### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE A T ME MP H IS JU L Y 18, 200 6 S es sio n ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E, D EP A R TM EN T O F C HI LD R EN ’S S ER V IC ES v. DANIEL R. HOWARD
IN TH E MA TTEROF : W. A. H. & A .N .H.

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-01-1866- 3 D. J. Alissand ratos, Chancellor

No. W2006-00585-C OA-R3-P T - F iled Augu st 8, 2006

This case stems from a petition to terminate a fathe r’s parental rights. At trial, the chanc ery court terminated the fathe r’s pa renta l rig hts as to his two mi nor childre n finding that g rounds for terminating the fathe r’s pare ntal rig hts e x isted under sections 36-1-113( g )(1) and 36-1- 113(g )(3) of the Tenne ssee Code by cl ea r an d convincing evidenc e and that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate the father’s pa renta l rig hts. On appea l, the State of Tenne ssee, Depa rtment of Children’s Service s conce des that therewas not clear and convincing evidenc e to s upport a finding that g rounds for te rminating the father’s pa renta l rig hts under sec tion 36-1-113(g )(1) ex isted. Howeve r, it asserts on a

ppeal that f

ather ’s nar cissistic personality disorder w as suffic ient evidenc e to support a finding that the g rounds for terminating the f ather ’s par ental rig hts pursuant to section 36-1-113( g )(3) of the Tenne ssee Code exis ted. On appe al, the father a sserts that the De partment of Children’s Service s failed to make rea sonable e fforts to reunite his family , an d t h u s , his parenta l rig hts may

not be terminate d as y et under section 36-1- 113(g )(3) . We reve rse.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3.; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Re verse d
A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.
Mitchell D. Moskovitz , Z acha ry M. Moore, Memphis, TN, f or Appe llant
Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ral a ndRe po rt e r; El iza be th C. Drive r, As sis ta nt Att orne y Ge ne ra l, Nashville, TN, f

or Appe lleeC o nsist en t wit h thi s C o urt’ s p o l i cy, we re fer to ch i l d ren i n sen si t i ve ca ses b y t he i r i nit i als. 1

-2- OP IN ION
I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY On May 19, 1999, Daniel R. Howa rd (“ Father” ) left his two minor childre n, A.N.H. and W.A.H., in the car e of his now f ormer ste pdaug hter, Ms. Tesa Dig g es (“ Dig g es”) . On May 21, 1 1999, Father wa s arr ested a s his employ er ha d reported the company trac tor-trailer that F ather

drove and the c arg o that Father wa s hauling as stolen. Acc ording to F ather , he was rele ased f rom jail four day s late r; du ri ng the tim e he wa s inc arc e rate d, Di g g e s to ok A. N. H. a ndW.A .H . to juv e nil e c ou rt ; th e r e af ter, the c hildren we re se nt to the Tennesse e De partment of Children’ s Services ( “DCS”); upon his relea se fr om jail, Father attempted to retrie ve his children from DCS; and DCS informed F ather that he would haveto petition the court to reg ain custody of the c hildren. On May 26, 1999, a prote ctive order was filed ag ainst Father. That same day , DCS filed a depende ncy

and negle ct petit ion. On Aug ust 6, 1999, the juvenile court r efe reefound A.N.H . and W.A.H. depende nt and neg lected. In that order , the juvenile court refe reeorder ed a home study of the c hil dr e n’ s pate rn a l g randpa re nts ’ h omein R os sto n, AR . N oth ing in the re c or d in dic a te s th a t th is study was completed. On J uly

15, 2001, the juvenile court refe reeorder ed a home study of F ather ’s resi d en ce
. Nothing in the r ecor d demonstrates that DCS completed this home studyeither. O n Au g us t 31 , 2 00 1, F a the r w a s a wa rd e d s up e rv ise d v isi tatio n w ith thec hil dr e n. Ei g ht d a y s late r, DC S fi le d a pe tit ionto t e rm inate F a the r’ s pa re ntal ri g hts in c hanc e ry c ou rt

. Th e pe tit iona lso so ug ht t o terminate the pare ntal rig hts of A.N.H.’ s and W.A.H.’s mother.
On Janu ary 9, 20 06 , the c hanc e ry c ou rt c on du c te d a hea ri ng on DC S’ pe tit ionto t e rm inate Father’s pa

renta l rig hts. At that hearing , Dr. Ea rle Done lson (“Dr

. Donelson”) testified as to Fathe r’s mental condition, stating that Fathe r suffe red f rom a na

rcissistic persona litydisorder. D r. Donelson’s psy cho l o gi ca l re p o rt of F ather was a lso submit ted to the court. I n that report, Dr. Donelson rec ommended that Father neede d to underg o intense psy chother apy sessions although the
ou tlo ok loo ke d p oo r f

or his re c ov e ry . N oth ing in the re c or d ill us tr a te s that DC S ma de a ny e ff ort to offe r services to help tre at Father’s na rcissistic persona litydisorder.

I n its fina l or der, the chanc ery court found that g rounds exis ted for the termination of F ather ’s pare ntal rig hts pursuant to sections 36-1-113(g )(1) and 36-1-113(g )(3) of the Te nnessee Code. The chanc ery court stated that it found that (1) F ather had abandoned his children; ( 2) F ather had willfully failed to pay child support to DCS; (3) the c onditions which led to the children’ s removal still persist, as we ll as other conditions which, in all r easona ble probability , would causethe childre n to be subjecte d to further abuse or neg lect and prec lude t he children’s safe return prese ntly or i n the fore seea ble future ; and (4) the continuation of the par ent/child relationship between the c hildren and Father would seriouslyimpede the c hildren’s c hance s of ea rly integ ration int o a saf

e, stable and pe rm a ne nt h ome . T he c ou rt a lso fou nd that it

wa s inthec hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re sts to t e rm inate-3-

Father’s pa

renta l rig hts. The parental rights of t he children’s m other we re not terminated as ther e was no service of

proce ss as to her.
II. I SS U E P R ESENTED Appellant has timely

filed his notice of a

ppeal and prese nts the following issue f or re view: 1. Whe the r the c hanc e ry c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

te rm inate d A pp e llant’ s p are ntal rig hts

. F or thefo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e re ve rs e thede c isi on of thec hanc e ry

c ou rt

. III. Discussion
Onapp e a l, A pp e llant h a s c on te nd e d th a t th e c hanc e ry c ou rt e rr e d w he n it

te rm inate d h is pare ntal rig hts with reg ards to A.N.H . and W.A.H. As we have pr eviously stated, “[t] ermination of a

person’ s ri gh ts as a par ent is a g raveand fina l de c isi on , irrev oca

bly a lte ri ng theliv e s o f t

he pa re nt andthec hil d involved ‘seve ring fore ver a ll legal rig hts and o b l igations’ of the pare nt.” Means v . Ashby , 130 S.W .3d 48, 54 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( l)(1) ( 2003)). B oth the United States Consti tution and the Tenne ssee Constitution recog nize a pare nt’s fundame ntal rig ht to the car e, custody , and control of his/her child. Santosky v . Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753, 71 L

. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S

. Ct. 13 88 (1 98 2) ; Ha wk v . H awk , 8 5 5 S. W. 2 d 5 7 3 , 5 7 9 (Tenn. 1993). “H oweve r, this rig ht is not absolute and pare ntal rig hts may be terminated if there is clea r and convincing evidenc e justify ing suc h termination under the applicable statute.” In re Drinnon , 776 S.W .2d 9 6 , 9 7 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. 1 9 8 8 ) ( ci t i n g Santosky , 455 U.S. at 769). “Te rmination proce eding s in Tennesseeareg overne d by statute.” In re M

.J.B. , 140 S.W .3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Th e le g isl a tur e ha s se t f

orth c e rt a in e nu me rate d g rou nd s whic h, if proven, w ill warrant the termination of par ental rig hts. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113( g ) (2003). Under our statutory scheme , a trial court’s de cision to terminate a pa rent’s pa renta l rig hts to a minor child must be based upon a finding that the g rounds for te rmination have be en prove n by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e and that te rm inatin g pa

re ntal rig hts to themin or c hil d a rein the c hil d’ s b e st interest

. T enn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(c ) (2003) . Clear and convinci n g e v id e n c e e s ta b li s h in g th e e xis te n c e o f a n y o n e o f the statut orily e nu me rate d g ro un ds wi ll su pp ort a de c isi on to t e rm inate a par ent’s par ental rig hts. See I n re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (T e nn . 2 00 2) ; I

n re C

. W. W. , 37 S.W .3d 467, 473 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 00 ). I n th e or de r t e rm inatin g parent a l rig hts , th e tria l c ou rt mus t also make specific f

