ECURRING 

LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

AS I HAVE 

OBSERVED THEM 

Recurring Logistic Problems 

As I Have Observed Them 
GENERAL MAGRUDER 
Recurring Logistic Problems 

As I Have Observed Them 

by 

Carter B. Magruder 

General, U.S. Army, Retired 

Center of Military History 

United States Army 

Washington, D.C., 1991 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Magruder, Carter B. (Carter Bowie) 

Recurring logistic problems as I have observed them / by Carter B. 

Magruder. 

p . cm. 

I. United States. Army -Supplies and stores-His tory-20th 

century. 2. United States. Army-Transportation-History-20th 

century. 3. World War, 1939- 1945-Logistics-United States. 

4 . Magruder, Carter B. (Carter Bowie) I. Title. 

UC23 1941-1969.M34 1990 90-1928 

355.4' II '0973-dc20 CIP 

CMH Pub 70- 39 

First Printing 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Washington, D.C. 20402 
Foreword 

The study of the logistical aspects of war is of particular 

importance in our peacetime Army because, as General Carter 

B. Magruder so forcibly reminds us in the pages that follow, 

basic problems tend to recur in logistics. Despite the radical 

transformation in equipment and supplies that separate today's 

Army from that entered by Magruder in 1917, the principles 

that guided the technical services of his day apply equally to 

those who serve in combat service support assignments in 

1989. But if the principles have endured, so too, as Magruder 

demonstrates, have the problems. It was General Magruder's 

hope, as it is of those historians who study this vital segment 

of the military craft today, that by examining these problems 

within the context of military operations, improvements can be 

achieved. 

I am pleased to be able to publish this important historical 

essay. Long buried in the Department of the Army's archives 

and known but to a handful of researchers, it will now be 

available to military students as well as to scholars who are 

increasingly coming to understand that the study of the logistical aspects of war is vital to an understanding of our military 

past. 

Washington, D.C. HAROLD W. NELSON 

Colonel (P), USA 

Chief of Military History 

v 

Preface 

My purpose in this prefatory note is to introduce the 

author, explain why and how the book was written, and in a 

general way provide signposts to guide the reader on his journey. General Carter Bowie Magruder, United States Army, was 

one of the last survivors of the cadre of planners and commanders who trained, deployed, supplied, and committed in 

global battle the millions of American troops raised by this 

nation in World War II. When, in 1961, Magruder retired from 

his last post (Commanding General, U.S. Forces in Korea and 

Eighth U.S. Army) he was recognized as the top logistician in 

the Army. During the final twenty years of his long military 

career he had acquired an intimate and accurate knowledge of 

the extraordinary tasks involved in providing support to troops 

fighting in theaters of war thousands of miles apart and a great 

distance from the American home bases. The span of Magruder's experience and knowledge extended from the preparations for the invasion of Northwest Africa (TORCH) to those 

last days when American troops were departing Vietnam. The 

illustrations he draws come from very diverse sources: witness 

the provision of support for a field artillery gun team and the 

contrasting employment of computer simulation to evaluate 

"worthwhile targets" and determine ammunition requirements 

to engage the same. 

After General Magruder took his retirement parade, the 

many years of his uniformed career given to logistics were 

augmented by a new role as a consultant for the Research 

Analysis Corporation (RAC). The apparition of the atomic 

bomb had forced the Army to recruit civilian physicists and 

mathematicians who could explain this new weapon and its 

effects. The Johns Hopkins University created a not-for-profit 

"think tank" at the Army's request to house these academicians and theorists, the Operations Research Office (ORO). 

Over the years the analytical methods applied to atomic studies 

Vll 
became useful in other areas of Army concern, particularly in 

the fields of computer simulation, war-gaming, and logistics. 

When ORO was expanded to become the Research Analysis 

Corporation-still a not-for-profit organization dedicated to 

Army problems-a considerable group of prestigious retired 

officers joined RAC, attracted by the opportunity to work on 

real and pressing Army problems. Magruder was part of this 

group; he had not lost his interest in the perennial problems 

inherent in the Army's logistical structure when he took off his 

uniform. The general now was a part of a research team, with 

no staff at his command, but he did have, and relished the 

opportunity to give free play to his ideas and to exploit the 

"possibilities" afforded by the high-speed digital computer. He 

enjoyed the intellectual challenge of these years, as this book 

clearly shows. But in the process of time, Magruder was ready 

for a final retirement, to play golf, join his old partners at 

bridge, and spend time with his adored wife. 

Now I must interject myself into this introduction (requesting the reader's indulgence) and explain how Carter's book 

came to be. His competence and expertise in the most complex areas of logistics seemed to dictate that this experience 

should be preserved for a new generation of Army logisticians, 

both uniformed and civilian. A written account, prepared by 

the general at the close of his career, could, it seemed to me, 

be modeled on the Final Report that is written when a theater 

of operations is closed and which is designed to summarize 

problems encountered and lessons learned. Such a piece, however, was not covered by the Army's contract with RAC, but I 

had a few "discretionary" dollars. 

Magruder was the soul of precision, so he received a formal 

memorandum which requested that he write a "think piece" 

that would "plumb all of your experience and your past thinking about Army logistics and distill . . . your personal findings 

and conclusions." As a selling point, I reminded the general of 

the "simple fact of life that the Army high-level decisionmakers and planners do not have time and opportunity to do 

the kind of thing that you might be able to do." When he 

accepted, I formed a review board from the top operations 

analysts in RAC, all with wartime experience, and from his 

Vll1 
peers among our consultants: retired Army Generals Thomas 

T. Handy, James E. Moore, and Charles D. Palmer. These 

latter three and Magruder normally acted in concert to give 

RAC programs in war-gaming and computer simulations a 

military depth and breadth that would have been hard to 

equal, then and now. 

Early in 1969, Magruder completed his first draft chapters. 

But there was a problem. The general had a reputation as a 

severe and rigorous taskmaster (those who witnessed his dealings with service chiefs when they became obstructionists can 

attest that Carter was not a pliable persona) . Magruder, however, was a very courtly gentleman of the old school who regarded any hint of personal aggrandizement as unbecoming an 

officer in the United States Army. Not surprisingly, his chapters were written in the third person and almost totally devoid 

of his own thumb prints. A second memorandum to Magruder 

contained a more precise statement of the "Object of the 

Exercise" (to use the old Leavenworth phrasing). He was not 

asked to write a field manual, nor was he to seek to encompass 

the entire field of logistics. Completeness, I suggested, was not 

a virtue except in textbooks. Very simply, he was being asked 

to say in print: "This is what I, Carter Magruder, now believe 

to be important in the area of logistics." Fortunately, General 

Handy, recognized as first among equals, was head of the 

special review board named for Magruder's manuscript. Handy 

took up the cudgels to get what he called "the most Magruder" 

into each successive revision. In time, Carter became less inimical to the words "I" and "my." 

There remained one last hurdle. The title given the completed book, in manuscript, was suggested by General Handy: 

"Recurring Logistic Problems As I Have Observed Them." 

This, at bottom, was what the book was about and seemed a 

clear statement that Carter spoke for himself alone. But at this 

time the war in Indochina had reached a peak, as had demonstrations against it back in the United States. Magruder became 

gravely concerned that the critics of Americans in uniform 

might somehow find a handhold in his book, or that he might 

offend serving officers who bore the heat of the day. I asked 

the two other members of the "4 Star" quadrivium to 

IX 
carefully read the final manuscript with Magruder's fears in 

mind. Moore and Palmer agreed that the book posed no such 

problems. General Palmer, with his usual trenchant acerbity, 

observed that Carter's comments were worthwhile because 

" ... they might cause some justifiable and possibly useful 

soul-searching in the Army." 

Magruder's task was accomplished. But RAC was in the 

throes of dissolution as the Army sought to bring operations 

research and analysis "in house." (It may be of interest to 

students of our national economy that I needed only $2,500 to 

publish the book in 1970, but no credit was extended.) The 

general's final manuscript disappeared into the Army's archival 

maw. Now, two decades later, Dr. Joel Meyerson, an Army 

historian preparing the official history of logistics in the Vietnam War, rediscovered Carter Magruder's last will and testiment to the Army he had served so faithfully. The Center of 

Military History turned to a selection of serving general officers assigned in logistics commands for a new critique of the 

Magruder work. (In retrospect, one may conclude that no book 

ever has be~n scrutinized by as many "stars" as this.) The 

book is being published as Magruder wrote it, with his inflections and conclusions. His format shows the logical mind for 

which he was famous. His organization of subject matter leads, 

in each case, to two specific summary statements: reasons why 

the (logistic) problem recurs, and the fOTm in which the problem probably will recur. 

The action officer working on a current contingency plan 

or the service school instructor trying to explain the wartime 

importance of the "repair parts problem" surely will find much 

in this book to illuminate and enlarge his understanding of his 

assigned task. But all may profit from General Carter Magruder's final words on integrity and the soldier; so said his 

peers twenty years ago. 

October 1989 HUGH M. COLE 

x 
Author's Preface 

I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided, 

and that is the lamp of experience. I know of no 

way of judging the future but by the past. 

Patrick Henry 

It is my objective in this paper to identify areas in which I 

have observed Army logistic problems recur, and then to 

review some of the specific problems that I have seen arise in 

each area, giving something of their history, the solutions attempted, the degree of success attained, and the reasons why I 

think they may arise again. This is done with the hope that 

some conceptions from my experience, however limited, may 

help others in the solution of future logistic problems. 

Shortages beget logistics problems. Critical problems arise 

and recur therefore with greater frequency when a maximum 

effort is being made. Korea, like Vietnam, was a limited war, a 

"guns and butter" war. In neither was the economy strained, 

so problems were less critical and less frequent. World War I 

was a maximum effort, but my experience in it was brief and 

only as a reserve second lieutenant of infantry. As a result, 

most of my examples are taken from World War II. World War 

II was a conventional war except in its last phase. Since World 

War II much of our military concern has focused on nuclear 

weapons, with some concern for chemical and biological weapons. I do not feel overwhelmed at the thought of nuclear war. 

Bearing in mind the precept of that grand old man Tom 

Jenkins, who taught us wrestling when I was a cadet at West 

Point, that "there ain't no hold that can't be broken," I feel 

that countermeasures will be developed to moderate the effect 

of nuclear weapons. I also think that until this is accomplished 

no great nation will risk such a war. Accordingly, I feel that 

both peacetime logistics and logistics in future wars may well 

Xl 
resemble logistics in early wars. The orientation of my 

thoughts on logistics is thus toward a major war in the future 

regardless of what weapons may be used. 

I have devoted a chapter to each area I have identified as 

one in which logistic problems recur. Within each chapter, I 

have stated the reasons why I believe the problems in the 

logistic area being covered recur, together with some indication as to the form and manner in which, when they recur, 

they may be presented to Army logisticians. My final chapter 

has been named both a statement of lessons learned and a 

summary. As a matter of fact, it is not a good example of 

either. What I have really done is to set forth what I believe to 

be important in logistics. To the extent that most of my socalled lessons learned are to some degree supported in my 

discussions of various recurring problems, it may be considered something of a summary. To the extent that I have stated 

conceptions that are generally true-although put in a simple 

form without qualifications in order to secure emphasis-it 

may be considered something of a statement of lessons 

learned. 

Having never intended to write a book or even a paper 

such as this one, I have kept no files from my active service. 

The accuracy of the statements made herein is, therefore, subject to the fallibility of my memory. 

This paper is based primarily upon some twenty-eight years 

of work devoted, in m£Uor part, to logistics. It includes my last 

twenty years of active duty in the Army, starting with my 

assignment to the G-4 Division, War Department General 

Staff, in 1941, and ending with my retirement in 1961. It also 

includes the succeeding eight years spent as a consultant on 

logistics to the Research Analysis Corporation and to the Log-istics Management Institute. In order to indicate what opportunities I have had to see problems recur in logistics and to 

develop logistics conceptions, I have listed in an appendix the 

assignments I held in my last twenty years of active service, 

with indications of some of the assigned or assumed logistic 

missions of the assignments. 

The conception for this paper came from Dr. Hugh M. 

Cole, Vice President of the Research Analysis Corporation, 

XII 
who had the gracious thought that just as we usually prepare a 

statement of problems encountered and lessons learned as we 

close a theater of operations, so I might prepare such a statement as I close my career in logistics. I am indebted to General T. T. Handy, Mr. Conway J. Christianson, and Dr. Charles 

A. H. Thomson for their review of this paper and their many 

helpful suggestions. 

1970 CARTER B. MAGRUDER 

XIII 

Contents 

Chapter Page 

1. Supply Requirements for an Overseas Theater of 

Operations ................................... 3 

Determination of Resupply Requirements fOT lV/ajor Items of 

Equipnlent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 

Determination of Ammunition Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 

Use of Local Resources in a Theater of Operations To 

Reduce Requirements on the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

2. Logistic Troop Requirements .................... 25 

ShoTtage of Logistics Troops at the Start of a War...... . 25 

Measures To Reduce the RequiTements for Theater Logistic 

Troops........................................ 31 

3. Logistic Support of Contingency Plans ............ 39 

4. Career Management of Logistic Personnel. . . . . . . . . 49 

5. Operation of the Logistic System ................. 57 

CooTdination of Command and Technical Authorities ... .. 57 

Monitoring the Operation of Overseas Supply ........... 58 

Application of Funds fOT Operations and Maintenance. . . . 60 

Use of Stock Funds for Repair Parts .................. 62 

Handling of Excess and Surplus PropeTty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 

Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 

Integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 

6. Maintenance of Materiel ......................... 77 

Standardization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 

Repairable Assemblies Versus Throwaway. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 

Quality of Rebuild. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 

In- Theater Versus Out-of Theater Repair. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 

Requirements for Repair PaTts ....................... 86 
Chapter Page 

Management of Repair Parts 88 

7. Intertheater Transportation ...................... 95 

Speed of Initial Deployment Overseas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 

Balance Between Sealift and Airlift ................... 101 

Moving Seaborne Cargo Ashore. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 

8. Production for War. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . .... . . 109 

Items To Be Provided for by Stockage or Production Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 0 

Production Lines To Be Maintained in Active Operation. . . 112 

Storage and Maintenance of Reserves. .. . . . ... . . . . . . . . . 115 

Industrial Security and Recovery From Nuclear Attack. . . . 117 

9. Lessons Learned in Logis tics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 

Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 

XVI 
Recurring Logistic Problems 

As I Have Observed Them 

CHAPTER 1 

Supply Requirements for an Overseas 

Theater of Operations 

The stimuli that activate the logistic supply system in war 

are the requirements of the theaters of operations. It follows 

that the first logistic problem area dealt with should be the 

determination of those supply requirements. The most critical 

recurring problems that I have observed in that area involve: 

I. The determination of resupply requirements for major 

items of equipment. 

2. The determination of ammunition requirements. 

3. The use of local resources in a theater of operations to 

reduce requirements on the United States. 

Each of these problems is dealt with separately below. 

Determination of Resupply Requirements 

for Major Items of Equipment 

In World War I the U.S. Communications Zone included 

three echelons of depots: advance, intermediate, and base. 

Stockage at each was based on French experience. Since the 

French had three years of wartime experience, these stockages 

were reasonably adequate. The supply system operated on the 

assumption that no shortage existed below a depot level unless 

unfilled requisitions had caused "due-outs" to be established 

at that depot. Thus a depot requisitioned on the next higher 

depot for any shortages below its authorized stockage level 

plus any "due-out" minus any "due-in." The beauty of the 

system was its simplicity. It worked well in a stabilized theater 

where the desirable depot stockages had been established by 

ample experience. 

At the time of its entry into World War II, the U.S. Army 

had no current supply consumption experience. We soon en-
4 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

countered difficulty in computing in the United States the 

requirements for the resupply of the North African Theater of 

Operations. The theater had equal difficulty in forecasting its 

own requirements when requisitioning as far in advance as 

necessary. In addition, we all had difficulty in determining the 

desirable level of the theater reserve which should provide 

protection against errors in forecasting requirements. These 

difficulties resulted from a lack of understanding of what constituted good replacement factors as well as a lack of data from 

which to derive them. 

In the first major U.S. offensive operation in World War II, 

American troops landed in North Africa. Brig. Gen. Thomas B. 

Larkin, who was responsible for the logistic support of the task 

force, which was made up from our troops in Great Britain and 

was to land at Oran, came back to Washington to make logistic 

arrangements. He asked that the War Department provide 

automatic resupply until the theater was ready to requisition. I 

was the action officer in charge of arranging the logistic support of the theater. In my previous year on the G- 4 War 

Department General Staff and in the headquarters of the Army 

Service Forces, I had never even heard of automatic resupply 

for anything except food, clothing, and POL (petroleum, oil, 

lubricants). Nevertheless, since it was obviously unreasonable 

to expect theater service chiefs to prepare requisitions in the 

confusion of a landing operation, I supported his proposal. I 

passed the requirement for automatic resupply to the Chiefs of 

Technical Services, who had knowledge in this field from 

having had to estimate consumption in preparing their budgets. General Larkin undertook that the theater would requisition for additional quantities of items for which the resupply 

rates proved too low so that they could be raised and to report 

items being received in excess of requirements so that resupply 

rates could be cut. This system worked, although not as well as 

we had hoped. Under the stress of combat, tactical movement, 

and a long line of communications, the theater reported shortages but not excesses. In addition, neither of us had recognized the importance of having the theater report such critical 

logistic actions as the reequipping of the British contingent 

with American signal equipment and the formation of provisional units equipped from theater reserve stocks. Such with-
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 5 

drawals from depot stocks were reflected only by requisitions 

on the United States and therefore appeared as normal consumption to the technical services. 

After several months, the reported supply consumption was 

so erratic that a mission was sent to the North African Theater 

of Operations to determine the causes and to establish replacement factors. Also, the Chiefs of Technical Services in Washington established closer liaison with their service chiefs in the 

theater. Replacement factors gradually improved but never 

reached any high degree of accuracy. There were too many 

complications. The theater troop basis was constantly changing 

as monthly convoys brought in new increments of troops. Materiel varied in model and age. Troops arrived in the theater 

with shortages in their initial equipment, both intentional and 

unintentional. For example, because of the shortage of cargo 

space, we intentionally shipped the first contingents to North 

Africa with only half their truck transport. Unintentional shortages occurred when equipment ordered for units failed to be 

delivered to them before embarkation or was lost en route. 

Many excesses, however, were never drawn down. This occurred because busy and poorly trained technical service personnel prepared many of their requisitions based entirely on 

replacement factors without considering current stockage and 

probable future operations, and partially because there was 

little disadvantage attached to having too much supply, whereas campaigns could be lost from having too little. 

In World War II, "order and shipping time" for most 

theaters was about four months. This meant that the time 

between the preparation of a theater monthly requisition and 

the delivery of the requisitioned items was four months, provided of course that the items were already in stock in the 

United States. The four-month time lag was equally applicable 

in automatic resupply. The time lag meant that the theater, or 

the technical services in the case of automatic supply, also had 

to estimate the consumption of each item for the next four 

months and requisition accordingly. These estimates required 

the use of replacement factors. 

Early in World War II the general understanding was that a 

replacement factor for an item was the percentage of the total 
6 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

quantity of that item in the hands of troops in a theater that 

should be replaced every month, based on average consumption, and that one replacement factor for an item in one theater would do for all theaters. During World War II we recognized that consumption of items varied with the operations 

that were being conducted. For example, larger amounts of 

many items were requisitioned when a major offensive was to 

take place. The Overseas Supply Divisions at the ports of 

embarkation, which were charged with editing requisitions 

from the theaters, were also charged with close liaison with the 

theaters on planned operations and with making judgments as 

to appropriate allowances above normal consumption. However, recognition was not given at that time to the desirability of 

establishing different replacement factors for different types of 

operations. 

Consumption of major items of equipment varies tremendously. As an example, I had occasion during a study at the 

Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) to examine the consumption of several major items of equipment by the First, 

Fifth, and Seventh U.S. Armies in Europe in World War II. All 

three armies were in the same combat posture (attacking); all 

were fighting the same enemy; and all had a similar balance 

among combat troops, combat support troops, and service 

troops. It could therefore be expected that their rates of consumption would be quite uniform. But in looking at the consumption of several selected items by the First Army as a base, 

the consumption by the other armies of the same items averaged 69 percent for items consumed at rates below First Army 

rates, and averaged 171 percent for items consumed at rates 

above First Army rates. These figures show normal variations 

and indicate that under the most favorable circumstances forecasts of consumption should not be expected to be more accurate than between approximately 69 percent and 171 percent 

of the actual consumption. 

The difficulty of accurate forecasting is well illustrated by 

the "Report of the General Board, U.S. Forces, European 

Theater of Operations," prepared immediately after the close 

of hostilities. It shows that the First Army, even with the 
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 7 

advantage of known consumption rates experienced in North 

Africa, Sicily, and Italy, overestimated its monthly replacement 

factors very heavily, and the War Department, although much 

more conservative in its estimates than the First Army, still 

overestimated quite heavily on twenty-two items, while underestimating on only four. 

It is my opinion that if the experience data available are 

fairly recent and from a similar war, a good replacement factor 

may forecast consumption with an accuracy between 50 and 

200 percent when applied to average consumption over a 

period of six months or more. Deviations for short periods will 

be much greater. The degree of accuracy attainable in estimating replacement factors for a war forecasted against an enemy 

who may have many surprises in store will probably be lower 

than the 50-200 percent range, with a corresponding degree 

of danger of critical supply shortages. This danger must be 

considered in determining the size of the reserves to be established in any theater of operations and in the United States. 

Even with good replacement factors based on valid experience, a period of unexpectedly intense operations could cause 

critical shortages in less than the four months usually required 

for "order and shipping time." To provide against unexpected 

requirements, expenditures, or losses is one of the functions of 

the theater reserve. 

The theater reserve is normally expressed in "days of 

supply." A day of supply is generally understood by the military as a quantitative term indicating a general average of daily 

consumption. As an example, if an automobile is run on the 

average 12,000 miles a year, then a 60-day supply of gasoline 

would be the gasoline to drive the car 2,000 miles, although, 

with fairly hard driving, 60 days of supply could be exhausted 

in 4 days. For major items of materiel a day of supply is a 

function of a replacement factor. Thirty days of supply for any 

specified item for any theater of operations is computed by 

multiplying the replacement factor for the specified item by the 

quantity of the item in the hands of troops in the theater. 

The theater reserve in war has three basic purposes. First, 

it must provide immediate replacement of materiel consumed 
8 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

above that forecast based on replacement factors. Thus it 

offers protection against errors in replacement factors and 

against unexpected surges in consumption. Second, it must 

tide the theater over initially until the line of communications 

with the United States is in full operation and thereafter whenever the line of communications is interrupted. In World War 

II, interruptions were caused by submarine attack on convoys. 

In World War I, the equivalent of an interruption was caused 

by uncontrolled shipments of cargo jamming the railway yards 

of New York so that they had to be emptied by shipment 

overseas whether the supplies were required by the theater or 

not. In World War II and Vietnam, interruptions were caused 

by the jamming of overseas ports with cargo above the capacity 

of the ports to unload. Third, must provide equipment for 

urgently needed provisional units, formed from personnel replacements. In World War II it was extensively so used in 

North Africa; in Korea it was used on occasion to provide 

equipment for newly formed Korean units. 

Toward the end of World War II- with replacement factors 

firmly established by recent experience, with theater reserves 

generally built up above authorized levels, with convoys arriving regularly without loss of ships, and with theaters so well 

established that provisional units were a rarity-a theater reserve of 60 days of supply was reasonably adequate everywhere. Such a reserve level would probably be inadequate for 

any active theater at the beginning of a war. Certainly in any 

future conventional war in Europe, a 60-day reserve will be 

completely inadequate until the nuclear submarine threat has 

been overcome and replacement factors have been established 

by experience to reflect changes in enemy materiel and tactics. 

In preparation for any new war, the best possible forecast 

of replacement requirements for materiel for each overseas 

theater must be made to guide the laying up of reserves in the 

theaters and in the United States and to shape the establishment of industrial production capacities. The initial flow of 

supplies to any new theater will inevitably contain excesses and 

shortages even if a reasonably accurate operations plan has 

been made and if reasonably good replacement factors are 

available. The theater reserve should be large enough to take 
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 9 

care of most shortages. The important requirement is to minimize the number of shortages that cannot be filled by the 

theater reserves. Effective action can readily be taken to expedite shipments from reserves in the United States and, if necessary, to increase production if only a few items are involved. 

When many shortages exist, the expediting effort is spread 

thinner and is less effective. 

As long as they remained in existence, the Chiefs of Technical Services were charged with maintaining current replacement factors for items for which their services held responsibility. No standard procedure was prescribed for these determinations nor was any documentation required. For several years 

after World War II, replacement factors from World War II 

experience were considered adequate. The Army's experience 

in Korea caused relatively minor changes. There were, however, new items coming into the supply system, such as nuclear 

weapons and missiles and their launching and control equipment, for which there was no experience. A Materiel Requirement Review Panel was established in 1951 in the Department 

of the Army under the chairmanship of G-3. The panel had 

general officer representation from G-4, G-2, and the Comptroller. I was the G-4 representative. The formation of this 

panel gave recognition to the breadth and the level of interest 

that ought to be given to materiel requirements. At one time 

we reviewed the replacement factor for the medium tank and, 

as I remember it, raised it from 12 to 14. This change was 

based solely on the improvement that had been made in antitank guns and the start of development of antitank missiles. I 

realized at the time that many other influences such as tactics 

and wear-out ought to be considered and that we should be 

able to attack the problem in small segments, but I did not at 

the time conceive a solution. 

Responsibility for the computation of replacement factors 

now rests with the Army Materiel commander. In 1964 the 

Army Materiel Command, having experienced difficulty defending its requested appropriation for procurement of equipment and missiles because of the Department of Defense's 

contention that replacement factors did not reflect changes in 

materiel, tactics, and environment, sought the assistance of the 
10 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Research Analysis Corporation to develop a sound methodology for computing replacement factors. Such a methodology 

was developed under a project entitled System for Estimating 

Materiel Wartime Attrition and Replacement Requirements 

(SYMWAR). I took part in this project. The first effort of the 

SYMW AR project was directed toward developing a methodology for estimating replacement factors for a future conventional war, although this focus was justifiably subject to some 

criticism. The methodology had nothing usable for nuclear 

war, although war games indicate that NATO could not hold 

against a full-scale attack by the Warsaw powers without at 

least battlefield nuclear weapons. 

SYMWAR's conventional war methodology provided for 

variations in the replacement requirements for items of materiel based on changes in environment (as between North Africa 

and France), types of operations to be conducted, and changes 

in both U.S. and enemy materiel and tactics. The heart of the 

methodology was the loss rate table. In most cases, three such 

tables were required for each item: one derived from the best 

historical data available, a second derived by updating the first 

to reflect changes known to have taken place, and a third 

derived by modifying the second to forecast for a future war by 

reflecting changes expected to take place between the present 

and the date of that possible war. 

The best historical data for any item then in use usually 

came from World War II. World War II information was admittedly inaccurate and incomplete, so its use introduced inaccuracies into our computations. The methodology, however, 

was developed for both current and future use, and the reporting systems now in use in Vietnam and expected to be in use 

in future wars should provide historical data of greater accuracy. 

