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A-16



Background on DMGs

DMGs are low-fidelity, paper-and-pencil simulations of incidents that might occur in
battlefield environments. A DMG presents a dilemma with high levels of uncertainty. Each
participant has a limited amount of time to consider how he would react, which adds time
pressure to the exercise. DMGs are intended to provide low-cost experiential training, and to
allow practice in rapid decision making. They also provide a context for teaching and
practicing the other exercises. DMG originator, John Schmitt, describes how a DMG is
played in the following text:

Playing a [DMG] is very simple. Putting yourself in the role of the
commander, you read (or have described to you) the situation; within an
established time limit you decide what plan to adopt and communicate that
plan in the form of the orders you would issue to you unit if the situation were
for real. You provide an overlay of your plan. Then, and this is an important
part of the process, you explain the plan as a means of analyzing why you did
what you did (1994, p. 3).

DMGs can provide several benefits to those engaged in a DMG seminar. The learning
objectives for participating in DMGs are to:

improve one’s ability to make decisions quickly and effectively;
begin to make better sense of new situations, see patterns, and spot opportunities
and options that were not seen before;

¢ become more comfortable with a variety of different situations;
develop more advanced and ambitious tactics; and
become more familiar with weapons capabilities, employment techniques, and
other technical details.

DMGs can be used by trainers to: allow their trainees to practice rapid decision
making; get their trainees to more deeply reflect upon the reasoning behind their decisions;
allow trainees to rehearse decision-making elements of a field exercise prior to that exercise;
and reinforce lessons that the trainer covered in a lecture. DMGs can be tailored to specific
decision areas in the DMG design process.

Perhaps the most important benefit of DMGs is that they can provide participants
with practice in battlefield decision making in a safe, cost-effective manner. While they can
never fully simulate the stresses of real military conflict scenarios, DMGs can expose the
participants to a wide range of challenging battlefield decisions, if they are developed
properly.

While a DMG can be developed by simply creating a situation and environment, and
then requiring some action, a more focused approach to development can result in a higher
quality DMG. By starting the development process by focusing on specific challenging
decisions that an envisioned participant can be expected to face, a DMG can be created that
forces the participant to deal with those decisions. In this way, DMGs can be tailored to

20



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

A Directorate of the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command

EDGAR M. JOHNSON
Director

Research accomplished under contract
for the Department of the Army

Klein Associates Inc.
Technical review by

Kenneth L. Evans
_ Rex R. Michel

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this Research Report has been made by ARI.
Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Attn: TAPC-ARI-PO, 5001
Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This Research Report may be destroyed when it is no longer
needed. Please do not return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral
and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this Research Report are not to be construed as an official
Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.



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B-10



window, through a ground level wall, through a door, and even through underground sewer
pipes. Given the wide variety of entry point possibilities, the need for three-dimensional
thought in MOUT environments becomes clearly apparent. The critical decisions within this
decision requirement are:

determining the strengths and vulnerabilities of the building and its inhabitants;
determining the point of entry (where to enter the building);

determining entry technique and equipment to be used (how to enter the building);
considering the tradeoff between a stealth versus a speedy entry; and

if taking fire, assessing whether to enter the building or drop back and reassess
the situation.

Determine how to clear the building. This decision requirement involves the actual
clearing of the building, room-by-room and floor by floor. Many challenges arise for the
platoon leader during this stage of the operation. His job is to orchestrate the clearing, which
entails split-second decisions to direct his clearing teams, limited yet critical communication
with the clearing and support (outside the building) teams, construction of situation
awareness inside and around the building, and judgments of the welfare and morale of the
platoon. The critical decisions and judgments within this decision requirement are:

assessing the situation within the building;

determining the flow of the clearing:

determining how to employ personnel and teams;

determining how and where to proceed;

communicating directions and information;

determining how and when to evacuate casualties;

determining whether to request reinforcements or call for fire;
determining the mental and physical state of the soldiers;
determining when the clearing is completed; and

determining whether rooms in the building are manned by the enemy.

Determine how to maintain and extend security. During the process of the actual

clearing it is imperative that the clearing unit secure areas of the building that have already
been cleared. The purpose of this decision requirement is to ensure that “clean” areas remain
clean, that the enemy cannot enter and clear the building behind your unit, thereby regaining
control and posing a significant threat to the clearing unit. The technique frequently used by
platoon leaders to maintain security entails tasking one clearing team (generally four
soldiers) to clear two-three rooms (depending on the building and the circumstances of the
mission) and then remain in or near the rooms to keep them secure. A second clearing team
will leapfrog the first and take responsibility for clearing the next set of rooms, securing
them, and so on. This technique not only enables good security, but also maximizes the
effectiveness of the clearing unit; when mental and physical exhaustion sets in from clearing
a few rooms, the team is given a crucial yet less demanding task.

The critical decision faced by the platoon leader during this phase of the operation is
determining where to place security elements.

10



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B-5



progresses, and especially as it reaches the echelon of the participant, it should get
into specifics.

Is there a good level of time pressure? A DMG should put participants in a crunch.
They should feel as if they are truly pressured. They have little time to sit and wait.
They must make some sort of decision. If “sit and wait” is an acceptable answer to
the DMG, then there is not enough time pressure. Add chaos or enemy action to
increase the pressure. Conversely, if there is only time for a knee-jerk response to the
dilemma, it is unrealistic for participants to think out a detailed response. For
example, if the DMG places a platoon leader out in the open being directly fired upon
by an enemy soldier 50 meters away, the obvious response is to drop and return fire.
This is too much time pressure to create a situation where complex decision making
can be practiced.

Does DMG contain uncertainty? The right level of uncertainty is critical in a DMG. If
everything is known — exact enemy and friendly locations, sizes, capabilities,
resources, intents, and every square meter of terrain — this creates an unrealistic and
simple DMG that will produce little variation in responses. The real battlefield is
fraught with uncertainty. A good amount of uncertainty enhances a DMG and allows
for multiple interpretations of the situation. Different assumptions are made and
different courses of action are taken, leading to a DMG seminar filled with learning.
The DMG should not tell participants everything about the situation; it should leave
some unknowns. However, a DMG should not be designed with so much uncertainty
that no decision can be made at all. To test the level of uncertainty, ask colleagues to
participate in the DMG and assess whether they contain too much or too little
uncertainty.

Are there multiple acceptable courses of action? The most common error in creating a
DMG, especially when it is based on one’s own personal experiences, is to create it
with a specific “right answer” in mind. This virtually guarantees an unsuccessful
DMG ~ a leading DMG that has only one acceptable answer. As you review your
DMG, ask yourself whether you had one answer in mind when developing it. If so,
change the characteristics of the game to make it more complex. Also, have
colleagues evaluate the DMG to see whether they can think of more than one
acceptable answer. A good DMG will leave a participant thinking, “What a mess I am
in!”

Does DMG force a tough decision? Just as there should be multiple acceptable
courses of action, there should also be no perfect course of action. The participant
should feel like he has been placed on the hot seat where he must do something, but
he is not at all clear what to do. DMGs should not be “no-brainers.” A good DMG
forces a participant to make a tough decision. At the end of a DMG session,
participants should come out with lessons learned, but not a shared vision of one right
answer.

27



UNFOLDING SITUATION

1* squad, accompanied by your platoon sergeant, secures the perimeter and the rest of the
platoon then approaches the building without incident. 1° squad is currently maintaining

security around the perimeter. 2" squad has entered the building and 3" squad has just entered
behind them.

You are now directly outside the building by the doorway. You suddenly hear a brief
exchange of gunfire and information starts coming in:

SL2: “We got one bad guy in the first room to the right. He fired, but we took him out
without any hits on us. We’re moving on.”

SLI: “Sir one of my men just saw a gun in the southeast comer window on the second
story. He thought it looked bigger than a°47. We also just picked up on some gunfire coming
from inside the building. Sir, some civilians out here are trying to tell us to get away from here.
They look pretty upset, but we can’t understand them.

SL3: “24 squad has just cleared the room to the right. No one there. It’s secure for you
enter. We’re moving on behind second squad.”

Aa EERREREeereeeees

Time-out #1

Participants record answers to these questions. Give them two minutes to answer the
questions. Inform them of this time limit to keep their answers concise.

5. What is current threat size, location and intent?
6. What would you do at this point:
a. Continue the building-clearing mission.
b. Evacuate the building and call for reinforcements.
c. Have squads hold positions while you gather info and talk to Platoon Sgt.

D4



points, questions to be answered at the stopping points, and a facilitation process to be used
at the conclusion of the scenario. This exercise became Version 2.0.

The second step was to run through the SA Appreciation Exercise Version 2.0 to
determine strengths and weaknesses. This was done with a group of four Klein Associates
researchers. The researchers played the roles of platoon leaders and participated in the
exercise. One of the findings was that the facilitation section was too long. This was
streamlined in the revision so that only key points were addressed and fewer participants
answered each question. The scenario was also modified to include more ambiguous cues.
One of the problems with the scenario was that each piece of information in the story had
meaning. Several cues unrelated to the story development were subsequently incorporated as
distractions. The sound of breaking glass is one example. This cue is not important to the
story in that it is not tied to an enemy action. The participants, however, do not know this and
may be distracted into thinking the cue has importance. The output of this step was a revised
version of the exercise, SA Appreciation Exercise Version 3.0.

Version 3.0 was then tested with a second group of Klein Associates researchers in
the third step. Three individuals played the roles of platoon leaders and participated in the
exercise. The goal was to determine whether the revisions to the story and the facilitation
were effective. Feedback from our senior military consultant was also solicited at this point.
One of the major findings was that an aspect of the story was inconsistent with typical enemy
behavior. Some of the cues suggested that the enemy was luring the U.S. troops into an
ambush while other cues suggested that the enemy was caught unaware and simply
defending themselves. One of the inconsistencies was removed while purposefully retaining
ambiguity about enemy intent. In an effort to further streamline the facilitation, the number
of stopping points was reduced from three to two stopping points. At the conclusion of this
demonstration there was not agreement about the facilitation. Therefore, two versions were
developed. The versions differed in both the questions asked at each stopping point and the
questions and discussion covered in the facilitation.

Versions 4.1 and 4.2 were tested with Blackbirds at IOBC. Half the Blackbirds (five
people) participated in Version 4.1 and the other half participated in Version 4.2. The
answers, discussion, and feedback generated from each version were recorded and used to
make the final revision. The major finding was that questions about the participants’ SA and
their subsequent courses of action were the most fruitful questions. The facilitation was
revised to more heavily emphasize these questions and draw the link between SA and
actions. The final version can be seen in Appendix D.

Discussion

Based on the demonstration with the IOBC Blackbirds, the SA Appreciation Exercise
appears to be an effective tool for addressing the stated learning objectives. It is a forum to
help platoon leaders understand the importance of SA, how SA develops in a MOUT
operation, and how SA affects actions and outcomes. One of the strengths of the tool is that it
demonstrates these objectives in the context and chaos of a MOUT mission. This helps
participants visualize the importance of SA in context. Another strength is that it helps

34



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A-21



Basic DMG

Advanced DMG

Subtlety of cues

Cues are clearly presented.
Cues form a clear, easily-

recognizable picture.

No irrelevant cues are

presented.

Few cues needed to form
accurate representation of

situation.

Little inferencing needed

to interpret cues.

High number of cues
presented.

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interpretations of situation .
Cues are fuzzy.

Cues not experienced first-
hand.

Multiple cues needed to form
representation of situation.
Significant inferencing needed
to interpret cues.

Organizations
Involved

Within unit.

Interaction required with other
units, other services, other
agencies and organizations.

Number and
severity of
complicating
events

No unexpected events.

Equipment functions
properly (comms,
vehicles, etc.).

No casualties.

Team performs as trained.
Weather doesn’t preclude

normal operations.
Simplistic terrain.

Little time pressure (in

situation; but in practice,
time limit still enforced).

Unexpected events.

Equipment malfunctions or is
damaged.

Casualties.

Inexperienced team members.
Weather adversely affects
operations.

Complicated terrain.

High time pressure (situation is
developing rapidly).

Resources
available

Unlimited supplies.

Unit has access to optimal
transport configuration for

situation.

Unit is at full strength and

well-trained.

Unit morale/readiness is

high.

Radios are fully functional.

Limited supplies, given the
current situation.

Implied need to conserve
supplies, given uncertainty of
future events.

Transport capabilities not ideal
for situation.

Unit at or near lowest
acceptable operational
strength.

Multiple members of team are
inexperienced.

Unit morale low/fatigue high.
Radios are intermittently
functional.

30



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A-24



d. Evacuate the building and determine another entry/clearing strategy.
e. Call your company CO and ask for guidance.
f. Other. What?

7. What is your greatest concem at this moment?

8. What do you think the situation will look like in the next 5 minutes?

Continue with the scenario...

As you enter the building, you look into the room on the right. You see a dead man next
to a table with some official-looking documents lying around him. The room on the left is
empty, except for two rows of about 10 cots. Directly ahead is a wall, with a hallway splitting
left and right. The squad member guarding the room tells you that 2" squad has gone left and 3"
squad has gone right.

1* squad reports in: “Sir, we have an unarmed man on the roof. Wait, he just jumped
back into the room that had the big gun.”

You decide to continue the mission as planned. [Company CO gave you the go-ahead to
continue the clearing.] You think you hear a door slamming upstairs, and somewhere in the
building the sound of breaking glass echoes through the hallways. Next, you hear both squads
clearing rooms to the left and right, but no firing. In a moment of rare silence you again hear the
sound of breaking glass from somewhere on the first story, followed by what you think are
footsteps directly above you on the second story.

Suddenly, gunfire erupts from somewhere in the building, ahead and to the left as far as
you can tell. You hear return gunfire, as well as yelling of what sounds like frantic orders from
one of your squad leaders.

3" squad reports: “Hearing fire ahead and to the left of our position! Could be 2TM squad.
All clear in the building to the right!”

2TM squad leader call in: “We’re taking fire from the stairs! They’re heading up. We’re
following the...” Suddenly an explosion blasts from where you believe 2" squad to be. You
assume from the magnitude of the blast that at least a couple of your platoon members are likely
to be seriously hurt.

It’s hard to tell what just happened, especially since smoke from the blast is filling the
hallways. You now hear a heavy exchange ahead and to your left, though smoke prevents you
from seeing anything.

You hear an exchange of gunfire from the right rear comer of the building.



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A-2



| This game is an all out war situation in which U.N. forces have halted the advance of invading forces
|“) and are now pushing the remaining enemy battalion back toward their national boundary. The

-<-..} scenario entails clearing a grocery store believed to be occupied by as many as 5-6 enemy soldiers. The
grocery store is a one-story building with only one main entrance —a large glass double-door entry. The
platoon is currently operating at 60% with no anti-tank weapons or javelins.

BASIC

: Decision Requirements |

Addressed in the DMG _

Critical Decisions Faced

by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context

| to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

Le Mai

© Maintain big picture
&SA.

in enemy
perspective.

| « Determine how to

secure the perimeter.

| © Determine how to
approach the building. |

° Determine how to
enter the building.

Maintain awareness of
sectors of fire for all
friendly units.

Determine how to seal
off the area.

Determine where to
place security assets.
Identify hazards,
constraints, and
constrictions.
Determine point of
entry.

Determine entry
technique and
equipment to be used.
Determine how to
employ personnel and
teams.

Identify the most likely |

enemy location.

« Vehicles on the street.

© Street and building
sizes and locations.

© Building separations.

© Intel reports of

estimated enemy sizes.
¢ Sketch of grocery.

¢ Partially broken glass
door in front of
building.

* Resource limitations -
Platoon strength level,
lack of anti-tank and
javelin weapons.

« Time of day.

« Company commander
time requirement for
clearing.

© Roof characteristics ~
Flat with standard
ducts and graveled tar
surface.

‘oticing key urban
terrain in order to
anticipate enemy
actions.

© Assessing tradeoffs
regarding. breach’
entry points.

« Assessing different

routes of approach.



This report documents the development of the Decision Skills Training. We begin by
discussing how we used CTA methodologies to validate and expand the decision
requirements of platoon leaders in MOUT that were derived from the initial CTA, and how
the refined requirements were used as the basis for training development. We continue by
describing how MOUT scenarios, called Decision Making Games (DMGs), are developed.
DMGs are the foundation of the decision training. A set of MOUT DMGs that address the
decision requirements identified through the CTA are incorporated in IMPACT. Finally, we
describe the Situation Awareness Appreciation Exercise.

