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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

---o0o---

________________________________________________________________

PENNYMAC CORP.,

Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

LEWANNA GODINEZ,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

SCWC-18-0000185

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

(CAAP-18-0000185; CIV. NO. 13-1-0741)

OCTOBER 8, 2020

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND WILSON, JJ., AND 

CIRCUIT JUDGE BROWNING, ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY

OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J. 

I. INTRODUCTION

This case requires us to determine whether res 

judicata precludes a Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (“HRCP”) 

Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in a foreclosure 

proceeding. We conclude that it does not. 

Electronically Filed

Supreme Court

SCWC-18-0000185

08-OCT-2020

07:47 AM
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In 2017, the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit found 

Lewanna Godinez in default on her mortgage and granted summary 

judgment in favor of Respondent/Plaintiff PennyMac Corp.,

issuing a decree of foreclosure and entering final judgment. 

Before a foreclosure sale took place, Godinez filed an HRCP Rule 

60(b) motion, raising the issue of PennyMac’s standing to bring 

a foreclosure action against her. The circuit court denied the 

motion, and Godinez appealed. The Intermediate Court of Appeals 

(ICA) affirmed the circuit court’s denial, holding that res 

judicata barred Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) challenge to standing, 

citing to this court’s decision in Mortgage Electronic 

Registration Systems v. Wise, 130 Hawaiʻi 11, 17, 304 P.3d 1192, 

1198 (2013). 

We hold that res judicata did not preclude Godinez’s 

post-judgment HRCP Rule 60(b) motion and that Wise is 

inapplicable under these circumstances. Nevertheless, we agree 

with the ICA that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) motion. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of the ICA. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In December 2007, Godinez executed and delivered to 

Washington Mutual Bank, FA, a mortgage encumbering real property 
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on Maui as security for a promissory note.1 In September 2008, 

the United States Department of the Treasury closed Washington 

Mutual Bank, FA, appointing the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. 

In January 2010, Godinez defaulted on the note. The 

FDIC then assigned the Mortgage to J.P. Morgan Chase Bank in a 

Corporate Assignment of Mortgage. 

B. Circuit Court Proceedings

On July 5, 2013, Chase initiated foreclosure 

proceedings in the circuit court.2 While foreclosure proceedings 

were pending, in February 2014, Chase assigned its mortgage 

interest to PennyMac through a Hawaiʻi Assignment of Mortgage 

recorded on April 28, 2014. In May 2015,3 Chase filed a motion 

to substitute PennyMac as the plaintiff and “real party in 

interest.” The circuit court granted the motion and amended the

complaint and caption. 

In March 2016, PennyMac filed a motion for summary 

judgment asking the circuit court to find Godindez in default on 

the promissory note and mortgage, and issue a decree of 

 1 The mortgage was recorded in the State of Hawaiʻi Bureau of 

Conveyances on December 12, 2007. 

 

2 The Honorable Rhonda I.L. Loo presided.

3 Between April 3, 2014 and February 25, 2015, the case was put on 

hold for loss mitigation. 
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foreclosure. In support, PennyMac submitted a declaration 

attesting, “[PennyMac] has possession of the promissory note 

with standing to prosecute the instant action and the right to 

foreclose the subject Mortgage.” Godinez opposed the motion and 

argued, inter alia, that “PennyMac admittedly lacked standing at 

the time of the filing of the Complaint and therefore this Court 

lacks jurisdiction[.]” The circuit court held a hearing on 

PennyMac’s motion for summary judgment on June 28, 2016. At the 

close of the hearing, the court orally granted the motion. 

After the summary judgment hearing but before a 

written summary judgment order was filed, this court decided 

Bank of America, N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi 361, 390 P.3d 

1248 (2017), which held that “a foreclosing plaintiff must 

establish entitlement to enforce the note” by showing they had 

physical possession of it “at the time the action was 

commenced[.]” Id. at 368, 390 P.3d at 1255. Accordingly, on 

May 15, 2017,4 Godinez filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

standing, arguing “[PennyMac] clearly states [it was the] holder 

in due course of the note at the time of the verified complaint,

but do[es] not present evidence in any exhibits.” During a 

hearing on the motion, Godinez argued the then-recent decisions 

 4 On July 20, 2016, Godinez filed for bankruptcy, and the 

foreclosure proceedings were stayed until April 2017 when the bankruptcy 

proceedings terminated. 
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in Reyes-Toledo, and U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Mattos, 140 Hawaiʻi 26, 

398 P.3d 615 (2017), demonstrated that PennyMac lacked standing. 

In response, PennyMac argued that Godinez’s standing 

arguments were barred under the law of the case doctrine because 

the circuit court had already resolved the issue and orally 

granted PennyMac’s motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, 

recognizing that Reyes-Toledo required foreclosing parties to 

show they had possession of the note at the time the foreclosure 

complaint was filed, PennyMac asked the circuit court for “leave 

to supplement the record to support its (or its predecessor’s),

standing to commence this action.”

At the hearing on Godinez’s motion to dismiss for lack 

of standing, the circuit court applied the law of the case 

doctrine to the issue of standing and orally denied Godinez’s 

motion. The circuit court further discussed that in the 

interest of justice and judicial efficiency, the recent ReyesToledo decision did not warrant dismissal, and the court allowed 

PennyMac an opportunity to supplement the record to support its 

standing. Upon receipt of PennyMac’s supplemental Reyes-Toledo

declaration, on November 22, 2017, the circuit court entered 

written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order 

granting PennyMac’s motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, 

the circuit court issued the Foreclosure Decree and Judgment, 

appointing a Commissioner to oversee the sale. 
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Godinez did not appeal the order granting summary 

judgment or the Foreclosure Decree and Judgment. Instead, on 

January 16, 2018, Godinez filed a pro se HRCP Rule 60(b) motion 

for relief from the Foreclosure Decree. In the motion, Godinez 

alleged, inter alia, that newly discovered evidence rendered the 

Foreclosure Decree void and showed that PennyMac lacked 

standing. She maintained that the evidence was “newly 

discovered” because her previous attorney had “overlooked it.” 

PennyMac responded to Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) motion 

and argued, “all of the alleged new evidence could have been 

discovered by [Godinez] at any time prior to the entry of the 

Foreclosure [Decree], are not admissible or credible, and are 

not controlling in nature as to change the outcome of the 

Court’s ruling.” 

The circuit court summarily denied Godinez’s HRCP Rule 

60(b) motion, and Godinez filed a timely notice of appeal. 

C. ICA Summary Disposition Order

The ICA affirmed the circuit court in a Summary 

Disposition Order, noting that Godinez made “no discernible 

argument on appeal” that the circuit court abused its discretion 

in denying Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) motion. Further, the ICA 

held that “Godinez’s failure to appeal from the Foreclosure 

Decree and Judgment barred Godinez from now challenging 

PennyMac’s standing under the doctrine of res judicata,” citing 
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this court’s decision in Wise. (Emphasis added.) However, 

recognizing that res judicata could not be applied to void 

judgments, the ICA also observed, “[l]ack of standing does not 

render a court’s judgment void under HRCP Rule 60(b),” and 

quoted from this court’s decision in Tax Foundation of Hawaiʻi v. 

State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 188, 439 P.3d 127, 140 (2019): “[i]n 

Hawaiʻi state courts, standing is a prudential consideration 

. . . and is not an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.” 

Accordingly, the ICA concluded that the circuit court did not 

abuse its direction in denying Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) motion. 

Godinez filed an application for writ of certiorari 

asking this court to review one question: whether the ICA erred 

in holding that res judicata barred her from arguing that the 

plaintiff lacked standing in an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Res Judicata

“Application of res judicata is a question of law. 

Questions of law are reviewed de novo under the right/wrong 

standard.” Eastern Sav. Bank, FSB v. Esteban, 129 Hawaiʻi 154, 

157, 296 P.3d 1062, 1065 (2013) (citations omitted).

B. HRCP Rule 60(b)

A circuit court’s decision on an HRCP Rule 60(b) 

motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion: 
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[T]he trial court has a very large measure of discretion in 

passing upon motions under [HRCP] Rule 60(b) and its order 

will not be set aside unless we are persuaded that under 

the circumstances of the particular case, the court’s 

refusal to set aside its order was an abuse of discretion.

Hawaiʻi Hous. Auth. v. Uyehara, 77 Hawaiʻi 144, 147, 883 P.2d 65, 

68 (1994) (citations omitted).

“The burden of establishing abuse of discretion [in 

denying an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion] is on the appellant, and a 

strong showing is required to establish it.” Ditto v. McCurdy, 

103 Hawaiʻi 153, 162, 80 P.3d 974, 983 (2003).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Res Judicata Did Not Preclude Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) 

Motion

We have often recognized that “[a]ccording to the 

doctrine of res judicata, the judgment of a court of competent 

jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any court between the 

same parties or their privies concerning the same subject 

matter[.]” Kauhane v. Acutron Co., 71 Haw. 458, 463, 795 P.2d 

276, 278 (1990) (alterations and citation omitted). A party 

asserting res judicata has the burden of establishing: “(1) 

there was a final judgment on the merits, (2) both parties are 

the same or in privity with the parties in the original suit, 

and (3) the claim decided in the original suit is identical with 

the one presented in the action in question.” Bremer v. Weeks, 

104 Hawaiʻi 43, 54, 85 P.3d 150, 161 (2004). As we discussed in 
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Kauhane, the purpose of res judicata is to preclude successive 

litigation:

The purpose of the doctrine of res judicata is to 

prevent a multiplicity of suits and to provide a limit to 

litigation. It serves to relieve parties of the cost and 

vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, 

and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage 

reliance on adjudication. The res judicata doctrine thus 

furthers the interests of litigants, the judicial system 

and society by bringing an end to litigation where matters 

have already been tried and decided on the merits. It is a 

rule of fundamental and substantial justice, of public 

policy and private peace.

The doctrine therefore permits every litigant to have 

an opportunity to try his case on the merits; but it also 

requires that he be limited to one such opportunity. 

Unsatisfied litigants have a remedy: they can appeal 

through available channels. But they cannot, even if the 

first suit may appear to have been decided wrongly, file

new suits.

Kauhane, 71 Haw. at 463, 795 P.2d 278–79 (emphases added) 

(citations and alterations omitted). 

By definition, the doctrine of res judicata only 

applies to new suits: It is inapplicable in a continuation of 

the same suit. 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 

Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4404 (3d ed. 

2020) (“Res judicata applies as between separate actions, not 

within the confines of a single action on trial or appeal.”); 

cf. Ditto, 98 Hawaiʻi at 128 n.6, 44 P.3d at 279 n.6 (2002) 

(noting that the doctrine of collateral estoppel5 was 

 5 In the past, the term “res judicata” was used to describe both 

claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). 

See Exotics Hawaiʻi-Kona, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 104 Hawaiʻi 

358, 365 n.14, 90 P.3d 250, 257 n.14 (2004) (noting that the lack of 

distinction between the terms can lead to confusion). However, we have since 

clarified that, though “Hawaiʻi appellate cases may have conflated the two 
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inapplicable where the issues involved “essentially a 

continuation of the same suit and same claim”); see also

Esteban, 129 Hawaiʻi at 159, 296 P.3d at 1067 (applying res 

judicata based on a “previous lawsuit”); Bremer, 104 Hawaiʻi at

54, 85 P.3d at 161 (same, as to “original suit”); Kauhane, 71 

Haw. at 464, 795 P.2d at 279 (“both actions”); In re Bishop, 36 

Haw. 403, 416 (Haw. Terr. 1943) (“new action”).

Accordingly, the determinative question on appeal is 

whether Godinez’s post-judgment HRCP Rule 60(b) motion was a new 

action or a continuation of the same action. We conclude that 

that Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) motion was a continuation of the 

foreclosure decree and judgment, and therefore the ICA erred by 

applying the doctrine of res judicata.