The loss rates derived from historical data for each specific 

item were tabulated in a two-dimensional historical loss rate 

table. This table had a column for each "posture" (attack, 

defense, withdrawal) with data on such factors as area fire, 

rocket launcher fire, mines, air attack, damaged and abandoned, wear-out, etc. 

We found we needed to give special consideration to the 

postures mentioned above because materiel consumption ap-
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 11 

peared to vary widely depending upon which posture a force 

was in. Experience in World War II with respect to personnel 

had indicated such wide variation in casualty rates for different 

postures that personnel casualty rates were included in FM 

101 - 10 for some 14 postures, ranging from Covering and 

Security Force Action, through 5 variations of the attack posture, through 6 variations of the defense posture, to Pursuit 

and Retirement and Delaying Action. However, since our materiel replacement factors were to be used in conjunction with 

a forecast of tactical operations (to provide a basis for requisitioning several months before delivery and to indicate desirable changes in materiel production rates up to eighteen 

months in advance), we felt that there would be no purpose in 

having postures broken down to a degree of detail beyond our 

capacity to forecast tactical operations. Moreover, the materiel 

interest is in losses over periods of months, not days, as in the 

personnel casualty interest, and the time that a field army has 

remained in 1 of the 14 postures related to personnel casualties has rarely been as long as a month. 

We did find sufficient justification for using the 3 postures 

for estimating materiel consumption. A month in the attack 

posture results in above-average losses of materiel, such as 

armor, in the forefront of the battle exposed to the direct fire 

of the enemy. A month in the defense posture results in belowaverage losses of materiel because materiel is concealed from 

direct observation and enemy artillery has' to resort to area 

fire, which is not primarily effective against materiel. A month 

in withdrawal results in very high losses of mechanical equipment because breakdown results in abandonment. Withdrawal 

also results in almost complete loss of forward stockages of 

supplies because transportation is seldom available to move 

more than a few days of supply as fast as the troops move. 

We found we needed to give special consideration to cause 

of loss. Losses of any specific item of materiel are caused 

principally by the weapons the enemy uses against it and by 

abandonment, accident, or wear-out. Subdivision of losses in 

any posture by cause of loss permits the effects of new weapons to be contrasted with the effects of the old. Thus an 

improved enemy antitank gun will increase tank losses to direct 
12 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

fire, and the degree of its increased effectiveness over its 

World War II counterpart can be estimated by comparing the 

loss rate for tanks from direct fire in World War II. On the 

other hand, the improved antitank gun will not affect wear-out. 

Such effects as those resulting from improved design must be 

estimated by referring to the loss rate for tanks from wear-out 

in World War II. 

Loss rate tables can be developed without historical data by 

analyzing other types of data such as that on exposure to 

enemy attack, obtained from maneuvers; data on vulnerability 

to various types of enemy fire, obtained from proving ground 

tests; and data on enemy and friendly tactics and estimated 

personnel casualties, obtained from war games. This approach 

can be used to supplement the historical approach. It was the 

only method the SYMWAR project developed for new items. 

It is my opinion that both approaches should be used 

whenever data is available. The results should be compared 

and adjusted by judgment. The historical approach should be 

worked through whenever historical data is available for an 

item even remotely similar to the item under consideration 

because the results in actual combat reflect the effects of so 

many factors that are indeterminate in a theoretical study. 

Finally, a procedure as complex and as heavily dependent 

on judgment as the one developed in SYMW AR will give good 

results only if it is kept in continuous use by the AMC staff and 

the commodity commands, so that replacement factors reflect 

the latest information and so that the procedure can be improved by those who use it. I also believe that enough of the 

conception should be taught in the Army's schools so that 

those who must report the needed data accurately during 

combat will understand the reason why they are asked to bear 

this burden and the value of the end result. 

As already indicated, the methodology relied heavily on 

experience data from previous wars, and such data had not 

been adequately reported and assembled in either World War 

II or Korea. Then the Research Analysis Corporation was 

asked to help design and operate a materiel loss reporting 

system for Vietnam, one could be made to meet the data 
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 13 

requirements of the SYMWAR methodology. RAC eagerly accepted, and a reporting system designed by the Army and RAC 

was installed. Called the Combat Loss and Expenditure DataVietnam (COLED- V), it met all the SYMWAR data requirements except for "time in posture," which could be estimated. 

Thereafter, the SYMWAR project deviated from the original 

plan and gave primary attention to forecasting requirements 

for counterinsurgency, even though supplies never have been 

and probably never will be procured in advance for counterinsurgencies. Because stockages for conventional war are similar 

to and so much larger than those for counterinsurgency, the 

assumption has always been made that if the United States laid 

up reserves for a conventional war in Europe, there would be 

plenty for any counterinsurgency. This diversion of effort delayed the project, so that now the nuclear war aspect has been 

dropped. 

Reasons why the problem of the determination of resupply requirements 

for major items of equipment recurs. 

The problem of deciding the desirable size of the theater 

reserves, the CONUS materiel reserve, and the industrial production capacity that should be accepted for budgetary action 

occurs and recurs because of two conflicting points of view. 

The military have some recognition of the variations in materiel consumption in the past and of the difficulties of forecasting 

the future; they intentionally subordinate money to lives and 

cost to effectiveness; and they always keep in mind General 

Omar N. Bradley's observation that "in war there is no second 

prize for the runner-up." Consequently they seek protection in 

high levels of materiel reserves and production capacity. On 

the other hand, the civilians in the Department of Defense and 

the Bureau of the Budget have less conception of the variations that must be expected in consumption of materiel or of 

the effect of shortages on military operations. They are also 

closer to popular pressures which make preparations that 

might help win an ill-defined war in the indeterminate future 

seem far less important than holding military requirements 

down in order to leave funds for other government purposes 

without straining the national economy. They thus direct their 
14 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

efforts toward eliminating the military requirements that they 

do not consider adequately substantiated. There is so much 

judgment involved that neither side can prove the other 

wrong, and the argument is reopened with each new budget 

request. 

Forms in which the problem of the determination of resupply requzrements for major items of equipment will probably recur. 

When judgment is so large a factor, the military will never 

be able to convincingly justify any level of supply requirements 

except by developing replacement factors of increased validity 

that they can defend with greater assurance and perhaps with 

some greater degree of success. The forms in which this problem will probably recur will be two: first, the need to determine replacement factors for major items of materiel in conventional war in an accurate and defensible manner and, 

second, the need to determine replacement factors for major 

items of materiel in nuclear war. 

Determination of Ammunition Requirements 

The amount of ammunition required for any operation is 

not subject to very accurate determination. Generally speaking, 

the more ammunition that is fired, the easier it is for us to 

advance and the lower are our casualties. In World War I, after 

the failure of the Nivelle offensive and its very heavy casualties 

brought on mutiny in the French Army, efforts were made to 

restore morale by blasting enemy positions with so much artillery fire that most of the defenders were put out of action by 

death, wounds, or shock. This permitted enemy positions of 

limited size to be taken with smaller losses than had been 

previously incurred in such operations. Messins Ridge, Malmaison, and Verdun (1917) were examples of this type of operation. But neither the availability of artillery units nor the 

production of ammunition was ever so great in World War I as 

to permit this type of attack to be used on a broad scale. 

In World War II, ammunition was available in relatively less 

quantity than in World War 1. The heaviest bombardment by 

air and artillery combined was probably that on Cassino. It was 
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 15 

nonetheless insufficient to kill, wound, or demoralize most of 

the defenders. Ammunition in such quantities was not often 

available. In 1944 ammunition procurement, which was being 

carried out at rates based on North African and early Italian 

experience, fell considerably short of demand in Europe, and it 

sometimes became necessary to ration ammunition severely. 

For a time during the invasion of Southern France, for example, although we in Italy who were supporting the invasion had 

allotted the Sixth Army Group its proportionate share of our 

ammunition supply, the U.S. 3d Division of that force was 

rationed to ten rounds per gun per day, an amount that could 

easily be fired in five minutes. Commanders, once committed, 

seemed to push their troops to about that point where they 

would accept casualties without undue loss of offensive spirit. 

Commanders were reluctant, however, to initiate any operation 

without assurance that ammunition would be available in the 

quantity the commander felt was necessary. How commanders 

reached such determinations was an individual process. 

In Korea, although our artillery had been firing about 

twelve rounds to the enemy's one, General Van Fleet complained that there was a shortage of artillery ammunition. A 

congressional committee held an investigation. The committee 

established that Congress had appropriated all the funds that 

the Army had asked for ammunition. The fundamental question, however, was not settled or even clearly defined. It was, 

What is the proper basis for ammunition requirements? As an 

artilleryman who had spent four years as an instructor in the 

Gunnery Department of the Field Artillery School and as a 

logistician who had been particularly attentive to ammunition 

requirements in an active theater in World War II, I thought it 

was the ability to deliver effective fire on all worthwhile targets. These included targets identified as important areas of 

enemy occupation or activity by such means as visual observation or aerial photographs. They also included, for example, 

terrain features not known to be occupied but which, if occupied, would hamper an enemy attack. In a defense they also 

included possible enemy assembly areas. In other words, to me 

and to most artillerymen, a worthwhile target was one whose 

destruction or neutralization would make a direct contribution 
16 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

to the success of the mission upon which the command was 

engaged. 

As a Deputy G- 4 of the Department of the Army during the 

congressional investigation, I sent questionnaires to a great 

number of artillery battalion commanders who had served in 

Korea, asking each if he had ever been unable, because of a 

lack of ammunition, to fire on a target that he himself had 

considered worthwhile. The answers were unanimous in the 

negative. Opposed to this concept of worthwhile targets was 

the practice that had been established in Korea of firing the 

artillery even when no worthwhile targets, under my definition, 

were available-a practice of firing on areas that had no direct 

connection with the mission of the engagement or even of 

firing large amounts of ammunition when our troops were not 

engaged at all. Artillery had fired harassing and interdiction 

fires in World Wars I and II, but expenditures for this purpose 

were strictly limited. The difference in Korea was one of 

degree: heavy ammunition expenditures in harassing and interdiction fires were not only permitted but insisted upon. As a 

result of this practice, artillery ammunition expenditure rates 

being experienced in Vietnam when the supported troops are 

inactive are about equal to those experienced when the supported troops are in combat. 

The principal difference between World War II on the one 

hand and Korea and Vietnam on the other was that in World 

War II operations ammunition production was inadequate, and 

even in late 1944 severe rationing was necessary. In Korea 

ammunition production was relatively greater, so rationing was 

much less severe. In Vietnam ammunition production has been 

ample, so rationing has been unnecessary. In both Korea and 

Vietnam heavy expenditures of ammunition have been used in 

the hope of keeping personnel losses down. Ammunition consumption figures from World War II were not applicable in 

Korea and Vietnam; in the latter cases, the limitation on consumption apparently became more a function of the capability 

of service units to handle local distribution, of the physical 

endurance of artillery personnel in serving the guns, and of 

the ability of the guns to stand such rapid and prolonged 

firing. 
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 17 

Thus it appears that there are two possible expenditure 

factors that might be used for ammunition. One would be 

derived from World War II experience in periods when rationing was not severe. Ammunition requirements would be based 

on the desirability of accomplishing missions. The World War 

II rates would of course have to be adjusted for changes in 

artillery techniques, tactics, and materiel that have taken place 

since World War II. The second type of expenditure factor 

would be derived from the Korean and Vietnamese experience, 

when ammunition supply was virtually unlimited. Ammunition 

requirements would be based on the desirability of reducing 

personnel casualties and would be limited primarily by the 

capability of the artillery to fire. 

Reasons why the problem of ammunition requirements recuTS. 

It has never been politically desirable to determine the 

value of a casualty. As a result budgetary personnel in the 

Department of Defense, faced with the desirability of holding 

down fund expenditures, urge the military to reduce "waste" 

of ammunition. On the other hand, military personnel, faced 

with the desirability not only of securing added insurance that 

missions will be accomplished but also of holding down casualties, urge the provision of all the ammunition engaged forces 

can fire. 

Form in which the problem of ammunition requirements will probably 

recur. 

The form in which the problem recurs is a requirement to 

establish ammunition expenditure rates, the desirable size of 

the ammunition reserve, and the ammunition production base. 

It is probable that no mention ever will be made in any task 

order of any desirable balance between ammunition expended 

and casualties suffered. There is now evidence, in the congressional action on the 1969 budget, of an unwillingness to appropriate for Vietnam all the funds requested. This reluctance 

is normal in any postwar period or period of peace. It will 

force the Army to give more consideration to priorities within 

its own requirements as it seeks to secure the greatest possible 

military strength for the dollars available both for the current 

war and for any future war. 
18 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Regardless of the funds available, in any major effort the 

military services cannot have everything they want. The availability of industrial manpower, of production facilities, and of 

natural resources is limited. In World War II the sum of the 

requirements of the military services far exceeded the productive capacity of the United States, and so the requirements had 

to be reduced. Even then, as I remember one writer putting it, 

we consumed the Mesabi Range on the battlefields of Europe. 

Accordingly, the Army and the Department of Defense must 

recognize that more conventional ammunition means fewer 

tanks, fewer bombs, and fewer ships or less of some other 

related critical requirement. Similarly, more battlefield nuclear 

weapons mean fewer intercontinental ballistic missiles, fewer 

Polaris or Poseidon missiles, and fewer aircraft or less of some 

other critical related requirement. These considerations will 

probably cause the problem to recur in the form of a requirement initiated by the Army itself to establish to what degree 

the heavy ammunition expenditures in Vietnam are justified. 

Use of Local Resources in a Theater of Operations 

To Reduce Requirements on the United States 

The United States has a great wealth of resources and a 

history of being the "Arsenal of Democracy"." In addition, 

Americans in general have a feeling that everything good is 

produced in the United States and that the products of other 

countries are strictly second-rate. As a result, American overseas theaters in war are inclined toward requisitioning on the 

United States to the maximum extent. The British, on the 

other hand, lacking resources at home and used to seeking 

them in colonies, were much better prepared in World War II 

to live off the country to whatever extent was practicable. 

Local procurement overseas has many advantages. It saves 

our resources. It saves time and shipping space. The use of 

local labor reduces the requirement for U.S. service support 

troops. If the local construction industry is used, local procurement provides equipment and materials with which local workers are familiar. Local procurement overseas makes it possible 

for a supported nation to make a greater contribution to the 

common cause or a conquered territory to be forced to pay a 

part of the cost of the war. 
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 19 

I have encountered many illustrations of the advantages to 

the United States of local procurement overseas. Most of these 

illustrations were in World War II, because local resources in 

many of our overseas theaters in that war were abundant, but 

there were some in the wars in Korea and Vietnam. In all three 

wars the use of local labor was of major importance in reducing requirements for American logistic troops. Also, since local 

labor usually derives most of its own logistic support from the 

local economy, there has been a considerable saving in support 

tonnage required from the United States. 

I can illustrate most of the advantages of offshore procurement by an example of railway operations in Italy in World 

War II. Generally speaking, all the Italian railways were under 

the control of our Military Railway Service, an integrated British-American organization. The British and American railway 

troops, however, only had to handle rehabilitation and operation in the forward areas because they could turn over the 

operation of most of the lines in the rear to the Italians. In 

withdrawing in 1944 to a position covering Bologna, the Germans had been thorough in destroying the two railway lines, 

one on each side of the Arno River, that connect Leghorn with 

Florence. Every bridge was demolished, every tunnel blown in 

several places, every culvert blown, even every single rail cut. 

In preparing to support the American Fifth Army in the Po 

Valley campaign in the spring of 1945, it was necessary to put 

one of these railway lines back into operation. 

I was G-4 of the theater. Our original plan was to restore 

the rail line north of the Arno where reopening the Serravale 

Tunnel appeared to be less of a problem than replacing the 

ninety-six bridges and culverts that would be required on the 

rail line south of the Arno, especially since the South African 

Mines Brigade was made available for tunnel repair. Three 

months before the spring offensive was due to commence, it 

became apparent that a stratum of mud, in one of the places in 

the middle of the mountain where the tunnel had been blown, 

was causing so much difficulty that the tunnel could not be 

restored in time. The restoration of the railway line south of 

the Arno then became a very high-priority project. Brick and 

mortar were available locally as were Italians skilled in masonry, so contracts with Italian industry could be used to repair 
20 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

culverts or to replace temporary bridging with permanent masonry. The rebuilding of bridges, of which six were between 80 

and 100 feet long and one was 500 feet long, however, was too 

urgent and difficult to attempt by contract. Two battalions of 

American engineers and the construction company of a railway 

operating battalion were charged with the bridge building. The 

project would have been impossible to execute if we had been 

forced to requisition on the United States for railway bridging. 

Fortunately, the British had put an Italian firm (my memory is 

that it was the Tierne Steel Works) into operation, producing 

prefabricated steel railway bridge piers, bridge spans, and girders. These were made available as soon as we could use them, 

and the rail line was reopened before the Po Valley campaign 

commenced. 

I assume that Italy ultimately paid for most of this Italian 

assistance since under the armistice Italy undertook to make 

available such facilities, resources, and services as our forces 

required. The Italian government was not at the time, however, able to reimburse contractors and vendors furnishing facilities, resources, and services to the Allied Forces on requisition 

as was done in France. When we needed Italian currency in 

order to carry out local procurement, our finance officers drew 

lira from the Allied Financial Agency. These lira were accounted for just like dollars, with final settlement of accounts to be 

made at the peace table. 

Payment for the local procurement of facilities, resources, 

and services was a complicated and difficult problem that 

seemed to be handled differently in every country in which we 

operated and sometimes by several methods in one country, all 

because of differing international agreements. We started in 

North Africa with dollars on which the U.S. Treasury seal was 

printed in yellow (and usable in the United States as well as in 

North Africa) and ended up in Germany with marks, provided 

from the Termination of the War (TOW) budget and were 

handled just like our appropriated funds in the United States. 

Although all methods provided the essential ability to accomplish local procurement, I preferred the TOW budget-even 

though I found it just as hard to defend the occupation forces' 

TOW budget requirements to General Clay as I ever did later 

to defend the Army's procurement budget to the Appropria-
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 21 

tions Committee of the Congress. The use of the regular 

appropriated fund procedures, which were well understood by 

the American military, protected the German economy from 

unreasonable demands and provided better supervision and 

control over American personnel handling TOW appropriated 

funds than we had been able to exercise under the systems 

previously used. 

Although the use of occupation marks was an excellent way 

to place some of the cost of the occupation on the Germans, 

we had one major problem with our marks. In addition to 

using marks issued by the occupation authorities for local procurement, we also used them to pay our American military 

personnel. However, we allowed American military personnel 

to buy, for these occupation marks, postal money orders in 

dollars for transmittal to the United States. The Soviets also 

paid their personnel in the same marks and in large amounts. 

With the shortage of goods and the excessive availability of 

marks, the mark depreciated. Some Americans traded goods, 

either procured from the post exchanges or ordered from the 

United States, for depreciated marks and then converted large 

quantities of these marks into dollars through postal money 

orders. We s topped this practice by a res triction which in 

essence terminated any conversion of marks into dollars. Military personnel wishing to send dollars to the United States 

could increase their allotments, have pay checks deposited in 

American banks, or buy money orders at the pay table. 

Local procurement is advantageous not only to the military 

forces, but also to the local economy. Procurement in a theater 

of operations helps to keep the local economy operating. I can 

illustrate this with the very smallest of examples. When I had 

the IX Corps in Korea in 1954, I noticed our soldiers fishing 

in an irrigation reservoir but never catching anything. I dispatched a young captain to find a fish hatchery. He returned 

with the information that there appeared to be only two still 

active in Korea. They produced only one type of fish called the 

red horse, a species of carp. The Koreans used the red horse 

as a food fish. They released them as fingerlings in the rice 

paddies when they were flooded . The fish grew to eating size 

by the time the rice paddies were ready to be drained in the 
22 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

fall. In the disruption caused by the war, the demand for red 

horse had disappeared. As the only customer in sight, we 

contracted for the whole output of one of the hatcheries. I was 

ordered away before the fishing season, but I hope our purchase helped to keep the hatchery going until the commercial 

demand reappeared. 

In my opinion, U.S. military procurement, with its requirement that specifications be met, gave great impetus to quality 

control in Japan during the Korean War and helped change 

Japan from a nation that was noted for making cheap but poor 

copies of the products of other nations to a nation whose 

products were competitive in quality. Similarly, I believe that 

some of the current improvement of the Korean economy can 

be traced to local U.S. military procurement since the Korean 

War. During my period of command, I made every effort to 

encourage the Korean economy to produce for both the military and personal requirements of the American forces. One of 

our more successful efforts was what Maj. Gen. James A. Richardson called his "County Fair." This fair consisted of two 

buildings whose walls were covered with items, mostly hardware, that we thought the Koreans could produce and that we 

wanted to buy. By each item was a card showing how many we 

had bought in previous years, how much we had paid, and how 

many we expected to buy in the current year. With the exhibits 

were American experts who could discuss manufacturing processes with any prospective supplier. In our procurement we 

required the Korean products to meet American standards. 

Our exchange service made special efforts to procure Korean 

products for resale. Our quartermaster sought to buy Korean 

food products that met our standards of quality and sanitation. 

At first only the produce from the Seventh Day Adventist 

mission met these standards, but gradually more and more 

Korean food products did. One of our particularly successful 

steps forward was with the Korean fishing industry, to which 

we lent some of our veterinary personnel to teach sanitation 

and from which afterward we were able to buy seafood in 

considerable quantity. 

The disadvantages of local procurement are few. On occasion, it may strain the local economy. (Thus in 1946, with food 
SUPPLY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN OVERSEAS THEATER 23 

critically short in Germany, we stopped local procurement 

there of food for the American occupation forces.) More recently, offshore procurement has been restricted severely to 

cut down the gold flow in spite of the increased cost of importation from the United States. 

Our local procurement efforts in the past have been primarily the result of the initiative of the military personnel of 

the theaters of operations rather than the result of any guidance from the United States, primarily because those in the 

field could best see the possibilities at hand. Procurement 

efforts have been directed primarily toward big-tonnage items 

because the military authorities overseas were thoroughly alert 

to the criticality of transportation. The other incentives for 

local procurement have been time and convenience. No accurate information has been furnished overseas theaters on the 

needs or shortages of the United States economy. Some scrap 

iron, iron ore, and phosphates, for example, were shipped 

home from North Africa in World War II primarily as ballast. 

Much more could have been usefully shipped, although at 

some cost in loading time. On the other hand, a large quantity 

of oranges shipped to Britain from North Africa at the initiative of the theater stirred up a protest from importers that was 

so violent as to completely overshadow any expression of appreciation from the recipients who rarely enjoyed fresh fruit 

during the war. 

In the Korean War, some facilities, some construction materials, and a great amount of local labor were obtained locally. 

The mass of offshore procurement, however, was accomplished 

in Japan. The most spectacular example of local procurement 

was the tremendous operation established in Japan to rebuild 

American World War II equipment gathered from the whole 

Pacific area. One of the most important aspects in this operation was the capability of the Japanese to produce needed 

repair parts that were out of production in the United States. 

Japanese industry had so much experience copying western 

products that "reverse engineering" of a part for which no 

specifications were available seemed to give little trouble. This 

rebuilding capability in Japan was used after the Korean War 

not only to support U.S. and Korean forces in Korea but also 
24 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

to process military aid equipment for other Far Eastern nations. It has been used extensively in support of the war in 

Vietnam. 

Reasons why the problem of the use of local resources recurs. 

As long as the gold flow from the United States needs to 

be reduced, the reduction of local procurement overseas will 

continue to be studied. On the other hand, once the gold flow 

is corrected and a new war threatens, recognition will probably 

be given to the fact that U.S. resources are not inexhaustible. 

Impetus will then be given to increasing procurement overseas. 

Also, there may well be a long period during which the United 

States must retain troops in Vietnam and bolster the Vietnamese economy. During such a period, American military personnel would provide the equivalent of both an export market and 

a tourist trade. Local military procurement, both for the U.S. 

forces still in Vietnam and for military aid being provided by 

the United States to the Vietnamese forces, could be of great 

value in developing and supporting the local economy. 

FOTnl in which the problem of the use of local resources will probably 

recur. 

If war ever threatens in Europe, maximizing local procurement overseas will become critical to reduce shipping requirements, given the threat of the nuclear submarine. Also for such 

a war and for any other large war that may threaten, the 

necessity of conserving U.S. resources should lead to studies to 

determine, in advance, what items that are short in the United 

States can be procured locally and what monetary or requisitioning process should be used to procure them. The problem 

will also likely recur in the form of studies of how to foster the 

Vietnamese economy during the recovery period. 
CHAPTER 2 

Logistic Troop Requirements 

Logistic troop requirements usually are, and I believe 

always should be, under attack. This is for the simple reason 

that more personnel in logistic units means less personnel in 

combat units. However, after a critical review has been made 

and logistic troop requirements for an operation adequately 

justified, then those logistic troops should be considered just 

as essential to the success of the operation as the combat 

troops. Although most commanders would probably agree to 

such a statement, it just never seems to be handled that way. 

Rather, it is handled as a logistician in the North African 

Theater of Operations described a troop basis meeting in early 

1943. He said new troop units were asked for on the basis of 

parity: one tactical unit and then, in turn, one logistic unitexcept that the approved list came out in the ratio of one 

infantry division to one heavy maintenance company. 

The most critical recurring problems that I have observed 

in the area of logistic troop requirements are: 

1. The shortage of logistics troops at the beginning of a 

war. 

2. The need to determine measures, and their price, that 

can reduce the requirements for American logistic troops in a 

theater of operations. 

Shortage of Logistic Troops at the Start of a War 

Military forces require much the same type of services as 

the civilian community. As a result, most of the special skills 

needed already usually exist in any large group of mature 

personnel brought in by the draft. Such skilled personnel need 

only to be taught the military aspects of their skills and to be 
26 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

trained enough to acquire a minimum amount of discipline in 

order to form satisfactory logistic troops. Combat troops, on 

the other hand, must be taught skills not developed in the 

civilian community. They need to be toughened physically to 

endure the much greater rigors to which they will be exposed. 

They must acquire a much higher level of discipline to hold 

them to their tasks under hardship and danger. Because of 

these requirements, it is generally understood that it takes a 

year to train a combat unit but only six months to train a 

logistic unit. 

In time of peace the most basic control on the military is 

the limitation on personnel strength. In order to get the maximum military strength with a limited personnel base, the 

longer training-time requirement for combat units dictates that 

most of the units of the regular establishment must be combat 

units. Logistic personnel on active duty in peacetime are generally limited to those required to provide peacetime logistical 

support for the active combat forces. Combat forces require far 

less logistic support in peace than in war. In peace, shortages 

of materiel do not have to be replaced promptly; construction 

can be done by contract; there are few sick and no wounded to 

care for; and maintenance requirements are light because 

equipment is less used, better cared for, and not damaged by 

enemy action. 

When combat troops move out of their peacetime posts to 

go to war, these posts are used to accommodate newly formed 

combat units, which require trained logistic support as soon as 

they are formed. The departure of the original combat units 

does not therefore release the logistic personnel who supported them. In 1939 the 3d Division, then stationed at Fort Lewis, 

Washington, left that post to engage in a landing on the 

California coast, followed by several months of field maneuvers. This was one of the most important peacetime exercises 

the Army has ever held, and it was important that every available man take part. Yet we found it necessary to leave behind 

approximately one thousand soldiers from the division to take 

care of the post even though it was not occupied by other 

combat troops. 