Another report related to the effort has been written under separate title. Evaluating
an Approach to MOUT Decision Skills Training? describes an evaluation study conducted at
the U.S. Military Academy at West Point whereby the Decision Skills Training program and
IMPACT were assessed as tools to improve decision-making performance.

I. COGNITIVE TASK ANALYSIS
Overview

The cornerstone of our approach to developing decision-centered training for Army
soldiers in MOUT operations is Cognitive Task Analysis. CTA is the process of
understanding the cognitive complexities of a task. It provides a set of tools for eliciting and
representing general and specific knowledge pertaining to a particular activity, in this case,
MOUT decision making. CTA allows us to go beyond procedural knowledge and the
behavioral aspects of MOUT operations. The purpose is to get inside the soldier’s head, and
try to understand the “cognitive map” that guides his decision-making processes. We must
understand how both novice and experienced soldiers view their environments, and what
critical cues, expectancies, and goals they require to make a good decision in a specific
context. Employing CTA allows us to understand many of the cognitive aspects involved in
the judgment, decision-making, and problem-solving skills that are so critical in the uncertain
and ever-changing MOUT environment.

CTA methods evolved from the study of Naturalistic Decision Making (Klein,
Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993; Zsambok & Klein, 1997). They comprise
techniques for both eliciting and representing knowledge, and provide a means to identify
and articulate the cognitive demands and skills related to a given task. In MOUT
environments, proficient task performance places cognitive demands on the platoon leader as
well as physical ones. These cognitive demands include such activities as decision making,
judging, problem solving, and situation assessment. These cognitive demands serve as the
drivers of the physical tasks. That is, the platoon leader often must make some judgment or
decision before knowing which procedure or action to implement.

CTA provided us with a set of tools for eliciting general domain knowledge as well as
specific knowledge pertaining to the cognitive demands for MOUT environments. (These
tools will be discussed in further detail below.) The results of the CTA provide a framework

3 The ARI Technical Report, “Evaluating an Approach to MOUT Decision Skills Training,” can be obtained
through the U.S. Army Research Institute or through DTIC.



FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) has
been conducting research over the past several years to better understand the challenges of
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Such operations place great demands on
military personnel for new types of technical skill. They also generate a peculiar set of
cognitive requirements related to a wide range of judgments and decisions necessary in an
urban setting. It is critical our military be prepared for MOUT because the U.S., in large
measure, is a victim of its own successes. Due to our technological superiority, few
adversaries will be tempted to engage us in conventional warfare. At the same time, the
specter of urban conflict offers attractive advantages to adversaries, such as the potential loss
of civilian life, destruction of important landmarks, ease of access for media coverage, and
increased potential to inflict injuries on our soldiers with relatively unsophisticated weapons
systems. To make matters worse, the U.S. military has spent much less time preparing for
MOUT than for conventional warfare, and has comparatively less expertise upon which to
draw.

This report is the third of four Klein Associates research products developed under a
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) contract aimed at training platoon leaders to
make more accurate and timely decisions during urban operations. It offers a detailed and
comprehensive accounting of the decision-making requirements of platoon leaders in
building clearing missions, as well as the analytical procedures used to identify those
requirements. It also illustrates the process by which training materials were developed after
platoon leader decision requirements had been identified.

Recently, we published a guide for the warfighting community that provided an
overview of the decision requirements platoon leaders will face in the process of clearing
buildings, perhaps the most procedurally complicated and dangerous of all MOUT tasks
(ARI Research Product 2001-02). It was based on interviews with veterans having
substantial urban combat experience and it provided a non-technical introduction to much of
the material contained in the present report. This year we also released a CD-based instructor
training program called IMproving Performance through Applied Cognitive Training
(IMPACT). Appropriate for either institutional or unit training, IMPACT enables instructors
to facilitate their own Decision Making Game sessions, to create their own Decision Making
Game scenarios, and to help platoon leaders become better at making platoon-level MOUT
decisions. In the near future, we anticipate publishing a technical report of an evaluation of
the IMPACT program using cadets and instructors at the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point, NY. The results of this research were presented to the Director, Combined Arms
Training Directorate, U.S. Army Infantry School in May 01.

TA M. SIMUTIS
‘echnical Director



REFERENCES

Chi, M. T. H., Glaser, R., & Farr, M. J. (Eds.). (1988). The nature of expertise. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Crandall, B., & Getchell-Reiter, K. (1993). Critical decision method: A technique for
eliciting concrete assessment indicators from the "intuition" of NICU nurses. Advances

in Nursing Sciences. 16(1), 42-51. |

Crandall, B. W., Kyne, M., Militello, L., & Klein, G. A. (1992). Describing expertise in one- |
on-one instruction (Contract MDA903-91-C-0058 for U.S. Army Research Institute,
Alexandria, VA). Fairborn, OH: Klein Associates Inc.

Ericsson, K. A. (1996). The acquisition of expert performance: An introduction to some of
the issues. In K. A. Ericsson (Ed.), The road to excellence: The acquisition of expert
performance in the arts and sciences, sports, and games (pp. 1-50). Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Ericsson, K. A., & Smith, J. (1991). Toward a general theory of expertise: Prospects and
limits. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

Erwin, S. I. (2000, Aug.). Army wants fast combat decision making. National Defense.
85(561), 32. |

Feltovich, P. J., Ford, K. M., & Hoffman, R. R. (1997). Expertise in context. Menlo Park,
CA: AAAI Press/The MIT Press.

Grau, L. W., & Kipp, J. W. (1999, Jul/Aug). Confronting the specter. Military Review, 79(4),
9-17.

Hoffman, R. R., Crandall, B. W., & Shadbolt, N. R. (1998). Use of the critical decision
method to elicit expert knowledge: A case study in cognitive task analysis methodology.
Human Factors, 40(2), 254-276.

Klein Associates Inc. (1999). Decision skills training: Instructor guide (Prepared under
contract #N00178-97D-1043 for the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory ). Fairborn,
Ohio: Klein Associates Inc.

Klein, G. (1997). The recognition-primed decision (RPD) model: Looking back, looking
forward. In C. E. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds.), Naturalistic decision making (pp. 285-
292). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Klein, G. A. (1989). Recognition-primed decisions. In W. B. Rouse (Ed.), Advances in man-
machine systems research (Vol. 5, pp. 47-92). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc.

37



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B-13



U.S. Army Research Institute
for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Research Report 1776

Decision-Centered MOUT Training
for Small Unit Leaders

Jennifer Phillips, Michael J. McCloskey, Patricia L. McDermott,
Sterling L. Wiggins, Deborah A. Battaglia, Marvin L. Thordsen,
and Gary Klein
Klein Associates, Inc.

‘ August 2001

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

20010925 270



Research Report 1776

Decision-Centered MOUT Training
for Small Unit Leaders

Jennifer Phillips, Michael J. McCloskey, Patricia L. McDermott,
Sterling L. Wiggins, Deborah A. Battaglia, Marvin L. Thordsen,
and Gary Klein
Klein Associates, Inc.

Infantry Forces Research Unit
Scott E. Graham, Chief

U.S. Army Research institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences
5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

August 2001

nD

Army Project Number Small Business
20665502M770 Innovative Research

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

iii



Nothing in these ROE limits your right to take appropriate action to defend yourself
and your unit.

e In this high-intensity conflict, you have the right to use force to take appropriate
action to defend yourself and your unit, and to achieve your mission.
Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act.
U.S. forces can use any force deemed necessary under the circumstances and
proportional to the threat.

¢ Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons, self-defense, or to support
achievement of the mission.

Some ROE are subject to interpretation, such as “U.N. forces can use any force
deemed necessary under the circumstances and proportional to the threat.” It is up to the
soldiers to use their judgment in interpreting the ROE, and applying them to their particular
situations. This adds to the uncertainty and complexity in decision making that is
encountered during the DMG. Since we decided to keep Wrap It Up at the Basic level, we
limited the number of rules, and made them somewhat flexible. When developing DMGs at
higher levels of difficulty, or where the operative decisions are impacted by ROE (i.e., ROE
is one factor in the DRT), the ROE can be modified accordingly. As a general rule of thumb,
incorporate ambiguous or prohibitive ROE to increase the challenge for the participants.
Limit ROE to a maximum of 6-10 statements for the purposes of a classroom exercise. To
emphasize the learning objective of interpreting ROE, provide the same DMG twice,
changing only the ROE, and discuss how actions would differ as a result.

Step 7: Set the Requirement, checking the Why Difficult? column

The Requirement dictates how much time participants have to come up with an
answer, and what form the answer should take. The form might be verbal orders, sketches on
amap, written orders, or a list of considerations. We set the requirement so that participants
feel a significant amount of time pressure, but not so much that they cannot produce a
reasonable order. For platoon-level exercises, a 2-minute time requirement usually works. To
increase realism and provide practice in communication, we require participants to write
down and then verbally issue their orders. To prevent participants from producing vague
responses, we require them to sketch out their actions on the map or diagram. The
Requirement statement is typically one or two sentences.

Often, the Why Difficult? column will provide additional information that suggest
modifications to the DMG Requirement statement. For example, if a decision is made more
difficult because a platoon leader is typically out of communication with his squad leaders,
part of the Requirement may be to develop a plan to convey your orders to the squad leaders.

Step 8: Integrate Cues and Factors into Map/Diagram, using Why Difficult? to modify
The visual representation of the situation is generally a map or diagram of the area of

operations. These visual aids are critical elements of the DMGs. They provide the visual
context that cannot be presented within a textual description. Pictures or photographs need to

25



Ep

i Le
6: WRAPITUP

[
| The overall situation is an all out war in which U.N. forces are pushing enemy forces out of the
iddle-Eastern country they have invaded. In this scenario, the platoon is reloading supplies
| in a deserted town where no enemy have been encountered. In the midst of the supply reload,

| the company commander. orders the platoon leader to move to his position, 2 km north, to assist
>| him in a firefight. However, comms go out mid-sentence and the severity of the engagement is
| unclear to the platoon leader. Then, the squad conducting the reload begins to take fire from

| enemy elements across the street.

“ Decision Requirements
| Addressed in the DMG

Critical Decisions
Faced by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from ©
Decision Requirement

_ © Lead subordinates.

© Determine how to
secure the perimeter.

« Determine how to
approach the buil

BASIC _

| e Judge the combat
effectiveness of
individuals.

© Maintain control of
subordinates.

© Determine which
assets and people to
employ.

« Determine where to
concentrate fires.

© Determine how to
obscure the
approach.

| e Determine how to

| navigate the streets

| © General over-relaxed

attitude of platoon —
jovial, guard is let
down.

© Presumed and evident
enemy locations and
weapons.

* Street sizes and
layouts.

¢ Building sizes and
layouts.

« Reported enemy
strength and locations
based on rates of fire.

Visibility — dark night.

e Judging enemy |
strength and intent.
Balancing resources. |
* How to coordinate |
the machine gun |
elements when the
platoon has already
been engaged.

© Street crossing in
area where enemy is
likely to have line of
sight.



L
i
|

DMG 1: TWO INTERSECTIONS - A

This operation is an all out war scenario in which U.N. forces are assisting an allied country in
removing an organized invasion force from a neighboring country. The scenario involves a pre-dawn
mission to enter and clear the two-story courthouse. Initial reconnaissance has spotted an enemy

| platoon set up on the east side of the town, and a sniper positioned in a tower with line of sight to the

area around the courthouse. Upon approaching the courthouse the platoon spots 2 single enemy
| soldier patrolling on the west side of the town in the vicinity of the courthouse.

Decision Requirements : Critical Decisions \
Addressed in the DMG _ | Faced by Participants |

Primary Cues & Factors | Teaching/Discussion

| Incorporated as Context | Points Resulting from
to Influence the Decision | Decision Requirement |

© Determine how to | © Determine how to

« Determine how to

BASIC_

secure the perimeter.
Maintain the enemy’s

perspec:

seal off the area. i
| © Determine where to
place security assets.
| Identify the most
approach the building. likely enemy |
locatio:

.

the most
likely enemy course

| of action.

| © Determine route
and/or method of

| approach.

¢ Identify hazards,

constraints, and

_ © Determine how to
obscure the |
approach.

| © Determine how to
navigate streets.

| © Opportur

| @ Sueet size.

| © Cover/concealment

|e Highest buildings.

ties for cover
and concealment

© Perceived best ai
support fire.

fire position in street
crossi
imagini
enemy locations.
Street crossing in
area where enemy is
likely to have line of
sight.
Det
structures | to split fo:
° Weather.
Enemy activity inthe |
areca. |
© Windows knocked out. |
Buildings that control
intersections.

¢ Locations’characteristi
cs of building:
¢ Hazards and |
constrictions identified. |

28,

.

« Leverage points within
the city.

© Level of intensity of
conflict,

termining whether |



cognitive aspects related to that decision requirement. These cognitive aspects include:

the critical decisions and judgments relevant to each decision requirement,

the unique challenges of each critical decision or judgment (why the decision is
difficult),

the subtle cues (pieces of information that are directly perceived from the
environment) and other factors (pieces of general background knowledge) that
shape the decision, and

the strategies employed or aspects of expertise possessed by the decision maker.

The decision requirements identified in this effort fall into two distinct, yet related,
categories. The first category is the task-focused decision requirements. These six
requirements are the steps involved in a building-clearing operation. They are linear in nature
in that the platoon leader will generally address them one at a time and in the order presented
below. The task-focused decision requirements are:

Determine how to secure the perimeter
Determine how to approach the building
Determine how to enter the building
Determine how to clear the building

Determine how to maintain and extend security
Determine how to evacuate the building

The second category is task-independent decision requirements. These five decision
requirements are critical across all stages of a building-clearing mission. At any point during
the operation all of these decision requirements should be active. The task-independent
decision requirements are:

Maintain the enemy’s perspective (Think like the enemy)
Lead subordinates

Maintain the big picture and situation awareness

Project into the future

Understand and apply Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Figure 1 depicts the relationships between the decision requirements. The decision
requirements inside the boxes are task-focused. The decision requirements in the ovals
surrounding the boxes are task-independent, and apply across all of the task-focused decision
requirements. While each decision requirement has a distinct nature, there is tremendous
interdependence among the decisions during application. Placement of perimeter security
will influence the decisions made during the approach, entry, and clearing of the building.
Information collected during the approach and entry will impact the manner in which the
platoon leader instructs the clearing to occur. The method by which the platoon leader
decides to clear the building will affect the location and technique by which he will decide to
approach and enter the building. The way in which the clearing proceeded will impact the
decisions related to extracting the platoon from the building.



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This DMG can be conducted as follow-on to A Hot Time in Slackia ~ Part A, or as a stand-alone DMG.
In this DMG, the platoon leader is tasked with securing an intersection in a war-torn village, for an
upcoming Red Cross relief effort. A small group of armed civilians has holed up in a bank and have
shot out into the intersection with assault weapons, hitting several civilians. Now, the platoon leader
discovers that the armed civilians have hostages in the bank, and gunfire is heard inside. The civilians
outside are starting to throw rocks at the platoon, and one is filming the platoon with a camcorder. The |
platoon leader has been ordered to secure the situation.

Decision Requirements
Addressed in the DMG

|
i
i

Critical Decisions Faced
by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context

to Influence the Decision |

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

¢ Maintain big picture
&SA.
Project into the
future.
Interpreting and
applying ROE.
¢ Determine how to
approach the building.
© Determine how to
enter the building.

¢ Determine route’
method of approach.

¢ Determine how to
navigate the streets.

* Determine how to
obscure the assault.

| © Determine the

strengths and
vulnerabilities of the
building and its
inhabitants.

© Consider tradeoff
between stealth and
speed.

© Asses the big picture
situation.

¢ Maintain awareness of
civilians in the area.

© Set expectancies.

© Determine where to
proceed next.

* Mission and ROE.

¢ History of civilian
attitudes toward
peacekeeping forces.
Sketch of internal
layout of building.
Inability of company
commander to assist.
Civilians believed to be
in neighboring
buildings.

Rising anger level of
civilian crowd -
yelling, throwing
rocks.

* Gunfire and shouts
within building.
Civilian with
camcorder.

.

¢ Interpreting a
situation where
multiple threats are
involved.

¢ Acting within
established ROE
abandoning them in
an escalating
situation.

¢ Dealing with
civilians whose
intentions against
you are escalating.

© Dealing with
hostages in an urban
building-clearing
situation.

° Determining how to
approach a building
when the hostiles
inside are aware of
your presence.



