Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

FEMA: In or Out?
 

OIG-09-25 February 2009 
OIG 


Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Introduction 

“Since the end of World War II, Congress and Presidents have 

debated, formulated, and revised administrative responsibilities for 

emergency management.”1

 Some of the important questions that 

have been the subject of debate over the past 60 years, and that are 

particularly relevant today in the “FEMA In or Out” debate, 

include: 

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What the jurisdictional boundaries of the agency charged 

with emergency management should be; 

How responsibility for new or emerging threats should be 

assigned; 

Whether it is necessary (or advisable) to distinguish 

between natural and manmade threats; 

What is meant by “all-hazards,” and what elements need to 

be present in an agency with an all-hazards mission; 

What the relationship between crisis management and 

consequence management should be; and 

What the relationships among the federal, state and local 

governments should be during a disaster, and whether the 

relationships should change in the face of a catastrophe. 

On December 17, 2008, Congressman James L. Oberstar, 

Chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure, reopened the debate by submitting a memorandum 

to President-elect Barack H. Obama, recommending that the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) “be re-instated 

as an independent, cabinet-level agency reporting directly to the 

President.”2

 Two days later, Congressman Bennie G. Thompson, 

Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, 

recommended the opposite–that FEMA remain a part of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), warning that “FEMA 

removal from DHS would likely result in the hamstringing of 

1

 Henry B. Hogue and Keith Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Organization: 


Historical Developments and Legislative Options, Congressional Research Service (RL33369), June 1,
 

2006, p. 4. 


2

 Memorandum from Congressman James L. Oberstar to President-elect Barack H. Obama, Subject: An 


Independent FEMA, December 17, 2008. 


1 

 

federal grants, preparedness, and efforts to coordinate with State 

and local emergency managers. It would also likely undermine our 

ability to mount an effective response to disasters. Instead, our 

efforts must be focused on providing FEMA with needed resources 

and the organizational structure to perform successfully from 

within the DHS.”3 

In the past few months, as the federal government prepared for the 

transition to a new administration, others also began to weigh in on 

whether FEMA should be a part of DHS or whether it should be 

pulled out and made a stand-alone agency. The question is not 

new. FEMA’s inclusion in DHS has been the subject of intense 

debate in Congress, including during consideration of both the 

legislation that created the department, the Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), and the legislation passed in the wake of 

Hurricane Katrina, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act of 2006, (P.L. 109-295, Title VI – National Emergency 

Management, of the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act of 2007, hereinafter Post-Katrina Reform Act). 

In both instances, after much consideration and debate, Congress 

voted to include FEMA in DHS. 

In an effort to help focus and inform the current debate, we present 

in this white paper some of the important elements that should be 

considered when deciding FEMA’s placement in the federal 

government. 4 

3

 Memorandum from Congressman Bennie G. Thompson to President-elect Barack H. Obama, Re: A 


Strong, Effective Federal Emergency Management Agency, December 19, 2008. 


4 We performed nonaudit services to offer a summary of important arguments that should be considered 


when deciding FEMA’s placement within the federal government. 


2 

Background 

Emergency Management from 1950–1979 

The Federal Emergency Management Agency, created by 

Executive Order in 1979, is a product of the Carter administration. 

However, the federal government’s participation in emergency 

management has a long history. Prior to 1950, disaster relief was 

handled largely on an ad hoc basis, generally by the Office of 

Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President. 

This approach changed in 1950, when federal disaster relief was 

formalized in the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-875). The 

Disaster Relief Act authorized federal agencies, through the 

authority of the President, to provide assistance to states and 

localities when state and local capabilities had been overwhelmed 

by a major disaster or catastrophe. 

In 1951, President Truman delegated emergency management 

authorities vested in him by the Disaster Relief Act to the Housing 

and Home Finance Administrator. The Housing and Home 

Finance Administration held these responsibilities only until 1953, 

when authority was transferred to the Federal Civil Defense 

Administration, which had as its primary focus responding to “the 

potential damage of devastating modern weapons.”5 This is worth 

noting because it demonstrates another point in history when the 

federal government’s emergency management function was 

focused on both natural and manmade disasters. In fact, 

throughout the 1950s, military and civil defense capabilities 

received shared focus. Further, responsibility for carrying out 

federal emergency management functions fluctuated between 

civilian agencies, defense agencies, and the White House. 

Another major reorganization of emergency management functions 

occurred in 1961, after President Kennedy ordered a review of 

non-military defense and mobilization programs. Many 

operational civil defense functions were transferred to the 

Department of Defense (DOD), while some coordinating functions 

remained housed in the Executive Office of the President. Other 

functions were delegated to civilian agencies, including the 

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department 

of Agriculture. This reorganization resulted in a gap between civil 

defense and response to natural disasters. 

5

 Hogue and Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Organization, p. 6. 

3 

Emergency management saw more changes in the late 1960s and 

early 1970s. The Disaster Relief Act of 1969 (P.L. 91-79) 

expanded the federal government’s disaster relief responsibilities 

and delegated a number of responsibilities to the Office of 

Emergency Preparedness, housed in the Executive Office of the 

President. However, in 1973, the Office of Emergency 

Preparedness was abolished and many responsibilities were 

delegated to the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 

the General Services Administration, and the Department of the 

Treasury. Civil defense responsibilities remained in the DOD but 

were now housed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.6 

According to Hogue and Bea, however, “the dispersal of 

emergency management functions among federal agencies did not 

resolve administration challenges,”7

 and a 1977 study by the 

National Governors Association recommended that federal 

emergency preparedness and disaster relief responsibilities be 

consolidated into one office.8 

FEMA’s Early Years, 1979–1992 

In 1979, President Carter established FEMA as an independent 

agency, consolidating “more than 100 programs responsible for all 

kinds of disasters with those responsible for long-term preparation 

and quick response.”9 Agencies and functions that had been in the 

Departments of Defense, Commerce, and Housing and Urban 

Development, the General Services Administration, and the 

Executive Office of the President were folded into this new 

agency, and the modern-day FEMA was born. However, “Carter’s 

recipe for centralizing disaster policy never achieved his original 

goals, and emergency management remained fragmented and 

broken.”10 Criticism of the federal government’s disaster response 

efforts did not end; in 1983, 4 years after its creation, FEMA still 

struggled to become a “cohesive, effective organization.”11 At the 

end of the 1980s, in the wake of Hurricane Hugo and the Loma 

Prieta Earthquake, assessments indicated that while FEMA had 

improved, there were still shortcomings. After Hurricane Hugo, 

Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings called FEMA “the sorriest bunch 

6

 Ibid. 


7

 Ibid, p. 13. 


8

 Ibid. 


9

 Patrick Roberts, “FEMA After Katrina: Redefining Responsiveness,” Policy Review, June/July 2006, 


available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3402076.html. 


10 Ibid. 


11 Hogue and Bea, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Organization, p. 14. 


4 

of bureaucratic jackasses I’ve ever known.”12 The following year, 

after disasters in California, Representative Norman Y. Mineta 

claimed that FEMA “could screw up a two-car parade.” 13 

Criticism of FEMA was again severe after 1992’s Hurricane 

Andrew caused approximately $30 billion in damage in south 

Florida and left 160,000 people homeless.14 

The Witt Era, 1993–2001 

After taking office in 1993, President Clinton ushered in a new era 

at FEMA, one closely identified with James Lee Witt, the FEMA 

Director appointed by Clinton. Witt inherited an agency that was 

struggling and demoralized, and had “a reputation as a haven for 

White House cronies and incompetents.”15 In choosing a director 

for FEMA, then an independent agency, President Clinton looked 

to someone who was not just a political supporter, but who actually 

had experience in the field of emergency management. Witt had 

served under then-Arkansas Governor Clinton as the director of the 

state’s Office of Emergency Services for 4 years. 

In 1996, 3 years into Witt’s tenure, President Clinton elevated 

FEMA’s status to a Cabinet-level agency. FEMA was then what 

some are calling for now–an independent, Cabinet-level agency, 

with a director who had a direct line to the President. As evidence 

of Witt’s status and ability to communicate directly with the 

President, one article states that “while previous FEMA directors 

might have struggled for time with the President, Witt was invited 

to the White House for movie nights.”16 

By most accounts, Witt was successful at turning around this 

troubled agency, and FEMA generally performed well during the 

Witt years. Witt is also credited with bringing an all-hazards, allphases approach to FEMA.17 The agency did not escape all 

criticism, however. Some critics suggest that the “all-hazards 

approach” actually focused more on natural disasters, and the areas 

of civil defense and terrorism were neglected. One FEMA 

employee is quoted as saying, “some will say he introduced all 

hazards. I say he reduced the importance of some hazards at the 

12 Roberts, “FEMA After Katrina.” 


13 Ibid. 


14 Ibid. 


15 Justin Rood, “FEMA’s Decline,” Government Executive, October 1, 2005, available at 


http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?filepath=/features/1005-01/1005-01s2.htm. 
 16 Roberts, “FEMA After Katrina.” 


