divisions on a raid to the west designed to 

cut the Virginia Central Railroad and create a diversion for Grant’s major 

move to the south and east. Grant also ordered Meade to build a reserve 

line behind the Cold Harbor entrenchments that would be used to cover 

the move, and he sent word to the Union garrison at Fort Monroe to gather 

pontoons and bridge equipment in preparation for the river crossing. On 9 

June, Grant began his shift of base from White House on the Pamunkey to 

City Point on the James and informed the War Department that all future 

reinforcements should go to City Point or Bermuda Hundred.

By 12 June, all preparations were complete, and the Union army began 

its operation. Smith’s XVIII Corps was the first unit to move. His troops 

retraced their steps to White House where they boarded ships that carried 

them back down the Pamunkey, around the tip of the Virginia Peninsula, 

and up the James to Bermuda Hundred. Smith’s troops were to rejoin 

Butler, but they also were later to play a major role in the attempt to take 

Petersburg.

The next units to move were Warren’s V Corps and Wilson’s cavalry division. Early in the evening of 12 June, the cavalry secured Long 

Bridge on the Chickahominy, and soon after, Warren’s troops crossed the 

bridge and occupied a position at a small crossroads called Riddell’s Shop. 

Warren’s mission was to establish a blocking position to protect the move 

of the rest of the army and to deceive Lee into thinking Grant was only 

making a “short hook” between the Chickahominy and James Rivers. 

Warren performed his task skillfully. Throughout 13 June, he remained at 

Riddell’s Shop and prevented Confederate probes from discovering and 

disrupting the Union moves. Late in the day, the V Corps displaced toward 

Charles City Courthouse before following the rest of the army across the 

James River.

In the meantime, the IX Corps had pulled out of the line and briefly 

followed the route to White House before turning south toward the 

Chickahominy, while the II and VI Corps pulled back to the reserve line 

at Cold Harbor to cover the other units’ moves. On 13 June, the II Corps 
88

crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, passed to the east of V Corps, 

and reached the James at Wilcox’s Landing. The VI Corps crossed the 

Chickahominy further east at Jones Bridge, soon followed by the IX 

Corps.

Although Grant had gained a slight advantage on Lee several times 

in the campaign, the crossing of the James was the first time Grant had 

truly “stolen a march” on his skillful adversary. Each night at Cold Harbor, 

Lee bombarded the Union lines to ensure the Federals were still in place. 

On the night of 12 June, the Confederate bombardment did not draw the 

usual response, and Lee grew suspicious. On the morning of 13 June, he 

detached Early’s corps and sent it to the Shenandoah Valley to reinforce 

Breckinridge and counter Hunter’s continued advance. His remaining two 

corps inched forward at Cold Harbor and discovered that the Federals were 

gone. Lee suspected Grant was making a short flanking move over the 

Chickahominy, and he ordered his two corps to cross the river and advance 

toward Riddell’s Shop. The Southerners halted just short of Riddell’s Shop 

at nightfall. The Confederate commander was without his cavalry, which 

was pursuing Sheridan’s force to the west, and—like Grant earlier in the 

campaign—he was moving blindly. He ordered his infantry to advance 

beyond Riddell’s Shop on 14 June, but by then Warren was gone. Lee 

had lost track of the Union army. He wired Davis that he suspected Grant 

might move south of the James, but the Confederate commander felt he 

could not shift his army to Petersburg until he confirmed that it was Grant’s 

intended target.

In the meantime, the Army of the Potomac executed its river crossing. 

Part of the army crossed the James on transports at Wilcox’s Landing, and 

part crossed on a pontoon bridge that was constructed nearby. The crossing sites were about 12 miles below City Point. In this area, the river was 

2,100 feet wide and 80 feet deep. In addition, the Federals had to account 

for 4-foot tides. Union engineers began constructing the bridge from both 

banks simultaneously at 1600 on 14 June, and they finished at 2300. This 

remarkable engineering feat required 101 pontoons and three schooners 

anchored in the river. The bridge included a swinging span in the center 

that opened to allow river craft to get through to City Point.

The bridge handled most of the heavy traffic (wagons, artillery, and 

cavalry). The first to cross the bridge on 15 June were the trains, which 

totaled 50 miles in length. That evening, the IX Corps traversed the span, 

followed later the next day by one division of the VI Corps. Finally, on 

17 June, Wilson’s cavalry division crossed the bridge. On 18 June, Union 

engineers dismantled the bridge.
89

During this time, the bulk of the Union infantry were ferried across at 

Wilcox’s Landing. Hancock’s II Corps began embarking at midmorning 

on 14 June and was safely across the James by the next morning. Also 

on 14 June, Smith’s XVIII Corps arrived by sea transports at Bermuda 

Hundred. The V Corps ferried across at Wilcox’s Landing on 16 June. 

Later that day, two divisions of the VI Corps embarked at the landing and 

then sailed to Bermuda Hundred. All told, using the bridge and transports, 

100,000 Federals, 5,000 wagons, 56,000 horses and mules, and 2,800 head 

of cattle were safely on the south side of the James by the morning of 17 

June.

The initiation of the crossing of the James marks the formal end of 

the Overland Campaign. Grant’s forces seemed poised to take Petersburg 

virtually unopposed, but they would eventually have to settle for a siege. 

The Confederate repulse of the initial Union assaults on the city marked 

the beginning of the Petersburg Campaign.

In the end, the Overland Campaign did not produce a decisive victory for either side. Lee continued to hold Richmond; but he had yielded 

most of northern Virginia and his Army had taken a pounding. Grant had 

retained the initiative and advanced to the gates of Richmond. However, 

his forces had taken horrific losses, and his shift to the Petersburg line of 

advance was an admission that his initial overland approach had run its 

course.

In fact, it was probably the equally matched skill of the two commanders that had placed them in this situation. Throughout the Overland 

Campaign, Grant had often conceived sound plans, and on several occasions, he had come close to decisively defeating Lee’s army. However, 

Lee had countered Grant’s moves masterfully and was able, sometimes 

just barely, to block the Union advances. On several occasions, these 

maneuvers had culminated in horrific battles, but neither side could gain a 

decisive advantage. With two such skillful commanders, it should not be 

surprising that the Overland Campaign was a bloody, yet indecisive, campaign. Despite the inconclusive results, the campaign is rich with material 

that remains relevant to today’s military professional.
91

III. Suggested Routes and Stands

Introduction

The Overland Campaign was fought on several different battlefields 

and involved routes of march that stretched over 100 miles. This guide 

examines the entire campaign in a period of three days. However, groups 

wishing to conduct a ride of the Overland Campaign may not have a full 

three days available for the ride. In such cases, staff ride leaders may use 

a selected number of stands for a shorter ride (recommendations for modified rides are listed below). Keep in mind that the shorter the ride, the more 

likely the focus of analysis will shift from operational to tactical issues.

This staff ride involves significant car travel and some amount of 

walking. The large number of stands covers a wide variety of land with 

different sources of ownership and rules for access. The major battlefields 

are located mostly on lands with easy public access, and you can execute 

many of the other stands in parking lots or roadside “pull-overs” (a term 

used in this handbook to indicate a small area, sometimes just the shoulder 

of the road, where vehicles can park for a short time while conducting a 

stand).

Large areas of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania battlefields are preserved as part of the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military 

Park. This park, a unit of the National Park Service (NPS), covers the 

sites of four major Civil War battles: Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, the 

Wilderness, and Spotsylvania. Only the latter two are part of the Overland 

Campaign. 

Another series of engagements in the Overland Campaign occurred 

near the North Anna River. Unfortunately, much of the land in the area is 

private and inaccessible. However, an excellent stretch of ground (with preserved trenches) near Ox Ford is maintained in the North Anna Battlefield 

Park, a superb private and Hanover County joint venture. 

The last major battle of the campaign was Cold Harbor. Like the North 

Anna battlefield, only a relatively small portion of the ground of the 3 June 

Cold Harbor battle is maintained by the NPS. A short distance from the 

Cold Harbor NPS unit, however, there is another part of the Cold Harbor 

battle area maintained by Hanover County, Virginia.

In sum, most of the crucial battlefield stands are on easily accessible 

federal, state, or county lands. Staff ride leaders should coordinate with the 

NPS headquarters of the Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania Park as well as 

the NPS headquarters at Cold Harbor prior to their visit. The North Anna site 

and Hanover County Cold Harbor Park do not require prior coordination 
92

to visit. As always, staff ride leaders should execute a reconnaissance just 

prior to the ride to ensure all stands and routes are accessible.

On the other hand, the Yellow Tavern sites, and many of the other 

locations used for stands that cover operational movements, are located on 

road shoulders, business or church parking lots, and similar, small areas. 

Please exercise caution in parking and conducting your stands at these 

locations.

The best starting point for the Overland Staff Ride is Fredericksburg, 

where there is extensive lodging available for the staff ride group. 

Fredericksburg is also the starting point for day 2 of the ride. Ashland, 

Virginia, is the recommended starting point for day 3. Though smaller 

than Fredericksburg, Ashland has adequate lodging available and is best 

positioned for the first stand on day 3.

Overland Campaign Staff Ride Stands

Day 1

Stand 1, Campaign Overview

Stand 2, Germanna Ford

Stand 3, Wilderness Tavern

Stand 4, Saunders’ Field

Stand 5, Higgerson’s Field (Farm)

Stand 6, Intersection of Brock and Plank Roads

Stand 7, Tapp Farm (“Lee to the rear!”)

Stand 8, Burning Breastworks

Stand 9, Gordon’s Attack

Stand 10, Wilderness Summary and Next Movements

Stand 11, Todd’s Tavern

Stand 12, Corbin’s Bridge (drive-by)

Stand 13, Laurel Hill I

Stand 14, Laurel Hill II

Stand 15, Sedgwick’s Death

Day 2

Stand 1, Po River and 10 May Attacks

Stand 2, Upton’s Attack

Stand 3, East Angle (Confederate View)

Stand 4, Landrum Ridge (Union View, II Corps)

Stand 5, Angle I (Breakthrough)

Stand 6, McCoull House (Confederate Reactions)

Stand 7, Confederate Works

Stand 8, Angle II (Face of Battle)
93

Stand 9, Lee’s Last Line

Stand 10, Harris Farm and Spotsylvania Summary

Stand 11, Massaponax Church

Stand 12, Motley House and Guinea (Guiney’s) Station

Stand 13, Madison’s Ordinary (drive-by)

Stand 14, New Bethel Church

Stand 15, Milford Station (Bowling Green)

Stand 16, Mount Carmel Church

Stand 17, Hanover Junction and Doswell

Stand 18, Jericho Mills

Stand 19, Ox Ford (Ledlie’s Attack)

Stand 20, North Anna Summary

Day 3

Stand 1, Yellow Tavern I

Stand 2, Yellow Tavern II (Stuart’s Death)

Stand 3, Atlee’s Station

Stand 4, Haw’s Shop

Stand 5, Bethesda Church (drive-by)

Stand 6, Cold Harbor I

Stand 7, Cold Harbor II (Confederate Positions)

Stand 8, Cold Harbor III (Union Positions)

Stand 9, Cold Harbor IV (Next 10 Days)

Stand 10, Cold Harbor to the James River

Stand 11, Riddell’s Shop

Stand 12, Wilcox’s Landing

Modifications to the Three-Day Staff Ride

Although the Overland Staff Ride is best executed as a three-day event, 

there are possible one- and two-day staff rides from the Overland Campaign 

that could still have great educational value. Below are some suggestions 

for structuring one- and two-day staff rides that best take advantage of the 

selection of stands from the full list of Overland Campaign stands.

The easiest plan for one-day staff rides is simply to execute any one 

of the three individual days as described in the stand list for that specific 

day. However, the “break point” between day 1 and day 2 does not fall at a 

natural division between historic events (i.e., day 1 ends in the midst of the 

Spotsylvania battle). Below are two other alternatives for one-day staff 

rides. The first covers the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, and the second 

covers North Anna and Cold Harbor. Both of these one-day rides would 

forgo much of the operational aspects of the Overland Campaign and focus 

instead on tactical actions, which might fit well for a younger military 
94

audience such as Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC), West Point, 

or Officer Candidate School (OCS) students. The staff ride leader should 

keep in mind that the list below only covers the physical stand locations; 

the material of the stands that has been removed should still be covered in 

abbreviated form to maintain the continuity of the ride. Finally, because 

of the large distances and amount of historical material covered, it is not 

possible to conduct a one-day ride for the entire campaign. 

One-Day Wilderness and Spotsylvania Staff Ride

Stand 1, Wilderness Tavern (strategic overview and movements to the 

Wilderness)

Stand 2, Saunders’ Field

Stand 3, Higgerson’s Field (Farm)

Stand 4, Intersection of Brock and Plank Roads

Stand 5, Tapp Farm (“Lee to the rear!”)

Stand 6, Burning Breastworks

Stand 7, Gordon’s Attack

Stand 8, Wilderness Summary and Next Movements

Stand 9, Todd’s Tavern

Stand 10, Corbin’s Bridge (drive-by)

Stand 11, Laurel Hill (conduct the entire Laurel Hill battle [I and II] at the 

Laurel Hill I location; then use vehicles to get to Sedgwick Monument)

Stand 12, Sedgwick’s Death (include Po River and 10 May Attacks)

Stand 13, Upton’s Attack

Stand 14, East Angle (Confederate View)

Stand 15, Landrum Ridge (Union View, II Corps)

Stand 16, Conduct all of the following stands at the Bloody Angle: Angle I 

(Breakthrough), McCoull House (Confederate Reactions), Angle II (Face 

of Battle)

Stand 17, Lee’s Last Line

Stand 18, Harris Farm and Spotsylvania Summary

One-Day North Anna and Cold Harbor Staff Ride

Stand 1, Mount Carmel Church (use this stand to set the operational situation leading up to the North Anna fight).

Stand 2, Hanover Junction and Doswell

Stand 3, Jericho Mills (conducted at Ox Ford parking lot)

Stand 4, Ox Ford (Ledlie’s Attack)

Stand 5, North Anna Summary

Stand 6, Atlee’s Station

Stand 7, Haw’s Shop

Stand 8, Bethesda Church (drive-by)
95

Stand 9, Cold Harbor I

Stand 10, Cold Harbor II (Confederate Positions)

Stand 11, Cold Harbor III (Union Positions)

Stand 12, Cold Harbor IV (Next 10 Days)

Stand 13, Cold Harbor to the James River

Similar to the simple solution for a one-day ride, the easiest construct 

for a two-day staff ride is to execute either day 1 and day 2, or day 2 and 

day 3 as they are described later in this chapter. If conducting the days 2 

and 3 option, the staff ride leader should begin with the Laurel Hill I as 

well as the Laurel Hill II and Sedgwick’s Death stands from the end of 

the first day. Below is a possible two-day staff ride for the entire campaign. However, caveat emptor, this is a crowded two days that would be 

extremely difficult to perform.

Two-Day Overland Campaign Staff Ride

Day 1

Stand 1, Wilderness Tavern (strategic overview and movements to the 

Wilderness)

Stand 2, Saunders’ Field

Stand 3, Intersection of Brock and Plank Roads

Stand 4, Tapp Farm (“Lee to the rear!”)

Stand 5, Burning Breastworks, Gordon’s Attack, Wilderness Summary, 

and Next Movements

Stand 6, Todd’s Tavern

Stand 7, Corbin’s Bridge (drive-by)

Stand 8, Laurel Hill I, Laurel Hill II

Stand 9, Sedgwick’s Death, Po River, and 10 May Attacks

Stand 10, Upton’s Attack

Stand 11, East Angle (Confederate View)

Stand 12, Landrum Ridge (Union View, II Corps)

Stand 13, Angle I (Breakthrough), McCoull House (Confederate Reactions), 

Confederate Works, and Angle II (Face of Battle), all conducted at Bloody 

Angle

Stand 14, Lee’s Last Line

Stand 15, Harris Farm and Spotsylvania Summary

Day 2

Stand 1, Massaponax Church

Stand 2, Motley House and Guinea (Guiney’s) Station

Stand 3, Madison’s Ordinary (drive-by)

Stand 4, New Bethel Church

Stand 5, Milford Station (Bowling Green)
96

Stand 6, Mount Carmel Church

Stand 7, Hanover Junction and Doswell

Stand 8, Jericho Mills (conducted at Ox Ford parking lot)

Stand 9, Ox Ford (Ledlie’s Attack)

Stand 10, North Anna Summary

Stand 12, Atlee’s Station

Stand 13, Haw’s Shop

Stand 14, Bethesda Church (drive-by)

Stand 15, Cold Harbor I

Stand 16, Cold Harbor II (Confederate Positions)

Stand 17, Cold Harbor III (Union Positions)

Stand 18, Cold Harbor IV (Next 10 Days)

Stand 19, Cold Harbor to the James River

Stand 20, Riddell’s Shop

Stand 21, Wilcox’s Landing

Overland Campaign Three-Day Staff Ride

The following pages describe, in detail, the three day Overland Campaign staff ride. As stated previously, the three-day ride provides the best 

educational value. Each stand contains directions to the stand (with maps), 

an orientation, description, vignettes, and analysis.
97

Day 1

Wilderness to Spotsylvania

(4–9 May 1864)

Fredericksburg

20

Rapidan River

3

3

3 3

621

613

610

Po River

Ni River

Day 1

Stand 1

Stand 2

Day 1

Stand 3

Start

Point

2 Miles 4 Miles

Germanna

Ford

Wilderness

Tavern

1

1

17

17

95

95

95

Day 1 Overview

(1 of 3) N

Map 1.

Stand 1, Campaign Overview (Events up to 4 May 1864)

Stand 2, Germanna Ford (4–5 May 1864)

Stand 3, Wilderness Tavern (4–5 May 1864)
98

3

Day 1

Stand 4

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

613

20

621

Hill

Brock Road

-Ewell Drive

Orange Plank Road

Germanna Highway

Constitution Highway

Hill-Ewell Drive

Day 1

Stand 3

Day 1

Stand 7

Day 1

Stand 6

Stand 8

Stand 9

Stand 10 Day 1

Stand 5

Saunders’ Field

Higgerson’s Field

Tapp Farm

Brock-Plank

Intersection

Wilderness Tavern

Day 1 Overview

N (2 of 3)

Map 2.

Stand 4, Saunders’ Field (5 May 1864)

Stand 5, Higgerson’s Field (Farm) (5 May 1864)

Stand 6, Intersection of Brock and Plank Roads (5 May 1864)

Stand 7, Tapp Farm (“Lee to the rear!”) (6 May 1864)

Stand 8, Burning Breastworks (6 May 1864)

Stand 9, Gordon’s Attack (6 May 1864)

Stand 10, Wilderness Summary and Next Movements (7–8 May 1864)
99

648

627

649

608

613

613

613

612

612

608

613

Robert E. Lee Dr

Todd’s Tavern

Sedgwick’s

Monument

Laurel Hill

Gordon Road

Brock Road

Catharpin Road

Brock Road

Brock Road

Catharpin Road

Seays Road

Mill Pond Road

Pritchett

685

Road Blockhouse Road

Grant Dr

Day 1

Stand 13

Stand 14

Day 1

Stand 11

Day 1

Stand 12

Corbin’s

Bridge Day 1

Stand 15

1 Mile 2 Miles

Day 1 Overview

(3 of 3)

N

Map 3.

Stand 11, Todd’s Tavern (7–8 May 1864)

Stand 12, Corbin’s Bridge (drive-by) (8 May 1864)

Stand 13, Laurel Hill I (8 May 1864)

Stand 14, Laurel Hill II (8 May 1864)

Stand 15, Sedgwick’s Death (9 May 1864)
100

Stand 1

Campaign Overview

(Events up to 4 May 1864)

College Dr

Spotswood Drive

Rapidan River

Germanna Highway

Germanna Colonies

of Virginia

Visitor Center

757

3

375

Day 1

Stand 1

Day 1 Stand 1 N

1000 Feet

Map 4.

Directions: Starting at Fredericksburg (where interstate Route 95 crosses 

Virginia state Route 3), go west on Virginia Route 3 for approximately 

17.3 miles. At this point, you will be approaching the Rapidan River; just 

before reaching the river, turn left at the entrance to Germanna Community 

College (Route 375 or College Drive). After a short distance (about 100 

yards), turn right on an entrance road for the Germanna Colonies of 

Virginia Visitors Center (also called the Brawdus Martin Visitors Center). 

Park the vehicle in the Visitors Center parking lot and conduct the stand 

anywhere nearby (but not inside the Center).

The Visitor Center is run by the Memorial Foundation of the Germanna 

Colonies in Virginia, a group that honors the history of German colonies 

that were in this area in the 18th century. The staff ride leader should 

contact the Foundation prior to conducting the ride and ask permission to 

use their grounds:
101

 Memorial Foundation of the Germanna Colonies in Virginia

PO Box 729

 Locust Grove, VA 22508

Phone (540) 423-1700

 www.germanna.org

Orientation: You are currently standing in an area close to Germanna 

Ford, a crossing site on the Rapidan River. About 300 yards to your north 

is the Rapidan River. It may not be visible if the foliage is heavy. The road 

to your east is the modern Germanna Highway, which roughly follows the 

same path as the Civil War road to Germanna Ford. The actual ford is not 

visible from here, but you will be able to show it to the students at the next 

stand (Day 1, Stand 2).

The name, “Germanna Ford,” was derived from a colonial community 

of German ironworkers who settled here around 1714. They eventually 

moved on to Fluvanna County. There was a ferry here by 1732, but not 

during the Civil War. The German iron industry required large quantities 

of wood to be turned into charcoal. They had to cut large amounts of the 

forest, which—after the colonists had departed—resulted in a second 

growth tangle of trees and brush called “the Wilderness” (approximately a 

10 to 15 mile square).

Many Civil War battlefields had less tree undergrowth in the 1860s 

than there appears today. The society of the era needed to cut wood for 

fires, and the livestock ate much of the undergrowth. Even the forested 

areas were relatively clear of growth under the larger trees. However, the 

Wilderness was a notable exception to this rule.

Description: In early 1864, the war was almost three years old, and casualty 

lists were long on both sides. Both sides were war weary, but there were no 

signs of a negotiated peace or surrender from either side.

The North’s political and strategic situation was shaped by the fact that 

Abraham Lincoln faced a presidential election in 1864. Peace Democrats in 

the North were active, and they threatened to win the election and possibly 

end the war by agreeing to Southern independence. A Union victory in 

the field would enhance Lincoln’s chances for reelection. In addition, 

the three-year enlistments of many Union troops were expiring in 1864; 

therefore, to a large extent, the Federal armies had to be reconstituted. 

Lincoln was still looking for a successful commander, and he felt that 

Grant might be the answer.

In preparation for the 1864 military campaign, Lincoln altered the 

command structure in the North. He saw the need for a general in chief 

to coordinate all Union forces in all theaters. Major General Henry W. 

Halleck had been serving on paper as overall commander of the Union 
102

forces, but he acted more like a staff officer and advisor to Lincoln. He was 

clearly not the man for vigorous overall leadership. Lincoln pushed a bill 

through Congress to restore the rank of lieutenant general (formerly held 

only by George Washington and Winfield Scott—the latter by brevet). In 

March 1864, Ulysses S. Grant was ordered east, promoted to lieutenant 

general, and became general in chief of the Union armies. Halleck became 

chief of staff for the Union armies. He performed a valuable service for 

Grant by remaining in Washington to execute administrative duties and 

keep Grant free from the bureaucracy and politics of the capital.

The Southern situation was somewhat different, but fraught with 

problems of its own. This was not a presidential election year for the South 

(Davis had a six-year term under the Confederate Constitution). Thus, 

in the South, it was politics as usual, which meant a lot of presidential 

conflict with Congress and the states that asserted their own rights. For 

the most part, there was no enlistment expiration problem; but as always, 

the South faced an overall lack of manpower. Much territory had been lost 

(Tennessee and parts of other Southern states were under Federal control 

and the Trans-Mississippi had been cut off). Even so, the Confederacy 

was still functioning as a viable nation. Davis was satisfied with the 

military command in the east (he had great trust in Lee), but the west was 

a problem.

Although satisfied with Lee, Davis made some changes to the Southern 

command structure for the upcoming campaign. Against his will, Davis 

gave command of the Army of Tennessee (in the western theater) to 

General Joseph E. Johnston. Davis found a place for his friend, Braxton 

Bragg, as military advisor to the president. Because there was still no 

general in chief, Davis, Bragg, and Secretary of War James A. Seddon 

provided overall strategic direction.

With the command teams in place, both sides formulated their plans.

As general in chief, Grant had to develop a plan first for all of the 

Union forces. In forming the plan, Grant came to hold two basic principles: 

concentration (consolidate garrisons and focus on significant axes only) 

and coordination (all Federal forces working together on a similar 

timetable to force the Confederates to give up key places and overstretch 

their resources).

As a result, Grant’s plan called for two primary advances and three 

secondary ones. The primary thrusts were by Meade (the Army of the 

Potomac) against Lee and Richmond, and Sherman (the Military Division 

of the Mississippi) against Johnston and Atlanta. The secondary offensives 

were the following: Banks (the Department of the Gulf) to move on Mobile, 

Alabama; Sigel (the Department of West Virginia) to move on the Virginia 
103

and Tennessee Railroad and up the Shenandoah Valley; and Butler (the 

Department of Virginia and North Carolina) to move up the James River 

toward Richmond.

Rather than stay in the political swamp of Washington to direct the 

Union forces, Grant elected to take the field with Meade and the Army of 

the Potomac. Meade offered to step down, but Grant retained him, which 

led to a somewhat curious command relationship. Grant wanted to give 

Meade tactical control of the battles, but the general in chief’s presence 

often made Meade hesitant to show initiative. Grant retained Meade’s 

infantry corps commanders, but he gave Meade a new commander from the 

west, Phil Sheridan, who took over the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry.

After developing the overall plan, Grant outlined the specifics of the 

proposed campaign to all of his subordinate commanders, including his 

principal army commander in the east. Meade’s primary objective was 

Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, as stated in Grant’s orders to Meade 

dated 9 April 1864: 

Lee’s Army will be your objective point. Wherever 

Lee goes, there you will go also. The only point in which 

I am now in doubt is whether it will be better to cross the 

Rapidan above or below him. Each plan presents great 

advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. 

By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of 

ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid; but if we 

take this route all we do must be done while the rations 

we start with hold out; we separate from Butler, so that 

he cannot be directed how to co-operate. By the other 

route, Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies 

until another is secured on the York or James River. These 

advantages and objections I will talk over with you more 

fully than I can write them. (US War Department, The War 

of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records 

of the Union and Confederate Armies, Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901 [hereafter 

referred to as OR], series I, volume XXXIII, 828.)

For Meade, Richmond was to be a secondary objective. Grant desired 

to fight Lee outside of the city’s fortifications. The advance was to be 

overland (as opposed to Major General George B. McClellan’s earlier 

amphibious operation on the Peninsula), in order to protect Washington 

without detaching a large garrison.

As Grant’s orders indicated, there were two possible axes for an overland 

advance. The first option was a move around Lee’s left along the Orange 
104

and Alexandria Railroad toward Charlottesville. The main advantage was 

the open terrain, at least initially, by avoiding the Wilderness. The main 

disadvantage was a vulnerable and lengthening line of communications 

(LOC)—resupply would be difficult. The second option was a move 

around Lee’s right. The advantages were that naval superiority gave the 

Union forces a protected LOC for resupply and medical evacuation, 

and such a move might more easily cut Lee off from Richmond. The 

disadvantages were the restricted terrain in the Wilderness and the many 

rivers to cross. In the end, Grant selected the latter route around Lee’s right 

(to the southeast). 

Also, Grant specified that the tempo of operations was to be continuous 

so as to maintain the initiative. Grant probably hoped that he could defeat 

Lee in a decisive battle, but if that failed, he was prepared to continue 

operations in a campaign that would link multiple battles to further his 

strategic aims.

There are also other aspects of the situation of the Army of the Potomac 

worth noting. This was an army that had suffered numerous defeats under 

bad leadership. It was built by McClellan, and then squandered by him, 

Pope, Burnside, and Hooker. For this campaign, it was commanded by 

Major General George Gordon Meade, the victor of Gettysburg. It totaled 

99,400 troops (without the IX Corps). The army’s five infantry corps of 

1863 had been consolidated into three corps—the II, V, and VI Corps. 

(The I and III Corps, both devastated at Gettysburg, had been abolished 

and their units were given to the remaining II, V, and VI Corps.)

Working with the Army of the Potomac in an unusual relationship was 

the IX Corps under Major General Ambrose Everett Burnside. Burnside 

was senior in rank to Meade (he had been the army’s commander in 1862 

when Meade was only a division commander). To spare Burnside’s feelings, Grant had Burnside report directly to the general in chief instead of 

Meade.

Grant intended to control all elements of the campaign with a small 

staff of 14 officers. His idea was to give general directions and let Meade 

do the specific implementation. This system required much teamwork and 

forbearance to work well. Grant also wanted to speed up the army’s movements. He decreed a rigorous reduction in vehicles, but still ended up with 

4,300 wagons and 835 ambulances for the campaign.

The situation and planning of the Army of Northern Virginia differed 

significantly from its Federal counterpart. Lee wanted to assume an 

offensive stance to preempt the Federals. However, the Southern forces 

were hindered by weaknesses in manpower and logistics. At the end of 

March 1864, Lee learned that the Federals in his front were receiving 
105

reinforcements (the IX Corps) coming from the west. Lee thus asked for 

the return of Longstreet’s I Corps from Tennessee. Even after receiving 

Longstreet’s troops, Lee lacked the strength to launch a major offensive, 

and he would have to react to Grant’s initial move.

By 16 April, Lee had forecast three possible (and simultaneous) 

Federal moves in the eastern theater: across the Rapidan River, down 

the Shenandoah Valley, and up the James River Peninsula. Lee’s current 

forces were compelled to scatter their artillery and cavalry in order for the 

horses to forage. On 18 April, Lee issued a warning order for the Army of 

Northern Virginia to be prepared for movement, while he tried to divine 

the route of advance for Meade’s army.

On 2 May 1864, Lee ascended Clark’s Mountain with three corps and 

eight division commanders. The mountain was a Confederate signal post 

with a commanding view of the surrounding terrain. From here, Lee could 

see the camps of the Army of the Potomac around Culpeper (vicinity of 

Brandy Station), and he could see parts of his own army. Ewell’s II Corps 

was to the east, covered by the Rapidan River and Mine Run. Hill’s III 

Corps was visible to the southwest (near Orange Courthouse), which was 

also Lee’s headquarters. Out of view was Longstreet’s I Corps (minus 

Pickett’s division). This corps was about 25 miles south of Clark’s Mountain 

near Gordonsville. The cavalry corps, under Stuart, was scattered, either 

screening the line of Rapidan or south of Fredericksburg foraging for the 

horses.

The Clark’s Mountain signal detachment was under the direction of 

Sergeant B.L. Wynn. When he ascended the mountain on 2 May, Lee said 

“I think those people over there are going to make a move soon. Grant will 

cross by one of those fords” (B.L. Wynn, Confederate Veteran, vol. 21, 

68). Lee pointed in the direction of Germanna and Ely’s Fords. He asked 

Wynn if his troops had posted a night guard, and when told they had not, 

the army commander directed Wynn to begin posting a lookout at night as 

well as during the day.

At around midnight on 3 May, a signalman notified Wynn that the 

enemy camps were stirring. The message was relayed to Lee at Orange 

Courthouse. Lee asked if the Union forces were moving west or east, but 

the signalmen informed him that it was too dark to tell. At 0500 on 4 May, 

Wynn signaled that the Federal move was to the east toward Germanna 

Ford.

Lee soon issued orders for the Army of Northern Virginia to move east. 

Ewell was to move on the Orange-Fredericksburg Turnpike with most of 

his corps (minus two brigades). Hill was to move on Orange Plank Road 

with most of his corps (minus Anderson’s division). Initially, Longstreet 
106

was to move from Gordonsville to Todd’s Tavern, which would bring him 

on Hill’s right (southern) flank. Later, Longstreet was directed to move 

further north toward Verdiersville, and then take Orange Plank Road—this 

brought him behind Hill’s corps. Lee also asked the Richmond leadership 

to release Pickett’s division of Longstreet’s I Corps. Despite this request, 

Davis would hold Pickett back for the time being.

Lee’s intent, though not specified, can be inferred from his actions 

and orders. If Grant continued southeast, the Federals would have to 

pass through the Wilderness. Lee knew that he was unable to dispute all 

of the Rapidan crossings (partly because of the need for the dispersion 

of his cavalry), but he could wait until the Union army was across the 

river and in the Wilderness, and then strike the Federals while they were 

moving in this restricted terrain. Lee knew he was outnumbered, but he 

thought the Federals had only 75,000 men (this underestimate may have 

also contributed to Lee’s aggressiveness). Even with these aggressive 

intentions, everything depended on Longstreet’s arrival. Thus, Lee’s orders 

to Ewell and Hill on 4 and 5 May were somewhat ambivalent—he wanted 

to engage Grant in terrain that would help the Confederates, but he did not 

want to become committed until Longstreet arrived.

Vignette: Grant’s opinion of Meade improved after their initial meeting, 

according to a recollection of Grant’s comments from Horace Porter, a 

member of Grant’s staffs: “I [Grant] had never met General Meade since 

the Mexican War until I visited his headquarters when I came east last 

month. In my first interview with him he talked in a manner which led 

me to form a very high opinion of him. He referred to the changes which 

were taking place, and said it had occurred to him that I might want to 

make a change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac, and to put 

in his place Sherman, or some other officer who had served with me in 

the West and urged me not to hesitate on his account if I desired to make 

such an assignment. He added that the success of the cause was much 

more important than any consideration for the feelings of an individual. 

He spoke so patriotically and unselfishly that even if I had any intention 

of relieving him, I should have been inclined to change my mind after 

the manly attitude he assumed in this frank interview.” (Horace Porter, 

Campaigning with Grant, New York, NY: Century Publishing, 1897, 29.)

Analysis: 

1. Evaluate Grant’s plans. (Remember to justify your critiques.)

a. Briefly evaluate the overall strategy, including the roles of armies 

outside of the eastern theater (Sherman and Banks).

b. Look more closely at the eastern theater. Did Grant properly 
107

provide for coordination of the three main armies in the east? How could 

he have done better (if at all)? Did the general in chief choose the proper 

axis for each army (why or why not)?

c. Did Grant choose correct objectives for his forces (why or why 

not)? What is the South’s center of gravity (COG) overall and, more 

specifically, in the east?

d. Clearly, Grant has some awkward command arrangements—

could he have done better? Was Grant correct to travel with the Army of 

the Potomac? Should he have stayed in Washington? Was he attempting 

to do too many jobs (general in chief, theater commander, and tactical 

commander)?

e. Was Grant correct to retain Meade in command? Could command 

arrangements with Burnside’s corps have been better? How?

2. Evaluate Lee’s plan.

a. Were his forces well positioned to counter Grant’s offensive? 

Should Lee have tried to defend the river line? 

b. What is the Union’s COG? Did Lee choose the right objective (did 

he clearly define an objective)?

c. Were Lee’s reactions to Grant’s moves too aggressive? Did he 

need to be attacking at all? Was it worth risking battle in the Wilderness 

without having Longstreet in a closer position?

3. Modern relevance.

a. What aspects of centers of gravity (COGs) from 1864 are applicable 

today? Should the enemy’s army always be the primary objective? How 

important are capital cities? Where does the will of the people fit in?

b. What are the advantages and disadvantages of defending on a 

river line? Where should you position your troops when defending a river 

(in front, on, or behind the river’s edge)?

c. Today, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) do not travel with a regional 

combatant commander; however, can commanders at many levels still 

learn from Grant’s dilemma in locating their headquarters? How far 

forward should the commander be positioned? How can the military avoid 

both having the boss diverted by administrative duties in the rear and 

micromanaging his subordinates at the front?
108

Stand 2

Germanna Ford

(4–5 May 1864)

Spotswood Drive

Rapidan River

Germanna Colonies

of Virginia

Visitor Center

757

3

375

College Dr

Germanna Highway

Day 1

Stand 2

N

1000 Feet

Day 1 Stand 2

Map 5.

Directions: After completing the campaign overview stand in the vicinity 

of the Germanna Colonies Visitor Center, walk down to Germanna Ford. 

The walking path begins at the rear of the parking lot for the Visitor 

Center—the entrance may be a bit overgrown with brush, but the path 

is a fairly obvious trail (note that vehicles are no longer permitted on the 

road).

Follow the path for about 200 yards then it will bend to the right and 

open into an old gravel parking lot (no longer used). At the far end of the 

lot (left-rear corner), the walking path will start again. Continue on the 

path; it will go down to the riverbank. Conduct the stand near the river in a 

location where the group can see under the modern highway bridge.

Orientation: You are standing on the southeastern bank of the Rapidan 

River, the side that was occupied by the Confederates. Grant’s forces 
109

approached from the other bank. The actual ford is just east and north of 

the modern highway bridge.

There were no bridges here during the war (the Federals will place a 

pontoon bridge after they cross). The piers and abutments in the river on 

the near side of the modern bridge are from a 20th century rail line.

Description: The area of Germanna Ford was picketed by a detachment of 

the 1st North Carolina Cavalry Regiment. The 3d Indiana Cavalry Regiment 

of Brigadier General James H. Wilson’s Third Division rushed the ford at 

0300 on 4 May, scattering the Confederates, “who gave evidence of great 

fright running off and leaving blankets and overcoats and a half-cooked 

breakfast on the ground.” (An account by a Union cavalryman from Noah 

Andre Trudeau, Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 

May-June 1864, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1989, 31.)

Union engineers quickly constructed two pontoon bridges by 0530 

on 4 May. The bridges were 220 feet long. One was of wooden pontoons 

(upstream from our current position). The other bridge was of canvas 

pontoons (just downstream from the modern bridge at our current 

position).

The basic Union movement plan called for units to use two routes. 

This meant that the Union forces needed both Germanna Ford and Ely’s 

Ford. The movements at both fords were efficiently executed.

The bulk of the Union infantry troops crossed at Germanna Ford. The 

V Corps crossed from 0700 to 1300 on 4 May. The VI Corps crossed 

from 1300 to 1800 the same day. The IX Corps crossed on 5 May. The 

Fourth Division of the IX Corps under Brigadier General Edward Ferrero 

remained to guard the one bridge left in place after all of the combat forces 

had crossed. Grant arrived between 1200 and 1315 on 4 May and set up a 

temporary headquarters near the ford. He left at 1000 on 5 May, when he 

was frustrated by the lack of progress of Union attacks in the Wilderness. 

At 1800 on 4 May, the canvas pontoon bridge was taken up to be ready for 

use in crossing rivers further to the south. The wooden pontoon remained 

in place until the end of the battle of the Wilderness.

Fewer troops crossed at Ely’s Ford, but a large amount of the army’s 

trains and artillery crossed at this ford. Brigadier General David M. 

Gregg’s Second Cavalry Division arrived at 0200 on 4 May and secured 

the crossing site. The Federals had built two bridges at Ely’s Ford by 

0530 on 4 May. Hancock’s II Corps then crossed and continued on to 

Chancellorsville. The trains and artillery crossed after Hancock.

Vignette: Shortly after noon on 4 May, Grant crossed at Germanna Ford 

and set up his headquarters in an old abandoned farmhouse near the ford. 

The Union general in chief sat on the steps of the porch and lit a cigar. 
110

Nearby, Grant observed Meade’s more extravagant headquarters and was 

particularly amused by Meade’s new headquarters’ flag—a golden eagle on 

a silver wreath on a lavender backdrop. Grant remarked, “What’s this!—Is 

Imperial Caesar anywhere about here?” (Ulysses S. Grant, “Preparing for 

the Campaigns of ’64,” Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Volume IV, 

edited by Clarence Clough Buel and Robert Underwood Johnson, New 

York, NY: Castle Books, 1888, 97n.)

Analysis: Compare Civil War era engineering and river crossings with 

today’s methods. Note how quickly these 1864 veterans were able to get a 

bridge over the river. Can we do the same today?
111

Stand 3

Wilderness Tavern

(4–5 May 1864)

Day 1

Stand 3

Wilderness Tavern

Remains

Line of telephone poles

3

3

20

Germanna Highway (divided)

Constitution

Highway

Original (Civil War)

Intersection of

Orange Turnpike and

Germanna Ford Road

Day 1 Stand 3 N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Lyon’s Lane

Map 6.
112

Day 1

Stand 3

3

20

Germanna Highway

Constitution Highway

3

20

Location of Meade/Grant HQ

(no remains)

Location of

Wilderness

Tavern

(no remains)

Remains of

outbuilding Wartime Orange Turnpike

to Wilderness Tavern

Germanna Plank Road

Wartime

Wilderness Run

N

Day 1 Stand 3

(Showing War-Time Roads)

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 7.

Directions: Leave the Germanna Colonies Visitor Center and turn right on 

Virginia Route 3 (heading south and east on that route). Proceed 4.8 miles 

and you will come to the intersection with state Route 20. Continue going 

straight (east) on Route 3 for a very short distance past the intersection 

(0.2 mile); you will see a small dirt path (also called Lyon’s Lane) on the 

right side of the road. Pull the vehicle on to the path, and try to park as far 

forward and to the right as possible (thus leaving space on the dirt/gravel 

path for any other vehicles). You should see some ruins and a small plaque 

that mark the site of some outbuildings of the Wilderness Tavern. Conduct 

the stand near the ruins.

Orientation: From your location, you can look down a gravel road that 

parallels Route 3 (this gravel road traces the original path of the Orange 

Turnpike). This path passes under a telephone line—at this location was the 

original intersection of the Orange Turnpike and the Germanna Ford Road. 

The Orange Turnpike was built in 1822, and it connected Fredericksburg 

to Orange Courthouse, roughly 41 miles.
113

Description: The Federals arrived at this intersection on 4 May. The 

advance guard was Wilson’s Third Cavalry Division. He had the smallest 

of the three cavalry divisions (3,500 men). Wilson’s division led on the 

Germanna Ford axis, Gregg’s division led on the Ely’s Ford axis, and 

Brigadier General Alfred T.A. Torbert’s division guarded the trains. Torbert 

was to join Wilson when the trains were safe. Torbert’s mission changed to 

joining Gregg (instead of Wilson) when part of Stuart’s cavalry was found 

just south of Fredericksburg. Thus, Wilson’s small division was left alone 

to screen the army’s front and right.

Wilson began his move by going west on Orange Turnpike. He turned 

south at Robertson’s tavern to check the Orange Plank Road; however, 

he did not leave pickets at the Germanna Plank Road–Orange Turnpike 

intersection. Therefore, he missed the arrival of the Confederate II Corps 

(Ewell), which bivouacked at Robertson’s tavern that evening.

By midafternoon, Warren’s V Corps had arrived in this vicinity, and 

his four divisions camped here at 1400. Sedgwick stopped along the 

Germanna Plank Road in the rear of the V Corps. Hancock went down the 

eastern route (Ely’s Ford) and camped near Chancellorsville at 1300.

Confederate movements brought the Southerners closer to the 

Federals as they entered the Wilderness. Unencumbered by large trains, the 

Confederates continued moving east from their camps toward the Union 

army. Ewell’s II Corps halted around Locust Grove, about 4.5 miles west 

of our current location. Hill’s III Corps halted around New Verdiersville, 

on the Plank Road about 7 miles to the southwest of here (Lee was with 

this column). Longstreet was still out of supporting distance far to the 

southwest.

When Lee received word that Longstreet might join the Army of 

Northern Virginia by the middle of the next day (5 May), he issued orders 

(through his staff) to Ewell: “if the enemy moves down the river, he [Lee] 

wishes to push on after him. If he comes this way, we will take our old 

line. The General’s desire is to bring him to battle as soon now as possible” 

(OR, series I, volume XXXIII, part 2, 948). In fact, Longstreet would not 

arrive on 5 May (he later arrived on the morning of 6 May). Thus, these 

instructions were based on the mistaken belief that Longstreet was fast 

approaching, and Lee’s intentions were aggressive. During the evening, 

Stuart told Lee that Grant was still in the Wilderness.

After their halt on 4 May, the Federals hoped to clear the Wilderness 

the next day. Grant’s and Meade’s orders (published at 1800 on 4 May) 

called for Warren to move southwest to Parker’s Store. Hancock was to 

move southwest to Shady Grove Church. Burnside was to protect the 

Rapidan River crossings, relieving Sedgwick of that duty, and Sedgwick 

would move to Wilderness Tavern.
114

At 0500 on 5 May, Warren began to move. Three of his divisions, 

commanded by Brigadier Generals Samuel W. Crawford, James S. 

Wadsworth, and John C. Robinson were to move south, while Brigadier 

General Charles Griffin’s division was momentarily left in place facing west 

on the turnpike. The V Corps’ trains were to move with the divisions.

On receiving the message to hold in place until the V Corps had moved, 

the corps picket line commander, Colonel David Jenkins, responded: “the 

rebel infantry have appeared on the Orange Turnpike and are forming a 

line of battle, three quarters of a mile in front of General Griffin’s line of 

battle. I have my skirmishers out, and preparations are being made to meet 

them. There is a large cloud of dust in that direction.”

Warren was somewhat surprised by this information. At 0620, he 

halted his corps, notified Meade, and told Griffin: “push a force out at 

once against the enemy and see what force he has.”

At 0700, Griffin endorsed Warren’s message and forwarded it to his 

Third Brigade commander, Brigadier General Joseph Bartlett: “General 

Bartlett will please execute the within order.” 

(The above exchange of orders are in the OR, series I, volume XXXVI, 

part 2, 413-416.)

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. Major General Andrew A. Humphreys (Meade’s chief of staff) had 

done well in getting the large army moving, but not well enough to escape 

the Wilderness.

a. If the Wilderness was such a bad place for a fight, why did the 

Army of the Potomac stop when it was still inside of that terrain? Was it 

because of the large army trains, the plan, the cavalry, or other reasons?

b. Could the Army of the Potomac have gotten through the Wilderness 

faster? How might they have done this? Could they have used more fords 

and split the army into three columns? Should they have started at dark on 

the evening of 3 May instead of at midnight?

2. Was Lee correct in pressing for a battle in the Wilderness? How, if at 

all, does the Wilderness terrain benefit Lee? Does it benefit the attacker or 

defender, the smaller or the larger force? Why? Do the benefits outweigh 

the risks of attacking before Longstreet has actually arrived?

3. Relevance.

a. Which of the following factors do planners face today in road 

marches that reflect Humphreys’ planning of the march for the Army of 

the Potomac?
115

—The size of the logistics trail and the need for supplies versus 

the need for speed.

—The distance to the objective and the need to have the troops 

arrive ready to fight.

—How to best screen the movement.

—Supporting distance between march elements.

b. Civil War orders lacked a formal structure (e.g., five paragraphs) 

and often did not convey a commander’s intent. How might a modern 

commander’s intent have better helped both the Union and Confederate 

forces as they made initial contact?
116

 Stand 4

Saunders’ Field

(5 May 1864)

20

Higgerson’s Field

Plaque

Day 1

Stand 4

Saunders’ Field

Plaque

Wilderness

NPS Shelter

Constitution Highway (Orange Turnpike in the Civil War)

Day 1

Stand 5

Hill-Ewell Dr

Map N

Day 1 Stand 4

500 Yards 1000 Yards

Map 8.

Directions: Heading east on state Route 3, quickly, but carefully, move 

to the left lane so that you can cross at the next opening in the median 

and make a U-turn (less than 0.2 mile). Once you are heading back west 

on Route 3, stay in the left lane because you will make a left turn at the 

intersection with state Route 20. Continue west on Route 20 for about 

1.8 miles. On the left you will see an NPS road called Hill-Ewell Drive. 

Turn left and then immediately pull off to a small parking area on the right 

shoulder. Just across from the parking area is a small wooden footbridge 

that crosses some remains of Confederate trenches. Walk across the bridge 

to the plaque in the open area (Saunders’ Field) for the next stand.

Orientation: You are currently located at Saunders’ Field. The configuration of Saunders’ Field (the wood line) is about as it was during the 

Civil War. Remember the earlier discussion about the nature of Civil War 
117

woods—they tended to have less undergrowth than modern woods; however, the Wilderness was the exception with heavy undergrowth.

The Union picket lines for Griffin’s First Division, V Corps, on the 

morning of 5 May 1864, were located just to the east of this location. The 

road to the north (Route 20) is the Orange Turnpike, which runs generally 

west to east and is on the same path as the road was in 1864. Looking 

along the turnpike, which heads west toward Clark’s Mountain, you see 

the direction from which Ewell’s Confederate II Corps started on its move 

to this location.

Description: By 0730 on 5 May, Ewell’s II Corps was approaching from 

the west on Orange Turnpike. His three divisions were commanded by 

Major General Jubal A. Early, Major General Edward “Allegheny” 

Johnson, and Major General Robert E. Rodes. By this time, Lee realized 

that Longstreet would be delayed, and he issued new, more cautious orders. 

Ewell’s mission was to conduct a reconnaissance in force to make contact 

with the Army of the Potomac, but not to fight a general engagement. Lee 

estimated that Longstreet would not arrive until the evening of 5 May. Lee 

was still in a dilemma; he wanted to fight the Army of the Potomac in the 

Wilderness, but not until the morning of 6 May.

As initial contact was made, Warren’s V Corps needed to shift its 

positions considerably to launch an attack. Griffin’s division was deployed 

across the Orange Turnpike with pickets forward. Robinson’s division was 

at the Wilderness Tavern crossroads. Wadsworth’s division was moving 

into position in the vicinity of Jones’ Field (to our south). Crawford’s 

division was moving into position at the Chewning Farm (even further 

south).

As mentioned above, early on 5 May Griffin’s pickets had reported an 

enemy force moving east on Orange Turnpike. Warren, in turn, notified 

Meade. By 0600, Johnson’s division, leading Ewell’s II Corps, detected 

the Union pickets and began to deploy skirmishers to the right and left of 

the road. Both sides began harassing fires.

At about 0715, Meade arrived at Warren’s headquarters at Wilderness 

Tavern, and “at once directed [Warren] to halt his column and attack the 

enemy with his whole force.” The V Corps immediately began to deploy; 

Griffin’s division began preparing breastworks on the east side of Saunders’ 

Field. Also, Meade informed Hancock to halt at Todd’s Tavern.

Soon after, Meade sent word to Grant that he was suspending the 

movement south and was preparing to attack Ewell. At about 0830, Grant 

replied to Meade: “If any opportunity presents itself for pitching into a part 

of Lee’s Army, do so without giving time for dispositions.” 

(The exchange of correspondence among Grant, Meade, and Warren is in 
118

OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 2, 403-404.)

Within the next half hour, Meade had sent word to Grant that Warren 

was preparing to attack and that Sedgwick’s VI Corps was going to support him. Meade was now more intent on fighting Lee’s army in place 

rather than continuing south and getting out of the Wilderness. Perhaps, 

Meade, who was normally more cautious, was pleased to have Lee out 

of his Mine Run entrenchments, and therefore Meade was more willing 

to attack. For his part, Grant was probably less concerned about getting 

through the Wilderness than he was to force Lee into a fight.

From 0900 to 1300, Warren’s corps experienced difficulty in getting into position due to the thickly wooded terrain. To Warren’s north, 

Sedgwick’s VI Corps likewise found it difficult to link up with, and support, Griffin’s right flank. On Griffin’s left, a half-mile gap appeared between his division and Wadsworth’s men. Warren and his division commanders closed the gap by shifting Wadsworth to Higgerson’s Field; but, 

this left a new gap between Crawford’s and Wadsworth’s divisions.

In the meantime, Rodes’ Confederate division arrived and deployed 

to the south of the turnpike. Johnson was now on the turnpike and spread 

to the north. Early’s division went into reserve behind Johnson along the 

turnpike.

To Warren’s south, Hancock’s II Corps began to return to the 

Wilderness area from Todd’s Tavern, moving north along Brock Road. On 

the V Corps’ other flank, Brigadier General Horatio Wright’s division (VI 

Corps) deployed on Culpeper Mine Road, but did not move quickly to the 

sound of the guns. They were not in the fight for most of the day.

Still with insufficient support on his flanks at 1300, Griffin’s division 

attacked. Brigadier General Romeyn B. Ayres’ brigade made the advance 

on the north side of the turnpike. Ayres’ first line consisted of the 140th 

and 146th New York Regiments, battalions of US Army Regulars from 2d, 

11th, 12th, 14th, and 17th Regiments, and Winslow’s section of artillery.

These troops pushed back Brigadier General George H. “Maryland” 

Steuart’s Confederate Brigade (Johnson’s division), but a counterattack 

by Brigadier General Leroy A. Stafford’s brigade (also of Johnson’s 

division) struck the Union right and forced them back. The lines stabilized 

north of the turnpike; both sides exchanged harassing fire and dug in.

South of the turnpike, the Federals had some initial success. Brigadier 

General Joseph J. Bartlett’s brigade led the advance. With the support of 

Colonel Jacob B. Sweitzer’s brigade, they ruptured the Confederate center 

of Brigadier General John M. Jones’ brigade (Johnson’s division).

Unfortunately, Bartlett’s success left his brigade exposed. Brigadier 

General Lysander Cutler’s famed Iron brigade was supposed to support 
119

Bartlett on his left, but Colonel Andrew W. Denison’s brigade (Robinson’s 

division) failed to support Cutler. Some of Rodes’ Confederate brigades, 

south of Jones, were pushed back and disorganized, but Rodes rallied them 

for a stand that held. Also, Confederates to the north of the turnpike poured 

fire into the flank of the Federals south of the road.

At about 1400, the Union attackers fell back to the west side of 

Saunders’ Field, and both sides resumed work on breastworks they had 

started earlier. 

Vignettes:

1. This is an account of a fistfight between two soldiers during the struggle 

in Saunders’ Field. It is from John Worsham of the 21st Virginia Infantry 

Regiment:

Running midway across the little field was a gully 

that had been washed by the rains. In their retreat, many 

of the enemy went into this gully for protection from our 

fire. When we advanced to it, we ordered them out and to 

the rear. All came out except one, who had hidden under 

an overhanging bank and was overlooked. When we fell 

back across the field, the Yankees who followed us to the 

edge of the woods shot at us as we crossed. One of our 

men, thinking the fire too warm, dropped into the gully 

for protection. Now there was a Yankee and a Confederate 

in the gully—and each was ignorant of the presence of the 

other!

After a while they commenced to move about in the 

gully, there being no danger so long as they did not show 

themselves. Soon they came in view of each other, and 

they commenced to banter. Then they decided they would 

go into the road and have a regular fist and skull fight, 

the best man to have the other as prisoner. While both 

sides were firing, the two men came into the road about 

midway between the lines of battle, and in full view of both 

sides around the field. They surely created a commotion, 

because both sides ceased firing! When the two men took 

off their coats and commenced to fight with their fists, a 

yell went up along each line, and men rushed to the edge 

of the opening for a better view! The ‘Johnny’ soon had 

the ‘Yank’ down; the Yank surrendered, and both quietly 

rolled into the gully. Here they remained until nightfall, 

when the ‘Johnny’ brought the Yankee into our line. In 
120

the meantime, the disappearance of the two men into the 

gully was the signal for the resumption of firing. Such 

is war! (As quoted by Gordon C. Rhea in The Battles of 

Wilderness and Spotsylvania, National Park Civil War 

Series, Eastern National Park and Monument Association, 

1995, 10.)

2. After Griffin’s men were repulsed, their division commander rode 

back to Meade’s and Grant’s headquarters in a foul temper. Lieutenant 

Colonel Theodore Lyman, a member of Meade’s staff, witnessed the 

ensuing incident and recalled that Griffin complained loudly about the 

lack of supporting units on his right and left during the attack. Lyman 

added that Griffin “implied censure on General Wright, and apparently on 

his [Griffin’s] corps commander, General Warren.” Grant’s chief of staff, 

Rawlins, was outraged by Griffin’s outburst and urged disciplinary action. 

Grant agreed, and although clearly unfamiliar with Griffin’s name, the 

general in chief asked Meade, “Who is this General Gregg? You ought to 

arrest him.” Meade was notorious for his own temper, but for some reason, 

he remained unusually calm. Meade approached Grant, and noticing that 

Grant’s coat was undone, Meade began to button the commander’s coat 

as if he were a schoolboy. In a genial voice, Meade said, “It’s Griffin, not 

Gregg, and it’s only his way of talking.” (George R. Agassiz, ed., Meade’s 

Headquarters, 1863-65: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the 

Wilderness to Appomattox, Boston, MA: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922, 

91.)

Analysis:

1. Did Meade’s decision to fight in the Wilderness and his tactical 

deployments support the overall Union operational plan? Why or why 

not?

a. Was Grant correct to support Meade’s decision?

b. Could the Union army have continued its original plan of moving 

through the Wilderness and getting to the clear ground to the south? What 

were the advantages and the risks of continuing such a move?

c. Critique Warren’s conduct of the tactical fight in Saunders’ Field. 

Were his efforts supporting the operational plan?

2. Had Lee committed his army to the fight too soon? Should he have 

waited until Longstreet was closer to the battlefield before pushing Ewell 

forward? Why or why not? Was Ewell’s conduct of the battle helping Lee 

achieve his overall objectives?

3. How was the terrain affecting the battle for both sides? Examine the 

effects at both the tactical and operational levels of war.
121

4. What are some of the implications of the opening of the Wilderness 

fight for the modern military professional?

a. When should a commander alter his original plan based on 

changed conditions? How does a commander properly balance his 

decisions between the extremes of rigid adherence to the plan and losing 

the initiative by responding to every change by the enemy?

b. How does a commander properly craft the commander’s intent to 

allow subordinates enough freedom for the tactical fight?
122

Stand 5

Higgerson’s Field (Farm)

(5 May 1864)

20

Higgerson’s Field

Plaque

Day 1

Stand 4

Saunders’ Field

Plaque

Wilderness

NPS Shelter

Constitution Highway (Orange Turnpike in the Civil War)

Day 1

Stand 5

Hill-Ewell Dr

Day 1 Stand 5 N

500 Yards 1000 Yards

Map 9.

Directions: Continue south on Hill-Ewell Drive. After 0.7 mile there will 

be another small parking area on the right side with a marker and an open 

field beyond the marker. This is Higgerson’s Field. Walk to a spot near the 

middle of the field for a better view of the open ground.

Orientation: You are currently located at Higgerson’s Field (sometimes 

called Higgerson’s Farm). Saunders’ Field (the last stand) is just to your 

north. Higgerson’s Field is about the same size and configuration as it was 

in 1864.

Description: At 1300 on 5 May, the Union lines for Colonel Roy Stone’s 

brigade (Wadsworth’s division) were located to the north side of the field 

across the swampy area on the east side of Mill Branch. Stone had lost 

contact with Cutler on his right. The Union lines for Brigadier General 

James C. Rice (also from Wadsworth’s division) were located to the south 

of Stone on the east side of Higgerson’s Field.
123

At the same time, Rodes’ Confederate division was deployed to the 

south of the turnpike in the woods on the west side of the field. Similar 

to the problems encountered by the V Corps, the deployment of Brigadier 

General Junius Daniel’s brigade in a thick tangle of woods left a gap in the 

Confederate lines.

Wadsworth ordered his brigades forward at 1300. Stone’s 

Pennsylvanians struggled through the marshy area contiguous to Mill 

Branch and could not keep up with Cutler on the right. Stone’s line began 

to pull to the right to try and keep the link. Rice’s New Yorkers, not 

impeded by the marsh, also pulled to the right at a faster pace, causing 

their line to cross Daniel’s front obliquely and exposing the left flank to 

enfilading fire.

Early sent Gordon’s Georgia brigade to attack the flank of Wadsworth’s 

division. He found the gap north of Daniel’s brigade, but in the confusion 

thought he was on the far right flank of the Confederate line. Instead, Gordon 

advanced from between the gap and pitched into Stone’s Pennsylvanians 

on his left. When he discovered Rice’s Federals on his right flank, Gordon 

calmly directed half of his brigade to attack to the south, while the other 

half attacked to the north.

Stone’s men stalled, and then began to fall back, thus exposing the 

Iron brigade’s (Cutler’s) left flank. Daniel’s partially hidden Confederate 

brigade volleyed into Rice’s left flank and began to move forward. Rice 

received word that a Southern force, extending well to his rear, was 

coming up on his left. He confirmed the situation and immediately ordered 

a withdrawal to the east side of Higgerson’s Field.

Both Union brigades broke and were driven back across Mill Branch. 

The Confederates gave a brief pursuit. Wadsworth then tied in with 

Griffin’s division to the north and also began throwing up breastworks. 

Note that later in the day, Wadsworth was pulled out of the line and sent 

south to assist Hancock near Orange Plank Road.

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. Assess the performances of local commanders on both sides in the 

Higgerson’s Field fight. Should Wadsworth have done better despite the 

difficult terrain?

2. Was Warren correct in ordering his units to close to the north and 

cover the gaps in the line (or did he lose an opportunity with Crawford’s 

division to penetrate the gap between Ewell and Hill in Lee’s line)?

3. Does Ewell deserve credit for shifting reserves? Was Gordon skillful 

or lucky? Who won this phase of the battle of the Wilderness (5 May on 
124

the northern half of the field)? How did the results of this fight affect the 

operational plans on both sides?

4. What were Grant’s and Meade’s options? Is their original plan scuttled 

or should they try to resurrect it?

5. Should Lee have pressed his attacks or should he have waited for 

Longstreet? How should he have planned to use Ewell’s corps for the next 

day?
125

Stand 6

Intersection of Brock and Plank Roads

(5 May 1864)

613

676

Brock Road

Orange Plank Road 621

Flintlock Drive

Day 1

Stand 8

Stand 9

Stand 10

Day 1

Stand 6 Parking Area

Day 1 Stand 6 N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 10.

Directions: Continue south and southeast on Hill-Ewell Drive. In 2.5 

miles you will come to an intersection with Route 621. Turn left on Route 

621 (Orange Plank Road) and head east. After 0.7 mile you will come to 

an intersection with Route 613 (Brock Road). Important: You will want 

to stop in a small parking area on the right side of Route 621 about 50 

yards before you reach the intersection. Park the vehicles in this area and 

walk toward the intersection for the stand. Get a good view of the Orange 

Plank and Brock Roads, but then move slightly away from the roads so 

that traffic noise does not disrupt the stand.

Orientation: You have just left Higgerson’s Field; that stop summed up 

the battle of 5 May in the north (Orange Turnpike). Now, you will discuss 

the battle of 5 May on the southern sector of the Wilderness battlefield 

(near Orange Plank Road, or more simply Plank Road). You are currently 
126

at the intersection of Brock Road and Plank Road. Brock Road runs northsouth, starting at the Germanna Plank Road and continuing south to Todd’s 

Tavern and Spotsylvania. The Orange Plank Road runs east-west, linking 

Fredericksburg with Orange Courthouse and points further west.

Why is this intersection important? At least part of the answer is that the 

Northerners need to hold it to reunite their forces, particularly Hancock’s 

isolated II Corps to the south. If the Southerners take the intersection, they 

split the Federal army.

Description: For the Federals, most of the VI Corps was deploying in 

the north near Saunders’ Field. However, one division of the VI Corps, 

under Brigadier General George W. Getty, was sent behind Warren’s V 

Corps down Brock Road to hold this intersection. One Union cavalry 

regiment, the 5th New York, was deployed west of this location to delay 

any Confederate advance. The II Corps was just north of Todd’s Tavern. 

Hancock received Meade’s orders to rejoin the army in the Wilderness at 

about 1100.

On the Confederate side, while Ewell was battling Warren in the north, 

A.P. Hill’s III Corps was moving west to east on Plank Road, skirmishing 

with the 5th New York Cavalry Regiment. Longstreet’s I Corps was still 

marching to the battlefield and would not arrive until 6 May.

Getty arrived at the Brock-Plank intersection at 1130. Getty’s men 

advanced to this point (the rise in the ground at the intersection) without 

flankers or skirmishers, thus increasing their speed. Also, Warren’s earlier 

decision to keep his bulky wagon trains off the cramped Brock Road 

allowed Getty’s men to make good time. (See vignettes for a description 

of how Getty and his staff bluffed to hold the intersection.) Getty and his 

division had arrived just in time, and both sides paused as they decided on 

their next moves.

For about the next hour and a half, Getty deployed his brigades—a slow 

and laborious task in the thick woods. By about 1300, he had his brigades 

on line astride Plank Road. From north to south, the brigades were those of 

Brigadier General Henry L. Eustis, Brigadier General Frank Wheaton, and 

Colonel Lewis A. Grant (leading the famous Vermont brigade).

Opposing Getty was Major General Henry Heth’s Confederate division 

(Hill’s III Corps) deployed with three brigades across its front and one in 

reserve. From north to south, the front line brigades were those of Colonel 

John M. Stone (Davis’ brigade), Brigadier General John R. Cooke, and 

Brigadier General Henry W. Walker. Brigadier General William W. 

Kirkland’s brigade was in reserve.

Getty and Heth sparred until about 1400. In the meantime, Hancock 

had personally arrived at the crossroads at 1245. An hour later, Brigadier 
127

General David B. Birney’s division was the first II Corps’ unit to arrive 

near the intersection. By then, Getty’s and Heth’s men had put up hasty 

earthworks. Major General Cadmus W. Wilcox’s Confederate division 

came up behind Heth. Wilcox veered to the north of Heth’s units and set 

his troops into position.

Hancock had to decide how to deploy his arriving corps. While his 

troops continued to approach the crossroads, Hancock received confusing 

messages. Meade and Humphreys sent two orders that arrived in reverse 

sequence. The first order received (written second) told Hancock to attack 

west down Plank Road with the entire II Corps. It assumed that the II Corps 

was already assembled at the intersection. The second message (written 

first) reflected the V Corps’ difficulties: “Wadsworth’s division on Griffin’s 

left has been driven in, and Crawford’s division has been called in so that 

his line is thrown back considerably. His left must be more than a mile in 

rear of where it was before. Its exact position is not reported yet; will send 

you word as soon as it is known.” This note implied the need to attack with 

whatever troops were available in order to ease Warren’s situation.

Hancock replied at 1440: “Your dispatches of 12 and 1:30 PM just 

received. I am forming my corps on Getty’s left and will order an advance 

as soon as prepared. The ground over which I must pass is very bad—a 

perfect thicket.” 

At 1605, Hancock received another order from army headquarters: 

“The commanding general directs that Getty attack at once, and that you 

support him with your whole corps, one division on the right and one 

division on the left, the others in reserve, or such other disposition as you 

may think proper, but the attack up the Plank Road must be made at once.” 

(The above series of messages are in OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 

2, 407-410.)

Attempting to comply with the orders, Hancock directed Getty to 

attack, even though the II Corps was not positioned to give full support. 

Getty advanced virtually alone as Hancock attempted to get Birney’s 

division to the far right (north) flank of Getty. As Getty advanced, Colonel 

Lewis A. Grant’s Vermonters were heavily engaged by Cooke’s and 

Walker’s Confederate brigades.

Birney sent one brigade north of Getty (Brigadier General Alexander 

Hays) and another (Brigadier General J.H.H. Ward’s brigade) behind Grant 

to help Getty’s effort. The fighting was extremely heavy, and the losses for 

Grant’s brigade reflect this fact. In the Wilderness and Spotsylvania, 1,645 

out of 2,100 of the Vermonters were lost, with an estimate of 1,000 in the 

Wilderness alone. Eventually the Union advance was halted. Both sides 

kept up their fire, and soon Getty’s ammunition ran low.
128

At 1700, Hays’ brigade (Birney’s division) attacked on Getty’s right. 

Hays was killed while rallying his old regiment, the 63d Pennsylvania. 

Grant knew Hays and was deeply moved by his death. Once again, the 

Union attack stalled.

At roughly the same time, Brigadier General Gershom Mott’s division 

went into action on Getty’s left (south). Both of Mott’s Union brigades 

(one under Colonel William R. Brewster and the other under Colonel 

Robert McAllister) performed poorly. Walker’s brigade (Heth) routed 

them. Hancock had to rally Mott’s men to keep them in action.

By 1800, Getty’s division was fought out. It pulled back, and the 

II Corps (with the arrival of Brigadier General John Gibbon’s division) 

occupied the entire front line against Heth. Also at this time, part of 

Wilcox’s division (Hill’s corps) passed through Heth, hitting Getty just as 

he pulled back, and the Confederates took part of Rickett’s battery.

Toward evening, Wadsworth, advancing from the north, hit Brigadier 

General Edward L. Thomas’ brigade of Wilcox’s division and pushed 

them back. Along with Wadsworth and Getty, all of the II Corps was now 

up—but it was too late in the day to press a new Union attack.

Vignette: Getty and his staff had to bluff for time to hold the Orange Plank 

Road and Brock Road intersection. Riding ahead of his fast marching 

troops, Getty and his “small retinue” reached the intersection just as “a 

detachment of cavalry came flying down the Plank Road strung out like a 

flock of wild geese and were soon out of sight.” This was John Hammond’s 

5th New York Cavalry, finally giving away after slowing the advance of 

A.P. Hill’s Confederates since dawn. Captain Hazard Stevens, Getty’s 

chief of staff, wrote that a “few of the cavalrymen paused long enough ‘to 

cry out that the Rebel infantry were coming down the road in force. . . .’”

Getty hurried back an aide to bring his troops up at the double quick. 

Stevens continued the story: “Surrounded by his staff and orderlies, with 

his headquarters flag flying overhead, he took position directly at the 

intersection of the roads. Soon a few gray uniforms were discerned far 

up the narrow Plank Road moving cautiously forward, then a bullet went 

whistling overhead, then another and another, and then the leaden hail 

came faster and faster over and about the little group until its destruction 

seemed imminent and inevitable. But Getty would not budge. ‘We must 

hold this point at any risk’ he exclaimed ‘our men will soon be up.’” 

The Confederates hesitated at the sight of Getty’s squad, and the delay 

bought just enough time for the leading elements of the Union division to 

arrive. Getty recalled: “. . . Wheaton’s Brigade (the First) was brought up 

at the double-quick, faced to the front, and a volley poured in, which drove 

back the enemy’s advance. . . . The rebel dead and wounded were found 
129

within 30 yards of the cross-roads, so nearly had they obtained possession 

of it.” (Compiled from Getty’s report, OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 1, 

676, and Hazard Stevens, “The Sixth Corps in the Wilderness,” Papers of 

the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, volume IV, 189-190.)

Analysis:

1. Critique Hancock’s performance and Hill’s performance.

2. Who is the winner and who is the loser of this battle on the southern 

flank on 5 May (Federals or Confederates)? Justify your answer. Which 

side is in the better position for the next day?

3. Did the battle further Lee’s operational goals? What were Lee’s goals? 

Did they change? Did the battle further Grant’s goals?

4. Is this flank the place to make the main Union effort on 6 May, or 

should the Union forces choose a different main effort and disengage 

here?

5. What are the options on both sides? Look especially at the operational 

aspects. Can the Union forces look at another operational maneuver? What 

about unengaged Union forces (Burnside)? Examine this battle from the 

Southern perspective and the effect of the planned arrival of Longstreet. 

Keeping in mind their objectives for the next day (6 May), is this terrain 

going to favor the Union or Confederate forces? 
130

Stand 7

Tapp Farm (“Lee to the rear!”)

(6 May 1864)

Day 1

Stand 7

613

Forest Walk Drive

Tapp Farm

Clearing

676

Brock Road

Cannon

621

Orange Plank Road

Parking Area

621 Wilderness Park Drive

Hill-Ewell Drive

Park Farms Lane

Longstreet Drive

N Day 1 Stand 7

300 Yards 600 Yards

Map 11.

Directions: Turn left back on to Route 621 (Orange Plank Road) so that 

you are doubling back on the same path as before. After 0.7 mile you will 

pass the intersection with the Hill-Ewell NPS road. Stay on Route 621 

past the intersection for a short distance, and you will see an open field on 

the right (Tapp Farm) and then an NPS parking area also on the right (the 

parking area is 0.6 mile after the Hill-Ewell intersection). A small walking 

path enters about 30 to 40 yards into the field and leads to a cannon. The 

cannon area is a good spot to conduct the stand.

Orientation: You have just left the Brock-Plank crossroads and finished 

with an analysis of the battle on 5 May. You are now at the Tapp Farm 

clearing. The path of Plank Road is just south of your location. At the 

time of the fighting, the Tapp Farm clearing extended on both the north 
131

and south sides of the Plank Road (the modern field is only cleared on the 

north side of the road).

Description: During the night, Grant ordered an attack to start at 0430 

on 6 May, with Hancock to make the main effort. After receiving Grant’s 

instructions, Meade talked to his corps commanders who wanted to delay 

the start of the attack. Meade asked Grant to postpone the attack to 0600. 

Grant was sympathetic but feared that Lee could regain the initiative. 

Grant compromised and allowed a delay to 0500.

For his attack, Hancock was virtually a wing commander; he initially 

had more than six divisions under his command. This included his own II 

Corps: Barlow, Mott, Gibbon, and Birney’s divisions. In addition, Hancock 

had Getty’s division (VI Corps), Wadsworth’s division (V Corps), and 

one brigade from Brigadier General John C. Robinson’s division of the 

V Corps. Also, Hancock was told that Burnside would support his attack, 

although not directly under Hancock’s command.

The Union leadership hoped to rout Hill’s corps and take Parker’s 

Store (the next clearing about 2 miles west of the Tapp Farm) before 

Longstreet’s arrival. Hancock also feared that Longstreet might attack the 

Union southern flank while the attack was in progress; therefore, Hancock 

left substantial forces on Brock Road.

On the Confederate side, Hill was confident that Longstreet would 

arrive early in the morning. Consequently, the III Corps commander refused 

a request from Heth to adjust the Confederate positions and entrench; Hill 

told Heth to let the men sleep. Heth wanted Lee to intervene, but Lee let 

Hill have the final say. Wilcox was positioned south of Plank Road with 

Heth north and slightly to Wilcox’s rear. Lee’s trains remained at Parker’s 

Store.

Hancock’s command arrangements and deployment for the attack 

on the morning of 6 May were convoluted. Brigadier General Francis C. 

Barlow’s division was put under Gibbon’s command and deployed on 

Brock Road to cover any Confederate advance from the south. As a result, 

an entire division guarded the deep left of the line and was unavailable 

for the attack. Also, the II Corps artillery (42 guns) was left on Brock 

Road because it probably would not have been very useful in an attack in 

this wooded terrain. Gibbon’s (II Corps) own division (no longer under 

his command), Mott (II Corps), Getty (VI Corps), and Birney (II Corps) 

were all placed under Birney’s command. These forces were mostly south 

of Plank Road, and they were to deliver the main assault. Wadsworth’s 

division (V Corps) was north of Plank Road, deployed to advance against 

Hill’s Confederate left flank at a right angle. It was not under Birney’s 

command, but reported directly to Hancock.
132

The Federals had 25,000 troops in the attack. Hill had about 14,000 

men defending.

At 0500, the Federal attack began promptly on time. South of Plank 

Road, the lead Union line crashed into Wilcox’s position. Soon, Ward’s 

Union brigade hit Brigadier General A.M. Scales’ Confederate brigade 

and forced it to retreat. Scales’ left and right neighboring units also had 

to pull back. Brigadier General Samuel McGowen’s Confederate brigade was on Scales’ left (north). It fell back all the way to Tapp Farm. 

(See vignettes for McGowen’s exchange with Lee.)

Not long afterward, Wadsworth’s men smashed into the northern 

flank of Heth’s line (Brigadier General William W. Kirkland’s brigade). The Confederates were forced to fall back in confusion, but the 

Union success caused Wadsworth to run into the most northern units 

of Birney’s first two lines. Union units became intermingled, and there 

was some delay in sorting out the confusion. Despite the confusion, 

Hancock’s attack was succeeding. He was elated by the success. (See 

vignettes for description of Hancock’s exchange with Colonel Theodore 

Lyman.)

Confederates of Brigadier General John R. Cooke’s and Brigadier 

General Joseph R. Davis’ brigades (Heth) came forward and delayed 

Wadsworth. Even so, Lee was so worried about Hill’s crumbling 

line that he sent a staff officer (Lieutenant Colonel Walter Taylor) to 

Parker’s Store to prepare the trains for a withdrawal. In addition, he 

sent Colonel Charles S. Venable to hurry Longstreet.

Just before 0600, a crucial, short sequence of events delayed the 

Federals just enough for Longstreet to arrive. Wadsworth emerged 

from the trees at the northeastern corner of Tapp Farm. Confederate 

artillery battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel William Poague 

fired on Wadsworth with his 12 guns (Pogue’s battalion is represented 

by the gun at your current location). Wadsworth paused, then pulled 

back to the woods to prepare for a new advance.

Next, Hays’ brigade (under Colonel John Crocker because of Hays’ 

death on 5 May) and Ward’s brigade (both from Birney’s division) 

moved into the Tapp clearing on the south side of Plank Road. Poague 

turned his guns to face this threat. He lost some men to musket fire, but 

caused Birney’s lead line to pause and reform.

At about 0600, Longstreet arrived. He was advancing straight up 

Plank Road in a column. He needed to deploy into lines, but his units 

were only able to deploy one at a time.

First, Brigadier General Joseph B. Kershaw’s division deployed 

south of Plank Road. His leading brigade (Colonel John W. Henagan) 
133

immediately deployed across the entire front south of Plank Road to 

screen the deployment of the rest of the division. Wilcox’s troops (Hill’s III 

Corps) then retreated through Henagan’s position. Union troops still threatened to penetrate Henagan’s line, but Kershaw’s next brigade (Brigadier 

General Benjamin Humphreys) arrived just in time. With help from 

Brigadier General Micah Jenkins’ brigade (Major General Charles Field’s 

division of Longstreet’s corps), they stopped the Federals. Kershaw’s and 

Birney’s men exchanged heavy fire, but neither could advance.

By 0630, Kershaw was completely deployed. Humphreys’ brigade was 

on the left (on or near Plank Road). Henagan was south of Humphreys, and 

Brigadier General Goode Bryan’s brigade was further to the south (right). 

Jenkins’ brigade (of Field’s division) supported Bryan, while Brigadier 

General William T. Wofford’s brigade (Kershaw’s division) was in the rear 

as a reserve.

In the Tapp clearing north of Plank Road, Wadsworth reformed and 

renewed the charge. Field needed to buy time to deploy the rest of his 

division in this direction. He sent the lead unit, the famed Texas brigade, 

under Brigadier General John Gregg, into battle from the march. He 

ordered them to use bayonets if needed. This was the first of a series of 

Confederate attacks in this region that attempted to throw Wadsworth 

back into the woods (see vignettes for the “Lee to the rear” story). Gregg’s 

Texans (plus one Arkansas regiment) slammed into Wadsworth and bought 

crucial time, but they were decimated (half become casualties).

Brigadier General Henry L. Benning’s Georgia brigade followed 

Gregg. It too was decimated but inflicted additional damage on Wadsworth. 

The Union troops were now beginning to waver. Finally, Law’s Alabama 

brigade (commanded by Colonel W.F. Perry) formed a defensive line and 

a stalemate ensued at the Tapp clearing.

Hancock appealed for help from Burnside. Brigadier General Thomas 

G. Stevenson’s division (IX Corps) would eventually join Hancock, but 

this was after the fight in the Tapp clearing was over. Hancock also ordered 

Gibbon to send Barlow’s division around the southern end of Birney’s 

attacking forces and to hit Longstreet’s flank. (Hancock realized from prisoners that most or all of Longstreet’s corps was on Plank Road, and no 

longer threatened a flanking movement from the south on Brock Road.) 

Hancock claimed that he sent two copies of the orders; however, Gibbon 

said that he never received them. In any case, Colonel Paul Frank’s brigade 

(Barlow’s division) was the only unit from Gibbon that actually advanced. 

It came up south of McAllister, but his troops broke easily and retreated.

By 0700, some Union units were running short of ammunition. In the 

meantime, Kershaw hammered at the line south of Plank Road. He made 
134

very little headway, but forced Birney to commit two more of his brigades 

(under Brigadier General Joshua T. Owen and Colonel Samuel S. Carroll) 

to the fighting.

North of Plank Road, Wadsworth’s division was shaken but still 

attempting to advance. He had Cutler’s brigade in the lead. It was advancing 

in the woods on the north side of the Tapp clearing when it came to a 

stream in a ravine. Perry’s Alabama brigade occupied the other side of 

the ravine and they forced Cutler to stop. Colonel J. Howard Kitching’s 

independent brigade (heavy artillery regiments fighting as infantry) tried to 

support Wadsworth from the north. Perry sent Colonel William Oates’ 15th 

Alabama Regiment to stop them. His 450 men routed over 2,000 Federals. 

(Note that this is the same Oates who sometimes receives criticism for his 

fight against Joshua Chamberlain at Little Round Top.)

The 15th Alabama, now joined by two more regiments, found itself 

on Wadsworth’s exposed right (northern) flank. Perry’s whole brigade 

joined in the charge and routed all four of Wadsworth brigades. Cutler’s 

and Dana’s (formerly Stone’s) brigades fell back to the northeast near the 

Lacey house and were effectively out of the rest of the battle. Brigadier 

General Henry Baxter’s brigade (Baxter was wounded) and Rice’s brigade 

retreated down Plank Road. They reformed after reaching the BrockPlank Road intersection. Brigadier General Alexander S. Webb’s brigade 

advanced from its reserve position to steady the Union position north of 

Plank Road.

By 0830, both sides were exhausted. There was a temporary respite in 

the battle. At this time, Hancock was trying to handle multiple demands. 

He put Wadsworth in charge of all troops north of Plank Road (including 

Colonel Sumner Carruth’s brigade from Stevenson’s division of the IX 

Corps) and ordered a fresh charge. It gained little ground, but that part of 

the front was at least stabilized.

Hancock also tried to coordinate efforts with Burnside (with little 

results). He received a report of some Confederates on Brock Road and 

wondered if they could be Major General George E. Pickett’s division. (In 

reality, Pickett was detached from Longstreet and not near the battlefield.) 

Hancock ordered Birney to send a brigade (Eustis) back to Gibbon to 

help cover this potential threat. Later, Colonel Daniel Leasure’s brigade 

(Stevenson’s division) also went to support Gibbon.

Vignettes:

1. As the Union attack appeared to be on the brink of success, Colonel 

Theodore Lyman from Meade’s staff met Hancock. The II Corps commander 

informed Lyman: “We are driving them sir; tell General Meade we are 

driving them most beautifully.” Lyman told Hancock that Burnside was 
135

not up yet. Hancock exclaimed: “I knew it! If he could attack now, we 

would smash A.P. Hill all to pieces.” (Agassiz, ed., Meade’s Headquarters, 

1863-65: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to 

Appomattox, 94.)

2. The counterattack of Gregg’s Texans at the Tapp clearing prompted 

Lee to attempt to lead the charge personally as told by Colonel Venable 

of Lee’s staff. “The Texans cheered lustily as their line of battle, coming 

up in splendid style, passed by Wilcox’s disordered columns, and swept 

across our artillery pit and its adjacent breastwork. Much moved by the 

greeting of these brave men and their magnificent behavior, General Lee 

spurred his horse through an opening in the trenches and followed close 

on their line as it moved rapidly forward. The men did not perceive that 

he was going with them until they had advanced some distance in the 

charge; when they did, there came from the entire line, as it rushed on, 

the cry, ‘Go back, General Lee, go back!’ A sergeant seized his bridle 

rein. The gallant General Gregg (who [later] laid down his life on the 9th 

[of] October, almost in General Lee’s presence, in a desperate charge of 

his brigade on the enemy’s lines in the rear of Fort Harrison), turning his 

horse toward General Lee remonstrated with him. Just then I called his 

[Lee’s] attention to General Longstreet, whom he had been seeking, and 

who sat on his horse on a knoll to the right of the Texans, directing the 

attack of his divisions. He yielded with evident reluctance to the entreaties 

of his men and rode up to Longstreet’s position.” (Charles S. Venable, 

“The Campaign from the Wilderness to Petersburg,” SHSP, volume 14, 

Richmond, VA: 1873, 525-526.)

Analysis:

1. Critique Hancock’s performance. Did he arrange his forces properly? 

Could he have arranged troops better in this terrain?

2. Critique Hill’s performance. Is he to blame for the lack of preparation 

or was he right to let the troops sleep?

3. Note that Burnside is not a factor in the morning attack. What does 

this tell us about the Union problems with command arrangements (the IX 

Corps relation with the Army of the Potomac)?

4. Could Lee have done anything different to prevent the near disaster, or 

did he handle the battle well while waiting for Longstreet?

5. Was Longstreet’s counterattack handled well? Operationally, could he 

have come from another direction? Given the terrain and Union dispositions, 

was he constrained to a head-on approach (at least initially)?

6. What are the options for both sides once Longstreet’s initial attack is 
136

done and there is a temporary pause in the battle? Should either side renew 

tactical attacks (where)? Should either side halt their tactical action and go 

into another operational maneuver?

7. What can the modern professional learn from Hancock’s and Hill’s 

actions?

a. Hancock left considerable forces on Brock Road for security. How 

does a modern commander balance risk with security?

b. Like Hill, do modern commanders also have to balance resting the 

troops while maintaining continuous operations? How do commanders try 

to minimize this dilemma today?
137

 Stand 8

Burning Breastworks

(6 May 1864)

613

676

Brock Road

Orange Plank Road 621

Flintlock Drive

Day 1

Stand 8

Stand 9

Stand 10

Day 1

Stand 6 Parking Area

Day 1 Stand 8 N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 12.

Directions: On Route 621 (Orange Plank Road) head northwest toward 

the Brock Road intersection. Note that you are going back over the same 

path as before. (You have to go back and forth on this road for three stands 

in order to keep the battle descriptions in the proper chronological order.) 

Pull into the parking area you used for stand 6 on the right of Route 621 

just before the intersection of Brock Road and Orange Plank Road. For a 

different perspective from your earlier stand, walk about 25 yards into the 

woods. This will provide a better feel for the action at this stand.

Orientation: You have just come from Tapp Farm and are now at the Brock 

and Plank Road intersection. There are two parts to this stand. Part 1 is a 

discussion of Longstreet’s successful counterattack against the southern 

flank of Hancock’s line. Part 2 is the later Confederate attack on Hancock’s 

breastworks along Brock Road. 
138

Part 1: Longstreet’s Counterattack

Description: From about 0800 to 1000 there was a relative lull on the 

battlefield, although both sides continued to exchange fire. Wadsworth 

tried to rally Union forces on the north side of Orange Plank Road. On the 

south side of the road, the first two Union lines had meshed into one; the 

original third wave of Union units had now become the second line.

Longstreet decided not to renew his attack straight down Orange Plank 

Road. He sent Major General Martin Luther (M.L.) Smith (Lee’s chief of 

engineers) on a reconnaissance for an attack route around the Union left 

(southern) flank.

Smith returned to Longstreet’s headquarters at 1000 and made his 

report. Smith found that there was an unfinished railroad grade that passed 

south of the Union flank. This ground was perfect for a Confederate attack 

for several reasons. First, the railroad path was unguarded by Union forces. 

Second, the grade provided a covered route for Confederate forces to 

move into position. Finally, it allowed the disposition of units into attack 

formations perpendicular to the Union flank.

Longstreet was in overall command of the attack. The assaulting 

brigades were a mixture of different divisions from his own corps and 

A.P. Hill’s corps. In an unusual move, Longstreet put his aide, Lieutenant 

Colonel G. Moxley Sorrel, in charge of the three brigades on the flank 

(Wofford, Brigadier General William Mahone, and Brigadier General 

George T. Anderson). This was a big responsibility for a junior ranking 

officer—but Sorrel was experienced and Longstreet trusted him.

The Confederate attack began at 1100. The Union troops were totally 

surprised and routed. After the war, Hancock told Longstreet, “You 

rolled me up like a wet blanket, and it was some hours before I could 

reorganize for battle” (James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox,

Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1960, 568).

The Federal left (southern) flank brigade (McAllister) was routed first, 

then the rest of Mott’s division collapsed. Next, Colonel Grant’s Vermont 

brigade fell back. By 1200, Longstreet’s lead units (under Sorrel) reached 

Orange Plank Road and hit Wadsworth’s left as he was attempting to 

steady the fragments of his division north of Orange Plank Road. During 

this fighting, Wadsworth was mortally wounded while personally leading 

a counterattack. Wadsworth was from one of New York’s wealthiest and 

most respected families, and he had fought without pay. His soldiers and 

fellow officers admired him, and his loss was deeply felt. The Confederates 

captured Wadsworth and tried to comfort him in his dying moments. They 

also cared for his body and returned it to his family. (Note: The Wadsworth 

Monument is on the north side of Orange Plank Road about midway 
139

between the Tapp clearing and the intersection with Brock Road.)

By 1400, all Union troops were back at the breastworks along Brock 

Road (your current location).

The Confederate attack, though one of the most successful tactical 

actions of the campaign, had run into problems. Once again, the wooded 

terrain made controlling the units nearly impossible. Also, Confederate 

units moving from south to north (rolling up the Union flank) crossed 

paths with those units attacking the Federals from the front (west to east). 

Finally, Longstreet was seriously wounded (see vignettes). The wound was 

severe, knocking Longstreet out of command for the rest of the Overland 

Campaign and leaving the Confederate attackers short of leadership at a 

crucial time.

In sum, both sides were temporarily spent, and there was a pause in 

the action on this front.

Part 2: Assault on Brock Road

Orientation: You will not change locations after completing Longstreet’s 

attack. However, remind students that the Union entrenchments were on 

the west edge of the road. All of the II Corps artillery was still on the road 

and ready to support the defense.

Description: By 1430, Hancock had positioned all of his troops along Brock 

Road. They were continually building breastworks while the Confederates 

prepared to renew their attack. Eventually the line of earthworks had abatis 

in front. Robinson’s division (two brigades minus Baxter’s brigade, which 

was attached to Wadsworth’s division) reported to Hancock for battle and 

was added to the line.

Records on the deployment of the Union units are contradictory, but 

in general the positions started in the south with a mixture of Barlow’s and 

Gibbon’s brigades all under Gibbon’s provisional command. Next came 

brigades from Mott’s division and Birney’s division. Their right touched 

Plank Road. Next (north of the road) were brigades from Getty’s and 

Stevenson’s divisions. Then came a brigade detached from Gibbon with 

Robinson’s division to their right. Carroll’s brigade (Gibbon’s division) 

and Wadsworth’s spent men were in general reserve.

At 1500, Meade sent orders to Hancock to launch a new attack at 1800; 

however, Lee preempted the Union plans with his own renewed attack.

On the Confederate side, there was also considerable time devoted to 

sorting out the intermingled units and preparing them for a fresh assault. 

After Longstreet’s wounding, Lee took personal command of Confederate 

operations on Orange Plank Road. The Southern commander decided not 

to renew attempts to turn the far end of the Union left (southern) flank. 
140

Instead, he decided to mass on and just south of Orange Plank Road and to 

punch through the center of Hancock’s new line.

Lee’s attack dispositions involved 13 total brigades, but the main force 

consisted of Mahone (R.H. Anderson’s division), Humphreys (Kershaw’s 

division), Henagan (Kershaw’s division), G.T. Anderson (Field’s division), 

Davis (Heth’s division), and Bryan (Kershaw’s division) massed two 

brigades deep.

At about 1615, Lee’s assault began. The Confederate assaults were 

assisted by the direction of the wind (west to east), which lit the Union 

breastworks on fire and pushed smoke into the faces of the Union troops. 

(See vignettes on burning breastworks.)

Brewster’s and McAllister’s brigades (Mott’s division) both fell back. 

Davis, Henagan, and G.T. Anderson’s Confederate brigades exploited 

the gap and captured the breastworks. Federal artillery (II Corps reserve 

artillery) inclined to its right and hit the Confederates coming through 

Mott’s former position.

Hancock ordered Carroll’s brigade (Gibbon’s division) and Brooke’s 

brigade (Barlow’s division) to close the gap. Carroll’s troops were a 

“shock” outfit. They had repulsed Ewell’s elite troops (the Louisiana Tiger 

Brigade) on Cemetery Hill at Gettysburg in another fierce counterattack. 

Carroll’s men went immediately from the double quick into a bayonet 

charge and threw back the Confederates.

By 1700, the Union line was restored and the fighting died down. 

Hancock reported his successful defense, but sent a request to Meade to 

cancel the planned evening assault. Meade acquiesced.

Vignettes: 

1. After the initial success of Longstreet’s attack had run its course, 

the Confederate corps commander along with several other officers, 

including Brigadier General Micah Jenkins, rode forward to restart the 

attack near Orange Plank Road. Jenkins was particularly optimistic about 

the chances for further Confederate success: “We shall smash them now. 

I am happy; I have felt despair of the cause for some months, but am 

relieved, and feel assured that we will put the enemy back across the 

Rapidan before night. . . .”

Soon after Jenkins spoke, a volley of fire from Confederate troops 

accidentally hit the group of Southern officers. One bullet hit Jenkin’s in 

the head, and he fell mortally wounded. Longstreet went on to describe 

the events: “At the moment that Jenkins fell, I received a severe shock 

from a minie ball passing through my throat and right shoulder. The blow 

lifted me from the saddle, and my right arm dropped to my side. But I 

settled back to my seat, and started to ride on, when in a minute, the flow 
141

of blood admonished me that my work for the day was done. As I turned 

to ride back, members of the staff, seeing me about to fall, dismounted and 

lowered me to the ground.”

Longstreet was carried from the battle on a stretcher with a hat over 

his head. Soldiers began to mistake him for dead, and Longstreet raised 

his hat to reassure the troops. His wound was severe. He would not rejoin 

Lee until well into the Petersburg siege. (Longstreet, From Manassas to 

Appomattox, 563-564.)

2. Private Warren Goss, a soldier in Mott’s division, recalled the effects 

of the forest fires on the Union breastworks: “The fire swept on and 

reached our second line of entrenchments. . . . The men formed at some 

places eight and ten ranks deep, the rear men loading the muskets for the 

front ranks, and thus undauntedly kept up the fight while the logs in front 

of them were in flames. Finally, blistered, blinded, and suffocating, they 

gave way.” (As quoted by Richard Wheeler, editor, Voices of the Civil War, 

New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976, 388.)

Analysis:

1. Critique Hancock’s performance. Was he negligent to allow Longstreet 

to find an open flank? Did he recover well after the setback? Was his 

defense of Brock Road well planned?

2. Examine the overall Union army performance on the southern flank. 

Did Meade give Hancock enough forces? How effective was Burnside? 

Should Grant and Meade have looked for other options rather than to 

continue to fight in this terrain?

3. Analyze Longstreet’s attack on the flank. Were there any faults 

(perhaps the lack of a plan to follow the success and sort out the crossing 

of units on each other’s fronts in the path of attack)?

4. Critique Lee’s attack on Brock Road line. Was he correct to abandon 

any flank attacks and focus on a mass strike at the Union left/center? 

Should he have attacked at all? Were there better operational options (to 

include disengaging)?

5. What implications can you draw today from the two Confederate 

attacks on Hancock’s forces? Do concepts such as security and surprise 

apply as much today as during the Civil War, or has modern technology 

(satellites, drones, etc.) brought dramatic changes to these principles? Do 

ground reconnaissances retain their importance in today’s conditions?
142

Stand 9

Gordon’s Attack

(6 May 1864)

613

676

Brock Road

Orange Plank Road 621

Flintlock Drive

Day 1

Stand 8

Stand 9

Stand 10

Day 1

Stand 6 Parking Area

Day 1 Stand 9 N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 13.

Directions: This stand is at the same location as stand 8 (Burning 

Breastworks). 

Orientation: You will need to conduct this stand with a map, because you 

are not on the actual ground of Gordon’s attack. Gordon’s assault took 

place just north of Saunders’ Field where you were earlier in the staff ride 

(stand 4).

Description: The Union situation on the northern flank on 6 May had 

been generally quiet. Sedgwick’s VI Corps was already entrenching when 

Meade ordered the V and VI Corps to suspend planned attacks and dig in. 

The focus of Sedgwick’s command appeared to be on the corps’ center 

where Johnson’s division had been active in harassing the Union troops 

attempting to prepare their defenses.
143

On the Confederate side, Gordon conducted a reconnaissance and 

discovered the location of the Union right on the morning of 6 May. His 

patrols determined that security on the Union flank was almost nonexistent 

and there was a thick wood that could cover the approach of an attacking 

force.

Gordon proposed to Ewell that the Confederates launch an attack to 

roll up the flank of the VI Corps. Gordon’s division commander, Jubal 

Early, was initially against the effort due to the lack of a reserve in case 

the attack failed and the Federals counterattacked. Ewell hesitated to give 

Gordon permission for the attack without Early’s approval. Eventually, 

when the IX Corps was discovered moving south, Early changed his mind, 

and Ewell ordered a three-brigade attack to start at about 1800.

Gordon’s brigade was the main attacking force. In support was 

Brigadier General John Pegram’s brigade (Early’s division) on Gordon’s 

right and Brigadier General Robert D. Johnston’s brigade (Rodes’ division) on the left.

Brigadier General Alexander Shaler’s brigade (Wright’s division) was 

on the northern end of the VI Corps line. Next in line was the brigade of 

Brigadier General Truman Seymour, who was actually from a different 

division (under Brigadier General James B. Ricketts) than Shaler. Seymour 

was senior commander and was placed in nominal command of both brigades. Shaler realized the danger of the exposed position and requested 

additional troops through Seymour, but nothing came of the request.

By 1600, some 10,000 troops of V and VI Corps were assembled 

in the rear of the army’s center. These men waited while Meade tried to 

decide how best to use this ad hoc force in light of Hancock’s setbacks on 

the southern flank. Thus, Shaler’s force was spread in an attenuated line to 

cover for the other withdrawn VI Corps forces.

At 1800, Gordon’s brigade, supported by Johnston and Pegram, moved 

out toward Shaler’s position. As the attack commenced, it found many of 

the Union troops cooking dinner and working on their entrenchments with 

their weapons stacked nearby.

The assault swept into the Union pickets and quickly scattered them. 

Johnston’s men passed around the open Federal flank and gained their rear. 

Gordon’s brigade fell directly on Shaler’s thinly spread troops whose arms 

were stacked while they were still digging in. Pegram’s brigade drove 

Seymour out of position. After Seymour broke, Shaler’s brigade was isolated.

Colonel Daniel D. Bidwell’s Union brigade quickly refused its right 

flank, and both Seymour and Shaler rallied their men on Bidwell’s right 

extending the line. The two Union commanders were captured in the 

process of rallying their men.
144

For a time, Gordon’s attack created a panic among some troops and 

leaders on the Union flank. However, Sedgwick remained calm and fed 

reinforcements into the new line. The Union high command did not panic; 

Grant and Meade chided several flustered staff officers who showed up at 

their headquarters (see vignette). 

The new Union line held and the Confederate threat to the Federal 

flank ended.

Vignette: Lee’s attack on the Union right caused a shock among some staff 

officers, but Grant and Meade remained calm. Among those who came 

through the headquarters were two aides on Sedgwick’s staff who believed 

that the flank of the VI Corps was broken and that Lee might reach the 

Germanna Ford Road. Meade cuttingly questioned the officers about the 

available reserves and then said, “Nonsense! If they have broken our lines, 

they can do no more tonight.”

Grant also seemed unperturbed by the tales of disaster brought in by 

other officers, until one staffer’s comments tried his patience: “General 

Grant, this is a crisis that cannot be looked upon too seriously. I know 

General Lee well by my past experience; he will throw his whole 

army between us and the Rapidan, and cut us off completely from our 

communications.” Grant removed his cigar and heatedly replied, “Oh, 

I am heartily tired of hearing about what Lee is going to do. Some of 

you seem to think he is suddenly going to turn a double somersault, and 

land in our rear and both of our flanks at the same time. Go back to your 

command, and try to think what we are going to do ourselves, instead of 

what Lee is going to do.” (Agassiz, 98 and Porter, 68-70.)

Analysis:

1. Gordon claimed (after the war) that if his attack had been done earlier, 

with more daylight, the Confederates would have won a decisive victory. 

Do you agree or disagree (justify your answer)?

a. What is a decisive victory for the Southerners? Can they hope to 

destroy the Federal army or just give it minor setbacks?

b. What could the Southerners have done to better exploit their 

success? Did the Federals simply have too many reserves to be defeated?

2. Assess the Union command. Why were they so unprepared?

3. How does Gordon’s attack fit into the operational picture on both 

sides? Did it help to further Lee’s operational aims?
145

Stand 10

Wilderness Summary and Next Movements

(7–8 May 1864)

613

676

Brock Road

Orange Plank Road 621

Flintlock Drive

Day 1

Stand 8

Stand 9

Stand 10

Day 1

Stand 6 Parking Area

Day 1 Stand 10 N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 14.

Directions: This stand is conducted in the same location as the last stand.

Orientation: Because this stand is mostly a summary, there is no need 

for an orientation to this particular ground. However, once you begin 

discussing the movements of the armies on 7–8 May, you may want 

to redirect attention to Brock Road—the most direct route from the 

Wilderness to Spotsylvania. The stand consists of two parts: the summary 

of the Wilderness battle and the initial movements of both sides out of the 

Wilderness and toward Spotsylvania.

Part 1: Summary

Description: Although no one knew it at the time, the battle of the 

Wilderness ended on the night of 6 May. Three-quarters of a mile of often 
146

burning woods separated the armies, and each side was entrenched, thus 

discouraging any further attacks. It had been a blind, blundering battle 

with both sides showing as much determination as skill.

The Federal total losses were 17,666 (14,283 killed and wounded and 

3,383 missing). The Confederate losses were about 11,400 killed, wounded, and missing. Note that Confederate figures for this battle, while not 

very detailed are relatively reliable, but that as the campaign continued, the 

Confederates sometimes did not record their losses (or in some cases the 

records were lost) and the casualty figures become rough estimates. There 

had been several key losses among leaders on both sides with Longstreet’s 

wounding being particularly noticeable.

Analysis:

1. Who won this battle and why?

2. Analyze Grant’s and Meade’s performances. Had they made a mistake 

in getting caught in the terrain of the Wilderness? Who is to blame for the 

poor use of cavalry? Was the battle really necessary?

3. Had the Wilderness battle helped to accomplish Grant’s operational 

objective? Keep in mind his stated goal of destroying Lee’s army, his views 

on Richmond, and his coordination of efforts with Butler and Sigel.

4. Analyze Lee’s performance. Could he have avoided the piecemeal 

commitment of his army? Lee had just missed taking Brock Road (and 

splitting the Union army), but he had succeeded in tactically turning 

both Union flanks. Could he have done better? Did the Wilderness battle 

accomplish Lee’s operational objectives?

5. In light of the above analysis, what are the implications for the operational art today? How can commanders better ensure that tactical engagements fit into the operational design?

Part 2: Movements

Description: Early in the morning of 7 May, Grant decided to move by his 

left flank to force Lee to abandon his field works. This move required a 

change of base. The Rapidan bridges were taken up, thus breaking the link 

with the old base at Culpeper. At the same time, the Federals established 

a new base at the port of Belle Plain on the Potomac River. This new base 

gave the Federals a secure and shorter supply line that went from Belle 

Plain through Fredericksburg to the Union army.

At about the same time, Grant told Meade to prepare for a movement, 

particularly preparing the trains, moving the wounded, and pre-positioning 

the artillery reserve. While these preparations were made, Meade spent 
147

much of the day checking on Confederate intentions (he worried about 

a renewed Southern attack on his flanks). A brigade of Wilson’s cavalry 

division was sent to Germanna Ford to see if the Confederates would 

exploit Gordon’s attack. They reported that the Confederate troops were 

not preparing an attack. Other probes by the Union forces confirmed that 

Lee was not preparing for an attack.

The Federal movement was to begin that night (7 May) at 2030 (the 

trains were to start earlier at 1500). The overall plan was to use multiple 

routes for speed while keeping a screening force in front of Lee to protect 

the army’s march.

The V Corps was to pull out of the line, march behind the II Corps, 

and take Brock Road to Spotsylvania Courthouse. The VI Corps was to 

fall back to Chancellorsville, take Piney Branch Courthouse Road back 

to Brock Road, and follow behind the V Corps to Spotsylvania. The IX 

Corps was to follow the VI Corps and stop at Piney Branch Courthouse. 

Burnside’s corps was positioned as a reserve that could support any of 

the other three Union corps. The II Corps had the screening mission. 

Hancock’s troops were to hold until the other corps had passed and follow 

the V Corps down Brock Road to Todd’s Tavern.

The Union cavalry had two missions: to guard the Federal trains and 

to clear the road to Spotsylvania Courthouse.

As the Federals prepared their moves, Lee faced one major question: 

would Grant, like Hooker in 1863, retreat back across the Rapidan and 

Rappahannock? Initially, Lee believed that the Federals had one more 

day of fight left in them in the Wilderness. By midafternoon of 7 May, 

Stuart reported that the Federal cavalry had withdrawn. However, this was 

inconclusive—it might mean a Union retreat or a movement further south. 

As the day progressed, Lee learned that the Federals were pulling back 

from their right flank and that Grant was pulling up his Rapidan River 

bridges. The Confederate commander correctly concluded that Grant was 

going to move south and continue the campaign.

Once he was sure the Federals would continue, Lee decided that Grant 

had two options. The Federal commander could move to Fredericksburg, 

closer to his new supply line. On the other hand, the Union leader could 

move to Spotsylvania Courthouse, a more aggressive advance toward 

Richmond. This path was the fastest way to Hanover Junction, Lee’s critical 

supply point and a position that could cut Lee off from the Confederate 

capital.

In case Spotsylvania was Grant’s target, Lee took precautions. He 

ordered his artillery chief, Brigadier General William N. Pendleton, to cut 

a path through the woods from Plank Road, behind the Confederate lines, 
148

to a road leading to Shady Grove Church. This would give the Southerners 

a path parallel to the Union route on Brock Road.

Lee also selected a new commander for the Confederate I Corps. 

He had several choices, but Early was unpopular and Johnson was 

unknown. The army commander chose Major General Richard H. 

Anderson. Mahone took command of Anderson’s division.

Later in the afternoon, the situation became clearer for Lee. First, 

Federal cavalry was detected around Todd’s Tavern. Lee responded by 

telling Stuart to examine the road net toward Spotsylvania. Second, 

while visiting Ewell’s front, Lee learned that the large Federal artillery park in the vicinity of Grant’s headquarters (near the Wilderness 

Tavern) was moving to the south. This piece of news was the confirmation of Grant’s move south that Lee needed.

Lee ordered Anderson’s corps to pull out of their lines after dark, 

rest, and then march for Spotsylvania. Hill and Ewell were to follow.

The Union infantry corps began their move after dark. Warren’s 

V Corps moved at 2030 on 7 May, and it reached Todd’s Tavern at 

0330 on 8 May where it found the road blocked by Union cavalry. 

Sedgwick’s VI Corps moved at 2130 back to Chancellorsville and 

then to Piney Branch Courthouse. Burnside’s IX Corps moved at 0500 

on 8 May to Chancellorsville in order to guard the trains on 9 May. 

Hancock’s II Corps moved just before daylight on 8 May. Because the 

road was clogged, he was delayed and reached Todd’s Tavern at 0900 

on 8 May.

On the Confederate side, Anderson pulled out of the line after dark, 

but he could not find a place to rest because the woods were ablaze 

so he kept moving through the night and into 8 May. In the morning, 

he crossed the Po River at Corbin’s Bridge. Early in the morning of 8 

May, Lee got positive information from his cavalry that the Federal V 

Corps was near Todd’s Tavern. In response, he ordered Ewell’s corps 

to Shady Grove Church, and he headed for Spotsylvania Courthouse. 

He arrived there at 1430 on 8 May.

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. Grant appeared to have claimed the initiative after the Wilderness 

(despite Lee’s tactical attacks on 6 May). Why? Could Lee do anything 

different than react?

2. Critique Lee and Grant’s movement plans. Did they both have 

reasonable operational objectives and routes? Who had the greater 

expectation of success?
149

3. In what ways are the movements of Civil War armies and today’s 

armies similar and in what ways do they differ?

a. How do armies disengage with an enemy in contact and regain 

freedom of movement?

b. Do today’s armies still take advantage of movement on multiple 

routes?

c. What is the role of screening forces in an army movement?

d. What part do the trains and supply bases play in determining 

objectives and routes?
150

Stand 11

Todd’s Tavern

(7–8 May 1864)

613

Brock Road

Day 1

Stand 11

Todd’s Tavern

Pull-Over

612

612

613

Catharpin Road

Brock Road

Catharpin Road

Todd’s Tavern Store

Alsop

Day 1 Stand 11 N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 15.

Directions: As you leave the parking area, turn right and go the short 

distance to the Plank-Brock intersection. Turn right on Route 613 (Brock 

Road). Go south for 4.7 miles where you will come to Todd’s Tavern, 

which is situated near the intersection with County Road 612 (Catharpin 

Road). A modern country store called “Todd’s Tavern” is on the left (east) 

side of Brock Road, but the Civil War era tavern was on the right side 

of the road. There are some modern historical markers (maintained by 

Virginia) and a small parking area (pull-over) on the right. This is a good 

place to do the next stand. Also, this is a good location to give a lunch 

break if you brought pack lunches.

Orientation: You are now at Todd’s Tavern on Brock Road (this was 

the road that the Union V and II Corps took to Spotsylvania). This is an 
151

important road junction of Brock and Catharpin Roads. Brock Road leads 

south to Spotsylvania, and Catharpin Road leads west to the Confederate 

positions and routes.

Description: Sheridan’s cavalry had held Todd’s Tavern on 6 May. However, 

later that night, the Federal cavalry withdrew toward Chancellorsville. The 

withdrawal allowed Major General Fitzhugh Lee’s Confederate cavalry 

division to reoccupy the crossroads at Todd’s Tavern.

Grant’s movement plan required Sheridan to open Brock Road 

all the way to Spotsylvania for the leading Union infantry unit, the V 

Corps. Sheridan attempted to carry out these orders on 7 May. Merritt’s 

division (formerly under Brigadier General Alfred T.A. Torbert, who was 

suffering from a spinal abscess) came down the Furnace Road to Brock 

Road. Gregg’s division came down Piney Branch Church Road. Wilson’s 

division guarded the trains. Merritt’s and Gregg’s divisions were to seize 

Todd’s Tavern from Fitzhugh Lee, then Gregg was to continue west on 

Catharpin Road and seize Corbin’s Bridge.

The plan worked. Fitzhugh Lee contested Merritt starting about 0.75 

mile north of the Tavern, until Gregg appeared on the Confederate flank, 

which forced Lee to retreat south. Gregg continued toward Corbin’s 

Bridge, where he met Brigadier General Thomas L. Rosser’s brigade (of 

Major General Wade Hampton’s division) and drove it across the bridge. 

Merritt continued and found Lee 2 miles south behind log works. Merritt 

captured the works in a stiff fight.

Having succeeded so far, both Gregg and Merritt inexplicably 

withdrew to Todd’s Tavern at dark. The Confederates regained Corbin’s 

Bridge and the log works at the Piney Branch Road junction. The tired 

Federal cavalrymen bivouacked in the road at Todd’s Tavern. Sheridan 

made his headquarters at Alrich’s Farm.

On the evening of 7 May, Sheridan planned to seize Spotsylvania 

Courthouse and a crossing of the Po River the next day (8 May), but he 

did not tell Meade. Sheridan’s orders were marked as 0100 on 8 May and 

instructed the Union cavalry to move at 0500. The plan, if implemented, 

would have been too late.

In the meantime, Meade and his staff reached Todd’s Tavern at 0100 

on 8 May. He found the Federal cavalry blocking the road and without any 

orders to move. Sheridan was not at the crossroads. Angry, Meade ordered 

Gregg back to Corbin’s Bridge and Merritt south toward Spotsylvania. 

Meade notified Sheridan of these actions.

Merritt’s men again met Fitzhugh Lee’s troops. However, he was 

progressing so slowly that at dawn Warren replaced the Union cavalry with 

Robinson’s infantry division of the V Corps. Robinson gradually pushed 
152

the Confederate cavalry back through Alsop’s (north of Spotsylvania on 

Brock Road) as the morning progressed.

Also on the morning of 8 May, Wilson entered Spotsylvania 

Courthouse, driving out Brigadier General William C. Wickham’s cavalry 

brigade (Fitzhugh Lee’s division); but the Union cavalry was isolated, and 

Sheridan ordered Wilson to withdraw.

Late in the morning, Meade sent for Sheridan to come to the army 

headquarters at Piney Branch Church. A huge argument ensued. (See 

vignettes for Porter’s account of the argument and Sheridan’s view.) The 

argument was due to basic philosophical disagreements on the use of 

cavalry, the volatile personalities, and weariness. The conflict over the use 

of cavalry pitted Meade’s concept of having the mounted troops screen 

the infantry movements and guard the trains against Sheridan’s view of 

seeking to fight a major battle with the Confederate cavalry before doing 

any other missions.

After the argument with Sheridan, Meade went to Grant’s headquarters 

and described his shouting match with the army’s cavalry commander. 

Grant decided to give Sheridan what he wanted—permission to conduct a 

raid that would draw Stuart into a battle.

On 9 May, Sheridan gathered his forces and set out on a raid toward 

Richmond. He took nearly all of the Federal cavalry with him, thus leaving 

Grant and Meade without reconnaissance and screening assets for the next 

two weeks. Stuart followed Sheridan, but he left one-third of the Southern 

cavalry with Lee. 

Vignettes:

1. In his memoirs, Horace Porter provided a vivid account of the 

argument between Meade and Sheridan over the use (or misuse) of the 

Union cavalry on the road to Todd’s Tavern and Spotsylvania: “Meade had 

worked himself into a towering passion regarding the delays encountered in 

the forward movement, and when Sheridan appeared, went at him hammer 

and tongs, accusing him of blunders, and charging him with not making a 

proper disposition of his troops, and letting the cavalry block the advance 

of the infantry. Sheridan was equally fiery . . . his language throughout 

was highly spiced and conspicuously italicized with expletives.” (Porter, 

Campaigning with Grant, 83-84.)

2. Sheridan, in his postwar account of the argument over Todd’s Tavern, 

claimed that Meade had wrecked his plans, exposed Wilson to defeat, and 

made the cavalry useless: “I told him I could whip Stuart if he would 

only let me, but since he insisted on giving the cavalry directions without 

consulting or even notifying me, he could thenceforth command the 
153

cavalry corps himself—that I would not give it another order.” (Philip 

H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs, Volume I, New York, NY: C.L. Webster, 

1888, 368.)

Analysis:

1. Critique the Union command structure and climate. Does it have a 

systemic problem or personality conflicts?

2. Who has the better idea on cavalry employment—Meade or Sheridan 

(or neither)? How should Civil War cavalry be used?

3. How does this cavalry debate relate to modern warfare? Who performs 

reconnaissance today? It might be interesting to relate this debate to 

modern air force proponents of winning the air superiority battle before 

doing other missions (a view that seems close to Sheridan’s view of his 

role).
154

Stand 12

Corbin’s Bridge (drive-by)

(8 May 1864) 

648

627

649

608

613

613

613

612

612

608

613

Robert E. Lee Dr

Todd’s Tavern

Sedgwick’s

Monument

Laurel Hill

Gordon Road

Brock Road

Catharpin Road

Brock Road

Brock Road

Catharpin Road

Seays Road

Mill Pond Road

Pritchett

685

Road Blockhouse Road

Grant Dr

Day 1

Stand 13

Stand 14

Day 1

Stand 11

Day 1

Stand 12

Corbin’s

Bridge Day 1

Stand 15

1 Mile 2 Miles

N Day 1 Stand 12

Map 16.

Directions: From the Todd’s Tavern intersection, turn right (west) on to 

Catharpin Road, Route 612. Bear in mind that Lee’s men did not pass by 

this intersection. They followed Pendleton’s trail and farm roads leading 

from their positions in the Wilderness and intersecting with Catharpin 

Road at a point about 1.5 miles from the tavern intersection. The best 

landmark for locating this area is an orange road sign indicating a bend in 

the road and a 35-mile per hour zone. Continue past the road bend and then 

cross slowly (traffic permitting) over Corbin’s Bridge (about 2.5 miles). 

These directions will take you on part of the route that Lee’s troops took 

to get to Spotsylvania. You will cover about half of Lee’s total route—the 

segment beginning at the point where Pendleton’s path through the woods 

joined Catharpin Road.
155

Description: The last stand discussed the action at Corbin’s Bridge, so there 

is no need to stop on the bridge itself. As mentioned earlier, the Federals 

had taken Corbin’s Bridge on 7 May, and they were blocking Lee’s route to 

Spotsylvania. However, they voluntarily gave up the position that night.
156

Stand 13

Laurel Hill I

(8 May 1864)

Day 1

Stand 15

Spotsylvania

NPS Shelter

648

613

685

Pritchett

Road

Blockhouse Road

Grant Dr

613

Sedgwick

Monument

Maryland Monument Brock Road

Brock Road

Hancock Road

Isle of Laurels

Po River

Day 1

Stand 13

Day 1

Stand 14

Laurel Hill

(Spindle Field)

N Day 1 Stand 13

300 Yards 600 Yards

Map 17.

Directions: On Route 612, about 0.7 mile past Corbin’s Bridge turn left 

(southeast) on to Route 608, formerly the Shady Grove Church Road, now 

called Robert E. Lee Drive. Proceed along this road for 5.8 miles, then turn 

left on Route 648 (Blockhouse Road). Head north on 648 for about 1.0 

mile and you will come to an intersection with a small road (Route 685, 

also called Pritchett Road). Turn left on this road (685). The stand is on 

the north side of the road, only about 0.1 mile after turning. The best way 

to park is to go past the stand and continue another 0.1 mile down the road 

where the road widens slightly. Use the wider part (and road shoulder) to 

make a U-turn, and then double back on 685. There should be just enough 

room on the right hand shoulder for you to pull the vehicles off of the road 

and park directly opposite of the stand.

Across the road you will see the opening to a small walking path 

cut through the woods. This path goes past a monument to the Maryland 
157

brigade and then into an open field, which is Spindle Field (part of Laurel 

Hill). It is best to do this stand right at this opening, which gives a good 

view from the Confederate perspective.

Orientation: You are currently located on part of Laurel Hill (Spindle 

Field). The Confederate lines for Anderson’s corps were in the woodline 

just behind where you are standing. The Union assault positions for 

Warren’s V Corps were on the far wood line across the open field to the 

north. Brock Road is to the east of the open area. About 1.0 mile north on 

Brock Road toward Todd’s Tavern is the Alsop Farm.

This field is about the same proportions as the Civil War era Spindle 

Field, but the woods had less undergrowth (we are now out of the 

Wilderness). The Spindle house was situated roughly in the middle of the 

field on a slight rise in the ground. There was another open field behind the 

woods to the Confederate rear; this field was called Perry Field. The two 

fields together were called Laurel Hill.

Description: Lee had ordered Anderson, the new commander of the I 

Corps, to proceed to Spotsylvania on 8 May after resting his troops on the 

night of 7 May. However, the fires in the Wilderness area made it nearly 

impossible to rest, so he made an all-night march to the vicinity of the 

Blockhouse Bridge on the Po River before stopping his command for an 

hour to eat breakfast. If Anderson had followed Lee’s original instructions, 

he most likely would not have arrived in time to hold Spotsylvania.

The Army of the Potomac made an all-night march toward Spotsylvania 

on 7 May without stopping to feed the men (the problems with the 

cavalry—discussed earlier—meant that the Union infantry was “stopping 

and going” all night without being able to get sleep). By morning, Union 

V Corps infantry had replaced the Federal cavalry in the lead on Brock 

Road. Warren sent Robinson’s division down the eastern lane at Alsop’s 

(Brock Road split at Alsop’s and then rejoined near our location). The V 

Corps commander sent Griffin’s division down the western lane to push 

the Southern cavalry out of the way.

Both sides knew of the importance of Spotsylvania Courthouse. If the 

Federals could take the crossroads, Grant would be between Lee and the 

Confederate base at Hanover Junction (as well as Richmond).

At 0730, an unusual messenger—a bareheaded and shoeless old 

gentleman—hastened into Anderson’s camp with a message from Fitzhugh 

Lee that Union infantry was forming north of Spindle’s Field and about to 

attack. Fitzhugh Lee feared that he could not hold the Union infantry, and 

he needed assistance. Anderson started two brigades (Henagan’s South 

Carolina brigade and Humphreys’ Mississippi brigade) for the Brock Road 

at once, to be followed by the rest of the corps.
158

Stuart was at Laurel Hill to meet the approaching Confederate brigades, and he coolly placed them into position on top of the hill just minutes before the V Corps made its initial charge. Many of the Southern 

infantrymen had run the last mile to get to Laurel Hill. The Confederates 

had won the race to Spotsylvania—just barely.

Warren rode forward from the Alsop house and found Robinson 

deploying his division. Colonel Peter Lyle’s brigade was deployed on the 

left (east) of the road just past the junction where the two Alsop lanes 

reunite. The other two brigades were following behind.

Warren ordered Robinson to attack what he still believed was only 

Southern cavalry. Robinson requested to wait for his other two brigades 

to come up, but Warren told Robinson to advance at once. Robinson sent 

Lyle’s men down the left side of Brock Road in a column of regiments. 

They immediately ran into two of Henagan’s South Carolina regiments who 

were attempting to improve the hasty fieldworks left by the cavalry. Lyle’s 

men were repulsed, but they did not initially retreat. Instead, they deployed 

on line in partially covered low ground in front of the Confederates and 

continued to exchange fire with the Southerners.

Denison’s Union brigade of Marylanders, at the quick step and in a 

column of regiments, came down Brock Road to catch up with Lyle and 

was not aware that they were about to assault until they actually deployed 

on line in Spindle’s Field. Moving directly from column into line and then 

forward, the Maryland troops finally saw the Confederate works to their 

front.

Denison made the mistake of halting the brigade about halfway across 

the field. The troops then fired and attempted to reload in the open. Within 

minutes, Robinson and Denison were wounded. Henagan’s troops (three 

regiments were deployed on the west side of the road) opened a heavy fire 

at the halted Federals, decimating their ranks. The remaining Maryland 

troops eventually pushed on and some actually penetrated the Rebel breastworks, but they were driven back shortly thereafter. The Union troops and 

leaders were now aware that their foe was Confederate infantry and not 

cavalry.

Griffin’s division arrived as Denison’s troops fell back, and Warren 

sent them forward to renew the assault. Bartlett’s brigade of New York and 

Pennsylvania troops came up on the right of Denison and pushed past the 

Marylanders. The 83d Pennsylvania actually got troops on and over the 

Confederate barricades. Humphreys was deploying his troops to Henagan’s 

right when he witnessed the Union penetration, and he later wrote: “for the 

first and last time in my warring, I saw two hostile lines lock bayonets.” 

(Benjamin G. Humphreys, “Sunflower Guards” in the J.F.H. Claiborne 
159

Collection, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina.) 

Still, the Federals were forced back.

Next, Griffin sent Ayres’ Regulars and Sweitzer’s Massachusetts troops 

to reinforce Bartlett as they arrived at Spindle Field. To the east of the field, 

Coulter’s brigade (the last of Robinson’s units) made their way through the 

woods to support Griffin’s men. These last brigades moved beyond the 

gully only to have the broken remains of Denison’s and Bartlett’s brigades 

scramble through their ranks. While the exhausted Federals struggled, 

Humphreys launched a counterattack that finally drove Lyle’s men from 

the low ground to their front and also repulsed Coulter while pouring a 

galling fire into Griffin’s left flank. Like Robinson’s men before them, 

Griffin’s division was driven back from the Confederate breastworks.

At 1015, Warren informed Meade that his initial assaults had been 

repulsed. The V Corps commander contemplated his next move. Criticized 

three days before for taking too long to assemble his troops for the initial 

thrust across Saunders’ and Higgerson’s Fields (in the Wilderness), he 

now directed his next two divisions to launch attacks as soon as possible. 

Concurrently, the Southern line was being reinforced as the rest of 

Anderson’s I Corps came up.

About a half hour later, Cutler’s division (Cutler had recently moved 

up from command of the Iron brigade to take over for Wadsworth) 

advanced in the tracks of Griffin’s division on the west side of Brock Road. 

Crawford’s division attacked on the east side. The attack began, according 

to Warren’s own message, “in fine style, all bands playing” (OR, series I, 

volume XXXVI, part 2, 539-540). The Union advance reached the vicinity 

of the Spindle house—which the Confederates had burned to prevent its 

use by Union sharpshooters—and stalled. The two lines traded shots for a 

short time before the Union line faltered and returned to the north side of 

the field.

Vignette: Eugene Nash, a soldier in the 44th New York remarked of the 

entire episode of the V Corps’ piecemeal attacks at Laurel Hill: “There 

had been a miscalculation somewhere.” (Eugene A. Nash, A History of 

the Forty-Fourth Regiment New York Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War, 

1861-1865, Chicago, IL: R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co., 1911, 188.)

Analysis: It is probably best to wait until you cross the field and complete 

the full story of Laurel Hill before analyzing the actions of this battle.
160

Stand 14

Laurel Hill II

(8 May 1864)

Day 1

Stand 15

Spotsylvania

NPS Shelter

648

613

685

Pritchett

Road

Blockhouse Road

Grant Dr

613

Sedgwick

Monument

Maryland Monument Brock Road

Brock Road

Hancock Road

Isle of Laurels

Po River

Day 1

Stand 13

Day 1

Stand 14

Laurel Hill

(Spindle Field)

N Day 1 Stand 14

300 Yards 600 Yards

Map 18.

Directions: After completing the story of the V Corps’ first failed assaults 

(Laurel Hill I), move across the open field to the Union lines. The best 

position is just to the west of Brock Road at the edge of the wood line.

It is best to walk across the field to this stand to get a feel for the 

terrain, but you will also need to get the vehicles to this area. Once the 

Laurel Hill I stand is complete, have the drivers go back to the vehicles 

and drive on Route 685 (Pritchett Road) back to the intersection with 

Route 648. Turn left on 648 and head north for a short distance (0.1 mile) 

to the intersection with Brock Road (613). Turn left on Brock Road and 

proceed for 0.3 mile. You will come to the intersection with Grant Drive 

and the Sedgwick Monument will be located just off the road. Turn right 

on Grant Drive, and park the vehicles in the NPS shelter lot that is about 
161

100 yards down the road. The drivers can then walk back to the field and 

join the rest of the group.

Orientation: As the VI Corps began to arrive on the battlefield, they 

filed to the eastern side of Brock Road; the V Corps lines were on the 

west of Brock Road. Similarly, point out that Ewell’s corps extended the 

Confederate line on Anderson’s eastern flank (starting about 500 yards to 

the east of Blockhouse Road and Brock Road intersection and continuing about 1.5 miles to the northeast). Remind the students that you have 

basically walked from the Confederate positions (Stand 13) to the Federal 

lines.

Description: At 1330, Meade ordered a combined assault by the V and VI 

Corps, but it took Sedgwick another five hours before his troops were fully 

deployed. Rather than making this a three-corps attack, Meade decided to 

leave Hancock’s II Corps at Todd’s Tavern in the event Lee tried an attack 

around the Union right flank.

Having decided on a two-corps assault, Meade was unsure as to whom 

to put in command of the combined attack. Warren was junior, but was a 

Meade protégé. Sedgwick was senior, but Meade was not that comfortable 

with him. Meade attempted to solve the dilemma by telling Warren to 

“cooperate” with Sedgwick. Warren refused and stated that one or the 

other must be in command. Warren closed with “I’ll be damned if I will 

‘cooperate’ with General Sedgwick or anybody else” (James H. Wilson, 

Under the Old Flag, volume I, New York, NY: Appleton, 1921, 395-96). 

Meade did not take personal command of the attacking forces because 

he had become preoccupied with maneuvering Hancock’s troops into 

position.

Finally, the Union attack began at about 1830, but it was not coordinated. Two divisions of the VI Corps moved forward (Neill and Wright), 

but the V Corps on the right hesitated and then only came a short way 

out of the trenches. As darkness began to envelop the battlefield, Rodes’ 

division of Ewell’s II Corps met the Federal advance. The Union line faltered and fell back. The fighting ended in the darkness with Anderson’s 

and Ewell’s corps holding Laurel Hill and the repulsed V and VI Corps 

entrenching to the north.

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. What are the problems with the Army of the Potomac command? 

Who should have been in charge of the combined V and VI Corps attack: 

Warren, the man on the ground, or Sedgwick, the senior officer? Why not 

Meade himself?
162

2. Critique Warren’s actions. Was he right to commit forces piecemeal or 

should he have waited to launch his corps in a massed assault?

3. Critique Anderson’s actions. He marched all night on his own to the 

battlefield, and he was a new commander.

4. What are the operational implications of this engagement? What are 

the options now open to both Grant and Lee?

a. Should they both continue to battle for the Spotsylvania region—

why and how?

b. Would it be better to discontinue operations here and make a larger 

operational move to another location?
163

Stand 15

Sedgwick’s Death

(9 May 1864)

Day 1

Stand 15

Spotsylvania

NPS Shelter

648

613

685

Pritchett

Road

Blockhouse Road

Grant Dr

613

Sedgwick

Monument

Maryland Monument Brock Road

Brock Road

Hancock Road

Isle of Laurels

Po River

Day 1

Stand 13

Day 1

Stand 14

Laurel Hill

(Spindle Field)

N Day 1 Stand 15

300 Yards 600 Yards

Map 19.

Directions: Move the group across Brock Road to the Sedgwick 

Monument.

Orientation: You have only moved a short distance from the last stand, 

and thus you do not need to do a full orientation. Remind the students that 

you are located in the Union positions of the VI Corps.

Description and Vignette: Firing continued all night on 8 May and into 

9 May, keeping soldiers from getting any sleep. Only 300 to 400 yards 

separated the lines of the two armies. The troops kept busy improving their 

works during the firing.

The Union line extended from the vicinity of the Jones house in the 

west to the Brown house in the east. Except for Sedgwick and Grant, the 

Union commanders bickered over who was to blame for the bungled march 
164

and attacks on Spotsylvania. At 0630 on 9 May, Sedgwick received orders 

from Meade directing him to assume control of the front in his absence. 

Meade was losing confidence in Warren.

Also that morning, the VI Corps Chief of Staff, Colonel Martin T. 

McMahon, pointed out the location of Battery H, 1st New York Artillery 

at the angle of the Alsop Roads and jokingly told Sedgwick, “you are not 

to go near it today.” Sedgwick responded good-naturedly, “McMahon, I 

would like to know who commands this corps, you or I?” After McMahon 

responded with another jest and more seriously again urged Sedgwick not 

to go to the exposed location, the corps commander stated, “Well, I don’t 

know there is any reason for my going there.” Some 20 men had been 

killed and several officers killed and wounded by particularly effective 

Confederate sharpshooters in the area.

At about 0830, Captain William H. McCartney’s battery replaced the 

New York artillery. In the meantime, a New Jersey regiment had dug new 

entrenchments, and Sedgwick coming to this location discovered that the 

new positions blocked the fire of the guns. He directed the infantrymen to 

move. As they moved, Southern snipers became aroused. Several rounds 

hit near the men, and the troops dodged the rounds by lying on the ground. 

Sedgwick humorously chided them and said, “What are you dodging at? 

They can’t hit an elephant at that distance.” One man replied, “General, 

I dodged a shell once, and if I hadn’t, it would have taken my head off. I 

believe in dodging.” Sedgwick laughed and said, “All right my man, go to 

your place.” Almost immediately, there was a shrill whistle followed by a 

dull thud. Sedgwick was struck below his left eye and fell into McMahon’s 

arms. Sedgwick was dead before he hit the ground. (Martin T. McMahon, 

“The Death of General John Sedgwick,” in Battles and Leaders, volume 

IV, 175.)

Grant was informed of Sedgwick’s death by Horace Porter. Grant 

seemed to be in disbelief, stating: “Is he dead?” and then again, “Is he 

really dead?” (Porter, 90). Jeb Stuart, on hearing the news, stated that he 

“would have most gladly shared his blanket and last crust with him as he 

was one of the best friends I had in the old army.” (As quoted by Gordon 

C. Rhea, The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House to Yellow Tavern, May 

7-12, 1864, Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1997, 95, 

from the Alexander R. Boteler Diary, 9 May 1864, in William E. Brooks 

Collection, Library of Congress.)

Sedgwick was loved by his men and respected by officers on both 

sides. His tactical abilities were little better than average, but in an army 

fraught with political backstabbing, Sedgwick’s trustworthiness and calm 

under fire were needed commodities.
165

Meade replaced Sedgwick with one of the VI Corps’ division commanders, Major General Horatio G. Wright.

Analysis: None.
166

Day 2

Spotsylvania to North Anna

(9–24 May 1864)

638

Sedgwick

Monument

Courthouse Road

Day 2

Stand 1

Fredericksburg

17

95

Rappahannock River

Blockhouse Road

Mills Drive

Brock Road

95

95

1

1

1

Piedmont Drive

Gordon Road

Mine Road

Smith Station Road

W. Grant Dr

Landsdowne Road

610

3 3 3

612 620

208

208

208

17

Salem Church Road

Start

Point

Day 2 Overview

(1 of 5) N

1 Mile 2 Miles

Map 20.

Stand 1, Po River and 10 May Attacks (9–10 May 1864)
167

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Overview

(2 of 5) N

250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 21.

Stand 2, Upton’s Attack (10 May 1864) 

Stand 3, East Angle (Confederate View) (12 May 1864)

Stand 4, Landrum Ridge (Union View, II Corps) (11–12 May 1864)

Stand 5, Angle I (Breakthrough) (12 May 1864)

Stand 6, McCoull House (Confederate Reactions) (12 May 1864)

Stand 7, Confederate Works (12 May 1864)

Stand 8, Angle II (Face of Battle) (12 May 1864)

Stand 9, Lee’s Last Line (13–18 May 1864)
168

95

Rappahannock River

1

3

606

17

95

1

2

2

2

Ta River

Ni River

Ma River

Mattaponi

Matta

River

River Poni River

Po River

208

628

627

608

628

608

208

208

632

639

645

617

605

606

646

605 605

664 638

661

603

603

604

604

639

632

633

633

632

626

611

638

626

667

619

207

301

2 640

640

619

605

609

610

631

668

607 607

609

609

607

606

606

608

615

610

636

608

634

609

633

607

Wright’s Corner

Fredericksburg

Spotsylvania

Massaponax

Guinea

Bowling Green

Milford

Thornburg

Day 2

Stand 10

Day 2

Stand 11

Day 2

Stand 12

Day 2

Stand 13

632

Madison’s

Ordinary

Day 2

Stand 14

Day 2

Stand 15

Bethel

Church

Day 2 Overview

(3 of 5) N

2 Miles 4 Miles

Map 22.

Stand 10, Harris Farm and Spotsylvania Summary (19–21 May 1864)

Stand 11, Massaponax Church (20–22 May 1864)

Stand 12, Motley House and Guinea (Guiney’s) Station (21–22 May 1864)

Stand 13, Madison’s Ordinary (drive-by) (21–22 May 1864)

Stand 14, New Bethel Church (22 May 1864)

Stand 15, Milford Station (Bowling Green) (21–23 May 1864)
169

95

30

Mattaponi River

671

Day 2

Stand 15

Day 2 Overview

(4 of 5) N

2 Miles 4 Miles

95

95

2

603

2 2

639

2

658

639

658

639

658

647

683

684

603

603

601 601

601

738

689

601

676

685 738

685

688

652

652

652 301

301

2

301

684

654

690

654

656

654

656

716 601

601

656

652

652

722

640

628

North Anna River

North Anna River

Milford

Mt. Carmel

Church

Hanover

Junction

Day 2

Stand 16

1

Day 2

Stand 17

601

684

1

1

602

688

North Anna

Park

Day 2

Stand 18

Stand 19

Stand 20

Map 23.

Stand 16, Mount Carmel Church (23–24 May 1864)

Stand 17, Hanover Junction and Doswell (23–24 May 1864)
170

Day 2

Stand 20

North Anna Park

1

Washington Highway

30

95

North Anna River

Day 2

Stand 19

95

1

688

CSX (Virginia Central RR)

CSX (Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac RR)

Doswell Road

Verdon Road

Mt Hope Church Road

688

602

684

684

Day 2

Stand 18

Day 2 Overview

(5 of 5) N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 24.

Stand 18, Jericho Mills (conducted at Ox Ford parking lot) (May 1864)

Stand 19, Ox Ford (Ledlie’s Attack) (24 May 1864)

Stand 20, North Anna Summary (May 1864)
171

Stand 1

Po River and 10 May Attacks 

(9–10 May 1864)

Map 25.

Directions: The start point for day 2 is the Sedgwick Monument, the location of the last stand on day 1. If traveling from Fredericksburg, get on 

US Highway 1 (Jefferson Davis Highway—note that the Highway 1 name 

changes to Washington Highway south of the North Anna River) heading 

south. Go 3.0 miles and then turn right on Route 208 (Courthouse Road). 

Stay on Route 208 for 6.5 miles and enter the town of Spotsylvania. Turn 

right on Brock Road (Route 613) and go 0.3 mile where you will reach the 

NPS road, West Grant Drive, and the Sedgwick Monument (the last stand 

from day 1). Park your vehicle in the NPS shelter lot near the monument 

and conduct the stand near the shelter.

Orientation: This is the first stop on the second day of a three-day staff 

ride. Much of the discussion at today’s first stand concerns actions that 

take place at other locations. You can use a training aid (map) of your 

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 1

N 250 Yards 500 Yards
172

own or the park service map (a permanently mounted metal map) near the 

Sedgwick Monument for some of the discussion. If you use the park service map, note that the map is oriented with south at the top of the map.

At the start of 9 May, the boundary between Anderson’s I Corps and 

Ewell’s II Corps was near our current location. Early’s III Corps (Early 

replaced Hill who was sick) was not within sight; they covered the 

Confederate left (western) flank toward the Po River. On the other flank, 

M.L. Smith, Lee’s engineer, directed the construction and extension of 

Ewell’s line to hold key high ground. The work resulted in a semicircular 

position that was soon to be dubbed the “Mule Shoe.”

On the Union side, the bulk of the V Corps and parts of the VI Corps 

were near here; Brock Road roughly marked the boundary between these 

two corps. The II Corps was further west near the Po River, and the IX 

Corps had moved far to the Union left (east), somewhat isolated from the 

Army of the Potomac. Grant, though disappointed with the Laurel Hill 

fight, was not discouraged. He wasted no time assigning blame for past 

problems. He understood that a direct assault on the Confederate position 

would not likely succeed. He looked to find an opening on Lee’s flanks, 

but had no cavalry to find these flanks. Unsure of the ground and Lee’s 

positions, Grant directed Burnside to have the IX Corps in position at the 

point marked “Gate” on the Federal maps by 0600, 9 May, and to connect 

with the left (east) flank of the VI Corps.

Description: At 0400 on 9 May the IX Corps began its move. About three 

hours later, the lead element of the IX Corps, Brigadier General Orlando 

B. Willcox’s division, arrived at the Gayle house, just short of the Ni River 

crossing. Willcox mistakenly reported that he was at Gate, but his actual 

position at Gayle house was further south and east along the Fredericksburg 

Road. Because of this confusion, Grant and Meade thought that Willcox 

was at Gate and did not realize how far forward the Union division had 

advanced. After driving off some Confederate cavalry, Willcox’s division 

deployed and sent a brigade to secure the high ground on the south side of 

the Ni. Willcox was too far east and south to connect with the VI Corps, 

but the IX Corps was unknowingly in a superb position to roll up the 

Confederate right flank.

Brigadier General Robert D. Johnston’s brigade of North Carolina 

troops (Ewell’s II Corps) was sent to hold the Federals coming down 

the Fredericksburg Road until Hill’s III Corps could extract itself from 

Hancock’s front and extend the Confederate line to the south and east. 

After an assault by Johnston’s brigade was repulsed, Willcox sent another 

brigade to reinforce his front line. Johnston retreated closer to Spotsylvania 

Courthouse.
173

After these moves, Willcox reported to Burnside, “I am heavily engaged 

against superior numbers” (OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 2, 584). The 

division commander was misreading the situation; his division faced a 

lone Confederate brigade and more Union troops were on the way.

At 1230, Stevenson’s division (IX Corps) arrived, but no fighting 

occurred for over an hour and no effort was made to follow Johnston’s 

brigade as it fell back. Burnside remained at the Aldrich house, three miles 

from the Ni River, almost all day. (See vignettes for description of Burnside 

and his lack of initiative on 9 May.)

By midafternoon, Early’s III Corps had moved unmolested into position around the courthouse, and the Union forces had missed a great opportunity. (See vignettes for a Confederate’s opinion of the missed chance.)

Grant and Meade were soon aware that the III Corps had departed 

Hancock’s front and was moving into position to extend the Confederate 

right. Both also believed, however, that Ewell had extended the Confederate 

line toward Gate. The absence of cavalry was plaguing the Union efforts. 

The Northern leadership was not sure of the positions of Lee’s flanks nor did 

they know if Lee had thinned out his center. Meade was cautious; he wanted 

to move Hancock into the gap between the VI and IX Corps. Grant was 

aggressive; he wanted to use the II Corps to attack Lee’s left flank, threaten 

his rear, cut his supply line, and smash him against Burnside’s corps.

Grant’s view held sway. He ordered Burnside to entrench and hold 

Lee at all costs. He then ordered Hancock to move to the high ground west 

of Todd’s Tavern in preparation for a crossing of the Po River.

By 1400, the Union II Corps had completed its move and its location 

was unknown to Anderson. However, some Union troops shot at a small 

wagon train to scare the teamsters, and this, in turn, attracted Confederate 

attention to that flank. The Union troops quickly constructed a pontoon 

bridge, and Barlow’s division crossed the Po. Grant ordered the whole II 

Corps forward, but it took four hours to cross and organize the corps.

As evening approached, Hancock’s II Corps was re-united south of 

the Po and began to advance east on the Blockhouse Bridge, reaching the 

bridge at dark. Meade (with Hancock’s advice) agreed not to move the 

II Corps any further during the night. Instead, Hancock would launch an 

attack in the morning. In the meantime, the II Corps built several bridges 

on the Po in case of the need to retreat.

On the evening of 9 May, Lee realized that the Federal II Corps was 

isolated, and he sent Harry Heth’s reinforced division (III Corps) on a 

night march to hit Hancock from the south and west.

Grant’s plan for 10 May called for a coordinated, simultaneous attack 

from all four Union corps. Hancock was to roll up the Confederate left 
174

flank. Warren and Wright would attack at Laurel Hill while Burnside 

advanced down Fredericksburg Road. The Union leaders felt that Lee 

could not be in all of these positions at once, and thus either Hancock or 

Burnside would strike an open flank, or Warren and Wright would smash 

a weakened Confederate center.

Lee planned to hold his entrenched lines around the courthouse on his 

right and center while part of the III Corps, spearheaded by Heth’s flank 

attack, crushed the isolated Union II Corps.

At first light, Hancock’s corps started its move down the Shady Grove 

Church Road. The advance was slow. Barlow probed for a good spot to 

recross the Po River where the waterway formed a large bend in front of 

Mahone’s Confederate division, but the Confederate position was strong 

and the Federals risked being in a very exposed position.

At about 1030, while Hancock probed, Warren started launching a 

series of heavy skirmishes that verged on being full attacks. Warren was 

extremely aggressive on 10 May, perhaps because of the V Corps’ repulse 

on 8 May. After about two hours of costly thrusts, Warren called off his 

attacks, which had little effect on the heavily entrenched Confederate lines. 

Grant’s plan for a coordinated attack was already starting to unravel.

In fact, prior to noon, Grant had issued new orders that changed 

Hancock’s mission and tried to bring unified action back to the Federal 

forces. Based on Hancock’s reports, Grant and Meade decided that 

Mahone’s position was too strong and that the II Corps was vulnerable to 

Heth’s flanking move. The Union leaders decided to withdraw most of the 

II Corps back across the Po and use it to reinforce an attack by the V Corps 

at Laurel Hill. One division (Barlow) of the II Corps would remain south 

of the Po as “bait” to entice Lee into spreading his line thin.

Still mistakenly thinking that Lee had substantial forces in front of 

Burnside, Grant ordered the IX Corps to fortify its position and attack only 

if the opportunity presented itself.

The V Corps, joined by two divisions of the II Corps and supported by 

the VI Corps on its left, were to launch the main effort. The belief was that 

Lee’s line, spread from the Po all the way to Gate, was thin somewhere and 

would be broken by a concentrated attack. All attacks were to commence 

at 1700.

By 1430, Hancock had pulled most of his corps to the north of the Po, 

and Barlow’s division remained as the lure on the south side of the river. 

Heth’s reinforced division began its attack against Barlow. Over the next 

two hours, Barlow conducted a fighting withdrawal. After the war, Union 

leaders claimed that they had conducted a skillful rear guard action; the 

Confederates claimed that they drove Barlow from the field in disorder. In 
175

either case, the Union forces extricated themselves, but their diversionary 

effort failed to stretch Lee’s forces.

Not only were the Confederates still well prepared to receive any 

assault, the timing and coordination for the evening Union attack began to 

fall apart. Hancock, who was senior to Warren, was supposed to coordinate 

the II and V Corps attack at Laurel Hill. However, Barlow’s fight forced 

Hancock to return to the Po and use Birney’s division to support Barlow.

In Hancock’s absence, Warren rode to Meade’s headquarters and 

convinced him that the V Corps should attack immediately. Warren 

received permission to attack at 1530. Barlow was still engaged on the 

Po with Birney in support, and Mott’s division was detached to the VI 

Corps, thus only Gibbon’s II Corps division was ready to assist Warren’s 

afternoon attack.

The V Corps attack was a disaster. Casualties were high and the V Corps’ 

morale plummeted (several Federal units made only token advances). 

Warren bravely tried to rally his men by riding among the troops with a 

regimental flag, but the efforts had little effect. Later, Meade and Grant 

directed Hancock to reorganize the II and V Corps for another assault 

at 1830, but the V Corps were exhausted and barely advanced. Birney’s 

and Gibbon’s divisions (II Corps) attacked, and although one brigade did 

penetrate Anderson’s line, the Federals were forced to fall back.

Throughout the day, the IX Corps did little to support the other units’ 

attacks and did not divert any Confederate forces away from Lee’s center 

and left.

The VI Corps launched an assault at 1800, a residual effort from the 

planned evening attack, which you will cover in more detail at the next 

stand.

Vignettes:

1. A New York cavalryman recorded his observations of Burnside while 

the IX Corps conducted desultory operations on 9 May: “Gen. Burnside’s 

corps was passing our train and the General himself came in to our 

quarters where he stayed for near two hours refreshing himself with some 

of my brandy, etc., and amusing ourselves in conversation about the tide 

of battle.” (Alexander Newburger Daily Journal, 9 May 1864, Alexander 

Newburger Collection, Library of Congress.)

2. After the war, Jeb Stuart’s aide, Theodore S. Garnett wrote about the 

missed chance of Burnside’s IX Corps on 9 May: “It occurred to many 

of us at the time, that the enemy here lost the best opportunity they had 

during the whole campaign, to fall upon our flank and destroy our army.” 

Garnett later rode east to find Ewell’s right flank, which he was told 
176

was near the Fredericksburg Road. Garnett wrote: “I hunted in vain at least 

a half hour, in which I must have ridden quite a mile in a straight line from 

the said Road, without finding a vidette or picket, or any human being who 

could tell me where our troops were. If General Grant could have known, 

and it seems to me that nothing could have been easier to ascertain, that his 

line overlapped ours for such an immense distance, it would have been the 

work of a very few minutes to move against our right flank, throw it into 

confusion and seize the very ground on which we held him at bay for more 

than a week.” (Robert J. Trout, editor, Riding with Stuart: Reminiscences of 

an Aide-de-Camp, by Captain Theodore Stanford Garnett, Shippensburg, 

PA: White Mane, 1994, 59.)

Analysis:

1. How was the lack of Union cavalry beginning to cause problems 

for Grant and Meade? What could Grant and Meade have done better to 

compensate for Sheridan’s absence?

2. What were the flaws (if any) in the initial Union plan to turn Lee’s 

flank at the Po River? Was the plan abandoned too soon? Could the IX 

Corps have been used more productively? How?

3. What were the flaws (if any) in the later Union plan for a coordinated 

attack at 1700? How did Union commanders and their personalities 

exacerbate the problems (Warren’s desire to be aggressive, Meade starting 

to lose trust in Warren)?

a. What are the inherent difficulties in trying to coordinate multiple 

frontal attacks in the Civil War (technology, command and control 

problems, etc.)? 

b. Compare these coordination difficulties with conditions today. In 

what ways are multifront assaults made easier under modern conditions? 

In what ways do difficulties remain?
177

Stand 2

Upton’s Attack

(10 May 1864)

Map 26.

Directions: Continue down West Grant Drive for about 0.7 mile. Look for 

a sign (plaque) marking the path for Upton’s attack; it is a small sign next 

to a walking path in the woods on the right hand side of the road. The stand 

(which is really in three parts) begins here. Note: The vehicles need to 

continue to the final part of the stand. After dropping off the students, the 

drivers should continue down West Grant Drive, which will bend slightly 

to the right, for about 0.4 mile. At this point, West Grant Drive ends in a 

parking lot, but there is another NPS road (Anderson Drive) that leaves the 

parking lot at a 90-degree angle on the right. Turn on Anderson Drive and 

go about 0.2 mile before pulling over to the side of the road to park. There 

are some Confederate trenches at this spot with a path that leads over the 

trenches toward a wood line. (At the time of the writing of this handbook, 

the NPS was starting to use vegetation to mark the trench lines which have 

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 2 N 250 Yards 500 Yards
178

begun to fill in with erosion at Spotsylvania.) The drivers can park the 

vehicles here and walk the path over the trenches and through the woods 

to rejoin the group at the start point of the stand.

Orientation: The stand begins at the Upton sign at the entrance to the path 

into the woods. Mott’s supporting attack was further north of your position, out of view.

This is a three-part stand. Part 1 is the entrance into the woods that 

was Upton’s staging area. After completing the situation, follow the path 

through the woods and stop at a clearing where there is a monument that 

honors the regiments in Upton’s attack. Part 2 is the planning for the 

attack and initial assault actions. Part 3 goes from the monument to the 

Confederate trench line. At the trench line, cover the actual breakthrough 

and Confederate reactions as well as the analysis and discussion.

The Laurel Hill area, which was discussed at last stop, is to the southwest of this position. Upton’s attack was made on the same day as the fight 

we last discussed, but because of poor coordination and timing, Upton’s 

and Mott’s attacks did not mutually support Warren’s earlier attack.

Except for Mott’s division, the II Corps was involved with fights on 

the Po River and Laurel Hill for most of 10 May. On the night of 9 May, 

Mott’s division moved behind the VI Corps to take up positions on the VI 

Corps’ left flank.

The Union VI Corps was initially positioned in earthworks east of 

the Shelton house to your west. Brigadier General David Russell’s First 

Division (Wright’s old division) held the far left of Wright’s line. Next was 

Neill’s division (Getty’s old division). The rest of the VI Corps held the 

line further to the right and connected with the V Corps on that flank.

Mott was placed temporarily under Wright’s (VI Corps) command. 

Mott conducted two reconnaissances near the Brown house; both times 

Brewster’s brigade failed to penetrate Confederate skirmish fire and did 

not gain adequate information on the Confederate positions. (See vignettes

for descriptions of Mott’s performance.)

Description: Prior to noon, Meade ordered Wright to conduct a reconnaissance and prepare for an assault at 1700 as part of the Union leaders’ plan 

for a combined assault (as discussed at the last stand). At about 1200, Wright 

directed Russell to prepare for the assault. Russell, with Lieutenant Colonel 

Ranald S. MacKenzie (an engineer on Meade’s staff) did the reconnaissance. They found a path that led to the woods in front of the Confederate 

works. It allowed a covered assembly area and attack position that was only 

a short distance from the Confederates—a minimum of exposure for the 

charging troops. You are at the beginning of the path through the woods that 

Russell and Upton (later) used to conduct their reconnaissances.
179

(At this point, walk through the woods to the clearing with the monument that lists the regiments in Upton’s attack.)

Russell selected Colonel Emory Upton to lead the attack and ordered 

him to use part of his brigade with several attached regiments to make 

the assault. All told, Upton’s task-organized group had a total strength 

of roughly 3,500 to 4,000 soldiers. Upton was an amazing figure: ambitious, bright, and willing to try new tactics. (See vignettes for Upton’s 

biography.)

The Union brigades (minus) in the attack were deployed as follows: 

first wave—Upton’s own brigade (Russell’s division), second wave—

Eustis’ brigade (Russell’s division), third wave—Bidwell’s brigade (Neill’s 

division), fourth wave—Grant’s Vermont brigade (Neill’s division). The 

regimental dispositions are shown on the monument.

The Confederates located in the target area were Doles’ brigade 

(Rodes’ division) with Daniel’s brigade (Rodes’ division) on its left, and 

Walker’s brigade (Edward Johnson’s division) on its right.

Upton took all of the regimental commanders forward in the early 

afternoon for a reconnaissance. This was very rare in the Civil War—an 

extensive reconnaissance by a commander with all of his subordinates. 

Upton then issued detailed instructions.

The first wave was to load and cap muskets. The other lines were only 

to load (no caps); this meant they would advance without stopping to fire. 

All would fix bayonets. The first line was to make the initial penetration. 

Then, the right and center two regiments in the first wave were to turn 

right and take the Confederate guns (the 3d Richmond Howitzers under 

Captain Benjamin H. Smith) located at the juncture of Daniel’s and Doles’ 

brigades. The left regiment was to turn left and enfilade the trench line. 

The second line was to halt in the captured Confederate trenches and fire 

forward at any potential Confederate counterattacks. The third line was to 

hold directly behind the second wave and await orders. The fourth line was 

to halt at the edge of the woods at the jump off point of the attack—they 

were a general reserve. They were to be prepared to oblique to the left, 

which is where Upton felt the Confederates could most likely threaten his 

penetration. All officers were to constantly shout “Forward.” The soldiers 

were not to stop to shoot in front of the breastworks.

Mott was supposed to support Upton’s attack; but conflicting and 

vague instructions left Mott’s exact role unclear. At first, Meade directed 

Mott to support Burnside with an attack, if the IX Corps needed support. 

Later Mott was told simply to stay connected to Burnside’s right flank. 

Additional orders directed him to use part, or preferably all, of his division to support Wright’s (Upton’s) attack. Mott needed to place so many 

pickets to connect his flank with Burnside that he could only use 1,200 to 
180

1,500 troops (out of a division strength of perhaps 4,000 to 5,000 men) in 

his attack with Upton.

In addition, there was confusion over the timing of the attack. Mott 

ended up advancing at 1700—the original start time for Grant and 

Meade’s coordinated assault. Due to the uncoordinated timings of other 

Union assaults (particularly Warren’s early start at Laurel Hill), Upton 

received permission to delay his attack to 1800. No one informed Mott of 

the change; as a result, he began his move at the original 1700 time.

Finally, the exact method for Mott’s support and exploitation of 

Upton’s advance was unclear. Was Mott to come from behind Upton’s 

initial position and pass through Upton’s line, or just advance on Upton’s 

left while Wright used other VI Corps troops from Upton’s right to assist 

the attack? Should he advance simultaneously to divert enemy troops or 

advance later to exploit an already existing breakthrough? One concept 

was for certain—the plan never intended for Mott to attack before Upton 

(even though the Union confusion eventually caused this to happen).

In any event, Mott’s troops conducted their tentative advance at 1700. 

It was more of a probe than a full-fledged attack, and it was repulsed by 

Confederate artillery fire before even engaging the main defensive line. 

Mott’s men fell back in about 30 minutes and provided no support for 

Upton’s assault.

In the meantime, there was confusion with the artillery barrage for 

Upton’s attack. The start time for the attack had been postponed to 1800, 

but one battery opened at the original (1700) time. It was decided to let 

the one battery continue to fire slowly for the next hour so as not to alert 

the Confederates. Then the rest of the artillery began a heavy barrage from 

1800 to 1810.

At 1810, Upton’s infantry went forward. It took 60 to 90 seconds to 

cover the open ground from the woods to the Confederate works. Doles’ 

Georgians were surprised—they fired only a few sporadic shots, not volley 

fire. The Confederate fire from Walker’s brigade (the Stonewall brigade) 

on the Union left was somewhat more effective.

(Move from the Union position to the Confederate lines. From the 

Confederate perspective, point out that the trenches are not on the military 

crest. From the Southerners’ position, they cannot really see [and cannot 

fire] on the Union soldiers for a large segment of the Union advance.)

The Federals poured over the works by the weight of their numbers, 

speed, and surprise. In response, Smith’s Confederate battery (just south 

of the penetration) hit Upton with galling artillery fire. In the ensuring confusion, the Union troops were not able to follow their strict, planned roles 

for each of their waves. Many from first and second lines went forward 

to the second set of Confederate works, 60 to 80 yards to the rear. Some 
181

turned left—but only slightly—toward the McCoull house. Some cut in 

behind Smith’s guns, using the woods. An initial assault directly on the 

guns failed, but by circling behind Smith, the Union soldiers eventually 

seized the battery. Some elements of the leading two waves went down the 

line of earthworks toward the south, but not far enough to produce a bigger 

success. The third line (taking some of the second line with them) turned 

left and routed two regiments of the Stonewall brigade. Walker rallied the 

rest of the Stonewall brigade and formed a new line that stopped the Union 

advance in that direction.

Lee learned of the breakthrough and wanted to go directly to the 

area and lead a counterattack. However, he was persuaded to let the local 

commanders repair the breach. Witcher’s brigade was free due to the 

failure of Mott’s supporting attack, and it moved from the tip of Mule 

Shoe to Walker’s right and began re-taking the trenches from the Union 

attackers. Ewell soon arrived on the scene. Steuart’s and Battle’s brigades 

came up. Ewell rallied Daniel’s troops and got them to hold the southern 

flank of the breach.

Upton ordered Grant’s (fourth) line (the Vermonters) forward—

many had already moved on their own—but they had little effect. On the 

Confederate side, Gordon’s division, which had been in general reserve, 

arrived. Upton was now heavily outnumbered, and he had to retreat. The 

Federals went back over the same route from which they had come.

After the battle, the Union position was much the same as before. 

Throughout 11 May, Grant worked on strengthening the links between 

Burnside and Wright with Mott’s division.

The Confederates re-sorted their lines. Doles’ force had been virtually 

destroyed and their position in the trenches had to be covered by other 

troops.

The Union casualties were 1,000 killed, wounded, and missing. The 

Confederates lost over 300 killed and 950 prisoners. The wounded number 

is unknown. Note that Ewell underestimated his casualties in his official 

report—proven by the actual number of prisoners registered by the Army 

of the Potomac’s Provost Marshal.

Vignettes: 

1. Below are two unflattering reports of Mott recounting his performance 

on 10 May: Theodore Lyman (Meade’s staff) said “Mott appears stupid and 

listless.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (an aide to Wright) said Mott appeared 

“stupid and flustered.” (Agassiz, ed., Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-65: 

Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, 

208, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Touched With Fire: Civil War Diary and 

Letters of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1861-1864, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
182

University Press, 1946, 111.) In Mott’s defense, the orders he received 

were poor, and Mott did perform much better in later campaigns.

2. Biography of Upton: Emory Upton was born 27 August 1839 on a 

farm near Batavia, NY. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1861, 

ranking eighth in the class. He was at once assigned to help drill the untutored Federal volunteers who flooded Washington in the early months of 

the Civil War. As a commander in all three branches of the army (infantry, 

cavalry, and artillery), Upton has seldom, if ever, had his record equaled. 

He was advanced from lieutenant to a brevet major general of both regulars 

and volunteers in the short space of the war’s four years (he was a general 

at 25 years old). The interval was marked by extraordinarily valuable service on a score of battlefields. His most outstanding hour of combat came 

on the morning of 10 May 1864, when with 12 regiments he smashed into 

the Confederate lines at Spotsylvania and might have held the position if 

properly supported.

Upton had been colonel of the 121st NY since 23 October 1862, rose 

to brigade command, and was commissioned brigadier general two days 

after his attack at Spotsylvania. His service already included outstanding 

performances at Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville. After 

Spotsylvania, he fought with the VI Corps in Sheridan’s campaign in the 

Shenandoah Valley. He commanded a brigade and then took over a division from the mortally wounded Russell at the battle of Winchester where 

Upton, himself wounded, maintained command while being carried about 

on a stretcher. He later participated in Wilson’s cavalry raid as the commander of the Fourth Cavalry Division.

After the war, he reverted to the rank of captain in the artillery, but soon 

was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the 25th Infantry Regiment. For the 

next 15 years, he spent most of his time teaching and writing military treatises. From 1870 to 1875, he was Commandant of Cadets at West Point. 

He was later assigned to the Presidio of San Francisco in 1880. For some 

time, he suffered intolerably from an affliction that may have been severe 

migraine headaches. He took frequent leaves for his health, but with the 

pain and anguish of his malady mounting, he shot himself at the Presidio 

on 15 March 1881. He was buried in Auburn, NY, by the side of his young 

wife who had died 11 years earlier. (Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue,

Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1993, 519-520.)

Analysis:

1. Where does Upton’s attack leave both sides operationally? What can 

Grant and Meade do next? What are the Confederate options?
183

2. Discuss the importance of tactics and its impact on operations—this is 

a case where it is particularly valuable to focus on tactics because it shows 

innovation.

a. Has Upton foreshadowed a way to solve the tactical dilemma of 

the trenches (or is his technique a throwback to outdated tactics that really 

do not solve the tactical problem)?

b. How important are tactics to winning wars? Are operations and 

strategy more important?

3. What are aspects of Upton’s attack that still apply today (regardless 

of the tactical changes)? This might include leadership, reconnaissances, 

specific unit instructions, surprise, and speed.

4. Why does the Union leadership use only one reinforced brigade in 

their attack with the new tactics? Are they unprepared for its success? 

(Compare this hesitancy to commit large forces to new techniques, which 

brought about similar problems in World War I with gas and tanks.)

5. What are the problems of an attack after a successful breakthrough? 

What should the soldiers of the initial attack do? What about follow-on 

troops? What are the operational implications (e.g., if tactical attacks are 

bound to be limited in success due to the technology, what should the 

operational planner do)?
184

Stand 3

East Angle (Confederate View)

(12 May 1864)

Map 27.

Directions: Continue south on Anderson Drive for a short distance (about 

0.2 mile) where you will come to a “Y” in the road. Bear left at the “Y,” 

and you will be on another NPS road (Gordon Drive). Continue on Gordon 

Drive for about 0.7 mile, where the road will bear left and then come to 

another “Y.” Again, bear left at the “Y” and continue until the road ends 

at a parking lot (about 0.3 mile). Park the vehicles here. On one edge of 

the lot is a footbridge that crosses over Confederate trenches. It is best to 

walk across the bridge and conduct the next stand just a few yards past the 

bridge.

Orientation: This location (near the small park service bridge over the 

trenches) marks the east angle of the Confederate trench line—not to 

be confused with the “Bloody Angle” which is further to our west. The 

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 3

N 250 Yards 500 Yards
185

location of Upton’s breakthrough (from the last stand) is about 500 yards 

to the southwest.

Note that the Confederate command arrangements were undergoing 

extensive changes after the first few days of battle at Spotsylvania. On 8 

May, Jubal Early had temporarily replaced A.P. Hill in command of the III 

Corps due to Hill’s illness. Gordon took over command of Early’s division 

in Ewell’s II Corps. Colonel Clement A. Evans took command of Gordon’s 

brigade. After extensive casualties, the Louisiana brigades of Hays and 

Stafford were consolidated on 8 May. Hays was wounded on 10 May 

and succeeded by Colonel William Monaghan. The newly consolidated 

brigade was split again with Monaghan keeping Hays’ original brigade 

and Colonel Zebulon York taking the group that used to belong to Stafford. 

York and Monaghan both worked for Johnson during the 12 May fight.

Description: The purpose of this stand is to discuss the Confederate 

defensive plan and the implications of occupying a salient. There is no 

actual combat at this stand (the actual breakthrough and Confederate 

reactions come at later stands).

Lee’s chief engineer, M.L. Smith (he had found the old railroad cut 

in the Wilderness that helped Longstreet’s attack on 6 May), selected the 

Mule Shoe position. Smith selected the position on the evening of 8 May, 

and it was occupied by Ewell’s corps early on 9 May. Smith felt that the 

large salient was necessary to put troops on good terrain (high ground with 

clear fields of fire).

The salient was about a mile deep and a half-mile wide. The two angles 

at the tip were about 400 yards apart.

(Note: Pause here and discuss the questions below concerning the 

terrain and salients. After the questions and analysis, continue with the 

description, which will cover the withdrawal of Confederate artillery in 

the salient.)

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of occupying a salient?

a. The defender can reinforce faster from inside of the bulge than the 

attacker can around the outside.

b. The main problem with a salient is that the enemy has converging 

fire around the bulge, while the defender’s fire is dispersed.

c. Salients consume more manpower than a straighter line, and they 

are subject to being pinched off at the base.

d. Others?
186

2. A salient is usually picked to occupy key ground. M.L. Smith thought 

this terrain was worth a salient; was he correct?

3. As the defender, how do you overcome the weaknesses of a salient 

(both in terms of Civil War capabilities and under modern conditions)?

a. Increase firepower (put in more artillery).

b. Entrench.

c. Keep a reserve force for counterattacks.

d. Build a reserve line for a fallback position.

e. Others?

Description (cont): Smith and Ewell (with Lee’s support) attempted to 

bolster the Mule Shoe with several of the efforts listed above. Ewell’s 

corps artillery chief, Brigadier General Armistead L. Long, massed 40 

guns at the tip of the salient. The entire front line was well entrenched 

(both sides were highly skilled in field fortifications at this point in the 

campaign). Gordon’s division was positioned in reserve.

One weakness (up to the morning of 12 May) was the lack of a complete reserve line at the base of the salient. Upton’s attack had prompted 

Lee and Ewell to build a line, but they allowed the troops to rest on most of 

11 May. The line was only partially complete by the morning of 12 May.

Throughout 11 May, there was no heavy fighting, but the Union forces 

adjusted their lines in preparation for their dawn attack on 12 May. The 

Confederates detected this movement, but the Southern leaders were not 

sure how to interpret the various reports of Union moves. The Confederates 

repulsed a Federal probe (Miles’ brigade of Barlow’s division, II Corps) 

south of the Po River in the area of Todd’s Tavern. On their right flank, 

the Confederates observed Burnside’s IX Corps pulling back north of the 

Ni River. This was actually due to a mix up in orders, and the IX Corps 

moved back on the night of 11 May. The Southerners also repulsed a weak 

probe by Mott near the Landrum house.

Burnside’s adjustments, in particular, convinced Lee that the Union 

army might be planning a move back toward Fredericksburg. Ever aggressive, Lee hoped he might be able to strike the Federals while they were 

on the move, and he issued orders that postured the Army of Northern 

Virginia for a quick respoonse.

One order was specifically directed at the army’s artillery. Lee wanted 

the artillery withdrawn from forward positions before nightfall and prepared for movement. The I Corps chief of artillery, Brigadier General 

Edward Porter Alexander, felt that the artillery at Laurel Hill was critical 

to the Southern defense and decided not to move the cannon. Instead, he 

mounted all of the ordnance in the ammunition chests and cut paths to the 

main roads to be ready for movement.
187

The II Corps artillery chief, Long, decided to obey the letter of the 

order. He had 32 of the cannons in the Mule Shoe removed. This left only 

eight guns (two batteries) on the left (western) side of the salient. The 

division commander, “Allegheny” Johnson was not told of the move. 

During his evening inspection of the lines, he was surprised to find the 

guns missing. One of his brigade commanders, “Maryland” Steuart, was 

also uneasy, but he believed that headquarters would replace the removed 

cannons.

Shortly after midnight, the Confederates in the salient became concerned over the possibility of a Union attack. Near the Landrum house, 

pickets from Steuart’s brigade reported noise from the northwest. One 

Confederate staff officer called it “a subdued roar or noise, plainly audible in the still, heavy night air, like distant falling water or machinery.” 

(McHenry Howard, Recollections of a Maryland Confederate and Staff 

Officer under Johnston, Jackson and Lee, Baltimore, MA: Williams & 

Wilkins Company, 1914, 294.) Colonel William Terry of the 4th Virginia 

Regiment (Walker’s Stonewall brigade) reported that he could hear 

Northerners’ voices to his front.

At 0100 on 12 May, Steuart sent Johnson an urgent warning and plea 

for return of the artillery. Johnson sent his adjutant general to Ewell to 

report on the massing Northerners and ask for the return of the guns.

Ewell did not believe the situation was as serious as Johnson thought, 

but he forwarded the report to Lee. The Confederate commander was a 

bit frustrated over receiving conflicting reports (Jubal Early, in temporary 

command of the III Corps for the ill A.P. Hill, had just reported a Union 

move in his area). In any case, Lee gave permission for the return of the 

artillery to the Mule Shoe at about 0200 on 12 May.

Even after Lee’s decision, there were delays in replacing the guns. 

Long could not be located until 0330. It took more time to find the responsible artillery battalion commanders. Teams of horses had to be awakened, 

harnessed, and hitched. At 0430, the leading guns were just beginning to 

arrive as the Union attack started. Only a few cannons had enough time to 

unlimber and fire scattered shots before almost all were captured.

Johnson asked Gordon for support. Gordon moved Hoffman’s brigade 

and a part of Evan’s brigade into a second line of trenches on the left 

face of the salient. Johnson also sent a circular to his brigade commanders 

directing them to have the men awake and ready to defend by 0400.

Johnson’s division, which was about to receive the full force of the 

upcoming Union attack, totaled about 3,900 men: Walker’s brigade—

1,000, Monaghan’s brigade—750, York’s brigade—750, Witcher’s 

brigade—400, and Steuart’s brigade—1,000.
188

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. How well were the Confederates disposed to receive the Union 

attack? What could they have done better? Should Johnson and his brigade 

commanders have done more to be ready (and if so, what should they have 

done)?

2. Who is to blame, if anyone, for the removal of the artillery in the Mule 

Shoe? Were Lee’s actions and orders reasonable given the information he 

received and his understanding of Grant’s past actions?
189

Stand 4

Landrum Ridge (Union View, II Corps)

(11–12 May 1864)

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 4

N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 28.

Directions: Walk along the footpath that leads away from the bridge over 

the Confederate trenches and toward the Union lines. After about 300 

yards, the path will come to a plaque that discusses Barlow’s attack. It is 

best to conduct stand 4 near this plaque. Note that to the east of this plaque 

is another path that leads to the ruins of the Landrum house. If you have 

time, walk to the ruins for a quick look or conduct the stand from that location (although the view is probably better from the Barlow plaque).

Orientation: You are presently near the center right of the Union II 

Corps attack formation on 12 May (after the Federals had forced back 

Confederate skirmishers). The east angle is the Confederate trenches (the 

place you just came from). The west angle (bloody angle) is about 250 

yards to the southwest along the Confederate trench line.
190

After Upton’s success on 10 May, Grant allegedly said: “A Brigade 

today—we’ll try a Corps tomorrow” (Lumen H. Tenney, War Diary of 

Lumen Harris Tenney 1861-1865, Cleveland, OH: Evangelical Publishing 

House, 1914, 115). This observation was from an Ohio soldier who was a 

sentry guard at Grant’s headquarters. The quotation is taken from his 1914 

memoir. The quote is questionable in part because of the date of the source 

(recalled long after the war). In addition, neither Grant nor Meade ordered 

any of the Union units to adopt Upton’s tactics.

In any case, Grant planned for a new attack to take place early in the 

morning of 12 May, and he designated Hancock’s II Corps as the assaulting 

unit.

The position of the VI Corps was to the west of Hancock’s corps, and 

the position of IX Corps was to the east. The Brown house, the Union staging area, was on the other side of the woods that are less than 100 yards to 

the north and west of our current location. The II Corps (minus Mott who 

was already near the Brown house) would have to conduct a night march 

from the Union right flank to get to this location.

Hancock later used the Landrum house as his headquarters during the 

fighting in Mule Shoe. The path from here to the Landrum house marks the 

forward line of Confederate pickets driven in just before the assault force 

went forward.

Description: On 11 May, in preparation for a possible attack, Mott 

attempted a reconnaissance near the Landrum house, but his troops did 

not penetrate the Confederate skirmish line and failed to find the exact 

location of the Confederate positions. The Union leaders could guess the 

general location of the Mule Shoe from the outline of their own lines, but 

they would have to launch the attack without adequate knowledge of the 

terrain and enemy positions.

Grant issued the attack orders at 1500 on 11 May. He directed Meade 

to move the entire II Corps—after dark—behind Warren and Wright, and 

to launch an attack with II Corps on Wright’s left flank. The plan saw the 

main effort as the II Corps with the IX Corps in strong support. The VI and 

V Corps were to support heavily, but not as part of the initial breakthrough 

force. Nevertheless, VI Corps ended up providing the biggest support.

At about 1600, Meade met with his three corps commanders to discuss the proposed assault. Hancock wanted to know the exact point to be 

attacked and the route for his approach march. No one at Meade’s headquarters could give Hancock good answers to his questions. Everyone 

decided on the need for a reconnaissance.

Colonel Charles Morgan (Hancock’s chief of staff) and an aide 

accompanied Colonel Cyrus B. Comstock (of Meade’s staff) on the 
191

reconnaissance. In the rain, they missed a turn and wandered all the way 

to the IX Corps headquarters. They retraced their steps back to the Brown 

house where they asked Mott for help—but he could not provide anything 

new. Finally, they moved to a ridge where Confederate fire prevented them 

from getting a good view. They did not return until dark. Comstock went 

back to IX Corps to help with Burnside’s attack. Morgan went back to II 

Corps headquarters, but he could not offer much information.

At 1900, Hancock assembled his division commanders to discuss the 

attack. He could not tell his commanders about Confederate strengths and 

dispositions, the friendly forces supporting the attack, specific information 

of the approach route for the attack, or even a specific objective (other than 

to break the enemy line).

Despite the lack of intelligence and resulting vague guidance, Hancock 

was able to give some specific instructions on other issues. Barlow was to 

lead the approach march. He would start the march at 2200. Birney was 

to follow Barlow in the line of march and deploy on Barlow’s right for 

the attack. Mott was to be third in line and included in the assault force. 

Altogether, three divisions were to make the breakthrough. Gibbon was to 

join the corps later and act as a reserve or exploitation force for the other 

three divisions in the assault.

The march started on time in a pouring rain.

Colonel Morgan (who had done the earlier reconnaissance) accompanied Barlow along with Major George H. Mendell (an army engineer 

from Meade’s staff) who had conducted a separate reconnaissance in the 

Brown house area with Wright. Mendell had seen a different route than 

what Morgan saw. There is no definitive evidence as to the exact path of 

the route that was eventually taken.

The march was miserable because of the rain, mud, and darkness. The 

men were already tired from the earlier day’s march (from the Po River). 

They moved in silence, but maintained surprisingly good formation and 

discipline. (See vignettes for a description of the march.)

Once Barlow arrived at the Brown house (about 0200 on 12 May), 

he received general compass directions toward the Confederate lines. He 

also had a vague sketch map on the wall of the house done by an officer 

in Mott’s division.

Historians and participants have disagreed about events between the 

arrival in the assembly area and the start of the attack. Barlow claimed that 

he did not see Hancock until after an hour into the assault. Other accounts 

say that Hancock held a council of war with all of the division commanders at the Brown house, but even these accounts conflict over what might 

have been said.
192

The bottom line on final preparations for the attack remains that the 

attacking troops knew their dispositions but little else. The direction of 

attack was given by compass point. Barlow was to attack on the left, 

Birney to his right, with Mott directly behind Birney. Gibbon was to follow in reserve. The choice of attack formations was left to the division 

commanders.

Barlow was the only division commander that seemed to adopt a form 

of Upton’s tactics. He might have heard of the formation used in Upton’s 

attack two days earlier, but that is not known for sure (Barlow did not 

mention it in his report). He deployed two brigades in his first wave and 

two brigades following. All regiments were on line (side by side) in each 

brigade, but each regiment was “doubled on the center” meaning that the 

regiments were actually in columns that were two companies across (two 

companies in front and five companies deep). There were only 10 paces 

separating the brigades of the first and second waves. The result was a solid 

mass of about 275 to 300 men across the front and 20 men (ranks) deep.

Birney’s two brigades were on line, and regiments were in conventional two-rank formations. Mott’s two brigades deployed one behind the 

other in two-rank formations.

The corps artillery was positioned to the rear of the infantry and 

ready to move forward in support of the attack—but there was not to be a 

preparatory barrage. In fact, Hancock was not even sure of his artillery’s 

position—he left it completely under his chief of artillery’s discretion.

All II Corps units had instructions not to fire, nor even to shout, until 

they had pierced the Confederate lines. The entire II Corps’ attack force 

numbered about 19,000 men.

The scheduled time of attack was 0400, but 15 minutes prior to this 

time, Hancock asked for a postponement due to the poor visibility (fog). 

He got permission from Meade. Finally, at 0430, Hancock felt that there 

was enough visibility. Barlow’s and Birney’s troops started their move five 

minutes later, with the 66th New York Regiment in front of Barlow’s division as skirmishers. They were accompanied by pioneers with pick axes to 

clear the abatis in front of the Confederate lines.

The II Corps started forward from a position about half of a mile from 

your current location, covered by woods and the dense fog. They came to 

the slight rise of Landrum Ridge and captured many of the Confederate 

pickets before they could fire. The rest of the Southern skirmishers fled.

Many Union troops mistook the Landrum Ridge as their main objective. Some Union troops raised a cheer at the lane, breaking their orders 

for silence. Many other troops joined the cheer, but as the fog was now dissipating, they could see the main Confederate positions still lay ahead (the 
193

discoloration of the ground indicated freshly dug dirt and earthworks).

Barlow’s men lost most of their formation and were a solid mass as 

they swarmed into the valley between Landrum Ridge and Mule Shoe. 

Birney’s men were still roughly in their formations. Barlow somehow 

managed to slide further to the left to strike directly at the east angle. 

This opened a slight gap between Barlow and Birney. McAllister’s brigade 

(Mott’s division) filled the gap.

At about 150 yards from the Confederate line, in the valley between 

Landrum ridge and the earthworks, the Union troops ran into abatis. The 

pioneers tore at it, and infantrymen even used their bare hands.

The Union troops ran the last 100 meters, all yelling, with no shots 

fired.

Vignette: Historian Bruce Catton provides a vivid description of Barlow’s 

night march before the 12 May attack on the Mule Shoe.

After much blind galloping by couriers and staff officers, the immense mass of soldiers began to move, mud 

clinging to heavy feet at every step. Barlow had his compass points straight, and he set out confidently enough, 

with two staff officers beside him for guidance. But as 

they moved on, he learned that these officers knew no 

more than he did about what lay ahead of them. Indeed, 

they were complaining bitterly about being sent to conduct a move when they knew nothing whatever about it. 

They staggered and stumbled on . . . and nobody could 

see anything and nobody knew anything, and presently 

the whole situation struck Barlow as funny in a horrible 

sort of way.

At his side was Hancock’s chief of staff [Morgan], 

and this man, Barlow wrote, was “a profane swearer” 

who as they plodded on kept making pungent remarks 

about the conduct of the war. As this officer made the 

high command’s utter ignorance about everything connected with this venture more and more obvious, Barlow 

asked him finally, and in straight-faced jest, if he could 

at least be sure that there was not an open canyon a thousand feet deep between the place where they then were 

[and] the place where the Confederates had built their 

trenches, and the officer frankly confessed that he had no 

such assurance; upon which firebrand Nelson Miles, one 

of Barlow’s brigadiers, voiced his disgust so loudly and 

bitterly that Barlow had to tell him to shut up. The rain 
194

stopped and the sky began to grow dull and pale, and a 

thick clammy fog floated up from the lower ground. The 

vast column oozed along a slanting field, and Barlow at 

last told the staff people: “For Heaven’s sake, at least face 

us in the right direction, so that we shall not march away 

from the enemy and have to go around the world and 

come up in their rear.” (Barlow’s account is from Papers 

of the Military History Society of Massachusetts, Vol. IV, 

247; as told in Bruce Catton’s The Army of the Potomac: 

A Stillness at Appomattox, Garden City, NY: Doubleday 

& Company, Inc., 1953, 119-21.)

Analysis:

1. Was Grant and Meade’s decision for a new massed attack wise? Could 

they have tried more maneuvers, maybe to find a flank? Was a further 

operational pause needed?

2. Critique the plan and preparation for the attack. How effective was 

staff work and intelligence preparation? What steps are staffs supposed 

to take today to avoid the errors and/or omissions demonstrated by the 

Federals on 11 and 12 May?

3. What factors helped the Union forces achieve their surprise? Was it 

luck, the weather, Confederate mistakes, a good Union plan, or something 

else?
195

Stand 5

Angle I (Breakthrough)

(12 May 1864)

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 5

N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 29.

Directions: Take the walking path that bears right from the Barlow plaque. 

This path leads to the west angle where the VI Corps attacked, and it 

crosses over the top of the Confederate trenches on a small bridge. Then 

turn left and follow the road behind the Confederate trenches that leads 

back toward the east angle. Conduct the stand behind the Confederate 

lines at a point midway between the two angles.

Orientation: You are roughly in a position midway between Barlow’s and 

Birney’s penetration of the Mule Shoe. The east angle is to your right and 

the west “bloody” angle is to your left as you face toward the Union attack 

positions.

Description: York’s Louisiana brigade saw the Union forces clearing the 

abatis to their front (mostly of Birney’s division). They attempted to fire, 
196

but the previous night’s rain and morning fog made the powder wet. They 

tried to insert new firing caps, but the wet powder would still not ignite.

The Federals poured over the works without firing. Both Birney and 

Barlow made the first penetrations. It happened from the east angle to 

a point about 300 yards toward the west. (See vignettes that discuss the 

penetration.) Troops became mixed as they piled into the entrenchments. 

All of Barlow’s men were jumbled—Smyth’s men piled into Brooke’s brigade; Brown’s troops piled into Miles’ brigade.

On the Confederate side, the Stonewall brigade was routed; many of 

its troops were captured. York’s Confederate command was overwhelmed, 

and most were taken prisoner. The Confederate artillery (eight guns under 

Captain William Carter’s battery) that had remained in the salient got off 

one shot before losing the guns to the Union advance. The rest of the 

returning Confederate artillery attempted to unlimber. The lead battery 

may have fired one round, but almost all of these guns (12 of 14) were 

captured immediately. 

Nearly all of “Maryland” Steuart’s brigade was captured including 

the commander. While being escorted to the Federal rear, he refused to 

take courtesies from Hancock, who felt insulted. Steuart was later treated 

brusquely as a prisoner of war due to his surliness. Edward “Allegheny” 

Johnson was also captured, but he was more cordial and treated better. Just 

before being taken, he had made a valiant effort to rally his division and 

was seen exhorting the soldiers with his famous walking stick.

Union forces on the east face of the bulge (some from Barlow, most 

from Gibbon) got as far as Lane’s sector of the Confederate trenches before 

they ran out of steam. The Union soldiers on the west face (mostly Birney) 

continued down the trench line and hit Monaghan’s Confederate brigade. 

This unit also suffered, but the Union troops ran out of momentum.

Between 0500 and 0515, Hancock sent a report that he had taken the 

first line of trenches and captured several hundred prisoners. In fact, the 

attack was extremely successful—it had taken 0.75 mile of the Mule Shoe 

line (over a kilometer) and destroyed virtually an entire Confederate division (“Allegheny” Johnson’s division of Ewell’s II Corps). The Union staff 

officers at Grant’s and Meade’s headquarters were ecstatic at the news.

However, the Federal attack ran into major problems soon after the 

breakthrough. Confederate units on the flanks of the penetration were 

holding their positions, and the Union troops were becoming a disorganized mass. Units were intermingled and had lost their established formations. Union reinforcements kept piling into the trenches from the rear, but 

without direction. They only added to the confusion. With little direction, 

the mass of Union troops began to run straight forward (rather than trying 
197

to clear trenches on the left and right). This mass headed south into the 

open ground behind the apex toward the McCoull house and the neck of 

the Mule Shoe.

Vignette: A Union soldier with Barlow’s division described the final rush 

over the Confederate trenches: “All line and formation was now lost, and 

the great mass of men, with a rush like a cyclone, sprang upon the entrenchments and swarmed over.” (St. Clair Augustine Mulholland, The Story of 

the 116th Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion,

Philadelphia, PA: F. McManus, Jr. & Co., 1899, 197.)

Analysis:

1. What are the problems of an attack after a successful breakthrough? 

(This issue may have also been discussed at the Upton stand [stand 2].) 

a. What should the soldiers of the initial attack do? What about 

follow-on troops? 

b. Is larger always better (e.g., the use of an entire corps for the 

breakthrough instead of a brigade or division)?

c. Does there need to be more, less, or the same care taken in planning for the exploitation as the penetration?

2. Do Civil War conditions make a full victory in this type of penetration 

impossible (command and control problems, logistics/ammunition problems, mobility problems)?

3. What are the implications of tactical, logistical, and technical limitations for the operational planner (both in the Civil War and today)?
198

Stand 6

McCoull House (Confederate Reactions)

(12 May 1864)

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 6 N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 30.

Directions: Return to the cars, leave the parking lot at the east angle, and 

go east on Bloody Angle Drive. After about 0.4 mile you will come to a 

“Y” in the road. Bear right at the “Y.” Continue on Gordon Drive for about 

0.5 mile. You will come to a dirt road that goes to the right. After about 0.2 

mile on this road, you will come to a parking area at the end of the road. 

Conduct this stand here. At the conclusion of this stand, the drivers will 

need to move the vehicles while the rest of the group walks to the next 

stand. (Driving directions follow, and the directions for the walking group 

are at the beginning of the next stand.)

Driving directions to the next stand: Once this stand is over, turn the 

vehicles around and head back out the same dirt road. Once you reach 

the paved road (Gordon Drive), turn right. After less than 100 yards, you 

will come to a “Y.” Bear right at the “Y” which will put you on Anderson 
199

Drive. Go about 0.5 mile on Anderson Drive, which will bring you to 

a parking lot (you passed through this lot when coming to the stand for 

Upton’s attack earlier). Park the vehicles in this lot. You can then walk 

about 50 yards north of the lot along a footpath that brings you back to the 

west angle of the Mule Shoe where there is a large painting and a marker 

for the famous tree cut down by rifle fire during the fighting in the angle. 

Wait here for the rest of the group. Drivers will not be able to participate 

in stand 7. They should wait for the walking group and meet them at stand 

8.

Orientation: You are now at the site of the McCoull house, which was 

roughly in the center of the “thumb” formed by the Mule Shoe. To the 

north (beyond the woods) is the face of the salient where the II Corps 

broke through. To your south is the reserve trench line, which was not finished at the time of the Union assault on 12 May. Gordon’s reserve troops 

were also to the south, working on the trench line.

Note that the woods are in roughly the same location as they were 

then, but in 1864 they were not as thick and with almost no undergrowth, 

thus the Confederates in reserve could see the Union breakthrough.

Description: As the Union troops (mostly Barlow) emerged from the 

woods just north and east of the McCoull house, Gordon launched the 

first Confederate response on his own initiative. Brigadier General Robert 

D. Johnston’s brigade advanced from the reserve line at about 0445 and 

struck the Union troops at the tip of their column. Johnston’s brigade was 

wrecked (and Johnston wounded), but they bought some time for the rest 

of the Confederates.

After Johnston’s attack, Lee arrived on the scene, and under his direction, the Southerners began a series of counterattacks against the Union 

forces. Colonel Clement Evans’ brigade had begun an abortive attack on 

its own, but Gordon pulled Evans back and joined his brigade with Colonel 

John S. Hoffman’s brigade for a combined counterattack. Gordon personally led the two brigades forward, but before advancing, Lee was in their 

midst and looking as though he might lead the attack himself.

As in the Wilderness, Lee’s soldiers called for their commander to 

move out of the danger area, and a Confederate sergeant grabbed the bridle 

of Lee’s horse to guide the General to the rear. However, there were some 

differences between the Wilderness and Spotsylvania incidents. In the first 

instance, Lee was caught up in the emotion of the moment and in the 

direct line of fire; he was shouting and exhorting the men. At Spotsylvania, 

Lee was near the Harrison house and less emotional. He was grimly 

determined, but quiet, as he faced the grave but uncertain Union threat 

after the breakthrough. Lee was finally coaxed out of leading the attack, 
200

and Gordon took his two brigades forward. The counterattack drove the 

disorganized Union troops back in a fierce struggle. By 0700, Gordon had 

occupied the trenches formerly held by Steuart’s brigade.

In the meantime, on the west face of the Mule Shoe Rodes sent 

Brigadier General Stephen D. Ramseur’s brigade to help Daniels’ troops 

retake the trenches. Ramseur was wounded, but by 0600 the Southerners 

had reoccupied the west angle. At about the same time, Brigadier 

General Abner Perrin’s brigade launched a counterattack on Ramseur’s 

right. Perrin’s brigade had been transferred from Blockhouse Bridge to 

Spotsylvania Courthouse during the previous evening, and although it 

belonged to Mahone’s division, Gordon controlled it for this attack. Perrin 

was killed in the attack, but his Alabamians succeeded in regaining more 

of the original trench line.

By 0700, the Confederate counterattacks had pushed the Federals out 

of the interior of the salient. In many places (mainly from the west angle to 

the east angle), the Confederates were in their old trenches, but the Union 

soldiers clung to the outer side of the fortifications—the troops were thus 

separated only by the log wall on the far side of the entrenchments. For 

several hundred yards starting at the east angle, the Union troops held the 

trenches, but could not advance further.

The battle was now at equilibrium. Lee’s soldiers could not recapture 

all of the original line, but he needed his troops to keep the Union forces 

at bay while he finished digging the reserve line across the base of the 

salient. The Union troops wanted to expand their opening and overwhelm 

the defenders before Lee could establish a new line. Hancock had earlier 

sent a message to Meade asking the VI Corps to launch its attack. Could 

Wright’s VI Corps tip the battle decisively in the Union’s favor?

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. Evaluate the Confederate counterattacks. How important was it to 

have Gordon—the man on the spot—directing the attacks, even when 

using units from other commands (such as Perrin’s brigade)?

2. Were the counterattacks necessary at all? Could Lee have taken an 

operational view, pulled the army back to defensible terrain, and not spent 

so many lives in trying to re-take the original trenches?

3. In general terms that can apply today as well as the Civil War, what 

are some key elements to a successful counterattack? Is it normally better 

to wait until counterattacking units are concentrated or to attack as soon as 

possible even if it means units are committed piecemeal?
201

Stand 7

Confederate Works

(12 May 1864)

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 7

N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 31.

Directions: There is a walking path cut in the woods that you can see from 

the area of the McCoull house; it is on the northwest edge of the McCoull 

clearing and veers slightly left before eventually coming to the clearing at 

the west angle. Entering the woods, you will find remains of Confederate 

trenches that were the backup position for “Allegheny” Johnson’s division 

on the west face of the salient (not to be confused with the reserve line held 

by Gordon). There are several of these trenches; you can pick any one of 

them and stop to discuss some concepts about Civil War entrenchments.

Orientation: This stand is designed to provide background on Civil War 

entrenchments; it does not cover any particular operation in the battle. The 

trenches were a secondary line about 150 to 200 yards behind Johnson’s 

main defensive position.
202

Description: For much of the first half of the war, most Civil War officers 

did not believe in the use of field fortifications, which they felt might dull 

the offensive spirit of the troops. While many officers were West Point 

graduates and trained engineers, their knowledge was in extensive permanent fortifications such as those developed by the famed French engineer 

Sebastien Le Prestre de Vaubon. 

As the war progressed, both sides came to appreciate the increased 

killing power of rifled muskets, and they began to take advantage of field 

fortifications to protect their forces. By 1864, the combatants were habitually entrenching their defensive positions at nearly every stop. It is interesting to note that the growth of Civil War fortifications and the strength 

this gave the defender were precursors to the deadly trench warfare of the 

Western Front in World War I.

In the Overland Campaign, both sides showed a dramatic improvement in the skill and speed with which they made these field fortifications. In the Wilderness, Hancock’s breastworks were crucial to the Union 

defense on Brock Road. Hill’s III Corps was not properly entrenched and 

nearly routed, but Ewell’s II Corps made excellent use of fieldworks and 

was never really threatened with defeat.

Anderson’s (and later Ewell’s) entrenchments had blunted Warren’s 

attacks the first three days at Spotsylvania. Upton’s and Barlow’s attacks 

were specifically designed to overcome the problems of breaking a fortified position. (See vignettes for a description of Confederate skill in 

entrenching.)

There were basically two types of field entrenchments used in the war: 

the parapet and ditch and the trench and breastwork. The parapet style 

involved digging a large ditch and piling the dirt behind the ditch to form 

a high parapet. The soldiers would then have a firing step behind the parapet. This extensive work took some time, because of the need for a large 

amount of dirt from the front ditch to make the parapet high enough to 

protect the soldiers.

Ground level

Ditch

Parapet

Firing step

Figure 3. The parapet and the ditch.
203

The trench and breastwork took less time to build than the parapet 

style of work and was usually the initial work constructed by the soldiers 

(it could later be improved into the more extensive parapet and ditch). In 

this work, the dirt from the trench was piled in front (toward the enemy), 

thus reducing the need to have a deep trench. Often, the soldiers would 

construct a log wall that kept the dirt from falling back into the trench and 

might even extend higher than the dirt front. 

Figure 4. The trench and breastwork.

The trenches in this region were probably a mix of both types of fieldworks shown above, but with the “trench and breastwork” style being the 

more common. The Confederates had been in the region for several days, 

but many units had moved in and out of these positions as Lee shifted 

forces to meet Grant’s maneuvers on the flanks and thus did not always 

have enough time in place to improve their positions.

The infantrymen had to construct almost all of the field fortifications 

themselves. The few number of engineer troops (sometimes called pioneers) focused their efforts on more permanent fortifications, and in the 

field they constructed bridges and improved roads (the modern “mobility” 

tasks).

Staff engineers did assist the infantry in one major area—they usually 

laid out the trace of the trench line, although in many cases they could 

do little more than make slight modifications to the defensive positions 

already selected and occupied by the infantrymen.

Entrenching tools were not standard issue to the infantrymen. Units 

received two spades, two pick axes, and two hatchets for every 15 infantrymen and 13 mounted men, and these tools were usually carried in wagons 

with the regimental trains. Thus, the infantry normally began the entrenching process by scraping an individual position with a bayonet or mess tin 

Trench

Log wall

Dirt in front of wall,

sometimes called a glacis
204

until the tools could be brought forward. Even then, the low number of 

tools meant that most of the men had to use “homemade” instruments to 

build their entrenchments.

Vignette: In a letter home, Lieutenant Theodore Lymann of Meade’s staff 

gave this perspective on the skill of the Confederates in building field fortifications: “It is a rule that, when the rebels halt, the first day gives them 

a good rifle pit; the second a regular infantry parapet with artillery in position; and the third a parapet with an abatis in front and entrenched batteries behind” (Agassiz, ed., Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-1865: Letters of 

Colonel Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox, 100).

Analysis: This stand is mostly for information purposes; nevertheless, you 

may want to discuss the operational implications of field fortifications.
205

Stand 8

Angle II (Face of Battle)

(12 May 1864)

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 8

N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 32.

Directions: Continue the walk through the woods until you come to the 

clearing at the west angle. Depending on where you stopped to discuss 

entrenchments, your walk to the clearing should only be 200 to 300 yards. 

Once in the clearing, a good spot to conduct the stand is near a small footbridge over the Confederate trenches, which is near a large NPS mounted 

painting and the plaque for the oak tree cut down by rifle fire.

Orientation: You have just come from the McCoull house by way of some 

examples of Civil War trenches. You are back at the west angle. This was 

the VI Corps area for most of the fighting on 12 May. This location came 

to be known as the “bloody angle.” You can see the east angle from here 

(it is to the right as you face the Federal attack positions). You were at both 

angles in stands 3, 4, and 7 earlier today.
206

Description: After the initial Union penetration and the Confederate counterattack, the lines stabilized and the fight degenerated into a bloody slugfest during which little ground changed hands.

The II Corps retreated to the initial Confederate trench lines and 

then held. The Union troops stayed in the trenches and fought with the 

Confederates who tried to retake the positions. As mentioned earlier, part 

of the trenches were in Union hands and part in Confederate hands, with 

troops often separated only by the log walls of the entrenchments. Meade 

answered Hancock’s earlier call for help and ordered the VI Corps to attack 

and support the II Corps.

At about 0600, Wright received the order to join the attack. There was 

some confusion as to which unit would lead the attack. The first VI Corps 

unit to become engaged was Colonel Oliver Edward’s brigade of Neill’s 

division. Edward’s brigade moved forward shortly after 0630; they were 

the first VI Corps units to arrive at the bloody angle.

Some of Brewster’s Excelsior brigade (II Corps, Mott’s division) 

came forward on Edward’s right. Perrin’s Alabamians counterattacked at 

this time. Both sides exchanged continuous fire at close range across the 

breastworks. 

Shortly after Edward’s brigade was engaged, Colonel Daniel D. 

Bidwell’s and Brigadier General Frank Wheaton’s brigades (the rest of 

Neill’s division) joined in the fighting. Bidwell came directly behind 

Edward’s troops; Wheaton came in on Edward’s left. The final brigade of 

Neill’s division (Grant’s Vermont brigade) split into two parts. Half came 

in behind Barlow’s troops to the left of the Bloody Angle and supported 

the II Corps in this area. The other half went to its right and attacked on 

Edward’s right at the angle.

At about 0930, Wright committed Russell’s division to the battle. 

Upton’s brigade arrived first and extended the line further to the right 

(west) of the angle. Also at about this time, Wheaton shifted some of his 

troops to the left (east) to replace Brookes’ II Corps units that were out 

of ammunition. Soon after, Colonel Henry W. Brown’s New Jersey brigade came up behind Upton and formed for an attack at the “oak tree 

stump.” They were repulsed, but continued to fight on the far side of the 

Confederate breastworks.

It was sometime after 1200 when Lee definitively decided that he 

would abandon the Mule Shoe, but he needed more time to finish the new 

line at the base of the salient. This meant that the Southerners had to keep 

fighting in their current positions until the new entrenchments were done. 

The Union forces were also committed to expanding their earlier success. 

Thus, the fighting continued all day.
207

The Confederates finally withdrew shortly after midnight. The withdrawal was surprisingly easy—both sides were exhausted.

Many participants as well as historians have considered the 12 May 

fighting the most vicious of the war. It was mostly an infantry fight. The 

artillery could not get clear shots at the lines, which were so close together. 

Upton ordered up one battery. It got close enough for some effective 

canister, but soon all of the gunners and horses were killed. Despite the 

viciousness of the fight, there were pauses. Occasionally, units on both 

sides would stop firing, even when at close range. Among small groups 

there were demands for surrender (almost all refused), and units ran out of 

ammunition. To add to the misery, it rained on and off all day. Many dead 

and wounded were buried in the mud of the trenches.

The casualties for the Mule Shoe fight were horrific. The Northerners 

lost about 7,000 men total (killed, wounded, and missing). Two senior 

leaders were wounded: Wright and Brigadier General Alexander S. Webb 

(a brigade commander in Gibbon’s division). The Confederates lost about 

6,000 men total (at least 3,000 of which were prisoners) and 20 guns. 

Many senior Southern leaders were lost: Daniel and Perrin were killed; 

Brigadier General Samuel McGowan (brigade commander in Wilcox’s 

division, III Corps), Ramseur, R.D. Johnston, and Walker were severely 

wounded; and Johnson and Steuart were captured. Also on 12 May, Lee 

learned of Jeb Stuart’s death (at the battle of Yellow Tavern).

Vignettes: One of the main purposes of this stand is to give the group a 

feel for the horror and desperateness of this struggle—a look at the face of 

battle. The following list of vignettes need not be read in its entirety; pick 

several of the vignettes for discussion.

1. This description from historian Bruce Catton provides an evocative 

view of the scene: “Never before on earth had so many muskets been fired 

so fast on so narrow a front and at such close range. About all that kept 

the two armies from completely annihilating each other was the fact that 

most men were firing too rapidly to aim. A whole grove of trees behind 

the Rebel line was killed by shots that flew too high, and the logs of the 

breastworks were splintered and, a Confederate officer said expressively, 

‘whipped into basket stuff.’ Bodies of dead and wounded men were hit 

over and over again until they simply fell apart and became unrecognizable remnants of bloody flesh rather than corpses.” (Bruce Catton, The 

Army of the Potomac: A Stillness at Appomattox, 125.)

2. Brigadier General Thomas W. Hyde (staff officer in VI Corps) recalled 

that the battle blurred into scenes of “. . . bloodshed surpassing all former 

experiences, a desperation in the struggle never before witnessed, of mad 
208

rushes, and of as sudden repulses, of guns raised in the air with butts up 

and fired over log walls, of our flags in shreds. I never expect to be fully 

believed when I tell of what I saw of the horrors of Spotsylvania, because 

I should be loath to believe it myself were the case reversed.” (Thomas W. 

Hyde, Following the Greek Cross; or Memories of the Sixth Army Corps, 

Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894, 200.)

3. An account from Colonel Lewis A. Grant, commander of the Vermont 

brigade (VI Corps) reads: “. . . nothing but the piled up logs of breastworks 

separated the combatants. Our men would reach over the logs and fire 

into the faces of the enemy, would stab over with their bayonets; many 

were shot and stabbed through crevices and holes between the logs. Men 

mounted the works and with muskets rapidly handed them, kept up a continuous fire until they were shot down, when others would take their places 

and continue the deadly work.” (Colonel Lewis A. Grant to G. Norton 

Galloway, n.d., in “Capture of the Salient,” Philadelphia Weekly Times, 18 

November 1882.)

4. Sergeant Thomas F. Galwey of the 8th Ohio (Gibbon’s division, II 

Corps) searched for words to describe the struggle: “Nothing can describe 

the confusion, the savage blood-curdling yells, the murderous faces, the 

awful curses, and the grisly horror of the melee.” (Thomas F. Galwey, The 

Valiant Hours: An Irishman in the Civil War, Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole 

Company, 1961, 210.)

5. A member of McGowen’s brigade (Wilcox’s division, III Corps) 

recalled the horror of the angle fight: “The sight we encountered was not 

calculated to encourage us. The trenches . . . were filled with water. Dead 

men lay on the . . . ground and in the pools of water. The wounded bled 

and groaned, stretched or huddled in every attitude of pain. The water 

was crimsoned with blood.” (James Armstrong and Varina D. Brown, 

“McGowan’s Brigade at Spotsylvania,” Confederate Veteran, vol. 33, 

1925, 377.)

6. Historian William D. Matter described the heroic efforts of Harris’ 

Mississippians and McGowan’s South Carolinians in the bloody angle: 

“These Southerners had exhibited devotion to duty and physical endurance that almost defy belief. Doubtless, some had leapt the works and 

had surrendered during the day, and after dark a few might have slipped 

to the rear without orders to do so. But the vast majority had stuck it out, 

the South Carolinians for over eighteen hours, and the Mississippians for 

nearly twenty. During this time they had defended their position, unsupported, without food, their only water that scooped from puddles in the 

mud. No Confederate line or staff officer of division level or higher had 
209

seen fit to visit them after they had established their position at the works. 

They had fought their fight alone.” (William D. Matter, If It Takes All 

Summer, The Battle of Spotsylvania, Chapel Hill, NC: The University of 

North Carolina Press, 1988, 260.)

7. Grant’s aide, Horace Porter, wrote about the angle the day after the 

battle: “Our own killed were scattered over a large space near the ‘angle,’ 

while in front of the captured breastworks the enemy’s dead, vastly more 

numerous than our own, were piled upon each other in some places four 

layers deep, exhibiting every ghastly phase of mutilation. . . . below the 

mass of fast-decaying corpses, the convulsive twitching of limbs and the 

writhing of bodies showed that there [were] wounded men still alive and 

struggling to extricate themselves from their horrid entombment” (Porter, 

Campaigning with Grant, 111).

8. Below is the story of “Oak Stump of Spotsylvania.” This is provided as 

background information and to answer questions (it is best to avoid reading it verbatim):

On the morning of 13 May, a few members of the 

First South Carolina returned to the area of the west angle 

from their new position in the rear and examined the 

fallen oak tree. One of these men B.F. Brown, who was 

no relation to Col. Joseph Brown, found a piece of twine 

on the ground with which he measured the circumference 

of the stump just below the point where it had been severed. The measurement was sixty-three inches, indicating 

a diameter of approximately twenty inches. Brown kept 

the piece of string, and, as late as 1901, he had it along 

with his Appomattox parole in a dust-proof case.

Captain W.W. Old of Edward Johnson’s staff, who 

had escaped capture in the morning and had carried orders 

for Ewell the remainder of the day, also visited the oak 

tree on either the thirteenth or the fourteenth. Later in the 

day he described the severed tree to a group of officers 

that included General Lee. Lee appeared slightly skeptical about the story and quietly asked Old if he could show 

the generals the tree. Old led the party to the site. Here 

General Lee viewed the tree and the area where two of his 

brigades had served him as had few others.

Approximately one year later, on 10 May 1865, the 

Army of the Potomac was marching north to Washington, 

D.C. The First Division of the Second Corps camped in 

the general area of the Landrum farm near Spotsylvania 
210

Courthouse. Everyone in the division, which was now 

commanded by Nelson A. Miles, went sightseeing over 

the battlefield. Arriving at the west angle, Miles and 

the members of his staff discovered that the oak stump 

had been removed from the ground. The remainder of 

the tree still lay where it had fallen and was soon cut to 

pieces by Yankee relic hunters. Miles and his staff rode to 

Spotsylvania and had dinner at the hotel. They asked the 

proprietor, a gentleman named Sanford, if he knew who 

had removed the tree stump and what had become of it. 

Sanford professed ignorance of anything about the tree, 

and throughout the meal the table conversation centered 

around the missing stump.

As the members of the party left the hotel and prepared to mount their horses, an orderly reported to Miles 

that he had overheard a waiter saying to the cook that he 

could tell the general something about the tree. Miles sent 

for the waiter, who said that the stump was locked up in 

the smokehouse of the hotel. Sanford refused to unlock 

the door, so the Federals broke it with an ax and liberated the tree stump. In Washington, Miles presented it to 

Secretary of War Stanton.

Today the stump is on display in the Armed Forces 

History Section of the Smithsonian Institution’s National 

Museum of American History in the nation’s capital. It is 

an authentic identifiable casualty of the battle.” (Matter, If 

It Takes All Summer, 373.)

Analysis: Discuss the “face of battle”; focus on the nature of war, its brutality, heroism, and horror. Staff rides often focus on command decisions, 

but this is a chance to talk about the common soldier in combat.
211

Stand 9

Lee’s Last Line

(13–18 May 1864)

Sedgwick

Monument

Day 2

Stand 3

Blockhouse Road

W. Grant Drive

Bloody Angle Drive

Brock Road

Brock Road

Anderson Drive

Gordon Drive

Hancock Road

Burnside Drive

Barlow

Plaque

Landrum House

Ruins

McCoull House

Ruins

Upton

Plaque

East Angle

West “Bloody” Angle

Day 2

Stand 2

Day 2

Stand 1

P

P

P

Day 2

Stand 5

Day 2

Stand 6

Day 2

Stand 4

Day 2

Stand 9

Day 2

Stand 7

Stand 8

P

Anderson Drive

Day 2 Stand 9

N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 33.

Directions: Drive south on Anderson Drive for about 0.5 mile, and you 

will come to a “Y” in the road. Bear right at the “Y” which will keep you 

on Anderson Drive. After about 0.3 mile, the road will come to a dead end 

with a small parking area. At this location is one of the large mounted NPS 

maps. Conduct the stand somewhere close to the end of the road.

Orientation: You are now at a point about in the middle of the reserve 

line that Lee’s forces built on the base of the Mule Shoe; the bulge of the 

salient was north of this location. Note the remains of the entrenchments in 

the area. The woods were much less dense in 1864; thus, the Confederates 

had relatively clear fields of fire.

Before noon on 12 May, Lee decided that he could not hold the Mule 

Shoe. He ordered the remnants of “Allegheny” Johnson’s division to finish 
212

digging the new line across the base of Mule Shoe after Gordon’s division 

was committed to its counterattacks.

Back at the new line, Lee and Ewell urged the men to work faster. 

At about 0300 on 13 May, the fighting noticeably slackened, and the 

Confederates received orders to retire to the new positions. In the dark, 

drizzly night, the Southern soldiers slipped away unopposed and occupied 

the new line.

Description: On 13 May, both sides were exhausted. They rested without 

fighting; still, there were some activities. Mott’s division was disbanded. 

His two brigades were added to Birney’s division, and Mott became a 

brigade commander. Gibbon probed the new Confederate defensive line 

with one brigade (the brigade commander, Colonel Samuel S. Carroll, was 

wounded in the process). The Federals determined the line to be too strong 

for an attack at that time.

Later that day, Grant and Meade decided on a new plan. They wanted 

to pull the V Corps from the Union right flank and have it march behind 

the Union lines to a new position on the left that would threaten Lee’s 

flank. The VI Corps was to pull out of the line and follow the V Corps in 

order to support its effort.

The V Corps began its march at 2100 in a driving rainstorm that 

turned the roads to mud. The VI Corps started its march six hours later. 

Eventually, the plan for an early morning Union attack on 14 May collapsed. At the 0400 start time for the attack, the V Corps had only 1,000 

troops in position for the assault. The rest of the corps and all of the artillery were straggling behind in the mud. In addition, Wright’s VI Corps 

was well behind Warren’s straggling units. After several postponements, 

at 0900 Grant canceled the attack altogether.

In fact, Grant’s move had caught Lee off guard, and there were no 

Confederate units in position to stop a coordinated Union attack that morning. However, the difficulties of a night march in the rain and mud meant 

that Grant was probably asking his troops to do too much.

Later that night, Grant and Meade ordered Hancock to move his II 

Corps from the Union right to a position behind Warren’s corps. This 

would put Hancock roughly in the center rear of the Union lines—ready to 

deploy on either flank as needed.

Also on 14 May, Allegheny Johnson’s division consolidated into two 

brigades. Later that day, Lee realized the new threat to his right flank and 

began to shift part of Anderson’s corps to block the Union flanking move.

On 15 May, Grant began receiving some reinforcements to replenish 

his heavy losses. Over the next five days, he received 16,000 to 17,000 

soldiers (Union losses up to that time were 37,000 men).
213

Most of these reinforcements were “heavy artillery” regiments. 

These were units that had been manning the permanent fortifications in 

Washington, DC, for much of the war, but were now needed in the field 

to help replace the infantry losses. Although called heavy artillery, these 

units fought as infantry. In addition, these units were exceptionally large; 

they had suffered few casualties so far in the war and their organizational 

structures gave them extra companies. Their total regimental strength was 

usually between 1,200 and 1,500 men, larger than most veteran brigades.

Hancock’s corps executed its move (leaving behind Birney’s division) on 15 May. Late in the day, Lee received information that Hancock’s 

corps had moved. He ordered the remainder of Anderson’s corps to the 

Confederate right flank. This meant that Gordon’s reserve position (our 

current location) now became the left flank of the Southern army.

On 16 May both commanders planned their next moves. Anderson’s 

corps completed its move to the Confederate right flank as rain continued 

to fall.

On 17 May, Grant and Meade pondered their options. Wright returned 

to his position on the Union right and reported that Anderson’s Confederates 

had departed. The VI Corps commander talked with Humphreys and proposed an early morning attack for 18 May on the Confederate left flank.

Meade and Grant approved the plan and ordered Hancock to return to 

the Landrum house area and add his corps to Wright’s assault. Burnside’s 

IX Corps was also to assist in the attack. The Union leadership hoped that 

Lee had weakened his left and center enough to be vulnerable to a massed 

Union attack.

However, the Confederates were ready for the attack the next day. 

The trenches were manned by Ewell’s corps with Rodes’ division on the 

left and Gordon’s division on the right. These Southerners had not moved 

since 13 May, and they had prepared their defensive line well.

The Federals had hoped to launch the attack at 0400, but the VI Corps 

had difficulty getting into position. The assault finally started a half hour 

later. The II Corps led with two divisions, and the VI Corps led with one 

division on Hancock’s right (the IX Corps added two divisions on the II 

Corps’ left). The Federal offensive was a complete failure and over by 

0900. Wright never got more than three brigades involved, and all of 

the Union forces were repulsed without coming close to penetrating the 

Confederate lines. The well-positioned Southern artillery was particularly 

devastating to the Federals. Union losses were 2,000 men in return for 

negligible Confederate casualties.

Despite the successful repulse of the Union attack, Lee worried that 

attrition was ruining his army. He wired Jefferson Davis that any further 
214

losses might force the Army of Northern Virginia to fall back closer to 

Richmond. Lee did get one piece of good news: Major General John C. 

Breckinridge was bringing 2,400 troops from the Shenandoah Valley. They 

were going to Hanover Junction to be ready to help Lee’s army.

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. If this new Confederate position repulsed the 18 May Union attacks 

so easily, can Lee and the Southern leaders be criticized for occupying the 

Mule Shoe in the first place?

2. What operational options does Grant have after all of the attacks and 

maneuvers around Spotsylvania? Are there any more possibilities for success in the Spotsylvania area or does he need to disengage and move?

3. What are Lee’s options? He seems to be looking for offensive opportunities, but should he be solely focused on defending and wearing down 

the Union will to fight?
215

Stand 10

Harris Farm and Spotsylvania Summary

(19–21 May 1864)

Day 2

Stand 10

MacKlin Drive

208

Monument Lane

Smith Station Road

Bloomsbury Lane

Bloomsbury Lane

208

Heavy Artillery

Monument

Day 2 Stand 10 N

250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 34.

Directions: Drive back out on the same road that brought you to this stand 

(Anderson Drive). After 0.3 mile, you will come to a “Y” in the road. Bear 

right at the “Y” which will put you on Gordon Drive. After about 0.7 mile, 

you will come to another “Y” in the road. Bear right again, and this will 

put you on Burnside Drive. Stay on Burnside Drive for about 1.4 miles. 

It will take you off of the Park Service grounds; you should pass through 

a small wooden gate that is left open during the day. You will then come 

to an intersection with state Route 208. Turn left on Route 208. Go north 

on Route 208 for 1.3 miles and you will come to the entrance road of a 

housing development area on the left. This road is Route 1470 (also called 

Bloomsbury Lane). Turn left on Bloomsbury Lane and go for 0.8 mile. 

The road will change its name to Monument Lane; continue on this road 

for another 0.4 mile. At this point, you should be able to see a large stone 
216

monument on a rise in the ground on the right hand side of the road (the 

monument is about 100 yards from the road). Park on the road shoulder 

and walk to the monument. (Do not park in the private driveway next to 

the monument.) The monument is for heavy artillery units that fought in 

the Harris Farm battle, and it is a good spot for the next stand.

Orientation: Gate (the location that Burnside incorrectly identified on 9 

May) is to the north and east of your current location. The Mule Shoe is 

about 2 miles to the west and 1 mile to the south. About 200 yards to the 

east is a house and farm that was called the Harris Farm at the time of the 

Civil War (today it is called Bloomsbury). The ground was open at the 

time of the campaign (much like today except for the modern housing 

development). The Federal flank was positioned here, and the Confederate 

attacks came from the west of this location.

You will accomplish three distinct tasks at this stand. First, cover 

the fight at Harris Farm (the last engagement of the battles around 

Spotsylvania). Second, summarize the entire Spotsylvania battle (8 to 20 

May). Finally, describe the initial plans and moves that will culminate in 

the battles near the North Anna River.

Part 1: Harris Farm

Description: After the failure of the Union assaults on 18 May, Grant 

abandoned the idea of any further tactical assaults at Spotsylvania and 

searched for a way to get around the strong Confederate positions. His 

plan called for Hancock’s II Corps to go into a reserve position on 18 May, 

and then on the night of 19 May, the II Corps would move south along the 

path of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad.

Several historians have asserted that Grant planned to move Hancock’s 

corps well in front of the rest of the Union forces as “bait” to draw Lee out 

of his entrenchments. Whether or not Grant intended to dangle Hancock’s 

corps as an enticement, the Union general in chief clearly intended to continue his overall concept of moving around Lee’s right flank.

Hancock’s path was first to go east and reach the railroad at Guinea 

Station. Then he would follow the rail line south to Milford Station. At this 

point, Hancock was to force a crossing of the Mattaponi River. This move 

would seem to place the II Corps in a vulnerable position; but the advance 

skillfully used the Mattaponi as a screen and Lee would be forced to cross 

three tributaries (the Matta, the Po, and the Ni) to catch the Union forces.

As part of Grant’s plan, all of the Union corps shifted. On the evening 

of 18 May, the VI Corps moved behind the V Corps and positioned itself 

on that corps’ left. At 0200 on 19 May, Burnside’s IX Corps began its 

move behind the V and VI Corps, and after several delays was positioned 

on the VI Corps’ left.
217

Our current location marks the extreme right flank of the Union line 

on the morning of 19 May. The Union units on the flank included Warren’s 

V Corps near the Ni River—about 1 mile south of this location. Just north 

of Warren’s corps was a brigade of heavy artillery units under Colonel J. 

Howard Kitching. This brigade had been with the Army of the Potomac 

throughout the entire Overland Campaign and had recently been assigned 

to the V Corps. Kitching’s rightmost unit was posted here at Harris Farm.

A new unit composed entirely of heavy artillery regiments had joined 

the Army of the Potomac on the afternoon of 18 May. These new troops 

were assigned to the II Corps and positioned east of the Fredericksburg 

Road near Hancock’s headquarters at the Anderson house. The regiments 

were so large that they were formed into a division (without the usual intervening brigade headquarters) under Brigadier General Robert O. Tyler.

After the successful Confederate defense on 18 May, Lee remained on 

the defensive, but kept his eyes open for an opportunity to strike a strong 

blow against Grant’s forces. At his new headquarters at Zion Church, 

Lee received reports about Union movements that indicated a general 

move toward his right flank, but the reports lacked specific information. 

The Confederate commander suspected that Grant’s apparent move to 

the southeast might leave the road from Spotsylvania to Fredericksburg 

uncovered. This might present a chance for the Confederates to get a 

force between the Union forces and their supply base, which went through 

Fredericksburg to Belle Plain.

On the morning of 19 May, Lee decided that he needed to get more 

information. According to Lee’s aide, Major Taylor, the commander 

ordered Ewell to “. . . demonstrate against the enemy in his front as he 

[Lee] believed that Grant was about to move to our right and he wished to 

force his hand and ascertain his purpose.” (Walter H. Taylor, General Lee: 

His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861-1865, with Personal Reminiscences,

Norfolk, VA: Nusbaum Book and News Company, 1906, 243.)

These instructions have led to some controversy. Some historians 

claim that Lee intended for Ewell to do only a reconnaissance in force 

and that the Confederate II Corps commander violated Lee’s intent by 

launching a major attack. Other historians claim that Lee’s orders were 

vague and the army commander gave Ewell permission to take his whole 

corps (which had been reduced by recent fighting to about 6,000 men). In 

any case, Ewell seems to have intended to launch something more than a 

reconnaissance in force but less than an all-out assault.

By noon on 19 May, Ewell had fleshed out his plan. In addition to 

committing all of his corps’ infantry to the operation, Ewell made some 

other interesting decisions. First, he chose a circuitous route of march that 

he hoped would take him far enough to the northwest to get around the 
218

Union right flank. Second, he decided to leave almost all of his artillery 

behind. Ewell wanted to have this firepower covering his old trench 

positions in case of a Union attack. Also, Kershaw’s division (Anderson’s 

I Corps) moved from a reserve position to occupy Ewell’s old trenches 

while the II Corps conducted its attack.

At 1400, Ewell began his march. Rodes’ division was in the lead, followed by Gordon’s division.

As the Confederates were making their move, Grant continued preparations for Hancock’s advance. Grant sent a message to Halleck: “I shall 

make a flank movement early in the morning, and try to reach Bowling 

Green and Milford Station. If successful, Port Royal will be more convenient as a depot than Fredericksburg. I wish you could stir up the navy 

and see if they cannot reach there.” (OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 2, 

906.) The ease and efficiency of the Union changes of base throughout the 

Overland Campaign are a tribute to Grant’s logistical planning, Halleck’s 

administrative abilities, and the Federal Navy’s skill and dominance of the 

waterways.

Because Grant was already planning to shift his base, Ewell’s attack 

could not fulfill one of its original purposes, cutting the Federal supply line 

back to Fredericksburg. However, the Confederates might still have a brief 

opportunity to inflict a limited, tactical defeat if they could catch the Union 

troops on the right flank unprepared.

At 1500 on 19 May, Kitching’s “heavies” detected Confederate movement and sent reports back to Meade. The army commander sensed trouble 

and ordered Tyler to send part of his division to Kitching’s area and ready 

the rest of the division for movement. About an hour later, Tyler’s lead 

units arrived. They extended the Union flank a little further north from 

Harris Farm and then refused the line toward Gate.

At about the same time, Rodes’ leading brigade (Ramseur’s North 

Carolinians) pushed back skirmishers from Kitching’s brigade near Stevens’ 

Farm (about 0.75 mile west of our current location). The Confederates continued their advance, and the fighting became rather heavy as they reached 

the main Union lines at Harris Farm. At times, both lines swayed back and 

forth, but the Northern heavies displayed toughness and courage.

As the fighting continued, the rest of Rodes’ brigades came up to 

support Ramseur and struck Kitching’s men. Gordon’s division swung to 

the north and temporarily cut the road to Fredericksburg before hitting 

Tyler’s position. The veteran Confederates were surprised at how the 

green Union troops stood elbow to elbow in their exposed ranks—taking 

heavy casualties—and yet continued to hold their ground. (See vignettes

for descriptions of the heavies’ fight.)
219

At the Anderson Farm, Grant and Meade were just sitting down to dinner when they heard the musket fire from Harris Farm. Both commanders 

decided to dispatch the rest of Tyler’s division to Harris Farm to stop the 

Confederates. In addition, more Union reinforcements arrived. First, the 

Union Maryland brigade (V Corps) joined the battle. Next came part of 

Birney’s division of the II Corps. Finally, Crawford’s division (V Corps) 

came to the support of the heavies.

As darkness approached, the outnumbered and exposed Confederates 

were forced to fight for their survival. Rodes’ division held out against the 

heavy artillerymen; however, the additional Union reinforcements threatened to crush Gordon on several occasions. Finally, Gordon skillfully 

extracted his troops from their predicament. By 2200, the Confederates 

were back in their original lines.

The Confederates suffered about 900 total casualties at Harris Farm. 

The Federals lost about 1,500 men (most of the losses were among the 

inexperienced heavies who failed to make use of cover). Lee realized that 

the Union right was not exposed, and he reverted back to a defensive posture. Grant remained undeterred from his original plan to move Hancock 

to the southeast, and he continued with his shift of base from Belle Plain 

to Port Royal.

Vignettes:

1. A Union veteran from another regiment, talking to a newspaperman 

after the war, praised the efforts of the heavy artillerymen at Harris Farm: 

“After a few minutes they got a little mixed, and didn’t fight very tactically, but they fought confounded plucky—just as well as I ever saw the 

old Second [Corps].” (Charles A. Page, Letters of a War Correspondent, 

Boston, MA: L.C. Page, 1899, 72.)

2. A Union quartermaster soldier gave Colonel Wainwright (Warren’s 

chief of artillery) a darkly humorous description of the confused arrival 

of Union reinforcements: “First there was Kitching’s brigade firing at the 

enemy; then Tyler’s men fired into his; up came Birney’s division and 

fired into Tyler’s; while the artillery fired at the whole d—d lot.” (Allan 

Nevins, ed., A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles 

S. Wainwright, 1861-1865, New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, 

1962, 379.)

Analysis:

1. Critique both Lee’s and Ewell’s performances at Harris Farm. Is Lee 

correct to be looking for offensive opportunities or should he now be 

content with defensive operations designed to wear out the Federals?
220

a. Should he have used Ewell’s corps? Why not use cavalry? Had 

Sheridan’s raid had some effect? Were Lee’s orders appropriate?

b. Did Ewell organize correctly for his mission? Did he press the 

attack too hard?

c. Critique Grant’s and Meade’s reactions.

2. Although the Federals reacted relatively quickly to the Confederate 

attack, did the Union commanders miss an opportunity to destroy Ewell’s 

corps that had advanced to an exposed position?

3. Does the heavies’ performance have any lessons for us today? They 

fought heroically for not having seen fire before, but they took heavy casualties from lack of tactical skill. Where should leaders place their emphasis 

for the training of new troops? How much is enough training?

Part 2: Summary of Spotsylvania

Orientation: Conduct the summary at the Harris Farm location. Go over 

the locations of the opposing forces at the end of the battle (use a map). 

Note that over the course of the fighting, the armies had rotated almost 180 

degrees: the Union forces were mostly to the west of the Confederates on 

7 May and on the east of the Confederates by 20 May.

Description: The losses had been heavy on both sides. The Union casualties 

totaled 18,399 (2,725 killed, 13,416 wounded, and 2,258 captured or missing). The Confederate losses are less precise, probably about 12,000 total 

(there is no breakdown of killed, wounded, and captured or missing).

At the end of the battle, Lee’s army was not destroyed and continued to hold entrenched lines that appeared invulnerable to frontal assaults. 

Grant’s forces also held strong lines, and regardless of the high casualties, he retained the initiative. Despite the interruption of Harris Farm, the 

Union commander was prepared to continue his plan for Hancock to move 

to the south and east around Lee’s right flank.

Analysis:

1. Who won at Spotsylvania? Remember to look at this question in terms 

of the strategic and operational goals on both sides. Below are some considerations for this discussion.

a. Grant had not destroyed Lee’s army.

b. Lee failed to drive the Federals out of central Virginia and yielded 

the initiative to Grant.

c. Casualties were high—could both sides afford them? Was Grant 

intentionally pursuing attrition?

d. Lee did succeed in delaying Grant’s move to the south, which had 

operational effects on the eastern theater.
221

(1) Grant had intended to link up with Butler in 10 days after 

the start of the campaign (this would have been 15 May). By 21 May, 

the Army of the Potomac was still far from Butler’s forces near Bermuda 

Hundred. Beauregard was able to block Butler and send reinforcements to 

Lee.

(2) Similarly, Sigel’s defeat in the Shenandoah Valley gave 

Breckinridge the chance to reinforce Lee.

2. Given the results of Spotsylvania, what are the operational options for 

the commanders?

a. Was Grant’s new plan (Hancock’s move toward Milford Station) 

the best option? Why not stay at Spotsylvania and continue to hammer 

Lee’s line? Why not turn Lee’s left flank?

b. How much freedom of action did Lee have after Spotsylvania? 

Does he have options other than to simply counter Grant’s moves? Some 

historians think the Army of Northern Virginia, while still capable of a 

strong defense, was broken as an offensive force by the end of the battle. 

However, Lee received reinforcements while many Federal enlistments 

ran out. Lee probably had his best numeric odds of the campaign starting the week after Spotsylvania and continuing through the North Anna 

battles. Even if Lee’s army is capable of attacking, where and when should 

he strike?

Part 3: Initial Movements after Spotsylvania

Orientation: Using a map, trace the routes for each of the units as they are 

described below. The next several stands leave the tactical battlefield area 

of Spotsylvania and follow along the routes of Union and Confederate 

units.

In most cases, the traces of the Civil War roads were the same as the 

modern roads in use today. Of course the roads were not paved. Most Civil 

War roads were dirt with some of the better roads (for example, Telegraph 

Road) having a macadam surface of crushed stone. In a very few cases, 

one lane of a road might be planked over with wood as in the Orange 

Plank Road through the Wilderness. In heavy rain, most roads turned into 

quagmires, but a more common problem in the summer of 1864 was hot, 

dry weather that brought choking dust to each road march.

Description: Meade’s initial orders called for the II Corps to begin its move 

at 0230 on 21 May. Hancock, hoping to get a jump on the Confederates, 

received permission to start at 2200 on 20 May. The first leg of the corps’ 

move was to Guinea Station. Then the II Corps was to swing southeast 

to Bowling Green and Milford Station. Hancock also controlled the only 

cavalry left to the Army of the Potomac: an ad hoc force under Brigadier 
222

General Alfred T.A. Torbert, who had recovered from his earlier illness.

Warren’s V Corps left Spotsylvania at 1000 on 21 May. Initially, 

he was to take the same route as the II Corps toward Guinea Station. 

Burnside’s IX Corps was to follow the V Corps as far as Massaponax 

Church and then turn south on Telegraph Road to the Po River crossing at 

Stannard’s Mill. Burnside was not to begin his move until later in the day, 

and he did not reach the Po until darkness on 21 May. At the Mill, the IX 

Corps skirmished with a Confederate screening force. Burnside decided 

the Southerners’ position was too strong, so he reversed direction (using 

his discretionary orders) to follow in the path of the V and II Corps to 

Guinea Station.

Wright’s VI Corps was the Union rear guard at the Gayle house. In the 

afternoon, Wilcox’s Confederate division (III Corps) tapped Wright’s line 

with a reconnaissance in force. Burnside sent back some reinforcements to 

help Wright, and the Confederates did not press their attack. Wright finally 

joined the movement, departing the Gayle house at 2000 on 21 May.

Meanwhile, on the Confederate side, by 0900 on 21 May Lee had 

started receiving reports of Union movements. He had Confederate scouts 

at points on the Po River reporting back to him at 15 minute intervals 

through signal flags. The lack of Union cavalry continued to help Lee and 

hinder Grant.

Lee pondered his options. He saw that Grant was either heading 

straight south (on Telegraph Road) or southeast. Lee correctly concluded 

that Grant would shift his base to Port Royal. (Grant had already started 

the process, and the base became fully operational on 26 May.) This indicated that Grant was moving to Lee’s right, but still did not give definitive clues to Grant’s specific route. Lee had preferred to stay as far north 

of Richmond as possible. He feared being forced into fortifications near 

the capital and a siege he could not win. In the end, however, Lee finally 

decided that he could not risk staying north of the North Anna River. The 

Southerners would have a natural defensive position behind the river, and 

the army could still hold the critical rail center at Hanover Junction. In 

sum, Lee believed that the North Anna was the farthest position north of 

Richmond that he could continue to defend based on Grant’s probable 

moves.

At noon on 21 May, Lee told Ewell to prepare his II Corps for a move 

to Mud Tavern on Telegraph Road. Then at darkness, Ewell was to march 

south on the road toward the North Anna. Ewell began the move at 1600 

(a part of his troops were the Confederates that discouraged Burnside 

from continuing south on Telegraph Road at Stannard’s Mill). Anderson’s 

I Corps was to follow Ewell, and it began its move at 1800 on 21 May.
223

Early’s III Corps was the rear guard. It was their probe that tapped 

the Union VI Corps’ lines in the late afternoon. Also that afternoon, Hill 

resumed command of the III Corps. His corps began its move that night, 

and they marched on a parallel path west of Ewell and Anderson’s route 

on Telegraph Road.

During the day, Lee met with Hill, Anderson, and Major General 

W.H.F. “Rooney” Lee (his son and a Confederate division cavalry commander). Later he joined Ewell’s column for the Confederate move. The 

Confederate commander was in the saddle all day and did not sleep until 

0200 on 22 May.

The war had left Spotsylvania Courthouse for good. The scene now 

shifted south and east as both sides maneuvered toward the North Anna 

River.

Vignette: None.

Analysis: There are no specific questions at this point, because the last part 

of the stand is only an initial view of both sides’ movements. However, 

think about the commanders’ intentions for their various movements, the 

distances involved, and the conditions for the soldiers in the marches.
224

Stand 11

Massaponax Church

(20–22 May 1864)

Day 2

Stand 11

1

208

208

608

Smith Station Road

Massaponax Church Road

608

608

1

632 607

639

628

Jefferson Davis Highway

Bloomsbury Lane

Burnside Drive

628 208

608

Massaponax

Church

Gate

Day 2 Stand 11

N 1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 35.

Directions: From the Harris Farm location, drive back the same way you 

came. At the end of Bloomsbury Lane, you will reach the intersection 

with Route 208. Turn left on Route 208 and head back to “Gate” (the 

modern intersection with Route 628, Smith Station Road), which is about 

0.4 mile.

The intersection of Routes 208 and 628 has some stores and restaurants 

that may be a good place to stop for lunch. This intersection is at the Civil 

War location known as “Gate.” Route 208 is on the same path as the Civil 

War era Fredericksburg–Spotsylvania Road. At the time of the Overland 

Campaign, there was a gate on the road at this location that the owner 

used to collect tolls. At earlier stands, this location was discussed with 

Burnside’s movements on 10 and 11 May, and how Burnside confused 
225

Gate with the Gayle house (located about a mile further south on Route 

208, but not in existence today).

Head east on Route 628 (Smith Station Road) and proceed for 3.3 

miles. The road will make a sharp right bend and then intersect with Route 

608 (Massaponax Church Road). Turn left on Route 608 and proceed about 

1 mile. You should be approaching US Highway 1. Just before the intersection with US Highway 1, you will see Massaponax Church on the left 

hand side of Route 608. Park the vehicles in the church parking lot. (Try 

not to arrive on a Sunday morning, because the church still has an active 

congregation.) On the edge of the lot is a plaque with a famous picture of 

Grant’s staff meeting on some benches outside of the church. You should 

conduct the stand near this plaque.

Orientation: The last leg on Route 608 is along the same path that most of 

Grant’s troops took from the Spotsylvania area to Massaponax. The modern US Highway 1 closely follows the same route as Telegraph Road did 

in 1864. The church building itself is the same building that stood during 

the Civil War (there may have been some minor modifications to the front 

facade of the top floor after the war). Use a map to show the paths of the 

units as they passed through this location.

Description: Each Union corps passed through this location in their movements on 20 to 22 May. Hancock’s II Corps arrived at about 1300 on 20 

May. His infantry linked up with Torbert’s cavalry, but the cavalry was not 

ready to move. After a 90-minute delay, Hancock and Torbert departed for 

Guinea Station.

Warren’s V Corps followed Hancock. It passed through Massaponax 

at midday on 21 May and then continued to Guinea Station.

Burnside’s IX Corps passed through here on the evening of 21 May. 

As mentioned earlier, Burnside went directly south on Telegraph Road 

toward Stannard’s, but he felt the Confederate defenses at the Po were too 

strong. He backtracked up Telegraph Road and then turned toward Guinea 

Station.

Wright’s VI Corps passed here during the night of 21 May.

Vignette: Several of the most famous photographs of the Civil War 

were taken at Massaponax Church by Civil War photographer Timothy 

O’Sullivan. These photos show Grant, Meade, and members of their staffs 

sitting outside of the church. Unlike most Civil War photos, which are 

posed, these pictures show the Union officers at work (or in some cases, 

just relaxing). One of those photos is on the plaque in the church’s parking lot. Historian William A. Frassanito, in his book Grant and Lee: The 

Virginia Campaigns 1864-1865 (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
226

1982), reprints the photos and provides an excellent analysis of their origins and content. 

Analysis: No specific questions at this stand.
227

Stand 12

Motley House and Guinea (Guiney’s) Station

(21–22 May 1864)

Po River

Ni River

1

95

Day 2

Stand 12

608

Church Pond Road

607

Guinea

95

1

Jefferson Davis Highway

Stonewall Jackson Road

Poni River

609

606 606

Massaponax

Guinea Station Road

Massaponax

Church Church Road

Hickory Ridge Road

Flippo Drive

607

608

660

607

607

609

606

Motley House

CSX (Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac RR)

Day 2 Stand 12 N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Stand 11

Day 2

Map 36.

Directions: As you leave the church parking lot, go to the intersection with 

US Highway 1 and turn right. You will be heading south on US Highway 1 

(Jefferson Davis Highway). After 0.6 mile, turn left on Route 607, Guinea 

Station Road. In 3.6 miles, you will continue to go straight, but the road 

will change to Route 660. In another 1.5 miles, you will come to an intersection with Route 609. Turn right on 609, and then continue for another 

0.5 mile where you will come to an intersection with Route 606. Turn right 

on 606 (Stonewall Jackson Road).

Note that at the northwest quadrant of the 609 and 606 intersection (on 

your left as you approach the intersection) is the Motley house. It is private 

property, and you will not stop here. However, it was briefly Grant’s headquarters on the evening of 21 May.
228

After turning right on Route 606, go for 0.5 mile where you will reach 

a small NPS site on the right—the Stonewall Jackson Shrine. Enter the 

NPS road and park in the lot at the end of the road. You can do the stand 

on one of the walkways next to the parking lot.

Orientation: This site (Guinea Station) is preserved as the Stonewall 

Jackson Shrine, and it contains the building in which Jackson died after 

being wounded at the Battle of Chancellorsville in 1863. Our staff ride is 

concerned with the events of 1864, but you may want to see the building 

where Jackson died before you leave the area.

Using a map, relate this location back to Massaponax Church (stand 

11). During the Civil War, this ground was owned by the Chandler family. The large Chandler house no longer exists, but the small outbuilding 

where Jackson died is one of the original Chandler buildings.

Description: Lead elements of Hancock’s II Corps reached here at dawn 

on 21 May. Torbert’s cavalry led the II Corps. They pushed Confederate 

pickets back across the Poni River. Lee quickly learned of this, and he 

ordered Ewell to move further east to Mud Tavern. Hancock continued 

through here en route to Bowling Green.

Grant’s headquarters guard (the 114th Pennsylvania Regiment) took 

a bridge over the Poni River (just south of here) from the 9th Virginia 

Cavalry after Hancock’s corps had passed and shortly before Warren’s 

corps arrived.

The V Corps’ lead elements arrived at Guinea Station at 1500 on 21 

May; the main body arrived at 1700. Part of the corps crossed the Poni 

and moved to the Catlett house. One brigade moved forward to Madison’s 

Ordinary. The rest of the V Corps bivouacked in this vicinity. An exchange 

of orders between Meade and Warren throughout the night resulted in the 

0500 movement of the V Corps through Madison’s Ordinary back toward 

Telegraph Road. 

Grant arrived at dusk on 21 May. He initially stopped at George 

Motley’s house to have a meal prepared. He came to the Chandler property after the meal and returned to the Motley’s house for the night. (See 

vignettes for stories of Grant at Motley’s and Chandler’s houses.) By the 

time they arrived at Guinea Station, Grant and Meade realized that Lee 

was pulling back toward North Anna.

Grant had achieved part of his goal, he had turned Lee out of his 

Spotsylvania positions, and the Union commander now hoped to strike 

Lee’s moving force. But Burnside’s timid moves at Stannard’s, Grant’s 

own concern about Hancock’s exposed position at Milford Station, and 

the inherent difficulties in coordinating the separated Union corps all prevented the Federals from catching Lee.
229

By 0630 on 22 May, Grant recognized that Lee, taking advantage of 

possession of Telegraph Road, had placed the Confederates well ahead 

of the Union forces on the road to the North Anna. Grant now faced the 

choice of pursuing Lee directly to the North Anna or moving the bulk of the 

Union forces further east (initially following Hancock’s route) for another 

flanking movement along the Pamunkey River. Against Meade’s advice, 

Grant decided on a direct pursuit. Grant and Meade departed Motley’s at 

noon on 22 May.

The lead element of Burnside’s corps (part of Brigadier General Robert 

B. Potter’s division) arrived in this vicinity at 0200 on 22 May. Potter’s 

troops rested for several hours and then resumed their march at dawn on 

22 May. They followed Hancock’s path briefly before turning south to 

cross the Poni River at Downer’s Bridge en route to Bethel Church. The 

remainder of the IX Corps arrived at sunrise, rested for two hours, and 

then followed Potter to Bethel Church.

Wright’s VI Corps arrived here at 1000 on 22 May and immediately 

followed Warren’s path toward Madison’s Ordinary.

By noon on 22 May, Hancock’s corps held at Milford Station while the 

other three Union corps veered back toward Telegraph Road in the hope 

that a vigorous pursuit might catch the Confederates before they could 

entrench on the North Anna.

Vignette: Historian Gorden C. Rhea describes Grant’s activities at the 

Motley house and Chandler property on the evening of 21 May: 

With Guinea Station safely in Union hands, Grant 

repaired to the Motley house where he sat on the porch 

and lit a cigar. Deep in thought, he forgot about the embers 

and burned the arm of the bench. Mr. Motley stormed 

through the door and scolded the Union commander. 

“What are you trying to do,” he thundered, uncowed by 

the Federals who had occupied his property. “Burn my 

house down?” Duly chastised, Grant strolled over to the 

Chandler house north of the station and sat on the porch 

with his aide Porter. Presently a lady came to the door. 

Grant stood up, took off his hat, and introduced himself. 

Soon he and Mrs. Chandler were chattering away like 

old friends. “This house has witnessed some sad scenes,” 

she remarked, referring to Stonewall Jackson’s death the 

previous year. Grant interjected that he and Jackson had 

been contemporaries at West Point for a year, and that 

they had together served in Mexico. “Then you must have 

known how good and great he was,” she asked. “Oh, 
230

yes,” Grant answered. “He was a gallant soldier and a 

Christian gentleman, and I can understand fully the admiration your people have for him.” Mrs. Chandler became 

“very affected,” Porter observed, in describing the events 

surrounding Jackson’s death. After promising to place a 

guard to protect her property, Grant and his aide took their 

leave. (Gordon C. Rhea, To the North Anna River, Baton 

Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University, 2000, 236-237.)

Analysis: As mentioned earlier, it might be best to wait until you complete 

tracing all of the movements of the armies to the North Anna (stand 17 

at Hanover Junction) before doing a critique of these moves. However, 

you could evaluate Grant’s decision to move directly on Hanover Junction 

rather than conduct another flanking maneuver on the Pamunkey River.
231

Stand 13

Madison’s Ordinary (drive-by)

(21–22 May 1864)

Po River

Ni River

95 Day 2

Stand 13

1

Poni River 606

Madison’s

Ordinary

Stonewall Jackson Road

606

Guinea

95

Nancy

Wright’s

Corner

1

1

Paige Road

Edgehill Academy Road

632

632

606

626 605

605

CSX (Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac RR)

Day 2 Stand 13 N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Day 2

Stand 12

Map 37.

Directions: Exit from the Jackson Shrine and turn right on Route 606 

(Stonewall Jackson Road). Go for 1.8 miles on Route 606 where you will 

come to an intersection with Route 632 (Edgehill Academy Road). You 

will cross over the Poni River while on Route 606. Turn left on Route 

632 and travel for 3.2 miles where you will come to an intersection with 

Route 605 (Paige Road). This intersection marks the location of Madison’s 

Ordinary.

Use extreme caution at this stop. It is a busy intersection with private 

property surrounding the roads. If your party is small enough, you can pull 

the vehicles safely across the road (605) and slightly to the right to what 

looks like an old, abandoned building site with just enough space to park a 

few cars or small vans. If your group is too large (specifically if you have 
232

a bus), do not try to stop here; instead, proceed to the next stand and give 

the information for Madison’s Ordinary at that location using a map.

The route that you are traveling, from Guinea Station to Madison’s 

Ordinary, was the path for Warren’s V Corps.

Orientation: Madison’s Ordinary was so named because an “ordinary” 

was a tavern or eating house that served regular meals. The modern road 

pattern is almost identical to that of the Civil War with modern Route 605 

tracing the path of the 1864 road that went from Bowling Green in the east 

to Telegraph Road in the west.

Description: Warren’s lead troops, Kitching’s brigade of heavy artillerymen, arrived here on the night of 21 May. Kitching had been attached to 

Warren’s V Corps temporarily.

While Kitching’s men bivouacked, the Confederates were passing south on Telegraph Road only 1.5 miles west of here. Most of these 

Confederate troops were from Anderson’s I Corps. In addition, Lee himself passed south on Telegraph Road during the evening.

Lacking cavalry, the Union units failed to notice the Confederates in 

the darkness.

This presents an interesting “what if” of history: What if the Union 

troops had discovered the Confederates? Could they have struck the 

Southerners on the march as Grant often hoped they would do? Might 

they have captured Lee?

On the morning of 22 May, Colonel William W. Robinson’s Iron brigade (Cutler’s division) arrived at Madison’s Ordinary. At sunrise, they 

saw Confederate stragglers on Telegraph Road. They turned west here, 

picked up some of the stragglers, and then turned south on Telegraph 

Road, eventually moving through Harris Store to Dr. Flippo’s. The entire 

V Corps followed the Iron brigade and was clear of Madison’s Ordinary 

by midmorning.

The VI Corps followed the V Corps to Madison’s Ordinary and then 

turned on a road that paralleled Telegraph Road. This other, smaller road 

merged with Telegraph Road at Dr. Flippo’s. Thus, the V and VI Corps 

were close to each other from Madison’s Ordinary all the way to the North 

Anna.

Also on 22 May, Grant and Meade arrived at Madison’s Ordinary 

(from Guinea Station and Motley’s) in the early afternoon. They spent 

some time at the intersection watching the Union troops pass.

Vignette: None.

Analysis: None.
233

Stand 14

New Bethel Church

(22 May 1864)

Day 2

Stand 14

Ordinary

Woodford Road

Edgehill Academy Road

632

626

605

Bull Church Road

Paige Road

Church

Bethel

Sunshine School Road

Paige Road

South River Road

Dobie Lane

638

638

626 605

605

Day 2 Stand 14

N 1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Madison’s Day 2

Stand 13

Map 38.

Directions: Start traveling east on Paige Road, Route 605 (a left turn from 

Route 632). After 4.6 miles, you will reach an intersection with Route 638, 

South River Road (there is a road sign that says “Paige” at the intersection). Your next stand, New Bethel Church (today known as the Bethel 

Baptist Church), is on the right, just past the intersection. Pull into the 

church parking lot and conduct the stand in front of the church.

The path on modern Route 605 from Madison’s Ordinary to New 

Bethel Church and eventually to the next stand at Milford Station is not 

along the path of any particular corps. Instead, you are moving west to 

east, crossing each of the Union corps’ routes as you go (from V and VI 

Corps to IX Corps to II Corps). 

Orientation: Route 638 goes on a north-south axis, and it generally traces 
234

the original road taken by the IX Corps. Route 605 is an east-west path—to 

the east it leads to Bowling Green and Milford Station. The church building is partially the original from the Civil War, but it has been modified 

several times.

Description: Burnside’s IX Corps arrived here late on the morning of 22 

May having crossed the Poni River at Downer’s Bridge (about 2.5 miles 

north of here). For a time, the IX Corps prepared to support the V and VI 

Corps in an attack on the Confederates; but the Southerners had evaded 

the Union forces and were already approaching the North Anna. Having 

marched all night, the corps went into camp in this area, and Burnside 

made his headquarters here.

Grant and Meade made their headquarters at the Tyler house about 1 

mile north of here. They rode to this location late on the afternoon of 22 

May and conferred with Burnside at Bethel Church, and on at least one 

occasion, Burnside rode to the Tyler house to speak with Grant and Meade 

(see vignettes for an account of the Union leaders’ encounter with the Tyler 

ladies).

There appears to have been considerable looting by Union soldiers in 

this region (see vignettes). There were several reasons for this. First, this 

area of Virginia had seen less fighting than much of the rest of the state (and 

was thus an inviting target for looters). Also, the Federals had been fighting and marching without rest for almost three weeks, and they seemed to 

take out their frustrations on the locals. Finally, some of the old members 

of the Army of the Potomac felt that Grant and his “westerners” brought a 

more callous attitude to plundering and failed to enforce discipline.

Vignettes:

1. For a time on 22 May, Grant and Meade made their headquarters on 

the lawn of the Tyler house (called “Blenheim” by its owners). The Union 

leaders had several encounters with Mrs. Tyler and her “visibly pregnant” 

daughter-in-law, which ultimately resulted in a laugh much to the chagrin 

of Ambrose Burnside (as described by historian, Gordon Rhea).

One of the first Union visitors to the Tyler home was 

Meade’s staff officer, Theodore Lyman. A Union cavalryman had warned Lyman that Mrs. Tyler was a “rank 

secesher,” and the staff officer’s appearance at the front 

door drew tears from the young daughter-in-law and initial scorn from the mother who had lost a son at Antietam. 

However, after chatting for some time, the daughter was 

more amicable, and the mother recognized the benefit of 

having Union brass on her front lawn as a deterrent to 
235

looting. Lyman even managed to buy some eggs, milk, 

vegetables and hot cornbread before riding to New Bethel 

Church.

At about 1700 hrs, Lyman returned with Grant, Meade 

and their staffs. The Tyler ladies were waiting at the house 

when Grant called out “With your permission, I will spend 

a few hours here.” The younger Tyler politely agreed, but 

her mother-in-law was careful to ask the Union general 

for protection, “I do hope you will not let your soldiers 

ruin our place and carry away our property.” Grant gave 

his assurances, “I will order a guard to keep the men out 

of your place, and see that you are amply protected.” At 

this point, Mrs. Tyler leaned over to Horace Porter and 

asked with whom she had been speaking. Porter quietly 

informed her that it was General Grant.

The conversation grew more animated as the Tyler’s 

realized the importance of their guest. It soon developed 

that the younger lady’s husband was a colonel serving 

with Joe Johnston’s Confederate army in the west. She 

asked Grant if he had any information concerning the 

western campaign, and the Union commander answered 

that Sherman’s army was advancing on Rome, Georgia. 

The younger Mrs. Tyler huffed, “General Sherman will 

never capture that place. I know that country, and you 

haven’t an army that will ever take it.” Grant tried to 

respond politely that he disagreed, but the ladies became 

even more defiant. With impeccable timing, a courier 

delivered a telegram from Sherman that announced his 

capture of Rome. The younger Tyler burst into tears at the 

news while the elder woman proclaimed, “I came from 

Richmond not long ago, and I had the satisfaction of looking down every day on Yankee prisoners. I saw thousands 

and thousands of them, and before this campaign is over 

I want to see the whole of the Yankee army in southern 

prisons.” 

Just as Mrs. Tyler finished her tirade, Burnside rode 

up to the group. Removing his hat with a flourish, the 

IX Corps commander introduced himself to the ladies. 

Looking across the Tyler lawn at the large number of 

passing Union soldiers, Burnside asked Mrs. Tyler, “I 

don’t suppose, madam, that you ever saw so many Yankee 
236

soldiers before?” She quickly retorted, “Not at liberty, sir.” 

Porter recalled that everyone was “greatly amused, and 

General Grant joined heartily in the laugh that followed 

at Burnside’s expense.” (Rhea, To the North Anna River, 

277-278.)

2. Brigadier General Marsena Patrick was the Provost Marshal for the 

Army of the Potomac. He despaired over the Union plundering of local 

citizens and expressed his displeasure with Grant on this issue: “We had a 

time, before Starting, in overhauling marauders & house plunderers, some 

of whom I caught—Many complaints came to me & as I had a Culprit, I 

went to Meade, who told me [Patrick] that he was really unable to help 

me, that Grant had expressed himself strongly against protecting these 

people at all, and I learned that his Staff, were, themselves, engaged in 

sheep stealing, fowl stealing and the like. . . . I am very tired—& feel very 

despondent about Grant’s notion of discipline—” (David S. Sparks, ed., 

Inside Lincoln’s Army; the Diary of General Marsena Rudolph Patrick, 

Provost Marshal General, Army of the Potomac, New York, NY: Thomas 

Yoseloff, 1964, 375-376.)

Analysis: None.
237

Stand 15

Milford Station (Bowling Green)

(21–23 May 1864)

Map 39.

Colonial Road

605

619

Paige Road

Milford Road

722

207

2

2

2

301

301

301

301

Rogers Clark Blvd

Bypass

Fredericksburg Turnpike

Richmond Turnpike

Day 2 Stand 15

(1 of 2) N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile
238

Map 40.

Directions: Exit the Bethel Church parking lot and cross the intersection 

traveling east on Route 605 (toward Bowling Green). After 4.2 miles, you 

will come to an intersection. Turn right on Route 2.

As you travel on Route 2, you will pass through Bowling Green. You 

will pass the Civil War era courthouse and jail after about 0.8 mile, but do 

not stop in the town.

Shortly after the courthouse, you need to turn right on Milford Street 

(Route 619). Stay on Milford Street (619) for 1 mile, and then turn left on 

Route 207 (Rogers Clark Boulevard). In about 0.7 mile, you will reach 

an intersection with Route 722 (Colonial Road). At the intersection, turn 

left. In 1 mile, you will enter the small town of Milford. Park near the old 

railroad station (there are some small stores and a post office nearby) and 

then walk over to a plaque near the railroad tracks. The plaque is a Virginia 

State Civil War marker. Conduct the stand near this marker.

Orientation: The railroad tracks run in roughly a north-south direction 

and closely follow the Civil War era path of the rail line. The buildings 

Colonial Road 722

207

Rogers Clark Blvd 207

New Baltimore Road

Nelson Hill Road

Antioch Road

Church Street

722

628

722

640

P

Day 2

Stand 15

Plaque

CSX (Richmond,

Fredericksburg

and Potomac RR)

Day 2 Stand 15

(2 of 2) N

250 Yards 500 Yards
239

in this area are not from the Civil War era. You are now at the location of 

Hancock’s farthest advance as “bait” for Lee. The path of the staff ride 

from Madison’s Ordinary to here has crossed each of the Union corps 

routes (in order from V to VI to IX to II Corps).

Description: Hancock’s II Corps arrived at Bowling Green at 1000 on 21 

May. Some of the slaves in the area feared the Union troops and looked for 

their “horns,” having been told by their Southern owners that the Federals 

were devils. In any case, many slaves were freed, including about 100 

who were awaiting transport on the railroad to locations further south for 

safekeeping by their masters.

Also, the Union troops freed two prisoners in the local jail, one black 

and one white; but no one could figure out why these two were set free. 

The Union troops also broke into several stores taking primarily sugar and 

tobacco.

Just ahead of Hancock’s infantry, Torbert’s ad hoc cavalry unit had 

already reached Milford on the morning of 21 May. Torbert’s men found 

elements of the 1st and 11th Virginia Infantry Regiments in town awaiting 

transport. These troops belonged to Kemper’s brigade of Pickett’s division, which was in the process of moving from Beauregard’s command 

near Richmond to reinforce Lee’s army. The Union cavalry, after a sharp 

fight, cleared the town. Each side lost about 50 men, and the Union troops 

took an additional 74 Confederate prisoners.

In their retreat, the Confederates failed to destroy the bridge over the 

Mattaponi River. Hancock notified Grant and Meade of his position and 

the additional information that the Southern prisoners represented troops 

from Richmond intended to reinforce Lee.

On 22 May, Hancock remained in place, watched by Hampton’s 

Confederate cavalry. As noted earlier, Lee’s rapid withdrawal to the North 

Anna on 21 and 22 May left the Union command undecided on a course 

of action. Grant and Meade ultimately held Hancock in place, while they 

tried to use the V and IX Corps to strike Lee’s forces on the march. The 

proposed V and IX Corps’ attack never took place, while the II Corps 

remained in place all day on 22 May. After realizing that Lee was in full 

retreat, the Union high command moved the II Corps toward the North 

Anna on 23 May.

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. This is a good point to evaluate both sides’ movements from 

Spotsylvania to the North Anna and to summarize the last several stands 

of the staff ride.
240

2. Critique Grant’s moves after Spotsylvania.

a. Was Grant correct to leave the Spotsylvania area? Was it better to 

continue shifting to the southeast, or should he have considered a move to 

the west (against Lee’s left flank)?

b. How much did logistics affect Grant’s next move? Was he right to 

remain tied to bases that were supported by Union naval forces?

c. Was the use of Hancock’s corps as “bait” a sound operational 

move? What could the Union leadership have done to better support this 

move?

d. Were the various designated paths of the Union corps the best 

routes for the next move? The Union use of the rivers to protect their 

moves seems skillful, but was the Federal leadership too concerned about 

protection at the expense of aggressiveness?

3. Critique Lee’s response to Grant’s maneuvers.

a. Lee seemed to read Grant’s move to his right appropriately, but 

did he stay in the Spotsylvania fortifications for too long?

b. Was the decision to retreat all the way to the North Anna correct? 

Should he have tried to defend further north? Should he have considered 

offensive action north of the river?

4. Compare and contrast both the Federal and Confederate operational 

actions with current doctrine concerning operations—look for both similarities and differences. Below are some potential topics.

a. What were Grant’s and Lee’s decisive points and were these correctly chosen? What considerations in selecting decisive points are the 

same for the Civil War era as today? What considerations have changed?

b. Did both commanders select good lines of operations? What do 

today’s concepts of lines of operations have in common with 1864? What 

is different?

c. Did Grant risk exceeding his operational reach? Modern technology has often extended the geographic extent of operational reach. What 

factors that limited Grant still apply today?
241

Stand 16

Mount Carmel Church

(23–24 May 1864)

722

Rogers Clark Blvd

207

Nelson Hill

Road

722 628

605

2 301

2

2

301

301

639

601

639 Milford

Day 2

Stand 16

Mt Carmel Church

207

207 Richmond Turnpike

95

1

95

1

Glen Road

Ruther

601

CSX (Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac RR)

Day 2 Stand 16

(1 of 2)

N

1 Mile 2 Miles

Day 2

Stand 15

Map 41.
242

Rogers Clark Blvd

Day 2

Stand 16

Mt Carmel Church

207

1

207

1

Jefferson Davis Highway

Telegraph Road 657

Day 2 Stand 16

(2 of 2)

N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 42.

Directions: Return to Route 722 and continue for 0.2 mile to a four-way 

intersection. Turn right at the intersection—you will still be on Route 722, 

but the road name becomes Nelson Hill Road. After 2.2 miles, you will 

come to an intersection with state Route 207 (Rogers Clark Boulevard). 

Turn left on 207 and continue for 6.8 miles. You will cross US Highway 1 

(there is a set of traffic lights at this crossing).

You need to exercise extreme caution at this crossing and be ready to 

make an immediate left just after US Highway 1 on Route 657. This road 

is part of the old Telegraph Road that parallels the modern US Highway 1. 

After making the left on Route 657 you will see a church just a few hundred yards down the road. The church is currently called Carmel Baptist 

Church—during the Civil War it was known as Mount Carmel Church. 

Park in the church parking lot, and walk to a plaque (monument) that is 

about 50 yards in front of the church. This is a good place to conduct the 

stand.

Note that the route from Milford Station (stand 15) to Mount Carmel 
243

Church roughly traces the path of Hancock’s II Corps as it moved toward 

the North Anna River.

Orientation: Grant and Meade used this church as a headquarters during 

the North Anna battles. Their staffs laid wooden boards across the pews 

and placed their maps on top of the impromptu tables.

Route 657 follows the original Civil War path of Telegraph Road up to 

the church before it turns into a dirt path and dead ends on the east side of 

the church. Telegraph Road was the Civil War’s most rapid path from the 

Spotsylvania area to the North Anna.

Description: The Federal positions at dawn on 23 May had the V Corps 

between Dr. Joseph Flippo’s house and Harris Store on Telegraph Road—

about 6 miles north of the North Ann River (about 3 miles north of here), 

the VI Corps moving parallel with the V Corps in the same vicinity, and 

the IX Corps at Bethel Church. In addition, the II Corps was holding its 

bridgehead on the Mattaponi River at Milford.

In the morning, Grant and Meade were still at their headquarters at 

the Tyler house near Bethel Church. They soon realized that Lee had withdrawn rapidly enough to avoid battle north of the North Anna River. The 

Federal commanders departed the Tyler house before noon and set up 

their headquarters at Mount Carmel Church between 1300 and 1400 on 

23 May.

In the meantime, the Union commander ordered the Federal forces to 

move south in pursuit of Lee. Grant no longer worried about the II Corps 

(the “bait”), and ordered them to join in the pursuit of the Confederates. 

Grant seems to have felt that Lee’s forces were shaken from the severe 

battles at Spotsylvania, and he hoped to gain bridgeheads on the North 

Anna that would deny Lee the opportunity to use the river line to rest and 

refit his army.

The Federal army began its move immediately after receiving its 

orders. Warren’s V Corps moved down Telegraph Road to this location. By 

0900, Warren’s corps had arrived at Mount Carmel Church and advance 

elements proceeded south looking for Jericho “Bridge.” In fact, there was 

no bridge, but there was a ford further west at a place called Jericho Mills. 

A local slave told the Union leader that the only bridge up ahead was 

the Chesterfield Bridge. Torbert and his ad hoc cavalry arrived and told 

Warren that the II Corps was nearby. In order to avoid a traffic jam at 

Mount Carmel Church, Warren decided to leave Telegraph Road and move 

west where he would eventually find Jericho Mills’ Ford. The VI Corps 

followed the V Corps path.

Hancock’s II Corps moved from Milford Station southwest to Telegraph 

Road at Mount Carmel Church. After reaching the church at about 1130, 
244

the II Corps continued south on Telegraph Road where they were to cross 

the North Anna at a place he believed was called Chesterfield Ford. In 

fact, there was a Chesterfield Bridge (not Ford) where Telegraph Road 

crossed the North Anna, as well as a railroad bridge (for the Richmond, 

Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad) about a half mile east of Telegraph 

Road. Hancock had the II Corps prepare to take the bridges.

Burnside’s IX Corps followed Hancock’s troops for much of the route 

before veering slightly west of Chesterfield Bridge toward Ox Ford on the 

North Anna.

Warren, through the information of another slave, learned of the ford 

at Jericho Mills. He sent Griffin’s division to cross the river at the ford. 

The rest of the V Corps was to follow.

After Grant and Meade set up their headquarters at Mount Carmel 

Church, they directed Hancock to take the bridges at Chesterfield, but not 

to advance any further. Grant and Meade believed that Warren’s move 

upstream would flank Lee’s position and force the Confederates to retreat 

away from the river line. The VI Corps arrived at Mount Carmel Church 

in the midafternoon and was sent to support the V Corps. The IX Corps 

arrived at sundown and continued to Ox Ford.

Mount Carmel Church remained the Union high command’s headquarters throughout the North Anna operations. Sheridan’s cavalry arrived 

in this vicinity on 24 May in a driving thunderstorm. Two cavalrymen of 

the 10th New York were killed near the church by lightning on that day.

Also that day, the Union leadership finally removed one of the problems in their command structure, when Burnside’s IX Corps was officially 

placed under the Army of the Potomac. Whatever his faults, Burnside 

made it clear that he had no problems working in subordination to Meade 

(technically his junior), and Grant took the opportunity to remedy the awkward arrangement that had kept the IX Corps as an independent unit.

Vignette: The relationship between Grant and Meade reached a low point 

on the move to the North Anna. Given the awkward Union command 

structure, it is remarkable that Grant and Meade worked as effectively as 

they did, but as the campaign progressed the strain between the two began 

to show.

On 19 May, Meade wrote to his wife: “If there was any honorable way 

of retiring from my present false position, I should undoubtedly adopt it, 

but there is none, and all I can do is patiently submit and bear with resignation and humiliation.” (Letter from Maj. Gen. George G. Meade to 

his wife, 19 May 1864, located in the George G. Meade Collection at the 

Historical Society of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia as quoted by Rhea, To 

the North Anna River, 259.)
245

On 22 May, Grant overruled Meade and ordered the Army of the 

Potomac to the North Anna (rather than conducting a flanking movement 

on the Pamunkey River). This decision added to Meade’s frustration.

The next day, Meade’s frustration was reflected in an oddly humorous incident during the headquarters’ move to Mount Carmel Church. 

Normally the two Union commanders and their staffs traveled together, 

but Grant’s group set out early on 23 May. Meade noticed this, and according to an aide, “General Meade, who got his pride up at Grant’s rapidity, 

set off at a great rate that soon raised a cloud of dust and left the Lieutenant 

General far behind; whereat George G. was much pleased” (Agassiz, ed., 

Meade’s Headquarters, 1863-65: Letters of Colonel Theodore Lyman from 

the Wilderness to Appomattox, 122).

The inevitable tension between Grant and Meade may have had an 

impact on Meade’s performance later at Cold Harbor where he found himself with more tactical control than in earlier battles.

Analysis:

1. Examine Grant’s moves to the North Anna. Was he correct to conduct 

a direct pursuit?

2. Once at the river, Grant made a rare exception from his normal flank 

moves to the left (east) and attempted to use Warren’s and Wright’s corps 

to flank Lee on the west. Was this a good move?

3. Re-look the Grant and Meade relationship.

a. Has it worked well enough (up to now) to justify Grant’s decision 

to stay out of Washington? Could there be a better arrangement?

b. Compare the Grant-Meade relationship to our command structures 

and relationships today. You would not expect the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs to make his headquarters with a field force, but what are the proper 

roles for the combatant commander and combined force land component 

commander in modern actions? Where should they locate their headquarters (main, forward, and rear) and themselves? What lessons, good and 

bad, from Grant and Meade’s command situation still apply today?
246

Stand 17

Hanover Junction and Doswell

(23–24 May 1864)

Doswell Road

Day 2

Stand 17

Railroad

Office 688

1

1

Washington Highway

Doswell Park Road

Railroad Avenue

Doswell Road 688

CSX (Virginia Central RR)

CSX (Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac RR)

Day 2 Stand 17 N

100 Yards 200 Yards

Map 43.

Directions: After leaving the church parking lot, go back on Route 657 

(Telegraph Road) for a short distance, and then make two quick right turns 

so that you are heading south on US Highway 1. In about 5.0 miles, you 

will reach an intersection with Route 688 (Doswell Road).

Before you reach the intersection with 688, there are two points of 

interest: First, you will pass over the North Anna River at a position close 

to where Telegraph Road crossed the river over Chesterfield Bridge. This 

bridge was a major area of fighting on 23 and 24 May and is discussed in 

the next several stands. Second, about 0.25 mile south of the river, there 

is a large two-story brick house on the right side of US Highway 1. This 

building is from the Civil War era and is known as “Ellington.” Lee was 

at this location during some of the fighting for the North Anna, which is 

discussed at later stands. (Note: This is private property and not accessible 
247

for the staff ride, but you can mention it as you drive by and discuss it later 

in the ride.)

When you reach the intersection with 688 (Doswell Road), turn left 

and after traveling 0.3 mile you will reach Hanover Junction (there is a 

railroad administration building at this location where two sets of rail 

tracks cross). There is usually ample parking in front of the station for you 

to conduct this stand.

Please do not wander close to the railroad tracks. There are safety risks 

near the tracks. The workers at the rail station are willing to allow you to 

conduct the staff ride here, but they will rightfully intervene if your group 

begins to pose a safety risk.

IMPORTANT: You must visit the senior railroad representative at this 

location prior to your staff ride and get permission to visit the site. The 

property is owned by the railroad, and you need permission to use the site 

for your stand.

Orientation: This location was a crucial supply point for Lee’s army. 

The crossing of the two rail lines made it one of the critical locations in 

Virginia for the Overland Campaign. The Virginia Central Railroad goes 

from northwest to southeast; the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac 

Railroad goes from north to south. 

The Virginia Central was the more important rail line of the two—it 

brought supplies from the Shenandoah Valley and central Virginia to Lee’s 

army and Richmond. Note that the building at the rail junction is not a 

Civil War structure; built in 1928, it is an administrative building for the 

railroad.

Description: At 0200 on 22 May, Lee halted at Dr. Joseph A. Flippo’s 

house, about 9 miles north of our current location (Hanover Junction). Lee 

only stayed briefly and then proceeded another 1.5 miles further south to 

Steven’s Mill Pond where his staff erected Lee’s headquarters tent. Ewell’s 

corps was positioned near Dickinson’s Mill. After resting for about 90 minutes, Ewell’s corps continued its march south toward Hanover Junction. 

Lee accompanied Ewell’s men.

During the move, Lee sent a message to Wade Hampton to hold the 

Federals in check as much as possible and to fall back to Hanover Junction, 

while covering the movements of the Confederate infantry. Lee sent a message to Davis that explained his reasons for retreating to the North Anna 

line (see vignettes).

Lee also learned that reinforcements had arrived from Beauregard’s 

forces after stopping Butler’s Army at Bermuda Hundred. These forces 

consisted of Major General Robert F. Hoke’s brigade (which was assigned 
248

to Early’s division) and three brigades of Pickett’s division (under 

Brigadier General Seth M. Barton, Brigadier General Montgomery D. 

Corse, and Colonel William R. Terry; Brigadier General Eppa Hunton’s 

brigade remained near Richmond). These forces, some 8,000 to 9,000 

troops, along with Breckinridge’s men from the Valley, helped to make up 

for some of the Confederate losses.

The Union forces were also receiving some reinforcements (many 

of them were the heavy artillery regiments), and the Federals eventually 

received 16,000 to 17,000 troops by the end of the North Anna battle. 

However, many of these troops did not arrive until after the fighting on 

the river, and the Army of the Potomac lost additional troops as enlistment 

times ran out on some of the volunteer regiments.

In sum, Lee’s forces probably had a better ratio of troop strength during the North Anna struggle than they would have throughout the entire 

Overland Campaign. (See J. Michael Miller, The North Anna Campaign, 

“Even To Hell Itself,” Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1989, 6-11, for 

a detailed discussion of troop strengths prior to the North Anna fight.)

When Lee reached the North Anna, he ordered Ewell to take position 

on the south side of the river while still holding some small bridgeheads on 

the north side. Lee ordered the bridges for Telegraph Road (Chesterfield 

Bridge) and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad be held. 

The key position north of the river that protected the bridges was known as 

Henagan’s Redoubt (named after Colonel John W. Henagan whose South 

Carolina brigade from Kershaw’s division, I Corps, held the location).

Lee then rode further south to Hanover Junction and established his 

headquarters in the southwestern quadrant formed by the rail junction. At 

0930, Lee telegraphed the Confederate Secretary of War, James A. Seddon, 

that Ewell was in position on the North Anna with Anderson and Hill to 

arrive shortly and assume their positions on the river.

Although no Federals appeared on the river that afternoon (22 May), 

Hampton sent a report to Lee that the Union troops were moving south 

toward the North Anna River and Hanover Junction. Lee sent another message to Davis that spoke of taking the offensive, especially if he could get 

more reinforcements from Beauregard.

On the morning of 23 May, Lee rode forward from the Hanover 

Junction headquarters and conducted an extensive reconnaissance of the 

bridges on the North Anna. He decided not to fortify defensive positions on 

the south side at this time. There are several possible explanations for this 

decision. First, Lee may have felt the Federals would think the positions 

too strong and simply decide not to attack, thus not leaving Lee any chance 

for a counterstroke. Second, he may have wanted to maintain contact with 
249

the Union forces by using the bridgeheads on the north bank. Finally, he 

may have felt that he could not hold the river against a concerted attack 

because the south bank was lower than the north bank along most of the 

river (except at Ox Ford). In this case, the bridgeheads would hold the 

higher ground as long as possible and disconcert the Federals while setting 

the stage for a possible Confederate counterattack south of the river.

Lee positioned Anderson’s I Corps forward on the North Anna near 

the bridges. Ewell fell back further to Anderson’s right and rear. Hill 

was placed on the I Corps’ left flank at a location known as Anderson’s 

Tavern.

Federal troops arrived on the North Anna at about noon on 23 May. At 

this time, Lee was at Ellington (a two-story brick house owned by Parson 

Thomas H. Fox that you saw earlier on US Highway 1). He reiterated 

the need to hold the bridgeheads to his staff and commanders. While at 

Ellington, Lee and other Confederate leaders came under Union artillery 

fire. As more Union troops arrived (Hancock’s II Corps), the Federals 

applied more pressure to Henagan’s Redoubt.

As discussed earlier, the Union leadership had been confused over the 

terrain where Telegraph Road crossed the North Anna. At 1430 on 23 May, 

Hancock’s troops approached a stream just north of the North Anna called 

Long Creek and mistook it for the main river. About an hour later, Birney’s 

division forced Confederate pickets to withdrawal from Long Creek, and 

Hancock soon realized that the North Anna was about 0.5 mile further 

south.

With a better appreciation for the terrain, Hancock deployed his corps 

against Henagan’s Redoubt. Three brigades of Birney’s division (from 

west to east, Brewster, Colonel Byron R. Pierce, and Colonel Thomas W. 

Egan) carried the brunt of the attack, assisted by effective Union artillery 

fire. Birney’s men carried the redoubt and advanced up to the Chesterfield 

Bridge. Aided by Birney’s success, Barlow and Gibbon advanced to the 

railroad bridge. Both bridges remained intact.

During this fighting, there was increased artillery fire on the left of the 

Confederate line (Hill’s III Corps). Lee resolved to see the situation for 

himself, but he was so ill (fever and diarrhea were among the symptoms) 

that he had to ride in a carriage. After seeing Hill, Lee thought the Union 

moves were a feint (in fact, Warren’s V Corps was making a major move 

across the North Anna) and returned to Hanover Junction. Hill was still 

concerned about the Federal effort, and he ordered Wilcox’s division to 

move forward to Noel’s Station (on the Virginia Central Railroad) and to 

watch and possibly disrupt the Northern effort.

Vignette: On 22 May, Lee sent a message to Davis explaining his 
250

withdrawal to the North Anna River: “. . . in a wooded country like that 

in which we have been operating, where nothing is known beyond what 

can be ascertained by feeling, a day’s march can always be gained—I 

should have preferred contesting the enemy’s approach inch by inch; but 

my solicitude for Richmond caused me to abandon that plan.” (Clifford 

Dowdey, ed., Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee, New York, NY: Bramhall 

House, 1961, 746.)

Analysis:

1. Lee seemed determined to launch an attack if possible, even during 

his withdrawal. Should he have been considering offensive action? Why 

or why not? If so, where and when should he have attacked?

2. Was Hanover Junction really that important? How much of an influence should logistics have on operational issues? Was Lee restricting his 

operational choices too much based on logistics and rail lines?

3. Where should Lee have defended the North Anna—on the north side, 

the south side, or a combination?

a. What are the ways in which one can defend a river line (in front of 

the river, on the river, behind the river)? What does current doctrine say is 

the most effective way to defend a river line (if any “best way” exists)?

b. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each potential 

method of defending a river?
251

Stand 18

Jericho Mills

(May 1864)

Map 44.

Directions: Go back up Route 688 (Doswell Road) about 0.3 mile and turn 

right on US Highway 1 (heading north). After 0.4 mile, turn left on Verdon 

Road (Route 684). After 2.5 miles, you will see a sign on the right for the 

Ox Ford Battlefield Park. Turn right on the park road, go 0.5 mile down the 

road, and park in the lot. The next stand should be conducted at the picnic 

tables in the corner of the parking lot where the walking path begins.

The Ox Ford Battlefield Park is a joint project of private industry 

(General Crushed Stone Company), local government (Hanover County), 

and preservationists (National Heritage Preservation Association). It is a 

great success story of battlefield preservation, and it contains some of the 

most well-preserved Civil War trenches in Virginia.

Orientation: You are currently at the entrance to Ox Ford (North Anna 

Battlefield) Park. From this location, you need to discuss the battle fought 

1

7

2

6

5

4 3

9 8

Parking 10

Entrance Bench

and Sign

Walking Trail for North Anna Park

Day 2

Stand 20

Day 2

Stand 19

Day 2

Stand 18

Numbered Signs

for the Park Tour

North Anna River

Platform

Entrenchments

Platform

Entrenchments

Day 2 Stand 18

N

100 Yards 200 Yards
252

near Jericho Mills, because you will not be able to get to the actual site 

of the Jericho Mills battle (it is private land and not accessible to staff 

ride groups). Use maps to explain the battle from here. Show the general 

direction to the Telegraph Road and Hanover Junction (the last stand), the 

North Anna River, Chesterfield Bridge, Ox Ford, and Jericho Mills Ford.

Description: By 23 May, the Army of Northern Virginia had won the 

race to the North Anna. Hill’s corps was positioned on the left flank near 

Anderson’s Tavern and Hewlett’s Station on the Virginia Central Railroad. 

The troops rested (no entrenchments) while the army’s chief engineer, 

M.L. Smith, conducted a reconnaissance for a new defensive line.

At 0600 on 23 May, Confederate cavalry under Major General W.H.F. 

“Rooney” Lee reported to Hill that Union cavalry had arrived on the North 

Anna at Jericho Mills Ford (the Federals were part of Torbert’s unit, which 

had switched from leading Hancock’s corps to leading Warren’s corps). 

Hill allowed Wilcox to send one brigade, under Brigadier General Joseph 

Brown, forward to Noel’s Station. Hill informed Lee, but the army commander still thought the move was a feint.

The lead elements of the V Corps (Griffin’s division) arrived at Jericho 

Mills and found the ford undefended. Griffin immediately posted artillery on high ground to cover a crossing. Between 1330 and 1400, several 

Union brigades crossed the river (some troops in bare feet) and came into 

contact with Confederate pickets. By 1500, all of Griffin’s division was 

across the river.

Wilcox received word that Union infantry was crossing at the ford. 

Wilcox informed Hill who ordered Wilcox to move to the ford. Shortly 

thereafter, all of Wilcox’s division was moving forward to Noel’s Station.

After Griffin’s division, Crawford’s troops were the next to cross. Also, 

the Federals built a 160-foot pontoon bridge at the Jericho site. Griffin’s 

and Crawford’s divisions formed a line just south of the ford. Cutler’s division also crossed, but remained near the riverbank as a reserve. Having not 

yet encountered resistance, the Union troops in all three divisions stacked 

arms and began cooking dinner.

“Rooney” Lee incorrectly reported to Wilcox that only two or three 

Federal brigades were across the river. At 1730, Wilcox began his attack 

with his one division (four brigades) against three Federal divisions (6,000 

Confederates against 15,000 Union troops). The Confederates approached 

the Union line from the west and initially overlapped the Union right 

flank.

Warren heard the opening guns of Wilcox’s attack and sent word to 

have Cutler’s division move from the river bluffs and into position on 

Griffin’s right. This put Cutler’s troops in the direct path of Wilcox’s 
253

assault. Federal artillery at the Fontaine house and on the north bank of 

North Anna opened fire on Confederate artillery as it unlimbered to support Wilcox’s attack.

As Cutler’s division reached the plain on Griffin’s right, it was attacked 

by two Confederate brigades (Scales’ brigade, now under the command of 

Colonel William L. Lowrance, and Edward L. Thomas’ brigade). The Iron 

brigade (Colonel William W. Robinson) and the Pennsylvania Bucktails 

brigade (Colonel Edward S. Bragg) were jolted and pushed back. The 

Union brigade furthest on Cutler’s right (under Colonel J. William 

Hoffman) held its position.

Wilcox’s two other Confederate brigades attacked Ayre’s and Sweitzer’s 

brigades (of Griffin’s division). Sweitzer’s men broke, but Ayres’ Regulars 

held. Wilcox reported his success to A.P. Hill, while Federals filtered back 

to the pontoon bridge. Colonel Nathan T. Dushane’s Maryland Brigade 

moved forward to stem the Confederate advance and collided with stragglers on the bridge. The Maryland troops pushed many of the retreating 

Union troops into the river and arrived to help stop Wilcox’s advance.

Grant received information about the fight and sent word to Wright to 

have the VI Corps support Warren. In the meantime, Warren sent Colonel 

Peter Lyle’s brigade (Crawford’s division) to the sound of the guns. They 

took up a position and held back the Southerners. Also, three batteries 

under Colonel Charles S. Wainwright arrived to bolster Cutler’s division—

the guns helped to rally the men. Bartlett’s brigade moved out and flanked 

Lowrance’s brigade of North Carolinians. Caught between Bartlett and the 

artillery, Lowrance’s troops broke.

The Confederate attack had failed, and darkness fell before Hill or 

Wright reached the fighting. 

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. Had Lee or Hill underestimated the Union threat at Jericho Mills? 

Should the Confederates have defended on the river right at the ford?

2. Once the Federals had crossed, should the Confederates have attacked 

as they did? Was there a realistic chance of a Confederate victory? What 

was the goal of the attack? Did it support the operational concept?

3. Was the lack of cavalry still haunting Union movements (they were 

easily surprised by Wilcox’s attack)? What can commanders do with 

organic assets to improve intelligence?

4. What options are open to Lee and Grant on the evening of 23 May? 

As a reminder, the Union forces have a bridgehead at Jericho Mills and 
254

were on the riverbank at the Chesterfield Bridge and Railroad Bridge near 

Telegraph Road. In other words, the Federals have made a partial, but not 

complete, river crossing. Discuss advantages and disadvantages of various 

courses of action.
255

Stand 19

Ox Ford Mills (Ledlie’s Attack)

(24 May 1864)

Map 45.

Directions: After describing Jericho Mills from the parking lot, walk 

toward Ox Ford for the next stand. Start down the walking path, which 

will take you downhill and over a bridge. As you walk, you will pass some 

well-preserved trenches. Continue down the path (it is well marked) past 

several plaques (interpretive markers) erected by the county park commission. Marker number 6 is labeled for Ledlie’s assault and it marks the 

center of the Confederate position that repulsed his attack. However, it is 

better to continue to marker number 7, which has an elevated wooden platform that marks the right portion of the Confederate troops that defended 

against Ledlie. The view here makes it the best location for the stand.

Orientation: You are at the right hand portion of Mahone’s Confederate 

position (Hill’s III Corps). These troops faced Ledlie’s attack on 24 May. 

1

7

2

6

5

4 3

9 8

Parking 10

Entrance Bench

and Sign

Walking Trail for North Anna Park

Day 2

Stand 20

Day 2

Stand 19

Day 2

Stand 18

Numbered Signs

for the Park Tour

North Anna River

Platform

Entrenchments

Platform

Entrenchments

Day 2 Stand 19

N 100 Yards 200 Yards
256

(Use a map to refer back to Jericho Mills.) Ox Ford is less than 0.5 mile 

north of your current location. There were almost no trees in this area during Ledlie’s attack. The Confederates cleared the trees to help build their 

entrenchments and to clear fields of fire.

Description: Lee called a meeting for the evening of 23 May at his headquarters near Hanover Junction to decide on his course of action. Prior to 

the meeting, Lee positioned his forces to handle multiple contingencies: 

Pickett’s division (Anderson’s corps) and Rodes and Gordon (from Ewell’s 

corps) were positioned on the Virginia Central Railroad in the Confederate 

center rear to be ready to deploy as needed.

The meeting occurred after dark near a towering oak tree at the headquarters. All corps commanders were there, as well as some division 

commanders and much of the army staff (including the engineers). (See 

vignettes.) Lee conducted the meeting superbly, despite the signs of his 

increasing illness. All agreed that Hanover Junction was too crucial to 

abandon—they could not afford to withdraw. In addition, they decided 

that A.P. Hill could not regain the river line and would have to defend 

somewhere further south of the river.

As to the position of Lee’s right flank, there were varying opinions. 

Some in the group wanted to block the Chesterfield Bridge crossing by 

holding the south bank at the bridge, although the northern bank was 

higher. Others wanted to fall back from the river to the high ground at Fox 

house. Still another group was willing to pull back even further south to 

a wooded swampy area that was good, defensible terrain. Lee decided to 

pull back on both flanks and form an inverted “V” position with only the 

tip on the North Anna River at Ox Ford.

Although Lee’s “V” position was well suited for the defense, his intent 

was to launch an attack if the opportunity presented itself. The Southerners 

would use entrenchments on both sides of the “V” to minimize the need 

for front line troops in defensive positions. Lee then planned to keep large, 

mobile reserves that could shift to either flank for an attack. The inverted 

“V” would force Grant to commit to crossing the North Anna on both 

flanks. Once the Federals crossed, Union units would have to traverse the 

river twice if they wanted to reinforce from one flank to the other. With the 

Northerners thus vulnerable, Lee could wait to see which Union flank was 

more exposed, then mass the Confederate reserves and crush the Union 

forces before Grant could shift reinforcements.

The Union plan for 24 May called for an advance that mirrored Lee’s 

hopes. Warren was to move slowly, keeping the bridgehead secure south of 

Jericho Mills Ford. This would allow for Wright to cross the North Anna 

and reinforce the V Corps’ advance. Burnside was to demonstrate at Ox 
257

Ford and distract the Confederates. Hancock was to cross at Chesterfield 

Bridge and continue the attack. The II Corps was the main effort.

On 0700 on the morning of 24 May, Grant and Meade interviewed 

some slaves from the Doswell Plantation. The slaves said that their 

master—and a large party of Confederate troops—had fled the area. Grant 

and Meade were optimistic. They wanted Hancock to cross the river and 

press the Confederates. They appeared to be falling into Lee’s trap with 

misplaced enthusiasm.

At 0600, Lee rose and positioned Breckinridge. Then he rode to inspect 

Hill’s position. He snapped at Hill over the Jericho Mills battle: “Why did 

you not do as Jackson would have done—thrown your whole force upon 

these people and driven them back?” (as quoted by Rhea, To the North 

Anna River, 326, from a letter, Jedediah Hotchkiss to Henry Alexander 

White, 12 January 1897, in Hotchkiss Collection, Library of Congress). 

Soon Lee regained his composure, but he was clearly ailing—the outburst 

was very uncharacteristic of Lee’s command style.

Later that morning, the Union II Corps began its crossing of the North 

Anna. Birney crossed at the Chesterfield Bridge; Gibbon crossed on a 

makeshift pontoon bridge east of Chesterfield. By approximately 0900, 

Hancock’s corps had seized the high ground at Fox house, and an hour 

later, the entire II Corps was south of the river. On the other flank, Warren 

continued his move south. He moved cautiously and could not find Hill’s 

new line. The lack of Confederate opposition gave Grant and Meade more 

encouragement.

With both Union flanks advancing, Burnside’s corps became the key 

to the Union plan. The IX Corps needed to cross the river and connect the 

two separate Union wings.

Burnside’s first concept for taking the ford had the 21st Massachusetts 

(Leasure’s brigade, Crittenden’s division) and the 17th Michigan (Hartranft’s brigade, Wilcox’s division) cross near Ox Ford and occupy a small 

island in the river near the ford. The bulk of IX Corps artillery was massed 

on the north bank for an assault at Ox Ford. At the next stand, you will be 

able to see the actual ford. Note that the southern riverbank is higher than 

the northern riverbank, unlike most locations along the river. The assault 

was to begin with a single bugle call. The soldiers waited with incredible 

tension. At the last minute, the attack was called off.

By 1100, Burnside had developed a new plan. Crittenden was to cross 

Quarles’ Mill Ford (between Ox Ford and Jericho Mills Ford) and flank 

the Confederates out of their Ox Ford position. Earlier in the morning, 

the Pennsylvania Reserves (Crawford’s division, V Corps) had advanced 

along the southern bank of the North Anna River. Eventually, they took 
258

Quarles’ Mill Ford, which was thus uncovered for Crittenden’s crossing.

At the Mount Carmel Church headquarters, the Union leaders were 

still optimistic, but puzzled. Warren and Hancock were advancing steadily, 

but Burnside faced a tough entrenched foe that did not want to give up Ox 

Ford. Grant and Meade concluded that the Confederates would give up the 

ford once they realized they were flanked. They ordered Burnside to have 

the whole IX Corps across the river by the morning of 25 May.

The first of Crittenden’s brigades to cross at Quarles’ Mill Ford was led 

by Brigadier General James H. Ledlie. Burnside directed Crittenden to follow Ledlie with the rest of his division along the south bank and uncover 

Ox Ford. Burnside and Crittenden assumed that the Union advance would 

flank the Confederates and force them to retreat without an attack on 

entrenched positions.

However, Crittenden was having trouble getting the rest of his forces 

across the North Anna, and for a long time, Ledlie was still the only IX 

Corps unit on the south bank. They advanced through Crawford’s line and 

the 35th Massachusetts Regiment took the lead as skirmishers.

Confederate pickets gave their command a warning of the Federal 

approach. Mahone’s men—who had been resting—filled their earthworks 

and were ready for the Union advance.

Ledlie decided on an attack, precipitating a strange sequence of events. 

First of all, Ledlie was clearly drunk—he used alcohol to add to his courage. He grabbed an officer from the nearby 57th Massachusetts and told 

him to go back to the ford: “Give my compliments to General Crittenden. 

Tell him that there is a rebel battery in my front; ask him to please send 

me three regiments immediately, one on my right, one on my left and the 

other in the rear for support and I will charge and capture it” (OR, series I, 

volume XXXVI, part 3, 918). Ledlie had sent a regimental officer (instead 

of his staff) with this request for an odd deployment of reinforcements. 

These were the more obvious signs of his inebriation.

While waiting for his earlier messenger to return, Ledlie sent the 35th 

Massachusetts Regiment forward to drive back Confederate skirmishers. The regiment attacked, but was routed by Harris’ Mississippi troops. 

Already, this was a bad start to the operation, hurting morale for the rest 

of Ledlie’s troops.

At about 1700, Ledlie’s messenger found Crittenden. Crittenden said: 

“tell him [Ledlie] I have not the regiments to spare. The Division is not 

across the river yet. Tell him my orders are not to charge.” As the messenger departed, Crittenden called after him and reiterated the instructions: 

“Tell General Ledlie not to charge unless he sees a sure thing . . . use the 

utmost caution. . . . I have information that the enemy is posted in force in 
259

his front. Tell him to use the utmost caution” (John Anderson, The FiftySeventh Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion,

Boston, MA: E.B. Stillings and Company, 1896, 99).

Less than an hour later, the messenger returned to Ledlie and saw that 

the brigade was massing for its attack. He reported Crittenden’s instructions to Ledlie but “it is doubtful if he heard, or if he did, that he understood one word or cared” (Anderson, The Fifty-Seventh Regiment, 99).

The attack began with Ledlie clearly drunk, swaying from side to side 

as he led the men into the open field. The Confederate artillery pounded 

Ledlie’s men starting at about a mile distant from the Southern lines. The 

infantry (Harris’ Mississippi brigade and Perry’s Florida brigade) opened 

up at 100 yards. The Confederate infantry was three ranks deep, and soldiers passed loaded muskets forward to keep up continuous fire.

Crawford’s Union troops (V Corps) tried to help by pushing forward 

a strong skirmish line on Ledlie’s right, but it could not do much. Also, 

IX Corps artillery on the north bank of the river tried to help with a heavy 

bombardment.

To add to the misery, a huge thunderstorm broke out during the attack. 

Ledlie’s brigade halted at about 50 yards from the Confederate entrenchments and tried to exchange volleys with the Southerners. But they were 

ripped apart by the rifle and canister. Both of Ledlie’s flanks were exposed. 

Saunder’s Virginia brigade advanced slightly and raked Ledlie’s right flank 

with fire.

After about an hour of this slaughter, Ledlie decided to withdraw. 

However, his brigade was starting to lose cohesion. Harris’ men jumped 

over their breastworks and poured volleys into the Union soldiers as they 

tried to conduct their retreat. The retreat turned into a rout. The Union 

troops streamed through Crittenden’s other two brigades, which had 

finally crossed the river. During the rout, Ledlie could not be found. His 

subordinates tried to rally their men without Ledlie. He finally returned at 

midnight.

Union losses included 150 killed, 150 wounded, and 100 prisoners out 

of the original 1,500 soldiers that attacked.

While Ledlie’s brigade was wrecked, Hancock fought a battle on his 

front (the east side of the Confederate “V”). From 1500 to 1800, Hancock 

pushed troops forward in a piecemeal fashion, still unsure of the size 

and intent of the Confederate opposition. He got within 2 to 3 miles of 

Hanover Junction, but could not penetrate Ewell’s main entrenched lines. 

In the back and forth battle near the Doswell house, some Union brigades 

were pretty roughed up.

By late afternoon, all of the II Corps was well south of the river and 
260

seemingly exposed to Lee’s planned counterattack, while the rest of the 

Union forces were halted and unable to support Hancock.

Even though it seemed that Lee’s plan was working, throughout 24 

May Lee’s health deteriorated. By the afternoon, his doctor had confined 

him to bed (the only time during the war). He was delirious at times and 

shouted, “we must strike them a blow, we must never let them pass us 

again, we must strike them a blow” (Charles S. Venable, “The Campaign 

from the Wilderness to Petersburg,” SHSP, volume 14, Richmond, VA: 

1873, 535). Lee seemed to recognize the opportunity, but he was too ill to 

execute the plan, and he felt that he could not rely on his subordinates to 

carry out the attack without his presence.

Grant and Meade kept receiving reports from all of the corps commanders as the evening went on. By 2200 on 24 May, Grant grasped his 

position and Lee’s intent. He stated that the enemy and situation were “so 

different from what I expected” (OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 3, 153 

and 158). Later that night, Grant and Meade ordered Hancock to stop his 

forward movement and entrench. They also ordered Warren to cancel the 

attack on Anderson’s Tavern, and they told Wright to move to Warren’s 

support. Burnside was to cut roads through the woods and build bridges 

on the North Anna to improve the Union ability to move reinforcements to 

its flanks. Lee’s opportunity had passed.

Vignette: Historian J. Michael Miller relates a humorous story of Lee’s 

encounter with a teamster during his meeting on the night of 23 May:

As Lee gave orders for the disposition of the army, a 

series of oaths split the night air. “Get around here, you 

damned infernal long eared son of a jackass!” An enormous impact stressed the order. Obviously a nearby teamster was attempting to discipline his mule. One of the few 

things that brought Lee to anger was maltreatment of animals, but he resumed his orders after a small hesitation. 

The battle between man and mule continued. Lee began 

to give a peculiar shake of the head that his close officers 

knew that he used “when he was worried and what we 

used to call snapping at his ear.” The cursing only grew 

louder and the beating more furious. At last, Lee could 

stand no more and halted his instructions. In his most sentorian tone, he commanded, “What are you beating that 

mule for?”

The teamster, not knowing the owner of the voice, 

assumed a soldier was having fun with him. He called 
261

out in a crying shiftless whine, “Is this any of your-r-r-r 

mule?”

The officers under the oak tree straining to hold back 

their smiles, while Lee snapped at his ear several more 

times. The commanding general turned back to his business and finished the orders. The officers were certain 

that Lee took care of the teamster as soon as they had 

left. (Miller, The North Anna Campaign, 89-90, from an 

account of E. Porter Alexander in the E. Porter Alexander 

Papers at the University of North Carolina.)

Analysis:

1. Discuss the futility and foolishness of Ledlie’s attack. Does the military still have problems with incompetents like this today or does our officer system weed out such people?

2. Was Lee’s plan truly that brilliant? What were the strengths of his 

plan? Were there also weaknesses (perhaps a Union corps—supposedly 

isolated—could just as easily defend against a Confederate attack, using 

their entrenchments)?

3. What is the role of a commander’s health (specifically Lee’s bad 

health) in war? Compare with Napoleon at Waterloo, Lee at Gettysburg, 

even Halsey at Midway (replaced by Spruance).

4. What about Lee’s subordinates—why couldn’t they act on their own? 

Should Lee have trusted them more?

5. Note Lee’s own pugnaciousness. He was not content to sit behind 

entrenchments, and he felt that he needed a significant victory over Grant 

if he was ever to win the overall campaign.
262

Stand 20

North Anna Summary

(May 1864)

Map 46.

Directions: Continue further down the park’s walking trail toward Ox 

Ford. Stop at interpretive marker number 9. It is on a wooden platform 

that overlooks Ox Ford and the North Anna River. 

Orientation: Here at the Ox Ford overlook, you are at the very apex of 

Lee’s inverted “V” position (the park’s interpretive marker has a useful 

map also at this location). Ledlie’s attack was slightly to the south of this 

location, and Confederate troops here could probably hit Ledlie’s left flank 

with rifle fire.

Note the remains of the Confederate trenches, particularly the artillery 

positions, which are well preserved (and well sighted to cover the ford). 

The small island in the middle of the river (if the foliage permits the view) 

was the staging area for Burnside’s original plan of a two-regiment attack. 

1

7

2

6

5

4 3

9 8

Parking 10

Entrance Bench

and Sign

Walking Trail for North Anna Park

Day 2

Stand 20

Day 2

Stand 19

Day 2

Stand 18

Numbered Signs

for the Park Tour

North Anna River

Platform

Entrenchments

Platform

Entrenchments

Day 2 Stand 20

N

100 Yards 200 Yards
263

Now that you can see the actual Ox Ford and the nature of the terrain and 

Confederate positions, was Burnside right to call off his original assault?

Description: As stated at the last stand, late on the evening of 24 May, 

Grant and Meade realized their vulnerability, called off further advances, 

and ordered Union troops to entrench. By the morning of 25 May, the Union 

troops were ready to resist an attack, but they were still in an awkward position and ill disposed to resume the offensive from their current location.

On 25 May, there was scattered artillery fire and sharpshooting on 

both sides throughout the day. The Federals destroyed parts of the Virginia 

Central Railroad and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroads 

that lay behind their lines. This damage discomfited the Confederates for a 

while, but once the campaign shifted further south, the Southerners repaired 

the Virginia Central and re-established the supply line to the Valley.

At 1400, Grant and Meade shifted their headquarters to Quarles’ Mill 

and held a meeting of senior officers. They discussed two major options 

for the next move. First, they could move southeast, downstream along the 

Pamunkey River. The advantages for this move began with the fact that it 

was the safest move—the river would cover the Union right flank during 

the move. Also, it would continue to rely on a secure, waterborne line of 

communication (LOC). Finally, it would move the Army of the Potomac 

closer to Butler’s Army of the James.

The second option was to move inland around Lee’s left flank and 

push directly for Richmond, 25 miles away. The considerations for this 

plan included the advantage that it might surprise Lee (up to this point 

in the campaign, Grant had almost always opted to go around Lee’s right 

flank). A major problem was that the Union forces would break away from 

the water LOC, and in fact this might force the Federals to operate without 

a supply line for an uncertain amount of time. Warren and Hunt favored 

the inland approach; Meade preferred the move down the Pamunkey. 

Grant briefly leaned toward the inland route, but he finally decided on the 

move to the southeast.

Meade issued orders for the Army of the Potomac to begin its move 

on the night of 26 May. Many Union soldiers were glad for the short pause 

at the North Anna before the next move. However, some commanders and 

staff officers were frustrated by the continued moves to the same flank. 

(See vignettes for comments from a disgruntled Union officer.)

Confederate activities on 25 May continued to be influenced by Lee’s 

illness. Lee was still confined to his tent and snapped at his staff at times 

during the day. The Confederate troops remained in place. Late in the day, 

the headquarters moved 3 miles south to Taylorsville.

On 26 May, there was some sharpshooting in the midst of a heavy 
264

rain that flooded the trenches on both sides. In the evening, the Federals 

began their move; the trains had pulled back earlier in the day. The new 

supply base was fully operational at Port Royal (the transfer of bases from 

Belle Plain to Port Royal had been conducted during the fight on the North 

Anna).

After dark, all Federal troops south of the North Anna moved to positions on the north bank. This move was completed by 0300 on 27 May. 

Torbert’s and Gregg’s cavalry divisions led the Union move (Torbert 

returned to command of his former division and his ad hoc cavalry force 

was split up). The cavalry was to secure a crossing on the Pamunkey at 

Hanovertown. Sheridan’s other division (under Wilson) covered the army’s 

rear.

The VI Corps, followed by the II Corps, moved on the River Road 

using the Pamunkey to cover their right flanks. The V Corps followed by 

the IX Corps moved along a more northerly route.

Lee was initially unaware of the Union maneuver, but by the morning 

of 27 May, he suspected that the Federals were on the move again. With 

the Union departure, the battle for the North Anna River was over.

Vignette: Colonel Wainwright, chief of V Corps artillery, questioned 

Grant’s plans: “Can it be this is the sum of our lieutenant-general’s abilities? Has he no other resource in tactics? Or is it sheer obstinacy? Three 

times he has tried this move, around Lee’s right, and three times been 

foiled.” (Nevins, ed., A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel 

Charles S. Wainwright, 388.)

Analysis:

1. Total losses on the North Anna:

a. Union losses were 591 killed, 2,734 wounded, and 661missing 

(out of 68,000).

b. Confederate losses were about 2,500 total killed, wounded, and 

missing (out of 53,000).

2. Who won the battle and why?

a. Grant had failed to destroy Lee’s army and had not captured 

Richmond. Grant did force Lee to retreat all the way to the edge of 

Richmond, and he retained his freedom of movement (the initiative).

b. Lee had lost a lot of ground and failed to regain the initiative. He 

missed an opportunity to badly damage the Union forces on 24 May. Still, 

Lee had preserved his own army and still held Grant away from Richmond. 

Not long after the Union move to the southeast, the Confederates would 

re-establish their connection to the Valley, and thus the Southern stand on 

the North Anna ultimately protected the Confederate supply line.
265

c. In sum, who was in the better operational position after the North 

Anna?

3. Clearly Lee’s health problems were partly a result of fatigue, overwork, 

and connected to his belief that he had to personally supervise his new or 

unreliable corps commanders. Was Lee correct in questioning Ewell, Hill, 

and Anderson’s abilities (give your own evaluation of each)? Could he 

have done anything to better prepare these commanders? Could he afford 

to replace them?

Description (cont): After your discussion, set the stage for the next day of 

the staff ride by describing the movements of both sides on 27 May:

On the Union side, Sheridan’s cavalry occupied Hanovertown at 

0900 and crossed the Pamunkey, driving back some Confederate pickets. Two hours later, Russell’s division, leading the VI Corps, crossed at 

Hanovertown and established a secure bridgehead on the south side. The 

II Corps, following the VI Corps, arrived at Hanovertown, but stayed on 

the north side of the river.

The V Corps started its move at 0900, and the IX Corps left Mount 

Carmel Church early in the afternoon. Grant and Meade established their 

headquarters at Mangohick Church.

For the Confederates, Lee received reports at dawn that the Federals 

were gone from their North Anna positions. Later in the morning, 

Confederate cavalry under Brigadier General Lunsford L. Lomax (from 

Fitzhugh Lee’s division) reported the Federal crossing at Hanovertown 

(15 miles from Richmond).

Lee was still not sure if the Union move was a feint. He decided to 

position the army near Ashland. This was a central location that allowed 

the Confederates to cover Telegraph Road while being positioned to block 

Grant’s move to the southeast if necessary. The order of movement was II 

Corps, Breckinridge’s division, I Corps, and III Corps. Ewell, temporarily 

ill, was replaced by Early as the II Corps commander. The army stopped 

for the evening in a position between Ashland and Atlee’s Station.
266

Day 3

North Anna to Petersburg 

(11 May–15 June 1864)

95

295

1

Day 3

Stand 1

Stand 2

1

295

195 295

Mechanicsville

627

636

606

2

Turnpike

301

95

2

301

615

656 643

637

643

638

638

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Parham Road

627

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64

197 156

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633 632

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2

301 Studley Road

Atlee Station Road

Day 3 Overview

(1 of 2) N

1 Mile 2 Miles

Day 3

Stand 3

Day 3

Stand 4

Day 3

Stand 5

Day 3

Stand 6

Stand 7

Stand 8

Day 3

Stand 9

Stand 10

Map 47.

Stand 1, Yellow Tavern I (11 May 1864)

Stand 2, Yellow Tavern II (Stuart’s Death) (11–12 May 1864)

Stand 3, Atlee’s Station (28–29 May 1864)

Stand 4, Haw’s Shop (28 May 1864)

Stand 5, Bethesda Church (drive-by) (30 May–2 June 1864)

Stand 6, Cold Harbor I (31 May–2 June 1864)

Stand 7, Cold Harbor II (Confederate Positions) (3 June 1864)

Stand 8, Cold Harbor III (Union Positions) (3 June 1864)

Stand 9, Cold Harbor IV (Next 10 Days) (3–12 June 1864)

Stand 10, Cold Harbor to the James River (12–13 June 1864)
267

156 60

295

619

64

33

10

York River

64

295

Chickahominy River

James River

James River

James River

Appomattox

River

156

156

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609

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Darbytown Road

5

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Day 3 Overview

(2 of 2) N

2 Miles 4 Miles

Day 3

Stand 11

Day 3

Stand 9

Stand 10

Day 3

Stand 12

Map 48.

Stand 11, Riddell’s Shop (13 June 1864)

Stand 12, Wilcox’s Landing (13–14 June 1864)
268

Stand 1

Yellow Tavern I

(11 May 1864)

Technology Park Driv

Holly Glen e

Estates

Day 3

Stand 1

95

1

95

95

295

295

295

295

1

1

Virginia Center Pkwy

Telegraph Road

Jeb Stuart Pkwy

Harmony

Road

Battlefield Road

Day 3

Stand 2

Harmony

RoadBattlefield Road

Hedgewood Ave

Old Francis Road Old Francis Road

Towering Ave

Brook Road

Divided Hwy

Divided Hwy

Divided Hwy

Day 3 Stand 1 N 250 500

Yards Yards

Map 49.

Directions: Beginning in Ashland, start by heading south on US Highway 

1. About 6.5 miles after leaving Ashland on US Highway 1, you will come 

to an intersection with the Virginia Center Parkway. Turn left on Virginia 

Center Parkway and travel for 0.3 mile until you come to Battlefield Road. 

Turn right on Battlefield Road and travel for 0.2 mile. At this point, turn 

right on Old Francis Road, go a very short distance, and then make a 

quick left turn, which will put you on Battlefield Road again. Travel on 

Battlefield Road for 0.3 mile (it will bear right and change its name to 

Harmony Road). This path will end in a cul-de-sac. Park along the edge of 

the cul-de-sac; be careful not to block any of the driveways of the private 

homes. The best place for the stand is on the edge of the road just before 

it turns into the cul-de-sac and adjacent to an open field on the south side. 

Do not stand on any of the private property.
269

Orientation: You are at the location of the battle of Yellow Tavern, which 

occurred on 11 May. The two stands on Yellow Tavern are out of chronological sequence for the staff ride (note that the last stand yesterday at the 

North Anna covered events up to 27 May). It is necessary to break the 

chronology to avoid driving excessive distances back and forth to Yellow 

Tavern. Therefore, you must remind the students of the argument between 

Sheridan and Meade that led to the initiation of Sheridan’s raid on 9 May.

The current ground of the battlefield looks only partially like it did at 

the time of the battle: suburban sprawl and modern highways have overrun much of the area. Even so, you need to picture the ground as it was in 

1864. Telegraph Road ran to the east of the modern US Highway 1. Our 

current location is between these two roads. Confederate entrenchments 

for Richmond were several miles to the south of this location.

Your current location is in the center of Wickham’s Confederate 

Brigade at the opening of the Yellow Tavern battle. Note that there is a 

slight rise here that aided Wickham’s defense against the Federals who 

advanced from across the open field to the south.

Description: Sheridan began his raid early in the morning on 9 May with 

a column of 10,000 mounted troops (he took three divisions and 32 guns, 

virtually all of the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry forces). His column 

took up 13 miles of road as it marched. 

Sheridan’s cavalry began their march with a large move to the northwest that avoided the Southern infantry forces at Spotsylvania. Then the 

Union troops turned southwest along Telegraph Road toward the North 

Anna River and Richmond. Sheridan deliberately moved slowly, in order 

to draw Stuart into battle.

The Union cavalry crossed four streams (the Ni, the Po, the Ta, and the 

Mat, which all eventually meet to form the Mattaponi River), and by the 

end of the day, the Federal cavalry was well beyond the main battle lines 

at Spotsylvania. They also put forces on roads further west of Telegraph 

Road and approached the North Anna River near Anderson’s Ford (just 

north of Beaver Dam Station).

Stuart detected Sheridan’s move on 9 May, and he sent a brigade to 

harass the Union column from the rear. Later in the day, Stuart devised a 

more comprehensive plan for stopping Sheridan. He sent a second brigade 

to pursue the Federals and placed the two-brigade pursuing force under 

Major General Fitzhugh Lee. Stuart took one brigade under his personal 

command and attempted to move on a parallel path that would allow him 

to block Sheridan’s route. Stuart hoped to catch the Union forces in a vulnerable position while crossing the North Anna, but Stuart’s troops arrived 

too late to catch the Federals at the river.
270

Most of the Union cavalry was across the North Anna by 10 May, 

and they destroyed the Confederate supply depot on the Virginia Central 

Railroad at Beaver Dam Station. Southern guards detected Sheridan’s 

approach and set fire to most of the supplies before the Federals arrived. 

The Confederates lost three weeks worth of rations for the Army of 

Northern Virginia.

Brigadier General Wesley Merritt’s Union division pushed 10 miles 

south of Beaver Dam Station, destroying railroad tracks (which the 

Confederates later repaired without much difficulty), burning rolling stock 

(which was more harmful than the track damage to the Southerners), and 

liberating 378 Federal prisoners. The Union cavalry bivouacked on the 

South Anna on 10 May.

Also on 10 May, Stuart changed his plans. He notified Jefferson Davis’ 

military advisor, General Braxton Bragg, of Sheridan’s approach toward 

Richmond. Stuart wanted Bragg to use the Richmond garrison, positioned 

in the city’s fortifications, to assist in blocking the Union cavalry. He 

then accompanied Fitzhugh Lee’s two brigades (under Brigadier General 

Lunsford L. Lomax and Brigadier General William C. Wickham) and rode 

to join with the Richmond garrison to repulse the Union cavalry. This left 

one Confederate brigade (under Brigadier General James B. Gordon) following Sheridan’s force.

If Stuart’s blocking force could engage the Union cavalry and 

keep them distracted, the trailing Southern brigade might be able to hit 

Sheridan’s rear and inflict a major defeat on the Union force. In addition, 

Confederate reinforcements from the Richmond garrison might be able to 

assist Stuart’s efforts.

At 1000 on 11 May, Stuart arrived near Yellow Tavern. His force, both 

horses and men, was exhausted after hours of hard riding. Stuart formed 

his two brigades at right angles, perhaps hoping to catch Sheridan’s cavalry in an ambush (in modern terms, an “L” shaped ambush). Wickham’s 

brigade was east of Telegraph Road facing south. Lomax’s brigade was 

along Telegraph Road facing west.

Sheridan’s troops came down Mountain Road (from the northwest) 

soon after Stuart’s men were in position. Due to the structure of the road 

network, the Union forces, arriving from the west, actually moved into a 

position between the Confederates and Richmond positions, and fought 

the battle by attacking from the south to the north.

Merritt’s Union division was in the lead, and it quickly probed Lomax’s 

position. Custer’s brigade advanced between Wickham’s and Lomax’s 

forces. Gibb’s brigade joined the fight on Custer’s right, and along with the 

9th New York from Devin’s brigade, they flanked Lomax and forced him 
271

to withdraw. Both sides’ forces fought these engagements dismounted.

By 1400, Stuart had rallied Lomax’s men and positioned them on 

Wickham’s left, thus forming a straight line of defense. Although his 

plan for an ambush had been disrupted, Stuart hoped to hold his current 

defensive position and trap the Union cavalry between his forces and the 

Richmond garrison.

There was about a two-hour pause between Lomax’s withdrawal and 

the subsequent Union attack on Stuart’s position. During this time, Stuart 

received word that Gordon’s force had slowly pushed back Sheridan’s 

rear guard under Brigadier General David M. Gregg at Ground Squirrel 

Bridge. Despite this momentary good news, Stuart may have realized that 

Gordon was too far away to help the Confederates at Yellow Tavern.

Sheridan also received information about this engagement—a report 

that more accurately described Gregg’s successful delay of Gordon’s 

Confederates. Sheridan now realized that his rear was safe. During the lull 

at Yellow Tavern, he waited for the arrival of Wilson’s division. In addition, Sheridan conducted a reconnaissance toward Richmond and realized 

he was not threatened from that quarter.

At 1600, Sheridan launched a coordinated attack on Stuart’s position. 

Part of Custer’s brigade attacked dismounted, in the open field to the west 

of Telegraph Road (your current location). At the same time, Custer’s other 

two regiments, reinforced with the 1st Vermont Regiment from Chapman’s 

brigade, launched a mounted assault straight up Telegraph Road.

The rest of Chapman’s brigade, as well as Gibb’s brigade, advanced 

dismounted on Custer’s left. While a huge thunderstorm soaked the field, 

the Union forces began to overwhelm the Confederates.

As the battle reached its crisis, Stuart rushed to the center of his line 

on Telegraph Road. The Baltimore light artillery battery held this position 

and was soon swamped by Custer’s troops. Stuart committed his small 

reserve (the 1st Virginia Cavalry Regiment), which delayed the Union success but soon had to yield ground. During the fighting in the Confederate 

center, Stuart was shot (see vignettes). Fitzhugh Lee took over command 

of the Confederate forces.

The Union forces had an advantage in numbers, and Custer’s vigorous 

charge disrupted the Southern center. At the same time, dismounted Union 

troops overwhelmed the Confederates on both flanks. The Confederates 

suffered a significant tactical defeat, and their forces retreated in some 

disorder. However, Fitzhugh Lee did a good job of restoring order to his 

troops, and he withdrew north of the Chickahominy to avoid being trapped 

by the Union forces.

The fight had bought Bragg time to bring reinforcements to Richmond’s 
272

northern ring of entrenchments. These reinforcements helped to discourage Sheridan from attacking Richmond on 11 and 12 May.

Late in the day on 11 May, at about the same time that Fitzhugh 

Lee was trying to rally the Confederate cavalry after Yellow Tavern, 

Gregg’s Union forces (Sheridan’s rear guard) turned on Gordon’s pursuing Confederates. The Southerners launched an attack at Allen’s Station, 

but Gregg’s men, taking advantage of numbers and their repeating rifles, 

mauled the Confederates.

Vignette: During the fight at Yellow Tavern, Private John A. Huff mortally 

wounded Stuart. Huff had become dismounted during the fighting and was 

searching for a horse when he encountered Stuart. The following account 

of Stuart’s wounding is from historian Gordon C. Rhea:

Private John A. Huff, of the 5th Michigan, was a 

crack shot. He had served in Berdan’s Sharpshooters 

and held a prize as the regiment’s best marksman. The 

forty-eight-year-old soldier was running back [having lost 

his horse] when he spied a rebel cavalier sitting proudly 

erect, plume jauntily waving in the breeze. Huff turned 

and fired his pistol. A slug of lead bore into Stuart’s abdomen. “Dorsey, save your men,” the general shouted as he 

struggled to remain mounted. “Are you wounded badly?” 

a trooper inquired. “I am afraid I am,” Stuart replied. “But 

don’t worry boys. Fitz will do as well for you as I have.” 

Tom Walters, of Baltimore, began leading the general, 

who was still mounted, to the rear.

Fitzhugh Lee rode up among the 1st Virginia troopers. 

Stuart was sitting in his saddle, erect as ever, but clutching the pommel of his saddle with both hands. A soldier 

walked on either side supporting him, and an orderly led 

his horse. The line was in shambles, and Lee had no time 

to tarry. “As I went rapidly by our eyes met,” he wrote. 

“He recognized me, his whole face was illuminated in 

an instant, the old battle smile came back, and his voice 

ran out as clear and sonorous as I have ever heard it.” 

Stuart gave his last order. “Go ahead, Fitz old fellow,” he 

cried. “I know you’ll do what’s right.” And he managed 

to exhort the retreating Confederates, “Go back! Go back! 

I had rather die than be whipped.” (Gordon C. Rhea, The 

Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to 

Yellow Tavern, 209.)
273

Analysis:

1. Evaluate Stuart’s performance in both the pursuit and the fight at 

Yellow Tavern. Did he bring enough forces? Should he have committed 

to a fight at Yellow Tavern? Did his tactical plan make the best use of his 

outnumbered forces?

2. Evaluate Sheridan’s performance. Should he have been more 

aggressive—pressed his attack sooner? Should he have been more focused 

on Richmond and less on Stuart? Should he have won a more decisive 

victory (given his advantage in strength)?
274

Stand 2

Yellow Tavern II (Stuart’s Death)

(11–12 May 1864)

Technology Park Driv

Holly Glen e

Estates

Day 3

Stand 1

95

1

95

95

295

295

295

295

1

1

Virginia Center Pkwy

Telegraph Road

Jeb Stuart Pkwy

Harmony

Road

Battlefield Road

Day 3

Stand 2

Harmony

RoadBattlefield Road

Hedgewood Ave

Old Francis Road Old Francis Road

Towering Ave

Brook Road

Divided Hwy

Divided Hwy

Divided Hwy

Day 3 Stand 2 N 250 500

Yards Yards

Map 50.

Directions: Start back out of the cul-de-sac on Harmony Road (remember 

that Harmony Road will change its name to Battlefield Road). Continue 

for 0.3 mile where you will reach the intersection with Old Francis Road. 

Turn right on Old Francis Road and continue for 0.2 mile where you will 

reach the intersection with Telegraph Road. Turn right on Telegraph Road 

and go about 0.1 mile. On the right, you should see a sharp rise in the 

ground with a set of stairs leading up to a monument. This is the monument to Jeb Stuart and the site of your next stand. Park the vehicles, at the 

base of the monument, as far to the right on Telegraph Road as possible 

(make sure to leave space for passing traffic).

Orientation: Stuart’s monument is close to the position at which he was 

wounded. It was the center of the Confederate position on Telegraph Road. 

At this location, the modern Telegraph Road is the same as the road’s path 
275

was in 1864. The main purpose of this stop is to describe Stuart’s fate and 

sum up Sheridan’s raid. (You should have completed the tactical description of the battle at Yellow Tavern at the last stand.)

Description: Jeb Stuart was a heroic figure, and his death is a poignant 

story. (See vignettes for a description of his final days.) After his death, the 

two sides continued maneuvering for position.

The day after Yellow Tavern, Sheridan moved toward Richmond. 

He entered part of the city’s outer defenses, but determined that the risk 

of pressing into the city center was too great. Sheridan decided to head 

east and look for a crossing of the Chickahominy River to link up with 

Butler’s forces. The Union cavalry arrived at Haxall’s Landing on 14 May, 

just across from Butler’s Army at Bermuda Hundred. Sheridan initially 

planned to stay in this region for seven or eight days to rest and refit his 

worn units.

On 15 May, Sheridan met Butler to discuss future plans. Butler 

wanted Sheridan to join the Army of the James in an assault on Richmond. 

Sheridan refused and decided to leave Butler on 17 May to return to the 

Army of the Potomac.

Whether or not Sheridan had legitimate reasons for not assisting 

Butler, the Union cavalry commander and several other Union officers 

participated in a scheme that helped to undermine Butler’s position. Prior 

to departing, Sheridan and one of his division commanders, Wilson, met 

privately with one of Butler’s corps commanders, Major General William 

F. (“Baldy”) Smith. Smith disliked Butler, and he urged Sheridan and 

Wilson to tell Grant to terminate the efforts at Bermuda Hundred.

After departing on 17 May, Sheridan wrote to Cyrus Comstock (one 

of Grant’s staff) and Wilson wrote to John Rawlins to lobby for Butler’s 

removal and replacement with Smith. Although Butler remained in command of the Army of the James, Grant was persuaded to detach Smith’s 

XVIII Corps from Butler’s Army and have it join the Army of the Potomac. 

Comstock wrote in his diary on 26 May, “We have at last got the general to 

order a large part of the force under Butler now doing nothing, to join us 

via West Point.” (As quoted by William Glenn Robertson, Back Door to 

Richmond, Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1987, 233, 

from the Cyrus B. Comstock Diary, 26 May 1864, Library of Congress.)

Sheridan’s cavalry reached the Army of the Potomac at Mount Carmel 

Church on 24 May during the battle on the North Anna.

Vignette: After Stuart’s wounding, the Confederates cavalry commander 

insisted that he be taken to his wife in Richmond. As Stuart was carried to 

the rear, a Confederate courier, William B. Poindexter, saw the retreating 

Southern soldiers and later wrote: “I never saw such a distressed looking 
276

body of men, many of them shedding tears when they heard our gallant 

General had been shot.” (William B. Poindexter, “A Midnight Charge and 

the Death of General J.E.B. Stuart,” in SHSP, volume 32, 121.)

In a driving rainstorm, with thunder and lightning raging, Stuart’s 

ambulance crossed the Chickahominy and headed toward Richmond. 

The procession stopped for a short time at Atlee’s Station, where staff 

members and his doctor urged Stuart to have a sip of whiskey to ease his 

pain. The young cavalier had promised his mother that he would never 

drink alcohol, but after much urging, Stuart finally took a drink. An aide, 

Theodore S. Garnett, wrote: “This was the first and only drop of whiskey 

that passed Stuart’s lips in all his life.” (Robert J. Trout, ed., Riding with 

Stuart: Reminiscences of an Aide-de-Camp, by Captain Theodore Stanford 

Garnett, Shippensburg, PA: White Main Publishing Company, 1994, 71.)

Stuart was carried to the house of his brother-in-law, Dr. Charles 

Brewer, in Richmond where he suffered intense pain for most of 12 May. 

At noon, Jefferson Davis visited the stricken cavalry commander. During 

the afternoon, his condition continued to worsen. Here is how historian 

Gordon Rhea describes the final hours: “Toward evening, the general’s 

delirium increased. He spoke in broken sentences of his battles, then 

of his wife and children, then again of his battles. By nightfall, he was 

racked with agony, which he tried to relieve by applying ice to the wound. 

Knowing that his wife had been summoned, he asked the attending doctor if he would survive the night. Death, the physician answered, was fast 

approaching. At 7:30 it became evident that the end was near, and Stuart 

was asked if he had any last messages. Lillie Lee of Shepherdstown, was 

to have his golden spurs, he directed, and his staff officers his horses. ‘You 

had better take the larger horse,’ he suggested to a heavyset aide. ‘He will 

carry you better.’ His young son was to have his sword. Then he asked a 

clergyman to sing ‘Rock of Ages.’ After a brief prayer, he announced, ‘I 

am going fast now. I am resigned. God’s will be done.’ With these words, 

the Army of Northern Virginia’s cavalry chief breathed his last.” (Gordon 

C. Rhea, The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House and the Road to Yellow 

Tavern, 210.)

Stuart had died of peritonitis.

Analysis:

1. The Union losses for Sheridan’s raid were 64 killed, 337 wounded, 224 

missing (a total of 625). Confederate losses for the campaign are approximate. On 11 May alone, Wickham lost about 100 troops and Lomax nearly 

200. Gordon certainly also took high losses in his abortive attack on Gregg. 

Of course, the Confederate losses included Stuart.
277

2. Analyze Sheridan’s raid, focusing particularly on the operational 

aspects of the campaign. Consider some of these factors:

a. Casualties on both sides (who can afford the losses the most?). 

The Confederate cavalry was damaged, but not destroyed.

b. Stuart’s death. Note that psychologically both sides thought this 

was a major factor, but Stuart’s eventual replacement, Wade Hampton, 

performed well—perhaps even better than Stuart had performed.

c. Sheridan disrupted Lee’s lines of communication, but only temporarily (the damaged rolling stock did more harm to Lee’s supplies than 

tearing up the Virginia Central Railroad).

d. The Union cavalry gained confidence in its ability to fight the 

Confederates.

e. Sheridan had used his entire force in the raid and left Meade and 

Grant with virtually no cavalry for reconnaissance. Stuart had left two 

brigades of cavalry with Lee; for much of the campaign from Spotsylvania 

to the North Anna, Lee had much better intelligence than his Union opponents did.

3. Considering these factors, examine several questions within the context of analyzing Sheridan’s raid.

a. What was the best role for Civil War cavalry? Was it recon and 

screening, raiding, or acting as a mobile combat force in major battles?

b. Did cavalry need to destroy the opposing cavalry before performing its other missions? Why did Sheridan take all of his force? Could he 

have accomplished his mission with less?

4. Finally, look at Sheridan’s raid in a modern context. An analogy can 

be made with some modern air theorists who state that an air force must 

win the air superiority/supremacy battle before it can do ground support 

and other missions. Do you agree with this concept? What is the best way 

to draw out the enemy for destruction?
278

Stand 3

Atlee’s Station

(28–29 May 1864)

95

295

301

Day 3

Stand 3

Road

95

295

Sliding Hill Road

Station

Atlee

652

637

656

637

New Ashcake Road

Cool Spring Road

Central RR)

CSX (Virginia

Chamberlayne Road

Day 3 Stand 3 N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 51.

Directions: After completing the stand at Stuart’s monument, the best way 

to depart is to use the streets in the residential area to make a loop that 

will get the vehicles heading back (in the opposite direction) on Telegraph 

Road. Start by going forward on Telegraph Road for 0.2 mile where you 

will intersect with Harmony Road. Turn left on Harmony Road. This street 

will bend to the left and change its name to Hedgewood Avenue. After 

going 0.2 mile on Hedgewood Avenue, turn left on Towering Avenue. 

After 0.1 mile, you will return to Telegraph Road. Turn right on Telegraph 

Road. You will have completed the loop and will be heading north on 

Telegraph Road.

Continue on Telegraph Road for 0.2 mile where you will intersect with 

the Virginia Center Parkway. Turn left on Virginia Center Parkway and 

drive for 0.5 mile, where you will intersect with US Highway 1. Turn right 
279

on US Highway 1 and travel 1.1 miles, and then turn right at Sliding Hill 

Road (Route 656). Drive on Sliding Hill Road for 1.4 miles, which will 

then intersect with Atlee Station Road (Route 637). Turn right on Atlee 

Station Road and continue for 3.2 miles. At this point, you should be at the 

intersection of Atlee Station Road and Cool Spring Road. The stand is just 

past the intersection in a gravel clearing on the left side of Atlee Station 

Road (the clearing should be next to railroad tracks). Park the vehicles in 

the gravel area and conduct the stand at this location.

Orientation: This stand at Atlee’s Station chronologically follows the 

events on the North Anna and begins with events on 28 May. By this date, 

the battle at Yellow Tavern had been fought and Sheridan’s cavalry was 

back with the Army of the Potomac.

The area of this stand was the location of a small railroad station called 

Atlee’s Station. Lee established his headquarters just across the Atlee 

Station Road, initially in a tent as was Lee’s custom. There was no combat 

here, but this location was a key position with good roads that allowed 

Lee to keep the army ready to move in response to Grant’s next effort. 

You will need to use a map for this stand to point out unit locations and 

movements.

Lee met Beauregard at this station to discuss coordination of their 

forces in the upcoming operations. In particular, Lee asked Beauregard for 

reinforcements from the Richmond defenses to join the Army of Northern 

Virginia for the upcoming fight.

Description: After being stalled on the North Anna, Grant and Meade had 

decided to move around Lee’s right flank and use the Pamunkey River 

to screen their move. By 27 May, Sheridan’s cavalry and part of the VI 

Corps was across the Pamunkey near Hanovertown with the II Corps close 

behind.

After receiving reports of the Union move, Lee repositioned his army 

between Ashland and Atlee’s Station late on 27 May. Lee made Early the 

new II Corps commander, replacing the ailing Ewell who had lost the confidence of the army commander. (Ewell wanted to remain in command, but 

after meeting with Lee on 29 May the change to Early was confirmed.)

On 28 May, the bulk of the Army of the Potomac crossed the Pamunkey 

River. Torbert’s and Gregg’s cavalry divisions and Russell’s division of the 

VI Corps began the day across the Pamunkey River (on the southwest side) 

near Hanovertown. The V Corps moved at 0400, reached the Pamunkey 

River at Hanovertown, and began crossing at 0900. While waiting for the 

V Corps, Meade’s headquarters crossed the river in the morning and drove 

back some Confederate pickets.
280

While the V Corps crossed behind Russell’s division (VI Corps) at 

Hanovertown, the rest of Wright’s VI Corps crossed further upstream at 

Nelson’s crossing, a site that Torbert had secured. Hancock’s II Corps 

followed the VI Corps across the Pamunkey and then moved to a position 

on Wright’s left.

The IX Corps was slowed by the army’s trains and did not reach the 

river until 2200. They bivouacked at Hanovertown at 0100 on 29 May. By 

the end of the day, Grant and Meade had three corps across the Pamunkey 

in a bridgehead 3 miles wide and 1.5 miles deep. Also on 28 May, Grant 

and Meade sent two of Sheridan’s divisions forward of the bridgehead to 

find out what Lee was doing.

Meanwhile, at Bermuda Hundred, Butler had planned an attack on 

Petersburg, and he hoped to use Smith’s XVIII Corps for the operation. 

However, Union boats arrived on 28 May to move Smith’s corps to join 

the Army of the Potomac, and Butler canceled the attack.

Lee wrote Davis early on 28 May, stating that he was still unsure if 

Grant was moving toward Ashland (the Confederate left) or Mechanicsville 

(the Confederate right). Lee felt his current position was best until he positively determined the Federals’ next move.

The Confederate commander then ordered Hampton to move forward from Atlee’s Station and to gather intelligence on the Union forces. 

Hampton took a force that included elements from three Confederate cavalry divisions in the region.

Later in the morning, Lee, still very ill, moved his headquarters into 

the Clarke house just across from Atlee’s Station. This was an extremely 

rare occurrence: Lee usually lived out of his headquarters tent. Despite his 

illness, Lee continued to direct the army’s operations (see vignettes).

Early’s II Corps moved to Hundley’s Corner, a position along 

Totopotomoy Creek. (Note that Polly Hundley’s Corner and Hundley’s 

Corner are two separate locations.) Breckinridge’s division, on Early’s left, 

covered the Richmond-Hanovertown Road (also known as Atlee Station 

Road). Hill’s III Corps was on the army’s far left, north of Atlee’s Station 

and connecting with Breckinridge on Hill’s right. The I Corps (Anderson) 

was in a reserve position behind Early.

Also on 28 May, Union and Confederate cavalry fought the Battle of 

Haw’s Shop, which is covered at the next stand. (Note: Before moving 

to Haw’s Shop, cover the 29 May meeting of Confederate leaders that 

occurred at Atlee’s Station.)

At midafternoon on 29 May, Jefferson Davis rode to Atlee’s Station 

and spoke with Lee at the Clarke house. There is no record of their conversation; the meeting was brief, and in all probability, the two Southern 
281

leaders included a discussion of the transfer of reinforcements from 

Beauregard to Lee.

Beauregard arrived at the Clarke house later in the evening (after 

Davis had departed). Again, there is no record of their conversation, but 

it appears that Beauregard, at least temporarily, won his argument—Lee 

would not receive additional reinforcements from the Richmond forces. 

Lee wrote the next day, “I am unable to judge but suppose of course that 

with his [Beauregard’s] means of information, his opinion is correct.” 

(Clifford Dowdey, The Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee, New York, NY: 

Bramhall House, 1961, 757.)

At the time of these meetings, Beauregard was aware of the departure 

of Smith’s Union corps from Bermuda Hundred, but the Confederates did 

not know Smith’s destination. Given this uncertainty, the Southern leaders 

were probably prudent to keep most of Richmond’s garrison in place. Two 

days later, when Lee received information that Smith’s corps was joining 

the Army of the Potomac, Davis authorized the transfer of Major General 

Robert F. Hoke’s division from Beauregard to Lee just in time to fight at 

Cold Harbor.

Vignette: Lee’s illness, which started at the North Anna, continued to bother 

him on 28 and 29 May even as he conferred with Davis and Beauregard. 

His aide, Walter H. Taylor, wrote that the “general had been somewhat 

indisposed, and could attend to nothing except what was absolutely necessary for him to know and act upon.” Taylor saw some improvement in Lee’s 

condition on 29 May, but concluded that the “indisposition . . . was more 

serious than was generally supposed.” (Walter H. Taylor, Four Years With 

General Lee, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1962, 134.)

Analysis: There are no particular issues to discuss at this location.
282

Stand 4

Haw’s Shop

(28 May 1864)

301

Road

295

Station Atlee637

Central RR) CSX (Virginia

Chamberlayne

Road

295

301

627

606

640 Shady Grove Road

Studley Road

Buckeye Road

Studley Road

Rural Point Road

606

643

643

Meadow Bridge Road 627

627

Chestnut

Church Road

Day 3

Stand 4

Enon Church

Cool Spring Road

Day 3 Stand 4 N

1 Mile 2 Miles

Map 52.

Directions: Get back on Atlee Station Road (Route 637) and continue 

southeast. After 0.6 mile, turn left on to state Route 301 (Chamberlayne 

Road). Travel 1.1 miles on Route 301, and then turn right on to County 

Road 640 (Shady Grove Road). Continue on County Road 640 until you 

reach an intersection with County Road 606 (Studley Road). Turn left on 

to County Road 606 and continue for 4.9 miles. At this point you will 

come to an intersection with Buckeye Road. Just past the intersection, on 

the left side of Studley Road is Enon Church. This is the site for the stand. 

Park the vehicles in the church parking lot. You can conduct the stand at 

an historical marker located on the edge of the lot.

Orientation: You are currently located at Enon Church, which marked 

a focal point in the battle at Haw’s Shop. Haw’s Shop (a small machine 
283

shop) and the Salem Presbyterian Church were located a few miles east 

of this location. Union horse artillery was positioned at Haw’s Shop. The 

Haw house was about halfway between Enon Church and Haw’s machine 

shop.

Enon Church is a modern structure, but there was a church at this location in 1864. The historical marker at the church tells the story of Private 

John A. Huff of the 5th Michigan Cavalry. Huff had killed J.E.B. Stuart 

at Yellow Tavern and was himself mortally wounded in the fight at Haw’s 

Shop.

County Road 606 (Studley Road) is on the same path as the RichmondHanovertown Road was in 1864. During the Civil War, this road was often 

referred to as Atlee Station Road. The Confederates approached this position from the west. The Union forces advanced from the east.

Much of the terrain around the church is the same as in 1864. The road 

had fences on both sides, which constricted mounted operations for the 

cavalry.

Description: After Stuart’s death, Lee waited before appointing a permanent new cavalry chief (the choices were Wade Hampton or Fitzhugh Lee). 

The Army commander gave Hampton overall command for the reconnaissance at Haw’s Shop. Hampton put together a force that included units 

from all three available Confederate cavalry divisions: Brigadier General 

Thomas L. Rosser’s brigade (from Hampton’s own division) and Brigadier 

General Matthew C. Butler’s brigade (also from Hampton’s division) that 

included two newly arrived (and large) South Carolina regiments and a 

smaller Georgia contingent. Butler, himself, had not arrived in the Virginia 

theater yet, and thus Colonel Benjamin H. Rutledge led the brigade in this 

battle. The two other Confederate units with Hampton were Wickham’s 

brigade from Fitzhugh Lee’s division (Lee personally led this brigade for 

much of the battle) and Major General William W.H.F. “Rooney” Lee’s 

entire division, although Brigadier General John R. Chambliss’ brigade 

was the only unit of this division to participate in the fight (the rest of the 

division screened the northern flank of the main Confederate force).

Hampton’s mission was to find the Union forces and determine if the 

Union infantry was across the Pamunkey in force.

Sheridan was also tasked with a reconnaissance mission—to locate 

the main Confederate forces. Sheridan had two divisions available for 

the fight. Brigadier General David Gregg’s Second Division was the 

main force that advanced down Atlee Station Road. He had two brigades: 

First Brigade under Brigadier General Henry E. Davies, Jr., and Second 

Brigade under Colonel J. Irvin Gregg (no relation to his division commander, David Gregg). Torbert’s First Division began the day deployed to 
284

cover the Union river crossing at Nelson’s (north of the Haw’s Shop location), but was available to support Gregg. Custer’s brigade was the only 

unit from Torbert’s division to become engaged at Haw’s Shop. Wilson’s 

Third Division was guarding the army trains north of the Pamunkey and 

unavailable for the battle.

On 28 May, David Gregg pushed his lead brigade, under Davies, 

down the Atlee Station (Richmond-Hanovertown) Road toward Salem 

Presbyterian Church. Davies deployed his troops to cover the road 

(some mounted and some dismounted) and advanced west just past Enon 

Church.

Almost immediately, Hampton’s lead elements overran Davies’ pickets. Rosser’s and Wickham’s men launched a mounted charge that pushed 

Davies back to a position slightly east of Enon Church. However, the 

fences on both sides of the road hampered the Southern troops and effective Union fire halted their attack.

As the Confederates pulled back from their repulse, there was a lull 

on the battlefield and Hampton built a defensive line near Enon Church. A 

branch of Crump’s Creek and marshes protected the line on the Confederate 

left, and Haw’s Mill Pond was on the right. Hampton’s men dismounted for 

the upcoming fight and built hasty earthworks of dirt and fence rails. The 

entire line, divided by Atlee Station Road, was about 1.5 miles in length.

Rosser’s troops held the Confederate left (his brigade’s position was 

divided by Crump’s Creek). Later in the battle, Chambliss’ brigade would 

deploy on Rosser’s left. Wickham held the center and was positioned on 

both sides of Atlee Station Road. Butler’s brigade (under Rutledge) was 

positioned mostly on the right.

David Gregg began the Union attack by ordering Davies to probe the 

Confederate defensive positions near Enon Church. This was not an all-out 

attack, but the Union troops applied pressure along the entire Confederate 

line in a seesaw fight. Davies handled his troops well, shifting regiments 

to both sides of the road to keep constant pressure on the Confederate 

line. From 1100 to 1500, Davies’ troops forced Hampton to commit all of 

Rutledge’s troops to the fight.

On the Southerners’ side, the inexperienced South Carolina regiments 

showed stoical determination as they fought with single-shot Enfield rifled 

muskets against the Union breech-loaders and repeaters.

During this drawn-out struggle, Gregg committed his other brigade 

(J.I. Gregg) on Davies’ right flank. This move was balanced by the arrival 

of Chambliss’ Confederates. Shortly before 1500, David Gregg asked 

Sheridan for reinforcements. Gregg felt that some additional Federal 

troops could tip the balance in the Union favor and lead to a decisive victory. Sheridan ordered Torbert to send help. Torbert sent Custer’s brigade, 
285

which was resting with a supposed “day off.” Torbert’s other two brigades 

arrived late in the day and did not take part in the fighting.

Sheridan allegedly asked Meade to send forward Union infantry, and 

this claim has raised considerable controversy. Sheridan later wrote in his 

memoirs that he asked for infantry support so he could destroy Hampton’s 

force. Some historians have used this account to emphasize the feud 

between Meade and Sheridan and to blame Meade for failing to support 

his cavalry commander. (No doubt Sheridan was only too glad to use his 

memoirs to belittle Meade.) However, Sheridan’s official report at the time 

of the battle mentions nothing about a request for infantry support.

As the day wore on, Custer’s troops arrived and took up a position 

behind Davies’ line near the Haw house on Atlee Station Road. Custer 

ordered a dismounted assault down the road. He personally remained 

mounted and was conspicuous while leading the charge.

Davies’ force allowed Custer’s troops (four regiments from Michigan) 

to pass through their lines along the road and continued to provide supporting fires during Custer’s attack. The Union attack suffered an initial 

setback. Some of Rutledge’s Georgia troops found a gap between Davies 

and Custer, and there was a short but confusing incident of Union troops 

firing on each other.

Despite the Union difficulties, their attack began to push back the 

Southern cavalrymen. Although the Confederates continued their stubborn resistance, the situation changed dramatically between 1700 and 

1800. Rooney Lee (leading Chambliss’ brigade) mistook dismounted 

Union cavalry for infantry and persuaded Hampton to withdraw. Once 

Chambliss fell back, J.I. Gregg was able to thrust two Union regiments 

forward and flank Rosser’s brigade. Rosser began his withdrawal in good 

order, as did Wickham to the south. However, Custer’s troops felt the 

slackening Confederate resistance, and their renewed attack led to a breakthrough on Atlee Station Road. Davies’ troops followed Custer and soon 

the Confederates were routed.

Lee had to order Breckinridge’s infantry forward to cover the retreat of 

the cavalry. The Confederate cavalry safely withdrew behind Breckinridge’s 

lines and the Totopotomoy River. Sheridan, content with his tactical victory, did not order a pursuit. In fact, the Union cavalry buried its dead and 

then pulled back to a reserve position for the next two days.

Vignette: None.

Analysis:

1. Tactically, the Union cavalry defeated the Confederates, but another 

question emerges: Which side accomplished its mission in support of the 

overall operational plan? This question raises some earlier issues that were 
286

explored at Yellow Tavern. What is the role of cavalry? Should it focus 

on defeating enemy cavalry, conducting raids, or performing intelligence 

operations?

2. Although the Confederates lost the tactical battle at Haw’s Shop, Lee 

was provided valuable information that day. A report from Lee (OR, series 

I, volume XXXVI, part 1, 1031) late on the evening of 28 May stated that 

Confederate forces had captured Union infantry from the V and VI Corps 

during the fight at Haw’s Shop.

a. Union infantry did not participate in the fight at Haw’s Shop. There 

are no reports of V and VI Corps prisoners in any lower-level Confederate 

reports; thus, Lee’s information probably came from patrols near the Union 

bridgeheads, and not from troops at Haw’s Shop.

b. In any case, how useful was the information? On one hand, Lee 

had evidence that Union forces were crossing the Pamunkey (i.e., Grant 

was moving to Lee’s right)—a significant fact. On the other hand, Lee still 

remained unsure about the Union’s intentions, and thus he did not significantly shift his own forces on the day after the battle at Haw’s Shop (29 

May).

3. From the Union perspective, the battle appears to have been a lost 

opportunity.

a. Having achieved a tactical victory, Sheridan’s troops did not 

pursue the defeated Southerners and missed a chance to locate the main 

Confederate positions on Totopotomoy Creek.

b. After a period of burying the dead at Haw’s Shop, Gregg’s division went into a reserve position, and Torbert’s division shifted south to 

Old Church. The next day (29 May), Grant and Meade advanced their 

infantry toward the main Confederate lines without a cavalry screen.

c. In sum, did Grant, Meade, and Sheridan place too little value on 

the reconnaissance role of cavalry?
287

Stand 5

Bethesda Church (drive-by)

(30 May–2 June 1864)

Buckeye Road

Studley Road

606

Chestnut

Church Road

Day 3

Stand 5

Enon Church

Rural Point Road

606

643

Pole Green Road

627

627

Williamsville Road

615

644

360

360

Pine Slash Road

Walnut Grove

Mechanicsville Turnpike

Road

615

Spring Run Road Hanover Town Road

Summer Hill Road

615

Studley Road

Day 3

Stand 5

N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 53.

Directions: Note: The ground on which the Bethesda Church battles were 

fought is private property—you cannot stop at this location. You can conduct the discussion for this stand at the last location (Haw’s Shop) with 

a map and then drive by the Bethesda Church battlefield slowly or talk 

through the stand as you slowly pass the battlefield location. The latter 

option (talking while on the move) is best if you can speak to the whole 

group in the vehicle (e.g., a bus equipped with a microphone) and augment the talk with map handouts. In any case, begin the drive-by continuing in the same direction as earlier (east) on County Road 606 (Studley 

Road). After 1.0 mile, turn right on Route 615 (Williamsville Road). Stay 

on Route 615 for 2.6 miles and then turn right on Route 627 (Pole Green 

Road). After 0.8 mile on Route 627, you will come back to Route 615 

(which will have changed its name to Walnut Grove Road). Turn left on 

Walnut Grove Road, and then move very slowly (as traffic permits).
288

The main area of the Bethesda Church fighting was in the fields to the 

left of the road as you move. This ground is private property—do not trespass. If traffic is light, you might be able to come to a complete stop on the 

road shoulder and conduct the stand from inside your vehicle. Again, we 

must emphasize that you not trespass and that you not block traffic.

Orientation: You are currently near the intersection of Pole Green Road 

(which was called Shady Grove Road in the Civil War) and Walnut Grove 

Road. The paths of the modern roads are very close to the Civil War era 

roads in this location.

The actual Bethesda Church is 0.5 mile south of our current location 

(you will pass by it on the way to the next stand). Beaver Dam Creek is 

located along the wood line to the front and left (south and west).

This stand, the fight at Bethesda Church, is part of the series of battles 

that historians usually link together as the battle of Cold Harbor.

This area was the southern end of the Union line during the first battle 

at Bethesda Church on 30 May; but over the next few days, both sides 

shifted their forces and this region became the northern flank of the armies 

as they fought on 2 June.

Description: After Haw’s Shop, Lee finalized Ewell’s relief and officially 

placed Early in command of II Corps. He also made some minor adjustments to his line. Most of the Confederate forces remained behind the 

Totopotomoy, but Anderson’s corps moved forward between Breckinridge 

and Early. Anderson’s move allowed Early to shift his II Corps slightly 

south, near Beaver Dam Creek. Confederate cavalry screened to the north 

in response to a Union feint toward Hanover Courthouse.

As discussed earlier, the Union leadership did not make good use of 

its cavalry on 29 May. Grant, Meade, and Sheridan all deserve blame for 

the failure to use aggressively Union cavalry for reconnaissance. Gregg’s 

division spent most of the day burying the dead of Haw’s Shop and resting. Wilson’s division continued to guard the Union trains. Torbert’s 

division deployed further south toward Old Church probing toward the 

Confederate flank.

With most of the Union cavalry on other missions, Grant and Meade 

decided to use Union infantry for—in modern terms—a reconnaissance-inforce. The Union commander in chief was not sure if Lee was holding on 

the Totopotomoy or had pulled back to the Chickahominy River. At 0900 

on 29 May, Grant and Meade issued orders for Union moves. Russell’s 

division (VI Corps) shifted from its crossing point at Hanovertown and 

probed north to Hanover Courthouse. The remainder of the VI Corps 

slowly followed.
289

Hancock selected Barlow’s division to be the II Corps’ lead element. 

Barlow’s men advanced past Polly Hundley’s Corner and encountered 

Breckinridge’s division on the Totopotomoy. At 1600, Hancock let Meade 

know that the Confederates were on the Totopotomoy—still in front of 

the Chickahominy River. Burnside was able to position Potter’s division 

between Hancock’s left and Warren’s right, while the rest of the IX Corps 

occupied reserve positions behind Potter. Warren moved his entire corps 

south of the Totopotomoy, but he feared being isolated from the rest of the 

army and moved cautiously. The V Corps’ lead division (Griffin) encountered troops from Anderson’s Confederate I Corps. Torbert’s cavalry was 

further south of Warren and operated independently of the V Corps.

On the morning of 30 May, Grant and Meade knew that the Southerners 

held a position on the Totopotomoy. They ordered aggressive probes hoping to find an open flank on either side of the main Confederate position or 

a weakness in the middle. Returning from Hanover Courthouse, Wright’s 

corps struggled over marshes and difficult roads and did not reach the 

Confederate positions until late on 30 May. Hancock’s II Corps captured some Confederate forward positions, but did not press their attack. 

Burnside’s IX Corps filled the ground between Hancock and Warren, 

but did not attack. Warren’s corps continued its advance south of the 

Totopotomoy where it would come under attack at Bethesda Church.

On 30 May, Lee received a report from A.P. Hill that there was little 

activity on his front. In addition, Hancock’s probe did not present a major 

threat. Thus, Lee decided to attempt offensive operations, and he gave 

Early permission to attack Warren’s corps. He also urged Anderson to support Early’s attack. As was often the case, Lee gave both commanders 

considerable discretion in their missions (see vignettes).

Early was anxious to attack. He ordered his engineers to cut two paths 

from Shady Grove Road to Old Church Road (today called Mechanicsville 

Turnpike) to improve his ability to shift forces to his right flank. The new 

II Corps commander used these freshly cut roads to move his entire corps 

toward Bethesda Church in order to launch an attack on the Union V 

Corps.

The Confederate forces marched to their attack positions with Rodes’ 

division in the lead, followed by Lieutenant Colonel William Nelson’s 

artillery, Major General Stephen D. Ramseur’s division, and Gordon’s 

division. Ramseur was a young general who had received command of 

Early’s old division when Early was promoted to corps command.

At noon on 30 May, Doles’ brigade (leading Rodes’ division) made 

first contact with the Union forces. Rodes slowly developed the situation 

by deploying Daniels’ brigade on Doles’ left and pressing the Federals 
290

north along Walnut Grove Road. The Confederates pushed Colonel Martin 

D. Hardin’s brigade north, past Bethesda Church and the Tinsley house at 

the junction of Walnut Grove Road and Old Church Road. 

Hardin’s brigade fell back past Beaver Dam Creek, and for a time, 

Crawford’s left (and hence the entire V Corps’ left flank) was exposed. 

However, much of Early’s corps was still in march column on Old Church 

Road and needed more time to deploy. Also, Early wanted to coordinate his 

attack with Anderson’s corps. The II Corps commander sent messages to 

Anderson, urging the I Corps commander to join in Early’s attack. Finally, 

Union artillery to the west of the Bowles house hit the Confederate infantry hard enough to cause them to hesitate before attacking across Beaver 

Dam Creek.

The pause in the Confederate attack gave the Union troops the opportunity to reform and prepare for renewed Confederate assaults. The V 

Corps artillery commander, Wainright, brought forward several batteries 

that deployed on Crawford’s left, north of Shady Grove Road. Crawford 

positioned Kitching’s brigade on Hardin’s left (Kitching’s men were the 

formerly independent brigade of heavy artillerists that first joined the 

Army of the Potomac in the Wilderness). Griffin’s division entrenched on 

Crawford’s right, covering a possible advance by Anderson along Shady 

Grove Road. Lockwood’s division moved down Old Church Road, threatening the Confederate right. While Lockwood did not actually join in the 

fight, his appearance forced Rodes and Gordon to deploy parts of their 

divisions to the east.

After the initial Confederate pause, Early saw the strengthened Union 

line and waited for news from Anderson before deciding to commit to a 

major assault. In the meantime, Rodes’ men completed their deployment. 

Part of the division faced west toward Lockwood’s troops while Daniels’ 

brigade sparred with Kitching’s Union troops. By 1600, Ramseur’s division (only two of its brigades were available for the battle) completed 

deploying on Rodes’ left.

Despite the strength of the new Union position, Ramseur was eager to 

launch an attack. Union cannons near the Bowles house were pounding his 

troops, and the youthful Confederate commander pleaded with Early for 

permission to attack. Early reluctantly gave Ramseur permission at 1830.

The attack was a costly mistake. Gordon’s division was still deploying and could not support Ramseur. Rodes’ men were too occupied with 

protecting the Confederate right to assist. Even Ramseur’s two available 

brigades could not fully commit to the attack, because Brigadier General 

Thomas F. Toon’s brigade was pinned down by Federal fire on its open left 

flank. Thus, Colonel Edward Willis’ brigade (formerly known as Pegram’s 
291

brigade) attacked virtually alone. Willis’ Confederates advanced heroically (see vignettes). Even though they were caught in a severe crossfire 

of rifle and cannon, the Southerners closed to within 50 yards of the Union 

position. Willis went down with a mortal wound, and most of the other 

officers were killed or wounded. The Confederates fell back to their starting positions.

The repulse of Willis’ brigade ended the battle of Bethesda Church for 

30 May. The next day, Early pulled his corps back to the west of Bethesda 

Church and resumed the defense, while Lee planned the next Confederate 

move. Warren held his positions throughout the night and then probed 

slowly toward the retreating Southerners on 31 May.

While the battle raged at Bethesda Church on 30 May, Union and 

Confederate cavalry clashed along Matadequin Creek, several miles 

southeast of Bethesda Church. (Although you will not actually visit the 

Matadequin site, it is worth mentioning this engagement to set the stage 

for the next stand.)

After its inaction on 29 May, Sheridan’s cavalry became more aggressive on 30 May. Torbert’s division moved southeast of Warren’s V Corps 

to Old Church in order to clear the way for another possible shift of the 

Union army around the Confederate right flank. Butler’s Confederate cavalry brigade opposed Torbert’s move. Butler’s troops were the same South 

Carolinians who had fought at Haw’s Shop under Colonel Rutledge. By 

30 May, Brigadier General Matthew C. Butler had arrived and resumed 

command of the brigade.

The Confederates took the initiative by attacking over the creek, 

but Torbert had an advantage in numbers. The Federals replied with 

both mounted and dismounted attacks, forcing Butler’s men back. 

Reinforcements from Brigadier General Pierce M.B. Young’s brigade 

arrived, but could not stop the Federal advance. The Southerners retreated 

to Old Cold Harbor.

Torbert’s troops had gained a temporary advantage that paved the way 

for a potential Federal advance around Lee’s right flank.

Vignettes:

1. Lee’s order to Anderson for the battle at Bethesda Church demonstrated Lee’s style of command, which gave his subordinates considerable 

freedom, but also left the possibility for a lack of coordination: “After fortifying this line they [the Union forces] will probably make another move 

by their left flank over the Chickahominy. This is just a repetition of their 

former movements. It can only be arrested by striking at once at that part 

of their force that has crossed the Totopotomoy in General Early’s front. I 
292

have desired him to do this if he thought it could be done advantageously, 

and have written to him that you will support him. Please communicate 

with him at once. Whatever is determined on should be done as soon as 

practicable.” (OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 3, 850-851.)

2. Ramseur’s attack in the battle of Bethesda Church was a costly 

repulse, but the Southern soldier’s heroism earned the admiration of the 

Union soldiers who witnessed it. The historian of the 13th Pennsylvania 

Reserves recorded the event: “The slaughter was so sickening that Major 

Hartshorne leaped to his feet and called upon his assailants to surrender. 

Some hundreds did so. Rebels or no rebels, their behavior and bearing 

during the charge had won the admiration of their captors, who did not 

hesitate to express it.” (As quoted by Louis J. Baltz III, The Battle of Cold 

Harbor, May 27–June 13, 1864, Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1994, 

51.)

Analysis:

1. Critique Grant and Meade’s concept for a reconnaissance in force 

toward the Totopotomoy. Can infantry fulfill the role of testing the enemy 

lines?

2. Should Lee have been focused on resuming the offensive as he was at 

Bethesda Church? Did he need to attack Warren’s corps or should he have 

been content to stay on the defense?

3. Did the Confederates conduct the attack properly? Did Lee adequately 

coordinate the attack? Who deserves more blame for the attack’s repulse, 

Early or Anderson (or someone or something else)?
293

Stand 6

Cold Harbor I

(31 May–2 June 1864)

627

Sandy Valley Road

360Mechanicsville Turnpike

360

360

638

197 615

635

635

295

295

295

156 615

156

156

156

633 632

619

615

615

636

643

627

643

627

627

627

615

615

643

Day 3 Stand 6

(1 of 2) N

1 Mile 1 Miles

Day 3

Stand 6

Cold Harbor Road

Colt’s Neck Road

Beulah Church Road Crown Hill Road

Map 54.
294

P

P

Day 3

Stand 6

New Cold Harbor

633

Cold Harbor Road

Old Cold Harbor

NPS Headquarters

National

Cemetery

Rockhill Road

Bulah Church Road

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 7

Day 3

Stand 8

Day 3

Stand 9

Crown Hill Road

Parrish Place Lane

Boatswain Lane

Via Pann Dr

(private)

Cold Harbor Road

156

156

156

156

632

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 10

Day 3 Stand 6

(2 of 2) N

250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 55.

Directions: Continue in the same direction (south) on Route 615 (Walnut 

Grove Road). After traveling for 1.8 miles (during which you will cross 

US Highway 360—Mechanicsville Turnpike) turn left on Colt’s Neck 

Road (the road does not have a route number). Continue on Colt’s Neck 

Road for 0.7 mile and then turn left on Route 635 (Sandy Valley Road). 

After 0.5 mile on Route 635, turn right on Route 633 (Beulah Church 

Road). Continue on Beulah Church Road for 1.4 miles and then turn right 

on Route 632 (Crown Hill Road). Crown Hill Road will quickly merge 

with, and change its name to, Cold Harbor Road (Route 156). After 1.0 

mile on Cold Harbor Road, you will come to an intersection with an NPS 

road (Anderson-Wright Drive) and the Cold Harbor Park Headquarters 

on your right. Turn right and park in the NPS Headquarters parking lot. 

You can conduct the stand in the grassy area just down the slope from the 

headquarters building.

Orientation: You have just come from Bethesda Church where the 

Confederates attacked Warren’s V Corps on 30 May. Your current location 

is between Old Cold Harbor and New Cold Harbor.
295

During the drive to this location, you passed Old Cold Harbor (it was 

the intersection of Beulah Church Road and Crown Hill/Cold Harbor 

Road). Note that during the Civil War, Old Cold Harbor usually was just 

called “Cold Harbor.” Your current location is between the Union and 

Confederate lines during major battles on 1 and 3 June. The Union lines 

were to the east of here, and the Confederate lines were on the west. The 

NPS only owns a small part of the Cold Harbor battlefield—about 1 mile of 

the lines that eventually stretched for over 6 miles from Bethesda Church 

in the north to Turkey Hill in the south.

Description: On 31 May, Sheridan’s cavalry (Torbert’s division) pushed 

southwest toward Old Cold Harbor, following up its victory from the day 

before at Matadequin Creek. At 1600, Sheridan committed Gregg’s division in support of Torbert, and the Union cavalry took possession of Old 

Cold Harbor but halted short of New Cold Harbor.

The Federal II Corps probed the Confederate positions with Barlow’s 

division and found that the Southerners still held strong entrenched lines on 

the Totopotomoy River. The IX Corps moved south of the Totopotomoy and 

filled in positions that connected the II with the V Corps. The Totopotomoy 

River has a sharp bend that changes it from a north-south path (which provided a defensive line for the Confederates) to an east-west path (which 

was a barrier for both armies as they shifted further south). Warren’s V 

Corps cautiously moved west of Bethesda Church, encountered Early’s 

new line, and stopped to entrench its own position.

The Union VI Corps started 31 May with orders to probe the 

Confederate northern flank. Wright’s troops found the Confederates well 

entrenched. Late on 31 May, Meade sent orders for the VI Corps to pull 

back from its position on the Union right and move behind the army to the 

south. Wright was to be ready to support Sheridan’s cavalry at Old Cold 

Harbor on 1 June.

Smith’s XVIII Corps went through a trying two days on 30 and 31 

May. At 1100 on 30 May, Smith arrived at White House Landing (ahead of 

his troops). The soldiers began arriving on the night of 30 May. During that 

night, Smith received three copies of orders that directed his corps to New 

Castle Ferry. These orders reflected a desire to position Smith’s troops in a 

central position that could support a Union offensive in multiple locations. 

At 0900 on 31 May, the head of Smith’s column reached the Bassett house, 

about 3 miles from New Castle Ferry and not far from Old Church. It took 

all of 31 May to offload Smith’s men from their transports, and the tail of 

his corps did not reach Old Church until late on the night of 31 May.

Smith’s force was a composite unit from the Army of the James that 

included part but not all of his original XVIII Corps. The units were the First 
296

Division of the XVIII Corps (Brigadier General T.H. Brooks), the Second 

Division of the XVIII Corps (Brigadier General John H. Martindale), the 

Third Division of the X Corps (Brigadier General Charles Devens, Jr.), 

and an ad hoc artillery brigade. The modified corps totaled 17,000 men.

Despite Early’s repulse at Bethesda Church on 30 May, Lee still hoped 

to attack the Union left flank on 31 May. Lee wanted Hoke’s division (a 

reinforcement from Beauregard’s command) to spearhead a new assault 

that would blunt the Federal move at Old Cold Harbor. However, it took 

time to move Hoke from Bermuda Hundred to a new position north of 

the Chickahominy River. Only one brigade from Hoke (under Brigadier 

General Thomas L. Clingman) arrived near Cold Harbor on 31 May. 

Clingman’s infantry, as well as Southern cavalry, were forced out of Old 

Cold Harbor by Sheridan’s cavalry. Soon thereafter, Sheridan’s troops 

erected fieldworks at Old Cold Harbor.

Also during the day, Lee decided to shift his own army further to 

the right (south) to counter the Union thrust at Cold Harbor. Lee ordered 

Anderson to pull out of his positions on the Totopotomoy and march to Cold 

Harbor to join with Hoke and attack the Federals on 1 June. Breckinridge 

was instructed to extend his line to the south, fill the gap left by Anderson’s 

departure, and link up with Early’s left flank.

Although he held Old Cold Harbor, Sheridan feared he would not be 

able to retain it on 1 June against the increasing number of Confederate 

infantry. He had already fought Clingman’s infantry and received a report 

that Kershaw’s division of Anderson’s corps was on the way to Cold 

Harbor. On the evening of 31 May, Sheridan made the decision to evacuate 

Old Cold Harbor. Sometime near midnight, all of Torbert’s troops pulled 

out of their positions.

At 0100 on 1 June, Meade told Sheridan to hold Old Cold Harbor 

“at every hazard” (Philip H. Sheridan, The Personal Memoirs of P.H. 

Sheridan, New York, NY: De Capo Press, 1992, 221) and informed him 

that Wright’s VI Corps was on the way to reinforce the Union cavalry. 

Sheridan immediately ordered Torbert to reoccupy the entrenchments. 

Torbert’s men quietly filed back into position. They moved so stealthily 

that the Confederates did not notice the evacuation and reoccupation of 

the lines.

Anderson launched an attack on Sheridan at dawn on 1 June. He had 

Kershaw’s division from his own corps and Hoke’s division available for 

the attack. Anderson pressed Sheridan back and almost pushed the Union 

cavalry out of Old Cold Harbor. However, Confederate coordination problems left much of Hoke’s division out of the attack, and at 0900, Wright’s 

troops arrived just in time to hold the position.
297

Although the Union forces securely held Old Cold Harbor, Wright 

waited for Smith’s XVIII Corps to arrive before trying to seize New Cold 

Harbor. Meanwhile, Smith was still having trouble getting clear orders 

for his mission on 1 June. At daybreak on 1 June, Smith received instructions, which seemed to confirm his earlier destination of New Castle Ferry, 

thus filling the gap between the V and VI Corps. One of Grant’s aides, 

Lieutenant Colonel Orville E. Babcock, mistakenly wrote “New Castle 

Ferry” instead of “Cold Harbor,” thus causing misdirection in Smith’s 

movement (OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 1, 999).

Smith moved the short distance from the Bassett house to New Castle 

Ferry, but the V and VI Corps were not there. Soon after this move, 

Grant sent Babcock to Smith with corrected orders that gave him a new 

destination—a position between Bethesda Church and Old Cold Harbor—

and told him to join in an attack with VI Corps. The XVIII Corps marched 

to Old Cold Harbor, but did not arrive until the afternoon. Smith had little 

time to prepare for his joint attack with Wright.

At 1700, Smith and Wright attacked. The Federals took many of the 

Confederate rifle pits along the line and about 500 prisoners. The VI Corps 

also penetrated the Southern line at the juncture of Hoke’s and Kershaw’s 

divisions, but Anderson shifted two brigades to the area of the penetration 

and restored the line. Although they had come close to a major success, 

the Federals were unable to take New Cold Harbor, and they had suffered 

2,200 casualties in the effort.

Also on the afternoon of 1 June, Grant and Meade ordered Hancock 

to move from the far right of the Union line to a position in the rear of the 

lines near the army headquarters. The Federal leaders wanted to use the II 

Corps to support a Union attack on 2 June.

At 2100, Hancock received an updated destination and mission—to 

go to the far left of the Union line and support the VI and XVIII Corps in 

a coordinated attack on the morning of 2 June. A guide (Major William A. 

Paine) from army headquarters joined the II Corps to assist in the march. 

The original route was supposed to be a 9-mile road march. However, 

the guide claimed to know a shortcut. As the corps moved down the new 

road, the path got narrower and narrower. Artillery wheels got stuck in the 

trees that lined the narrow path. It was pitch dark and dusty—a miserable 

march.

Eventually, the corps could not continue on the “shortcut” and had to 

double back on part of the route. In the end, the II Corps actually traveled 

15 miles instead of the original 9 miles. Lead elements of the corps did not 

begin to arrive south of Cold Harbor until after daybreak on 2 June; the 

full corps was not in position until noon.
298

On the evening of 1 June, Lee realized that Hancock’s corps had left the 

front, and the Confederate commander correctly deduced that the Federals 

were attempting, once again, to shift around the Confederate right. Lee 

ordered Breckinridge’s division to pull out of its position and move south 

of Hoke’s division to extend the Confederate flank. Breckinridge’s march 

began at 2200 and was almost as miserable as Hancock’s. The troops were 

dead tired, and a guide (Major H.B. McClellan) selected a circuitous path 

(see vignettes). Breckinridge’s division arrived near Cold Harbor at about 

the same time as Hancock’s lead division and was able to block the Union 

path.

The withdrawal of II Corps made IX Corps the northernmost unit of 

the Federal line and required that Burnside refuse his right flank. On 2 

June, Burnside pulled the bulk of his corps south of the Old Church Road. 

He left two brigades in their original positions to cover the move. Meade 

told Warren about Burnside’s shift and ordered the V Corps commander 

to coordinate with IX Corps’ move. Warren placed Griffin’s division in 

reserve at Bethesda Church just in case he needed to assist Burnside.

At midday on 2 June, Lee ordered Hill to shift two of his divisions to 

the Confederate right (southern) flank. Although he was shifting forces to 

parry the Union maneuvers on the southern flank, Lee, as well as Early, 

hoped for an opportunity to attack in the Bethesda Church region, which 

had now become the Union right flank. At about 1400, Early detected the 

withdrawal of parts of the IX Corps and ordered an attack. Gordon’s and 

Rodes’ divisions from his own corps and Heth’s division, which remained 

behind when the rest of Hill’s III Corps departed, struck the Union lines. 

The Confederate attack achieved initial surprise and quickly brushed 

aside the two advanced Union brigades covering the IX Corps positions. 

The Confederates then struck the main IX Corps line. Rodes’ division 

found a gap between Burnsides’ left and Warren’s right, hit the IX Corps 

on this open flank, and routed two brigades of Crittenden’s division. 

Fortunately for the Northerners, Warren’s reserve (Griffin’s division) at 

Bethesda Church advanced to close the gap. In addition, the rest of the IX 

Corps stiffened, and by late afternoon, the Confederate attack had stalled.

In the meantime, on the southern portion of the lines (our current location), the Federals found themselves unable to execute the planned 2 June 

attack on Lee’s right flank. Just after midnight, Meade sent instructions to 

Smith, “You will make your dispositions to attack to-morrow morning [2 

June] on Major-General Wright’s right, and in conjunction with that officer’s attack. This attack should be made with your whole force, and as vigorous as possible” (OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 3, 468). The order 

lacked a specific time, boundary, or objective. Smith complained about the 
299

order. He said that he could not be ready—his troops were exhausted and 

out of ammunition. A few hours later, Smith received orders postponing 

the 0430 attack to 1700 on 2 June.

Hancock’s corps had already missed the planned 0430 start time for 

the attack. The last of the II Corps troops arrived at noon (2 June), and they 

were dead tired and ill prepared to make an assault. After more discussion 

between Grant and Meade, the Union commanders decided that it was too 

late to make an attack that would catch the Confederates off guard. Instead, 

they decided to take more time to prepare a coordinated, general assault. 

(See vignettes for correspondence between Grant and Meade.) Grant may 

have been motivated by a mistaken impression of Lee’s army; he thought 

that Lee’s force had been severely mauled by the fighting of the last few 

weeks and was ready to collapse.

The pause from 1 to 2 June, and eventually to 3 June, gave Lee time 

to move more forces into position and entrench. First, Breckinridge’s division moved to extend the Confederate line south of R.H. Anderson’s corps. 

Then, two divisions of A.P. Hill’s corps shifted south of Breckinridge and 

were in position to block Hancock by early afternoon on 2 June.

Vignettes: 

1. Lee directed his staff to send a guide to help Breckinridge’s division 

move to Cold Harbor on the night of 1 June. However, the man selected, 

Major H.B. McClellan, did not have a map and was not familiar with the 

ground. Not unexpectedly, McClellan took the division on an indirect 

route that delayed the movement. After the move was complete, Lee sent 

for McClellan. The errant major later recalled that he entered his commander’s tent “with a sinking heart.” Lee traced the correct route with his 

finger on a map and said in even tones, “Major, this is the road to Cold 

Harbor.” McClellan responded, “Yes, General, I know it now.” No further words were spoken, but McClellan remembered, “That quiet reproof 

sunk deeper and cut more deeply that [sic] words of violent vituperation 

would have done.” (Douglas Southall Freeman, R.E. Lee, New York, NY: 

C. Scribner’s Sons, 1935, volume 3, 383.)

2. Below is the exchange of orders between Grant and Meade that postponed the attack from 2 June to 3 June:

Grant to Meade (1400): “In view of the want of preparation for an 

attack this evening, and the heat and want of energy among the men from 

moving during the night last night, I think it advisable to postpone assault 

until early to-morrow morning.”

Meade to all Corps commanders (1430): “The attack ordered for 5 

P.M. today is postponed to 4:30 A.M. to-morrow. Corps commanders will 
300

employ the interim in making examination of the ground in their fronts, 

and perfecting their arrangements for the assault.” (OR, series I, volume 

XXXVI, part 3, 478-479.)

Analysis:

1. Analyze the factors that led to the Union inability to take New Cold 

Harbor from 31 May to 2 June.

a. Could the Union cavalry have done more to help take the 

crossroads?

b. Why were Wright and Smith late in launching their 1 June 

assault, and should they have pressed their attacks further after their initial 

success?

c. Who, if anyone, is to blame for the postponement of the 2 June 

attack to 3 June?

d. Consider the effects of the last month of constant fighting, marching, and casualties on the men, commanders, and their staffs as they tried 

to conduct the maneuvers at Cold Harbor. What can modern leaders learn 

about the effects of fatigue at all levels of an army? Today, how do we 

combat fatigue in continuous operations?

2. Some historians have argued that Grant had actually maneuvered too 

close to Richmond in the Cold Harbor region (particularly because the 

Pamunkey, Chickahominy, and James Rivers were bunched close together 

and restricted movement).

a. Do you agree? Why or why not?

b. Did Grant need to change his line of operations? Was it worth 

making one last attempt to overwhelm the Confederates with an assault?
301

Stand 7

Cold Harbor II (Confederate Positions)

(3 June 1864)

P

P

Day 3

Stand 6

New Cold Harbor

633

Cold Harbor Road

Old Cold Harbor

NPS Headquarters

National

Cemetery

Rockhill Road

Bulah Church Road

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 7

Day 3

Stand 8

Day 3

Stand 9

Crown Hill Road

Parrish Place Lane

Boatswain Lane

Via Pann Dr

(private)

Cold Harbor Road

156

156

156

156

632

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 10

Day 3 Stand 7

N

250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 56.

Directions: Continue on Anderson-Wright Drive (it becomes one way); 

after 0.4 mile, there will be a small parking area to the right with an NPS 

information plaque. Park in the parking area and conduct the stand near 

the plaque.

Orientation: You are on the Confederate side of the battle lines that 

repulsed the major Union assault of 3 June. The Union trenches are visible 

to the east of your current location. The ground between the trenches was 

open on 3 June 1864. Most of that ground was abandoned farmland, and 

the Confederates had cut down almost all of the trees in front of their positions. The initial Union attack positions were in a sparsely wooded tree 

line behind (east of) the trenches that are currently visible.
302

Description: From north to south, Lee had elements of Anderson’s I Corps, 

Hoke’s division, Hill’s III Corps, and Breckinridge’s division deployed to 

meet the main Union assault at 0430 on 3 June.

The Confederates had built extensive earthworks along the entire 

line prior to the Union attack. The southern end of the Confederate line 

(Breckinridge’s, Mahone’s, and Wilcox’s divisions) had been in place for 

over 12 hours, and the Confederate center (Anderson and Hoke) had had 

48 hours to improve their defenses. The Southerners angled the trench 

lines to form good fields of fire on the ravines that appeared as avenues of 

approach for Union attacks.

The Confederate units deployed near our current location were (from 

north to south) Brigadier General Evander Law’s brigade, Brigadier 

General George T. (“Tige”) Anderson’s brigade, and Gregg’s brigade—all 

from Field’s division (Richard H. Anderson’s corps). Brigadier General 

William T. Wofford’s brigade of Kershaw’s division was in reserve, further to the west of our position.

The specific unit located where you are standing was “Tige” Anderson’s 

Georgia brigade. In fact, Anderson’s men held most of the trench lines 

that are encompassed within the modern Cold Harbor NPS boundary. 

Somewhere to the left (north) of your position (the exact location is not 

sure) was the boundary between Anderson’s brigade and Law’s Alabama 

brigade. All Confederate brigades in this region were well entrenched, and 

Law’s troops were angled slightly (northeast to southwest), giving them 

an excellent ability to rake the flank of Union troops attacking Anderson’s 

position.

Vignettes: None.

Analysis: There are no particular questions for this stand, but stress how 

adept the soldiers had become at fortifying their positions (particularly the 

Confederates). Note the marked improvement in the quality of the earthworks as well as the speed in which they were constructed at Cold Harbor 

as compared to the works in the Wilderness.
303

Stand 8

Cold Harbor III (Union Positions)

(3 June 1864)

P

P

Day 3

Stand 6

New Cold Harbor

633

Cold Harbor Road

Old Cold Harbor

NPS Headquarters

National

Cemetery

Rockhill Road

Bulah Church Road

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 7

Day 3

Stand 8

Day 3

Stand 9

Crown Hill Road

Parrish Place Lane

Boatswain Lane

Via Pann Dr

(private)

Cold Harbor Road

156

156

156

156

632

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 10

Day 3 Stand 8

N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 57.

Directions: Continue down the one-way NPS road. During this ride, the 

road will curve to the right in a big loop. Go for 0.4 mile and you will come 

to another parking area on the right with a plaque. Park in this area and 

conduct the stand on the edge of the lot.

Orientation: You have just moved from the Confederate position to the 

Union position after the failed 3 June Cold Harbor attack. This location 

was probably where Brigadier General Thomas H. Neill’s division (VI 

Corps) entrenched after attacking the Confederate lines. Also nearby, 

probably just to the right (north) of this position, was Brigadier General 

William T.H. Brooks’ division of the XVIII Corps. The exact positions and 

paths of the attacking units are difficult to determine because many units 

overlapped in the attack.

The Union breastworks, which are located at this stand, mark the 

farthest advance of the attackers, but not the starting point of the Union 
304

attack. The Federals began from positions behind (east of) this location in 

a woods. When they reached this point, they could not advance any further 

so the troops dug in.

The Union plan for attack was shaped by Grant’s intent, but Meade 

had tactical control. The main effort was to be made by the three corps on 

the southern part of the line: from north to south, Smith’s XVIII Corps, 

Wright’s VI Corps, and Hancock’s II Corps. The V and IX Corps were also 

to attack, but only in a supporting role.

There was no reserve for exploitation—the Union plan was simply an 

attack on all lines. Corps commanders were left to choose their own main 

attack point, their formations, their dispositions, and their tactics. The start 

time for the advance was 0430.

(At this stand, only discuss the attacks of the II, VI, and XVIII Corps. 

The V and IX Corps attacks were not vigorous and were easily repulsed.)

Description: Meade did little to coordinate his corps commanders’ efforts, 

and neither he nor Grant examined the ground. Smith made an offer to 

coordinate his efforts with Wright, but the VI Corps commander gave a 

vague reply that did little to help coordination. Hancock and Wright did 

not exchange any information.

From north to south in the region of the main attacks, the Federals 

deployed Smith’s XVIII Corps, Wright’s VI Corps, and Hancock’s II 

Corps.

Hancock’s troops attacking in the south had the only, limited success 

of the day. Hancock formed his corps with Gibbon’s division on the right 

(north) and Barlow’s division on the left (south). Birney’s division was in 

reserve. (See vignettes for the story of the II Corps’ soldiers pinning tags 

on their uniforms before the attack.)

Both Barlow and Gibbon arranged their four brigades in dense formations with two brigades leading and two following. The division commanders instructed the men of the lead units not to stop and exchange fire 

with the Confederates. Perhaps they were trying to repeat the success of 

Mule Shoe.

Gibbon advanced in a heavy fog along a ravine. He made a limited 

penetration, but was forced to pull back.

Barlow had the best Union success of the day. Colonel George S. 

Patton’s Confederate brigade (Breckinridge’s division) was located across 

from Barlow’s division. Patton’s men had pulled back several hundred 

yards during the night because of heavy rains that flooded the trenches. 

There were still Confederate pickets in the trenches, but Barlow’s force 

overwhelmed them before the main Southern forces could re-occupy the 

fortifications, and Barlow took most of the first line. Hancock sent up 
305

some reinforcements from Birney, but Brigadier General Joseph Finegan’s 

Confederate brigade counterattacked and forced Barlow to pull back.

Wright’s VI Corps was next in line to the II Corps. The VI Corps 

troops had performed relatively well since the beginning of the Overland 

Campaign, fighting particularly ferociously at the bloody angle. However, 

it performed poorly in the 3 June attack, and failed to make a serious effort. 

Some historians have conjectured that the VI Corps may have lost its 

appetite for assaulting breastworks at Spotsylvania. In addition, Wright’s 

troops had seen the Confederates to their front improving their entrenchments since 1 June.

The VI Corps’ divisions were arranged with Russell in the south, 

Ricketts in the center, and Neill in the north. Due to the lack of coordination with the II Corps, Wright’s men started their advance later than 

Hancock’s attack.

Russell put the troops in his division on line. The men had observed 

the heavy casualties taken by Gibbon’s troops on their left, and this also 

helped to discourage them from pressing the attack. Even Upton had to 

admit: “an assault was ordered, but being deemed impracticable along our 

front, was not made” (OR, series I, volume XXXVI, part 1, 671).

Ricketts’ division had only two brigades. They were deployed side by 

side, but with fronts only two regiments wide. The deeper formation did 

little to help, and Ricketts’ attack was easily repulsed.

Neill put his brigades in the narrowest formation of the VI Corps. His 

division was in a column, four brigades each one behind the other. The 

ground on which you are standing marks the farthest advance of Neill’s 

division (Wheaton’s brigade). The VI Corps made no penetrations and did 

little to support the II and XVIII Corps’ attacks on the flanks.

Smith’s XVIII Corps attacked to the north of Wright’s VI Corps. Part 

of their attack was in this region (Brook’s division adjoined Neill’s VI 

Corps division just north of here). The XVIII Corps was the freshest and 

least attrited of the Union corps at Cold Harbor—they have been “sitting” 

at Bermuda Hundred (in fact, they had been campaigning—but they had 

not gone through the same brutal fighting as the II and VI Corps at the 

Wilderness and Spotsylvania). The Army of the Potomac soldiers considered the XVIII Corps to be “soft.” Smith’s troops were anxious to prove 

the Army of the Potomac troops wrong. The XVIII Corps pressed their 

attacks, no matter how fruitless, with considerable enthusiasm.

The XVIII Corps deployed with Devens’ division in the north, 

Martindale’s division in the center, and Brooks division in the south. 

Devens was spread out as a flank guard and did not really join in the 

attack. Martindale attacked with two brigades side by side. Brooks placed 
306

his brigades in a column. He hoped to take advantage of a ravine to cover 

his approach to the Confederate trenches. Within each brigade, the regiments were deployed one behind the other, thus making for a dense attack 

formation.

Smith’s attack hit G.T. Anderson’s, Law’s, and Humphreys’ Confederate brigades. Their position was particularly strong because Evander 

Law had conducted a recon and repositioned the line with excellent fields 

of fire.

The XVIII Corps’ attack began (as had the other corps’ attacks) with 

a signal gun. Martindale’s division was immediately raked by rifle and 

canister fire. Both brigades tried to find some covered path in which to 

advance, but they were stopped with heavy casualties. Brooks’ units 

advanced further because of a ravine that gave the lead brigade (Brigadier 

General Gilman Marston) some cover. However, as soon as Marston’s brigade emerged into the open, it was raked with rifle fire, especially on its 

left. The brigade veered to its right to avoid the fire and then was pinned 

down in front of the Confederate works.

Brooks’ second brigade in the column (under Colonel Guy V. Henry) 

emerged from the ravine, but was stopped dead in it tracks by Confederate 

fire that had zeroed in on the location. So many troops were cut down so 

fast that the troops in the brigade behind Henry dove to the ground thinking that an order was given to lie down. The attack was a failure with 

heavy casualties. The Union troops, rather than retreat, began to dig in at 

their advanced locations under Confederate fire.

All attacks along the line had failed by 0630. The only report of success to Meade’s headquarters was a brief note from Hancock when Barlow 

made some penetration, but Hancock soon sent word that the attacks were 

all stalled. Smith’s messages were the most pessimistic—he clearly stated 

that any more attacks would be a waste of life. At about 0700, Grant sent 

a message to Meade that the attacks could be called off if there was no 

chance of success.

Meade was nearly at the peak of his frustration over the command situation and the slowness of his corps commanders in recent operations. His 

temper was even worse than usual. He bullishly sent orders for more attacks. 

Most of the orders were ignored (the soldiers and their officers knew better 

than to renew the attacks), but there were some additional losses.

There are claims that the Union lost 7,000 killed and wounded in 15 

minutes on 3 June. This number is probably unrealistic, but it is not unreasonable that there were 7,000 Union casualties in the attacks for the entire 

morning (roughly two hours). The breakdown of Union casualties for the 

three main days of fighting (1 to 3 June) was:
307

II Corps 3,510

V Corps 1,340

VI Corps 2,715

XVIII Corps 3,019

IX Corps 1,701

Total 12,285

Confederate casualties totaled 1,200 to 1,500.

(Note that casualties for the entire time of the Cold Harbor battle, 30 

May to 12 June, were 12,738 Union and about 3,400 Confederates.)

Grant later wrote in his memoirs that he regretted only two assaults that 

he had ordered in his career. One was the second attack on the Confederate 

siege lines at Vicksburg on 22 May 1863 and the other was the 3 June 

attack at Cold Harbor. Of the two, Grant admitted that the Cold Harbor 

attack was the most useless (Ulysses Simpson Grant, Personal Memoirs of 

U.S. Grant, New York, NY: De Capo Press, 1952, 444-445).

Vignettes:

1. In a famous incident, Horace Porter, of Grant’s staff, observed soldiers 

of the II Corps doing some unusual sewing on their uniforms prior to the 

3 June assault. “As I came near one of the regiments that was making 

preparations for the next morning’s assault, I noticed that many of the 

soldiers had taken off their coats, and seemed to be engaged in sewing up 

rents in them. This exhibition of tailoring seemed rather peculiar at such 

a moment, but upon closer examination it was found that the men were 

calmly writing their names and addresses on slips of paper, and pinning 

them on the backs of their coats, so that their dead bodies might be recognized on the field, and their fate made known to their families at home.” 

(Porter, Campaigning with Grant, 174-175.)

2. Another account by Porter tells of Grant’s regrets over the attack, 

reflecting in part Grant’s own words from his memoirs. According to 

Porter, Grant spoke with his staff on the evening of 3 June and stated: “I 

regret this assault more than any one I have ever ordered. I regarded it as a 

stern necessity, and believed that it would bring compensating results; but, 

as it has proved, no advantages have been gained sufficient to justify the 

heavy losses suffered.” (Porter, 179.)

Analysis:

1. Was Grant a butcher? What was his original intent for this attack? 

Was it reasonable for him to expect success on 2 June or by 3 June? Was 

Grant really a believer in frontal assaults, or did he more commonly try to 

maneuver?
308

2. Discuss the declining quality of the troops and fatigue on both sides 

(look at the VI Corps’ effort in particular). How should this factor affect 

the operational planner? What were alternatives to the 3 June assault (other 

than simply not attacking)? 
309

Stand 9

Cold Harbor IV (Next 10 Days)

(3–12 June 1864)

P

P

Day 3

Stand 6

New Cold Harbor

633

Cold Harbor Road

Old Cold Harbor

NPS Headquarters

National

Cemetery

Rockhill Road

Bulah Church Road

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 7

Day 3

Stand 8

Day 3

Stand 9

Crown Hill Road

Parrish Place Lane

Boatswain Lane

Via Pann Dr

(private)

Cold Harbor Road

156

156

156

156

632

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 10

Day 3 Stand 9

N

250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 58.

Directions: Continue on the NPS road. It will complete the loop and come 

back past the NPS Headquarters and back to Cold Harbor Road after 

0.4 mile. Turn left on Cold Harbor Road. After 0.3 mile, you will see an 

entrance on the right for a Hanover County Park that contains another portion of the Cold Harbor battlefield. Turn right into the County Park area 

and park the vehicles in the gravel parking area near the entrance. Off to 

one side of the gravel lot, you will see a walking path into the woods (it is 

marked with a sign). Take the walking path into the woods and conduct the 

stand about 100 to 150 yards into the wood line. There is a small plaque 

with a sketch map of the battle lines (originally done by a soldier to show 

a friend’s family where his friend had been buried), which is a good place 

to do the stand.

Orientation: You are currently located in what was the fifth trench line 

of the Union VI Corps in June 1864. After the failed attacks of 3 June, 
310

Union and Confederate soldiers continued to improve their works and 

build trench lines to add depth to their defense.

The last stand (stand 8) marked the first line of the VI Corps. You 

can see on the county park’s plaque, with its sketch map, the depth of the 

trenches.

This area had no trees at the time; as the trench lines grew in depth, 

the terrain began to look like a World War I moonscape. George Stevens, 

a surgeon in the VI Corps, described this area: “The whole plain occupied 

by our Army was dug over. One is reminded, in riding over the plains, of 

the colonies of prairie dogs with their burrows and mounds.” (George T 

Stevens, Three Years in the Sixth Corps, Albany, NY: S.R. Gray, 1866, 

354.)

For the next 10 days at Cold Harbor, the two armies were locked 

together in miserable conditions. Sharpshooters were active on both sides. 

Although the troops tried to dig deeper, death still awaited many soldiers 

who simply raised their heads. The weather was hot during this period, 

baking the soldiers, most of whom could not even get a chance to bathe in 

the stinking trenches.

At this stand, you will cover the events at Cold Harbor from the end 

of the attack of 3 June to the departure of the Federal forces on 12 June. 

There are no major battles during this time, thus the description portion 

of this stand will cover other key events during the siege-like warfare at 

Cold Harbor with a focus on Grant’s formulation of a new plan to cross 

the James River.

Description: Starting on the night of 3 June and continuing through the 

next day, the Confederates made some adjustments in their lines. Early 

pulled his left flank back from Bethesda Church, thus refusing the flank 

for a better defensive position. Lee transferred Heth (who had been 

attached to Early on the northern flank) back to Hill and moved him to the 

Confederate southern flank. The Confederates put pontoon bridges on the 

Chickahominy River in case Grant decided to try another move around the 

Confederate southern flank.

The Federals also made some small adjustments in their positions. 

Burnside and Warren moved their corps back about 2 miles and refused 

the Union right flank. The entire Union line was shortened by 1 mile, 

which indicated a purely defensive intent on the Cold Harbor front. The 

Federals brought up a battery of 24-pound Coehorn mortars to bombard 

the Confederate trenches with high angle fire. The Southerners countered 

by super elevating a howitzer.

On 4 June (and continuing for several days afterward), there was some 

grumbling in the Union ranks and among the officers over the Federal 
311

leadership (see vignettes). Both sides began expanding their trench 

systems.

On 5 June, Grant formulated the outline of a new plan for the campaign. He explained the concept in a telegram to Halleck. Grant stated that 

at the outset of the campaign, he had hoped to defeat Lee’s army north of 

Richmond before transferring the Union forces south of the James. He 

admitted that he was not able to accomplish the goal of defeating Lee’s 

forces (Grant blamed this on the Confederate’s unwillingness to come out 

of their entrenchments). He rejected the concept of maneuvering back to 

the north of Richmond, in part because it would extend his supply lines too 

far away from their seaborne sources.

Thus, Grant decided to shift the Federal forces to the south of the 

James and sever Lee’s army and Richmond from its supply sources in the 

south. The Federal commander would preface his move with a cavalry 

raid to the northwest to deceive Lee. Then the Union forces would cross 

the James, shifting its base to City Point, and take Petersburg. Grant asked 

Halleck to start sending several ferryboats down to the James in preparation for the move.

Also on 5 June, Grant and Lee began exchanging a series of messages 

that ultimately established a truce on 7 June for the recovery of dead and 

wounded between the lines. Below is a brief summary of the events of the 

truce (the texts of the messages are in the OR, series I, volume XXXVI, 

part 3, 599-600, 603-604, 638-639, and 666-667).

Under the accepted rules of warfare of the 19th century, the losing side 

in a battle was supposed to send a flag of truce to the victor to ask for a 

cease-fire that would allow both sides to recover their dead and wounded. 

Grant waited two days after the 3 June assaults before making initial inquiries about a truce. It took a message from Hancock (through Meade) to 

prompt Grant into sending a note to Lee.

It is difficult to know exactly why Grant waited, but several historians 

have argued that he did not want to admit that the 3 June attack had been 

a failure. Grant’s first message asked for local parties, under white flags, 

to collect the dead and wounded; thus, he was not requesting a general 

truce.

Lee replied that Grant needed to follow the accepted rules of warfare 

and request a truce. Grant, either misunderstanding Lee or still unwilling 

to recognize the defeat of 3 June, sent a message to Lee implying that Lee 

had accepted the original proposal. Lee responded by insisting that Grant 

make the formal request for a truce.

On 6 June, Grant relented and asked for a truce. Unfortunately, there 

were delays in getting messages across the line, and the Federal units were 
312

not ready for the initial cease-fire time (the evening of 6 June). Union pickets mistakenly captured a Confederate burial party; Grant later had them 

returned. Finally, on 7 June, both sides recovered their wounded and dead. 

Sadly, very few wounded had survived, and they had suffered for days in 

the hot sun.

Grant certainly bears a large responsibility for this sad episode, 

although a few historians are probably too harsh in assigning evil motives 

to Grant. In any case, some of the officers and soldiers in the Union army 

blamed Grant for not taking care of his wounded and dead soldiers who 

had fought so heroically on 3 June.

As the events of the truce were unfolding, Lee received word on 6 

June that Union troops under Hunter had forced Confederate forces in the 

Shenandoah Valley to retreat. He decided to send Breckinridge and his 

division back to the Valley to stop Hunter. It would take several days to 

rearrange Lee’s lines before Breckinridge’s men could begin their move.

On the same day, Early discovered the shift of Union forces on his 

front and received Lee’s permission to try to turn the Union right flank. 

Early advanced toward the new Union lines of the IX Corps; however, 

his attack was bogged down in the swampy ground around Matadequin 

Creek. After pushing back some Federal pickets, Early decided to have his 

troops return to their own lines.

For the Federals, 6 June was also a busy day. Grant ordered Smith’s 

corps to move out of the Cold Harbor lines to Cole’s Landing on the 

Chickahominy River. This was in preparation for embarking on ships and 

moving to Bermuda Hundred.

In addition, Grant sent Porter and Comstock on a three-part mission. First, they were to inform Butler of Smith’s move back to Bermuda 

Hundred. Then they were to warn Butler to stay alert in case Lee tried to 

attack the Army of the Potomac while it was moving to the James River. 

Most importantly, Grant’s two staff officers had to find a suitable crossing 

site on the James.

Later that day, Warren’s V Corps moved into a reserve position behind 

the main Union lines. The corps reorganized as the Pennsylvania Reserves 

mustered out of the army.

On 7 June, Sheridan began the cavalry raid designed to deceive Lee 

from the Army of the Potomac’s main move to the James. The Federal cavalry commander took two divisions with him: Torbert and Gregg. Wilson’s 

division remained behind with the Army of the Potomac. In addition to 

distracting Lee’s attention, Sheridan was to tear up as much track of the 

Virginia Central Railroad as possible.

Also on 7 June, Meade banished a reporter, Edward Cropsey, from the 
313

Union camps (see vignettes). This was one of the lowest points in Meade’s 

relationship with the press.

On the Confederate side, Early tried another probe of the Union right 

flank. Once again, Anderson did not support the effort. Ramseur’s division 

reached the Union picket lines, and after some light skirmishing, it withdrew. After this probe, Early’s II Corps went into a reserve position behind 

the main Confederate lines. Anderson extended his front to the north and 

became the left flank of the army. Breckinridge’s division departed for 

the Valley under the temporary command of Brigadier General Gabriel C. 

Wharton.

The next day, Ewell made one last appeal to Lee to resume command 

of the Confederates’ II Corps. Lee turned him down. Later, Lee received 

word from Hampton that Sheridan had crossed the Pamunkey River. He 

ordered Hampton to pursue Sheridan. Hampton, with Lee’s permission, 

took almost all of the Confederate cavalry. Thus, in a reversal of the Yellow 

Tavern raid, Lee had lost his “eyes” for the next several days, while Grant 

and Meade had retained significant Union cavalry for reconnaissance and 

screening. Finally, Lee alerted Anderson to be prepared to attack the Union 

right flank on 9 June, if the Federals were withdrawing. Pickett’s division 

was to spearhead this attack.

Early in the morning of 9 June, Anderson probed the Union front. He 

immediately realized that the Federals had not withdrawn and canceled 

Pickett’s attack.

On the Federal side, Grant told Halleck that all future reinforcements 

for the Union forces were to go to City Point or Bermuda Hundred. Meade 

ordered the Army of the Potomac’s acting chief engineer, Major Nathaniel 

Michler, to survey a new defensive line in the rear of the Cold Harbor 

lines. The line was to be shorter than the current lines, but very strong, so 

that a single corps could hold it safely. Its purpose was to act as a screen 

for the army once it begins its move to the James.

On 10 June, Meade issued orders for the troops to draw four days 

worth of rations—a sure sign of impending movement. Additionally, 

Meade ordered Warren to move two of his divisions out of their lines on 11 

June in preparation for a movement across the Chickahominy on 12 June. 

Hancock was ordered to pull Gibbon’s division out of the line in preparation for the II Corps’ move to the James. Wright extended his VI Corps to 

occupy the lines of the II Corps as it moved.

The next day, Grant sent a warning order to Butler, outlining his plan 

for the movement to the south side of the James. For his part, Lee shifted 

Early to his right flank in case Grant decided to cross the Chickahominy. 

However, Lee, Davis, and Bragg learned of Hunter’s continued devastation 
314

in the Shenandoah Valley (despite the sending of Breckinridge’s division 

earlier as reinforcements). The next day, the Confederate leaders determined that Early’s corps would have to be sent to the Valley.

On 12 June, although he had not received word on a crossing site on 

the James from Comstock and Porter, Grant made the decision to begin 

the movement. Later that afternoon, word came from Comstock and Porter 

that they had found a site for the crossing, thus reassuring the Union general in chief.

Vignettes:

1. In a letter to his sister written while in the Cold Harbor trenches, 

Emory Upton poured out his discontent over his superiors’ leadership: 

“I am disgusted with the generalship displayed. Our men have, in many 

instances, been foolishly and wantonly sacrificed. Assault after assault has 

been ordered upon the enemy’s entrenchments, when they knew nothing 

about the position or strength of the enemy. Thousands of lives might have 

been spared by the exercise of a little skill; but, as it is, the courage of the 

poor men is expected to obviate all difficulties.”

A day later he wrote again: “. . . some of our corps commanders are not 

fit to be corporals. Lazy and indolent, they will not even ride along their 

lines; yet, without hesitancy, they will order us to attack the enemy, no 

matter what their position or numbers.” (Peter S. Michie, ed., The Life and 

Letters of Emory Upton, New York, NY: D. Appleton, 1885, 108-109.)

2. Marsena Patrick, Meade’s Provost Marshal, echoed Upton’s frustrations: “There is much feeling in regard to this murderous & foolish system 

of assaulting, without supports, reserves, or any adequate force to hold 

the works that may be carried.” (David S. Sparks, ed., Inside Lincoln’s 

Army. The Diary of General Marsena Rudolph Patrick, Provost Marshal 

General, Army of the Potomac, 380.)

3. While his division was shifting position, one of Sheridan’s cavalry 

commanders, Brigadier General James H. Wilson, visited Grant’s and 

Meade’s headquarters and spoke with members of their staffs. Wilson 

recounted that Grant was frustrated by his subordinates’ inability to translate his general orders into effective, detailed plans.

Grant asked Wilson, “What is the matter with this army?”

Wilson replied, “It will take too long to explain, but I can tell you how 

to cure it. Give Parker a tomahawk, a supply of commissary whiskey and 

a scalping knife and send him out with orders to bring in the scalps of general officers.” (James Harrison Wilson, The Life and Services of General 

Smith, Wilmington, DE: John M. Rogers, 1904, 98.) Captain Ely S. Parker, 

Grant’s adjutant, was a Seneca Indian.
315

4. Meade, often irritable, was particularly frustrated at Cold Harbor. 

Although Meade did not publicly voice his disappointment in the fighting, 

he poured out his views in letters to his wife.

In every instance that we have attacked the enemy in 

an entrenched position we have failed, except in the case 

of Hancock’s attack at Spottsylvania [sic], which was a 

surprise discreditable to the enemy. So, likewise, whenever the enemy has attacked us in position, he has been 

repulsed.

I think Grant has had his eyes opened, and is willing to 

admit now that Virginia and Lee’s army is not Tennessee 

and Bragg’s army. Whether the people will ever realize 

this fact remains to be seen. (George Meade, ed., The Life 

and Letters of George Gordon Meade, volume 2, New 

York, NY: Scribner’s, 1913, 201.)

5. On 7 June, Meade banished a reporter, Edward Cropsey, from the 

Union camps. Cropsey wrote for the Philadelphia Inquirer, the “hometown” newspaper for Pennsylvanian George Meade. In the 2 June issue 

of the Inquirer, Cropsey wrote an article that was often complimentary to 

Meade, but it also claimed that Meade had counseled Grant to withdraw 

after the Battle of the Wilderness.

When the paper arrived in camp a few days later, Meade read the article 

and was enraged. He ordered the arrest of Cropsey (who had just returned 

to the Army from Washington). He asked Cropsey where he had heard the 

false story of Meade’s advising a retreat in the Wilderness. Cropsey told 

him: “It was the talk of the camp.” Meade declared, “It was a base and 

wicked lie,” and he said that he would make an example of Cropsey.

Meade met with his provost marshal, Marsena Patrick, and the two 

decided on Cropsey’s punishment: the reporter was to be paraded through 

the Union camps seated backwards on a mule and then banished from the 

army. As the order for punishment was being written, Grant walked into 

the tent and approved the decision. The order was published on 7 June. 

Throughout the document, Cropsey’s name was repeatedly misspelled 

as “Crapsey.” The order declared that “Crapsey” had published “libelous 

statement on the commanding general of this army calculated to impair the 

confidence of the army in their commanding officer, and which statement 

the said Crapsey has acknowledged to be false, and to have been based on 

some idle camp rumor. . . .”

The punishment was carried out on 8 June. Cropsey rode on a particularly homely mule with a placard hung over his body that said “Libeler 

of the Press.” As he rode, a bugler and drummers accompanied him and 
316

played the “Rogue’s March.” The troops laughed and jeered Cropsey, and 

one soldier wrote “He was howled at, and the wish to tear him limb from 

limb and strew him over the ground was fiercely expressed.”

In the end, Meade’s actions only served to exacerbate his already 

difficult relations with the press. After the incident, Cropsey and his fellow 

journalists made an informal agreement not to mention Meade in their 

articles, unless in connection with a negative event. For about the next six 

months, almost all of the Northern newspapers referred to the Army of 

the Potomac as “Grant’s Army,” furthering Meade’s frustration. (Ernest 

B. Furgurson, Not War But Murder, Cold Harbor 1864, New York, NY: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, 220-222.)

Analysis:

1. Do the problems of the truce negotiation at Cold Harbor exist today? 

Do the current rules of warfare allow for truces to help the wounded? Do 

such rules apply when fighting terrorists?

2. Was Grant correct to choose a crossing of the James for his next 

move? Do you agree with his reasons for rejecting a move to his right 

(northwest)?

3. Why did the lines and tactics at Cold Harbor begin to resemble World 

War I trench warfare? Both sides were already becoming accomplished 

at building entrenchments, but were there particular conditions at Cold 

Harbor that lent to an expansion of trench works?

4. What does the Meade–Cropsey incident show us about military–press 

relations? What is similar and what is different between the military–press 

relationships in 1864 and the military–press relationships of today?
317

Stand 10

Cold Harbor to the James River

(12–13 June 1864)

P

P

Day 3

Stand 6

New Cold Harbor

633

Cold Harbor Road

Old Cold Harbor

NPS Headquarters

National

Cemetery

Rockhill Road

Bulah Church Road

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 7

Day 3

Stand 8

Day 3

Stand 9

Crown Hill Road

Parrish Place Lane

Boatswain Lane

Via Pann Dr

(private)

Cold Harbor Road

156

156

156

156

632

Anderson-Wright Dr

Day 3

Stand 10

Day 3 Stand 10

N 250 Yards 500 Yards

Map 59.

Directions: Return down the walking path to the gravel parking lot. 

Conduct the next stand in the lot.

Orientation: Using a map, identify the routes from Cold Harbor to the 

James River. The purpose of this stand is to discuss the Union plan for 

leaving Cold Harbor and moving to the James, and to trace the initial 

moves.

Description: To reiterate, Grant and Meade had taken some preliminary 

actions for the movement to the James. Sheridan was raiding the Virginia 

Central Railroad to the north of Richmond and had drawn almost all of 

the Confederate cavalry in pursuit. Meade had directed the digging of a 

reserve line behind the Cold Harbor positions to help screen the Union 

move, and he had issued marching rations to the troops. Comstock and 
318

Porter were examining potential crossing sites. The Federals were gathering ferryboats, barges, and bridging material at Fort Monroe. The supply base, as well as Smith’s corps, was being shifted from White House 

Landing to City Point. Finally, warning orders for the move had gone to all 

the corps commanders and to Butler.

Comstock and Porter selected a site for constructing the bridge across 

the James River. The location was near Fort Powhatan, where a bend in the 

James provided a narrower crossing between Weyanoke Neck on the north 

bank and Windmill Point on the south. Wilcox’s Landing (sometimes called 

Wilcox’s Wharf) was nearby, and could be used to ferry troops across the 

river. The bridging site was 12 miles downriver from City Point, and the 

river was 2,100 feet wide and 20 feet deep at this location.

The entire operation for the move across the James was extremely 

complex. The site was 22 miles from Cold Harbor in a direct line, but 

some of the Federals had to march 50 miles over the winding roads to 

make the crossing. In addition, the Union troops had to cross two rivers (the Chickahominy and the James). If Lee discovered the move, he 

could attack the Federals and defeat their separated corps, or he could take 

advantage of the rail net between Richmond and Petersburg to transfer 

forces below the James and block Grant’s move. Timing and deception 

were critical if the Federals were to succeed.

After Grant issued his movement orders on 12 June, he broke camp 

and moved his headquarters to Summit Station.

The troop movement began after dark on 12 June. The II and VI 

Corps fell back and occupied the new defensive line in the rear of the 

Cold Harbor positions to cover the move. Part of Wilson’s cavalry division secured Long Bridge over the Chickahominy and then probed west to 

clear room for Warren’s move.

At 1800, Warren’s V Corps left the Cold Harbor lines. They crossed 

the Chickahominy River at Long Bridge and followed Wilson’s cavalry 

toward Riddell’s Shop. Their mission was to set up a blocking position at 

the crossroads at Riddell’s Shop that would screen the move of the rest of 

the army. The XVIII Corps arrived at White House Landing in preparation 

for the seaborne move to Bermuda Hundred. Burnside’s IX Corps initially 

followed Smith’s corps and then turned south toward the crossing on the 

Chickahominy at Jones Bridge (east of Long Bridge and protected by the 

V Corps).

On 13 June, the V Corps held its position at Riddell’s Shop for 

much of the day with some skirmishing from the Confederates. At 2000, 

Warren’s troops pulled out of Riddell’s Shop and moved toward Charles 

City Courthouse. Smith’s XVIII Corps embarked at White House Landing 
319

and sailed downriver. The IX Corps was delayed for much of the day, 

but they finally crossed Jones Bridge in the evening. The II and VI Corps 

pulled out of the second line and moved south.

Later that day, the VI Corps, having crossed the Chickahominy at Jones 

Bridge (ahead of the IX Corps), moved toward Charles City Courthouse. 

The II Corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and its lead 

units reached Wilcox’s Landing at 1730. The lead unit of the Army of the 

Potomac had reached the James.

Vignettes: None.

Analysis:

1. Critique the Union plan for departing Cold Harbor and reaching the 

James River. What were its strengths? What were its weaknesses?

2. Many historians contend that the Union plan and staff work was much 

better in the move to the James than in most of the previous movements 

of the Overland Campaign. Do you agree? If so, what factors may have 

contributed to the improvement?
320

Stand 11

Riddell’s Shop

(13 June 1864)

295

630

295

64

Grapevine Road

Meadow Road

Old Cold Harbor New Cold

Harbor

633 632

619

613

156

156

156

156

156

628

628

Cold Harbor Road

Rockhill Road

Cold Harbor Road

Old Hanover

Road

613

Chickahominy River

Day 3 Stand 11

(1 of 2)

N 1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 60.
321

295

Charles City Road

30

Chickahominy River

64

295

64

Elko Road

Meadow

Road

156

156

156

156

Day 3

Stand 11

60

60

60

30 30

Technology Blvd

Memorial

Drive

Poplar Spring

Road

White Oak Road

Charles City Road

Hines Road

Darbytown Road

600

156

156

Portugee Road

Elko Road

Day 3 Stand 11

(2 of 2) N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 61.

Directions: Exit the parking lot by making a right on Cold Harbor Road 

(Route 156). After traveling 4.1 miles on Cold Harbor Road, turn left on 

Old Hanover Road. Go for 0.2 mile on Old Hanover Road and then turn 

left on Grapevine Road. After 1.4 miles, turn left on Meadow Road. After 

2.6 miles on Meadow Road, you will come to an intersection with US 

Highway 60. (The intersection of Meadow Road and US Highway 60 is 

a good place to stop for lunch, because fast food and convenience stores 

are nearby.) Continue on Meadow Road for 5.0 miles. Along the way, 

Meadow Road will change its name to Elko Road. After 5 miles, turn 

right on Charles City Road. Travel on Charles City Road for 1.2 miles 

where you will reach a four-way intersection. At this intersection, Charles 

City Road comes from the east and then turns right (north). If you were to 

continue straight, the road becomes Darbytown Road. The road to the left 

(south) is Willis Church Road. The stand is at this intersection. It is best 

to turn right where there is some room on the right side of the road to park 

and exit the vehicles for the stand. (Keep in mind that when the stand is 

complete you will need to get back in the cars and make a U-turn that will 
322

enable you to head back on Charles City Road. In any case, be cautious at 

this intersection—many vehicles pass at high speed.)

Orientation: The route to our current location (Riddell’s Shop) is not on 

the same path taken by Warren’s V Corps (the staff ride takes a more direct 

route to save time). There was no settlement here during the war; the location was named for a blacksmith’s shop nearby. Both sides had fought 

in this area in 1862 in the Seven Day’s Battles. Warren deployed in this 

vicinity to cover the movement of the other Union corps to the James. The 

paths of the Charles City, Darbytown, and Willis Church Roads are the 

same paths as in the Civil War. Controlling this crossroad prevented Lee 

from probing east and discovering the Union move.

Description: Warren’s V Corps spent almost all of 13 June deployed at 

this location. One cavalry brigade from Wilson’s division screened to the 

west of the crossroads. Having fulfilled its mission, the V Corps departed 

at 2000 for Charles City Courthouse.

The Federal movements, to include Warren’s deployment here, helped 

to keep Lee in the dark. Unable to take the initiative, Lee waited for signs 

of Union intentions. Lee had his artillery bombard the Union lines at Cold 

Harbor every night at 2100; each time the Federals responded and the 

Confederate leader knew they were still in place. On the night of 12 June, 

the Federal artillery response was noticeably weaker than normal. Even 

so, on 13 June Lee sent Early and the II Corps (8,000 troops) to the Valley. 

As Early was departing, Lee discovered that the Federals had left Cold 

Harbor. Jefferson Davis suggested to Lee that he recall Early, but Lee 

decided to let Early complete the move.

After the discovery that the Union Army was not at Cold Harbor, Lee 

tried to probe for the Federals. He ordered both of his remaining corps 

(Anderson and Hill) across the Chickahominy toward Riddell’s Shop. 

Confederate cavalry ran into the Union cavalry screen and pushed them 

back. The Southerners halted in front of Warren’s infantry at Riddell’s 

Shop at nightfall on 13 June. The Southerners occupied a line from White 

Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill. Lee directed Hill to continue the advance the 

next day.

As Hill advanced early on 14 June, Lee discovered that the Federals 

had left Riddell’s Shop. At 1210, Lee telegraphed Davis, “I think the 

enemy must be preparing to move south of the James River” (as quoted 

by Freeman, R.E. Lee, volume 3, 226-233, from Lee’s Dispatches: 

Unpublished Letters of Robert E. Lee, C.S.A., to Jefferson Davis and the 

War Department of the Confederate States of America, 1862-65, New 

York, NY: 1915, 227). Without his cavalry, Lee could not get a fix on 
323

Grant’s moves, and he could not risk sending Confederate forces across 

the James until he had more hard information on the Federals.

Vignettes: None.

Analysis: There are no specific points for analysis at this stand. You may 

want to point out that Warren’s performance in the Overland Campaign 

was uneven; however, he and the V Corps did an excellent job in screening 

the army’s move at Riddell’s Shop.
324

Stand 12

Wilcox’s Landing

(13–14 June 1864)

Charles City Road

Chickahominy River

Elko Road

156

60

Hines Road

631

602

617

156

156 Warriner Road

Willis Church Road

Haupt’s Lane

Old Union Road

Roxbury Road

Charles City Road

622

603

604

106

600

600 600

609

609

106

106

603

609

106

Portugee Road

Barnett’s Road

Lott Cary Road

Barnett’s Road

Chambers Road

Day 3 Stand 12

(1 of 2) N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 62.
325

602

615

Barnett’s Road

Lott Cary Road

607

618

609

618

618

620

612

155

155

5

609

5

5

Lewis Tyler Road

James River

Adkins Road

Wilcox Wharf

Road

John Tyler Memorial Hwy

Day 3

Stand 12

Church Lane

Courthouse Road

Day 3 Stand 12

(2 of 2)

N 1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 63.

Directions: As mentioned earlier, you need to maneuver carefully at the 

intersection of Charles City Road and Willis Church Road so that you 

are back on Charles City Road heading east (opposite the direction you 

traveled earlier). After 1.2 miles, you will come to an intersection. Keep 

going straight—the road name will remain Charles City Road, but it will 

change numbers from Route 156 to Route 600. After 4.4 miles, turn left on 

Route 106 (Roxbury Road). Continue a short distance (0.2 mile) on Route 

106 and then turn right on Route 609 (Barnett’s Road). After 3.7 miles 

on Route 609, turn left on Route 602 (Lott Cary Road). Travel for 3.0 

miles on Route 602 and then turn right on Route 618 (Adkins Road). After 

4.5 miles you will come to a “T” intersection with Route 5 (John Tyler 

Memorial Highway). Turn left at the “T” and then make an immediate 

right turn (less than 0.1 mile) back on to Route 618 (Wilcox Wharf Road). 

Continue on Route 618 until it ends at the James River where you will find 

a parking lot at the landing. Park the cars in the lot and conduct the stand 

on the riverbank where you can get a good view of the river.
326

Orientation: Using a map, show the students the location of the last stand 

(Riddell’s Shop) and the path you drove to get here. You are currently at 

Wilcox’s Landing. As you face the river, downriver is to the left; upriver 

is to the right. Your current location is the landing where soldiers were ferried across. The site where the Federals built their bridge should be visible 

(in good weather) to the left (east). It is about 3 miles downriver at the 

second bend in the James.

Description: Hancock’s II Corps arrived here (Wilcox’s Landing) at 1730 

on 13 June. The troops began to embark on transports at 0900 the next day. 

The II Corps’ crossing was completed by early morning on 15 June.

At 1600 on 13 June, Union engineers, under Major James C. Duane 

and Brigadier General Henry W. Benham, began construction on the James 

River Bridge. They built the bridge from both ends, Weyanoke Neck on 

the north bank and Windmill Point on the south. The bridge was completed 

at 2300 on 13 June—it had taken only 7 hours to build. The bridge was 

2,100 feet long and consisted of 101 pontoons and 3 schooners. It accommodated a four-foot tidal rise, and there was a swing span in the middle 

that opened up for Federal ships moving to and from City Point.

From 14 to 17 June, a major portion of the Army of the Potomac 

crossed the bridge. The army’s trains, totaling 50 miles in length and 

including 3,500 head of cattle, crossed at various times throughout all four 

days. The IX Corps traversed on the evening of 15 June. Getty’s division 

of the VI Corps crossed on 16 and 17 June. Finally, Wilson’s cavalry division crossed on 17 June. The Federals dismantled the bridge the next day.

The rest of the army crossed the James by various means. The XVIII 

Corps reached Bermuda Hundred by boat on 14 June and marched on 

Petersburg the next day. The II Corps ferried across the river from our 

current location at Wilcox’s Landing on 14 and 15 June and later joined 

Smith’s corps in the advance on Petersburg. The V Corps ferried across the 

James on 16 June. Two divisions of the VI Corps embarked on ships near 

the bridging site on 16 June and sailed to Bermuda Hundred.

All told, by the end of 17 June, 100,000 Federal troops, 5,000 wagons, 

56,000 horses and mules, and 3,500 cattle had crossed the James River 

safely.

In the meantime, Lee remained unaware of the Federal move and had 

not shifted any of his troops south of the James. The gates to Petersburg 

seemed wide open on 15 June as Beauregard with roughly 3,000 men faced 

the advancing XVIII and II Corps, totaling over 30,000 men. It seemed 

that the Confederates would not be able to hold the city, but fate would 

dictate another outcome.
327

Vignette: Horace Porter penned this account of Grant watching the crossing of the James: “As the general-in-chief stood upon the bluff on the 

north bank of the river on the morning of June 15, watching with unusual 

interest the busy scene spread out before him, it presented a sight which 

had never been equaled even in his extended experience in all the varied phases of warfare. His cigar had been thrown aside, his hands were 

clasped behind him, and he seemed lost in the contemplation of the spectacle. The great bridge was the scene of a continuous movement of infantry columns, batteries of artillery, and wagon-trains. The approaches to the 

river on both banks were covered with masses of troops moving briskly to 

their positions or waiting patiently their turn to cross. . . . The bright sun, 

shining through a clear sky upon the scene, cast its sheen upon the water, 

was reflected from the burnished gun-barrels and glittering cannon, and 

brought out with increased brilliancy the gay colors of the waving banners. 

The calmly flowing river reflected the blue of the heavens, and mirrored 

on its surface the beauties of nature that bordered it. The rich grain was 

standing high in the surrounding fields. The harvest was almost ripe, but 

the harvesters had fled. . . . It was a matchless pageant that could not fail 

to inspire all beholders with the grandeur of achievement and the majesty 

of military power. The man whose genius had conceived and whose skill 

had executed this masterly movement stood watching the spectacle in profound silence. Whether his mind was occupied with the contemplation 

of its magnitude and success, or was busied with maturing plans for the 

future, no one can tell. After a time, he woke from his reverie, mounted 

his horse, and gave orders to have headquarters ferried across to the south 

bank of the river.” (Porter, 199-200.)

Analysis: It is often best not to discuss the final stand of the staff ride at 

this time. Save the discussion, and review of the entire staff ride, for the 

integration session.
329

IV. Integration Phase

Introduction

As this handbook has previously emphasized, a staff ride consists of 

three phases. The first phase is the “Preliminary Study Phase.” This phase 

is conducted before the visit to the battlefield and prepares the students 

for the visit. The second phase is the “Field Study Phase.” This phase is 

conducted on the battlefield and enables students to understand historical 

events through analysis of the actual terrain. The final phase of a staff ride 

is the “Integration Phase.” No staff ride is complete without an integration 

phase, because it is critical for the students to understand what happened, 

why it happened, and, most importantly, what can be learned from the 

study of the battle or campaign.

There are several factors that the staff ride leader should consider 

when planning for and conducting the integration phase. First, the leader 

must work with the organization that is participating in the ride and select 

a time and location for the integration session. Occasionally, units may 

have to depart shortly after the last stand of the field phase, and the staff 

ride leader must conduct the integration phase on the battlefield immediately after completing the field study phase. However, when possible, 

students should have some time for personal reflection and thought before 

the integration phase. Thus, the integration phase is best if conducted the 

day after the field study phase ends. Even if you cannot wait an extra day, 

it is best to do the integration session at a location different from the last 

stand, a place comfortable and dry that will encourage open discussion 

from all the participants.

The staff ride leader should organize the integration phase based on 

the unit, time available, and training objectives. The leader can conduct 

the integration phase in a format similar to an after action review (AAR), 

or may simply lead a discussion with participants on what they learned. 

You can have specific students brief particular items, or just have an 

open discussion with minimal structure. It is important to keep in mind 

that the integration phase is not an AAR of the ride itself (i.e., ways to 

improve the ride). While it is useful to seek constructive criticism in order 

to continue to improve the ride, this should be done at another time or 

perhaps with written AAR comments. Instead, the integration phase is 

used for the students of the campaign to integrate their preliminary study 

with the fieldwork to gain insights that are relevant to their current duties 

and enhance their professional development. Whatever method the staff 

ride leader chooses to employ, the most important thing to remember is 

that the participants should do the majority of the talking. 
330

One method that often produces a fruitful integration phase is to conduct the session in three parts based on three broad questions. Sometimes, 

the leader need only present the general question and let others carry the 

conversation, or the leader may have to ask more follow-up questions to 

prod the discussion. Each of the three questions is discussed below.

What aspects of the campaign had you developed in the preliminary 

study phase that changed or were strongly reinforced because of your 

study of the ground? 

This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is central to a staff 

ride, otherwise the campaign could simply be studied in the classroom. 

Of course, students may develop a wide range of answers based on 

personal study and observations in the field. Some of the more popular 

aspects of the discussion of terrain for the Overland Campaign include 

the vast distances of the operational maneuver, the wooded nature of 

the Wilderness, Upton’s use of cover and concealment in his attack, the 

limited space of the Bloody Angle (so many men tragically died in such 

a confined area), the effectiveness of Lee’s inverted “V” position on the 

North Anna, the depth of the defenses at Cold Harbor, and the width of 

the James River that needed to be bridged. The staff ride leader can ask 

a related question, which may also generate good discussion: Did seeing 

the terrain alter your opinion of any of the leaders? A common response 

to this question is that Grant may not deserve the label of “butcher” given 

the weapons systems of the day and the defensive advantages of the terrain 

and field fortifications.

What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects have remained 

the same since the Overland Campaign? 

The answers to the “changed” aspects will probably seem more 

obvious to the modern military professional and often will be related to 

technology. This may include changes in weapons, transportation systems, 

communications, and numerous other pieces of equipment. The aspects 

that have “remained the same” may not seem as numerous at first, but 

the students will often build on some initial answers and find many good 

items. The role of personalities; command relationships; the importance of 

logistics; the need for strong, positive leadership and an ability to motivate 

soldiers; the importance of operational maneuver; determination; courage; 

and fear are just some of the items of warfare that seem to have changed 

little since 1864. Depending on the group, you may want to ask a few 

more focused questions. For example, if you have a quartermaster unit, 

you can ask the following: What aspects of logistics have changed and 

what aspects have remained the same?
331

What insights can the modern military professional gain from the 

Overland Campaign that are relevant today? 

Clearly, the participants can take this discussion into a vast number 

of arenas. Once again, the type of unit participating in the staff ride might 

help to guide the discussion. For example, a military intelligence unit 

might focus the commander’s situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and the importance of reconnaissance. Keeping in mind that the Overland Campaign is as much an operational level staff ride as it is tactical, it 

might be useful to prompt discussion by using the elements of operational 

design as a framework for relevant lessons. These elements are:

	End state/military conditions.

	Center of gravity.

	Decisive points and objectives.

	Lines of operations.

	Culmination point.

	Operational reach/approach/pause.

	Simultaneous and sequential operations.

	Tempo.

These terms are provided as a tool; the staff ride leader may use some 

of them, use another framework, or simply let the students take the discussion in whatever direction they want.

The three suggested integration phase questions are to aid in sparking 

discussion, not to provide hard and fast “rules” of warfare. Note that the 

handbook provides examples of possible answers to the questions, but it 

does not attempt to provide a list of “right” answers. The staff ride leader 

should take time before the session to write down his or her own answers 

to these questions to have some potential ideas to generate student discussion. At the same time, the staff ride leader should strive for the participants to develop their own answers, and thus be prepared to let the discussion roam many different paths.

333

V. Support

1.	 Information and assistance.

	 a.	 The Staff Ride Team, Combat StudiesInstitute, Fort Leavenworth,

Kansas, has conducted numerous Overland Campaign Staff Rides and can

provide advice and assistance on every aspect of the staff ride. The Staff

Ride Team can also provide facilitators to lead an Overland Campaign

Staff Ride. Visit the Combat Studies Institute website for information on

obtaining staff ride assistance and/or leadership. Staff Ride Team support

includes background information, detailed knowledge of the battle and

battlefield, and familiarity with the Overland Campaign area.

Address:	 Combat Studies Institute

ATTN: ATZL-CSH

201 Sedwick Avenue, Building 315

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

	 Telephone:	 DSN: 552-2078

	 Commercial: 	(913) 684-2078

	 Website: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/staff_ride/index.asp

b.	 Large parts of the Overland Campaign Staff Ride take place on

National Park Service (NPS) Battlefield Parks. It is important to contact 

the staff of the NPS and let them know you are conducting a staff ride.

Members of the United States military can enter NPS Battlefield Parks free 

if conducting a staff ride, and the park staff at all locations are extremely

helpful.

The battlefields of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania belong to the 

Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park. The park’s

headquarters is Fredericksburg, and it has visitor centers at Fredericksburg

and Chancellorsville. The Wilderness and Spotsylvania battlefields do not 

have visitor centers.

	 Address:	 120 Chatham Lane

Fredericksburg, VA 22405-2508

Telephone: Superintendent’s Office

(540) 373-4510

Fredericksburg Visitor Center

(540) 373-6122

Chancellorsville Visitor Center

	 	 (540) 786-2880

	 Website: http://www.nps.gov/frsp/
334

The Cold Harbor battlefield is a part of the Richmond National 

Battlefield system of parks. Cold Harbor has its own visitor center. Send 

mail to the Richmond office:

Address: Richmond National Battlefield Park

3215 East Broad Street

Richmond, VA 23223

	 Telephone: 	Cold Harbor: (804) 226-1981

Richmond: (804) 771-2145

	 Website: http://www.nps.gov/rich/

You need to contact the Memorial Foundation of the Germanna

Colonies in Virginia to stop at the first stand near Germanna Ford.

	 Address:	 Memorial Foundation of the Germanna Colonies in

Virginia

PO Box 279

Locust Grove, VA 22508-0279

	 Telephone:	 (540) 423-1700

	 Website: http://www.germanna.org

c. The North Anna and part of the Cold Harbor battlefields are 

maintained and operated by the Hanover County Parks and Recreation

Department (HCP&RD) and are not affiliated with the National Park 

Service. The HCP&RD maintains a substantial portion of the Confederate

trench lines of the North Anna battlefield and Union trench lines at the 

Cold Harbor site. These sites are open to the public; however, there are no

restrooms or picnic areas at these two sites, nor is there food available for

purchase. No park personnel are present to assist you; but, brochures and

information about this portion of the campaign are available in the small

wooden boxes at the park entrance. Each park is extremely well marked

with interpretive signs and possesses well-marked and well-maintained

trail systems that are posted to guide you through the various actions

in a logical sequence. The North Anna Park is somewhat isolated and

may be closed at unusual times. It is recommended that you contact the

HCP&RD to verify dates and times of availability. For military staff rides,

the park service employees are amenable to ensuring the parks are open if

coordinated ahead of time.

	 Address:	 Hanover County Parks and Recreation Department

ATTN: Director

13017 Taylor Complex Lane

Ashland, VA 23005
335

	 Telephone:	 (804) 365-4695

	 Website: http://www.co.hanover.va.us/parksrec/default.htm

2.	 Logistics.

a.	 Meals. There are many restaurants in Fredericksburg, Richmond,

and Ashland that are convenient to hotel locations and should take care

of breakfast and dinner. Lunch can either be a box lunch carried on the

vehicles or you can eat at nearby fast-food restaurants. As noted in the

stands, we have recommended times to pause in the staff ride for lunch on

all three days.

b. Lodging. Groups can find many hotels in Fredericksburg (for the 

night after day 1) and in either Ashland or Richmond (for the night after

day 2). If the group wants to cut down on lodging costs, there are many

military bases in Virginia and the Washington, DC, area, but they are not

as conveniently located as the hotels.

c. Travel. If the group is flying to the area, the Richmond airport is 

the most convenient to use. Once on the ground, larger groups will need

to contract for a bus—make sure it has a microphone and public address

system as well as a restroom. Smaller groups (less than 20) might find it 

easier for parking and maneuvering to use rental vans.

3.	 Other considerations.

a.	 A reconnaissance of the stands and route just prior to execution of

the ride is imperative for a successful staff ride.

b.	 Ensure that every member of the group has water. Additionally,

some restrooms are available on the route. Plan for adequate stops at these

facilities.

c.	 Ensure that your group has proper clothing for inclement weather.

Thunderstorms can occur in any season. Some walking is required for each

of the major battlefields you visit. Comfortable boots or hiking shoes are 

recommended. We recommend that you do not wear sandals or running

shoes.

d.	 Mosquitoes, ants, chiggers, ticks, and other insects are prevalent

from March to October, so insect repellent is advised. Poison ivy is also

present in some of the more remote areas.

e. Road traffic in the Wilderness areas can be heavy. The area has 

several nearby housing subdivisions that ensure almost constant traffic 

along the Orange Turnpike (Virginia Highway 20), the Orange Plank

Road (County Road 621), and Brock Road (County Road 613). Several
336

stands are conducted near major roads and some foot movement across or

parallel to the roads is necessary. Be sure to use traffic guards and stress 

safety to group members when getting off and on the vehicles and when

moving across or near the roads. Similarly, be careful of US Highway 1

and the highly traveled roads around Richmond.
337

Appendix A

Order of Battle, Wilderness

1. Federal Forces.

Headquarters, Armies in the Field

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant

Escort: B, F, and K Companies, 5th United States Cavalry

Commander, Army of the Potomac

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade

Guards and Orderlies

Independent Company Oneida (New York) Cavalry

Provost Guard

Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick

1st Massachusetts Cavalry, C and D

80th New York Infantry (20th Militia)

3d Pennsylvania Cavalry

68th Pennsylvania Infantry

114th Pennsylvania Infantry

Volunteer Engineer Brigade

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham

50th New York Engineers*

*With the exception of 11 companies of the 50th New York, this command, with 

its commander, was at the Engineer Depot, Washington, DC.

Battalion US Engineers

Capt. George H. Mendell

Artillery Chief, Army of the Potomac

Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt

Artillery Reserve, Army of the Potomac

Col. Henry S. Burton

First Brigade (heavy artillery, fighting as infantry), Col. J. Howard Kitching

6th New York Heavy Artillery

15th New York Heavy Artillery

Second Brigade, Maj. John A. Tompkins

Maine Light, 5th Battery (E)

1st New Jersey Light, Battery A

1st New Jersey Light, Battery B

New York Light, 5th Battery

New York Light, 12th Battery

1st New York Light, Battery B
338

Third Brigade, Maj. Robert H. Fitzhugh

Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery

New York Light, 15th Battery

1st New York Light, Battery C

New York Light, 11th Battery

1st Ohio Light, Battery H

5th United States, Battery E

First Brigade Horse Artillery, Capt. James M. Robertson

New York Light, 6th Battery

2d United States, Batteries B and L

2d United States, Battery D

2d United States, Battery M

4th United States, Battery A

4th United States, Batteries C and E

Second Brigade Horse Artillery, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom

1st United States, Batteries E and G

1st United States, Batteries H and I

1st United States, Battery K

2d United States, Battery A

2d United States, Battery G

3d United States, Batteries C, F, and K

II Corps

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock

Escort: 1st Vermont Cavalry, Company M

First Division, Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow

First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles

 26th Michigan

61st New York 

81st Pennsylvania

140th Pennsylvania

183d Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth

28th Massachusetts

63d New York

69th New York

88th New York

116th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank

 39th New York

 52d New York (Detachment 7th New York attached)

 57th New York
339

 111th New York

 125th New York

 126th New York

Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke

2d Delaware

64th New York

66th New York

53d Pennsylvania

145th Pennsylvania

148th Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon

Provost Guard: 2d Company Minnesota Sharpshooters

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb

 19th Maine

 1st Company (Massachusetts Sharpshooters)

 15th Massachusetts

19th Massachusetts

20th Massachusetts

 7th Michigan

42d New York

59th New York

82d New York (2d Militia)

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joshua T. Owen

152d New York

69th Pennsylvania

71st Pennsylvania

72d Pennsylvania

106th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll

14th Connecticut

1st Delaware

14th Indiana

12th New Jersey

10th New York Battalion

108th New York

4th Ohio

8th Ohio

7th West Virginia

Third Division, Maj. Gen. David B. Birney

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. J.H. Hobart Ward

 20th Indiana
340

 3d Maine

 40th New York

 86th New York

 124th New York

 99th Pennsylvania

 110th Pennsylvania

 141st Pennsylvania

 2d United States Sharpshooters

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alexander Hays (k); Col. John S. Crocker

4th Maine

17th Maine

 3d Michigan

5th Michigan

93d New York

57th Pennsylvania

63d Pennsylvania

105th Pennsylvania

1st United States Sharpshooters

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott

First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister

 1st Massachusetts

 16th Massachusetts

 5th New Jersey

 6th New Jersey

 7th New Jersey

 8th New Jersey

 11th New Jersey

 26th Pennsylvania

 115th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. William R. Brewster

11th Massachusetts

70th New York

71st New York

72d New York

73d New York

74th New York

120th New York

84th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (II Corps), Col. John C. Tidball

6th Maine Light, Battery F

Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery
341

New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery

1st New York Light, Battery G

4th New York Heavy, 3d Battalion

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B

4th United States, Battery K

5th United States, Batteries C and I

V Corps

Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren

Provost Guard: 12th New York Battalion

First Division, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres

140th New York

146th New York

91st Pennsylvania

155th Pennsylvania

2d United States, Companies B, C, F, H, I, and K

11th United States, Companies B, C, D, E, F, and G, 1st Battalion

12th United States, Companies A, B, C, D, and G, 1st Battalion

12th United States, Companies A, C, D, F, and H, 2d Battalion

14th United States, 1st Battalion

17th United States, Companies A, C, D, G, and H, 1st Battalion

17th United States, Companies A, B, and C, 2d Battalion

Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer

 9th Massachusetts

22d Massachusetts (2d Co Massachusetts Sharpshooters attached)

 32d Massachusetts

 4th Michigan

 62d Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett

20th Maine

18th Massachusetts

1st Michigan

16th Michigan

44th New York

83d Pennsylvania

118th Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson

First Brigade, Col. Samuel H. Leonard

 16th Maine
342

 13th Massachusetts

 39th Massachusetts

 104th New York

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry Baxter

12th Massachusetts

83d New York (9th Militia)

97th New York

11th Pennsylvania

88th Pennsylvania

90th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison

1st Maryland

4th Maryland

7th Maryland

8th Maryland

Third Division, Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford

First Brigade, Col. William McCandless

 1st Pennsylvania Reserves

 2d Pennsylvania Reserves

 6th Pennsylvania Reserves

 7th Pennsylvania Reserves

 11th Pennsylvania Reserves

13th Pennsylvania Reserves (1st Rifles)

Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher

5th Pennsylvania Reserves

8th Pennsylvania Reserves

10th Pennsylvania Reserves

12th Pennsylvania Reserves

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth (mw); Col. Richard 

Coulter

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler

 7th Indiana

 19th Indiana

 24th Michigan

 1st New York Battalion Sharpshooters

 2d Wisconsin

 6th Wisconsin

 7th Wisconsin

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. James C. Rice

76th New York

84th New York (14th Militia)
343

95th New York

147th New York

56th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Roy Stone (w); Col. Edward S. Bragg

121st Pennsylvania

142d Pennsylvania

143d Pennsylvania

149th Pennsylvania

150th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (V Corps), Col. Charles S. Wainwright

Massachusetts Light, Battery C

Massachusetts Light, Battery E

1st New York Light, Battery D

1st New York Light, Batteries E and L

1st New York Light, Battery H

4th New York Heavy, 2d Battalion

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B

4th United States, Battery B

5th United States, Battery D

VI Corps

Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick

Escort: 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company A

First Division, Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright

First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown

 1st New Jersey

 2d New Jersey

 3d New Jersey

 4th New Jersey

10th New Jersey

 15th New Jersey

Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton

 5th Maine

121st New York

95th Pennsylvania

96th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. David A. Russell

 6th Maine

 49th Pennsylvania

 119th Pennsylvania

 5th Wisconsin
344

Fourth Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alexander Shaler (c); Col. Nelson Cross

65th New York

67th New York

122d New York

82d Pennsylvania (det)

Second Division, Brig. Gen. George W. Getty (w); Brig. Gen. Frank 

Wheaton; Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton

 62d New York

 93d Pennsylvania

 98th Pennsylvania

 102d Pennsylvania

 139th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant

2d Vermont

3d Vermont

4th Vermont

5th Vermont

6th Vermont

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill; Col. Daniel D. Bidwell

 7th Maine

 43d New York

 49th New York

 77th New York

 61st Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry L. Eustis

7th Massachusetts

10th Massachusetts

37th Massachusetts

2d Rhode Island

Third Division, Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. William H. Morris

 14th New Jersey

 106th New York

 151st New York

 87th Pennsylvania

 10th Vermont

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour (c); Col. Benjamin F. Smith

 6th Maryland

110th Maryland

122d Ohio
345

126th Ohio

67th Pennsylvania (Det)

138th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (VI Corps), Col. Charles H. Tompkins

Maine Light, 4th Battery (D)

Massachusetts Light, 1st Battery (A)

New York Light, 1st Battery

New York Light, 3d Battery

4th New York Heavy, 1st Battalion

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G

5th United States, Battery M

IX Corps

Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside

(This corps was under the direct orders of Lt. Gen. Grant until 24 May 1864, when 

it was assigned to the Army of the Potomac.)

Provost Guard: 8th United States Infantry

First Division, Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson

First Brigade, Col. Sumner Carruth

 35th Massachusetts

 56th Massachusetts

 57th Massachusetts

59th Massachusetts

4th United States

 10th United States 

Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure

3d Maryland

21st Massachusetts

100th Pennsylvania

Artillery (First Division)

2d Maine Light, Battery B

Massachusetts Light, 14th Battery

Second Division, Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter

First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss

36th Massachusetts

58th Massachusetts

51st New York

45th Pennsylvania

48th Pennsylvania

7th Rhode Island
346

Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin

31st Maine

32d Maine

6th New Hampshire

9th New Hampshire

11th New Hampshire

17th Vermont

Artillery (Second Division)

 Massachusetts Light, 11th Battery

New York Light, 19th Battery

Third Division, Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox

First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft

 2d Michigan

 8th Michigan

 17th Michigan

27th Michigan (1st and 2d Co Michigan Sharpshooters attached)

 109th New York 

51st Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Benjamin C. Christ

1st Michigan Sharpshooters

20th Michigan

79th New York

60th Ohio (9th and 10th Co Ohio Sharpshooters attached)

50th Pennsylvania

Artillery (Third Division)

7th Maine Light, Battery G

New York Light, 34th Battery

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero (This division was not available for battle during the Wilderness Campaign, but was restricted to guard 

detail.)

First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried

 27th United States Colored Troops

 30th United States Colored Troops

 39th United States Colored Troops

 43d United States Colored Troops

Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas

 30th Connecticut (Colored) (Det)

19th United States Colored Troops

23d United States Colored Troops

Artillery (Fourth Division)

Pennsylvania Light, Battery D

Vermont Light, 3d Battery
347

Cavalry (IX Corps)

3d New Jersey

22d New York

13th Pennsylvania

Reserve Artillery (IX Corps), Capt. John Edwards, Jr.

New York Light, 27th Battery

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery D

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery H

2d United States, Battery E

3d United States, Battery G

3d United States, Batteries L and M

Provisional Brigade (IX Corps), Col. Elisha G. Marshall

24th New York Cavalry (dismounted)

14th New York Heavy Artillery

2d Pennsylvania Provisional Heavy Artillery

Cavalry Corps

Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan

Escort: 6th United States Cavalry

First Division, Brig. Gen. Alfred T.A. Torbert

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. George A. Custer

 1st Michigan

 5th Michigan

 6th Michigan

 7th Michigan

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas C. Devin

4th New York (Detached, guarding trains)

6th New York

9th New York

17th Pennsylvania

Reserve Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt

19th New York (1st Dragoons)

6th Pennsylvania

1st United States

2d United States

5th United States (Co B, F, and K escort to Lt. Gen. U.S. Grant)

Second Division, Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry D. Davies, Jr.

 1st Massachusetts

 1st New Jersey

 6th Ohio

 1st Pennsylvania
348

Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg

1st Maine

10th New York

2d Pennsylvania

4th Pennsylvania

8th Pennsylvania

16th Pennsylvania

Third Division, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson

Escort: 8th Illinois (Detachment)

First Brigade, Col. John B. McIntosh

1st Connecticut

2d New York

5th New York

18th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. George H. Chapman

3d Indiana

8th New York

1st Vermont

2. Confederate Forces.

Commander, Army of Northern Virginia

Gen. Robert E. Lee

I Corps

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet (w); Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson

Kershaw’s Division, Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw

Kershaw’s Brigade, Col. John W. Henagan

 2d South Carolina

 3d South Carolina

 7th South Carolina

 8th South Carolina

 15th South Carolina

 3d South Carolina Battalion

Humphreys’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys

13th Mississippi

17th Mississippi

18th Mississippi

21st Mississippi

Wofford’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William T. Wofford

 16th Georgia

 18th Georgia

 24th Georgia
349

 Cobb’s (Georgia) Legion

 Phillips (Georgia) Legion

 3d Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters

Bryan’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Goode Bryan

10th Georgia

50th Georgia

51st Georgia

53d Georgia

Field’s Division, Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field

Jenkins’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Micah Jenkins (k); Col. John Bratton 

 1st South Carolina

 2d South Carolina

 5th South Carolina

 6th South Carolina

 Palmetto (South Carolina) Sharpshooters

Anderson’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson

7th Georgia

8th Georgia

9th Georgia

11th Georgia

59th Georgia

Law’s Brigade, Col. William F. Perry

 4th Alabama

 15th Alabama

 44th Alabama

 47th Alabama

48th Alabama

Gregg’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Gregg

3d Arkansas

1st Texas

4th Texas

5th Texas

Benning’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry L. Benning

2d Georgia

15th Georgia

17th Georgia

20th Georgia

Artillery (I Corps), Brig. Gen. E. Porter Alexander

Huger’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Frank Huger

 Fickling’s (South Carolina) Battery

 Moody’s (Louisiana) Battery
350

 Parker’s (Virginia) Battery

 J.D. Smith’s (Virginia) Battery

 Taylor’s (Virginia) Battery

 Woolfolk’s (Virginia) Battery

Haskell’s Battalion, Maj. John C. Haskell

Flanner’s (North Carolina) Battery

Garden’s (South Carolina) Battery

Lamkin’s (Virginia) Battery

Ramsay’s (North Carolina) Battery

Cabell’s Battalion, Col. Henry C. Cabell

Callaway’s (Georgia) Battery

Carlton’s (Georgia) Battery

McCarthy’s (Virginia) Battery

Manly’s (North Carolina) Battery

II Corps

Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell

Early’s Division, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early

Hays’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays

 5th Louisiana

 6th Louisiana

 7th Louisiana

 8th Louisiana

 9th Louisiana

Pegram’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Pegram

13th Virginia

31st Virginia

49th Virginia

52d Virginia

58th Virginia

Gordon’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon

13th Georgia

26th Georgia

31st Georgia

38th Georgia

60th Georgia

61st Georgia

Johnston’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Robert D. Johnston

5th North Carolina

12th North Carolina

20th North Carolina

23d North Carolina
351

Johnson’s Division, Maj. Gen. Edward Johnson

Stonewall Brigade, Brig. Gen. James A. Walker

 2d Virginia

 4th Virginia

 5th Virginia

 27th Virginia

 33d Virginia

Steuart’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart

1st North Carolina

3d North Carolina

10th Virginia

23d Virginia

37th Virginia

Jones’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. John M. Jones

 21st Virginia

 25th Virginia

 42d Virginia

 44th Virginia

 48th Virginia

 50th Virginia

Stafford’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Leroy A. Stafford

1st Louisiana

2d Louisiana

10th Louisiana

14th Louisiana

15th Louisiana

Rodes’ Division, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes

Daniel’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel

 32d North Carolina

 43d North Carolina

 45th North Carolina

 53d North Carolina

 2d North Carolina Battalion

Ramseur’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur

2d North Carolina

4th North Carolina

14th North Carolina

30th North Carolina

Doles’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. George Doles

 4th Georgia

 12th Georgia

 44th Georgia
352

Battle’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle

3d Alabama

5th Alabama

6th Alabama

12th Alabama

26th Alabama

Artillery (II Corps), Brig. Gen. Armistead L. Long

Hardaway’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Robert A. Hardaway (Under special 

direction of Col. J. Thompson Brown)

 Dance’s (Virginia) Battery

 Graham’s (Virginia) Battery

C.B. Griffin’s (Virginia) Battery

 Jones’ (Virginia) Battery

 B.H. Smith’s (Virginia) Battery

Nelson’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William A. Nelson (Under special direction 

of Col. J. Thompson Brown)

Kirkpatrick’s (Virginia) Battery

Massie’s (Virginia) Battery

Milledge’s (Georgia) Battery

Braxton’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Carter M. Braxton (Under special direction of Col. J. Thompson Brown)

 Carpenter’s (Virginia) Battery

 Cooper’s (Virginia) Battery

 Hardwicke’s (Virginia) Battery

Cutshaw’s Battalion, Maj. Wilfred E. Cutshaw (Under special direction of Col. Thomas H. Carter)

Carrington’s (Virginia) Battery

A.W. Garber’s (Virginia) Battery

Tanner’s (Virginia) Battery

Page’s Battalion, Maj. Richard C.M. Page (Under special direction of 

Col. Thomas H. Carter)

W.P. Carter’s (Virginia) Battery

Fry’s (Virginia) Battery

Page’s (Virginia) Battery

Reese’s (Alabama) Battery

III Corps

Lt. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill

Anderson’s Division, Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson

Perrin’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Abner Perrin

 8th Alabama

 9th Alabama
353

 10th Alabama

 11th Alabama

 14th Alabama

Mahone’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William Mahone

6th Virginia

12th Virginia

16th Virginia

41st Virginia

61st Virginia

Harris’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Nathaniel Harris

 12th Mississippi

 16th Mississippi

 19th Mississippi

 48th Mississippi

Wright’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright

3d Georgia

22d Georgia

48th Georgia

2d Georgia Battalion

Perry’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Edward A. Perry

2d Florida

5th Florida

8th Florida

Heth’s Division, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth

Davis’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis

 2d Mississippi

 11th Mississippi

 42d Mississippi

 55th North Carolina

Kirkland’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William W. Kirkland

11th North Carolina

26th North Carolina

44th North Carolina

47th North Carolina

 52d North Carolina

Cooke’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John R. Cooke

 15th North Carolina

 27th North Carolina

 46th North Carolina

 48th North Carolina
354

Walker’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry H. Walker

40th Virginia

47th Virginia

55th Virginia

22d Virginia (Battalion)

Archer’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James J. Archer (Fought under 

Walker’s Brigade)

13th Alabama

1st Tennessee (Provisional Army)

7th Tennessee

14th Tennessee

Wilcox’s Division, Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox

Lane’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James H. Lane

 7th North Carolina

 18th North Carolina

 28th North Carolina

 33d North Carolina

 37th North Carolina

McGowan’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan

1st South Carolina (Provisional Army)

12th South Carolina

13th South Carolina

14th South Carolina

1st South Carolina (Orr’s Rifles)

Scales’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales

 13th North Carolina

 16th North Carolina

 22d North Carolina

 34th North Carolina

 38th North Carolina

Thomas’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas

14th Georgia

35th Georgia

45th Georgia

49th Georgia

Artillery (III Corps), Col. R. Lindsay Walker

Poague’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William T. Poague

 Richard’s (Mississippi) Battery

 Utterback’s (Virginia) Battery

 William’s (North Carolina) Battery

 Wyatt’s (Virginia) Battery
355

McIntosh’s Battalion, Lt. Col. David G. McIntosh

Clutter’s (Virginia) Battery

Donald’s (Virginia) Battery

Hurt’s (Alabama) Battery

 Price’s (Virginia) Battery

Pegram’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William J. Pegram

 Brander’s (Virginia) Battery

 Cayce’s (Virginia) Battery

 Ellett’s (Virginia) Battery

 Marye’s (Virginia) Battery

 Zimmerman’s (South Carolina) Battery

Cutts’ Battalion, Col. Allen S. Cutts

Patterson’s (Georgia) Battery

Ross’ (Georgia) Battery

Wingfield’s (Georgia) Battery

Richardson’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Charles Richardson

Grandy’s (Virginia) Battery

Landry’s (Louisiana) Battery

Moore’s (Virginia) Battery

Penick’s (Virginia) Battery

Cavalry Corps

Maj. Gen. James E.B. Stuart

Hampton’s Division, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton

Young’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Pierce M.B. Young

 7th Georgia

 Cobb’s (Georgia) Legion

 Phillip’s (Georgia) Legion

 20th Georgia Battalion

Jefferson Davis (Mississippi) Legion

Rosser’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser

7th Virginia

11th Virginia

12th Virginia

35th Virginia Battalion

Fitzhugh Lee’s Division, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee

Lomax’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax

5th Virginia

6th Virginia

15th Virginia

Wickham’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Williams C. Wickham

1st Virginia
356

2d Virginia

3d Virginia

4th Virginia

William H.F. Lee’s Division, Maj. Gen. William H.F. Lee

Chambliss’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. John R. Chambliss

 9th Virginia

 10th Virginia

 13th Virginia

Gordon’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James B. Gordon

1st North Carolina

2d North Carolina

5th North Carolina

Horse Artillery, Maj. R. Preston Chew

Breathed’s Battalion, Maj. James Breathed

 Hart’s (South Carolina) Battery

Johnston’s (Virginia) Battery

McGregor’s (Virginia) Battery

Shoemaker’s (Virginia) Battery

Thomson’s (Virginia) Battery
357

Appendix B

Order of Battle, Spotsylvania

1. Federal Forces.

Headquarters, Armies in the Field

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant

Escort: B, F, and K Companies, 5th United States Cavalry

Commander, Army of the Potomac

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade

Guards and Orderlies

Independent Company Oneida (New York) Cavalry

Provost Guard

Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick

1st Massachusetts Cavalry, C and D

80th New York Infantry (20th Militia)

3d Pennsylvania Cavalry

68th Pennsylvania Infantry

114th Pennsylvania Infantry

Volunteer Engineer Brigade

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham

50th New York Engineers*

*With the exception of 11 companies of the 50th New York, this command, with 

its commander, was at the Engineer Depot, Washington, DC.

Battalion US Engineers

Capt. George H. Mendell

Artillery Chief, Army of the Potomac

Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt

Reserve Artillery, Army of the Potomac

Col. Henry S. Burton

First Brigade (heavy artillery, fighting as infantry), Col. J. Howard Kitching

6th New York Heavy Artillery

15th New York Heavy Artillery

Second Brigade, Maj. John A. Tomkins

5th Maine, Battery E

1st New Jersey, Battery A

1st New Jersey, Battery B

5th New York Battery

12th New York Battery

1st New York, Battery B
358

Third Brigade, Maj. Robert H. Fitzhugh

9th Massachusetts Battery

15th New York Battery

1st New York Battery C

11th New York Battery

1st Ohio, Battery H

5th United States, Battery E

First Brigade Horse Artillery, Capt. James M. Robertson

6th New York Battery

2d United States, Batteries B and L

2d United States, Battery D

2d United States, Battery M

4th United States, Battery A

4th United States, Batteries C and E

Second Brigade Horse Artillery, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom

1st United States, Batteries E and G

1st United States, Batteries H and I

1st United States, Battery K

2d United States, Battery A

2d United States, Battery G

3d United States, Batteries C, F, and K

II Corps

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock

Escort: 1st Vermont Cavalry, Company M

First Division, Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow

First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles

 26th Michigan

 61st New York

 81st Pennsylvania

 140th Pennsylvania

 183d Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth

 28th Massachusetts

 63d New York

69th New York

88th New York

116th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Paul Frank (relieved); Col. Hiram L. Brown (c); 

Col. Clinton D. MacDougall

 39th New York

 52d New York
359

 57th New York

 111th New York

 125th New York

 126th New York

Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke

2d Delaware

64th New York

66th New York

 53d Pennsylvania

 145th Pennsylvania

 148th Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon

Provost Guard: 2d Company Minnesota Sharpshooters

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alexander S. Webb (w); Col. H. Boyd McKeen

 19th Maine

 1st Company (Sharpshooters)

 15th Massachusetts

 19th Massachusetts

 20th Massachusetts

 7th Michigan

42d New York

59th New York

82d New York (2d Militia)

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joshua T. Owen

152d New York

 69th Pennsylvania

 71st Pennsylvania

 72d Pennsylvania

 106th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Samuel S. Carroll (w); Col. Theodore G. Ellis; 

Col. Thomas A. Smyth

 14th Connecticut

 1st Delaware

 14th Indiana

 12th New Jersey

10th New York Battalion

108th New York

4th Ohio

8th Ohio

 7th West Virginia

Fourth Brigade (arrived on 17 May), Col. Mathew Murphy (w); Col. 

James P. McIvor
360

 155th New York

 164th New York

 170th New York

 182d New York

Third Division, Maj. Gen. David B. Birney

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. J.H. Hobart Ward (relieved); Col. Thomas 

W. Egan

 20th Indiana

 3d Maine

 40th New York

 86th New York

 124th New York

 99th Pennsylvania

 110th Pennsylvania

 141st Pennsylvania

 2d United States Sharpshooters

Second Brigade, Col. John S. Crocker; Col. Elijah Walker

4th Maine

17th Maine

3d Michigan

5th Michigan

93d New York

57th Pennsylvania

63d Pennsylvania

105th Pennsylvania

1st United States Sharpshooters

Fourth Division (incorporated into Birney’s Third Division on 13 May), 

Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott

First Brigade, Col. Robert McAllister

 1st Massachusetts

 16th Massachusetts

 5th New Jersey

 6th New Jersey

 7th New Jersey

 8th New Jersey

 11th New Jersey

 26th Pennsylvania

 115th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. William R. Brewster

11th Massachusetts

70th New York

71st New York
361

72d New York

73d New York

74th New York

120th New York

84th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (II Corps), Col John C. Tidball

6th Maine Light, Battery F

Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery

New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery

1st New York Light, Battery G

4th New York Heavy, 3d Battalion

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B

4th United States, Battery K

5th United States, Batteries C and I

V Corps

Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren

Provost Guard: 12th New York Battalion

First Division, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres

140th New York

146th New York

91st Pennsylvania

155th Pennsylvania

2d United States, Companies B, C, F, H, I, and K

11th United States, Companies B, C, D, E, F, and G, 1st Battalion

12th United States, Companies A, B, C, D, and G, 1st Battalion

12th United States, Companies A, C, D, F, and H, 2d Battalion

14th United States, 1st Battalion

17th United States, Companies A, C, D, G, and H, 1st Battalion

17th United States, Companies A, B, and C, 2d Battalion

Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer

 9th Massachusetts

 22d Massachusetts

 32d Massachusetts

 4th Michigan

 62d Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett

20th Maine

18th Massachusetts
362

1st Michigan

16th Michigan

44th New York

83d Pennsylvania

118th Pennsylvania

Second Division (disbanded on 9 May—Lyle’s brigade assigned to Cutler’s 

division, Coulter’s brigade assigned to Crawford’s division, Denison’s 

brigade assigned directly to corps), Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson (w); Col. 

Richard Coulter

First Brigade, Col. Peter Lyle

 16th Maine

 13th Massachusetts

 39th Massachusetts

 104th New York

 90th Pennsylvania

 107th Pennsylvania (arrived 16 May)

Second Brigade, Col. Richard Coulter; Col. James L. Bates

12th Massachusetts

83d New York

 97th New York

 11th Pennsylvania

 88th Pennsylvania

 Third Brigade, Col. Andrew W. Denison (w); Col. Charles E. Phelps 

(c); Col. Richard N. Bowerman

1st Maryland

4th Maryland

7th Maryland

8th Maryland

Third Division, Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford

First Brigade, Col. William McCandless (w); Col. William C. Taley 

(c); Col. Wellington H. Ent

 1st Pennsylvania Reserves

 2d Pennsylvania Reserves

 6th Pennsylvania Reserves

 7th Pennsylvania Reserves

11th Pennsylvania Reserves

 13th Pennsylvania Reserves

Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher; Col. Silas M. Bailey

5th Pennsylvania Reserves

8th Pennsylvania Reserves

 10th Pennsylvania Reserves

 12th Pennsylvania Reserves
363

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler

First Brigade, Col. William W. Robinson

 7th Indiana

 19th Indiana

 24th Michigan

 1st New York Battalion Sharpshooters

 2d Wisconsin

6th Wisconsin

 7th Wisconsin

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. James C. Rice (k); Col. Edward B. Fowler

 76th New York

84th New York

95th New York

147th New York

56th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Edward S. Bragg

121st Pennsylvania

142d Pennsylvania

143d Pennsylvania

149th Pennsylvania

150th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (V Corps), Col. Charles S. Wainwright

3d Massachusetts Light, Battery C

5th Massachusetts Light, Battery E

1st New York, Battery D

1st New York, Batteries E and L

1st New York, Battery H

4th New York Heavy, 2d Battalion

1st Pennsylvania, Battery B

4th United States, Battery B

5th United States, Battery D

VI Corps

Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick (k); Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright

Escort: 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company A

First Division, Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright; Brig. Gen. David A. Russell

First Brigade, Col. Henry W. Brown

 1st New Jersey

 2d New Jersey

 3d New Jersey

 4th New Jersey

10th New Jersey
364

 15th New Jersey

Second Brigade, Col. Emory Upton

5th Maine

121st New York

95th Pennsylvania

96th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. David A. Russell; Brig. Gen. Henry L. Eustis

 6th Maine

 49th Pennsylvania

 119th Pennsylvania

 5th Wisconsin

Fourth Brigade, Col. Nelson Cross

65th New York

 67th New York

 122d New York

 82d Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton

 62d New York

 93d Pennsylvania

 98th Pennsylvania

 102d Pennsylvania

 139th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Lewis A. Grant

1st Vermont (Heavy Artillery) (arrived 14 May)

2d Vermont

3d Vermont

4th Vermont

5th Vermont

6th Vermont

Third Brigade, Col. Daniel D. Bidwell

 7th Maine

 43d New York

 49th New York

 77th New York

 61st Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry L. Eustis

7th Massachusetts

10th Massachusetts

37th Massachusetts

2d Rhode Island
365

Third Division, Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. William H. Morris (w); Col. John W. Schall; 

Col. William S. Truex

 14th New Jersey

 106th New York

 151st New York

 87th Pennsylvania

 10th Vermont

Second Brigade, Col. Benjamin F. Smith

6th Maryland

110th Ohio

 122d Ohio

 126th Ohio

 67th Pennsylvania

 138th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (VI Corps), Col. Charles H. Tompkins

4th Maine, Battery D

1st Massachusetts, Battery A

1st New York, Independent Battery

3d New York, Independent Battery

4th New York Heavy, 1st Battalion

1st Rhode Island, Battery C

1st Rhode Island, Battery E

1st Rhode Island, Battery G

5th United States, Battery M

IX Corps

Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside

(This corps was under the direct orders of Lt. Gen. Grant until 24 May 1864, when 

it was assigned to the Army of the Potomac.)

Provost Guard: 8th United States Infantry

First Division, Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Stevenson (k); Col. Daniel Leasure; 

Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittendon

First Brigade, Lt. Col. Stephen M. Weld, Jr.; Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie

 35th Massachusetts

 56th Massachusetts

 57th Massachusetts

 59th Massachusetts

4th United States

 10th United States

Second Brigade, Col. Daniel Leasure
366

3d Maryland

 21st Massachusetts

 100th Pennsylvania

Artillery (First Division)

 2d Maine, Battery B

 14th Massachusetts Battery

Second Division, Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter

First Brigade, Col. Zenas R. Bliss (w); Col. John I. Curtin

 36th Massachusetts

 58th Massachusetts

 51st New York

 45th Pennsylvania

 48th Pennsylvania

 7th Rhode Island

Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin

31st Maine

32d Maine

6th New Hampshire

9th New Hampshire

11th New Hampshire

17th Vermont

Artillery (Second Division)

 11th Massachusetts Battery

19th New York Battery

Third Division, Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox

First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft

 2d Michigan

 8th Michigan

 17th Michigan

 27th Michigan

 109th New York

 51st Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Benjamin C. Christ (w); Col. William Humphrey

 1st Michigan Sharpshooters

20th Michigan

79th New York

60th Ohio

50th Pennsylvania

Artillery (Third Division)

7th Maine, Battery G

34th New York Battery
367

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero

First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried

 27th United States Colored Troops

 30th United States Colored Troops

 39th United States Colored Troops

 43d United States Colored Troops

Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas

30th Connecticut (Colored)

19th United States Colored Troops

23d United States Colored Troops

Artillery (Fourth Division)

 Pennsylvania Independent Battery D

 3d Vermont Battery

Cavalry (IX Corps)

3d New Jersey

22d New York

2d Ohio

13th Pennsylvania

Artillery Reserve (IX Corps), Col. John Edwards, Jr.

27th New York Battery

1st Rhode Island, Battery D

1st Rhode Island, Battery H

2d United States, Battery E

3d United States, Battery G

3d United States, Batteries L and M

Provisional Brigade (IX Corps), Col. Elisha G. Marshall

2d New York Mounted Rifles (dismounted) (arrived 15 May)

14th New York Heavy Artillery

24th New York Cavalry (dismounted)

2d Pennsylvania Provisional Heavy Artillery

Cavalry Corps

Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan

Escort: 6th United States Cavalry

First Division, Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. George A. Custer

 1st Michigan

 5th Michigan

 6th Michigan

 7th Michigan

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas C. Devin

4th New York
368

6th New York

9th New York

17th Pennsylvania

Reserve Brigade, Col. Alfred Gibbs

19th New York

6th Pennsylvania

1st United States

2d United States

5th United States

Second Division, Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.

 1st Massachusetts

 1st New Jersey

 6th Ohio

 1st Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg

1st Maine

10th New York

2d Pennsylvania

4th Pennsylvania

8th Pennsylvania

16th Pennsylvania

Third Division, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson

First Brigade, Col. John B. McIntosh

 1st Connecticut

 2d New York

 5th New York

 18th Pennsylvania 

Second Brigade, Col. George H. Chapman

3d Indiana

8th New York

1st Vermont

2. Confederate Forces.

Commander, Army of Northern Virginia

Gen. Robert E. Lee

I Corps

Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson

Kershaw’s Division, Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw

Kershaw’s Brigade, Col. John W. Henagan

 2d South Carolina

 3d South Carolina
369

 7th South Carolina

 8th South Carolina

 15th South Carolina

 3d South Carolina Battalion

Wofford’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William T. Wofford

16th Georgia

18th Georgia

24th Georgia

Cobb’s (Georgia) Legion

Phillip’s (Georgia) Legion

3d Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters

Humphreys’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys

 13th Mississippi

 17th Mississippi

 18th Mississippi

 21st Mississippi

Bryan’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Goode Bryan

10th Georgia

50th Georgia

51st Georgia

53d Georgia

Field’s Division, Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field

Jenkin’s Brigade, Col. John Bratton

 1st South Carolina

2d South Carolina (Rifles)

 5th South Carolina

 6th South Carolina

 Palmetto Sharpshooters

Anderson’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson

7th Georgia

8th Georgia

9th Georgia

11th Georgia

59th Georgia

Gregg’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Gregg

 3d Arkansas

 1st Texas

 4th Texas

 5th Texas

Benning’s Brigade, Col. Dudley M. DuBose

2d Georgia

15th Georgia
370

17th Georgia

20th Georgia

Law’s Brigade, Col. William F. Perry

4th Alabama

15th Alabama

44th Alabama

47th Alabama

48th Alabama

Artillery (I Corps), Brig. Gen. E. Porter Alexander

Haskell’s Battalion, Maj. John C. Haskell

 Flanner’s (North Carolina) Battery

 Garden’s (South Carolina) Battery

 Lamkin’s (Virginia) Battery

 Ramsay’s (North Carolina) Battery

Cabell’s Battalion, Col. Henry C. Cabell

Callaway’s (Georgia) Battery

Carlton’s (Georgia) Battery

McCarthy’s (Virginia) Battery

Manly’s (North Carolina) Battery

Huger’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Frank Huger

Fickling’s (South Carolina) Battery

Moody’s (Louisiana) Battery

Parker’s (Virginia) Battery

J.D. Smith’s (Virginia) Battery

Taylor’s (Virginia) Battery

Woolfolk’s (Virginia) Battery

II Corps

Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell

Early’s Division, Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early; Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon

Pegram’s Brigade, Col. John S. Hoffman

 13th Virginia

 31st Virginia

 49th Virginia

 52d Virginia

 58th Virginia

Gordon’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon; Col. Clement A. Evans

 13th Georgia

 26th Georgia

 31st Georgia

 38th Georgia

 60th Georgia
371

 61st Georgia

Johnston’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Robert D. Johnston (w); Col. Thomas 

F. Toon

 5th North Carolina

12th North Carolina

20th North Carolina

23d North Carolina

Johnson’s Division (after sustaining heavy casualties on 12 May, the 

division officially disbanded on 21 May: the Virginia regiments were 

consolidated into a brigade under Brig. Gen. William Terry and assigned 

to Early’s [Gordon’s] division, the Louisiana brigade was also transferred 

to Early’s [Gordon’s] division, and the North Carolina regiments were 

assigned to Ramseur’s brigade in Rodes’ division), Maj. Gen. Edward 

Johnson (c)

Stonewall Brigade, Brig. Gen. James A. Walker (w)

 2d Virginia

 4th Virginia

 5th Virginia

 27th Virginia

 33d Virginia

Steuart’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. George H. Steuart (c)

1st North Carolina

3d North Carolina

10th Virginia

23d Virginia

37th Virginia

Jones’ Brigade, Col. William Witcher (w)

 21st Virginia

 25th Virginia

 42d Virginia

 44th Virginia

 48th Virginia

 50th Virginia

Louisiana Brigade (Consolidated), Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays (w); Col. 

William Monagham

1st Louisiana

2d Louisiana

5th Louisiana

6th Louisiana

7th Louisiana

8th Louisiana
372

9th Louisiana

10th Louisiana

14th Louisiana

15th Louisiana

Rodes’ Division, Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes

Daniel’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Junius Daniel (mw); Col. Bryan Grimes

 32d North Carolina

 43d North Carolina

 45th North Carolina

 53d North Carolina

 2d North Carolina Battalion

Ramseur’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur (w)

 2d North Carolina

 4th North Carolina

14th North Carolina

 30th North Carolina

Battle’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle (w)

 3d Alabama

 5th Alabama

 6th Alabama

12th Alabama

 26th Alabama

 61st Alabama

Doles’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. George Doles

4th Georgia

12th Georgia

44th Georgia

Artillery (II Corps), Brig. Gen. Armistead L. Long

Braxton’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Carter M. Braxton

 Carpenter’s (Virginia) Battery

 Cooper’s (Virginia) Battery

 Hardwicke’s (Virginia) Battery

Nelson’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William Nelson

Kirkpatrick’s (Virginia) Battery

 Massie’s (Virginia) Battery

Milledge’s (Georgia) Battery

Page’s Battalion, Maj. Richard C.M. Page

 W.P. Carter’s (Virginia) Battery

 Fry’s (Virginia) Battery

 Page’s (Virginia) Battery

 Reese’s (Alabama) Battery
373

Hardaway’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Robert A. Hardaway

Dance’s (Virginia) Battery

Graham’s (Virginia) Battery

C.B. Griffin’s (Virginia) Battery

Jones’ (Virginia) Battery

B.H. Smith’s (Virginia) Battery

Cutshaw’s Battalion, Maj. Wilfred E. Cutshaw

Carrington’s (Virginia) Battery

A.W. Garber’s (Virginia) Battery

Tanner’s (Virginia) Battery

III Corps

Lt. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill (replaced on 8 May 

due to illness); Maj. Gen. Jubal A. Early

Anderson’s (Mahone’s) Division, Brig. Gen. William Mahone

Perrin’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Abner Perrin (k); Col. John C.C. Sanders

 8th Alabama

 9th Alabama

 10th Alabama

 11th Alabama

 14th Alabama

Mahone’s Brigade, Col. David A. Weisiger

6th Virginia

12th Virginia

16th Virginia

41st Virginia

61st Virginia

Harris’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Nathaniel H. Harris

 12th Mississippi

 16th Mississippi

 19th Mississippi

 48th Mississippi

Wright’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright

3d Georgia

22d Georgia

48th Georgia

2d Georgia Battalion

 10th Georgia Battalion

Perry’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Edward A. Perry

2d Florida

5th Florida

8th Florida
374

Heth’s Division, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth

Davis’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joseph R. Davis

 2d Mississippi

 11th Mississippi

 26th Mississippi

 42d Mississippi

 55th North Carolina

Cooke’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John R. Cooke (w)

15th North Carolina

27th North Carolina

46th North Carolina

48th North Carolina

Walker’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry H. Walker (w); Col. Robert M. Mayo

 40th Virginia

 47th Virginia

 55th Virginia

 22d Virginia Battalion

Archer’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James J. Archer (working under Walker)

13th Alabama

1st Tennessee (Provisional)

7th Tennessee

14th Tennessee

Kirkland’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William W. Kirkland

11th North Carolina

26th North Carolina

44th North Carolina

47th North Carolina

52d North Carolina

Wilcox’s Division, Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox

Lane’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James H. Lane

 7th North Carolina

 18th North Carolina

 28th North Carolina

 33d North Carolina

 37th North Carolina

McGowan’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan (w); Col. Joseph 

N. Brown

 1st South Carolina (Provisional)

 12th South Carolina

13th South Carolina

14th South Carolina

1st South Carolina (Orr’s Rifles)
375

Scale’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales

 13th North Carolina

 16th North Carolina

 22d North Carolina

 34th North Carolina

 38th North Carolina

Thomas’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas

14th Georgia

35th Georgia

45th Georgia

49th Georgia

Artillery (III Corps), Col. R. Lindsay Walker

Poague’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William T. Poague

 Richard’s (Mississippi) Battery

 Utterback’s (Virginia) Battery

 Williams’ (North Carolina) Battery

 Wyatt’s (Virginia) Battery

McIntosh’s Battalion, Lt. Col. David G. McIntosh

Clutter’s (Virginia) Battery

Donald’s (Virginia) Battery

Hurt’s (Alabama) Battery

Price’s (Virginia) Battery

Pegram’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William J. Pegram

 Brander’s (Virginia) Battery

 Cayce’s (Virginia) Battery

 Ellett’s (Virginia) Battery

 Marye’s (Virginia) Battery

 Zimmerman’s (South Carolina) Battery

Richardson’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Charles Richardson

Grandy’s (Virginia) Battery

Landry’s (Louisiana) Battery

Moore’s (Virginia) Battery

Penick’s (Virginia) Battery

Cutts’ Battalion, Col. Allen S. Cutts

Patterson’s (Georgia) Battery

Ross’ (Georgia) Battery

Wingfield’s (Georgia) Battery

Cavalry Corps

Maj. Gen. James E.B. Stuart (mw)

(Stuart was mortally wounded at the battle of Yellow Tavern on 11 May; Lee did 

not formally appoint a replacement, but Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton became de 

facto cavalry corps commander.)
376

Hampton’s Division, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton

Young’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Pierce M.B. Young

 7th Georgia

 Cobb’s (Georgia) Legion

 Phillip’s (Georgia) Legion

 20th Georgia Battalion

 Jefferson Davis (Mississippi) Legion

Rosser’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser

7th Virginia

11th Virginia

12th Virginia

35th Virginia Battalion

Fitzhugh Lee’s Division, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee

Lomax’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax

 5th Virginia

 6th Virginia

 15th Virginia

Wickham’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Williams C. Wickham

1st Virginia

2d Virginia

3d Virginia

4th Virginia

William H.F. Lee’s Division, Maj. Gen. William H.F. Lee

Chambliss’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. John R. Chambliss

 9th Virginia

 10th Virginia

 13th Virginia

Gordon’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James B. Gordon

1st North Carolina

2d North Carolina

5th North Carolina

Horse Artillery, Maj. R. Preston Chew

Breathed’s Battalion, Maj. James Breathed

 Hart’s (South Carolina) Battery

Johnston’s (Virginia) Battery

McGregor’s (Virginia) Battery

Shoemaker’s (Virginia) Battery

Thomson’s (Virginia) Battery
377

Appendix C

Order of Battle, Cold Harbor

1. Federal Forces.

Headquarters, Armies in the Field

Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant

Escort: B, F, and K Companies, 5th United States Cavalry

Commander, Army of the Potomac

Maj. Gen. George G. Meade

Guards and Orderlies

Independent Company Oneida (New York) Cavalry

Provost Guard

Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick

1st Massachusetts Cavalry, C and D

80th New York Infantry (20th Militia)

3d Pennsylvania Cavalry

68th Pennsylvania Infantry

114th Pennsylvania Infantry

Volunteer Engineer Brigade

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham

50th New York Engineers*

*With the exception of 11 companies of the 50th New York, this command, with 

its commander, was at the Engineer Depot, Washington, DC.

Battalion US Engineers

Capt. George H. Mendell

Artillery Chief, Army of the Potomac*

Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt

*Between Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor, the Army of the Potomac’s Artillery 

Reserve was disbanded and the batteries distributed to the subordinate corps.

Artillery Park, Army of the Potomac

15th New York Heavy, 2d Battalion

II Corps

Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock

Escort: 1st Vermont Cavalry, Company M

First Division, Brig. Gen. Francis C. Barlow

First Brigade, Col. Nelson A. Miles

 26th Michigan

 5th New Hampshire (arrived 1 June)
378

 2d New York Heavy Artillery

 61st New York

 81st Pennsylvania

 140th Pennsylvania

 183d Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Richard Byrnes (k); Col. Patrick Kelly

28th Massachusetts

63d New York

69th New York

88th New York

116th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Clinton D. MacDougall

 39th New York

 52d New York

 57th New York

 111th New York

 125th New York

 126th New York

Fourth Brigade, Col. John R. Brooke (w); Col. Orlando H. Morris (k); 

Col. Lewis O. Morris (k); Col. James A. Beaver

2d Delaware

7th New York Heavy Artillery

64th New York

66th New York

53d Pennsylvania

145th Pennsylvania

148th Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. John Gibbon

First Brigade, Col. H. Boyd McKeen (k); Col. Frank A. Haskell

 19th Maine

 1st Company Sharpshooters

 15th Massachusetts

 19th Massachusetts

 20th Massachusetts

 7th Michigan

42d New York

59th New York

82d New York (2d Militia)

184th Pennsylvania

36th Wisconsin

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joshua T. Owen
379

152d New York

69th Pennsylvania

71st Pennsylvania

72d Pennsylvania

106th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Smyth

 14th Connecticut

 1st Delaware

 14th Indiana

 12th New Jersey

 10th New York Battalion

 108th New York

4th Ohio

8th Ohio

 7th West Virginia

Fourth Brigade, Brig. Gen. Robert O. Tyler (w); Col. James P. McIvor

8th New York Heavy Artillery

155th New York

164th New York

170th New York

182d New York

Third Division, Maj. Gen. David B. Birney

First Brigade, Col. Thomas W. Egan

 20th Indiana

 3d Maine

 40th New York

 86th New York

 124th New York

 99th Pennsylvania

 110th Pennsylvania

 141st Pennsylvania

 2d United States Sharpshooters

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas R. Tannatt

4th Maine

17th Maine

1st Massachusetts Heavy Artillery

3d Michigan

5th Michigan

93d New York

57th Pennsylvania

63d Pennsylvania
380

105th Pennsylvania

1st United States Sharpshooters

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott

 1st Maine Heavy Artillery

 16th Massachusetts

 5th New Jersey

 6th New Jersey

 7th New Jersey

 8th New Jersey

 11th New Jersey

 26th Pennsylvania

 115th Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade, Col. William R. Brewster

11th Massachusetts

70th New York

71st New York

73d New York

74th New York

120th New York

84th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (II Corps), Col. John C. Tidball

6th Maine Light, Battery F

Massachusetts Light, 10th Battery

New Hampshire Light, 1st Battery

1st New Jersey Light, Battery B

1st New York Light, Battery G

4th New York Heavy, 3d Battalion

New York Light, 11th Battery

New York Light, 12th Battery

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery F

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery A

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery B

4th United States, Battery K

5th United States, Batteries C and I

V Corps

Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren

Provost Guard: 12th New York Battalion

First Division, Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres 

5th New York (arrived 1 June)

140th New York 
381

146th New York

21st Pennsylvania Dismounted Cavalry (arrived 1 June)

91st Pennsylvania 

155th Pennsylvania 

2d United States, Companies B, C, F, H, I, and K

11th United States, Companies B, C, D, F, and G, 1st Battalion

12th United States, Companies A, B, C, D, and G, 1st Battalion

12th United States, Companies A, C, D, F, and H, 2d Battalion

14th United States, 1st Battalion

17th United States, Companies A, C, D, G, and H, 1st Battalion

17th United States, Companies A, B, and C, 2d Battalion

Second Brigade, Col. Jacob B. Sweitzer

 9th Massachusetts

 22d Massachusetts

 32d Massachusetts

 4th Michigan

 62d Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Bartlett

20th Maine

18th Massachusetts

29th Massachusetts

1st Michigan

16th Michigan

44th New York

83d Pennsylvania

118th Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. Henry H. Lockwood (relieved); Brig. Gen. 

Samuel W. Crawford

First Brigade, Col. Peter Lyle

 16th Maine

 13th Massachusetts

 39th Massachusetts

 94th New York

 104th New York

90th Pennsylvania

 107th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. James L. Bates

12th Massachusetts

83d New York

97th New York

11th Pennsylvania
382

88th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Col. Nathan T. Dushane

1st Maryland

4th Maryland

7th Maryland

8th Maryland

Purnell (Maryland) Legion

Third Division, Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford (The Pennsylvania 

Reserves mustered out of service after the battle at Bethesda Church on 

30 May.)

First Brigade, Col Martin D. Hardin

 1st Pennsylvania Reserves

 2d Pennsylvania Reserves

 6th Pennsylvania Reserves

7th Pennsylvania Reserves

11th Pennsylvania Reserves

 13th Pennsylvania Reserves

Third Brigade, Col. Joseph W. Fisher

5th Pennsylvania Reserves

10th Pennsylvania Reserves

12th Pennsylvania Reserves

Independent Brigade, Col. J. Howard Kitching

6th New York Heavy Artillery

15th New York Heavy Artillery

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler

First Brigade, Col. William W. Robinson

 7th Indiana

 19th Indiana

 24th Michigan

 1st Battalion New York Sharpshooters

 2d Wisconsin

 6th Wisconsin

 7th Wisconsin

Second Brigade, Col. J. William Hofmann

3d Delaware (arrived 1 June)

4th Delaware (arrived 1 June)

46th New York

76th New York

95th New York

147th New York

56th Pennsylvania
383

157th Pennsylvania (arrived 1 June)

Third Brigade, Col. Edward S. Bragg

121st Pennsylvania

142d Pennsylvania

143d Pennsylvania

149th Pennsylvania

150th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (V Corps), Col. Charles S. Wainwright

3d Massachusetts Light, Battery C

5th Massachusetts Light, Battery E

Massachusetts Light, 9th Battery

1st New York Light, Battery B

1st New York Light, Battery C

1st New York Light, Battery D

1st New York Light, Batteries E and L

1st New York Light, Battery H

New York Light, 5th Battery

New York Light, 15th Battery

1st Pennsylvania Light, Battery B

4th United States, Battery B

5th United States, Battery D

VI Corps

Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright

Escort: 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Company A

First Brigade, Col. William H. Penrose

1st New Jersey

2d New Jersey

3d New Jersey

4th New Jersey

10th New Jersey

15th New Jersey

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Emory Upton

2d Connecticut Heavy Artillery

5th Maine

121st New York

95th Pennsylvania

 96th Pennsylvania

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry L. Eustis

 6th Maine

 49th Pennsylvania

 119th Pennsylvania
384

 5th Wisconsin

Fourth Brigade, Col. Nelson Cross

65th New York

67th New York

122d New York

23d Pennsylvania

82d Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Neill

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Frank Wheaton

 62d New York

 93d Pennsylvania

 98th Pennsylvania

 102d Pennsylvania

 139th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Lewis A. Grant

2d Vermont

3d Vermont

4th Vermont

5th Vermont

6th Vermont

11th Vermont (also called 1st Vermont Heavy Artillery)

Third Brigade, Col. Daniel D. Bidwell

 7th Maine

 43d New York

 49th New York

 77th New York

 61st Pennsylvania

Fourth Brigade, Col. Oliver Edwards

7th Massachusetts

10th Massachusetts

37th Massachusetts

2d Rhode Island

Third Division, Brig. Gen. James B. Ricketts

First Brigade, Col. William S. Truex (w); Col. John W. Schall

 14th New Jersey

 106th New York

 151st New York

 87th Pennsylvania

 10th Vermont

Second Brigade, Col. Benjamin F. Smith

6th Maryland
385

9th New York Heavy Artillery

110th Ohio

122d Ohio

126th Ohio

67th Pennsylvania

138th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (VI Corps), Col. Charles H. Tompkins

4th Maine Light, Battery D

5th Maine Light, Battery E

1st Massachusetts Light, Battery A

1st New Jersey Light, Battery A

New York Light, 1st Battery

New York Light, 3d Battery

4th New York Heavy, 1st Battalion

1st Ohio Light, Battery H

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery C

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery E

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery G

5th United States, Battery E

5th United States, Battery M

IX Corps

Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside

Provost Guard: 8th United States Infantry

First Division, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. James H. Ledlie

 56th Massachusetts

 57th Massachusetts

 59th Massachusetts

 4th United States

 10th United States

Second Brigade, Col. Joseph M. Sudsberg

3d Maryland

21st Massachusetts

100th Pennsylvania

Provisional Brigade, Col. Elisha G. Marshall

2d New York Mounted Rifles (Dismounted)

14th New York Heavy Artillery

24th New York Cavalry (Dismounted)

2d Pennsylvania Provisional Heavy Artillery

Acting Engineers

 35th Massachusetts
386

Artillery (First Division)

 2d Maine Light, Battery B

14th Massachusetts Light Battery

Second Division, Brig. Gen. Robert B. Potter

First Brigade, Col. John I. Curtin

 36th Massachusetts

 58th Massachusetts

 45th Pennsylvania

 48th Pennsylvania

 7th Rhode Island

Second Brigade, Col. Simon G. Griffin

2d Maryland (Detachment)

31st Maine

32d Maine

6th New Hampshire

9th New Hampshire

11th New Hampshire

17th Vermont

Acting Engineers

 51st New York

Artillery (Second Division)

 11th Massachusetts Light Battery

 19th New York Light Battery

Third Division, Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Willcox

First Brigade, Col. John F. Hartranft

 2d Michigan

 8th Michigan

 27th Michigan

 109th New York

51st Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. William Humphrey

1st Michigan Sharpshooters

20th Michigan

60th Ohio

50th Pennsylvania

Acting Engineers

 17th Michigan

Artillery (Third Division)

 Maine Light, 7th Battery (G)

New York Light, 34th Battery

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero
387

First Brigade, Col. Joshua K. Sigfried

 27th United States Colored Troops

 30th United States Colored Troops

 39th United States Colored Troops

 43d United States Colored Troops

Second Brigade, Col. Henry G. Thomas

19th United States Colored Troops

23d United States Colored Troops

31st United States Colored Troops

Artillery (Fourth Division)

 Pennsylvania Independent Battery D

3d Vermont Battery

Reserve Artillery (IX Corps)

New York Light, 27th Battery

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery D

1st Rhode Island Light, Battery H

2d United States, Battery E

Cavalry Corps

Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan

First Division, Brig. Gen. Alfred T.A. Torbert

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. George A. Custer

 1st Michigan

 5th Michigan

 6th Michigan

 7th Michigan

Second Brigade, Col. Thomas C. Devin

4th New York

6th New York

9th New York

17th Pennsylvania

Reserve Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wesley Merritt

19th New York (1st Dragoons)

6th Pennsylvania

1st United States

2d United States

5th United States

Second Division, Brig. Gen. David McM. Gregg

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr.

 1st Massachusetts

 1st New Jersey

 10th New York
388

 6th Ohio

 1st Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. J. Irvin Gregg

1st Maine

2d Pennsylvania

4th Pennsylvania

8th Pennsylvania

13th Pennsylvania

16th Pennsylvania

Third Division, Brig. Gen. James H. Wilson

First Brigade, Col. John B. McIntosh

 1st Connecticut

 3d New Jersey

 2d New York

 5th New York

2d Ohio

18th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. George H. Chapman

3d Indiana

8th New York

1st Vermont

First Brigade Horse Artillery, Capt. James M. Robertson

 New York Light, 6th Battery

 2d United States, Batteries B and L

 2d United States, Battery D

 2d United States, Battery M

 4th United States, Battery A

 4th United States, Batteries C and E

Second Brigade Horse Artillery, Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom

1st United States, Batteries E and G

1st United States, Batteries H and I

1st United States, Battery K

2d United States, Battery A

2d United States, Battery G

3d United States, Batteries C, F, and K

XVIII Corps

Maj. Gen. William F. Smith

First Division, Brig. Gen. William T.H. Brooks

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. Gilman Marston

 81st New York

 96th New York
389

 98th New York

 139th New York

Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Hiram Burnham

8th Connecticut

10th New Hampshire

13th New Hampshire

118th New York

Third Brigade, Col. Guy V. Henry

21st Connecticut

40th Massachusetts

92d New York

58th Pennsylvania

188th Pennsylvania

Second Division, Brig. Gen. John H. Martindale

First Brigade, Brig. Gen. George J. Stannard

 23d Massachusetts

 25th Massachusetts

 27th Massachusetts

 9th New Jersey

 89th New York

 55th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Griffin A. Stedman, Jr.

11th Connecticut

8th Maine

2d New Hampshire

12th New Hampshire

148th New York

Third Division, Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, Jr.

First Brigade, Col. William B. Barton

 47th New York

 48th New York

 115th New York

 76th Pennsylvania

Second Brigade, Col. Jeremiah C. Drake (k); Col. Zina H. Robinson

13th Indiana

9th Maine

112th New York

169th New York

10th New York Heavy Artillery

Third Brigade, Brig. Gen. Adelbert Ames

4th New Hampshire
390

3d New York

117th New York

142d New York

97th Pennsylvania

Artillery Brigade (XVIII Corps), Capt. Samuel S. Elder

1st United States, Battery B

4th United States, Battery L

5th United States, Battery A

2. Confederate Forces.

Commander, Army of Northern Virginia

Gen. Robert E. Lee

I Corps

Lt. Gen. Richard H. Anderson

Kershaw’s Division, Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw

Kershaw’s Brigade, Col. John W. Henagan; Col. Lawrence M. Keitt 

(in command 31 May to 1 June)

 2d South Carolina

 3d South Carolina

 3d South Carolina Battalion

 7th South Carolina

 8th South Carolina

15th South Carolina

 20th South Carolina

Humphreys’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humphreys

13th Mississippi

17th Mississippi

18th Mississippi

21st Mississippi

Wofford’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William T. Wofford

 16th Georgia

 18th Georgia

 24th Georgia

Cobb’s (Georgia) Legion

 Phillip’s (Georgia) Legion

 3d Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters

Bryan’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Goode Bryan

10th Georgia

50th Georgia

51st Georgia

53d Georgia
391

Pickett’s Division, Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett

Kemper’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William R. Terry

 1st Virginia

 3d Virginia

 7th Virginia

 11th Virginia

 24th Virginia

Hunton’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Eppa Hunton

8th Virginia

19th Virginia

25th Virginia Battalion

56th Virginia

24th Virginia Cavalry Battalion

 32d Virginia

Barton’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Seth M. Barton

 9th Virginia

 14th Virginia

 38th Virginia

 53d Virginia

 57th Virginia

Corse’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Montgomery D. Corse

15th Virginia

17th Virginia

18th Virginia

29th Virginia

30th Virginia

Hoke’s Brigade, Lt. Col. William G. Lewis

6th North Carolina

21st North Carolina

54th North Carolina

57th North Carolina

1st North Carolina Battalion

Field’s Division, Maj. Gen. Charles W. Field

Jenkin’s Brigade, Col. John Bratton

 1st South Carolina

 2d South Carolina

 5th South Carolina

 6th South Carolina

 Palmetto Sharpshooters

Anderson’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. George T. Anderson

7th Georgia
392

8th Georgia

9th Georgia

11th Georgia

59th Georgia

Law’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. E. McIver Law

 4th Alabama

 15th Alabama

 44th Alabama

 47th Alabama

 48th Alabama

Gregg’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Gregg

3d Arkansas

1st Texas

4th Texas

5th Texas

Benning’s Brigade, Col. Dudley M. DuBose

2d Georgia

15th Georgia

17th Georgia

20th Georgia

Artillery (I Corps), Brig. Gen. E. Porter Alexander

Huger’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Frank Huger

 Fickling’s (South Carolina) Battery

 Moody’s (Louisiana) Battery

 Parker’s (Virginia) Battery

 J.D. Smith’s (Virginia) Battery

 Taylor’s (Virginia) Battery

 Woolfolk’s (Virginia) Battery

Haskell’s Battalion, Major John C. Haskell

Flanner’s (North Carolina) Battery

Garden’s (South Carolina) Battery

Lamkin’s (Virginia) Battery

Ramsay’s (North Carolina) Battery

Cabell’s Battalion, Col. Henry C. Cabell

Callaway’s (Georgia) Battery

Carlton’s (Georgia) Battery

McCarthy’s (Virginia) Battery

Manly’s (North Carolina) Battery

II Corps

Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early

Early’s (Ramseur’s) Division, Maj. Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur
393

Pegram’s Brigade, Col. Edward Willis (mw); Col. John S. Hoffman

 13th Virginia

 31st Virginia

 49th Virginia

 52d Virginia

 58th Virginia

Johnston’s Brigade, Col. Thomas F. Toon

5th North Carolina

12th North Carolina

20th North Carolina

23d North Carolina

Gordon’s Division, Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon

Gordon’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Clement A. Evans

 13th Georgia

 26th Georgia

 31st Georgia

 38th Georgia

 60th Georgia

 61st Georgia

 12th Georgia Battalion

Terry’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William Terry

2d Virginia

4th Virginia

5th Virginia

10th Virginia

21st Virginia

23d Virginia

25th Virginia

27th Virginia

33d Virginia

37th Virginia

42d Virginia

44th Virginia

48th Virginia

50th Virginia

Louisiana Brigade, Col. Zebulon York 

1st Louisiana

2d Louisiana 

5th Louisiana 

6th Louisiana

7th Louisiana
394

8th Louisiana

9th Louisiana

10th Louisiana

14th Louisiana

15th Louisiana

Rodes’ Division, Maj. Gen. Robert Rodes

Daniel’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Bryan Grimes

 32d North Carolina

 43d North Carolina

 45th North Carolina

 53d North Carolina

 2d North Carolina Battalion

Ramseur’s Brigade, Col. Risden T. Bennett; Brig. Gen. William R. Cox

1st North Carolina

2d North Carolina

3d North Carolina

4th North Carolina

14th North Carolina

30th North Carolina

Doles’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. George Doles (k); Col. Philip Cook

 4th Georgia

 12th Georgia

 44th Georgia

Battle’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Cullen A. Battle

3d Alabama

5th Alabama

6th Alabama

12th Alabama

26th Alabama

 61st Alabama

Artillery (II Corps), Brig. Gen. Armistead L. Long

Hardaway’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Robert A. Hardaway

Dance’s (Virginia) Battery

Graham’s (Virginia) Battery

C.B. Griffin’s (Virginia) Battery

B.H. Smith’s (Virginia) Battery

Braxton’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Carter M. Braxton

Carpenter’s (Virginia) Battery

Cooper’s (Virginia) Battery

Hardwicke’s (Virginia) Battery

Nelson’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William Nelson
395

Kirkpatrick’s (Virginia) Battery

Massie’s (Virginia) Battery

Milledge’s (Georgia) Battery

Cutshaw’s Battalion, Maj. Wilfred E. Cutshaw

Carrington’s (Virginia) Battery

A.W. Garber’s (Virginia) Battery

Tanner’s (Virginia) Battery

Page’s Battalion, Maj. Richard C.M. Page

W.P. Carter’s (Virginia) Battery

Fry’s (Virginia) Battery

Page’s (Virginia) Battery

Reese’s (Alabama) Battery

III Corps

Lt. Gen. Ambrose P. Hill

Mahone’s Division, Maj. Gen. William Mahone

Perrin’s (Sander’s) Brigade, Col. John C.C. Sanders

 8th Alabama

 9th Alabama

 10th Alabama

 11th Alabama

 14th Alabama

Mahone’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. David A. Weisiger

6th Virginia

12th Virginia

16th Virginia

41st Virginia

61st Virginia

Harris’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Nathaniel H. Harris

 12th Mississippi

 16th Mississippi

 19th Mississippi

 48th Mississippi

Wright’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright

3d Georgia

22d Georgia

48th Georgia

2d Georgia Battalion

 10th Georgia Battalion

Finegan’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joseph Finegan

2d Florida

5th Florida
396

8th Florida

9th Florida

10th Florida

11th Florida

Heth’s Division, Maj. Gen. Henry Heth

Davis’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Davis

 2d Mississippi

 11th Mississippi

 26th Mississippi

 42d Mississippi

 55th North Carolina

Kirkland’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. William W. Kirkland (w); Col. George 

H. Faribault

11th North Carolina

26th North Carolina

44th North Carolina

47th North Carolina

52d North Carolina

Cooke’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John R. Cooke

 15th North Carolina

 27th North Carolina

 46th North Carolina

 48th North Carolina

Walker’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Birkett D. Fry

40th Virginia

47th Virginia

55th Virginia

22d Virginia Battalion

13th Alabama

1st Tennessee (Provisional)

7th Tennessee

14th Tennessee

Wilcox’s Division, Maj. Gen. Cadmus M. Wilcox

Lane’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James H. Lane (w); Col. John D. Barry

 7th North Carolina

 18th North Carolina

 28th North Carolina

 33d North Carolina

 37th North Carolina

McGowan’s Brigade, Lt. Col. J.F. Hunt; Brig. Gen. James Conner (4 June)

1st Carolina (Provisional)

12th South Carolina
397

13th South Carolina

14th South Carolina

1st South Carolina (Orr’s Rifles)

Scale’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alfred M. Scales (ill); Col. William L 

Lowrance

 13th North Carolina

 16th North Carolina

 22d North Carolina

 34th North Carolina

 38th North Carolina

Thomas’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. Edward L. Thomas

14th Georgia

35th Georgia

45th Georgia

49th Georgia

Artillery (III Corps), Col. R. Lindsay Walker

Poague’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William T. Poague

Richard’s (Mississippi) Battery

Utterback’s (Virginia) Battery

Williams’ (North Carolina) Battery

Wyatt’s (Virginia) Battery

McIntosh’s Battalion, Lt. Col. David G. McIntosh

Clutter’s (Virginia) Battery

Donald’s (Virginia) Battery

Hurt’s (Alabama) Battery

Price’s (Virginia) Battery

Pegram’s Battalion, Lt. Col. William J. Pegram

Brander’s (Virginia) Battery

Cayce’s (Virginia) Battery

Ellett’s (Virginia) Battery

Marye’s (Virginia) Battery

Zimmerman’s (South Carolina) Battery

Cutts’ Battalion, Col. Allen S. Cutts

Patterson’s (Georgia) Battery

Ross’ (Georgia) Battery

Wingfield’s (Georgia) Battery

Richardson’s Battalion, Lt. Col. Charles Richardson

Grandy’s (Virginia) Battery

Landry’s (Louisiana) Battery

Moore’s (Virginia) Battery

Penick’s (Virginia) Battery
398

Cavalry Corps

Army of Northern Virginia

(Although not formally assigned to corps command, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton 

served as the de facto cavalry corps commander.)

Hampton’s Division, Maj. Gen. Wade Hampton

Young’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Pierce M.B. Young (w); Col. Gilbert J. 

Wright

 7th Georgia

 Cobb’s (Georgia) Legion

 Phillip’s (Georgia) Legion

 20th Georgia Battalion

Jefferson Davis (Mississippi) Legion

Rosser’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Rosser

7th Virginia

11th Virginia

12th Virginia

35th Virginia Battalion

Butler’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Matthew C. Butler

4th South Carolina

5th South Carolina

6th South Carolina

7th South Carolina

Fitzhugh Lee’s Division, Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee

Lomax’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Lunsford L. Lomax

 5th Virginia

 6th Virginia

 15th Virginia

Wickham’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Williams C. Wickham

1st Virginia

2d Virginia

3d Virginia

4th Virginia

William H.F. Lee’s Division, Maj. Gen. William H.F. Lee

Chambliss’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. John R. Chambliss

 9th Virginia

 10th Virginia

 13th Virginia

Gordon’s Brigade, Col. John A. Baker

1st North Carolina

2d North Carolina

3d North Carolina
399

5th North Carolina

Horse Artillery, Maj. R. Preston Chew

Breathed’s Battalion, Maj. James Breathed

Hart’s (South Carolina) Battery

Johnston’s (Virginia) Battery

McGregor’s (Virginia) Battery

Shoemaker’s (Virginia) Battery

Thomson’s (Virginia) Battery

Breckinridge’s Division

Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge (Reported directly to Lee)

Echols’ Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Echols; Col. George S. Patton

22d Virginia

23d Virginia Battalion

26th Virginia Battalion

Wharton’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Gabriel C. Wharton

30th Virginia Battalion

51st Virginia

62d Virginia (Mounted)

Maryland Line, Col. Bradley T. Johnson

2d Maryland

1st Maryland Cavalry (Detached to Lomax’s Cavalry Brigade)

1st Maryland Battery

2d Maryland Battery

4th Maryland Battery

McLaughlin’s Artillery Battalion, Major William McLaughlin

Chapman’s (Virginia) Battery

Jackson’s (Virginia) Battery

Hoke’s Division

Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke (Reported directly to Lee)

Martin’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James G. Martin

17th North Carolina

42d North Carolina

66th North Carolina

Clingman’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Thomas Clingman

8th North Carolina

31st North Carolina

51st North Carolina

61st North Carolina

Hagood’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood

7th South Carolina Battalion

11th South Carolina
400

21st South Carolina

25th South Carolina

27th South Carolina

Colquitt’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Alfred H. Colquitt

6th Georgia

19th Georgia

23d Georgia

27th Georgia

28th Georgia

Read’s 38th Virginia Battalion Artillery, Maj. John P.W. Read

Blount’s Battery

Caskie’s (Virginia) Battery

Macon’s Battery

Marshall’s (Virginia) Battery
401

Appendix D

Biographies of Primary Participants

Ulysses Simpson Grant. Grant was born on 27 

April 1822 at Point Pleasant, Ohio, and given 

the name Hiram Ulysses Grant. He entered 

West Point in 1839, and, due to an administrative error, was enrolled as Ulysses Simpson. 

From that point on, his full name became 

Ulysses Simpson Grant. Grant was an excellent 

equestrian but a mediocre student, graduating 

21st out of 39 in the class of 1843.

Grant joined the infantry and served in the Mexican War with the 4th 

Infantry Regiment. He participated in the campaigns of Zachary Taylor 

and Winfield Scott in which he earned two brevets for valor, and also performed well as the regimental quartermaster. Soon after the war, Grant 

married Julia Dent, a devoted wife and great source of happiness and comfort to Grant. He next served in the Pacific Northwest, where he quickly 

became bored with peacetime garrison duty. This boredom and separation from his family led Grant to excessive drinking, which caused Grant 

to resign his commission in 1854. From 1854-61, Grant tried farming, 

real estate, local politics, and clerking at his brothers’ store, all with little 

success. 

When the Civil War broke out, Grant obtained command of the 21st 

Illinois Infantry Regiment and was given the rank of colonel. As Grant 

readied his regiment for combat, he was commissioned a brigadier general 

on 7 August 1861, in large part because of his connections with Illinois 

Representative Elihu B. Washburne. After a small skirmish at Belmont, 

Missouri, Grant’s first major combat came when he led the army component of the joint force that seized Forts Henry and Donelson. These victories brought Grant to the favorable attention of the American public and 

the nickname “unconditional surrender” for the terms he demanded of the 

Confederate forces in Donelson. Grant’s career faltered after he was surprised and almost defeated at the Battle of Shiloh. Reinforced on the first 

night of the battle, Grant drove the Confederates from the field, but in the 

coming days was given the largely ceremonial position of second in command to Major General Henry W. Halleck, commander of the combined 

Federal forces in the advance on Corinth, Mississippi. 

When Halleck was named general in chief of the army and moved to 

Washington, Grant again assumed command of the Army of Tennessee and Library of Congress
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from December 1862 to July 1863 campaigned to take Vicksburg. When 

Grant finally succeeded in besieging and capturing that city, he ensured 

that the Union gained control of the Mississippi River. After Major General 

William Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland was defeated at Chickamauga 

and besieged in Chattanooga, Grant became commander of all Federal 

forces in the western theater. Grant assembled relief forces to help the 

Army of the Cumberland, and he raised the siege of Chattanooga. 

Grant’s triumphs impressed President Lincoln, and he was promoted 

to lieutenant general and selected to be general in chief of the army. In 

this new position, Grant devised a plan that called for all Union armies to 

attack the Confederacy simultaneously in 1864. The new general in chief 

elected to command the Union armies from the field, rather than from 

Washington, and he accompanied Major General George Gordon Meade’s 

Army of the Potomac for the rest of the war. Despite high casualties in 

the Overland Campaign and the long months of the siege at Petersburg, 

Grant’s determination in 1864 and 1865 ensured success for the Union. 

Grant accepted the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on 9 April 

1865 at Appomattox, paving the way for the end of the war. 

As a national hero, Grant was easily elected President of the United 

States in 1868. Unfortunately, his two terms as president were filled with 

corruption and scandal, although Grant remained honest and was not 

personally involved in the corruption. After leaving the presidency, Grant 

and Julia toured the world, but it was not long before the former president 

found himself out of money and ill. Grant died in 1885, but not before 

showing once again his will and determination by completing his memoirs 

while in severe pain. To this day, his book remains a classic of military 

literature.

George Gordon Meade. Meade was born on 

31 December 1815 in Cadiz, Spain, where his 

father was serving as an agent for the United 

States Navy. The elder Meade brought his 

family back to the United States and settled 

in Philadelphia. Young George obtained an 

appointment to West Point and graduated in 

1835 ranking 19th in a class of 56. After some 

short service in Florida and Massachusetts, 

Meade resigned his commission in 1836 

to seek a career in civil engineering. Six years later, however, Meade 

returned to the army and was appointed a second lieutenant in the Corps 

of Topographical Engineers. Library of Congress
403

Meade settled into his military engineering duties, working primarily 

in coastal regions on the construction of lighthouses and breakwaters. 

During the Mexican War, he served at Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and 

Monterey, receiving a brevet to first lieutenant for his service. After the war, 

Meade returned to his engineering duties, eventually working on surveys 

of the Great Lakes. He had achieved the rank of captain by the outbreak of 

the Civil War, but was quickly made a brigadier general of volunteers at the 

request of Pennsylvania Governor Andrew G. Curtin. He took command 

of one of the three newly organized Pennsylvania brigades and joined the 

Army of the Potomac in time to participate in the Peninsula Campaign in 

June 1862. At Glendale, one of the Seven Days Battles, Meade received 

two severe wounds; however, he recovered quickly enough to rejoin his 

brigade and participate in the 2d Bull Run Campaign. 

Promoted to division command, Meade was in the thick of the fighting 

at Antietam where he received temporary command of the Union I Corps 

after Major General Joseph Hooker was wounded. Meade returned to his 

division command prior to the battle of Fredericksburg and led his troops 

superbly, making the only significant Federal penetration of the Confederate lines in the battle. For his efforts, Meade received command of the V 

Corps, which he led at the battle of Chancellorsville in May 1863. 

Much to his own surprise, Meade received command of the Army 

of the Potomac, just prior to the battle of Gettysburg, over several more 

senior officers. Under these difficult conditions, Meade performed capably 

and turned back the Confederate invasion at Gettysburg. In the following 

campaigns at Bristoe Station and Mine Run, Meade demonstrated a cautious 

nature and reluctance to force Lee into battle. These campaigns proved 

to be Meade’s last opportunity to exercise true independent command. 

Grant’s appointment as general in chief and his decision to accompany 

the Army of the Potomac in the Overland Campaign forced Meade to 

work in Grant’s shadow for the remainder of the war. Meade worked 

professionally to support Grant’s strategy, but in private, he poured out the 

frustrations of his position in letters to his wife and with vitriolic attacks 

on newspapermen. Despite the awkward command arrangement, Meade 

persevered through the tough fighting of the Overland and Petersburg 

Campaigns and was the Army of the Potomac’s commander at the end of 

the war receiving the honor of leading his army in the victory parade in 

Washington after the Confederate surrender. 

During Reconstruction, Meade was assigned to command departments 

in the east and south and eventually assumed command of the Military 

Division of the Atlantic with his headquarters in Philadelphia. He was still 
404

serving in this position when he died of pneumonia on 6 November 1872.

Winfield Scott Hancock. Hancock was born on 14 

February 1824 in a small village near Norristown, 

Pennsylvania. Hancock’s father practiced law, and 

his mother was a milliner. In 1840, Hancock was 

appointed to West Point; four years later, he graduated 18th in a class of 25. He then served for two 

years in the Indian Territory before fighting in the 

Mexican War. During the war, he served with the 

infantry and was brevetted to first lieutenant for gallantry at Contreras and 

Churubusco. 

After the war, Hancock saw service in a wide variety of locations. He 

became a regimental quartermaster in garrison at Saint Louis, Missouri, 

then was promoted to an assistant quartermaster in the campaigns against 

the Seminoles in Florida, served in Kansas during the violence in 1857-58, 

and participated in the expedition against the Mormons in Utah. He was 

assigned as chief quartermaster in Los Angeles, California, at the outbreak 

of the Civil War. 

On 13 September 1861, Hancock secured an appointment as brigadier 

general of volunteers and took command of a brigade in the Army of 

the Potomac. He served with distinction in the Peninsula and Antietam 

Campaigns, taking command of a division in the II Corps after the mortal 

wounding of Major General Israel B. Richardson. Hancock skillfully 

handled his division in the army’s next two major battles at Fredericksburg 

and Chancellorsville. When the II Corps commander, Major General 

Darius N. Couch, resigned his command, Hancock found himself, a firsttime corps commander, going into the Gettysburg Campaign. Nonetheless, 

Meade gave Hancock great discretionary powers on all three days of the 

battle, and the II Corps commander rewarded Meade with an outstanding 

performance before being severely wounded during the repulse of Pickett’s 

charge. The wound would never completely heal; nevertheless, Hancock 

returned to command of the II Corps, which became the spearhead for many 

of the Army of the Potomac’s major attacks in the Overland Campaign. 

In the subsequent Petersburg Campaign, Hancock’s corps continued 

to be the Union’s strike force in many operations; but, decimated by 

casualties, the II Corps suffered defeat at the battle of Ream’s Station. 

Both sides settled into their trenches for most of the winter of 1864; 

however, Hancock’s wound worsened, and he left command to recruit 

injured soldiers for the Veteran Reserve Corps. Toward the end of the war, Library of Congress
405

he took a department command, a position he held when the Confederates 

surrendered. 

After the war, Hancock served briefly as commander of Washington’s 

defenses and then commander of the Department of Missouri in a campaign against the Plains Indians. In 1867, he assumed command of a military district conducting reconstruction in Texas and Louisiana. Because 

his policies clashed with the Johnson administration, he was transferred to 

the Division of the Atlantic in New York. He held this position (with one 

brief interlude in the Dakotas) until the end of his life. While still in command of this division, Hancock received the Democratic Nomination for 

President of the United States in 1880, but lost to James A. Garfield in one 

of the closest elections in American history. He died on 9 February 1886 at 

Governors Island, New York.

Gouverneur Kemble Warren. Warren was born 

on 8 January 1830 in Cold Spring, New York. 

An energetic child and bright student, Warren 

secured an appointment to West Point at the age 

of 16. Warren continued to display his academic 

qualities when he graduated second in his class 

at the academy in 1850 and was commissioned in 

the Corps of Topographical Engineers. He spent 

several years surveying extensive sectors of the 

Mississippi River, assisted in a project that studied the best routes for 

railroads to expand to the Western United States, and won acclaim for 

his topographical report from an expedition to the Nebraska and Dakota 

territories. He then returned to the Military Academy as an instructor of 

mathematics, the position he held at the outbreak of the Civil War. 

On 14 May 1861, Warren became lieutenant colonel of the 5th New 

York Regiment and soon saw action at the battle of Bethel Church. He 

was promoted to colonel and, while leading a brigade in the V Corps, 

was slightly wounded at the battle of Gaines Mill. Warren continued 

to see action in several more battles on the Peninsula. His brigade saw 

heavy action at the battle of Second Manassas, but was held in reserve at 

Antietam and Fredericksburg. 

Warren was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers and 

became the Army of the Potomac’s chief engineer prior to the battle of 

Chancellorsville. It was in this capacity that Warren earned his greatest 

fame by recognizing the importance of Little Round Top at Gettysburg 

and helping Union troops to secure that position. For several months after Library of Congress
406

the battle, Warren commanded the II Corps while Hancock recovered from 

his wounds. Warren then received permanent command of the V Corps 

prior to the Overland Campaign. Warren’s performance in this campaign 

has been the subject of some controversy; he certainly made several errors, 

but his high-strung personality and constant criticism of superiors’ orders 

probably magnified any mistakes. 

In the subsequent Petersburg Campaign, Warren rendered capable 

service, but again clashed with Meade and Grant because of his prickly 

personality. Warren suffered a sad end to his Civil War career when Major 

General Philip Sheridan relieved Warren of command of the V Corps at the 

battle of Five Forks just a week prior to Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. 

Warren had performed capably at Five Forks, but his constant clashes with 

his superiors and Sheridan’s short temper led to his relief. 

After the war, Warren stayed in the army and returned to engineering 

duties. Among his many engineering accomplishments was the design 

and construction of the Rock Island Bridge over the Mississippi River. 

Although a court of inquiry exonerated Warren for his performance at Five 

Forks, he died on 8 August 1882 before the court published its results.

John Sedgwick. Born on 13 September 1813 

at Cornwall Hollow, Connecticut, Sedgwick 

received his early education in local schools and 

then spent two years teaching. Just before turning 

20, Sedgwick entered the United States Military 

Academy, and graduated in 1837 ranked 24th in 

his class. Sedgwick had a particularly active career 

prior to the Civil War. He served in the fighting 

against the Seminoles and in the movement of the 

Cherokees from Georgia to Oklahoma on the Trail 

of Tears. After several postings in garrison duties, he served in the major 

campaigns of both Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott during the war with 

Mexico, where he was brevetted to captain and then major. 

In 1855, Sedgwick, who was originally an artillery officer, became 

major of the newly authorized 1st Cavalry Regiment. At the start of 

the war, Sedgwick briefly took command of the regiment before being 

commissioned a brigadier general of volunteers on 31 August 1861. 

While commanding a division in the II Corps in the Peninsula Campaign, 

Sedgwick was wounded at the battle of Glendale (or Frayser’s Farm) in 

June 1862. After recovering from his wounds, Sedgwick returned to lead 

his division at Antietam where he was wounded three times and carried 

from the field unconscious. Library of Congress
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After his recuperation (which caused him to miss the fight at 

Fredericksburg) and a brief period in command of the IX Corps, Sedgwick 

took command of the unit he would command until his death, the VI Corps. 

In the Chancellorsville Campaign, Hooker directed Sedgwick to take Mayre’s 

Heights and come to Hooker’s assistance when the bulk of the Army of the 

Potomac was heavily engaged at Chancellorsville. Sedgwick succeeded in 

taking the Heights, but when Hooker failed to maintain pressure on Lee’s 

forces, Sedwick was forced to go over to the defense at Salem Church where 

he successfully withdrew his force across the Rappahannock River. 

At Gettysburg, the VI Corps saw little action while acting as the army’s 

reserve. In the Overland Campaign, Sedgwick’s corps was surprised on its 

right flank by Gordon’s Confederates in the Wilderness, but eventually 

managed to establish a new line. Three days later, Sedgwick was positioning his troops at Spotsylvania when he was struck by a Confederate 

marksman’s bullet and died almost instantly.

Horatio Gouverneur Wright. Wright was born 

in Clinton, Connecticut, on 6 March 1820, where 

he attended local schools before receiving an 

appointment to West Point in 1837. Four years 

later, he graduated second in his class and joined 

the Corps of Engineers. Aside from a two-year 

assignment as an instructor at West Point, Wright 

performed engineering duties prior to the Civil War. 

This included extensive service in Florida, which 

kept him from serving in the Mexican-American War, where he assisted 

in constructing Forts Taylor and Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas islands. In 

1855, Wright was promoted to captain and became the assistant to the 

army’s chief engineer in Washington, DC.

Soon after the outbreak of the war, Wright assisted in the Federal 

evacuation of the Norfolk Naval Yard where he was captured by Virginia 

State troops who held him for only four days. For a time, Wright 

continued to serve in engineer positions, first in construction of some of 

the Washington defenses, then as the chief engineer for Heintzelman’s 

division at 1st Bull Run, and then as the chief engineer for the Federals 

in the Port Royal Expedition. Transferring to combat command, Wright 

was made a brigadier general of volunteers in September 1861 and led an 

expedition against the Florida coast in February 1862. He led a division in 

the Charleston Campaign before assuming command of the Department of 

Ohio, a position he held until May 1863. 

Wright returned to division command in May 1863, leading a division Library of Congress
408

of Sedgwick’s VI Corps at Gettysburg where it saw little action. Wright and 

his men played a more active role in the Battle at Rappahannock Station 

and Mine Run Campaign in November 1863. Wright was in command of 

this division through the early stages of the Overland Campaign. When 

Sedgwick was killed at Spotsylvania, Wright assumed command of the 

VI Corps. He led the corps through the rest of the Overland Campaign to 

include the bloody repulse at Cold Harbor. 

The VI Corps continued to serve with the Army of the Potomac during 

the beginning of the siege at Petersburg until July 1864, when Jubal Early’s 

Confederate raid on Washington prompted Grant to transfer Wright and 

his corps to the capital. The VI Corps joined other units in the area to 

form the Army of the Shenandoah under Philip Sheridan and drive Early 

south through the Valley, devastating the area as a source of supplies, and 

fighting successful battles at Winchester, Fisher’s Hill, and Cedar Creek. 

Wright’s corps returned to the Petersburg area, where it played a major 

role in breaching the Confederate fortifications and forcing Lee’s army 

into retreat and surrender in April 1865. 

After the war, Wright spent a year commanding the Department of 

Texas before resuming engineering duties. After reverting to his regular 

rank of lieutenant colonel, Wright worked his way to colonel and then 

brigadier general in 1879 when he became chief engineer of the army. 

Among his many projects after the war were various harbor improvements 

and construction of the Washington Monument. Wright retired in 

Washington, DC, where he died in 1899.

Ambrose Everett Burnside. Burnside was born in 

Liberty, Indiana, on 23 May 1824. He received a 

primary school education before apprenticing to be 

a tailor. At the age of 19, Burnside was appointed to 

West Point; he graduated 18th in the class of 1847 

and joined the army as a brevet second lieutenant 

in the artillery. Arriving in Mexico too late to 

participate in the fighting, he joined the American 

garrison occupying Mexico City. Not long after, 

he reported for duty on the southwestern frontier where he was slightly 

wounded in a skirmish with the Apache Indians. 

In 1853, Burnside resigned his commission and started a gun 

manufacturing company in Rhode Island. Although the breech-loading 

rifle he invented was an excellent weapon, he failed to get a government 

contract and eventually sold his company. After taking a job with a railroad Library of Congress
409

company, Burnside became active in the Rhode Island militia, reaching 

the rank of major general with the state’s home forces. At the start of the 

Civil War, Burnside organized a 90-day regiment, the 1st Rhode Island 

Infantry, and brought them to Washington. He commanded a brigade at 1st 

Bull Run and soon after was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers. 

He next commanded a successful expedition that seized a large strip of the 

North Carolina coast for the Union, earning him the rank of major general. 

A large part of Burnside’s force (designated the IX Corps) was transferred 

to Virginia in July 1862 and fought at 2d Bull Run, although Burnside 

himself missed the battle while working to funnel newly arriving troops 

to the front.

After turning down two offers to command the Army of the Potomac 

prior to the battle of Antietam, Burnside resumed command of the IX 

Corps in McClellan’s army for that battle. Despite some criticism for his 

performance at Antietam, Lincoln chose Burnside to replace McClellan, 

but the new army commander—after a promising start—led his forces 

to defeat at Fredericksburg. This defeat, coupled with undermining 

comments from some of his subordinates, led Lincoln to remove Burnside 

from command and place him in charge of the Department of Ohio. In 

the fall of 1863, returning to field command that included parts of his old 

IX Corps, Burnside successfully defended Knoxville against Longstreet’s 

Confederates. Burnside and the IX Corps were transferred back to the 

eastern theater in the spring of 1864, where they began the Overland 

Campaign reporting to Grant (rather than being assigned to the Army of 

the Potomac) due to Burnside’s seniority over Meade. The IX Corps saw 

action in all of the major engagements of the Overland Campaign in May 

and June 1864. During this time, Burnside was formally placed under 

Meade’s command. 

During the subsequent siege of Petersburg, Burnside’s corps was 

repulsed in the disastrous Battle of the Crater. In fact, Burnside had 

energetically supported the operation, but the Union defeat was too much 

for Burnside’s career to withstand. After a court of inquiry placed much of 

the blame for the crater on Burnside, he removed himself from command of 

the IX Corps and eventually resigned from the army in April 1865. Despite 

the disappointing end to his military career, the genial Burnside retained 

many friends who assisted him in gaining several business positions after 

the war. Burnside went on to serve as governor of Rhode Island for three 

terms and then as a United States Senator from his adopted state until his 

death in 1881.
410

William Farrar Smith. Smith was born in St. 

Albans, Vermont, on 17 February 1824. He 

graduated from West Point in 1847 ranking 

fourth in a class of 41 students. At West Point, 

Smith attained the nickname “Baldy,” which his 

friends would call him throughout his military 

career. Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers, 

Smith served in several survey and exploration 

duties before being assigned as a mathematics 

instructor at West Point. Later, he served in Florida, where he contracted 

malaria, and although he recovered, Smith had recurring bouts of weakness 

and depression from the disease for the rest of his life. 

At the start of the Civil War, Smith became colonel of the 3d Vermont Regiment before joining McDowell’s staff for the battle of 1st Bull 

Run. He was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers and commanded 

a division of the VI Corps on the Peninsula and in the Antietam Campaign. Smith then became commander of the VI Corps, which he led at 

Fredericksburg. In that campaign, he was one of the most vocal critics of 

Burnside, bordering on insubordination, which led to his removal from 

corps command and loss of promotion to major general. Smith then served 

in several minor positions before dramatically resurrecting his career by 

helping to restore the supply line to the Union forces under siege at Chattanooga in the fall of 1863, earning him back his major general’s rank. 

Impressed with Smith’s performance, Grant brought him east to command 

the XVIII Corps in Benjamin Butler’s Army of the James. Smith did little 

to support Butler’s efforts in the Bermuda Hundred Campaign, but found 

time to criticize his commander. His corps then joined the Army of the 

Potomac and fought tenaciously at Cold Harbor, but once again Smith 

criticized his superior officer—this time George Gordon Meade. 

When Grant shifted the Union forces south of the James River, 

Smith’s corps was given the task of taking a lightly defended Petersburg. 

Smith, who had witnessed the effectiveness of Confederate entrenchments at Cold Harbor, hesitated in front of Petersburg, spent most of 

the day conducting a reconnaissance, and failed to press home his late 

attack. The Confederates thus gained enough time to reinforce the city. 

Smith retained his command for about a month, but was relieved on 

19 July 1864. He remained inactive for the remainder of the war and 

then returned to his regular rank of major in the engineers in 1865. He 

served for two more years before resigning from the army and becoming 

president of a cable telegraph company and then a commissioner with 

the New York City police. Later he worked on many government harbor Library of Congress
411

and river projects as a civilian engineer. He died in Philadelphia on 28 

February 1903.

Philip Henry Sheridan. The circumstances and 

date of Sheridan’s birth are murky, with much 

of the confusion resulting from Sheridan’s own 

changing story. In any case, his memoirs put his 

birth at Albany, New York, on 6 March 1831. 

Soon after, Sheridan’s family moved to Ohio 

where young Philip received a primary education 

and worked in a store prior to his appointment to 

West Point. He graduated in 1853, ranking 34th 

out of 49 cadets. 

Sheridan was commissioned in the 4th Infantry Regiment and served in 

several frontier assignments until the opening of the Civil War. He started 

the war as a quartermaster and commissary officer and served as Henry 

Halleck’s quartermaster in the Union advance on Corinth. In May 1862, 

Sheridan became colonel of the 2d Michigan Cavalry Regiment. Several 

months later, Sheridan was made a brigadier general of volunteers and 

rose to division command, fighting at Perryville and Stone’s River where 

his division defended stubbornly against repeated Confederate attacks. 

At Chickamauga, Sheridan’s division was caught in the maelstrom of 

Longstreet’s successful breakthrough and driven from the field. Sheridan 

and his division redeemed their defeat when at Chattanooga—without 

orders—they joined in an attack on Missionary Ridge which routed 

Bragg’s army. Grant was impressed by the fiery Sheridan and made him 

the chief of cavalry for the Army of the Potomac when the two came to the 

eastern theater in the spring of 1864. 

Sheridan’s cavalry performed indifferently in the opening of the 

Overland Campaign, and he soon found himself quarreling with Meade 

over the role of the army’s cavalry. As a result of this argument, Grant 

allowed Sheridan to go on a raid toward Richmond that eventually led to the 

battle of Yellow Tavern and the death of Jeb Stuart. Returning to the Army 

of the Potomac just prior to the battle at Cold Harbor, Sheridan’s cavalry 

again achieved mixed results while trying to conduct reconnaissance and 

screening missions for the army. Not long into the siege at Petersburg, Jubal 

Early’s raid on Washington prompted Grant to send Sheridan to the capital 

with the mission of crushing Early and devastating the Shenandoah Valley 

so the Confederates could never use it as a supply source again. Sheridan 

took command of two infantry corps and three cavalry divisions, naming 

them the Army of the Shenandoah, and defeated Early at Winchester and 

Fisher’s Hill before laying waste to the Valley. Sheridan placed his army in National Archives
412

camp at Cedar Creek in October 1864 and went to Washington, DC, to meet 

his superiors. Early launched an attack, which surprised the Union force, 

but Sheridan earned the adulation of the North by riding to the battlefield, 

rallying the Federal troops, and crushing Early’s army. Sheridan received 

the rank of major general in the Regular Army and then rejoined the Union 

forces at Petersburg. 

In April 1865, Sheridan led a mixed infantry and cavalry force that 

smashed George Pickett’s Confederates at Five Forks leading to the Confederate withdrawal from Petersburg; one week later, he played a crucial 

role in bringing Lee to bay at Appomattox. Shortly after the end of the 

war, Sheridan commanded the Federal army on the border with Mexico 

that pressured Napoleon III to end his intervention in Mexico. Sheridan 

was less successful as a district commander in Louisiana and Texas during 

Reconstruction and was removed from that position for his overly stringent policies in 1867. Nonetheless, when Sherman replaced Grant as commanding general of the United States Army in 1869, Sheridan was promoted to lieutenant general. He served in a number of major commands 

during the Indian Wars and was the chief American observer during the 

Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71. In 1884, Sheridan assumed the duties of 

commanding general of the army, and in 1888, Sheridan was promoted to 

full general. He died in August 1888 at Nonquitt, Massachusetts.

Robert Edward Lee. Born in Westmoreland 

County, Virginia, on 19 January 1807, 

Robert E. Lee was the fifth child of noted 

Revolutionary War general Henry “LightHorse Harry” Lee. Henry Lee squandered his 

family’s money forcing them to move to a small 

house in Alexandria, where Robert received 

his early education. In 1825, Lee received an 

appointment to West Point and graduated four 

years later second in his class. Remarkably, Lee 

did not receive a single demerit in his entire four 

years as a cadet. Upon graduation, Lee was commissioned in the Corps of 

Engineers. 

Prior to the Mexican War, Lee performed his duties with distinction 

to include projects at Forts Pulaski, Monroe, and Hamilton, as well as 

superintending engineer for St. Louis harbor. In the Mexican War, Lee 

shone as one of the finest young officers in the army while serving on 

Winfield Scott’s staff in the march on Mexico City. Lee was brevetted 

three times for his gallantry and distinguished conduct. After the war, he Library of Congress
413

continued his outstanding service, first in construction of forts in Baltimore 

Harbor, then as superintendent of the Military Academy at West Point, and 

then as lieutenant colonel of the 2d Cavalry Regiment. Lee was on an 

extended leave at his home in Arlington at the time of John Brown’s raid in 

October 1859. He was given command of the detachment of marines that 

captured Brown, after which he returned to duties in Texas. 

When the South seceded, Scott recalled Lee from Texas and offered 

him command of the US Army (with the approval of Abraham Lincoln). 

Lee decided to go with his state, and he turned down Scott’s offer, resigning his commission on 20 April 1861. After arriving in Richmond, Lee 

received command of Virginia’s forces, and when these were incorporated 

into the Confederate Army, Lee received a Confederate commission, initially for brigadier general and soon after to the full rank of general. Lee’s 

first campaign in the war was in the western counties of Virginia (later to 

become the state of West Virginia), where he was unsuccessful due in part 

to the pro-Union sentiments of the local population. After this campaign, 

Lee spent a brief time inspecting coastal fortifications before returning to 

Richmond to become the military advisor to President Jefferson Davis. Lee 

returned to field command in June 1862, when he replaced the wounded 

Joseph E. Johnston in command of Confederate forces (soon to be designated the Army of Northern Virginia) fighting against McClellan’s Union 

army in the Peninsula. Lee wasted little time in seizing the initiative, and 

in the Seven Days Battles, he hammered McClellan’s forces, forcing the 

Federals to retreat from the doorstep of Richmond. He followed up this 

victory with another triumph over John Pope’s Federal army at 2d Bull 

Run. Based on these successes, Lee decided to invade the North, but a 

copy of Lee’s orders fell into Union hands, and McClellan, reappointed to 

command, was able to force Lee out of Maryland after the bloody battle 

at Antietam. 

Back in Virginia, Lee defeated Ambrose Burnside at Fredericksburg 

before achieving one of his most brilliant victories at Chancellorsville. In 

this campaign, Lee was heavily outnumbered, but he gambled—splitting 

his forces in the face of the enemy—and attacked Hooker’s exposed right 

flank, forcing the Federals to retreat. After this victory, Lee again decided 

on an invasion of the North, but his effort ended in defeat at Gettysburg 

in July 1863. In the Overland Campaign, Lee skillfully parried Grant’s 

attacks, but he found himself forced to rely increasingly on the defense, 

as his army was battered by the Federals’ repeated attacks. Finally forced 

into a siege at Petersburg, Lee was compelled to stretch his lines to the 

breaking point from June 1864 to April 1865. During this time, Davis 

appointed Lee as general in chief of the Confederate armies, but it was 
414

too late to have much practical effect on the war. Finally, in April 1865, 

Grant was able to penetrate Lee’s Petersburg lines, force the Confederates 

to retreat, and trap Lee’s troops at Appomattox, where the Confederate 

commander surrendered. 

After the war, Lee conducted himself with the utmost dignity, urging reconciliation between the North and South. He became president of 

Washington College (later renamed Washington and Lee) in Lexington, 

Virginia, where he proved to be an able educator while continuing to set an 

example of high morale character for his students. Lee died on 12 October 

1870 at Lexington.

James Longstreet. Born on 8 January 1821 in 

Edgefield District, South Carolina, Longstreet 

spent much of his youth in Augusta, Georgia. 

After his father’s death, Longstreet and his 

mother moved to Somerville, Alabama, the state 

from which he was appointed to West Point. 

He graduated from West Point in 1842, ranking 

54th in a class of 62 cadets. Commissioned as a 

second lieutenant, Longstreet served with the 4th 

Infantry Regiment in Missouri and Louisiana, and 

then in Florida with the 8th Infantry. He participated in the Mexican War 

with both Zachary Taylor’s army on the border and then Winfield Scott’s 

army in the march on Mexico City. Wounded at Chapultepec, Longstreet 

received two brevets for his gallantry during the war. Recovering from his 

wounds, Longstreet was promoted to captain in 1852, and then to major, 

as paymaster in New Mexico, in 1858. 

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Longstreet resigned his commission and traveled to Richmond to offer his services to the Confederacy. 

Longstreet soon received a brigadier general’s commission and fought at 

the battle of 1st Bull Run. After that battle, he was promoted to major 

general and fought at the battle of Seven Pines (Fair Oaks) on the Peninsula. His performance at Seven Pines was lackluster, but his strong leadership and determination in the ensuing Seven Days Battles earned him the 

everlasting respect of the Army of Northern Virginia’s new commander, 

Robert E. Lee. Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson became the army’s two 

“wing” commanders (later formalized as corps), and in this role, Longstreet launched a devastating attack that routed John Pope’s Federal force 

at 2d Bull Run. Longstreet and his corps then participated in the Maryland 

Campaign culminating in the battle of Antietam, after which he was promoted to lieutenant general. Valentine History Center
415

In November 1862, Longstreet’s corps repelled Ambrose Burnside’s 

attacks on Marye’s Heights at Fredericksburg, but he and his troops were 

on detached duties at Suffolk, Virginia, and thus missed the battle of 

Chancellorsville in May 1863. He rejoined Lee’s army for the Gettysburg 

Campaign where he and Lee often disagreed over tactics at the famous 

battle. Despite the disagreements, Longstreet played a major role on the 

last two days of the battle. After the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg, 

Longstreet and his corps joined Braxton Bragg’s army and were 

instrumental in defeating the Federals at Chickamauga. 

In the following months, he was less successful as an independent 

commander at Knoxville, where he was unable to take the city from 

Burnside’s Union forces. Longstreet’s corps returned east just prior to the 

opening of the Overland Campaign, and although he played an important 

part in stopping the Federal attack in the Wilderness, Longstreet was 

severely wounded in that fight and would not rejoin the army until the 

end of the Petersburg siege. Once back with the army in April 1865, 

Longstreet was with Lee in the retreat from Petersburg and the surrender 

at Appomattox. 

Although generally admired and respected by his fellow Southerners 

during the war, Longstreet became a controversial and, in some cases, 

reviled figure in the South after the war. He joined the Republican Party, 

and as a personal friend of Grant from the prewar days, Longstreet was 

appointed the US Minister to Turkey in 1880. Later, he was the commissioner of Pacific railroads under the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations. Longstreet also wrote his memoirs, which had several criticisms of 

Lee and other former Confederate leaders. His writings and Republican 

connections were certainly contributing factors to harsh attacks from 

Jubal Early and other Southern leaders (and writers) in the postwar period. 

He died on 2 January 1904, the last survivor of the Confederate high 

command.

Richard H. Anderson. Grandson of a famous 

Revolutionary War general, Anderson was born 

on 7 October 1821 in Sumter County, South 

Carolina. Anderson received an appointment 

to West Point, and graduated in 1842 ranked 

40th in a class of 56. After attending the 

cavalry school, he reported for duty with the 

2d Dragoon Regiment on the western frontier. 

He served with the Dragoons in the Mexican 

Military History Institute

War where he earned a brevet to first lieutenant 
416

for gallantry. Anderson remained with the regiment, reaching the rank 

of captain before resigning his commission to join the Confederacy in 

1861. He was present at the bombardment of Fort Sumter and succeeded 

P.G.T. Beauregard as commander at Charleston, receiving a promotion to 

brigadier general on 18 July 1861. 

After a short period as Braxton Bragg’s assistant in Pensacola, Florida, 

Anderson transferred to Virginia in early 1862, took command of a brigade 

in James Longstreet’s division, and fought in the Peninsula Campaign at 

Seven Pines, Gaines Mill, and Malvern Hill. In July, he was promoted to 

major general and took command of a division under Longstreet, who 

now commanded a “wing” (later officially designated a corps). Anderson’s 

division fought well at 2d Bull Run, Antietam, and Fredericksburg. While 

the bulk of Longstreet’s corps was on detached duty, Anderson’s division 

remained with Lee’s army and contributed significantly to the Confederate 

victory at Chancellorsville. In the reorganization that took place after this 

battle, Lee created a new corps under A.P. Hill, and Anderson’s division 

moved to this III Corps. His division was most heavily engaged on the 

second day at Gettysburg, where his troops joined with Longstreet’s attack 

on the Union left flank and center, although Anderson received some 

criticism for not attacking promptly with his full force. 

In May 1864, Anderson led his division competently in the Wilderness. 

After Longstreet was wounded, Lee selected Anderson to take over 

command of the Confederate I Corps. In what was probably Anderson’s 

best performance of the war, the new corps commander force-marched 

his men to Spotsylvania, arriving prior to the Federals and saving the 

crucial crossroads for the Southerners. Anderson commanded I Corps for 

the remainder of the Overland Campaign and most of the ensuing siege 

at Petersburg. When Longstreet returned to command in 1865, Anderson 

took command of a segment of the Richmond defenses. In April, when the 

Federals broke Lee’s Petersburg lines, Anderson and his Richmond troops 

joined in the Confederate retreat only to be routed and largely dispersed 

or captured at the battle of Saylor’s Creek. Because he no longer had a 

command and the war was near its end, Lee relieved Anderson and allowed 

him to return home just prior to the surrender at Appomattox. 

Anderson’s postwar life was spent in poverty as he passed through 

several jobs before finally becoming South Carolina’s phosphate agent. He 

died on 26 June 1879 in Beaufort, South Carolina.
417

Richard Stoddert Ewell. Ewell was born on 8 

January 1817 in Georgetown, District of Columbia, 

where he lived until he was nine and his family 

moved to Prince William County, Virginia. He 

graduated 13th in the West Point class of 1840. Ewell 

won a brevet for gallantry for his performance in 

the Mexican War and then served with the dragoons 

on the southwestern frontier, reaching the rank of 

captain prior to the Civil War. 

On 7 May 1861, Ewell resigned his commission and soon was promoted to brigadier general in the Confederate army. After commanding a 

brigade at 1st Bull Run, Ewell was promoted to major general and commanded a division under Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley Campaign. 

Ewell and his division were part of Jackson’s force that joined Lee’s army 

on the Peninsula and participated in the attacks on McClellan’s Union 

army during the Seven Days Battles in June and July 1862. Ewell continued to command his division at Cedar Mountain, but was wounded at the 

battle of Groveton, and because of the wound, lost his leg. Ewell received 

a wooden leg, to which he seemed to adjust well, but his recovery kept him 

out of action for nearly ten months, missing Antietam, Fredericksburg, and 

Chancellorsville. 

Ewell returned to duty at the time that Lee was reorganizing the Army 

of Northern Virginia after Jackson’s death at Chancellorsville, and he was 

named Jackson’s replacement in command of the Confederate II Corps. 

Ewell led his corps through the three-day battle at Gettysburg, but his performance in this battle has come under considerable criticism from some 

participants and historians, especially his decision not to attack Cemetery 

Hill on the evening of 1 July 1863. Nonetheless, he retained his command 

and performed credibly at the battle of the Wilderness. At Spotsylvania, 

however, Lee began losing confidence in Ewell, and the army commander 

was probably not overly concerned when Ewell took a leave of absence for 

his bad health at Cold Harbor. 

Ewell returned to active duty late in the war and took command of 

the Richmond defenses. His garrison joined in the Confederate retreat 

after Grant’s forces penetrated the Southern lines at Petersburg, but soon 

thereafter Ewell was captured in the Confederate disaster at Saylor’s Creek 

in April 1865. He was briefly imprisoned at Fort Warren, Massachusetts, 

and then released in August 1865. Ewell moved to a farm in Spring Hill, 

Tennessee, where he died on 25 January 1872. Library of Congress
418

Jubal Early. Born on 3 November 1816 in Franklin 

County, Virginia, Early was the son of a wealthy 

tobacco plantation owner. He attended local public 

and private academies in Lynchburg and Danville 

until securing an appointment to West Point. In 

1837, Early graduated from the academy in the 

top third of his class. Upon graduation, he served 

for a year with the 3d Artillery Regiment in the 

campaigns against the Seminoles, but then resigned 

his commission to study law in Franklin County. 

Early began his law practice in 1840 and was highly successful, rising 

to become the prosecuting attorney for Franklin and Floyd counties. During 

the Mexican War, Early left his law practice to serve as a major with the 

Virginia volunteers. After the war, Early practiced law until the start of the 

Civil War, while also serving for a time as a member of the state assembly. 

Early voted against secession at the Virginia Convention in April 1861, but 

did not hesitate to stay with his state after the Convention voted to join the 

Confederacy. He quickly entered the Southern army as a colonel and commanded the 24th Virginia Infantry Regiment at 1st Bull Run. After the battle, 

Early was promoted to brigadier general and commanded a brigade in the 

Peninsula, where he was slightly wounded at the battle of Williamsburg. He 

continued to lead the brigade at Cedar Mountain in the 2d Bull Run Campaign before succeeding the wounded Richard Ewell as division commander 

in September 1862. Early led the division at Antietam and Fredericksburg 

rising to major general. At Chancellorsville, Lee entrusted Early with a virtually independent role at Marye’s Heights and Salem Church. Early and his 

division returned to subordinate command under a new corps commander, 

Ewell, after Stonewall Jackson’s death, and he led the division at Gettysburg. 

Early had temporary command of Ewell’s II Corps during parts of the Mine 

Run Campaign in November 1864, and he took temporary command of the 

III Corps for an ailing A.P. Hill at Spotsylvania in the Overland Campaign. 

Early returned briefly to division command before assuming command of 

the II Corps from Ewell at Cold Harbor. This change later became permanent, 

and Early was promoted to lieutenant general. Lee detached Early’s corps 

in June 1864 and sent them to operate in the Shenandoah Valley. Initially 

successful, Early drove Federal forces north through the valley and threatened 

Washington. However, Union reinforcements from Petersburg joined the 

troops in the capital area, and led by Philip Sheridan, the Federals defeated 

Early at Winchester, Fisher’s Hill, and Cedar Creek, effectively ending 

Confederate use of the Shenandoah Valley. The remnants of Early’s force 

were dispersed by Custer’s Union cavalry at Waynesboro in March 1865. Library of Congress
419

After Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, Early made his way to Mexico 

where he hoped to revive some sort of Confederate effort. Eventually, Early 

gave up this endeavor and returned to Lynchburg, Virginia, to practice law. 

Early became the first president of the Southern Historical Society and began 

writing numerous articles that did much to create the romantic image of the 

“lost cause” of the Confederacy. He also vigorously defended Robert E. Lee 

while launching vicious attacks on the reputation of James Longstreet. Later 

in life, Early supervised the drawings of the Louisiana Lottery before dying 

on 2 March 1894.

Ambrose Powell Hill. Hill was born on 9 

November 1825 in Culpeper, Virginia. In 1842, 

he received an appointment to West Point and 

was slotted to graduate with the famous class of 

1846. However, Hill contracted an illness while 

on furlough during his junior year (there has been 

some conjecture that this was a venereal disease) 

and eventually graduated in 1847 ranked 15th 

in his class. Whatever the origins of his illness, 

Hill would have recurring health problems, 

especially in the later years of the Civil War. After graduation, Hill was 

commissioned in the artillery and sent to Mexico, but he arrived too late 

to see any fighting. 

Returning to the United States, Hill fought against the Seminoles in 

Florida and worked for the office of the superintendent of the Coast Survey. 

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Hill resigned his commission and joined 

the Confederate army as colonel of the 13th Virginia Regiment. Hill, in 

reserve at 1st Bull Run, was promoted to brigadier general in February 

1862 and then led his brigade into battle at Williamsburg in the Peninsula 

Campaign. Soon after, he was promoted to major general and received 

command of a division. Hill’s division fought superbly during the Seven 

Days Battles, after which his newly named “Light Division” became a part 

of Stonewall Jackson’s wing (corps) of the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Hill’s division fought at Cedar Mountain in the 2d Bull Run Campaign, and 

at Antietam they arrived just in time to blunt Ambrose Burnside’s attack, 

saving Lee’s army from near certain disaster. Part of Hill’s division was 

driven back at Fredericksburg, but the Confederates restored the line.

In May 1863, the Light Division participated in Jackson’s famous 

flank attack at Chancellorsville, and Hill briefly commanded Jackson’s 

corps after Jackson was wounded; however, Hill himself was wounded 

and turned command of the corps over to Jeb Stuart. Hill recovered from 

his wound, was promoted to lieutenant general, and received command National Archives
420

of the newly created III Corps in the reorganization of Lee’s army after 

Chancellorsville. At Gettysburg, Hill, perhaps ill, performed indifferently 

on the first two days of the battle, and Lee gave Longstreet temporary 

command of two of Hill’s divisions in Pickett’s charge on the third day of 

the battle. 

Hill was back in command of the III Corps at the start of the Overland 

Campaign in the Wilderness, but once again illness would plague him and 

he would have to give temporary command of the corps to Jubal Early 

during parts of the Spotsylvania and North Anna battles. Hill’s health 

improved enough to allow him to command his corps for the majority 

of the Petersburg siege. Even so, Hill was bedridden on the morning of 

2 April 1865 when the Union forces broke the thin Confederate lines at 

Petersburg. Once the breakthrough had occurred, Hill rose from bed, put 

on his uniform, and rode to the front to try to rally the troops. Two Federal 

soldiers saw Hill riding toward the front and killed the Confederate corps 

commander only one week before the surrender at Appomattox.

James Ewell Brown (Jeb) Stuart. Born on 6 

February 1833 in Patrick County, Virginia, Jeb 

Stuart was one of 11 children. Stuart’s father was 

a prominent politician in Virginia, and his mother 

was a pious woman who instilled faith and strict 

morals in her children. Young Stuart chose to follow 

a military career and obtained an appointment to 

West Point. He graduated 13th out of a class of 46 in 

1854 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 

the cavalry. He spent the majority of his time prior 

to the Civil War with the 1st Cavalry Regiment on the Kansas frontier, 

but he gained his greatest prewar fame by capturing John Brown during 

the latter’s raid on Harpers Ferry in 1859. Stuart was a subordinate to 

Robert E. Lee in this operation, and the two quickly established a lifelong 

friendship. 

Stuart had just been promoted to captain when the Civil War broke out, 

and he resigned his commission to become a colonel in the Confederate 

army and commander of the 1st Virginia Cavalry Regiment. Early in 

the war, Stuart gained fame for his exploits while serving under Joseph 

Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley and aggressively leading his cavalry at 

1st Bull Run. He was promoted to brigadier general in September 1861 and 

then further enhanced his reputation by providing Lee superb intelligence 

information for the Seven Days Battles while riding completely around 

the Union Army of the Potomac. In July 1862, Stuart was promoted to Library of Congress
421

major general and received command of the Army of Northern Virginia’s 

cavalry forces (initially division-sized and eventually a corps by 1864). He 

rendered skillful service in the 2d Bull Run Campaign by leading a raid that 

disrupted Union commander John Pope’s supply line and gained valuable 

intelligence. At Antietam and Fredericksburg, Stuart’s horse artillery was 

positioned against the flank of the Union army and it harassed and helped 

disrupt the Federal attacks. 

One of Stuart’s best performances of the war occurred at 

Chancellorsville, where he temporarily took command of Jackson’s 

infantry corps after Jackson was wounded. Stuart doggedly continued 

the Confederate attack that drove Joseph Hooker’s Federals across the 

Rappahannock River. Stuart’s performance in the following Gettysburg 

Campaign was less noteworthy. First, his cavalry was surprised at Brandy 

Station, and although the Confederates retained the battlefield, they had 

suffered a blow to their reputation. Second, Stuart attempted another grand 

raid around the Army of the Potomac in the week before Gettysburg, but 

he misjudged the time it took to complete the expedition and did not rejoin 

Lee’s army until the second day of battle at Gettysburg. Stuart did a better 

job of keeping Lee informed in the Mine Run Campaign in the fall of 1863 

and at the beginning of the Overland Campaign in 1864. After the battle 

of the Wilderness, Stuart and part of his cavalry force detached from Lee’s 

army to pursue Philip Sheridan’s Union cavalry that was conducting a 

raid toward Richmond. Stuart caught up with Sheridan’s raiders at Yellow 

Tavern on 11 May 1864, but during the course of the battle, Stuart was 

mortally wounded and died the next day.

Wade Hampton III. Born in Charleston, South 

Carolina, on 28 March 1818, Hampton was the son 

of a wealthy planter who had earned fame while 

fighting with Andrew Jackson at New Orleans in 

the War of 1812. Young Wade received an extensive 

private education before attending South Carolina 

College (now the University of South Carolina), 

from which he graduated in 1836. Hampton 

had studied law, but he did not practice, instead 

devoting his time to managing his family’s already extensive property. 

He was extremely successful and reputed to be the largest landholder 

in the South prior to the Civil War. In 1852, Hampton was elected as a 

representative to the South Carolina General Assembly, and six years 

later he became a state senator. 

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Hampton accepted a commission National Park Service
422

as a colonel and proceeded to organize the Hampton Legion, which he 

equipped, to a large extent, at his own expense. (The “legion” was slightly 

larger than a regiment and consisted of infantry, cavalry, and even its 

own artillery.) Hampton brought the legion to Virginia and was wounded 

at 1st Bull Run. He then became an infantry brigade commander and 

participated in the Peninsula Campaign. In May 1862, he was promoted to 

brigadier general. Hampton was wounded again at Fair Oaks, and after his 

recovery, he took over a cavalry brigade in Jeb Stuart’s cavalry division 

in July 1862. Hampton’s brigade had a small role at 2d Bull Run, and 

then performed skillfully in covering the Confederate delaying action at 

South Mountain in the Antietam Campaign. During the Fredericksburg 

operations, Hampton led several raids behind the Union lines, capturing 

Union prisoners and providing valuable intelligence. Hampton and his 

troops missed Chancellorsville because they were on detached duties 

south of the James River. Returning in time to fight at Brandy Station, 

Hampton received a slight wound while repelling a Union attack. He was 

with Stuart during the Gettysburg Campaign, which left a large part of the 

Confederate cavalry out of contact with Lee’s army. 

After rejoining the army, his brigade then fought in the heavy, but 

inconclusive, cavalry action east of Pickett’s charge on 3 July 1863. 

Hampton was severely wounded in this action, but he recovered, received 

a promotion to major general, and took over a division in the newly 

reorganized Confederate cavalry corps before the year was over. Hampton 

helped to screen Lee’s movements at the start of the Overland Campaign, 

before joining with Stuart in pursuit of Philip Sheridan’s Union cavalry 

that was conducting a raid on Richmond. Hampton’s division fought in 

the battle against Sheridan at Yellow Tavern in which Stuart was fatally 

wounded. Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee were the leading contenders to take 

over the cavalry corps, but Robert E. Lee hesitated to appoint a replacement. 

Eventually, Hampton emerged as the most reliable commander, fighting 

skillfully at Haw’s Shop and thwarting Union cavalry operations at 

Trevilian Station, and thus receiving formal appointment to command of 

the cavalry corps. During the Petersburg siege, Hampton gained further 

fame by leading the famous “Beefsteak Raid” behind Union lines and 

capturing the Federals’ herd of cattle. 

In January 1865, Hampton and part of his force were detached from 

Lee’s army and sent to join Joe Johnston who was attempting to halt 

Sherman’s advance through the Carolinas. Hampton was promoted to 

lieutenant general in February and commanded a corps under Johnston 

at the battle of Bentonville. At the war’s end, Hampton returned to his 

home state and opposed the harsh Reconstruction policies of the radical 
423

Republicans. He was elected governor of South Carolina in 1876 and 

served two terms before being elected a United States Senator in 1879. 

After serving his senate term, Hampton became commissioner of the Pacific 

Railways. He died at Columbia, South Carolina, on 11 April 1902.

425

Appendix E

Historical Maps of the Area

The maps in this appendix serve two major purposes. First, the maps 

should aid the staff ride leader in following the unit movements while 

reading the text. Second, the maps will help the staff ride leader to prepare 

visual aids to use during the field phase of the staff ride. It is recommended 

that in making visual aids from the maps, the staff ride leader expand the 

maps to about 20 by 30 inches, mount the maps, and cover the maps with 

plastic or acetate to waterproof them.

The maps are grouped into two sections. The operational maps show 

the major corps movements between the battles of the campaign. The 

tactical maps show the battles themselves, usually at brigade or division 

level. Within each of the sections, the maps are generally in chronological 

order. 

Willis

X

Ramseur/II

Hardin

X

Crawford/V

II

XXX

I

XXX

XXX

Sheridan

XXX

Stuart

Key for Historical Maps

Union Confederate

Infantry Corps

(operational maps)

Infantry Brigades

(tactical maps)

Cavalry Corps

Unit Size (corps); XX Division

X Brigade

III Regiment

Unit Designation (I Corps)

Unit’s Superior Commander

(Ramseur); and corps (II Corps)

Unit Commander (Willis)

Unit Movement

(operational)

Attack (tactical)

Retreat (tactical)
426

CulpepperCourthouse

Pony Mtn

Cedar Mtn Stony Mtn

Brandy Station

Railroad

Railroad

Orange &Alexandria

Kelly’sFord

US MineFord

Mine Run

River

Richardsville

Rappahannock

River

Rapidan

Bank’sFord

Richard’sFord

River

Rappahannock

Fredericksburg

Falmouth Chancellorsville

Hamilton’sCrossing

River

Massaponax

& Potomac

Fredricksburg

Richmond,

River Ny

River

Po

Aldrich

Todd’sTavern

Alsop Shady Grove

Church

Parker’sStore

WildernessTavern Wilderness

Church Locust

Grove

Orange

Road

Plank

Ely’sFord

CulpepperMine Ford

GermannaFord

River

Rapidan

Morton’sFord

SumervilleFord

RacoonFord

Verdiersville

NewVerdiersville

Unfinished Railroad

Orange Turnpike

Richard’sShop

Clark’s Mtn

RapidanStation

I

XXX

XXX

VI

II

XXX

XXX

III

XXX

V

II

XXX

XXX

IX IX Corps began spread along Orange and Alexandria RR from the Rappahannockto Manassas, approximately 25 miles to the northeast.

I Corps began 4 May located vicinity of Gordonsville and spread further to the Southwest. It reached Brock’sBridge, 10 miles to the south, on the afternoon of 4 May.

Movements into

the Wilderness:

4 May 1864

N

2 Miles 4 Miles 6 Miles

Map 64.

Operational Maps
427

CulpepperCourthouse

Pony Mtn

Cedar Mtn Stony Mtn

Brandy Station

Railroad

Railroad

Orange &Alexandria

Kelly’sFord

US MineFord

Mine Run

River

Richardsville

Rappahannock

River

Rapidan

Bank’sFord

Richard’sFord

River

Rappahannock

Fredericksburg

Falmouth Chancellorsville

Hamilton’sCrossing

River

Massaponax

& Potomac

Fredricksburg

Richmond,

River Ny

River

Po

Aldrich

Todd’sTavern

Alsop Shady Grove

Church

Parker’sStore

WildernessTavern Wilderness

Church Locust

Grove

Orange

Road

Plank

Ely’sFord

CulpepperMine Ford

GermannaFord

River

Rapidan

Morton’sFord

SumervilleFord

RacoonFord

Verdiersville

NewVerdiersville

Unfinished Railroad

Orange Turnpike

Richard’sShop

Clark’s Mtn

RapidanStation

I

XXX

XXX

VI

II

XXX

XXX

III

XXX

V

II

XXX

XXX

IX

Getty

Movement to Battle in

the Wilderness:

5 May 1864

N

2 Miles 4 Miles 6 Miles

Map 65.
428

Rowe

Tapp

Wilderness

Tavern

Wilderness

Church

Chancellorsville

Lacy

Alrich

Todd’s

Tavern

Piney Branch

Church

Block

House

Hart

Alsop

Spindle

Spotsylvania

Courthouse

Shady Grove

Church

Shady Grove Church Road

Corbin’s

Bridge

Block House

Bridge

Po River

Old Courthouse

Road

Catharpin Road

Catharpin Road

Furnace Road

Brock Road

Orange Plank Road

White Hall

Road cut by

Pendleton

Brock Road

Germanna

Ford Road

Orange Turnpike

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

II

XXX

III

XXX

II

XXX

Movement from the

Wilderness to Spotsylvania:

7-8 May 1864 N

1 Mile 2 Miles

II Corps reached

Todd’s Tavern at

1200 on 8 May

III Corps probed

toward Todd’s

Tavern on 8 May

I

XXX

I Corps

Parker’s

Store

Chewning

V Corps

II Corps reached Shady Grove

Church at 1100 on 8 May; at

1430 it was ordered to support I Corps at Spotsylvania.

VI Corps Reached Piney Branch

Church at 1200 on 8 May; at

1330 it was ordered to support

V Corps at Spotsylvania.

IX Corps reached

Alrich late on 8 May.

Map 66.
429

Hamilton’s Crossing

Fredericksburg

Todd’s

Tavern

Richmond

Rappahannock River

Wilderness

Tavern

Alrich’s

Chesterfield Mattapony River

Spotsylvania

Courthouse

Massaponax

Church

Richmond,

Ni River

Po River

Ta River

and Potomac

Fredericksburg

Railroad Guinea

Station

New

Market Bowling Green

Chilesburg

Telegraph Road

North Anna River

Little River

Beaver

Dam Station

Pamunkey River

Virginia Central Railroad

Hanover

Junction

Tailorsville

Hanover Courthouse

Goodall’s

Ashland

Station

Ground Squirrel

Bridge

Mountain Road

Allen’s Station

Hungary

Station

South Anna River

Yellow

Tavern Meadow

Bridge

Mechanicsville

XXX

Sheridan

XX

Davies

XX

Gordon XX

F. Lee

with Stuart

Lee

XXXX

XXX

Stuart

Grant

XXXX

XXX

Sheridan

Movements to

Yellow Tavern

8-11 May 1864

N

3 Miles 6 Miles

Map 67.
430

Moncure

Quarles’

Mill

Ox Ford Chesterfield

Bridge

Mount Carmel Church North Anna River

Jericho

Mills

Athens

Chesterfield

Station

Telegraph Road

Milford

Station

Penola

Church

Tyler

Chilesburg

Mattaponi

River

Polecat Creek

Poor

House

Wright’s

Tavern

Saint Margaret’s

Church

Harris’

Store

Golansville

New Bethel

Church

South River

Ta River

Bowling

Green

Downer’s Madison’s Bridge Ordinary

Lebanon

Church

Nancy

Wright’s

Corner

Spotsylvania

Courthouse

Ma River

Zion

Church

Ridge Road

Traveler’s Rest

Snell’s

Bridge

Massaponax

Church

Mud Tavern

Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad

Fredericksburg

Road

Stanard’s Mill Po River

Ni River

Matta River

Motley

Catlett’s Chandler

Littleton

Flippo

Movement from

Spotsylvania to

the North Anna:

21 May 1864

N

1 Mile 2 Miles

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

II

XXX

III

XXX

III II

XXX

II Corps

I

XXX

II Corps

Guinea

Bridge

V Corps

Map 68.
431

Moncure

Quarles’

Mill

Ox Ford Chesterfield

Bridge

Mount Carmel Church North Anna River

Jericho

Mills

Athens

Chesterfield

Station

Telegraph Road

Milford

Station

Penola

Church

Tyler

Chilesburg

Mattaponi River

Polecat Creek

Poor

House

Wright’s

Tavern

Saint Margaret’s

Church

Harris’

Store

Golansville

New Bethel

Church

South River

Ta River

Bowling

Green

Downer’s Madison’s Bridge Ordinary

Lebanon

Church

Nancy

Wright’s

Corner

Spotsylvania

Courthouse

Ma River

Zion

Church

Ridge Road

Traveler’s Rest

Snell’s

Bridge

Massaponax

Church

Mud Tavern

Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad

Fredericksburg Road

Stanard’s Mill Po River

Ni River

Matta River

Motley

Catlett’s Chandler

Littleton

Flippo

Movement from

Spotsylvania to

the North Anna:

Evening 21-22 May 1864

N

1 Mile 2 Miles

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

III

XXX

III

II

XXX

I

XXX

Guinea

Bridge

V Corps

(in two

columns)

II

XXX

IX Corps

VI Corps

I Corps

II Corps

III Corps

Map 69.
432

Moncure

Quarles’

Mill

Ox Ford Chesterfield

Bridge

Mount Carmel Church North Anna River

Jericho

Mills

Athens

Chesterfield

Station

Telegraph Road

Milford

Station

Penola

Church

Tyler

Chilesburg

Mattaponi River

Polecat Creek

Poor

House

Wright’s

Tavern

Saint Margaret’s

Church

Harris’

Store

Golansville

New Bethel

Church

South River

Ta River

Bowling

Green

Downer’s Madison’s Bridge Ordinary Lebanon

Church

Nancy

Wright’s

Corner

Spotsylvania

Courthouse

Ma River

Zion

Church

Ridge Road

Traveler’s Rest

Snell’s

Bridge

Massaponax

Church

Mud Tavern

Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad

Fredericksburg Road

Stanard’s Mill Po River

Ni River

Matta River

Motley

Catlett’s Chandler

Littleton

Flippo

Movement from

Spotsylvania to

the North Anna:

Evening 22-23 May 1864

N

1 Mile 2 Miles

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

III

XXX II

XXX

I

XXX

Guinea

Bridge

I Corps

III Corps

V Corps

VI Corps

IX Corps II Corps

Map 70.
433

Atlee’s

Station

Yellow

Tavern

Richmond

Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad

Chickahominy River

Virginia Central

Old

Church

Old Cold

Harbor

Cold Harbor

Bethesda

Church

Hanovertown

Dabney

Ferry

New Castle Ferry

South Anna River

Cump’s Creek

Enon

Church Haw’s

Shop

Littlepage

Bridge

Nelson’s

Bridge

Taylor’s

Ford

Railroad Hanover

Courthouse

Mangohick Church

Ashland

Ellott’s

Crossing

Concord

Church

Pamunkey

River

Bethel

Church

Pamunkey River

Mount

Carmel

Church

Hanover

Junction

North Anna Ri

Little River

ver

New Found River

Ox

Ford

Chesterfield Station St. Paul’s

Church

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

II

XXX III

XXX

II

XXX

I

XXX

II Corps

IX Corps

V Corps

VI Corps

III Corps

I and II Corps

Movement from the

North Anna to Cold Harbor

27 May 1864 N

3 Miles 6 Miles

Creek

Totopotomoy

Map 71.
434

Yellow

Tavern

Richmond

Creek

Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad

Chickahominy River

Virginia Central

Old

Church

Old Cold

Harbor

Cold Harbor

Bethesda

Church

Hanovertown

Dabney

Ferry

New Castle Ferry

South Anna River

Cump’s Creek

Enon

Church Haw’s

Shop

Littlepage

Bridge

Nelson’s

Bridge

Taylor’s

Ford

Railroad Hanover

Courthouse

Mangohick

Church

Ashland

Ellott’s

Crossing

Concord

Church

Pamunkey

River

Bethel

Church

Pamunkey River

Mount

Carmel

Church

Hanover

Junction

North Anna River

Little River

New Found River

Ox

Ford

Chesterfield Station St. Paul’s

Church

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

III

XXX

III

II

XXX

II

XXX

Totopotomoy

II Corps

V Corps

VI Corps

IX Corps

Atlee’s

Station

Brckrdg

XX

I

XXX

III Corps

II Corps

I Corps

Movement from the

North Anna to Cold Harbor

28 May 1864 N

3 Miles 6 Miles

Map 72.
435

Ashland

YellowTavern

Atlee’sStation

New ColdHarbor

BethesdaChurch

Old ColdHarbor

EnonChurch

Chickahominy River

Totopotomoy

Creek

Haw’sShop

OldChurch

Pamunkey River

New Castle

Ferry

Hanovertown

HanoverCourthouse

Cump’s Creek

Virginia Central Railroad Dabney Ferry

Nelson’sBridge

Pamunkey River Taylor’s Ford

Movement to

Cold Harbor:

Union Probes

29 May 1864

N

2 Miles 4 Miles

XXX

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

III

I

XXX

II

XXX

II

XXX

Brckrdg

XX

Russell’s DivVI Corps

Neill’s DivVI Corps

Birney’s DivII Corps

Barlow’s DivII Corps

Griffin’s DivV Corps

Map 73.
436

Chaffin’s

Bluff

City

Point

& Potomac Railroad

Central Railroad

Virginia

Richmond, Fredericksburg

& Petersburg Railroad Richmond

Richmond

Petersburg

& Petersburg Railroad

Riddell’s

Shop

Southside Railroad

Norfolk

Petersburg Railroad

Weldon &

Railroad

Bermuda

Hundred

Peninsula

Grant’s

Pontoon

Bridge

Wilcox’s

Landing

James River

James River

James River

City Point

White

House

Cold

Harbor

Chickahominey

Long

Bridge

Charles City

Courthouse

River

River

Appomattox

White Oak Swamp Creek

York River

Richmond &

Railroad

Bethesda

Church

Totopotomoy Creek

Hanovertown

Pamunkey River

Mattapony River

Hanover

Courthouse

Movement from

Cold Harbor to the

James River

12-14 June 1864

N

5 Miles 10 Miles

Malvern

Hill

Jone’s

Bridge

Drewrey’s

Bluff

VI

XXX

V

XXX

IX

XXX

II

XXX II

XXX

I

XXX XVIII

XXX

James

XXXX XXX

Beauregard

(part)

Windmill Point

Weyanoke Neck

III

XXX

XVIII Corps

embarks

13 June and

sails to Bermuda

Hundred

II Corps

crosses

14-15 June IX Corps

crosses

15 June

VI Corps

crosses

16-17 June

V Corps

crosses

16 June

XVIII Corps

arrives by boat

14 June

V Corps sets

blocking position

13 June, departs

14 June

Confedertaes

arrive after

Union V Corps

departs 14 June

Map 74.
437

Saunders’Field

Wilderness Run

Flat Run

Lacy Farm

WildernessTavern

Orange Turnpike

Orange

Turnpike

HiggersonFarm

Germanna Plank Road

Gordon

X

Early/II

Rice

X

Wadsworth/V

Denison

X

Robinson/V

Sweitzer

X

Griffin/V

Ayres

X

Griffin/V

Bartlett

X

Griffin/V

Cutler

X

Wadsworth/V

Stone

X

Wadsworth/V

Hays

X

Early/II

Pegram

X

Early/II

Daniel

X

Rodes/II Battle

X

Rodes/II

Jones

X

Johnson/II Johnso

Steuart

X

Johnson/II

Walker

X

Stafford

X

Doles

X

Rodes/II

Robinson

XX

Wilderness:

Saunders’ Field

and Higgerson Farm

5 May 1864, 1300 to 1500 hours N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Culpepper Mine Road

V Corps

hnsoJo n/II

hnsoJo n/II

Map 75.

Tactical Maps
438

HiggersonFarm

ChewningFarm

Widow TappFarm

Parker’sStore

Orange Plank Road

Unfinished Railroad

Unfinished Railroad

Brock Road

Eustis

X

Getty/VI

Walker

X

Heth/III

Wheaton

X

Getty/VI

Grant

X

Getty/VI X

Hays

Birney/II

X

Ward

Birney/II

McAllister

X

Mott/II

X

Brewster

Mott/II

Stone

X

Heth/III

Kirkland

X

Heth/III

Cooke

X

Heth/III

McGowan

X

Wilcox/III

Thomas McGowan

X

Wilcox/III

Scales

X

Wilcox/III

Lane

X

Wilcox/III

Wilderness:

Brock Road and

Orange Plank Road Intersection

5 May 1864, 1300 to 1500 hours

N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Confederate

Trains

Poague

Map 76.
439

HiggersonFarm

ChewningFarm

Widow TappFarm

Parker’sStore

Orange Plank Road

Unfinished Railroad

Unfinished Railroad

Brock Road

Eustis

X

Getty/VI

Walker

X

Heth/III

Wheaton

X

Getty V/ I

Wheaton

X

Getty V/ I Grant

X

Getty/VI

Hays

X

Birney/II

Ward

X

Birney/II

McAllister

X

Mott/II

Brewster

X

Mott/II

Brewster

X

Mott/II

Stone

X

Heth/III

Kirkland

X

Heth/III

Cooke

X

Heth/III

McGowan

X

Wilcox/III

Thomas

X

Wilcox/III

Scales

X

Wilcox/III

Lane

X

Wilcox/III

Cutler

X

Wadsworth/V

Baxter

X

Wadsworth/V

Stone

X

Wadsworth/V

Rice

X

Wadsworth/V

Car ol r l

X

Gibbon/II

Car ol r l

X

Gibbon/II Owen

X

W

Gibbon/II

ebb

X

Gibbon/II

Wilderness:

Situation at the

Opening of Hancock’s Attack

6 May 1864, 0500 hours

N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Confederate

Trains

Poague

Map 77.
440

Widow TappFarm

ChewningFarm

Parker’sStore

Orange Plank Road

Unfinished Railroad

Brock Road

Anderson

X

Field/I

Jenkins

X

Field/I

Perry

X

Field/I

Benning

X

Field/I

Wofford

X

Kershaw/I

Bryan

X

Kershaw/I

Humphreys

X

Kershaw/I

Confederate

Trains

Eustis

X

Getty/VI

Wheaton

X

Getty/VI

Grant

X

Getty/VI

Hays

X

Birney/II

Ward

X

Birney/II

McAllister

X

Mott/II

Brewster

X

Mott/II

Cutler

X

Wadsworth/V

Baxter

X

Wadsworth/V

Stone

X

Wadsworth/V

Rice

X

Wadsworth/V

Carroll

X

Gibbon/II

Owen

X

Gibbon/II

Webb

X

Gibbon/II

Gregg

X

Field/I

Poague

Henagan

X

Kershaw/I

Kitching

X

Independent

Heth and

Wilcox

(reforming)

XXX

Hill

Wilderness:

Longstreet Halts

Hancock’s Attack

6 May 1864, 0600 to 0830 hours

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Map 78.
441

Widow TappFarm

ChewningFarm

Parker’sStore

Orange Plank Road

Unfinished Railroad

Brock Road

Anderson

X

Field/I

Jenkins

X

Field/I

Perry

X

Field/I

Wofford

X

Kershaw/I

Bryan

X

Kershaw/I

Humphreys

X

Kershaw/I

Confederate

Trains

Eustis

X

Getty/VI

Wheaton

X

Getty/VI

Grant

X

Getty/VI

Hays

X

Birney/II

Ward

X

Birney/II

McAllister

X

Mott/II

Brewster

X

Mott/II

Rice

X

Wadsworth/V

Carroll

X

Gibbon/II

Owen

X

Gibbon/II

Webb

X

Gibbon/II

Poague

Henagan

X

Kershaw/I

Kitching

X

Independent

Wilderness:

Longstreet Turns

Hancock’s Flank

6 May 1864, 1100 hours

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Frank

X

Barlow/II

Carruth

X

Stevenson/IX

Leasure

X

Stevenson/IX

Mahone

X

Anderson/III

Stone

X

Heth/III

Harris

X

Anderson/III

Wright

X

Anderson/III

Perrin

X

Anderson/III

E. Perry

X

Anderson/III

Gregg and

Benning

(reforming)

XX

Field/l

Stone, Baxter,

And Cutler

(reforming)

XX

and Cutler

Wadsworth/V

Map 79.
442

Map 80.

Widow TappFarm

Orange Plank Road

Unfinished Railroad

Brock Road

Eustis

X

Getty/VI

Wheaton

X

Getty/VI

Grant

X

Getty/VI

Frank

X

Barlow/II

Rice

X

Wadsworth/V

Carroll

X

Gibbon/II

Owen

X

Gibbon/II

Kitching

X

Independent

Robinson

XX

V Corps

Leasure

X

Stevenson/IX

Miles

X

Barlow/II

Smyth

X

Barlow/II

Webb

X

Gibbon/II

Brooke

X

Barlow/II

Wilderness:

Lee Assaults the

Brock Road Position

6 May 1864, 1700 hours

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Bryan

X

Kershaw/I

Stone

X

Heth/III

Wright

X

Anderson/III

Anderson

X

Field/I

Henagan

X

Kershaw/I

Humphreys

X

Kershaw/I

Mahone

X

Anderson/III

Jenkins

X

Field/I

Wofford

X

Kershaw/I

Perry

X

Field/I

Perrin

X

Anderson/III

E. Perry

X

Anderson/III

Union IX Corps Approaching

Birney

XX

II Corps

Mott

XX

II Corps

N
443

Flat Run

Orange Turnpike

Gordon

X

Early/II

Seymour

X

Ricketts/VI

Hays

X

Early/II

Pegram

X

Early/II

Stafford

X

Johnson

Brown

X

Wright/VI

Neill

X

Shaler

Getty/VI

X

Wright/VI

Russell

X

Wright/VI Upton

X

Wright/VI

Bartlett

X

Griffin/V

Johnston

X

Early/II

Steuart

X

Walker

Johnson

X

Johnson

Wilderness:

Gordon’s Attack

6 May 1864, Evening

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Germanna Plank Road

Culpepper Mine Road

Map 81.
444

Denison X Robinson/V

Spotsylvania:

Warren’s Initial Attack

Laurel Hill

8 May 1864, 0830 hours

N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Humphreys X Kershaw/I

Trigg

Trigg

Spindle

J. Perry

Jones

Harrison

McCoull

Henagan

X

Kershaw/I

Coulter Robinson/V X Lyle X Robinson/V

Ayres Griffin/V X Sweitzer Griffin/V X

Bartlett X Griffin/V

Alsop

Pritchartt

Map 82.
445

Shelton

Trigg

Tinder’sMill

WidowTalley

Jones

F. Lewis

Hart Alsop

Talley

Graves

Pritchett

Hicks

Waite’sShop

Spindle

Harrison

J. Perry

Chewning

Pritchett Talley’s Mill Old Block House

Spindle

SpotsylvaniaCourthouse

Dabney

Trigg

McCoull

Landrum

Beverley

Beverley

Gayle

Alsop

Brown

Stevens

Harris

Hicks

XXX

VI

II

XXX

XXX

III

V

XXX

II

XXX

IX

XXX

Spotsylvania:

Movements on the Po and Ni

10 May 1864 N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

I

XXX

Po River

Gate

Ni River

Po River

II Corps advancesacross the Po River

Heth (III Corps) moves tocounter Hancock’s advance

IX Corps) advances pastGate and across the Ni River

Map 83.
446

A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

I

J

K

L

Shelton

Landrum

McCoull

Upton’s Order of Battle:A—121st NY G—43d NYB—96th PA H—77th NYC—5th ME I—119th PAD—49th PA J—2d VTE—6th ME K—5th VTF—5th WI l—6th VT

Doles

Walker Hays Witcher Stuart

Upton

Spotsylvania:

Upton’s Attack

Mule Shoe

10 May 1864, 1800 hours

N

Daniel

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Entrenchments

Mott

XX

II Corps

Map 84.
447

Brown

Landrum

McCoull

Harrison

Lane

Witcher

Steuart

Hoffman

Monaghan

Evans

Daniel

Ramseur

Battle

R.D. Johnston

Webb

X

Gibbon

Brooke

X

Barlow

Crocker

X

Birney

Brewster

X

Mott

Smyth

X

Barlow

Brown

X

Barlow

Miles

X

Barlow

Carroll

X

Gibbon

McAllister

X

Mott

Spotsylvania:

II Corps Assault

Mule Shoe

12 May 1864, 0430 hours

N

1/4 Mile 1/2 Mile

Owen

X

Gibbon

Ward

X

Birney

Confederate Picket Line

Confederate Picket Line

Walker

York

Map 85.
448

4

2 3

1

6

Harrison

5

Hoffman

Evans

Spotsylvania:

Confederate Response

Mule Shoe

12 May 1864, 0445 to 0700 hours

N

1/8 Mile 1/4 Mile

Confederate Counterattacks/Moves1—R.D. Johnston 0445-05002—Hoffman 0500-07003—Evans 0500-07004—Ramseur 0540-06005—Perrin 0615-07006—Doles 0515-0630

4

4

McCoull

Map 86.
449

Brown

Landrum

McCoull

Harrison

Hoffman

Daniel

Evans

Ramseur

Battle

Brooke

X

Barlow

Wheaton

X

Neiil/VI

X

Eustis

Russell/VI

Upton

X

Russell/VI

XX

Birney

II

Barlow

XX

II

Spotsylvania:

Reinforcements Arrive

Mule Shoe

12 May 1864, 0730-1000 hours

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

L. Grant

X

Neill/VI

Bidwell

X

Neill/VI

McGown Harris

Perrin &

Harris McGowan

Edwards

X

Neill/VI

Brown

X

Russell/VI

Wofford

Map 87.
450

Shelton

Trigg

Tinder’sMill

WidowTalley

Jones

F. Lewis

Hart Alsop

Talley

Graves

Pritchett

Hicks

Waite’sShop

Spindle

Harrison

J. Perry

Chewning

Pritchett Talley’s Mill

Old BlockHouse

Spindle

SpotsylvaniaCourthouse

Dabney

Trigg

McCoull

Landrum

Beverley

Beverley

Gayle

Alsop

Brown

Stevens

Harris

Hicks

XXX

VI

II

XXX

III

XXX

V

XXX

II

XXX

XXX

IX

Spotsylvania: Grant Shifts Left

and Lee Counters

13-14 May 1864

N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

I

XXX

Po River

Gate

Ni River

Po River

I Corps shifts toLee’s right flank

V Corps moves VI Corps moves

Map 88.
451

Shelton

Trigg

Tinder’sMill

WidowTalley

Jones

F. Lewis

Hart Alsop

Talley

Graves

Pritchett

Hicks

Waite’sShop

Spindle Harrison

J. Perry

Chewning

Pritchett Talley’s Mill

Old BlockHouse

Spindle

SpotsylvaniaCourthouse

Dabney

Trigg

McCoull

Landrum

Beverley

Beverley

Gayle

Alsop

Brown

Stevens

Harris

Hicks

XXX

VI

II

XXX

III

XXX

V

XXX

II

XXX

XXX

IX

Spotsylvania:

Grant Shifts Right and Attacks

17-18 May 1864 N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

I

XXX

Po River

Gate

Ni River

Po River

VI Corpsmoves

VI Corps attacks

II Corpsattacks

IX Corpsattacks

Map 89.
452

Yellow Tavern

Beaver Creek

Turnpike

Brook

Mountain

North Run

Church

Turner’s Run

Road

North Run

Chickaho

Upper miny River

Chickahominy

Bridge

Yellow Tavern

11 May 1864

0800 to 1400 hours N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

II I

Whickam

III

Reserve III

Reserve

II I

Whickam

III

Whickam

I II

Whickam

III

Custer

III

Lomax

III

Lomax

III

Lomax

III

Custer

III

Devin

III

Devin

III

Devin

II

Gibbs

I I

Gibbs

II II

Gibbs

I I

Gibbs

II

Map 90.
453

Yellow Tavern

Beaver Creek

Turnpike

Brook

Mountain

North Run

Church

Turner’s Run

Road

North Run

Chickahominy River

Upper

Chickahominy

Bridge

I II

Whickam

III

Reserve III

Reserve

III

Whickam

II I

Whickam

III

Whickam

III

Custer

III

Lomax

III

Lomax

III

Lomax

III

Custer

III

DevinIII

Devin

III

Devin

Yellow Tavern

11 May 1864

1400 to 1900 hours N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

III

Chapman

III

Chapman

III

Chapman

III

Custer

III

Custer

Map 91.
454

Thomas

X

Wilcox/III

)- Sweitzer(

X

Griffin/V

III

III

III

III

III

III

Bartlett

X

Griffin/V

Lyle

X

Cutler/V

Ayres

X

Griffin/V

Fisher(-)

X

Crawford/V

Units of Cutler’s Div(V Corps) attempting to rally

Fisher(-)

X

Crawford/V

Lane

X

Wilcox/III

Brown

X

Wilcox/III

Lowrance

X

Wilcox/III

North Anna:

Jericho Mills

23 May 1864, 1800 to 1830 hours

N

1/8 Mile 1/4 Mile

Jericho Mills

Map 92.
455

Wright

X

Mahone/III

Weisiger

X

Mahone/III

Saunders

X

Mahone/III

X

Harris

X

Perry

Thomas

X

Wilcox/III

Thomas

Wilcox (-)

XX

III Corps

Heth (-)

XX

I Corps

Heth (-)

Archer

X

Heth/III

XX

Pickett

I Corps

Kershaw

XX

I Corps

Henegan

X

Kershaw/I

Field

XX

I Corps

Perce

X

Birney/II

Egan

X

Birney/II

Mott

X

Birney/II

Curtin

X

Potter/IX

Griffin

X

Potter/IX

B’ster

X

Birney/II

B’ster

Willcox

XX

IX Corps

Rob’son

X

Cutler/V

Tyler

XX

II Corps

Crawford

IX Corps

XX

Ledlie

X

C’den/IX

Ledlie

Marshall X

IX Corps

Crittenden(-)

XX

IX Corps

Griffin

XX

IX Corps

Fox Mill

Anderson’s Tavern

Quarles’Mill

Chandler

North Anna River

North Anna River Ox Ford

ChesterfieldBridge

Fox

Virginia Central Railroad

Telegraph Road

Richmond, Fredericksburg

& Potomac Railroad

New Market

Little River

North Anna:

Lee’s Inverted “V”

and Ledlie’s Attack

24 May 1864, 1800 hours

N

1⁄2 Mile 1 Mile

Map 93.
456

SalemChurch Enon Church

Mill Creek

Crump’s Creek

Haw’sShop Atlee Station Road

HawHouse

II

I

Whickam

I

I

I

Wh

ickam

III

Whickam

I

II

Ruttledge 

III

Davies

III Whickam

III Rosser

III Rosser

III

Rosser Rosser III

I II

Gregg

II

I

Merritt III

avies

D

I

I

I

Davies

I II

Gregg

III

Davies

Haw’s Shop:

Both Sides Deploy

28 May 1864, 1100 to 1400 hours

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

I

Map 94.
457

SalemChurch

EnonChurch

Mill Creek

Crump’s Creek

Haw’sShop

Atlee Station Road

HawHouse

III

Whickam

III

Whickam

III

Whickam

III

Rutledge

II I

Davies

III

Whickam

III

Rosser

III

Rosser

III

Rosser

III

Rosser

Custer

I II

Merritt

III

Davies

I II

Davies

III

Gregg III

Davies

III

Rutledge

III

Rutledge

III

Chambliss

III

Chambliss

III

Chambliss

III

Chambliss

III

Chambliss

III

Chambliss

III

Merritt III

Merritt

II I

Merritt

II I

Merritt

I II

Devin

III

Devin

III

Devin

II I

Devin III

Gregg

III II I II I II I

Custer

Haw’s Shop:

Final Union Attack

28 May 1864, 1600 to 1800 hours

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Map 95.
458

Beaver Dam Creek

BethesdaChurch

Matadequin Creek Shady Grove Church Road

Old Church Road

Toon

X

Ramseur/II

Lockwood XX V Corps

XX Rodes II Corps Gordon XX II Corps

Pickett

XX

I Corps

Willis

X

Ramseur/II

Fisher

X

Crawford/V Hardin

X

Crawford/V

Ayres

X

Griffin/V Sweitzer Griffin/V X

Bartlett X

Griffin/V Kitching X Crawford/V

Cutler V Corps

XX

Cold Harbor:

Bethesda Church

30 May 1864, 1800 hours

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Map 96.
459

BeulahChurch

Cold Harbor

Gaines’Mill

New ColdHarbor

Cold Harbor:

Sheridan Holds

1 June 1864, Morning

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Keitt

X

Kershaw/I

X

Torbert

Merritt

Hagood

X

Hoke

Martin

X

Hoke

Colquitt

X

Hoke

Clingman

X

Hoke

Bryan

X

Kershaw/I

X

Torbert

Custer

X

Torbert

Devin

Wright’s VI Corps

Map 97.
460

BeulahChurch

Cold Harbor

New ColdHarbor

Cold Harbor:

Wright and Smith Attack

1 June 1864, Evening

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

Hagood

X

Hoke

Martin

X

Hoke

Colquitt

X

Hoke Clingman

X

Hoke

Grant

X

Neill/VI

Wheaton

X

Neill/VI

Edwards

X

Neill/VI

Bidwell

X

Neill/VI

Cross

X

Russell/VI

Penrose

X

Russell/VI

Keitt

X

Kershaw/I

Humphreys

X

Kershaw/I

Wofford

X

Kershaw/I

Bryan

X

Kershaw/I

Eustis

X

Russell/VI

Upton Eustis

X

Russell/VI Burnham

X

Brooks/XVIII Truex

X

Ricketts/VI

Smith

X

Ricketts/VI

Marston

X

Brooks/XVIII

Henry

X

Brooks/XVIII

Barton

X

/XVIII Devens

Drake

X

/XVIII Devens

X

Stannard

Martindale/XVIII

Map 98.
461

Cold Harbor

BethesdaChurch

Gaines’Mill

New Cold Harbor

BeulahChurch

Allen’sMill

Mechanicsville

Boatswain Creek

Walnut GroveChurch

Chickahominy River

Enon Church

Beaver Dam Creek

Shady GroveChurch

Haw’s Shop

Pole Green

Church

Old Church

Totopotomoy Creek

Ricketts

XX

VI Corps

Russell

XX

VI Corps

Neill

XX

VI Corps

Kershaw

XX

I Corps

Hoke

Martindale

XX

XX

XVIII

Corps

Devens

XX

XVIII Corps

Brooks

XX

XVIII Corps

Pickett

XX

I Corps

Field

XX

I Corps

Ramseur

XX

II Corps

Rodes

XX

II Corps

Lockwood

XX

V Corps

Griffin

XX

V Corps

Cutler

XX

V Corps

Crittenden

XX

IX Corps

Gordon

XX

II Corps

Heth

XX

III Corps

Wilcox

XX

III Corps

Willcox

XX

IX Corps

Potter

XX

IX Corps

Gibbon

XX

II Corps

Mahone

XX

III Corps

Breck’dge

XX

Barlow

XX

II Corps

Birney

XX

II Corps II Corps begins move

II Corps arrives

Breckinridgebegins move

Wilcoxbegins move

Breckinridge andWilcox arrive

Cold Harbor:

Both Sides Shift Forces

2 June 1864

N

1 Mile 2 Miles

Map 99.
462

Turkey

Hill

Cold Harbor

Gaines’Mill

NewCold Harbor

Boatswain Creek

BeulahChurch

Chickahominy River

Whea- ton

X

Neill/VI

Cross

X

Russell/VI

Robinson

X

Devens/XVIII

X

Eustis

X

Upton

Russell

VI

X

Horn

X

Schall

Ricketts VI

Grant

X Neill/VI

Bidwell

Neil/VI X

Edwards

Neil/VI

X

Marston

Martindale XVIII

XStannard

Brooks

XVIII

XBurnham X

Henry

Martindale XVIII

Stedman X

Gibbon/II

X

Tyler

Penrose

X

Russell/VI

Barlow/II

X

Byrnes

Gibbon/II

X

McKeen

Gibbon/II

X

Owen

X

Gibbon/II

X

Smyth

Barlow/II

X

Brooke

Barlow/II

X

Miles

Barlow/II

X

McD ll ’

Colquitt

X

Hoke

Clingman

X

Hoke

Hagood

X

Hoke

Martin

X

Hoke

Wofford

X

Kershaw/I

Lane

X

Wilcox/III

Wright

X

Mahone/III

Patton

X

Breckinridge

Wharton

X

Breckinridge

Weisiger

X

Mahone/III

Harris

X

Mahone/III

Finegan

X

Mahone/III

Sanders

X

Mahone/III

Anderson

X

Field/I

Hunton

X

Pickett/I

Gregg

X

Field/I

Humphreys

X

Kershaw/I Law

X

Field/I

Henagan

X

Kershaw/I

Cold Harbor:

Union Assault Positions

3 June 1864, Morning

N

1⁄4 Mile 1⁄2 Mile

X

Map 100.
463

Bibliography

The following bibliography is not meant to be comprehensive; instead, it is 

meant to provide the staff ride leader a list of sources to aid in research, augment 

this handbook, and assist in the preparation of the staff ride.

Official Compilations. The Official Records (OR) is the primary source for almost 

any campaign history and staff ride of the Civil War.

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union 

and Confederate Armies. US War Department, Washington, DC: US 

Government Printing Office, 1880-1901.

Campaign and Battle Studies. These studies include books that cover the entire 

Overland Campaign as well as individual battles. Of particular note are the works 

by Gordon Rhea that together form a multivolume history of the campaign in 

extensive depth with balanced judgment.

Baltz, Louis J., III. The Battle of Cold Harbor, May 27–June 13, 1864. Lynchburg, 

VA: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1994.

Cannan, John. The Wilderness Campaign, May 1864. Conshohocken, PA: 

Combined Books, Inc., 1993.

Catton, Bruce. The Army of the Potomac: A Stillness at Appomattox. Garden City, 

NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1953.

____________. Grant Takes Command. Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1969.

Dowdey, Clifford. Lee’s Last Campaign. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska 

Press, 1993.

Freeman, Douglas Southall. Lee’s Lieutenants. Three Volumes. New York, NY: C. 

Scribner’s Sons, 1942–44.

Furgurson, Ernest B. Not War But Murder, Cold Harbor 1864. New York, NY: 

Alfred A. Knopf, 2000.

Gallagher, Gary W., ed. The Spotsylvania Campaign. Chapel Hill, NC: University 

of North Carolina Press, 1998.

____________, ed. The Wilderness Campaign. Chapel Hill, NC: University of 

North Carolina Press, 1997.

Grant, Ulysses S. “Preparing for the Campaigns of ’64.” Battles and Leaders of 

the Civil War, Volume IV. Edited by Clarence Clough Buel and Robert 

Underwood Johnson. New York, NY: Castle Books, 1888.

Humphreys, Andrew A. The Virginia Campaign of ’64 and ’65. New York, NY: 

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1908.

Matter, William D. If It Takes All Summer, The Battle of Spotsylvania. Chapel Hill, 

NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988.
464

Miller, J. Michael. The North Anna Campaign, “Even To Hell Itself.” Lynchburg, 

VA: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1989.

Porter, Horace. Campaigning with Grant. New York, NY: Century Publishing, 

1897.

Rhea, Gordon C. Cold Harbor. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University 

Press, 2002.

____________. The Battles for Spotsylvania Court House to Yellow Tavern, May 

7–12, 1864. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1997.

____________. The Battle of the Wilderness, May 5–6, 1864. Baton Rouge, LA: 

Louisiana State University Press, 1994.

____________. The Battles of Wilderness and Spotsylvania. National Park Civil 

War Series, Eastern National Park and Monument Association, 1995.

____________. To the North Anna River. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 

University Press, 2000.

Robertson, William Glenn. Back Door to Richmond. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana 

State University Press, 1987. 

Scott, Robert Garth. Into the Wilderness With the Army of the Potomac. 

Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1985.

Siegel, Charles G. No Backward Step. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 

2000.

Smith, Gene. Lee and Grant. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1984.

Steere, Edward. The Wilderness Campaign. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 

Books, 1960.

Trudeau, Noah Andre. Bloody Roads South: The Wilderness to Cold Harbor, 

May–June 1864. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1989.

Venable, Charles S. “The Campaign from the Wilderness to Petersburg.” Southern 

Historical Society Papers (SHSP), Volume 14. Richmond, VA, 1873.

Unit Histories. This list represents only the works cited in this handbook.

Anderson, John. The Fifty-Seventh Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers in the 

War of the Rebellion. Boston, MA: E.B. Stillings and Company, 1896.

Hyde, Thomas W. Following the Greek Cross; or, Memories of the Sixth Army 

Corps. Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1894.

Mulholland, St. Clair Augustine. The Story of the 116th Regiment Pennsylvania 

Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion. Philadelphia, PA: F. McManus, 

Jr. & Co., 1899.

Stevens, Hazard. “The Sixth Corps in the Wilderness.” Papers of the Military 

Historical Society of Massachusetts, Volume IV.
465

Diaries, Letters, and Other First Hand Accounts. This list, like the unit 

histories above, represents only the works cited in this handbook.

Agassiz, George R., ed. Meade’s Headquarters, 1863–65: Letters of Colonel 

Theodore Lyman from the Wilderness to Appomattox. Boston, MA: 

Atlantic Monthly Press, 1922.

Alexander, Edward P. Military Memoirs of a Confederate. New York, NY: De 

Capo Press, 1993.

Armstrong, James and Varina D. Brown. “McGowan’s Brigade at Spotsylvania.” 

Confederate Veteran, Volume 33, 1925.

Boteler, Alexander R. Diary, 9 May 1864, in William E. Brooks Collection, 

Library of Congress.

Comstock, Cyrus B. Diary, 26 May 1864, Library of Congress.

Dowdey, Clifford, ed. Wartime Papers of R.E. Lee. New York, NY: Bramhall 

House, 1961.

Galwey, Thomas F. The Valiant Hours: An Irishman in the Civil War. 

Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Company, 1961.

Garnett, Captain Theodore Stanford. Riding with Stuart: Reminiscences of an 

Aide-de-Camp. Edited by Robert J. Trout. Shippensburg, PA: White 

Mane, 1994.

Grant, Col. Lewis A. to G. Norton Galloway, n.d. “Capture of the Salient.” 

Philadelphia Weekly Times, 18 November 1882.

Holmes, Oliver Wendell. Touched With Fire: Civil War Diary and Letters 

of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1861–1864. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 1946.

Humphreys, Benjamin G. “Sunflower Guards.” The J.F.H. Claiborne Collection, 

Southern Historical Collection. University of North Carolina.

McMahon, Martin T. “The Death of General John Sedgwick.” Battles and 

Leaders of the Civil War, Volume IV. Edited by Clarence Clough 

Buel and Robert Underwood Johnson. New York, NY: Castle Books, 

1888.

Meade, George, ed. The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade. Two 

Volumes. New York, NY: Scribner’s, 1913.

Michie, Peter S., ed. The Life and Letters of Emory Upton. New York, NY: D. 

Appleton, 1885.

Nash, Eugene A. A History of the Forty-Fourth Regiment New York Volunteer 

Infantry in the Civil War, 1861–1865. Chicago, IL: R.R. Donnelley 

& Sons Co., 1911.
466

Nevins, Allan, ed. A Diary of Battle: The Personal Journals of Colonel Charles 

S. Wainwright, 1861–1865. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & World, 

1962.

Newburger, Alexander. Daily Journal, 9 May 1864. Alexander Newburger 

Collection, Library of Congress.

Page, Charles A. Letters of a War Correspondent. Boston, MA: L.C. Page, 1899.

Sparks, David S., ed. Inside Lincoln’s Army: The Diary of General Marsena 

Rudolph Patrick, Provost Marshal General, Army of the Potomac. New 

York, NY: Thomas Yoseloff, 1964.

Taylor, Walter H. General Lee: His Campaigns in Virginia, 1861–1865, with 

Personal Reminiscences. Norfolk, VA: Nusbaum Book and News 

Company, 1906.

Tenney, Lumen H. War Diary of Lumen Harris Tenney 1861–1865. Cleveland, 

OH: Evangelical Publishing House, 1914.

Wheeler, Richard, ed. Voices of the Civil War. New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell 

Company, 1976.

Wilson, James Harrison. The Life and Services of General Smith. Wilmington, 

DE: John M. Rogers, 1904.

Wynn, B.L. Confederate Veteran. Volume 21.

Biographies and Autobiographies. The works listed below represent a limited 

selection of the biographies and autobiographies available on the participants in the 

campaign (the lives of Grant and Lee alone have spawned scores of biographies). 

Though selective, these works provide a good starting point to the study of the 

key leaders on both sides.

Cleaves, Freeman. Meade of Gettysburg. Norman, OK: Oklahoma University 

Press, 1960.

Freeman, Douglas Southall. R.E. Lee. Four Volumes. New York, NY: C. Scribner’s 

Sons, 1935.

Jordan, David M. “Happiness Is Not My Companion”: The Life of General G.K. 

Warren. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988.

____________. Winfield Scott Hancock: A Soldier’s Life. Bloomington, IN: 

Indiana University Press, 1988.

Grant, Ulysses Simpson. The Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant. Two Volumes. 

New York, NY: Charles L. Webster, 1885–86.

Longstreet, James. From Manassas to Appomattox. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 

University Press, 1960.

Marvel, William. Burnside. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 

1991.
467

Pfanz, Donald. Richard S. Ewell: A Soldier’s Life. Chapel Hill, NC: University of 

North Carolina Press, 1998.

Robertson, James I. General A.P. Hill: The Story of a Confederate Warrior. New 

York, NY: Random House, 1987.

Sheridan, Philip H. Personal Memoirs. Two Volumes. New York, NY: C.L. 

Webster, 1888.

Simpson, Brooks D. Ulysses S. Grant: Triumph Over Adversity, 1822–1865. 

Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 2000.

Thomas, Emory M. Bold Dragoon: The Life of J.E.B. Stuart. New York, NY: 

Harper & Row, 1986.

Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Blue. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University 

Press, 1964.

____________. Generals in Gray. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University 

Press, 1959.

Wert, Jeffry D. General James Longstreet: The Confederacy’s Most Controversial 

Soldier. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1993.

Wilson, James H. Under the Old Flag. Two Volumes. New York, NY: Appleton, 

1921.

Winslow, Richard Elliot, III. General John Sedgwick: The Story of a Union Corps 

Commander. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1981.

Wittenberg, Eric J. Little Phil: A Reassessment of the Civil War Leadership of 

General Philip H. Sheridan. Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002.

Other Sources. These last two books provide excellent information that does not 

fit into the categories above.

Frassanito, William A. Grant and Lee: The Virginia Campaign, 1864–1865. New 

York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1983.

Robertson, William Glenn. The Staff Ride. Washington, DC: US Army Center of 

Military History, 1987.

469

About the Authors

Dr. Curtis S. King is an associate professor for the Staff Ride Team, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and an adjunct 

professor at Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas. He graduated 

from the United States Military Academy with a B.S. in History and 

English Literature, and received a Ph.D. in Russian and Soviet history 

from the University of Pennsylvania. While on active duty, Dr. King 

served as an instructor at the United States Military Academy, a professor 

at the Combat Studies Institute, and spent a 6-month tour in Sarajevo, 

Bosnia, as a NATO historian. He retired from the Army in May 2002, and 

since October of that year he has been with the Combat Studies Institute. 

Dr. King has published numerous articles and entries to edited works on a 

wide variety of military history topics.

Dr. William Glenn Robertson is the Command Historian, US Army 

Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, and the Deputy Director, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Previous positions 

include Chief of Staff Rides, Combat Studies Institute; and Professor 

and Associate Professor, Combat Studies Institute. He received a B.A. 

in History from the University of Richmond, an M.A. in History from 

the University of Virginia, and a Ph.D. in History from the University 

of Virginia. Dr. Robertson’s published works include The Staff Ride; 

Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18–20 September 

1863; The Battle of Chickamauga; and numerous other publications and 

articles.

Lieutenant Colonel Steven E. Clay is the Chief of the Research and 

Publications Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Previous assignments at Fort Leavenworth include Chief of the Staff Ride 

Team and Executive Officer of the Combat Studies Institute. He received 

a B.A. in History from North Georgia College, an M.A. in History from 

Southwest Texas State University, and graduated from the US Army 

Command and General Staff College. LTC Clay’s published works include 

Blood and Sacrifice: A History of the 16th Infantry from the Civil War to 

the Gulf War; several entries in the Historical Dictionary of the United 

States Army; and various articles for professional magazines.