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Basic DMG Advanced DMG
Situational « Non-emergency situation; |e Emergency situation;
demands action not immediately immediate action required.
required. ¢ Civilians present and in dire
e Few civilians present. need of immediate assistance.
Operational ¢ ROE is unrestrictive. ¢ ROE is restrictive.
constraints e ROEis e ROE is ambiguous.
simple/straightforward. ¢ ROE becomes obsolete in
e Freedom to initiate any course of mission.
action without ¢ Requirement to clear actions
coordination/permission prior to implementation.

from other agency.

Civilian ¢ No civilians present. ¢ Civilians in midst of

presence operations.

e Difficult to distinguish
civilians from hostiles.

Complexity of |e Single task. ¢ Multiple simultaneous and/or
Mission sequential, linked tasks.

The Dimensions of Complexity table is meant to provide general guidelines for
developing various levels of DMG difficulty. Basic DMGs are defined as scenarios in which
the majority of attributes match the “basic DMG” column. Likewise, advanced DMGs
contain mostly attributes of the “advanced DMG” column. In both cases, however, some
attributes may be more closely aligned with the opposite column, or the attribute may fall
somewhere in between the two columns. Intermediate DMGs are defined as scenarios that
contain an even mix of basic and advanced attributes, or scenarios that contain mostly
attributes falling in between the basic and advanced columns. Take, for example, the
“Organizations Involved” dimension. Assuming that the DMG participant is playing the role
of a platoon leader, a basic DMG may present a dilemma in which the platoon leader’s
actions affect only his platoon (e.g., determining where to place security elements around a
building). In an advanced DMG, the platoon leader’s actions may well have repercussions for
higher headquarters as well as political implications (e.g., how to handle a hostile element in
a peacekeeping mission, when the media is present). In an intermediate DMG, the actions of
the platoon leader might impact the company (e.g., deciding between dealing with a local
enemy force or proceeding to link up with the rest of the company). In the case, the DMG is
more complex than basic level (within unit) and less complex than advanced level
(interaction required with other units, other services, other agencies and organizations).

The Dimensions of Complexity table can also be used to access difficulty level and

modify accordingly. If a DMG is found to be too simple for the intended audience, then the
learning that takes place will be limited. To modify the DMG, the developer can choose a

31



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DMG 5: SURPRISED BY AN UNEXPE

eae

CTANT

ENEMY

| This game is an all out war situation in which U.N. forces have halted the advance of invading forces
| and are now pushing the remaining enemy battalion back toward their national boundary. The scenario
takes place in a deserted village made up of one-story buildings. The platoon is in a large warehouse,
checking supplies and communicating with the rest of the company, when 8 enemy soldiers are spotted
milling around outside a building down the street. Two of them then cross the street and enter another

building. The platoon’s mission is to destroy or capture all enemy forces.

Decision Requirements
Addressed in the DMG

Critical Decisions
Faced by Participants _

Primary Cues & Factors

Incorporated as Context

to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
oints Resulting from
et

cision Requirement

i
|
|

BASIC

Determine how to
secure the perimeter.
Determine how to
approach the building.
Maintain the big
picture.

Maintain enemy
perspective.

| @ Determine which

| Identify most likely

¢ Determine how to
seal off area. |

assets and people to
employ.

¢ Determine how to
obscure the assault.

enemy course of

action.

Assess mission

progress against

mission plan and

objectives.

« Assess the big
picture situation.

| Higher-level mission via

Commander's Intent.
Darkness via night,
overcast skies.

Intel reports of expected
enemy strengths in town.
Squad leader reports of
enemy numbers and
weapons.

Appearance of building
vacancies.

© Street widths.

Building heights.

1
|

Pe
Di
.

How to select a route |
of approach,
considering
placement of |
windows and doors
on non-secure
buildings.
Determining relative
importance of
fighting the ener
versus risk to
platoon.

Using the element of
surprise.

Imagining enemy
intent,

C46



Klein, G. A., Calderwood, R., & MacGregor, D. (1989). Critical decision method for

eliciting knowledge. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 19(3), 462-
472.

Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., & Zsambok, C. E. (Eds.). (1993). Decision
making in action: Models and methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

Klinger, D. W., Andriole, S. J., Militello, L. G., Adelman, L., Klein, G., & Gomes, M. E.
(1993). Designing for performance: A cognitive systems engineering approach to
modifying an AWACS human-computer interface (Technical Report AL/CF-TR-1993-
0093). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: Department of the Air Force, Armstrong Laboratory,
Air Force Materiel Command.

Klug, J. P. (2000, May/June). Armor’s role in future U.S. MOUT doctrine. Armor, 79(4), 9-
17.

Militello, L., & Lim, L. (1995). Patient assessment skills: Assessing early cues of necrotizing
enterocolitis. The Journal of Perinatal & Neonatal Nursing, 9(2), 42-52.

Militello, L. G., & Hutton, R. J. B. (1998). Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA): A
practitioner's toolkit for understanding cognitive task demands. Ergonomics, Special
Issue: Task Analysis, 41(11), 1618-1641.

Phillips, J., McDermott, P. L., Thordsen, M., McCloskey, M. J., & Klein, G. (1998).

Cognitive requirements for small unit leaders in military operations in urban terrain

(Research report 1728). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences. (ADA355505)

Schmitt, J. F. (1994). Mastering tactics . Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association.
Schmitt, J. F. (1996). Designing good TDGs. Marine Corps Gazette.

Schraagen, J. M. C., Chipman, S., & Shalin, V. (Eds.). (2000). Cognitive task analysis.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Zsambok, C. E., & Klein, G. (Eds.). (1997). Naturalistic decision making. Mahwah, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

38



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (from. . . to)
August 2001 Final November 1998 - July 2001
4, TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER
Decision-Centered MOUT Training for Small Unit Leaders DASW01-99-C-0002
Sb. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
65502
6, AUTHOR(S) 5c. PROJECT NUMBER

Jennifer Phillips, Michael J. McCloskey, Patricia L. McDermott, M770
Sterling L. Wiggins, Deborah A. Battaglia, Marvin L. Thordsen, and 5d. TASK NUMBER

Gary Klein 6901

5e. WORK UNIT NUMBER

C12
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8, PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
Klein Associates Inc.

1750 Commerce Center Blvd. North
Fairborn, OH 45234-3987

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. MONITOR ACRONYM

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Avenue ARI

Alexandria, VA 22333-5600 11. MONITOR REPORT NUMBER
Research Report 1776

42, DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

13, SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
COR: Kenneth L. Evans

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words):

This research effort applied principles of Naturalistic Decision Making to identify the cognitive challenges involved in platoon
leader decision making in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) building clearing missions. The findings informed
the development of classroom, hardcopy, and multimedia training products to support Infantry Officer Basic Course students in
MOUT decision making. A Cognitive Task Analysis of the building clearing task entailed a series of in-depth interviews with
Amny personnel experienced in MOUT. The analysis resulted in a detailed representation of eleven high-level decision
requirements associated with the building-clearing task. Cognitive demands related to each requirement — critical decisions and
judgments, sensory cues, other factors, and expert strategies — are included in the representation. Four products were developed
based on the findings of the analysis: sixteen decision-centered training scenarios for MOUT environments; an interactive,
multimedia tool (IMPACT) that supports instructors in training MOUT decision making skills; a classroom exercise that
supports situation awareness appreciation and understanding; and a guide that provides supplemental information regarding the
building clearing task from a platoon leader’s perspective.

15, SUBJECT TERMS
Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Cognitive Task Analysis Decision Making Situation Awareness (SA)

: - 19. LIMITATION OF | 20. NUMBER 21. RESPONSIBLE PERSON
| ABSTRACT OF PAGES (Name and Telephone Number)
46. REPORT | 17. ABSTRACT | 18. THIS PAGE Dr. Ken Evans
Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited 109 (706) 545-2565



Take a moment to look at the responses and figure out what is interesting and where the
Pp ig g "
answers differ. Lead a discussion that points out the change in SA over time and the differences
C at Pi gi
between the two peoples’ interpretation. You may want to start off
with an open-ended questions such as “What do you notice about
these answers?” or “What do you notice about the differences in
these answers?” Ask Person A or B about what they were noticing | Remember that you are
at different points, “What about the situation made you think x, y, not evaluating the
z?” or “What happened in the story to make your assessment answer, you are ae
change?” If there are differences between Time 1 and 2 ask what trying to uncover the
a . . thinking behind the
the person was noticing at each point. If there are differences answer.
between Person A and B at one of the times, ask what each person .
was noticing at each time. The point is to have the class understand
what information in the story led to the specific assessments. Sample answers: the big gun
indicated that there may be more enemy than expected, the civilians factored into my assessment,
or the presence of cots made me think this was a headquarters of some sort.

Tip

Point out that assessments can change as more information is gathered. Ask the
participant why this matters and how it could impact the mission. You could ask, “Assessments
often change as more information is gathered, so what? How will this affect your mission?” One
of the ways it can affect the mission is that people may have a tendency to stick with their
assessment and explain away information that does not fit their assessment.

Point out that different people may experience the same situation and have different
assessments. Again, ask the participants why this matters — what affect does it have on the
mission. One effect is that a commander may assume that subordinates are interpreting the
situation in the same way when this is not the case. As a result, the subordinate may act in a way
that is unexpected. This shows the importance of a commander clearly communicating his
assessment and intent.

What to do if the assessments are not different. One thing you can do is ask other people
in the class if their assessments changed over time. If this does not yield any differences state
that in many situations new information can change assessment. Ask the participants if they have
experienced these types of situations. Ask, “Why does different people having the different
interpretations matter — how could this affect the mission?”

Part 2: Impact of assessment on COA

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that assessments affect actions and
actions affect outcomes. Therefore assessments are critical to mission success.

Record the answers of Person A and Person B for question 2. Look at the answers to
determine differences in the COAs. Ask the participants what they notice about the COAs. If the
COAs are all alike, ask if anyone else had a different COA. Use this opportunity to reiterate the

D-7



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A-9



Situation Awareness Appreciation Exercise

Introduction to Participants

The purpose of this exercise is to think about situation awareness — SA. SA means
simply, what you believe is happening in a situation based on the information you have available
to you, and based on your experience in similar situations. We want to use this exercise to talk
about how SA develops and how it impacts your actions.

In this exercise you will be put in the position of a platoon leader in a MOUT situation.
We will describe to you a specific scenario that you are experiencing. You may want to take
notes on the events. We will break twice during the scenario and have you record answers to a
few questions. Please do this independently, without talking. After the second break, we will stop
the scenario and move on to discuss your answers and talk about situation awareness.

Scenario:

Political/Enemy Situation:

An Army battalion has been deployed as part of a U.N. peacekeeping force in the capital
of the revolution-torn, Third World country of Checkistan. There are two major, armed factions
fighting for control of this high-desert country. Violent clashes with Soviet-made weapons—
typically AK-47s and RPGs and truck-mounted machine guns are not uncommon.

Climate:

The battalion’s broad mission is as it has been for the three months that it has been
deployed in Checkistan: to maintain order and provide a security presence. Over the past three
months, the factions and civilians have grown more and more hostile toward the peacekeeping
forces. Occasionally during patrols or required building clearings, your platoon has been
harassed by sniper fire or attacks by small (2-3 soldier) units. The enemy would typically hit and
tun on the peacekeeping forces, trying to escape before any real counter-action could be taken.

Rules of Engagement:

Nothing in these ROE limits your right to take appropriate action to defend yourself and you
unit.

a. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or threats of attack.

b. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly only to promote the
safety of peacekeeping forces. :

c. USS. forces should use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances
and proportional to the threat.



specific training demands, known difficult cognitive challenges, and/or particular events in
upcoming exercises. The instructor can also then develop DMGs to reinforce lessons that he
presents in a classroom setting. As discussed in Section II, this decision-centered approach to
DMG development was a key part of this effort.

Translating DRTs to DMGs

In the course of this effort, Klein Associates developed a series of DMGs tailored to
the specific challenging decisions that Army platoon leaders face in MOUT environments.
These challenging decisions were identified, elaborated, and represented in the initial
research effort and enhanced in the early stages of the current project. The process for
developing the DRTs is found in Section II. The actual DRTs can be found in Appendixes A
and B.

In order to create DMGs tailored to the Army platoon leader MOUT-specific decision
requirements, we developed and refined a general process for developing decision-centered
DMGs. The MOUT DRTs contain platoon leader judgments and decisions that make MOUT
building clearing operations challenging. The tables are a result of extensive, in-depth
interviews with several Army MOUT experts with operational experience. In this section we
will present the development process by walking the reader through the development of one
DMG - Wrap It Up — using the high-level MOUT decision requirements of Securing the
Perimeter and Approaching the Building. The DRTs in Appendix A present these two
decision requirements.

Step 1: Identify decision-focus area(s) and learning objectives for DMG

Assuming that we want to develop a DMG that addresses the cognitive aspects
associated with securing the perimeter and then approaching a building that is to be cleared,
we choose Securing the Perimeter and Approaching the Building as the high-level decision-
focus points for this scenario. Within both of these high-level focus areas are several
individual decisions that must be made. A portion of these decisions, which are represented
in the left-hand columns, will guide the likely learning objectives for this scenario. The
challenging decisions involved in Securing the Perimeter are:

determine how to seal off the area;

determine where to place security assets;

determine which assets and people to employ;

determine where to concentrate fires;

synchronize fire and the shifting of fire; and

if multiple buildings are to be cleared, determine which to clear first.

The challenging decisions involved in Approaching the Building are:

e determine route and/or method of approach;
e determine how to navigate the streets;

21



The curriculum spans 16 weeks, with MOUT instruction accounting for less than 1 of
the weeks. Specifically, the MOUT module includes: 4-5 hours of classroom time devoted to
high level doctrinal issues (such as building construction and the difference between
precision MOUT and surgical MOUT); 8 hours of field walk-throughs pertaining to
procedures such as entering a room, clearing a hallway, and clearing a stairwell; and 8 hours
of evaluation time during which the students actually perform the drills and procedures. Of
the nine battle drills taught at IOBC, only one is related to MOUT. IOBC instructors rely
heavily and almost exclusively on Field Manual (FM) 7-8 — which does not cover MOUT —
to support the structure of the course. (FM 90-10-1 with Change 1 is the MOUT “bible.”)

As to where the DST could fit into the IOBC curriculum, the current schedule of
teaching requirements is fairly tight. There is little downtime during which the DMGs could
be played. Students are sometimes given homework assignments to be completed over a
weekend, but rarely overnight assignments because of time restrictions. Instructors are
encouraged to have “hip-pocket training” on hand to use during downtime. Downtime might
occur during the course of a field exercise, or at the end of classroom time slots. Instructors
are not required to use allocated classroom time in its entirety. If the lesson concludes early,
the rest of the period can be used at the discretion of the instructor.

Students do not have regular access to computers at this time. Instructors have access,
but use computers only to compile grades and evaluations for each student. However, IOBC
does employ the computer simulation, JANUS, once during the course. Each platoon writes
an operations order and inputs into JANUS the plan they intend to execute. The system
mimics the enemy, and students fight a simulated battle. This exercise occurs in Week 10 and
is a large scale simulation exercise. They allocate about 4 hours to the exercise, including an
hour After Action Review.

The Students

Students entering IOBC come from Officer Candidate School (OCS), the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point, or a ROTC program. The students from OCS are prior
enlisted, typically with about 8 years of Army experience. They are the most knowledgeable
with regard to tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The next most experienced and
knowledgeable students are those who come from a military academy. They generally have
3-4 weeks of TTP-related training each summer. The prior enlisted students are the only ones
who enter IOBC having been exposed to the MOUT environment.

IOBC has a low attrition rate. After attending IOBC, most lieutenants enter either
Airborne School or Ranger School. Typically lieutenants will finish both of these schools
prior to being assigned to a unit. There are exceptions. There are also lieutenants who receive
additional schooling prior to a unit assignment.

Few IOBC graduates will be sent directly to assignments with the possibility of
conducting MOUT operations. The MOUT module at IOBC is merely an introduction to the
basics, and lieutenants will almost always receive additional MOUT training in their units
prior to being confronted with a MOUT mission.

17



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Time-out #2
Again, give the participants 2 minutes to answer the questions to keep them concise:

1. What is current threat size, location and intent?
2. What would you do at this point: :
Continue the building-clearing mission.
Evacuate the building and call for reinforcements.
Have squads hold positions while you gather info and talk to Platoon Sgt.
Evacuate the building and determine another entry/clearing strategy.
Call your company CO and ask for guidance.
f. Other. What?
3. What is your greatest concern at this moment?
4. What do you think the situation will look like in the next 5 minutes?

enor

FACILITATION

Part 1: SA differences

The learning objectives of this section is to show differences in SA:
© assessments change over time as more information is obtained, and
¢ different people can see and experience the same situation and have difference
assessments.

Choose one student to present his answers to question 1 (SA). Record his or her answer
for both Time 1 and Time 2 on the board. Ask if any of the students have a different assessment
of the situation. Record a second student’s answers to question 1 at Time 1 and Time 2 on the
board. You may want to use a table format (see below). Be sure to leave room for answers to
other questions.

Time 1 Time 2
Person A. Answer to question 1 Answer to question 1
Person B Answer to question 1 Answer to question 1 .
D6



Dimensions of Complexity

One objective of the DMG development process was to create games at varying
levels of difficulty-basic, intermediate, and advanced. We therefore identified dimensions of
DMG complexity as a standardized tool for developing DMGs at a certain level of difficulty,
and assessing the difficulty level of a particular game. For each DMG created in this effort,
the initial development step was to plan its level of difficulty. The Dimensions of Complexity
table was then used throughout the development process to ensure the content of the game
matched the desired level of difficulty. In some cases we modified the difficulty level of a
DMG based on feedback received from the IOBC Blackbird sessions or from our consultant.
The dimensions of complexity also informed these modifications.

We began defining the dimensions of complexity by gathering subjective assessments
of the difficulty of a wide range of individual DMGs. We grouped the DMGs into categories,
and then performed a thematic analysis, identifying individual characteristics of each DMG
in each level. We identified 10 difficulty dimensions that seemed to distinguish the more
challenging DMGs from the less challenging ones. We then identified attributes of each
dimension that tended to make the DMGs more or less difficult. These dimensions and their
attributes are presented in Table 1.

Table 1.
Dimensions of DMG Complexity
Basic DMG Advanced DMG
Level of ¢ Communications are clear. | ¢ Mission statement seems to
Uncertainty ¢ Little or no ambiguity in lose appropriateness.
scenario description or e Higher intent is vague or
background. missing.
e Nature of situation is e  Superiors are unavailable.
known. ¢ Nature of situation is
e Players in the situation are unknown.
known. e Players in the situation are
Mission is clear. unknown. :
Higher intent is clear. ¢ Capabilities of other players
Superiors are readily are unknown.
available. © Communications are lost.

29



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The Cues column from the DRT can provide invaluable information to answer these
questions with meaningful information that is relevant to the decision requirements. These
critical cues are essential elements when constructing the Scenario portion of the DMG. They
are the perceptual elements of the environment that influence the challenging decisions.
While they cannot be represented with high fidelity in a pencil-and-paper DMG, mention of
some of the cues can help the participant paint a more detailed mental picture of the situation.
The cues add content to the scenario that platoon leaders should consider when making their
decisions. Looking at the Cues column of the DRTs for Securing and Approaching, we
incorporated several cues that could influence the decisions. For example, we inserted
information on nearby structures that can be used for cover or concealment (used in
determining how to navigate the street), street sizes and layouts (used in determining
route/method of approach), presumed and evident enemy weapons and locations (used when
assessing which assets and people to employee). These cues can be incorporated in maps and
diagrams (e.g., building layouts and street sizes), or in the actual text of the scenario
(examples are “...when you hear gunfire, AK-47 you believe...”, “He radios in to you:
‘Lieutenant, we are taking enemy fire from the storefront 20 meters to the northeast.... From
the rate of fire I'd say there are about five or six weapons trained on us.””). It is unwise and
unrealistic to incorporate all the potential cues for a decision into a scenario. We purposely
leave some cues out in order to increase the inherent uncertainty of the DMG, and to leave it
up to the participants to think ahead and ask relevant questions after the DMG scenario is
initially presented to them.

Step 4: Use the Why Difficult? column to make the decisions more challenging

The Why Difficult? column in a DRT is invaluable in creating a DMG that is
challenging. When making a DMG, a common mistake is to create a situation with one
obvious right answer. There is little learning that will occur with DMGs developed in this
manner. The Why Difficult? column can prevent the one-right-answer mistake from
happening. This column provides information on what makes the selected decision or focus
difficult. It identifies some elements about the environment, situation, or general climate that,
if present, could make this decision even more difficult.

In this step, we reviewed the Why Difficult? column for each decision that is
expected to be encountered, and identified complexities to add to the Scenario. For Wrap It
Up, we start with the decision of determine route and/or method of approach. The Why
Difficult column identifies that this decision can be especially difficult when open spaces are
involved and threats are hidden. We therefore incorporated very little clutter in the streets, a
large open space that must be crossed to reach the enemy building, and a report of an
additional possible enemy (“...one of my guys thought he just saw something move in the
building directly across the street.”).

The report of an additional possible enemy also makes the decision of which assets
and people to employ more challenging. The Why Difficult? column for this decision tells us
that, if the platoon leader gets information that increases the uncertainty regarding what he
will encounter during the mission, it will be inherently more difficult to determine the usage
of assets and people.

23



INTERMEDIATI

fe

DMG 11: AC

LEARING OPERATION ©

from another direction.

The platoon in this DMG is conducting an on-foot, advance security patrol as part of a larger clearing |
operation through a supposedly deserted, war-torn village. No enemy activity is expected, but a soldier
| is hit by sniper fire. By the time the platoon leader reaches the scene, other soldiers have pulled the
| injured man behind some barrels, and smoke has been dispersed, but the smoke is clearing, and the
soldiers are pinned down. To complicate things, it appears as. though there is a secondary threat coming

: Decision Requirements
Addressed in the DMG

Critical Decisions
Faced by Participants

|
L

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

| Teaching/Discussion
| Points Resulting from
| Decision Requirement

© Maintain Enemy
Perspective.

© Lead Subordinates.

« Determine how to
Secure the Perimeter.

© identify the most
likely enemy
locations.

* Identify how enemy
can exploit friendly
vulnerabilities.

¢ Maintain control of
subordinates.

« Determine how to
seal off the area.

* Determine where to
place security assets.

« Determine how and
when to evacuate
casualties.

¢ Historical enemy
weapons. tactics.

© Location of rest of
company.

« Dispersements of
platoon.

* Rate of sniper fire.

© Smoke in intersection.

¢ Nonavailability of
resources.

* Sizes/locations of
buildings in intersection.

* Actions/Status of platoon
members on scene.

© How to effectively
use elements of
cover and conceal.

¢ Assessing enemy

| intent.

* Understanding issues
involved in dealing

2 wounded
soldier.

« How urban terrain
can be leveraged by
both friendly and
enemy forces.



for developing training applications by treating human decision processes explicitly and
incorporating them as the basis for the final product.

In the initial study we conducted a CTA of the building clearing operation within a
MOUT environment (Phillips, McDermott, Thordsen, McCloskey, & Klein, 1998), we
conducted nine interviews with seven highly skilled and experienced Army operators from
the 75" Ranger Regiment (two individuals were interviewed twice). The result was a set of
Decision Requirements Tables describing cognitive demands of the building clearing task
from a platoon leader’s perspective.

The first activity under the current effort involved validating and expanding the CTA
findings. This task was accomplished through additional CTA interviews with MOUT
subject-matter experts (SMEs). The finalized CTA findings would serve as a basis for
creating training interventions intended to improve decision-making and cognitive skills of
lieutenants likely to operate as platoon leaders in MOUT. Because the overarching goal of
the project was to develop training tools that could be implemented by Army instructors, a
second set of CTA interviews was conducted to identify requirements of the user group (i.e.,
instructors who train Army lieutenants). Each of these two rounds of CTA interviews will be
discussed in turn.

Validation of Initial CTA Findings
Method

Three SMEs were identified to validate the initial CTA findings (Phillips et al., 1998).
All were retired soldiers with significant experience in MOUT. Two were retired Sergeants
Major; one spent most of his career in the 75 Ranger Regiment, and the other was with
Army Special Operations. The third interviewee was a retired Colonel who had been an
infantry officer for 14 years and was involved with Army Special Operations (including
Delta Force) for 14 years.

Each of the three interviews employed a semi-structured format and spanned
approximately 2 hours. The Decision Requirements Tables (RTs) created in the earlier
effort provided a focal point for the interviewer questions and SME responses.’ As the
interview progressed, the DRTs were edited to reflect the new information and clarifications
of prior information that resulted from the SME responses. Two additional knowledge
elicitation techniques were employed as well: the Knowledge Audit, and a new technique
utilizing scenarios.

Knowledge Audit

The Knowledge Audit is a method designed to efficiently survey various aspects of
expertise (Militello & Hutton, 1998). It identifies ways expertise is or is not used in a domain

* Decision Requirements Tables are one format for Tepresenting knowledge elicited through a CTA. For further
information about the initial version of the DRTs, see Phillips, McDermott, Thordsen, McCloskey, & Klein
(1998).



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B-8



APPENDIX C
DECISION MAKING GAMES: SUMMARIES AND LINKAGES TO

THE DECISION REQUIREMENTS TABLES



DECISION-CENTERED MOUT TRAINING FOR SMALL UNIT LEADERS

CONTENTS

I. Introduction
The Challenges of MOUT
Objective of this Effort...

II. Cognitive Task Analysis .

Overview .......

Validation of Initial CTA Findings

Method.
Results ..
User Requirements Analysis

or Decision

Background on DMGs.
Translating DRTs to DMGs
Dimensions of Complexity.

DMG Library: Linkages to Findings. 32
IV. Situation Awareness Appreciation Exercise . 32
Exercise Development. 33

Discussion..............+.
V. Conclusions

References .........ssessessessessesseesecssssessecsessessessessessesssssessessessessessessuesucsuesassaessesuessesseesreaesaeeneeeeseee 37

Appendix A. Task-Focused Decision Requirement.........c.ssssssssscsssecsesseeseessesesseeseeseenees A-l

Appendix B. Task-Independent Decision Requirements

Appendix C. Decision Making Games: Summaries and Linkages to the Decision......... C-1
Requirements Tables
Appendix D. Situation Awareness Appreciation Exercise ...........ssecsssssecsscescescesseeseeseeeeeee D-1
ix



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B-12



point that different assessments can lead to different COAs and that these COAs ultimately affect
mission outcomes.

If there is time, discuss answers to questions 3 and 4. You do not need to record these
answers on the board, just discuss them. Options for probing include:

¢ How did different assessment affect how different participants predicted the situation
would look like in 5 minutes? What does this tell you about the impact of Situation
Assessment?

¢ Ask participants about their greatest concerns. How did this affect their actions or
what they were looking and listening for?

Section 3: Wrap-up

The purpose of this section is to ensure the learning objectives are met.

Ask the participants what they learned from the exercise. Make sure the three points were
covered:

¢ Situation assessment can change over time as more information is gathered
¢ Different people may interpret the same situation differently
¢ Situation assessment affects actions and outcomes

Ask the participants how their actions will be different as result of this exercise.

D-8



a pa ge

‘DMG 9: ADE

ADLY APPROACH ©

| The U.N. has been deployed on a humanitarian relief operation to a country plagued by factional

| fighting and terrorist activities. The scenario involves a nighttime operation to clear and occupy the

| town hall in order to support the distribution of food and medical supplies the next morning. As the
platoon approaches the town hall, the platoon leader notices that the two-story warehouse he planned
to use as an overwatch position has potentially been compromised. He also notices two men with rifles
and duffle bags hurrying across the street. At the same time, the platoon sergeant reports commotion to

|

the east and a bad feeling

about the situation.

Decision Requirements —

Addressed in the DMG |

Critical Decisions Faced
by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors

Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

i

| @ Maintain enemy

NTERMEDIATE

i
perspective. |
Maintain big picture
&SA.

Interpreting and

applying ROE.

¢ Determine how to
secure the perimeter.

¢ Determine how to
approach the building.

© Identify the most likely
enemy location.

© Assess the big picture
situation,

¢ Maintain awareness of
civilians in the area.

© Determine which assets
and people to
employee.

* Determine where to
concentrate fires.

« Determine how to
navigate the streets.

© Determine where to
place security
elements.

¢ Historical enemy
weapons, tactics, sizes
— aimed at rel

sites.

© Standard ROE.

* Road widths 12-14

feet.

Variation of building

construction.

¢ Time of night/moon
lighting.

Intel reports of enemy
occupations.

* Warehouse
location/status.

* Status of warehouse
door and lock.

¢ Weapons and
perceived cautious
nature of enemy.

¢ Direction of enemy

movement.

Platoon Sgt. Report of
commotion from ~20
people.

¢ How do you infer
hostile intent.
Applying ROE to en
ambiguous situatio:
Judging critical
urban terrain.
© Navigating the
streets and plac:
security elements in
an urban
environment,

C-10



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A-13



This decision requirement is more complicated than it often appears on the surface.
Soldiers at all experience levels stress that it is important to think like the enemy. However,
only those soldiers with extensive practice and experience can actually do it. The requirement
is to actually put oneself in the enemy’s mind set and plan from that perspective. What are
his enemy’s (i.e., the friendlies’) vulnerabilities? How can he best exploit his strengths
against those vulnerabilities? What are the key leverage points (e.g., buildings with good
vantage points, intersections, well-constructed buildings) in the environment? These
questions mirror the aspects of OCOKA (observation; cover and concealment; obstacles; key
terrain; and avenues of approach) that Rangers use to guide their consideration of the
enemy’s perspective. The goal of this decision requirement is to internalize the enemy’s
objectives and most promising strategies for achieving those objectives, so that actions can
be taken to deny the enemy his objectives.

Lead subordinates. This decision requirement is about managing a distributed team in
order to sustain a continuous flow of operation. The platoon leader will lose the ability to
maintain his situation awareness and orchestrate the operation if he loses control of his
subordinates. Furthermore, control must be maintained to prevent subordinates from being
forced to make decisions for which they are not responsible. This decision requirement is a
difficult one because of the distributed nature of the team, the frequently chaotic environment
in which it works, and the fact that subordinates do have the physical ability and procedural
knowledge to conduct the clearing without the direction of the platoon leader. The critical
decisions and judgments within the decision requirement are:

¢ clearly communicating and directing subordinates;
© maintaining control of subordinates; and
° judging the combat effectiveness of individuals.

Maintain the big picture and situation awareness. This decision requirement has to do
with keeping track of the events and status within and surrounding your mission. The platoon
leader’s situation awareness will continually be updated as he takes in additional pieces of
information. This information will come from his own visual inputs, communications with
his clearing and support units, communications with his company commander and/or
adjacent platoon leaders, and auditory cues from the environment itself including gunfire,
running footsteps, and the like. He will use his situation awareness at all stages of the mission
to make decisions. In addition, he will use his situation awareness to set expectancies for
what he should or should not encounter, and to project into the future. The critical decisions
and judgments within this requirement are:

assessing mission progress against the plan and objectives;
assessing the big picture situation;

maintaining awareness of the civilians in the area;

maintaining awareness of sectors of fire for all friendly units; and
setting expectancies.

Project into the future. Throughout the mission the platoon leader must think ahead to
the next steps in the operation. He must consider how current actions are achieving the

13



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A-4



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A8



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B-11



Approach

the
Building

Figure 1. Decision requirements.

Similarly, the task-independent decision requirements have a large impact on each of
the task-focused requirements and on each other. The platoon leader’s situation awareness
and projection of future events will shape his decision making as he secures the perimeter,
approaches, enters, and clears the building, and maintains security within the building.
Moreover, his situation awareness will be molded by his ability to think like the enemy, and
in turn, his situation awareness will mold his projection of future events. Throughout the
mission, the platoon leader’s leadership abilities and application of the ROE are crucial.

Note that each of the eleven decision requirements is relevant during the pre-mission
planning as well as mission execution. In nearly every building-clearing operation, the plan
developed prior to the mission will break down to some extent during its execution.
Therefore the platoon leader will be forced to adjust the plan on-the-spot, as the environment
presents unexpected obstacles or additional information cues. For the purposes of this
project, we have focused on the decisions and adjustments a platoon leader must make during
mission execution. While the planning and preparation stages present their own variations of
these unique challenges, it is during mission execution that decision making becomes time
pressured, the situation continuously changes, stakes are high, and uncertainty runs rampant.
This is the time when decision making becomes the most challenging for the platoon leader.



HOD 7
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A-12



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

CSM Sam Spears (Ret.) contributed invaluable advice and information throughout the
project. We could not have been successful in understanding the intricacies of MOUT
environments nor in developing the Decision Skills Training without his ongoing and
generous assistance.

Likewise, MAJ John Hyatt (Ret.) provided critical assistance with regard to logistics
and content knowledge. We especially acknowledge his role as a facilitator for the videoclips
used in the IMPACT multimedia tool, and his input to the Decision Making Games.