1. An HRCP Rule 60(b) motion is a continuation of the

action

Although we have not addressed whether an HRCP Rule 

60(b) motion is a continuation of the original action, we have 

acknowledged that the primary purpose of the motion “is to 

authorize the reopening of a closed case or a final order.” Cho 

v. State, 115 Hawaiʻi 373, 383, 168 P.3d 17, 27 (2007) (emphasis 

 

doctrines,” “[c]laim preclusion and issue preclusion are . . . separate 

doctrines that involve distinct questions of law.” Esteban, 129 Hawaiʻi at 

158, 158 n.8, 296 P.3d at 1066, 1066 n.8. Nevertheless, even if the ICA 

intended the term “res judicata” to refer to issue preclusion, the result is 

the same because, as we explained in Ditto, both doctrines apply only in a 

second, subsequent case. 98 Hawaiʻi at 128 n.6, 44 P.3d at 279 n.6. 
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and citation omitted). We now clarify that an HRCP Rule 60(b) 

motion is a continuation of the original action. 

HRCP Rule 60(b) permits a party to seek relief from a 

“final judgment, order, or proceeding”:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 

relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a 

final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 

reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 

neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 

diligence could not have been discovered in time to move 

for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 

(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 

satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 

upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 

vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 

should have prospective application; or (6) any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation of the 

judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable 

time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one 

year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 

or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not 

affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 

Under the federal equivalent of HRCP Rule 60(b),6

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 60(b), federal 

courts have recognized that an FRCP Rule 60(b) motion is 

“considered ancillary to or a continuation of the original 

suit[.]” Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating, Inc., 627 F.2d 

792, 799 (7th Cir. 1980); see Charter Twp. of Muskegon v. City 

of Muskegon, 303 F.3d 755, 762-63 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[S]o long as 

the Rule 60 claim is one which seeks relief from judgment, it is 

 6 “Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) is 

essentially identical to HFCR Rule 60. Therefore, authorities interpreting 

the Federal Rules are ‘highly persuasive.’” Thomas-Yukimura v. Yukimura, 130 

Hawaiʻi 1, 7 n.16, 304 P.3d 1182, 1188 n.16 (2013) (citation omitted). 
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not considered an independent claim[.]”); Bankers Mortgage Co. 

v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1970); see also 12 

Moore’s Federal Practice - Civil § 60.61 (3d ed. 2020) (“A[n 

FRCP] Rule 60(b) motion is considered a continuation of the 

original proceeding.”). 

The Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides: “The 

[Rule 60(b)] motion is to be distinguished from a separate 

action, . . . to set aside a judgment, and from an attack on a 

judgment made defensively when the judgment in question is 

relied upon by an opposing party in the course of a subsequent 

action.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 78 Relief by 

Motion (Am. Law. Inst. 2020) (emphasis added). With regard to 

both state and federal Rule 60(b) motions, the Restatement notes

that “in most jurisdictions[,] the motion is regarded as a 

continuation of the original action[.]” Id.

PennyMac claims that “an appeal of an order disposing 

of a Rule 60(b) motion cannot be used [as] a vehicle to 

challenge an underlying judgment,” and similarly argues that 

Godinez “is not permitted in a Rule 60(b) motion to collaterally 

attack the lower court’s conclusion that Respondent had standing 

when Petitioner could have complained of that conclusion and the 

judgment thereon on direct appeal.” “A collateral attack ‘is an 

attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a proceeding not 

instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting or 
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modifying such judgment or decree.’” Kim v. Reilly, 105 Hawai‘i

93, 96, 94 P.3d 648, 651 (2004). A Rule 60(b) motion is 

therefore not a “collateral attack” — the purpose of Rule 60(b) 

is to provide a mechanism for challenging a final judgment.

HRCP Rule 60(b) (“On motion . . . the court may relieve a party 

or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment. . .”);

see also Watts v. Pinckney, 752 F.2d 406, 410 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(noting a Rule 60(b) motion is a direct attack on a judgment).

In sum, we conclude that Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) 

motion was not a new action but rather a continuation of the 

original foreclosure case.

2. Res judicata does not apply to an HRCP Rule 60(b)

motion

Godinez asserts the ICA erred in holding that res 

judicata barred her HRCP Rule 60(b) motion. She argues, “To 

hold that a Rule 60(b) motion is precluded under the doctrine of 

res judicata defies logic, procedure, is contrary to and 

inconsistent with [Wise], and in effect would completely nullify 

Rule 60(b).” She further argues, “Courts have long held that 

direct attacks on judgments under Rule 60(b) are not subject to 

res judicata,” citing a case from the Supreme Court of Alaska,

Dixon v. Pouncy, 979 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Alaska 1999), which in 

turn cited cases from the Sixth and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
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Appeal. We agree with Godinez and hold that the ICA erred in 

applying res judicata to her HRCP Rule 60(b) motion. 

As Godinez notes, a number of other states have held 

that res judicata generally does not apply to Rule 60(b) 

motions. See, e.g., Jones v. Murphy, 772 A.2d 502, 505 (Vt. 

2001); Dixon, 979 P.2d at 524; New Maine Nat. Bank v. Nemon, 588 

A.2d 1191, 1194 (Me. 1991); Pepper v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 

N.A., 801 P.2d 144, 150-51 (Utah 1990). Federal courts have 

likewise recognized that res judicata generally does not bar 

FRCP Rule 60(b) motions. See Watts, 752 F.2d at 410 (“Res 

judicata does not preclude a litigant from making a direct 

attack under Rule 60(b) upon the judgment before the court which 

rendered it.” (alteration omitted) (quoting Jordon v. Gilligan, 

500 F.2d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 1974)); cf. Estrada–Rodriguez v. 

Lynch, 825 F.3d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Collateral estoppel 

does not apply here because the . . . issue was not previously 

determined by a valid and final judgment in a prior action 

. . . . Instead, the . . . issue was determined at an earlier 

stage of the same action and was reconsidered pursuant to the 

reopening of the action.”). As the United States Supreme Court 

observed, “[i]t is clear that res judicata and collateral 

estoppel do not apply if a party moves the rendering court in 

the same proceeding to correct or modify its judgment.” Arizona 

v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619 (1983).
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PennyMac argues res judicata bars Godinez from 

relitigating the issue of standing, relying on a case from the 

Supreme Court of Ohio, Bank of America, N.A. v. Kuchta, 21 

N.E.3d 1040, 1045-47 (Ohio 2014), and an unpublished ICA 

decision, Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Lacuesta, No. CAAP-14-

0001121, 2017 WL 2117678, at *2 (Haw. App. May 15, 2017), which 

cited to Kuchta. In Kuchta, the court held that res judicata 

barred borrowers from challenging standing by filing a Rule 

60(b) motion. Id. at 1045. However, the Kuchta decision goes 

against the weight of authority on this issue, and so we find it 

unpersuasive.

In concluding res judicata applied to Godinez’s HRCP 

Rule 60(b) motion, the ICA relied on our decision in Mortgage 

Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Wise, 130 Hawaiʻi 11, 

304 P.3d 1192 (2013). But Wise does not control here because it 

involved a separate proceeding in which the doctrine of res 

judicata was properly applied.7

As we explained in Wise, “mortgage foreclosure 

proceedings may be treated as analogous to two separate

proceedings for res judicata purposes” because of their 

 7 We recognize that the ICA has applied res judicata as a bar to 

HRCP Rule 60(b) motions within the foreclosure context in numerous cases. 

See, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Panzo, Nos. CAAP-14-0001356, CAAP-15-0000660, 

2017 WL 1194002 (Haw. App. March 31, 2017); Nationstar Mortg. LLC v. 

Boonstra, No. CAAP-18-0000583, 2019 WL 2441427 (Haw. App. June 12, 2019). 

Our decision today does not disturb those prior decisions that have become 

final.
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“bifurcated nature[.]” Id. at 17, 304 P.3d at 1198 (emphasis 

added). As a result, we held that “res judicata would preclude 

[p]etitioners from challenging [r]espondent’s standing in their 

appeal from the order confirming sale” because “challenges to 

[r]espondent’s standing were subsumed under the foreclosure 

judgment, which had [become] final and binding.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Wise said nothing about Rule 60(b) motions, which we 

had previously recognized could be filed even after a 

foreclosure decree became final. Beneficial Hawai‘i, Inc. v. 

Casey, 98 Hawai‘i 159, 166, 45 P.3d 359, 366 (2002) (analyzing 

the merits of issues raised in a Rule 60(b) motion filed eleven 

months after the foreclosure decree entered).

Thus, our decision in Wise did not dispense with res 

judicata’s separate-action-or-proceeding requirement. Rather, 

Wise reinforced the notion that res judicata only applies 

between separate actions or proceedings. 130 Hawaiʻi at 19 n.12, 

304 P.3d at 1200 n.12 (“[B]y filing a motion [for the] 

confirmation of sale, [r]espondent may be understood to have in 

effect filed a separate action upon the judgment in a 

foreclosure action.” (emphasis added) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted)).

As Godinez argues, her HRCP Rule 60(b) motion was 

filed as a direct challenge to the Foreclosure Decree and 

Judgment. It was filed before the commencement of any 
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foreclosure sale or the inception of a separate action to 

confirm the sale.8 Under these circumstances, Wise was 

inapplicable and res judicata did not preclude Godinez from 

challenging standing. Accordingly, the ICA erred in this 

regard. 

B. The ICA Correctly Affirmed the Circuit Court’s Denial of 

Godinez’s Rule 60(b) Motion

Notwithstanding the incorrect application of res 

judicata, the ICA properly concluded that the circuit court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) 

motion. Trial courts are vested with “a very large measure of 

discretion” in deciding HRCP Rule 60(b) motions, Hawaiʻi Housing 

Authority v. Uyehara, 77 Hawaiʻi 144, 147, 883 P.2d 65, 68 

(1994), and, as the ICA recognized, “Godinez makes no 

discernible argument on appeal as to whether the [c]ircuit 

[c]ourt abused its discretion in entering the Order Denying 

Relief[.]” 

Godinez argues for the first time in her application 

for writ of certiorari that relief is warranted under HRCP Rule 

60(b)(6), the rule’s catch-all provision, which authorizes 

 8 As discussed below, the circuit court retains discretion to deny 

an HRCP Rule 60(b) motion even without application of res judicata. Thus, if 

Godinez had filed her motion after the foreclosure sale took place (or even 

just shortly before), the circuit court could have denied the motion as 

untimely because Rule 60(b) motions must be filed within a “reasonable time” 

or, alternatively, because a lender or third-party would be prejudiced by 

overturning the judgment. See 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 

Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2857 (3d ed. 2020). 
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relief for “any other reason justifying relief from the 

operation of the judgment,” based on PennyMac’s lack of 

standing. Relying on our decision in Tax Foundation, 144 Hawai‘i

at 192, 439 P.3d at 144, Godinez asserts that lack of standing 

is grounds for relief under HRCP Rule 60(b)(6), “especially as 

this [c]ourt has identified standing . . . [as] one of the 

‘prudential considerations of judicial self-governance.’” 

In response, PennyMac argues Godinez waived all of her 

arguments that relief was warranted under any provision of HRCP

Rule 60(b). But even if Godinez had not, “[t]here are simply no 

extraordinary circumstances that warrant extraordinary relief 

under HRCP Rule 60(b)(6).” We agree. 

1. Godinez’s argument that PennyMac lacked standing does 

not constitute “extraordinary circumstances”

A party seeking relief under HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) after 

the time for appeal has run must establish the existence of 

“extraordinary circumstances” that prevented or rendered them 

unable to prosecute an appeal. Uyehara, 77 Hawaiʻi at 148–49, 

883 P.2d at 69–70. This is because HRCP Rule 60(b)(6) “is not 

for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated and 

deliberate choices [they have] made.” Id. at 149, 883 P.2d at 

70 (quoting In re Hana Ranch Co., 3 Haw. App. 141, 147, 642 P.2d 

938, 942 (1982)). 
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Godinez has not demonstrated “extraordinary 

circumstances” sufficient for the relief requested. The record 

does not support Godinez’s claim that PennyMac lacked standing. 

The circuit court found that PennyMac had standing after 

PennyMac filed a declaration to comply with our decision in 

Reyes-Toledo. Given the circuit court’s unchallenged findings,9

Godinez has failed to demonstrate how the court abused its 

discretion in denying her HRCP Rule 60(b) motion.

2. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion by 

declining to reverse previously decided issues

“[A] fundamental precept of common-law adjudication is 

that an issue once determined by a competent court is 

conclusive.” Arizona, 460 U.S. at 619. This “general 

principle[] of finality and repose” is embodied in the law of 

the case doctrine, which provides that “when a court decides 

upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the 

same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.” Id. at 618. 

 9 Had there been reliable evidence that PennyMac lacked entitlement 

to enforce the promissory note because its predecessor-in-interest did not 

possess the note at the time the complaint was filed, a different outcome 

could be warranted. See Reyes-Toledo, 139 Hawaiʻi at 369, 390 P.3d at 1256 

(describing standing as a necessary safeguard given the “widespread problems 

created by the securitization of mortgages”); see also Deutsche Bank Nat. 

Trust Co. v. Johnston, 369 P.3d 1046, 1053 (N.M. 2016) (“Under these 

circumstances, not even the plaintiffs may be sure if they actually own the 

notes they seek to enforce.”). For example, issues related to standing could 

justify HRCP Rule 60(b) relief based on fraud or newly discovered evidence. 

However, not only has Godinez failed to demonstrate entitlement to relief 

under those sections of HRCP Rule 60(b), she has abandoned those arguments on 

appeal. Accordingly, Godinez has failed to demonstrate “extraordinary 

circumstances” sufficient to justify relief.
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20

Accordingly, the circuit court was within its discretion to 

leave an issue it had already decided undisturbed.

We have previously addressed the law of the case 

doctrine only as applied by lower courts on remand after an 

appeal. E.g., Ditto, 98 Hawaiʻi at 128, 44 P.3d at 279. The

doctrine can also be invoked by a trial court with respect to 

its own rulings, and in that instance, the doctrine is 

discretionary and operates as a presumption against 

reconsideration.10 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & 

Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4478.1 (2d ed. 

2020). Here, in adjuicating Godinez’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of standing, which was filed prior to Godinez’s Rule 60(b) 

motion, the circuit court refused to reconsider the issue based 

on the law of the case doctrine. It would not have been an 

abuse of discretion for the court to apply the same rule when 

faced with the same question in Godinez’s Rule 60(b) motion. 

Godinez fully litigated the question of standing 

before the trial court, filing numerous motions, challenging the 

documents submitted by PennyMac, and arguing the issue before 

 10 By contrast, when “the law of the case” has been established by 

an appellate court, the lower court is obliged to apply it. Ditto, 98 Hawaiʻi 

at 128, 44 P.3d at 279; see also Weinberg v. Mauch, 78 Hawaiʻi 40, 47, 890 

P.2d 277, 284 (1995) (“The doctrine of the law of the case states that a 

determination of a question of law made by an appellate court in the course 

of an action becomes the law of the case and may not be disputed by a 

reopening of the question at a later stage of litigation.” (citations and 

quotation marks omitted)). 
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21

the court at the summary judgment hearing as well as at the 

hearing on her motion to dismiss after this court decided ReyesToledo. Nothing in the record suggests that Godinez did not 

have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. And, as 

the ICA noted, Godinez failed to timely appeal from the circuit 

court’s summary judgment order. 

Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Godinez’s HRCP Rule 60(b) motion, and the 

ICA properly affirmed the circuit court’s decision.

V. CONCLUSION

Subject to the foregoing clarification, we affirm the 

ICA’s January 10, 2020 Judgment on Appeal.

Gary Victor Dubin and /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald

Frederick J. Arensmeyer

for petitioner /s/ Paula A. Nakayama

Patricia J. McHenry, /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna

Peter T. Stone and

Sun Young Park /s/ Michael D. Wilson

for respondent

/s/ R. Mark Browning