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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Cheshire

No. 2019-0028

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

PAUL R. SPAULDING

Submitted: May 8, 2019

Opinion Issued: May 17, 2019

Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Elizabeth C. Woodcock, 

assistant attorney general, on the memorandum of law), for the State.

David M. Rothstein, deputy director public defender, of Concord, on the 

memorandum of law, for the defendant.

HICKS, J. The defendant, Paul R. Spaulding, appeals the order of the

Superior Court (Ruoff, J.) that he be detained without bail pending resolution 

of the charges against him. See RSA 597:2, IV(a) (Supp. 2018). We affirm.

The record establishes the following facts. The defendant was charged 

with two counts of misdemeanor domestic violence, see RSA 631:2-b (Supp. 

2018), one count of felony reckless conduct, see RSA 631:3 (Supp. 2018), and 

one count of felony criminal threatening, see RSA 631:4 (2016). At his 

arraignment on those charges, he pleaded not guilty. Based upon an affidavit 

that has not been provided as part of the appellate record and representations 
2

by the State, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that preventive 

detention was warranted and ordered the defendant to be detained without 

bail. See RSA 597:2, IV(a). The court also issued a domestic violence criminal 

order of protection. See RSA ch. 173-B (2014 & Supp. 2018).

The court held a probable cause hearing on the charges a few days later. 

At that time, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the criminal threatening 

charge and filed a new charge against the defendant, criminal threatening with 

a deadly weapon, to which the defendant pleaded not guilty. See RSA 631:4, 

II(a)(2). At the probable cause hearing, the court heard testimony about the 

event that gave rise to the charges against the defendant. Specifically, there 

was testimony that at approximately 2:00 in the morning on December 16, 

2018, there was a call regarding a domestic argument between the caller’s 

mother and the defendant. The caller informed dispatch that the defendant 

had discharged a firearm outside.

Officers were dispatched to an apartment building in Hinsdale at which 

the domestic disturbance allegedly was taking place. When the officers arrived, 

they heard yelling from one of the apartments. The apartment door was open, 

and the officers issued multiple commands to the defendant to exit. Seeing a 

firearm on the defendant’s hip, the police took him into detention immediately. 

The defendant was “very, very angry” and “vocal” and could be heard saying to 

the complainant, “[Y]ou did this to me, you did this to me.” One officer 

described the defendant as “growling” with anger. As officers placed the 

defendant into the cruiser, they heard him yelling, “I’m going to kill the bitch.”

After he was detained, the police recovered both the firearm on the 

defendant’s hip and a second gun. One gun was a Kel-Tec nine-millimeter,

semiautomatic pistol that was missing one round of ammunition; the other was 

a Smith & Wesson nine-millimeter, semiautomatic pistol that was not missing 

any rounds. At the jail, the police seized a magazine of ammunition from the 

defendant as well as a knife with a six-inch blade. Police testified that the 

knife was sheathed and “stuffed into the . . . inside of [the defendant’s] 

waistband by his underwear.”

Police then interviewed the complainant and her daughter. They were 

told that the complainant and the defendant had been in an intimate 

relationship for approximately one year. Although the defendant lives in 

Vermont “most of the time,” he stayed with the complainant occasionally.

The complainant told the police that she and the defendant had gone out 

with other building tenants that night and that the defendant had had “a 

couple Jack and Cokes.” When the complainant and the defendant came 

home, they had smoked some marijuana, and the defendant then had become 

“enraged,” although the complainant said that she had “no idea why.” When 

the complainant attempted to leave the apartment, the defendant prevented 
3

her from doing so by grabbing her shoulders and pinning her against the wall

of the bedroom so that she could not move. Eventually, he released his grip, 

but when she attempted to leave the apartment he stood in front of the door 

and would not let her leave. When she was finally able to leave, she fled to the 

first floor apartment of a neighbor.

While in the neighbor’s apartment, the complainant heard the defendant 

come downstairs and leave the building only to return and begin banging on 

the neighbor’s door. The defendant sounded rageful as he said, “[I]f you don’t 

open the door, I’m just going to shoot it down.” The complainant felt afraid and 

assumed a “vertical fetal position.” She told police that she was afraid because 

she knew that the defendant had a gun and his possession of a gun had been

“contentious in their relationship.” The complainant also said that she felt 

afraid because she had never seen the defendant act like this before.

The complainant then heard the defendant ascend and descend the 

stairs rapidly, running outside the apartment building. Less than a minute 

later, the complainant heard a gunshot.

The complainant’s daughter confirmed that the argument between the 

defendant and the complainant occurred after the two had returned to the 

apartment that night and that the complainant had run downstairs to the first 

floor neighbor’s apartment. The complainant’s daughter heard the defendant 

banging on the neighbor’s door and heard him say “I’m not doing this anymore, 

I’m just going to shoot it down,” or words to that effect. She then heard the 

defendant go upstairs, threaten to kill himself, run downstairs, and run 

outside. She heard a gunshot, and, at that point, called the police. The police 

interviewed a nearby neighbor who said that he heard a “pop,” which he 

believed to be a gunshot.

Based upon the testimony at the hearing, the trial court ruled that there 

was probable cause with respect to the two domestic violence charges and the 

criminal threatening with a deadly weapon charge. The court ruled that the 

reckless conduct charge lacked probable cause and, therefore, dismissed it.

The State requested that the court maintain its prior preventive detention 

order. The trial court did so, finding “that the combination of alcohol, 

domest[ic] violence, threats to kill the [complainant], to shoot a door down, the 

discharge of a firearm, the defendant’s combativeness with the police, and the 

fact that he was armed with a . . . knife and two loaded semi-automatic 9MM 

pistols[,] all warrant detention without bail.” This appeal followed.

We review the trial court’s decision under our unsustainable exercise of 

discretion standard. See Petition of Second Chance Bail Bonds, 172 N.H. ___, 

___ (decided February 13, 2019) (slip op. at 5); cf. State v. Tsopas, 166 N.H. 

528, 531 (2014) (concerning a trial court’s decision to modify bail). In 
4

determining whether a trial court ruling is an unsustainable exercise of 

discretion, we consider “whether the record establishes an objective basis 

sufficient to sustain the discretionary judgment made.” State v. Lambert, 147 

N.H. 295, 296 (2001). To show that the trial court’s decision is not 

sustainable, a party “must demonstrate that the court’s ruling was clearly 

untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of [that party’s] case.” Id. 

(quotation omitted).

On appeal, the defendant contends that the court erred by ordering him 

detained without bail because there was a “lack of proof of clear and convincing 

evidence of danger.” RSA 597:2, IV(a) vests the court with broad discretion to 

order a defendant to be held without bail. It provides:

If a person is charged with any criminal offense, an offense 

listed in RSA 173-B:1, I or a violation of a protective order under 

RSA 458:16, III, or after arraignment, with a violation of a 

protective order issued under RSA 173-B, the court may order 

preventive detention without bail, or, in the alternative, may order 

restrictive conditions including but not limited to electronic 

monitoring and supervision, only if the court determines by clear 

and convincing evidence that release will endanger the safety of 

that person or the public. The court may consider the following 

conduct as evidence of posing a danger, including, but not limited 

to: 

(1) Threats of suicide.

(2) Acute depression.

(3) History of violating protective orders.

(4) Possessing or attempting to possess a deadly weapon in 

violation of an order.

(5) Death threats or threats of possessiveness toward 

another.

(6) Stalking, as defined in RSA 633:3-a.

(7) Cruelty or violence directed toward pets.

RSA 597:2, IV(a) (emphases added); cf. Petition of Second Chance Bail Bonds, 

172 N.H. at ___ (slip op. at 7-8) (concerning the bail forfeiture statute).

Here, the trial court found the requisite evidence of posing a danger in 

the defendant’s use of alcohol, domestic violence, threats to kill the 

complainant, threats to shoot a door, discharge of a firearm, combativeness 
5

with the police, and being armed with two, loaded, semi-automatic pistols and 

a knife with a six-inch blade. The record also contains evidence that the 

defendant threatened to commit suicide and that he acted possessively toward 

the complainant by refusing to allow her to leave the apartment.

To the extent that the defendant argues that the trial court erred by not 

considering “circumstances outside the offense,” we disagree. Notably, no 

relevant “circumstances outside the offense” were brought to the trial court’s 

attention at the probable cause hearing. Moreover, the statute does not require 

the court to consider “circumstances outside the offense” when determining 

whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the person’s release will 

endanger “that person or the public.” RSA 597:2, IV(a). Nor, contrary to the 

defendant’s assertions, does the statute require the trial court to consider less 

restrictive alternatives to detention without bail before ordering such detention. 

Given the evidence before the trial court, we cannot conclude that it 

unsustainably exercised its discretion when it found by clear and convincing 

evidence that detention without bail was warranted in this case.

Affirmed.

LYNN, C.J., and BASSETT, HANTZ MARCONI, and DONOVAN, JJ., 

concurred.