Logistic troops in the peacetime troop base are always 

vulnerable to elimination. Reduction of logistic troops is called 
LOGISTIC TROOP REQUIREMENTS 27 

"cutting out the fat" in press releases. This has been going on 

in the U.S. European Command in recent years. It took place 

after World War I to such an extent that at the beginning of 

World War II the active Army had only 11 percent of the 

logistic troops necessary to support overseas the available 

combat units. Lacking sufficient active-duty logistic troops to 

meet requirements at the beginning of a war, the Army has 

come to rely on reserve logistic units. A good reserve unit can 

be called up and put in shape for deployment to an overseas 

theater in perhaps three months. 

Although the Army carries few logistic troops in its active 

peacetime establishment and has to train reserve logistic units 

before they are ready to be committed to an active theater, the 

need for logistic troops precedes the need for combat troops 

in war. For example, early in World War II we sent combat 

troops to the British Isles. Supplies were shipped concurrently 

with the combat troops, but logistic troops to receive, store, 

and issue these supplies were either unavailable or untrained. 

It was hoped that, while still training on the job, the logistic 

troops would gradually identify, inventory, and store the supplies sent. Yet over six months later, when some of these same 

combat troops were sent from the British Isles to invade North 

Africa, they could not be equipped and supported from the 

supplies known to have been shipped to the British Isles. Some 

of the equipment and all of the supply support had to be 

shipped from the United States. Thus at a time when equipment and supplies, as well as shipping, were critically short, 

great quantities of supplies on hand were unavailable for use 

because trained logistic troops had not been available in numbers to balance the combat troops sent overseas. 

A related illustration of the same difficulty in the same war 

was the accumulation of shipping awaiting unloading in many 

overseas ports for lack of logistic troops to unload, segregate, 

and store the cargo. Noumea, New Caledonia, was the most 

publicized example, with over eighty ships waiting to unload in 

September 1942. It took four months to bring this backlog of 

ships down to an acceptable level. 

In the Korean War the shipping situation was ameliorated 

by the availability of the fine Port of Pusan and by the use of 
28 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Japan for storage and transshipping by LSTs. The shortage of 

logistic troops was a little less critical than in World War II 

because the logistic troops who had supported the American 

occupation of Japan were available. These logistic troops, however, had to be split between the U.S. troops in Korea and the 

U.S. base in Japan. As a result, there were problems in receiving, storing, and distributing supplies in Korea, problems 

made doubly difficult because the Koreans had few logistic 

troops of their own. At the same time, our first efforts were 

mainly directed at developing among the Koreans the capability to organize and train combat units. 

It was not until I came to Korea as the United Nations 

commander in 1959, six years after the Armistice, that any real 

effort was made to establish an all-Korean line of communications to support the Korean Army. This time lag was not 

inadvertent. There are many preliminary requirements that 

must be met before an effective line of communications can be 

established by any foreign country using U.S. materiel. They 

include, among other things, a requirement that the foreign 

personnel learn English so they can read our manuals or that 

our manuals be translated into the foreign language. Neither is 

an easy task because of the many technical terms involved. 

A still more difficult requirement in many countries is the 

inculcation of integrity, which is essential to all military operations but peculiarly to logistics. Integrity emerged as a problem in the Korean Army during my period as United Nations 

commander. The Korean Military Academy, patterned on West 

Point, had been established during the Korean War. Its graduates were therefore the junior officers of the Army. They had 

been taught high standards of integrity, and so, on occasion, 

they considered unethical some of the things they were directed to do. I had observed the same problem in much milder 

form in our own Army when our post-World War I West Point 

classes came in under the integrated World War I officers, 

many of whom had lower standards. Some of the latter, for 

example, had attended colleges where cheating was normal. I 

still remember the protection we juniors felt because we could 

call for an inspector general. This assurance that any complaint 

would receive a fair and impartial investigation by its very 

existence exerted an influence so strong that it rarely needed 
LOGISTIC TROOP REQ.UIREMENTS 29 

to be invoked. Although the Korean Army, had been patterned 

on the United States Army, it had no inspector general. I 

urged the establishment of an Inspector General's Department 

on the Korean Army, and the problem, if not eliminated, was 

certainly ameliorated. I felt that elimination of the problem 

could come only when graduates of the Korean Military Academy had reached the top levels of the Army. 

One of the principal reasons given for American reluctance 

to establish a Korean-manned line of communications, pilferage, is worthy of note. Pilferage takes place in every theater of 

operations. It cannot be stopped under our laws and practices, 

any more than shoplifting can be stopped, except by an uneconomical amount of effort. What pilferage does take place is 

usually militarily inconsequential, but publicity makes it a political issue out of all proportion to its true importance. As a 

result, the military provide excessive protection. For example, I 

found a company of eighty American soldiers protecting our 

main Exchange Service warehouse in Korea even as we had to 

use Koreans to keep our American combat units up to 

strength. I directed the Exchange Service to contract for 

Korean guards. This proved satisfactory because when property was lost the contractor, unhampered by American practices, 

fired guards without having to prove guilt or negligence. The 

Korean Army proved entirely capable of holding down pilferage to a reasonable level in operating its own line of communications. 

Vietnam, in its early phases, showed the effect of a shortage 

of logistic troops similar to that of World War II. The French 

had never organized and trained all-Vietnamese units but had 

furnished officers, noncommissioned officers, and specialists. 

As a result, when the French withdrew, the burden of furnishing logistic units fell heavily on the United States. Ships awaiting unloading accumulated at Saigon. Great quantities of unidentified supplies accumulated ashore. The situation was not 

relieved until the United States built and manned a new line of 

communications, which included a new port and the base 

depots at Cam Ranh Bay. Many of the unidentified supplies, 

and some of the accumulated supplies that proved to be 

excess, were shipped from Vietnam to Okinawa. The identifica-
30 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

tion and inventorying of the remaining supplies are still incomplete (mid-1969). This situation was the result not only of the 

lack of logistic troops in the regular u.s. troop basis but also 

of the presidential decision against the calling up of reserve 

units upon which secondary reliance had been placed. 

Reasons why the problem of a shortage of logistic troops at the beginning 

of a war recurs. 

With manpower ceilings being a basic control of the Army, 

there will always be competition between the requirements for 

combat troops and logistic troops. Because the combat troops 

take longer to train and have much more popular appeal, the 

balance will normally be weighted in favor of the combat 

troops. Those bearing responsibility for logistic support must 

continually strive to secure a reasonable balance. 

Form in which the problem of a shortage of logistic troops at the 

beginning of a war will probably recur. 

Efforts to support the establishment of a level of logistic 

troops in balance with combat troops will usually take the form 

of developing the troop basis for a projected operation in a 

way that presents the logistic troop requirement in the most 

convincing manner available. Initially this can probably best be 

done by confirming or establishing' the capacity of each type of 

logistic unit, determining the tasks to be performed and the 

time available for each task, and then computing the logistic 

units required to perform the tasks. This method, however, has 

been used before without achieving an increased authorization 

of log'istic troops. I believe that in the future the Army will 

prove the need for logistic troops by using war-gaming to 

forecast the risks that accompany a shortage of logistic troops. 

The original concept of the RAG's project on this subject 

included the establishment through tactical-logistic war games 

of supply shortages, of their influence on the capability of 

combat troops, and of the resulting likely effect on the 

progress of the campaign. This concept has never been carried 

out, but it will probably be considered again when some responsible logistician, having done everything he can to reduce 

logistic troop requirements and increase availability, still feels 

a critical need to support a level of logistic troops higher than 

that which has been approved. 
LOGISTIC TROOP REQUIREMENTS 

Measures To Reduce the Requirements for 

Theater Logistic Troops 

31 

Since efforts to secure what is considered to be an adequate level of logistic troops have usually failed, continuous 

study of the expedients that have been used or might be used 

to reduce this need is indicated. Among the possible measures 

that should be considered are those which reduce the need for 

logistic troops in general and for American logistic troops in 

particular. Among these measures are simplification of distribution, improvement in reliability and durability of equipment, 

reduction in fuel consumption, use of local labor to perform 

the desired services, reduction of the theater requirement for 

logistic support by increased use of transportation, modification of maintenance policy to reduce the overseas maintenance 

load, and organization and training of allied logistic troops to 

replace American. 

Combination of items into packages, so that a relatively 

small number of packages instead of many individual items can 

be distributed, has been tried many times with some success in 

reducing the requirement for logistic personnel. An example 

of one of the most successful efforts is the K-ration. One 

package contains one meal for one combat soldier, and individual packages can be packed in quantity in large containers. 

Thus several cases of K-rations can be supplied a unit instead 

of the many different items needed if cooks had to prepare 

foods by combining the necessary ingredients. The disadvantage is that our standard of living in peacetime is so high that 

merely providing sufficient nutrition is not enough to satisfy 

our soldiers. Even the greater variety of the C-ration appears 

unacceptable for periods of long duration. Industry is making 

efforts along the same line with prepared food mixes. More 

popular among soldiers, these mixes save some labor and still 

simplify distribution. This solution is less efficient than combat 

rations, and in some cases the mixes do not keep as well in 

storage. 

Industry has also created kits that include all the items 

necessary to make the more common repairs needed by some 

mechanical items. Thus a repair kit for a specified make and 
32 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

model of carburetor can be purchased. This simplifies distribution but increases supply because all the items in a repair kit 

are seldom used. 

The ultimate military objective is of course a standard container with a standard content that will supply a specified unit 

for a specified time period. The overseas shipping container 

developed at the end of World War II was the best size of 

container for fitting into the holds of ships, into European 

freight cars, or into military trucks. We worked with standard 

lists of contents for the occupation forces in Germany but 

found peacetime requirements too different from wartime requirements to permit useful testing. These containers are still 

in use and protect their contents against damage in shipment 

and against pilferage. A disadvantage is the need for a crane in 

handling them. This disadvantage may be eliminated by the 

use of the trailers now being carried on flatcars by American 

railroads and on ships built to carry them. The development of 

a satisfactory standard content still eludes us. Like the automatic resupply of a theater of operations, almost any standard 

content will supply many items in greater quantities than required and many, many others in inadequate quantities, if at 

all. Experience has established that only food is consumed at a 

uniform rate. Progress is probably possible if the minimum 

requirements are listed on requisition. 

Although improvement in reliability and durability of 

equipment has always been an objective, we have made only 

moderate progress. Industry has a limited incentive because so 

much profit is made in maintenance and repair parts. I have 

seen only one proposal that I thought might stimulate real 

action on the part of industry. It was a proposal of Lear 

Siegler, a manufacturer of aircraft and automatic parts to put 

in one fixed-price contract, to be awarded competitively, the 

provision of a specified number of end items and an undertaking to maintain them for their specified life at the expense of 

the manufacturer. Such a contract would give the manufacturer 

a strong incentive to build reliability and durability into his 

product. So far as I know this approach has not yet been tried. 

The tremendous fuel requirements of a theater of operations in this motor age invite attention to any possibility of 

reduction. With the reduction of fuel requirements goes the 
LOGISTIC TROOP REQ.UIREMENTS 33 

reduction in the requirements for the construction and operation of pipelines, the erection of tankage, and all the other 

actions involved in the receipt, storage, testing and distribution 

of POL. 

When I became Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, I raised 

the question of why we still put gasoline engines instead of 

diesels in our tanks. I wanted the reduced fuel requirement, 

the greater range, and the reduced fire hazard that the diesel 

offered. I was told there was a ruling of the Munitions Board 

based on the belief that the Air Force and Navy needed all the 

diesel oil that could be secured by the military services. An 

investigation showed that this was no longer true, so we put a 

diesel engine in the M60 tank. 

The ultimate fuel saving in sight when I was Deputy for 

Logistics could come from the introduction of nuclear power. 

Looking forward to the time when our surface-to-air missiles 

and our antiballistic missiles would provide a considerable 

measure of protection against intercontinental nuclear attack, I 

believe that the Army could make an important contribution to 

combat power in nuclear war if it had armored vehicles that 

fired nuclear weapons and were nuclear shielded and nuclear 

propelled. We already had nuclear weapons suitable for 

mounting in tanks, our tank armor already gave a reasonable 

degree of protection against the blast and heat of a nuclear 

burst, though not enough against radiation, and we already 

had a project for a very large nuclear-powered tractor for a socalled logistic train. I personally did not think much of the 

logistic train, but I supported the project strongly because I 

wanted progress toward a small nuclear-powered engine for 

tanks. The project has since been discontinued, but I look to 

see small nuclear-powered engines developed when the state 

of the art is further advanced. 

There are many ways of utilizing local labor. If the economy of the country in which operations are to be conducted is 

operating, it may be possible to contract for services such as 

the construction of depots, the operation of manufacturing 

plants or the running of railroads. Varying amounts of assistance and supervision are required. This method was used on 

occasion in Italy and France in World War II. 
34 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

If the local economy is in bad shape, a greater degree of 

assistance is required tending toward more supervision, the 

provision of some or all equipment and the provision of some 

or all materials. Furthest down the scale in this area is the 

Type B unit which is really an American logistic unit with its 

normal equipment as carried in the Table of Organization and 

Equipment, but from which all personnel have been removed 

except those for administration and those possessing certain 

critical skills. The American personnel withdrawn are replaced 

with indigenous personnel. Variations of this solution were 

used in North Africa in World War II and in the Korean War. 

Depending on the type of work required, the terms of 

surrender, the international agreements in force and the political situation, it is sometimes possible to utilize prisoners of war 

for local labor. Italian prisoners of war who volunteered for 

the work were used with limited success in North Africa in 

World War II, as authorized by the Geneva Convention. After 

Italy capitulated and then declared war on Germany, it was 

possible to keep the former Italian paws as Italian military 

personnel, but it was considered politically desirable to replace 

many of them with Italian civilians. Also civilians required less 

support from us than did paws. 

When the German forces in Italy surrendered in May 1945, 

special terms in the surrender allowed us to use them for a 

wide variety of military purposes and, as I remember it, regardless of whether or not they volunteered. They were, however, remarkably willing. We used German logistic units in 

their original organizations under their own officers. They required little instruction, guarding, or supervision. They gave 

fine service. The Italian public, however, had become antagonistic to the Germans and resented the relative freedom from 

restraint with which we allowed the German paws to operate. 

Although the German paws were conducting themselves in an 

exemplary fashion, it became politically desirable to restrict 

such of our uses of them that puts them in contact with the 

Italian civil population. In Germany after World War II, we 

organized Polish and Baltic displaced persons, mostly paws 

who had been held by the Germans, into logistic units under 

their own officers. They too performed fine service. No effort 
LOGISTIC TROOP REQUIREMENTS 35 

was made to utilize North Korean prisoners of war in the 

Korean War because great numbers of willing South Koreans 

were available and needed some means of earning a living. 

All the methods of utilizing personnel available locally are 

dependent on economic and political conditions that are hard 

to foresee and are usually handicapped by language difficulties. 

Most required a considerable amount of time before they 

become effective. Accordingly, primary dependence in the 

early stages of an operation is best placed in American logistic 

units with local personnel being utilized as early as practicable. 

Where transportation is available, a short evacuation policy 

reduces the need both of medical units and of hospital construction in a theater of operations. In World War II some of 

the burden of care for sick and wounded was taken off the 

theater by the use of hospital ships. In Korea, enough air 

transportation was available to ship many sick and wounded 

back to Japan. In Vietnam, air transportation is used still more 

widely to bring sick and wounded back to Japan, Hawaii, and 

the United States. A short evacuation policy provides better 

medical service. It has the disadvantage that many experienced 

men do not go back to their units and those who do are away 

longer. This in turn increases the requirement for replacement 

and lowers the level of experience in units. 

Where transportation is available, the requirement for logistic support in a theater of operations also can be reduced by 

transferring some of the maintenance load to a base outside 

the theater or to the United States. This was not practicable in 

World War II because cargo shipping was so critically short. It 

was extensively used in Korea where ample shipping, particularly LSTs, permitted easy loading for back haul to Japan. It is 

still more extensively used in Vietnam, with unserviceable 

items of all types being outs hipped to both Japan and the 

United States for repair. Replacement items have to be 

shipped in, increasing the transportation workload. The quality 

of maintenance is probably considerably higher but the repair 

cycle is much longer requiring a larger supply of end items. 

The Air Force has long utilized transportation to reduce 

maintenance performed overseas. Unserviceable aircraft engines are shipped back to the United States, usually by air 
36 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

freight, for repair. This has the advantage that better maintenance is accomplished with a lesser stock of tools and parts. It 

has the disadvantage of requiring a larger pipe line of engines 

and of using transportation that is critically needed for other 

purposes in the early stages of an operation. The desirability 

of this kind of procedure depends on the weight, size, and 

complexity of the item to be repaired. It is usually inappropriate for heavy items like armored vehicles but it is probably 

efficient for many light items such as electronic equipment. 

Where air transportation is available and a ground line of 

communications is difficult to establish, maintain, or protect, 

an air line may be established. An air line of communications 

may reduce the need of many types of logistic support if the 

requirements for the construction, maintenance, and operation 

of the necessary air bases are less than the requirements of 

that part of the ground line of communications that is replaced. Up to the present, air has been only supplementary to 

a ground line of communications, unless the "Dump Run" 

across the Himalayas from Chabua in India to Kunming in 

China in World War II for the period up until the Burma Road 

was reopened can be considered an exception. Recently a 

study that estimated the savings of logistic troops that could be 

effected if an air line of communications replaced the ground 

line was used to help justify the development of the C-SA 

aircraft. Such a line of communications has the disadvantage 

that a defeat leaves the field army with no logistic base to fall 

back upon. 

The more end items or parts are classified "throwaway" 

instead of "repairable," the less maintenance support is required. In World War II the shortage of logistic units influenced local decisions not to repair many items and parts even 

though they were not classified as "throwaway." Maintenance 

effort was usually available only to replace major assemblies, 

not to repair them. As a result engines, transmissions, rear 

axles, and many types of electrical and electronics components, 

although not classified as throwaway, were replaced rather 

than repaired. In Korea the soldiers often made the decision 

for us as to whether or not to repair with respect to end items 

normally man-carried. In the rugged Korean terrain any man-
LOGISTIC TROOP REQUIREMENTS 37 

carried load was a burden. Soldiers were unwilling to carry 

unserviceable items in action and so often threw them away. 

For some items, lack of repair parts has at times made the 

decision for us as to whether or not to repair. Thus in the 

engineer depot supporting the IX Corps in Korea, I once 

counted over 120 different sizes, makes, and models of generators parked in outside storage and unrepairable because of lack 

of parts. They might just as well have been abandoned since 

the supply of parts for nonstandard equipment is too complicated to be efficiently carried out in war. Increased degrees of 

standardization reduce requirements for both maintenance and 

supply units. This subject is covered at length in Chapter 6, 

"Maintenance of Materiel." But the opposite side of the picture must also be considered. Many actions toward reducing 

repair increase requirements for supply. 

Since we have in the past and expect in the future to 

operate with allies, and since being a great industrial nation 

and the "Arsenal of Democracy" we usually supply most of the 

materiel, we are inclined to assume the very heavy logistic 

burden of operating a line of communications with our own 

personnel even though it serves allies as well as Americans. 

Thus Americans operated the line of communications in the 

invasion of Southern France in World War II even though it 

supported a French Army as well as an American Army. Americans operated the line of communications in Korea supporting 

the Koreans and the troops of many other nations. We do the 

same in Vietnam. I do not say this is wrong because it is 

certainly more efficient. I do feel that we should reduce the 

magnitude of the burden by arranging to start at the earliest 

practicable date the organization and training of allied logistic 

troops and turning over to them whatever tasks they can effectively handle. The earliest practicable date could well not await 

the beginning of a war but be the date on which we start a 

military aid program. 

Reasons why the problem of reducing American logistic troop requlrements for a theater of oper-ations reCUTS_ 

There is little hope of ever securing in peacetime the activation and training of all the logistic units that will be needed 
38 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

in war. Those responsible for logistic support must therefore 

take all practicable measures to reduce the requirement for 

logistic troops and the impact of any expected shortage in such 

troops in war. 

Form in which the problem of reducing American logistic troop requirements for a theater of operations will probably recur. 

The problem of how to reduce the requirements for logistic 

troops will probably recur in the form of studies, research, 

tests, and plans for direct action oriented toward: 

a. Simplification of distribution by broader use of containers with standardized content. 

b. Improved reliability and durability of equipment. 

c. Use of local labor. 

d. Use of transportation to support shorter evacuation policies, to return equipment to the United States for repair, or to 

reduce ground lines of communications. 

f. Reduction of the maintenance load by making more components and parts "throwaway" instead of "repairable." 

g. Organization and training of allied logistic troops. 
CHAPTER 3 

Logistic Support of Contingency Plans 

Ever since the armies of Genghis Khan swept across most 

of Asia and Europe, virtually without any logistic drag on their 

freedom of maneuver, the progress of civilization has been 

increasing the quantity and complexity of military materiel and 

the standard of living of military personnel. As a result, the 

logistic "tail" of any major force has become so great that the 

establishment, maintenance, and protection of a line of communications must be assured before any maneuver can be 

seriously considered. In World War II, when a new theater of 

operations was being opened, it was a function of Headquarters, Army Service Forces, to recommend, among other things, 

the logistic units that should operate the line of communications, the level of supply reserves that should be stored in the 

communications zone, and the provision of any special equipment or supplies not carried in Tables of Organization and 

Equipment (TO&E). Decisions in these areas determined the 

size of the logistic tail. 

No logistics doctrine handed down from World War I 

pointed out the importance of special equipment or construction materials. This was because these items had been determined before the United States entered that war. Determining 

such requirements was therefore a relatively new field for U.S. 

logisticians when American forces first went into new theaters 

in World War II. Examples of the more important types of 

major items of equipment not carried on Tables of Organization and Equipment, and therefore not automatically furnished 

with troop units, are landing craft and railway rolling stock. 

Examples of the more important types of construction materials are barbed wire, pierced steel plank, and invasion-type pipe 

for POL pipe lines. 
40 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Troop units carry with them the minimum equipment essential to combat. They do not carry much for logistic purposes. For some of the more important and common logistic 

equipment, logistic troop units have been formed to provide 

both the equipment and the operators. Special logistic equipment, needed because of specific conditions in a theater of 

operations, however, is not necessarily carried in the tables of 

organization of logistic units. For example, to reduce the requirement for cargo ships in the North African operations in 

World War II, general-purpose 2%-ton trucks were packed 

partially disassembled in what was called a "twin unit pack." 

Assembling these trucks without special equipment was a laborious job. Finally, a troop unit equipped with special equipment and organized and trained under General Motors advisers was sent to Casablanca. But meanwhile, at Oran, improvised equipment had been built from what was available locally, and local laborers had been trained to do the work under 

U.S. Ordnance supervision. Both assembly plants served the 

purpose. 

It is the usual practice in military planning to prepare 

operational plans first and then prepare logistical plans to 

support them. In order to avoid a lengthy "cut-and-try" approach to an acceptable combined operational-logistic plan, we 

found in World War II planning that an operational concept 

should be immediately followed by a transportation capability 

study. Only if the transportation system will support, or can be 

made to support, the forces necessary to carry out the operations plan is it worthwhile to go farther in the logistic plannmg. 

During the preliminary consideration of proposed contingency plans in the past, I had occasion to demonstrate that 

certain operations were infeasible because of transportation 

alone and so was able to avoid all other logistic computations. 

Examples of such contingency plans included a landing at 

Genoa in World War II, infeasible because, unless the enemy's 

transportation system was crippled by a preliminary major air 

offensive, he could build up forces in the objective area faster 

than we could; an invasion of Europe through Greece, again in 

World War II, when the western Mediterranean was still 
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS 41 

closed, infeasible because the available shipping could not 

transport and support more than half the necessary force in 

the objective area; and a plan considered in peacetime, to be 

implemented in the event of war, for a major force to be 

landed far inland by air and thereafter supported by air using 

amphibians (this plan would have given support to the completion of the development and procurement of the MARS heavy 

amphibious transport plane), infeasible because of the tremendous tonnage that would have had to be moved over a long 

and vulnerable air line of communications and the resulting 

size of the required air fleet. 

No one who has not carefully studied the subject is likely 

even to imagine the shrinkage that takes place in a really long 

line of communications. It was forcefully brought home to me 

by a chart that General George C. Marshall, the Army's Chief 

of Staff, called "the intestinal tract." It was brought to the 

Quebec Conference by Col. Frederick S. Strong, Jr., from the 

China-Burma-India Theater. It was a map showing the planned 

line of communications from Calcutta in India to Kunming in 

China when the Burma Road was reopened. The width of the 

line indicated the tonnage per month passing any point. Different colors indicated the tonnages being moved by different 

means of transport. The chart showed .6 million tons a month 

going into Calcutta, but less than .2 million reaching Kunming. 

The .4 million tons a month that was diverted provided whatever was not available locally for the maintenance and operation of the line of communications, which included the port of 

Calcutta, the Bengal and Assam Railway, the barge lines up the 

Brahmaputra, the airlift across the Himalayas, and the roads 

and pipelines from Calcutta to Kunming. It also provided 

much of the support for the British forces covering India, for 

the three Chinese divisions being trained by the Americans, 

and for several bases for American long-range bombers. Although it would have been inaccurate to charge all tonnage 

diverted to these forces to the maintenance and operation of 

the line of communications, it was certainly reasonable to 

charge much of it because the protection of this line of communications was one of the principal reasons for these forces' 

being where they were. 
42 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

In studying transportation in support of the invasion of 

North Africa in World War II, we found that available cargo 

shipping was inadequate to carryall the TO&E equipment of 

the troops plus a reasonable increment of the theater reserve. 

It was not, however, so inadequate as to make the operation 

infeasible, and so I recommended that the theater agree that 

the task force would go with only half its truck transport since 

the initial American role was supposed to be static. General 

Mark W. Clark (in Washington representing the theater commander) accepted this recommendation. When later developments required the U.S. II Corps to move into Tunisia, more 

motor transport became a critical necessity. Because motor 

transport was the only major shortage, we were able to expedite its shipment when shipping and escorts for an extra 

convoy were found. 

If the transportation system will support, or can be developed in time to support, the forces necessary to carry out the 

operational plan, the rest of the logistics can usually be 

brought into line within a reasonable time. This is because 

Army units are designed to fight practically any kind of war 

anywhere, and Army mobilization plans provide balanced 

forces at the rate they can be moved overseas to Europe (the 

nearest probable theater of operations). The expression 

"within a reasonable time" is used because there have always 

been peacetime shortag·es in materiel and logistic troops that 

are usually considered and accepted as reasonable risks in the 

development of the budget. Given the resources of the United 

States, any such shortage can be eliminated in time, and this 

time is always considered when accepting the risk as reasonable. Starting from scratch, almost any type of logistic unit can 

be organized and trained in six months, and almost any item of 

materiel can be produced in quantity in eighteen. These are 

the maximum times. It is seldom that something has not been 

done to help cut these times. A reserve logistic unit, for example, can usually be put in shape to go to a theater in three 

months. A going production line can have its rate of production increased by being put on a two-shift basis. The production rate will not be doubled (an increase of about 75 percent 

is usual) nor will the increased rate be effective immediately. A 
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS 43 

gradual increase takes place over several months as personnel 

are recruited and trained and as subcontractors for parts and 

components increase their production. 

The successful logistic support of contingency plans depends primarily on recognizing far enough in advance all requirements in the transportation field and any special requirements for service troops or materiel beyond those provided 

with a balanced force organized and equipped in the standard 

manner. Our first requirement, then, is to secure or produce 

such contingency plans far enough in advance to give time for 

organizing and training the necessary logistic troops and producing the necessary materiel. Although this time has varied in 

the past, depending on the requirements and availability of 

logistic troops and materiel and our capacity to organize and 

train troops and to produce materiel, we found in World War 

II that we could do very well if we had a year between planning and execution. 

As Director of the Planning Division of the Army Service 

Forces, one of my functions was to keep a close liaison with 

the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff 

(OPD) and either secure contingency plans from them far 

enough in advance or prepare them in my own division. These 

contingency plans, when made, were given to the technical 

services, which then each computed its own personnel, troop, 

and materiel requirements to support the plans. Army Service 

Forces (ASF) headquarters required the technical services to 

develop a basis of assignment for each type of logoistic support 

unit (such as so many units per corps, or one for so many 

items to be supported). Headquarters reviewed the proposed 

logistic troop requirements agoainst the theater and overall 

combat troop bases and special requirements. It defended and 

presented the resulting logistic troop list to the Deputy Chief 

of Staff of the Army, who required justification for the units 

and reviewed the totals against the manpower resources available to the Army. ASF headquarters also reviewed the materiel 

requirements developed by the technical services and included 

them in the Army supply program. To the best of my memory, 

no, review by item was made by higher authority except by the 

War Production Board, which reviewed the requirements for 
44 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

raw materials and productive capacity with a view to reducing 

them to what was feasible for industry. Under wartime pressures, Congress had neither the time nor the staff to make an 

overall detailed review. 

Although not prescribed as such in World War II, there 

was an effective overall limitation on the size of both logistic 

troop and materiel requirements. This limiting general factor 

was the availability of cargo shipping. In a global war with 

many theaters of operations, the basic . allocation of strength to 

each theater was made by the annual allocation of cargo shipping to it. Logistic troops were furnished in a fairly definite 

proportion to combat troops, to combat support troops, and to 

air forces. 

The original BOLERO troop basis of one million men to be 

transported to the United Kingdom for the cross-channel operation was made up under then Col. John E. Hull. I worked 

with the technical services to produce the logistic troop component. The troop basis came out in four approximately equal 

segments: troops in divisions, combat support troops, Air 

Corps troops, and logistic troops. This BOLERO troop basis was 

a model, the composition and proportions of which held up 

pretty well throughout the war. The Air Corps percentage 

came down a little, but I do not remember a distinct trend in 

any of the other segments. Troops requested by a theater were 

not sent unless they could be supported with the cargo tonnage allocated. The cargo tonnage available thus roughly set 

the ceiling, and within that ceiling we produced balanced 

forces and balanced logistic support. 

To be satisfactory, a contingency plan does not need to be 

detailed nor even very accurate. We are not trying to outguess 

the enemy or do the theater commander's thinking for him; we 

are trying to have available the resources the theater needs. 

We found in World War II that if we had available the planned 

logistic resources for an operation, there were relatively few 

unforeseen requirements regardless of how the commander 

decided to accomplish the mission. We could expedite the 

provision for these unforeseen requirements. The fewer the 

unforeseen requirements, the more they could be expedited. 
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS 45 

One of the early efforts to provide logistic troops and 

special logistic equipment to a theater in World War II was for 

the operations in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Long 

before any specific objectives in these islands had been selected, I and Captain Warlick, acting for the Navy, together drew 

up a logistic troop basis and a list of special equipment believed to be required. Lacking any better information, we selected a typical atoll from the Pacific Pilot, published by the 

U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, and studied it to provide a 

basis on which to estimate requirements. We agreed which 

service should provide each unit or item. We sent the list to 

the commander in the Pacific, who endorsed it and asked for 

its early delivery. Early delivery was accomplished because 

planning and action had started far enough in advance of the 

landings. The recommendations included some 20,000 logistic 

troops and such special equipment as amphibious tractors (to 

get across the coral reefs), dumb barges (to provide depot 

storage for supplies, which could then be moved from atoll to 

atoll without being unloaded ashore and then reloaded), and 

saltwater stills (there was little or no fresh water on any atoll). 

Captain Warlick accompanied the operations against Tarawa 

and Kwajalein and saw the effectiveness of the advance planning effort firsthand. 

The War Department came out of World War II with a 

formalized planning system based on the Strategic Logistics 

Study. This document started with a scenario describing the 

campaign to be carried out and a combat troop basis. It was 

then supposed to develop requirements for logistic troops and 

special logistic equipment far enough in advance to permit the 

organization and training of troops and the procurement of 

special equipment. 

The Strategic Logistics Study procedure has had its ups 

and downs since World War II. Three major influences hurt it. 

Tacticians are reluctant to forecast combat operations far 

enough in advance to provide for procurement items with long 

lead times. Logisticians themselves are inclined to make the 

whole procedure prohibitively laborious by going into a degree 

of detail that is unjustified given the inaccuracies that always 

accompany long-range tactical estimates. Budget specialists 
46 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

oppose procurement of items for which proof of need is tenuous. 

During the stress of World War II, the Army Service Forces 

could and did develop contingency plans, determine the logistic requirements to support these plans, and then procure the 

necessary materiel and organize the necessary service troops. 

Such initiative, however, is not practicable in peacetime or 

even during limited wars such as Korea and Vietnam when 

funds and personnel spaces are closely regulated by the Department of Defense, the Bureau of the Budget, the Congress, 

and the President. I have long felt that there is a basic need in 

peacetime to develop contingency plans and procedures for 

computing logistic support requirements for those plans that 

are approved by or are acceptable to all these superior echelons as a basis for appropriation requests. As Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Logistics, I was unable to accomplish this, but I hope 

that a general recognition of its importance will come in the 

future. 

I know of no contingency plans or any supporting strategic 

logistics study prepared in advance for the Korean War. The 

war was started with a surprise attack by an underrated enemy. 

The time from conception to execution was so short that we 

could only provide troops and equipment already available. 

Logistic troops to support the combat forces were sent from 

Japan, but they had to leave behind a considerable proportion 

of their strength to operate the logistic base remaining in 

Japan. Equipment and supplies had to come from what was left 

over from World War II. Fortunately this equipment included 

the landing craft needed for the Inch'on landing. Most of the 

equipment and supplies, particularly the motor transport, required major rehabilitation. Fortunately, again, this rehabilitation had been started two years before the war broke out, and 

although little in the way of serviceable reserves was on hand, 

the rebuild program was in operation and could be expanded. 

The fact that Korea was fought without the prior provision 

of materiel and logistic troops does not prove that contingency 

planning is unnecessary. It only indicates that for a small war 

against an unsophisticated enemy the United States can provide most of the logistic requirements from such resources as 
LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY PLANS 47 

it has kept available against the possibility of a major war. Even 

so, such a small war will likely be hampered and delayed a 

little by an inadequate number of service units in the Active 

Army and by a lack of special items of materiel for which 

requirements could have been foreseen and provided. For 

Korea, such deficiencies were corrected as expeditiously as 

practicable. Reserve logistic units, although inadequately 

trained, were called to active duty and sent to the theater. 

Airlift had to be used within Korea even for such heavy cargo 

as ammunition until the Korean National Railway could be put 

back into operation. This was delayed by a lack of railway 

troops as well as by a shortage of railway equipment that had 

to be produced in Japan, which had built the railway when 

Korea had belonged to it. Problems in the production of steel 

shell cases for artillery were overcome before the supply of 

brass shell cases, used and reused, gave out. 

Unlike the war in Korea, the war in Vietnam came as no 

surprise. Our commitment, once initiated, expanded gradually. 

But so far as I know, there again was no approved operational 

plan with a supporting strategic logistics study to serve as a 

basis for procurement. Rather, requirements were developed 

in the theater and met as soon as practicable. Fortunately, 

there were no particularly critical needs for materiel not available from reserves. A need for helicopters and their supporting equipment did develop, but their production was already 

being expanded. On the other hand, the logistic troop situation was critical. The usual shortage of logistic troops in the 

Active Army troop basis existed at the beginning of the expansion. The President's decision not to call up Reserve units 

caused hastily organized, inadequately trained logistic units to 

be sent. Apparently, the theater logistic system is only now 

(late 1969) recovering from the effects of this decision. 

Reasons why the problem of providing logistic support for contingency 

plans recur. 

The provision of logistic support for a contingency plan is 

a complicated procedure. When any important part of the plan 

is not satisfactorily justified to those engaged in budgetary 

review, then all the needed logistic resources are not likely to 

be provided. When the logistic support being made ready in 
48 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

peacetime is inadequate, responsible logisticians will have to 

press for improved procedures that are logical, defensible, and 

unders tandable. 

Form in which the pmblem of providing logistic support f01' contingency 

plans will probably recur. 

The problem may recur in the form of a requirement to 

provide a contingency plan or scenario that is defensible as a 

basis for securing appropriations in peacetime for the provision of logistic support. It may recur in the form of a requirement for the improvement of any of the procedures by which 

the logistic troop and materiel requirements to support a contingency plan are determined. The problem may even recur in 

a somewhat similar form as a requirement to play a war game 

over and over with the same initial inputs but with varying 

tactics to develop the best use of a new weapon and to determine its capabilities (as was done recently in replaying a war 

game testing the tactics of the Cheyenne helicopter). The ultimate objective is to determine a contingency plan that will be 

reasonable if the new weapon is provided. In my opinion good 

contingency plans can best be developed by expanding a war 

game to include more logistics, by modifying it to make the 

tactical operations reflect the effects of any inadequacies in 

logistic support, and by slowing it down to a more likely rate 

of operations, rather than playing the same game over and 

over. If such a game is based on a reasonable and probable set 

of political and military circumstances, the line of action developed ought to make a defensible plan. 

The problem could arise for any specific procedure in 

regard to the determination of requirements for items coming 

under the Army's procurement of equipment and maintenance 

appropriation. It could also arise for any group of procedures 

in regard to the determination of broad theater requirements 

or for any specific item in the support of a contingency plan. 

All of these possibilities seem to me to require competence in 

conducting war games that take into account the broadest 

range of possibilities. 
CHAPTER 4 

Career Management of Logistic 

Personnel 

Reorganizations are generally directed toward solving certain specific problems. While doing so, they usually create new 

problems. Several years ago an Army reorganization reduced 

the functions of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and 

eliminated much of the Army's technical service system. 

Whether or not this reorganization solved whatever problems 

it was supposed to solve, it created some new problems, or 

rather reopened some old ones, by eliminating the solution 

that was in effect. I consider the most critical of these problems to be the career management of logistic personnel. This 

is also the problem to which I devoted the most attention 

when I was Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics from 1955 to 

1959. 

It is axiomatic that the success of any organization depends 

heavily upon the selection, training, and utilization of its personnel. Until shortly before World War II, each chief of a 

combat army or a technical service, subject to rather broad 

guidance from the General Staff, exercised a strong influence 

on personnel selection and assignment through his personnel 

office and a strong influence on doctrine and training through 

his board, his school, and his technical inspections. For the 

technical services, the matter of selection and recruitment of 

competent officers was particularly critical. Graduates of the 

U.S. Military Academy were commissioned only in the combat 

arms, the Engineers, and the Signal Corps. The Ordnance 

Corps, the Quartermaster Corps, the Chemical Corps, and, 

later, the Transportation Corps had to depend for officers on 

ROTC and on transfers from the combat arms. Each of the 

Chiefs of Technical Services could influence the choice of a 
50 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

competent officer by his personal interest. The evidence of 

personal interest often took the form of an indication by the 

chief that the officer concerned would be given certain future 

assignments. Advanced study in a civilian institution was one 

of those assignments most sought. The prestige of the service 

chief was also a factor, given the power he wielded and the fact 

that he had been selected as the outstanding man in his specialty. As a young lieutenant of Field Artillery, for example, I 

thought of the Chief of Field Artillery as being at the top of 

my profession. I did not even know the names of the heads of 

the General Staff divisions. I recognized the Chief of Staff, 

General John J. Pershing, as a great soldier, but he, like the 

rest of his staff, were too remote to be of other than historical 

interest to me or most other junior officers. 

After the elimination of the Chiefs of Combat Arms before 

World War II, the difference between the handling of officers 

in the combat arms and the technical services became quite 

marked. The difference was basically in the degree of personal 

attention that the officer at the top of his profession gave to 

the selection, training, and assignments of the officers over 

whom he had supervision. Throughout World War II and 

Korea, G-l sought to perform these tasks for the combat arms 

largely based on career records-instead, as before, on personal knowledge. Perhaps I can best express the difference this 

way: if a major unit commander needed an Ordnance officer, 

he could be confident that the man offered to him had been 

carefully selected, probably by the Chief of Ordnance himself, 

as having the training, background, and characteristics that 

would make him a good Ordnance officer for the unit. If the 

commander needed an operations officer, he could be confident only that the man offered to him by G-l, War Department General Staff, was from one of the combat arms, was of 

the proper grade, and had probably had some experience or 

training that might fit him for the assignment. 

The combat arms officer assigned then had to sink or swim, 

but commanders were not enthusiastic about trying out individuals in key positions who might or might not be able to 

perform adequately. If they proved inadequate, it might have a 

serious effect on the performance of the unit. As a result, a 
CAREER MANAGEMENT OF LOGISTIC PERSONNEL 51 

practice developed under which commanders made individual 

name requests, based on their own knowledge or that of their 

staff officers. While more satisfactory to the commander with a 

vacancy to fill, this asking for individuals by name had the 

disadvantage that the individual usually was already serving 

under some other commander, who was likely to feel that his 

own mission precluded the release of the officer. During 

World War II and Korea no one acting weighed the importance of the two positions for the good of the service as the 

Office of the Chief of Field Artillery would have done. Where 

the considerations supporting a transfer were particularly 

strong, an appeal by the requesting commander or by the 

individual himself to his next higher superior, thereby reaching 

a more disinterested level, was sometimes used, but this was 

accomplishing an action in spite of the system rather than 

because of it. 

With the elimination of most of the Chiefs of Technical 

Services, the personnel of most of those services are now (mid1969) in a similar but even less desirable position than the 

personnel of the combat arms have been in for many years. 

They are specialists, and in an age of great technological 

progress, specialization is essential. Specialists are best judged 

and guided by men successful in their specialty. Nevertheless, 

decisions on individuals are no longer made by a respected 

service chief or his service personnel officer who knows many 

individuals either personally or by long familiarity with their 

records and whose success in office depends largely on how 

well these individuals are used. No personnel specialist, however competent, has prestige approaching that of the former 

Chiefs of Technical Services. No computer can make the 

people it manages feel that it has a personal interest in or 

understanding of their careers. 

With respect to the logistician who is a generalist, the man 

who is to become a G-4 at any level of command, the situation 

is particularly bad. So far as I know, before I became Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Logistics no one had ever tried to guide the 

careers of individuals in the generalist logistic field. As a 

result, generalist logisticians were being developed only by 

chance. It was certainly so in my own case. After eighteen 
52 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

years of service, none of which was in logistics, I was assigned 

to the G- 4 Division of the War Department General Staff in 

June 1941. Thereafter I spent most of my next twenty years of 

service in logistics because I had gained experience in the field 

while few others had. When I became Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics, I sought to manage the development of generalist 

logisticians. 

My efforts at career management in the generalist logistic 

field recognized the preeminence of combat arm or technical 

service. The technical services had good career guidance for 

developing officers in their own specialty. The Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Personnel was endeavoring to establish an adequate 

system for the combat arms. I accepted that officers chose 

their arm or service because they desired assignments with the 

troops, the schools, or the agencies of the chosen arm or 

service. I found, however, that there were so many branchimmaterial assignments in the Army that on the average an 

officer spent about half his service after reaching the grade of 

major in such assignments. Logistics could then be a secondary 

Military Occupational Specialty (MaS). I therefore sought to 

avoid disturbing officers' assignments with their own arms or 

services. Rather, I sought to interest officers in the grade of 

major or above who had performed well in one assignment in 

logistics in having assignments in logistics alternate with assignments in their own arm or service. I undertook that as 

long as they remained in my logistics career program, I would 

endeavor to assure them that their assignments in logistics 

would become more and more challenging. In addition, I undertook to add my influence to that of their arm or service in 

securing for them whatever school assignments they were 

ready for and whatever promotions they had earned. To assist 

me in this effort, I asked to be assigned to all the general 

officer promotion boards on which I could legally sit, which 

was half of them. This was a heavy and time-consuming task, 

but studying and restudying the records of hundreds of colonels and generals gave me a good knowledge of all the senior 

officers with logistics experience and enabled me to give support to those who were deserving. 

In order to be able to arrange for assignments of everincreasing responsibility, I had to convince all the senior com-
CAREER MANAGEMENT OF LOGISTIC PERSONNEL 53 

manders in the Army that the best way for each of them to 

obtain a competent G-4 staff officer or logistic commander 

was to take one of the officers I nominated. I handled the 

senior logisticians personally. When I left the Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, every important logistic 

position in the Army was held by a logistician nominated by 

me and accepted by his commander or, in one case, suggested 

by his commander and concurred in by me. 

With respect to technical service officers who preferred to 

remain strongly service oriented rather than join the logistics 

career program, I supported the service chief in his management of their careers by helping to secure desirable school 

assignments and promotions for those who were worthy. I 

went beyond this only in exceptional cases, such as those of 

officers who might become candidates themselves for chief of a 

service. Because I was Deputy for Logistics, I was also president of the board that nominated officers to become one of 

the Chiefs of Technical Services. I therefore sought to know 

personally and be familiar with the records of the brightest 

prospects, and I sought to see to it that these officers were 

given assignments that broadened their backgrounds to fit 

them better for the top positions. No officer nominated for 

chief of a service by one of these boards during my tenure ever 

failed of selection. 

I finished my assignment as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics by recommending to the Chief of Staff and the Secretary three officers well qualified to take my place: a former 

technical service chief, whose assignment as a deputy Army 

commander I had arranged in order to broaden his background; a logistician with a broad background, whose assignment as an overseas communication zone commander I had 

arranged to give him some high-level command experience as 

well as more logistical experience, and my deputy, whose previous assignment as commander of an overseas communications zone I had arranged to give him command experience 

and confidence. One was selected to replace me. The other 

two became Army commanders, proof that their work in logistics had not handicapped them with respect to assignment in 

other fields. I do not present these instances to show myself in 
54 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

a favorable light. The various officers concerned had shown 

themselves outstanding before I ever exerted any influence. I 

only sought to ensure that they were prepared for higher 

assignments in logistics. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, however, no longer has the authority over logistic officers 

personnel selection that I had and, therefore, not the same 

opportunity to exert personal influence. 

My efforts at career management for Department of the 

Army civilians in logistics were similar to those for officers but 

more restricted. While transferring civilians to desirable assignments in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

from the field or from the offices of the Chiefs of Technical 

Services was practicable; the reverse was not because of the 

lower grade structure. As a result, desirable assignments outside the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics had to 

be sought in the offices of the Army secretariat or the Department of Defense. One problem that I sensed with respect to 

civilians in my own office was that even the best of them were 

not accorded respect as readily as were their military counterparts, and this limited their effectiveness. In order to correct 

this, I sought to build the prestige and broaden the outlook of 

a few of the truly outstanding civilians by sending them, one at 

a time, to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces or the 

National War College. This was a painful process insofar as 

current workload because no replacements were allowed. However, the objective was attained. The performance and increased status after graduation of those who were sent to the 

highest military schools has been gratifying. 

With respect to technical service civilians, assignments 

overseas had caused a continuing problem. When such civilians returned from overseas, there was not necessarily an appropriate assignment in grade available for them. There were 

two exceptions. Ordnance had developed a career field for 

ammunition specialists. Personnel in this specialty were assured appropriate assignments whenever they returned to the 

United States from overseas. The Corps of Engineers, where 

an engineer district was established overseas under the supervision of the Chief of Engineers, also assured its civilian personnel appropriate assignments on return to the United States. 
CAREER MANAGEMENT OF LOGISTIC PERSONNEL 55 

Civilians were predominant in many technical fields in 

which their qualifications were needed overseas, yet these civilians were understandably reluctant to accept overseas assignments with no assurance of acceptable assignments on return 

to the United States. When they did accept assignments overseas, they often became virtual exiles and stayed overseas 

almost indefinitely. I sought to have all the technical services 

arrange assignment methods that would accomplish for all 

their civilians what Ordnance had done for its ammunition 

specialists. I had a civilian personnel directorate within my own 

office to help me with this. The Deputy Chief of Staff for 

Logistics no longer has such a directorate. 

My efforts at career management for technical service enlisted men included requiring the offices of each of the Chiefs 

of Technical Services to establish a career pattern in each 

specialty in their service that would permit a really good man 

in any specialty to advance in his Qwn or a related specialty to 

the top enlisted grades. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics 

no longer has the Chiefs of Technical Services to work 

through. 

Reasons why the problem of career management of logistic personnel 

recurs. 

In a technical age the Army needs specialists. It appears to 

me that the lack of personal attention of individuals in high 

positions to the careers of technical personnel will cause the 

Army to lose some of its best specialists from dissatisfaction 

and will reduce the ability of the Army to develop new ones of 

equal quality. Poor logistic performance will indicate the need 

to secure and train such specialists. 

Form in which the problem of career management of logistic personnel 

will probably reCUT. 

Just as shortages of doctors have in the past prompted the 

Army to study how to secure, train, and retain doctors, so will 

the shortage of qualified logistic personnel prompt the Army 

to study how and take necessary action to secure, train, and 

retain them. 

CHAPTER 5 

Operation of the Logistic System 

There are many problem areas in the operations of any 

system as complex and as dispersed as the logistic system. I 

have selected for discussion in this chapter some of the more 

important problems not covered elsewhere. 

Coordination of Command and Technical Authorities 

Before the reorganization that eliminated some of the 

Chiefs of Technical Services, the Army had two concurrent 

lines of authority. In the so-called chain of command, commanders issued orders to next subordinate commanders to 

control operations. There were virtually no restraints on this 

chain of command. In the so-called technical channels the staff 

officer of a technical service issued technical guidance related 

to the functions of his service to the staff officers of his service 

at the next lower headquarters and to units of his service 

reporting to his headquarters. Technical information flowed 

back up this same channel. Thus it was proper for a commander in the chain of command to direct an Ordnance maintenance unit to give first priority to the repair of medium tanks. 

It was equally proper for the Ordnance officer on the staff of 

that commander to give guidance to the unit on when and how 

to replace a tank turret. 

In this system, the Chief of Ordnance commanded a board 

and various proving grounds that made technical studies and 

tests, arsenals that did research and development and a little 

production, and schools that helped develop and teach Ordnance technique. He had technical inspections made of the 

operation of Ordnance units and of the care and use of Ordnance equipment in the hands of other units. Through his 
58 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

technical channels he issued guidance on Ordnance matters 

and received through the same channels information on how 

Ordnance equipment was functioning under varying field conditions. He also received information on enemy ordnance. This 

flow of technical guidance down and information up was generally understood throughout the service and operated without 

conflict with the chain of command. It gave a technical service 

chief information upon which to base technical guidance, research and development, and retrofit decisions. The elimination of many of the chiefs of service and the introduction of 

functional units left the technical channels inoperable. 

Reasons why the problem of coordination of command and technical 

authorities recuTS. 

Without the flow of information and guidance down and 

information and suggestions up through technical channels, 

research and development, retrofit, repair, and operation of 

equipment will suffer. 

Form in which the problem of coordination of command and technical 

authorities will pTObably recur. 

The Army will need to seek a standard method of providing technical guidance from the Commodity Commands to the 

field and of securing from the field information for the Commodity Commands on technical performance and suggestions 

for improvement without conflicting with or overburdening 

command channels. 

Monitoring the Operation of Overseas Supply 

One of the major steps forward taken in the effective 

supply of overseas theaters in World War II and continued in 

the Korean War was the establishment of an Overseas Supply 

Division at each port of embarkation. Early in World War II 

some theater commanders were allowed to have "rear echelons" either in the War Department or at the port of embarkation supporting the theater. These rear echelons lacked authority and sometimes caused confusion because they were 

concerned with supporting only their own theaters. They were 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 59 

replaced by the Overseas Supply Divisions, which had both 

authority and expanded functions. To correct errors in requisitioning, an Overseas Supply Division edited theater requisitions against consumption rates already experienced, modified 

to provide for projected operations; to expedite shipments, it 

extracted requirements and forwarded them to appropriate 

depots, received reports when shipments were ready, and followed up on delays; to avoid jamming the port, it called forward shipments according to desired priorities of delivery and 

ships available; to ensure that ships were loaded "full and 

down" (cargo space filled and ship loaded down to the PlimsolI marks) and that high-priority cargo was accessible for early 

unloading, it participated in planning the loading of ships; to 

facilitate theater supply operations, it forwarded cargo documentation well ahead of a ship's arrival overseas; and to ameliorate the effect of a ship's sinking, it promptly ordered forward replacement cargoes. 

The Overseas Supply Divisions operated under the authority of the War Department. Thus, many War Department responsibilities for theater resupply were concentrated in one 

agency to which a theater commander could look to fill his 

needs. The Overseas Supply Divisions maintained close liaison 

with the theaters they were supporting so as to be familiar with 

theater problems and also be prepared to provide unusual or 

exceptionally large requirements for projected operations. 

Reasons why the problem of monitoring the operation of overseas supply 

recU1'S. 

The Overseas Supply Divisions were discontinued about 

1962. Many difficulties in the supply of Vietnam and other 

overseas commands have occurred since in the areas in which 

the Overseas Supply Divisions had operated. Ships have arrived in overseas ports in greater numbers than could be unloaded promptly. Undetected errors in requisitions have 

caused unwanted deliveries. Lack of follow-up has caused failures and delays in delivery. Unmarked shipments have arrived. 

Documentation has often failed to arrive in advance of ships 

and has often been inadequate. Many other difficulties of the 

types the Overseas Supply Divisions were organized to eliminate would probably have occurred had Vietnam been a major 

war. 
60 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

For'm in which the problem of monitoring the operation of overseas 

supply will probably recw". 

The problem will probably recur as a requirement for a 

means to correct one or all of the deficiencies mentioned 

above or as a proposal to fix "throughput" responsibility in 

some agency, which would accept supplies from the supplier or 

depot and deliver them to the military consumer overseas. 

Application of Funds For Operations and Maintenance 

In peace, field commanders finance those operations that 

require local financing with their allocation of funds from the 

Appropriation Operations and Maintenance, Army (O&MA). 

Such funds are seldom available in adequate amounts, and so 

determining the priority of their application is required and 

usually presents many difficulties. This problem does not arise 

overseas in war. In war, overseas field commanders finance 

local procurement of goods and services by a great variety of 

means, usually determined by expediency but basically without 

restriction. 

Among the many purposes for which O&MA funds may be 

expended, deferred maintenance of real estate, minor construction, and purchase of repair parts seem to me to have 

given the most trouble. These purposes compete with each 

other for the available O&MA funds. 

Deferred maintenance of real estate is one purpose for 

which the requirements always seem to exceed the available 

funds. Deferred maintenance is reported to the Congress in 

each annual budget presentation as part of the defense of the 

O&MA appropriation request. At various times the House Appropriations Committee has insisted that enough of the operations and maintenance appropriation be used for deferred 

maintenance to reduce the backlog, but such a reduction has 

seldom been accomplished. One reason is that the Army retains many structures long beyond their economic lifetime because replacement through the appropriation Military Construction, Army (MCA), is so difficult. The second reason that 

the backlog of deferred maintenance increases is because maintenance of real estate has relatively low priority compared with 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 61 

the other purposes for which locally available O&MA funds can 

be used. A third reason is that there are no very clear or 

accurate standards by which to repair or renovate and no way 

of estimating accurately the cost of repairing structural parts 

that are inaccessible until repair is started. As a result, preliminary estimates are usually low. 

Minor construction is also a purpose for which requirements always seem to exceed the available funds. This is partially because remodeling and extension, which are the most 

common types of projects under minor construction, are 

always difficult to justify. It is partially because a construction 

project using O&MA funds can be started at once, whereas it 

takes about three years to get started if funds are sought 

through the MeA appropriation. Some control in minor construction has been attempted by limiting, for a single project, 

amounts that are within the authority of various decision 

levels. This restriction on size without influence on type and 

number of construction projects has not proved to be a very 

valuable control. 

The procurement of repair parts is a third purpose for 

which the requirements always seem to exceed the availability 

of funds. I have never seen a reasonable justification for restricting the use of repair parts: failure to replace an unserviceable part reduces the efficiency of a much more expensive 

mechanism and risks damage to other parts. Nevertheless, such 

a restriction exists because of the requirement that local commanders finance their requisitions for repair parts from their 

allocations of O&MA funds. This has proved to be a bad type 

of control. 

These three purposes discussed above, then, are purposes 

for which requirements usually exceed available funds. They 

are also purposes that compete with each other for the inadequate funds available. Priority among them is a matter of 

judgment for the responsible commander. In Korea, I inherited a theater reserve that contained a great deal of unserviceable Ordnance equipment left unrepaired for lack of parts. I 

also inherited a strong commitment to minor construction. 

The former commander had placed a lower priority on repairing unserviceable equipment to achieve logistical readiness for 
62 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

combat than on constructing facilities to improve the troops' 

standard of living so that their morale would be higher and 

they would be more likely to reenlist. Maintenance of facilities 

habitually occupied a low priority since it contributed less 

directly to military effectiveness. 

Reasons why the problem of the application of O&MA funds recuTS. 

In the past there has always been a shortage of O&MA 

funds, so the problem of how best to apply them continually 

recurs. It is generally accepted that authority for deciding their 

application ought to be largely decentralized. But it is possible 

that a limited degree of centralizing influence could be exerted 

to good purpose by establishing some standards in each of 

three areas discussed. 

Form in which the problem of application of O&NIA funds will probably 

recur. 

The form in which the problem will probably recur is in a 

requirement to determine what influence should be exerted by 

central authority on the application of O&MA funds and how it 

should be exerted. More specifically, the requirement may call 

for determining what standards can and should be set by the 

Department of Defense and the military departments to influence how much is done toward each of the three purposes 

discussed. 

Use of Stock Funds for Repair Parts 

The original proposal for establishing stock funds provided 

that they would be revolving funds. Capitalization would come 

from the stock fund's assuming ownership of repair parts already held by the Army and already paid for by the Army. 

Army agencies would buy repair parts from the stock fund with 

new O&MA money. These funds would then be available to 

buy new repair parts at the Army's discretion without restriction. 

The stock funds have never operated in the manner proposed. Most of the money accumulated in the stock fund was 

withdrawn, as was the Army's discretionary authority to expend 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 63 

what was left. These actions eliminated all logistic advantages 

from the stock fund and left one major logistic disadvantages, 

the stock fund in the communications zone of the European 

Command. This was an experimental downward extension of 

the stock fund that, in my time, I had been unable to block. It 

is still operating in 1969. Under it, the Seventh Army in 

Europe must buy repair parts from the stock fund that owns 

the repair parts in the communications zone, paying for them 

with the O&MA funds allocated to Seventh Army. When funds 

run low, review of requisitions has to be resorted to in order 

to devote funds to the most important requirements. This 

causes delay in repairing even high-priority items and causes 

turbulence in the system as parts already bought are turned 

back in for credit with which to finance the purchase of other 

parts. When funds run out, equipment goes unrepaired even 

though the required parts are in the theater. 

Reasons why the problem of the use of stock fimds for repair parts Tecurs. 

Any effort to improve the operation of the supply system in 

filling requirements for repair parts will find the overseas stock 

fund in Europe to be a handicap and will probably find the 

stock funds in the United States to be of questionable value. 

Form in which the problem of the use of stock fimds for repair paTts will 

probably reCUT. 

The problem of stock funds will probably recur either in 

connection with studies to improve the effectiveness of repair 

parts supply in Europe or in connection with any study that 

examines whether the tremendous amount of bookkeeping and 

reporting that the Army now does produces results commensurate with the diversion it causes of supervisory attention and 

manpower from training and support of combat. 

Handling of Excess and Surplus Property 

No one with any knowledge of logistics thinks that the 

building up of excesses can be avoided. When Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Chief of Staff of Army Service Forces in World 

War II, was asked how excesses could be avoided, he is reported to have answered that he did not know but one thing he did 
64 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

know was that the side that won this war was going to end up 

with great excesses and the side that came out without excesses was going to be the side that had lost. General Styer did 

not mean that reasonable efforts should not be made to avoid 

excesses-he was merely recognizing the facts of life, some of 

which are covered below. 

To the military in a combat theater an item in excess is of 

little consequence. If movement is necessary, excesses can be 

left behind. To the military at department level excesses are of 

consequence only if resources used in their production caused 

shortages of some other needed item. On the other hand, a 

shortage or even a threatened shortage can have a critical 

effect on a campaign. A prudent military commander is always 

looking over his shoulder to see if adequate resupply is coming 

in. If resupply appears questionable, he will probably institute 

rationing, which reduces combat effectiveness, or he will slow 

down operations, or both. 

It is therefore to be expected that excesses will accumulate 

in an overseas theater during a campaign. These can, however, 

be limited. One measure toward this end is the requirement 

for adequate inventorying that should identify accumulated excesses so that they can be drawn down. A second measure is 

the requirement for a reasonably accurate reporting of the 

expenditure of materiel by cause or purpose to support the 

determination of replacement factors. Good replacement factors improve the accuracy both of theater requisitions and of 

plans for the procurement of new materiel in the United 

States. A third measure is the requirement for an editing 

agency removed from the pressure and confusion of active 

operations. This agency helps eliminate gross errors that not 

only handicap theater supply but also introduce corresponding 

errors in the requirements for new production. 

It is important to distinguish between, on one hand, excesses that may develop in an active theater because supply is 

greater than consumption or in the United States because 

inaccurate replacement factors provide the basis for procurement plans and, on the other hand, surpluses at the end of a 

war. The first can be limited. The second cannot be avoided. 

At the end of the World War I, the U.S. Liquidation Commission, operating under the War Department but not under 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 65 

the Commander in Chief, American Expeditionary Forces 

(AEF), promptly sold all the property left behind by the AEF 

to France for a lump sum. Although most of this equipment 

had been heavily used and much was becoming obsolete, as 

does most equipment at the end of a war, various congressmen 

were quit critical of the sale. Because of this congressional 

criticism, Lt. Gen .. Brehon B. Somervell at the end of World 

War II asked that a civilian agency dispose of surplus property 

overseas. The Foreign Liquidation Commission was created to 

perform this function under the Department of State. 

After the defeat of Germany, the best equipment of our 

forces in Europe was shipped to the Pacific, where the war 

continued. The forces expected to remain in the occupation of 

Germany were equipped with the best materiel remaining. Certain items, mostly weapons, were returned to the United States 

for war reserves. In the European Theater, a force of some 

three million men-which had gone overseas with about two 

short tons per man of initial equipment and had built up 

behind it perhaps another ton per man of similar materielshrank rapidly as political pressure to bring the troops home 

grew in the United States. The occupation force was finally 

stabilized at about 100,000. Troops returning home turned in 

all of their equipment except some of their personal equipment. This left me, as G-4 European Theater, with something 

like six million tons of excess and surplus property spread over 

France, Belgium, and Germany. That in France and Belgium 

was in the custody of the Western Base, which had a strength 

of some twenty thousand men. As the redeployment of the 

main forces approached completion, it would be possible to 

redeploy the troops of Western Base also, provided the property in their custody could be disposed of. It was quite apparent that the cost of paying and maintaining the twenty thousand men and renting the depots they were occupying would 

soon vastly exceed any return we might obtain from the sale of 

the excess and surplus property. I therefore had the theater 

chiefs of tt hnical services ship to our depots in Germany 

whatever e( .ipment and supplies still remaining in France and 

Belgium they thought the occupying forces might use. Admittedly, this flooded our depots in Germany, but it also left our 
66 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

depots in France and Belgium ready to dispose of what was 

now only surplus on hand. 

The Army wanted to have the surplus property disposed of 

as rapidly as possible. The Foreign Liquidation Commission 

quite understandably wanted to get the best price possible. In 

spite of this difference in objectives, the two agencies cooperated well. I have only praise for the Foreign Liquidation Commission. It did its work well, yet I still question whether a 

quick bulk sale to each country in which we had surplus property, as was done in World War I, would not have been more 

economical. The savings in personnel costs and rentals would 

have been considerable. On the other hand, returns from 

intergovernmental sales in both wars were probably never collected, as most war debts were forgiven or allowed to fade into 

oblivion. 

The equipment and supplies shipped to Germany from 

Western Base were packed hurriedly by foreign employees or 

American personnel eager to go home. Packing was poor and 

identification was often lacking. The same was true of equipment and supplies turned in by our redeploying troops to our 

depots in Germany. The problem then became one of identification and of evaluation of condition. Most of the problem was 

ordnance; we had a major operation in unpacking, cleaning, 

identifying, and evaluating these items at the Mannheim Depot 

in Germany. Again, as in the case of the retail sales of surplus 

property, I cannot prove that this operation was uneconomical. 

I just think it was. Both were highly successful politically. 

There was relatively little congressional criticism and even 

some praise for our handling of surplus property. 

At the end of the Korean War the disposal of equipment 

left behind by our redeploying troops offered little difficulty 

because we used it to complete the equipment of the Korean 

forces and to replace such of their equipment as was not 

economical to repair. Most of the equipment reserves for our 

forces in Korea, including much rebuilt equipment, were held 

in Japan during the Korean War and used thereafter for LendLease throughout the Asian fringe of the Communist bloc. I 

did, in Korea in 1959, inherit a couple of large motor truck 

graveyards. We had furnished equipment to the Koreans with a 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 67 

proviso that when no longer required it should be returned to 

us. Therefore, worn-out trucks, stripped of all usable components, accumulated. Unable to sell them, we were only able to 

get a steel mill to take them off our hands if we helped haul 

them to the mill. 

Before we intervened in Vietnam with major forces, the 

French pulled out leaving large quantities of unserviceable 

equipment, again returned to us under a Lend-Lease type of 

agreement. The government official who first saw these dumps 

called them "acres of diamonds," and soon the Army was 

shipping these "diamonds" to Japan for rebuild. Once more I 

have no proof that this operation was uneconomical, although 

I think it was. It was successful politically. 

Reasons why the problem of handling of excess and surplus property 

recur. 

There have accumulated in Vietnam quantities of unidentified supplies and of unserviceable equipment. As I write this in 

mid-1969, some of this property is being outshipped to Okinawa for identification or to Japan for repair, but, as our troops 

redeploy, more property will accumulate. How to handle this 

property economically and without political repercussions is a 

problem that is already with us and one that will probably 

become more acute. 

Form in which the problem of handling excess and surplus property will 

probably recur. 

The problem will probably recur as a requirement to establish guidelines on how excess and surplus property in Vietnam, 

Okinawa, and Japan shall be segregated for identification, 

repair, or disposal and on how disposal shall be accomplished. 

Management 

We in the military have studied and practiced management 

all our lives. The exercise of command is management. Unfortunately, when management recently became a fetish, all managers seemed to learn the virtues of centralization, computerization, use of all-powerful project officers, and cost-effective-
68 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

ness, but not to understand their limitations. These are procedures that are useful and easily applied in a simple and routine 

business. But the problems of war are neither simple nor 

routine. For the military, I feel it is usually better to decentralize, often better to approximate, almost always better to restrict the authority of project officers, and never permissible to 

measure cost only in dollars. 

Among military matters, logistics is particularly complex. 

Decisions should be made at those points where there is understanding, and only on the broadest logistic subjects is there 

understanding at a high level. One of the best examples of 

good management that I have ever seen illustrates this point 

When I was G- 4 of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations 

in World War II, Maj . Gen. Otto Nelson came from Washington to be deputy theater commander. He brought with him a 

group of "efficiency experts." They questioned everything. 

They sought suggestions, from the lowest levels as to how 

operations should be conducted. They had their own suggestions too, although none of them had ever seen a theater of 

operations before. I remember that, in that period, time and 

motion studies had shown that a man surrounded by a semicircle of filing cabinets that he could reach without leaving his 

chair was the height of efficiency. This arrangement was advocated with the same fervor that is now accorded the computer. 

Since I had no power to stop this harassment, I didn't try. 

Instead, I prepared to present my cause to the theater commander. I never had to. As everyone's patience was nearing 

exhaustion, General Nelson sent the efficiency experts home. I 

awaited a detailed directive. None ever came. Not even a single 

suggestion. General Nelson had just made us take a careful 

look at our own operations and left corrective action up to the 

judgment of the operators, the people who knew what they 

were doing. They were thoroughly stimulated. They took, of 

their own initiative, many desirable actions that they would 

have resisted had the actions been directed. They also prevented a number of undesirable actions that would have been 

forced upon them had they been directed by centralized authority. This experience illustrates an approach that was remarkably effective because it avoided the disadvantages of excessive centralization, or, to use Secretary of Defense Charles 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 69 

Wilson's terms, the disadvantages of "a concentration of ignorance." 

With the inability of the generalist logistician to acquire a 

thorough knowledge of all the field under his jurisdiction, a 

logistic commander is at the mercy of his subordinates. It was 

my practice to try to keep the decision making down where the 

knowledge was, but in the development of broad policies and 

the handling of problems that impacted on several areas, I had 

to use my own staff. Since, in many cases, I could not learn 

enough myself to make the best decision, my practice was to 

severely cross-examine the staff officer who had presumably 

gone deeply into the problem, this in order to satisfy myself 

that he had done his homework. Such a procedure was necessary for me but unpleasant for the staff officer and brought me 

a reputation for being hard on my subordinates. Once a staff 

officer had established his reputation with me for accuracy, 

thoroughness, and good judgment, I abandoned this practice. 

Thereafter he not only had freedom from cross-examination, 

he also had my best efforts to foster his career. 

When a war starts, many more decisions have to be made 

and made quickly than can be made by the top officials. If the 

lower echelons have not been used to making decisions in 

peace, they won't make them in war. For example, before 

World War II, we in G-4 War Department General Staff, had 

been required to include a paragraph in every staff study, 

stating how much the recommendation would cost. We had to 

obtain the initials of an officer in our Fiscal Section indicating 

the appropriation to be charged and certifying that the funds 

were available. With that background, I received quite a shock 

a day or two after Pearl Harbor when, as General Somervell's 

night executive, I saw him allocate to the corps area commanders some $300 million. This was an action that had been 

cleared within the War Department General Staff but to the 

best of my knowledge had not yet even been put in a supplementary budget, much less appropriated. This was completely 

contrary to all peacetime practice, yet it was a very necessary 

action. I doubt that anyone in G-4 except General Somervell 

would have even thought of such an action. Fortunately, he 

had operated with wide latitude as Works Projects Administrator for New York. 
70 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

In the making of decisions in areas where his knowledge is 

inadequate, a logistician may require a good deal of data, and 

now this seems always to call for a computer. However, care 

must be taken that the computer is not misused. A computer is 

a wonderful instrument when used for actions of a repetitive 

nature with programs that have been thoroughly checked out. 

Nevertheless, although many decisions on important logistic 

problems can be made based on a data bank derived from the 

mass of routine reports that is characteristic of computerization, many cannot. This is not because the computer is not 

accurate, but because in war so many variables are introduced 

that a routine report may produce data not all on the same 

basis. Such data are not suitable for processing. A good example occurred when we were gathering data on ammunition 

expenditures by mission in Vietnam under the COLED-V 

(Combat Operations Loss and Expenditure Date-Vietnam) 

project. The reports had been showing artillery ammunition 

expenditures subdivided by the mission being supported, such 

as search and destroy, clear and hold, and security and base 

camp defense. Then reports started coming in with an added 

subdivision: harassing and interdiction. Since artillery expends 

ammunition in harassing and interdiction fires in support of all 

types of missions, this subdivision rendered the data being 

gathered unusable until new definitions were put into effect. 

Similarly, when the theater changed the nomenclature of offensive missions from two (search and destroy and clear and hold) 

to three (search and destroy, cordon and search, and clear and 

secure), no one had the information necessary to redivide the 

data gathered under the two old missions so that it would fit 

under the three new ones. As a result, we could not combine 

the old and new data into a data base. Any routine reporting 

system must be continually policed to insure that apples and 

oranges are not processed as if they were the same. 

I would like to see the ammunition expenditure system, 

which has been developed by the Army and the Research and 

Analysis Corporation working together, continue throughout 

the war in Vietnam and thereafter in peace. This would ensure 

that at the beginning of the next war valid data in this critical 

area would be accumulated properly. Since this is not to be, I 
\ 

OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 71 

hope that the reporting system will be taught in the Army's 

schools. This is the only method I know by which a practice 

not in daily use can be kept alive in peace ready to be put into 

operation effectively in war without a period of policing, explanation, and interpretation. 

A second concern in using routine reports to gather data 

bases for use in computers results from the new problems that 

continually arise in war. Material gathered by routine reports 

designed to produce data for use in the development of solutions to a certain set of problems is not necessarily usable in 

the development of answers to new problems. I have found 

that the most useful report is one called for to help in solving 

a specific problem. In initiating such a report, explanations 

must be offered and interpretations made in light of the intended use of the collected data. Such a report must be policed through several reporting periods, its provisions thoroughly clarified, and explanations from reporting agencies for 

indicated shortcomings considered, all with respect to the specific problem to be solved, before the report will serve its 

purpose well. A commander can act only on a relatively few 

problems. Reports not bearing on one of these problems-and 

therefore not likely to be called to the attention of the commander to whose headquarters they are submitted-do not 

deserve attention at lower levels in competition with all the 

other demands of war. Such reports become both inaccurate 

and inapplicable to the new problems brought about by continually changing circumstances. Situations change so rapidly 

in war that data being reported in successive months may not 

be on the same basis. 

Finally, time is almost always critical. Many important decisions in war cannot await the accumulation of the exact data 

that a computer requires. Accordingly, when available data 

have not been gathered to help in the solution of the specific 

problem at hand, it is usually better to use a quick approximation and get the decision made promptly. 

Along with centralization and computerization, I consider 

the management practice of using powerful project officers to 

be misused. Currently a project officer is a czar authorized to 

make far-reaching decisions that are bound to affect many 
72 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

projects other than his own in ways that he may well not 

understand. The commanders in whose fields the project officer operates may suffer critical interf :rence in many areas as a 

result. Great authority is proper unly for a project officer 

handling a project of top priority such as the Manhattan 

project, which developed the atomic bomb, or perhaps the 

Polaris project, which developed the submarine-launched missile. Using project officers with broad authority for many 

projects at the same time, however, is a dangerous practice. 

Virtually no priority is ever absolute. Responsible commanders 

must therefore exercise judgment in the degree to which the 

requirements of one project are allowed to infringe on the 

requirements of others, even those of lesser priority. 

The proper function of a project officer, in my opinion, is 

that of an expediter. He takes part in the development of 

reports and schedules. He has access to everyone but no authority to give orders. He detects problems through his schedules and reports and through frequent visits to all agencies and 

installations working on his project. He brings these problems 

to the responsible commanders, going as high as necessary to 

get action. He may suggest solutions but cannot dictate them. 

He follows up energetically on decisions, and he reports their 

effects and progress to the responsible commander. 

No discussion of management can well omit the measurement of cost against effectiveness. This is a perfectly valid 

procedure, but it is subject to misuse with relation to the 

military. For commercial transactions, the cost factor is properly measured in dollars because the basic purpose of commercial transactions is to make a profit in dollars. If a firm cannot 

make a profit, it fails. For military transactions, the cost factor 

should be modified because the basic purpose of military 

transactions is success in war. Accordingly, effectiveness, in 

addition to having a relationship to dollars, also bears a relationship to lives lost, to lives blighted by wounds, and to the 

effects of a national defeat. Since the value of lives, health, and 

victory is difficult to determine, it is usually desirable to measure cost against effectiveness only to decide which of two 

roughly equally effective systems should be acquired and in 

other cases to provide the best system that can be developed 

but to do so at the lowest reasonable cost. 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 73 

Reasons why the problems of management recur. 

New and successful commercial management practices must 

always be considered for possible adoption by the military. 

And as such practices already adopted by or imposed on the 

military prove disadvantageous, the question will be raised as 

to the desirability of abandoning or changing them. 

Form in which the problems of management will probably recur. 

The problem will probably recur as a requirement to determine whether or not a new management procedure should be 

adopted by the military or whether the results being accomplished by an existing procedure are worth the loss in strength 

caused by the diversion of effort from matters more closely 

allied to war. 

Integrity 

Throughout the military services, integrity is essential to 

operational effectiveness. An officer making a decision must be 

able to rely on any information he receives from another in the 

military as being the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth to the best of the individual's ability to observe and 

report. This degree of integrity is of course required of a 

logistician as well as of any other military officer, but beyond 

this, a logistician should so conduct himself as to avoid any 

possible implication of a conflict of interest. 

Ever since the start of World War II, military appropriations have been large. Logisticians handle most of these funds, 

including those for procurement, for operations and maintenance, and for construction. The public and the Congress are 

extremely sensitive to the use of these funds because of their 

impact on local economies. In the obligation of these funds, 

judgment exerts a major influence. This combination of big 

money being applied in sensitive areas and being applied 

based in large measure on judgment is bound to produce 

many challenges by disappointed contractors and disappointed 

localities. 

Logisticians are also involved in disposing of surplus property, in reducing or discontinuing going operations that carry 
74 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

large payrolls, in closing installations and in disposing of real 

estate. Here, too, are large transactions, in sensitive areas 

being heavily influenced by judgment, and here too are protests and complaints. 

Our best defense is a reputation for adhering to an exceptionally high code of ethics. It is not enough for a logistician to 

be honest. It is necessary that he so conduct himself that there 

is no basis for even the suspicion that anything other than the 

best interests of the military service and of the nation have 

been allowed to influence any official transaction. 

It may seem unfair that there should be a higher standard 

of integrity demanded of us than that prevailing in the business world or even than that required of the civilian officials of 

the government, but whereas lack of popular support may only 

cause one politician to be replaced by another, lack of popular 

support may cause the military to dwindle to a dangerously 

inadequate level of strength. We in logistics can retain the 

confidence of the public and ·of our superiors and the respect 

of our subordinates only if every transaction is completely 

above suspicion. 

When I was Deputy for Logistics I took pride in the realization that no justifiable negative reflection on the integrity of 

any logistician ever came to my attention. On the other hand, 

there were actions taken to insure the Army against any possible embarrassment. For example, one of the Chiefs of Technical Services felt that it was not becoming to his office to 

disqualify himself when a decision was required that might 

influence one of the companies in which he held stock. On his 

own initiative, he therefore sold his stock in any company that 

had dealings with the Army. His wife, who had inherited some 

such stocks many years before, also sold hers, taking a heavy 

capital gains tax. 

I had occasion to take only one action in regard to integrity 

when I was Deputy for Logistics, and that was prompted not 

by any action of anyone in logistics but by offers and invitations that I knew of others in logistics receiving or that I 

received myself. All were of the type common in business 

circles and accepted by the government as proper tax deductions for entertainment. Accordingly, I wrote a letter to each of 

the Chiefs of Technical Services advising him that I felt it must 
OPERATION OF THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM 75 

be assumed that any business expected to receive at least 

equivalent value for its expenditures on entertainment. Therefore, any courtesy beyond what a military official could personally return or beyond what would be accorded the business on 

a visit to a military installation might be interpreted as improper influence and was best declined to avoid the risk of embarrassment to the Army. 

At a later date, the Department of Defense issued a similar 

directive on this subject that was widely distributed and 

aroused considerable clamor. The clamor, however, subsided 

quickly. I think this was because there was general recognition 

that it is best for the services to give the appearance as well as 

the actuality of complete integrity. 

Reasons why the problem of integrity recurs. 

As long as there are disappointed bidders on contracts and 

disappointed localities seeking the retention of going operations, there will be challenges against unfavorable decisions. 

Only so long as the military enjoys an unsullied reputation for 

integrity can these challenges be effectively restricted to matters of fact or judgment. 

Form in which the problem of integrity recur. 

There are currently unresolved questions as to what is 

ethical for a member of Congress and as to what is ethical for 

a justice of the Supreme Court. Although I feel that the military has a much clearer idea of what is unethical for a logistician, I doubt that it is possible to express it in precise terms. I 

think there will, therefore, always be a grey area in which 

interpretations will be required. 

CHAPTER 6 

Maintenance of Materiel 

The supply of repair parts is so critical to effective maintenance that I prefer to deal with both repair and maintenance 

together. 

The maintenance of materiel is a tremendous logistic 

burden. As already discussed, to reduce this burden some 

effort has been directed toward improving the reliability and 

durability of equipment. Still more important is the command 

supervision that should be given to care in the operation of 

equipment and to preventive maintenance. I have not dealt 

with command supervision at length because it does not require analysis, it requires attention. When we had horses in the 

Field Artillery, the horses were taken care of before the men. If 

the grade was steep, the cannoneers dismounted and pushed 

on the wheels; if the footing was bad, the men did some 

roadwork before the horses were driven across. Inanimate 

equipment suffers as much from abuse or neglect as did horses 

but tired men will abuse or neglect equipment unless command supervision is continuously and forcefully exercised. 

Making a plan for the maintenance of any complex item or 

group of items, such as motor vehicles, tracked vehicles, 

radios, or helicopters, is an involved process requiring consideration of many factors. I have dealt with some of the more 

critical factors individually and have gathered them into this 

chapter. They are standardization, repairable versus throwaway 

assemblies, quality of rebuild, in-theater versus out-of-theater 

repair, and requirements for and management of repair parts. 
78 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Standardization 

Commercial practice reflects the teachings of experience 

and is generally a reliable guide for the military except when 

conditions encountered in a theater of operations differ greatly 

from those in the civilian economy. Today, the era of the 

crossroads mechanic is pretty well over. Stocking repair parts 

for many different makes of one end item is too great a burden 

to be economically practicable, as is keeping on hand the many 

special tools required for different makes and training repairmen for the special operations peculiar to different makes. As 

a result, automotive service departments specialize in one 

make of car, stocking repair parts for that make and hiring 

factory-trained mechanics. Similarly, many manufacturers of 

electric appliances now have repair agencies for their own 

products widely distributed. Some firms, particularly those producing computers, only lease their equipment while retaining 

control of service, repair, and parts. 

The military has little time to train repairmen for many 

makes and models of its equipment, and cannot carry a great 

variety of special tools and large stockages of repair parts and 

still be mobile. As a result, standardization is a virtual military 

necessity. 

Along with its manifest advantages, standardization carries 

certain disadvantages that always require consideration. Standardization of a complex item sometimes means procurement 

from a very few sources or even a sole source. In an emergency this kind of procurement limits the military's access to the 

rest of industry until other sources have converted to the 

production of the standard item. This transition can be difficult. During the Korean War, although a military arsenal could 

successfully manufacture steel cartridge cases and lent every 

assistance, there was a long delay before industry could duplicate the process satisfactorily. A similar delay has occurred in 

the manufacture of rifles. And, as a third example, we once 

had a number of rear axle failures on a standard truck made by 

a second manufacturer. The difference was finally found to be 

in the hardness of the steel used in the rear axle housing. The 

first manufacturer used steel of a Brinell hardness of la, but 

this did not appear on the specifications because his standard 
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 79 

factory practice was to use steel of that hardness for any rear 

axle housings. The second manufacturer used a softer steel. 

The use of a sole source results in the loss of competition 

on subsequent annual buys. It denies to the military the use of 

proprietary processes and items of other companies that might 

have been found to be desirable. It reduces incentive toward 

continuous product improvement. It causes large amounts of 

funds to go to a major firm as the prime contractor and freezes 

out small firms except as they may be selected by the prime 

contractor as subcontractors for parts of components. 

This last is of particular concern to congressmen, most of 

whom receive appeals from constituents seeking government 

business. Where the constituent is an unsuccessful bidder he 

seldom has much of a case. But the story is different when, 

because a prime contractor prefers to negotiate with his usual 

subcontractors, he has not been allowed to bid at all. Congress 

generally feels that government procurement ought to be open 

to bidding by all qualified producers not only for the prime 

contract but also for subcontracts. Prime contractors, on the 

other hand, feel that, if they are to be responsible for the end 

item, they ought to be allowed to negotiate with subcontractors with whom they have dealt before and in whom they have 

confidence. The solution most acceptable to Congress is to 

have the military break out the maximum practicable number 

of components, buy them through open competition, and provide them to the prime contractor as government-furnished 

equipment. This has the disadvantages of requiring the government to administer many more contracts and of making the 

government responsible to the prime contractor for the quality 

and promptness of delivery of the components it provides. An 

alternative, less acceptable to Congress, is to require the prime 

contractor to secure wide competition in his procurement of 

components. 

The introduction of federal stock numbers facilitated the 

supply of parts and components already used in more than one 

end item. Not very much, however, has been done in seeking 

to introduce the maximum number of standardized parts 

during the design stage of an end item. The Society of Automotive Engineers, I believe, pioneered this effort in the auto-
80 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

motive field with the publication of its handbook. The Army 

Corps of Engineers has sought to standardize components 

such as electric motors used in several end items of engineer 

equipment. A study made by the Logistics Management Institute recommended that design engineers be required to select 

parts and components from a recommended listing or present 

a written explanation of why an exception was required. This 

appears to be the most effective approach to maximum standardization that I have seen. It would require a design engineer 

to do a great deal of reference work but, it would save him 

from redesigning parts and components that had already been 

designed, and it would produce a degree of standardization as 

yet unseen in the American military. 

Although standardization is generally accepted as a virtual 

military necessity, it is not always practicable. The greatest 

difficulties in achieving standardization have been found in 

engineer-type equipment. Most ordnance is required only by 

the military and is therefore designed, developed, and produced for the military. Engineer equipment, on the other 

hand, is largely commercial-type equipment and can be bought 

off the shelf. Since manufacturing plants must be tooled up to 

produce specially designed ordnance equipment, production 

runs large enough to supply the requirements of the whole 

Army are normal. Engineer-type equipment is produced by 

many relatively small producers, none of whom has the capacity to produce the full Army requirements without giving up its 

commercial market and becoming a captive industry. So, until 

there is a degree of concentration in the engineer equipment 

industry similar to that in the automotive industry, standardization will probably continue to be subordinated to maintaining 

a healthy competitive engineer equipment industry. 

The problem of the need for standardization of military 

engineer equipment has continually recurred. One solution, 

which I supported strongly, was to standardize by theater. 

Thus Europe might have one make of %-ton shovel, Vietnam a 

second make, Korea and Japan together a third make, and the 

United States several makes. Since access to repair parts is 

easier for equipment in the United States, makes of engineer 

equipment of which the Army has few items are best kept here. 
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 81 

Standardization by theater has the disadvantage that troops 

moving from the United States to a theater have to be reequipped with items of a make different from that with which 

they trained. Also, the quantity and diversity of repair parts 

that must be stocked in U.S. depots is increased. Accordingly, 

theater standardization as policy is a substitute to be used only 

when overall standardization cannot be attained. 

Reasons why the problem of standardization recurs. 

The problem of standardization recurs because of the basic 

conflict between the desirability of facilitating supply and 

maintenance by having only one type of each end item and the 

desirability of spreading military orders widely through industry. 

Form in which the problem of standardization will probably recur. 

The problem of standardization will probably recur in the 

form of a requirement to help solve such difficulties as the 

reduction of tonnage of repair parts that units must stock, the 

variety of parts that units must stock, the size of catalogues, 

the burden that ordering repair parts places on the communications system, the difficulty of procuring replacement repair 

parts from industry, the training of maintenance specialists, 

and the variety of special tools that must be carried. 

Repairable Assemblies Versus Throwaway 

Major assemblies had to be replaced in World War II because of lack of adequate maintenance capability. Often, perhaps usually, no effort was made to repair these major assemblies during active operations. In other words, we were treating major assemblies as throwaway assemblies. As manufacturing processes have become more complex and efficient and as 

maintenance specialists have become harder to train and relatively more expensive, the trend of the civil economy has 

turned in the same direction. Throwaway assemblies can be 

made more cheaply, save the time of expensive repairmen and 

have greater reliability than repaired assemblies. Throwaway 

assemblies used in replacement do not even have to be identi-
82 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

cal internally to the assemblies they replace; they only need to 

match them in form, fit, and function. This greatly facilitates 

securing competition in procurement. It also facilitates securing production of small quantities, always difficult to arrange 

with the larger companies. 

Reasons why the problem of repairable versus throwaway assemblies 

recurs. 

Like standardization, the use of throwaway assemblies is an 

important possibility in any effort to simplify supply or facilitate maintenance. 

Fm'm in which the problem of repairable versus throwaway assemblies 

will probably recur. 

The possibility of converting repairable assemblies to 

throwaway assemblies will arise whenever an attempt is being 

made to reduce maintenance effort. 

Quality of Rebuild 

After V-E Day in World War II our forces in Europe 

shipped their best motor vehicles to the Pacific. They left a 

large proportion of unserviceable vehicles that the theater had 

never had the time and maintenance units available to repair. 

They also had a large stock of repair parts. At the same time, 

the German automotive industry was idle and could be employed without cost to the United States. The Ordnance officer 

of the European Command successfully put these resources 

together in the first great rebuild operation. Unfortunately, 

others after him sought to do the same thing without the same 

resources and with vehicles that had already been rebuilt once 

or even twice. Although they earned praise for economy, there 

is considerable question whether their efforts were worthwhile. 

Experience since has indicated that only the first rebuild is 

economically desirable and then only when circumstances, such 

as those mentioned above, are favorable. 

Before the Korean War broke out, a rebuild operation for 

motor vehicles in Japan was started. The vehicles available 

were those left from the World War II campaigns in the Pacific. Already worn, they had deteriorated further because of age 
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 83 

and exposure. Japan had never had much of an automotive 

industry. There were few repair parts, and the U.S. automotive 

industry, swamped with civilian orders for new vehicles, was 

most reluctant to produce parts for vehicles no longer in production. The Japanese, long adept at copying products of 

other nations without the drawings and specifications, produced repair parts in the same manner. So some repair parts 

used were new, some were worn, some were unused but had 

deteriorated in storage, some were rebuilt and some were 

imitations. The performance of these rebuilt vehicles left much 

to be desired. 

As Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, I was never satisfied 

that rebuilding vehicles was desirable except under the conditions that prevailed in Germany at the end of World War II. 

Although I was unable at the time to secure conclusive data to 

support my belief (because vehicles lost their identity in the 

rebuild process), I did change the policy from rebuild to "inspection and repair as necessary" with the intention of closing 

out all overseas vehicle rebuild operations at an early date. 

Since my time, data gathered in studies by the Research Analysis Corporation have indicated that the cost of rebuilding 

major components such as engines and transmissions is about 

one-third that of new engines and transmissions but that the 

rebuilt assemblies last only about one-third as long as the new 

ones. This would make the cost factor about equal. The reduced reliability, however, so critical in war, and the earlier 

obsolescence make complete vehicular rebuild, especially overseas, a highly questionable process. 

The above discussion relates primarily to the quality of 

rebuild of motor vehicles, and by rebuild I mean complete 

disassembly. It does not necessarily apply to other items. Rebuild becomes less questionable when only components are 

rebuilt, especially when those to be rebuilt are a minor part of 

the whole end item. Thus, for example, the rebuilding of 

aircraft engines has long proved economical. 

I did not ever have a chance to test the idea of returning 

unserviceable equipment to the original manufacturer for rebuild. This would be practicable only while the manufacturer 

was still producing the same item. Assuming the willingness of 

the original manufacturer, then his more skilled personnel, his 
84 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

factory knowledge of tolerances, and his better availability of 

repair parts might well make rebuild of some types of end 

items both economical and satisfactory as to quality. 

Reasons why the problem of quality of rebuild recurs. 

The factors in influencing rebuild vary for each type of 

item, so separate study and determination are required for 

each type of item. Data may well be difficult to obtain for many 

items, but a rebuild decision ought not be made without some 

knowledge of the quality to be expected from the process. 

Form in which the problem of quality of rebuild will probably recur. 

The problem will arise in the form of a requirement for a 

determination of what quality of rebuild is desirable and practicable whenever a maintenance plan is being made with respect to any item or group of items. Many considerations other 

than quality will enter, such as availability of maintenance 

units, availability of transportation, rate of new production, 

and use to which required equipment is to be put, but of all 

these considerations the quality of rebuild is probably the one 

most difficult to assess. 

In-Theater Versus Out-of-Theater Repair 

In World War II the Army generally repaired equipment as 

close to its point of use as practicable. This was partially 

because the most critical shortage in the war was cargo shipping, partially because overland transportation was heavily burdened, and partially because equipment had to be returned to 

action quickly. Possession of air superiority made it possible to 

repair equipment well forward without enemy interference. 

These considerations outweighed the disadvantages of having 

to support additional men in the theater to perform the maintenance. 

In the Korean War the nearness of the Japanese industrial 

complex, adequate shipping, ready accessibility of the ports to 

the combat zones, and American air superiority made transportation to Japan for repair easy, got the repair job done in 
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 85 

Japan about as rapidly as it could be done in Korea and saved 

supporting many maintenance units in Korea. 

In Vietnam, on the other hand, few facilities make desirable 

locations for maintenance shops because every installation has 

to be protected from guerrillas and movement within the theater is subject to attack. On the other hand, shipping and 

supplies are plentiful. As a result, some maintenance is done 

well forward, in division areas, to avoid long movements within 

the theater, but expensive equipment requiring difficult or 

extensive repair is shipped to Japan or the United States. The 

repair cycle for this equipment is long, introducing a requirement for a large pipeline. 

For any future sophisticated war there are many new developments that will complicate the determination of whether or 

not to repair intheater. Long-range missiles will make large 

repair shops vulnerable targets. Possible enemy air equality or 

even superiority will make them still more vulnerable. Enemy 

infiltrators will be able to pass through our lines, more dispersed for fear of enemy nuclear attack, and will make 

intratheater movement more difficult. Moreover, the vulnerability of shipping to nuclear submarine attack and the vulnerability of ports to missile and air attack will make out-oftheater water transportation more difficult for heavy items for 

repair. On the other hand, increased availability of air transport should make out-of-theater repair for light items easier 

even though air and missile attack on our air bases may 

hamper this movement. These considerations indicate the desirability of spending more money for durability and ease of 

maintenance of heavy items. 

Reasons why the problem oj in-theater versus out-of theater repair recurs. 

Many design and production decisions ought to be made in 

the light of whether the item concerned will probably be repaired largely in theater or out of theater. 

Form in which the problem oj in-theater versus out-oj-theater repair will 

probably recur. 

The problem of in-theater versus out-of-theater maintenance should recur in the form of a requirement to determine 
86 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

the influence that repair policies should have on the design of 

new items. Thus an item might have to be light enough to 

facilitate air transport out of the theater, or components most 

difficult to repair might have to be readily accessible for removal and built to facilitate separate shipment. The problem 

should recur in connection with the logistic support plan for 

any theater since fewer maintenance troops will be required if 

much maintenance is done out of theater, and provision must 

be made for backhaul and outloading. The problem should 

also recur in the form of a requirement for the justification for 

air transport: small, light, and expensive items being repaired 

out of theater should be shipped by air; complex delicate items 

should also be shipped by air as the most rapid and least 

rugged means practicable. 

Requirements for Repair Parts 

The forecasting future requirements for repair parts for any 

end item so that they can be stocked in adequate, but not 

excessive, quantity and identifying and handling the tremendous number and variety of parts required by military units in 

the field are among the most difficult of logistic problems. 

Many approaches have been attempted toward forecasting 

requirements for repair parts. Estimates based on knowledge 

and judgment are usually required of a manufacturer before 

the first production run of an end item. Such estimates are of 

necessity based on experience with similar items. However, if 

the end item is completely new, there will, of course, be no 

similar items by which to judge. Even if similar items have 

been produced, changes are normally made to correct weaknesses found in them, so old consumption data may not be 

very good. Some data on repair parts requirements are acquired during engineering and troop tests, but these tests are 

short and the end items usually operate under relatively favorable conditions such as with good preventive maintenance and 

prompt repair. 

The consumption of repair parts by a new item bears little 

resemblance to the consumption of repair parts by the same 

item after a considerable amount of rough usage, aging, exposure, and poor maintenance. I once had the first two helicop-
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 87 

ters from the production run of a new model run to destruction in an effort to determine the repair parts requirements 

early, but the experiment was not particularly successful. Continuous use does not result in the same wear as intermittent 

use, nor does it reflect the effects of deterioration from time 

and exposure or the effects of a rugged environment and poor 

maintenance. Tracked vehicles in North Africa in World War II 

wore out tracks, drive sprockets, and idler wheels at a vastly 

accelerated rate because sand and oil make a very abrasive 

compound. Lava ash from an eruption of Vesuvius caused us 

to experience rapid wear of brakes in Italy, with a resulting 

critical shortage of brake lining. Thievery of jeeps in North 

Africa caused heavy consumption of distributor rotors. (Removing the distributor rotor was for a time a more effective 

protection than removing the ignition key. It ceased to be 

much protection when those inclined toward larceny or borrowing obtained spare distributor rotors, upsetting estimates 

of requirements.) Moisture and heat in Vietnam have caused 

severe deterioration of many parts of radio equipment. 

Inability to forecast repair parts requirements accurately 

accents the importance of gathering and analyzing consumption data promptly after an end item is put into service in the 

United States and again after it is introduced into a theater. 

The present reporting system, with some modification, may be 

adequate, but thorough analysis has usually been lacking. RAC 

study groups have done outstanding work in extracting, purifying, supplementing, and analyzing existing reports and have 

been able to produce excellent forecasts of the life of many 

important assemblies. 

Reasons why the problem of forecasting r'equirements for repair parts 

recurs. 

The size of the initial buy of repair parts, the size of the 

reserve of each part to be maintained, the size of the final buy 

when an item goes out of production, and the avoidance of 

surpluses left over after the end item goes out of the systemall depend upon the accuracy of consumption forecasts made 

at various periods in the service life of an end item. Since, for 

the various reasons previously discussed, accurate forecasts of 

the requirements for repair parts and assemblies cannot be 
88 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

made prior to extensive use of the end item and since adequate forecasts are not being made after use is initiated, the 

resulting shortages and excesses cause the problem to recur. 

The successful work of RAe study groups in forecasting the 

life of important assemblies indicates that such studies should 

be made of each new model of a critical item in each new 

environment in which it is operated. 

Form in which the problem of forecasting requirements for repair parts 

will probably recur. 

The form in which the problem will probably recur will be 

as a requirement to modify the reporting system to insure that, 

for a new and critically important end item, the reporting 

system will provide adequate data for forecasting consumption 

of assemblies and parts or as a requirement to analyze the data 

provided by the reporting system and to forecast the life or 

consumption rates of important parts, important assemblies, or 

an end item itself. 

Management of Repair Parts 

Even if it were possible to forecast requirements for repair 

parts accurately, there would still be problems in their management. The requirement is for a system that is reliable and 

rapid yet simple enough to be operated by personnel with little 

training-this without unduly reducing the mobility of units or 

even depots in theaters of operations. As in all recurring problems, there are conflicting influences, and modifications can be 

made by shifting the balance. Thus, complete capability to 

repair an end item requires that every part of which the end 

item is made be available for requisitioning. On the other 

hand, simplicity, mobility, and speed of operations exert influences toward reducing parts available for requisitioning to a 

relatively small percentage of those that go into the assembly 

of the end item. Providing interchangeable parts common to 

several end items leads to storing parts in order by Federal 

Stock Number. On the other hand, simplicity and reliability 

exert an influence toward segregation of parts by end item so 

that in one "master depot" as in World War II or in one 

section of a depot overseas one can quickly find everything 
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 89 

needed for a specific end item. In an Army made up largely of 

draftees-some of whom must receive their training in a few 

months in order to perform their service in an active theater 

within the two years for which they are drafted-and in an 

Army in which logistic troops must usually be supplemented by 

local laborers, simplicity is essential. On the other hand, the 

increasing complexity of equipment developed in an age of 

rapidly advancing technology makes simplicity difficult to 

attain. 

In World War II, parts were supplied primarily on the 

estimates of the Chiefs of Technical Services, with theaters 

requisitioning more when shortages occurred and reporting 

when excesses were building up. When theaters reached the 

point of requisitioning for their needs, the usual practice was 

to requisition parts based on the rates developed by the service 

chief with little or no adjustment for the variations from those 

rates caused by conditions peculiar to the theater. In some 

cases repair parts were furnished in box lots, each intended to 

provide a balanced supply of repair parts for a specified 

number of a particular end item for a specified time. With a 

section of a depot set aside for parts for each important end 

item, these box lots provided ready restockage. When a new 

supply point had to be established, a certain degree of balance 

was assured by sending box lots. When shipments were mixed 

up en route, they were easy to segregate. When a depot 

moved, it was easy to send forward a small but fairly balanced 

stockage. The system was criticized because some types of 

parts were in excess. Thus, a box lot of %-ton truck parts 

contained, among many fast-moving parts, a steering wheel 

and a rear axle housing, which were seldom required. This 

criticism could have been met by changing the contents of the 

box lots, although it would not have been worthwhile to 

modify box lots already delivered by the manufacturers. 

At the end of the war, we had in Germany a great quantity 

of repair parts, some of which had been repacked and shipped 

a number of times. Documentation had been lost or never 

prepared. It required a major operation, with skilled parts 

specialists sent from the United States, to sort, clean, identify, 

and determine the serviceability of these repair parts and 

return them to stock. If we had not been able to obtain local 
90 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

labor at no expense to the United States, I doubt that the 

operation would have been worthwhile. There is certainly a 

case for a policy of disposing of parts not obviously in good 

condition, not easily identified, or not obviously expensive. 

In Korea, a widespread practice developed whereby units 

removed components from end items prior to turning the end 

items in for higher level maintenance because they had experienced difficulty in getting these components by requisition. 

These components were usually held in units not authorized to 

hold them. Maintenance units had to replace these components, and this caused strange fluctuations in repair parts requirements. Units became overloaded, but this was not serious 

because of the degree of stabilization that existed in the 

middle and late periods of the war. The practice was condemned by the technical services but tolerated, if not encouraged, by the combat arms. It was overcome only when maintenance units refused to accept incomplete end items for repair. 

The best preventive against such practices is, of course, for 

units to be able to obtain parts and assemblies easily when 

required. 

In World War II and Korea the supply chain paralleled the 

command chain. Although the impetus for supply was supposed to come from the rear, there was also supposed to be an 

impetus from the front. Thus, having submitted a requisition, a 

supply man was supposed to wait a reasonable period. Then, if 

the item or items required were important, he was supposed to 

visit the next higher echelon, bringing samples of the required 

items if identification appeared to be a problem. If he didn't 

get the supplies there, he went to the next higher echelon and 

his commander to the next higher commander. It was remarkable how poorly the supply system worked, particularly for 

repair parts, when this type of follow-up was not used and how 

well when it was used. 

In the early 1950s the Army, in an effort to take advantage 

of new developments, introduced into its supply system Federal Stock Numbers (to facilitate the use of parts interchangeable 

between two or more end items), the one-line requisition (to 

eliminate the delay cause by assembling multi-item requisitions 

and then breaking them down among depots for supply), electronic transmission of the data on punch cards (to reduce the 
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 91 

time from requisition to delivery), and computerized inventories (to maintain inventories up to date without manual inventorying). Under this system, called the Modern Army Supply 

System, requisitions went to a centralized theater inventory 

control point, which directed a depot having the item in stock 

to ship. Thus, a unit in Vicenza tactically based on a line of 

communications from Leghorn could not requisition on a 

depot in Leghorn. Rather, its requisition went to Maison Fort 

in France, which directed shipment from any depot having the 

item and from which shipping· costs were low. This system put 

a tremendous burden on the theater communications network. 

It also broke the clear-cut line of responsibility for supply 

so that if supply failed to arrive, it was difficult to place responsibility. If radio communications failed or were jammed, 

the whole system would break down. If a requisition had to go 

to the United States, it was automatically forwarded to an 

appropriate U.S. depot for supply without editing, and neither 

intentional nor unintentional errors were caught. For example, 

a sergeant in Europe requisitioned an expensive turret lathe . 

There was no shortage, the lathe was not authorized to his 

unit, nor did his unit have a special need for one; the sergeant 

had just always wanted one. It was delivered. Of course, most 

errors were not intentional. Some were errors in identifying 

the proper Federal Stock Number or in copying its many 

digits. These caused erroneous deliveries or delays while the 

proper number was sought. Other errors were caused by rerequisitioning hard-to-get items. Inventories were maintained 

at the theater inventory control point and corrected by reports 

of transactions at depots. Depot commanders had no knowledge of the inventories in their own depots, nor were physical 

inventories made to verify or correct automatic data processing 

inventories. Parts in depots were stocked by number. Gone 

were the days when, as a last resort, a supply man could take 

in his hand an unserviceable part of a Reo 2 %-ton truck for 

which he had been unable to secure a replacement, go to the 

Ordnance depot upon which he was based, find in the depot a 

section devoted to parts for the Reo 2 %-ton truck, find the 

parts man in charge of the section who was familiar with parts 

for the truck, and get the part. 
92 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

When I became Deputy for Logistics in 1955, this Modern 

Army Supply System was in operation. It was working poorly. 

The problem I faced was whether or not to keep the system 

and hope that, by modifying the procedures and training the 

personnel, its advantages might be retained and its weaknesses 

reduced. The alternative I considered was initially to limit the 

use of the automatic data processing equipment to the performance of the functions that we had previously found to be 

essential and so had performed manually-but to perform 

them faster and with a higher degree of accuracy. Only after 

this basic system was operating effectively would we expand it 

to take advantage of any of the capabilities of the equipment to 

perform the additional functions that it was then performing 

unsatisfactorily under the Modern Army Supply System. I 

probably made the wrong decision. I kept the Modern Army 

Supply System with minor modifications. The system, with 

some additional modifications, is still in operation. It still 

works poorly. Even reaction speed, which was supposed to be 

one of its principal advantages, has never lived up to expectations. The modified system now in operation has been surveyed extensively and many causes of failure and delay have 

been identified. The lack of simplicity, the impracticability of 

follow-up, and the probable collapse in the event of communications difficulties appear to me to be the major weaknesses. 

If much heavier stockages were held at each level, performance of the supply system could undoubtedly be improvedexcept in the accumulation of excesses. However, Army units, 

even depots, must be able to move on short notice, so stocks 

must be held down to critical and fast-moving items. When I 

was Deputy for Logistics, we introduced a system that included 

"prescribed load lists" for the stockage of fast-moving items 

and relied primarily on cannibalization for the provision of 

slow-moving "fringe" items. Fringe items, which included most 

repair parts, were required seldom and usually in lots of only 

one. In war there are usually many more damaged end items 

than can be repaired anyway. The parking for cannibalization 

at each direct support unit of at least one end item of each 

important type would provide a ready source of slow-moving 

fringe items. On rapid unit movements, items undergoing can-
MAINTENANCE OF MATERIEL 93 

nibalization could be abandoned and replaced at the new location by other damaged items. 

In time of peace it was intended that, if no damaged end 

item were available, undamaged end items would be used. This 

was supposed to be limited to some extent by judgment. For 

example, new and expensive end items for cannibalization 

might be permitted only to general support maintenance units. 

The reduction in requisitioning was expected to more than pay 

for the cost of even new items cannibalized in peace. Supply 

time of fringe items would have been tremendously reduced. 

This system was prostituted as a result of a misguided interpretation of economy that not only indicated that serviceable 

or slightly damaged end items should not be cannibalized 

(leaving no source for fringe items except requisitioning) but 

even required that items cannibalized should be disassembled 

and the parts picked up on stock records, this increasing paper 

work and reducing mobility. 

Reasons why the problem of management of repair parts recurs. 

Repair parts are in tremendous variety and difficult to identify. Federal Stock Numbers contain many digits and are the 

source of many errors. The system in use makes follow-up of 

unfilled requisitions difficult. It places a tremendous load on 

the available communications. It is not delivering the parts 

required in a reasonable time, and some not at all. 

Form in which the problem of management of repail" parts will probably 

recur. 

As combat units continue to be unable to secure promptly 

the parts they require, the problem will arise in the form of a 

requirement to redesign the system either in whole or in part 

to secure greater simplicity, greater reliability, and greater mobility, or any combination of these. 

CHAPTER 7 

Intertheater Transportation 

Overseas operations give rise to many transportation problems. Although some of these problems are primarily the responsibility of the Navy or Air Force, almost all of them have 

important implications for the Army since it is the Army that 

must be transported and supported overseas. The Army 

should therefore be prepared to influence their solution influence on their solution. The areas in which I have particularly 

noted that problems recur are: 

1. The speed of initial deployment overseas. 

2. The balance between sealift and airlift. 

3. The best method of moving seaborne cargo ashore. 

Speed of Initial Deployment Overseas 

During and since World War II, and particularly since we 

became interested in Southeast Asia, a great deal of thought 

has gone into speed of initial deployment. The concern has 

been both speed of deployment to NATO in Europe and 

speed of deployment to Asian areas on the fringe of the Communist bloc. There has been two assumptions: that the early 

arrival of U.S. forces in the objective area might well be critically important and in some cases decisive and that a smaller 

force delivered quickly might accomplish as much as a larger 

force delivered later. 

Before an answer can be given to the problem of hm·.., 

rapidly we can place a force of a specified size in a specified 

area, many questions must be resolved. For example, an important question is whether the movement is primarily for the 

psychological effect of presence or if the force is expected to 

engage in heavy combat. If the movement is for a psychologi-
96 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

cal purpose like showing the flag, the force could be moved 

with little more than individual equipment, but if the force is 

expected to fight, it should be moved with full combat equipment and reserve supplies. The second type of movement 

requires, in terms of tonnage per man, many times the amount 

of the first. Normandy was at one extreme end of the scale; we 

knew we would fight a first-class enemy. The initial movement 

to Korea was less extreme; we expected a much less determined and competent enemy and did not take the time to 

complete the organization and equipment of the troops. Lebanon was further down the scale. Although primarily psychological, the force went with most of its equipment and some 

supplies, which added to the psychological-political effect, 

demonstrating a stronger determination than a mere landing 

would have indicated. 

Once the size and composition of the force and the mission 

it is expected to accomplish are decided, there are many preparatory measures that can be taken to increase the speed with 

which deployment can be accomplished. It is entirely practicable to take preparatory measures for a very rapid deployment, 

but most of them must be initiated well in advance, and their 

costs are high. For example, we are now withdrawing troops 

from Vietnam. If we wished to redeploy them to Vietnam, 

they, their equipment, and their necessary supplies would be 

available and could be moved in record time because the line 

of communications between the United States and Vietnam is 

operating at a large capacity. However, it required serveral 

years to establish this capacity. When the question arises as to 

how long it will take to deploy a specified force into an overseas area, the problem becomes one of determining what preparatory measures need to be taken, at what time and at what 

cost, and how fast they can be accomplished. The preparatory 

measures that need to be taken vary with the geographic location of the objective area, with the situation in the objective 

area, with the strength and condition of the troops to be sent, 

with the degree of governmental support behind the operation 

and with many other influences. 

The prepartory measure that probably requires the longest 

time is the provision of the specialized transportation that 
INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION 97 

would in many cases speed up the deployment. The development and production of the C-SA aircraft, the roll-on, roll-off 

ship, the fast-deployment logistic ship, and the larger types of 

landing craft are examples. The economics of peacetime use 

can limit the provision of these aids to rapid deployment. To 

the extent that they cannot be economically utilized in peace to 

move military cargo, they compete for funds with combatant 

aircraft and ships. The case for the C-SA is particularly strong 

because it is economically usable in peace and it avoids the 

threat of the nuclear submarine in war. The case for the rollon, roll-off ship is good because it moves cargo in peacetime 

almost as cheaply as commercial shipping (making up for carrying less than normal tonnage by requiring far less than 

normal time to load and unload). The case for the fast-deployment logistic ship is less strong because it is a very specialpurpose ship that is less economical to operate in peace and 

therefore competes for funds with Navy combatant ships. The 

same applies to the larger types of landing craft. 

Another preparatory measure that may require a long time 

is the construction or improvement of airports and seaports. 

The airports and seaports of the United States are adequate 

for almost any level of overseas movement, except as regards 

outshipment of ammunition, bombs, and missiles, where safety 

provisons for the local civilian population cannot meet Coast 

Guard standards. Adequate facilities are found in few potential 

objective areas. Improvements are virtually always required. 

When no facilities exist, construction is a matter of months or 

even years. 

With airports well spaced across the Pacific, along the 

southern fringe of Asia, along the Mediterranean, and across 

the Atlantic-all in use by the Military Airlift Command-the 

United States now has some capacity for air movement virtually anywhere in the world provided there is an adequate air 

base in the objective area. Two questions, however, normally 

arise: one is the diplomatic question of authority to use airports and to make overflights of foreign territory for the purpose of the specific movement intended; the other is the question of the improvement, maintenance, stockage, and operation 

of the airports to be used. 
98 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Other nations can be very sensitive to the purposes of 

flights over their territories and to the use to which even U.S. 

operated bases in their territories are put. Prior agreements in 

which the specific purpose of the intended movement was not 

contemplated are of doubtful value. Refusals are common. For 

example, in the Lebanon crisis of 1959, Greece, although our 

ally in NATO, refused permission for U.S. troops going to 

Lebanon to overfly Greek territory. When we first sent troop 

detachments to Vietnam, India, although a recipient of U.S. 

aid, refused permission for U.S. troops to overfly Indian territory. Even if clearance is obtained, any air base that must 

sustain unusually heavy traffic has to heavily stocked with fuel 

and repair parts and manned with personnel for servicing and 

repairing aircraft and maintaining runways. This is a major 

requirement. Just how major was indicated by a computation 

made when we first became involved in Vietnam. This computation indicated that it would require as much time to make 

these preparations at the necessary air bases as it would to 

transport the first troops to Vietnam by water. 

Since most commercial cargo moves by sea, existing seaports usually have far more capacity than existing airports. 

More way stations are usually available and already fairly well 

stocked with fuel. Ships can either make the round trip without 

refueling or can refuel at some port en route without encountering the sensitivity about airports. The high seas are open to 

transit, so diplomatic clearance is required only if movement is 

to go through claimed territorial waters or through the Suez 

Canal. If port capacity in the objective area is inadequate, the 

need for new construction can usually be temporarily avoided 

by using landing craft, although the initial movement will usually be slowed down by the need to move the landing craft to 

the port of debarkation. 

Aircraft and ships are scattered all over the world. Few 

active ships are empty and available in home ports. The assembly of shipping for a large movement is a matter of several 

weeks or even months. We do have a large number of older 

cargo ships in storag·e, but the time required to put such ships 

back in commission is considerable. Aircraft are more readily 

available than ships because their turnaround time is so much 
INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION 99 

less. Both ships and aircraft have important commercial missions that cannot be suddenly discontinued without serious 

disadvantages. In World War II the British Import Program, 

required to keep the British economy running, was given priority over strictly military requirements. As railway passenger 

service in the United States declines, our ability to withdraw 

commerical aircraft for military service will also decline. Further, the aircraft and ships we assemble must be protected. 

Depending upon the capabilities of the enemy, naval escorts 

for our ship convoys, air cover for our transport aircraft approaching the theater, and security for our ports and airports 

in the objective area may need to be provided. 

There is always a considerable number of individuals in 

each unit who are not available for combat service overseas: 

those sick, those absent without leave, those attending schools, 

those whose term of service is approaching its end, those 

facing trial by general court matrial, or those restricted by 

political measures (such as, at one time, those brought into the 

Army for service in the Western Hemisphere only). Replacing 

these men and filling any personnel shortages that already 

exist with qualified personnel can cause a serious delay. When 

we sent troops to Iceland before we entered World War II, 

one of the first requirements was for an Engineer battalion. By 

transferring men from the other battalion of the same regiment, the first battalion was made ready in a few days. This 

however rendered the second battalion entirely unfit for overseas service and, when it was called for, a delay of several 

weeks was required, and even then the battalion was handicapped by an excessive number of replacements. An expeditionary force can be kept ready at all time, but at the expense 

of personnel turbulence throughout the Army that the Army 

itself has generally been unwilling to accept. 

It is the nature of our democracy that we do not often take, 

in advance, all or even many measures to permit rapid intervention in any foreign area. This is probably because any overt 

preparation that has not been publicly debated and cleared is 

subject to congressional challenge and diplomatic embarrassment. We can therefore keep troops in Europe under NATO, 

as a sort of extension of World War I; troops in Japan and 

Korea, as a sort of extension of World II and the Korean War; 
100 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

and troops in Thailand incident to the war in Vietnam. But in 

none of the ways mentioned, nor in World War I or Lebanon, 

did we decide in advance to be prepared to intervene rapidly 

and take many of the concrete measures that would facilitate 

such intervention. 

We have taken some measures. In an effort to make the 

best use of airlift in expediting initial deployment, forward 

stockage of equipment has been used. The maximum use of 

forward stockage has been made in Europe, where division sets 

of equipment have been stocked with a view to flying the 

troops to their equipment. This requires a heavy investment in 

depot space and in personnel to maintain the equipment in 

storage and make it ready for issue. It also involves the procurement of two sets of equipment for the same division. As 

equipment depreciates in storage or becomes obsolete, it must 

be replaced in both division sets. 

A lesser degree of forward stockage has been used when 

troops are not in the objective area. This has included storing 

heavy and bulky equipment and supplies such as tanks, trucks, 

heavy engineer equipment, 'artillery, and ammunition in an 

area in which U.S. troops are already stationed that is part way 

to one or preferably several objective areas. This measure has 

the great advantage of reducing depreciation and obsolescence 

through issue to the local troops of equipment from the forward stockage and replacement from the United States. 

We have provided, under foreign military aid, military 

equipment and supplies for the troops of countries in whose 

interest we might intervene. If such countries are threatened, 

whether from without or within, they must fight in their own 

defense; else we are unlikely to intervene. If their troops are 

not overwhelmed, they can hold seaports and airports open to 

facilitate our troop movements. If they are overwhelmed, the 

problem ceases to be rapid intervention and becomes massive 

intervention. But in regard to forward stockage, another possible approach would be to issue to a threatened country, 

through foreign military aid, more than enough stocks for its 

own forces. An American expeditionary force could then 

borrow back some of the bulky or heavy items. This approach 

has been considered but, so far as I know, never used. 
INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION 101 

The speed of movement to an objective area is thus not a 

simple question of how fast an airplane can fly or a ship can 

sail. It is a complicated problem in which there are many 

factors, and these factors can be greatly changed by preparations that require time and money and that reveal our intentions. 

Reasons why the problem of speed of deployment recurs. 

Each time the deployment of troops to some area of the 

world is studied, one of the problems raised is how quickly 

deployment can be made. 

Form in which the problem of speed of deployment will pmbably recur. 

The form in which the problem usually recurs is with respect to the degree to which some measure relating to transport means-forward stockage, reserve fleet, air-transportable 

equipment, for example-will increase the speed of deployment to some critical objective area. The problem may recur 

just as the overall question arises of how fast military support 

of a specified size can be provided to some specified area. 

Perhaps the most general form in which the problem will 

probably recur will be as a requirement for a methodology, 

preferably computer assisted, by which the influences on the 

speed of deployment to any area can be varied among possible 

values and the effect of any combination determined. Such a 

methodology, applied in a war game, should give valuable 

information. 

Balance Between Sealift and Airlift 

Movement by air overseas is much faster than movement by 

sea, but capacity is more limited. In commercial practice, air 

carries overseas something less than 5 percent of freight, water 

over 95 percent. Air transport can be increased to perhaps 15 

percent, but this increase is not a matter of aircraft alone but 

of building, manning, stocking and operating bases on the 

route to the objective area and in it. Even when an air line of 

communications is in full operation, its capacity can be greatly 

increased only by such measures as moving in additional aircraft maintenance personnel, and in runway maintenance 

equipment and personnel, increasing stockage of fuel and 
102 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

parts, and perhaps building additional runways, hardstands, 

and fuel storage. 

Movement of resupply by air instead of water cuts order 

and shipping time less than the difference in transit times 

would indicate. If an overall order and shipping time by water 

is forecast at 120 days, a reduction of transit time from 20- 30 

days by water to 1-2 days by air does not reduce order and 

shipping time proportionally. Expediting action all along the 

line is also required if a major speedup in delivery is to be 

accomplished. This involves such measures as special requisitions, granting of priority, elimination of editing, direct communication to the supplying depot, priority for picking and 

packing at the depot, lighter packing, air or express shipment 

to the aerial port of embarkation, prompt loading, prompt 

departure of loaded aircraft, prompt unloading of aircraft at 

overseas air bases, and prompt forwarding of freight to destination. This movement can of course be further speeded if the 

same plane picks up freight at the depot and delivers it to the 

air base of ultimate destination. But this measure is practical 

only in special circumstances, not for general-purpose freight 

movement. The larger and more varied the tonnage to be 

moved, the less expediting action is workable. The effect of a 

combination of air movement and expediting action has reduced order and shipping time for Vietnam from an average of 

98 days for routine handling and shipment by water to 43 days 

for expedited handling and shipment by air. Air transport is 

therefore still basically a supplementary means of overseas 

transport particularly adaptable to the movement of personnel 

and high-priority, lightweight cargo. 

In every overseas operation, our buildup in the area initially occupied must be faster than what the enemy can accomplish lest we risk early defeat. The time for initial deployment 

should therefore be reduced as much as possible. Airlift is one 

of the means of expediting deployment, and its maximum use 

must therefore be considered in the early phases of any overseas operation. So far as I know, the German conquest of 

Crete has been the only overseas operation in which the whole 

force was delivered into the objective area by airlift. This was a 

Pyrrhic victory. The losses were so heavy that the Germans 
INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION 103 

were never able to mount another such effort. All deployments 

since then have been made primarily by sealift, with airlift in a 

strictly secondary role. This does not necessarily hold for the 

future as the airlift available steadily increases and as more and 

more airbases are built all around the world. Changed conditions must be evaluated for each operation planned in the 

future. 

In the later phases of any overseas operation, rapid resupply of critically needed personnel and materiel gives airlift a 

particular advantage. This was the type of use of airlift that the 

United States has made in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. 

The practice has been to have the staff of the overseas theater 

decide on the utilization of the airlift tonnage from the United 

States allotted to the theater. 

Finally, airlift avoids the nuclear-powered submarine threat, 

which may cause heavy losses of shipping in any war in which 

the Soviet Union takes part. 

Reasons why the pmblem of the balance between airlift and sealift 

recurs. 

In the planning for every overseas operation, the problem 

of how best to use available airlift arises. In preparing the 

Army's recommendations for procuring ships and aircraft for 

military lift, the most desirable balance for the more important 

contingency plans should be considered. 

Form in which the problem of the balance between airlift and sealift will 

probably recur. 

The problem of this balance arises in the form of a requirement for recommendations concerning the procurement of 

such items as the C-5A aircraft and the fast-deployed logistic 

ships. It arises with every requirement for the preparation of a 

contingency plan for an overseas operation. 

Moving Seaborne Cargo Ashore 

Delivering ships to an overseas theater is primarily a Navy 

problem, but moving troops and cargo ashore is a problem in 

which the Army has an important and sometimes a primary 

interest. 

Shipping immobilized offshore for unloading is highly vulnerable to submarine attack. Shipping in port offers a concen-
104 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

trated and highly vulnerable target for air or missile attack. 

Moving troops and cargo ashore in minimum time and with 

minimum loss is a basic requirement of overseas operations. 

The speed with which troops and cargo are moved ashore 

reduces the period of maximum vulnerability. It also reduces 

the shipping and port facilities required. Matching up ports, 

ship, port equipment, and port personnel for effectiveness and 

speed is a critical problem. , 

Although it is possible in fair weather to make an initial 

landing on an open beach, ports are an early necessity. If they 

are blocked, they must be opened; if they are damaged, they 

must be repaired; if none are available, they must be built. In 

World War II, parts such as Naples were frequently damaged 

by our own bombing prior to their capture. If damage by our 

bombing was light, demolitions were carried out by the enemy 

prior to his evacuation, as was done at Leghorn. Both examples resulted in extensive destruction of port facilities and 

equipment necessary to the operation of the port. Piers, railway culverts, bridges, and tunnels blown, tracks cut, cranes 

destroyed or evacuated, and power generation facilities destroyed. In addition, ports were blocked with sunken ships, 

cranes, and harbor craft. This must all be considered in advance so that the attacking forces bring with them equipment 

to replace what has been carried away or damaged beyond 

repaIr. 

Port construction where no port existed was accomplished 

in World War II for the Normandy landings by the sinking of 

Phoenixes and hulks to form harbors on open beaches. Ports 

were unblocked and repaired in World War II by Navy marine 

salvage teams and Army engineers working together. These 

units acquired many of their skills by experience in that war. 

The Germans became more skillful at blocking and damaging 

ports and the Americans more skillful at unblocking and repairing them as the Mediterranean campaigns required, in succession, the opening of the ports of Bizerte, Naples, Leghorn, 

and Marseilles. Opportunities for good training in this area in 

peacetime are rare. 

In World War II, ports were vulnerable targets. At Bari we 

lost 16 ships, 38,000 tons of cargo, and 1,000 casualties in one 
INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION 105 

air raid. With the development of missiles, ports have become 

more vulnerable. After World War II, in an effort to ensure 

dispersion of shipping in port in any future European war, the 

NODEX exercises were held periodically. These exercises involved selecting locations, dispersed for protection against nuclear attack, along the Garonne estuary and the western coast 

of France where up to five ships could be anchored or berthed 

and unloaded. A new location was supposed to be tried out in 

each exercise to test the adequacy of anchorages, the effect of 

tides and currents, and the accessibility to roads and railroads, 

and to determine what should be done in the event of war to 

make the location suitable for use as a small port. 

Ports offered no great problem in the Korean War. Pusan 

was a fine port and was always in our hands. Inchon and 

Wonsan were captured undamaged, although Wonsan was 

heavily mined. In Vietnam inadequate port capacity forced the 

construction of a new port at Cam Ranh Bay, where the 

DeLong pier was used to expedite operations. Developed after 

World War II, the DeLong pier is a prefabricated pier that can 

be floated into place and then jacked up on its own piles. 

Most of the cargo for overseas theaters must be carried in 

commercial shipping. Special-purpose shipping is necessary in 

many cases, particularly LSTs and smaller landing craft, but 

such craft are generally uneconomical to use in peacetime and 

in reality compete for funds with combatant ships. The LST, 

however, proved itself in World War II and Korea. It was 

invaluable at Anzio, when most cargo was delivered in loaded 

trucks. These were driven ashore, unloaded, and driven back 

on board the LST, which sailed the same night it arrived. The 

speed with which an LST can be loaded and unloaded of 

vehicles make it economical for use in peacetime when short 

hauls are required as between Japan and Korea. 

After World War II the military pioneered the use of an 

overseas shipping container that, among its other advantages, 

speeds up cargo handling. The much larger commercial containers now coming into use speed up cargo handling still 

more. The military can foster this militarily desirable commercial development by using containers for shipping in peacetime. 
106 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Vehicles are an important part of military cargo. Their 

movement requires a disproportionate amount of space for 

their weight. During World War II, this disproportion demanded the partial disassembly of manufactured vehicles and crating 

for shipment in twin or single-unit packs. Although this practice made cargo handling less difficult, it required complicated 

reassembly. The roll-on, roll-off ship was developed after 

World War II to handle vehicles. It is valuable militarily in that 

it reduces the time of great vulnerability of shipping in overseas ports in war and avoids disassembly, crating and reassembly of wheeled vehicles. 

Speed of unloading can be greatly facilitated by port equipment appropriate to the port to be used. Mobile cranes, floating cranes, rough terrain forklift trucks, harbor craft, and amphibious vehicles are all valuable under certain conditions. In 

over-the-beach operations, amphibious vehicles such as the 

amphibious 2%-ton truck (DUKW) in World War II were particularly valuable because they could deliver cargo directly 

from ships to dumps, avoiding the vulnerable and slow cargo 

transfer operation that would otherwise have been conducted 

at the water line. Heavy-lift helicopters promise to be valuable 

in this type of operation provided the ships are suitable for the 

operation of helicopters. 

Reasons why the problem of moving seabome cargo ashm·e recurs. 

The success of any major overseas operation depends heavily upon the efficiency and speed with which cargo is moved 

ashore. Every new possibility that might improve our capability 

in this sensitive area should be carefully evaluated. The problem will recur whenever an overseas operation is planned and 

the adequacy of the means available to get cargo ashore rapidly is considered. It will recur each year when the budget is 

developed and the decision is made concerning what landing 

equipment should be procured by the Army or recommended 

by the Army for procurement by other agencies. It will recur 

whenever consideration is given to the development or procurement of new types of ships or new types of port equipment. 
INTERTHEATER TRANSPORTATION 107 

Form in which the pmblem of movzng seaborne cargo ashore will probably recur. 

The problem will recur in the form of a requirement to 

determine the equipment that should be provided for a specific 

overseas operation or that should be procured and kept on 

hand as a general-purpose reserve. It will recur as a requirement for recommendations as to any concepts of ship-to-shore 

cargo movement or new types of cargo ships or new pieces of 

landing equipment. 

CHAPTER 8 

Production for War 

For many years the Army has supported the proposItIOn 

that supply readiness for war should be provided partially by 

reserve stocks on hand, partially by production lines in operation, and partially by production lines in mothballs. It also 

emphasized that the size of the reserve stocks ideally must be 

great enough to fill wartime requirements until the rate of 

production can reach the established rate of consumption. The 

Army Staff has also favored the assumption that any war will 

start without a preliminary period of strained relations in 

which production can. This provision of reserve to last from Dday until production equals consumption, called the "D-P Day 

Concept," has usually been considered theoretically reasonable 

by most national administrations. But the initial cost would be 

so great, the cost of storage and maintenance would be so 

high, and the effect of obsolescence would be so severe that no 

budget has ever provided for more than a very small fraction 

of either the reserve stocks or the production capacity required. It has therefore been necessary for the Army to concentrate its efforts on securing the greatest practicable degree 

of material readiness from the funds made available. 

Some of the more important questions involved in arriving 

at an overall plan of how to achieve the best possible degree of 

materiel readiness include: 

1. What items should be provided for by stockage or production capability? 

2. What production lines should be maintained in active 

operation and what reserves should be stored and maintained? 
110 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

3. What is the vulnerability of the production base to nuclear attack, and what are the plans for recovery from the results 

of a nuclear attack? 

Items To Be Provided for by Stockage 

or Production Capability 

The Army has usually been able to have its requirements 

met for the initial equipment and peacetime training of its 

active units. It has never had its supply requirements met for a 

possible future war, so it has to determine those items for 

which to make a substantial provision and those items for 

which to make little or no provision. This decision has to be 

made with respect to each specific item. When I was in logistics in the Department of the Army, I had a study made, and 

kept alive by frequent revision, that evaluated various factors in 

regard to each important item of supply in order to reach a 

determination as to the degree of readiness that should be 

provided for that item and how it should be provided. The 

more important factors were criticality to combat, rate of obsolescence, rate of depreciation in storage, availability of commercial substitutes and cost. If an item was highly critical to 

combat, a substantial provision was made for it. The other 

factors influenced how the provision was made. 

Weapons and communication equipment were high on the 

list. Administrative and special-purpose equipment were low. 

For example, tanks were high because they were among our 

principal items of fighting equipment. Armored personnel carriers were a little lower because, although they brought the 

infantry to the battlefield fresh and gave some protection 

against enemy fire and radioactive fallout, infantry could move 

without them. Observation aircraft were high; transport aircraft, relatively low. 

Most newly developed items in areas where the state of the 

art is changing are subject to extensive modification as use in 

the field brings out weaknesses and possible improvements. 

Such items, if bought in great quantity, quickly become obso-
PRODUCTION FOR WAR 111 

lete and therefore, to my study concluded, were not to be 

bought to be placed in reserve. Rather, reliance to replace 

consumption was to be placed on expanding in war production 

lines that had been kept operating slowly in peace. Helicopters 

and missiles were in this category. 

For items critical to combat that depreciate rapidly in storage, reserve stocks were to be limited to quantities that would 

be used up in peacetime training and reliance was to be placed 

on production capacity. Dry-cell batteries were an example. 

Although not as suitable for field use and not as standardized as military items, many commercial items can be used 

satisfactorily as substitutes, particularly in training. Similarity 

between commercial items and the corresponding military 

items makes the conversion of manufacturing facilities to wartime production easy. Large reserves of such items were not to 

be procured. General-purpose cargo vehicles were in this category. 

The cost of individual items is considered before they are 

standardized and included in Tables of Organization and 

Equipment. The cost of an individual item entered into the 

problem of providing equipment readiness primarily as an influence on how high a level of readiness was to be provided 

and by what means it was to be provided, i.e., by stocks in 

storage, by production facilities on standby, or by a production 

line in operation. Thus medium tanks, which were among the 

items most critical to combat, had to be provided for. They 

could not be bought for stockage in great quantity because of 

cost. Because of the threat of obsolescence, it was desirable to 

depend as much as practicable on a going production line. We 

had equipment for three production lines. We sought to keep 

one line as thoroughly modernized as possible and operating 

at a very low rate. We sought to keep the others as modernized as possible but in storage. Modernization was accomplished for all three lines through an annual contract. When 

the operator of the going production line lost the competition 

for the next annual contract, his production line was placed in 

storage. The new contractor was required to modernize and 

activate one of the production lines that was previously in 

storage. 
112 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Reasons why the problem of items to be provided for by stockage or 

production recurs. 

As new items are developed or new production methods 

are devised or as changes arise in the probability of occurrence 

of various possible future wars, the criticality of specific items 

to combat changes, as does the justification for their stockage 

and production. All should therefore be redetermined. 

Form in which the problem of items to be provided for by stockage or 

production will probably recur. 

The problem recurs during development of each annual 

budget in the form of a requirement for a decision that specifies the items for which funds will be sought, whether for the 

provision of reserves, for the maintenance of reserves, or for 

ensuring industrial readiness. 

Production Lines To Be Maintained 

in Active Operation 

The requirement for going production lines and for materiel reserves varies greatly among the three military services. It 

takes so long to build new combatant ships that the Navy must 

be maintained basically as a force in being, since it has to fight 

any war, except the longest ones, primarily with the ships on 

hand at the beginning of the war. Army equipment, on the 

other hand, takes a relatively short time to produce, so the 

Army can be, and is, basically a mobilization base. The Regular 

Army is not usually large enough in peacetime to fight even a 

brush-fire war. It has expected to be expanded after an emergency arises. While it is being expanded, materiel can be produced. The Army therefore depends for materiel primarily on 

production after an emergency arises. Heavy aircraft take more 

time to produce than Army types of materiel but less time than 

ships. The Air Force is in between the Navy and Army. It is 

primarily a force in being but must rely more heavily than the 

Navy on new production after an emergency arises. 

Since the Army is going to be expanded after an emergency 

arises and equipped primarily from production initiated or 

expanded at that time, it is important that there be at least one 

going production line for each critical item. This production 
PRODUCTION FOR WAR 113 

line should be frequently modified so that it is producing the 

best model that has been developed of that critical item. The 

production line itself should be thoroughly modernized so that 

if an emergency arises that requires the establishment of additional production lines, industry has an example to copy and 

experienced personnel to advise and assist in installation and 

initial operation. 

In the late 1950s great political pressure was exerted to 

eliminate the Army's arsenals and rely entirely on industry. 

The Army's response was based primarily on the the fact that 

there are many items critical to combat for which there are no 

close commercial counterparts and for which production is not 

kept going continuously. For such items there is no "captive" 

industry. When new production is needed after a period in 

which there has been none, many difficult problems arise. The 

previous manufacturer may be producing some other important item and thus unable to undertake the new production, or 

a competitor may win the new contract. In such cases the new 

manufacturer has to depend upon records and the cooperation 

of the previous manufacturer. Even with the best of cooperation, which is uncertain, there will be some loss of know-how 

because of inexperience, new personnel and confusion in the 

transfer of records. There is often the question of the proprietary rights of the previous manufacturer. Regardless of whether the previous manufacturer or a new one wins the contract, 

there is often a major time loss because the manufacturer 

starts to redesign any equipment or procedures that require 

change because of modification in the end item or because of 

the introduction of new manufacturing processes only after the 

awarding of the contract. 

For each important item not in continuous production by a 

commercial concern, the Army needs its own flexible facilities 

that can do research and development work and also maintain 

in their personnel the knowledge of how to establish an efficient production line or, better, facilities that keep in operation 

a production line of limited capacity producing the best item, 

with the best production equipment, with highly competent 

experienced personnel. New manufacturers then have access to 

an operating model and to experienced personnel who can 

assist them in initiating production of the required item. The 
114 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Army's solution to the problem of prompt procurement in an 

emergency relies on its arsenals in conjunction with such commercial production lines as it can keep in operation. 

During the period while I was Deputy for Logistics, it was 

then Army policy to spread production for the initial provision 

of any new item over five years or more, so as to keep production lines running, although slowly, and to introduce improvements into going production lines as soon as the responsible 

Chief of Technical Service felt they were desirable and worth 

the cost. The object of this approach was to have as many 

critical-item production lines as possible going before any 

emergency and to have them producing the best possible item. 

When it became necessary to expand production to the maximum, we would thus already be producing the item we wanted 

and there would be no delay to work out manufacturing procedures or to test the end items, as improved, before expansion 

of production could be accomplished. Admittedly, contracts 

negotiated with the more competent manufacturers were preferable to wide-open competition. Also, it was accepted that 

some contractors would endeavor to increase their profits by 

negotiating high charges for engineering changes. Our protection against excessive charges was the judgment of the contracting officer and the necessity for contractors to protect 

their reputations in order to secure future contracts. 

The conflict that is continually waged is that of economy 

against quality. Voltaire's comment that "the budget is the 

enemy of the good" may apply in many circumstances, but it is 

not valid for military materiel, as I sought to bring out in my 

discussion of cost-effectiveness in Chapter 5, above. 

Reasons why the problem of production lines to be rnaintained in active 

operation recurs. 

There is little argument as to the desirability of having 

production lines in operation at the outset of an emergency. 

The question is, How much is it worth to have a production 

line in operation and modernized? This question arises whenever the production of an item is planned and whenever an 

engineering change is considered. 
PRODUCTION FOR WAR 115 

Form in which the problem of production lines to be maintained in active 

operation will probably recur. 

The problem will probably recur as a requirement for a 

recommendation as to how the procurement of anyone of the 

items particularly critical to combat should be planned. It is 

sure to recur when there is some threat to the security of the 

United States strong enough to change the accent from cost 

reduction to increased military capability. 

Storage and Maintenance of Reserves 

In addition to the initial cost of reserves, the costs of 

storage and maintenance exert a strong influence against the 

buildup of heavy stockages. Few items can be stored without 

deteriorating, and many require a considerable amount of care 

but still deteriorate. Canned goods deteriorate. Fabrics deteriorate. In spite of the most careful packing and storage, both 

the propellant and the high explosive in conventional ammunition deteriorate. Mechanical items of all types deteriorate, especially when two parts made of dissimilar metals touch and 

electrolysis takes place. Rubber-composition parts and rubber 

insulation on wires deteriorate. The rate of deterioration of 

some mechanical items is slowed if they are operated occasionally. Rubber deteriorates more slowly if it is stored in nitrogen. 

Many items will deteriorate more slowly if they are stored 

under conditions of controlled temperature and humidity. 

Generally speaking, various measures can be taken, each at a 

certain cost, to slow deterioration, but some deterioration still 

takes place. This indicates the desirability of rotating stocks, 

that is, issuing the oldest first. 

During the period of storage, obsolescence also takes place. 

The rate of obsolescence is particularly critical where the state 

of the art is changing rapidly, such as for missile and electronic 

items. The cost of keeping reserves on hand, then, is the cost 

of storage and maintenance in storage plus the reduction in 

value that takes place because of deterioration and obsolescence during the period of storage. 

Whenever a long-range plan for the management of an 

improved model of an item is made, a decision is required as 

to how the new model and the older models will be distributed One solution, used in the past, has been to put the new 
116 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

model in the hands of troops and keep the older models in 

storage. The new model will enhance the combat capability of 

the troops, but this use will also cause the new items to be 

worn out in training. The older models kept in storage will 

then have to be used in war. Another solution has been to 

issue the older models to troops and put the newer models in 

storage. Under this solution, the best equipment suffers from 

deterioration in storage, and the troops never get their hands 

on it in peacetime except for familiarization. Weaknesses in the 

new model are not discovered as quickly as when it undergoes 

heavy use. A third solution has been to issue two sets of 

equipment, one for training and one for familiarization and 

use in war. This places a heavy maintenance burden on the 

troops. 

Those who plan for the management of an item soon to go 

out of the system must decide about continuing its maintenance. One solution has been to repair unserviceable items 

promptly and put then back into service until they cease to be 

economically repairable. The units so equipped have usually 

been those of the National Guard and Reserve that would not 

be called early in an emergency. This practice permits some of 

the newer equipment to be stored in reserve. Another solution 

has been to place unserviceable items of older models in storage unrepaired, as part of the war reserve, with a view toward 

repair and issue in the event of war. These items are then 

disposed of unrepaired when they become obsolete. This saves 

limited maintenance funds and reduces the investment in reserves but keeps obsolescent materiel longer and increases the 

risk of having to use it in war. 

Reasons why the problem of storage and maintenance of reserves recurs. 

The above discussions are far from complete, but they 

should convey the realization that there are many conflicting 

influences that bear on the acquisition and storage of materiel 

for war. These influences vary for different items and under 

different military situations. Whenever any of these influences 

change, the problem of what to do about storage and maintenance of reserves recurs. 
PRODUCTION FOR WAR 117 

Form in which the problem of storage and maintenance of reserves will 

probably recur. 

The problem will probably recur as a requirement either 

for a general policy for the acquisition, storage, and maintenance of war reserves or for a recommendation with respect to 

a specific critical item. 

Industrial Security and Recovery From Nuclear Attack 

The most critical external threat to the security of the 

United States is an intercontinental ballistic missile attack by 

the USSR. The possible effects of a variety of such attacks and 

the possible rate of industrial recovery from them has been 

studied to some extent. Civil defense measures have been 

studied, and some few small steps have been taken to reduce 

losses and damage from nuclear attack. Our reliance, however, 

has been placed on our capability to survive a nuclear attack 

and launch a decisive counterattack the "second strike." To 

this end, protection has been provided for our nuclear missile 

systems, but not for our industrial capacity to produce them. 

As the USSR increases its nuclear capability and its antiballistic missile capability, the credibility of our second-strike 

capability is reduced. The problem of what the United States 

should now do if it is decided that a nuclear preponderance in 

our favor will not be maintained therefore arises. 

As our own ballistic missile defense is further developed 

and as other defensive measures are discovered, the overwhelming effectiveness of a nuclear attack will be lessened and 

the probable duration even of an all-out nuclear war increased. 

This, in turn, will increase the importance of production after 

such a war starts and will focus more attention on industrial 

security and recovery from nuclear attack. 

Reasons why the problem of industrial security and recovery from nuclear 

attack recurs. 

As the effectiveness of the various nuclear weapons and 

countermeasures fluctuates, the requirement for restudying 

measures for industrial security and recovery will recur with 

each important fluctuation. 
118 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Form in which the problem of indust1"ial security and recovery from 

nuclear attack will probably reCUT. 

The problem will probably recur as a requirement for new 

studies, in the light of changed circumstances, of the probable 

effects of nuclear attack on the United States, of desirable civil 

defense measures and of desirable measures to facilitate industrial recovery. The emphasis will likely be on a more prolonged struggle than previously assumed, possibly with the 

accent on fostering a capability of continuing the war with 

materiel produced after the initial nuclear exchange. 
CHAPTER 9 

Lessons Learned In Logistics 

In previous chapters I have reviewed various logistic problems that I have observed recur over the years. The specifics of 

these logistic problems, dealt with individually, do not seem to 

me to give an adequate conception of the general conclusions 

that I have reached as a result of my experience in logistics. I 

have, therefore, added this chapter as a sort of summary, 

presenting in it the lessons I have learned largely from dealing 

with the recurring problems previously discussed. Where the 

basis for a lesson learned has not been adequately brought out 

in the discussion of recurring problems, I have sought to add it 

in this chapter. 

There is not much that is new to any trained logistician in 

the statements of lessons learned that I have included. There 

seems to me, however, to be a good deal in them that has 

been forgotten or disregarded in the years since World War II 

when the accent has been on economy and efficiency in peacetime operations as distinguished from preparations for effective operations in war. 

There are a few hard and fast rules for the logistician. 

Probably no one realizes this better than I from the effort to 

develop some general conclusions from my own experience for 

this chapter. I trust that those I have developed will be viewed 

by readers as valid under most of the varied conditions I have 

encountered in the past but as needing to be confirmed or 

modified if widely differing conditions are met in the future. 
120 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Lessons Learned 

1. Among the important requirements for the effective resupply from the United States of a theater of operations in war 

are: 

a. A flow of material from new production that, as soon as 

practicable, will become equal to the expected rate of consumption by all theaters of training in the United States and by 

our aid to allies. 

b. Reserves in the United States large enough to fill forecasted theater requirements until the rate of production can 

catch up with the rate of consumption and to provide a "surge 

tank" from which to fill unforecasted theater requirements 

until production can be adjusted to meet them. 

e. A continuous flow of materiel expenditure reports from 

the theater which show cause of loss or reason for expenditure 

so as to permit the updating of replacement factors and a 

recomputation of the forecasted rate of consumption on which 

both new production and reserve stockages should be based. 

It is to be expected that actual average consumption in a 

new theater will vary widely from that computed with replacement factors developed before war starts. It is to be expected 

that actual average consumption in an established theater will 

vary considerably even from that computed with replacement 

factors developed after theater experience has been accumulated over several months. It is to be expected that actual monthly consumption will vary widely from actual average consumption. Experience in World War II indicated the need for a twomonth reserve in the United States even after the rate of 

production had reached the rate of consumption. 

2. The initial equipment and supply requirements of a 

theater of operations in war are best determined in advance 

through planning, or better, war-gaming a contingency plan 

through at least six months of active operations. This provides 

a basis for necessary estimates of: 

a . The time that will elapse before the resupply pipe line 

from the United States is in full operation. 

b. The requirements for equipment not carried in the 

Tables of Organization and Equipment. 
LESSONS LEARNED IN LOGISTICS 121 

c. The types and expected intensity of operations by 

month. 

d. The level of the theater reserve required to assure balance in distribution and to tide the theater over any probable 

interruption in the movement of resupply from the United 

States. 

e . The requirements of allies who are to be supplied from 

the United States. 

f. The resources available in the theater that should be 

exploited. 

3. The requirements of a theater of operations in war for 

ammunition vary between a rather indeterminate minimum 

needed to strike critical targets effectively and a maximum 

limited only by the durability of weapons and the physical 

capability of personnel to operate them. In any major war our 

raw materiel resources, our production capacity, and our transportation will dictate a limitation on the quantity of ammunition produced. The criticality of opertions being conducted 

will dictate the allocation of ammunition to theaters and the 

rationing of ammunition within theaters. In any minor war the 

desirability of reducing our own casualties may cause ammunition allocations to a theater to approach the maximum. 

4. Local wartime procurement in an overseas theater of 

operations saves time and transportation, conserves the resources of the United States, helps keep the local economy 

operating, and permits a supported nation to make a greater 

contribution to the common cause or requires a conquered 

territory to pay a part of the cost of the war. Local peacetime 

procurement in overseas areas stimulates the local economy, 

helps establish quality control in the industry of underdeveloped nations, and teaches our own procurement personnel 

how to contract with foreign industry. 

5. Well-trained logistic troops are a critical requirement in 

war at the opening of a theater of operation. Without them, 

even if there is no fighting, unloading of shipping will be 

delayed and supplies will accumulate unsorted and unidentified 
122 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

and therefore unusable. In addition, if there is fighting, communications will be poor; the distribution of food, ammunitition, and POL will be slow; casualties will be inadequately 

cared for; and maintenance of materiel will be ineffective. 

Peacetime reductions in logistic troops should not be allowed 

to eat into the trained logistic troop requirements for the first 

three months of any theater of operations whose opening 

might be required on very short notice. Beyond this, logistic 

troop requirements may be compromised if necessary to provide trained combat troops. 

6. Since smaller logistic troop requirements allow more 

combat troops in the field, continuous efforts must be made to 

reduce logistic troop requirements for a theater of operations. 

Important among the many methods that should be considered 

are: simplification of distribution by broader use of containers 

with standard content; improved reliability and durability of 

equipment; reduction of fuel consumption; use of local labor; 

use of transportation to support shorter evacuation policies, to 

return unserviceable equipment to the United States for repair, 

and to reduce ground lines of communications; reduction of 

the maintenance load by making more components "throwaway" instead of "repairable"; and organization and training of 

allied logistic troops. 

7. An operational concept should be immediately followed 

by a transportation capability study. If the transportation 

system will support, or can be developed in time to support, 

the forces necessary to carry out a contingency plan, the rest 

of the logistics scan usually be brought into line. 

8. The logistic purpose served by planning is to permit the 

initiation of action to meet logistic requirements early enough 

so that they can be provided without upsetting the orderly 

organization and training of logistic troops or the orderly operation of production and supply of materiel. It is not to be 

expected that any plan prepared far in advance will be executed without modification or even major revision. It is to be 

expected, however, that the logistic resources provided to support the original plan will meet the mass of the requirements 
LESSONS LEARNED IN LOGISTICS 123 

for the final plan. The provision of any unforecasted requirements can then be expedited. The more accurate the original 

plan, the fewer will be the unforecasted requirements. The 

fewer the unforecasted requirements, the more they can be 

expedited without inflicting confusion on other areas. 

9. The best way to prepare a good contingency plan is to 

war game it over and over. The combination of two contestants and an umpire will help to provide against weaknesses 

being overlooked or strengths being overestimated. In succesSIve games the various lines of action, both friendly and 

enemy, can be tested against each other and the strongest 

developed. 

10. The price that must be paid for good personnnel management is the detailed and continuing personal attention of 

individuals in high positions. These individuals seek to obtain 

and retain competent personnel to assist them in discharging 

those responsibilities; their prestige and authority is adequate 

for the tasks of recruiting placement and career guidance; and 

their experience and integrity make their decisions sound. 

What is needed is some adequate method of performing the 

personnel functions once performed by the Chiefs of Combat 

Arms and Technical Services as well as a method of bringing 

the interest of each member of the General Staff to bear on 

the careers of senior personnel in his field. 

11. The proper reward for competence is increased responsibility. The satisfaction that a good man derives from his work 

comes fom the feeling that his abilities are being fully utilized 

on important work. The logistics field is more flexible than the 

command field, where promotions, pay, and decorations usually follow the assignment of responsibilities, and where reclassification and demotion usually follow inability to perform adequately in combat. There are always routine logistics assignments to which mediocre personnel can be relegated, but there 

are also challeng-ing assignments crying for outstanding people 

to fill them. 

12. In an age of great technological progress and resulting 

specialization, the military needs channels by which informa-
124 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

tion and guidance relating to a specialty are passed up and 

down through individuals at each echelon who understand the 

specialty. The old "technical channels" served this purpose. 

Some similar channels for the logistics field are needed. 

13. Experience has proven that the Department of the 

Army, with its worldwide responsibilities and broad policy 

functions, is not the right level to edit requisitions, distribute 

them to proper agencies for supply, follow up on availability, 

call forward shipments, arrange for expedited action in shortages, implement priorities for shipment of cargo set by the 

theater, ensure that cargo documentation is forwarded in advance of shipments, and take measures to replace lost cargo. A 

monitoring agency is required. Without such an agency the 

overseas theaters have no single point of contact in the United 

States to deal with supply failures. Just as a project officer 

supervises and expedites the production of a specific item, so 

such an agency (once the Overseas Supply Division at a port of 

embarkation) should supervise and expedite the supply of a 

specific theater. 

14. The degee that resources are wasted in war can be 

limited by measures taken before excesses and surpluses accumulate. The following measures are basic: 

a. Both the fact and the cause of a materiel expenditure 

must be reported by theaters of operations. This furnishes the 

basis for an intelligent estimate of future requirements. The 

Army's recently developed COLED- V reporting system, to be 

discontinued in 1970, would meet this requirement for ammunition if reinstituted before an overseas theater is established. 

b. Theaters of operations must report overages as well as 

shortages. Experience has indicated that, particularly in the 

early phases of an overseas operation, this is neglected. The 

whole Army needs to recognize that the buildup of excesses in 

a theater of operations results in a corresponding excess of 

reserves and production in the United States and that the 

resources so used should be converted to produce something 

needed. 

c. Requisitions from a theater of operations must be edited 

by an agency independent of the theater and removed from 
LESSONS LEARNED IN LOGISTICS 125 

the pressure and confusion of active operations. Errors should 

be caught before supply action is taken, and excessive requirements should be challenged and, if not justified, then reduced. 

15. Measures to redistribute excesses and use surpluses are 

of questionable value. The important objective is to prevent 

their accumulation. The time, effort, and cost of storage, correspondence, transfer, and bookkeeping are such that it is 

usually economical to keep material that is locally excess until 

it is used and to dispose promptly of material that is surplus 

after weighing the cost of holding it against any increased 

return that may be obtained by delay to seek a better price. 

16. Decisions should be made at the lowest level at which 

all the important factors bearing on a problem can be adequately weighed. The decision maker will then have some 

firsthand knowledge of matters relating to the problem rather 

than having to rely entirely on a summary, which never gives a 

complete understanding and often gives an inaccurate one. In 

time of emergency, the need for prompt action and the great 

number of decisions that must be made force decision making 

to lower levels. If individuals at these levels are accustomed to 

making such decisions in peace, their decisions in war are 

much more likely to be prompt and sound. If they are accustomed to passing their problems up to higher levels in peace, 

they will delay and temporize in war. 

17. Compliance with outside advice should not be required 

of the individual carrying responsibility for an operation. In 

the logistic field we receive many inspections, surveys, and 

reviews of our operations by outside agencies or individual 

consultants who are seldom informed on military matters. Although logistics is probably the closest military function to 

commerce and industry, only the military who have had experience in war can visualize the effect that a proposed measure 

may have. Improvements come, then, not from outside experts 

dictating solutions, but from their working with the military to 

develop solutions that reflect their combined knowledge. 

18. The most useful type of report is one called for to help 

in the solution of a specific problem. In initiating such a 
126 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

report, explanations can be offered as to the use to which the 

data collected is to be put. Only after a report has been 

policed through several reporting periods-its provisions thoroughly clarified and the explanations from reporting agencies 

for indicated shortcomings considered-will it serve its intended purpose well. 

19. Where a specific important problem is known in advance and a reporting system has been developed to provide 

the data to solve it, that reporting system should be kept alive 

in peace. Otherwise changes in tactics, techniques, nomenclature, or accounting practices will render the reporting system 

unusable at the beginning of a new war. If the reporting 

system is not to be kept operating in peace, it should be taught 

in the Army's schools to ensure that the use of the data is 

known and the necessary explanations of interpretations that 

make the data usable are understood. 

20. Reports not of sufficient importance to be frequently 

called to the notice of the commander to whose headquarters 

they are submitted are seldom worth the trouble of preparation. 

21. A project officer should be an expediter who is to 

report rather than a czar who is to direct. The very existence 

of a second czar discredits the authority of the first, and the 

existence of several can only result in confusion. An absolute 

priority that would justify a czar is rare. In my time only the 

Manhattan project was worthy of one. 

22. Cost-effectiveness is a valid consideration for military 

purposes only if the cost factor includes consideration not only 

of dollars but also of lives lost, lives blighted by wounds, and 

the effects of a national defeat. For commercial transactions, 

the cost factor is properly measured in dollars because the 

basic purpose of commercial transactions, is to make a profit in 

dollars. For military transactions the cost factor must be modified because the basic purpose of military transactions is success in war. Accordingly, effectiveness, in addition to having a 

relationship to dollars, also bears a relationship to casualties, 

wounds, and the successful outcome of a war. Since the value 
LESSONS LEARNED IN LOGISTICS 127 

of lives, health, and victory is difficult to determine, it is usually desirable to use cost-effectiveness only in deciding which of 

several roughly equally effective systems should be acquired. 

Where the systems are not equally effective, it is better to 

provide the best system or item that can be developed at its 

lowest reasonable cost. 

23. Maintenance of material is so heavy a logistic burden 

that continuous effort should be directed toward reducing it. 

Maintenance requirements can be reduced by the following 

measures, among others: by a greater degree of standardization, by contracting for a higher degree of durability and maintainability, by making more parts throwaway instead of repairable, by improving the quality of rebuild, by transporting unserviceable material out of a theater of operations for repair, 

by prompt and adequate supply of repair parts, by care in 

operation, and by command supervision of preventive maintenance. All should be exploited. 

24. The rate of consumption of repair parts for any new 

important end item should be determined as soon as the item 

is put into service and its accurace should be improved with 

experience. Repair parts consumption for any new item must 

be expected to vary widely from forecasts, regardless of how 

carefully made. Consumption will vary considerably with usage, 

age, and environment. Careful study of repair parts consumption through the useful life of the first models of any important 

new item is therefore necessary to establish requirements. 

25. The impetus of supply is also from the front. The old 

axiom that "the impetus of supply is from the rear" is applicable to routine supply operations, but if supplies fail to arrive 

or if some special or unusual supplies are required, then a 

supply officer of the unit needing the supplies should go to 

higher supply echelons. If the shortage is critical, then his 

commander should go to higher command echelons to get 

action going. 

26. The supply of seldom-used repair parts should be handled by cannibalization. In war there will be plenty of end 

items damaged by enemy action to provide sources for canni-
128 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

balization. For training in peace, undamaged end items should 

be cannibalized when damaged items are not available. 

27. The movement of heavy equipment by air in the opening of a theater of operations is usually an undesirable procedure. In establishing a new theater, the requirement is usually 

not only for speed but also for strength to maintain a preponderance of force in the objective area. Strength is built up 

most rapidly by moving only personnel and light equipment 

(weapons up to and including l06-mm recoilless rifles and 

4.2-inch mortars and transport up to and including %-ton 

trucks) by air. Heavy engineer equipment needed to build or 

repair airbases and ports is an exception. Armor, artillery, 

most heavy engineer equipment, transport over % -ton, artillery ammunition are best moved by water. It is well to plan, 

then, that operations requiring full divisions must await the 

unloading of the first shipment by sea. 

28. All possible measures that can be taken in advance to 

speed unloading of sea transport in a new theater of operations are critical. The most dangerous time is when ships are 

being unloaded, both because the entire force is not ready to 

fight and because ships in harbor make a target highly vulnerable to attack by air, missile, or submarine. Among the critical 

logistic measures are the provision of landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and cargo helicopters; the use of roll-on, roll-off 

ships or containerized ships; the containerization of cargo; 

training in the pre-stowage planning for ships; and the training 

of engineers in beach operations, port clearance, and reconstruction, and construction and repair of airfields. Foreign 

military aid to a country on whose behalf the United States 

might intervene is probably the most valuable logistic measure 

that can be taken in advance. Even for a very weak nation, 

military aid is far more than just a measure to enable it to 

prove its willingness to fight in its own defense before the 

United States intervenes. Military aid to a foreign nation may 

also help to provide some invaluable time for the United States 

to prepare its expeditionary force; give some assurance that a 

beachhead will be held protecting port facilities so that a landing operation will be unnecessary; ensure that some artillery 
LESSONS LEARNED IN LOGISTICS 129 

and armored units will support our lightly armed troops that 

may arrive by air before the first sea shipments arrive; provide 

some stockage of transport and ammunition that can be borrowed until our own transport and ammunition arrive in adequate quantity; and instill some capacity in the troops of the 

aided nation to operate their own line of communications 

using and maintaining our types of equipment to save us from 

having to provide the logistic troops to perform these tasks for 

them. 

29. An operating production line that can make the best 

end item so far developed with the best production equipment 

is an invaluable military resource. It is unlikely that the "United 

States will start a war in the foreseeable future. We must 

therefore expect to react to the initiative of other nations. With 

an Army most like being a mobilization base, rather than a 

force in being, this takes time. No administration has been 

willing to finance the establishment of reserves of materiel 

large enough to last until the rate of production can catch up 

with the rate of consumption once mobilization occurs. We 

must therefore rely primarily on production initiated after the 

emergency appears imminent. The production of materiel 

takes more time than the organization and training of troops. 

Anything that speeds up the provision of materiel therefore 

speeds up the time when our strength can be brought to bear. 

To know in advance what we want to produce and how to 

produce it is, under these circumstances, far more valuable 

than stocks of obsolescent materiel. 

30. Time, the essential measure of logistic readiness (as 

well as for everything else), should be bought by moving up 

the beginning of logistic action. Napoleon said, "you can ask 

me for anything you like, except time," and Benjamin Franklin 

said, "he that reseth late must trot all day." Although Franklin 

omits that he may not arrive at all, he comes closest to making 

the point that is not given sufficient recognition, namely that 

we can provide time by starting early. Thinking a possible 

operation all the way through and making a tentative plan, 

however inaccurate, may reveal areas where information is now 

firm enough to initiate some action; may point up possible 
130 RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

problem areas where study of alternatives or even initiation of 

research now will save time later; and may help in the recognition of the degree of accuracy of information, the degree of 

actual availability of resources, and the degree of authority to 

proceed. History shows what a nation threatened with war did 

in advance to enhance its preparedness; what it might have 

done is conjecture. But we in the military need to orient our 

minds more to identifying what proved to be critical early m 

each war and what the Army might have done, regardless of 

current political obstacles, to improve the situation. 

31. A logistician must not only have integrity but also 

complete freedom from any suspicion of a conflict of interest. 

Throughout the military services, integrity is essential to operational effectiveness. It is not enough, however, for a logistician to be honest. It is necessary that he so conduct himself as 

to ensure that there is no basis even for suspicion that anything other than the best interests of the military service and 

of the Nation has been allowed to influence any official transaction. 
Appendix 

APPENDIX 

Background of the Author In Logistics 

Chronology 

Pre-1941 

1941 

1942-1944 

1944-1945 

1945-1948 

1948-1949 

1949- 1951 

No logistics other than the little involved in 

peacetime service with troops or learned in the 

Army schools, except for one year, 1931-1932, 

at Purdue University, studying automotive engmeerIng. 

Action officer in G-4 Division, War Department General Staff. 

Planning Division, Headquarters, Army Service 

Forces. Director, 1943-1944. Logistic support 

from continental United States for overseas operations in World War II. 

G-4, Mediterranean Theater of Operations. 

Logistic support in an active theater of operations. 

G-4, European Theater. Clearing up logistic 

aftermath of World War II. Designing the line 

of communication for our forces in Europe in 

the event of another war. 

Deputy Chief of Staff, European Command, 

and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Europe. 

Deputy Undersecretary of the Army and Chief, 

Office of Occupied Areas. Support from U.S., 

primarily logistic, for the occupations of Germany, Austria, and Japan. 
134 

Chm 110log), 

1951- 1952 

1953 

1954 

1954-1955 

1955-1959 

1959-1961 

RECURRING LOGISTIC PROBLEMS 

Deputy G- 4 for Plans and Programs, Department of the Army. Logistic support from the 

continental United States for United Nations 

forces in the Korean War. 

Commanding General, 24th Division, Korea. 

Commanding General, IX Corps Group, 

Korea. Provision of corps troops for the organization of the Republic of Korea V Corps. 

Resettlement of refugees into war-devastated 

areas. 

Chief of Staff, Far East Command. 

Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department 

of the Army. 

Commanding General, United Nations Com 

mand, U.S. Forces, Korea, and Eighth U.S. 

Army. Establishment of a separate Republic of 

Korea line of communications. Enhancement 

of the ability of the Republic of Korea to earn 

foreign exchange. 

* U.S.GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1990 - 259-883 QL 3