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99–649 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–105] 

WORLD WIDE THREATS 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 2, 2016 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee on Armed 

Services ................................................................................................................. 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Marrs, Maj Gen James, USAF, Director for Intelligence, J–2, Joint Staff ......... 5 

Stewart, LtGen Vincent R., USMC, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency ....... 2 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................... 39 

Stewart, LtGen Vincent R. .............................................................................. 41 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[Response provided was classified and retained in committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 71 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 71 

Mr. Moulton ...................................................................................................... 72 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 71 

(1) 

WORLD WIDE THREATS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2016. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

This year, as we did last year, the committee meets today to get 

an assessment of the threat environment in which our military personnel are asked to operate. I think it is important that we understand not only the threats that are out there today, but the general 

direction of trends as we make decisions about this year’s Defense 

Authorization Act. 

If we just think about some of the things that have changed since 

we had this hearing last year, we can remember the enormous 

amount of time and effort spent about Russia’s activities in 

Ukraine. Of course, those gains have been consolidated, and now 

there is the most significant military presence in the Middle East 

that they have had since the 1970s. 

Meanwhile, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] has launched 

attacks, both in Europe and the United States, and it has spread 

to more countries including, notably, Libya and Afghanistan, as 

well as others. There have been reports which have been confirmed 

in other congressional hearings about ISIS use of chemical weapons 

on the battlefield. 

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to be provocative to the point 

of even detaining U.S. sailors recently. North Korea launches missile tests and nuclear tests and sticks its finger in the eye of the 

world. And meanwhile, China is continuing to develop its islands 

out of the Pacific Ocean and has begun to install, according to reports, military aircraft and surface-to-air missiles on those islands. 

So needless to say, the world is not getting any simpler, and the 

world is not getting any less dangerous. 

I really appreciate our witnesses being here today to help explore 

these issues. I would remind members that this obviously is an 

open, unclassified session. Immediately upon its conclusion we will 

go into a classified session with the same witnesses, so if you have 

questions that required a classified answer, obviously withhold and 

we will do that in the classified session. 
2 

Before turning to our witnesses, I would be pleased to yield to 

the distinguished gentlelady from California for any comments she 

would like to make. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member’s statement 

be entered into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mrs. DAVIS. We look forward to Ranking Member Smith returning, hopefully within a few weeks, absolutely. And it has been an 

honor to try and help out in this role. 

As we know, and, Generals, you are here to discuss again how 

complex and a dangerous place the world is today, unpredictable. 

And we know that there are at least five key national security 

challenges that are driving defense planning and budgeting. All of 

them key, all of them critical, and we look forward to your comments today. 

It is so important for us to receive clear objective and comprehensive assessments from the defense intelligence community. A deep 

and clear understanding of these threats, and the trends and developments that drive them, is fundamental to the committee’s work 

in shaping the defense budget, and in helping the Department of 

Defense and the rest of the national security establishment perform their duties effectively. 

So we look forward to your comments. I know I would like to discuss our priorities, and how perhaps those are changing. We certainly acknowledge your difficult and challenging work. And thank 

you again for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

We are pleased to welcome back before the committee, Director 

of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Vincent 

Stewart, and welcome, I believe for the first time, at least in this 

capacity, the Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff, Major General James Marrs, our witnesses today. Thank you both for being 

here. 

Without objection, your complete written statements will be 

made part of the record, and we would be pleased to hear any oral 

comments you would like to make at this time. General Stewart. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN VINCENT R. STEWART, USMC, 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General STEWART. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis, 

members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide Defense Intelligence Agency’s assessment of the global security environment and the threats facing the Nation. 

Mr. Chairman, my statement for the record details a range of 

multifaceted challenges, adversaries’ threats, foreign military capabilities, and transnational terrorist networks. Taken together, these 
3 

issues reflect the diversity, scope, and complexity of today’s challenges to our national security. 

In my opening remarks, I would like to highlight just a few of 

these threats, which represents our five focus areas in all warfighting domains: space, cyberspace, air, surface, and subsurface. 

Turning first to the current threat from ISIL. With the coalition 

engaged against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] is helping the warfighter and our policymakers better understand both the ideology and the capabilities of 

ISIL. ISIL, as well as like-minded extremists, are born out of the 

same extreme and violent Sunni Salafi ideology. These Salafi 

jihadis are determined to restore the caliphate, and as they have 

shown, are willing to justify extreme violence in their efforts to impose their social order on others. 

As the Paris attacks demonstrated, ISIL has become the most 

significant terrorist threat to the United States and our allies. In 

2015, the group remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria and expanded globally. Spectacular external attacks demonstrate ISIL’s 

relevance and reach and are a key part of their narrative. 

ISIL will probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in Europe, and attempt to direct attacks on the United States homeland, 

in 2016. ISIL’s foreign fighter cadre is core to its external attack 

capability, and a large number of Western jihadists in Iraq and 

Syria will pose a challenge for Western security services. 

On the ground in Syria and Iraq, ISIL continues to control large 

swaths of territory. In 2015, coalition strikes impeded ISIL’s ability 

to operate openly in Iraq and Syria, curtailed its use of conventional military equipment, and forced it to lower its profile. In 

2016, the growing number of anti-ISIL forces, and emerging resource shortfalls, will probably challenge ISIL’s ability to govern in 

Iraq and Syria. However, the group probably will retain Sunni 

Arab urban centers. 

Turning to Afghanistan: In their first full year in the lead, Afghan Security Forces increasingly conducted independent operations; however, these forces struggled to adapt to a lack of coalition enablers and at high operational tempo, which led to uneven 

execution of operations. As a result, insurgents expanded their influence in rural areas, limiting the extension of government control. The deployment of Afghan specialized units and their enablers 

will be necessary to continue securing key population centers in Afghanistan. 

Russia: Russian military activities continue at historically high 

levels. Moscow continues to pursue aggressive foreign and defense 

policy, including conducting operations in Syria, sustaining involvement in Ukraine, and expanding military capabilities in the Arctic. 

Last year, the Russian military continued its robust exercise schedule and aggressively, and occasionally, provocative out-of-area deployments. We anticipate similar high levels of military activities 

in 2016. 

Turning to China: China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive 

military modernization program to advance its core interests, 

which include maintaining its sovereignty, protecting its territorial 

integrity, and projecting its regional influence, particularly in the 

South China Sea. In addition to modernizing equipment and oper-
4 

ations, the People’s Liberation Army has undergone massive structural reforms, including increasing the number of navy, air force, 

and rocket force personnel, establishing a theater joint command 

system, and reducing their current seven military regions down to 

five joint theaters of operations. 

China has the world’s largest, and most comprehensive, missile 

force and has prioritized the development and deployment of 125 

regional ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to expand its conventional strike capabilities against the United States forces in the region. And they field an antiship ballistic missile, which provides 

the capability to attack U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific 

Ocean. China also displayed a new intermediate-range ballistic 

missile capable of striking Guam during its September 2015 military parade in Beijing. 

In North Korea: North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is 

evolving, and evolving ballistic missile programs are a continuing 

threat. In January, North Korea issued a statement claiming that 

it had successfully carried out a nuclear test, and last month, 

North Korea conducted another space launch. 

The Democratic Republic of Korea displays of a new modified 

road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, during their recent 

parade, and its 2015 test of a new submarine launch ballistic missile capability, further highlights Pyongyang’s commitment to diversifying its missile forces and nuclear delivery options. North 

Korea also continues efforts to expand its stockpile of weaponsgrade fissile material. 

In space, China and Russia increasingly recognize the strategic 

value of space and are focusing on diminishing our advantage with 

the intent of denying the U.S. use of space in the event of conflict. 

Both countries are conducting antisatellite research and developing 

antisatellite weapons, making the space domain increasingly competitive, contested, and congested. 

In cyberspace, DIA remains concerned about the growing capabilities of advanced state actors such as Russia and China. They 

target DOD personnel, networks, supply chain, research and development, and critical infrastructure information in the cyber domain. Iran and North Korea also remain a significant threat to 

conduct destructive cyberattacks. Non-state actors’ use of cyberspace to recruit, propagandize, and conduct open-source research 

remains a significant challenge. 

Mr. Chairman, the men and women of your DIA are providing 

unique defense intelligence around the world and around the clock, 

to the warfighters, the defense planners, the defense acquisition 

community, and policymakers to provide warning and defeat these 

and other threats. 

I look forward to the committee’s questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Stewart can be found in the 

Appendix on page 41.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

General Marrs. 
5 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES MARRS, USAF, DIRECTOR 

FOR INTELLIGENCE, J–2, JOINT STAFF 

General MARRS. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Mrs. 

Davis, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to represent the intelligent equities of the Joint 

Staff and combatant commands at this hearing. 

As the primary military intelligence adviser to the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am responsible for providing daily intelligence information to the Chairman, his staff, and many senior defense and national decision makers. Additionally, as the J–2, I also 

conduct intelligence operations, plans, and policy assessments, and 

make recommendations to the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and combatant commands. 

I share Lieutenant General Stewart’s concerns regarding the 

global threats we face and look forward to taking your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. 

Let me just ask each of you a relatively simple question. Our 

core responsibilities under the Constitution are to provide and support, build, and maintain the military forces that are necessary for 

the defense of the country. And a lot of the decisions we make affect not just the military today but the military tomorrow, 3, 5 

years out. So the trends, the way things are moving are important 

for us to try to keep in mind. Nobody can predict the future, but 

the general direction of things. 

So my question to you is, what is or are the primary trends that 

you see in the threat environment that we should take into account 

in making decisions about military personnel and pay and benefits 

and weapons and equipment and so forth? What are those trends 

that you think are so significant that we have got to keep those in 

mind as we make the program-by-program decisions that it is our 

responsibility to make? General Stewart. 

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I will start, and General Marrs 

will correct me when I am done. 

We talk about the complexity in the world today, but we are 

looking at breakdown of nation-states as we knew them in the 

past. We are talking about regions where nation-states are fracturing, and we are uncertain how those nation-states will act after 

conflict is done. We are seeing resurgence of Russian activity, as 

I mentioned earlier, where Russia intends to exert its influence on 

the global stage and will challenge our interests wherever those interests are globally. 

China, again, continues to push the envelope in reclaiming territory, disputed territory in the South China Sea that will complicate 

our ability to maneuver and conduct operations in the Pacific. 

These terrorist organizations, whether it is Al Qaeda or it is ISIL, 

continue to push the idea that they will replace the international 

order as we know it with an extreme ideology. 

So whether it is resurgent Russia in Europe, whether it is a rising Iran in the Middle East and the conflict between Iran and the 

Saudis in the Middle East or it is a competition with China in the 

Pacific, there are just a range of global actions that we simply 

are—we have not seen the likes of which, in certainly my time as 

I have served. 
6 

So the world is far more complicated, it is far more destabilized, 

it is far more complex than at any time that I have seen it, and 

the outcomes in the next several years will be decisive for our Nation. 

And, Jim, I don’t know if you have got—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General Marrs, before you respond, what 

I heard then was the breakdown of the liberal order and the nation-states system is one of the dominant trends that has a number 

of repercussions that we have to keep in mind as we think about 

military capability. Now, I may have heard it—but that is what my 

ears heard. 

General STEWART. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. All right. General Marrs. 

General MARRS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I think I would underscore two things that General Stewart mentioned: First, on the non-state side of the house, I think the continued challenge of ungoverned or weakly governed areas is something that absolutely is facilitating the growth of these violent extremist organizations. That combined with the relative ease of access of technology, and specifically cyber technology, that allows 

these organizations to rather quickly develop linkages. 

What I would say on the state side of this is that the real challenge, I think, is the volume of capabilities we are seeing being developed that really threaten our competitive advantage. And principally, what we are seeing in Russia and China is just a breadth 

of capabilities from strategic systems to anti-access/area denial to 

even, I would say, a growing adeptness at operating sort of just 

short of traditional military conflict that is posing a significant 

challenge in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I am repeating this back to you just to 

make sure I understand. So among the things I think you said are 

erosion of our technological superiority, and that is us, especially 

versus Russia and China; and then these new forms of warfare conflict are another part of that, at least on the state side, but actually 

ISIS employs them as well through their social media and other aspects. Is that the gist of it? 

General MARRS. That is accurate, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. 

General STEWART. If I could. Look at it in three terms: Our resurgence of competitive nation-states that compete against our interests; breakdown of traditional nation-states, generates ungoverned space, generates conflict that we are not quite sure how that 

will play out; and then the ability for emerging states or even nonstate actors to have access to disruptive technology that is readily 

available across a wide range of networks. 

So those three things combined leads to a trend that has manifested itself as a very, very unstable condition in our world today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Which makes our job complex, because we have 

got to prepare for everything from nuclear war down to hybrid and 

the kind of little green men sort of situations where you don’t really know what is happening. And that is the challenge that you all 

face as well. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
7 

Thank you, again, for being here. 

Given what you have just stated, could you share with us how 

we then reorder, if at all, our intelligence priorities framework? 

What are we doing differently? Clearly during the Cold War intelligence collection was important. That obviously has been shifted in 

many ways to counterterrorism for a number of years. So what is 

changing, if at all? Why? And what should we be doing about it in 

terms of resources? 

General STEWART. So none of us in the Intelligence Community 

like to set priorities because we will invariably get it wrong. The 

area that we think is stable will turn out to be unstable. But I will 

tell you what I have done. We have got five priorities that I consider no-fail mission for the defense intelligence enterprise. 

How do we win the current fight, primarily focused against those 

transregional terrorist threats, whether they be in Iraq, Syria, or 

in Afghanistan. That is priority number one. 

The next set of priorities are focused on these nation-states who 

will compete with us on the globe. Russia, as a dominant nucleararmed challenge to our interest around the globe. Iran, how will 

Iran behave as it comes out of a sanction regime, has increased 

revenues, continues to develop missile capability, competes with its 

neighbors in the region. North Korea, we have seen the level of activity in North Korea, whether it is nuclear missile technology, 

intercontinental or medium-range ballistic capability, a regime that 

can best be described as unstable, certainly uncertain what its intentions are. 

And longer term, what will China and China’s role be on the 

international order. China presents itself as a peaceful rise to regain its status on the international stage. We are not so certain 

that that rise will be peaceful because of some of the things that 

it is doing in the Pacific and globally. 

So those are our five top priorities. There are a whole series of 

contingencies that we are still thinking about, but if you ask me 

today where I was putting my resources, those were the top five. 

And hopefully, General Marrs and the J–2 and the rest of the folks 

are thinking about some of the lesser priorities so that we are not 

surprised by something that happens on the stage. 

Mrs. DAVIS. General Marrs, do you want to comment? 

General MARRS. And I think the one thing I would add is more 

from a process perspective, so the focus is absolutely where General 

Stewart said it is. What we are working, along with DIA and USDI 

[Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence], is on what is called 

an integrated defense intelligence priorities framework. And that is 

a project that has been underway over the last year, and it is basically to set in place a formalized mechanism where we, as a Department, can better articulate what the defense intel priorities are 

and make sure that those are clearly linked to the national level 

framework. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And does that allow for some reordering 

within that? I guess it is the out-of-the-box thinking. And as an example, where would you see that where you actually had shifted 

in seeking something that you hadn’t expected within that framework? 
8 

General MARRS. So it is probably premature to say that about 

this process that is just evolving right now. So literally, we are 

working with USDI on a version 1.0 of this capability that will see 

or be unveiled later this spring. 

But I will say that, absolutely, a big part of what we have to do 

is, while we are mindful of these larger strategic challenges out 

there, that we still have a team that has to play position around 

the world and be thinking about the things that aren’t in the paper 

right now. 

And I am confident that the team has a good approach for that, 

both in terms of how we as defense or intel professionals think 

about warning, and really that is our part of the trade craft that 

helps to avoid surprise. And also at the national defense or at the 

ODNI [Office of the Director of National Intelligence] level, thinking about tradecraft in the sense of what has been called in the 

2014 national intelligence strategy ‘‘anticipatory intelligence.’’ So it 

is even at that level trying to figure out how we better make room 

for that in our daily activities. 

General STEWART. If I could add though, given the five priorities, 

the five focus areas I talked about, we have done a series of seminars to look at those key areas, and think our way through, not 

only from the country specific but the regions, what we know 

today, and really start thinking about what are some of the black 

swan events that we are not all thinking about, the nonlinear 

events that could unfold. 

And so we are putting in place a process where we think about 

alternative analysis, black swan events, awfully hard to call. It is 

interesting to note that one of the events that we looked at in the 

Middle East was what would happen if the Mosul Dam collapsed. 

And we are hearing increasingly now this discussion about the 

viability of the Mosul Dam and what that would mean. That is 

something that is nontraditional intel kind of thinking, but it 

would have significant implications if that event occurred. 

So we have got some processes in place where we are thinking 

about alternative analysis and red teaming so that we are not 

caught blind looking at Russia, and Iran, and North Korea, and 

miss some event. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES [presiding]. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for a series of questions. 

General Stewart, General Marrs, first of all, thank you both for 

being here. 

General Stewart, I would never instruct a general what to do but 

I am going to request, especially with those three stars, that you 

pull that mike just a little closer to you so that we can hear you 

even better. We are proud of your service. And I was looking at 

your re ́sume ́. I wished I had time to read it all in the record, but 

through all of those over 35 years, I guess now—how many years 

total do you have? 

General STEWART. I think I am starting my 35th year. 

Mr. FORBES. We just are so proud of what you have done. 

As the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, one of the 

things that we are doing now to everyone that appears before this 
9 

committee based on some information we got at our retreat for the 

committee a week or so ago is, did you have to submit your statement for the record to any individual or entity prior to submitting 

it to us today? 

General STEWART. Not for review. We certainly submit that, so 

that my bosses are aware of what I submitted. But not for review, 

not for modification, not for changes. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. So who do you submit it to? 

General STEWART. Both the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] and USDI. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Now, the other question I would ask is, we 

looked at this—in your best personal, professional military judgment as well as the written statement that is here, as I understand 

from your written statement, you are to give us an assessment of 

the global security environment and to address the threats facing 

the Nation. 

As Chairman Thornberry mentioned, sometimes we are looking 

directionally because it is hard for us just to take a snapshot of 

today. But if we were going back to, let’s say, the beginning of this 

decade—we could pick any other time that you think would be preferable, but let’s begin in 2010—if I were to ask you, would that assessment and security environment and threats facing the Nation, 

is it better today or worse today than it was in 2010? 

General STEWART. I would assess it is far more complex today 

than it was in 2010. The things I have outlined, breakdown of nation-states, conflict in region, reemergence of competitive peers, far 

more complex, and I would submit more dangerous than it was in 

2010. 

Mr. FORBES. And to help us with our colleagues when we are trying to get dollars for defense, if we were to ask you to give me a 

percentile figure from 1 to 10, 1 being no change, 10, let’s say, 

being an alarming change, where would you peg it along that continuum between 1 to 10, between let’s say 2010 and today? 

General STEWART. Now, that is not real good math here, but I 

would probably put it in the five or six range. 

Mr. FORBES. Five or six range. 

General STEWART. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Now, the other thing we are always looking at too 

is our ability to forecast what we think these things are going to 

get worse or better. So let’s go back to 2010 because we started 

making a lot of cuts to national defense back around 2010, 2011, 

2012. Was this threat assessment that has changed, as you indicated to a five or six, along that continuum, were they predicted 

at that particular point in time, or were these surprises to us? 

General STEWART. There were certainly lots of indications of Russian military modernization. There is certainly lots of indication of 

China military modernization, the reclamation effort. ISIL was not 

a dominant theme, but Al Qaeda was certainly still a threat. So I 

don’t know that any of these are large surprises. The morphing of 

Al Qaeda into ISIL probably took some elements by surprise, but 

all of the pieces were there. 

So much of the things that we are seeing today, we saw the precursors of those things in 2009, 2010, 2011, and have now just 

manifested themselves on the international stage. So it is hard for 
10 

me to call them surprises when there are lots of indicators there 

in the past. 

Mr. FORBES. So then just to sum up, basically the assessment of 

the global security environment on the threats facing our Nation 

today have gotten about a 6 on a 1-to-10 scale in terms of difference between no change and alarming change. And according to 

your best assessment, most of those were predictable probably at 

the beginning of the decade as we went into this? 

General STEWART. I think there are great philosophers somewhere out there that said prediction is particularly difficult especially when it is about the future. So I think there are certainly 

some trends there that would indicate that we would be headed for 

troubling times if we did not reverse or counter. 

A growing Russian military modernization, a more assertive and 

aggressive China in the Pacific, the breakdown of some of these 

states in the Middle East, the competition between Iran and Saudi 

Arabia, the possibility that ISIL would establish or attempt to establish the caliphate; all of those precursors were there. They have 

just now gone full blown in the last 3 to 5 years. 

Mr. FORBES. And I would concur with your assessment, and I 

think our big concern is that, that is why many of us were so puzzled that we began cutting national defense so much over this decade when we could have predicted pretty much this kind of alarming war we are now facing. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Stewart and General Marrs, welcome. Thank you for 

your testimony before this committee today as we help to shed light 

on some of the most dangerous threats that are facing the Nation 

around the world today. 

General Stewart, I will start with you. I thought that was a very 

insightful analysis in terms of the challenges we face, in terms of 

resurgence of nation-states, breakdown of some traditional states, 

and the rise of destructive technologies. 

Can you give the committee a sense of how you are properly organizing and resourcing the Defense Intelligence Agency to both 

better understand these threats and understand where they are 

going in the future? 

Maybe some specific examples, so that we understand what the 

outcomes of these trends are going to be, how they will challenge 

the United States going forward, and how we are prepared to 

counter those threats? 

General STEWART. Following the lead of my predecessor, you 

know, we have organized, reorganized the Defense Intelligence 

Agency along integrated intelligence center lines. That allows us to 

focus on regional challenges and give a center director all of the authority to work with the combatant commands to understand the 

many challenges in that region. That is a key foundational portion 

of what we have done to get a better sense of the challenges that 

we face. 

We have laid on top of that an architecture, at least we are 

building an architecture. We probably refer to it as ICITE [intel 

community information technology environment], that will allow us 
11 

to use a cloud-based architecture to move content, make content 

available to the analysts wherever they are in the enterprise. 

That, I think, will be very significant in making information 

available and then using some big data analytic tools to help us to 

see these trends and represent those trends in a more timely manner. That is a very important next step. 

And then leveraging or working closely with our partners, our 

international partners, so that when we understand we have shortfalls or risk, we can use our partners to cover, to mitigate some of 

those risks or shortfalls. I do not have enough capacity to cover the 

globe. I will not be able to cover every contingency and every crisis 

given the structure that we have today, which is why we focus primarily on those five areas that I have talked about. 

But we are doing all the things process-wise, organizational-wise, 

architectural-wise, command and control-wise, to make sure we 

have the best information ready to deliver to our policymakers. 

And anything this committee can do to help increase our capacity 

would be greatly welcomed. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General. 

So among the things that you touched on and one of the things 

that concerns me the most, of course, is the rise of destructive technologies. And clearly, none can be greater than the cyber threats 

that we face. And how do you feel we are positioned in terms of 

our ability to understand our adversaries’ cyber capabilities, and do 

you feel that we are properly resourced to defend against those 

threats? 

General STEWART. We are actively building back the analytic capability to understand adversaries’ cyber capabilities. So we are 

building that back. We have made some investments to get some 

analysis in that space. 

Thinking about the cyberspace, that domain, the ability to 

counter activities in that space from kinetic actions, which requires 

a level of analysis that just find the nodes that we could defeat 

kinetically, all the way through the more discrete cyber, understanding key nodes, key networks, key routers, key switches. That 

requires an exquisite level of intelligence that we have not invested 

in over the last several years. 

So we are starting to build those pieces back now. That will take 

us a little bit of time. The fact that we are focused on those key 

threats, key actors, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, will help us, 

but it won’t position us to deal with the non-state or the emergent 

actor in that space. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And General, do you believe that CYBERCOM 

[Cyber Command] should be its own independent COCOM [combatant command], and how might this benefit our cyber operations 

worldwide? 

General STEWART. I haven’t really thought about that question, 

to be honest. And I am hesitant to go there, because I know that 

Admiral Rogers, the commander at U.S. Cyber Command, has an 

opinion on that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. We just want your opinion. 

General STEWART. So I will just say at this point, CYBERCOM 

needs the relationship that it has with NSA [National Security 

Agency] far more than NSA needs CYBERCOM. I don’t know that 
12 

CYBERCOM could be effective and carry out its mission without 

that very close relationship, integral, integrated relationship that 

it currently has with NSA. It would have to build significant capacity to understand the threats and counter those threats, and I 

think that would be very costly in the near term. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you both. 

Chairman, I will yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman yields back. 

Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Forbes. 

And thank you General Stewart, General Marrs, for being here 

today. 

And General Stewart, I appreciate you citing concerns about 

maintaining our technological edge and evolution of unconventional 

warfare. This is a focus of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities 

Subcommittee. I have the privilege of working with Congressman 

Langevin on these issues, and we look forward to working with you 

in the future to address that. 

And also, General, Jim Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, recently discussed potential threats being posed by advancements in biotechnology, including an ability to edit human 

genes, so-called gene editing. I am concerned about the types of 

technologies falling into the hands of terrorist groups or even lone 

actors. 

Can you describe for the committee the national security threats 

being posed by these and similar biotechnologies. 

General STEWART. I am always hesitant to talk about sequencing 

a genome. Could we take this to the closed hearing, if that is okay? 

Mr. WILSON. Be happy to. 

General STEWART. Because I don’t want in this setting to talk 

about either our capabilities or an adversary’s effort in this space. 

Mr. WILSON. I’d be happy to. 

And again, thank you for your extraordinary service. I did represent Parris Island, so I have a deep affection. My late father-inlaw was one of you, a marine. 

And General Marrs, with your recent experience as U.S. Cyber 

Command director of intelligence prior to your post as Joint Staff, 

could you please explain what deliverables can be expected from 

the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental project. 

And Secretary Carter has established a program between the 

military’s innovators, cyber warfare operators, and private sector 

innovators, such as Silicon Valley. What technologies or tactics 

should be developed to keep intel-driven operations in the lead 

against any enemy with regard to cyber warfare? 

General MARRS. So, sir, I think the specific focus of that program 

is still evolving, but it really, for me, comes down to how do we better harvest the volume of information that exists out there, and figure out innovative ways to basically make sense of that cloud and 

apply it to keeping our networks safe. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, we really appreciate your leadership. 

And also, General Marrs, the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence has reported that roughly 30 percent of the former 

Guantanamo detainees are confirmed or suspected and reengaging 
13 

in terrorism killing American families. What trends has the DIA 

observed in detainee recidivism and the capacity and willingness in 

past practices of foreign countries receiving detainees to take appropriate steps to mitigate the risks that they would reengage in 

terrorism to threaten and kill American families? 

General STEWART. If I could jump on that one, please. The recidivism rate remains about 17 percent confirmed recidivism. Most of 

the nation-states where we transferred detainees have done a really credible job in either controlling, monitoring, or keeping them 

from getting back into terrorist activities. We have not seen an upward trend in recidivism. Like I said last year when I briefed this 

committee, we were somewhere in the 18, 19 percent range, and we 

remain about that same rate today. 

Mr. WILSON. And something that concerned me, a number of the 

detainees were sent to Yemen, but it has disintegrated. What has 

happened to the detainees in that country? 

General STEWART. If I could take that one for the record, please. 

I don’t have specifics on Yemeni detainees, but if I could take that 

one for the record, I will get back to you. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. WILSON. And additionally, what is the assessment of the relationship between Russia and Cuba? 

General STEWART. Russia continues to have a strong partnership 

with the Cubans. They continue to do out-of-area exercises with 

Cuba. The relationship is not as close as it was during the height 

of the Cold War. I think that is basic calculus of what is important, 

but I think they do well together. 

Mr. WILSON. Would that include port and landing rights within 

that country? 

General STEWART. Yes, Congressman. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much. And appreciate both of 

you. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the patience in letting me get back to my chair. Wasn’t too obvious. 

General, can you talk a little bit more about China—and I apologize I wasn’t here, but I was here for your opening statement—in 

discussing the three categories of territorial integrity. There was 

the first one, but then you talked about its projection into the 

South China Sea. 

Do you do strategic or operational assessments or tactical assessments about the intent beyond South China Sea and how China 

might be using its investment in surface and other modernization 

for projection beyond the South China Sea? 

General STEWART. So we have seen not only reclaiming some 

3,000 acres of land in the South China Sea, we also see increasing 

naval activity in the East China Sea, disputed territory with 

Japan. Building commercial capability on these outlying regions 

will ultimately mean that China will want to defend their economic 

interests. 

So we are starting to see surface-to-air missiles being placed in 

the region. We are starting to see, as I have indicated, increased 
14 

missile technology that can counter our naval forces. We are seeing 

outposts being built. 

Mr. LARSEN. Specific to investment with surface combatants 

though, do you see this as a test zone for operations beyond the 

first and second island chains? 

General STEWART. At this point, the evidence seems to indicate 

defending the Nine-Dash Line and the territorial disputed areas. 

The aircraft carriers that they are building, the one that they built 

and the second one, I believe, they just commissioned, will not have 

the same blue open ocean capability that our aircraft carriers have, 

nor will it be able to execute air operations the way that we use 

our carriers. 

So at least initially, it looks like it is localized. But some of the 

excursions now with port facilities in Africa and their submarine 

technologies suggest a much broader global capability in the offing. 

And I can talk more specifically about the surface capability in 

closed hearing. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, I would prefer that. I will just follow up and 

I will yield back. 

It is not just you, others out of the Pentagon and maybe the 

State Department have used the term they are reclaiming land. 

And let’s be clear, they are not reclaiming anything; they are creating land. They are not reclaiming land that exists; they are creating land in violation of international law and we need to be clear 

about that. 

If we say they are reclaiming land that doesn’t exist by creating 

it, it sort of gives us some justification that it was theirs to claim 

in the first place. And I think we need to really push back hard 

on this because they are creating that which does not exist and 

that which is not recognized by international law. 

General STEWART. I think that is a fair assessment that the territory does not exist. They are building territory. In the reclamation language, it suggests that they are falling back on their ancestral claim that this territory existed. It is part of their land domain, and so it is really just building that back in. 

So technically, you are absolutely right; there is no territory 

there. They are building territory. And so the language is not as 

precise as we probably should have it. 

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. All right. Thanks a lot. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, is recognized 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Stewart, there has been much discussion about Russia 

and the Open Skies Treaty. And so I want to ask you a question 

about the Open Skies Treaty. Can you please provide the committee with details on the counterintelligence risks to the United 

States and our allies of a digital electro-optical, EO sensor and an 

infrared sensor, IR sensor. We are aware these planes fly over not 

only the United States but also our allies in Europe. And can you 

provide the committee with any reports or assessments DIA has 

prepared on these questions? 

Now, we have heard, of course, responses that we can just cover 

things, that we can mitigate this. But if we can, also the Russians 
15 

can. But the concern I guess we have is what are we actually getting from this treaty, because Russia does get more because of our 

space assets, the clarity which we have versus the clarity that is 

offered from their access from Open Skies. And can’t this information be used such as simple task such as targeting and threatening 

the United States? 

This is obviously something that has been a significant amount 

of discussion. I would like to know what the DIA has reviewed, 

what assessments you have done, and what the DIA has prepared. 

General STEWART. I have got to keep this really simple for me. 

This Open Skies discussion is, think Polaroids in the 1960s, 1970s, 

and 1980s, versus 1080 high-definition capability as we go to a digital environment. The things that you can see, the amount of data 

that you can collect, the things that you can do with post-processing using digital techniques allows Russia, in my opinion, to get 

incredible foundational intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, 

ports, all of our facilities. 

So from my perspective, it gives them a significant advantage 

and, yes, we both can use the same techniques. But I have a great 

concern about the quality of imagery, the quantity of the imagery, 

the ability to do post-processing of digital imagery, and what that 

allows them to see as foundational intelligence that I would love 

to have personally, and I would love to deny the Russians having 

that capability. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. Thank you. I note many people have 

been very concerned because of then, as you just described that fidelity of information, how it is translated into actual risks to the 

United States. 

Now, as we were coming out, I would like to ask both of you, we 

were in the anteroom here, we were having a discussion about the 

number of exercises that Russia is having. General Breedlove has 

testified before us and has foreshadowed to our committee his concern of the snap exercises that Russia is using that have translated 

into actual military action and the inability to discern when an exercise is going on or when an actual military action is going to be 

pursued. 

As you look at this, my concern has been—I think a lot of people 

who are looking at it are very concerned that these exercises are 

not training but they are actually practicing. I would love to hear 

from both of you your thoughts on the Russian posture and the exercises that they are undertaking. 

General STEWART. The recent snap exercises have been realistic. 

They have been threatening. They show a level of sophistication 

that I have not seen in the 20 or so years that I have been watching Russian/Soviet activity. It certainly looks as realistic training 

as anything I have seen the Russians do. 

Now, whether that is training because of the improved military, 

improved technology, lessons learned from what they have seen us 

do, or genuinely practicing for out-of-area or defense of Russian 

sovereignty, quote ‘‘sovereignty,’’ they are as realistic as anything 

that I have seen the Russians do over the last 20 years. 

There is some evidence that previous snap exercises were great 

rehearsal exercises for their deployment into Syria. So if you take 

that as a model, then you can extrapolate that these practice, very 
16 

deliberate, very thoughtful, high-intensity rehearsals could be rehearsals for some other either localized or out-of-area operations. 

General MARRS. Sir, I think I would echo General Stewart’s comments and just underscore that our impression has absolutely been 

that Russia has been evolving the art of using these exercises to 

create ambiguity and within that ambiguity make our task of 

warning against potential action more difficult. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Lieutenant General Stewart, so what I am hearing here, Russia, 

China, Iran, North Korea, are the four national threats. We all 

agree on that. And global jihad is our growing transnational threat. 

And part of what makes answering these difficult is that they all 

require very different approaches to deal with them. 

So terrorism requires more special forces; China, you know, requires us to have a strong maritime and naval capability; the Russians require the ground forces; and Iran and Korea will continue 

to use asymmetrical tools to basically mess with us. 

From your perspective, is the U.S. meeting these threats with 

the right balance of resources at this point or into the future? And 

does refocus towards Asia or the proposed rotational brigade that 

we are having going through Eastern Europe, for example, allocate 

our resources smartly enough, or is this an area where we are 

probably missing the mark, now and maybe looking 5 years forward? 

General STEWART. So I am always hesitant to talk about the 

right force construct, because that really is an intelligence question, and I would defer to the service chief and the chairman to 

talk about the right force construct. Certainly in my conversations 

and in the things that we have reported, we have explained the totality of the threat, the challenges that we face. And I think, I 

would like to defer to the services and the chairman to talk about 

what is the right construct military forces. 

Mr. GALLEGO. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I don’t know if you can do it in this setting or not, but one of 

the things that concerns me is the link between Russia and Iran, 

the new amount of money that Iran now has, obviously, to purchase weapons, most of which would likely come from Russia, and 

the impact that that may have on the strategy in Syria. 

General STEWART. One of the things that we assess, in addition 

to Russia moving into Syria to prop up the Assad regime, is Russia’s ability to demonstrate their advanced weapons capabilities, to 

buyers in the Middle East and across the globe. So we certainly expect that this show of capability as Iran gets additional resources 

as they come out of the sanction regime could lead to Iran purchasing advanced weapon systems from the Russians. 

We have already seen them go through with the deal of the S– 

300. There is discussion about some of their aircraft that the Russians are using in the region. So I fully expect that Iran will use 
17 

some of their resources to continue to modernize their military 

forces and that their supplier of choice will likely be the Russians. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, they already have the ability in Iran to hit 

a multitude of countries in the region, dozens of countries in the 

regions. The thing that they did not have was a quality targeting 

system and then questions about the actual capacity of the warhead, if you will, on the missile. Do you believe that our sanctions 

will hold in keeping them from getting better targeting and stronger warheads? 

General STEWART. Our sanctions in the past have not kept the 

Iranians from developing the most sophisticated ballistic missile 

capability in the region, capable of reaching all of their potential 

adversaries, capable of reaching into Europe. They have not only 

built a very robust missile technology; they have improved their accuracy; they have improved their mobility. I don’t see them changing that trajectory because their missile capability is a way to confuse, confound our actions, and it is a guarantee for the regime. 

So I don’t see sanctions changing that trajectory at all. I think 

as we lift sanctions, in fact, there is increase in likelihood that they 

will find ways to improve lethality, mobility, range of all of their 

missile systems. 

Mr. SCOTT. Gentleman, thank you for your service. I will save 

the remainder of my questions for the next hearing. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, is recognized for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, again, thank you for your service. 

Russia has become to many a more serious threat over the course 

of the last 5 years, particularly with Putin. When we are making 

projections through intelligence, what is the likelihood of that leadership remaining past the end of the year? What does your intelligence tell you? 

General STEWART. The likelihood that Putin will remain—— 

Mr. NORCROSS. Putin remains past the end of the year, because 

there are a number of folks who have come out publicly suggesting 

that the economy is strangling him and he is hanging on by a shoestring. 

General STEWART. He has a weak economy. He has demographic 

issues within the country. I see no indications that Putin will not 

survive the near term, near term being the next year or so. Their 

out-of-area operations and the casualties and the economy could 

cause some internal unrest, but when you look at his—in spite of 

the economy, you look at his popularity ratings, all of us should be 

as popular as he is viewed in Russia. 

The Russian people have a tendency to endure more suffering 

and pain than most of us are willing to accept. So I see no trend 

at this point that indicates that he will not be here through 2016 

and beyond. 

Mr. NORCROSS. So when we take a look back at what caused the 

downfall of the old Soviet Union, primarily, along with many other 

issues, it had to do with the economy that drove that nation into 

the ground. 
18 

With Iran now entering the oil market and along with the U.S. 

and international, that is a serious glut, where we are not hearing 

from any of the economic forecasters that that is going to rebound. 

That is their single driver for their economy. Do you see that trend 

continuing? 

General STEWART. That trend will continue. It will challenge a 

number of domestic issues. It will cause them to reprioritize some 

of their military spending, so they will spend at a lower rate. It will 

challenge whether or not they can sustain large scale out-of-area 

operations, but I don’t see it in the near term as a challenge to 

Putin and the regime. 

Mr. NORCROSS. And just to follow up on one issue. You talk 

about his popularity ratings. Of course, anything that comes out of 

Russia you take with a grain of salt, has very little to do with the 

truth. 

What independent assessment do you have that his popularity 

actually does remain strong with the general public? 

General STEWART. I don’t have any independent. I know what 

the Russians publish and I know that Russia also controls the narrative far better than we do in this country, in any Western country. So he is controlling the narrative, he controls to a great extent 

what the Russian people see and the conclusions that they draw 

from that, but there isn’t anything that I have seen that genuinely 

refutes the belief that he is a strong leader. He is making Russia 

stand up to the West, he is demonstrating historical Russian desire 

to be a dominant world player. 

I don’t see anything outside of the Russian narrative that refutes 

that which they are feeding the Russian people. So in the absence 

of something definitive, the Russian people believe he is standing 

up to the West, they believe he is a strong and forceful leader, they 

believe he has put Russia in the rightful place where they should 

stand on the international stage, and the economy is painful, but 

it is worth enduring, because we are now a dominant power. 

Mr. NORCROSS. The economy is also driving China in a direction 

that they are not comfortable with. In fact, we just read they laid 

off 1.2 million workers, which, given the size of the country, doesn’t 

seem significant, but it is. 

Do you see the economy driving their military program at a slower pace than it has been? 

General STEWART. I have not seen a slower pace, though I suspect that if the economy continues the way it is, that they will have 

to again make some prioritization, they will reduce their activity, 

but I don’t think they are walking away from this military modernization. It may slow, but they are not walking away from this 

military modernization. That is core to China’s future. 

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. And I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Stefanik, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Stewart and General Marrs, for your service and for being 

here today to testify. 

Like many of my colleagues, I want to focus my question on the 

implications of a resurgent Russia to the Intelligence Community. 

In addition to your testimony today, we have heard from senior 
19 

leaders in DOD, as well as leaders in academia, of Russia’s resurgence and military modernization in terms of their ability to apply 

this hybrid threat model in Eastern Europe. 

What is your assessment of how well our Intelligence Community 

is equipped to counter this hybrid threat, what changes have we 

made, and what changes do we still need to make in order to maintain pace with the very complex 21st century threats we are facing 

today? 

General STEWART. I am not sure that I am at all comfortable 

with the hybrid threat description. I think most nation-states 

would be really insane to take us on in a conventional approach, 

because of our superiority in our conventional weapons systems. 

So they are going to take us on in the information space and try 

to control and dominate the narrative, they are going to try to come 

after us in asymmetric large or small formations that will confuse 

our targeting effort. That only makes sense to counter the way we 

are structured and the way that we generally fight and have 

fought, for the last 15 or 20 years. 

So I am sometimes anxious when I hear Russia ascribed to creating this hybrid threat warfare, because I think it just makes 

sense to counter our superior conventional capabilities. 

Now, having said that, how do you defeat that? How do you get 

after that from an intelligence standpoint? That requires a significant more investment in understanding the open source environment, so that you can understand these little green men as they 

show up, because they are going to do some things in the open 

source that you ought to be able to exploit. You are going to require 

much more robust HUMINT [human intelligence] capability, and 

those HUMINT capabilities must be targeted against specific 

threats and specific regions. And then you have got to have a way 

to deal with the idea that an adversary will want to deny, degrade, 

deceive, destroy your information environment, and your information messaging. 

So if you can think your way through those, at least those three 

layers, you have got a chance to defeat the, quote, little green men, 

and then be able to apply conventional military capabilities against 

an advance. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Do you feel that the Intelligence Community is 

adequately equipped to address those threats that you just outlined 

and the changing nature related to the open source environment, 

the increase in HUMINT capabilities that we need? What changes 

do we need to make going forward? 

General STEWART. So, yes, we are starting now to reenergize how 

we use open source as foundation to what we do in the Intelligence 

Community. I think for far too long we have invested in the highend, high-technology collection where, in many cases, there is a 

great deal of information that we could use, foundational type of 

intelligence that is available open source, publicly available with 

limited or no expectation of privacy. 

So we are starting to put the model together where we can leverage the open source environment. We are not there yet. We need 

a good governance model, we need a model that talks about ethical 

behavior in the open source environment, what are the right tradecrafts to use in the open source environment, how do you protect 
20 

private citizens’, American citizens’, information in that environment. So we are stepping our way through that now. 

In terms of the HUMINT aspect, there is still more that we need 

to do in refining precisely where those hard targets are and investing that human capability against those hard targets. I think we 

are making progress, but we are not quite where we need to be at 

this point. 

Ms. STEFANIK. General Marrs, do you have anything to add? 

General MARRS. I think at this point I would just say that, and 

really it has been emphasized well by General Breedlove in his recent testimony, that there has been a concerted effort at the senior 

levels of the Department, not just in DOD with General Breedlove, 

the Secretary, and the chairman, but also working with Director 

Clapper on how to make these changes quickly. And I would be 

happy to talk in more detail in closed session on that. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Great. Thank you for your testimony. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, gentlemen. I am going to run through 

a few questions in different parts of the world, the first starting 

with Iran. I know that our intelligence in the past has been relatively limited or poor, and I am wondering now in the post-Iran 

deal world that we are living in how your intelligence picture has 

changed or improved, or what you are looking at in helping us both 

as we are looking at the implementation of the deal, but also what 

is happening in Iran overall. 

General STEWART. I hate to do this, I really do, but I would like 

to take this to a closed session. 

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. I thought you would say that. 

General STEWART. Because I think talking about where our footprint and where our opportunities might be would—— 

Ms. GABBARD. Sure. Moving over to Eastern Europe, what would 

you say Russia’s priorities are, given their actions and activities in 

Syria as well as Ukraine? And then also on the Ukraine side, how 

much and how effectively have you seen the Ukrainian military 

using their new special forces and unconventional tactics against 

the so-called Russian separatists there along the border? 

General STEWART. I am going to take the first question, and then 

maybe General Marrs will take the Ukrainian question. 

Russia has not lost sight of Ukraine as an important, maybe 

even vital, interest to be included as part of the Russian Federation. So I view their activity in Syria as multidimensional, one of 

which is, how do we take the international community’s focus off 

of Ukraine while we keep it in this state of isolated conflict and 

maybe cause the Ukrainian regime to do something that falls outside of the Minsk agreement and, therefore, allows Russia to continue its activity. So I think part of—one of the things that I believe Russia has done in Syria is taken our attention off of the 

Ukraine. And I suspect that at some point they will come back to 

Ukraine either under the guise that, we have solved the problem 

for you in the West by our actions in Syria, therefore, you ought 

to lift your concerns, your restrictions, and your sanctions against 

our activities in Ukraine, and you ought to give us some dividend, 
21 

and that dividend might be defined as, your hands off of Ukraine, 

because it is part of our sphere of influence. 

So I think this is a very—and maybe I am ascribing too much 

to the Russian thinking, but I think this is part of the grand plan 

that Ukraine remains in a state of conflict, but never lose sight of 

the fact that Ukraine must be part of the Russian sphere of influence and outside of the West’s. 

General MARRS. And I think my answer to your second question 

regarding the effectiveness of the Ukrainian special forces has been 

improved and, I think, led to an increased stability—or increased 

agility on the part of Ukraine to respond to separatists’ actions. 

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Generals, for being here today. 

I have two areas of concern: one is obviously the foreign fighters 

as they flow back and forth from Syria and Iraq. General Breedlove 

was quoted, I think just recently in regards to his testimony, you 

know, the fact that, you know, the daily flow into Europe, you 

know, they are using that disguise of refugees coming in, and they 

are really taking advantage of that in Europe, but also possibly 

here in the United States. 

Can you comment in regards, do we have a good handle on that 

or not? 

General STEWART. In Europe, I am not sure that there is a great 

handle on how you sift through potential foreign fighters, jihadists 

that are coming in through this mass migration. So that is an 

issue, I think, there. 

I am not concerned about the U.S., because of the capabilities 

that we have within our homeland defense. The things that we can 

do with the biometrics and the screening process makes it far less 

likely for them to just come across the border hidden within a mass 

wave of migrants. 

So I think it is less of a challenge here. It is not a completely 

diminished challenge, but I think it is far less here than it is in 

Europe. 

Mr. NUGENT. But wouldn’t that be the case—I mean, obviously 

that is true if they are coming through a point of entry in the 

United States—— 

General STEWART. Right. 

Mr. NUGENT [continuing]. But if they are coming across an open 

border area, obviously we don’t have the ability to do that kind of 

screening, correct? 

General STEWART. Correct. Open borders, if they don’t come 

through, I don’t—I don’t put that at the high end of my threat concern. 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

General STEWART. And let me tell you where I put my threat 

concern at with migrants. My threat concern with migrants are the 

migrants who are legitimately moving to get out of a crisis environment. They get to a nation-state, whether it is here or in Europe. 

They get marginalized, they get isolated, they get dissatisfied, 

they feel disenfranchised, they don’t have opportunity, and they be-
22 

come a source to be recruited and radicalized, because now they 

view their situation as worse now than it was in the past. 

Mr. NUGENT. You are seeing that, you know, in Germany and 

others where they are actually going and getting a one-way visa 

back to the country they came from, whether it is Afghanistan or 

Iraq or Syria, because they feel marginalized within the country 

they have gone to, and I get that. I mean, we see that across the 

board where people can be self-radicalized for whatever reason they 

may harbor within their hearts, but I worry about those that have 

the military experience, and I am sure you do too, of having served 

in combat. 

It is a big difference between reading about it and actually doing 

it. So I am concerned that—it seems like that is an issue that obviously needs more discussion. 

But getting to Russia in particular, I would just tell you that, 

you know, from the—you know, the approach that we have taken, 

and one of the generals that sat here and testified in front of us 

said, you know, we are hugging the bear. We thought that we could 

embrace Russia and live with them in a way that we are going to 

have mutual agreement. And obviously in their reaction and what 

they are doing in the Baltic States, what they have done in Crimea 

shows that that was a miscalculation. 

Now, I don’t know if it was a miscalculation because of our intelligence ability to let our executive branch know, or if we told them 

and they just didn’t act. Can you give me some—as we relate to 

the State Department back and forth? 

General STEWART. I think maybe some of this is a little bit of revisionist history—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Okay. 

General STEWART [continuing]. To be quite honest. Russia—Russia is carrying out and acting today in the same way that a nationstate—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Well, I agree, but did we not try to take a different 

approach with Russia? As one of the generals that sat here and 

spoke about it, we were trying to hug the bear. 

General STEWART. Absolutely. 

Mr. NUGENT. We were trying to get them to—we thought we—— 

General STEWART. And wouldn’t that have been a—— 

Mr. NUGENT [continuing]. Had a different reset. 

General STEWART. Wouldn’t that have been a positive thing to 

do—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Oh, absolutely, but—— 

General STEWART [continuing]. If we could have gotten the Russians to—— 

Mr. NUGENT [continuing]. But did we honestly—did they have 

the intel to give them the proper perspective to know that, hey, listen, that may or may not happen? That is all I am asking. 

General STEWART. I think we had a pretty good sense that Russia would act in its interests, that Russia would be concerned about 

being encircled and isolated by Western forces, that Russia would 

revert back to thinking—going back to czarist time about their role 

in the European continent. So all of that was available for folks to 

look at. 
23 

The approach that we took, whether it is to try to get Russia to 

act in a more responsible way within the international community, 

I don’t know that any of us could have predicted that Vladimir 

Putin would come to power and would change that trajectory that 

was set by those leaders who preceded him. So it always looks better in retrospect—— 

Mr. NUGENT. Always. 

General STEWART [continuing]. But I certainly think the policy of 

trying to get Russia to act in a different way than it had, in the 

competitive way that it had acted over the last previous 50 years, 

was probably a positive thing. 

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and I yield back. 

Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. Thank you, General, General. 

I have two different questions on two different subjects. And I 

just go back to your comments about ISIS and the answer you just 

gave. I just need to fully understand this. 

ISIL will probably conduct additional attacks, attacks in Europe 

and attempt to direct attacks in the United States homeland in 

2016. I think that is, at least my constituents, what their fear is, 

that it won’t—the lone attacker will probably give way to directed 

attacks. How do we—I am sure you have answered this already, 

but could you do it again? How do we address that? We know it 

is coming. We think it is coming, anyway. We strategize around it. 

What is our strategy? What do I tell my constituents about how we 

are going to direct—— 

General STEWART. I can tell you what the Intelligence Community will try to do: get as clean an understanding of the foreign 

fighters who have gone into Iraq and Syria to support ISIL; try to 

get the best appreciation for those who are flown back, and we 

have some techniques that has been very helpful; and most importantly, to make sure as a community, we share, not just across the 

defense intelligence community, but our law enforcement communities and all those who will see activities. That really is the key. 

If we can share this information that each of us have in our different silos, and I think that has gotten a lot better over the last 

several years, we have a great opportunity to counter some of these 

threats and challenges coming from overseas. So—— 

Mr. ASHFORD. So it is train—sorry. 

General STEWART. I am sorry? 

Mr. ASHFORD. No. I am sorry. Go ahead. 

General STEWART. We will not stop the lone wolf attackers. That 

someone is going to get radicalized and someday pick up a weapon 

and go after Americans, that is almost impossible to stop, but we 

can certainly get a good sense of those who are acting overseas, 

those who have got military training, and those who we are seeing 

indications that they are either coming back or trying to influence 

individuals in this country. 

Mr. ASHFORD. And I know Congress in various ways has attempted to address the refugee issue, the visa issue. Aren’t those 

legitimate concerns? I mean, to me I, as a Member who cosponsored a bill on refugees, it wasn’t that we didn’t want refugees to 

come here, isn’t it reasonable that the flow of ISIL-related individ-
24 

uals back into Europe or into the United States through an existing program that is legitimate, I mean, you know, refugee program 

or visa program, isn’t that a valid concern that we must have? 

General STEWART. Absolutely legitimate, absolutely valid concern. Where it rises to the level of most dangerous threats for me, 

we have mechanisms in place, we have procedures in place that 

mitigates many of those concerns. So those that are coming 

through established borders, ports of entries and the like, not as 

great a concern. Could some come through borders where we don’t 

have control? Absolutely. How high would I put that on the list of 

threats? Something to monitor, but not terribly high on my list. 

Mr. ASHFORD. All right. And that is—for example, we don’t stop 

a refugee program or we don’t stop a visa program, but we think 

about it as something that could be an avenue of flow of—where 

there could be a flow of individuals that could, in fact, lead an attack. 

I mean, my concern in listening to this for all year, year and a 

half now almost, is this sense that they are training people in 

Syria, they have sophisticated abilities, they haven’t used their 

cyber ability apparently yet, but, like, they might or could in the 

future, but that when you train somebody and they are radicalized 

ab initio, they are radicalized there; it is not radicalizing a lone 

wolf in Nebraska, it is—and that person could come back into Europe or the United States or anywhere else, and they are doing it 

already in other parts, obviously, Libya and other parts of the 

world, and they could put together a force of like-minded people 

and, you know, attack us. That is not an—that is a concern, isn’t 

it? Obviously, you have said it is, but—— 

General STEWART. That is a concern and that is a plausible scenario. 

Mr. ASHFORD. And then my next question, thank you, is related 

to intelligence gathering and cyber and all these very high-tech 

fields that you have done a great job, I think, in elevating, and it 

is—but how do we in a general sense, how do we recruit our young 

people to do that work? How do we get them interested in not 

being in the private sector right away making, you know, bundles 

of money, and going into work for you? How do we do that, in your 

view? What are the recruitment tools? 

General STEWART. Yeah. I am going to start a little bit, and then 

maybe General Marrs will pick this up. 

I have found no problems with the marines, who are genuine patriots, who had great technical skills, who are willing to do this 

business in cyberspace when I was associated with U.S. Army 

Command. None of them were leaving because they could get paid 

more by any of the industry giants. They did this business because 

they were true patriots who wanted to serve their country. 

Where I found folks who left, was because we didn’t have any 

well-designed construct to retain them and allow them to continue 

to do this highly skilled work that they wanted to do. In spite of 

bonuses, we tended to move them off to do what they viewed as 

nontrivial missions. And so they weren’t leaving for money; they 

were leaving because they couldn’t get to do the things they wanted 

to do. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, General. I am way over time, so—— 
25 

The CHAIRMAN. General Marrs, is there anything you wanted to 

add on that question right quick? 

General MARRS. Sir, I guess I would just say, having had some 

opportunities to be a consumer of cyber skills along the way, that 

absolutely the more we can get out early on and, I guess, expose 

our young folks to what is possible within this community, once 

they see that and the mission that is involved, it is pretty easy at 

that point to bring them on. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. The only thing I would add, General, is to 

the extent we can help in these career tracks, we want to be helpful. A lot of it is not within—or traditionally within the thing that 

we decide, but there are some aspects of this, and we want to be 

helpful in just what you said. 

Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and your service. 

General Stewart, you mentioned, you know, the transnational 

threats, the ISIS threat, you know, certainly didn’t have happen 

overnight. I talk about it as a generational threat. I don’t think it 

is going to be defeated overnight. 

In your best military judgment, you know, how long do you think 

we are going to be dealing with this type of threat? Again, it is 

right now ISIS, but it comes in many jihadist forms and affiliates 

in these ungoverned spaces. How long do you think we will be dealing with this as a major threat, requiring military capabilities, you 

know, to address the threat? 

General STEWART. Yeah. That is a terrific question. We have 

spent a little bit of time recently looking at this particular threat, 

the ISIL, the center of gravity, what are their critical vulnerabilities, so that we could take this particular threat down. But the reality is that it is based on a very extreme Salafist ideology, and unless there is a narrative that counters that ideology, it will reemerge someplace else in some other form. 

That is probably not an ideology that we in the West can 

counter. We need our partners in the region who believe in the 

broadest sense of Islam and what it brings to the table to have this 

dialogue, this conversation about how do we—this very marginalized group. 

When you take apart the 1.6 million Muslims and you whittle it 

down to this, Salafist jihadist, movement, you are probably talking 

less than a couple hundred thousand folks, who are as great a 

threat to Islamic regimes. 

In fact, in many cases a greater threat to Islamic regimes than 

they are to the West. So we need them to counter that ideology and 

offer an alternative view of Islam that allows people to feel like 

they are part of a society that is looking to take care of their citizens, to enhance their opportunities, and, oh, by the way, practice 

their religion as they see fit. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But is it safe to say that is a whole-of-society approach, whole-of-government, that there still might be a military, 

you know, potential that we need to be prepared for, given this 

threat? It is not going to go away in the next year or two, I guess, 

is what I am trying to say. 
26 

General STEWART. It is a long-term challenge that we always 

have to maintain that military capability to take out their command and control, take out their leadership, take out their networks that finance—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Wherever they are. 

General STEWART. Wherever they are. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Whether that is Libya, Iraq, Syria. 

General STEWART. Absolutely. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Moving on again, my time in the military, 

you know, one of the biggest things we were concerned about was 

terrorists and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] coming together. And, you know, we have seen the desire, threat equals, you 

know, capability plus intent, of ISIS to acquire biological or chemical weapons or to recruit individuals who have those capabilities 

to create them. 

Can you comment on any concerns you have about the nexus of 

ISIL and WMD? 

General STEWART. Neither ISIS nor Al Qaeda has walked away 

from their desire to develop chemical, biological capability that 

they can use against the West. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it. 

General STEWART. They have retained that intent. 

Ms. MCSALLY. And as far as the capability, can you comment on 

that, or should we wait until the classified? 

General STEWART. I think we could talk about it more fully in 

the classified setting, but they will recruit expertise who can bring 

a range of capabilities to ISIL, whether that is financers—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. 

General STEWART [continuing]. Media consultants, or chemical 

experts. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Is it fair to say the difference between Al Qaeda, 

where they were trying to maybe acquire it where it existed, 

whereas ISIS is trying to recruit individuals with the expertise to 

potentially home-grow it? 

General STEWART. There is some indication that ISIL is working 

very hard to develop their own capability. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. 

Total different topic. Vice Admiral Branch, the chief of Naval Intelligence, and since November of 2013, he hasn’t had a security 

clearance due to an ongoing investigation. A number of our colleagues wrote a letter to Secretary Mabus about this last week. 

I can’t picture—again, we are not going to weigh in on the investigation or anything like that, but being in a position where you 

have oversight of Navy intelligence, but you have no security clearance for over 2 years, I can’t picture him not being able to be in 

meetings or provide oversight. 

Can you share, General Marrs, how that impacts your day-inand-day-out interaction with the naval intelligence operation? 

General MARRS. I think day in and day out, our partnership is 

very, very strong at the senior leadership level, but—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. But he can’t be in the room. 

General MARRS. And I will say for the individuals who represent 

him, but I will absolutely agree that it is not an optimal situation 

for the Navy. 
27 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you. 

General Stewart, do you have anything to add? Okay. Thanks. 

And one last topic on the reports coming out of CENTCOM [Central Command] where about 40 percent of analysts are saying that 

they feel that the integrity of the analysis is potentially not pure. 

I don’t know how better to say that. General Stewart, do you have 

any—— 

General STEWART. I am so glad you asked that question, because 

my staff has been trying to keep me from not commenting on this, 

and I desperately want to comment on it, because I think the assertion that somehow 40 percent of that workforce either represents the totality of our analytic enterprise or truly represents that 

their judgments are not being accounted for disturbs me more than 

I can state. 

We have a very robust process of thinking through the analytic 

effort, citing your sources, validating and vetting your sources. 

Opinions count slightly, only because you are a three-star, your 

opinions count. Analysts must apply the analytic rigor that is necessary to deliver that content in a compelling way to their commander. 

The 40 percent, and I saw this number distorted to 400, is absolutely gross distortment of the challenges that they face down at 

CENTCOM. It undermines the great workforce that we have down 

there at CENTCOM, who every single day are giving their best 

judgment to that commander about how activities and actions are 

going on the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility]. 

Ms. MCSALLY. But there is an investigation ongoing. 

General STEWART. There is an ongoing—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. So clearly there is some—— 

General STEWART [continuing]. Investigation. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah. Okay. 

General STEWART. We neither control the scope nor the pace of 

that investigation. And it is remarkable that folks have named 

names in an investigation prior to that investigation being completed. And if these individuals are exonerated, no one will retract 

the really distorted reporting that they have had in this situation. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I am way over my time. So thank you. And thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

General STEWART. I thank you for giving me an opportunity—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely. 

General STEWART [continuing]. To vent on that one. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Tell me how you really feel. 

The CHAIRMAN. General, it is true, however, and I have read that 

report myself cover to cover, that they are reflecting in the survey 

data that there is more question at CENTCOM than the other combatant commands about whether the analysts believe that the work 

they do is altered in some way. And I understand your point about 

the 40 percent. I have, again, looked through all those charts, and 

I don’t want to get into too much specifics here, but there is a reason to have an investigation. 

And as I have said, we are working with the Intelligence Committee as well as Defense Appropriation Committee, being respectful of the IG [Inspector General] investigation, but it is a matter 

of interest for this committee if, in fact, intelligence is being shaped 
28 

in some way to please superiors, whether they be military or political superiors. So we are also trying to be really careful and not 

interfere with the IG investigation, but to say there—you did not 

say this, and I am not trying to put words in your mouth either. 

To say there is not an issue at CENTCOM, I think, would be also 

a misrepresentation of what this survey showed. 

I am happy for any further comments you would like to make. 

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, there is an issue there. And 

the only thing that I have asked folks to do is let the investigation 

play out. Let’s do a thorough investigation, let’s understand what 

the real issues are down at Central Command, and not impugn the 

entire analytic effort of the defense intelligence enterprise—— 

The CHAIRMAN. No. 

General STEWART [continuing]. Which is what some people have 

done. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. 

General STEWART. And that is disturbing when you are trying to 

lead a workforce that have the challenges that we talked about 

here, and yet they are questioned and challenged and judged poorly 

in the media and by a number of other individuals. It just is unfair 

to that workforce, it is unfair to the leadership. 

The CHAIRMAN. No. I think that is right. And you are perfectly 

right to defend the workforce that is doing incredibly difficult work 

every single day. And I think you are also exactly right that this 

investigation, both the IG investigation and what we are doing 

among the committees, ought to proceed, but as is appropriate for 

intelligence, it ought to proceed not in the public eye. And I think 

that, in my opinion, those are perfectly valid points to make. At the 

same time I would say, but they have got to proceed, because there 

is an issue there that needs to be pursued. 

Mr. Walz, thank you for letting me take a little of your time— 

delay your time a little bit. The gentleman is recognized. 

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you both for being 

here. 

Again, I will try and get up to that line where I understand some 

of this may have to go into the classified, but after the 2009 Georgian incursion by the Russians, it became apparent to them, it 

looks like, that their armor wasn’t where it needed to be, and there 

has been talk of how much they put into that and how much they 

have done. 

I am curious about what you are able to gather from this, because we can gather that they have new main battle tanks and 

things like that, but putting an armored vehicle into the field is 

one thing, keeping it there is quite another. 

I am more interested in what do we know about their maintenance or logistics, how do they do that, and are they doing it to 

a level that should be of concern? 

General STEWART. Yeah. I think we probably should talk about 

this in a closed hearing, because they have systematically modernized, not just the weapons system, how they deploy and employ 

those forces and sustain those forces. 

Mr. WALZ. Very good. No. I appreciate that. 

The only other thing I would say as we are talking worldwide 

threats and those things, General Stewart, and I was out to visit 
29 

you, and several of us, where you made a statement that was pretty profound and stuck with me. 

Some of our challenges worldwide and security challenges do 

start here at home, whether it is budgetary or, as the chairman has 

made a calling of, and I totally agree with him, on acquisition reform. And I think it is always important whenever we are discussing these capabilities what you need, we do have a lot of influence in that. 

And your statement candidness on acquisition reform is something I repeat often and the chairman has pushed it. And I know 

this is a very hard lift, but I just wanted to reassure you, it is sinking, and it is obvious from the leadership and the chairman and 

many on this committee. So I thank you for that and do understand that as you have to think about all the things that are being 

asked about here, it does come back home to budgetary, it does 

come back home to acquisition, how fast you can field things you 

need to field. So I appreciate that help. 

I yield back, Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for 

being here. I always appreciate those who give their lives to the 

cause of protecting their fellow human beings. 

General Stewart, you know, there are obviously a lot of us that 

are concerned that we seem not to be having the kind of at least 

observable progress on ISIS, at least in the timeframe we would 

like to see it. I know everybody feels the same way. But in light 

of that, what do you consider to be the Islamic State’s center of 

gravity? What are we doing to attack that center of gravity? What 

is the strongest thing that we can do against their weakest and 

most vulnerable and most critical—— 

General STEWART. So we define the center of gravity, the source 

of their power as either the virtual or the physical caliphate. So the 

existence of a caliphate, the narrative that the caliphate exists is 

a draw to forces. 

Mr. FRANKS. Yep. 

General STEWART. It is a draw to that ideology that, we are going 

to be part of this final caliphate and this final battle. So the caliphate must be destroyed. The notion, the narrative of the caliphate 

must be destroyed. We can go after that in a number of ways. You 

have got to go after the leadership. We can’t take pressure off the 

leadership and we can’t take pressure off of the middle management, the bureaucrats who run this proto-state we call ISIL and 

its caliphate. You have got to go after the narrative, as we talked 

about earlier. You have got to go after its financial networks. These 

are all critical vulnerabilities. 

And you are seeing some increased activity against those financial nodes and networks, how they generate cash, because if they 

are going to act like a proto-state, they are going to have to generate cash, they are going to have to pay employees, they are going 

to have to run the machinery, they are going to govern like a state, 

and so you can start going after those things that will allow them 

to act as a proto-state, act as a caliphate. Leadership, command 

and control, financial networks, infrastructure, logistics nodes, and 

all those things are legitimate targets, and we are seeing quite a 
30 

significant increase from Central Command and others in going 

after those very specific nodes. 

