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20-2262-cv

Smith v. Brookhaven Science Assocs., et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 25th day of May, two thousand twenty-one.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

RICHARD C. WESLEY,

Circuit Judges.

JOSEPH SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 20-2262-cv

v.

BROOKHAVEN SCIENCE ASSOCIATES, LLC, dba

Brookhaven National Laboratory, INTERNATIONAL 

BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS-LOCAL 

2230, CHRIS LUONI, CHRIS TSCHINKEL, JOSEPH 

TRIOLO, MICHAEL KEATING, JOSEPH PAGANO,

Defendants-Appellees.

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: STEPHEN BERGSTEIN, Bergstein & 

Ullrich, New Paltz, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: MARC S. WENGER (Henry S. Shapiro, on 

the brief), Jackson Lewis P.C., Melville, 

New York, for Brookhaven Science 

Assocs., LLC, dba Brookhaven National 
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Laboratory, Chris Luoni, Chris Tschinkel, 

Joseph Triolo, Michael Keating, and 

Joseph Pagano.

MICHAEL D. BOSSO (Thomas P. Keane, on 

the brief), Colleran O’Hara & Mills LLP, 

Woodbury, NY, for International 

Brotherhood of Electrical Workers –

Local 2230.

Appeal from the July 7, 2020 judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of New York (Gary R. Brown, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the July 7, 2020 judgment of the District Court be and 

hereby is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Smith challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 

to Defendants-Appellees Brookhaven Science Associates, LLC, d/b/a Brookhaven National 

Laboratory (“BNL”), the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers – Local 2230 (the 

“Union”), and individual defendants Chris Luoni, Chris Tschinkel, Joseph Triolo, Michael Keating, 

and Joseph Pagano. Smith challenges the legality of his termination by BNL under the Labor 

Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185, arguing that material issues of fact remain as to 

whether BNL had just cause to fire him, and thus whether his termination violates a collective 

bargaining agreement. He also argues that the Union, which declined to pursue an arbitration 

following Smith’s termination, breached its duty of fair representation in bad faith because of its 

allegedly improper investigation process and conflicts of interest. Together, Smith’s claims against 

BNL and the Union are a hybrid Section 301 / fair representation claim. We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the District Court’s “grant of summary judgment de novo, examining the 

evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences in favor of, the [party against 

whom judgment was granted].” Sullivan-Mestecky v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., 961 F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 

2020) (quoting Burke v. Kodak Ret. Income Plan, 336 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2003)). Summary judgment 

is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the [party for whom 

judgment is granted] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

To prevail on a hybrid Section 301 / fair representation claim, a plaintiff “must demonstrate 

both (1) that [the employer] breached its collective bargaining agreement and (2) that [the union]

breached its duty of fair representation.” Sanozky v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 415 

F.3d 279, 282 (2d Cir. 2005). The collective bargaining agreement in this case states that BNL “shall 

not have the right to discharge an employee except for just and reasonable cause.” BNL’s 
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disciplinary policy lists “intimidating, coercing or threatening any other employee for any reason” as 

a “Dischargeable Behavior Violation[ ].” As for Smith’s claim against the Union, “a union breaches 

the duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, 

discriminatory, or in bad faith.” Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 44 (1998).

First, Smith argues that summary judgment is inappropriate because BNL fired Smith in bad 

faith. The District Court found that there was no issue of material fact that BNL’s termination of 

Smith was for just and reasonable cause because multiple employee witnesses reported “threats of 

workplace violence” of “sufficient magnitude”—that Smith carried a knife, kept it “sharp,” and 

would use it to harm coworkers with whom he had grievances. Smith posits that a jury could find in 

his favor based on evidence that several employees did not hear Smith threaten his coworkers; he 

had worked at BNL for eleven years without incident; his knife was a tool used to perform daily 

work; and allegations that the independent investigation’s outcome was predetermined. He also 

argues that BNL and the Union worked together to achieve the “improper objective” of firing 

Smith, similar to an alleged prior quid pro quo in which BNL treated Union officials charged with time 

theft leniently in exchange for the withdrawal of pending grievances against BNL. Drawing all 

permissible inferences in Smith’s favor, we disagree, substantially for the reasons stated in the 

District Court’s thorough Memorandum and Order granting reconsideration. That some employees 

did not hear Smith threaten his coworkers does not negate that five employees did. And possession 

of a knife for legitimate purposes does not contradict simultaneous threats to use it for illegitimate 

purposes. Thus, we find Smith’s arguments against BNL to be without merit.

Second, Smith argues that the Union breached its duty of representation in bad faith. He 

alleges that the Union conducted an inadequate investigation by ignoring Smith’s attempts to suggest 

witnesses or add clarifying context; instead, the Union inappropriately deferred to BNL’s findings. 

He also argues that the Union allowed a biased Union official to improperly influence the 

investigation and determination. We need not address these arguments because Smith failed to 

establish a genuine issue of material fact that the employer, BNL, breached its collective bargaining 

agreement with Smith. As stated ante, a hybrid Section 301 / fair representation claim requires the 

plaintiff to prove that both the employer and the Union are liable to the employee. Cf. White v. White 

Rose Food, 237 F.3d 174, 183 & n.13 (2d Cir. 2001).

CONCLUSION

We have reviewed all of the arguments raised by Smith on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the July 7, 2020 judgment of the District 

Court.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk