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[Congressional Bills 118th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 9766 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

118th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 9766

   To establish an interagency working group to ensure the security, 
 resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 23, 2024

 Mr. Pfluger introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on 
Homeland Security, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
   To establish an interagency working group to ensure the security, 
 resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Undersea Cable Security and 
Protection Act''.

SEC. 2. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP AND REPORT ON ENSURING THE SECURITY, 
              RESILIENCY, AND INTEGRITY OF UNDERSEA CABLES.

    (a) Interagency Working Group.--
            (1) Preparation of report.--Not later than 60 days after 
        the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 
        Homeland Security, in consultation with the Chairperson of the 
        Federal Communications Commission, shall convene an interagency 
        working group (in this section referred to as the ``working 
        group'') to prepare the report under subsection (b) and provide 
        the briefing under subsection (c).
            (2) Chairperson.--The Secretary of Homeland Security shall 
        serve as the chairperson of the working group.
            (3) Membership.--The working group shall be composed of 
        participants with relevant background or expertise, as 
        determined by the Security of Homeland Security, with the 
        approval of the head of the relevant Federal department, 
        agency, or component, as appropriate, from each of the 
        following:
                    (A) The Department of Homeland Security.
                    (B) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
                Agency of the Department.
                    (C) The United States Coast Guard.
                    (D) The Department of Justice.
                    (E) The Department of Defense.
                    (F) The Federal Communications Commission.
                    (G) The Department of Commerce.
                    (H) Any other component of the United States 
                Government, regardless of whether such component is an 
                element of the intelligence community, that the 
                Secretary, in consultation with the head of such 
                component, determines would materially assist in the 
                activities of the interagency working group.
    (b) Report.--
            (1) Requirement.--Not later than one year after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
        in consultation with the Chairperson of the Federal 
        Communications Commission, shall submit to the appropriate 
        congressional committees a report--
                    (A) assessing the challenges of protecting 
                commercial undersea telecommunications cables landing 
                in the United States (in this section referred to as 
                ``undersea cables'') and cable landing stations in the 
                United States from security threats posed by the 
                People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the 
                Islamic Republic of Iran, and any foreign entity of 
                concern; and
                    (B) examining the roles and responsibilities of the 
                United States Government and the private sector to 
                ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of such 
                undersea cables and cable landing stations.
            (2) Matters to be included.--The report under paragraph (1) 
        shall include a description of each of the following:
                    (A) Past, ongoing, or planned efforts by the 
                Department of Homeland Security, pursuant to its role 
                and responsibilities as the Sector Risk Management 
                Agency for the communications sector in accordance with 
                National Security Memorandum-22, issued April 30, 2024 
                (relating to critical infrastructure security and 
                resilience), and the Federal Communications Commission, 
                to protect undersea cables and cable landing stations 
                in the United States from acts of espionage, 
                cybersecurity threats, and from physical damage or 
                disruption, including the cutting of such cables, and 
                efforts to protect cable landing stations in the United 
                States from vandalism, sabotage, and related terrorism 
                threats.
                    (B) The capabilities of the People's Republic of 
                China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of 
                Iran, and any foreign entity of concern to target and 
                compromise undersea cables, or to intercept data 
                transmissions or sensitive information originating from 
                such cables.
                    (C) The potential for espionage or malicious cyber 
                activity by repair vessels that are owned, controlled, 
                or operated by state-owned entities of the People's 
                Republic of China and involved in the construction, 
                maintenance, or repair of undersea cables.
                    (D) The risks, including an associated assessment, 
                posed to undersea cables by natural causes, the lack of 
                geographic undersea diversity of cable landing stations 
                in the United States, and accidental damage, and the 
                extent to which United States cable operators and 
                telecommunications companies rely on repair vessels 
                that are owned, controlled, or operated by state-owned 
                entities of the People's Republic of China.
                    (E) Past, ongoing, or planned actions of the 
                Department and the Commission to conduct outreach to 
                allies and partners of the United States relating to 
                countering the security threats posed to commercial 
                undersea telecommunications cables of such allies and 
                partners by the People's Republic of China, the Russian 
                Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and any 
                foreign entity of concern.
                    (F) Current mechanisms in place within the 
                Department, the Commission, and the private sector to 
                detect, prevent, suppress, investigate, mitigate, and 
                respond to any acts or threats referred to in 
                subparagraph (A) affecting undersea cables or at cable 
                landing stations in the United States.
                    (G) The resources required for the Department and 
                Commission to initiate new, or expand existing, 
                operations to protect undersea cables from acts of 
                espionage, cybersecurity threats, or physical damage or 
                disruption, including the cutting of undersea cables, 
                and to protect cable landing stations in the United 
                States from vandalism, sabotage, or related terrorism 
                threats.
                    (H) Recommendations for expanding operations by the 
                Department and the Commission to protect undersea 
                cables from acts of espionage, cybersecurity threats, 
                or physical damage or disruption, including the cutting 
                of undersea cables, and to protect cable landing 
                stations in the United States from vandalism, sabotage, 
                or related terrorism threats, including an assessment 
                of the feasibility of the following:
                            (i) Establishing an interagency and public-
                        private coordination and incident and threat 
                        reporting mechanism to ensure the security, 
                        resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables 
                        and the protection of cable landing stations in 
                        the United States.
                            (ii) Training a dedicated intelligence 
                        officer or analyst cadre of the Department 
                        composed of undersea cable experts to ensure 
                        the security, resiliency, and integrity of 
                        undersea cables and the protection of cable 
                        landing stations in the United States.
                    (I) Recommendations for the Department, the 
                Commission, private sector partners, and Federal, 
                State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners to 
                jointly develop and establish standards, guidelines, 
                best practices, methodologies, procedures, or processes 
                to ensure the security, resiliency, and integrity of 
                undersea cables and the protection of cable landing 
                stations in the United States.
                    (J) The benefits and drawbacks, and associated 
                analysis, of designating the Department of Homeland 
                Security as the lead Federal entity responsible for 
                ensuring the security, resiliency, and integrity of 
                undersea cables and the protection of cable landing 
                stations in the United States.
            (3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in classified form, but may include an unclassified 
        annex.
    (c) Briefing.--Not later than 30 days after the submission of the 
report under paragraph (1), the working group shall provide to the 
appropriate congressional committees a briefing on the findings and 
recommendations contained in such report.
    (d) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Homeland Security and the 
                Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Homeland Security and 
                Governmental Affairs and the Committee on Commerce, 
                Science, and Transportation of the Senate.
            (2) Cybersecurity threat.--The term ``cybersecurity 
        threat'' has the meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 
        Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).
            (3) Foreign entity of concern.--The term ``foreign entity 
        of concern'' has the meaning given such term in section 9901 of 
        the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651).
            (4) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given such term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
            (5) Malicious cyber activity.--The term ``malicious cyber 
        activity'' means activities, other than those authorized by or 
        in accordance with United States law, that seek to compromise 
        or impair the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 
        computers, information or communications systems, networks, 
        physical or virtual infrastructure controlled by computers or 
        information systems (as such term is defined in section 2200 of 
        the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650)), or 
        information resident thereon.
            (6) Sector risk management agency.--The term ``Sector Risk 
        Management Agency'' has the meaning given such term in section 
        2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650).
                                 <all>
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