So the caliphate is under attack. How that will play out over the 

next 12 to 18 months will be where we will focus our effort to understand the impact that we are having going after those center of 

gravity and defeating the idea of a caliphate, both in the physical 

and virtual space. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I was glad to hear you mention going after the 

narrative. That is more of a strategic approach, in my judgment, 

because, you know, tactically we usually prevail, but oftentimes in 

the effort to try to prevent this motivation that the discussion the 

caliphate prevents, sometimes we don’t address this on a strategic 

level. So I am glad to see. I know it is difficult for a military force 

to have a psychological approach, but it nevertheless is pretty important when a group feels that they are somehow transcendentally 

justified in doing what they are doing. It is important to attack 

that, and I appreciate you saying that. 

Let me shift gears, if I could, and probably, given the time I 

have, need to address this to both of you. What do you consider the 

importance of Iran’s ballistic missile program to its military strategy in the wake of the Iran deal, or the JCPoA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]? And in your assessment, how likely is it that 

Iran will continue to move forward with the development and testing of these systems despite threats of new sanctions? 

General STEWART. Iran’s missile program is one of the centerpieces of defense of their regime. They have built a very robust 

missile capability in the face of 30-plus years of sanctions. There 

is no indication that they are going to walk away from their ballistic missile technology and capability. They will continue to improve their ranges, they will continue to improve lethality, they 

will continue to improve maneuverability, and I don’t see that 

changing any time under any sanctions regime. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, it is not exactly encouraging, but I think you 

are absolutely right. 

General, did you have any—— 

General MARRS. Sir, I would just add that absolutely Iran sees 

its ballistic missile capability as key to its power projection. And 

I guess of additional concern is what they have stated publicly is 

their intent to conduct another space launch potentially as early as 

this year, and that could unveil a capability that may have intercontinental range. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I will try quickly here. Do you believe that 

Russia is attempting to supplant American leadership in the Middle East with a hegemony led by kind of a Moscow-Tehran combination? 

General STEWART. In a word, yes. 

Mr. FRANKS. All right. That is a fast answer. 

Thank you very much, both of you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Having served in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps, the 

only thing—you know, I walked away opposed to the stability operations, or what we used to call nation building, but now I have con-
31 

cluded that the only thing worse than that is doing regime change 

without a follow-on stability operation or nation building, and that 

is what we have today in Libya. And I am just very concerned that 

the vacuum that has been created through regime change has 

given a real anchor for ISIS or for these extremist groups to operate out of. 

To what extent do you see them moving out of Raqqa in Syria 

and over to Libya? 

General STEWART. The specifics of any forces, ISIL forces, moving 

to Libya, I think we should talk about in a closed hearing. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. 

General STEWART. However, the Libyan branch of ISIL is the 

most capable and the next most dangerous branch of the ISIL enterprise. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. What I saw when I was in Iraq in 2005– 

2006 was that the Sunni Arabs felt pushed out of the Baghdad government, the Shia-dominated Baghdad government. And I think it 

is hard for us to understand, but they have such a vertically integrated form of government, that all the decisions really come out 

of Baghdad. I mean, there is no revenue at the local or the provincial level, and so when you use the term ‘‘pushed out of the government,’’ it is far more significant than anything that we can comprehend here. And that the Kurds had insisted on a provision in 

their constitution whereby they could form the semiautonomous regions. And when we look at where ISIS was able to come into Iraq 

and easily take over areas, they were all the Sunni-dominated 

areas of Iraq. And I would hope that we could push our government to try and influence the Baghdad government to allow this 

formation of a semiautonomous region in a post-ISIS Iraq, but 

going to where we are right now, it would seem that we are making gains in pushing back the ISIS in Iraq. We have certainly just 

taken Ramadi, albeit probably destroyed it, take it. 

Where do you see—what is the prognosis for Mosul right now? 

General STEWART. I think every effort is being made to get after 

Mosul this year. As you know, urban operations is complex, it is 

fought in multiple dimensions. So isolating Mosul is the first step, 

whether or not the Iraqi Security Forces are ready to go in and systematically clear an urban environment, a large urban environment. I don’t believe that they have the capability. They will need 

a significant amount of help from coalition partners. I don’t know 

that they will ask for that help. So I am not as optimistic about 

seizing and clearing Mosul in this year, as I have read recently. We 

can begin the operations, we can begin to isolate, we can do some 

of the preparatory work, but securing, taking, and securing Mosul 

in the next 8 to 10 months is not something I am seeing in my 

crystal ball. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Lastly, and this is to both of you, and that 

is, when I look at ISIS, they have maybe three streams of revenue 

coming in: one is through contributions from radical Islamists 

throughout the Islamic world; the second one is industries that 

they have taken over, whether petroleum or cement; and then the 

third is their ability to tax economic activity in the areas that they 

govern. To what extent have we compromised those three sources 

of revenue? 
32 

General STEWART. I think we have made a pretty significant dent 

in their oil revenues by targeting some of the transport. I think we 

have done significant dent in their cash reserves by striking some 

of those targets. The taxing of locals, I am not sure how successful 

we have been. 

And your third area was? 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, I think contributions coming—— 

General STEWART. Contributions. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Yeah. I think as long as they are seen as ascendant, that money is going to flow. And I think the fact that we have 

reversed some of that perception, I think, has been helpful. 

General STEWART. Reversing the ascendency will reduce the 

amount of support, external support, that they get. 

Mr. COFFMAN. General. 

General MARRS. The only thing I would add is that success, I 

think, against both the oil infrastructure and the banking facilities 

is a result of just some excellent Intel Community collaboration. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just touch on a couple things right quick. 

Afghanistan, we haven’t talked about. To what extent do you believe that a significant terrorist threat to the United States would 

re-form in Afghanistan without constant pressure being applied 

against it, whether that be Al Qaeda or ISIS? 

General STEWART. There is no doubt in my mind that if there is 

not constant pressure on either ISIL in the Uruzgan Province or 

remnants of Al Qaeda, that they will continue to pursue targeting 

U.S. and Western interests from safe havens in Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. General Marrs, do you have a different 

view? 

General MARRS. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Press reports indicate that an ISIS operative was captured, and hopefully, of course, he will be interrogated. 

My question is have interrogations been a significant source of intelligence that have helped prevent terrorist attacks in the past, 

and has that source of intelligence diminished in recent years? 

General STEWART. Interrogation, as I understand it from the 

Army Field Manual, which is about establishing a rapport with the 

detainee so that you can get truly valuable intelligence, has 

worked. I don’t know if I can quantify how much it has prevented 

terrorist activity, but that type of technique works, it gets good insights that lead to other operatives, it gives us insights into how 

the network operates. So there is value there, and ultimately that 

could prevent terrorist activity. 

The, quote, enhanced interrogation techniques are a guarantee of 

having a detainee tell you what they want—what you want to hear 

in order to stop the pain. 

The CHAIRMAN. Really what I was getting at is we hadn’t been 

doing much questioning, because we hadn’t had many captures in 

recent years. Isn’t that right? 

General STEWART. So you may have noticed an uptick in special 

operations intended to capture, interrogate, and gather materials 

that will give us greater insights into the network, and I think that 

will pay dividends in the long term. 
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The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I think a significant source of our information, we have not had in recent years, we ought to—hopefully will 

have it, that is part of the reason—this is not you all’s issue, but 

we asked the administration to provide a plan on how they intend 

to deal with detainees that they capture in the future. It was one 

of the omissions in the report that we received last week. 

That is all I have. Susan, do you have anything else? Okay. 

Thank you both for being here. And this will conclude the open 

session of our hearing, and we will see you all momentarily upstairs. The hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 2, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 2, 2016 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 2, 2016 

(71) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. Jim Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, recently discussed 

potential threats being posed by advancements in bio-technology, including an ability to edit human-genes, so called ‘‘gene-editing.’’ I am concerned about these types 

of technologies falling into the hands of terrorist groups or even lone actors. Can 

you describe for the committee the national security threats being posed by these 

and similar bio-technologies? 

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. WILSON. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this committee 

that that Afghan leaders are ‘‘skeptical we will continue to be there’’ beyond the end 

of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said President Obama’s plan to draw down to 5,500 

troops by the end of 2016 from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, 

would leave the United States with ‘‘a very limited ability’’ to conduct its 

counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please describe what are the 

security risks associated with a further drawdown of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end 

of 2016, and what key indicators will you look for over the next several months to 

inform policymakers on force levels and drawdown timelines? 

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. WILSON. In his January 2016 report, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction observed that, ‘‘the Taliban now controls more territory 

than at any time since 2001.’’ What is DIA’s estimate of the extent of Taliban control in Afghanistan? 

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. WILSON. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this committee 

that that Afghan leaders are ‘‘skeptical we will continue to be there’’ beyond the end 

of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said President Obama’s plan to draw down to 5,500 

troops by the end of 2016 from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, 

would leave the United States with ‘‘a very limited ability’’ to conduct its 

counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please describe what are the 

security risks associated with a further drawdown of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end 

of 2016, and what key indicators will you look for over the next several months to 

inform policymakers on force levels and drawdown timelines? 

General MARRS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

Mr. GARAMENDI. To what extent does the Open Skies Treaty’s provision that all 

information collected on Open Skies flights be shared with all parties to the treaty 

mitigate the counterintelligence threat posed by potential Russian flights with a 

new, electro-optical sensor? 

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. How well are defense intelligence missile warning capabilities postured to address the nation-state threats highlighted during the hearing (Russia, 

China, Iran and North Korea)? 

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON 

Mr. MOULTON. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S. and U.K. 

and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats, including enhanced Russian 

naval activities? 

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. MOULTON. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S. and U.K. 

and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats, including enhanced Russian 

naval activities? 

General MARRS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

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