indings of f

act and conclusions of law justify ing-4- its de c isi on . T e nn. Co de Ann . § 36 -1 -1 13 (k ) ( 20 03 ); se e als o I n re M.J.B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654. Th e h e ig h te n e ds tan d ar do f p r o o f ap p li e dto p ar e n ta l termination proceeding s ensure s the unwar rante d termination or interferenc e wit h a p ar en t ’s co n s t i tu t i o n al l y p ro t ec t ed ri gh t s reg arding
a minor child. In r e M.W .A. , 980 S.W .2d 620, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). This Court has pre viouslyframed the cle ar and convincing
e vid e nc e stand ardin the fo llo wi ng te rm s: Although it does not re quire a s much certainty as the “bey ond a rea sonable doubt” standard, the “cle ar and convincing evidenc e” standard is more exacting than the “pr epond erance of

the evidenc e” standard. O’Danie l v. Me ss ier , 905 S.W .2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ap p. 19 95 ); Brandon v. W right , 838 S.W .2d 532, 536 (Tenn. Ap p . 1992). In order to be clea

r and convincing , evidenc e must eliminate any serious or substantial dou b t about the cor rec tness of the conclusions to be dra wn from the evidenc e. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co. , 833 S.W .2d 896, 9 0 1 n .3 (Tenn. 19 92 ); O’Danie l v. Me ssier , 905 S.W .2d at 188. Such evidenc e should producein the fa ct -f inder’s mind a firm belief

or convic tion as to the tru t h o f t he alleg ations sought to be e stablished. O’Danie l v. Messier , 905 S.W. 2da t 18 8; W iltcher v. Bradley , 708 S.W. 2d40 7, 41 1 ( Te nn . A pp . 1 98 5) . In c on tr ast to the pre ponderance of

the evidenc e standa

rd, cle ar and
c on vin c ing e vid e nc e sh ou ld d e m on str a te that th e truth of the fa cts asserted is “hig hly probable ” as opposed to merely

“more probable” t h an not. Lettner v. Plummer , 559 S.W .2d 785 , 787 (Tenn. 1977) ; Go lds mi th v . R ob e rts , 622 S.W .2d 438, 441 (Tenn. Ap p. 19 81 ); Brandon v. W right , 838 S.W .2d at 536.

I n re C

. W. W. , 37 S.W.3 d at 47 4; see also Scott v. M eans , 130 S.W .3d 48, 54-55 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2003). I n revie wing a trial court’s dec ision to t erminate the par ental rig hts of pare nt to a minor chi l d , this Court applies the following stand ardto a

tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t:
Be cause of t he heig htened bur den of pr oof re quired by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(c )(1 ), we must adapt Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d)’ s customary standard of-5- revie w for c ases of

this sort. First, we must revie w thetria l c ou rt ’s sp e c if

ic fi nd ing s o f f

a c t de novo in
acc ordanc e with Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Thus, e ach of the trial court’s spe cific f actua l findings will be presumed to be corr ect u nless the evidenc e preponde rate s otherwise. Second, we must determine whether the fa cts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by

the pr eponderanc e of the evidenc e, c le arl y a nd c on vin c ing ly e sta bli sh the el e me nts require d to terminate a

biological pare nt’s pare ntal rig hts. J on e s v . G ar re tt , 92 S.W.3 d 835 a t 83 8; In re Valentine , 7 9 S.W.3 d at 54 8- 49 ; In re Adoption of Mu ir , 2 0 0 3 Tenn. A p p
. LE X I S 8 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 WL 22 79 45 24 , at *2 ; In re Z.J.S. , 2 0 0 3 T e n n
. A p p
. LE X IS 4 1 5 , N o
. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 2 2 3 5

- CO A

- R3

- JV , 2 0 0 3 WL 21266854, at *10 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 3, 2003) ( No Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 11 app lic a tio n f ile d) ; Ray v . Ray , 83 S.W. 3d72 6 at 73 3; I

n re L

. S

. W. , 2001 Tenn. App. LEXI S 659, No. M2000-01935-COA-R3-J V, 2001 WL 1013079, at *5 (Te nn. Ct

. App. S ept. 6, 2001), perm. a pp. denied ( Tenn. De c. 27, 2001).