17 Ibid. 


5 

expense of others.”18 One analyst suggests that Witt “had refused 

to take on more responsibility for terrorism preparedness because 

he thought the threat was too unpredictable for the agency to be 

able to address effectively.” 19 Unpredictable as it is, terrorism was 

a threat, and this became all too apparent on September 11, 2001 

(hereinafter 9/11). 

Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 2001–2005 

Although most Americans were not thinking about the threat of 

terrorism prior to 9/11, officials in Washington were. The U.S. 

Commission on National Security/21st Century, commonly 

referred to as the Hart-Rudman Commission (after its co-chairs, 

former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman), was established 

in 1998 “out of a conviction that the entire range of U.S. national 

security policies and processes required reexamination in light of 

new circumstances. Those circumstances encompass not only the 

changed geopolitical reality after the Cold War, but also the 

significant technological, social, and intellectual changes that are 

occurring.”20 In short, the purpose of the Commission was to 

engage in a comprehensive review of U.S. national security 

requirements for the 21st century and develop a strategy and 

implementation “roadmap” for the future. 

After several years of study, the Commission suggested that the 

terrorist threat was real and that national security needed a major 

overhaul. One of their primary recommendations was to create a 

National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) responsible for 

planning, coordinating, and integrating federal homeland security 

functions. Their vision was to make FEMA the centerpiece of the 

NHSA and transfer three federal agencies “on the front line of 

border security” – the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the 

Border Patrol – into the new agency. They envisioned NHSA 

having three directorates – Prevention, Critical Infrastructure, and 

Emergency Preparedness and Response.21 

It is important to note here that during the time of the HartRudman Commission’s activities, the nation inaugurated a new 

President, George W. Bush. While FEMA remained an 

independent agency under Bush, the President did not include 

18 Ibid. 


19 Ibid. 


20 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security: 


Imperative for Change: The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century,
 

February 15, 2001, p. v.


21 Ibid. 


6 

FEMA’s new director, Joe Albaugh, as a member of his Cabinet. 

Unlike James Lee Witt, Albaugh did not come to the position with 

emergency management experience; he came as the former 

campaign manager for the President. 

On March 21, 2001, Congressman Mac Thornberry introduced 

H.R.1158, a bill to establish the National Homeland Security 

Agency. The bill was referred to the Government Reform 

Committee, and subcommittee hearings were held, but there was 

no further legislative action. In a sense, the legislation was 

overcome by events when the terrorist attacks of 9/11 occurred, 

and on October 11, 2001, Senator Joseph Lieberman introduced 

S.1534, a bill to establish the Department of National Homeland 

Security. Eventually, it was H.R. 5005 that was signed into law, 

creating the Department of Homeland Security and transferring 

FEMA to the new department. 

DHS officially began its operations in March 2003, when 22 

federal agencies were merged. Its multiple missions included 

“preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the United 

States, reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing the 

damages from attacks that occur, and helping the nation recover 

from any attacks.”22 

FEMA underwent several transformations between 2001 and 2005, 

but the most significant by far was the transfer of its functions, 

personnel, resources, and authorities to the Emergency 

Preparedness and Response Directorate of the newly-created 

Department of Homeland Security. Shortly after the transfer, 

members of the emergency management community began 

complaining that DHS was stripping FEMA of its authorities and 

resources, and that the department’s overwhelming focus on 

terrorism, to the detriment of attention to natural disasters, was 

hurting morale. Critics argued that FEMA was beginning to suffer 

a “brain drain,” losing experienced professionals in all aspects of 

emergency management. In late summer of 2005, when Hurricane 

Katrina hit the Gulf Coast, FEMA’s division directors for 

preparedness, response, and recovery had left; FEMA had 500 

vacancies; and 8 of its 10 regional offices were headed by “acting” 

directors.23 

22 David M. Walker, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission 

and Management Functions, Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland 

Security (GAO-07-1240T), September 18, 2007, p. 2. 23 U.S. House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to 

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, February 15, 2006. 

7 

FEMA Post-Katrina, 2005–Present 

There is no need here to recap FEMA’s shortcomings in 

responding to Hurricane Katrina. Extensive studies have been 

done and numerous experts have written about what went wrong. 

It is important, however, to outline some critical changes that 

occurred post-Katrina. 

In October 2006, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act was signed into law. The Act contained provisions that 

directly addressed what were perceived as the major shortcomings 

of FEMA and its response to Hurricane Katrina. The Act made 

FEMA a distinct entity within DHS and placed restrictions on 

actions that the Secretary of DHS can take affecting FEMA, 

directed that the FEMA Administrator [sometimes referred to as 

FEMA Director] report directly to the Secretary, created a direct 

line of communication between the FEMA Administrator and the 

President during times of emergency, and restored to FEMA many 

of the functions that had been transferred to other parts of the 

department.24 

While FEMA has not again faced a catastrophe on the scale of 

Hurricane Katrina, it has generally been perceived as performing 

relatively well in responding to disasters in the past few years. 

Arguments for Keeping FEMA in DHS 

Despite generally positive reviews of FEMA’s performance in the 

most recent disasters, calls to return FEMA to its independentagency status have been renewed. The arguments for this proposal 

are discussed below, but before addressing them, we will outline 

the arguments for leaving FEMA in DHS. These include, 

especially, the nation’s current vulnerability to terrorism, the 

synergy and resources FEMA enjoys as part of DHS, and the 

importance of avoiding the stovepiping of preparedness and 

response functions. 

Vulnerability to Terrorism 

Our last two presidents, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and the 

current U.K. Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, all had to deal with a 

24 Government Accountability Office, Letter to Congressional Requesters, Actions Taken to Implement the 

Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (GAO-09-59R), November 21, 2008. 

8 

major terrorist attack in their respective countries during their first 

year in office. While there have been no recent reports of a 

specific imminent threat, some argue that the United States faces 

an increased risk of a terrorist event during the first year of the new 

presidency.25 In November 2008, shortly before the Presidential 

election, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell told 

intelligence officials that the new administration might be tested by 

a terrorist attack during its first year, citing, “the World Trade 

Center was attacked in the first year of President Clinton, and the 

second attack was in the first year of President Bush.”26 Presidentelect Barack Obama made a statement to this effect during a recent 

interview, saying that it was “important to get a national security 

team in place, because transition periods are potentially times of 

vulnerability to a terrorist attack,”27 and Vice President-elect Joe 

Biden warned that “it will not be six months before the world tests 

Barack Obama like they did John Kennedy.”28 

We simply cannot predict whether there will be a terrorist attack in 

this country in the next year. Given that there is an elevated risk of 

this happening, however, we must consider whether it makes sense 

to make major changes to our homeland security apparatus during 

this period. It is critical to note here that the talk of removing 

FEMA from DHS generally focuses on the perceived benefits to 

FEMA–on which not all sides agree. What is not always included 

in the debate is consideration of the effect that FEMA’s removal 

would have on the department. 

Since 2003, a number of support functions for the different 

components of DHS have been interwoven. A reorganization 

would impact not only FEMA, which would have to reconstitute 

itself as a stand-alone agency, but also DHS as a whole, which 

would have to adjust to losing an important component. Don Kettl 

warns that “FEMA has gone through a long and wrenching series 

of reorganizations.... Change for the sake of change could simply 

induce organizational whiplash and further destabilize an already 

unstable organization.”29 John Harrald warns that pulling FEMA 

25 Homeland Security Presidential Transition Initiative, Protecting the Homeland from Day One: A 


Transition Plan, Prepared by Third Way and the Center for American Progress and Action Fund, 


November 2008. 


26 Peter Bergen, “Safe at Home,” The New York Times, December 14, 2008. 
 27 Don Gonyea, “Obama: Seamless Security Transition A Priority,” Morning Edition, November 17, 2008, 


available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=97078485. 
 28 Michael Abramowitz, “Biden Warns World Will ‘Test’ Obama, Prompting McCain Response,” The 


Washington Post, October 20, 2008, available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/thetrail/2008/10/20/biden_warns_world_will_test_ob.html. 


29 Donald F. Kettl, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 


Affairs, National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong? June 8, 2006, p. 2. 


9 

 

out of DHS would mean a difficult transition period and the 

rewriting of doctrine and the redesign of systems, “but natural 

hazards and terrorists are not going to wait for us to reorganize yet 

again.”30 

Ongoing Reviews 

It is clear that removing FEMA from DHS at this point would 

cause considerable upheaval, to both FEMA and the department. 

Such action should not be taken without very careful consideration. 

At this time, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) 

is underway at DHS, and the first QHSR report is due in December 

2009. This comprehensive review of the department was 

mandated by Congress in the Implementing the Recommendations 

of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). 

The National Academy of Public Administration has just begun an 

independent assessment of preparedness and response integration 

with a focus on FEMA’s 10 regional offices, and will provide 

recommendations on the integration, synchronization, and 

strengthening of preparedness programs between FEMA and its 

regional offices. 

Experts have cautioned that “major structural changes, such as 

bureaucratic adjustments involving the Department of Homeland 

Security, should follow a detailed strategic review and be 

addressed later in the first term.”31 The formal recommendation of 

the Homeland Security Presidential Transition Initiative is that “A 

decision to remove FEMA should be deferred until the completion 

of the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review in late 2009. 

Maintaining the status quo in the first year avoids unnecessary 

instability and confusion at a time of elevated risk. It also provides 

time for the new administration to consult with congressional 

leadership and build support for any major changes that may be 

contemplated within the QHSR process.”32 

30 John R. Harrald, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 


Affairs, National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong? June 8, 2006. 


31 Homeland Security Presidential Transition Initiative, Protecting the Homeland from Day One,
 

Introduction. 


32 Ibid, p. 15. 


10 

Synergy and Resources 

A primary benefit to FEMA of being part of the 200,000-plus 

person Department of Homeland Security is the wealth of 

resources available to FEMA through other DHS components. 

These connections create synergies that were never available to 

FEMA as a stand-alone agency. In DHS, FEMA is coupled with 

components that have far-reaching responsibilities and capabilities, 

including search and rescue, communications, law enforcement, 

intelligence, and infrastructure protection. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has cited areas of 

interconnectedness, including grants, through which Urban Area 

Security Initiative and State Homeland Security Program funding 

can be used for mass evacuation planning; interoperable 

communications; DHS Science &Technology expertise for the 

Equipment Standards Program; and a huge surge capacity of 

personnel that can be tapped in case of a disaster.33 

Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff recently said that “until 

this Department was formed, interagency planning on the civilian 

side was not a well-executed responsibility.”34 In contrast, 

Admiral Thad Allen testified in 2006 that since DHS’ creation, the 

relationship between the Coast Guard and FEMA has been greatly 

strengthened. Prior to the establishment of DHS, Coast Guard and 

FEMA interaction was infrequent. In 2006, the number of joint 

exercises had increased 354%, from 13 in the years 1999-2002 to 

59 in the years 2003-2006.35 

Chertoff has also stated “the fact that FEMA and other components 

of DHS have had an opportunity during times of rest to plan, train 

and exercise together and to build capabilities that are capable of 

crossing jurisdictional lines has allowed us to have the kind of 

capabilities to support an emergency that would not be the case if 

we were in different departments.”36 Those joint capabilities were 

evidenced in recent disasters. 

33 Government Accountability Office, Letter to Congressional Requesters, Actions Taken to Implement the 


Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.


34 Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at Johns Hopkins University, December 3, 


2008, available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1228482474306.shtm. 


35 Admiral Thad W. Allen, FEMA’s Placement in the Federal Government, Testimony before the U.S. 


Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, June 8, 2006. 


36 Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at Johns Hopkins University, December 3, 


2008. 


11 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard, the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE), and the Secret Service were all vital.37 More 

recently, in responding to Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, “FEMA was 

supported by all of the elements and all the powers of the 

Department of Homeland Security.”38 CBP provided security for 

the transit of life-sustaining goods and provided aerial assets that 

allowed surveying of damage. In the past, FEMA relied on DOD 

for aerial surveillance, which cost considerably more than using 

CBP. TSA supported 20 FEMA commodity distribution locations, 

augmenting FEMA staff with 366 additional employees in the 

field. The Coast Guard performed land, maritime, and air searchand-rescue missions. Chertoff argued that when “it’s necessary to 

quickly call upon other agencies, the quickest way to do that is not 

by reaching to another department of government, ... but it’s to 

have the ability of the Secretary to immediately order assistance to 

be rendered in all of the elements and capabilities of the entire 

Department of Homeland Security.”39 

Finally, it is important to discuss DHS grants and their importance 

to the emergency management community. When FEMA initially 

joined DHS, many of its grants functions were transferred to other 

parts of DHS. Since Hurricane Katrina, FEMA administers almost 

all DHS grants, both those focused on natural hazards and those 

focused on terrorism. Pulling FEMA out of DHS would almost 

certainly disrupt the grants function in the short term, and it could 

result in once again separating out “emergency management” 

grants from “terrorism” grants, which we know from experience 

leads to inefficiency, duplication, and waste. The synergies that 

have been realized in homeland security grants should be an 

important consideration when debating the merits of removing 

FEMA from DHS. 

Preparedness and Response 

The well-recognized cycle of emergency management includes 

preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation. This is true of 

all emergency management, whether for natural or manmade 

37 Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff, Building an Integrated Preparedness and Emergency 


Management System: The Case for Keeping FEMA Within the Department of Homeland Security, 


Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, June 8, 


2006. 


38 Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at Johns Hopkins University, December 3, 


2008. 


39 Ibid. 


12 

 

hazards. It is helpful to think of these elements as a four-legged 

stool. Remove one of the elements, and the stool becomes 

unstable. Some would suggest that we need two stools– one 

labeled crisis management and one labeled consequence 

management. The problem is that we know from the past that this 

structure simply does not work well. It is evident in the 

“stovepipes” that existed prior to the creation of DHS. 

Chertoff sums up the argument, stating that 

“the core of the argument made about FEMA is that 

somehow FEMA’s involved with consequence 

management, dealing with the response, and DHS, in other 

respects, is dealing with preventing or protecting against a 

response, and that if these are different functions, that 

therefore they ought to be under different roofs, and I really 

beg to differ with that. I think that is a profound 

misunderstanding of how one plans and prepares and 

executes in the face of a possible emergency and an actual 

emergency because the truth is emergencies don’t come 

neatly packaged in stovepipes and if there’s any lesson 

we’ve learned in dealing with terrorism or dealing with any 

other crisis, it is that stove-piping is the enemy of efficient 

and effective response.”40 

The Hart-Rudman Commission report states, “the current 

distinction between crisis management and consequence 

management is neither sustainable nor wise. The duplicative 

command arrangements that have been fostered by this division are 

prone to confusion and delay.”41 We would add that this 

duplication wastes time, energy, and resources. Preparedness and 

response are fundamental to homeland security. If FEMA is 

removed, a duplicate agency would most certainly be created in 

DHS, because preparedness and response are so fundamental to 

DHS’ mission that it could not operate effectively without them.42 

Finally, Kettl suggests that for local frontline first responders, there 

is no line between terrorist and non-terrorist hazards; first 

responders must focus on all-hazards-plus. The federal approach 

and structure should match the local approach. “Separation would 

40 Ibid. 


41 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security, p.
 

20. 


42 Senator Susan M. Collins, Opening Statement, Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland 


Security and Governmental Affairs, National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong? June
 

8, 2006. 


13 

create deep fissures between national policy and the realities of 

local response.”43 

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 

It is worth mentioning, in the context of merging entities and the 

growing pains that can result, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 

(P.L. 99-433), which increased integration among the armed 

services.44 Like most “independent” agencies, the defense 

agencies did not want to be integrated initially, but over time the 

arrangement has created a stronger DOD. The Defense 

components did not want their individual roles and authorities to 

be diminished, and they resisted integration for years. The Desert 

One episode–the failed attempt to rescue the hostages in Iran 

during the Carter administration–was the final straw in this 

arrangement. This failure prompted passage of the GoldwaterNichols Act. 

Just as passage of the Homeland Security Act did not automatically 

bring jointness to homeland security functions, neither did the 

Goldwater-Nichols Act immediately solve the challenges in the 

military. According to Wormuth, “the Department of Defense 

took more than 40 years to evolve from the War Department into 

the Defense Department, and then another 20 years after passage 

of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act to mature into the integrated 

agency of today.”45 

Arguments for Making FEMA a Stand-Alone Agency 

In the past few months, emergency managers and others have 

called for FEMA to be removed from DHS. In November 2008, 

the U.S. Council of the International Association of Emergency 

Managers (IAEM-USA) formally adopted the position that 

FEMA’s independent agency status should be restored, with the 

agency reporting directly to the President. The organization 

further urged that the FEMA Director be included as a member of 

the President’s Cabinet. 

43 Kettl, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 


National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong? p. 7. 


44 Chertoff, Building an Integrated Preparedness and Emergency Management System: The Case for 


Keeping FEMA Within the Department of Homeland Security. 


45 Christine E. Wormuth with Anne Witkowsky, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or 


Not)?, A Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 4 Report, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols and the Center for 


Strategic and International Studies, June 2008, p. 13. 


14 

Kettl suggests that calls for FEMA’s removal may be based on a 

faulty premise– that James Lee Witt transformed the troubled 

agency and made it successful– under Witt, FEMA was 

independent– therefore, FEMA should be restored to independent 

status. Kettl points out, however, that FEMA did not always 

perform well in the past, even when it was an independent agency. 

FEMA was an independent agency when it was roundly criticized 

for its response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Problems were also 

recognized during the TOPOFF 2000 exercise, again while FEMA 

was an independent agency.46 

“When viewed against the history of emergency management, the 

success FEMA enjoyed in the 1990s was the exception, not the 

rule,” Roberts states.47 Kettl suggests that under Witt, “success in 

managing FEMA flowed from the leader’s ability to lead.... 

restructuring cannot substitute for leadership.”48 In 2006, David 

Walker, then-Comptroller General of the United States, said, 

“there are pros and cons to keeping FEMA in or out, but the 

quality of leadership...and the quantity of resources has more to do 

with the success of the agency.”49 

Calls for Independent FEMA, With Cabinet-level Status and 

Direct Line to the President 

Those who would like to see FEMA removed from DHS are 

calling for three basic elements: (1) independent agency status, (2) 

including the FEMA Administrator in the President’s Cabinet, and 

(3) giving the FEMA Administrator a direct line to the President. 

Addressing the third element first, the FEMA Administrator 

already has a direct line to the President during a disaster. 

Congress recognized this shortcoming in the aftermath of 

Hurricane Katrina and legislated this relationship in the PostKatrina Reform Act. GAO recently found that the FEMA 

Administrator does give advice directly to the President during 

meetings.50 

46 Kettl, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 


National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong?


47 Roberts, “FEMA After Katrina.” 


48 Kettl, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 


National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong? p. 5 (Emphasis is in original). 


49 Aimee Curl, “Senate Panel Unlikely to Recommend Taking FEMA Out of DHS,” FederalTimes.com, 


March 15, 2006, available at http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=1598146. 
 50 Government Accountability Office, Letter to Congressional Requesters: Actions Taken to Implement the 


Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.
 

15 

The critical thing to note here, however, is that having a direct line 

to the President does not necessarily equate to having the ear of the 

President. As mentioned above, Witt did have the ear of President 

Clinton, but this likely stemmed more from his personal 

relationship with the President than from his status as FEMA 

Director. The Post-Katrina Reform Act “assures that there will be 

direct access but it cannot assure that the relationship with the 

President will be strong or that the Administrator will have the 

president’s confidence.”51 

The second element, including the FEMA Director in the Cabinet, 

is a decision that cannot be legislated. While not defined in law, 

the Cabinet traditionally includes the Vice President and the heads 

of 15 executive departments. The President has the discretion to 

accord Cabinet-level rank to other officials. Currently, in addition 

to the heads of the 15 executive departments, Cabinet-level status 

has been given to the White House Chief of Staff, the Director of 

OMB, the United States Trade Representative, the Administrator 

of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Director of the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy. Executives who do not 

currently have Cabinet-level status include the Director of the 

Central Intelligence Agency, the Administrator of the Small 

Business Administration, and the Administrator of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration. 

The first element of the argument, granting FEMA independent 

agency status, arguably could be accomplished legislatively or by 

Executive Order. But this arrangement will not necessarily solve 

FEMA’s problems or address the concerns of those who would like 

to see FEMA removed from the Department of Homeland 

Security. As evidenced above, FEMA often performed poorly 

even when it was an independent agency. According to Kettl, 

“structure matters. But leadership counts far more.”52 

Conclusion 

In 2001, the Hart-Rudman Commission, addressing the topic of 

military intervention abroad, warned that “resisting the ‘CNN 

effect’ may be one of the most important requirements of U.S. 

51 Memorandum from Congressman Bennie G. Thompson to President-elect Barack H. Obama, Re: A 


Strong, Effective Federal Emergency Management Agency. 


52 Kettl, Testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 


National Emergency Management: Where Does FEMA Belong? p. 3. 


16 

policymaking in the coming period.”53 This admonition is all the 

more important today, when the country faces an increased threat 

of terrorism and has experienced a number of serious disasters over 

the past few years. 

Just over 5 years ago, the approach to and structure for homeland 

security were completely revamped. Have things gone perfectly 

since? Clearly, the answer is no, but that is not enough 

justification to undertake a major reorganization that would have 

far-reaching effects, particularly before a careful study of the 

potential consequences can be carried out. In addition to the 

arguments made above, there are two key arguments for not 

removing FEMA from DHS, at least not in the short term. 

It Takes Years for a Complex Organization to Develop 

When DHS was created 5 years ago, 22 disparate agencies were 

merged into one large organization. These agencies brought their 

own missions, processes, systems, and cultures. Merging them 

into a single organization was a complex undertaking, and this type 

of undertaking is not accomplished quickly. GAO reported that its 

work on mergers and acquisitions shows that successful 

transformation of a large organization can take at least 5 to 7 years, 

even for organizational mergers that are less complex than DHS.54 

On the fourth anniversary of DHS’ creation, GAO wrote, 

“Prior to the creation of DHS, we testified on whether the 

reorganization of government agencies might better address 

the nation’s homeland security needs. At that time, we 

testified that the nation had a unique opportunity to create 

an effective and performance-based organization to 

strengthen the nation’s ability to protect its borders and 

citizens. We noted that the magnitude of the challenges 

that the new department would face would require 

substantial time and effort and that implementation of the 

new department would be extremely complex. Often it has 

taken years for the consolidated functions in new 

organizations to effectively build on their combined 

53 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a National Strategy: A 

Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom: The Phase II Report on a U.S. National Security 

Strategy for the 21st Century, April 15, 2000, p. 7. 54 Government Accountability Office, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on 

Implementation of Mission and Management Functions (GAO-07-454), August 2007. 

17 

strengths, and it is not uncommon for management 

challenges to remain for decades.”55 

As an example, GAO points to the creation of the Department of 

Defense. As discussed above, the most recent major DOD 

restructuring began 20 years ago with the Goldwater-Nichols Act 

of 1986. GAO reports that DOD continues to face serious 

management challenges. Wormuth also points to DOD as an 

example of the time it takes for complex organizational changes to 

succeed, stating that “DHS is a young member of the federal 

bureaucracy, and it will need considerable time to fully mature.”56 

DHS must make more progress, but “reorganization is not a 

panacea.”57 

Further, the Post-Katrina Reform Act, enacted just a little over 2 

years ago, brought major changes to DHS, and to FEMA in 

particular. These reforms have not had time to work, and 

restructuring now would only set the department and FEMA back 

further. 

Success Depends on Leadership More Than Structure 

The success of an organization is often more about the 

organization’s leadership than its structure. The Hart-Rudman 

Commission recognized this when first considering a restructuring 

of national security policy. “Organizational reform is not a 

panacea. There is no perfect organizational design, no flawless 

managerial fix. The reason is that organizations are made up of 

people, and people invariably devise informal means of dealing 

with one another in accord with the accidents of personality and 

temperament. Even excellent organizational structure cannot make 

impetuous or mistaken leaders patient or wise, but poor 

organizational design can make good leaders less effective.”58 

It is interesting to note that when people talk about FEMA’s 

“successful years,” these years are invariably linked with James 

Lee Witt. Credit for turning the organization around is generally 

ascribed to Witt personally, not to an outside force mandating 

reorganization. 

55 David M. Walker, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission 


and Management Functions. 


56 Wormuth with Witkowsky, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe, p. 13.
 57 Ibid. 


58 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National Security, p.
 

vi. 

18 

Chertoff recently stated, “I would say that one of the lessons I’ve 

learned, maybe ‘the’ lesson I learned in the last eight years is 

we’ve had three major catastrophic events, 9/11, Hurricane 

Katrina, and the financial meltdown. In each case, the real nub of 

the problem was [that] leaders made decisions looking only at the 

short term and sacrificing the long term.”59 

Now is not the time to think short term, particularly when it comes 

to our homeland security. Terrorism is not a threat only in the 

short term, and natural disasters certainly are not, so we need to be 

thinking long term. Thinking long term requires giving the 

Department of Homeland Security the time any large organization 

needs to mature. Thinking long term means giving the reforms 

introduced by the Post-Katrina Reform Act time to work. 

Thinking long term means resisting the “CNN effect” mentioned 

above and ensuring that FEMA is positioned to continue as a vital 

component of our homeland security and emergency management 

infrastructure. 

59 Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at Johns Hopkins University, December 3, 

2008. 

19 

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