We thank Drs. Ken Evans and Scott Graham of the U. S. Army Research Institute at
Fort Benning, GA, for their valuable support, advice, and feedback. They provided sound
direction and guidance throughout the project.

The Infantry Officer Basic Course enabled us access to their instructors and recent

graduates. We thank the organization for providing these information sources, and we thank
those individuals for generously sharing their time and knowledge.

vi



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TOIs9C [END

(Auiaua 9y} ayt] YUIYE) aANaadsaad s,Auiaua ay) UIE JUTE

B3



¢ identify hazards, constraints, and constrictions; and
e determine how to obscure the assault.

Prior to developing this DMG, we decided to emphasize learning points around
moving, protecting, and coordinating assets. Therefore, we chose to use the decision
requirements of determine which assets and people to employee, determine where to
concentrate fires, determine how to navigate the streets, and determine how to obscure the
assault as key decisions for the DMG.

Step 2: Ensure that specific decisions will have to be encountered in DMG

As the DMG develops, it should be leading to a climax where the platoon leader is
forced to deal with at least some of these decisions. To accomplish this in the DMG Wrap It
Up, we have one of the squad leaders report to the platoon leader that they are taking fire
from a building 20 meters ahead. We place the platoon in streets, and force the platoon leader
to determine how they will deal with the enemy element in that building. Some of the platoon
has taken cover, but none are at the building. It must be approached.

It is important to note that the initial teaching points that are selected are typically not
the only ones that eventually are reinforced in the DMG. By conducting each DMG with
Army personnel, we discovered that several additional teaching points emerged from the
DMG seminars. In the case of Wrap it Up, additional teaching points that emerged centered
around the tradeoffs of completing the original platoon mission versus responding to

unexpected calls for support from higher units, and the general assessment of enemy strength
and intent.

For each decision, the DRT incorporates features that can make that decision difficult,
along with the cues and other factors that are used in making that decision. While the |
individual decisions within the table can be used as focus points for the DMG, the
accompanying information (i.e., Why Difficult?, Cues, and Factors) can be used to develop a
relevant background and scenario of the DMG.

Step 3: Integrate Cues into Scenario to provide meaningful decision making context

The Scenario portion of the DMG tells the main story in the game. It is the heart of
the DMG, and describes the situation being encountered. It should address, at a minimum,
the following six questions:

Who am I?

What is my mission?

What are my resources (soldiers, weapons, communications, etc.)?
Where are my squads, company commander, and fellow platoons?
What is my current environment (described in text, map, picture, etc.)?
What is the situation and/or problem?

22



APPENDIX B

TASK-INDEPENDENT DECISION REQUIREMENTS

B-1



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pue siouuns ‘sais Aejor uel
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0} pue uoojeyd sty yOq
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(ju02D) Surpying ay) 28ayd 07 MOY aUTUIII}Ig

A-20



Through efforts to make sense of the situation as it unfolds, platoon leaders will be
able to make more appropriate decisions in compliance with ROE. A good situation
awareness is critical to judging whether particular criteria within the ROE have been met
(e.g., whether a hostile act has taken place), and subsequently determining what range of
options are available to the platoon. Incidentally, a good situation awareness also enables the
platoon leader to justify his actions in the future if need be.

User Requirements Analysis
Method

The intended trainer audience for the DST was instructors at the Infantry Officer’s
Basic Course (IOBC) at Fort Benning, GA. These instructors provide initial infantry
schooling to lieutenants who have just entered the Army. All infantry officers attend IOBC
prior to any other assignment. The primary goal of the user requirements analysis was to
capture the characteristics, objectives, and constraints of the IOBC instructors. We also
sought information as to the training cycle of Army lieutenants, and the role played by IOBC
in the larger picture. With this information we were better able to determine the types of
instructional materials most appropriate for the domain, in order to design the DST program
and the IMPACT multimedia train-the-trainer tool.

The user requirements analysis was accomplished through a series of interviews with
current IOBC instructors. We conducted 1-2 hour semi-structured interviews with 4
Captains, 3 Staff Sergeants, and 1 Sergeant First Class. We used the first two interviews to
capture general information pertaining to the IOBC curriculum, structure, and process. In all
eight interviews we asked instructors a series of questions around the following topics:

Personal background and military experience;

Knowledge and experience in MOUT;,

Experience as an IOBC instructor and as an instructor at other schools or units (if
applicable);

Teaching style and educational philosophy;

Challenges faced teaching at IOBC;

Use of the support mechanisms put in place by IOBC for the instructors;
Reactions to the MOUT DST program we proposed.

The interview data for each instructor were then documented by sorting the data into
eleven categories:

1. Training experience, including instruction on how to instruct and time at IOBC.
2. Comments related to training decision making.
3. Comments related to training leadership skills.

4. Comments related to training teamwork/collaboration.

15



dimension in the table and alter factors in the Scenario and/or Background to make the DMG
more difficult. For example, the first dimension is Uncertainty Level. To increase the level of
uncertainty and subsequently the difficulty level in the DMG, the developer could have
communications fail at a critical moment, make the higher intent less clear, or change the
environment so that the Mission Statement becomes irrelevant. Altemately, if the DMG is
too complicated, a reverse process can be used where elements of uncertainty are replaced
with clear, certain information. For example, the company commander could be made
available over the radio for advice and guidance.

DMG Library: Linkages to Findings

In the section Translating DRTs to DMGs above, we discussed how one DMG, Wrap
It Up, was created from the DRTs. In the tables in Appendix C, we summarize each DMG in
the library and relate the content to the DRT information and teaching points.

IV. SITUATION AWARENESS APPRECIATION EXERCISE

The SA Appreciation Exercise is a paper-and-pencil learning tool developed to
address needs identified during the CTA. Situation Awareness, or Understanding the Big
Picture, is critical to MOUT operations. The purpose of the SA Appreciation Exercise is to
help platoon leaders understand the importance of SA and its role in conducting the mission.
Specifically, the learning objectives of the exercise are to:

e illustrate that SA can change over time as new information is gathered;

¢ illustrate that different people can experience the same situation and have
different interpretations; and

¢ demonstrate that SA affects actions and mission outcomes.

These objectives tend to be intuitive when they are introduced. However, recognizing
these points in the chaos of a MOUT mission and understanding their significance may not
be as obvious. For example, consider the first objective — SA changes over time as new
information is gathered. Although this is a logical statement, we heard from experts that
novice platoon leaders tend to “stick with the plan” even when the situation changes. The
novices may explain away data that does not fit their initial interpretation. The SA
Appreciation Exercise explores these objectives in the context of an ambiguous and chaotic
MOUT mission so platoon leaders can see how new information alters their interpretation
and how sticking to their initial interpretation could be dangerous.

The second objective — different people can have different interpretations of the same
situation — is important because a leader should not automatically assume that subordinates
have the same assessment. As a result the subordinates may not have the same expectations
or may not fully understand orders. The third objective is to tie everything back to actions
and mission outcomes. The point of developing an accurate SA is that your actions are
dependent on your assessment of the situation. A leader may respond differently if he
believes the enemy is a two-man team than if he believes he is up against an entire squad.
These actions will ultimately affect the mission outcome.

32



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A-14



The Instructors

IOBC instructors are Captains, Staff Sergeants, and Sergeants First Class. The
Captains are responsible for planning the 16 weeks, evaluating and mentoring students
(although NCOs conduct a great deal of informal mentoring), and delivering the bulk of the
classroom training. The NCOs conduct the field training with students. They are the “hands-
on, face-to-face” instructors who are with students continuously throughout the course.

There is significant variation in the degree of experience instructors have upon
entering IOBC. Some have taught at several other schools, while others may take their first
instructional assignment at IOBC. All incoming instructors are “required” to attend a two-
week Instructor Training Course (ITC). However, not all instructors go through ITC, and
some do not attend until after their first rotation (i.e., 16-week course) is complete. ITC
teaches instructors general oral presentation skills, how to write learning objectives, test
administration, and how to address task conditions and standards. Instructors also deliver a
12-minute “class” during ITC and receive feedback from the other instructors. Instructors
generally move on from IOBC after three years.

Implications of the CTA for Decision Skills Training Design ,

The results of the MOUT SME CTA and the user requirements analysis became the
basis for the two Decision Skills Training products: the IMPACT multimedia tool, described
immediately below, and an SA Appreciation exercise, described in Section IV. Both were
specifically designed for Captains at IOBC, who are responsible for the bulk of classroom
training. However, the NCO instructors are not precluded from employing the learning tools.
In fact, the Decision Skills Training in IMPACT is well-suited for either classroom
instruction or for use during downtime in the field.

IMPACT

The IMPACT multimedia train-the-trainer CD-ROM is the primary Decision Skills
Training application resulting from this effort. The purpose of the tool is to train instructors
to facilitate Decision Making Game (DMG) scenarios, using a Decision Making Critique to
debrief the sessions. It also includes guidance for developing DMGs, and incorporates a
library of 16 MOUT DMGs, which were created using the findings from the CTA conducted
with MOUT SMEs. (For more information about how the DMGs were developed, see
Section III.)

IMPACT contains 6 modules:
Mock Decision Making Game Seminar. It is our belief that instructors will be better
facilitators of DMGs if they have participated in a game as students. The mock DMG

seminar places the instructor in the student’s position with an interactive DMG session.

Introduction. The introduction briefly describes the type of decision making
addressed by IMPACT — recognitional (e.g., Klein, 1989; Klein, 1997), as opposed to

18



DMG 7: NIGHTMARE ON ELM STREET _

{ This scenario places the platoon leader in a humanitarian and peacekeeping effort to provide relief but
| also to police a ravaged, war-torn country. The platoon is conducting an on-foot patrol in an area that
they are very familiar with. Suddenly, the platoon leader discovers that the local town drunk has shot
| his wife and a couple neighbors and is holding his children hostage. He starts making threats of
shooting more people, and then grazes the platoon sergeant in the shoulder.

INTERMEDIATE

Decision Requirements
Addressed in the DMG

Critical Decisions
Faced by Participants |

Primary Cues & Factors | Teaching/Discussion
| Points Resulting from

Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Decision Requirement

¢ Maintain Big Picture
&SA.

« Maintain Perspectiv

¢ Interpret and apply
ROE.

* Secure the Perimeter.

Approach the

Building.

* Mai

| © Set expectancies.
| © Determine how to

¢ Determine route

Identify the most
likely enemy course
of action.

tain awareness
Jians in the

of
area.
seal off the area.

and/or method of
approach.

¢ Building construction —
plywood, one-story.

¢ Common building
interior layout - 4 rooms.

¢ Typical occupancy of

town buildings.

Layout of town block.

* Current state of town

police force.

Civilian attitudes toward

forces.

* History of civilian
violence and drinking.

* Standard ROE.

¢ Semi-automatic gunfire.

¢ Urgency from company
commander.

© Anxious reactions of
civilian crowd.

© Statements/actions of
volatile civilian.

.

|

.

| © Diffusing escalating

civilian situations
before they get out of
hand.

Estimating level of
threat

Operating within
peacekeeping ROE
when a friendly
casualty occurs.
Building clearing
when child civilians
are involved.

C-8



APPENDIX A

TASK-FOCUSED DECISION REQUIREMENTS

A-l



TWO INTERSECTIONS - B

This operation is an all out war scenario in which U.N. forces are assisting an allied country in
removing an organized invasion force from a neighboring country. The scenario involves a daylight
operation to clear a museum from current positions in the courthouse next door. Known enemy

| forces include two squads and a sniper positioned in nearby buildings, and patrols roaming
_ throughout the area. As one of the friendly squads moves toward the museum, shots are fired from

across the street and forward elements from an enemy unit of unknown size are spotted moving into
the town from the north.

|
|
|

Decision Requirements
Addressed in the DMG

Critical Decisions
Faced by Participants |

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

BASIC

¢ Determine how to
approach the building.

© Determine how to
enter the building.

| © Lead subordinates.

.

Determine how to
navigate streets.
Identify hazards,
constraints, and
constrictions.

Determine strengths

and vulnerabilities of

the building and its,

inhabitants.

Determine point of

entry.
Determine entry
technique. and
equipment to be
used.

Consider tradeoff

between stealth and

speed.

Maintain control of

subordinates.

°

Actions of neighboring |

platoon.

Reports of enemy
strength.
Platoon visuals on
enemy locations.

Perceived awareness of |

enemy.
Observed enemy
security levels.
Building construction
and openings.
Approaching enemy
reinforcements.
Sounds/reports of
machine gun fire.
Building and street
sizes and locations.

.

How to regroup

forces in the midst of |

a firefight.

How to place units to |

maintain control
while support each
other.

How to act in
accordance with
commander's intent
when mission may
need adjustmen’
Whether to give up
security when
ordered, if under fire.
How to cover
unknown enemy
threats from multiple
locations.

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A-19



be

This operation is an all out war scenario in which U.N.
| removing an organized invasion force from a neighboring country. The scenario involves a daylight
mission to clear an old chapel occupied by enemy units approximated at 2-3 fire teams. At the last
minute, the company commander communicates to the platoon leader that ROE has changed and now

restricts damage to religious sites unless absolutely necessary.

. forces are assisting an allied country in

| Decision Requirements

_ Addressed in the DMG |

Faced by Participants

Critical Decisions

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

© Interpret and apply
ROE.

© Determine how to
approach the buildi

© Determine how to
enter the building.

_ © Determine how to

BASIC

clear the building.

r

.

.

Determine how to
navigate streets.
Identify hazards,
constraints, and
constrictions.

Determine strengths’

vulnerabilities of
building and
inhabitants.
Determine entry

technique/equipment.

Determine how to
employ personnel
and teams.

* ROE limiting use of force
on religious places.

¢ Last known sniper
location.

* Lack of visual ID on
other E forces.

« FRAGO from company
commander.

© Building locations.

Available resources

(smoke, breaching

explosives).

¢ Platoon strength.

_ © Forcing enemy out of

© Clearing a building
of enemy units.

Interpreting
ambiguous ROE.

cultural’ religious

site under restrictive

ROE. |
¢ Determining :

approaches in

daylight operations.

C4



be designed to show the critical cues that are important when making the decisions associated
with this scenario. Given this requirement, it is easy to understand the benefits of high
fidelity and realism here. Sketched pictures are better for helping the participants envision the
situation and recognize critical cues than is text. Maps are better than sketched pictures.
Photographs are better than maps (or can be supplemental). Video is better than photographs
because it allows multiple perspectives and can provide visual cues.

For this effort, we developed representations using software drawing programs. We
were sure to include relevant terrain features, and locations and sizes of friendly and enemy
forces if known. If forces are questionable or unknown, they can be represented by a question
mark. Also include a scale of distance. Designate where the participant would be located in
the scenario. Other prominent features that are mentioned in the scenario should be
designated as well. For the DRTs involved in Wrap It Up, we integrated such cues and
factors as locations of obstacles on streets, sizes of streets, building sizes and relative
locations, and suspected enemy locations. To increase the difficulty of the DMG, we could
have looked for uncertainties in the Why Difficult? column and represented them by
including less detail on the map.

Step 9: Name the DMG

Once we developed the framework for the DMG, we named it. We selected a name,
Wrap It Up, that allowed us to remember the content. The name may refer to the general
Situation, attributes of the physical environment, the dilemma, or some other prominent
feature.

Step 10: Evaluate and modify the DMG

During this effort we developed a methodology for evaluating the quality and
difficulty level of DMGs. We identified a series of questions that should all be answered
“yes” for the DMG to likely be successful (Schmitt, 1996).

Does the DMG tell a story?

Does the DMG go from general to specific?

Is there a good level of time pressure?

Does the DMG contain uncertainty?

Are there multiple acceptable courses of action?
Does the DMG force a tough decision?

Does the DMG tell a story? The most important quality of a DMG is that it is
interesting. The DMG should tell an action story that grips participants. Developers of
DMGs have a tendency to get caught up in the nuts and bolts of the DMG. It is
therefore a good idea to ask others if they think the DMG tells a good story. Also ask
them for specific ideas on how to make it even more engaging.

Does the DMG go from general to specific? A good DMG usually starts out with

general characteristics of the environment, enemy, and friendly forces. As it

26



Objective of this Effort

The objective of this project was to capitalize on the considerable MOUT experience
that exists among selected soldiers and combat veterans to identify the critical cognitive
aspects of MOUT decision making and subsequently enhance current Army training. The
experts in urban operations have extensive operational experience and have learned lessons
that cannot be found in any training manuals. By using Cognitive Task Analysis (CTA)
methods (e.g., Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Militello & Hutton, 1998; Schraagen,
Chipman, & Shalin, 2000) to elicit these lessons, we can identify the decision requirements:
the critical and challenging decisions and judgments, the information (cues and factors) that
influences those decisions and judgments, and the sources of that information. We can use
the arsenal of CTA methods to define the decision requirements of MOUT missions, and
we can use those decision requirements to guide the development of a training program that
boosts decision skills in MOUT. The training is intended to teach lieutenants to learn like
experts, so that they can more quickly climb the learning curve and make sound decisions
more quickly than would otherwise be possible.

Small-unit leaders, such as lieutenants leading platoons, have little or no operational
experience from which to draw when making combat decisions. Therefore they are a prime
audience for training in decision making. Furthermore, the training lieutenants receive for
MOUT-specific requirements is scant in comparison to other mission types. In this project
we developed a program of Decision Skills Training specifically aimed at boosting decision
performance of platoon leaders in MOUT. However, the program is applicable to other
echelons of command and mission types.

Two products comprise the Decision Skills Training program. The first is a
multimedia, train-the-trainer CD-ROM titled IMPACT! — IMproving Performance through
Applied Cognitive Training, which was developed to prepare and support instructors in
Decision Skills Training. The CD includes a substantial library of scenarios called Decision
Making Games (DMGs) that have been carefully structured to simulate practice in effective
decision making. The second is a supplementary paper-and-pencil exercise, the Situation
Awareness (SA) Appreciation Exercise, which was developed to guide instructors in the
specifics of facilitating the understanding of the changing nature of SA during mission
execution (See Section IV).

In addition to the Decision Skills Training products (IMPACT and the SA
Appreciation Exercise), a third product resulted from this effort. MOUT: Decision Making in
Action’ describes the nature of decision making in MOUT. The guide presents lessons
learned from experienced MOUT operators. It is intended for instructors of platoon leaders as
well as soldiers and leaders who may fight in MOUT environments.

' For more information about IMPACT, or to order a copy, contact Debbie Battaglia of Klein Associates (937-
873-8166 ext. 139 or Debbie@decisionmaking.com).

? For more information about the MOUT: Decision Making in Action, or to order a copy, contact Debbie
Battaglia of Klein Associates (937-873-8166 ext. 139 or Debbie@decisionmaking.com).



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A3



I. INTRODUCTION
The Challenges of MOUT

The past decade has seen a rise in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT),
where units operate in cities and villages rather than traditional battlefields that are
characterized by vast expanses of uninhabited terrain. It is estimated that the trend toward a
higher proportion of MOUT missions will continue given that a huge segment of the world’s
population resides in urban centers. Army Rangers and Special Forces have handled most of
the Army’s most recent MOUT missions. However, Army senior leadership anticipates that
with the rise in MOUT battles, regular Army infantry units will be called upon on a more
frequent basis to conduct these operations (Erwin, 2000). It therefore becomes critical to
prepare infantrymen appropriately.

The MOUT environment presents a distinct set of challenges to soldiers and leaders.
The streets and buildings comprising the terrain possess unique characteristics, and the nature
of inter-city warfare, where civilians are intermixed with hostile units, is quite different from
traditional battlefields (Grau & Kipp, 1999). Furthermore, the intensity level of operations
conducted in MOUT varies tremendously, and different levels of conflict call for drastically
different responses and tactics. While current training addresses MOUT tactics and
procedures, the extent of that training pales in comparison to traditional combat training
(Klug, 2000), and as a result the unique nature of decision making in MOUT receives
relatively little attention.

The danger is that soldiers, no matter how well trained and prepared to carry out
difficult procedures and actions, cannot be protected from the consequences of their poor
decisions. MOUT places leaders in highly demanding situations where they have to operate
with a high degree of independence. Thus, relatively junior officers are going to be facing
high risks and demanding situations with very little preparation for handling the decisions
and judgments in the MOUT mission (Grau & Kipp, 1999; Klug, 2000). As we have seen in
Chechnya, Mogadishu, Berlin in WWII, Hue City, and many other urban battlefields, the
casualty rates can be staggering compared to warfare conducted in open terrain such as
Desert Storm (Grau & Kipp, 1999).

MOUT missions involve a broad range of critical and challenging decisions and
judgments. One potential reason for the virtual exclusion of decision-making training within
instructional programs is that it is difficult to identify the decisions and the strategies that
skilled soldiers use. Generally, only the experts in a field have a bank of knowledge
regarding how to effectively deal with these critical decisions. And, like experts in most
fields, they often cannot articulate the tacit knowledge surrounding their decision making
without the assistance of an outside party trained in eliciting such information. Given the
expectation that more and more Army infantrymen will participate in MOUT, it has
become necessary to capture the tacit knowledge from experts and make it available
to less-experienced operators through decision-centered training.



demonstrate the link between SA and actions and outcomes. The exercise goes beyond
simply stating there is a link; it demonstrates the connections through the participants’
answers at the various stopping points. Exposure to different people’s interpretations of the
same events is a powerful experience.

However, despite this observation, the SA Appreciation Exercise has not had a true
validation. There is no evidence that the tool does in fact increase participants’ appreciation
of good SA on the battlefield. Some of the questions that should be answered in a validation
study are:

¢ are participants in the exercise more likely to communicate their assessment and
intent to subordinates?

¢ are participants more flexible in adjusting their assessments in an incident than |
those who have not participated in the exercise?

© are courses of action in subsequent exercises different from those generated by
individuals who have not participated in the SA Appreciation Exercise?

Answering these questions would be an important part of validating the usefulness of the
exercise for achieving the learning objectives.

V. CONCLUSIONS

This project resulted in several significant accomplishments. First, the CTA of the
building clearing operation identified decisions and challenges unique to MOUT
environments. The skill and operational experience of the SMEs who were interviewed
enabled us to capture critical aspects of expertise related to MOUT missions. To our
knowledge, this is the first and only effort to elicit and document these cognitive demands.
As a result, we were able to develop decision-centered products to support and train MOUT
decision making.

The key product is the Decision Skills Training. The two components of the Decision
Skills Training program are the IMPACT multimedia train-the-trainer CD-ROM, and the SA
Appreciation Exercise. The central feature of IMPACT is the DMG scenario. The CD-ROM
includes a library of DMGs and supporting modules that teach instructors how to facilitate,
debrief, and create their own DMGs. The SA Appreciation Exercise uses a scenario similar to
a DMG to generate discussion and insights as to how SA shifts over time, the fact that
different individuals can interpret the same situation differently, and the effect of SA on
decisions and actions.

To develop these Decision Skills Training products it became necessary to create a
series of DMG scenarios that leverage the knowledge acquired from the MOUT SMEs.
Therefore another substantial outcome of this effort was a process for translating the CTA
findings into learning objectives, and using the DRT data to create DMGs that address key
decisions, issues, and challenges in MOUT. In addition to refining a development process,
we also identified dimensions of DMG complexity and descriptors of low and high
complexity along each dimension. Since student audiences possess varying levels of MOUT

35



mission objectives and therefore what subsequent actions must take place to further the
accomplishment of the objectives. This entails mentally simulating how current actions will
change the situation, and being prepared to make decisions regarding next steps within that
new context. In addition, he must mentally simulate the results that might be achieved
through the projected next steps to determine whether those are favorable results, and adjust
his directions to his unit accordingly. Within this decision requirement, the critical decisions
and judgments are:

© determining where to proceed next;
© determining the personnel necessary for mission accomplishment, and
© determining where to locate oneself to best direct and support the unit.

It is crucial that these decisions occur well ahead of real-time events, otherwise they cannot
be implemented in time to have the desired effects,

inderstand and apply Rules of Engagement (ROE). This decision requirement was
added during the current effort. It reflects the challenge of working within ROE that can be
ambiguous and sometimes contradictory. The two critical decisions under this decision
requirement are:

e Interpret ROE
e Apply ROE

Interpreting ROE is difficult because often the rules are written by politicians or
lawyers who are not in a position to understand the application of the rules on a battlefield.
The result can be ROE that seem clear at the outset, but once unexpected circumstances arise
on the battlefield, soldiers are at a loss for how to interpret and apply the ROE. SMEs
therefore recommend that upon receiving ROE, platoon leaders ask as many “what-if”
questions as possible to glean a better understanding of the boundaries and restrictions, and
ask for guidance on how ROE should be interpreted under each situation.

Applying ROE is a decision that goes hand in hand with interpreting ROE. It is
challenging for several reasons. Units typically train under non-restrictive ROE, however,
especially in low- to mid-intensity conflicts, ROE can be significantly more restrictive.
Platoon leaders may need to be more deliberate when making decisions under unfamiliar
ROE restrictions, although time pressure makes deliberation impractical. Restrictive ROE
also place heavy limits on what the platoon can do to accomplish a mission. Platoon leaders
must be prepared to be creative and think ‘out of the box’ to produce solutions that are
effective yet within the range of acceptable action. Furthermore, there can be a conflict
between the safety and welfare of the platoon, and the ROE. Platoon leaders are in the
difficult position of being entrusted with the lives of their soldiers, while being required to
understand how their actions on the battlefield will affect the larger political climate. To
make things worse, ROE can even change during the course of a platoon’s mission, resulting
in confusion and the need to re-think portions of the plan to ensure that they comply with
ROE.

14



Task-Focused Decision Requirements

The task-focused decision requirements correspond to the stages of the building-
clearing operation. The technical report produced from the earlier CTA effort describes
five task-focused decision requirements (Phillips et al., 1998). In this section we will
summarize those five decision requirements and describe in greater detail the additional
decision requirement identified in the current study (Determine how to evacuate the
building). The unabridged task-focused DRTs can be found in Appendix A.

Determine how to secure the perimeter. The task addressed by this decision
requirement has to do with strategically placing units around the outside of the objective
building in order to provide fire support to the clearing units. Depending on the mission, the
support element will provide cover and/or backup fire during all stages of the mission (the
approach, the entry, and the clearing), will prevent people from entering or exiting the area
surrounding the building, and will serve as an overwatch or early warning function for the
platoon leader and higher command. This is an essential decision requirement in building
clearing. As one interviewee remarked, “A support by fire position will make or break you.”

The determination regarding how to secure the perimeter occurs to a great extent
during the planning stage prior to the mission. However, given the difficultly of pinpointing
the environmental conditions under which the mission will occur, most plans will require at
least minor adjustments once the mission is begun. Within this decision requirement the
critical decisions and judgments are:

determining how to seal off the area;

determining where to place security assets;

determining which assets and people to employ;

determining where to concentrate fires;

determining how to synchronize fires and the shifting of fires, and

if multiple buildings are to be cleared, determining which to clear first.

Determine how to approach the building. The platoon leader’s goal in this decision
requirement is to get his units to the building in a safe and effective manner. Sometimes the
approach will be by air (via helicopter), sometimes by ground (on foot or in vehicles), and
sometimes under ground (through the sewer systems). The four critical decisions and
judgments within the decision requirement are:

determining route and/or method of approach;
determining how to navigate the streets;

identifying hazards, constraints, and constrictions; and
determining how to obscure the assault.

Determine how to enter the building. This decision requirement is about deciding on
an entry point that can be accessed relatively easily, provides a good starting point for the
actual clearing that will occur once the unit has entered the building, and does not present a
significant threat to the clearing unit. The entry may be from the roof, through a top story



DECISION-CENTERED MOUT TRAINING FOR SMALL UNIT LEADERS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Research Requirement:

This research effort sought to understand and support U.S. Army platoon leader
decision making in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). Specifically, the MOUT
building clearing mission was investigated. A program of Decision Skills Training for
MOUT was developed to meet the needs of platoon leaders. The following research
requirements were addressed in the project:

e Expand and validate a detailed representation of the decision requirements
involved in clearing a building from the platoon leader perspective.
Develop a new knowledge elicitation technique to support the previous goal.
Assess the decision training needs of instructors at the Infantry Officer Basic
Course (IOBC) at Fort Benning, GA. |
e Refine and document a methodology for translating decision requirements into
Decision Making Game training scenarios.
© Utilize the research findings to develop a multimedia tool to support IOBC
instructors in training decision-making skills in new lieutenants.
Develop and conduct an initial evaluation of the multimedia tool.
Develop an exercise that supports Army platoon leaders in appreciating the
importance of a solid situation awareness in MOUT environments.
e Identify and document lessons learned by MOUT experts.

Some of these requirements were set at the start of this research effort, while others
emerged as the project progressed. All of them, however, supported the overall objective of
supporting and improving platoon leader decision making in MOUT.

Procedure:

The methodologies employed to achieve these requirements were grounded in the
Naturalistic Decision Making framework for investigating real-world decision making. Given
the project objectives, the methods relied on the knowledge and skill of Army experts in
MOUT and training. In a previous effort, a Cognitive Task Analysis of Army MOUT experts
resulted in initial descriptions of the critical decisions and judgments in building clearing
operations (Phillips, McDermott, Thordsen, McCloskey, & Klein, 1998). These findings
were represented in Decision Requirements Tables. In the current effort the Decision
Requirements Tables were expanded and validated, applying new and existing knowledge
elicitation techniques to another group of Army MOUT experts. The findings of the
Cognitive Task Analysis, represented in the Decision Requirements Tables, provided the
basis for the content of the Decision Skills Training. The findings from a user needs analysis
conducted on IOBC instructors identified characteristics of the trainers envisioned to

vii



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A-26



deliberate. It explains that the training is intended to boost decision-making skills through
practice and experience with context-rich, albeit low fidelity, decision scenarios.

Facilitating DMGs. This module breaks down the DMG seminar into a series of steps,
and explains how to facilitate each step. It also includes a discussion of positive and negative
facilitation behaviors. Video clips are incorporated throughout to exhibit each of the steps
and to model various facilitation styles.

Decision Making Critique. This is a critical module in IMPACT. The Decision
Making Critique is a debrief method focusing on the how and why behind the decisions and
assessments of the students. This module teaches instructors to utilize the Decision Making
Critique, again breaking it down into steps. Video clips are used to show how to use each
question and what types of student responses the instructor should try to elicit. Facilitation
tips are also included.

Creating DMGs. This module explains the key components of a DMG and provides
guidelines for developing each section of a game. The user can also choose to develop a
DMG while working through the module. If this option is selected, the user will input
scenario development notes as prompted. The end result is a printable worksheet that can be
used as a framework for creating a complete DMG.

DMG Library. This module contains 16 MOUT DMGs developed based on the CTA
findings. Basic, intermediate, and advanced level games are included. Each DMG includes
the actual scenario and facilitator notes. The facilitator notes present teaching points to aid in
selecting an appropriate DMG for the student group. They also include potential questions
that students may ask about the scenario and recommended answers, and contingencies that
the instructor can incorporate into the scenario as desired.

Ill. SCENARIO (DECISION MAKING GAME) DEVELOPMENT

A key portion of this project involved the development of a library of MOUT
Decision Making Games (DMGs) for inclusion in the IMPACT tool. In the process of
developing these DMGs, two additional research objectives were met. First, we refined a
methodology for translating CTA findings (in the form of DRTs) to relevant training
requirements and to scenarios in the form of DMGs. Second, we developed dimensions that
allowed us to classify DMGs according to difficulty level.

This section describes the DMG development portion of the project, and is divided
into the following sections:

Background on DMGs

The process for translating DRTs to DMGs

The DMG complexity dimensions and how they impact DMG difficulty level
Summary of the DMG library developed for this project, including the links
between the CTA findings and both the teaching points and DMG content.

19



and provides examples based on actual experience. The Knowledge Audit draws directly
from the research literature on expert-novice differences (e.g., Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988;
Ericsson, 1996; Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Feltovich, Ford, & Hoffman, 1997) and our own
Critical Decision Method studies of decision making (e.g., Crandall & Getchell-Reiter, 1993;
Crandall, Kyne, Militello, & Klein, 1992; Klinger, et al., 1993; Militello & Lim, 1995).

The Knowledge Audit was developed as a relatively inexpensive and simple method
for applying CTA to the process of training development. It focuses on the categories of
knowledge and skills that distinguish experts from others, using elicited examples that are
based on actual experiences. These categories include: diagnosing and predicting, situation
awareness, perceptual skills, improvising, metacognition, recognizing anomalies, and
compensating for equipment limitations. The Knowledge Audit employs a set of probes
which elicit examples of the types of skills used on-the-job. The probes enabled the
interviewers to deepen on the information already present in the DRTs from the initial effort,
and produce additional entries where necessary.

Scenario-Based Elicitation

A new interview technique — scenario-based elicitation — was used in two of the three
interviews. The goal of the technique is to elicit a broader and deeper range of cues and
factors related to decision making by grounding the interview in a series of situational
contexts. This elicitation technique is highly interactive between the interviewers and
interviewee. The interviewee is asked to build a scenario, and the interviewers probe key
aspects of the scenario as well as the decisions that must be made. Dimensions of the
contexts are altered one at a time (e.g., through ‘what-if’ probes) and the impact of the
change on the SME’s situation assessment and decisions are recorded. Not only does the
resulting data produce sets of cues and factors, it also indicates the relative importance of
certain pieces of environmental information, and how particular patterns of cues and factors
are interpreted.

The process for the scenario-based elicitation is as follows:

1. The lead interviewer begins by presenting and explaining the DRTs, including
how they were developed, their purpose, and the meaning of each column of data.
The contents of the tables (i.e., the MOUT-specific data) are also explained as
they pertain to the purpose of the study. In this case, we described our goal of
eliciting the decision requirements of platoon leaders in a building clearing
operation. The interviewee is also given the opportunity to ask questions about the
tables and their contents.

2. The lead interviewer presents and explains DMGs, which are low-fidelity (paper-
and-pencil), context-rich scenarios used primarily for training purposes (Klein
Associates Inc., 1999; Schmitt, 1994). See Section III for further description of
DMGs. The purpose of this step is to familiarize the interviewee with the nature
of the scenarios around which the interview will occur.



Wrap It Up was designed as a Basic level DMG, so we did not add a great number of
difficulties. If we were interested in further increasing the difficulty, we might have added
additional items from the tables, such as limiting the amount of ammunition available to the
platoon.

Step 5: Use the Factors column to support the development of a Background
The Background of a DMG should provide detail on the following issues:

Who is or has been feuding?

What is the political and/or cultural climate?

What is the current status of the area?

What are the recent trends in activity and attitudes?
Why is the platoon in this location?

How long has the platoon been deployed?

What are the friendly and enemy big pictures?

Factors can be used to provide the context for these background issues to an extent
that allows the participants to immerse in the DMG situation. These factors are different from
cues in that they are not typically immediate or perceptual. They can be considered general
knowledge, such as economics of an area, general attitude of civilians toward the military, or
typical tactics employed by the enemy. They provide supplemental information that not only
helps to create a history for the DMG, but also creates critical context for making decisions.
Much of this context is found in the Background, but it can also influence parts of the
Scenario and ROE as well.

For the decision of determining an approach route, the DRTs indicate that level of
ambient lighting (day vs. night), information from recon (intelligence reports), and overall
mission are all critical factors when making this assessment. Therefore, we specifically
included this information in either the Background or Scenario. For example, we provided an
intelligence report on past enemy activity (“In the past four weeks, the enemy forces have
been mainly reactive and attacking only sporadically. They have been operating in small
groups of 4-8 soldiers. ..”).

Step 6: Develop ROE, taking Factors into account

ROE are consistently challenging in the chaotic MOUT environment. Within very
short periods of time, a soldier’s mission can transform from humanitarian relief to
peacekeeping to all-out war. Given the transient nature of MOUT, ROE rapidly become
outdated or irrelevant. They can also be so vague that they cannot be easily interpreted.
Nonetheless, they are often listed in the DRTs as factors that influence MOUT decisions. For
this reason we developed (for Wrap It Up and other DMGs) the following standard set of
ROE that are a representative sample of what might be encountered in a MOUT
environment:

24



In this scenario, the platoon is deployed as part of a U.N. humanitarian and peacekeeping effort to

provide relief to a war-ravaged country of impoverished citizens. It is conducting an on-foot patrol on
the eve of an anniversary known for coordinated outbreaks of violence. Tensions around the country
are high, and the platoon witnesses several civilians unloading heavy crates into a warehouse and
guarding them with weapons. Rumors are circulating that later that night there will be an outbreak of

|

|

|

violence. |
|

{ | Primary Cues & Factors | Teaching/Discussion |

|

Decision Requirements Critical Decisions Incorporated as Context | Points Resulting from |
__ Addressed in the DMG__ Faced by Participants to Influence the Decision | Decision Requirement |
. intain enemy © Identify the most ¢ Current date (coincides [| ¢ How to diffuse an |
perspective. likely enemy course with violent anniversary). | escalating situation |
* Maintain big picture | of action. | ¢ Emptiness of streets. / before it gets out of
and SA. « Maintain awareness . © Civilianlocationsand hand.
© Interpreting and | of civilians in area. weapons. | © Stopping armed
applying ROE. © Assess the big Recognition of civilians civilians with unclear |
© Determine how to | picture situation. astown troublemakers. | intent.
secure the perimeter. Determine how to © Standard ROE. | @ Operating within
¢ Determine how to seal off area. | © Children in building | established ROE
approach the building. | ¢ Determine where to | « Reports from company | When your role is
place security assets. | commander. | peacekeeper.

* Determine route | Informal intel reports of | * Determining |
andor method of | _ planned violence. appropriate level of |
approach, © Civilian actions. action when clearing

| © Time of day. a building with
i | Civilians.
| |e Interpreting civilian
| intent while
envisioning
progression of
| events.

C-16



DMG 8: CAUGHT IN THE INTERSECTION

The platoon in this DMG is conducting a motorized clearing operation through a war-ravaged village.
| The rest of the company is encountering unexpected resistance and radios for assistance. The platoon
leader is suddenly faced with loss of communications with one of the squads, fire from an unknown
| enemy, and a disabled vehicle in the intersection, separating the squads. Meanwhile, the company’s
situation seems to be worsening, leaving the platoon leader to determine how to manage both his own
| situation and the needs of the company.

=
i=

V]

|

Decision Requirements | Critical Decisions Faced

by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

<
ry
lad

|
=
5
=
Zz

yy

Addressed in the DMG |

Maintain enemy |
perspective.

¢ Lead Subordinates.

« Maintain Big Picture
&SA.

© Determine how to
clear the building.

Identify how enemy
can exploit friendly
vulnerabilities.
Anticipate enemy
deception techniques.
Clearly communicate
with and direct
subordinates.

Assess mission
progress against
mission plan and
objectives.

Assess the big picture
situation.

Determine how and
where to proceed.
Determine how and
when to evacuate
casualties.

« Enemy force typical

sizes, weapons, tactics.
Intel reports suggesting
town will be empty.
* Call from company
commander to provide
immediate
reinforcement.
Building characteristics
— varied states of
decay, 1-3 stories.
* Rate of small arms fire
— suggests 5-10 enemy.
¢ Rocket grenade launc!
Squad leader report of
casualties.
© Lack of radio
communications.
Report of movement in |
another building. t

© Understanding
leverage points and
vulnerabilities in
urban settings.

© Dealing with
multiple immediate
goals and limited
resources.

¢ Balancing needs of
platoon with rest of
company.

© Dealing with

communications

losses and physical

seperation in urban

settings.

Assessing enemy

intent.



3. The interviewee is asked to read a DMG scenario (in this case, a MOUT DMG).

The purpose of this step is similar to Step #2 — to familiarize the interviewee with
the nature of DMGs.

4. The lead interviewer refers the interviewee to the DRTs, and asks the interviewee
to select a high-level decision requirement with which to begin the scenario
development. In this case, the high-level decision requirements corresponded to
stages of the building clearing mission. Using the decision requirement selected,
the interviewee is assisted in creating a rough scenario that might be encountered
on the MOUT battlefield.

5. The interviewers employ Critical Decision Method (Klein, Calderwood, &
MacGregor, 1989; Hoffman, Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998) and Knowledge Audit
(Militello & Hutton, 1998) probes to elicit decisions, judgments, cues, factors, and
expert-novice differences pertaining to the situation. Then the interviewers alter
one dimension or piece of context, and probe to determine whether and how the
decisions and judgments are altered. At times, the interviewers ask the
interviewee what changes to the scenario would produce a different assessment or
decision. This process of altering the scenario and recording the impact on
decision making continues until the key variations are exhausted. Note that within
a particular decision requirement, the set of key variations is substantial but not
extensive; on average, we discussed 7-10 variations. The set of decisions within
the decision requirement selected serve as a guide to ensure thoroughness by the
interviewers.

6. The interviewers then probed another decision requirement. In this case, since all
the decision requirements were highly related and semi-linear in nature, it was not
necessary to develop a new scenario. The scenario developed for the first decision
Tequirement selected was effective as a frame for each of the other decision
requirements. The process described in Step 5 was utilized for each of the
remaining decision requirements in turn.

Overall this interview technique was highly effective for validating and expanding
pre-existing CTA data. We believe the linear nature of the decision requirements was critical
to the success of this method given the short time frame (i.e., 2-hour interviews). We also
believe the extensive amounts of experience and skill possessed by the SMEs contributed to
the success of the technique. It is unclear whether this approach could be utilized with
interviewees at lower levels of experience.

Results

The findings of this research have been combined with the earlier findings. Two
additional decision requirements resulted from the current effort’s validation interviews
(Determine how to evacuate the building and Understand and apply Rules of Engagement).
Additional data and clarifications of previous data were also obtained through the validation
interviews. All data are represented in the DRTs (see Appendixes A and B). Each DRT
centers on one decision requirement, and the information within each table details the



This DMG can be conducted as follow-on to. Hot Time in Slackia — Part B, or as a stand-alone DMG.
In this DMG, the platoon has just breeched a two-story bank that is holding hostiles and hostages. The
platoon is in the process of securing an intersection in a war-torn village, for an upcoming Red Cross
relief effort. From directly outside the main door of the bank, the platoon leader begins receiving sit
reps from his squad leaders. Someone fires on the security element from inside the building; the
internal squads are taking fire as well. Comms are lost when suddenly, 1“ squad leader flies out of the
& window directly above the platoon leader.

T

Decision Requirements | _ Critical Decisions
Addressed in the DMG | Faced by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

* Maintain awareness
of civilians in area.

« Determine where to
proceed next.

« Determine personnel

| and unit size
necessary for
mission
accomplishment.

* Maintain control of
subordinates.

© Clearly communicate
with and direct
subordinates.

« Determine how to | © Assess the situation
clear the building. | within the building.
= Maintain big picture | Determine flow of
and SA. | the cleari
Lead subordinates. | © Determine whether
* Project into the | to request
future. | reinforcements or
i call for fire.
|
{

e Width of hallways in
building.

Screaming (likely

hostages).

Squad leader reports of

building interior.

* Observed number of
hostiles.

¢ Wall material and
thickness.

* Status of communications
with squad leaders.

* Sounds of gunfire.

¢ Sounds of fighting.

« Reported enemy
sightings.

¢ Reported enemy i
footsteps. {

1% squad leader emerging |
from window.

How do you
maintain the big
picture with limited

communications and |

visual information.
Determining when to
change current
course of action.
Regaining situation
awareness in an
urban environment.
The importance of
maintain
communications with
the platoon.

Issues around
building clearing
when hostiles with
hostages are
involved.

C-15



d. You may not seize property of others to accomplish your mission.
e. Detention of civilians is authorized for security reasons or self-defense.

f. Placing fire on religious or cultural centers or towards schools or hospital is
forbidden.

Situation:

Your company has been providing security to a small village in Checkistan for the past
week. Most of the population of the town has fled, leaving behind very few possessions. Those
civilians that remain are in need of medical relief. A Red Cross relief mission has been planned.
Your platoon has received orders from your company CO to secure the intersection of Ist and
Main for the Red Cross relief effort due to arrive and set up there in 2 hours. In this particular
area of town, the buildings seem to have been completely deserted and looted. Typically, there
has been nothing in these barren buildings, not even furniture.

As your platoon approaches the intersection on foot, your soldiers are fired upon by what
appears to be a solitary armed man who immediately runs into the building on the northwest
corner of the intersection. No one in your platoon is injured. You realize that if this threat
remains in that building, they will prevent the intersection from being secure for the relief effort.
You decide that you need to clear that building immediately.

The building is roughly 40 x 60 feet from what you can tell. It is two stories high, and
the windows on the first story all seem to be boarded up. There are several cleared windows
without glass on the second story. You estimate that there are roughly eight rooms per story and
probably a single staircase somewhere in the building.

After surveying the building, you issue the following orders to your platoon:

“We need to clear that corner building of all enemy presence. The Red Cross relief effort
will be here in less than 2 hours, and we can’t have any threats firing upon their station. This is
what we need to do:

e 1%*squad: Secure the perimeter of this building. Make sure that you have eyes-on all
around and that no one gets in or out without you knowing.
2TM squad: You will enter the building first. Clear as you go.
3" squad: You will enter behind 2" squad and assist in the clearing of the building. It’s
not a small building, so both squads are necessary.



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A-22



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B-2



Determine how to evacuate the building. This decision requirement was added to the
DRTs after the validation interviews. It involves extracting the clearing element from the
building once the clearing is complete. An extraction point in the target building must be
chosen, and the platoon must relocate itself from the building to another building or secure
location. The extraction point and route is always planned in advance of the mission,
however, the platoon leader must be prepared to adjust or completely change the plan in
response to what is encountered during the mission. Extraction points could be on the roof (if
evacuating via helicopter), through doors or windows, or through breach points.

The critical decisions and judgments related to evacuating the building are:

choose an extraction point;

determine how to conduct the evacuation;

determine how to handle noncombatants;

determine where to locate oneself during evacuation; and
ensure subordinate vigilance.

One important objective in choosing an extraction point is to set the platoon up for
the next operation. The extraction point should enable the platoon to position themselves to
plan for the next operation or to begin the next operation, depending on the circumstances.
The extraction point should also be selected based on the safety it offers the platoon. The
platoon leader should factor in cover and concealment opportunities within the city,
especially if the platoon will have to cover a significant distance outside the cover of
buildings on their way to the next location. (Note that this references the navigate streets
decision within the Approach the building decision requirement.) The platoon leader must
also consider the situation inside the building: locations of doors and windows, location of
noncombatants in the building (if applicable), and the general building layout.

The decision regarding how to conduct the evacuation is a challenging one. The
platoon must maintain control and domination of the building while gradually decreasing its
combat power in the building. At this time, risk of fratricide increases. The platoon’s
movement out of the building can draw the attention of other platoons operating in the
vicinity. They may mistake the platoon for hostiles, or simply react automatically out of self-
defense (despite the pre-brief that explained the other platoons’ missions). The high threat
levels in MOUT environments are known to cause itchy trigger fingers, especially with less
experienced soldiers. In addition, friendlies rarely control all the structures in an area, so by
evacuating a secure building, the platoon moves back into “hostile territory.”

Given the dangers involved in evacuation, it is critical that the platoon leader enable
mutual support. Often the first group sent out of the building will set up an overwatch
position for the rest of the platoon. Also, the platoon leader must give soldiers clear limits of
movement and concise instructions in order to keep the extraction controlled and thereby
minimize the risk.

Noncombatants who were found during the clearing add a degree of complexity to the
extraction. While clearing, the noncombatants were most likely cuffed and/or guarded in a

11



of

This DMG has the platoon leader conducting a mounted security patrol through a small village as part

a U.N. peacekeeping force. The civilian intents are mixed. Most are peaceful, but a few are
troublemaking thugs, looking to capitalize on the chaos. During the patrol, some of the thugs begin
torturing other civilians, even killing one. Other civilians are angered at this and they respond. The
situation rapidly escalates. A media crew is capturing the entire incident on film, including the platoon
leader, who must now deal with the situation.

Decision Requirements
Addressed in the DMG

Critical Decisions Faced
by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

¢ Lead Subordinates.

¢ Maintain Big Picture
&SA.

Project into the
future.

Interpreting and
applying ROE.

¢ Secure the perimeter.

© Clearly communicate
with and direct
subordinates.

Assess mission

| progress against

mission plan and

objectives.

Maintain awareness of
civilians in the area.

¢ Maintain awareness of
sectors of fire for all
friendly units.

© Set expectancies.

| ¢ Determine where to
proceed next.

* Determine how to seal
off the area.

| © Determine where to

concentrate fires.

¢ Typical enemy
weapons, sizes, tactics.

Historical civilian
attitude toward forces.

* Mission of
peacekeeping forces.

« Friendly weapons.
sizes — attached MG
squad.

¢ Distance between
forces and enemy.

* Standard ROE.

Current enemy assets —

MG on truck, AK-47s.

Enemy actions —
beating civilians, firin;
at UN helo, throwing
civilian off bridge.

© Nervous reactions of
civilians.

| © Location of civilian

group.

¢ CNN camera.
Dispersed locations of
forces.

Interpreting ROE in
complex, escalating
situations.

© Dealing with
civilians with
varying intentions.

© Dealing with media
in MOUT
environments.

¢ Using non-lethals.

e¢ Communicating with
a distributed platoon
in MOUT.

C-17



5. Comments on MOUT training (at IOBC and other places, if applicable).

6. How he instructs...

a. How he prepares for giving instruction (may be more applicable for
Captains).

b. Description of instructor materials available to him, or that he uses.

c. Discussion of how he flexes materials and\or instructional approach to his
teaching style or to his view of what is most important to teach.

d. What he teaches that is not in the manual or stated curricula.

e. Hardest things about teaching; what students struggle with.

7. Educational philosophy — perspective on best teaching strategies, what he tries to
offer his students, or anything that drives the way he approaches his teaching.
Also, qualities of a good instructor.

8. Indications of DST fitting or not fitting into IOBC — e.g., what he says about
downtime, whether he uses scenarios now, and so forth.

9. What a student should walk away from IOBC having learned.
10. Reactions to our DST materials.
11. Other comments.

We compiled the data from each interview to develop a profile of the IOBC
curriculum, students, and instructors. This profile contained only information directly
relevant to the design of the DST program. The profile and the interview notes were
referenced periodically during development of the SA Appreciation exercise (see Section IV)
and of IMPACT.

IOBC Profile
The Curriculum

Each IOBC class consists of 5 platoons of students, comprising a company. A
maximum of 40 students make up a platoon, which is also referred to as a cadre. Three
instructors are assigned to each cadre: a Captain, an Staff Sergeant (often from mechanized
infantry), and an Sergeant First Class (often from light infantry, and preferably a Ranger).
Civilians, typically retired military, also provide a portion of the instruction. The Captain is
ultimately responsible for the training of the lieutenants.

The IOBC motto and general educational philosophy is “crawl, walk, run.” First,

teach the students to crawl by telling them how to perform a skill. Then, they walk by
practicing the skill. Lastly, running entails performing the skill in the context of an exercise.

16



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In this DMG, the platoon leader is tasked with securing an intersection in a war-torn village, for an

upcoming Red Cross relief effort. As the platoon approaches the intersection to begin this peacekeeping

task, the leader notices uneasiness among the civilians, along with some slung weapons on a few of the

male civilians. Suddenly, the platoon gets caught in the middle of what appears to be a gunfight at the

intersection between opposing factions. At least three men have entered a store in the intersection and
_ begin firing at civilians. One of the platoon members is hit, apparently unintentionally.

Decision Requirements | Critical Decisions
Addressed in the DMG | Faced by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

© Project into the © Determine where to
future. | proceed next.

* Determine how to ¢ Determine how to
secure the perimeter. seal off the area.

¢ Determine how to « Determine where to
approach the buildi place security assets.

¢ Determine which
assets and people to
employee.

| © Determine route

and/or method of

| approach.

_ © Identify hazards.
constraints, and
constrictions.

© Determine how and
when to evacuate

i casualties.

Increasing hostility
toward peacekeeping
forces by civilians.

« Typical weapons and
tactics of armed
factions.

« Number of civilians in
intersection.

 Size/construction of
buildings — 1-3 stories,
reinforced concrete.

¢ General condition of

building openings —
broken windows,

blocked by furniture,
covered with wire
mesh.

* Narrow streets and
yards,

* Perceived uneasiness

of civilians — quiet,

guarded looks.

Upcoming food relief

mission.

Echoing gunfire from

multiple positions.

« Report from civilian of
3 armed hostiles firing
at civilians.

.

© Interpreting situations
where multiple threats
are involved.

* Securing an
intersection under
adverse circumstances.

© Dealing with civilians
when intent is unclear.

© Leveraging urban
terrain to approach and
secure @ dangerous
intersection.

« Establishing fields of
fire in urban terrain.

C-1



We employed the above quality checklist for each of the 16 DMGs developed in this
effort. We also used an additional, more rigorous quality test for our DMGs. We conducted
DMG validation sessions with IOBC Blackbirds. (Blackbirds are recent graduates of IOBC
who for various reasons have not yet moved to their next assignment.) For each DMG, one
Klein Associates representative facilitated a seminar with 4-6 Blackbirds. Two Klein
Associates observers assessed the quality of the seminar as it was being conducted. They
answered questions such as whether the participants seemed engaged, whether they seemed
to experience time pressure, what courses of action were generated, what types of questions
participants asked, what issues arose in the debrief, and so forth.

Further, we elicited feedback from the IOBC Blackbirds on both the quality of the
DMG learning experience and how to improve them. Participants completed a feedback form
consisting of the following eight questions:

How much time pressure did you feel you were under in this scenario?

How challenging were the decisions you had to make?

What would you change to make the scenario more challenging?

How interesting was the scenario (was it exciting, did it grab your attention)?
How helpful was the visual aid in understanding the scenario?

Would you change the visual aid or add anything to it? If so, please describe.
What did you like least about the scenario?

What did you like most about the scenario?

Once the feedback forms were completed, an informal group discussion ensued. The
Klein Associates representatives asked specific questions pertaining to the participants’
feedback in order to clarify and expand on their comments and suggestions.

Observations by our representatives in concert with feedback from the Blackbirds
were used to improve upon each scenario. Most improvements involved clarifying the
wording in the DMG text or increasing the realism of the scenario. In a few cases, the events
in the DMG Scenario were altered to increase or decrease the difficulty level.

The validation sessions also enabled us to prepare facilitator notes for each DMG.
The facilitator notes consist of four components. First, the Executive Summary paragraph
provides a brief description of the DMG. Second, a set of 4-6 Teaching Points indicate what
types of issues should be discussed and what types of lessons will result from playing the
DMG. The teaching points are based on the original decision-focus areas identified for the
DMG as well as the issues that arose during the Blackbird session. Third, a list of Potential
Participant Questions provides clarification questions that participants might ask about the
scenario, as well as recommendations for how to answer those questions (to increase or
decrease level of difficulty). Finally, the facilitator notes include a set of Potential
Contingencies that can be added to the DMG at the facilitator’s discretion. The facilitator
notes for each DMG are available in IMPACT’s DMG Library module.

28



holding area. If they are not kept bound, they become a potential threat to the last team
leaving the building. In some cases the platoon leader makes the decision as to how to handle
the noncombatants during the evacuation. (In many cases, higher headquarters will make this
decision ahead of time.) The decision will be made based on the number of noncombatants in
the building — are there enough to cause problems for the platoon? — whether they have
exhibited hostility, and how civilians in the region have responded in the past to U.S. forces.
The level of intensity of the conflict also comes into play. Generally speaking, the higher the
intensity, the greater the threat posed by noncombatants. There is also a chance that the
enemy has slipped in with the civilians. In some situations the platoon will sort through the
noncombatants prior to evacuating to ensure that no hostiles are amongst them. In that case,
the platoon would likely uncuff the civilians. Under other circumstances, the platoon leader
may decide to leave them bound, primarily to ensure their safety. Bound, they are not a threat
and therefore platoon members are unlikely to shoot at them for any reason. If they are
unbound, there is a chance that a soldier could interpret a movement or act as hostile, and fire
in self-defense.

Another concern during the evacuation is ensuring vigilance of subordinates. There is
a tendency for soldiers to let down their guard once the clearing is complete. They take on a
“going home” mentality. The platoon leader must remind the platoon to stay sharp; the
extraction can be tricky and risky.

Task-Independent Decision Requirements

The task-independent decision requirements represent judgments and assessments
that should be operative throughout a building-clearing operation and that should shape
decision making within each stage of the operation. For this reason, there is significant
overlap between the data in the task-independent and task-focused decision requirements.
Still, we discuss the task-independent decision requirements separately in order to highlight
their criticality. In this section we briefly describe the four decision requirements identified in
the earlier study, and we present in greater detail the additional decision requirement
(Understand and Apply Rules of Engagement) identified in the validation interviews. The
complete set of task-independent DRTs are presented in Appendix B.

Maintain the enemy’s perspective. According to SMEs, this is one of the most critical
yet most difficult decision requirements. Throughout mission execution a good platoon
leader will continuously put himself in the enemy’s position and think like the enemy in
order to guide his own decision making. The critical decisions and judgments within this
requirement are:

identifying the most likely enemy course of action;

identifying the most likely enemy location;

identifying how the enemy can exploit friendly vulnerabilities; and
anticipating enemy deception techniques.

These judgments will influence every decision that the platoon leader makes during the
course of the mission. They will serve as additional cues to shape the decision making.

12



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A-18



implement the Decision Skills Training. In conducting the IOBC user needs analysis, both
experienced and novice instructors were regarded to ensure that the training tools developed
would assist all levels of instructors.

Findings and Products:

The Cognitive Task Analysis conducted in this effort validated and expanded upon
the earlier findings. Most notably, two additional decision requirements were uncovered.
First, it was found that the determination of how to evacuate the building once cleared
involves a series of critical assessments by the platoon leader. In this task-focused decision
requirement, the platoon leader must consider extraction points, deal with noncombatants,
ensure subordinate vigilance, and place himself in an appropriate location, while
simultaneously orchestrating the removal of his soldiers.

The second new decision requirement identified is that of understanding and applying
Rules of Engagement (ROE). A platoon leader’s actions must adhere to stated ROE, however
these ROE can be vague, ambiguous, or even contradictory. Further, with the transient nature
of MOUT environments, it can be especially challenging to operate within a solitary set of

ROE. This results in significant cognitive demands on the platoon leader to both interpret and
apply ROE.

A scenario-based program of Decision Skills Training was assembled based on the
Decision Requirements Tables and the user needs analysis. The primary Decision Skills
Training product is IMPACT — IMproving Performance through Applied Cognitive Training.
IMPACT is a multimedia tool, which teaches instructors how to facilitate Decision Making
Games, conduct decision-centered critiques, and create their own Decision Making Game
scenarios. Sixteen MOUT Decision Making Games, developed from the Decision
Requirements Tables, are also included in IMPACT.

It became clear in the research effort that situation awareness is not only critical for
platoon leaders in MOUT environments, but is one of the skills with which lieutenants are
most likely to struggle. New platoon leaders often fail to appreciate the importance of good
situation awareness. Therefore, a secondary Decision Skills Training product was created.
The Situation Awareness Appreciation Exercise focuses on giving platoon leaders an
appreciation for the importance of situation awareness. Specifically, the exercise is designed
to illustrate how situation awareness can change over time, how it can be different for
different people in the same situation, and how it can affect actions and mission outcomes.

A third product, a guide to MOUT decision making, was also developed and is
intended for use by both instructors and soldiers. The guide utilizes the findings represented
in the Decision Requirements Tables to present the stages of the building clearing operation,
explain factors and issues that arise during each stage, and describe the decision-making
challenges unique to MOUT environments. This handbook is not part of the Decision Skills

Training program, however, it would serve as a good supplement for instructors teaching
MOUT decision making.

viii



INTERMEDIATE

aes eo

DMG 10: ENEMY FROM THE WE

In this scenario the platoon has taken up defensive positions at an intersection in a war-torn, urban

| environment to provide security for medical relief efforts. Enemy vehicles suddenly appear at the
intersection, but from an unexpected direction. At the same time, other enemy forces begin engaging 2
nearby squad. This DMG is a reversal of Caught in the Intersection, where the enemy forces are positioned

| as the friendlies were and vice versa. The purpose of the reversal is to help the participant better envision

enemy actions and intent. It works best when the participants are not informed about this reversal, but

rather, discover it on their own.

Decision Requirements |
Addressed in the DMG

Critical Decisions Faced
by Participants

Primary Cues & Factors
Incorporated as Context
to Influence the Decision

Teaching/Discussion
Points Resulting from
Decision Requirement

¢ Lead Subordinates.

* Maintain Big Picture & |
SA.

© Secure the Perimeter.

| Clearly communicate

with and direct
subordinates.

¢ Maintain control of
subordinates.

¢ Assess the big picture

situation.

Maintain awareness of

sectors of fire for all

friendly units.

© Set expectancies.

« Determine where to
concentrate fires.

¢ Determine how to seal
off area.

« Village characteristics —
war-ravaged brick and
wood buildings. 1-3
stories.

Civilian numbers and
intent - ~1000 friendly.
stay inside.

© Squad distribution.

© Sound of exchange of
weapons fire.

« Report from squad
leader on perceived
engagement of
neighboring platoon.

« Radio report that
company commander
has been hit.

« Disappearance of 1*
platoon.

* Report of visual
ID/sounds of enemy
vehicles approaching.

« Rate of speed of
approach of enemy
vehicles.

© The importance and
difficulty of
maintaining
communications and
conveying intent in
urban environments.

© How to take the enemy

Tspective.

« Dealing with the loss of
communications with
higher command.

« Compensating when the

rest of the company is

unable to achieve their
mission.

Improvising when

friendly status is

unknown.



The SA Appreciation Exercise consists of a table-top scenario and guidelines for
facilitating the scenario. Both the scenario and the facilitation were designed to address the
learning objectives. The scenario is filled with uncertainty and ambiguity. It is written from
the perspective of a platoon leader tasked with ensuring there is no enemy in the area and
clearing buildings if necessary. The platoon is fired upon by one enemy soldier who runs into
anearby building. The situation quickly escalates as the platoon enters the building. The
scenario is paused at two points and the participants are asked to answer four questions
relating to their assessment of the situation. These questions are:

1. What is current threat size, location and intent?

2. What would you do at this point:

Continue the building-clearing mission.

Evacuate the building and call for reinforcements.

Have squads hold positions while you gather info and talk to Platoon Sgt.
Evacuate the building and determine another entry/clearing strategy.

Call your company CO and ask for guidance.

Other. What?

mono sp

3. What is your greatest concern at this moment?
4. What do you think the situation will look like in the next five minutes?

The facilitation takes place at the end of the scenario. It focuses on the answers to
questions #1 (SA) and #2 (course of action based on that SA). The facilitator attempts to
draw the connection between the SA at different points in time by different people to action
attempted and eventual outcomes. The entire exercise can be found in Appendix D. The next
section describes the process of developing the exercise.

Exercise Development

The SA Appreciation Exercise was developed in several iterative steps. In each step,
emphasis was placed on ensuring the exercise addressed the learning objectives. Each step
consisted of a cycle of exercise development, a run-through of the exercise, and revision. The
four major steps are described below.

In the first step, two different Klein Associates teams developed an SA Appreciation
Exercise independently. The two teams were tasked with developing a scenario-based
exercise that addressed the general goal of helping platoon leaders understand the importance
of SA. One of the important outcomes of this step was a refinement of the goals to reflect the
learning objectives described above. The team members agreed that these were the major
points that participants should take away from the exercise. The two teams developed slightly
different exercises. One exercise (Version 1.1) contained decision points in which the
exercise was paused and the participants answered questions about their SA. The other
exercise (Version 1.2) emphasized the facilitation at the conclusion of the scenario. The
strengths of each version were combined to create a tool that contained a scenario, stopping

33



APPENDIX D

SITUATION AWARENESS APPRECIATION EXERCISE



knowledge and experience, it was imperative to create DMGs representing distinct levels of
difficulty.

Another outcome of the effort was the MOUT: Decision Making in Action guide, a
document describing the decision challenges of a building clearing operation for an audience
of instructors and soldiers. In the handbook, we present high-value information culled from
the DRTs and translate it into a user-friendly format for operational personnel. (The DRTs
are representations of CTA findings intended primarily for use by researchers and designers.)
The goal was to provide an initial view of decision-making issues pertaining to building
clearing missions, and provoke further consideration of the intricacies and challenges of
MOUT.

Although not documented in this report, another outcome of the project was an
evaluation study of IMPACT and the MOUT Decision Skills Training program. The study
was conducted at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. It compared the decision
performance and other subjective ratings (e.g., quality of the learning experience) of cadets
who received Decision Skills Training through IMPACT-trained facilitators, versus cadets
who received generic decision game training through non-IMPACT-trained facilitators. The
findings indicate that IMPACT is a very usable training tool. While we were unable to find
significant differences in decision-making performance between the two groups of cadets, the
IMPACT-trained cadets rated their learning experience as more positive than did the non-
IMPACT-trained cadets. The documentation of the study, Evaluating an Approach to MOUT
Decision Skills Training, can be obtained through the Army Research Institute or by
contacting the authors of this report.

The products developed in this effort represent a major step in the right direction. But
they are only the first step. MOUT environments present a wealth of new challenges for
decision makers at all levels of command and control. And while training in procedures is
essential for all soldiers in MOUT environments, the procedures are only one piece of the
training puzzle. As Army MOUT missions continue to grow in number, complexity, and
intensity, training must focus more on critical thinking and decision-making skills.

36