In re M .J.B. , 140 S.W .3d at 654. “We re view all issues of law de
n ovo upon the re cord w ith no presumption of corr ectne ss.” In re Valentine , 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002)

. Du e to the g ravity

of the ir con seque nc e s, pr oc e e din g s to terminate pa

renta l rig hts r equire individualiz ed decision making

. In re Swanson , 2 S.W .3d 180, 1 8 8 (T enn. 1999). To that end, we a re mindful that in c ases of this nature a signific ant portion of the proof pr e se nte d at tria l c on sis ts o f t e sti mon ia l e vid e nc e . A s su c h, wemus t also take a ccount of

the following principle which g uides our re view of a tria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t: Unlike appe llate courts, trial courts ar e able to obse rve witnesses as they

testify and to assess their deme anor, wh ic h b e st s itu a te s tria l ju dg e s t o evaluate wi tne ss cre dibilit y
. Se e Sta te v . P ru e tt , 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (T e nn . 1 99 0) ; Bowman v. Bowman , 836 S.W .2d 563, 56 6 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 1) . T hu s, tria l c ou rt s a rein the most favora

ble position to resolve fac tual disputes hinging on cre dibilit y

determinations. See Tenn- Tex Properties v. Brownell-Ele ctro, Inc. , 7 7 8 S.W .2d 423, 42 5- 26 (Tenn. 1 98 9) ; Mi tc he ll v . A rc hib ald , 971-6- S

. W

. 2 d2 5 , 2 9 ( T e n n
. C t

. A p p
. 1 9 9 8 )

. A c c o r d i n g l y, appellate courts will not re-e valua t e a trial judge’ s assessment of w itness cre dibili t yabsent c lear and
c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e t o th e c o n tr ary. S e e H u m p h rey v. Dav id W

itherspoon, Inc. , 734 S.W .2d 315, 315-16 (T e nn . 1 98 7) ; Bingham v. Dy ersburg Fabrics. Co. , Inc. , 567 S.W .2d 169, 170 (Tenn. 1978)

. W e lls v . Te nn . B d. of R e ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999)

. In re M. A.R

. , 183 S.W .3d 652, 659-61 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2005).

I n its order terminating F ather ’s par ental rig hts, the chanc ery court stated that it found that g ro un ds e xiste d b y

c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e to t e rm inate F a the r’ s p are ntal rig hts pu rs ua nt t o sections 36-1-113( g )(1) and (g )(3) and that it was in the c hildren’s be st interests that Father’s pa re ntal rig hts be te rm inate d. Se c tio n 3 6- 1- 11 3 o f the Te nn e sse e Cod e state s inpe rtine nt p art :

(g ) Initiation of termination of pare ntal or g uardianship rights may be ba se d u po n any

of thefo llo wi ng g ro un ds : (1) Abandonment by

the par ent or g uardian, as def ined in § 36-1-102, ha s occur

red;

. . . (3) ( A) The child has been r emoved f rom the home of the pare nt or g uardian by

order of a c ourt for a

period of six (6) months and: (i) The conditions that led t o the child’s removal or other conditions that i n all rea sonable proba bilitywould cause the child to be subjected to further abuse or neg lect and that, theref

ore, pr event the
c hil d’ s sa fere turn to th e c areof thepa re nt( s) or g ua rd ia n( s) , s til l pe rs ist ; (ii) Ther e is littl e likelihood that t h es e co n d itions wil l be re medied
a t a n e arl y date so that the c hil d ca n b e sa fe ly re turne d to thepa

re nt( s) or g uardian(s) in the ne ar f uture; and (i ii) Th e c on tin uatio n of the pa re nt o r g ua

rd ia n andc hil d r e latio ns hip g reatly diminis hes the c hild’s chanc es of e arly integ ration into a safe , stable and pe rmane nt home. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36- 1-113(g )(1) , (3) ( 2005). On appe al, DCS conce des that thereis n o t clear and c onvincing evidenc e to support terminating Father’s pa

renta l rig hts pursuant to section 36-1-113(g )(1) . Thus, our ana ly sis turns on whether there is clear

and convinc ing e vidence to support a finding t hat t he grounds under sec tion 36-1-113( g )(3) wer e met. On appeal, DCS contends that there is clea r and convincing evidenc e that conditions other than the c onditions t hat led to the childre n’s re moval exis t that would subject theS e c tio n 3 6 -1 -1 0 2 d e fine s “[a ]g g ra v a te d c irc u m sta n c e s” a s “a b a n d o n m e n t, a b a n d o n m e n t o f an infa n t, 2

a g g ra v a te d a ssa u lt, a g g ra v a te d kid n a p p ing , es p e c ia lly a g g ra v a te d kid n a p p ing , ag g ra v a te d c h ild a b u se a n d ne g le c t, agg r ava t ed s exu al expl oi t at i on of a mi nor , es peci al l y ag gr ava t ed s exu al ex pl oi t at i on of a mi nor , ag gr ava t ed r ape, r ape, rape of a chi l d , i ncest, o r severe chi l d ab use, as d ef i ned at § 3 7

- 1

- 1 0 2

. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 0 2 (9) (20 0 5 ). A b an d o nm en t und er this d efi nit i o n m ea ns :

(i ) Fo r a p eri o d o f fo ur (4) co nsecut i ve m o nt hs i m m ed i at el y p reced i ng t he f i l i ng of a pr oce edi n g or pl ea di n g t o t er mi n at e t he p aren t al r i g h t s of t h e par en t ( s ) or gu ar di an( s ) of

t he chi l d who i s t he s ubj ect of t he pet i t i on f or t er mi nat i on o f par ent al rig h ts o r a d o p tio n , t h a t t h e p a re n t(s) o r g u a rd ia n (s ) e ithe r h a v e w ill fully fa iled to
v isit o r h a v e w ill fully fa iled to s u p p o rt o r h a v e w ill fully fa iled to m a k e re a so n a b le pay men t s t owa r d t h e s u ppor t of t h e ch i l d; ( i i ) T he chi l d h as been r emo ved f r om t he home of

t he pare nt ( s ) or gu ar di an( s ) as t h e r es u l t of

a pe t i t i on f

i l ed i n t h e j u v en i l e cou r t i n w h i ch t h e ch i l d w as fou n d t o be a dependen t an d neg l ect ed ch i l d, as def i ned i n § 37- 1- 10 2, an d t he ch i l d was pl ace d in th e c u sto d y o f the d e p a rtm e n t o r a l ic e n se d c h ild -p la c ing a g e n c y, tha t t h e ju v e n ile
co urt found, or t he cour t wh er e t he t er mi nat i on of par ent al r i gh t s pet i t i on i s f i l ed find s, tha t t h e d e p a rtm e n t o r a li c e n se d c h ild -p la c ing a g e n c y m a d e re a so n a b le
e ff o rts to p re v e n t re m o v a l o f t h e c h ild o r th a t t h e c irc u m sta n c e s o f t h e c h ild ’s situa tio n p re v e n te d re a so n a b le e ff o rts fro m b e ing m a d e p rio r to th e c h ild ’s re m o v a l; and f or a p er i od o f

f our (4) mo nt hs f ol l owi ng t he r emo val , t he depart ment o r ag enc y has mad e reasonab l e ef fo rt s t o ass i st t he p arent (s ) or g u a rd ia n (s) t o est ab l i sh a sui t ab l e ho m e fo r t he chi l d , b ut t hat t he p arent (s ) o r guardian( s) have m a d e no r ea s on abl e ef

for t s t o pr ov i d e a s u i t abl e h ome an d h av e demon s t r at ed a l ac k of
c o n c e rn fo r th e c h ild to su c h a d e g re e th a t it a p p e a rs u n like ly t h a t t h e y w ill b e a b le t o provi de a s ui t abl e h om e f or t he chi l d at an ea r l y dat e; (c o n tinu e d ...)
-7- c hil dr e n to fu rthe r a

bu se or ne g le c t. S pe c if

ic a lly , DC S a sse rt s that F a the r’ s na rc iss ist ic pe rs on a lit y disorder pr events the r euniting of Father with his children. Father asserts that D CS failed to provide
rea sonable e fforts to reunite his family

. “The succe ss of a pare nt’s reme dial eff orts g ener ally

depends on the Depa

rtment’s assistance and support.” In re Ge or gia nna S. , M2005-01697-COA- R3-PT, 2006 Tenn. App. L EXI S 192, at * 2 2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. M ar
. 2 1 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g In re C.M.M

. , 2004 Tenn. App. LEXI S 160, No. M2003- 01122-COA-R3-PT, 2004 WL 438326, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2004)) (no. perm. app. filed). Pursuant to section 37-1-166 of the Tenne ssee Code, w ith certain exceptions, DC S m ust make
rea sonable e fforts to reunite a f amily or make it possibl e for

the childre n to return home. Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-166 ( 2005). Those e x ceptions include:

(4) Rea sonable e fforts of t h e t y p e desc ribed in subdivision (g) (2) sh a ll n ot b e re qu ir e d to be ma de wi th re sp e c t to a pa re nt o f a c hil d if
a c ou rt of c omp e te nt j urisd ic tio n h a s d e te rm ine d th a t: (A) T he par ent has subjec ted the ch i l d that is the subject of the petition or any sibling or half-sibling of t he child who is t he subjec t of the pe tit ion or

a ny oth e r c hil d r e sid ing te mpo ra ri ly or pe rm a ne ntl y in the home to ag g ravated circ umstances a s defined in § 36- 1-102; 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2 ( i i i ) A bi ol ogi cal or l ega l f at her has ei t her wi l l f ul l y f ai l ed t o v i s i t or w i l l f ul l y f ai l ed t o m ake reasonab l e p ayments t o ward t he supp o rt o f t he chi l d ’ s m o t her d uri ng t he fo ur ( 4 ) m o nt hs i m m ed i at el y p reced i ng t he b i rt h o f t he chi l d ; p rovided , t hat i n no i ns t anc e s hal l a f

i nal order t er mi nat i ng t he pare nt al r i gh t s of a par ent as det er mi ned p urs uant t o t h i s s u bdi v i s i on ( i i i ) be e n t er ed u n t i l a t l ea s t t h i r t y ( 30) da y s h ave el ap sed si nce t he d at e o f t he chi l d ’ s b i rt h; ( i v ) A par en t or g u ar di an i s i n ca r ce r at ed at t h e t i me of t h e i n s t i t u t i on of

a n a ct i on or pr oceedi ng t o decl ar e a chi l d t o be an abandoned ch i l d, or t he pare nt or gu ar di an h a s b e e n inc a rc e ra te d d u rin g a ll o r p a rt o f t h e fo u r (4 ) m o n ths im m e d ia te ly prec edi ng t he i ns t i t ut i on of s uch act i on or procee di ng , and e i t her ha s wi l l f ul l y f ai l ed to v isit o r h a s w ill fully fa iled to s u p p o rt o r h a s w ill fully fa iled to m a k e re a so n a b le p ayments to w a rd t he supp o rt of t he chi l d fo r f o ur ( 4 ) consecut i ve m o nt hs i mmedi at el y pr ec edi n g s u ch pa r en t ’ s or g u ar di an ’ s i n ca r ce r at i on , or t h e par en t or g u ar di an h as e n g ag ed i n c on du ct pr i o r t o i n ca r ce r at i on t h at e x h i bi t s a w an t on di s r eg ar d for t h e we l f ar e of t h e ch i l d; or ( v) T he c hil d , as a n ewborn i nfant ag ed s eve nt y
- t wo ( 72 ) hour s or l es s , was v ol u n t ar i l y l ef

t a t a f ac i l i t y by s u ch i n f ant ' s mot h er pu r s u an t t o § 68- 11- 255; a n d, for a per i od of

t hi r t y ( 30 ) day s af

t er t he dat e of vol un t ar y del i ver y , t he mo t her f ai l ed t o vi s i t or s e e k c on t a c t w i t h t h e i n f a n t ; a n d, for a pe r i od of t h i r t y ( 30 ) da y s af t er n o tice w a s g ive n un d e r § 3 6 -1 -1 4 2 (e ), a n d no les s tha n nin e ty (9 0 ) d a ys cum ul at i vel y , t he m o t her fai l ed t o s eek co nt act with the i nf ant t hrough t he d e p a rtm e n t o r to re v o k e he r v o lun ta ry d e live ry o f t h e infa n t;

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 1

- 1 0 2 (1)(A ) ( 2 0 0 5 ).
-8-

(B ) A s se t ou t in§ 3 6- 1- 11 3, thepa re nt h a s: (i) Committ ed murde r of any sibling or ha lf-sibling of the c hild who is the subject of the petit ion or any other c hild residing te mporarily or permanently

in the home; (ii) Commit ted voluntary manslaug hter of any

sibling or ha lf-sibling of thec hil d w ho is the su bje c t of thepe tit io n o r any

oth e r c hil d residing temporarily

or permanently

in the home; (i ii) Ai de d o r a

be tte d, a tte mp te d, c on sp ir e d, or so lic ite d to c omm it
s u ch a murde r or suc h a voluntary manslaug hter of the child or any sibling or ha lf-sibling of

the child who is the subject of the pe tition or any other c hild residing te mporarily or per manently in the home; or (iv) Committ ed a felony

assault that re sults in s erious bodily injury to the child or any

sibling or half-sibling of the child who is the subject of the pe tition or any other c hild residing te mporarily or permanently

in the home; or (C) The pa

renta l rig hts of the par ent to a sibling or half-sibling have b e e n t e r m i n a t e di n v o l u n t ar i l y; Tenn. Code Ann. § 37- 1-166(g )(4)

. “B eca use of this obligation, [DCS ] must not only establish eac h of the e lements in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1-113(g )(3) (A), it must also establish b yclea r and convincing evidenc e that it made reasona ble efforts t o reunite the family and that these eff

orts wer e-9-

to no avail.” In re Ge or

gia nna S. , 2006 Tenn. App. LEXI S 192, at *22-23 (c i t i n g In r e C

. M.M. , 2004 Tenn. App. L

EXI S 160, 2004 W L

438326, at *7).
At the hea

ring on DCS’ motion to terminate Fathe r’s parental rights, Dr . Donelson testified as to Father’s na

rcissistic personalitydisorder an d as t o Fa t her’ s fitness to be a pa rent. How ever , no thi ng in the re c or d in dic a te s th a t D CS atte mpt e d to pr ov idea ny se rv ic e s to F a the r t o h e lp h im
overc ome his narc issist ic persona lity disorder so that he would be in a position to properly car e for his children.
A similar issue was re cently decide d by

the Eastern Section of t h i s C o u rtin State of T e n n e s s e e , D e p a r t m en t o f C h i l d re n ’ s S e r v i c e s v . S

. V. , No. E2006-00686- COA-R3-PT, 2006 Tenn. App. LEXI S 462 (Tenn. Ct. App. J uly 6, 2006). I n that case , the Depa rtment of Children’s Servic es attempted to terminate the rig hts of a mother as to her c hildren. Id. at *3. Mother wa s diag nosed with a narcissistic personality disorder. Id. at *11. The De partment of Children’ s Services f ailed to i nf orm th e mothe r o f this dis or de r andfaile d to pr ov idese rv ic e s to the mo th er to a ssi st h e r i n obtaining the nece ssary

treatment. Id. at *29-30. B ased o n this failure, the c ourt reve rsed the decision of the j u v en ile court stating that it would be premature at this poi nt to terminate the mother’s pa

renta l rig hts. Id. at *30.

Likewise, Father has been diag nosed as having a nar cissistic personality disorder. A s stated
e arl ie r, no thi ng in the re c or d in dic a te s th a t D CS ma de a ny re a so nable effo rt s to a ssi st F a the r i n obtaining a

ppropriate medical c are . Although D r. Donelson noted i n his evaluation of F ather that F a the r’ s atti tud e tow ardDC S a nd his ov e rall de me a no r wo uld lik e ly re nd e r any tr e a tme nt’ s su c c e ss ve ry po or , it do e s n ot e xcu se DC S f

ro m it s statut ory ob lig a tio ns to m ake re a so na blee ff orts t o r e un ite Father with his children.

I n addition to failing to provide service s to Fathe r to tr eat his personality disorder, nothing in the re c or d in di cat e s th a t D CS c on du c te d a ho me stu dy

of thepate rn a l g randpa

re nts ’ h omein Ros sto n, ARor

a ho me stu dy

of the F a the r’ s re sid e nc e a s re qu ir e d by the She lby Cou nty Juve nil e Cou rt re fe re e ’s or de rs . A s su c h, it a pp e ars to b e pr e matur e to t erm in a te F a the r’ s p are ntal rig hts

. Ac c or din g ly , w e re ve rs e thede c isi on of thec hanc e ry

c ou rt

.

IV. C ONCL US I ON
F or the a fo re me nti on e d re a so ns , we re ve rs e the de c isi on of the c hanc e ry c ou rt . Co sts of thi s appeal are taxed to the St ate of Tenne ssee, De partment of Children’s Service s, for whic h execution
m a y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ary.-10- ___________________________________ ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE