UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

in the First

U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

WORLD

WAR

ANTHOLOGY, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY, 

AND ANNOTATED ORDER OF BATTLE
Cover: Marine Sentry on duty on the Rhine River during 

the occupation of Germany.

Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Annette D. Amerman

History Division

United States Marine Corps

Quantico, VA 22134

2016

 WORLD

WAR

ANTHOLOGY, SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY,

AND ANNOTATED ORDER OF BATTLE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

in the First

U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Amerman, Annette D.

U.S. Marine Corps in the First World War : anthology, selected bibliography, and annotated order of battle / by 

Annette D. Amerman.

 pages cm. -- (U.S. Marines in World War I commemorative series ; no. 2)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. United States. Marine Corps--History--World War, 1914-1918. 2. United States. Marine Corps--Organization. 

3. United States. Marine Corps--History--Bibliography.--Organization. 4. World War, 1914-1918--United States. 5. 

World War, 1914-1918--Bibliography. I. Title.

D570.45.A83 2015

940.4’5973--dc23

2015023492
No. 2 in the U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer

Director of Marine Corps History

Angela J. Anderson

Series Editor

U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

Annette D. Amerman

General Editor

U.S. Marines in World War I Centennial Commemorative Series

Vincent J. Martinez

Graphic Designer

This printing represents as closely as possible the original works as they were published at the time, with minor alterations to the text 

based on current standards for style, grammar, punctuation, and spelling. In some instances, we have retained the original spelling 

of specific places and things as they represent the accepted spelling for the historical period.

This pamphlet history, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the First World War, is published for the education and training 

of Marines by the History Division, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia, as part of the Marine Corps’ observance of the 

centennial anniversary of that war. Editorial costs have been defrayed in part by contributions from members of the Marine Corps 

Heritage Foundation.

vii

CONTENTS

PREFACE................................................................................................................................ xi

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. xiii

PART I

MARINES AND VETERANS ANALYZE THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Readying for War...................................................................................................................... 3

Hints to the Foot Soldier in Battle......................................................................................... 5

Captain André LaFargue, French Army

Artillery in Europe ............................................................................................................... 21

Major M. E. Locke, U.S. Army

Garrison Training for Field Service ...................................................................................... 25

Major George Van Orden, U.S. Marine Corps

Camp Sanitation in Trench Warfare..................................................................................... 28

A Military Observer

Quantico Barracks................................................................................................................ 33

Second Lieutenant Charles Phelps Cushing, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

Parris Island in the War........................................................................................................ 37

Major W. R. Coyle, U.S. Congress

Over There................................................................................................................................ 41

Machine Guns of the 4th Brigade........................................................................................ 43

Major Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller Jr., U.S. Marine Corps
viii

American Marines in the British Grand Fleet ..................................................................... 60

Major Edwin N. McClellan, U.S. Marine Corps

Value of Aviation to the Marine Corps ................................................................................ 70

Major Alfred A. Cunningham, U.S. Marine Corps

The Battles of Belleau Woods (two parts)............................................................................. 77

Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Otto, German Army (Ret)

A Critical Analysis of Flank Protection,............................................................................... 94

2d Division, (AEF, France) 3 October to 9 October 1918

Major R. H. Schubert, U.S. Marine Corps

A Brief History of the 4th Brigade....................................................................................... 97

Major Edwin N. McClellan, U.S. Marine Corps

The Lafayette Radio Station...............................................................................................113

Commander S. C. Hooper, U.S. Navy

American Marines in Siberia during the World War .........................................................115

Major Edwin N. McClellan, U.S. Marine Corps

Peace and Occupation ............................................................................................ 121

Cease Firing at Eleven........................................................................................................123

Rufus C. Burleson

An Analysis of the Crossing of the Meuse River................................................................125

2d Division AEF on 10–11 November 1918

Lieutenant Colonel D. L. S. Brewster, U.S. Marine Corps

Demobilizing the Brigades.................................................................................................129

Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Evans, U.S. Marine Corps

PART II

POSTWAR ANALYSIS

Over There, Over Here.........................................................................................................139

Over Here! Marines in Texas during World War I.............................................................141

Annette D. Amerman

Marines in the Azores Islands in World War I: Diary of Walter S. Poague........................143

Antonio M. Godinho

Marines Aloft in World War I ...........................................................................................153

James R. Nilo
ix

Leathernecks at Soissons....................................................................................................159

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)

75 Years Ago . . . With the Marines at Blanc Mont............................................................169

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)

The 13th Regiment: World War One .................................................................................180

James C. Jenkins

Fourragère of the 5th and 6th Regiments...........................................................................186

Joel D. Thacker

Commanders..........................................................................................................................189

Harbord and Lejeune: A Command Precedent..................................................................191

Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Edwards, U.S. Marine Corps

Battalion Command “Over There”: The 5th Regiment, 1917–18 .......................................194

Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., U.S. Marine Corps

Battalion Command “Over There”: The 6th Regiment, 1917–18 .......................................197

Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., U.S. Marine Corps

Battalion Command “Over There”: 6th Machine Gun Battalion .......................................200

Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., U.S. Marine Corps

Regimental Command “Over There”: 1917–18 ..................................................................203

Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., U.S. Marine Corps

PART III

ANNOTATED ORDER OF BATTLE.........................................................................207

APPENDIX A - Command List........................................................................................235

APPENDIX B - Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations.................................................247

APPENDIX C - Selected Bibliography ............................................................................259

APPENDIX D - Personal and Unit Awards and Decorations.......................................265

APPENDIX E - Reserve Decorations ..............................................................................271

INDEX...................................................................................................................................293

xi

PREFACE

The aim of this collection is to give readers the broad historical strokes to U.S. Marine Corps 

participation in World War I, as well as to show that the Corps’ contribution to the war 

effort was not limited to the 4th Brigade. World War I created the modern-day Marine 

Corps; an adaptive force-in-readiness even when seemingly relegated to ship and barracks duty.

When selecting the articles for the anthology, a pattern emerged and it seemed fitting to maintain that pattern. Part I reflects the articles that Marines were reading before and during the war. 

These men were well read—they were eager to learn what combat was like in trench warfare, to 

understand the new dangers found in chemical warfare, and to try to understand their new allies 

against the Germans. These men returned home and quickly put pen to paper. They were keen to 

tell of their exploits and achievements in France, Germany, and elsewhere. There was no one better to tell that story than the veterans themselves. While World War I has faded from collective 

memory with the passing of the last of its veterans, a few stalwarts took up the torch to remind 

everyone of these brave Marines, as well as to understand the long-term impacts of the war on the 

Corps. Part II of the anthology looks at the war through the lens of devotees who have kept these 

stories alive.

Lastly, a simple order of battle would not suffice. Part III offers prolific users of, and fans of, 

Gordon L. Rottman’s U.S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle (2001) an annotated order of 

battle with appendices as the perfect bookend of this work. The order of battle includes descriptions of most of the smaller detachments and various shore duties of the Corps in direct support of 

the war. This volume concludes with a selected bibliography that was modified and updated from 

Jack B. Hilliard’s 1967 publication, An Annotated Bibliography of the United States Marine Corps in 

the First World War. It now includes record repositories and relevant Web sites to aid researchers.

This book could not have been possible without the contributions and encouragement from 

several members of the Marine Corps History Division, including Deputy Director Paul J. Weber,

the late Dr. Stephen Evans, and Mr. Robert V. Aquilina formerly with the Reference Branch. 

I extend particular gratitude to my very supportive colleagues, and “lunch bunch” members Dr. 

Nicholas Schlosser and Mr. Paul Westermeyer. Research cannot be achieved alone and, therefore, 
xii

Preface

I must thank Mrs. Cindy Evans, Mrs. Lindsay Grose, and Mrs. O’Dell McGuire of the Library of 

the Marine Corps, as well as Mrs. Alisa Whitley, Mr. Greg Cina, and Mr. Chris Ellis of our Marine 

Corps Archives. The staff of the U.S. Army’s Military History Institute also deserves every accolade 

I can bestow—and more! Additionally, I must thank Major John M. “Jack” Elliott, USMC (Ret), 

and Mr. Al Barnes (Army Combined Arms Support Command)—both men, whose own enthusiasm for the topic and willingness to read drafts and to share treasured finds, kept me motivated 

more than either of them know. I remain most grateful to Senior Editor Angela Anderson and

Visual Information Specialist Vincent J. Martinez for making me sound and look good. We gratefully acknowledge the permission received from Leatherneck, Marine Corps Gazette, and Naval

Institute Proceedings for allowing us to reprint their articles. Lastly, I sincerely thank my dear 

friends for listening to me ramble about the topic for reading drafts, for allowing me to spend my 

vacation with them and still work, and so much more—Laura J. Levi and Peter M. Wood.

Annette D. Amerman

Branch Head, Historical Inquiries and Research Branch

Marine Corps History Division
xiii

INTRODUCTION

The significance of the First World War on the U.S. Marine Corps cannot be overlooked. When the 

United States declared war against Germany on 6 April 1917, there were just 462 commissioned 

officers, 49 warrant officers, and 13, 214 enlisted men on active duty in the Marine Corps; of those, 

2,236 were already forward deployed outside the continental United States. When hostilities ended in 1918, 

approximately 30,000 men had been assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) and another 

1,600 for naval duty ashore. During the course of the war, the Corps fielded a combat brigade, consisting 

of two infantry regiments and a machine gun battalion, for duty on the front lines; another brigade of two 

regiments and a machine gun battalion was used to keep the forces fed, clothed, and moved into and out 

of the combat zone as part of the Army’s Services of Supply. Furthermore, the Corps provided two aviation squadrons for service with the Navy for antisubmarine warfare duty in the English Channel and in the 

Azores. Aside from those forces in direct combat and in support of those same forces, additional Marine 

detachments were detailed to guard radio stations, naval magazines, ammunition depots, warehouses, cable 

stations, and for other naval activities. In less than two years, the Corps had more than doubled in size to 

52,819 officers and men—the largest it had ever been. It took another 23 years and another world war to 

reach the same level again.* The Corps met the challenges put before it, proving that it was a force-inreadiness that was prepared for any clime and location.

The purpose of the anthology is two-fold; first, to provide readers with a quick and broad overview of 

Marine Corps participation in the First World War. This is not a combat narrative nor is it a lengthy narrative history; this work is meant as a quick reference guide to aid those researching Marines in the First 

World War. Second, the collection is meant to educate the general populace to the fact that the Corps’ contribution to the war effort was not limited to the 4th Brigade. Most of the histories produced focus heavily, 

and rightly so, upon the combat actions of the Marines in the 4th Brigade; however, of the 30,000 Marines 

with the American Expeditionary Forces, two thirds were in locations other than the 2d Division’s area of 

operations in France. The contributions of these “other” Marines have been glossed over by historians with 

passing references. While this work is not meant to provide detailed histories, it does serve as a point of 

reference for family members of the veterans attempting to understand their relative’s role in the war.

This work is divided into three parts, each having subordinate sections that organize the material into 

easily digestible chunks of information, starting with the anthology of articles, then an annotated order 

* Maj Edwin N. McClellan, The United States Marines in the World War (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920), 

9–10.
xiv

Introduction

of battle, and lastly the selected bibliography. Each section could easily stand alone as a smaller individual 

publication; however, combining each into a single volume seemed a better option for researchers looking 

for a single-source reference work.

Articles in the anthology were chosen for their ability to provide details not found in other locations, 

or they clarified and amplified information found in other sources. Part I’s articles were written by Marines 

and other veterans of the war—it is their point of view used to understand the war and their achievements. 

Historians 100 years later can provide a sterile and objective idea of the war, but the veterans lived through 

the battles and their first-hand accounts are often more accurate and gripping. The war is presented via the 

articles in three phases—prewar, the war itself, and postwar peace and occupation duty.

Articles found in Part II were authored by historians, archivists, Marines, and other interested parties 

and provide the reader with more details on individual battles as well as information on commanders and 

lesser-known aspects of the war, such as awards and decorations. These articles were chosen to “round-out” 

the historical perspective of the volume itself and to fill in some of the gaps left by the articles in Part I.

The annotated order of battle came as a direct result of the research conducted to create the order of 

battle. Over the years, numerous reference requests regarding the small, lesser-known Marine Corps units in 

the war have been collected in notes and scraps of paper and, with the coming of the centennial, it seemed 

the time to compile those notes into a single publishable work. The result is herein, even though it is acknowledged that there are likely gaps that remain due to the lack of available information or records. The 

source material for the annotated order of battle starts with Major Edwin N. McClellan’s The United States 

Marine Corps in the World War supplemented by various articles, History Division and secondary publications, oral history interviews, muster rolls, and documents found in the Historical Reference Branch’s working files. The materials were generally readily available within the History Division, but scattered through 

various files and books making research time consuming. Therefore, a single location has been created.

The selected bibliography is not all encompassing; it was not intended to cover every article ever written on the subject of Marines in World War I. The bibliography takes the foundational work produced 

by Hilliard in 1967, subtracts works not exclusive (or nearly exclusive) to the First World War or Marine 

Corps in the war, and adds those produced since its publication. In addition to the newer works published, 

the bibliography also includes the most relevant oral history interviews of World War I veterans (several 

who became Commandant of the Marine Corps) and personal paper collections—all of which are still 

maintained by the Marine Corps History Division. Outside repositories of collections most relevant, such 

as photograph collections and state record collections on World War I veterans, are also included to provide 

a wider resource pool for researchers.

The appendices supplement the information found in the order of battle. The list of acronyms found 

with the muster rolls from the war—used to decipher the supplemental casualty rolls—provides details on 

such units as depot divisions and field hospitals that were not found in the course of researching the order 

of battle. Information on the medals and decorations awarded to the men who fought was included because 

awards, such as the Navy Cross and Distinguished Service Cross, were born from the government’s and 

commanders’ desire to appropriately decorate these men. Lastly, a list of valor awardees from the Marine 

Corps Reserve is included. This was compiled by Colonel Walter G. Ford, USMC (Ret), as part of his research on the creation of the Marine Corps Reserve. 
PART I

MARINES AND VETERANS ANALYZE 

THE FIRST WORLD WAR
“With the 2d Division.”

Courtesy of C. Leroy Baldridge, Marine Corps Archives
READYING FOR WAR

5

Precepts and Duties of the Foot Soldier

Precepts of a Foot Soldier

The Infantryman is Victory’s Workman

All arrangements having been made, the men fallen 

in, and everything being in readiness; the general 

sends his infantry into action.

Thenceforward, in the midst of shot and shell, 

they will scarcely hear any orders, and will see no 

reinforcements; they will be alone, but people are 

counting on them. They are victory’s workmen.

Everyone, to the Humblest,

Is Responsible to His Country

In these decisive hours, the man who is the hope 

of his country often does not think about that. The 

battle is limited to the immediate surroundings of 

his shelter; he thinks that he does not amount to 

much, concludes that his effort is almost useless, 

and sometimes says to himself: “What’s the use of 

exposing myself any longer for so little?” Since there 

are no officers, because they are scattered here and 

there along the line, there is nothing to rouse the 

skirmisher and carry him along; he excuses himself 

by saying that he is doing as everyone else, and in 

this way the battle becomes stationary because the 

ultimate fractions no longer move.

When the skirmisher finds himself alone, and 

out of sight of his leaders, his country is still looking 

at him; whether he advances or falls, it blesses him.

In Battle, Fight

On the field of battle there are, first of all, the real 

combatants: those who do harm to the enemy. But 

there are also timid persons who lose their heads 

and think only of blotting themselves out in some 

hole. These latter appear for the sole purpose of furnishing useless corpses.

Whatever you may do, your life is exposed to 

danger; at least let it serve some useful purpose and 

be paid for in advance.

Live and Conquer

There is no question of getting yourself killed bravely and disappearing; you must live and conquer. In 

order to preserve their lives, cowards try not to expose them, but brave men rely upon their valor to 

protect themselves.

The coward is strongly tempted. It is more 

agreeable to stay in your hole than to advance 

amongst bullets, but the coward has no self-control 

and becomes foolish. This is why, if he succeeds in 

preserving his life once or twice, he finally makes a 

false move, which, in war, is paid for with one’s life.

The brave man is cunning; he dares to look in 

the face of danger, knows when to scorn it in order 

to advance, and when it would be rash to face it. He 

is not afraid of the enemy, because the enemy is a 

man whom he can always get at with boldness and 

skill.

A good rifle, nimble legs, a clear eye and a cool 

head; that is the charm to take you through bullets 

and enable you to kill your enemy.

Brave Men Make Good Soldiers

The man who is not a good soldier has no self-respect. In order to follow one’s chiefs into danger, 

one must have respect and affection for them; the 

riff-raff has neither faith nor rule; it respects nothing, and loves itself only.

When the chief is gone and the soldier finds 

himself alone, what drives him along the path of 

duty in spite of all his agony and fear: his conscience.

Complete Victory

Many Frenchmen have already given their lives for 

victory. Henceforward, has anyone the right to say 

he is tired and to stop? No; for one cannot profit by 

the sacrifices of one’s comrades without bringing to *

 Translated by LCdr W. N. Jeffers, U.S. Navy.

HINTS TO THE FOOT SOLDER IN BATTLE

by André LaFargue, Captain, 153d Regiment of Infantry*
6

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

an end the task for which they have died. No peace 

without complete victory, even at the cost of all your 

limbs.

Germany wanted war, and her claws must be 

drawn for a long time; people will bless us for it.

The Duties of the Soldier

Follow the Chief

The chief is the rallying point; it is not necessary for 

him to watch his troops, for they should follow him 

blindly. If he falls, they keep on without him and 

avenge him.

Never abandon the body of an officer to the enemy; his troops carry it away or come back to look 

for it.

Avenge Your Dead

When he thinks about past combats, the combatant 

sees again his comrades who sleep in every patch of 

ground where the regiment has stood.

They have fallen, and others have taken their 

places in the company. They, so strong and brave, 

can do no more, but their memory lives and their 

sacrifice has not been in vain.

They are always in the hearts of those who remain and, at this thought, every man feels a cold 

rage mount in him and render his arm stiffer and 

his eye clearer.

In the trench and in battle, you must not rest 

until you have made the enemy pay very dearly for 

the stricken comrade.

The dead cry for vengeance. No rifle shoots so 

straight as the rifle of a dead man.

Bury the Dead, Succor the Wounded

One should give honorable burial to one’s dead 

comrades. You must have enough heart, in spite of 

fatigue and the oppression of danger, to bury them 

otherwise than in the first hole with a little earth on 

top of the body.

You must bind up the wounded and, when you 

cannot leave your station, put them under cover until the occasion allows you to take them to the rear, 

even though you are ready to drop with fatigue and 

sleep.

Do Harm to the Germans

This idea should always be awake in the heart of 

the combatant. It gives him that silent and ferocious 

ardor, which is the real thing; if he is ready to faint, 

it sustains him. When you are suffering and you feel 

your courage ebbing, put a cartridge in your rifle 

and aim straight.

Conduct toward Prisoners

You must spare the enemy who surrenders, while always on guard against the treacheries [that] are customary among the Germans. To massacre for the 

pleasure of killing is a cowardly barbarism, which 

dishonors the troops.

However, in the mêlée, so long as resistance 

continues and there is risk of the enemy regaining 

the upper hand, there must be no quarter, for mercy 

often costs dear.

The wounded enemy is an unfortunate who 

should be succored, and you must no longer be conscious of the hated uniform.

Always Remember That You Are a Frenchman

In a word: if the foot soldier asks himself how he 

should behave, let him always remember that he is 

a French soldier.

When Is a Man Timid or a Coward?

Trials are awaiting the soldier at every step on the field 

of battle; he must be well acquainted with them in order 

to resist them, and to bring back to the straight path 

the comrade who abandons himself to the temptations 

of fear.

You are not timid or a coward because you are 

afraid or feel sick; so if you should feel that way, do 

not get discouraged and lose confidence in yourself.

Danger always makes a strong impression 

on people, and no one ever gets used to shot and 

shell; it is too contrary to human nature. However, 

as you become seasoned to war and become better 

acquainted with danger, you will be less rattled because you will know when there is something to be 

afraid of and when you can sleep in peace.

Sometimes a man feels out of sorts; his body 

suffers and his mind is sick. For instance, you find 

yourself suffering under the influence of bombard-
7

Readying for War

ments or of violent combats; you remain motionless 

in the mud and cold and rain; the hours pass slowly; 

the war is long, and you speculate on the unknown 

of tomorrow. Then you get bad ideas in your head: 

this is the “blues.” A man who has the “blues” is 

not a coward; he becomes one if he lets himself go, 

if he continually whimpers over his miseries and 

thenceforward tries to find some way of leaving his 

post. He is a brave man if he says to himself: “I’m 

not worth much lately, but that will all pass by; let’s 

wait, work, or sleep.”

The Timid Man

The timid man is a soldier who is afraid of a shadow.

He fires in the air or lets go over the parapet 

without showing his head. He trembles, thinks 

himself lost, and falls back as soon as he sees an 

enemy advancing toward him; he cannot stand the 

sight of an adversary because he always believes he 

is stronger than himself.

When he is on sentry go, he hears and sees 

Germans everywhere.

When on patrol or on picket (and this is when 

he is at his best), he is always imagining that a German is about to pounce upon him; if he hears a 

noise, he runs away at full speed, breathless, shouting that the enemy is advancing, and terrifying all 

hands; now, it is a cow moving about, or a wounded 

man moaning as he drags himself toward our lines.

The Coward

The coward is the man who abandons his post for 

any reason. He accompanies the wounded without 

orders, not to help them, but in order to get to the 

rear and stay there.

If he gets a slight wound or a scratch, he is perfectly happy and takes advantage of it to save himself and leave his comrades to face the worst of the 

danger.

It is absolutely forbidden to leave your post without 

authority.

He does not dare throw a grenade or fire a shot 

for fear of the reply.

Men who run away are cowards.

Those who surrender without having used all 

their cartridges, or without having done everything 

possible to escape from the enemy, are cowards.

The Riff-raff

These are those few individuals who have the welladvertised idea of not doing their duty or of committing some bad action.

Soldiers who get under cover: they sneak off and 

hide when their chief is not looking and only appear several days later after the battle is over, saying 

that they got lost.

In former wars, when those men came in to eat 

in the evening, their messmates used to pass judgment on them and whip them till the blood flowed.

Men of this class do not want to expose themselves; they think of living later in peace and happiness, while brave men have brought peace with 

their blood.

This trickery is not to be tolerated; everybody 

must move on.

When Is a Man Brave?

Most soldiers are brave; a great many of them do 

not even know it.

Trench Fighting

The foot soldier in the trenches is not over-fond of 

work; he often prefers to curl up in the mud under indifferent shelter to taking a little trouble. So, 

when he is subjected to bombardment, he has no 

cover to get under.

Furthermore, the foot soldier considers that he 

is in the trench merely to keep the enemy from getting through if he attacks. Since the enemy does 

not attack every day, the fighting habit is lost, and 

the enemy is left to plant entanglements and dig his 

shelters without molestation, so that, when the time 

comes to attack him, you will have to go up against 

thoroughly prepared defenses, which must be taken 

by main force.

The enemy that you do not kill beforehand will 

perhaps kill you on the day of the assault.

What the Foot Soldier Should Do

in the Trenches

1. Be careful of himself.

2. Train himself and get seasoned to war.

3. Destroy Germans.
8

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

How to Take Care of Yourself

To get yourself killed or wounded in the trenches 

through carelessness or negligence is sheer stupidity because you have not been of any use. A soldier can never be replaced. Therefore build yourself 

a good shelter so that you can laugh at bombardments and sleep in peace. Do not do the imprudent 

things with which everybody is so familiar. Watch 

over your comrades who are careless, and especially 

over newcomers and young soldiers who want to 

see everything and are ignorant of trench customs.

How to Get Seasoned to War

In the trenches, people fall into ways that are bad 

in battle. They stay continually in the shelters; when 

they move about, it is nearly always in the zigzags, 

so that they find it very disagreeable to have to pass 

through open spaces where the bullets are whistling.

You must fortify yourself so as not to let any 

bullet bother you on the day of attack. To this end, 

go on patrol at night, and plant entanglements in 

front of the first line.

You should profit by your stay in the trench to 

learn skill [that] is your surest protection in battle.

Every day fire a carefully aimed string at the 

enemy’s trench; study the point of aim of your rifle 

for different ranges; practice quick aiming to prepare yourself for firing at close range.

Every soldier familiarizes himself with the 

throwing of the different types of grenades; he 

should interest himself in everything charged with 

explosives, the methods of priming bombs, trench 

weapons, etc.

How to Destroy Germans with Your Rifle

You may pass months in front of an enemy’s trench 

without seeing a single German; consequently, it is 

difficult to do them any harm.

However, with skill and patience, you will succeed in getting good results.

Begin by carefully watching the adversary’s 

trench and learn exactly where you can get him if 

he shows himself for half a second.

Places Where the Enemy Hangs Out

Loopholes: all of these are not manned. Those [that] 

are too easily seen are simply to attract attention. 

Loopholes for rifle fire are often at the level of 

the ground, in which case they are only just wide 

enough to let the rifle through and are masked with 

sods or a tuft of grass.

In order to recognize the loopholes that are really manned, it is necessary to draw fire by showing a hat above the parapet, while other men to the 

right or left keep a lookout.

Shelters: there are always people about the entrances to the shelters; these are places where someone can always be surprised.

Shelters are indicated by an extra elevation of 

the parapet. Generally, the enemy has the stupidity to cover his shelters with an excess of sandbags, 

which are visible even from outside the trench. A 

peephole is often to be found immediately alongside the shelter. Finally, escaping smoke is the best 

indication of the inhabited part.

Observation posts: these are indicated by an accumulation of sandbags and the regular appearance 

of periscopes. The periscopes do not extend much 

above the parapet and are often wrapped in grass or 

a sandbag, but minute observation of everything all 

the time will reveal their cautious appearance.

When the enemy artillery is firing or when his 

trench mortars are at work, that is the time when 

you can observe some fleeting movement in the observation posts.

Times When the Enemy Is Out of Doors

In the morning and on cold sunny days, everybody 

is out of doors.

At mess time in fair weather; this period is often indicated by a slackening of the rifle fire.

When our trenches are under bombardment, 

the enemy gathers about the loopholes to amuse 

himself.

At night, the enemy leaves his trenches to repair the damage to his defenses or entanglements 

caused by our artillery fire.

Reliefs: the time of relief can be recognized by 

the slackening of the rifle fire, the sound of voices, 

silhouettes at certain points when the zigzags are 

impracticable.
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Readying for War

You can always tell when relief has taken place 

by the change in the attitude and habits of the enemy. By repeating the observations, it is possible to 

learn the days for relief.

To mishandle the enemy arriving on relief is 

the best way of intimidating him during his stay in 

the trenches.

Organization of the Look-out

1. In order to observe a given spot, watch through a 

small peephole. The peephole is simply a hole made 

in the parapet with a stick or a pipe placed inside 

the trench and pointed at the spot to be watched. 

A few [pieces of ] sod are placed at the outlet of the 

peephole so that it may not look too regular. Avoid 

looking continuously through wooden peepholes or 

through the shields, as these are often spotted by 

the enemy.

2. To watch a part of a trench, look through a 

peephole arranged on the bias in the parapet or use 

a periscope. Use a small piece of a mirror on the end 

of a stick, stuck in the reverse of the trench, for getting a general view of the enemy’s trench.

Observation through binoculars (chief of section’s glasses): as a rule, the enemy’s trench appears to be completely deserted, but when looked 

at through binoculars, it is astonishing how many 

details are revealed. From time to time, you see the 

eye of the enemy lookout at his peephole, close up, 

or the haze of a cigarette.

The binocular is useful for observing a determined point; not a single movement of the enemy 

escapes, and the rifle fire becomes instantaneous 

and deadly.

In observing through a peephole, look through 

only one side of the binocular.

Organization of Fire

It is necessary to be able to fire without danger at a 

single determined point, and at parts of the enemy’s 

trench outside of the marked spots.

1. In order to fire instantly at a marked spot 

(peephole of an observation post, etc.), keep a loaded rifle pointed at it all the time.

Hence, it becomes necessary to construct a rest 

capable of resisting the recoil of the rifle without 

disturbing the aim. A rudimentary rest (a sort of 

vise) can be built from materials to be found in 

the immediate vicinity of the trenches. All that is 

needed is two boards to form the jaws, a hinge to 

hold them together, a foot to which the end of one 

of the boards is securely nailed, and a strong bolt to 

close the jaws.

Put a piece of cloth between the jaws and the 

rifle.

To fire a little more to the right or left, use small 

wooden wedges.

A peephole is located beside the rest; if the 

lookout sees a shadow pass by the slot in the enemy’s shield, a simple pressure of his finger sends a 

bullet straight to the mark.

Use perforating bullets against the enemy’s 

shields, so that if you miss the slot you will be sure 

of hitting the enemy by penetrating the shield.

2. In order to be able to fire at an enemy who 

may show himself outside the limits of the spot 

marked down, make wooden loopholes diagonally 

in the parapet, so as to be protected against shots 

coming from in front of you (the most frequent). 

These loopholes are used without a rest.

The lookout detailed to these loopholes is chosen from among the best shots; he watches a section 

of the German trenches, and if he sees an enemy 

suddenly show his head, he takes aim and fires.

How to Make the Enemy Show Himself

In order to enable the marksmen stationed at the 

loopholes to fire at the enemy, he must be made to 

show himself.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

A number of methods of accomplishing this may 

be thought of:

An attack may be simulated by opening a sudden fire, shouting, and firing grenades. This will 

make the enemy spring to his loopholes.

A cap or a hat shown from time to time in 

the loophole or on a level with the parapet 

will draw the fire of the enemy’s lookout, who 

immediately receives several shots in his own 

loophole.

The earth of the parapets or the saps* may be 

stirred about.

A number of tricks can be contrived, among 

others, decoy fires, at nightfall. Straw is lighted, 

shouts are uttered, and dummy figures moved about; 

the enemy, without fail, will rush to his loopholes to 

enjoy the show and mock his adversary. When it is 

estimated that his loopholes are manned, fire into 

them.

How to Use the Rifle-grenade to

Inflict Daily Losses on the Enemy

There is no question but that the use of riflegrenade is capable of inflicting greater losses upon 

the enemy than a bombardment.

* Short trenches that were dug from the front-trench into noman’s land. The sap heads, usually about 30 yards forward of the 

front line, were then used as listening posts.

The rifle-grenade arrives unexpectedly and 

without any noise; it bursts before there is time to 

get away from it. It is not used at fixed times, like 

the bombardment and, furthermore, the enemy 

cannot avoid it continuously by taking refuge in his 

shelters. When he moves about, his mind is always 

under a strain to keep on the lookout. This perpetual threat makes the enemy’s stay in the trench 

extremely trying.

Before firing grenades, it is first necessary to 

observe the enemy’s trench closely in order to find 

out the places where he hangs out and where it is 

sometimes possible to reach him, such as shelters, 

sniper’s posts, zigzags, trench crossings, latrines, etc.

The officers indicate the direction and the approximate range of points that cannot be seen directly.

Rifles are secured in the rests facing the most 

important points, and a grenade fired at intervals 

day and night. In this way, it is possible to surprise a 

sentry, a smoker in his shelter, a noncommissioned 

officer, or a cook circulating in the trench.

Sometimes the enemy attempts to reply, in 

which case the fire must be redoubled in violence 

and kept up continuously. As soon as the enemy 

feels that he is the weaker, he will think of nothing 

but getting under better cover.

In certain cases (enemy reliefs, supply parties, 

working parties, gathering of troops before an attack), instead of executing a slow and continuous 

individual fire, it is preferable to open a sudden and 
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Readying for War

violent surprise fire with the greatest possible number of rifles. The firing begins with a volley and is 

afterward continued at will.

When the artillery has broken down parts of 

the enemy’s trenches and made breaches in his entanglements, he takes advantage of darkness to repair the damage. He may be considerably worried 

and subjected to losses by raining grenades upon 

the places [that] have been torn up during the day.

The Attack on the Trench

In case of an attack, everybody goes promptly to 

his battle station. Sometimes, when the attack is 

preceded by a violent bombardment, the station is 

wiped out; the trench is nothing but a mass of holes 

and hillocks. You must then take such shelter as you 

can find; a solid trench is not necessary in order to 

fight.

Sometimes, it also happens that the enemy succeeds in getting into your trench and pushing by before the defenders can get out of their shelters. You 

must not think that all is lost; make a space around 

the shelters with grenades and shoot the enemy in 

the back. By working in this way, intrepid garrisons 

have annihilated whole German companies, which 

had already pushed beyond the first trench.

Protection against Asphyxiating Gases

How to foresee a gas attack.

The attack takes place in quiet weather with 

a light wind.

The enemy remains quiet in the sector for 

several days.

From time to time, a noise of sheet iron being 

moved about is heard in the enemy trench.

Work may be observed going on along the 

whole line of the trench.

Trial balloons or smoke rising behind the enemy’s lines, to show the direction of the wind, are 

valuable indications.

When the attack is launched, you hear a prolonged whistling sound; this is one of the only indications at night.

Measures of Protection

Always place the mask where it can be found instantly without searching for it.

When an attack is foreseen, put the goggles on 

your forehead and hang the mask around your neck 

so that you can adjust it quickly.

As soon as the attack is let loose, give the alarm; 

put on your goggles first, and then your mask.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Get to your battle station and open fire to prevent the enemy [from] advancing and to break up 

the gas cloud.

Carry out the general instructions that have 

been given in advance by the noncommissioned officers.

Do not take off your mask as soon as the gas 

cloud has gone by, for a new one may come along.

Do not touch food that has been exposed to the 

gas cloud.

Never wet your mask, and do not take it out of 

its box unnecessarily.

The Battle

What does the infantryman do in battle?

It is always and everywhere the same thing:

After the artillery has demolished the enemy’s 

defense and terrified the defenders, the infantryman dashes forward to the assault and clears 

out the position.

He pursues as far as he can in order to gain as 

much ground as possible at one stroke.

He sticks like a porous plaster under the fire 

of the big, high explosive shells, so as not to give 

up an inch of what he has taken.

Therefore:

Close up to within assaulting distance of the 

enemy (between 100 and 200 meters);

Assault;

Pursue;

Hold tight.

If not already within assaulting distance, close 

in on the enemy, whether by night or by day.

By day, the approach is made under cover of the 

artillery. You must advance smartly and not slow-up 

under shell fragments; the longer you stay in the 

rain, the wetter you get.

However, when the enemy’s rifle fire becomes 

hot and accurate as, for example, at close ranges, it 

is not possible to advance in exact alignment; you 

must run at top speed and keep firing in order to 

kill your enemies in advance.

From that moment you are no longer information; you can no longer hear orders in the din, and 

you cannot always see your leaders.

This is the time when the soldier, instead of 

thinking himself lost and stopping, takes the initiative with his comrades and keeps going; sometimes 

watching for his chance a long time, running, digging, firing, throwing grenades. This is the subject of 

the following pages.

The Bombardment

Raw troops are very much upset by shell fire, especially by shells of large caliber. Seasoned soldiers 

do not like it any better, because the din and whistling of the violent explosions confuse and addle the 

brain.

Seasoned soldiers, however, know that the shell 

often makes more noise than it does harm, and that 

after a terrifying bombardment everybody is not 

wiped out, by a long shot.

How to Be Safe against Shell Fire

The heavy “soup kettle” (Marmite*), which is so terrifying, is in reality only dangerous if it falls on the 

spot where you happen to be, because all the fragments go up in the air.

Therefore, lie down when the “soup kettle” arrives. Even if you are quite close to it, you run no 

risk.

Avoid getting up immediately after the explosion, especially when within 200 or 300 meters of 

the burst, because the pieces do not come down for 

a long time afterward.

The helmet and the knapsack (with an inside 

padding formed by the jacket or the folded blanket) 

are fairly effective as a protection against shrapnel 

balls.

How to Escape Shell Fire

In Battle

Advance as rapidly as possible, so as to get out of 

the marked zones. Some men completely lose their 

heads and, no longer having the strength to advance, 

lie face down on the ground; they will be wiped out 

on the spot.

Get close to the enemy. In this way, the enemy 

heavy artillery will have to cease firing for fear of 

* Marmite is a vitamin-rich spread included in soldiers’ ration 

packs.
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Readying for War

putting the shells indiscriminately among their own 

and our men.

When the artillery fire is violent, it causes disorder and confusion in the ranks. Each soldier has 

ears only for the approaching shell; he slows down, 

and is strongly tempted to get under cover. In this 

way, many units break up, running pell-mell or 

stopping. Disorder means massacre.

Therefore, advance exactly in your place in 

ranks and keep in alignment. If you see anyone wavering, give him a crack with your fist and keep him 

in ranks.

In the Trench

Dig shelters. Do not wait till the last minute, as often happens, through indifference.

If you cannot dig deep shelters, carry the line of 

the trench close to the enemy under cover of darkness.

How to Use Your Rifle

The rifle is used to destroy the enemy at long range, 

so as to be able to approach him without risk. Every 

soldier as he advances thus clears a space ahead of 

him, and he has every interest in making a complete 

job of it.

In order to use your rifle efficiently, you must:

Take up a good position and be on the watch;

Take the point of aim of your rifle;

Keep your eye on the enemy;

Know just when to fire.

How to Post Yourself

(See examples of construction of a firing post.)

In order to fire effectively, you must be sheltered. A 

soldier who is continually in danger of being hit is 

nervous in his motions; he hurries, and the enemy 

simply laughs at his wild shots.

The first care of the sharpshooter about to open 

fire should, therefore, be to construct or arrange a 

safe and comfortable firing post.

This will consist of an earth embankment to 

protect him against bullets coming from in front 

and a loophole. The loophole, however, instead of 

being directed straight toward the enemy is arranged obliquely; consequently, fire is not opened at 

first upon the enemy directly opposite, but upon the 

adversaries more to the right.

In this way, you do not run the risk of being 

shot in the forehead, as frequently happens when 

you have just arrived in a new shelter and the enemy has his eye on you. All bullets coming from the 

front bury themselves in the embankment without 

doing you the slightest harm.

Avoid disclosing your position to the enemy, for 

if bullets are continually striking around the rifleman, they will end by worrying him and getting his 

nerve. Therefore, do not change the appearance of 

natural cover or shelter (hummocks, tufts of grass, 

etc.), behind which you have stopped; hide any 

earth you disturb, and work cautiously in order not 

to attract the enemy’s attention. The shelter should 

merge itself into the surroundings.

The rifle very often reveals the sharpshooter’s 

post. Avoid raising the rifle in loading; slide it along 

the loophole at the level of the ground, without ever 

raising it.

Mask the barrel, which should never project beyond the embankment.

Take care that the discharge of the rifle does 

not raise any dust. To this end, arrange some bunches of grass toward the muzzle.

To Take the Point of Aim of Your Rifle

The sight-settings for 200 and 400 meters are not 

sufficiently accurate to allow [for] always hitting a 

small object, such as the head of an enemy under 

cover; it is necessary to aim a little above or below 

the mark. Determining the point at which it is necessary to aim in order to hit the desired object is 

called “taking the point of aim” of the rifle. In order 

to do this, fire at a target the same distance away as 

the objective and so situated that it is easy to spot 

the shots (a clump of earth).

How to Keep a Lookout on the Enemy

Even at short range, the German sharpshooters are 

hard to make out; their position is most often indicated by the visibility of their shelter and by their 

rifle, as has been said before.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

As soon as you have marked down an enemy, 

bring your rifle to your shoulder, wait till he shows 

himself, and fire as soon as he appears. Do not pay 

any attention to another until the first is put out of 

action. After getting rid of one adversary, pass on to 

the next, going from right to left. In this way, you 

will expose yourself to frontal shots only by degrees, 

and as you become master of the situation.

When You Must Fire

When no enemy is in sight, watch and wait; fire 

only when he appears, that is to say, when he uncovers himself to fire or to advance. You will generally 

be warned by the raising of his rifle.

When a movement occurs, or is about to occur, 

in our line, the adversary does not fail to fire, and is 

obliged to show himself.

In firing at an enemy who is running, do not 

try to hit him on the fly; aim at a spot over which 

he must pass and fire just as he is about to reach it.

When the enemy takes flight, fire and keep firing; finally, when the enemy ought to be destroyed, 

he will leave only a few men on the ground. Set 

your sight carefully; in this way, even if you get nervous and only fire “into the brown,”* your fire will 

be murderous.

When you are hidden and the enemy advances 

without misgiving, hold your fire until he gets close 

up (to be used against patrols).

What to Fire at

The rifleman ordinarily fires at the adversary whom 

he has picked out in the place which has been indicated to him, but he must abandon the indicated 

objective on his own initiative under the following 

circumstances:

APPEARANCE OF

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS

They are recognized by their gestures, because 

they are generally in the center of groups, and 

because they are the first to start out. Fire at 

* Originally referred to hunters firing into a covey of game 

birds without aiming at any particular bird, but was later used 

for soldiers firing into a charging mass of enemy combatants.

them to put them out of action and to make 

their neighborhood untenable.

ENEMY GROUP IN MOTION

Concentrate your fire on these groups.

You can tell when the enemy is preparing to 

make a dash by the movements occurring in his 

line and by the guns [that] stick up.

After the enemy has made a rush, keep a 

sharp lookout for there are always men who 

have fallen behind who will try to catch up or 

new groups about to start.

ATTEMPT AT INFILTRATION

At times, the enemy tries to creep up singly 

or in small groups, either running or crawling 

along. Watch each man as he starts out and arrives.

MACHINE GUNS

Fire immediately at every machine gun that is 

being mounted or [that] comes into action.

SIGNALLERS AND RUNNERS

Fire at any enemy making signals, as well as at 

every lone man moving about the field of battle, 

because he may be passing orders or a noncommissioned officer.

THE ENEMY PRESENTING HIS FLANK

Take advantage of every opportunity to fire into 

the flank of an enemy fraction. In order to do 

this, advance or move laterally if necessary. The 

fire of a single man upon the enemy flank can 

force a whole line to bend back.

Examples of the Construction

of a Firing Post

In order to fire well, it is necessary to begin by using 

your shovel well.

I. Skirmishers’ Holes

The skirmishers help each other with the shovel, 

working side by side, and one digging while the 

other fires.
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Readying for War

II. Manner of Approaching a Crest

The rifleman should not lie down directly at the 

summit of the crest, but should approach it very 

carefully by crawling. Dig behind the crest and 

push the earth forward until you can see the enemy 

(from 1 to 2).

Note that this rifleman is letting the muzzle of 

his rifle project outside, which is incorrect.

III. Construction of a Breastwork

IV. Utilization of a Tree Trunk

Note that this rifleman avoids showing the 

muzzle of his rifle in loading.

How the Skirmisher Approaches

the Enemy

Some soldiers have only one idea: to hide themselves.

You come on the battlefield to fight. Consequently, you should make use of the accidents of the 

ground only for the purpose of:

Posting yourself advantageously and firing effectively.

Getting to grips with the enemy without getting yourself killed.

When to Advance

Skirmishers think that they must wait for orders 

before advancing; now, since the chiefs of sections 

are sometimes absent and often can neither be seen 

or heard, it happens that groups of men remain immobile for entire days.

The skirmisher should advance on his own initiative whenever he has cover [for] a few paces, or a 

few dozen paces, ahead. He must always be trying 

to gain another inch of ground.

Difficulty of Advancing

on One’s Own Initiative

It is very trying to advance by short stages. When 

the skirmisher has gotten into a hole, he breathes; 

at least he is under cover. It seems to him that the 

whole air over his head is full of bullets; they graze 

him and make him flatten out still more. He has the 

impression that he will certainly be shot through 

and through if he gets up in this rain of lead.

Where is the enemy? He is not to be seen, 

and yet, as soon as the skirmisher shows himself, 

the bullets begin to smack. Those invisible but ever 

watchful rifles worry him and he no longer dares to 

venture into the open. Furthermore, the next cover 

seems an extraordinary distance away; his equipment weighs him down and encumbers him, he 

finds himself heavy and clumsy when he would like 

to have wings to get up and run.

Besides, the skirmisher is comfortable in his 

shelter and, when he has fixed it up, he has no idea 

of leaving it.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Skirmishers must not be discouraged if they experience these trying impressions. The moment of 

starting out is hard, but when you are on your way 

and running, you no longer hear the bullets whistling. However, if you stop advancing and remain 

hidden, cowardice sets in.

When Must You Advance?

In order to reach a cover that you have your eye 

on, you must begin by destroying or terrifying with 

your rifle everybody who might bother you while 

you are making for it.

You can dash forward without risk:

As soon as the enemy has ceased firing, or as 

soon as his bullets begin to pass very high. 

(This, however, is difficult to be sure of, because 

the skirmisher always thinks that the bullets are 

just grazing his ear.)

You can also make an unexpected dash during a lull or a let up in the fusillade; the enemy, 

who is no longer paying any attention, springs 

to his rifle and fires, but too late; however, look 

out for those who delay and the shots that follow.

Above all, take advantage of the moments 

when the enemy’s position is being bombarded 

by your own artillery.

The Rush

Before starting, fix carefully the place where you are 

going to post yourself.

When the movement has not been ordered by 

a noncom, have an understanding with your comrades as to the starting signal, so that there will be 

no tardies.

Warn your neighbors to be ready to fire if the 

enemy appears.

Do not attract the enemy’s attention by raising 

your rifle or standing up.

Close your cartridge pockets and secure your 

tool well at your belt.

Run as fast as you can during the rush.

Open out.

As soon as you arrive, arrange your cover, then 

enlarge it so that others can join the new line.

Infiltration

Sometimes it is possible to gain a new position 

without having to cross open ground.

When there is a trench, which allows of reforming on a more advanced line, the skirmishers 

glide gradually along the trench to the new line.

If the trench is not continuous, it is completed 

by digging at the open parts.

Avoid with the greatest care going into a shelter one after the other, either running or crawling, 

when the enemy may see. The first man passes by 

but the second stays on the way.

V. Utilization of a Heap of Stones

One is at times separated from the enemy by a wide 

stretch of open ground. In this case, it is difficult 

to take a position at short range from the enemy 

to prepare for the assault. Every man who remains 

motionless on open ground is quickly put out of

action. Under these conditions, fill your sandbag 

before leaving the last cover, before quitting the 

last cover, putting a few stones in the middle of the 

earth to better stop the bullets. The sandbag carried 

under the left arm during the rush will, when you 

stop, give you the start of a shelter, which it will be 

easy to complete.

The Skirmishers at Ypres

(7 November 1914)

On 7 November 1914, our attacking line had 

stopped 300 meters from the German trenches, 

from which a heavy and accurate fire was being 

maintained. Our men threw themselves pell-mell 

into the shell holes and old trenches; they were decimated and replied ineffectually to the enemy’s fire, 

firing at random from the bottom of the shelters 

and accomplishing nothing beyond cutting the willow branches over the heads of the Bavarians.
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Readying for War

Two skirmishers had succeeded in establishing 

themselves in a shell hole in advance of our line. 

One of them prepared to fire toward the flank, carefully working a loophole on the bias in the earth 

bordering the excavation, without changing the appearance of the shell hole so as not to attract the 

enemy’s attention. He then took the point of aim of 

his rifle and began to watch. He soon marked down 

an adversary well to his right, aimed at the place 

where he had disappeared, and waited. Each time 

the enemy appeared, the skirmisher got off a quick 

and accurate shot. In this he passed in review in 

succession, from right to left, all the heads that appeared. The Bavarians could not understand where 

the bullets were coming from, and redoubled the 

intensity of their fire upon the shelters where our 

line was huddled. Then, becoming more prudent, 

they took off their helmets, and no longer showed 

more than a corner of their eyes, but, even so, their 

appearance was often too long. In their turn, they 

cut the branches over the heads of the French, their 

fire slackened, and finally died out completely.

Meanwhile, the two skirmishers took turns in 

digging and firing, and enlarging their hole so that 

two more men were able to join them. The construction of the trench was continued rapidly, and finally, 

when the shelter was large enough, a group of noncoms and about 15 men joined them in a rush.

Facing them, the fire from the German trench, 

after a few quickly suppressed attempts to reply, 

seemed to be smothered, silence gradually spread 

over this corner of the battlefield, and a lull occurred.

About noon, the group suddenly rose and, in 

two rushes at full speed over open ground, they 

reached a line of old abandoned French shelters 30 

meters from the enemy. The Germans, in their surprise, fired only at the last moment, wounding two 

men. Throughout the day, this weak group succeeded in maintaining themselves at close range from 

the Bavarians, who did not dare to drive them out, 

with a loss of only one wounded.

At night, under the protection of this group, 

the whole company glided forward and dug silently, 

their rifles beside them with bayonets fixed. At daylight, the furious Germans could see a whole trench, 

which had been dug under their very noses, and the 

points of the bayonets sticking up out of it.

This shows what can be done, almost without 

loss and under critical circumstances where most 

people would have lost their heads and given up, 

by the skill and audacity of, at first, two skirmishers, 

and then a small group.

Grenade Fighting

The grenade is the weapon of the foot soldier as 

well as the rifle and the bayonet.

In action you must always have grenades in 

your haversack and know how to handle them well.

Use of the Grenade

On the defensive, the grenade is used to establish 

in front of the trench a barrier [that] the adversary 

cannot get by.

In an attack, the grenade serves to drive the enemy from a trench, a shelter, a machine-gun nest, a 

house, or a cellar.

Preparation for an Assault

by Use of the Grenade

Sometimes, in the course of action, an intrepid 

group succeeds in getting very close to an enemy 

trench; artillery preparation cannot be carried out, 

and assault under these conditions is dangerous. 

The attempt is then made to overcome the enemy 

with grenades in order to attack him with the bayonet afterward.

A few skirmishers provided with grenades try 

to get within throwing distance of the enemy, by 

utilizing all the accidents of the ground, shell holes, 

and abandoned enemy trenches, and completing 

their path by use of the tool where necessary. If it 

is not possible to approach by day, they wait until 

darkness to creep silently into a cover very dose to 

the enemy.

Meanwhile, the rest of the group awaits under 

cover the moment for the assault.

The bombers smother the enemy under a continuous hail of well-directed grenades and force 

him either to evacuate the place or to take refuge in 

his dugouts. Then is the time to assault.

The group stands-by and fixes bayonets. At 

a signal, all stand up together. They dash forward 

without shouting, fall upon the surprised enemy, 
18

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

and bayonet or shoot him in his holes before he has 

thought of defending himself.

Grenade Fighting in a Zigzag or Trench

At times, in the course of battle, one is obliged to 

progress through trenches or zigzags.

The enemy must then be driven back step by 

step and all the barricades he has established taken 

in succession by grenade fighting.

Use of the Sandbag in Advancing

The skirmishers are then divided into three groups:

A point;

A supply chain;

A group to fill sandbags.

The point is composed of:

One man (rifleman) armed with rifle or revolver, whose sole duty is to prevent the passage of 

the enemy and protect the bombers.

Fight in a Zigzag

Two bombers (throwers) who throw grenades upon 

the enemy’s barricade and upon the portion of the 

zigzag in rear to prevent bringing up supplies.

Grenade charges or Cellerier bombs thrown by 

hand (fused by a group in the rear) may be used to 

advantage in blowing up sandbag barricades.

The supply chain is composed of a few men 

placed several paces apart so that they can get out of 

the way without bothering one another. They pass 

grenades in haversacks or bags.

The third group fills sandbags so that a barricade can be quickly established. It fires riflegrenades to interfere with the enemy’s supply and 

to bar his lines of retreat.

The most profound silence is kept and all noises 

coming from the enemy are carefully noted. When 

the point judges that the enemy is overcome, one 

man crawls forward in the smoke, looks around the 

corner, and signals to his companions. Progress is 

made in this way from turn to turn and from traverse to traverse.

It is easy enough to protect yourself against the 

enemy’s grenades; you see them coming, they do 

not burst immediately, and you have time to throw 

them into a corner; besides, a good many grenades 

fall outside the trench.

However, the formation of close groups must 

be avoided. When a grenade arrives, everybody 

squeezes together and the grenade kills all hands.

When the enemy has a momentary advantage, 

the sandbag barricades must be multiplied, and the 

trench obstructed either by piling up the sandbags 

or by tumbling in the trench walls. In this way, the 

enemy’s advance is slowed up; he delays to clear the 

passage, which often gives you a chance to regain 

the supremacy, or else he must show himself in the 

open where he is exposed to the rifles.

Imitate the cries of wounded men to draw the 

enemy into an ambuscade.

Precautions to Be Taken

in the Fight Inside the Trenches

Look out for long, straight portions of trenches; 

they are a snare laid for the assailant, who rushes 

into them thinking that he is sheltered and gets 

himself massacred. These parts of the trenches are 

often enfiladed by rifles or by machine guns placed 

in the traverses.

Likewise, you must pay attention to places 

where connecting trenches or zigzags cross. The enemy often retires to the bottom of a lateral branch. 

When the assailant advances rapidly in the zigzag, 

he sometimes neglects these branches, which open 

into the side of the zigzag being followed. The enemy comes out of his hiding place, and traps the 

assailant when he has passed by. The Germans 

sometimes mask the entrance to these refuges with 

a piece of canvas.

When you come to a new zigzag, throw in a 

few grenades; explore it, and barricade it, leaving 

one man on watch, if it is not considered necessary 

to advance by it.

The Assault, the Mêlée, and the Pursuit

When a strong attacking line has succeeded in establishing itself about a hundred meters from the 

enemy (in order to allow the artillery to fire), and 

the artillery has made sufficient preparation, the assault is delivered.
19

Readying for War

The Assault

The infantry dashes forward in successive lines of 

skirmishers, which are called waves. Each wave 

leaves the trench at a walk; they take their dress, 

then advance at the double, making a number of 

rushes according to the distance. In spite of the 

running, of the bullets, and of those who fall, they 

remain aligned like a wall to the end. It is necessary to 

reach the entanglements without firing a shot, so as not 

to delay.

The first entanglement, if it is in existence, is 

crossed, and the line reformed on the far side. The 

line again advances; at 60 meters from the trench, 

charge; come to charge bayonets with one motion 

and spring upon the enemy.

Each man runs straight for the point of the 

trench which is ahead of him; watches the loopholes and the parapet and, if a head or a rifle appears, he drives it back with a shot and then leaps 

upon the parapet. He clears away everything that 

blocks his path with rifle and bayonet. You must 

not leave behind you anyone who may shoot you 

in the back, as has often happened. Make sure that 

the Germans lying at the bottom of the trench are 

really dead.

If all the enemy surrender at once, do not massacre them, but disarm them quickly. Men detailed 

in advance and the trench clearers alone look out 

for prisoners, because skulkers are in the habit of 

showing great readiness to gather in the prisoners 

they have not captured.

Machine Guns

A machine gun opening fire should become the target for all hands; it must be subjected to a hail of 

bullets.

The Mêlée in the Enemy’s Position

and the Pursuit

The trench, cleared of its defenders in a few seconds, 

is crossed without stopping; the assaulting force lies 

down 10 meters beyond it and opens fire on the second trench. The line being reformed, it again takes 

up the assault, in careful alignment as at first.

It is absolutely forbidden to enter the zigzags; it is a 

great temptation, but you never come out of them again, 

and a handful of men will stop the progress of a 

company for hours. Men detailed in advance follow 

the zigzags according to a fixed itinerary and prevent the enemy from enfilading the space between 

two trenches.

The violence of the assault creates great disorder among the enemy, who does not know who is 

holding out and who has fallen.

Advantage must be taken of this confusion to 

go as far as possible; if there is any delay, the barrier 

fire will soon be started.

However, the men must not go out in disorder, 

singly, like maniacs; they would be at the mercy of 

the slightest fusillade* or the least counteroffensive.

Hence:

Always rally about the company noncoms;

Reform a line of skirmishers while on the 

march;

Advance quickly on the heels of the adversary, in good order, keeping a sharp lookout, 

and the rifle ready.

Certain men are detailed to crawl rapidly in advance; they cover the rally and the advance of the 

lines of skirmishers. It is their duty to seize important points (crossings of the zigzags, etc.), whose 

occupation will prevent the arrival of reinforcements and cut off the retreat of certain groups of 

defenders.

Every soldier should be well acquainted with 

the plan of the enemy’s trenches; he must be able 

to head for such and such a shelter, such and such a 

machine gun, or such and such trench crossing.

Where to Take Information

Before starting out, every soldier must know exactly 

where he will surely find someone who will quickly 

stop the fire of his artillery when it is firing short, 

or cause it to commence firing when the occasion 

presents itself.

* Simultaneous or continuous discharge of firearms.
20

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Failings [that] Every Soldier Must Prevent

During the mêlée and the pursuit, a certain amount 

of confusion sometimes occurs among the assaulting troops. A small number of bad soldiers is 

enough to cause disorder.

The timid spread alarm by shouting: “They are 

coming back . . . asphyxiating gases . . . the company 

is wiped out . . . all the officers are killed . . . we are 

trapped.”

These men must be made to keep still; if they 

fall back, jump on them and make them advance, to 

avoid a panic.

Skulkers profit by the confusion and the disappearance of the leaders to stay hidden in rear under 

some pretext or other; they are anxious to accompany the wounded or prisoners, pretend to be putting the trench in a state of defense or say that they 

were lost. All these people will be picked up by the 

police details.

Enemy Counterattacks and Flanking Fire

Scattered groups of skirmishers have a tendency to 

retreat precipitately before the slightest counterattack or when subjected to flanking fire, because 

their leaders have fallen, and because they are few 

in number and are afraid of being surrounded. A 

single soldier who falls back is enough to carry the 

others with him.

Ground [that] has been gained is to be bitterly 

defended; you must not retreat. When there are 

no officers or noncoms left, there are still intrepid 

soldiers to stop those who tremble, and shout at 

them: “I’ll kill the first man who hesitates.” Isolated 

groups of skirmishers should entrench themselves 

in the corner of a trench; if they are surrounded, 

they must defend themselves to the last cartridge, 

and then use German rifles and cartridges.

FOUR RESOLUTE MEN UNDER COVER, WHO FIRE ONLY WHEN SURE OF A 

HIT, ARE ABSOLUTELY UNAPPROACHABLE.
21

The following notes and impressions of the writer 

are the result of his recent presence in Europe, both 

on the western front and elsewhere. The observations made pertain particularly to artillery activities, and other matters outside of that sphere were 

merely incidental. The impressions obtained resulted from visits to training and school centers of the 

English artillery in England; to the schools, ammunition parks, ordnance repair shops, and operations of intelligence, balloon and airplane services 

behind the British lines in France; the operations 

of the artillery staffs at British Great Headquarters, Army Headquarters, Corps Headquarters, and 

Divisional Headquarters; also visits to all types of 

British artillery in position and firing, forward observing stations, and general scenes of activity at 

the front from Ypres [Belgium] to Armentières 

[France]. This front was the scene of the successful 

Wytschaete-Messines [ridge] attack on 7 June 1917 

last and the further advance in this region since 4 

August of this year. Embraced also in this visit was 

a trip to the French front in the vicinity of Rheims, 

covering the sector of Craonne-Moronvilliers.

The writer was particularly struck with the operations at the Wytschaete-Messines battle referred 

to above, as they constitute one of the most, if not 

the most, successful offensives of the Allies to date. 

This battle resulted in forcing back the German line 

for an average depth of 2,000 yards, over a 10-mile 

front, and destroyed the southern face of the troublesome Ypres salient. It was accomplished with 

a minimum loss of men, which was due in a great 

measure to the power and efficiency of the British 

artillery; which after a seven-day bombardment, 

covering every objective in the area selected for assault, succeeding in overmastering the German artillery and causing the withdrawal of its guns. With 

its own divisional guns, the British then formed, on 

the day of the assault, a rolling barrage and a standing barrage for its infantry. The infantry followed 

this rolling barrage, at a distance varying from 50 to 

100 yards, and captured the ground above described. 

It will be seen, then, what a controlling influence on 

any offensive the artillery exercises in this war. The 

French and British now possess a formidable artillery, both in numbers and efficiency, and it is still 

being augmented. Such an artillery is secured by the 

mobilization of all national industries to produce 

the materiel and the most thorough organization 

and training of the personnel. Our task is the same 

as that of the Allies.

Our present artillery organization is believed 

to be very satisfactory in many respects until we 

get beyond the regimental organization. We have 

yet to create the artillery staffs for the higher units. 

Abroad, the artillery staffs of the armies, corps, and 

divisions are quite numerous and might seem, when 

listed, to have an excessive number of officers. But 

in both British and French armies, it can be safely 

said that there is not one too many officers to coordinate the complex activities of the artillery, especially during such an offensive as above described. 

Organizations for such staffs will undoubtedly be 

evolved for us. It is regretted that data on this subject must be excluded from an article such as this.

The subject of training or instruction is most 

important. The training of officers and men ceases 

only during the time when actually engaged at the 

front. Before going to the front, there is intensive 

instruction for both the new officers and the new 

men. Immediately upon the withdrawal from the 

front for purposes of rest, selected officers and men 

are at once sent to various schools behind the lines 

and there instructed. This applies not only to the 

artillery, but to all branches of the Army. Behind 

the French and British lines, there are schools of 

application for every form of military activity. Every British Army has its artillery school, and at this 

school officers are given the training [that] will 

keep them ready to employ the methods of the 

“moving battle” (war of maneuver), as well as the 

methods of trench warfare. The article by Colonel 

ARTILLERY IN EUROPE*

by Major M. E. Locke, 8th Field Artillery

* From Field Artillery Journal, which was first published in 1911 

by the U.S. Field Artillery Association in Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 

and was an official publication of the U.S. Army Field Artillery 

Corps.
22

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

[Henry J.] Reilly in the April–June [issue] of the 

Journal described the French artillery school at 

Fountainebleau, giving some idea of the extent and 

thoroughness of just one phase of this training. It 

was the writer’s privilege to visit and inspect this 

school thoroughly. It is sufficient to say that it turns 

out 9,000 fairly well-trained artillery officers a year. 

It is impossible to give here the results obtained 

by these intensive methods of instruction, but the 

writer can say that he has seen field batteries [that] 

were trained in three months from raw recruits. He 

saw them when they were ready to go to the front, 

at which time they conducted service practice and 

executed mounted drill in a very creditable manner. 

There is no doubt that a system [that] can turn out 

efficient troops in such a short time is a growth. By 

this time, a great corps of instructors, drawn from 

officers who by reason of wounds or other disabilities are no longer fit for the front, is available for 

this work. Such a corps is lacking with us at present. 

By the return of officers to this country, after a certain service at the front, for duty as instructors, the 

work of instruction can be greatly expedited.

In the conduct of artillery operations, trench 

warfare has produced many changes. The normal 

appearance of a field battery in position is quite different from what one would expect, judged by the 

open battle methods taught in all armies before this 

war. The guns are kept in pits or surrounded by trees 

to such an extent that distant aiming points are impossible. No caissons are with the guns, the ammunition being in racks in the pits. These pits have little 

or no covering, usually only sufficient head covering 

to resist shrapnel or shell splinters. The limbers and 

horses are ordinarily one to two miles in the rear of 

the guns; the BC [or battery commander’s] station, 

if such exists, is in the battery itself.

All observation of fire is made from the posts 

of the forward observing officers (FOOs), which 

are called observation positions (OPs) and are in 

masked and carefully protected positions located 

near the first line of trenches. If possible, they avoid 

putting the OP in the front line trenches themselves. These OPs are connected by telephone with 

their batteries, and from them the fire is conducted, 

usually by the captain, during an important action. During “Peace Time War,” as the English call 

the normal conditions along the front, the duty of 

FOO is taken in turn by each of the battery officers 

for a certain length of time. This duty at times is, of 

course, extremely dangerous.

The personnel at the battery usually have dugouts constructed wherein they can take refuge when 

bombarded. It is expected that they take refuge in 

these dugouts whenever the battery is bombarded, 

unless they are engaged on some special or important gun service, such as delivery of a barrage. In 

such case, they must remain at their posts, whatever 

may be the cost.

Over each gun is stretched a canopy of netting 

to which are tied tufts or strips of burlap painted 

green, yellow, and brown. These nets form the camouflage for the guns and diminish the chances of 

their detection by aerial observers. Every British 

light gun carries on it as part of its equipment one 

of these nets. Extra ammunition is scattered around 

everywhere in the vicinity of the battery (“dumps”). 

Every such “dump” is camouflaged with brush or by 

paulins thrown over them and painted the various 

colors required by that particular terrain. The art of 

camouflage is one of the most interesting products 

of this war. It calls to its service everything from the 

work of artists and sculptors down to that of day 

laborers. It is regretted that this article cannot more 

fully describe its activities.

The wire communications of a battery in position are a very complex thing. There is frequently a 

telephone exchange in the BC station, which makes 

it possible for the BC to talk to his division commander, to his battalion commander, to his FOOs, 

and to the commander of the infantry whose front 

he protects. To many of these officers, he has alternative routes of communication besides the direct lines thereto. All telephone wires are buried 

six to eight feet in the ground until the area of the 

trenches is reached, where, if it is no longer possible 

to bury them, they are pinned on to the side of the 

trenches. All telephone lines in the trench area have 

the double metallic circuit, as the ground return 

permits the enemy to read all messages by means 

of detectors created for the purpose. For the same 

reason, messages at the front are sent in buzzer code 

instead of by voice. Both sides forbid the use of spoken messages over the telephone where the lines are 

located in the trench district except in the greatest 

emergencies.
23

Readying for War

It is not an uncommon sight in the posting of 

batteries to see the guns posted in tiers. The firing 

of artillery over personnel in its front is taken as a 

matter-of-course procedure. Batteries in the lower 

tier of guns usually have a parados [or protective 

berm] in the rear of each gun as a partial protection 

from premature bursts of guns in the rear.

The writer cannot recall having seen the employment of a distant aiming point in any battery, 

light or heavy. The siting of the guns usually forbids 

this. The normal procedure seemed to be to establish the direction of the directing gun by the use of 

the map or compass bearings, then establish parallel 

fire in the battery and give each gun its own aiming post not more than 50–100 yards away. Another 

method was to establish by some form of survey the 

line of fire for a sort of sight bar set up close beside 

a gun and then by means of a reflecting apparatus 

on the gun sight secure parallelism of the gun with 

the sight bar.

It will be seen, from the extent of the communication system of a battery, that a great number 

of men will be needed in the BC detail. British 

batteries, including signalers, have about 21 men. 

Our own details will have to be materially increased 

and signaling must be carefully taught, using all the 

various kinds of materials—large flag, small flag, 

telephone, buzzer, daylight lamp, daylight shutter, 

etc.—depending upon conditions. Every known 

means of communication has been, and may often have to be, employed, including such things as 

rockets, flares, carrier pigeons, and dogs. So great is 

the need for many and thoroughly expert signalers 

that every British battery endeavors to maintain a 

competent understudy for every signal man in the 

detail.

As regards the technique of firing, the following 

were noticed as among the most important features:

The widespread use of firing by the map;

The frequency of firing by compass;

The methods of conducting “airplane shoots” 

(conduct of fire from airplanes);

The calibration of guns to compensate for 

loss of muzzle velocity due to wear of the guns;

Corrections for atmospheric conditions; 

[and]

Corrections for map’s distortion.

It will be seen from the above that a large 

amount of the work of the guns partakes of the 

character of bull’s-eye shooting, particularly when 

charged with the destruction of small material targets. At any rate, every precaution is taken to ensure 

the shot falling in a small zone.

Three great kinds of work exacted of the artillery may conveniently be grouped as follows:

“Destructive shoots”;

Counterbattery work; [and]

Barrages.

The “destructive shoot” is firing undertaken to 

demolish various hostile structures, such as firing 

trenches, communication trenches, wiring, dugouts, 

depots, dumps, etc. These “destructive shoots” may 

be performed by all classes of guns, but are usually 

the function of the heavier calibers. Counterbattery 

work is usually the function of the heavy guns and 

howitzers. Like the subject of camouflage, a detailed description of the various activities of counterbattery work extends far beyond the scope of this 

article. The head of a counterbattery service calls 

to his aid for the location of hostile batteries the 

assistance of the intelligence, flash-spotting, balloon, airplane, and aerial photograph services, to say 

nothing of the map department. He assigns to his 

batteries for destruction all targets located by the 

foregoing instrumentalities.

Barrage firing may be a curtain of fire [that] 

rolls along the ground at a predetermined rate. This 

is called the rolling barrage. Behind it marches our 

own infantry at such a sufficiently short distance 

that they are able, after a barrage has rolled over a 

trench, to rush into that trench before the defense 

can come up from their dugouts and line the parapet with their machine guns. It goes without saying 

that, during the intensive bombardment, the defense cannot remain in their fire trenches and live. 

They must take refuge in their dugouts.

The standing barrage is a curtain of fire [that] 

moves by a series of lifts or bounds, varying in 

amount, having some definite objective at each lift. 

Its principal duty is to bring fire to bear on certain 

areas in advance of the rolling barrage from which 

ruinous fire might be delivered upon our attacking infantry as, for example, machine guns posted 
24

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

in suitable places and fired by indirect fire through 

our rolling barrage into our infantry. The standing 

barrage, by the use of smoke shell, also masks the 

progress of the attack from the enemy.

All barrage fire is a function of the divisional 

artillery. It seems well established that infantry, after 

proper artillery preparation, can advance under the 

cover of a well-regulated barrage, but its advance is 

limited to the range of the guns. When the extreme 

limit of the barrage has been attained, the infantry must consolidate and wait until the guns can be 

pushed to the front. A multitude of details must be 

cared for when making the arrangements for barrage firing for a great attack. The coordination of 

these details finds its expression in the barrage maps 

prepared and issued by each corps and in the firing 

schedules prepared by every battery commander. In 

doing all the foregoing, the need for the numerous 

high artillery staffs already spoken of becomes apparent. Once supplied with his barrage map, every 

battery commander must make out for each of his 

guns a timetable for firing in the barrage. This table 

is far more exacting than that of any railroad train, 

for every gun must during every designated minute 

of time fire a certain number of shots with a certain 

set of firing data different for various times.

The infantry in the front line trenches has a 

certain amount of divisional artillery told off to defend its front. Infantry in the front line trenches, 

which suspects an attack, sends in to its supporting artillery an SOS call. Censure awaits any battery [that] fails to respond by fire within 30 seconds 

after the call is sent. The response has come in 17 

seconds. The fact that guns are, when not otherwise 

employed, always kept laid on their SOS positions 

and that the sector for each gun is so small simplifies this performance somewhat.

Undoubtedly there will be evolved some “doctrine” of training for all our artillery, designed to 

give instruction in all that it is needful to know in 

this present war. It is believed that this instruction 

will involve the following subjects for artillery officers, some of which had not attained before the war 

the importance [that] they now have, viz.:

More instruction in map and compass firing;

The preparation of battery battle charts;

The calibration of guns;

Correction for atmospheric conditions;

Greater proficiency of officers in all kinds of 

signaling;

Aerial observation of fire;

The conduct of fire at service practice from 

OPs;

Camouflage;

The preparation of barrage maps and timetables; [and]

Methods of counterbattery work.

In the pursuit of these studies the instruction 

must never lose sight of the principles covering artillery in the open battle as laid down in our drill 

regulations.
25

Nothing can be more dangerous than to attempt 

new or unusual minor tactical methods in the face 

of the enemy. Until soldiers in the mass are so 

drilled in the desired minor tactics that their conduct under the stress of battle is practically instinctive, their fighting value is very uncertain. Even the 

Roman soldiers, of whom it has been said that “the 

exercises were battles without bloodshed, and their 

battles bloody exercises,” were not proof against 

terrible defeats when this rule was violated. History furnishes many examples of disasters following 

upon well thought out schemes [that] had the one 

fatal defect of changing tactical mechanism at the 

moment of opening battle.

Students of the careers of great leaders are often prone to overlook, or to lay little stress upon, 

the fact that Philip II of Macedon fashioned the 

army with which Alexander conquered the world; 

that Hamilcar Barca bequeathed a veteran army to 

his son Hannibal; that Frederick the Great owed 

his achievements, in great measure, to the wellorganized and experienced army of his father. 

Changes in drill tactics, in actual fighting methods, 

were made by these captains, not on the battlefield, 

but by unremitting drill and instruction in garrison 

and in camp. Their victories were due to splendid 

conceptions in grand tactics, based upon confidence 

in the minor tactical skill of their subordinates.

The leader whose officers and men lack instruction in the minor tactics of field service is placed in 

an unhappy dilemma. Being unwilling, or unable, 

to trust to his subordinates the details of outposts, 

plans of reconnaissance, etc., he tries to do all himself; he succeeds principally in destroying initiative, 

self-confidence, and willingness to assume responsibility among the members of his command. Who, 

with experience in field service, has not seen captains and lieutenants leading squads, field officers 

directly commanding sections and companies? At 

the time that trained intelligent action was demanded, it was felt that instruction in even the rudiments had to be given. Only ignorance, lack of 

numbers, and deficient morale of the enemy made 

such procedure possible.

The demands made upon the Marine Corps 

for men for expeditionary service frequently—in 

fact, almost continually—reduce home garrisons to 

the point where any instruction beyond close order 

drills and target practice is looked upon as hardship. 

The difficulty of finding time for field service exercises does not reduce the importance of conducting 

them; it does, however, make imperative the selection of methods of instruction that utilize every 

moment of the few available hours. Necessary, useful, and interesting labor is never considered hardship by troops: it is inefficient and wasteful methods 

that arouse discontent and resentment.

A number of years ago, a book (Extracts from an 

Infantry Captain’s Journal, Von Arnim, [1897]) was 

published, detailing a method by which the difficulties of teaching minor tactics in garrison were surmounted. The exercises were most elementary and, 

though the distances and tactics no longer conform 

to requirements, the method is as useful and interesting today as it was on the date of publication. 

There is hardly a post in the Marine Corps that has 

not in its immediate vicinity as many topographical 

features for exercises as the post discussed in Von 

Arnim’s book.

The Army Service Schools have recently published two booklets upon this same subject: Studies in Minor Tactics, 1915, and Captain [A. W.] 

Bjornstad’s Small Problems for Infantry [1916]. The 

problems in both of these studies are conducted on 

maps. It is only in the preface of Captain Bjornstad’s book that emphasis is laid upon the fact that 

the importance of this kind of study is in the method taught. Misunderstanding of the true relation of 

map problems to the training of enlisted men may 

lead to attempts to instruct noncommissioned officers by having them study the problems given in 

these books.

Considerable imagination is required to convert conventional map signs into mental pictures of 

what the ground actually looks like. Special training 

in map making, map reading, and tactical exercises 

is necessary before a student can properly conduct 

minor tactical exercises on a map. To the average 

GARRISON TRAINING FOR FIELD SERVICE

by Major George Van Orden, USMC
26

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

noncommissioned officer, the map problem might 

just as well be written in Sanskrit or Russian. Attempts to conduct map problems with enlisted men 

are more harmful than good, for the most simple 

maneuvers are swathed in a cloak of mystery that 

confuses and discourages the men and causes them 

to lose self-confidence.

There is a clear line of demarcation between the 

proper use of map problems and exercises on the actual terrain. When the maneuvering troops cover too 

large an area to be swept by the eye, the plans must 

be laid out on the map. The relation of the details of 

the problem to each other can be truly appreciated 

only in this way, and the use of the map, whether for 

instruction or in active campaign, becomes natural 

and proper. When, however, the problem is so restricted in scope that all of the troops concerned 

and the essential surroundings can be actually seen 

by the leader, the problem should be conducted as 

an exercise on the ground. It is inconceivable that a 

squad leader would ever be called upon in campaign 

to post a sentinel or to conduct a patrol on the map. 

Why, then, should he be required to go through the 

forced and unnatural process of conducting such 

problems on the map?

Noncommissioned officers—and all men trained for scouting—should be trained to read road 

maps, to be able to pick out prominent topographical features on such maps, and to make sketches 

of restricted areas, outguard positions, fords, etc. 

Beyond that, map work is largely a waste of time, 

unless they are to be educated as topographers instead of squad and section leaders. This should not 

be separate from other forms of instruction. Map 

reading, the sketching of fords, noting the characteristics of bridges, etc., should be coincident with 

exercises in reconnaissance. Instruction sketching of 

outguard positions should be a part of every outpost 

exercise. With Americans, it is necessary to teach 

why as well as how.

Those who have read Von Arnim’s book will recall that, in each of the exercises described, the men 

were marched to a selected point and then conducted through the posting of an outpost, an attack, etc. 

Every detail was carried out in full and the reasons 

for the dispositions explained to the men. Throughout all of the description is apparent the fact that 

the ground had been carefully studied beforehand, 

and the exercises selected to fit the ground.

The proper planning of an exercise in minor 

tactics involves much more labor than its subsequent conduct. It is not sufficient to decide that a 

certain position on a road is a good place for a sentry squad. The ground to right, left, and rear must be 

reconnoitered to ensure that it is such as would be 

chosen as part of a general outpost line. If defense 

against attack on the outpost is to be part of the exercise, the ground in front must be reconnoitered to 

determine from which direction the enemy should 

properly attack. When all of the details have been 

provided for, a short but clear and complete story 

must be concocted, leading up naturally to the tactical situation with which the exercise begins. This is 

essential to arouse interest and to impress upon the 

squad leader the relation of the duties of his squad 

to the larger duties of the company and the regiment. Instruction proceeds most rapidly and satisfactorily when the men are made to feel at every 

step the importance of their individual work to the 

success of a whole campaign. All of this requires, on 

the part of the company officers, imagination, ingenuity, and hard work, but it is valuable and intensely 

interesting practice. Indeed, they will usually find 

themselves reaping far greater benefits than do the 

men. Napoleon attributed his almost uncanny skill 

in quickly solving tactical situations to the fact that 

he thought about them always.

The training of enlisted men for field service 

should be systematized, not only for ease in carrying it out, but also in order to ensure placing elementary instruction before more complicated

exercises. To avoid loss of time in the field, a certain 

amount of instruction must be given indoors, but it 

should be reduced to a minimum. The object here is 

to impart information to the soldier, rather than to 

test his knowledge. Instruction should therefore be 

given in the form of lectures and discussions; rarely 

by recitation methods. The principles governing minor tactical situations are best impressed upon the 

memory by applying them, during the lecture, to 

simple problems similar to the ones to be solved later in the field. The theory of topographical sketching must also be taught, but indoor work cannot 

ordinarily go much beyond drill in the use of instruments and conventional signs. If a B-H relief map 
27

Readying for War

is available, sketching methods can be practiced to 

a certain extent, and tactical problems can be well 

illustrated. The relief map is, however, only an improvement on the flat map; it can be used, not as a 

substitute for field exercises, but only to lead up to 

them.

While this preliminary work is going forward, 

the company officers should read and study the 

problems in—let us say—patrolling, in the two 

Army Service School publications already mentioned. In connection with this study, they should 

be read what the Field Service Regulations have 

to say on the subject of reconnaissance. Having 

thus refreshed their minds on the points involved 

in leading a patrol, they should go together out a 

road in the vicinity of the post and select points at 

which various incidents might happen to a patrol 

in actual campaign in that kind of country. Every 

detail should be carefully examined in order that 

nothing unnatural be included. Incidents should be 

chosen to emphasize underlying principles—such, 

for example, as the reasons for adopting particular 

formations, the importance of sending back information, etc. In order to sustain interest, the situations should follow each other in an ascending scale 

of excitement to the climax of a fight. On the way 

back to the post, a story that throws a glamor about 

the whole affair can be composed and perfected. 

What the men have been taught can also be compared with what they should know before undertaking such an exercise, and any deficiencies noted 

and corrected. Not until then will all be ready.

The patrol exercise is suggested as the first to 

be undertaken as it covers the greatest amount of 

ground and will give, both in the preparation and in 

the conduct, opportunities to pick out positions for 

exercises in advance and rear guards, outposts, etc.

Where two or more companies are stationed at 

a post, it is preferable that the company officers plan 

independently the exercises for their men. There 

will be greater variety in the use made of the terrain, and greater opportunity to display ingenuity 

and resourcefulness.

The advantage of this method of instruction lies 

in the fact that what has been done several times 

in practice becomes the natural and normal thing 

to do in the serious business of war. Perplexity and 

uncertainty are eliminated and the soldier gains 

confidence from the feeling that he is competent to 

meet any situation that may arise. The terrain exercise, carefully and naturally conducted, approaches 

very nearly the real thing in war experience, and experience is one of the things that men do not readily forget.
28

In the first line trenches, each battalion section has 

one or more regimental aid posts [in care of ] of 

[the] RMO [regimental medical officer].

1. Infectious Diseases: all cases showing fever are 

immediately evacuated to [a] rest station, where 

they can be observed and isolated, and from there 

sent to casualty clearing stations, from where they 

are evacuated to the base. Contacts to mumps and 

measles, trench fever, and hemorrhagic jaundice 

are not interfered with. Those from diphtheria and 

cerebrospinal meningitis and scarlet fever are sent 

back in quarantine. Those from scarlet fever are 

kept for 10 days, those from diphtheria and cerebrospinal meningitis until bacteriologically clear on 

two consecutive negatives at least 24 hours apart.

The underlying principle is to get all infectious 

cases out at the earliest possible moment from the 

well.

2. Water Supply: (a) in petrol tins carried up with 

rations from 200-gallon twin reservoirs, at nearest 

point possible to lines. Twin to facilitate alternate 

chlorination; (b) from farm wells in neighborhood, 

always chlorinated; (c) from wells approximately 

500 yards back in bays off communication trenches; 

(d) water bottles brought in filled from chlorinated 

designated sources as men go into trenches; (e) in 

strong points, a store of chlorinated water is always 

kept in rum jars. In tin cans objectionable tastes develop; (f ) in one place, water was carried from highest point up stream to a three-by-four-by-two-feet 

deep box filled with clean sand, [then] run into a 

twin reservoir where it was chlorinated; (g) in another area, pipes were led into trenches from supplies in the back area.

3. Food Supply: (a) each man is supplied with 

three days’ “iron rations,” to be used in emergency 

only; (b) otherwise carried up every night. The fresh 

meat is cooked in the reserve area and brought up in 

labeled sandbags to be warmed up for each platoon. 

Coke is supplied for warming up in trenches, also to 

make tea; (c) in the winter, hot soup or cocoa or tea 

is brought up in two-gallon insulated petrol tins for 

use after 0100; 10 ounces for each man.

4. Sullage Water and ablution water collected in 

tins to be carried back and emptied on soil or in 

holes where it will not be a nuisance.

5. Refuse: is collected in sandbags hung up at intervals in trenches, to be carried back and buried in 

the night—usually within 200 feet of the trenches. 

In some cases, it has been carried back by the ration 

parties to be burned in the “rest area.”

6. Excreta: collected in petrol drums flyproofed 

with 1 percent cresol solution; the feces pails in addition are provided with improvised automatically 

falling covers; “chloride of lime” is freely scattered 

around about. At night, the feces and urine are buried inside of 200 feet of the trenches generally.

7. Bodies: generally are not buried locally but 

brought back to cemeteries usually from 1,000 

yards on from the trenches. They are covered with 

three feet of earth, at least when possible.

8. Vermin: the men are supplied with a powder 

to dust into clothes and an ointment to rub into 

seams of underclothes and breeches; the active 

principle there is crude petroleum.

9. Rats: these are a great nuisance and numerous traps, dogs, cats, and ferrets are used for their 

destruction, and the men kill many of them. We 

have not used poisons or virus; we are afraid of the 

virus (too closely related to enteric group), and the 

men are too closely associated with the rats. In case 

plague should come about, we would have to; perhaps more rigid destruction of rats would protect us 

against trench fever, so called.

10. Trench Feet: (a) drain trenches as much as 

possible; (b) use “waders,” kept in trench stores, 

thigh high. Puttees** are removed on coming into 

trenches always. Each man brings with him two 

pairs dry socks; each night, two additional pairs are 

brought up with rations in watertight bags. Men 

wash and dry feet at least once every 24 hours, using 

** A strip of cloth that is wound around the lower leg from 

knee to ankle.

CAMP SANITATION IN TRENCH WARFARE*

by a Military Observer

* From The Military Surgeon, December 1917.
29

Readying for War

afterward a talcum-camphor powder; care is taken 

to have them move about. Each platoon officer is 

responsible for the carrying out of these precautions.

11. Inspection is done each day by the regimental medical officer. The responsibility of keeping the 

trenches clean and sanitary rests on the commanding officer and his staff. The medical officer has advisory capacity only.

12. Personnel: each company supplies a sanitary 

squad and is aided by a sanitary fatigue when necessary.

Reserve Areas: usually about 1,000 yards behind 

front line. (1) Vermin: as in trenches. (2) Food: can 

usually be cooked without hindrance. (3) Water 

Supply: water carts brought up here, chlorinated always from designated sources. Local wells not used 

at all if can be avoided. (4) Milk: no local milk is 

used; either condensed or milk powder used. (5) Excreta: flyproofed always; tin biscuit cresol solution 

in cans, buried. In dry alluvial soils, pits are dug and 

boxes enclosed in wooden boxes with automatically 

falling covers; closed seats placed over them, the 

area fenced off. Kept dark, these pits do very well 

one and a half feet wide at top, two feet wide at bottom, four by five feet deep, but thoroughly covered. 

When unit goes out, these are thoroughly filled in 

and marked. (6) Refuse: still has to be buried. (7) 

Sullage water: radiating shallow trenches filled with 

old tin cans and covered with earth are used. A tin 

box filled with grass or straw with chloride of lime 

scattered through it deals with this very well. The 

trenches are one foot wide, two feet deep and long, 

according to the absorbing quality of the soil.

Cemeteries: usually in this area very well kept.

Rest Area: usually four or five miles back from 

the front lines. Huts, billets, or tents. There are three 

field ambulances per division. One of these is in rest 

generally, one is conducting a “rest camp” for the 

care of noninfectious temporarily sick and has one 

section for the reception, sorting and distribution 

to casualty clearing stations of infectious cases. Scabies cases are usually treated at the rest camp. The 

other field ambulance has charge of the advance 

dressing stations and the main dressing station of 

the division.

Convalescent Camp: in charge of a combatant 

officer; looks after the chronic sick room visitant 

and light duty men. From this, fatigues are supplied 

for all kinds of odd jobs.

1. Chlorination and Distribution of Water. In 

the Camps: each 500 men has a water cart assigned 

them with a constant water detail in charge, who always carries his own supply of calcium hypochlorite 

in quarter-pound tins with him on his cart and always does his own chlorinating. There is a standard 

measure in each tin. A tin is used for four days only, 

then discarded. Tins with wet or colored contents 

are immediately replaced. The supply of these tins is 

got with the rations of the unit. It is the “water detail’s” duty to keep his cart in good repair and clean. 

There is a driver to look after the horses. Water is 

to be taken from approved and assigned supplies 

only, and always to be chlorinated—no chances are 

taken. By frequent tests, using the iodine tester, 

the number of measures to be used to the standard 

cart (100 gallons) with each water [container] is 

prominently indicated on signboards at each source, 

where a special detail usually from the Sanitary 

Section is placed to see that the “water detail” men 

do the chlorinating. A record of each cart, the hour 

of taking, the unit, whether supplies are with them, 

whether the water tank is clean, and whether the 

“water detail” accompanies the cart. It is the “water 

detail” man who puts the chlorine into the cart. In 

many of the areas, there are well-organized piped, 

hydranted or water-tanked systems. The standard 

canton flannel filters and alum chlorifiers are practically never used. They soon deteriorate and get out 

of repair and generally on the rough roads tear the 

water-cart tanks all to pieces. Some of the waters 

require one measure, some as high as four.

2. Reduction of Fly and Insect Pests: (a) Mosquitoes: all ponds and stagnant waters, whether used 

for washing water or horse-drinking water, are in 

the mosquito season oiled once a week, using about 

four ounces of coal oil for each 200 square feet of 

surface. (b) Flies: all refuse is burned daily. Horse 

manure also and human feces either burned or buried. Food stores are screened as much as possible. 

Some have tried the biothermic method of disposing of horse manure. It is not a success in camps; no 

one will take the necessary trouble required. Strong 

solutions of borax or cresol frequently sprinkled 

on manure have been tried but have not been bril-
30

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

liantly successful. With all refuse and horse manure 

burned, the flies nearly disappear.

3. Campaign against Rats: no serious campaign 

against rats has been undertaken. They are a great 

nuisance, but they are fine scavengers. The men kill 

them on every occasion. The cats and dogs and ferrets of the trenches get rid of a good many of them. 

Traps are used, but are not very successful. Poison 

has been proposed, but we have enough self-inflicted

wounds already, and there is a general objection 

therefore to use poison. Rat-infecting bacteria have 

been advised, but these organisms are so closely related to the colon group of organisms that we do 

not use them; of course, if plague were to come on 

the scene, steps would have to be taken to meet the 

rat pest, but so far nothing serious has been done.

4. Disposal of Kitchen and Ablution Water: this 

is most satisfactorily done by using the can-filled

radiating trenches as with the disposal of urine but, 

in addition, to place alternate layers of straw or

grass and a liberal allowance of calcium hypochlorite in a straining tin at the hub of the trenches. 

When soiled, the straw or grass is burned in the 

incinerator.

Destruction of Body Vermin: (a) bed bugs are 

almost unknown among the troops; (b) head lice 

cases are rarely encountered. As a preventive, the 

hair is kept clipped; as a remedy, Vaseline or coal oil 

is used, being careful to prevent blistering; (c) body 

louse infection is frequent. For their destruction: (1) 

a powder for dusting into the clothes and an ointment for application to the seams of underclothes 

and trousers is supplied. The active principle of both 

these preparations is crude petroleum. It is fairly effective, but there is some difficulty in getting the 

men to intelligently and regularly use it; (2) baths, 

usually shower baths, are given as frequently as

possible, usually every three weeks, after which 

the men are given a clean set of underclothes and 

shirt, but since from 25 to 40 percent of the lice on 

each individual are present in the crotch seams of 

the trousers, respreading soon takes place. To meet 

this contingency in the smaller bath places, whilst 

the men are taking their baths, the trouser seams 

are ironed with hot flatirons. This helps out very 

much; (3) one large central bath is usually provided 

for each division, where from 1,000 to 1,500 men 

can be bathed each day. Some of these are provided with a Fodden disinfector—two large pressure 

steam sterilizers on a motor lorry, the steam being 

supplied by the boiler of the lorry. A temperature 

of 100–110° C is attained in these, but when men’s 

clothing has to be put through them at a rate of 

100–150 sets per hour, it is too slow and only the 

most seriously infested sets are done. The Belgians 

at their two main bath houses put the men’s clothes, 

each in his own bag, through the same process, but 

use a much larger disinfector supplied from a large 

stationary steam boiler with convenient mechanical devices for quick handling, and get the best of 

results. For our troops who are continuously on the 

move, the Belgian apparatus is too cumbersome and 

the boilers too heavy to be portable; (4) to rid men 

completely of their lice, it is necessary that all their 

clothing be done at one time, including even their 

greatcoat and, where possible, their individual blankets, and this should all be done when they are taking their bath, in a matter of from 25 to 30 minutes. 

Many of the units have put up disinfectors after the 

following plan, and with almost complete success, 

even under the difficulties of active service. Two 

contiguous rooms, double walled, sawdust filled, 6 

feet wide, 10 feet long and 6-and-a-half feet high, 

with a door at one end and a 1-foot wide 3-foot 

long window at the other end, with hooks from the 

ceiling on which to hang a numbered wooden holder for the clothes of each man. Around the walls are 

placed five rows of radiating two-inch steam pipes, 

kept continuously hot by circulating steam supplied 

usually by a standard threshing machine boiler. In 

the center of the floor, with a protecting shield over 

it, is placed a free steam outlet, all regulated from 

the outside. The clothes, turned inside out, are hung 

in this chamber as the men go into the bath, free 

steam is admitted from the floor outlet, the door 

and window slightly open until the air is pretty 

well driven out (1 minute), then are closed and 

the steam flow continued for 5 minutes, and shut 

off; the whole then allowed to stand for 10 minutes more, then the window and door are opened 

wide and the clothes taken out as soon as can be 

and shaken. They are dry and deloused and the eggs 

destroyed. The clothes are then handed to the men 

and can be immediately put on. Having two chambers, the work can go on alternately in one, then the 

other, and the whole process not take more than 25 
31

Readying for War

minutes. The temperature attained is from 85° to 

95° C, if the boiler is capable of keeping up in itself 

a pressure of 40 pounds per square inch through 

the process, and it usually can; (5) it is being seriously considered to fit up box cars in this way to be 

supplied with steam from a locomotive boiler for 

troops on the move. In Salonika, this has been done 

successfully (The men, after their bath, are issued 

clean underclothes, the old ones being left behind 

to be washed for future use.); (6) in some areas, 

Clayton sulphur-gas disinfectors have been set up. 

With 5 percent of gas in the chamber in which are 

hung the clothes, the lice and eggs are killed in one 

hour, but often not more than 3 percent of the gas 

can be gotten into the room, seven or eight hours 

then being required to kill the eggs and the lice. It 

is rather slow for active service purposes; (7) in one 

casualty clearing station, they sprinkled the clothes 

with gasoline, rolled them up tightly, then placed 

them in a small cellar room practically air tight, and 

left them so for 24 hours, when generally the lice 

and their eggs were dead. But this takes time and 

uses up very precious gasoline, and is not free from 

fire danger.

Disinfection of Clothing and Bedding: (1) by 

steam in a Thresh disinfector, by the same process 

in the magnified Thresh or Fodden disinfector, or 

in the flowing steam room described as above; (2) 

by sulfur gas, either from liquefied sulphurous acid 

containers or from that supplied by the Clayton disinfector; (3) a very effective method of dealing with 

body lice is by the hot air process. All that is needed 

is a thick wall tempered say 10 by 10 by 7 feet high. 

A dugout would do, or any small room, provided it 

is insulated; clothing could be hung in this, and into 

the room a brazier placed and the door closed. The 

small window will allow for observing the effect of 

the heat on bits of paper hung here and there; if 

the paper browns, then air should be let in, but as 

a rule it does not. A temperature of 85° C is easily 

got and with this temperature lice and their eggs are 

destroyed quite certainly in 15 minutes.

Construction of Bathhouses and Laundries: usually it is one bathhouse and one laundry on the same 

ground for each division, as near the center of the 

area as possible. For outlying concentrations, additional small bathhouses are put up. Sometimes these 

conveniences are set up in buildings already existent 

(breweries), in other cases are new constructions. (a) 

Bathhouse: one put up last summer in ———— 

salient combined the wants and the experiences of 

a couple of years. A small stream was dammed for 

a plentiful supply of water, the water was pumped 

by a small steam pump to an overhead tank [that] 

could serve for the laundry as well, also for fire protection. A water heater, on the plan of a Daisy water heater, was provided to supply hot water to a 

second tank to meet cold water, and from there be 

distributed to a set of rose-sprays piped overhead in 

a room floored with corrugated iron, duck-boards 

on top for the men to stand on; no cubicles provided. All the men bathe in one room, 40 at a time. 

A man from the platform regulated the tempered 

water and the supply to avoid wastage; the drainage 

went to a reception tank, where it could be treated 

before entry into the stream with the laundry water further down. In the anteroom, provided with 

wall and center benches, the men undressed, their 

valuables were looked after by a noncommissioned 

officer, their soiled underclothes being collected 

into baskets to be washed and their jackets, trousers or breeches and greatcoats and blankets, if they 

have brought these last with them, were taken by 

attendants, a number being given to each man, and 

they were put through the steam disinfector whilst 

the men went on to the shower bath. After their 

bath, by another passage they went into a dressing 

room where they dried up and were given clean 

underclothes, shirt and socks, and then got each 

their disinfected jackets, trousers, etc. Reinfection 

with vermin was thus avoided—the whole process 

took from 25 to 30 minutes. (b) Laundries: in general, the arrangements were as follows: hot water 

in an overhead tank heated by exhaust steam or by 

a Daisy heater piped over the tubs; also cold water 

was piped there. Women hired locally washed the 

clothes in the ordinary tubs of the country, using 

washboards and soft soap, usually made up from bar 

soap (15 bars yellow soap, 30 pounds washing soda, 

9 pails water, boiled together). The clothes had been 

previously disinfected either in a Fodden or in the 

chamber disinfector used for delousing. The floors 

were of corrugated iron leading to a central drain, 

thence to the reception tank. The women stood on 

duckboards. The clothes were then wrung either by 

hand or put through a roller wringer (power driven) 
32

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

and hung outside to dry in suitable weather; otherwise they were dried in drying huts heated by stoves 

down the center, the clothes hung closely on wires. 

The heated saturated air was periodically extracted 

by fans and, when properly handled, the clothes 

dried in eight hours. After this, the clothes were 

sorted and folded, not ironed, those needing mending being sent to the mending room. In winter, 

15,000 pairs of socks were washed and dried daily.

From the fact that the stream water had to be 

used again down below, the dirty water had to be 

purified. The following method gave satisfaction. 

Twin tanks of 6,000 gallons capacity each were 

provided. When 3,000 gallons of fresh laundry and 

bath water had reached this, one pound of hypochlorite of lime was added with thorough mixing to 

each 25 gallons of the stuff and then left standing 

for at least six hours, and whilst the twin tank was 

filling a thick, light scum of calcium soap enmeshing much fluff and other debris rose to the surface. 

This was skimmed off, mixed with sawdust, and 

burned in an incinerator. The clean fluid left was 

run into another tank to be used over again and 

again when water was scarce, or after running up 

through a sand screen, it was discharged into the 

stream below. It was expensive, but it gave satisfaction; other methods and other chemicals might 

have done better, but they could not be procured. 

Hypochlorite of lime is supplied to us freely. The 

buildings for bath and laundry purposes are generally built of rough, cheap lumber and covered with 

tar paper and roofed in with corrugated iron.

Additional Rest Areas: when a division has 

been in action several months in any one section 

and whose corps is not to be moved from there, it 

has been found useful to get it at a point further 

back out of gunfire and out of the noise of the front 

where the men could do light training and rest.

The sanitation of any area is the duty of the OC 

in that area—his medical officer is his sanitary adviser. In addition to this, we have a Sanitary Section 

composed of 27 men and a captain in charge—the 

business of this section is to coordinate the sanitation of the area and to inspect it. It is not their duty 

to do the fatigue work, they are there to instruct 

and to inspect—the OC of the Sanitary Section 

reports to the ADMS [assistant director of medical services] of the division, and through him any 

recommendations reach the units concerned.

Our corps has, besides this, a sanitary adviser 

coordinating the work of the Sanitary Sections 

of the divisions of the corps. The army in which a 

corps is situated has a DADMS [deputy assistant 

director of medical services] in sanitation, whose 

duty it is to supervise the sanitation of the corps 

and the divisions in the area. Daily reports of the 

infectious diseases arising in each corps area are 

sent to the DMS [director of medical services] of 

the army in which they are. In this way, knowledge 

is had of incidence of infectious diseases in the 

whole area daily; the DADMS sanitation goes then 

wherever there is indication of trouble. There is a 

mobile laboratory in each corps area to look after 

any analysis and bacteriological examinations when 

required in that area. Civil authorities reciprocate 

with the local military authorities in reporting infectious diseases amongst the civil population, and 

measures are taken accordingly in case of major infectious diseases. The patients are removed from the 

area and the homes from which they came put out 

of bounds for troops. The civil authorities look after 

the disinfection, etc. The military and civil sanitary 

authorities also reciprocate in the control of the estaminets; in many of the areas, it is required of the 

proprietors of these places that all drinking utensils 

be properly sterilized with boiling water after use 

by each customer. If we adopted the French method 

of carrying (each soldier his own cup), this difficult 

task—the controlling of spreading disease by drinking cups—would be very much reduced. The French 

soldier carries his cup with him always and, when 

he drinks wines or beer, drinks from his own cup. 
33

As train travelers on the trunk line between Washington and Richmond approach a station 34 miles 

south of the national capital and 80 [miles] north of 

Richmond, they perk up and take notice nowadays 

of a new “point of interest” along the route—Quantico, V[irginia], city of the Soldiers of the Sea. By 

daylight, there is a view from the car windows of 

the drill grounds and the barracks of a post of 7,000 

United States Marines. In the evening, the 350 

buildings climbing a hillside and scattered over a 

flat between this high ground and the nearby banks 

of the Potomac River are as ablaze with lights as a 

factory town.

Six months ago, Quantico’s chief “interests” 

were fishing and mining. The town was little more 

than a whistling station in the woods. When a platoon of Marine pioneers landed at the town’s rickety 

dock from a steamboat one afternoon in the middle 

of May, only a small field, now part of the parade 

grounds, was cleared; all the rest of the tract’s 6,000 

acres was in forest. The platoon spent the night in 

a deserted dancing pavilion on the river bank and, 

when the lunch the men carried in their haversacks 

was gone, they had to buy up all the edibles on the 

shelves of the village post office and general store.

Though the actual work of clearing and building did not begin until well along in May, it went 

ahead with a rush once it got under way. In another 

six weeks, the construction contractors had cleared 

upward of a 100 acres of forest, and a small city of 

one-story wooden barracks was open to receive a 

regiment of Marines, which arrived to begin training for service overseas. These Marines did their 

part to help police the company streets of stumps 

and construction litter, but the heaviest of the work 

was complete before they arrived. Water from artesian wells in the hills was flowing in the new city’s 

water mains, the sewage system was in operation, 

and telephones installed. The electric light plant 

was working, though the engines, as yet, had no 

roofs above them.

From a signal tower on the highest western 

hilltop, the construction company took “progress 

pictures” every week to show the speed with which 

new buildings were sprouting up in the clearing. 

On the hillside just below this tower, great blocks 

of quarters for the enlisted men of the infantry

regiments kept creeping steadily southward. Each 

company was assigned to a group of six of these 

buildings—four for living quarters (50 men to a 

“shack” 98 feet by 20 [feet]), one building for a mess 

hall, one for a washroom.

At the foot of the hill, a long, broad street—

Barnett Avenue—was laid out, and as soon as 

sufficient quarters for the enlisted men had been

completed a row of living quarters and offices for 

the commissioned officers began to spring up along 

the avenue’s eastern curb line.

Then, in the center of this row, appeared a large 

building for the YMCA New Britain, Connecticut, 

made this $10,000 present to the sea soldiers of 

Virginia for use as a reading and writing room and 

entertainment hall. As part of the gift, the generous New Britains included the services of readingroom attendants, physical instructors, and a teacher 

of French.

By the time this article sees print, the YMCA 

building will be part of a cantonment community center. To the east of the YMCA will rise a 

structure with a floor space 110 [feet] by 232 feet, 

to be used either as a gymnasium or as an auditorium, [with a] seating capacity [of ] about 3,000. 

In an alcove annex to this, a circulating library will 

be installed. There is a possibility that the Knights 

of Columbus will soon add to the group another 

soldiers’ clubhouse. The military post office is next 

door to the YMCA, and two public service buildings, the powerhouse, and the cold storage plant are 

at the eastern edge of the group.

A little way east of Barnett Avenue, the railway 

bisects the cleared land of the post. Across the tracks 

lies the parade ground—a “flat” of sand and clay. 

One of its virtues is that it drains well. An hour or 

two after a rain, it is dry enough for drill. The artillery camp and a group of hospital buildings border 

the parade ground on the south, with a river making 

QUANTICO BARRACKS

by Second Lieutenant Charles Phelps Cushing, USMCR
34

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

a big shining semicircle behind them. The riverbank 

at the eastern edge of the drill grounds drops off 

rather steeply, but there is a sandy beach below for 

swimming parties and for the tables of the clothes 

scrubbers. In midsummer, swimming was part of 

the Quantico finishing school’s regular course, and 

it was not rare at the close of the afternoon drill 

period to see a thousand or more Marines splashing 

in the Potomac at once. All enlisted men who did 

not know how to swim were put through dry-land 

swimming drill—a “minnow school”—by a physical 

director from the YMCA.

On a choice site beside the parade [grounds] 

and overlooking the river is the old dancing pavilion, transformed now into an officers’ clubhouse. Its 

floor dimensions are 40 [feet] by 80 feet; it has two 

fireplaces, a smoking room for the men, a dressing 

room for the ladies, and a email kitchen to provide 

buffet luncheons.

Concerning a smaller clubhouse in the immediate neighborhood, the writer has no information 

beyond the authoritative statement that this is to be 

“a strictly stag affair.”

Potomac Avenue—the “main street” of oldtime Quantico and the “downtown section” of today—starts westward from the wharf, bounds the 

parade grounds on the north with restaurants, 

barber shops, a drug store, clothes pressing establishments, a bank, a military outfitting shop, some 

pool halls, and the two-story brick building [that] 

it headquarters for the post commandant and the 

assistant paymaster. Once, this was the only brick 

structure in town, but the prosperity of Quantico 

finally took away this cherished distinction.

After Potomac Avenue crosses the railway 

tracks, it mounts a wooded hill to a high crest, 

which in Civil War days was the site of a fort. Today, 

nothing remains of the old defenses but a half-filled 

trench and a dismantled cannon. The hill is capped 

now with a covered reservoir and a new 35-room 

brick hotel. A dozen bungalows dot the slopes close 

around. The Quantico Hotel puts on rather metropolitan airs, and boasts eight more bathrooms than 

the Commercial House of Tonganoxie, Kansas. The 

rates are metropolitan also—$90 to $95 a month for 

one person, American plan; $155 to $160 for two. 

Furthermore, you are warned to make your reservations as many months as possible in advance. The 

bungalows—five rooms, unfurnished—rent from 

$25 to $35 a month. Board at the hotel is $67.50 

a month.

The scarcity of quarters in Quantico has caused 

many officers to commute to Fredericksburg, 20 

miles south. A few have even been making daily excursions to Washington. The monthly commutation 

rate to Fredericksburg, on a card that permits the 

holder to make as many trips a day as he pleases, is 

$9. The rate to Washington commuters is $11.50 

for a coupon book containing 26 round-trip tickets. 

The train schedule for Quantico fits in well with the 

time of the drill periods.

Each junior officer is provided quarters in the 

row of barracks fronting Barnett Avenue—a room 

furnished with an iron bedstead and a mattress, a 

five-drawer dresser, a washstand, a table, a chair and 

a steel locker. In the center of each of these barracks 

is a larger room for a meeting place, provided with a 

table, chairs, a stove, and a telephone. [Behind] the 

barracks are washrooms with hot-water showers.

In the pioneer era of life in Quantico, six 

months ago, there were more reasons than there are 

at present for wishing to join the commuters. The 

early settlers in the cantonment can recall the days 

before the hotel was opened and before feminine 

society came to town, the days when there was only 

one brick building downtown, no paved streets, no 

bank, no drug store, no military clothes shop, no 

clean restaurants. We can look at the contrast now 

and marvel at the transformation.

The Quantico Marines do not hesitate nowadays to match their barracks in a prize contest 

against any other rush-order cantonment in the 

land. Though it is not so large as the Army’s new 

camps, it is a model of its kind. We have 350 buildings of various types and sizes; five miles of concrete 

paving; a water supply from five artesian wells; two 

auditoriums in which to provide entertainments, 

which are given every weekday evening; two clubhouses for officers; a highly efficient system of lights 

and telephones; a model range, well screened by 

trees from winter winds (48 rifle targets and 8 pistol 

targets), and a miniature battlefield, with trenches, 

emplacements, bombproofs [sic] and camouflage, 

all patterned after the latest fashions in France. As 
35

Readying for War

for our health record, the books on that are open 

too, and anyone who may have feared that this section of the Potomac valley would prove a pest hole 

of malaria will discover that the sanitary precautions kept malaria down to 0.016 of 1 percent.

All this has not been brought about without 

labor and sweat and skillful planning. The natural 

obstacles—forests and swamps—may have spurred 

the soldier citizens of Quantico to do a better job 

than they would have made of it if the task to face 

had been easy. This, just as in the case of larger cities—Chicago, for example—built better and bigger 

because of the stimulus of having to fight swamps, 

and a Kansas City or a Seattle recruit thrives on 

the job of leveling down the clay banks. No doubt 

a good many Marines took real satisfaction in peeling off their shirts and going out to battle with the 

stumps in their company streets.

That “bit of Flanders in Virginia”—Quantico’s 

miniature battlefield—is another piece of work, 

which costs a lot of arduous labor and which is all 

the more cherished accordingly. No imported engineer corps did the planning or the construction; 

Marines laid it out, dug it, revetted it, chopped 

down trees for the roofs of its bombproofs, and even 

put on the finishing touches of camouflage.

The students of the Officers’ Training School 

did their “bit” in trench digging, tree chopping, and 

the like. From their camp at the south edge of the 

cantonment, they trooped out two days a week to 

the battlefield and learned how to do by actually 

doing. This school is a story in itself, which may 

claim its just dues of space in The Gazette in a future issue. The present writer need do no more than 

record that the school set a high mark of efficiency 

in its first course of three months’ training. A large 

proportion of the graduates of the first Quantico 

camp were students who had had previous military 

training, and the pace these picked men set left 

some of the less fortunate of us gasping for breath 

at the finish.

Concerning the personnel and equipment of 

the artillery camp, this magazine, like the rest of the 

press in war time, is not privileged to speak without 

restrictions. It is permissible to say that the approximate population of the camp is a thousand men, 

and that these thousand established for themselves 

an enviable reputation for quickness to learn their 

trade and for soldierly smartness. The artillery camp 

has one of the choicest sites in the cantonment—

and has made the most of its advantages.

Down by the railway station is the big shed of 

the Quartermaster’s Department (500 [feet] by 60 

feet) and of the commissary (250 [feet] by 60 feet). 

In the same neighborhood is a garage for a fleet of 

35 motor trucks. Business is on a big scale in this 

big cantonment, but the machinery has run swiftly 

and smoothly throughout.

No other of Uncle Sam’s “outfits” can complain 

that the Quantico Marines have caused them a 

minute’s delay, for the “first to fight” have also been 

the first to stand by, ready for the signal to shove 

off. All things considered, the teamwork of this, the 

largest of Marine encampments, has been quite as 

good as that of smaller units, and that is saying a 

good deal.

The Quantico finishing school, training for 

duty overseas, rounded into its present state of efficiency with the minimum loss of time. While the 

forests were still being mowed down and only half 

of the barracks had mushroomed up in the clearing, the first fighting forces arrived and began to 

drill. As fast as quarters were ready, more companies 

poured in. While dynamiters blasted stumps out of 

the ground and the big guns at Indian Head roared 

and splattered shells up and down the Potomac, the 

Quantico Marines were perfecting themselves in 

close-order drill, were learning new tricks of trench 

warfare, practicing new bayonet strokes on dummies in the company streets, and acquiring skill in 

the art of hand-grenade throwing.

Graduating classes departed for service overseas; other classes from the recruit depots took their 

places. The artillery camp began to set up a competition of noises against the bombardments of Indian 

Head and Winthrop. Strange, new tractors, something like baby “tanks,” began to cavort around the 

cantonment; steam rollers, high-power trucks and 

ambulances, pop-pop motorcycles, and machine 

gun fusillades added to the din of many preparations to give a right royal welcome to certain representatives of the imperial German government.

We are all proud to have played a part in these 

preparations; and though Quantico is not yet a de-
36

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

light to the eye of a landscape architect, we are all 

a little proud of Quantico. For, above all, this city, 

hacked out of the forest, is distinctively ours—with 

the stamp of the Soldiers of the Sea upon it, a little 

more snug and shipshape and complete than anything else of the sort that we know about on this 

side of the Rocky Mountains.
37

Editor’s Note

This article is published because it gives an excellent description of the work performed in our principal training camp during the war, when the Parris Island depot 

was increased to many times its normal size.

In what I have to say, I would like you to remember 

that the one point that is foremost in my heart as 

the very necessary thing for the American people to 

do is to effectively put into practice a system of universal military training for all Americans. Against 

this proposition in the past has been raised the objection that, as a nation, we would be unwilling to 

give from one to three years of the productive life 

of our young manhood when anyone could see that 

our splendid isolation rendered an invasion unlikely. 

The message I bring to you is that, during the period of the war, the United States Marine Corps 

trained infantry soldiers whose performance was 

not excelled by the troops of any nation. They were 

equipped, outfitted, and trained in eight weeks, and 

often effectively in the trenches in four weeks more, 

and when I tell you the story of the work done at 

Parris Island [South Carolina] you will agree with 

me that the same system put into effect 100 percent 

in every section of this country would be of lasting 

benefit to the moral and physical well-being of our 

people, and an immense power in furthering the 

cause of right and justice in the world.

I landed in Parris Island on a midsummer day, 

with 250 boys from all points east of the Rocky 

Mountains, and this was the day’s intake of raw material. Overalls, boots or short-waisted coats, straw 

hats and canes, with coats and without coats, it was a 

conglomerate cross-section of the American continent. Volunteers, all of them, mostly under 21 [years 

of age], with a sprinkling of middle-aged businessmen; they travelled many days, many of them. 

“Snap out of your dope and fall in column of fours” 

was the word through a four-foot megaphone from 

the cheerleader as we approached the dock. For the 

next few days, the megaphone played a big part 

in handling the applicants, and for all the time of 

their training, from hit-the-deck in the morning to 

lights-out at night, and often in between, “Snap out 

of your dope” was the word they heard and readily 

learned to heed. Five minutes saw them on the road 

to the receiving barracks, which they reached about 

1930, to find a wash and hot supper awaiting them. 

Their numbers had been telegraphed ahead, and 

there was a place for every man. A suit of pajamas, a 

towel, soap, sheets and a blanket were issued immediately after supper and, in the process, they doffed 

civilian garb, and for the next few days looked like 

a Chinese crew in the white cotton drill of the issue 

garment. A bunk to sleep in was their introduction 

to reveille the next morning and, after chow and policing their quarters, they were introduced to [Edwin] Denby [later secretary of the Navy]. Daily at 

1000 seven days in the week and 12 months in the 

year, Denby, himself a war enlistment, as sergeant, 

lieutenant, and afterward major, delivered the goods 

for two hours in a most soul-stirring talk on snap, 

spirit, morale, and Americanism. Never twice alike, 

rarely repeating himself, always moving his hearers, 

Denby delivered the goods, and many a man was so 

moved by his sermon that afterward, as penitent, he 

told Denby, as father-confessor, such little items of 

his past life as he had neglected or failed to declare. 

These items ran all the way perhaps from a wife and 

family heretofore unmentioned, to such items as 

fines for speeding, which he thought should be on 

the record. To see the fire in this man as he stood 

talking to his Chinese-looking crew, with shaven 

heads and white pajamas, was indeed an inspiration. I heard him four times, and would like to have 

heard him many more. After which [came] the 

doctors. And the organization was wonderful. Each 

man was painted, chest and back, with iodine his 

own distinguishing number, so that no one passed 

his examination for him. In this semitropical climate, an abundance of clothes was not necessary, 

and outside, under a mulberry tree, this wholesale 

examination went forward. In columns of twos to 

the doctor with the stethoscope, with their heads 

PARRIS ISLAND IN THE WAR*

by Major W. R. Coyle, Member of Congress

* Speech delivered 11 April 1919.
38

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

turned right and left so as not to breathe on him, 

four to six taps, breathing as ordered, in time to the 

word of command given by the assistant, an average 

of 10 to the minute passed under his listening ear, 

and occasionally one was laid aside for further investigation, and as they marched away, another doctor 

watched them for length of leg and coordination of 

physique and build. Scars and distinguishing marks 

for future record were noted. Eyes, throat, ears and, 

most particularly, feet, every single item examined, recorded, passed on and inspected, and last, 

but not least, the iodine stamp which showed one 

more “leatherneck” accepted for his country’s cause. 

From noon to noon, the day’s intake was handled 

by the doctors, and occasionally one was rejected, 

and occasionally the signs, “If you don’t know, you 

get killed,” would scare off another one. Every man 

was impressed with the seriousness of the work, and 

the doctor’s organization worked 24 hours to the 

day, recording, classifying, and card-indexing. Three 

shifts in this and many other departments, so that 

the whole might steadily move, and at noon of the 

second day they were turned over to their sergeant, 

who commanded 66 of them, never tiring, and for 

eight weeks he [would] sleep with them—I was going to say swear at them—but that was rare. There 

was all too much swearing, but not by those in authority, and we were able to instill into fine young 

noncommissioned officers, most of them trained 

since the outbreak of the war, that spirit of the football field, which leaves the discipline to the coach 

and requires of the captain to give the signal to the 

team to jump as one man. As the sergeant took his 

men to the quartermaster’s storehouse, the likeness of the place to a Ford factory was more apparent. As the white-clad or unclad men walked into 

the issue room, experienced hands would call out 

to the workers up aloft among the shelves, “Shirt 

two, short; trousers one, long.” A blanket placed on 

the counter had fired at it underclothes and socks, 

and as it was pushed along the slippery top, the applicant donned his nether garments as he moved 

forward, trousers and shirt followed to the counter, 

and even the shoes he put on hopping on one foot 

to keep up with the crowd. A hat landed on top 

of his head, and cap followed of the same size, at 

which point an inspector, and for the shoes a doctor, 

went over the man and his garments, and as they 

came in at one end raw material, they came out the 

other veritable khaki-colored Fords. Every day for 

the period of the war, a full complement of clothes, 

rifles, equipment and cleaning gear, even to bathing suits, razors, and blanco,* most difficult of all to 

obtain, was available to every man who reported for 

training at the Marine Corps station. On the second day, always equipped, he was ready to start for 

my camp. His clothes marked with name and company, and packed in his canvas sea bag, went ahead 

by motor track, and about 1900 every evening, six 

miles over the road, they marched to the lower end 

of the island, where I played the same part toward 

the Marine Corps that the parochial school plays 

toward the catholic church. I got them while they 

were young and molded their future.

At the entrance to the maneuver grounds, the 

officer commanding the battalion received his billeting schedule, his assignment to mess hall, and 

drill schedule for the following day, and the evening 

gave them an opportunity to get settled in tents and 

dispose their new-found possessions, in general, according to rule, but in particular according to the 

definite requirements of each battalion commander. 

Two days later, an inspection of 200 tents in the 

battalion streets would fail to disclose any lack of 

uniformity or precision. Of course, this depended 

on the officer in charge of the battalion, and we endeavored to eliminate at this point the careless or 

heartless officer. That evening for five minutes, their 

battalion commander or camp commander addressed them for a few moments, generally on the 

necessity of writing a letter home. They were also 

advised that the camp was run, as far as possible, according to traffic signs, that we endeavored to avoid 

arbitrary rules, and we covered the camp with signs 

to “Seek the tidy tin.” We found it got better results 

with the men we had than issuing voluminous orders and attaching various fines and penalties. This 

was the last admonition on the schedule for eight 

weeks except for their contact with their own officers and noncoms. On the morning of the fourth 

day started the daily routine of instruction. At 0730 

in the morning, breakfast and camp police being 

over, they began the facings, marchings, and school 

* Boot polish.
39

Readying for War

of the soldier. Physical exercise, swimming, and personal combat, scrubbing clothes, and kitchen police. 

For three weeks, we had them at this camp and, as 

I watched one day, 5,000 pass in review at sunset 

parade, it was difficult to believe that none of them 

had served [more than] four weeks, and many of 

them only two. At every point, they were handled 

by expert coaches, and everywhere the spirit of the 

football field was the spirit that maintained. In 

these three weeks, they acquired most remarkable 

precision in close order drill and snap I have seen at 

no other point in the manual of arms. They learned 

assurance with their bayonet. They learned to scale 

a 9-foot wall and climb a 30-foot rope. Ninety-five 

percent learned to swim, and all learned to keep 

themselves clean, and between times had the typhoid inoculation and conned their Morse’s Manual [Morse code], and as they marched away at the 

end of three weeks to the training camp, the station 

band at the head of the column, frequently at the 

close of an evening parade, and always singing, “We 

are coming over,” it made one feel that the inspiration that led them into this service would surely 

tell on the battlefield. In the next two weeks at the 

training camp, they perfected their drills, learned 

interior guard and extended order, something of 

boxing and wrestling, and always five weeks from 

their arrival saw them at 0600 in the morning on 

the rifle range, the recruit battalion, ready to begin the serious work of an infantry soldier. Daily, 

2,400 men, for seven hours, in two shifts, worked 

at the 66 targets, as recruits, juniors and seniors, 

their schedule was laid out and planned. Specialists 

handled them in the early stages and modifications 

of sighting and position drill that again marked a 

considerable advance, and in their last two weeks in 

working with service charge, always with the same 

coach, and each man with his own coach, they studied and mastered the problem. For the period of the 

war, 1,200 men per week at 66 targets, 89 percent 

qualified, an unparalleled record in any Service in 

the world, and the quiet major who ran this camp 

played his part in winning the war. The rifle coaches, 

some 300 of them, all expert shots, would make any 

organization or any city a leader. Windage, sightsetting, the art of blackening the sights, and always 

holding on the target and correcting the sights to 

reach it were points thoroughly covered. The results 

that these coaches accomplished should go to their 

everlasting credit, and this organization was built 

up largely after our entry into the war.

I saw the process of taking these men from 

among the experts of the week before, and the officer charged with responsibility had always to vary 

his tactics. He described shipboard and Navy Yard 

West Indies, South America, recruiting duty and 

officers’ training camp, painting a glowing picture 

of the pleasures of each, and asked for volunteers 

for each in turn, and after a small group had fallen 

for several or all of these details, he turned almost 

as though it were inadvertently to those who were 

left, and said, “And what do you men want to do?” 

Taken off their guard, the answer was almost unanimous, “We want to go to France,” and from those 

men they picked the rifle coaches, because only the 

man who wanted to go to France was effective for 

training others to go.

To the countless hundreds, high adventurers 

for God and country, who in their own minds have 

missed the glory that comes only of battle service, 

this record and tribute is offered. Their esprit and 

patriotism was expressed on that false armistice day, 

when the only shouts and cheers at Parris Island 

came by phone from Charleston; a sergeant of 20 

summers and two of them on Parris Island said to 

me, “As long as I live, I’ll never live down the fact 

that I did not get to go to France. But I’m glad it’s 

over for the boys over there,” and to him and to you 

few thousand others my answer was and is, “You 

offered your life on your country’s altar when you 

joined the Marines. If, as coach or company commander, the full sacrifice was not required, you yet 

will live and die inspired by the same high motives 

which took you into the Marines, and even as those 

who died on ‘far-flung battle line,’ you will live and 

die for America, Semper Fidelis.”

OVER THERE

43

The object of this article is to present to the 

readers of the Gazette in simple terms some 

of the difficulties experienced by machine 

gun companies of the 4th Brigade, U.S. Marine 

Corps, operating with the 2d Division in France, 

and to touch briefly some of the many questions 

arising about the proper method of training, equipping, and using machine guns in the field. It is desired to avoid all technical terms and discussions. 

For those who wish to go fully into the subject of 

machine gun work, there are complete pamphlets 

covering machine gunnery in all its phases, which 

can be obtained and studied.*

In general, machine gun subjects may be divided into two classes: (a) tactical employment of 

guns, and (b) organization and direction of fire. The 

principles of (b) are true regardless of what guns 

are used, while (a) differs with all the conditions 

[that] may normally change tactical situations and 

is a complete study in itself. A knowledge of it is 

necessary for the higher commander while it is not 

necessary for him to know the functioning of guns 

or how to organize or direct their fire from a technical standpoint.

In view of the fact that there is a general misunderstanding throughout the Service of the difference between automatic weapons and machine 

guns, it might be well at the start of this article to 

point out the difference and to give definitions for 

each arm, which will apply to all references used 

herein.

An automatic rifle is a light hand arm capable 

of sustaining automatic fire, air cooled, without a 

tripod mount, usually fed from a magazine, and carried by the infantry soldier himself.

* Army War College, Machine-Gun Drill Regulations (Provisional), 1917; War Department, Provisional Machine-Gun

Firing Manual, 1917; War Department, Supplement to Machine-Gun Drill Regulations (Provisional), 1917, and Provisional 

Machine-Gun Firing Manual, 1917; U.S. Army, Handbook on 

Fire Control Instruments for Machine Guns, 1918; machine gun 

manuals for all the various types of guns; confidential notes issued on machine guns from time to time during the war by the 

Army War College.

The machine gun is a relatively heavier weapon, 

water cooled to make it capable of prolonged fire at 

high rates, mounted on a suitable tripod to make 

it capable of being used for direct and indirect fire, 

usually fed from a belt, having a crew of from three 

to nine men, and on account of its weight being carried on some form of wheel transportation.

Thus the light Browning is a Browning Automatic Rifle and the heavy Browning is a Browning Machine Gun. While the fire of the automatic 

rifle and machine gun is infantry fire and similar 

in many respects, the functions of these two arms 

are widely dissimilar and it is not the intention to 

discuss the automatic rifle.

When the 5th Regiment went to France, one 

machine gun company was a part of the organization of each infantry battalion. This organization 

was changed later and the machine guns of the 

4th Brigade were: a four-company battalion coming immediately under the command of the brigade 

commander, and a regimental company to each of 

the infantry regiments. The battalion commander 

of the Machine Gun Battalion was in addition, the 

brigade machine gun officer, and as such was the 

tactical adviser of the brigade commander in all machine gun matters, being on his staff for this purpose. (G. O. No. 82, Hdq. AEF, 28 December 1917, 

Par. 3) He, however, had only the administration of 

his own battalion and, while he could recommend a 

course of training to be followed by the regimental 

companies, the actual training of these companies 

was the responsibility of the regimental commanders unless the brigade commander saw fit to place 

it in the hands of the commanding officer of the 

Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. This method of 

instruction and training for special units, such as 

machine guns, was carried out sometimes in the 

2d Division. Prior to the Saint-Mihiel drive, all 14 

machine gun companies of the division were assembled at one camp and placed for instruction under 

the command of the division machine gun officer.

In the line, while fighting was in progress, the 

machine gun companies [that] were attached to the 

MACHINE GUNS OF THE 4TH BRIGADE

by Major Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller Jr., USMC
44

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

infantry battalions came under the tactical control 

of the infantry battalion commander, while administratively they remained as before. The machine 

gun commanders of companies so detailed to infantry battalions thus became the tactical advisers 

on machine gun matters of the battalion commanders of infantry.

Where machine guns were used in batteries 

or groups, these batteries came under the battery 

commanders: officers detailed for this work, and 

operating directly under orders from the brigade or 

division machine gun officer. In this way, the actual 

tactical command of the regimental machine gun 

companies might come under the command of the 

battalion commander of the brigade machine gun 

battalion. In an attack, the guns may start in batteries in putting down barrage fire, but in the final 

assault some at least accompany the infantry and 

assist in consolidating the position gained. These 

guns may or may not be with the advance wave of 

infantry, but they are under command of the infantry battalion commander, and the captain of the 

machine gun company should be with or in close 

liaison with the infantry battalion commander.

The duties of the battalion commander of a 

machine gun battalion, when he has lost the tactical control of his guns, are to coordinate all the 

machine guns on the brigade front; seeing that the 

fire of guns overlap on the flanks of the battalions; 

“hooking up” his line with adjoining troops; assuring ammunition supply; changing, with the infantry 

battalion commander’s knowledge, any guns [that] 

have been badly placed; keeping headquarters informed of the positions of guns and similar duties.

The 6th Machine Gun Battalion was organized 

in the United States in August 1917, and consisted 

of the 77th and 81st Companies. In January 1918, 

after arrival in France, the 15th and 23d Companies were attached. These last two companies had 

left the United States as machine gun companies, 

but [were] assigned to the infantry battalions of 

the 5th Regiment. On reorganization, they were 

placed in the 6th Machine Gun Battalion while the 

8th Company was held in the 5th Regiment as its 

machine gun company, and the 73d Company was 

the regimental company of the 6th Marines. This 

completed the machine gun organization of the 

4th Brigade. The 7th Company had left the United 

States as a machine gun company, but was held at 

Chaumont [France] on special duty until October 

1918, when the company was broken up and the 

men used as replacements for other machine gun 

companies of the 4th Brigade.

The Marine machine gun companies went to 

France armed with the Lewis Automatic Rifle fitted with a tripod and carried on the “Cole” carts. 

This equipment did not fit in with the Army plans 

and the Lewis guns were turned over to the Army 

for use by their forces, being replaced by the standard French Hotchkiss equipment, the Hotchkiss 

being a heavy gun and having all the attributes of 

a machine gun except one—the fact that it was air 

cooled. At first, the Hotchkiss did not meet with 

favor, but as time wore on it was seen that it was 

an excellent weapon, thoroughly dependable, of 

greater range than the Lewis, easier to conceal, but 

harder to carry when necessity required the moving 

of guns by hand. Its big fault was the fact of its being air cooled, which on prolonged barrage fire cut 

down its rate of speed to approximately 25 rounds 

a minute. A slightly greater rate can be maintained, 

but the heat causes the barrels to get cherry red and 

makes the handling extremely difficult.

On the reorganization of the 4th Brigade along 

the lines decided upon by General Headquarters 

AEF, all units went in training and the machine 

gunners perfected themselves in the various kinds 

of fire, signals, etc. During this training, they were 

handicapped by lack of fire control instruments and 

were forced to improvise. This really turned out to 

be a blessing in disguise, as it taught the men more 

of the theory of fire than they would have had had 

they all of the latest equipment. It may be noted 

here that the fire control equipment taken to France 

with the Lewis guns was largely improvised; that 

used with the Hotchkiss was much better and was 

capable of being used for very accurate work. The final fire control outfit issued with the Browning was 

excellent in design and quality but short in quantity.

In March, the division moved to the trenches 

near Verdun and here the brigade received its first 

real fighting, and while this sector, an old organized 

trench sector, was at that time considered a very quiet one, it was an excellent way to break in the units 

to actual fighting conditions. Here the machine gun 

companies were assigned as follows: 15th Company 
45

Over There

with 3d Battalion, 6th Marines; 23d Company with 

the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines; 77th Company with 

3d Battalion, 5th Marines; 81st Company with 2d 

Battalion, 6th Marines; 8th Company with 1st Battalion, 5th Marines; [and] 73d Company with 1st 

Battalion, 6th Marines. In all operations hereafter 

in which it became necessary to assign machine gun 

companies to infantry battalions, these companies 

always went with the same battalions, except at Belleau Woods and at Soissons, as will be explained 

later. The wisdom of keeping the same machine gun 

company with the same infantry battalion is apparent. The officers and men know each other and have 

confidence in each other’s ability. This reduces the 

amount of orders and instructions necessary upon 

the joining of a new company. As frequently attack 

orders are received a very short time before the actual attack is made, it is of great assistance to the 

infantry battalion commander to know that he has 

a machine gun company commander who thoroughly understands what his ideas are and what is 

expected of him, without having to be told in minute instructions.

In this trench work, the machine gunners 

learned much, although no drills and instructions 

were held. Emplacements were built under camouflage, and experience was gained in securing protection against observation by enemy avions, caring 

for animals and equipment under the most adverse 

conditions, supplying ammunition, the rationing of 

companies, etc. At first, the units went into the line 

with French officers, the French troops being held 

in support. However, the Boche attack of March 

1918, having gained so much headway, it became 

necessary for the French to remove as many of their 

troops as possible, and in consequence the lines of 

the 4th Brigade were greatly extended and the units 

given full control of their sectors.

At first, an attempt was made to have each machine gun company cook its own rations, but this 

was soon found to be a mistake. The gun positions 

were so far apart that the men carrying the rations 

were exhausted by the long trips through the mud 

of the trenches. As the system of defense was a series of strong points and the machine guns were 

always with the infantry, the method of having 

the machine guns rationed with the infantry was 

worked out. Rations would be turned over to the infantry companies at the dump; this company would 

then ration certain of the machine gun positions 

with certain of its own platoons; in other places, the 

machine gun companies would furnish the cooks 

and ration the infantry. It was not unusual for machine gun companies to have three or four different 

galleys and yet have many of its men rationing with 

other companies. The supply échelon of each machine gun company was in the rear and was charged 

with getting up the rations, which was always done 

at night under the supervision of a company train 

officer. This officer was also charged with the care of 

all animals, equipment, and the maintenance of the 

ammunition supply in case of attack. His post was 

at the station of the supply échelon and, needless to 

say, the company train officer, or supply officer as he 

is sometimes called, acting as he does under general 

instructions only, must be a reliable man of quick 

judgment, possessed of abundant initiative, cool 

and courageous. While the position of train officer 

is not a popular one, one of the best lieutenants of 

the company should be placed on this detail. This is 

one of the many things learned at this time.

Here also were learned many tricks of the machine gun trade, which up to this time had not been 

found in textbooks; how to establish mechanical 

means of covering certain areas with fire at night; 

safety precautions to keep from shooting into our 

own patrols or working parties; how to furnish sentry and ration details and still get the maximum 

amount of rest; liaison, a subject which up to this 

time we had not really understood, and one which 

is a complete study in itself; and best of all, how to 

give general directions to platoon and section commanders and to trust to them for the execution of 

the details to carry these out. Probably the most 

valuable item of all those learned in this sector was 

the self-reliance acquired by platoon and section 

commanders, which taught them to rely on their 

own judgment and gave them confidence in their 

own ability to handle their own units under any 

conditions that might arise. This initiative and selfconfidence, coupled with strict discipline, are essentials of the best efficiency of machine guns, and are 

well illustrated in the making of a smooth relief.

In order to make a relief at night, it is necessary that the arrangements be made carefully and 

carried out with clock-like precision. The incom-
46

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

ing company has only to get in place by daylight, 

but the outgoing company must be clear of enemy 

aerial observation by this time. In order to accomplish this, the relief usually starts as soon after dark 

as possible, guides meet incoming sections at previously designated places and conduct them to the 

gun positions [that] had been reconnoitered the day 

before by platoon commanders, and if possible section chiefs. This necessitates the breaking up of the 

relieving company shortly after it starts its march 

toward the front, with a consequent loss of control 

on the part of the company commander. In the case 

of machine guns, where sometimes single guns are 

widely scattered, it can be very readily seen that the 

noncommissioned personnel must be thoroughly 

competent to take charge in emergencies. The company commander, on the breaking up of his company, goes direct to the PC of the old company and 

there takes over the defense plans, orders, trench 

stores, etc. Each section or platoon goes to its designated place and its chief takes over from the old 

chief. When the new chief is satisfied, both chiefs 

make a written report to their respective company 

commanders that the relief is complete. The old 

runner then takes the new runner to report to the 

PC of the company commander, showing him the 

route. One or more noncommissioned officers are 

left with the new section or platoon and the old section or platoon marches out, going to a previously 

appointed rendezvous. As the last section reports 

the relief complete, the two company commanders report to the infantry battalion commander 

and an officer is left with the new company commander for 24 hours, or until such time as relieved 

by him. The old company commander then collects 

his details and leaves to rejoin his company, which 

may not be assembled until it is miles behind the 

line, depending on the probability of artillery fire 

and observation. At first, an attempt was made to 

collect these companies together and march them 

to their new billets, which was discovered to be a 

mistake, as it kept the tired men of the first sections relieved waiting on the road for many hours. 

There is no advantage in forming a company prior 

to their arrival in billets, and to do so really only 

exposes it to the possibility of being shelled. There is 

a tendency on the part of machine gunners to avoid 

the fatiguing work of carrying heavy guns by hand, 

particularly through winding trenches deep in mud, 

and to avoid this an attempt is frequently made to 

exchange guns with the incoming company, the old 

company leaving its guns in position and picking 

up the guns of the new company at the point where 

the gun carts are farthest advanced. This is a mistake and should not be allowed, as each company 

is taking its material, sight unseen, and each may 

be called upon, prior to an opportunity for a careful 

examination, to resist an attack. There is also a tendency to neglect the care of guns, when it is known 

that these guns will be turned over in a few days to 

someone else.

Where a company is marching assembled on 

roads liable to shellfire, a 50- or 75-yard interval is 

left between sections or platoons. On dark nights, 

this places the sections out of sight of each other, 

and guides must be left at all turns; strictest march 

discipline is necessary; noises or lights are forbidden. It is very difficult to prevent men from surreptitiously smoking on a long night march; however, if 

they have once been shelled or bombed for this reason, additional instructions are usually unnecessary.

If the enemy suspects a relief is to be made, he 

will shell the roads and approaches with a resultant 

large casualty list. The night of a relief, no one gets 

any sleep. The train comes forward to get the guns 

and material [that] are being brought out, that part 

of it which belongs to each section being taken to 

the point most accessible. The kitchens and cook 

force are kept in readiness and an estimate made 

of the time of arrival of the first sections, when a 

hot meal should be in readiness. Upon receiving 

this meal, all men are turned in for rest and sleep, 

the mule drivers feeding their animals first. About 

noon the day following the relief, all equipment is 

completely overhauled and made ready for immediate action. Lists of missing parts, breakages, [and] 

damaged equipment are submitted to the supply officer who takes the necessary steps to replace them. 

All this became second nature and the only instructions necessary were the time of relief and where 

the guides were to meet. All else was done as a matter of course.

In the middle of May, the 2d Division was relieved from the trenches and went to the rear for 

rest. The last of May, hurry up orders came to move 

to the front, and on 31 May, it embussed the ma-
47

Over There

chine gun companies taking their guns and as much 

ammunition as could be handled, all gun carts reporting to the supply or train officers and moving 

together as a battalion train or regimental train, or 

as part of the regimental train for the carts of the 

regimental machine gun companies. Travelling by 

camion is hard on machine gunners, as it means 

that all movement on debussing must be made by 

hand, [with] the weight of guns, tripods, ammunition, etc., quickly tiring the men out, so that when 

they should be really fresh they are usually nearly 

exhausted. This fact soon became very patent to machine gunners, but was a feature [that] apparently 

did not enter into staff consideration until we had 

had much more experience; for this reason also, machine gunners should be armed with pistols only, as 

the carrying of rifles is a great mistake [that] results 

in a consequent diminution of ammunition supply. The French machine gun regulations prescribe

that the packs of machine gunners shall be carried 

on the gun carts in order that the men may arrive at 

the last stage of the advance as fresh as possible. In 

practice, it is necessary under almost all conditions 

to carry guns and ammunition some distance by 

hand in order to avoid observation and to save men 

and animals. On arriving at Montreuil-aux-Lions, 

orders were received as to where the line was to be 

formed to stop the German advance toward the 

Paris-Metz road. The machine guns were formed 

into groups, the 15th and 23d Companies forming 

the left group and the 77th and 81st forming the 

right group. These groups were further subdivided 

into batteries. Both groups were connected to battalion PC by telephone and operated entirely under 

the command of the machine gun battalion commander, the regimental companies remaining with 

the regiments. At the time of the formation of these 

groups, the French had not fallen back to this line, 

so the establishment of the groups was a simple 

matter. This group formation did not take into consideration the possible later use of machine guns 

with the infantry battalions, and therefore when the 

group system was broken up by the necessities of 

the tactical situation, machine gun companies were 

not with the infantry battalions to which they belonged. The group system remained in force until 

after the first attack of the Germans, when the right 

group particularly did terrific execution; however, 

gaps in our line were filled, infantry moved forward 

to get better positions, attacks by parts of our line 

caused a breaking up of the group system and soon 

companies became intermingled. On 6 June, [First] 

Lieutenant [ Jack S.] Hart of the 81st Company 

had with him in the attack on Bouresches and in 

the consolidation of Bouresches after its capture, 

two guns of the 81st Company, four guns of the 73d 

Company, and four guns of the 77th Company. This 

intermingling caused much confusion in the supply 

of rations, ammunition, etc., as well as throwing officers and gun crews together who were not known 

to each other. Had the group system originally been 

smaller and had we been more experienced, the 

problem of keeping companies together would not 

have been so difficult. Under the circumstances, it 

was impossible to keep these machine gun companies with their proper infantry battalions, the companies themselves not even being kept intact. This 

taught us the principle of small groups and unity of 

command and the lesson was well learned at this 

time. Only once after this were companies intermingled and then it was done in verbal orders a few 

minutes before an attack when no other disposition 

was apparently possible.

Liaison between these groups of machine 

guns and infantry was poor at times, the infantry 

frequently not knowing where the machine guns 

were—a dangerous practice. It is essential that the 

infantry commanders know where the machine 

guns are at all times and equally essential that the 

machine guns know the infantry dispositions in order to properly support them with fire. This lack of 

liaison was due largely to an attempt to keep the 

tactical command of all machine guns under the 

battalion commander of the machine gun battalion 

and to lack of a proper understanding of the principles of liaison. Later on in the war, this practice 

might have been possible, but at this time the art 

of liaison was not sufficiently developed to make it 

possible, and it is doubtful whether under the best 

conditions this system can be carried to as efficient 

results as that of giving the tactical command of the 

machine guns to each battalion commander. The 

reason for this is evident when it is remembered 

that each regiment has only its own front to keep 

liaison with, and for this purpose has a regimental 

headquarters group. Should both regiments of the 
48

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

brigade be in line, the machine gun battalion would 

then have to keep liaison with the whole of the brigade front, or double the front of a regiment, and its 

facilities are less than those of one regiment. Then 

again, the infantry battalion commander is entirely 

responsible for the sector occupied by his battalion 

and it is only reasonable that he should have complete control over all infantry weapons occupying 

that sector or which by their fire aid in its defense. 

Again we find a very valuable lesson was learned—

one which stood us in good stead later—we saw the 

lack of harmony and cooperation in our units [that] 

was due to this poor liaison and bad teamwork and 

a desire on the part of the machine gunners to make 

a separate arm out of their weapon. We had had 

our lesson, and thereafter the infantry and machine 

guns worked smoothly like a beautifully tuned motor, each depending on the other to do his own job 

and letting the other alone in its execution.

This and other observations of a similar nature 

are not intended in the light of criticism but are 

merely a statement of facts as they occurred. It must 

be remembered that machine gun companies were 

more or less of a new departure for Marines and, 

while we had had them before, never had they been 

used in the manner developed in this war. In addition, principles [that] were acknowledged to be 

correct were daily being changed to meet new conditions and new developments in the art of warfare. 

We may consider that we were fortunate in making these errors early in the game, recognizing them 

when made, and correcting them immediately.

The operations around Belleau Woods were 

particularly hard on the machine gunners; the infantry battalions were in line for several days at a 

time and then would come out for a rest of a few 

days. The machine gunners, as above explained, not 

being at this time attached to any infantry battalion, 

remained in the line; two companies were constantly on the front for 22 days, and on being relieved 

were absolutely exhausted.

About 5 July, the machine guns were relieved 

by the guns of the 26th Division and went back to 

the reserve lines where they rested by constructing 

machine gun emplacements on the “Army Line,” as 

the support trenches then under construction were 

called. Here they were held until after the July drive 

of the Boche had been stopped, when orders suddenly came to embuss on camions. The 6th Machine 

Gun Battalion started to march on the afternoon 

of 16 July and, after a hike of about 16 kilometers, 

halted and waited for camions, the train forming 

and starting the march for the new area under the 

battalion supply officer, the regimental machine gun 

companies moving with their regiments. At about 

0400, the battalion embussed and continued on the 

road until about 1500 the following day, when it 

debussed not far from Taillefontaine. Here orders 

were received from a French regulating officer to 

go into camp in a certain spot in Villers-Cotterêts 

woods. This necessitated a march of several kilometers, the already tired men carrying the guns and 

ammunition by hand. In this movement, the battalion carried more ammunition than usual (under instructions) and several trips had to be made before 

all ammunition was gotten into camp. Just before 

dark, orders were received to attack at 0435 [on] 18 

July, the following morning. After some delay, liaison was made with the 5th Regiment (which was 

the assaulting regiment), plans for the attack were 

received, and the battalion put in march as early as 

possible, about 2230 after a short consultation with 

the company commanders. This march through the 

woods was the worst the battalion ever experienced. 

The roads were packed with men and transport; going was slow; it was raining; and the men had had 

practically no rest since 1700 the day before.

The 5th Regiment made the attack on time, the 

machine guns failing to get to the jump-off trench 

by H-hour, but joining the 5th Regiment on its 

break from the woods. This lateness in joining was 

in no way detrimental to the attack, as the first part 

was made through thick forest where automatic fire 

was really the function of automatic rifles and not 

machine guns, and very little could have seen done. 

Consolidation of the first objective was made about 

1500 on 18 July, which necessitated the scattering 

of all machine gun units. At about this time, orders 

were received to attack with the 3d Brigade at 1700. 

All companies were called in and the attack made. 

Upon reaching the objective, the guns were placed 

in the reserve. At daylight on 19 July, orders were 

received to attack at 0800 with the 4th Brigade, 

which was done, two companies attacking and two 

in support. These orders to attack were received at 

the last minute, so that verbal instructions were still 
49

Over There

being given to unit commanders at about 0754, 15 

minutes before the attack was to take place. One 

machine gun company was immediately available 

and was assigned to cover the entire front, this being the only other incident already referred to in 

which the machine gun companies did not operate 

with the infantry battalions to which assigned, and 

in this case the assaulting battalion of the 6th Regiment was that to which the scattered machine gun 

company belonged. Reinforcements had to be sent 

up from time to time owing to extremely heavy casualties, until practically the entire battalion was in 

line or in close support. Thus the original company 

was widely scattered. However, all other companies 

were kept well intact. No attempt was made to get 

up rations to the front line companies on 19 July, 

owing to gas and extremely heavy shellfire, machine 

gunners rationing at this time from emergency rations carried by the men themselves. At dark on 19 

July, orders were received for a relief by the French, 

which was finally effected about 0200, [with] the 

companies marching out to Bois de Retz where 

they bivouaced about daylight [on] 20 July.

On the night of 18 July, the battalion got some 

rest. Except [for] this brief period, they had been on 

the move under trying conditions from 16 July at 

1700 until 20 July at about 0700.

During this time, the 6th Machine Gun Battalion had lost 97 men, killed and wounded, all of 

whom were casualties of 19 July. The advance on the 

eighteenth had been very rapid against a surprised 

enemy who gave little resistance. This was the start 

of the Allies’ offensive, which terminated with the 

Armistice.

The entire attack had been secretly and swiftly 

done. It was not known until almost dark on 17 July 

that the attack was to be made; maps were few; no 

one knew much about the plans; and considering 

these facts the execution of the attack was smooth. 

All caissons, gun carts, and rolling kitchens had 

been left far to the rear and neither the battalion 

supply officer nor the battalion commander had any 

knowledge of where they were going. On arrival, 

the battalion supply officer had to find the battalion in all the masses of thousands and thousands 

of men [that] were banked in the woods; to locate 

the position of the companies on the line; locate 

the ration dumps, ammunition dumps, etc.; place 

the battalion train in the best position possible for 

supplying the battalion; and to communicate with 

the battalion commander for instructions. The train 

officer through a representative reported his position and arrival before noon on 19 July, giving the 

precise location of all company kitchens, ammunition, caissons, etc., and being prepared at that time 

to immediately get up a hot meal in the event of 

necessity. One company being in support at that 

time was furnished with a hot meal—none of the 

others got it.

Platoon and company commanders had difficulty in reporting the position of their guns due to 

lack of maps; PCs were hard to find due to rapid 

movement and lack of maps; runners had to display 

the greatest amount of ingenuity; telephone lines 

were not run and could probably not have been 

maintained in the heavy shellfire of 19 July. Hot 

food was ordered prepared, the kitchens to meet the 

companies on relief; however, low flying aeroplanes 

bombed the kitchens, puncturing the coffee boilers 

of one of them, and the train was ordered to the rear 

by some officer unknown. As a result, the battalion 

got no food until late in the day. It is absolutely essential that someone in authority be with the train 

in order to prevent such occurrences as this. This 

bombing and machine gunning of the kitchens and 

trains by low flying aeroplanes caused us to put antiavion brackets on many of the caissons. The spare 

guns of each company were carried on the caissons 

and whenever there was a prospect of encountering low-flying German planes, guns were mounted 

on these antiavion brackets and tracer and armorpiercing ammunition carried available for immediate use. Had we had this disposition during the 

Soissons drive, we might have accounted for several 

Boche planes, provided, of course, the four mules 

hitched to the caissons felt so disposed. It is probable that one of the support companies brought 

down an enemy aeroplane while he was machine 

gunning our front line, as he was being fired on by 

many guns and came down in no man’s land.

Upon coming out of the fighting in Soissons, 

the 2d Division shortly found its way to billets in 

rear of Nancy where the 4th Brigade remained until 

the night of 5–6 August, when the first of the units 

relieved the French in the Marbache sector, Pontà-Mousson. This, like the trench sector near Ver-
50

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

dun, was a quiet sector and was looked upon in the 

nature of a rest. Here the machine guns went into 

old established gun positions, many of them being 

concrete pill boxes or reinforced concrete positions 

in the cellars of houses in which the gun crews lived 

in comfort with even electric lights. Those guns fortunate enough to be thus placed had no trouble in 

maintaining their galleys at or nearly at the gun positions themselves. Rations were easy to get up and 

the work light. Some guns were not so fortunately 

situated, but even the worst positions were better 

than the average positions at Verdun.

The only activities in this sector were two attempted trench raids by the Germans, both of which 

failed—one on the night of 7 August, which was 

accompanied by heavy artillery preparation, resulting in the wounding of two men of the 23d Company, the only casualties sustained by the machine 

guns in this sector. The system of defense here was 

a series of strong points, two or more guns being in 

every strong point with about a platoon of infantry. 

On the first raid, the guns of one strong point with 

one each from adjacent strong points opened fire to 

protect the wire and fired for about one hour and 

12 minutes, the raid being repulsed with heavy loss 

to the Germans. This raid was discovered before it 

really started, the Boche having a premature explosion among their pioneers while attempting to blow 

up the wire, in addition to being discovered by our 

patrols in no man’s land while they were on the way 

over. This gave their position away exactly and that 

fact alone insured the failure of the raid. The second raid was attempted the following night against 

the positions along the canal, the machine guns of 

which were those of the 81st Company. This raid 

got in close enough for the Boche to throw their 

hand grenades across the canal into the infantry 

positions, but they were unable to take prisoners, 

although it is probable that some of the raiding 

party got into the positions themselves. The fact 

that the Boche were able to get so close and have 

no guns bear on them developed a faulty disposition of guns [that] was immediately changed. The 

81st Company had relieved the French only on the 

night of 7 August and had taken over the French 

gun positions, therefore, had been in less than 24 

hours when the raid occurred. Trench raiding was 

given up by the Germans after these two unsuccessful attempts.

On 18 August, the division was again relieved 

and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion with the regimental companies of the 5th and 6th Regiments 

marched to Camp Bois de l’Évêque, where they 

remained until 3 September, overhauling material, 

and training personnel under the charge of the division machine gun officer. Officers and noncommissioned officers went to school and worked out 

the organization and direction of fire on the range; 

group and battery work was drilled and the machine 

gun units brought up in efficiency. This training period was much needed, as many of the replacements 

did not know machine gunnery, and while they had 

picked up much, there was still much to learn. The 

older well-trained men had become rusty, and in 

general the efficiency of machine guns was at about 

its lowest ebb in spite of the fact that we had been 

continually fighting since June. Our experiences 

had taught us that continual actual fighting with 

practically no drills and schooling does not tend 

to keep the units up to a high state of efficiency. 

Due to casualties and sickness, changes are made 

so fast that sometimes it is almost impossible for a 

battalion commander to keep up with the officers 

of his battalion. Especially in some technical units 

like machine guns is it necessary to hold school and 

drills to keep the personnel up to their mark. The 

private of one day is the sergeant of the next, while 

today’s sergeant is tomorrow’s lieutenant. Gun corporals are potential platoon commanders and must 

know how to read maps, make out barrage charts, 

work out all classes of indirect fire, and in general 

understand how to handle guns tactically to the 

best advantage of the infantry, and to give the infantry maximum fire protection without having to 

call on them for assistance. While this and much 

more [is] necessary to [create the] best, efficiency 

can be taught the average corporal, he cannot very 

well learn it for himself with the limited facilities 

available at the front, unless some form of schooling and drill is used. On the other hand, it is much 

easier to teach the average man at the front than it 

is to teach the average man in barracks in time of 

peace; he knows the reasons for things and besides 

has a consuming interest in being able to inflict his 
51

Over There

will on the enemy and to prevent the enemy from 

inflicting his on him.

During our stay at Camp Bois de l’Évêque, 

we had field maneuvers in the American style of 

fighting in the open. Soon it became evident from 

this and from rumors and preparations daily being 

made that we were about to go in for a fight. Men 

returning from hospitals told us of the talk in the 

SOS [Services of Supply] of the big drive on the 

Saint-Mihiel salient and in other places.

On 3 September, the brigade started moving, 

continuing by night marches, billeting in the woods 

during the day until 8 September when all were in 

rear of the lines near Limey. Here we received complete maps, attack orders, intelligence data, etc., for 

the Saint-Mihiel drive. Barrage charts were made 

out, gun positions reconnoitered and constructed, 

fire data worked out, and ammunition dumps established. This was all done at night by working parties 

from the companies.

On the night of 11–12 September, all companies moved into their previously prepared battery positions for the barrage, each company

having three batteries of four guns each. Routes 

were marked out beforehand and the companies 

were able to get fairly close to the trenches by mule 

carts, the return routes for trains across fields being 

also selected beforehand, so as to avoid the congestion on the roads, all traffic being on the move to 

the front on the last night and the roads being filled 

with artillery. Barbed wire had to be cut on these return routes and the openings had to be found in the 

dark and the rain, no mean achievement in itself. It 

was done smoothly and all company trains got back 

safely without casualty.

The plans of attack for the 2d Division called 

for the 3d Brigade to make the assault, the 4th Brigade following in support; later the 4th Brigade was 

to make a passage of lines and continue the attack 

or hold while the 3d Brigade was to be drawn in 

support. The regimental companies of the 5th and 

6th Regiment were held with their regiments to 

avoid any possible chance of getting lost, while the 

4th, 5th, and 6th Machine Gun Battalions formed 

the batteries and put down the indirect overhead 

fire, covering all tender points in the enemy lines. 

The intelligence maps of the Boche lines were wonderful; we knew the location of every PC, dressing 

station, tank trap, dump, machine gun position, 

artillery position, etc.; how he made his relief and 

by what routes; therefore, we could estimate how 

he would retreat. All these points we had studied 

for days ahead, and the machine guns were placed 

where the batteries could best harass these points.

Each company was to open fire at H-hour and 

to continue until our infantry had advanced into the 

danger zone, when it would cease, pack up, and join 

its infantry battalion as it passed the gun positions. 

The companies were placed so they would be in the 

path of advance of these battalions.

All guns opened at H-hour, 0500, and fired 

from 40 to 50 minutes, depending on their positions, the fire being not only over our own assault 

waves, but also over some of the supporting waves. 

Companies averaged about 15,000 rounds fired or 

about 30 rounds a minute. Orders were to fire one 

strip (25 rounds) a minute, as it was not the desire 

to get the guns so hot they could not be handled. 

This brings up again quite forcibly the desirability 

of having water-cooled guns, as with water-cooled 

guns four or five times this amount could have been 

fired with ease.

All companies joined their battalions (companies had to wait for battalions), the first to advance taking up the march about 15 minutes after 

the completion of the barrage. In the advance, the 

method of going forward was the same in all companies and was the result of careful study of other 

advances, not only ours, but also those of the British 

and French. This system might almost be termed the 

standard system of advance and was used by the 4th 

Brigade wherever possible hereafter. One machine 

gun platoon advanced on line with the leading wave 

of the support company of each infantry battalion 

and on its right flank, one in a similar position on 

the left flank, and one just in rear of the center. Thus 

they were able to protect the flanks of the battalion, effect cross fire over the heads of the leading 

waves, and therefore give them more protection 

than if actually with them. They were close enough 

to the leading waves to advance and consolidate 

with them if necessary and advisable, and they were 

well in hand. The rear platoon protected the flanks 

of the other two platoons, acted as the support to 

the whole line, and was charged with the antiaircraft protection work of the battalion, preventing 
52

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

low flying planes from machine gunning the advancing infantry, and to this end was equipped with 

tracer and armor-piercing bullets. The machine gun 

company commander was with or near the infantry 

battalion commander, while the platoon commanders were with their platoons. Where visibility was 

good, only one platoon would advance at a time, the 

other two being set up ready to fire. During the advance at Saint-Mihiel, this was not always possible, 

as the rate of advance, 100 meters in four minutes, 

was steadily maintained and, while the guns had 

no trouble in keeping up with the infantry, in order 

to do so it was sometimes necessary to move more 

than one platoon at a time.

On reaching the objective and on the passage of 

the lines of the 3d Brigade, the guns took consolidating positions on the final objective. The SaintMihiel drive being one of the limited objectives 

and these objectives being gained the first day, the 

mission of the guns was then solely that of consolidation and defense. However, small movements 

were made at several places in the lines to get better 

defensive positions to withdraw to the objective in 

some instances where it had been overrun, and for 

similar reasons.

One or two interesting incidents occurred during this process. On one occasion, the guns of one 

platoon covered the infantry, which was withdrawing to better positions just as a Boche counterattack 

was launched, by walking back two at a time, always 

having two guns firing—this being done smoothly 

without previous instructions, with the guns fairly 

well scattered and with the platoon commander 

badly wounded—a graphic illustration of the work 

of well-trained noncommissioned officers who 

know what to do and who do it without orders. This 

is at all times an indispensable quality in machine 

gun noncommissioned officers who, owing to wide 

distribution of guns, are sometimes placed entirely 

on their own, as in emergencies it would frequently 

be too late to act on orders if they were waited for, 

even from the platoon commander, unless he happened to be at that particular place himself.

Another example of excellent judgment and 

handling came when a platoon commander with 

two guns observed a Boche counterattack break 

from some woods toward his front, in such a way 

that the leading wave was at an angle to his guns. 

Instead of opening on this good target, he waited 

until they had advanced some distance from the 

wood and had come into perfect enfilade, when he 

opened fire with tracer bullets checking up on his 

estimate of the range. Both guns were maintained 

at their maximum rate of fire with the result that 

this wave of about a hundred men (estimated) was 

practically annihilated, breaking the attack.

The advisability of having tracer bullets was 

again demonstrated here when a Boche Fokker 

plane flew low over the support lines while bringing 

down a French plane. The guns of the two companies in support opened on him with the result that 

he immediately crashed, landing about 10 feet from 

one of the guns, the pilot being taken alive.

On the evening of the 15th of September, the 

last of the machine guns were relieved by men of 

the 78th Division and marched by easy stages at 

night to billets where they remained from 21–26 

September, and training was again resumed.

The improvement in the use and handling of 

machine guns was very marked in the fighting at 

Saint-Mihiel, and this was largely due to the prior 

knowledge of the plans. However, the training prior to the attack, and a better understanding of the

tactical handling of guns by both infantry commanders and machine gun officers themselves,

contributed largely to their success. There was no 

friction between units or arms, all having confidence in each other and working together, further 

developing that spirit which made the 2d Division 

the wonderful fighting machine it was. This is not 

to be taken to mean that there was friction at other 

times; there was none, although the development 

of the attack did not always proceed as smoothly 

due to various causes: newness to the game, lack 

of understanding of the tactical use of guns, poor 

liaison, lack of complete orders and maps may be 

mentioned as a few of these causes. Liaison here 

was fair, the battalion and regimental PCs being 

connected by telephone liaison between the company and battalion PCs by runner. It is interesting 

to note that all telephone communications between 

the 6th Machine Gun Battalion units and from 

battalion PC to brigade PC were made and maintained by battalion headquarters liaison men, this 

insuring quicker communication and relieving the 

[U.S. Army] Signal Corps of that work.
53

Over There

The rapid advance and road congestion, due 

largely to artillery movement, made the ration supply difficult, again demonstrating the necessity of 

good supply officers. The ammunition supply was 

excellent, the company trains establishing dumps 

in rear of the lines on the evening of the first day, 

the caissons and carts being held further to the rear 

with more ammunition in reserve.

On 27 September, the machine guns were again 

on the move, entraining for an unknown area. Detraining on the morning of the twenty-eighth at 

Vitry-la-Ville, march was made to Sarry [at a distance of ] 20 kilometers; after billeting that night 

march was resumed on the morning of the twentyninth and continued for 14 kilometers when, as the 

brigade was arriving in the zone of aerial observation, halt was made until night, then the march was 

resumed until daylight when the 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion camped in the Bois de Courtisal, north 

of Suippes—distance marched, 46 kilometers. The 

regimental machine gun companies in all these 

movements moved with the regiments.

On 1 October, orders were received to advance 

toward Somme-Py and to relieve the French there; 

as this advance was to be made at night over the old 

trench area of the Champagne in which the roads 

were not well denned and the chances of getting 

lost were great, and as no definite instructions had 

been received as to dispositions, it was assumed the 

machine gun disposition would follow that generally employed by the French, and the machine gun 

companies were ordered to join their infantry battalions before or during the advance. Liaison was 

established with the infantry and rendezvous decided on. This again brings up the advantages of 

having machine gun companies always assigned to 

the same infantry battalions; though no information had been received, yet companies were able to 

join battalions with a certainty that should they be 

so employed they were properly placed.

In order to make clear the difficulty of maintaining liaison with machine gun units, the following extract from the history of the 6th Machine 

Gun Battalion is quoted. This, as will be seen, is 

merely a log of events:

At 3.00 P.M., October 1st the 15th Company 

established liaison with the 3rd Battalion, 6th 

Marines. At 6.00 P.M., this date, it broke camp 

and marched along the Souain-Somme-Suippes

road, where it joined the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines.

About 4.00 A.M., October 2nd, at a point 

about 2 kilometres south of Somme-Py, position was taken in Trench de Gottingue.

The 23rd Company joined the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, at 5.45 P.M. at 267–270.0 

(Tahure map), and marched with them at 7.15 

P.M., via the Route Nationale to Somme-Py, 

arriving there at about 2.00 A.M., October 2nd 

and relieved the French in the support positions along the railway running through the 

southern edge of the town; left of company at 

railway station, and the right along embankment at 269.0–277.0 (Tahure map).

The 77th Company joined the 3rd Battalion, 

5th Marines, on the Chaussere-Romaine road, 

and marched with it. Relieved the French units 

in reserve line Trench de Gottingue at 275.6–

268.5 (Tahure map), two platoons relieving the 

French in Gottingue and one platoon relieving the French in Trench Stuttgart [at] 275.9-

268.7 (Tahure map). Relief completed at 3.30 

A.M., October 2nd.

The 81st Company joined the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and relieved the French units 

west of Somme-Py, in vicinity of 268.0–277.4 

(Tahure map). Relief completed at about 4.00

A. M., October 2nd.

The French were confused and uncertain 

about their own positions and those of the enemy. Roads were badly congested.

On October 2nd, the 15th Company remained in place all day. The attack scheduled 

for 11.00 A.M. was postponed for 24 hours. 

The 23rd Company remained in place, being 

subjected to harassing fire from enemy machine 

guns all day. The 77th Company remained in 

place, guns set up for and fired at enemy avions, 

and was shelled intermittently by enemy artillery. The 81st Company remained in place, establishing two new gun positions 266.8–277.6 

(Tahure map). Personnel office took position in 

Suippes.

On October 3rd, the 15th Company attacked 

at 5.00 A.M.; 1st platoon with the 82nd Com-
54

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

pany on the right flank, 2nd platoon supporting the rear centre of the battalion, and the 

3rd platoon supporting the left flank. Company Commander Captain Kingman was the 

battalion commander. The Company reached 

its objective without incident, taking up line 

279.8–266.8–280.3–267.6 (Tahure map). The 

company remained in this position until October 4th.

The 23rd Company formed for attack with 

the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, along the railway embankment west of Somme-Py. Machine 

guns followed in the 2nd wave in squad columns. The advance began at 7.45 A.M., the 

company being subjected to heavy artillery and 

machine gun fire from left flank. The 6th Marines, along old improved road from point 266.0 

–280.0 (Tahure map), in Trench de Ètienne, 

toward the south, two platoons of machine 

guns in line and one platoon held in support, 

At 10.00 P.M., drew back, acting on orders, to 

point 267.0–280.0 (Tahure map). Remained 

here until 5.00 A.M., October 4th. The 77th 

Company took up positions in Trench Dusseldorf 275.7–267.8 (Tahure map), at 5.00 A.M., 

1st platoon with the 3rd platoon with the 45th 

Company, attacked in general direction of 343 

degrees compass bearing, battalion in support 

of the 5th Regiment. Attack started at 5.50 

A.M. Advance made to Bois de Somme-Py, arriving there at 2.00 P.M., remained in this position until 6.30 P.M., then moved forward to 

road 281.0–266.7 (Tahure map); the right flank 

at crossroads 281.07–267.2 (Tahure map), left 

flank about 900 metres west of crossroads. Gas 

and shellfire on the crossroads at night. The 

Company remained in this position until 6.00 

A.M., October 4th.

The 81st Company received orders to advance at 5.50 A.M.—orders received at 5.40 

A.M. The 1st platoon advanced with the right 

support company, the 2nd platoon being held 

at Battalion Headquarters as a reserve. All platoons were slow; in moving out, duel to lateness of receipt of the orders. The objective was 

gained at 8.30 A.M., and consolidated, 4 guns 

on the right flank, one gun with each centre 

company, and 3 guns on the left flank. One gun 

with the 5th Marines, having become lost from 

the company, joined the 5th Marines on its advance.

At 5.00 P.M., October 4th, the 15th Company, 1st and 3rd platoons, supported the 82nd 

and 84th Companies in the advance on machine 

gun nests on Blanc Mont. At 6.00 P.M., withdrew and remained in place until next day. The 

23rd Company attacked with the 6th Marines, 

acting with support battalion. Two crews were 

knocked out while forming for attack. Great 

quantities of gas and shells were used. Two 

platoons supporting and one in reserve. Direction of the attack was toward St. Èteinne and 

parallel to St. Ètienne-Somme-Py road. Were 

shelled from arc of 300 degrees, but met with 

no resistance. The company reached a point 

265.0–283.0 (Tahure map), about noon. Infantry fell back to a point 265.0–282.0 (Tahure 

map), and consolidated, two platoons remaining in advanced positions three hours to cover 

consolidation. Right of line in woods on right 

of St. Ètienne-Somme-Py road at 266.0–282.0 

(Tahure map). Line extended along the road a 

short way and then toward the west. Company 

Commander and second in command were casualties.

The 77th Company at 6.00 A.M., leapfrogged 

the 6th Marines, and advanced in general direction 343 degrees compass bearing. Advance 

made without artillery preparation, and met 

with considerable artillery and machine gun 

fire. Platoons assigned as follows: 1st with 20th 

Company as left flank protection; 2nd with 

16th Company, left flank of leading wave; and 

3rd with 45th Company, right flank of leading wave. Advance was made to a point about 

3 kilometres north of crossroads. Encountered 

opposition on right of line. On left, units met 

heavy machine gun and one-pounder fire from 

front and left flank and suffered heavy casualties, The 47th and 45th Companies advanced 

through woods toward St. Ètienne the 3rd 

platoon using direct overhead fire to assist the

advance. The infantry and machine guns were 

suddenly subjected to heavy machine gun fire 

from the front flanks—apparently the woods 

had not been cleared out during the advance. 
55

Over There

The infantry retired harassed by machine gun 

fire, and on flanks notably the left flank (French). 

All guns were organized on line 265.5–282.4, 

266.3–282.3 (Tahure map). This company 

now had only 9 guns, others being destroyed 

by shellfire or crews’ casualties in the advance. 

About 7.00 A.M., the 2nd platoon with the 

16th Company encountered the enemy at close 

quarters, who attacked with hand grenades and 

tried to put the gun crews out of action before 

the guns could be set up. The attack was held 

up by pistol fire until the guns could be put in 

action. The 81st Company remained in place.

On October 5th, the 15th Company moved 

into support position behind the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, and held front line for the 

remainder of the day. This line was from 284.2–

265.4 to 284.2–266.1 (Tahure map). The objective was 287.1–263.0 to 287.6–260.0 (Tahure 

map), but was not reached. The 23rd, 77th, and 

81st Companies remained in place.

On October 6th, the 15th Company at daylight moved forward to attack the enemy positions on the ridge due east of St. Ètienne, 

passing through the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. 

Artillery preparation from 5.30 A.M. to 6.30 

A.M. The attack succeeded. Formation of guns 

the same as for previous attacks. All platoons 

on the line for consolidation. The 23rd Company remained in place. The 77th Company at 

about 7.30 P.M., dropped back to Trench de St. 

Ètienne, on the slope of Blanc Mont. The 81st 

Company remained in place, becoming reserve 

on advance of the 5th Marines. At 4.30 P.M., 

moved forward, taking up positions along the 

ridge south of St. Ètienne.

On October 7th, the 15th Company remained in place. During the night the 142d Infantry arrived and occupied the same positions.

The 23rd Company at about 10.00 P.M. 

withdrew and took up reserve positions along 

Trench de St. Ètienne, from 266.8–281.2 to 

267.5–281.1 (Tahure map). The 77th Company 

remained in place.

The 81st Company withdrew and took up reserve positions on Blanc Mont ridge.

On October 8th, the 15th Company remained in place, the 141st Infantry advanced at 

5.20 A.M. The 23rd, 77th and 81st Companies 

remained in place.

On October 9th, the 15th Company remained in place. The 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines, 

was relieved. The 23rd Company remained in 

place during the day. Relief was started at 3.00 

A.M., October 10th, marching back along the 

Route Nationale, arriving at Camp Marchand 

at 4.00 P.M., October 10th. The 77th Company 

remained in place during the day, being relieved 

at 2.30 A.M., October 10th, and marched to 

Camp Marchand, arriving at 3.00 P.M., October 10th. The 81st Company remained in place 

during the day, being relieved at night by machine guns from the 36th Division, relief was 

completed at 1.30 A.M. Marched to Camp 

Marchand, arriving during the afternoon of 

October 10th.

On October 10th the 15th Company was relieved about dark, marched to Camp Marchand, arriving there about 4.00 A.M., October 

11th. The personnel office and Supply Train 

joined the battalion at Camp Marchand.

From this account of the participation of the 

machine guns in the Champagne operations may 

be gleaned many formations, but interesting side 

lights are not shown. For example, the casualties 

in this fight, while not the greatest sustained, were 

heavy.

Killed 25

Wounded 104

Shell shocked 4

Gassed 7

Died of wounds 13

Total 153

These casualties were practically all from the gun 

crews, although some may have come from the train 

in bringing up rations, etc. A safe estimate of men 

engaged in the advance echelon would be about 7 

men to a gun and 12 guns to a company; including 

officers, noncommissioned officers, and runners the 

companies may have averaged as high as 100 men 

to a company.
56

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

It may be well to note here how casualty reports 

are handled. The personnel office took its position in 

the town of Suippes near the train; this office consisted of the battalion adjutant and the necessary 

clerks, at least one being left from each company in 

charge of the company records, descriptive books, 

etc. The battalion medical staff was divided among 

the dressing stations where most needed; the guns 

being so scattered it was not practicable to establish 

a machine gun battalion dressing station. As far as 

possible, a hospital apprentice was kept in each of 

the different stations. As casualties would occur at 

the guns, they were reported by the next runner to 

battalion PC; each night as rations came up a copy 

was sent to the personnel office containing all casualties [that] had occurred since the previous report. 

These reports were on field message blanks, pieces 

of paper, or anything else available, and showed the 

nature of the wound or death. The regulation reports of casualties were made out by the personnel office after a careful check and sent on to the 

division personnel adjutant. The 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion’s hospital apprentices kept a list of all machine gunners evacuated from stations at which 

they were serving; these lists were made from the 

carbons of the evacuation tags, and were checked 

by the personnel adjutant as soon as received after 

coming out of the line. This method with a careful muster made on the relief would usually show 

most casualties and keep the missing list small. The 

history of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion shows 

only eight missing men for the entire period of the 

war, and some of these have since doubtless been 

located.

Infantry protection for machine guns on the 

march is necessary, though seldom needed. The experience of the 77th Company in the advance in 

being attacked with hand grenades and in holding 

off this attack until the guns could be set up is interesting and the only time this occurred in the brigade. At least, it can be said the Boche were willing 

to take a sporting chance. Had they been able to get 

in on the guns before they were set up, they could 

easily have annihilated the gun crews. On the other 

hand, if the gun crews were able to get the guns up 

their own chances of escape were small and, on this 

particular occasion, the guns won.

Difficulty was again encountered in rationing 

companies owing to rapid and repeated change of 

position and congestion of roads. This difficulty is 

normal and must be overcome by excellent work 

on the part of the train. The best method of handling rations was discovered to be by almost personal work between the companies and the train, a 

man from each company train preceding the ration 

carts to the battalion PC with a map, if one is available. Here he can ascertain the position of the guns, 

which may have been changed since the preceding 

night, and arrangements can be made as to where 

the ration carts would deliver rations to each part 

of his company. This information is then sent by 

company runner to the company commanders with 

instructions as to where the ration parties were to 

meet the carts. Even this method has its disadvantages, as conditions may change to such an extent as 

to make it inadvisable to have the carts at the places 

selected by the battalion commander or to get the 

ration parties up to that point, owing to heavy shelling, gas, or some similar reason. However, like many 

other arrangements, this was the best that could be 

done, and while not as good as it might have been, 

was satisfactory.

It is to be noted that, during this fighting, information was lacking on many important points, 

causing some confusion. Orders were clear and concise, but unit commanders had but little information 

concerning the intention of the high commanders 

and were unable, therefore, to take correct action at 

all times. It is probable that the French staff work 

on these occasions was very good, but owing to the 

fact that most of the times during which the Marines fought with the French they were placed in 

line at the last minute they were therefore unable to 

receive full information as to plans.

In the capture of Blanc Mont ridge, 78 Boche 

machine guns were taken out of one nest. The Boche 

by this time had come to depend largely on machine 

guns for defense, but their lack of trained machine 

gunners was noticeable at times. In front of SaintÈtienne-à-Arnes, however, our line was held up for 

some time due to a very cleverly concealed nest of 

guns [that] was so placed in the open and without 

cover except from view that its fire appeared to be 

coming from an entirely different locality, and our 

inability to locate its exact position caused a delay 

in putting it out of action. During all of our fight-
57

Over There

ing from July to the Armistice, [we realized that] 

had the Boche had machine gunners as clever as the 

man who made this position, our losses would have 

been infinitely greater.

The period from the relief in the Champagne 

to 1 November was spent largely on the road. On 

reaching the billeting area upon relief, machine 

guns remained in camp for six days, when orders 

were received to march to Leffincourt and relieve 

the 73d French Division. A march of 109 kilometers was made. On arrival, these orders were revoked 

and the march back was started, which carried the 

brigade around the Argonne Forest up into positions to start the final phase of the Meuse-Argonne 

drive on 1 November. On this march, all six machine gun companies of the brigade were together 

and, while the infantry battalions were picked up by 

camions and given a ride after a rest of a few days 

in billets, the machine guns marched the entire distance, so again they reached the jump-off in a tired 

condition, although we had a short period of time 

between our arrival and the attack. This time was 

spent in constructing machine gun emplacements at 

night and preparing for the attack on 1 November.

The assault was made by the 5th and 6th Regiments passing through the 42d Division (American); all machine guns of the 42d Division remained 

in place assisting in the barrage until the advance 

had progressed to their limit of fire, when they 

withdrew. The entire machine gun personnel of the 

2d Division less the two companies assigned to the 

assaulting battalions took part in the barrage, which 

lasted for [more than] two hours. It was feared that 

the assault battalions might lose their machine gun 

companies if the advance was as rapid as planned, 

had they taken part in the barrage; therefore, these 

guns were held ready for the assault in the jumpingoff trenches. It is interesting to note that, in this 

barrage fire, the division had 255 machine guns 

working on about a three-kilometer front, which is, 

I believe, the largest number of guns ever employed 

on a front of similar length during the entire time 

of the war on the part of the Allies.

All preparations for this attack were made 

ahead of time and followed the general lines laid 

down in the Saint-Mihiel attack. Again emplacements were dug, fire data and barrage charts made 

out ahead of time; many guns had wet sand bags at 

hand to cool the barrels; ammunition was brought 

up and every contingency possible was provided for 

in advance. Again the disadvantage of air cooled 

guns was demonstrated. The 89th Division on our 

right, using Vickers water cooled guns, fired during the same length of time in preparation for their 

own attack over five times the amount of ammunition fired by the 2d Division.

In the plan of attack, a halt was to be made on the 

first objective, and here it was planned to put down 

a second barrage, positions being selected from the 

map and instructions issued as to what points were 

to be covered. On arrival at these positions, it was 

found inadvisable in some instances to attempt a 

barrage, owing to features of the ground and to the 

fact that while it is a very simple matter to draw an 

objective on a map it is a very difficult matter for 

all infantry units to stop exactly on that objective. 

Therefore, in some instances, we found our infantry 

had advanced a little beyond the objective in such a 

way as to make it extremely dangerous to our own 

troops to open fire. There were, however, several 

instances in which the guns were able to assist in 

the advance both to the first objective and beyond 

by direct overhead fire. This work was done in the 

reduction of machine gun nests and in the capture 

of artillery positions in which whole batteries were 

taken, the machine guns preventing the bringing up 

of the battery horses so that the field pieces could 

not be moved. In reducing machine gun nests they 

were able to obtain a preponderance of fire, and in 

that way to permit the infantry to encircle and take 

these nests with small loss. This is in itself an answer to many who contend that a machine gun is a 

good defensive weapon but useless on the offensive. 

The machine gun is as good an offensive weapon as 

defensive, but it must have well-trained personnel 

and must be handled in a tactically correct manner 

by infantry commanders. Lack of understanding 

of the powers and limitations of the machine guns 

caused a lack of efficiency in the work of the guns 

themselves. This the British were quick in discovering and in their machine gun training centre at 

Grantham, England, they had many courses which 

were attended by infantry officers alone. All general 

officers, colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors 

were sent to these schools, as well as machine gun 

officers themselves, who not only learned machine 
58

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

gunnery here, but also were sent back from time to 

time on short refresher courses in order that they 

might keep up with the latest developments.

During the advance commencing 1 November, 

the machine gun platoons were on the flanks and 

center of the infantry using their same old dispositions, which were changed from time to time to 

meet the conditions of the advance, always, however, consolidating on the front line with the infantry 

whenever it halted.

Great difficulty was experienced in getting up 

rations and ammunition, owing to the rapidity of 

the advance and the conditions of the roads. About 5 

November, the roads were only kept clear with tractors, and in supplying the companies with rations 

the machine guns fared better than the infantry as 

rations could be brought up by the light machine 

gun carts. Here also the machine gun trucks of the 

motorized battalion proved their worth—they carried ammunition to the front and wounded to the 

rear after all other forms of motor transportation 

except tractors had failed.

This fighting was some of the hardest the machine gunners had during the war, owing to the

rapid movement during which they had their 

heavy guns and ammunition to carry. The weather 

was cold and rainy and the exhausted men, sleeping in the mud, when they had a chance to sleep, 

and getting little if any hot food, were rapidly being 

evacuated for sickness. This condition was getting 

to be serious, as around 10 November few of the 

companies had more than 50 percent, of their total 

strength available for duty.

On 10 November, orders came to force the 

crossing of the Meuse, and on that night three companies—the 8th, 23d, and 81st—were ready for the 

crossing. The 81st did not make the attempt, owing 

to the fact that the bridges were shot away as fast as 

the engineers could throw them. The 23d, which by 

this time had only five active guns, put one gun over 

the river to protect the approaches on the successful 

laying of a bridge by the engineers, the other four 

guns being held in the near bank to cover the crossing which was made at the foot of the hill, on which 

the Boche had three tiers of machine guns rising 

one over the other. Due to casualties, these four 

guns had to be salvaged, so that that company managed to get only one gun over the river. The 8th Machine Gun Company went over and consolidated 

the positions gained. In spite of terrific opposition, 

this attacking force gained their objectives and, on 

the morning of 11 November, held the bridgehead 

that they had been ordered to take.

One of the interesting features of this crossing 

was a machine gun duel between a Boche gun and 

one of the 8th Company guns. The Boche gun was 

discovered after the 8th Company had gotten over 

the river, and it appeared to be not far away, firing at 

about right angles to the position of the 8th Company gun, which immediately set up and opened 

fire. The range was unknown and the location only 

visible by an occasional flash. As this gun of the 8th 

Company was one of the leading guns in the attack, 

it was safely assumed that the flash seen was that of 

a German gun. After several bursts of fire at varying ranges, the Boche gun became silent, and the 

following day the gunners were discovered dead at 

their guns not 100 yards away.

On the declaring of the Armistice, the 2d Division remained in position for about a week preparing for a march into Germany. During this time, 

the Hotchkiss machine guns of the 4th Brigade 

were replaced by the new Browning. New equipment was drawn and everything prepared to meet 

resistance on the march. The spirit of the men was 

excellent, as it had been all during the war. The 23d 

Company, which on the morning of 11 November 

had only one active gun in commission, turned in 

a few days later when drawing the Brownings, 16 

Hotchkiss guns, almost complete, their total allowance. The spirit had been instilled into all machine 

gunners that where possible they must bring out all 

their guns. As an example, one gun was brought out 

in the Champagne [that] had been hit with a piece 

of high explosive shell on top of the handle block, 

the fragment penetrating into the mechanism and 

jamming there. No part of the gun could be moved 

nor could any part of it be taken down, and yet tired 

men brought that gun out by hand about 15 or 20 

kilometers, just so they could say that they had not 

lost it—the gun itself being about as worthless as its 

equal weight in stone.

In the foregoing, probably more stress has been 

laid on the work of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion 

than on that of the two regimental companies of 

the 5th and 6th Regiments. The reason for this is 
59

Over There

not that the companies of the 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion did any better work than the regimental 

companies, but solely because more data is available 

from the 6th Machine Gun battalion history on the 

work of those machine guns than there is on that 

work performed by the 8th and 73d Companies.

There are very many other features of the work 

of the machine guns in France, which are interesting and instructive, but in order to make a resume 

of the whole operation it is manifestly necessary 

to skim lightly over the subject and not spend too 

much time on any one phase.

The equipment used by the machine gunners 

of the 4th Brigade was the standard French Hotchkiss equipment; mule carts, Hotchkiss fire control 

equipment, etc. In addition, the 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion carried eight caissons, two to each company, which were the standard American infantry 

caissons; the regimental companies also carried two 

each. Escort wagons, rolling kitchens, ration carts, 

water carts, and medical carts, in accordance with 

the AEF tables of organization, were carried.

While the equipment was French in so far as 

the machine guns themselves were concerned, the 

organization of these companies followed more 

nearly the line of the British. On the adoption of 

the Browning, the Browning equipment was the 

same as that used by the French with the necessary 

changes in the carts to fit the difference in guns. 

This form of transportation proved very satisfactory, 

and I believe is more practical than that used by the 

British.

The training of machine gun units in France was 

originally along French lines; however, it was soon 

changed under orders from General Headquarters, 

AEF, so that the training then closely followed the 

British line. The British use of machine guns was in 

general better than that of the French. Their organization was different and the tactical handling of 

guns by the French changed little during the whole 

war. This may have been due to the fact that the 

French Hotchkiss gun was really not a machine 

gun in all respects, whereas the British Vickers was, 

and was therefore capable of being used according 

to correct tactical principles. The French machine 

guns were very frequently, even in the last stages of 

the war, used purely as automatic rifles. It was the 

British Machine Gun Corps [that] originated and 

perfected the barrage and battery system of firing, 

and while, according to our ideas, they carried this 

to extremes, yet the use of batteries was a decided 

step forward and at times of an estimable value. The 

lack of correct handling of machine guns on the 

part of the French was probably largely also due to 

the fact that each machine gun company was an independent unit in itself, by which I mean that it was 

independent of all other machine guns and formed 

part of an infantry battalion. It was found in all divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces that 

the regimental machine gun companies, no matter 

how well officered, were probably a little behind the 

organized machine gun battalions in efficiency, due 

without doubt to the fact that small units of specialist troops find it harder to train individually than a 

collected organization of such troops. This the British discovered early in the war, with a result that 

all machine guns were formed into a machine gun 

corps [that were] specially officered and specially 

trained. Battalions from the machine gun corps 

were assigned to brigades and operated with those 

brigades in the same manner that our machine gun 

battalions operated with our brigades.
60

Division 9 Organized

for Overseas Service

Division 9, Atlantic Fleet was organized for overseas service, under command of Rear Admiral 

Hugh Rodman, on 13 November 1917. The [USS] 

New York [BB 34] was designated as the flagship 

with the Wyoming [BB 32], Florida [BB 30] and 

Delaware [BB 28] completing the division. At this 

time, Division 9 was at Yorktown, Virginia, officially and publicly known as Base Two.

The vessels of Division 9 left Yorktown, Virginia, [on] 13 November 1917 for their respective Navy yards for overhaul and provisioning in 

anticipation of proceeding overseas. The division 

rendezvoused at Lynnhaven Roads, Virginia, on 24

November 1917.

Marines in the Division

At this time, the Marine officers serving onboard 

the vessels of Division 9 were as follows: New York, 

Major Nelson P. Vulte (division Marine officer and 

aide on staff of commander, Division 9), Major Julian P. Willcox, and First Lieutenant Richard H. Jeschke; Wyoming, Major Randolph Coyle and First 

Lieutenant Benjamin W. Gally; Delaware, Major 

Paul A. Capron and Second Lieutenant Donald U. 

Bathrick; Florida, Captains William H. Rupertus 

and Charles M. Jones.

They Sail for Scapa Flow

The division, escorted by the destroyer [USS] Manley [DD 74], sailed from the Virginia Capes on the 

afternoon of 25 November 1917. Rough weather 

was encountered almost at once, and increased in 

severity until on the thirtieth the wind was blowing considerably over 100 miles an hour. Due to the 

heavy weather, Thanksgiving Day festivities were 

featured by their absence. An enjoyable Thanksgiving dinner at sea requires an even keel and an appetite. Neither existed to any normal degree. Those 

who did eat can testify that it was like eating dinner on a seesaw or an express elevator with added 

minor distractions in the form of an inch or so of 

water sloshing around under foot and the air growing more stale and smelly beneath the batteneddown hatches. By this time, everybody onboard the 

American vessels had learned of their destination—

Scapa Flow, that mystery base in the Orkneys.

Thanksgiving Day at Sea

This day of thanksgiving fell on the twenty-ninth 

and the Manley celebrated it by becoming separated from the division. The Delaware dropped 

out of formation with a crippled port engine. The 

Florida also decided to go it alone and ran before 

the storm. The storm moderated on 2 December. 

On this date, the division was a very much scattered 

one, the New York and Wyoming being in company, 

while the Delaware and Florida were each in single 

blessedness somewhere. The storm had raised havoc 

with materiel. The Wyoming lost both lifeboats and 

had a steamer stove-in. The Florida rejoined on 

the fourth, but the Delaware did not show up until 

three days later.

At 0230 on the sixth, the Delaware spoke to 

HMS Constance [1915], and two hours later that 

vessel took position astern of the Delaware. These 

two vessels joined the division at the rendezvous off 

Cape Wrath at 0645 [on] the seventh.

Arrive at Scapa Flow

The American vessels were picked up by a British 

light cruiser, HMS Blanche [1909], and 10 destroyers early on the morning of the seventh and escorted into Scapa Flow, where the crews of the British 

vessels turned-to and gave the Americans a “hearty 

three cheers” and a royal welcome. It was “cold as 

the deuce” but, as one Marine expressed it in his 

diary, “Gun watches off. Hurrah!”

The first conscious act of the Marines after arrival was to coal—one of those heartbreaking coalings starting in empty bunkers. At this time, the 

Marines first became acquainted with the small 

AMERICAN MARINES IN THE BRITISH GRAND FLEET

by Major Edwin N. McClellan, USMC
61

Over There

regulation bags of the British Navy holding about 

200 pounds. The colliers looked sort of unfriendly 

and the coal itself was a fiendish mixture of fine, 

lung-filling dust [and] smothering lumps that defied the shovels and maddened the shovelers. A

bitter wind added to the misery, while cutting snowsqualls were unwelcome visitors. It was an all-night 

sort of horrible nightmare and the stuff seemed to 

go aboard the ships with pitiful slowness. As one 

Marine remarked: “It was a new game, strange coal 

and stranger colliers, and we did not handle it well 

at first, but before long we had that darned Welsh 

coal trained so it would roll over and play dead.”

Official and personal matters were assisted 

greatly by the British assigning a vessel of their fleet 

to each of the four American battleships.

The Division 9 was designated as the Sixth Battle Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

Proceed to Rosyth

Ten days at Scapa, and the American vessels moved 

to Rosyth with the Fifth Battle Squadron—25 knot 

oil-burning battleships, all veterans of Jutland, the 

commander-in-chief himself leading the way onboard the [HMS] Queen Elizabeth [1913]. The 300 

miles were covered at 18 knots, which is not remarkable, but the fact that a flotilla of submarines—socalled tin-fish—held the same pace did make the 

Americans take notice. Of course, a screen of British destroyers was also present. The vessels anchored 

off the Rosyth Dock Yard near Edinburgh at about 

0900 [on] the eighteenth.

Christmas and New Year’s Day were celebrated 

and many liberty parties were shoved off to Edinburgh while the ships were at this location.

The Labor Party, House of Commons, visited 

the New York on 20 December.

Admiral [ John R.] Jellicoe went aboard the 

New York on the twenty-second and Admiral [David] Beatty the following day.

The division left Rosyth the day after Christmas and indulged in tactical maneuvers in the Firth 

of Forth, anchored off Burnt Island the same day, 

returning to Rosyth on the twenty-seventh.

Return to Scapa Flow

The American vessels returned to the storm and 

gloom of Scapa about the middle of January 1918. 

Accompanied by HMS Queen Elizabeth, HMS Iron 

Duke [1912], and a destroyer screen, they sailed 

from Rosyth on 14 January and arrived at Scapa 

Flow the next day.

The waters of Scapa swarmed with ducks of all 

kinds, while an occasional seal was observed.

There was a bright display of aurora borealis on 

the night of 30 January.

German Submarines Interrupt

Maneuvers

The American vessels, as a squadron of the Grand 

Fleet, left Scapa Flow on 31 January for maneuvers 

in the North Sea. About 1000 [on] 1 February, the 

vice admiral, commanding the Fifth Battle Squadron, signaled the New York that there were two German submarines dead ahead of her, distant about 

1,000 yards. Firing was heard from the direction of 

the British vessels, as the New York veered out of 

column to starboard, followed by the other vessels 

of the division. The destroyers attacked the submarines with depth charges and drove them down.

About 1140 of this same date, according to the 

log of the Delaware, that vessel “apparently passed 

over some sunken object as several distinct shocks 

were felt under torpedo room, first on starboard 

bow, then on port, then under fire room.”

The steering gear of the Florida jammed, and 

she avoided ramming a destroyer by a narrow margin on the above date.

A fire broke out and was extinguished on 4 

February in the moulding shop of the Florida.

The crown prince of Denmark and our ambassador were guests of honor onboard the New York

on 5 February.

The Mystery

On 6 February, the Florida vigilantes sighted a light 

on the horizon. It grew bigger and bigger. A steady 

red light. Even sleepy eyes kept vigil as they watched 

the phenomenon increase in size. They marveled. It 

assumed shapes of various objects and possessed an 
62

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

uncanny appearance—as the visions of a drug fiend. 

It presented its own peculiar portent of evil to each 

observer. The suspense grew to a breathless terror, 

then—“the Moon!”

Attacked by Submarines Near Norway

The division, accompanied by the Third Light 

Cruiser Squadron and a destroyer screen, sailed 

from Scapa Flow on 7 February for the purpose 

of escorting a convoy of small freighters to a point 

near Bergen, Norway. The Florida and Wyoming almost collided on the seventh.

Submarines were encountered on the eighth, 

about 20 miles off Selbiorns Fiord near Bergen. 

Since this location was in the path of the German 

submarines as they passed from Kiel to their northern base, the fleet was ready for them.

The speed and cleverness of the camouflaged 

battleship monsters were very suggestive of polo 

ponies as they wheeled and darted in their successful maneuvers in avoiding the submarines, torpedoes, and floating mines. During the attack, the 

Delaware became separated for a short time from 

the division. Her log best describes what happened, 

and reads in part as follows:

At 12:45 p.m., sighted British cruisers on starboard bow and starboard quarter. At 12:50 

sighted coast of Norway, Bommelo Island, 

ahead and on starboard bow. At 1:17 sighted a 

fleet of merchant vessels on starboard bow. At 

1:22 trained battery in direction of submarine 

as reported by U.S.S. Wyoming. At 1:36 U.S.S. 

Florida reported torpedo passed from starboard 

to port. At 1:41 destroyer dropped depth bomb 

two points abaft Delaware’s port beam. At 1:53 

sighted wake of torpedo from primary on starboard bow. Put rudder hard right and torpedo 

passed port bow and along port beam. Delaware left formation. At 1:54 saw from primary 

and flying bridge the wake of a torpedo or more 

probably a periscope as it moved very slowly, so 

fired one shot from port anti-aircraft gun after 

which saw no more of torpedo or periscope. At 

2:08 lookouts aloft sighted and reported wake 

of torpedo dead ahead. Put rudder hard left and 

passed just inside of wake which was not again 

seen after passing abaft the beam. Steamed at 

full speed away from locality and then manoeuvred to rejoin squadron which was continuing 

on a southerly course. At 2:35 sighted four suspicious objects about 700 yards on starboard 

beam, by order, destroyer investigated and 

found same to be fish floats. At 3:25 caught up 

with and rejoined Division. Sounded the general alarm, general quarters on the bugle, and 

manned all battle stations to repel submarines 

and torpedoes where the wake of the torpedo 

was sighted. * * *

The log of the Florida for this date shows that 

that vessel sighted the “wake of submarine” ahead; 

that the ship was headed for ramming but passed 

through wake after submarine had passed from 

port to starboard; that shortly afterward the ship 

was maneuvered “to avoid torpedo”; that at 1158 

the ship was maneuvered to avoid another torpedo; 

that at 1408 two periscopes of submerged submarines were sighted and shortly afterward the wake 

of a torpedo passed close aboard from astern between the Wyoming and the Florida; that at 1406 a 

torpedo missed the Florida by about 100 feet.

The official story of the experiences of the Florida in this engagement is recorded in her log as follows:

At 1:35 p.m., U.S.S. New York hoisted “Submarine to Starboard,” and at 1:43 annulled 

it. At 1:40 changed course to 175 degrees. At 

1:45 a submarine periscope was sighted from 

the conning tower bearing 30 degrees (relative) 

but was lost sight of U.S.S. Florida and U.S.S. 

Delaware fell out to port and starboard respectively to avoid torpedoes, and U.S.S. Delaware

fired five-inch battery at periscope. Destroyer 

astern dropped two depth charges. In all, two 

submarines and five torpedoes were sighted by 

squadron.

In describing the experience of the Wyoming in 

the North Sea, one Marine expressed himself as follows:

These trips gave us new ideas in endurance 

and discomfort, watch and watch, zigzagging 
63

Over There

steadily at 18 knots, fog, storm, and the North 

Sea, plus a big coaling the instant we got back 

to the base. The North Sea has attained a certain prominence during this war, but it is not 

yet sufficiently infamous. It is the darndest, 

most miserable body of water ever, especially in 

winter, a rotten place to sail, fish, or fight. Once 

or twice a month it gets fairly clear, about as 

clear as Pittsburgh, but usually the visibility is 

unmentionable. Storms work up to a remarkable intensity in a few short hours, and then

everything and everybody is wet and cold and 

inclined to think favorably of life on the old 

farm.

Our first trip we flushed a sub, which let fly 

a “tin-fish” across our bows and ducked. That 

was the memorable occasion when the Delaware broke loose and flew over the horizon like 

a hen in front of an automobile, her speed being estimated at 30 knots. * * * And, we did not 

stand Torpedo Defence watches in port in the 

Grand Fleet.

Another writer has described the North Sea as 

“a seething cauldron in a drenching mist.”

On the night of 9 February, another flurry hit 

the squadron. Searchlights were observed north of 

the ships lighting up the whole horizon. All were 

on the qui vive, but soon quieted down when the 

searchlights turned out to be nothing but the antics 

of old aurora borealis.

[The] Texas Arrives

The [USS] Texas [BB 35] joined the division at 

Scapa Flow on 11 February, having sailed from the 

United States on 30 January. Her Marine officers 

were Captain Pedro A. del Valle and First Lieutenant Frank P. Snow.

The Marines of the American vessels had their 

first experiences in the building of roads on British 

territory when they landed on 12 February, [Abraham] Lincoln’s birthday, to assist the natives in that 

work. This was but the first of several visits ashore 

for a similar purpose.

Submarines a Nuisance

during Maneuvers

The division sailed from Scapa Flow on 16 February, participated in the maneuvers with the Grand 

Fleet in the North Sea, and returned to Scapa Flow 

on the 17th. During this cruise, German submarines were cause for worry to the Florida, Texas, and 

Delaware. The log of the Delaware for the sixteenth 

reads as follows:

At 9:25 a.m., sounded the general alarm and 

stationed all hands at action stations. At 9:45 

the U.S.S. New York reported a submarine on 

her port hand. Changed course to starboard 

and went ahead full speed to avoid submarine 

as reported by the U.S.S. New York. Steadied on 

course 50 degrees true and sighted what appeared to be a submarine periscope, dead astern, 

distant about 700 yards. At 10:00 changed 

course to regain position in formation and resumed standard speed.

The log of the Texas states that at 0920 the crew 

of that vessel “went to General Quarters” and later 

No. 20 gun fired once at “what appeared to be a 

submarine periscope,” 600 yards off.

The only reference in the log of the Florida

of the sixteenth to submarines was: “At 9:40 a.m., 

sighted submarine on port beam. Sheared out,” etc.

The weather experienced during this cruise was 

rather tempestuous, one who was present stating 

that “it raised Cain with the top and bottom of the 

Old North Sea.” The heavy seas damaged the boats 

of the American vessels, particularly those of the 

Delaware.

The New York shifted the flag to the Wyoming

on 18 February, on which date she sailed from Scapa Flow for New Castle-on-Tyne, to have her paravanes* installed. She rejoined the fleet on 3 March.

[George] Washington’s birthday was celebrated 

at Scapa Flow.

* An underwater defensive device against mines, consisting of a 

pair of torpedo-shaped vanes towed at the bow of a ship, usually a minesweeper, by cables that can cut the cable of a moored 

mine, causing the mine to rise to the surface, where it can be 

destroyed or removed from the water.
64

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Submarines Engaged

while on Escort Duty

[On] 8 March the division, with the Second Light 

Cruiser Squadron and a destroyer screen, sailed from 

Scapa Flow on convoy duty for Silbiorns Fiord. The 

squadron, on 11 March, ran into a fog bank and the 

New York and Delaware tried for the port gangway 

of the Florida. At 1135 [on] the twelfth, the Delaware sighted a torpedo on her starboard beam. The 

sun glare interfered in locating the submarine. The 

Florida’s log of the twelfth reported the fact that 

“at 11:40 a.m., Delaware hoisted submarine port 

warning.” The Wyoming’s log of the twelfth states 

that “at 11:43 Delaware reported a submarine going from port to starboard.” Floating mines were 

also encountered on this cruise and were sunk by 

the gunfire of the destroyers.

At 0800 [on] 13 March, the vessels half-masted 

their colors in honor of the late former Secretary of 

the Navy G[eorge] von L. Meyer.

St. Patrick’s Day, the seventeenth, was not forgotten, although little opportunity was given for 

celebrating.

Three admirals and one commodore of the 

Royal Navy visited the New York on 31 March.

On 2 April, the Delaware left Scapa Flow for 

New Castle for docking and paravanes installation, 

sailed from New Castle on 16 April, and rejoined 

the fleet at Rosyth on the 17th.

Second Visit to Rosyth

Leaving Scapa Flow on 11 April, the division, with 

the Grand Fleet, arrived at Rosyth on the 13th.

Engagement with German Submarines

The division, less the Delaware, left Rosyth on 17 

April on escort duty to Norway and returned to 

Rosyth on the 20th. On the seventeenth, the Texas

fired at a submarine forward of the Florida. The destroyers dropped four depth charges. The Florida’s 

log for the seventeenth shows that “at 3:40 p.m. 

Texas hoisted submarine sighted to port signal.”

The Wyoming left Rosyth for New Castle for 

docking and paravanes installation on 23 April and 

rejoined the division at Rosyth on 9 May.

The New York was visited on 23 April by a 

French admiral.

Searching for the German Fleet

On 24 April, the division, less the Wyoming, sailed 

from Rosyth with the Grand Fleet for the vicinity of Heligoland, on another “baiting” cruise for 

the Germans. News had been received that the 

German High Seas Fleet was out, but the Grand 

Fleet returned to Rosyth on the twenty-sixth without meeting the enemy’s fleet. During this cruise, 

at about 0730 on the twenty-fifth, the Americans 

heard firing, and at 0745 the destroyers opened fire, 

signaling that they had sighted mines.

On 8 May, a division of British destroyers fired 

torpedoes at the vessels of the Sixth Battle Squadron for practice.

On 9 May, the Florida sailed for New Castle for 

docking and paravanes installation and rejoined the 

division at Rosyth on 25 May.

The Marine detachment of the New York, under 

Major Willcox, went ashore at Rosyth and drilled 

for a detachment of British Marines under Major 

Wainwright of HMS Barham [1914].

The New York was inspected on 28 May by the 

Duke of Atholl, King George’s personal representative.

Vice Admiral [William S.] Sims officially visited the New York on 5 June.

On 7 June, the Deputy First Sea Lord, Admiral 

Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, visited the New York. He followed his inspection of the ship with an optimistic 

speech offering a rousing welcome to the Americans.

Admiral Sir David Beatty visited the New York

on 12 June.

Back to Scapa Flow

On 19 June, the division left Rosyth for Scapa Flow, 

where they arrived the next day. A new game was 

tried there—covering the U.S. mine layers as they 

placed the great mine barrage across the North Sea.

At Scapa in June, the midnight sun could almost be seen; it was light enough to read all night 

and sunset and sunrise were practically all in one.
65

Over There

Escort American Mine Layers

and Drive Off Submarines

The division, with the Sixth Light Cruiser Squadron and a destroyer screen, left Scapa Flow on 30 

June to act as escort for the American Mine-laying 

Squadron that put down the North Sea mine barrage from a point off the Orkneys to the Norwegian 

Coast. They soon picked up the [USS] San Francisco

[C 5] and three other American mine layers.

At 1625, the Wyoming sighted what appeared 

to be the periscope of a submarine and opened fire 

with the starboard after-group of 5-inch guns. The 

Wyoming went full speed ahead on both engines 

and turned to port, which brought the submarine 

astern. The Wyoming ceased firing [shortly after] 

and resumed her position in formation.

The log of the Florida showed that she fired one 

shot at 1625 from her No. 9 gun at a periscope wake 

on her starboard quarter; and at 1630, destroyers 

dropped depth charges.

The log of the Texas discloses that the Wyoming

reported a submarine at 1626. The log of the Delaware shows that what appeared to be the wake of a 

submarine was sighted at 1630 dead astern.

About an hour later, the submarines appeared 

again. At 1725, the port sky gun of the Florida fired 

one shot at a periscope wake on the starboard quarter and five minutes later the destroyers dropped 

depth charges. The log of the Wyoming states that 

“at 5:22 p.m. Delaware and Texas opened fire on 

submarine on starboard quarter.” The antiaircraft 

guns of the Texas fired two shots at the periscope. 

The log of the Delaware shows that a submarine 

wake was sighted at 1724, and that [the] No. 1 

antiaircraft gun fired three shots and [the] No. 13 

5-inch gun fired three shots. A submarine wake, or 

what appeared to be such, was observed between 

the Florida and Wyoming. No shots were fired as 

it was concluded to be a “hallucination created by 

wakes meeting.”

On 1 July, the Delaware sighted a mine, which 

was sunk by the destroyers.

Fourth of July Celebrated at Scapa Flow

The division returned to Scapa Flow on 2 July, and 

the Fourth of July was celebrated “in the dreary 

North.” The division, with the Grand Fleet, sailed 

from Scapa Flow on 6 July for maneuvers off Jutland Bank and arrived at Rosyth on the 8th.

At Rosyth Again

The Texas returned to Scapa Flow on the seventh 

and rejoined the division at Rosyth on the morning 

of the twelfth.

King Albert I and Queen Elizabeth of Belgium 

visited the New York on 9 July. As their majesties 

approached the ship, the American kite balloon fell 

from its height in a flaming spiral into the firth.

The Arkansas Joins the Division

The [USS] Arkansas [BB 33] sailed from the United 

States on 14 July. At 1425 on 22 July, [the] No. 2 sky 

gun of the Arkansas fired two shots at an object on 

the port beam. Later the submarine oscillator indicated a sound to the starboard. She picked up Cape 

Wrath light on the twenty-fifth and anchored at 

the Northern Base on the same date. While cruising from the Northern Base to rejoin the division 

at Rosyth, the Arkansas experienced some thrills. At 

2102 [on] 28 July, a submarine periscope was sighted and [the] No. 2 sky gun fired 35 shots, while the 

destroyers dropped depth charges. She joined the 

division at Rosyth on the twenty-ninth. The Arkansas brought over the House Naval Committee. Her 

marine officers were Captains Roy D. Lowell and 

Charles I. Emery.

The battalion of Marines from the division was 

ashore on 15 July at Rosyth for drill.

King and Queen of England Visit

the New York

The King and Queen of England visited the New 

York on 22 July. Prior to this visit HMS Oak [1912], 

carrying the royal guests, passed down the line and 

the usual honors were rendered, including the three 

cheers from the men manning the rails. Details 

from each of the American ships went onboard the 

flagship New York to welcome the royal party.

On the 27th of July, the House Naval Committee visited the flagship New York.
66

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

The Delaware Returns to United States

The Delaware, flying her “homeward bound” pennant, sailed for the United States on 31 July and 

arrived at Yorktown, Virginia, [on] 12 August.

On 5 August, Sir Robert [L.] Borden, prime 

minister of Canada, visited the New York.

With the American Mine Layers

Early on 8 August, the division with the Fifth Battle Squadron and Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron 

left Rosyth as escort for the American Mine-laying 

Squadron.

The log of the Wyoming, under date of 8 August, 

states that “at 12:53 p.m., sighted a buoy with red 

flag on port bow distant about 1,000 yards. Passed 

buoy abeam distant 75 yards.” Later: “At 10:06 p.m. 

sighted object resembling a periscope one point 

abaft port beam distant 250 yards. Blew one blast 

on siren and headed away from object at full speed.”

The log of the Arkansas for 8 August records the 

fact that the Wyoming had sighted an upright stick 

in the water and that the Florida had reported a 

torpedo crossing the bow. The log of the Florida for 

the eighth reads that “at 10:05 p.m. torpedo passed 

ahead from port to starboard.”

The log of the Texas for 9 August states that 

the Arkansas sighted a submarine at 0652, and fired 

with her five-inch guns. The Texas fired twice at the 

submarine and the destroyers dropped depth charges. The log of the Arkansas for 9 August states that 

“at 6:54 a.m. a periscope was sighted and that fire 

was opened on it with port sky guns. Also that Wyoming and Texas also opened fire and that destroyer 

dropped a depth charge.”

The division arrived back at Rosyth on 10 August. On 19 August, the battalion of Marines was 

ashore for a hike of about eight and a half miles.

On 20 August, a congressional committee visited the New York.

On 22 August, the division sailed from Rosyth and participated in maneuvers with the Grand 

Fleet in the North Sea as part of the Red Fleet. It 

was a storm cruise and everybody was glad to get 

back to Rosyth on the twenty-fourth.

Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. 

Roosevelt visited the division on 29 August.

A battalion of American Marines from the 

division, under command of Major Vulte and the 

British Marines from the Fifth Battle Squadron, drilled together ashore at Rosyth on 5 September. Moving pictures were taken of the drills,

parades, etc.

Samuel Gompers* visited the New York on 11 

September.

Admiral Mayo and [his] staff visited the New 

York on 21 September.

Playing Tag Between Scapa Flow

and Rosyth

The division left Rosyth on 23 September and arrived at Scapa Flow two days later during a nasty 

gale. Five days later, the thirtieth, the division, in 

company with the Grand Fleet, sailed from Scapa 

Flow and arrived at Rosyth on 1 October.

On 9 October, a fire occurred in the storeroom 

near No. 4 handling room of the Texas at 2030.

Several officers were detached and several joined 

on 10 October. Captain William H. Rupertus was 

detached from the Florida and Second Lieutenant 

James B. Darby joined. First Lieutenant Richard H. 

Jeschke was detached from the New York and Second Lieutenant William C. Hall joined.

First Lieutenant Benjamin W. Gaily was detached from the Wyoming on 12 October, and Second Lieutenant Edward Earle joined on the 10th.

Second Lieutenant Stanley E. Wilson joined 

the Texas on 10 October, and First Lieutenant 

Frank P. Snow was detached 14 October.

The division sailed from Rosyth on 12 October 

and arrived at Scapa Flow the next day.

Out to Head Off German Raiders

The greatest thrill of all came in the middle of October. “Enemy ships, heading for Pentland Firth 

at high speed,” trying to escape into Atlantic to 

* Samuel Gompers was a cigar maker who emigrated to New 

York in 1863. He helped organize Cigarmaker’s International Union and made it a model for other unions. In 1881, he 

helped establish the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, which was reorganized into the American Federation of Labor. Gompers was the organization’s first president 

and held the post for more than 40 years.
67

Over There

raid shipping. It was black as ink and blowing up 

a bit. Out through Pentland Firth which, with its 

skerries* and tide rips, is considered a murderous 

piece of water even in broad daylight, the vessels 

dashed. Battle stations at 0200; no sleep for anyone all night. Daylight found the American vessels 

in company with some old British battle cruisers 

and light cruisers in the Atlantic, searching, hoping 

and praying for a chance to justify their existence 

as fighters; but, as expressed by one of the disappointed, they “never did hear another word about 

those damn raiders.” This was on 14 October, and 

the vessels arrived back at Scapa Flow the same day.

The New York Bags

a German Submarine

At 1645 [on] the fourteenth, while returning to 

Scapa Flow from heading off this reported German 

battle cruiser raid, the New York struck a submerged 

object in Pentland Firth near the entrance to Scapa 

Flow. This was later pronounced to be an enemy 

submarine, and so the New York was officially accredited with [downing] a German submarine. The 

starboard propeller of the New York was so severely 

damaged that she had to go to New Castle for repairs. On her way down, she was attacked by enemy 

submarines, but drove them off. On 15 October, the 

flag was shifted to the Wyoming when the New York

left for Rosyth for repairs.

At Rosyth

The division, less the New York (Wyoming flying 

the flag), left Scapa Flow on 18 October and arrived at Rosyth the next day. The Wyoming sighted 

a floating mine on the morning of the nineteenth 

and destroyer sank it with gunfire. The Texas sailed 

for New Castle for docking and paravanes installation on 20 October and rejoined the division on 5 

November.

Prince Yorihito of Japan, accompanied by 

Prince Arthur of Connaught, visited the New York

on 3 November.

The king, queen, and crown prince of England 

on 20 November visited the New York.

* Ledges, rocks, cliffs, shelves, or ridges.

Celebrating the Armistice

“Armistice Day” was celebrated in a most elaborate manner. The entire Grand Fleet was assembled 

in the Firth of Forth on the afternoon of 11 November. That afternoon, Queen Elisabeth signaled, 

“Splice the main-brace. Negative 6th B.S.,” which 

in plain English meant: “Everybody get an edge 

on except the American Squadron.” Another report of the general signal broadcasted from [the] 

commander-in-chief, Grand Fleet; was: “The Armistice commenced at 11:00 to-day, Monday, and 

the customary method in His Majesty’s service of 

celebrating an occasion is to be carried out by ships’ 

companies splicing the main brace at 9:00 p.m. today. Hands are to make and mend clothes.” Needless to say the signal was obeyed. By sundown, all 

was set for the grand celebration. It was like a good 

old-fashioned football celebration or election night 

in New York. King George reviewed the fleet, and 

everybody manned the rail with eager willingness.

Every searchlight was turned on from 2100 until 2230. Every whistle and siren in the fleet—and 

there must have been at least 300—broke loose. Every hand was on deck with all the noise they could 

muster. Commanding officers made speeches at the 

urgings of the crews.

The firth was teeming with small craft carrying jubilant and noisy throngs—officers and men—

up and down the line. Many of these stopped long 

enough at the gangways of the dry American battleships to embark a load of Americans to the ships 

where General Order No. 99 did not apply. Motor 

sailors from the American ship, manned by large 

crews, carrying bands and flying American, British, 

and French colors, passed around the fleet. The celebration lasted well into the night, and it is quite 

probable that no other Armistice Day celebration 

in the world equaled it in brilliance or in noise.

Surrender of the German

High Seas Fleet

On the 21st of November, Admiral Beatty wired 

the following message to the admiralty: “The 

Grand Fleet met this morning at 9:20, five battle 

cruisers, nine battleships, seven light cruisers, and 

forty-nine destroyers of the High Seas Fleet, which 
68

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

surrendered for internment and are being brought 

to Firth of Forth.”

And this was “The Day.”

The American battleships occupied a prominent position in the north column of the Grand 

Fleet on the occasion of the surrender of the German High Seas Fleet on 21 November 1918, off 

the mouth of the Firth of Forth. They assisted in 

escorting the German vessels into port, but did not 

accompany them to Scapa Flow, where they were 

interned.

The division, in company with the Grand Fleet, 

got under way at about 0330 on the twenty-first. 

At 0846, HMS Cardiff [D 58], leading the German High Seas Fleet, was sighted. The American 

squadron countermarched and steamed on parallel course to German fleet for the Firth of Forth. 

May Island was sighted about 1200; Fidra Gap was 

passed shortly before 1300; Inchkeith was passed 

about 1345; Black Rock Gate was passed through 

about 1350 and Oxcars Gate about 20 minutes later; and the Americans came to anchor about 1420. 

The Queen Elizabeth stood-in about half-past three 

and the usual honors, including three cheers for 

Admiral Beatty, were accorded. One of those who 

was present wrote: “Then at last we did meet the 

German High Seas Fleet, on Surrender Day, and 

escorted it into the Firth of Forth. It was a wonderful, almost terrible, sight; and it gave one a feeling of 

embarrassment in looking on at another’s shame.” 

Admiral Beatty said: “It was a pitiful day to see 

those great ships coming in like sheep being herded 

by dogs to their fold, without an effort on anybody’s 

part; but it was a day that everybody could be proud 

of.”

The Nevada Joins

The day after the surrender of the German Fleet, 

the [USS] Nevada [BB 36], that had been serving 

with Division 6 of the Atlantic Fleet stationed at 

Bantry Bay, Ireland, joined Division 9 (Sixth Battle Squadron), at Rosyth, and proceeded with it to 

Portland. The Marine officers serving on the Nevada were Major Rolland E. Brumbaugh and Captain Sidney W. Wentworth.

American Vessels Leave

British Grand Fleet

On the forenoon of 1 December, the Sixth Battle 

Squadron of American battleship prepared for sea, 

being under orders to weigh anchor at 1145.

Rear Admiral Hugh Rodman paid his respects 

to Admiral Beatty on the Queen Elisabeth and returned to the New York. Quite a number of the flag 

and commanding officers of the Grand Fleet went 

onboard the New York unofficially to pay their respects. Admiral Sir David Beatty went onboard 

the New York about 1100. He was piped over the 

side, and received by eight officer sideboys,* Rear 

Admiral Rodman and [his] staff, the commanding 

officers of the American vessels, and the officers of 

the New York.

All hands were mustered on the forecastle, and 

Sir David Beatty, commander-in-chief of the British Grand Fleet, made a cracking good speech in 

his usual, straightforward, sailorman’s style.

Rear Admiral Rodman replied in a few words 

to Admiral Beatty’s speech, saying that the sentiments expressed by him were most heartily reciprocated; that this feeling could not be put in words; 

and that they would give a demonstration of their 

feeling toward the commander-in-chief by giving 

him three rousing cheers.

Admiral Beatty left the New York, the American vessels got under way, broke out “Homeward 

Bound” pennants, and proceeded out of the harbor, 

exchanging cheers and messages of friendship and 

good luck with everybody.

The New York, followed by the Texas, Nevada, 

Arkansas, Wyoming, and Florida, in column, were escorted to May Island by the Fifth Battle Squadron 

and the Eleventh Destroyer Flotilla. The Barham, 

Vice Admiral Arthur C. Levenson’s flagship, and 

the [HMS] Malaya were on the starboard, and the 

[HMS] Valiant [1914] and [HMS] Warspite [03] 

on the port. The Eleventh Flotilla took up a screening formation ahead and on either beam. Upon 

approaching May Island, the British units turned 

outboard and exchanged farewell cheers and fe-

* A sideboy is a member of an even-numbered group of seamen

posted in two rows at the quarterdeck when a visiting dignitary 

boards or leaves the ship.
69

Over There

licitous messages with the Americans, the Barham

displaying the plain English hoist “Good Bye-e-ee-e-e-e.”

Admiral Beatty radioed the following message 

to the departing Americans:

Your comrades in the Grand Fleet regret your 

departure. We trust it is only temporary and 

that the interchange of squadrons from the two 

great Fleets of the Anglo-Saxon race may be 

repeated. We wish you good-bye, good luck, 

have a good time and come back soon.

The reply message read as follows:

Your friendly and brotherly signal of God speed 

deeply appreciated by the officers and men of 

the Sixth Battle Squadron. We will never forget 

the hospitality which has made us feel as a part 

of one big family and we intend to maintain 

that relation for all time. We all hope to serve 

again under your command.

Fleet Honors President Wilson

Sailing from Rosyth on 1 December, the American vessels arrived at Portland on the 4th, finding 

the [USS] Utah [BB 31], Oklahoma [BB 37], and 

the Arizona [BB 39] in the harbor. The Marine officers on these vessels were: Utah, Major Leon W. 

Hoyt (division), Captain Keith E. Kinyon and First 

Lieutenant James J. Bettes; Arizona, Captain David 

H. Owen and Second Lieutenant Joseph L. Nolan; 

and Oklahoma, Captain William H. Davis and First 

Lieutenant Clifford C. Cowin.

Admiral Sims went aboard the Wyoming just 

before the two divisions (6th and 9th) sailed from 

Portland for Brest on 12 December. On the morning of the next day, the [USS] George Washington

[ID 3018] (flying the president’s flag) and the [USS] 

Pennsylvania [BB 38] (flying Admiral Mayo’s flag) 

were sighted. The president was rendered full honors. Anchoring off Brest, France, on the thirteenth, 

the rails were manned and other honors rendered as 

the George Washington and Pennsylvania passed in. 

The Marine officers of the Pennsylvania were Colonel Frederic L. Bradman (fleet), Major George C. 

De Neale, and Second Lieutenant Alien R. Sherman. Those of the George Washington were Major 

David H. Miller and Second Lieutenant Louis F. 

Peiper.

The Wyoming, carrying as passengers Admiral 

Sims and Mr. Davis, the newly appointed American ambassador to Great Britain, sailed from Brest 

on the afternoon of the thirteenth and arrived at 

Plymouth, England, the next day. Admiral Sims 

and Mr. Davis left the ship. The ship was coaled and 

sailed to join Divisions 6 and 9 en route from Brest 

for the United States.

Sail from Brest for Home

The Divisions 6 and 9 (less the Pennsylvania, that rejoined shortly after sailing, and the Wyoming) sailed 

on 14 December for the United States. The Utah

dropped out on [the] seventeenth and rejoined the 

next day. The Wyoming rejoined on the twenty-first. 

Land was sighted about 1200 of Christmas Day. 

The vessels came to anchor off Ambrose Lightship 

early on the twenty-sixth and later proceeded into 

the harbor.

Home

The return of the overseas battleships was signalized by a notable naval review on the morning of 

the twenty-sixth, for which all available vessels of 

the fleet in home waters were assembled. The returning ships were accorded a great demonstration 

as they steamed into New York Harbor. The secretary of the Navy onboard the [USS] Mayflower [PY 

1] and the assistant secretary of the Navy on the 

[USS] Aztec [SP 590] reviewed the homecoming 

of the battleships. Onboard these vessels were also 

the secretary of war and other cabinet members, 

senators and members of Congress, representatives 

of the diplomatic corps, Navy, Marine Corps and 

Army officers, and distinguished civilians who had 

rendered conspicuous service during the war. The 

naval review was followed by a land parade of all the 

returning officers, bluejackets, and Marines.
70

In common with every new weapon introduced to 

the military Service, Marine Corps aviation has 

travelled a rocky and uphill road. Its small size 

has tended to make the jolts more frequent and 

severe. Nothing short of the firm conviction that 

it would ultimately become of great service to the 

Corps sustained the enthusiasm of the small number of officers who have worked to make it a success. The past year has seen the completion of the 

first of the stages through which our aviation must 

pass. Prior to this, we had practically no official status or recognition. While we sent 182 officers and 

1,030 men to the front in France, and they made 

a splendid record under severe conditions, we had 

no aerodromes at home, no shops or other facilities; 

in fact, nothing permanent [belongs to aviation], 

and could very readily have been disbanded entirely. 

When it was realized that the Marine Corps’ permanent strength of 17,000 was entirely inadequate 

and that a larger permanent strength must be requested, the figure decided upon was approximately 

one-fifth the authorized strength of the Navy, or 

about 26,380. It was desired to utilize this number 

for ground duties; therefore, Congress was asked to 

authorize an additional 1,020 men for aviation duty, 

making the total 27,400. This gave us permanently 

our aviation personnel. The next task was to secure 

well-equipped home stations for our personnel, and 

it required the surmounting of many discouraging obstacles before the Navy Department, which 

handles the expenditure of all aviation funds, approved the construction of flying fields at Quantico, 

Parris Island, and San Diego. With this much accomplished and our men and pilots well trained, we 

feel that the time has about arrived when we can 

demonstrate our usefulness to the Corps, which I 

am confident will be great.

One of the greatest handicaps [that] Marine 

Corps aviation must now overcome is a combination of doubt as to usefulness, lack of sympathy, and 

a feeling on the part of some line officers that aviators and aviation enlisted men are not real Marines. 

We look upon the first two criticisms complacently, 

knowing that we can abundantly prove our usefulness even to the most skeptical, and that when 

we have done so, we will receive the sympathy and 

hearty support of all Marine officers. The last criticism we resent vehemently as an injustice, so far as 

it applies to loyalty, supreme pride in the Corps, and 

a desire to do what is assigned to us as quickly and 

as well as it can be done. Conditions arising from 

the necessity of organizing and training in a short 

time an aviation section, with practically nothing to 

start with and the nature of the duty, which does 

not allow the older officers to keep their juniors 

continually under their observation and guidance as 

is allowed in ground work, may have prevented the 

instillation in the younger pilots of all the qualities 

necessary in a Marine officer to the same degree as 

is done in infantry work. We have realized this difficulty and have made an earnest effort to overcome it 

and believe, with some few exceptions, that we have 

been successful. Now since the rush of organizing 

for war service is over, this difficulty will be easily 

and simply overcome and the task of aviation officers made much more simple by taking into aviation only those young officers who have had enough 

service with infantry troops to be thoroughly indoctrinated with Marine Corps discipline and spirit.

It is fully realized that the only excuse for aviation in any Service is its usefulness in assisting the 

troops on the ground to successfully carry out their 

operations. Having in mind their experience with 

aviation activities in France, a great many Marine 

officers have expressed themselves as being unfriendly to aviation and as doubting its full value. 

I am confident that this must have been caused by 

some local condition, as the French, British, and 

Belgian troops in the sector over which the 1st 

Marine Aviation Force and the British squadrons 

operated were enthusiastically “full out” for aviation. In our own aviation section we intend, before 

asking a vote of confidence from the remainder of 

the Corps, to demonstrate to their complete satisfaction that we can contribute in a surprising degree to the success of all their operations, save many 

VALUE OF AVIATION TO THE MARINE CORPS

by Major Alfred A. Cunningham, USMC
71

Over There

hours of weary, fruitless “hiking” and materially 

shorten each campaign. Previous to now, we have 

had no opportunity to do this. During the war, we 

were unfortunately not allowed to serve with the 

4th Brigade, but were placed in a sector containing 

only British, French, and Belgian troops. Since the 

war, all our effort has been required to secure flying 

fields and the construction of buildings and hangars 

on them. We would have been hopelessly handicapped without these facilities. Now since they are 

nearing completion, we are looking forward with 

enthusiasm to our real work of cooperating helpfully with the remainder of the Corps. All we ask is 

a spirit of cooperation and encouragement, and that 

judgment be reserved until the proper time.

Judging from the unfamiliarity of the average 

Marine officer with what has been accomplished by 

Marine aviation, we have failed woefully to advertise. A short resume of what has been accomplished 

will perhaps be of interest.

In May 1912, when the writer was detailed 

for aviation, the Marine Corps took very little interest in the subject. In those days, it was looked 

upon more as a crazy sport than as anything useful, 

and when I look back on the old original Wright 

35-horsepower planes I flew, where one sat on a 

board projecting out into atmosphere, I am inclined 

to agree with that view. About eight months later, 

another Marine officer was assigned to aviation 

and, during the next year, we accumulated six Marine enlisted men. There was very little increase in 

personnel until the [First] World War began. On 

6 April 1917, Marine aviation amounted to 4 officers and 30 men, all part of the complement of 

the Naval Air Station Pensacola, Florida. From this 

time, we began to work energetically for expansion. 

Our ambition was to organize a first-class aviation 

force to operate with the Marine forces we hoped 

would be sent to the front. During the next few 

months, we secured a flying field at Philadelphia, 

organized a full squadron of land planes, and began 

intensive training, so that we would be ready to go 

to France with the other Marine Corps forces. In 

order to have the latest aviation information, the 

commanding officer of this squadron was sent to 

France to serve with the French aviation forces for 

three months. This officer made every possible effort, both with the War Department in Washington 

and American Expeditionary Forces in France, to 

secure authority for our Marine aviation squadron 

to serve with the Marine brigade in France. No success whatever attended these efforts. Army aviation 

authorities stated candidly that if the squadron ever 

got to France it would be used to furnish personnel 

to run one of their training fields, but that this was 

as near the front as it would ever get. Confronted 

with this discouraging outlook, the squadron commander set about to find some other way of getting 

his squadron into the fight. The only aviation operations abroad planned by the Navy at that time were 

antisubmarine patrols in flying boats. After visiting the Navy flying station at Dunkirk, France, and 

talking with officers of the British destroyer patrol, 

it was realized that Marine aviation’s opportunity to 

get into the fight lay right here. The situation was as 

follows: submarines were causing enormous losses 

to shipping; their main operating bases and repair 

shops were [in Belgium] at Ostend, Zeebrugge, 

and Bruges, all within easy reach by plane from 

Dunkirk; [and] the water for 10–15 miles off these 

bases is so shallow that a submarine cannot safely 

negotiate it submerged. If these waters could be 

patrolled continuously during daylight with planes 

carrying heavy bombs, submarines attempting to 

enter these bases could be destroyed. Destroyers 

were prevented from patrolling these shallows efficiently in daylight by the heavy shore batteries, but 

could under the cover of darkness and with mines 

close the channels at night. This was evidently such 

an effective plan that inquiries were made as to why 

it was not put into effect. These inquiries developed 

[to a point] that the Germans realized the danger 

of such a plan and energetically suppressed any attempts of the British Navy to patrol these waters 

with seaplanes, sending out their best land pursuit 

planes to shoot them down. An inquiry as to why 

the British did not patrol this area with bombing 

planes protected by fighting land planes developed 

the fact that they were so hard pressed on the front 

in Flanders and northern France that they could 

not spare the planes for this work.

Why could not the Marine Corps man the necessary number of planes to allow this operation to 

be carried out? Jubilant at having discovered a prospective field of usefulness for Marine Corps aviation, our squadron commander hurried home and 
72

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

placed the whole scheme before the Major General 

Commandant, had a hearing before the General 

Board and the secretary [of the Navy], and as a result orders were issued soon afterward to organize 

four Marine land squadrons as quickly as possible 

and secure from the Army the necessary planes to 

carry out the operation. It may well be imagined 

that, with the prospect of getting into some real 

thick fighting, all hands turned to with a rush, and 

by May 1918, we had our planes and four of the 

best-trained fighting squadrons that ever went to 

war. A short time before going overseas, a British 

ace and all-round aviation expert was ordered to 

spend a week with these squadrons to give them 

their finishing touches. After three days, he stated 

that they were the most thoroughly trained squadrons he had seen away from the front, and that he 

could offer no suggestions for improvement—that 

they were then ready to go over the front lines.

Before the Marine squadron arrived in France, 

the Navy decided to make the main objective the 

destruction of the bases at Ostend, Zeebrugge, and 

Bruges, and to increase the number of land squadrons, manning the additional squadrons with Navy 

personnel and assigning a naval officer to command 

the whole operation. It was somewhat of a disappointment that the status of this operation, which 

was originated and organized by the Marine Corps 

as a Marine operation, should have been changed. 

But with the prospect of getting into the fight, 

nothing could discourage the squadrons.

The Northern Bombing Group, which was the 

title given the combined Navy and Marine Corps 

land plane bombing operation in Belgium and 

northern France, although supposedly operating 

under the British, was in reality almost an independent body. It was composed of four Marine squadrons of 18 DH4 planes* each, known as the Day 

Wing, and was to have had four Navy squadrons 

of six Caproni [Ca. 1] night bombing planes each, 

known as the Night Wing. Only one Navy squadron was organized and it got into difficulties and 

sent, prior to the Armistice, only one plane over the 

front on one raid. Although handicapped on account of the inability of the naval bases at Pauil-

* Airco British two-seat biplane day bomber.

lac, France, and Eastleigh, England, to furnish us 

our planes, spare parts, and tools, the four Marine 

squadrons accomplished a great deal. The results of 

one of our raids, verified after the enemy had evacuated Belgium, showed that we totally destroyed a 

troop train, killing about 60 officers and 300 men. 

The Marine aviators also introduced an innovation 

at the front. A French regiment was isolated during 

an offensive near Stadenburg, and it was decided 

to feed them by plane. Sacks of food were bundled 

into planes and they flew low over the isolated regiment and made good deliveries of much-needed 

subsistence. This necessarily had to be done at a low 

altitude and under a heavy fire from every weapon 

the enemy could bring to bear. It is believed to have 

been the first instance of its kind. This organization 

participated in the Ypres-Lys offensive and the first 

and second Belgian offensives.

The following is a table of what was accomplished over the front lines. The objectives of some 

of these raids were 75 miles from our aerodromes, 

nearly all of the distance over German territory:

Number of raids with the 43

French and British

Number of independent raids 14

Pounds of bombs dropped 52,000

Number of food-dropping raids 5

Pounds of food dropped 2,600

Number of enemy planes shot down 12

Pilots and observers cited for 25

decorations (two for the Medal of Honor)

In the meantime, other activities were being 

worked out by Marine aviation. An organization 

of 12 officers and 133 men was organized and sent 

to the naval base at Ponta Delgada, Azores, where 

they carried on an antisubmarine patrol with seaplanes and flying boats until the Armistice. A temporary flying field was secured at Miami, Florida, 

where approximately 282 pilots and 2,180 aviation 

mechanics were completely trained, including advanced and acrobatic flying, gunnery, bombing, 

photography, and radio. A Marine aviation unit of 

6 officers and 46 men was organized and attached 
73

Over There

to the Naval Air Station Miami, Florida, and performed practically all the long overseas patrols for 

that station.

In March 1919, a squadron of six land planes 

and six flying boats was organized and attached 

for duty to the 1st Brigade in Haiti, and in February 1919, a flight of six land planes was organized 

and attached to the 2d Brigade in Santo Domingo. 

These organizations have been seriously but unavoidably handicapped by a lack of suitable planes 

and not enough personnel to properly carry on the 

work. These handicaps will be removed in the near 

future. However, both brigade commanders have 

requested that the number of planes be increased, 

and very complimentary reports as to the value of 

the aviators’ work have been received. They patrol 

regularly the whole island and have saved many 

long, hot, and fruitless “hikes.” They have located 

bands of cacos, dispersed them with machine-gun 

fire and performed many useful services, which will 

be explained later.

Naturally our first and most important peacetime duty was to secure permanent well-equipped 

flying fields as close as possible to large Marine 

Corps posts, so that we could by actual demonstration prove our usefulness. The difficulty of accomplishing this was greater than all our previous

endeavors. We received abundant proof that, 

whether the government wastes money or not—

as is claimed by the public—it certainly does not 

waste it on the Marine Corps. It was finally accomplished, however, and we now have nearing completion well-equipped stations at Quantico and Parris 

Island, and the establishment of a similar station at 

San Diego is approved and work on it will begin 

when the ground at the Marine base is in condition.

The question regarding aviation, which is of 

most interest to the Marine Corps is: of what practical use is it to us? We see the planes flying around 

and they seem to be enjoying themselves, but how 

will they help us perform our mission? It is confidently believed that this question can be answered 

to your satisfaction. This article will mention some 

of the ways aviation will be helpful to the Marine 

Corps. These suggestions will not attempt to cover 

every use aviation can be put to or to mention anything [that] is not practical with the present development of planes and the art of flying them. No one 

can more than prophesy what the future development of aviation will allow it to do.

It is my opinion that a great part of the evident 

lack of belief in aviation shown by officers serving 

with ground troops is caused by the entirely unnecessary amount of flying [that] is done with no 

specific object in view, except the practice the pilot gets in handling his plane. This naturally creates 

an impression that the only use the planes have is 

to give their pilots practice in handling them. This 

impression should and will be removed. There are 

many important military problems [that] must be 

worked out by aviation and so many interesting 

opportunities to work in cooperation with troops 

on the ground that flights should rarely be made 

in future except with some useful military purpose 

in view.

The following paragraphs give some of the duties we believe we can perform satisfactorily, provided always that suitable equipment is furnished. 

They require no equipment impossible to secure 

with the present state of development.

Every officer who served at the front in the 

[First] World War was given a rather impressive 

demonstration of the damage and demoralizing effect of bombs dropped from the air, and was perhaps 

extremely annoyed by being shot up by a machine 

gun in an airplane, which it seemed impossible to 

hit from the ground. It will be remembered that 

troops in this war were, for the most part, well protected in trenches and dugouts from aerial attack as 

well as from attacks on the ground, and that both 

bombing and gunnery from airplanes will be much 

more effective against guerrillas and troops with less 

permanent protection. During the late war, proper 

advantage was not taken of the possibilities of radio and radio-telephonic communication between 

planes and between ground troops and planes.

Let us assume that the commanding general 

of a Marine expeditionary or advanced base force 

with his troops onboard transports is approaching 

a port at which he is supposed to land in the face 

of enemy opposition. Would it be of value to him 

if one or more of his Marine aviators left his ship a 

hundred or more miles off shore, flew over the port, 

photographed the harbor, and returned in time to 

have the finished photographs in the hands of all 

subordinate commanders before land was sighted? 
74

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

This would allow the commander to plan his operation, not with inaccurate maps, but with actual photographs showing every detail of any effective plan 

of resistance. Pilots would hardly be available at an 

enemy port. The photographs of the harbor in practically all tropical waters show clearly the channels, 

buoys, reefs, sandbars, and minefields, if any exist, 

allowing the ship to be navigated into the harbor 

without a local pilot.

If the commanding general desired to prevent 

the removal from any locality of enemy stores, railway equipment, and locomotives, would it not be of 

service to him if the aviator left the ship before the 

enemy was aware of its presence and destroyed the 

railway tracks or bridges and made the highways 

impassable by bombing? During the actual landing, 

the planes could with machine-gun fire and small 

fragmentation bombs so demoralize resistance as to 

make the task of landing much easier and safer.

After having landed, the following are a few of 

the ways the planes can be useful to the troops:

They can locate quickly bodies of the enemy 

and communicate instantly their approximate 

strength, location, disposition, and actions. The 

enemy can be watched and any movement instantly reported. In this connection, there has 

been developed a portable radio and radiotelephony ground set, which is so small and easily set up that one can be carried by two or three 

men or on the back of a mule, horse, or donkey. 

In future operations, every unit [that] has one 

of these—and every unit should have one—will 

be in instant communication with the planes 

and through them with any other station.

Photographs of enemy defenses, proposed 

battle terrain, or any other object or area of 

reasonable size within a radius of 50 miles can 

be taken, developed, and the desired number 

of prints delivered to the troops in time to use 

them in the plan of attack or defense. I have 

personally seen photographs distributed to 

the various organizations 45 minutes after the 

plane [that] took them had landed.

Planes continuously in communication with 

headquarters can patrol wide areas daily or 

hourly, which duty would require large bodies 

of troops and much fatigue to accomplish otherwise.

By bombing and machine gunnery, the enemy can be harassed and prevented from making orderly dispositions.

Enemy troops and population well in rear of 

the line of resistance can be kept in a demoralized condition, and enemy ammunition and 

supply depots and other military objects destroyed.

Any railways, bridges, and roads within a radius of 100 miles can be quickly made impassable.

Rapid communication can be furnished between detached bodies of our troops in difficult 

country, and officers can be quickly transported 

anywhere on urgent missions.

In thick and rough country, the planes can 

keep headquarters informed at all times of the 

disposition, progress, and needs of our troops.

In the event the enemy has planes, we can 

protect our troops from observation and annoyance and prevent the enemy from securing 

benefit from his planes.

For the field artillery, the following are some of 

the ways in which we can be helpful:

Difficult and temporary targets can be located 

quickly, accurately described and changes in 

targets promptly reported.

The bursts of our shell can be accurately spotted and corrections for the next shot instantly 

reported.

Targets invisible from the ground can be kept 

under accurate fire by corrections given by the 

planes.

Photographs of targets can be furnished 

showing progressively the results of artillery 

fire.

The location of hidden artillery batteries 

causing damage can be discovered and reported.

At night, designated areas can be kept lighted 

by parachute flares, etc.

Through its speed and remarkable visibility, 

and by the use of its radio and radio-telephone, 

together with visual signals which must be 

developed, the airplane will cooperate with 
75

Over There

the signal and communication troops so as to 

greatly increase their effectiveness.

For advanced base work:

In addition to the duties mentioned above, 

which aviation will perform—and nearly all 

these will enter into advanced base work as 

well—the planes will cooperate in the following ways:

Offshore patrols to prevent surprise raids by 

enemy light forces.

Antisubmarine patrols.

Spotting for shore batteries in attacks by enemy ships.

Communication between the base and our 

vessels offshore.

Photographing, bombing, and torpedoing 

enemy craft and bases within reach.

On account of the aviator’s ability in most localities to pick up and chart enemy mine fields,

airplanes should furnish valuable assistance in 

countermining and mine sweeping.

A large part of the work performed by the Marine Corps is to combat guerrilla and bandit warfare, usually in tropical countries where roads are 

few and ground communications almost nil. We 

must not overlook the valuable assistance aviation 

can render in this kind of fighting or fail to realize 

its many helpful possibilities in the occupation of 

such territories whether fighting is in progress or 

not. The enemy encountered under these conditions 

are usually unstable and can not withstand punishment. They are nearly always superstitious and easily stampeded or cowed by methods of warfare with 

which they are unfamiliar. They base their hope for 

success on their ability to make raids and get away 

before the necessary number of our troops arrive. 

When an attempt to round them up is made, their 

knowledge of the country and their ability to travel light and fast allow them to lead our troops an

exhausting chase for some time before they are dispersed, if that is accomplished. The work of the Marine Corps aviators in Haiti and Santo Domingo 

has abundantly shown the possibilities in this class 

of operations. Difficult country can be patrolled so 

completely and frequently that it is impossible for 

bands to form without being discovered. To cover 

an area as thoroughly and frequently as can be done 

by airplanes would require a prohibitive number of 

troops and a weary amount of “hiking.” The planes 

in Haiti have already proved that they can, without 

assistance from the ground, disperse and almost destroy bands of cacos with gunnery and small bombs. 

When these insurrectos realize that they cannot 

congregate without being attacked within a very 

short time thereafter by our planes, their enthusiasm quickly disappears and the unfamiliar form 

of attack from the air greatly assists in their discouragement. If the planes could perform no other 

service for our expeditionary troops than to make 

unnecessary the long marches formerly required in 

searching for cacos they would be worth their keep, 

but a little imagination will suggest to any experienced Marine officer numerous duties the planes, 

on account of their special abilities, can perform for 

them.

It is believed that enough has been said to show 

those who are students of Marine Corps operations 

that an intelligent development of aviation and an 

encouraging spirit of cooperation between it and 

our troops can only result in enabling the Corps 

to perform its function much more quickly and efficiently. Marine officers very properly “like to be 

shown,” and nothing is more desired by Marine 

Corps aviation than a chance to work out with our 

troops the problems suggested above, as they feel 

assured that such an opportunity can result only in 

mutual respect and confidence.

Before closing this article, I would like to mention something [that] might interest prospective 

pilots. Above all, aviation is a young man’s game. 

It requires a young heart, nerves, lungs, eyes, and 

reflexes. It has been said that after a man reaches 

a certain age, he has too much sense to do what 

an aviator is required to do. There are exceptions, 

of course, and older men have been good fliers, but 

I believe they are exceptions, and my eight years’ 

experience and observation has shown me that, provided they have the necessary amount of judgment, 

the younger the pilots are the better. I believe it is 

good policy to set the maximum age for applicants 

for pilot’s duties at around 25 years. I am also led 

to believe that the average term of usefulness for a 

pilot flying regularly is not over five years. At the 
76

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

end of that time, they know the work thoroughly, 

but those who are still alive have lost the “pep” and 

enthusiasm [that] is essential.

The established policy regarding pilots is that 

they will not be ordered to aviation duty until they 

have had enough experience with troops to have 

become thoroughly qualified Marine officers. The 

ordinary length of the detail will be five years, after 

which they will return to duty with troops.

Aviation is probably the most highly technical branch of the military Service. It differs from 

other arms in the unusually fast development of its 

equipment, planes, motors, etc. The administrative 

and technical part of it is really a profession [that] 

requires long experience and constant study to fit 

one to properly make decisions, which decisions 

must necessarily be correct, as the life of the pilot, 

even in peace times, depends upon their soundness. 

For self-evident reasons, it is necessary for any aviation organization to have enough old experienced 

aviation officers to run the technical part of it on 

sound principles proved by experience, and to prevent the enthusiasm and inexperience of younger 

pilots from causing harm. This necessity for officers 

of long experience is recognized and unquestioned, 

and for this reason a very small number of pilots 

who show special aptitude will be continued in 

aviation duty indefinitely to furnish the number of 

expert and experienced officers required.

The men in aviation are enlisted especially for 

aviation duty, and are sent through the regular recruit course at Parris Island or Mare Island, after 

which they are given a thorough education in gasoline motors, as shop machinists, and in practical and 

theoretical airplane repair and upkeep. Our main 

trouble with enlisted men has been that, after giving 

them an excellent education, they discover that men 

performing identically the same duties in the Army 

and Navy draw much more pay than they. As a result, they become dissatisfied and do not reenlist. 

It is hoped and believed that this will be remedied 

shortly and their pay put on a par with men doing 

similar work in the Army and Navy.

For fear that, by mentioning in this article the 

skeptical feeling regarding aviation [that] is supposed to exist among some officers, I have given an 

erroneous impression, I would like to state that I believe the number of officers who hold this attitude 

constitutes a small minority of the officers of the 

Corps. The subject is only mentioned here because 

the whole article is an effort to show Marine Corps 

officers that, with encouragement and cooperation, 

we can be of real service to them, and to show commanding officers what parts of their problems they 

can use aviation to perform. Naturally, the ones we 

wish most to convert are those who at present do 

not fully believe in us.
77

The American 1st Division had taken up its position in a relatively quiet sector. The 3d Division had 

not yet been tested as a whole, although one of its 

units, the 7th Motorized Machine Gun Battalion, 

had taken a successful part in the Battle of ChâteauThierry during the night of 31 May–1 June [1918]. 

It was reserved for the 2d Division, therefore, to 

give the answer to the then all-important question: 

how will the American troops behave in a pitched 

battle? Therein lay the significance of the battles for 

the possession of Belleau Woods.

The stirring impression produced on the 

hard-pressed Frenchmen by the appearance of the

Americans on the western front is pictured in vivid 

language by [ Jean de] Pierrefeu in his book, Sector 

I: Three Years at Great General Headquarters [1922]:

Striking was the contrast in appearance between the Americans and the French regiments, whose men, in torn uniforms, hungry 

and hollow-eyed, were scarcely able to hold 

themselves erect. New life had come to bring 

a fresh, surging vigor to the body of France, 

bled almost to death. Thus it came to pass that 

in those crucial days when the enemy stood 

for a second time on the Marne, thinking us 

disheartened, then, contrary to all expectation, 

an ineffable confidence filled the hearts of all 

Frenchmen. . . . General Pétain, who clearly 

discerned what a vital force they were radiating, thereafter repeatedly pronounced the word 

“Americans” with the satisfaction of the builder 

of imperishable monuments who perceives an 

inexhaustible source of labor in the midst of the 

threat of a general strike. . . . General Foch, too, 

included the Americans as an essential factor in 

all his plans for the coming offensive.

The drama of the situation is enhanced when 

one remembers that this intervention came at a time 

when, at a meeting of the Supreme War Council 

at Versailles, the premiers of France, England, and 

Italy issued the following desperate appeal for help 

to President Wilson:

There is danger that the war will be lost, unless the speedy arrival of additional American 

troops serves to restore the weakened Allied reserves. Thus only can defeat be averted, because 

of the exhausting of the Allied reserves long 

before those of the Germans.

How did the allies come to be in such a desperate situation? The German attack between Soissons and Reims had begun on 27 May, with the 

storming of the supposedly impregnable Chemin 

des Dames Hill Range, and the French and English 

positions nearby. By 30 May, they had reached the 

Marne. The French divisions thrown into this battle 

had been completely crushed; they evaporated, as a 

French officer aptly expressed it, like rain drops on 

white-hot iron. Not until 1 June could the French 

High Command interpose an organized resistance. 

The German High Command now added to the 

7th Army, led by Colonel General von Boehn, four 

divisions [that] had been in the second line, namely, 

the 197th, 237th, 10th, and 231st Infantry Divisions. 

These troops were now grouped on the right wing 

of the 4th Reserve Corps, commanded by General 

of Infantry [Richard] von Conta, who had then 

reached the Marne. The mission of this corps was a 

fan-shaped advance to the southwest, while the advancing corps under [General Arnold von] Winckler, [General Georg] Wichura, [General Alfred 

von] Larisch, and [General Hermann Karl Bruno 

von] Francois, took up their positions to the right, 

facing west. In advancing toward the west, the German High Command hoped to reach Compiègne, 

and then, by an attack at Noyon, to close the pocket 

that had been formed there.

There was no intention, however, that the four 

divisions pushing southwest should make a thrust 

for Paris. Even if successful, this would have created a front in the shape of a spearhead, unfavorable both strategically and tactically. Their mission 

was therefore limited to protecting the flanks of 

the corps advancing to the west. The four divisions 

were followed by two more—the 5th Guard Infantry and the 28th Infantry Divisions—detached from 

THE BATTLES OF BELLEAU WOODS: PART I

by Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Otto, German Army (Ret)
78

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

the forces [that] had reached the Marne. ChâteauThierry was taken on 1 June, after intense houseto-house fighting, by the 231st Infantry Division, 

advancing on the left wing. Owing to the timely 

arrival of American troops, however, they did not 

succeed in establishing a bridgehead to the railroad 

on the southern bank of the Marne as they had 

been ordered to do. The other three divisions kept 

up a powerful advance to the southwest and, during 

the night [of ] 1–2 June, pushed back the opposing 

troops everywhere, breaking the French line sharply 

in the neighborhood of Gandelu, over a front of 

four kilometers. Again American troops had to be 

moved to the front to cover this break.

The German divisions were still attacking on 

3 June. The 197th Infantry, which had advanced 

farthest on the right flank, succeeded that day in 

occupying Veuilly, Eloup, Bussiares, and Hill 164, 

close to Les Mares farm. On the other hand, every 

effort made by the 28th Reserve Regiment to penetrate Veuilly forest failed; intense machine-gun 

fire stopped the German troops at the edge of the 

woods. Under cover of approaching darkness, the 

2d and 4th Companies, supported by a mine thrower, 

again attempted to penetrate the woods but were 

once more repulsed by the fierce enemy fire. This 

extraordinarily strong resistance was entirely unexpected by the Germans, who thought that they 

were pursuing a beaten foe. They had no means of 

knowing that on 2 June, the American 23d Infantry 

Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 5th [Regiment],

the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 2d Engineer Company, had established strong defenses 

here, with the 2d Battalion of the 5th [Regiment] 

adjoining them on the right.

The 237th Infantry Division, with the 462d Infantry Regiment, was to occupy Hill 142 and Champillon that day, and then proceed to Marigny, while 

the 461st Infantry Regiment was to attempt the 

capture of Lucy-le-Bocage. As the artillery was not 

ready to open fire until 1215, the attack could not be 

launched until 1230. The 462d Regiment then found

such formidable resistance in the strongly defended 

woods on its front that it could advance only as far 

as one kilometer south of Torey, north of the woods. 

During the night, the 462d Infantry was relieved by 

the 460th. The 461st Regiment now completed the 

occupation of Belleau Woods, pressing forward as 

far as the western edge. After repulsing an enemy

counterattack at 1500, they cleared the southwest 

corner of the woods of enemy machine-gun nests, 

and pushed their advance posts far to the southwest 

and to the southern edge of the woods. The whole 

woods now came under severe artillery fire of every 

caliber, which continued throughout the day and

the following night. The attack on Lucy-le-Bocage 

was abandoned because this place was under enfilading fire from the heights near Triangle.

The 10th Infantry Division, which had taken 

Bouresches on 2 June, was now working up its defenses, as ordered.

At midnight [on] 3 June, General von Conta 

issued the following order to his corps:

1. The right wing of the 7th Army will continue the attack, the Conta Group assuming 

the protection of the flanks during the attack. 

The group will fight for a suitable defense position. This position is located in the following 

line: Veuilly—Marigny—La Voie du Châtel—Hill 201 about one kilometer southeast of 

Montgivrault—Le Thiolet—Hill 204 west of

Château-Thierry.

2. The exact hour of the attack will be ordered 

later. The attack will not take place prior to June 

7. Get necessary information and prepare at 

once.

In this attack, the 5th Guard Infantry Division

was to be placed on the right, next to the 197th Infantry Division.

This, then, was the situation on the night 

of 3 June. The American troops, fresh and in full 

strength, had absorbed the remnants of the crushed 

French troops. Facing them were the Germans, 

with morale heightened by the habit of victory, but 

with ranks considerably worn and thinned by the 

campaign. The Americans formed such a formidable wall that the commanding general, von Conta, 

found it necessary to spend several days in preparation, and to add another division preliminary to an 

attack which had for its objective merely the capture of a defensive position.
79

Over There

On 4 June at 0900,* the exhausted French 45th 

Infantry Division was relieved by the American 

2d Division on the Champillon-Monneaux front, 

where the Americans had actually established 

themselves on 3 June. On their left was the newly 

arrived French 167th Infantry Division, which had 

relieved the shattered 43d; parts of the American 

2d Division stationed here had to be withdrawn 

from the remnants of the French 43d Division. On 

their right was the French 10th Colonial Division, 

among whom were isolated units of the American 

3d Division. This led the Germans to believe that 

they were facing the American 3d Division. It was 

by design that the French, who had no confidence 

yet in the American leadership, thus avoided having 

here the American 2d and 3d Divisions united under their own commanding general, as would have 

been natural. It was not until 2 September that the 

Americans were allowed an independent sector of 

their own.

In general, the positions were as follows:

Facing the American 5th Marines was the German 460th Infantry Regiment of the 237th Division.

* In this account, Central European time is used. It differs by 

one hour from Western European time. As daylight-saving 

time was used on both sides, this difference continued throughout June. Accordingly, 0900 in the German account corresponds to 0800 in the American account.

Facing the 6th Marines was the 461st Infantry Regiment of the same division.

Facing the 9th Infantry Regiment was the 

398th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Division; 

and facing the 23d Infantry was the 47th Infantry Regiment of the 10th Division.

This alignment is only approximate. The front 

of the American units of the 4th Brigade extended 

farther east than the German regiments opposite 

them, so that the right wing of the 5th [Regiment] 

was opposite the right wing of the 461st Regiment

and, similarly, the right wing of the 6th Marines 

overlapped the right of the 398th Regiment at 

Bouresches.

The German divisions spent that day, 4 June, 

solely in strengthening the positions they had 

reached, with the 10th Infantry Division established 

on the hills north and east of Bouresches. This place 

had originally been occupied by the 3d Battalion of 

the 398th Regiment but, owing to the lowness of 

the ground, it did not appear advisable to leave a 

whole battalion here, and to persist in holding it 

at any cost. Accordingly, the commander of the 

398th Infantry ordered two companies withdrawn 

on the night of 3–4 June, and ordered further that 

the railway be made part of the main defense line. 

Bouresches was to serve only as an outpost. On the 

main front, the battalions entrenched themselves by 

companies, with machine gun companies distribut-
80

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

ed in separate nests to the rear. Small outposts were 

extended as far as the heights of Triangle and the 

Bouresches-La Roche-Vaux road.

In the morning, the 461st Infantry Regiment

ascertained through prisoners and dead that they 

were facing the American 5th and 6th [Regiments]. 

Major [Hans Otto] Bischoff, the commander, reported in the afternoon that an American attack 

was being made in the direction of Belleau and the 

northwestern corner of Belleau Woods. It was natural that a unit attacking for the first time would not 

have the skill of seasoned troops, and it was equally 

natural that the Germans should count on that lack 

of experience. The Americans were caught front 

and flank by the machine-gun fire of the 1st Battalion, 461st Regiment, and, after heavy losses, retired 

to Hill 169. However, the defenders of the woods 

suffered greatly from the effects of the continuous 

heavy artillery fire in which the American 2d Field 

Artillery Brigade, posted along La Voie du ChâtelCoupru, took a very prominent part.

[For] 5 June was rather quiet, except for a 

French attack in the direction of Gandelu and 

Veuilly, which pushed back the German outposts 

to the edge of the village; the village itself being 

retained. There were also sporadic attacks by the 

Americans along the front of the 461st Infantry, 

which were repulsed, with many dead in front of 

the German positions; prisoners confirmed that the 

American losses were heavy. These daringly conducted raids served to convince General von Conta 

that he had before him a strong and enterprising 

foe. Accordingly, on 5 June, he issued the following 

order:

The attack ordered on June 3 is for the present 

deferred. However, the attack is to be so thoroughly prepared that it could be made within 

forty-eight hours after receipt of the order.

With the German battalions thus standing on 

the defensive on 6 June, the French 167th Division 

and the American 2d Division launched a combined 

attack. The French succeeded in entering Veuilly, 

but were ejected in a vigorous counterattack made 

by two companies of the 28th Replacement Infantry 

Regiment. The left wing of the 197th Division was 

pushed back to a line including the crossroads one 

kilometer west of Torey, the road leading south of 

Bussiares, and the northern end of the square patch 

of woods west of Bussiares. Owing to the fact that a 

new attack was expected early the next morning, and 

that his position projected too far from the line, the 

division commander, Lieutenant General Wilhelmi, 

voluntarily evacuated Veuilly during the night.

According to the German conception of the 

conduct of battle on 6 June, the two fresh divisions in full force, after a brief artillery preparation and gassing of the enemy artillery, should have 

rushed simultaneously in thin lines of skirmishers 

along the entire front. However, General [ Joseph] 

Degoutte, commander of the French XXI Army 

Corps, to which the American 2d Division was attached, had a different idea. He had the attack made 

in echelon, developing gradually from the left to the 

right in assigned periods of time, so that the different regiments followed one another into battle like 

the ribs of an opening fan. The right wing of the 

4th Infantry Brigade did not advance until evening. 

This ingenious method of attack, well suited in view 

of possible flanking movements, had the great disadvantage of enabling the Germans to concentrate 

their artillery fire every time exactly on the attacking troops.

If the Americans, notwithstanding their extraordinary bravery, did not meet with greater material success on 6 June, the fault lies mainly in this 

arrangement of the French corps commander.* Precious American blood, and much of it, was shed, 

without any necessity.

The difference between the German and the 

French methods is very clearly shown in the map 

* Note by MajGen J. G. Harbord, U.S. Army (Ret), division 

commander of the American 2d Division: “I am obliged to acquit General Degoutte of any responsibility as to the tactical 

methods employed on that date, nor was there any concerted 

action, of which I am aware, between the American 2d Division and the 167th French. With the information we had had 

that the woods were unoccupied by the Germans, we gave it 

no artillery preparation, thinking thereby to take it by surprise 

or to find it unoccupied. Occupied as it was by machine gun 

nests well placed, the tactical formation of the time, which was 

the advance in successive waves as we were then being taught, 

did entail considerable losses. My recollection is that the attack 

took place late in the afternoon. Colonel Otto starts it at 4:45 

a.m. He is probably confusing our attack on the woods with the 

French attack on Bussiares.”
81

Over There

of 7 June. This map also shows in what manner the 

Germans expected the attack of the American 2d 

Division to be carried out.

In accordance with orders from General 

Degoutte, at 0445, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 

Marine’s 5th Regiment joined the French 167th 

Division in the attack, the 1st Battalion on the left, 

the 2d on the right. This attack struck the 1st Battalion of the 460th Regiment, and the 9th Company

of the 462d Regiment, echeloned to the right. As the 

French had succeeded in making a temporary entry 

into Bussiares (they were ejected at 0945 by a Saxon 

Jäger battalion*), the 9th Company of the 462d Regiment, and the 9th Company of the 460th Regiment, 

were surrounded by superior forces and cut off in 

the early morning hours and, after a particularly 

brave defense, were practically annihilated. Only 

a small number of the 9th Company, 460th Regiment, succeeded in fighting their way back to their 

battalion with their bayonets. The 10th and 11th 

Companies, 460th, dug themselves in, in their patch 

* A German military term adopted around 1630 to refer to elite 

light infantry or, as the term implies, hunters.

of woods southwest of Torey, in the face of the enemy attacking on all sides. They repulsed the attack 

with severe losses, but were continually harassed by 

low fliers who almost touched the treetops. The few 

available reserves were rushed in turn to the places where the enemy was approaching the closest, 

sometimes within a few paces. A vigorous counterattack by the 12th Company, 460th, whose company 

commander fell in this comradely endeavor, cleared 

the way to the north. The enemy now covered the 

woods with heavy artillery fire, including gas shells. 

To have sent further support would have entailed 

severe losses; the regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tismer, therefore decided to withdraw 

both companies. Of course, this could only be done 

after dark. Accordingly, these two hard-pressed 

companies withstood the enemy attacks most creditably during the whole day. In order to support 

the front of the 460th Regiment, the 2d Battalion, 

462d, was now wedged in between the 3d Battalion, 

460th, on the right, and the 1st Battalion, 460th, on 

the left; the right flank of the 3d Battalion, 460th, 

was secured by the 10th Company, 462d, and by establishing flanking machine-gun nests.
82

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Following the orders of the Conta Group, the 

237th Division was now required to take over a 

strip heretofore covered by the 197th Division. The 

2d Battalion, 460th, therefore took position to the 

right, next to the 3d Battalion, 460th. At nightfall, 

the regimental alignment was to be reestablished as 

follows: the 2d Battalion, 460th, to the right; the 1st 

Battalion, 460th, to the left; the 2d and 3d Battalions, 

462d, and the 10th and 11th Companies, 460th Regiment, to be established to the rear. To facilitate this, 

at 1930, a heavy artillery barrage was directed along 

the front of the entire position. In the meantime, a 

raid by the enemy at 1800 was easily repulsed. Despite the heavy artillery fire, enemy raids were made 

at 2000 at different points as far as the line of the 1st 

Battalion, 460th. They were beaten off by a powerful 

counterattack of the 1st Company, 460th, and the 

flanking machine-gun fire of the 461st Regiment. 

Three Americans were taken prisoners.

By 2300, the 460th Regiment had completed the 

change of position. The two companies surrounded 

in the grove slipped away from the enemy in good 

order, without the loss of a single machine gun.

The 461st Regiment, holding Belleau Woods, 

reported that at 0630 the Americans had made 

a surprise attack on the 2d Battalion, holding the 

eastern half of the woods, but that the attack broke 

down on the front line. The southeastern tip of the 

woods had been left out of the defensive line on 5 

June, presumably because of the danger of a surrounding movement.

The enemy’s intentions were obvious, as his

artillery fire became more intense, particularly in 

the region east and north of Bouresches, while the 

activities of his flyers became more pronounced.

The division commander, Major General von

Diepenbroick-Grüter, at 1850, issued the following 

order: “We must expect continuous attacks on the 

front of the 10th Division.”

The attack of the [Corps’] 3d Battalion, 5th 

[Regiment], and the 2d and 3d Battalions, 6th [Regiment], late that evening, was therefore not at all 

unexpected by the Germans. It was directed chiefly 

against the left wing of the 398th Regiment, particularly the 1st Battalion, and the right wing of the 

47th Regiment, 1st Battalion. The Americans were 

obliged to come down from the heights they were 

occupying before the eyes of the Germans. They did 

this in thick lines of skirmishers, supported by columns following immediately behind. The Germans 

could not have desired better targets; such a spectacle was entirely unfamiliar to them. Under similar 

conditions, German troops would have advanced in 

thin lines of skirmishers following one another like 

waves, or in small, separate units of shock troops, 

moving forward in rows with their light machine 

guns, utilizing whatever shelter was offered by the 

terrain until they were in a position to open fire. It 

was thus that the French had advanced the same 

day, through the grain fields, until they had crept 

close to the German defenders. However, when one 

considers that this was their first real fight, this procedure of the Americans is by no means surprising. 

Troops coming under fire for the first time often 

proceed in just that way. The German soldiers of 

1914, generally conceded to have constituted the 

best army ever known, often advanced in almost the 

same way as the Americans did on this occasion, 

despite orders to the contrary. This is evident from 

the French and English descriptions of the early 

battles. And yet in those days, they defeated all the 

French and English armies, driving them back of 

the Marne, although they suffered great losses, particularly in officers. It is, therefore, perfectly clear 

why the vigorous American battalions adopted that 

method of advancing to the attack. And it was only 

natural that the entire artillery, machine-gun, and 

infantry fire of the defenders should have been concentrated on these advancing masses. It was thus 

that the first attack broke down with severe losses.

This failure by no means disheartened the 

Americans. They kept on attacking with tenacity. 

Gradually the German artillery fire to the westward became weaker, as they themselves were under heavy fire from the enemy, and suffered great 

losses. The artillery battery of the 21st Infantry, for 

example, had three men left at the guns at 2055, and 

it was, of course, impossible to keep up an effective barrage. All officers, noncommissioned officers, 

and other personnel were either dead or wounded. 

It thus became easier to run the barrage. Making 

good use of the bed of a brook, the 2d Battalion, 

6th Marines, at 2030 succeeded in entering Bouresches. As has been seen, there was here only an 

outpost consisting of the 7th and 8th Companies of 

the 398th Regiment. After a furious house-to-house 
83

Over There

battle, they were ordered to withdraw to the main 

defense line to avoid being cut off.

Now began a struggle of unexampled obstinacy. 

The American battalions set about their mission of 

capturing Belleau Woods, the Bouresches railway 

station, and Hills 126 and 133, unconditionally resolved to the last man to do so, cost what it might. 

But the German battalions defended this, their 

main defense line, with equal determination. After 

bitter fighting, the Americans finally had to give up 

the struggle, but with the village of Bouresches in 

their possession. The heroic spirit with which these 

brave troops attacked will be realized from the 

fact that, in front of the 4th Company, 398th Regiment, alone, 100 American dead were counted the 

following morning. On the German side, too, occurred something generally considered very rare in 

the war; the infantry, particularly the 1st Battalion, 

398th, had almost completely exhausted their ammunition. An emergency supply had to be brought 

up during the night by the 3d Battalion, 6th Grenadier Regiment, which had been stationed to the rear. 

The division commander now sent the 2d and 3d 

Battalions, 6th Grenadiers, to support the 398th Regiment. The rifle strength of each of the battalions, 

however, did not exceed 200. The 3d Battalion, 6th 

Grenadiers, was posted in the northwestern corner 

of the woods, near Rochette farm; the 2d Battalion

was echeloned behind the right wing of the 398th 

Regiment.

After the 398th Regiment was thus protected 

against a further expected attack from Bouresches, 

Lieutenant Colonel Rotenbucher, commander of 

the 47th Infantry Regiment, ordered the 1st Battalion, on whose right wing the 4th Company had given 

way before the American attack at 1930, to eject the 

enemy that had penetrated the wood patch east of 

Hill 192. Captain Rickert, the battalion commander, conducted this counterattack with unusual skill. 

He waited until dusk and until after the enemy captive balloon had been hauled down. From 2110 to 

2114, the enemy were showered with machine-gun 

fire from a northerly direction. Here, too, he left 

the 2d and 3d Companies. In the meantime, the 1st

and 4th Companies advanced, unobserved, through 

a ravine southeast of the wood patch in the vicinity 

of Point 175. At 2114, the two companies threw 

themselves on the enemy, whose whole attention 

had been turned to the north. In the ensuing fight 

in the woods, Lieutenant Gluckert fell, wounded, 

into the hands of the enemy, but the surprise attack 

was a complete success. The enemy sought to save 

themselves by a hasty retreat in a northerly direction, but thus came under the hot fire of the 398th 

Infantry. Here, too, numerous dead and wounded 

Americans covered the field, some of the wounded 

begging for water in German.

The total losses of the 10th Infantry Division

on 6 June were as follows: killed, 24; wounded, 101; 

missing, 2 officers and 24 men. The losses of the 

237th Division were considerably greater: killed, 6 

officers and 72 men; wounded, 10 officers and 218 

men; missing, 5 officers and 90 men. The 237th Division took 40 American prisoners; the 10th [took] 

7 Americans.

Thus ended the battles of 6 June. Both sides 

have reason to be proud of the deeds of their young 

men there.

[For] 7 June was comparatively quiet. The right 

wing of the 197th Division withstood an attack by 

the French from the direction of Gandelu, losing 

a little ground. During the night, this division was 

relieved by the 5th Guard Division.

At noon, the 237th Division received reports of 

a concentration of enemy infantry in the woods between Torey and Lucy-le-Bocage. This pointed to 

an attack on the 461st Regiment. Accordingly, the 

1st Battalion, 462d Regiment, was assigned to the 

461st as a reserve. In the afternoon, after a strong 

artillery preparation, the Americans actually did try 

an attack along the entire front of the regiment. On 

the right wing, the attack broke down in the German advanced positions owing to a hot machinegun fire; on the left wing, the Americans advanced 

on the line from Hill 181 to the left, but they were 

finally driven off. Whether a major attack had been 

planned or whether it was simply a local demonstration has not been determined.

The losses of the 237th Division on that day 

were: killed, 9; wounded, 68; missing, 8.

The 10th Division also believed that it nipped 

in the bud an enemy attack in the early morning 

hours of 7 June by a combined artillery, machinegun, and infantry fire. A patrol from the 10th Company, 398th, found Bouresches strongly occupied by 

American forces. Some of their trucks on the way 
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

to the rear came under vigorous German machinegun fire. During the night of 7–8 June, the 47th 

Regiment was relieved by the 444th Regiment of the 

231st Division. The division now extended its quiet 

front to the west by the width of a regiment.

The losses of the 10th Division amounted to 

2 officers and 8 men killed, 1 officer and 50 men 

wounded, and 13 men missing; there were also 3 

officers and 20 men gassed, having inhaled German gas.

An incident very characteristic of the bold behavior of the Americans took place that day near 

the 231st Division. During the relief of the 1st Battalion, 442d Regiment, by the 2d Battalion on Hill 

204, some men of the 8th Company suddenly came 

upon Americans and Frenchmen on top of the hill 

in a clearing [that] divides the southern part of the 

woods. Two startled Americans were captured, and 

were led behind the lines by some food carriers of a 

machine gun company. But despite all their efforts, 

the Germans could not get a clear statement from 

them. However, it was believed that a strong enemy patrol had pushed in between the 6th and 8th 

Companies during the relief operations. Due to the 

impenetrable underbrush and the heavy machinegun fire, the 8th Company failed to dislodge them, 

as did a counterattack by the 3d and 4th Companies

along the edge of the woods, ordered by Major von 

Görne, the regimental commander. Another attack 

made by the 3d Battalion, 442d Regiment, also ended in failure.

The division commander, Major General von 

Hülsen, then issued an energetic order to clean out 

that “American nest.” The efforts were repeated on 

8 June and again on 10 June, but the intruders, no 

doubt considerably reinforced by the French, held 

their own, notwithstanding the fact that they were 

hemmed in by a semicircle of the 442d Regiment. 

Their tenacity was so great that, finally, all efforts to 

dislodge them were given up. The German position 

on Hill 204 was strongly fortified to form a ring 

around the “American nest.”

On 8 June at 0100, the 460th Division asked 

the 237th Division for a barrage, but the threatened 

enemy attack did not materialize. At 0130, however, 

the 461st Regiment, stationed on their immediate 

left, repulsed an attack made in strong force after a 

drum fire of 15 minutes.

At 0500 came an attack against Belleau Woods 

by the 3d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], reinforced by 

one company of the 2d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], 

and two companies of the 2d Engineers. The 461st 

Regiment made the following report concerning 

this attack:

At 5:00 A.M. the enemy renewed his attack 

along the entire front of this regiment. Beaten 

back everywhere else, he succeeded in penetrating on the left wing, favored as he was by the 

possession of Bouresches. A counterattack by 

the 6th and 8th Companies, 461st, and the 365th 

Engineers Company, threw the Americans back 

to their original position in the woods. The 

mass of dead lying in front of the point where 

they temporarily broke our line indicates that 

the enemy suffered great losses. Forty prisoners 

were taken by the 461st Regiment.

The losses of the 237th Division were: 2 officers 

and 49 men killed; 8 officers and 128 men wounded; and 2 men missing.

At 0200, an attack was made against the 398th 

Regiment, 10th Division, by the American 34th Infantry Regiment, but was beaten back with great 

losses. Attempts by our own men during the early 

morning hours to bring in the American wounded 

lying along the front failed because the enemy evidently misunderstood the attempt, and fired on the 

hospital unit. During the night of 9 June, the 398th 

Regiment was relieved by the 109th Grenadier Regiment of the 28th Division.

The losses of the 10th Division on 8, 9, and 

10 June were: 5 men killed; 1 officer and 29 men 

wounded; and 18 men sick.

With the relief of the 197th Division by the 5th 

Guard Infantry Division, and of the 10th Division

by the 28th, the division fronts were shifted to the 

right by the width of one battalion. The front of the 

5th Guard Division was narrowed; the 197th Infantry Division was required to take over Bussiares 

during the night of 8–9 June; and the 40th Regiment of the 28th Infantry Division was shifted to 

take over the eastern half of Belleau Woods. This 

last, as we will see later, proved fateful.

Lieutenant General [Albano] von Jacobi, commander of the 237th Division, which has held our 

interest so much, had among his officers some out-
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standing regimental commanders. Lieutenant Colonel Tismer, commander of the 460th Regiment, to 

which had been assigned the 3d Battalion, 462d, 

and a company of shock troops, to take over Bussiares, anticipated the events of the coming day in 

the following order, issued at 2325:

If the enemy attacks tonight at Bussiares or Torey and breaks through anywhere, a counterattack should be made immediately, if possible, in 

order to gain ground that can be used later as an 

advanced position if it offers favorable facilities 

for defense.

The 3d Battalion, 462d Regiment, and the company of shock troops were to enter Bussiares; the 3d 

Battalion, 460th, and the 1st Battalion, 462d, were 

to hold themselves in readiness in the hollow near 

Licy-Clignon.

Such was the situation when the enemy, at 

0440 on 9 June, after a vigorous artillery preparation, attacked the front of the 5th Guard Infantry 

Division and Bussiares. They succeeded in pushing 

back the 20th Regiment of the 5th Guards, which 

was unacquainted with the ground, and in surrounding several of its companies in the triangular 

wood patch southwest of Bussiares, but they were 

unable to force their way into the village. At 0800, 

they increased their artillery fire with considerable 

use of gas shells. At 0930, they made a furious attack and, after a violent house-to-house fight, penetrated into Bussiares. Thereupon followed a terrific 

counterattack of the 2d and 3d Companies of the 

460th Regiment. In full force, they threw the enemy 

out of the village and followed him to the heights 

southeast of Bussiares. They established positions 

here, but were compelled to return to the southern 

edge of Bussiares because they were suffering from 

the short-range fire of their own artillery. The enemy held out in some of the houses on the western 

edge until 1630, when they were ejected. During 

the night, the 3d Battalion, 460th Regiment, occupied Bussiares, relieving the 3d, 462d.

The 461st Regiment repulsed an attack during 

the night, and again at 0500, another American attack directed along the entire front of the regiment. 

It was learned from statements of prisoners that the 

attack had been made by the 5th and 6th [Regiments] and the 23d Infantry, but that it had been 

repulsed with heavy losses.

THE BATTLES OF BELLEAU WOODS:

PART II

by Lieutenant Colonel Ernst Otto, German Army (Ret)

The losses sustained during these daily battles had 

reduced the companies of the 461st Regiment to 

such an extent that it became necessary to put almost the entire regiment on the front line in order to attain the required strength in our main

defensive line. There remained in reserve only the 3d 

Company, directly behind the 1st Battalion; the 9th 

Company, behind the 2d Battalion; the 365th Engineer Company, directly behind the left wing; and 

the 366th Engineer Company, near the center. Major 

Bischoff, the regimental commander, a veteran in 

African bush and forest fighting, had thus far been 

able to repel all American attacks by those methods. 

During the night of 10 June, he was to turn over the 

left half of his regiment’s front in Belleau Woods to 

a battalion of the 4th Regiment, 28th Infantry Division. From the officer sent in advance, he learned 

that this battalion was to relieve six weakened companies of his regiment by stationing only two companies on the main defense line, while the other two 

companies were to be echeloned east of the woods. 

Major Bischoff protested at once. He insisted that 

the customary procedure must be avoided; that the 

woods were so thick that a counterattack coming 

from a deep position would be ineffective. His arguments did not prevail, however, as the plans of 

the 28th Division had already been approved. Major 

Bischoff had a presentment of what was to be enacted on that scene in the next few days. To provide 

against the worst, he left six heavy machine guns 

in the relinquished position, but unfortunately only 

for 24 hours.

The losses of the 237th Division on 9 June 

amounted to 40 men killed, 6 officers and 163 men 

wounded, and 3 officers and 57 men missing. Those 

of the 28th Division, which had taken over the new 

front at 1000, were 9 men killed [and] 1 officer and 

44 men wounded.

The commander of the 28th Division, in his 

order of the day dated 8 June, addressed his tired 

troops as follows:
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

An American success along our front, even if 

only temporary, may have the most unfavorable influence on the attitude of the Entente 

and the duration of the war. In the coming 

battles, therefore, it is not a question of the possession or non-possession of this or that village 

or woods, insignificant in itself; it is a question 

whether the Anglo-American claim that the 

American Army is the equal or even the superior of the German Army is to be made good.

Nowhere is the thought more clearly expressed 

than in this order of Major General Bohm.

On 10 June, the main defense line along the 

front of the 5th Guard Division was shifted back to 

the north of Clignon Brook. The main defense line 

of the 460th Regiment was also drawn back. The village of Bussiares, now but an outpost, was occupied 

only by the 3d and 4th Companies of the 460th. This 

shift was accomplished without interference by the 

enemy.

The 461st Regiment had now taken over a battalion front from the line of the 460th. Only the 

1st Battalion of the 461st was now left in Belleau 

Woods. An attack on this battalion at 0500, preceded by the heaviest artillery preparations, was 

repulsed by machine-gun and artillery fire. At the 

same time, the Americans made an attack against 

the 2d Battalion of the 40th Regiment in the eastern 

half of the woods. This attack and a further one from 

the direction of Bouresches were both repulsed.

The losses of that day amounted to 1 officer and 

36 men killed, 5 officers and 132 men wounded, 

and 4 men missing in the 237th Division; 137 men 

killed, 247 wounded, and 50 missing in the 28th 

Division.

We now come to the decisive American attack 

of 11 June, executed mainly by the 2d Battalion, 

5th [Regiment], and the 1st Battalion, 6th [Regiment].

At 0330, the enemy artillery fire had reached its 

maximum effectiveness. At 0530, the 1st Battalion, 

461st, was attacked in the western half of the woods. 

Our demand for an artillery barrage received no answer, as our signal lights could not be seen through 

the heavy fog. Nevertheless, this attack was beaten 

off. Fifty American dead lay along the front of the 

battalion. Immediately after, however, the enemy 

broke through the right wing of the 2d Battalion, 

40th Regiment, and appeared on the flank and rear 

of the 1st and 4th Companies of the 461st Regiment. 

Favored by the fog, he immediately renewed his 

attack on the front of the two companies. After a 

bitter night battle, the German companies lost 3

officers and 80 men as prisoners; the rest fought 

their way through by bayonet to the north, where 

they were incorporated into the 2d, 3d, 5th, and 7th 

Companies of the 461st Regiment, under Major Hartlieb, the battalion commander. Major Hartlieb, after 

building a strong barricade in the woods, marched 

at the head of his companies to the counterattack, 

sweeping along, by his own example, those units 

exhausted by the struggles of the day. This spirited 

procedure had its [intended] effect; by noon, the 1st 

Battalion, 461st, had regained its position.

Upon being informed of the enemy incursion, 

the commander of the 237th Division advanced the 

1st Battalion, 462d Regiment, into the wood patch 

near Les Brusses farm, and the 2d Battalion, 462d, 

to Point 182. The hard-pressed 1st Battalion, 461st, 

was reinforced by the 1st and 3d Companies of the 

462d, and two machine gun platoons. It should 

be noted here that, in the 1st and 2d Battalions of

the 460th Regiment, the number of influenza cases 

began to increase about this time to an alarming 

degree.

On the front of the 2d Battalion, 40th, in 

the eastern part of the woods, the first American

attack had been repulsed by the 7th and 8th Companies. However, owing to the thinness of the 

lines—against which Major Bischoff had protested 

in vain—the Americans succeeded in a second attack in breaking through the right wing of the 2d

Battalion, 40th Regiment. In this operation, the 

Americans made good use of the bed of a brook, 

which ran through the middle of the woods in a 

northeasterly direction. The captain of the 5th Company, 40th, standing here in reserve, immediately 

threw himself upon them. But his company was 

soon scattered in the thick forest. There remained 

under his control but few of his men, or of the mine 

throwing company stationed in the woods, and 

he was overwhelmed by numbers. His company, 

thrown into confusion, together with the 7th and 

8th Companies of the 40th Regiment, was attacked 

flank and rear. In the ensuing bayonet battle fought 
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on both sides with the utmost bravery, both sides 

suffered great losses. The general confusion among 

the defenders was increased by German-speaking 

Americans who, in the thick woods, called out,

“Wo ist das Regiment 40?” and the like, apparently 

for assistance. This confusion resulted in the loss of 

practically the entire personnel of the three companies; but [a] few succeeded in fighting their way 

through. Those who did not fall in battle were taken 

prisoners.

The 1st Battalion of the 40th was now thrown 

into the counterattack. They were received by the 

Americans, however, with a heavy machine-gun 

fire, and advanced only 200 meters. Their losses 

were so heavy and their ranks so thinned that any 

further effort at counterattack seemed hopeless. The 

commander of the 28th Division now ordered the 

2d Battalion of the 110th Regiment, which had advanced to the region southwest of Étrépilly, to the 

support of the 40th Regiment. The new troops were 

stationed to the right of the 1st Battalion, 40th, and 

Captain Mencke was given command of the two 

battalions in the attack. He pushed forward another 

200 meters, and then came to a standstill; his machine guns and mine throwers were powerless in the 

thick forest. His men were so exhausted by about

2000 that all attempts to advance were stopped. The 

front line was even moved back a little to get a better situation.

The brigade commander issued orders to retake 

the old line the next day at any cost.

The losses of the 237th Division on this day 

amounted to 2 officers and 28 men killed, 2 officers and 114 men wounded, and 3 officers and 82 

men missing. Those of the 28th Division have not 

been fully established, but they amounted to about 

3 officers and 151 men killed, 6 officers and 355 

men wounded, and 1 officer and 53 men missing. 

The number of prisoners was probably somewhat 

greater than this.

Quiet reigned along the front of the 460th and 

the 461st Regiments during the forenoon of 12 June. 

The Americans contented themselves with feeling 

out the positions with strong patrols.

At 1701, however, a surprise attack was made 

on Belleau Woods without artillery preparations, 

[and] executed mainly by the 2d Battalion, 5th 

[Regiment]. The 1st Battalion, 461st, repulsed the 

enemy in the advanced positions. The 8th Company, 461st, which formed the connection between 

the 40th Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 461st, also 

met with success. Some 50 dead lay along the front. 

But the neighbor on the left was not so fortunate. 

Soon afterward, the 8th Company was completely 

surrounded from the left and cut off, while the 7th 

Company, 461st, was attacked from the rear. On the 

northeastern corner, also, the enemy was advancing 

clear through the woods.

Accordingly, Major Bischoff ordered the 2d 

Battalion, 461st, to withdraw as far as Pavilion Hill, 

but not to give up that position under any circumstances because it dominated the ground as far as 

Hill 190–Belleau-Torcy, and its loss would have necessitated the withdrawal of the entire line back of 

Clignon Brook.

In accordance with these orders, the left wing 

of the 2d Battalion, 461st, fell back and proceeded to 

a counterattack toward the northeastern part of the 

woods, with the 5th and 7th Companies of the 461st, 

and the 1st and 3d Companies of the 462d. This attack succeeded, and the troops established themselves in the woods south of Pavilion Hill, beating 

off all further attacks. There was now a gap between 

the 461st and the 40th Regiments, which was filled 

by the 2d and 4th and Machine Gun Companies of 

the 1st Battalion, 462d. These units now formed the 

left wing of the 461st Regiment.

As there was very little firing coming from 

the woods at 2000, a skirmish line reconnoitered 

through the forest to the northern edge of the large 

clearings, where they dug themselves in.

Lieutenant General von Jacobi now concentrated the entire fire of his artillery on the southern 

part of the woods. He also requested the commander of the 5th Guard Division, Major General von 

Haxthausen, to join in the fire, and detailed the 2d 

Battalion, 462d Regiment, stationed at Les Brusses 

farm, to the support of the 461st Regiment.

On the front of the 28th Division, the 2d Battalion, 110th Regiment, and parts of the 1st Battalion, 40th, had renewed the attack at 0415. The 

American resistance here proved exceptionally vigorous. However, the German right wing succeeded 

in reaching the old line at 0601.

A strong artillery fire began at 1730, soon followed by attacks en masse. The American masses, 
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advancing in part in columns, were subjected to 

a murderous fire; nevertheless they continued to 

throw in new forces. They succeeded in breaking 

through at various points. Now they appeared in the 

rear of the 2d Battalion, 110th Regiment, and the 1st 

Battalion of the 40th. After an obstinate resistance, 

both battalions were forced back. Those remaining behind fought their way to the eastern edge of 

the woods, and then returned to the BoureschesBelleau road, where they were incorporated into the 

1st Battalion of the 110th.

Thus the bold 2d [Battalion], 5th [Regiment], 

succeeded in driving completely out of the woods 

the forces of the 28th Division that had established 

themselves there.

The losses of the 237th Division amounted to 8 

men killed, 5 officers and 48 men wounded, and 1 

officer and 63 men missing. Those of the 28th Division were 2 officers and 43 men killed, 1 officer 

and 274 men wounded, and 1 officer and 35 men 

missing.

The question here might suggest itself: how can 

it be explained that the Germans, after fighting off 

with unheard of bravery continuous American attacks for seven days, should have been overwhelmed 

in hand-to-hand fighting in the comparatively short 

time of two days, as soon as the Americans had 

forced their way into the forest? The question is the 

more pertinent and the success of the Americans 

the more creditable because it had been common 

knowledge that it was precisely in hand-to-hand 

fighting that the German was an exceptionally redoubtable foe. It had been repeatedly demonstrated 

during the long course of the World War that, due 

to the Furor Teutonicus* once dreaded by the Romans, the Germans were so superior to the French 

and the Russians in this form of combat—and what 

is more important, felt themselves so superior—

that it was only when the French and Russians outnumbered them that they dared meet the Germans 

at close quarters. The marked superiority of the 

German race over the Roman and Slavic races in 

hand-to-hand fighting impressed itself throughout 

the hardest battles of the World War. If the sportloving English, and the powerful Canadians and 

Australians, proved to be the equals of the Germans 

in hand-to-hand combat, it must be remembered 

that, like ourselves, they are of Germanic blood.

* Latin for Teutonic Fury and refers to the ferocity of the Germanic tribes during the Roman Empire.
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Over There

To give a complete answer to this question, 

we must also examine the organization and equipment of a German infantry regiment at this time. In 

each, there was a mine thrower company of six light 

mine throwers; each of the three battalions had one 

machine gun company with eight heavy machine 

guns; each of the four companies of a battalion had 

six light machine guns. With such an organization, which was quite similar to that of the French, 

the German infantry possessed a great firing force 

[that] enabled them to beat off the American attacks. But the small number of men armed with 

the rifle—men with bayonets—constituted a great 

disadvantage once the fighting started inside the 

forest itself. Moreover, their shock troops had been 

considerably thinned out. It was quite the contrary 

with the Americans.

Even as it was, the equipment of the attacking 

division had been reduced before beginning the offensive in order to give them greater shock force. 

During trench warfare, each infantry regiment 

had as many as 12 light mine throwers, 24 grenade 

throwers, and 36 heavy and 96 light machine guns.

There is another point. Even before the opening of the Chemin des Dames offensive, a German 

commanding general had seriously recommended 

to the High Command that each two divisions be 

merged into one, because he believed that the fighting strength of our infantry had been too much reduced. In the first place, the infantry regiments were 

weak in numbers; secondly, the number of specialists not participating in actual combat amounted 

to 2,000 in each division. As the specialists have 

smaller losses than the fighting men, the result was 

that after the first heavy engagements they were actually numerically grater than the infantry troops.

Now, what was the actual situation with regard 

to strength? The German battalions stationed opposite the American 2d Division had suffered heavy 

losses since 27 May. It is difficult to determine the 

actual losses during and after each of the daily battles. However, a good grasp of the situation may be 

gained from the report of the 237th Division that, 

on 13 June, its rifle strength, exclusive of machinegun and mine-thrower troops, was:

460th Regiment—21 officers—575 men

461st Regiment—12 officers—429 men

462d Regiment—14 officers—478 men

In accordance with a brigade order, all available 

men from the transport service had been concen-
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trated and brought to the front line. This added on 

the front of the 462d Regiment a total of 1 officer, 

58 noncommissioned officers, including a sergeant 

major, and 150 men, all of whom were urgently 

needed, as the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 460th 

Regiment had had [more than] 100 new cases of influenza in the last two days.

It may be assumed without doubt that the rifle 

strength of an American company at this time was 

about equal to that of a German battalion. When 

the German companies reported that they were attacked by superior numbers in the woods, that must 

actually have been the case.

On 13 June, a concerted attack was planned to 

be made under the commander of the 28th Division, with the object of regaining the woods and 

the village of Bouresches. The artillery preparations 

began at 0400, and 15 minutes later the united battalions of the 109th, 110th, and 128th Regiments

began the advance; but they were soon driven back 

to their positions by heavy machine-gun fire from 

the woods and from Bouresches. Parts of the 109th 

Grenadier Regiment did succeed in establishing a 

foothold in Bouresches, where they left an outpost. 

As the attack failed to progress, the 461st Regiment

did not join in.

Toward five o’clock in the afternoon, the positions still held by the right wing of the 28th Division and the 2d Battalion of the 461st Regiment

were attacked by the Americans, but they did not 

succeed in forcing the Germans completely out of 

the woods. The 461st Regiment, reinforced by the 

2d Battalion, 462d, managed to reestablish its communications and to organize the main defense line 

for further resistance.

The losses of the 237th Division amounted to 4 

officers and 32 men killed, 3 officers and 106 men 

wounded, and 9 men missing. Those of the 28th Division amounted to 65 men killed, 317 wounded, 

and 35 missing. The total losses of the 28th Division

from 27 May to 15 June amounted to 70 officers 

and 2,100 men.

The conditions existing in the 40th Regiment on 

13 June were described as follows: “Due to exhaustion, malnutrition, and above all to lack of junior 

officers, the fighting value of these troops is practically nil.”

On 15 June, a gathering of American troops in 

the northwestern part of the woods in front of the 

237th Division was scattered by a withering fire. The 

237th lost 1 officer and 13 men killed, and 1 officer 

and 60 men wounded. Major Mors, commander of 

the 462d Regiment, died as a result of severe wounds 

received on 6 June. On 16 June, the gallant 237th 

Division was relieved by the 87th Division.

The conditions existing in the 237th Division

are best described in the following extract from the 

diary of Lieutenant Breil, commanding the 12th 

Company, 461st Regiment, and in private life a head 

schoolmaster:

He who escaped being wounded during the 

days around here may surely boast of exceptionally good fortune. But there was no time to 

worry about that; we were too exhausted. What 

our men did here can only be judged by one 

who was on the scene himself. How feeble and 

sick we were, with fever (the influenza), and diarrhea, all of us without exception, and yet we 

held out! Here we had a good example of the 

influence of a leader. Major Bischoff, the veteran African fighter, said to his men: “I know 

you are all sick. Any physician would have you 

put on the sick list. But will you allow the successes won with our blood to be jeopardized or 

even lost? A man can endure anything so long 

as he has the will to do so. Clench your teeth, 

then! Put yourselves together! When we get out 

of this place we will have time to recuperate.” 

Not a man reported himself sick.

The other divisions—the 10th and 28th—were 

among the finest in the German Army. As the most 

successful German division, the 28th (Baden) Infantry had led the attack from Chemin des Dames 

to the Marne, defeating and hurling back all the 

French who opposed its bold dash. Like the 5th 

Guard, this division had been relieved on the Marne 

in order to undertake a new task. The troops of both 

divisions naturally had been used up by the long 

drawn-out fighting, without any intervening periods, and were sorely in need of rest.

The question might therefore be raised: why 

did the German Supreme Command place these 

badly worn troops in the battle line, well know-
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ing that they could not live up to their standards or 

their reputations? As a matter of fact, general headquarters still had at its disposal at that time, in the 

army group of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, 

alone, 37 fully manned and fresh divisions. But it 

desired to use them in a decisive offensive against 

the English in the region of Ypres, the plan being 

to push their northern wing back against the sea 

and to roll up their southern wing. As stated before, 

there was no intention of making an attack on Paris. 

The great offensive launched between Soissons and 

Reims, as well as the later attack on both sides of 

Reims, [for] 15–17 July was intended as a diversion 

to cover this mighty so-called “Hagen” (hedging) 

operation. It was only as a result of the successful 

attack of the Allies on 18 July that the German Supreme Command was compelled to abandon that 

vast plan, and to use the “Hagen Divisions” for defense in other quarters.

On 14 June, the Supreme Command issued 

orders to the army groups of the German crown 

prince to suspend the offensive and to organize for 

the defensive. This put an end not only to the battles 

raging since 9 June on the front of the 18th Army in 

the region of Noyon on the Avre and the Matz and 

to the great offensive conducted by the right wing 

of the 7th Army west and southwest of Soissons, but 

also to the local attacks in the Belleau Woods region. The latter offensive could have been brought 

to a successful conclusion only by the use of fresh 

troops. The 28th Division was no longer equal to the 

occasion.

The newly arrived 87th Division now took over 

the right sector of the front of the 28th Division; 

the latter, in turn, the right sector of the front of the 

231st Division. This front, on which there had been 

so much fighting, now became a so-called “quiet 

front.” However, as will be seen, there was no lack 

of fighting here, even if it was a “quiet front.”

The transfer of the positions to the 87th Division gave rise to the suggestion that the northern 

corner of the woods be evacuated, and that the main 

defense line be withdrawn to the slopes behind the 

villages of Belleau and Torey, to gain a stronger advanced position. In the forest itself, an advanced position could have been created only by clearing the 

very thick underbrush with mines. However, General von Conta did not approve this plan.

The division commander stationed the 345th 

Regiment on the right, and the 347th on the left. 

Within the woods was the 1st Battalion, 347th, less 

one company, which was withdrawn to Belleau village as a reserve.

We shall now take only a brief further glance 

at the events concerning Belleau. On the night of 

17–18 June, our positions in that region were attacked by infantry patrols, which were repulsed by 

light machine-gun fire and hand grenades. During 

the night of 18–19 June, the enemy made a surprise attack along the entire line of the division with 

infantry and machine guns. At 0450 [on] 20 June, 

without special artillery preparations, they attacked 

the front of the 347th Infantry in strong lines of 

skirmishers, but without success. Patrols from 

the 3d Battalion, 347th, found between 60 and 70 

American dead in one small area. They appeared to 

belong to the 7th Infantry Regiment.

On 21 June at 0630, the enemy attacked the 

11th Company, 347th Regiment, then stationed in 

the woods. This attack broke down close to our 

lines, with heavy losses to the enemy. We captured 

three wounded Americans of the 7th [Infantry].

On 23 June between 2400 and 0500, four patrol 

raids in considerable force took place, the last one 

after artillery preparation. All were beaten off with 

rifle and machine-gun fire.

On 24 June, they attacked at 2000 and, after being beaten off, again at 2215; once more, they were 

repulsed with heavy losses after we had resorted

to barrage fire. Commencing at about 1230, there 

were sporadic raids by grenade throwers against the 

1st Battalion, 347th. Simultaneously, patrols advancing on the right wing of the battalion were driven 

off. At 0300, a rush against the center of the battalion was repulsed. At 0400, the enemy again made 

unsuccessful attacks on the right and left wings of 

this battalion. In this attack, the enemy crept in cautiously with their helmets covered with green brush. 

French troops were now found with the Americans. 

Along the left wing of the battalion, the enemy was 

only 50 or 75 meters from the German lines.

The conclusive American attack took place on 

25 June. The divisional report was as follows:

At 5:00 p. m., a very heavy artillery fire suddenly began from Belleau and the high ground
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

between the woods and the village. Simultaneously, medium and heavy mine throwers 

directed a fire on the part of the woods held 

by us. At 6:00 p. m., the adjoining battalions 

and the artillery positions also came under fire. 

The companies on the left, the 3rd and 4th of 

the 347th Regiment, stationed nearer the edge 

of the woods, suffered severe losses, since the 

mines burst for the most part in the trees.

The infantry attack began about 6:30 p. m. 

The battalion at first evaded the force of the 

blow. Captain (Cavalry) Kaulbars, commander 

of the battalion, was informed of the heavy losses suffered by the companies and, at 7:00 p. m., 

he sent an emergency call, by radio, for the assistance of the 3rd Battalion, in reserve. He now 

distributed the 1st Company of shock troops 

among the 3rd and 4th Companies. At 7:12

p. m., division headquarters was informed by the 

artillery observers that the battalion was again 

advancing on the woods. At 7:45 p. m., observers noticed white light signals from the depth 

of the woods (“Here we are.”) At 8:09 p. m., an 

artillery observer reported that the northern tip 

of the woods was again in our possession, and 

that the enemy fire had quieted down.

An infantry flier sent by the division reported 

that the infantry had again reached the old line.

After a short pause, a new attack was opened 

at 8:30 p. m. The enemy broke into our positions between the 3rd Company and what remained of the 4th. Both were rolled up against 

the 2nd and 5th Companies of the 2nd Battalion, 

adjoining them on the north. A regrouping of 

the massed shock troops for defense could not 

be effected for lack of time, particularly since 

at the very opening of the attack the captain 

of the 4th Company had been killed, and the 

captain of the 3rd Company mortally wounded. 

Those prisoners captured in our counterattack 

fell again into the hands of the enemy.

At 10:15 p. m., there were only remnants of 

the five companies participating in the fighting. They succeeded in establishing themselves 

anew in positions now held along the ToreyBelleau road.

The division had dispatched two companies 

of the reserve battalion of the 3rd Replacement 

Regiment to Belleau from the region north of 

Bouresches. These companies were detailed to 

the 347th Regiment for use on the thinned portion of its front. The 6th Company occupied the 

southern edge of Belleau as a measure of precaution.

The total losses of the five participating companies of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 347th

Regiment, amounted to 7 officers and 433 noncommissioned officers and men. Of these, 2 officers and 64 non-commissioned officers and 

men returned wounded. Therefore, there remained 5 officers and 369 non-commissioned 

officers and men to be classed as dead or missing. Assuming that the report from Eiffel Tower of 5 officers and 259 men prisoners is correct, 

110 men must be counted dead. The 66 mentioned above as wounded were light cases, and 

returned to duty before the second attack. At 

the ratio of 1 dead to 2% wounded, there would 

be a total of 275 wounded, with 209 of them either seriously wounded or lightly wounded but 

not recovered. On this basis we should count 

264 less 209, or 55 unwounded prisoners, who 

must belong mainly to the five companies stationed in the western corner of the woods, and 

attacked in the rear.

So much for the report of Major General Feldkeller, commander of the 87th Infantry Division. 

Reports to the effect that part of the Americans 

wore German uniforms with insignia of the 109th 

Grenadier Regiment are no doubt mere stories. On 

the other hand, it is true that they sought to create confusion amidst their foe by calling out in the 

German language.

Belleau Woods was now entirely in the hands 

of the American 2d Division.

To get an accurate conception of the effect produced by the first appearance of the young American troops in a pitched battle in the western theater 

of war, we must keep in mind both the material results attained and the moral impression produced. 

The two combined will give a correct picture. It 

is much like the effect of a well-directed artillery 

fire; every experienced soldier knows that often the 

moral effect is decidedly greater than the material.
93

Over There

The enormous moral impression created by the 

appearance of the Americans on the side of the Allied powers was dwelt upon at the beginning. In the 

course of my narrative, I have pointed out that the 

death-defying boldness of the Americans, their impetuous onslaughts, and their tenacious endurance 

were well recognized by the opposing troops and 

produced a great impression on them.

The opinion of the commanding general of 

the 4th Reserve Corps, von Conta, concerning the 

Americans after these battles is evidenced from the 

following report, dated 17 August 1918:

Fighting Value: The 2nd American may be described as a very good division, and might even 

be considered as fit for use as shock troops. The 

numerous attacks by the two Marine regiments 

in Belleau Woods were executed vigorously and 

without regard for the consequences. Our fire 

did not affect their morale sufficiently to interfere appreciably with their advance; their nerves 

had not yet been used up.

The replacement troops must be pronounced 

excellent. They are healthy, strong, physically 

well-developed men from eighteen to twentyeight years of age, who only need the proper 

training to be turned into opponents worthy of 

respect.

In spirit the troops are lively and full of a 

grim, but good-natured, confidence. Indicative 

is the expression of a prisoner “We kill or get 

killed.”

General Ludendorff had recognized from the first 

reports how considerable was this new foe and how 

great the danger when many such fine American divisions appeared on the front. On 8 June, he therefore issued the following order to all army groups 

on the western front:

American units appearing on the front should 

be hit particularly hard in order to render difficult the formation of an American army.

The order is significant in that it shows what a high 

value even the German Supreme Command set on 

the aid of American arms.

So it was the 2d Division that brilliantly and 

deeply engraved in a glorious chapter of the history 

of the war the answer to the question as to how the 

Americans would behave in a pitched battle.

On the edge of the blood-drenched woods, 

however, we might well erect a monument draped 

with the French, German, and American colors, 

and bearing the inscription:

These are the Woods of Belleau; in June 1918, 

wrested from the French after a brave defense 

by the Germans, storming on in a bold two-day 

offensive; heroically defended by them for nine 

days; then taken by storm in two days with incomparable bravery by the Americans, who remained victoriously in possession of the woods. 

Honor to the unexcelled heroes of the three nations who, true to their fatherland, here fought 

and died.
94

“A critical analysis of flank protection” in the action 

of the 2d Division in France 3–9 October 1918.

In presenting this monograph, I hope to show 

that without flank protection how the advance of a 

division stopped—stopped as though the leading 

elements had come to a red traffic signal.

About the first of October, the 2d Division 

entered the sector of Somme-Py—French Fourth 

Army. The enemy was holding stubbornly in positions [that] he had occupied since 1914. The French 

had conquered the difficult system of trenches 

south of Somme-Py after several days of terrible 

fighting and, on 1 October, were holding on a line 

one kilometer northwest of Somme-Py. These gains 

had been made over an area of complete desolation where the Germans had constructed a most 

amazing mass of deep trenches and concrete fortifications. The wide stretches of chalky ground, torn 

and scarred by years of artillery bombardment, the 

thickly scattered bodies of French and Germans, 

the vast mine craters, gave the men of the 2d Division a very vivid conception of their new task. Never 

had they seen such grim, horrible evidence of war’s 

destruction. One saw nothing but tangled masses 

of wire, torn bodies, great ugly duds, dead horses, 

smashed guns scattered over the chalkish waste.

General [ John A.] Lejeune’s plan called for a 

converging attack by the 3d and 4th Brigades, the 

4th jumping off just north of Somme-Py [and] 

making the main effort on Blanc Mont (key point 

of German lines between Rheims and the Argonne), 

the 3d Brigade to jump off three kilometers northeast of Somme-Py and attack in a west by northwest direction, principal objective being the well 

organized strong point [at] Mede ah Ferme. Both 

brigades to attack on a front of one and one-half 

kilometers. The artillery preparation was to consist 

of a five-minute intense bombardment by all guns 

of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade firing at the maximum rate. The lines of advance of the two brigades 

were to converge at a point three kilometers from 

the jump-off, closing at this point the large angle 

of difficult terrain [that] was to be neutralized. This 

angle included the Bois de la Vipère and a fortified 

wooded hill, which were to be heavily bombarded 

with gas shells.

The attack started at 0550; the 6th [Regiment]

leading and the 5th [Regiment] supporting in the 

4th Brigade; the 9th Infantry leading and the 23d 

Infantry supporting in the 3d Brigade. Two companies of 12 French tanks each, one company to each 

of the two leading battalions of the 4th Brigade and 

the same to the 3d Brigade. System after system 

of trenches, all heavily manned, were swept over. 

Heavy flanking fire caused many casualties on the 

Marine left, but the advance continued and at 0830 

the 9th [Infantry] and 6th [Regiment] were on the 

division’s first objective.

The hostile forces holding this narrow sector in 

which the 2d Division advanced were the 51st Reserve, 200th, and 203d Divisions. Elements of the 

213th Division had been brought from reserve position in anticipation of the attack. This force was 

distributed in depth, occupying positions in great 

force with orders to hold at all cost.

At this point, let me give you a general picture 

of the strength of opposing forces and also the adjacent French troops.

In the American organization, we have approximately 50 men per platoon (six squads), two 

sections of three squads each, then the four platoons 

per company; total 200 men [in] four companies 

per battalion or 800 men. The normal strength of 

the infantry company was 250 on the rolls, the 

50 men left behind or the well-known 20 percent 

made up the company headquarters rear echelon, 

cooks, messmen, ration carriers, ammunition carriers, etc. We have then a total of six infantry battalions per brigade, or about 4,800 men in the fighting 

line per brigade.

At the beginning of the war, the French companies were similar to the American; 250-man companies but, during 1917–18, they went into action 

with 100 per company—four companies per battalion—three battalions per regiment—three regiments per division (No. brigades); a total of 3,600 

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FLANK PROTECTION, 2D DIVISION (AEF, FRANCE)

3 OCTOBER TO 9 OCTOBER 1918

by Major R. H. Schubert, USMC
95

Over There

men in the three infantry regiments of the division 

as against 4,800 infantry men in the American brigade.

The German strength and organization were 

similar to the French.

The success achieved in less than three hours 

was greater than anticipated. The angle between the 

two brigades was cut off so swiftly that the several 

hundred Germans isolated there offered but little 

resistance and were easily captured.

General Lejeune’s plan was as brilliantly executed as it was daringly conceived.

Early in the afternoon, elements of the 4th Brigade assisted the French in driving the Germans 

from their very strong position in the Essen Hook.

The two brigades were ordered to continue the 

advance at 1600 [on] 3 October, seizing the wooded heights south and southwest of Saint-Étienne. 

The 23d Infantry passed through the 9th [Infantry] 

and moved up to the new objective, sustaining severe losses from machine-gun fire [that] appeared 

to come from every direction. The 5th [Regiment]

on the left were so heavily engaged protecting the 

left flank where the French had not yet come up 

that they were unable to leave the position and pass 

through the 6th Marines until the following morning.

The situation at the end of the first day was generally satisfactory, although decidedly precarious. 

Both flanks were exposed to the German machine 

guns and artillery. The morning of 4 October promised to be a critical one and, during the night [of ] 

3–4 October, all possible preparations were made 

to defeat possible counterattacks. The 4th Machine 

Gun Battalion took position on the left flank nearly 

two kilometers in rear of the advance positions.

They were faced directly west at right angles to 

the division line of advance, holding positions from 

which they could powerfully resist deep flank attacks from the left.

DESPATCH EXTRACTS 4 October [1918]

From 4th Brigade to 2d Division

Have you seen anything of any French on our 

left in the other Corps; try to reestablish liaison 

and let us know if possible so we won’t shoot 

them.

The 170th Division (French Chasseurs) on the 

right was relieved by the 167th Division and were 

in support position. They were ordered by the XXI 

Corps commander to move westward across the 

rear area of the 2d Division and take position facing west.

At daybreak, the Germans launched two powerful counterattacks striking at both flanks nearly 

two kilometers back of the divisions’ advance positions. The German plan was to drive their two flank 

forces through, rolling up the 2d Division’s flanks.

On the right, at one point, they succeeded in 

breaking through but a brilliant counterattack by 

the 9th [Infantry] recovered all ground and captured many prisoners.

On the left, the German counterattack started 

just as the 5th [Regiment] were moving up to pass 

through the 6th and the assaulting waves of the 5th 

cut off the bewildered Germans and took many 

prisoners.

On the 5 October, the two brigades advanced 

to line.

From 5 to 9 October, very little advance could 

be made. The French were coming up very slowly; 

the losses were increasing. During this period, the 

Germans contented themselves by laying down terrific harassing fire from artillery and machine guns. 

This fire was of unprecedented volume and intensity, so accurately placed on all lines of approach from 

the rear that carrying parties bringing up food and 

ammunition were rarely able to get through.

An attempt was made to carry the long wooded ridge east from Saint-Étienne. The woods were 

crossed and crisscrossed with open lanes where the 

trees had been cut down and the borders of the 

lanes strongly wired. Machine guns on these lanes 

caused very heavy casualties in the 3d Brigade. The 

nights were very cold, and the men had no blankets, 

no hot food, no water. The shallow “foxholes” were 

their only protection against the crashing shells that 

showered down. I have here extracts of a Despatch.

[2145 on 4] October Phone

From 4th Brigade to 2d Division

Have repelled two counterattacks possibly 

three. We need all the artillery protection we 

can get. Can the Division have an aviator lo-
96

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

cate enemy batteries so that counter battery can 

be done? Our men are digging in and doing all 

that man can do to hold out, but something 

must be done to keep down enemy’s fire. Our 

losses are about fifty percent—more among officers and sergeants.

Pressure on the left flank was considerably relieved by an attack at 0615 [on] 5 October. A battalion of the 6th [Regiment] stormed a large redoubt 

west of Blanc Mont, capturing 213 prisoners and 75 

light and heavy machine guns.

On the night of 5–6 October, plans were perfected for the final reduction of the Saint-Étienne 

ridge and the occupation of the high ground beyond. 

The French were to advance on Saint-Étienne, the 

6th [Regiment] and 23d [Infantry] were to carry 

the ridge.

The attack was launched at 0630 after an hour’s 

artillery preparation. Heavy flanking fire from the 

right slowed up the advance somewhat, but at 0930 

the attacking troops had all gained their objectives. 

The French forced an entrance into Saint-Étienne 

but were driven out. Fighting in the town continued 

throughout the day and the town changed hands 

several times.

The tactical situation was somewhat improved 

the evening of 6 October. French units on the left 

flank of the division were well up and making continuous progress in spite of most desperate resistance by the enemy. On the right flank, however, the 

French had not yet succeeded in capturing Bemont 

Château. This condition necessitated a refusal of the 

division’s right flank.

Starting on the night [of ] 6–7 October, the division was gradually relieved by the 36th Division. 

The troops of the 36th had never been under fire, 

and it was necessary to feed them into the lines by 

degrees.

The difficulties of exchanging forces in so active a sector can only be appreciated by those in 

command. Everything possible was done to give 

the newcomers an opportunity to harden to it. They 

were supported by battalions from the 2d Division, 

the 2d Engineers, and the entire 2d Artillery Brigade. As a result, the men of the 36th [Division] 

soon became oriented and fought with splendid 

valor. Their attack on 8 October with the 9th Infantry and 6th [Regiment] in close support was delivered with great force and resulted in a substantial 

gain. Relief of the 3d and 4th Brigades was completed on the night [of ] 9–10 October. The 2d Division Artillery Regiments and Engineers stayed in 

line to support the infantry of the 36th Division in 

the advance to the Aisne River.

The most costly to the Germans was the holding of these strong German divisions on this front 

when they were so sorely needed elsewhere.

Losses to 2d Division during the period from 

2–10 October were 41 officers and 685 men killed, 

162 officers and 3,500 men wounded, 6 officers 

and 579 men missing—total 209 officers and 4,764 

men. Its captures included 48 officers and 1,915 

men, 25 guns, 332 machine guns.

Conclusion

I hope there has been some analysis of this action 

that may help others as it has helped me, and the 

high spots that I shall always remember are: first, 

that had the forces on the left and right of the 2d 

Division been able to advance as planned the losses to the division would have been comparatively 

slight; second, that the rapid advance of the 2d Division left the hostile flanks in the air and permitted a later advance of friendly forces on the flanks; 

third, that a commanding general in all respects 

(General Lejeune) and a staff hard to equal visualized before this action, what flank protection would 

be required when they employed those eight battalions in column; and last, that the mission was carried out as planned, but the division could not move 

forward and exploit the advantage gained because 

of the unprotected flanks.

Bibliography

The 2d Division AEF in France 1917–19, Historical 

Committee 2d Division Association.

Girard L. McEntee, Military History of the World War

(New York, 1937).

Records of 2d Division, vol. 4 (Field Messages).
97

The Historical Division has been asked to describe 

the [First] World War operations and other activities of the 4th Brigade in a series of articles to appear in the Marine Corps Gazette. It is yet too early 

for any Historical Division to place its stamp of approval on a composition purporting to be a close 

analysis of an event occurring during the war, a 

criticism from a professional viewpoint of any particular major or local operation, or one that asserts 

opinions or draws conclusions of an important nature.

It is quite proper and also desirable that books 

and articles be written that will give the public information about what its military representatives 

have accomplished, but the expression of opinions, 

the drawing of conclusions, and the assertion of 

criticisms, should be left to the individual writers until all available information upon the subjects have not only been gathered together by the 

Historical Division, but carefully studied without 

prejudice in favor of one’s own organization or any 

particular individual.

These proposed articles by the Historical Division will be limited to the statement of facts

secured in a mechanical fashion from official operation reports, field orders, general orders, orders, war 

diaries, etc., and will be a mere recital of the movements and positions of troops, and the occurrence of 

events, while in none of the published articles under 

its name will opinions, conclusions, or criticisms be 

expressed, except in a very few instances, where it 

would appear beyond cavil that such are warranted. 

It is obvious that even this is but the presenting of 

an ex parte statement, which is inconclusive if there 

exists a conflicting report of another organization.

This first article will give a general outline of 

the activities of the 4th Brigade, with some statistics, and while it may be dry reading, it is believed 

that it is necessary in order that the articles following, which will describe the operations in detail, will 

be more readily appreciated.

In order to save repetition it should be understood that the Marine brigade, except where otherwise stated, operated as a unit of the 2d Division, 

and while it may not always be expressed, the other 

elements of that division were present in every operation doing their share of fighting and the work.

The 4th Brigade was composed of the 5th and 

6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. From 27 June 1917 to the middle of September 

1917, the 5th Regiment was a unit of the 1st Division of Regulars. Although the 5th Regiment was 

the only organization of Marines in France at the 

time, the 4th Brigade was formed on 23 October 

1917, when Colonel Charles A. Doyen cabled acceptance of his appointment as brigadier general. 

From 26 October 1917 to 8 August 1919, the 4th 

Brigade was a part of the 2d Division of Regulars, 

except [for] 20–23 October 1918, when the brigade 

was provisionally at the disposal of the IX French 

Army Corps, in the vicinity of Leffincourt. On 8 

August 1919, the brigade was transferred back to 

the naval service.

On 29 May 1917, in accordance with directions 

issued by the president, the secretary of the Navy 

directed the Major General Commandant “to organize a force of Marines to be known as the Fifth 

Regiment of Marines for service with the Army as 

a part of the first expedition to proceed to France in 

the near future.” The 5th Regiment was accordingly 

organized at the Navy Yard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 7 June 1917, with Colonel Charles A. 

Doyen in command and Major Harry R. Lay as adjutant.

General [ John J.] Pershing and his staff, accompanied by two Marine officers, preceded the 

first expedition to France, sailing late in May 1917 

from the United States.

On 14 June 1917, the first expedition of American troops left the United States for France and the 

5th Regiment embarked on the naval transports 

[USS] Henderson and Hancock, and the auxiliary 

cruiser De Kalb ([formerly the] Prinz Eitel Friedrich), formed approximately one-fifth of it. The 

fourth group, including the Hancock, did not sail 

until 17 June 1917.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 4TH BRIGADE

by Major Edwin N. McClellan, USMC

Officer-In-Charge, Historical Division, Marine Corps
98

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

The orders received by the convoy commander 

on the day prior to sailing read, in part:

A military expedition is to be embarked on the 

above-named transports, augmented by a Regiment of Marines embarked in naval vessels, for 

transportation to a destination already communicated.

The De Kalb was in group one, the Henderson in 

group two, and the Hancock in group four; all were 

part of the escort and not the convoy.

Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, the convoy commander, flying his flag on the Seattle, personally 

commanded the first group, while Major General 

W. L. Sibert on the [USS] Tenadores [1913] was the 

senior Army officer embarked.

The passage of the four groups across the Atlantic was successfully accomplished without a single disaster or the loss of a life due to enemy causes.

At 2215 [on] 22 June 1917, the first group, including the De Kalb was attacked by enemy submarines. The wake of a submarine was sighted crossing 

50 yards ahead of the Seattle’s bow from starboard to 

port. A few seconds later, the De Kalb and Havana

sighted torpedoes and opened fire. Two torpedoes 

passed close to the Havana, and one passed ahead 

and one astern of the De Kalb. The second group 

encountered two submarines, the first at 1150 [on] 

26 June 1918, about 100 miles off the French coast, 

and the second two hours later.

The De Kalb arrived at Saint-Nazaire, France, 

on 26 June 1917; the Henderson [arrived] on 27 June 

1917; and the Hancock [arrived] on 2 July 1917. On 

27 June 1917, the commanding officer of the 5th 

Regiment reported to the commanding general, 

1st Division, American Expeditionary Forces, and 

from that date the 5th Regiment was considered as 

being detached for service with the Army by direction of the president.

Five hundred negro stevedores had been 

brought from the United States by the Army to 

discharge ships, but they were found inadequate for 

the large number of ships concerned. The Marines 

relieved the situation somewhat by turning to and 

discharging their own vessels.

On 27 June 1917, the 1st Battalion, less the 15th 

Company, which joined the battalion the following 

day, disembarked from the De Kalb and occupied 

quarters ashore. On this date, Lieutenant Colonel 

Logan Feland joined the 5th Regiment. On 28 June 

1917, the 2d and 3d Battalions went ashore from 

the Henderson for a practice march, and the following day the 1st Battalion erected tents on a campsite a short distance outside of Saint-Nazaire. By 

2000 [on] 3 July 1917, the entire 5th Regiment was 

ashore under canvas.

On 15 July 1917, the 5th Regiment, less the 

3d Battalion, which remained behind to perform 

guard duty, and other detached units and officers 

proceeded to the Gondrecourt Training Area and 

was stationed in Menaucourt and Naix.

On 1 August 1917, General Pershing inspected 

the battalions at the two towns where they were billeted.

On 15 August 1917, the 1st Division, including 

the 5th Regiment, was reviewed by its commanding general on a plateau 12 miles distant from the 

training area.

On 19 August 1917, General Pershing and 

General Pétain, commander-in-chief of all the 

French forces, inspected the Marines, as a unit of 

the 1st Division. General Pétain congratulated the 

colonel of the regiment on the splendid appearance 

of its officers and men, as well as the cleanliness of 

the towns.

Every opportunity was taken advantage of to 

perfect the regiment for combat duty, but this work 

was handicapped by the fact that many units of the 

regiment were scattered along the line of communications, performing duty of a necessary but of a 

nontraining nature. One company and one battalion commander left the regiment on 22 September 

1917 for duty in England, and did not rejoin the 

regiment until 11 March 1918. Many other officers 

and men were placed on detached duty.

On 24–25 September 1917, that part of the 5th 

Regiment available for training arrived in the Bourmont Training Area and was stationed at Damblain 

and Breuvannes.

The following letter dated 10 November 1917, 

addressed by General Pershing to the Major General Commandant, is both complimentary and explains why the Marines were used along the line of 

communications:
99

Over There

Your Marines having been under my command 

for nearly six months, I feel that I can give you 

a discriminating report as to their excellent 

standing with their brothers of the Army and 

their general good conduct. I take this opportunity, also, of giving you the reasons for distributing them along our Line of Communications 

which, besides being a compliment to their 

high state of discipline and excellent soldierly 

appearance, was the natural thing to do as the 

Marine Regiment was an additional one in the 

Division and not provided for in the way of 

transportation and fighting equipment in case 

the Division should be pushed to the front. 

When, therefore, service of the rear troops and 

military and provost guards were needed at our 

base ports and in Paris it was the Marine Regiment that had to be scattered, in an endeavor to 

keep the rest of the organized division intact.

I have been obliged to detach a number of 

your officers as Assistant Provost Marshals in 

France and in England, all of which I take it you 

will agree with me was highly complimentary 

to both officers and men, and was so intended. 

I can assure you that as soon as our service of 

the rear troops arrive, including a large number 

of officers and men for the specific duties now 

being performed by your men, the Marines will 

be brought back once more under your brigade 

commander and assigned to the duties which 

they so much desire in the Second Regular Division, under General Bundy.

It is a great pleasure to report on your fine 

representatives here in France.

Colonel Charles A. Doyen was in command of 

the 5th Regiment from the date of its organization 

on 7 June 1917 to 29 October 1917; and Lieutenant 

Colonel Hiram I. Bearss [was in command] from 

30 October 1917 to 31 December 1917. Colonel 

Wendell C. Neville having arrived onboard the 

De Kalb at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 28 December 1917, reported to the 4th Brigade for duty on

1 January 1918, and on that date assumed command of the 5th Regiment, continuing in command 

until July 1918.

The 6th Machine Gun Battalion was organized 

at the Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia, by order 

of the Major General Commandant on 17 August 

1917. The battalion was designated the 1st Machine 

Gun Battalion, but on 20 January 1918, after arrival in France, was renamed the 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion. On 14 December 1917, the battalion 

sailed from New York on the De Kalb, arriving at 

Saint-Nazaire, France, [on] 28 December 1917. On 

3 January 1918, the battalion arrived at Damblain 

in the Bourmont Training Area and began training 

with headquarters at Germainvilliers.

Major Edward B. Cole was in command of the 

6th Machine Gun Battalion from the date of its 

organization until 10 June 1918, when he received 

a mortal wound.

On 4 August 1917, in accordance with directions issued by the president, the secretary of the 

Navy directed the Major General Commandant 

“to organize a force of Marines, to be known as the 

Sixth Regiment of Marines, for service with the 

Army in France,” and the regiment was organized 

as directed.

On 23 September 1917, the 1st Battalion of the 

6th Regiment sailed on the Henderson from New 

York and landed at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 5 October 1917. On 17 October 1917, the 73d Machine 

Gun Company, Headquarters and Supply Companies, and Colonel Albertus W. Catlin, commanding officer of the 6th Regiment, with his staff, sailed 

from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on the De Kalb

and [then] from New York on 18 October 1917, 

arriving at Saint-Nazaire, France, on 1 November 

1917. On 31 October 1917, the 3d Battalion of the 

6th Regiment sailed from New York onboard the 

Von Steuben and anchored at Brest, France, on 12 

November 1917. On 20 January 1918, the 2d Battalion of the 6th Regiment sailed on the Henderson from New York and arrived at Saint-Nazaire, 

France, [on] 5 February 1918, and with the arrival 

of this last battalion, the entire 6th Regiment was 

in France.

On 23 October 1917, the 4th Brigade was organized with Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen in 

command. Brigade headquarters was at Damblain. 

Brigadier General Doyen continued in command 

until 7 May 1918, when he published in General 

Orders No. 5 that he had relinquished command. 
100

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Major Harry R. Lay was the first brigade adjutant, and performed the duties of that office from 

24 October 1917 to 9 August 1918, except during 

the period 7 February to 8 May 1918, when Major 

Holland M. Smith was brigade adjutant.

On 26 October 1917, Brigadier General Charles 

A. Doyen, U.S. Marine Corps, assumed command 

of the 2d Division as its first commanding general, 

and announced his staff in General Orders No. 1, 

with station at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, serving as 

such until relieved by Major General Omar Bundy, 

U.S. Army, who announced that he assumed command in General Orders No. 4, [on] 8 November 

1917.

Like the 5th Regiment, the 6th Regiment spent 

several months performing the necessary but undesired duties along the line of communications. 

On 12 January 1918, Colonel Albertus W. Catlin 

established headquarters for the 6th Regiment at 

Blevaincourt in the Bourmont Training Area. The 

3d Battalion arrived in this area on 12 January 1918, 

the headquarters units the same date, the 1st Battalion during January 1918, and the 2d Battalion on 

10 February 1918.

Therefore, on 10 February 1918, the 4th Brigade was in the Bourmont Training Area intact, 

with the exception of one company on duty in England, training industriously as an infantry brigade of 

the 2d Division. While the brigade had been organized on 23 October 1917, and had actually functioned as a brigade with elements of all three of its 

units present from 12 January 1918, it was not until 

10 February 1918 that the brigade was perfected.

Neither the Marine brigade nor any other elements of the 2d Division was the first American 

unit to enter the front lines since the 1st Division 

enjoyed that honor on 21 October 1917, when it 

entered the line in the quiet Toul sector.

The 4th Brigade remained in the Bourmont 

Training Area with headquarters at Damblain until 14 March 1918, when it commenced movement 

into subsectors of the Verdun front; the first units 

of the brigade entering the front line during the 

night of 16–17 March 1918, with headquarters at 

Toulon. On 1 April 1918, brigade headquarters was 

changed to Moscou. The brigade remained on the 

Verdun front until 14 May 1918, when it proceeded 

to an area around Vitry-le-François for open warfare training, with headquarters at Vanault-lesDames. In the meantime, on 6 May 1918, Brigadier General James G. Harbord assumed command 

of the brigade, relieving Brigadier General Doyen 

who had been ordered to the United States on account of his physical condition. Brigadier General 

Doyen relinquished command of the brigade most 

unwillingly, and the reasons for his relief are best set 

forth in the citation of a Navy Distinguished Service Medal, which will be posthumously awarded to 

him, reading as follows:

By reason of his abilities and personal efforts, 

he brought this brigade to the very high state of 

efficiency, which enabled it to successfully resist the German Army in the Château-Thierry 

Sector and Belleau Woods. The strong efforts 

on his part for nearly a year, undermined his 

health, and necessitated his being invalided to 

the United States before having the opportunity to command the brigade in action, but 

his work was shown by the excellent service 

rendered by the brigade, not only at Belleau 

Woods, but during the entire campaign when 

they fought many battles.

General Pershing, in a letter to Brigadier General Doyen, stated in part:

Your service has been satisfactory and your 

command is considered as one of the best in 

France. I have nothing but praise for the service 

which you have rendered in this command.

On 14 May 1918, the brigade left the area 

around Vitry-le-François, as it was unsuitable, and 

proceeded to an area around Gisors-Chaumonten-Vexin, with headquarters at Bou-des-Bois. The 

brigade was in this area when sudden orders came 

to move to the Château-Thierry sector.

On 27 May 1918, Brigadier General John A. 

Lejeune and Major Earl H. Ellis sailed from New 

York onboard the Henderson and arrived at Brest, 

France, on 8 June 1918.

In order to understandingly appreciate the importance of the early operations participated in by 

the Marine brigade as a unit of the 2d Division, it 

is necessary to remember that in 1918, prior to the 
101

Over There

middle of July, the offensive was in the hands of the 

Imperial German Staff, and that between 21 March 

1918 and 15 July 1918, the Germans directed no 

less than five major offensives against the Allied 

lines in efforts to bring the war to a successful conclusion for the central powers. American troops assisted in breaking up every one of these drives, but 

the 2d Division, including the Marines, participated in only one that in the Château-Thierry sector.

The first offensive (Somme) of the Germans 

was stopped within a few miles of Amiens, and the 

second (Lys) overran Armentières. In this second 

German offensive, which lasted from 9 to 27 April 

1918 and which has been designated by the Americans as a major operation, there were approximately 

500 American troops engaged.

Then late in May 1918, with startling success, 

which brought a corresponding depression to the 

morale of the Allies, the Germans launched their 

third offensive west of Rheims, crossed the Chemin des Dames, captured Soissons, and the last day 

of May found them marching in the direction of 

Paris down the Marne Valley. It was at this critical time that the 2d Division, including the Marine 

brigade, together with elements of the 3d and 28th 

Divisions were thrown into the line and in blocking 

the German advance in the Château-Thierry sector rendered great assistance in stopping the most 

dangerous of the German drives.

Without minimizing in any way the splendid 

actions of the 26th Division at Seicheprey and 

Xivray in April 1918, or the brilliant exploit of the 

1st Division at Cantigny in May 1918, the fact remains that the 2d Division, including the Marine 

brigade, was the first American division to get a 

chance to play an important part on the western 

front, and how well it repelled this dangerous thrust 

of the Germans along the Paris-Metz highway is 

too well known to be dwelt upon at length in this 

preliminary article.

The fighting of the 2d Division in the ChâteauThierry sector was divided into two parts, one a 

magnificently stubborn defensive lasting a week, 

and the other a vicious offensive. The defensive 

fighting of the 2d Division between 31 May and

5 June 1918 was part of the major operation called 

by the Americans the Aisne defensive. Without discussing at this time the tactical or strategic significance of the work of the 2d Division in the Aisne 

defensive, suffice to say that its psychological effect 

upon the morale of the Allies was tremendous and 

has been recognized in practically every writing 

worthy of consideration up to the present date.

The close of the Aisne defensive on 5 June 1918 

found the line of the 2d Division well established 

but not including Hill 142, Bois de Belleau, Bouresches, or Vaux, and the Germans were in possession 

of Château-Thierry on the right of the 2d Division, 

and continued to hold that town until about 17 July 

1918.

On 6 June 1918, the 2d Division snatched the 

initiative from the Germans and started an offensive on its front [that] did not end until 1 July 1918. 

The Marine brigade captured Hill 142 and Bouresches on 6 June 1918, and completely cleared Bois 

de Belleau of the enemy on 26 June 1918, a major 

of Marines sending in his famous message: “Woods 

now U.S. Marine Corps entirely.” On 1 July 1918, 

the 3d Brigade captured Vaux. The artillery, engineers, and the other elements of the 2d Division 

assisted materially in these successes, while a regiment of the 3d Division was in Belleau Wood for a 

few days about the middle of June.

During these 26 days of constant fighting, 

which has been defined by general headquarters of 

the AEF as a “local engagement,” the 2d Division 

suffered 1,811 battle deaths (of which approximately 1,062 were Marines), and suffered additional 

casualties amounting to 7,252 (of which approximately 3,615 were Marines). It was that fighting 

and those 9,063 casualties that made the name 

Château-Thierry famous.

The achievements of the 4th Brigade in the 

Château-Thierry sector were twice recognized by 

the French. The first, which changed the name of 

the Bois de Belleau, was a beautiful tribute, spontaneously made, to the successes and to the losses of 

the 4th Brigade, and shows the tremendous effect 

that the retaking of Belleau Woods and other nearby positions from the Germans had on the feelings 

of the French and the morale of the Allies. Official 

maps were immediately modified to conform with 

the provisions of the order, the plan director used 

in later operations bearing the name Bois de la Brigade de Marine. The French also used this new name 

in their orders as illustrated by an “Ordre General” 
102

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

dated 9 August 1918 signed by the commanding 

general of the VI French Army, reading in part as 

follows:

Avant la grande offensive du 18 Juillet, les troupes 

americaines faisant partie de la Vle Armee francaise se sont distinguees en enlevant a l’ennemi le 

Bois de la BRIGADE DE MARINE et le village de VAUX, en arretant son offensive sur la 

MARNE et a FOSSOY.

The order changing the name of Bois de Belleau reads as follows:

VIe

 ARMÉE au Q. G. A., le 30 Juin 1918.

Etat-Major

6930/2 ORDRE

En raison de la brillante conduite de la 4éme Brigade de la 2éme D. U. S. qui á enlevé de haute lutte 

BOURESCHES et le point d’appui important du 

BOIS de BELLEAU, défendu avec acharnement 

par un adversaire nombreux, le Général Commandant la VIe

 ARMÉE décide que dorénavant, dans 

toutes les piéces officielles, le BOIS de BELLEAU 

portera le nom de “Bois de la Brigade de Marine.”

Le Général de Division DEGOUTTE

Commandant la VIe

 ARMÉE

(Signed) DEGOUTTE.

à M. le Général Cdt la 4me Brigade de Marine.

s/c. de M. le Général Cdt la 2me D. U. S.

The second recognition by the French of the 

Marines’ work in the Château-Thierry sector were 

citations of the 4th Brigade, 5th and 6th Regiments, and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, in 

French Army orders, that of the brigade, the others 

being identical, reading as follows:

Aprés approbation du Général Commandant en 

Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en 

France, le Général Commandant en Chef les Armées Françaises du Nord et du Nord-Est, cite à 

l’Ordre de l’ARMÉE:

4e

 BRIGADE AMÉRICAINE

sous les Ordres du Général de Brigade James G. 

HARBORD, comprenant: le 5e régiment de marine, sous les Ordres du Colonel Wendell C. NEVILLE, le 6e régiment de marine, sous les ordres du 

Colonel Albertus W. CATLIN, le 6e bataillon de 

mitrailleuses, sous les ordres du Commandant Edward B. COLE:

“A été jetée en pleine bataille, sur un front violemment attaqué par l’ennemi. C’est affirmée aussitôt 

comme une unite de tout premier ordre. Dés son 

entrée en ligne, a brisé, en liaison avec les troupes 

françaises, une violente attaque ennemie sur un 

point important de la position et entrepris ensuite 

á son compte une série d’opérations offensives. Au 

cours de ces opérations, grace au courage brillant, á 

la vigueur, á l’allant, á la ténacité de ses hommes 

qui ne se sont laissés rebuter ni par les fatigues, ni 

par les pertes; grace a l’activité et á l’énergie de ses 

Officiers; grace enfin á l’action personnelle de son 

Chef, le Général J. HARBORD, la 4e brigade a 

vu ses efforts couronnés de succés. En intime liaison 

l’un avec l’autre, ses deux régiments et son bataillon de mitrailleuses ont réalisé, aprés douze jours 

de lutte incessante (du 2 au 13 Juin 1918) dans un 

terrain trés difficile, une progression variant entre 

1500 á 2000 métres, sur un front de 4 kilometres, 

capturant un nombreux matériel, faisant plus de 

500 prisonniers, infligeant á l’ennemi des pertes 

considérables et lui enlevant deux points d’appui 

de premiére importance: le village de BOURESCHES et le bois organisé de BELLEAU.”

Au Grand Quartier Général, le 22 Octobre 1918,

Le Général Commandant en Chef,

Signé: PÉTAIN.

During the first attack on Belleau Wood on 6 

June 1918, Colonel Albertus W. Catlin was severely 

wounded and was relieved in command of the 6th 

Regiment by Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee, who 

continued in command until the regiment was demobilized in August 1919.

When Major Edward B. Cole was mortally 

wounded on 10 June 1918, he was relieved in command of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion by Captain H. E. Major, who on 11 June was relieved

by Captain George H. Osterhout, who retained 

command until relieved by Major Littleton W. T. 

Waller Jr. on 20 June 1918.
103

Over There

During the fighting in the Château-Thierry 

sector, the headquarters of the 4th Brigade was successively at Montreuil-aux-Lions (in an automobile 

for half an hour on the way to the front lines), Issonge farmhouse, and La Loge farmhouse. After 

being relieved by elements of the 26th Division during the night of 5–6 July 1918, the brigade moved 

to an area in rear of the lines and occupied what was 

known as the “line of defense” or “Army line,” with 

headquarters at Nanteuil-sur-Marne. The brigade 

remained there until 16 July 1918.

During the time the above described fighting 

was going on, the Germans were frustrated in their 

fourth 1918 drive (Noyon-Montdidier defensive) 

between 9–15 June 1918 and, of course, being busy 

in the vicinity of Bois de Belleau, the Marines had 

no opportunity of engaging in it.

On 15 July 1918, the Germans attacked for the 

fifth time in 1918 and, as events turned out, it was 

the last, for from the time of its failure they were 

on the defensive. The Allied troops, including many 

Americans, held this attack, called by the Americans the Champagne-Marne defensive, which was 

on a large scale and the grand initiative passed 

from the Germans to the Allies on 18 July 1918, 

when Marshal Foch launched what is termed by 

the Americans the Aisne-Marne offensive. In this 

magnificent and gigantic offensive, the Marine brigade and other elements of the 2d Division played 

leading parts in the vicinity of Soissons.

General headquarters, AEF, on 28 May 1919, 

credited the 2d Division units with participation in 

the major operation of Champagne-Marne defensive, but on 2 June 1919 rescinded this credit.

On 11 July 1918, Brigadier General James G. 

Harbord, commanding general of the Marine brigade, received notification of his appointment as 

a major general, and two days later left on a fivedays leave of absence. As Colonel Neville had 

been evacuated to a base hospital after leaving the

Château-Thierry sector, Lieutenant Colonel Harry 

Lee assumed temporary command of the brigade. 

Major General Harbord and Colonel Neville both 

returned in time to enter the Aisne-Marne offensive, the former in command of the 2d Division and 

the latter in command of the 4th Brigade.

Of the six Allied offensives taking place in 1918 

dignified by the Americans as major operations, the 

brigade of Marines, with the other units of the 2d 

Division participated in three; the first being the 

Aisne-Marne in which the Marine brigade entered 

the line near Soissons.

On 17 July 1918, the 1st Moroccan Division, 

and the 1st and 2d Divisions of American Regulars 

were hurriedly and secretly concentrated by forced 

night marches through rain and mud in the Bois 

de Retz, near Soissons, the headquarters of the 4th 

Brigade being established at Vivières.

The getting to the “jump-off ” on time for this 

operation will always share in Marine Corps history 

with the glorious victory that followed.

Early on the morning of 18 July 1918, Marshal Foch threw these three picked divisions at the 

unsuspecting Germans with overwhelming success, and again on the following day. Major General 

James G. Harbord, commanding the 2d Division in 

this operation, describes the two days’ fighting of 

his division in these words:

It is with keen pride that the Division Commander transmits to the command the congratulations and affectionate personal greetings 

of General Pershing, who visited the Division 

Headquarters last night. His praise of the gallant work of the Division on the 18th and 19th 

is echoed by the French High Command, the 

III Corps Commander, American Expeditionary Forces, and in a telegram from the former 

Division Commander. In spite of two sleepless 

nights, long marches through rain and mud, 

and the discomforts of hunger and thirst, the 

Division attacked side by side with the gallant 1st Moroccan Division and maintained 

itself with credit. You advanced over six miles, 

captured over three thousand prisoners, eleven 

batteries of artillery, over a hundred machine 

guns, minenwerfers,* and supplies. The Second 

Division has sustained the best traditions of the 

Regular Army and the Marine Corps. The story 

of your achievements will be told in millions of 

homes in all Allied lands to-night.

This was one of the greatest strategic successes 

of Marshal Foch and that the part played by the 

* German mine throwers.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Marines was appreciated by the French is illustrated by the 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion being cited in French Army 

orders. The citations of the 6th Regiment (that of 

the 5th Regiment being similar) and that of the 6th 

Machine Gun Battalion are quoted below:

Aprés approbation du Général Commandant en 

Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en 

France, le Général Commandant en Chef les Armées Francaise du Nord et du Nord-Est, cite á 

l’Ordre de l’ARMÉE:

LE 6e

 REGIMENT de MARINE

AMÉRICAINE,

sous les ordres du Lt.-Colonel LEE,

“Engagés á l’improviste dans l’offensive du 18 Juillet 1918, en pleine nuit, dans un terrain inconnu 

et trés difficile, ont deployé pendant deux jours, sans 

se laisser arréter par les fatigues et les difficultés du 

ravitaillement en vivres et en eau, une ardeur et 

une ténacité remarquables, refoulant l’ennemi sur 

11 kilométres de profondeur, capturant 2700 prisonniers, 12 canons et plusieurs centaines de mitrailleuses.”

Au Grand Quartier Général,

le 25 OCTOBRE, 1918.

Le Général Commandant en Chef,

Signe: PÉTAIN.

Aprés approbation du Général Commandant en 

Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en 

France, le Maréchal de France, Commandant en 

Chef les Armées Française de l’Est, cite á l’Ordre 

de l’ARMÉE:

Le 6e

 Bataillon de Mitrailleuses U. S. Marine, 

sous les ordres du Commandant L. W. T. WALLER.

“Quoique trés fatigué par un long trajet en camion et une marche de nuit sur des routes difficiles, 

ce bataillon c’est précipité á l’attaque le 18 Juillet 

1918, prés de VIERZY et a puissamment contribué á consolider et á maintenir la position atteinte ce jour-lá.

“Dans le matinée du 19 Juillet, il c’est vaillamment porté en avant, en terrain découvert, sous un 

violent feu d’artillerie et de mitrailleuses, soutenant résolument l’attaque lancée contre les positions 

renforcées de l’ennemi.

“Ayant á faire face á une forte résistance ennemie 

et á des contre-attaques continuelles, a fait preuve 

du plus beau courage en consolidant rapidement et 

en tenant résolument l’importante position conquise par l’infanterie ce jour-lá.”

Au Grand Quartier Général, le 4 Mars 1919.

Le Maréchal,

Commandant en Chef les Armées Française

de l’Est.

PÉTAIN.

During the action, brigade headquarters was 

moved to a cave in Vierzy.

Colonel Logan Feland was in command of the 

5th Regiment during the Aisne-Marne offensive, 

near Soissons, and continued in command of it with 

the exception of two days in July 1918 (when Brigadier General Lejeune commanded the 4th Brigade and Colonel Neville the 5th Regiment), until 

21 March 1919, when he was relieved by Colonel 

Harold C. Snyder, who retained command until the 

date of demobilization.

The 4th Brigade was relieved about midnight 

19 July 1918 and, after remaining in a reserve position until 22 July 1918, marched to an area farther 

in the rear, but still in a reserve position, brigade 

headquarters being established at Taillefontaine. 

After final relief from this active sector, the brigade 

was billeted 24–25 July 1918 in an area around 

Nanteuil-le-Haudouin, brigade headquarters being 

established at Nanteuil. The brigade remained in 

this area, cleaning and resting up until 31 July 1918.

On 25 July 1918, Brigadier General John A. 

Lejeune arrived and assumed command of the 4th 

Brigade on 26 July 1918, [with] General Orders 

No. 16 reading as follows:

I have this day assumed command of the Fourth 

Brigade, U.S. Marines.

To command this Brigade is the highest honor that could come to any man. Its renown is 

imperishable and the skill, endurance and valor 

of the officers and men have immortalized its 

name and that of the Marine Corps.
105

Over There

Brigadier General Lejeune retained command 

until 29 July 1918, when he became commanding 

general of the 2d Division, relieving Major General Harbord who left to assume command of the 

Services of Supplies. Colonel Neville, on this latter 

date, resumed command of the 4th Brigade.

On the last two days of July 1918, the units of 

the brigade entrained for a 24-hour railroad journey, which took them to an area around Nancy, 

with headquarters at Villers-lès-Nancy, where they 

remained resting and refitting until 9 August 1918.

On 7 August 1918, information was received 

of the promotion of Brigadier General Lejeune to 

the grade of major general, and of Colonel Neville 

to the grade of brigadier general, both to date from 

1 July 1918.

On 5 August 1918, movement of units of 

the brigade was started for the occupation of the 

Marbache subsector, near Pont-à-Mousson, on 

the Moselle River. By 8 August 1918, the movement was completed, with headquarters established 

at Scarponne just across the Moselle River from 

Dieulouard. The sector was quiet and occupation 

uneventful except for an enemy raid, which was 

successfully repulsed and prisoners captured.

On 8 August 1918, Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. 

Ellis was appointed adjutant of the 4th Brigade, relieving Lieutenant Colonel Harry R. Lay who had 

been detailed as inspector general of the 2d Division.

The relief from the Marbache sector was completed on 18 August 1918, and the brigade moved 

to an area about 20 kilometers southeast of Toul, 

headquarters being established at Favières. Intensive training for the impending Saint-Mihiel offensive was indulged in here.

The brigade started to move from this area on 

the night of 2 September 1918, and after a series 

of night marches, during which time headquarters 

were established at Pont-Saint-Vincent, Velaineen-Haye, and Bouvron, the brigade arrived just outside of Manonville, headquarters being established 

in Manonville. From 12 to 16 September 1918, the 

brigade was engaged in the Saint-Mihiel offensive 

in the vicinity of Thiaucourt, Xammes, and Jaulny. 

Headquarters during these operations were successively at one kilometer north of Lironville, Thiaucourt, and finally at Manonville, on 16 September 

1918.

On 20 September 1918, the brigade moved to 

an area south of Toul, with headquarters at Chaudenay. The brigade remained in this area until 25 September 1918, when it moved by rail to an area south 

of Châlons-sur-Marne, with headquarters at Sarry.

From 1 to 10 October 1918, the 2d Division 

was placed temporarily at the disposal of the IV 

French Army under General [Henri] Gouraud.

On 28 September 1918, the brigade moved by 

bus and marching to the Souain-Suippes area, with 

headquarters at Suippes. On 1 October 1918, the 

brigade, with the rest of the 2d Division, marched to 

the front line near Somme-Py on the night of 1–2 

October 1918 and relieved elements of a French division. The brigade headquarters was located in the 

trenches about two-and-a-half kilometers south of 

Somme-Py. The relief was effected before daylight 

without incident.

The Battle of Blanc Mont, fought by the 2d 

Division as a unit of the IV French Army between

3 and 9 October 1918, was one of the most powerful and effective blows struck under the direction 

of Marshal Foch against the retreating Germans, 

and its brilliantly successful conclusion was due in 

a great degree to the military genius of Major General John A. Lejeune of the Marines.

On 27 September 1918, Major General 

Lejeune was summoned to the headquarters of the 

IV French Army where General Gouraud, placing 

his hand upon the range of hills on the map representing Blanc Mont Ridge and turning to General 

Lejeune said, “General, this position is the key of 

all the German defenses of this sector, including 

the whole Rheims Massif. If this ridge can be taken 

the Germans will be obliged to retreat along the 

whole front thirty kilometres to the river Aisne. Do 

you think your Division could effect its capture?” 

General Lejeune responded that he felt certain the 

2d Division could take the stronghold pointed out, 

whereupon he was informed that he would be ordered to make the attack within a few days and was 

directed to prepare a plan for the assault.

The results of this operation are described in an 

order of the 2d Division dated 11 November 1918, 

reading in part as follows:
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

In the Champagne District, October 2nd to 

10th, it fought beside the Fourth French Army. 

On October 3rd, it seized BLANC MONT 

RIDGE, the keystone of the arch of the main 

German position, advanced beyond the Ridge 

and, although both flanks were unsupported, it 

held all its gains with the utmost tenacity, inflicting tremendous losses on the enemy. This 

victory freed RHEIMS and forced the entire 

German Army between that city and the ARGONNE Forest to retreat’ to the AISNE, a 

distance of 30 kilometres.

The amazing success of the attack and the vital effect of the capture of Blanc Mont Ridge and 

Saint-Étienne is described in the words of General 

Gouraud himself in a letter to Marshal Foch, reading in part as follows:

Because of the brilliant part played by this 

“Grand Unit” in the offensive of the IV Army, 

during the autumn of 1918, I propose the 2nd 

American Division for a citation in “The Order of the Army,” upon the following specific 

grounds:

The 2nd Infantry Division, U.S., brilliantly 

commanded by General Lejeune, * * * * played a 

glorious part in the operations of the IV Army 

in the Champagne in October 1918. On the 

3rd of October, this division drove forward 

and seized, in a single assault, the strongly entrenched German positions between BLANC 

MONT and MEDEAH FERME, and again 

pressing forward to the outskirts of SAINT 

ÉTIENNE-a-ARNES, it made, in the course 

of the day, an advance of about six kilometres.

It captured several thousand prisoners, many 

cannon and machine guns, and a large quantity 

of other military material. This attack, combined with that of the French divisions on its 

left and right, resulted in the evacuation by the 

enemy of his positions on both sides of the River Suippe, and his withdrawal from the Massif 

de Notre-Dame-des-Champs.

The further opinion of the French as to the results and effect of the 2d Division’s operations in 

Champagne is set forth in the following quoted extract from Information Bulletin No. 12 of the IV 

French Army dated 7 October 1918:

Up to October 4th, at which date the present 

bulletin is written, the IV Army has pushed 

its advance up to objectives of the very highest importance. A splendid American Division, 

full of dash and ardor, the 2nd Division, U.S., 

placed at the disposition of the 21st Corps on 

October 3rd made itself master of MASSIF 

DU BLANC MONT, which dominates the 

valley of the ARNES and gives us excellent 

outlook on the valley of the SUIPPE, in rear 

of the region of MONTS; this conquest rapidly brought about the downfall of NOTREDAME-des-CHAMPS and the GRAND 

BOIS de SAINTSOUPLET.

During this operation, the headquarters of the 

brigade was advanced from the trenches two-anda-half kilometers south of Somme-Py to a point 

half a kilometer south of that town.

The 5th and 6th Regiments were cited in 

French Army orders for their splendid accomplishments in the Champagne [sector]. The citation of 

the 5th Regiment, that of the 6th Regiment being 

similar, reads as follows:

Aprés approbation du Général Commandant en 

Chef les Forces expéditionnaires Américaines en 

France, le Maréchal de France, Commandant

en Chef les Armées Françaises de l’Est, cite á 

l’Ordre de l’ARMÉE:

Le 5éme Regiment de Marine Américain, sous 

les Ordres du Colonel Logan FELAND:

“A pris une part glorieuse aux opérations engagées 

par la 4éme Armée en CHAMPAGNE, en Octobre 

1918. Le 3 Octobre 1918, a participé a l’attaque 

des positions allemandes fortement retranchées entre le BLANC MONT et la Ferme MEDEAH, et, 

poussant de l’avant jusqu’aux abords de SAINTÉTIENNE-á-ARNES, a réalisé une avance de 6 

kilométres. A fait plusieurs milliers de prisonniers, 

capturé des canons des mitrailleuses et un important matériel de guerre. Cette attaque combinée 

avec celle des Divisions Françaises, a eu pour consequence l’évacuation des deux rives de la SUIPPE et 

du Massif de NOTRE-DAME-des-CHAMPS.”
107

Over There

Au Grand Quartier Général, le 21 Mars 1919.

Lé Marechal

Commandant en Chef Les Armées Françaises 

de l’Est.

Signe: PÉTAIN.

On 10 October 1918, having been relieved from 

the line in the Blanc Mont sector, the brigade took 

station in the Suippes-Somme Suippes-Nantivet 

area and the adjacent camps with headquarters at 

Suippes, being assigned as IV French Army reserve. 

The brigade remained in this area resting and refitting until 14 October 1918 when, in accordance with 

orders, it marched to the Vadenay-Bouy-la-VeuveDampierre area, north of Châlons-sur-Marne, with 

headquarters at Bouy. While here, orders were received placing the 4th Brigade provisionally at the 

disposal of the IX French Army Corps to hold a 

sector in the region Attigny-Vancq-Aisne River.

Accordingly, on 20 October 1918, the brigade 

was temporarily detached from the 2d Division and 

marched to the area Suippes-Nantivet-SommeSuippes, with headquarters at Suippes. On 21 October 1918, in obedience to orders, the Marines 

hiked to the vicinity of Leffincourt, where brigade 

headquarters was established. While about to take 

over the assigned sector, the 4th Brigade received 

orders to rejoin the 2d Division, which was preparing to enter the Meuse-Argonne offensive. After a 

hard march, these orders were obeyed and brigade 

headquarters established at Montpellier on 23 October 1918.

On 24 October 1918, Major Matthew H. 

Kingman relieved Major Littleton W. T. Waller, in 

command of the 6th Machine Gun Battalion, Major Waller joining the 2d Division staff as division 

machine gun officer.

On 25 October 1918, the brigade moved to 

the Les Islettes area with brigade headquarters 

at Camp Cabaud. On the evening of 26 October 

1918, the brigade moved to the area south of Exermont and bivouaced in the woods that night with 

brigade headquarters at Exermont. The brigade remained in bivouac in this area until the night of 

30–31 October 1918, when it moved forward into 

line to participate in the immense Meuse-Argonne 

offensive, which had started on 26 September 1918.

Relieving elements of the 42d Division just 

south of Landres-et-Saint-Georges, the Marine 

brigade, early on the morning of 1 November 1918, 

jumped off, following a terrific barrage, for its final operation of the war, the conclusion of which at 

1100 on the morning of 11 November 1918 found 

the Marines firmly established on the heights of the 

far bank of the Meuse River after an advance of 30 

kilometers.

The operations of the 2d Division, including 

the Marines, are described in the following official 

reports.

In recommending that the 2d Division be cited in G. H. Q. Orders for its excellent work in the 

attack of 1–11 November 1918, the commanding 

general, First Army, states on 16 January 1919, in 

part as follows:

4. In the 1st Army attack on November 1, 1918, 

the 2nd Division was selected and so placed in 

the battle line that its known ability might be 

used to overcome the critical part of the enemy’s 

defense. The salient feature of the plan of attack 

was to drive a wedge through Landres-et-St. 

Georges to the vicinity of Fosse. It was realized 

that if the foregoing could be accomplished the 

backbone of the hostile resistance west of the 

Meuse would be broken and the enemy would 

have to retreat to the east of the Meuse. Success in this plan would immediately loosen the 

flanks of the 1st Army. The 2nd Division was 

selected to carry out this main blow.

5. The 2nd Division accomplished the results 

desired in every particular on the first day of the 

attack, not only clearing the hostile defenses of 

Landres-et-St. Georges and the Bois de Hazois 

but continuing its advance to the vicinity of 

Fosse, i.e., about 9 kilometres. This decisive 

blow broke the enemy’s defense and opened the 

way for the rapid advance of the Army.

With reference to the first day’s attack, the 

commanding general, Fifth Army Corps, wrote officially on 2 November 1918, in part as follows:

The Division’s brilliant advance of more than 

nine kilometres, destroying the last stronghold 

on the Hindenburg Line, capturing the Freya 
108

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

Stellung, and going more than nine kilometres 

against not only the permanent, but the relieving forces in their front, may justly be regarded 

as one of the most remarkable achievements 

made by any troops in this war. For the first 

time, perhaps, in our experience the losses inflicted by your Division upon the enemy in the 

offensive greatly exceeded the casualties of the 

Division. The reports indicate, moreover, that 

in a single day the Division has captured more 

artillery and machine guns than usually falls to 

the lot of a command during several days of 

hard fighting. These results must be attributed 

to the great dash and speed of the troops, and 

to the irresistible force with which they struck 

and overcame the enemy.

The following citation in Fifth Army Corps 

General Orders No. 26, dated 20 November 1918, 

gives a further description of these operations:

The 2nd Division, in line at the launching of 

the attack, broke through the strong enemy resistance, and leading the advance, drove forward 

in a fast and determined pursuit of the enemy, 

who, despite new divisions hastily thrown in, 

was driven back everywhere on its front. This 

division drove the enemy across the MEUSE, 

and under heavy fire and against stubborn resistance, built bridges and established itself on 

the heights. The cessation of hostilities found 

this Division holding strong positions across 

the MEUSE and ready for a continuation of 

the advance.

An order of the 2d Division dated 5 November 

1918, reading in part as follows, tells what occurred 

subsequent to the first day’s attack:

During the night of November 2–3, the 2nd 

Division moved forward overcoming the resistance of the enemy’s advanced elements, and 

at 6.00 A.M., it attacked and seized the enemy’s line of defense on the ridge southeast of 

VAUX-en-DIEULET.

Late in the afternoon, the enemy, having reorganized his line on the border of BELVAL 

FOREST, was again attacked and defeated. After nightfall and in a heavy rain, the advanced 

elements of the Division pressed forward 

through the Forest, and occupied a position on 

the heights south of BEAUMONT, eight kilometres in advance of the divisions on our right 

and left.

During the night of November 4–5, the Division again pressed forward, occupied BEAUMONT and LETANNE and threw the enemy 

on its front across the MEUSE.

An order of the 2d Division dated 12 November 1918, describing the historic crossing of the 

Meuse River on the night before the Armistice became operative, reads as follows:

1. On the night of November 10th, heroic 

deeds were done by heroic men. In the face of 

a heavy artillery and withering machine gun 

fire, the 2nd Engineers threw two foot bridges 

across the Meuse, and the first and second battalions of the 5th Marines crossed resolutely 

and unflinchingly to the east bank and carried 

out their mission.

2. In the last battle of the war, as in all others 

in which this division has participated, it enforced its will on the enemy.

The commanding general of the Fifth Army 

Corps has this to say about the crossing of the 

Meuse by the Marines, who were assisted by the 

artillery, engineers, and other troops of the 2d Division:

Especially I desire to commend the Division 

for the crowning feat of its advance in crossing the Meuse River in face of heavy concentrated enemy machine gun fire, and in driving 

the enemy’s troops before it, and in firmly establishing itself upon the heights covering the 

desired bridgehead. This feat will stand among 

the most memorable of the campaign.

The general success achieved by the 2d Division 

in the Argonne-Meuse offensive is well described 

by the words of the order citing Major General 

John A. Lejeune of the Marines for a Distinguished 

Service Medal reading in part as follows:
109

Over There

In the Argonne-Meuse offensive his division 

was directed with such sound military judgment and ability that it broke and held, by the 

vigor and rapidity of execution of its attack, enemy lines which had hitherto been considered 

impregnable.

During this fighting, the headquarters of 

the 4th Brigade was successively established at: 

Exermont, half a kilometer north of Exermont,

Sommerance, Bayonville-et-Chennery, Fosse, Belval-Bois-des-Dames, and Beaumont.

On “the eleventh hour, the eleventh day, of the 

eleventh month, of the year 1918,” Brigadier General Wendell C. Neville, commanding general of 

the 4th Brigade, published the following tribute to 

the officers and men of the 4th Brigade:

Upon this, the most momentous hour in the 

history of the world war, the undersigned wishes to express to his command his sincere appreciation of their unfailing devotion to duty and 

their heroic and courageous action during the 

recent operations.

The time, when the results of our efforts during the past year are shown, is here. The hour 

has arrived when the convulsion which has 

shaken the foundations of the civilized world 

has ceased. The enemy is defeated and the 

principles of freedom and democracy have triumphed over barbarism and autocracy. We may 

all feel justly proud of the extent of our participation, which has forced the enemy to a cessation of hostilities. It is fitting, at this time, to 

think of those of our comrades who have fallen 

on the field of honor and rejoice in the fact that 

they did not give their lives in vain.

Your display of fortitude, determination, 

courage and your ability to fight has upon more 

than one occasion been a determining factor in 

making history, and your work has had a direct 

bearing upon the remarkable chain of events, 

which have this day culminated in such a satisfactory manner. Along the fronts of Verdun, 

the Marne, the Aisne, Lorraine, Champagne, 

and the Argonne, the units of the Fourth Brigade Marines have fought valiantly, bravely and 

decisively. They have nobly sustained the sacred 

traditions and have added glorious pages to the 

already illustrious history of the United States 

Marine Corps. It is a record of which you may 

all be proud.

On 17 November 1918, the 2d Division commenced its march to the Rhine, passing through 

Belgium and Luxembourg. The German frontier 

was reached 25 November 1918, crossed on 1 December 1918, the Rhine reached 10 December 1918, 

and crossed on 13 December 1918. During this 

march and up to the time the 4th Brigade settled 

down to its occupation duty in Germany, brigade 

headquarters were successively established at Margut, Bellefontaine, Arlon, Usseldange, Berg, Eppeldorf, Neuerburgh, Waxweiler, Prüm, Budesheim, 

Wiesbaum, Ahrweiler, Neuenahr, Burgbrohl,

Rheinbrohl (2 kilometers northeast of ), and Henningen (1 kilometer northeast of ).

The duties of the 4th Brigade with the Army 

of Occupation in Germany were uneventful, the 

outstanding features being the establishment of a 

Rhine River patrol, manned and commanded by 

Marines; an extended visit, inspection, and review 

by the secretary of the Navy; and the operation of 

the 2d Division, including the Marines, made about 

the middle of June 1919, in which an advanced position was taken as a part of the concentration of the 

Third Army immediately preceding the signing of 

the treaty of peace by the Germans.

Headquarters of the 4th Brigade during the 

greater part of the occupation of Germany was at 

Nieder Bieber, while during the last operation when 

the advanced position was taken, just prior to Germany signing the peace treaty, it was at Herschbach. 

On the date the treaty was signed, the 5th Regiment, with headquarters at Hartenfels, occupied the 

most advanced position ever occupied by Marines.

Just before departing from Germany, headquarters was at Nieder Bieber, and with the exception of Brest, France, this was the last headquarters 

the brigade had in Europe.

Major Charles D. Barrett relieved Lieutenant 

Colonel Earl H. Ellis as brigade adjutant in April 

1919, and held that position until the brigade was 

demobilized. Lieutenant Colonel Ellis was assigned to duty as second in command of the 5th 

Regiment. On 12 March 1919, Colonel Logan Fe-
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

land was temporarily appointed brigadier general 

to rank from 9 March 1919 and accepted appointment and executed oath on 17 March 1919. On 21 

March 1919, Colonel Harold C. Snyder assumed 

command of the 5th Regiment, relieving Brigadier 

General Logan Feland, who after acting as aide 

for the secretary of the Navy arrived in the United 

States on the Von Steuben on 13 May 1919.

A great many Marines were returned from Europe gradually and in small detachments from the 

date the Armistice became operative.

The commanding general of the 2d Division 

and his staff, headquarters of the 4th Brigade, the 

5th Regiment, and the 2d Battalion of the 6th 

Regiment, arrived in the United States onboard the 

George Washington on 3 August 1919; the remainder 

of the 6th Regiment arrived in the United States 

early in August 1919 onboard the Rijndam and the 

Wilhelmina; the 6th Machine Gun Battalion arrived in the United States onboard the Santa Paula

on 5 August 1919.

The company of Marines and battalion commander (major) and staff, forming a part of the 

Composite Regiment, Third Army, returned to the 

United States onboard the Leviathan on 8 September 1919, and were returned to the naval service in 

September 1919.

The colonel commanding the Composite Regiment, in a letter dated 21 September 1919, commended the battalion commander and staff, the 

commanding officer of the company, and the

Lieutenants for their loyalty and attention to 

details and the Noncommissioned officers and 

men for their soldierly appearance, high standards of morale and discipline. The Composite Regiment paraded as escort to the General 

of the Army in London, Paris, New York, and 

Washington, DC. The Regiment has been favorably commended. This is entirely due to the 

loyalty, energy, and attention to duty of the officers and individual soldiers in the Regiment; 

and in this the Marine Corps representatives 

deserve a large share.

On 8 August 1919, the 4th Brigade, as a part of 

the 2d Division, paraded in New York City. Major 

General John A. Lejeune, with many Marine officers on his staff, was in command.

On 8 August 1919, the 4th Brigade was transferred to the naval service upon its arrival at Quantico, Virginia.

On 12 August 1919, the 4th Brigade under 

Brigadier General Neville, then a part of the naval 

service, was reviewed by the president of the United 

States in a parade at Washington, DC.

A company of Marines and a battalion commander, as a part of the Third Army Composite 

Regiment, paraded in New York and in Washington, DC, as escort to General Pershing. The 1st Division also formed a part of these parades.

The demobilization of the 4th and 5th Brigades 

was effected at Quantico, Virginia, and the Naval 

Operating Base, Hampton Roads, Virginia, respectively. This undertaking was by far the largest and 

most important of its kind that had ever confronted 

the Marine Corps, but due to the coordination of 

the various departments interested, and the farreaching and clearly denned instructions issued in 

advance, the demobilization of these units was effected in a remarkably short time, being completed 

on 13 August 1919 and in a manner bringing satisfaction to the men discharged and reflecting to the 

credit of the Corps. The success of these efforts is 

evidenced by the following statement of demobilization:

Discharged or transferred to inactive status:

4th Brigade 6,677 enlisted men.

5th Brigade 6,671 enlisted men.

In addition to the enlisted men released, there were 

also about 200 officers of the two brigades who 

were either discharged or transferred to an inactive 

status.

To summarize the operations and certain statistics of the 4th Brigade, the following are set forth:

The 4th Brigade as a unit of the 2d Division 

participated in actual battle in France in the 

following sectors between the inclusive dates 

set down:
111

Over There

Toulon sector, Verdun: from 15 March to 13 

May 1918.

Aisne defensive, Château-Thierry sector: 

from 31 May to 5 June 1918.

Château-Thierry sector (capture of Hill 142, 

Bouresches, Belleau Wood): from 6 June to 9 

July 1918.

Aisne-Marne (Soissons) offensive: from 18 

July to 19 July 1918.

Marbache sector, near Pont-à-Mousson on 

the Moselle River: from 9 to 16 August 1918.

Saint-Mihiel offensive, in the vicinity of Thiaucourt, Xammes, and Jaulny: from 12 to 16 

September 1918.

Meuse-Argonne (Champagne) (capture of 

Blanc Mont Ridge and Saint-Étienne): from 1 

to 10 October 1918.

Meuse-Argonne (including crossing of the 

Meuse River): from 1 to 11 November 1918.

Under the rulings of General Headquarters, 

AEF, the Marine Corps units serving with the 2d 

Division are entitled to silver bands on the staffs 

of their colors for battle participation in the abovementioned engagements.

General Headquarters, AEF, ruled that the 2d 

Division, including the 4th Brigade, participated 

in only four major operations: the Aisne defensive 

(31 May to 5 June 1918); the Aisne-Marne offensive (18–19 July 1918); the Saint-Mihiel offensive 

(12–16 September 1918); and the Meuse-Argonne 

offensive (1–10 October 1918 and 1–11 November 

1918). The operations [that] resulted in the capture 

of Blanc Mont and Saint-Étienne were construed 

to be included in the Meuse-Argonne offensive despite the fact that the operations were a part of the 

operations of the IV French Army, far to the west of 

the western limit of the American Argonne-Meuse 

sector, and further that the work of the 2d Division 

was continued by another American division. The 

operation [that] resulted in the capture of Hill 142, 

Bouresches, Bois de la Brigade de Marine by the 

Marine brigade, assisted by artillery, engineers, etc., 

of the 2d Division, and the capture of Vaux by the 

3d Brigade, engineers and artillery of the 2d Division, were held to be local engagements rather than 

a major operation. The 2d Division suffered about 

9,000 casualties in this operation.

Marine Corps deaths in France, as obtained 

from Marine Corps records on 10 December 1919, 

are divided as follows:

Deaths Officers Enlisted 

men

Total

Killed in action 47 1,420 1,467

Died of wounds 

received in action 31 960 991

Died from accident 4 24 28

Died from disease 15 271 286

Other causes 2 11 13

Total 99 2,686 2,785

The records of the 2d Division show that 252 

officers and 8,277 enlisted men were wounded, and 

24 officers and 962 enlisted men were gassed between 15 March and 11 November 1918.

The French Army recognized the splendid work 

of the 5th and 6th Regiments by citing them no less 

than three times in army orders for achievements 

in the Château-Thierry sector, in the Aisne-Marne 

(Soissons) offensive, and in the Meuse-Argonne 

(Champagne). The 6th Machine Gun Battalion 

was similarly cited for its work in the ChâteauThierry sector and Aisne-Marne (Soissons) offensive. The 4th Brigade received a similar citation for 

its work in the Château-Thierry sector. Since only 

two French Army citations are sufficient to make 

an organization eligible for the award of the French 

fourragère, the high standard of the Marine units 

is evident. The only American organizations [that] 

have received permission to accept or wear the 

French fourragère are three sections of the ambulance service and one aero squadron, all of which 

were temporary organizations and have been now 

demobilized.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

A Marine Corps unit arrived in France with 

the first expedition of American troops. Between

26 June 1917 and 11 November 1918, Marines 

were in Europe with the AEF a total of 504 days, 

of which 66 days were in active sectors and 71 in 

quiet sectors.

The following number of decorations were 

awarded Marines:

Medals of Honor 5

(American)

Distinguished Service Medals 4

(American)

Distinguished Service Crosses 363

(American)

Distinguished Service Order 1

(British)

Croix-de-Guerre 1,237

(French)

Legion of Honor 15

(French)

Médaille Militaire 9

(French)

Belgian decorations 4

Italian decorations 6

Montenegrin decorations 4

Total 1,648

The 2d Division captured 343 pieces of heavy 

and light artillery, 58 trench mortars, 1,350 machine guns, and 8 antitank guns; it captured 12,026 

prisoners; and advanced 61 kilometers against the 

enemy.
113

The Lafayette high-power radio station at the village of Croix d’Hins, France, about 15 miles from 

Bordeaux, the construction of which was undertaken during the war by the United States Navy 

in conjunction with the French authorities for the 

purpose of ensuring adequate and reliable communication facilities between the United States government and the American Expeditionary Forces 

in France, was formally turned over by representatives of the Navy to the French government on

18 December 1920, and the station was then formally inaugurated in the international wireless

service of the world.

The construction of a super high-power radio station in France was deemed necessary after 

the entrance of the United States into the World 

War, in view of the extremely heavy and constantly 

increasing volume of trans-Atlantic traffic being 

handled by the ocean cables, and the not remote 

possibility that this means of communicating with 

our forces abroad might be interrupted.

It was decided, therefore, to establish a super 

high-power radio station in France [that] would be 

capable of communicating with the American stations during all periods of the day and night and 

all seasons of the year regardless of possible interference from the powerful station at Nauen [Germany], or from atmospheric disturbances prevailing 

during the summer months. Accordingly, the Navy 

Department was entrusted with the task of establishing a station in France [that] would be not less 

than twice as powerful as any radio station then in 

existence.

The construction of the station was far advanced when the Armistice was signed, at which 

time, however, all work was stopped, as the very 

urgent need of the station as no longer apparent. 

Later, however, the French government requested 

that the station be completed as an after-war measure, and work was again resumed and carried to 

completion.

The principal engineering features of the Lafayette radio station are eight self-supporting steel 

towers each 820 feet in height, resting on immense 

concrete foundations [that] rise 12 feet above the 

ground level; the antenna system, and the transmitting equipment consisting of 1,000-kw [kilowatt] 

arcs complete in duplicate.

The eight towers, resting on their foundations, 

thus providing a height of 832 feet from the ground 

level to the tops of the towers, are arranged in two 

rows of four each, the rows being spaced 1,320 feet, 

and the towers in each row likewise being spaced 

1,320 feet apart; giving a total antenna area of 

5,227,200 square feet, this antenna area far exceeds 

that of any other existing radio station.

The antenna is of the inverted “L” type, [with] 

the longitudinal antenna wires, consisting of number three silicon-bronze cable, being supported by 

triatics stretching across the aisle formed by the two 

rows of towers.

The arc equipment is of the Federal Poulsen 

type and is capable of withstanding a 25 percent 

overload, thereby making 1,250 kw available intermittently for short periods of time. The contract for 

the arc transmitting equipment called for the delivery of a high frequency current of 500 amperes 

continuously on a wave length approximately three 

times the natural period of an antenna having a true 

capacity of 0.047 microfarad and a total continuous 

undamped wave radio frequency resistance, exclusive of radio apparatus and connections, not to exceed 1.3 ohms under operating conditions.

The characteristics of the antenna system and 

oscillatory circuit, as permanently installed, are outlined below:

Capacity 0.05 microfarad

Antenna resistance 0.45 ohm

Ground resistance 0.90 ohm

Loading inductor aid connections 0.30 ohm

Total oscillatory circuit resistor 1.65 ohms

Antenna natural period 8,130 meters

Effective antenna height 172 meters

THE LAFAYETTE RADIO STATION

by Commander S. C. Hooper, U.S. Navy
114

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

The average height of the antenna horizontal 

wires is 650 feet, which shows the average sag of the 

wires to be 182 feet, since the tops of the towers are 

832 feet above ground level.

The equipment was adjusted to five wave 

lengths, namely 13,900, 16,300, 18,700, 21,200, and 

23,500 meters, the latter being considered as the 

contract wave length for the purpose of acceptance 

tests. A maximum antenna current of 610 amperes 

was obtained without damage to the installation. 

The antenna current used during the 30-day tests, 

which were conducted from 21 August to 19 September 1920, averaged about 450 amperes on the 

various wave lengths.

The signals from the Lafayette station as received at Cavite, Philippine Islands; San Francisco, California; Balboa, Canal Zone; Bar Harbor, 

Maine; and Washington, DC, during the 30-day 

tests were of from three to eight times greater intensity than those of other high-power radio stations of the world of approximately equal distances.

Work on the station began on 28 May 1918 

and was completed on 21 August 1920. The total 

cost of the station, which the French government 

has agreed to assume, was approximately $4 [million].

A commemorative tablet has been placed on 

the radio power building near the main entrance, 

bearing the following inscription in both English 

and French:

LAFAYETTE RADIO STATION

Croix d’Hins, Gironde, France

In Honor of General Lafayette

Conceived for the purpose of ensuring

adequate and uninterrupted trans-Atlantic

communication facilities between the

American Expeditionary Forces engaged in the

World War and the Government of the

United States of America.

Erected by the United States Navy

in conjunction with and for the

Government of France.

It is understood the Lafayette station will exchange trans-Atlantic radio traffic with stations in 

the United States and across the continents of Europe and Asia with the French station at Saigon, 

Indo-China, and also with other high power radio 

stations in various parts of the world.
115

Although the [USS] Brooklyn (CA 3), flagship of 

the United States Asiatic Fleet, was in Vladivostok 

Harbor, Siberia, in November 1917 when the [Aleksandr F.] Kerensky government was overthrown 

by the Bolsheviki; no part of her crew was landed, 

as the Kerensky adherents remained in power in 

Vladivostok for several months after their chief had 

been deposed. But upon the return of that vessel in 

March 1918, conditions made it imperative for Admiral Austin M. Knight, the commander-in-chief 

of the United States Asiatic Fleet, to send a force of 

Marines and Bluejackets ashore.

“Brooklyn” Arrives at Vladivostok

The Brooklyn, with the regular Marine detachment, 

consisting of Captain Archie F. Howard, Second 

Lieutenant Conrad S. Grove III, and about 75 

enlisted men, augmented by an additional 50 enlisted men, organized at Cavite, Philippine Islands, 

arrived at Vladivostok, Siberia, on 1 March 1918. 

While en route from Manila to Vladivostok, six 

machine gun crews were organized, equipped, and 

trained. These crews carried out firing exercises at 

sea on the way north.

Weather conditions were adverse for training as 

the Brooklyn neared Vladivostok. The weather being extremely cold, the exercises, of necessity, were 

limited to drills in the overcrowded quarters of the 

Marine detachment. The Marines, however, as usual 

turned to with a willing spirit and accomplished all 

that could be desired in the way of training.

After breaking from two to four feet of ice on 

entering the harbor of Vladivostok, the Brooklyn 

went alongside the dock on 1 March 1918. Then 

disappointments followed in rapid succession. Everybody had fondly expected to land immediately 

upon arrival, but as events turned out the Marines 

languished onboard ship until late in June.

Lieutenant Colonel Little

Performs Important Duties

Lieutenant Colonel Louis McC. Little was the fleet 

Marine and intelligence officer on the staff of Admiral Knight, and he had prepared complete plans 

in anticipation of an immediate landing upon arrival at Vladivostok. Lieutenant Colonel Little was 

performing this duty at the most interesting time 

when the Republic of China was finally induced 

to declare war against Germany; when the effect 

of the Bolshevistic demoralization made it appear 

that Russia and her dependencies were to become 

the tool of Germany; and when the possibility of 

reestablishing an eastern front was being seriously 

considered.

Lieutenant Colonel Little was sent out on a 

special mission into China and Siberia by Admiral Knight who, upon its successful completion, 

expressed himself as most highly satisfied with the 

results attained. Prior to his being relieved by Major 

Paul E. Chamberlin on 29 April 1918, Lieutenant 

Colonel Little was in charge of the Bureau of Military Information [that was] made up of the American, British, and Japanese forces on the spot, and 

obtained valuable information, including a large 

number of important maps.

Japanese Land

The following proclamation was issued by Rear Admiral Kato [Tomosaburo] when the Japanese sailors 

landed at Vladivostok:

CITIZENS:

I, the Commander of the Japanese Squadron, 

appreciating the present conditions in Russia 

and wishing an immediate suppression of civil 

dissention and the realization of the aims of the 

Revolution, until now have avoided any action 

that would interfere with the internal politics 

of Russia, or would assist or hamper any party. 

Such would tend to delay the establishment of 

a stable government according to the desires of 

the people. It is deplorable that conditions have 

failed to improve and disorder grows daily. It is 

evident that the authorities are unable to suppress disorder. I do not feel that the lives and 

AMERICAN MARINES IN SIBERIA DURING THE WORLD WAR

by Major Edwin N. McClellan, USMC
116

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

property of the citizens of the Japanese and 

Allied Governments are safe. The killing and 

wounding of three Japanese citizens in broadest 

daylight is a regrettable and a surprising incident. In view of this incident I have no other 

alternative for the protection of lives and property of the Japanese citizens but to land a detachment from the forces under my command, 

and take such measures as may be deemed adequate to insure the safety of life and property. 

Instructions have been requested from the Imperial Japanese Government governing further 

action.

As the measures taken are only for the protection of life and property, I again declare my 

deep friendship and sympathy for the Russian 

Government and people. It is my intention and 

desire that the people be not alarmed, and as 

heretofore, will pursue their daily business.

Commander of the Japanese Squadron,

REAR ADMIRAL HIROHARU KATO.

5 April, 7th Year of Taisio [1918].

The log of the Brooklyn for 5 April 1918 contains the following notation in the morning watch:

5:15. Japanese landing force consisting of about 

160 men and three steam launches and four 

pulling boats left H. I. M. S. Asahi, and at 5:25 

whole force had landed near railway station 

and marched UP towards Japanese Consulate 

in close formation, column of fours.

7:00. Three boat loads of supplies from H. 

I. M. S. Iwami landed astern, and loaded into 

carts.

8:00. Four boat loads of supplies from H. I. 

M. S. Iwami landed astern.

Major Fryer Relieves Major Chamberlin

Major Chamberlin was relieved by Major Eli T. 

Fryer on 4 May 1918, Major Fryer continuing as 

fleet Marine and intelligence officer until after the 

Armistice of 11 November 1918 became operative.

Bolsheviki Overthrown

From their arrival on 1 March 1918 until 29 June 

1918, the Marines onboard the Brooklyn lived on 

rumors regarding happenings that “were to be” 

ashore, and the detachment was at all times prepared to leave the ship at a minute’s notice for any 

duty it might be called upon to perform.

In June 1918, Vladivostok, and practically all 

of Siberia, was ruled by Soviets [with] the Bolsheviki being in control. About a week prior to 29 June 

1918, the Soviets, seeing that its days of power were 

about to expire, made attempts to ship away from 

Vladivostok the enormous quantities of war material in their possession to the interior of Russia, but 

these efforts proved unsuccessful as the Allied Military Council proclaimed that not a single shell or 

any other kind of ammunition in Vladivostok and 

neighborhood should be moved without its consent, which, of course, was never accorded. Military 

guards from the several war vessels in the harbor 

were placed over the depots and other buildings in 

which the war materials were stored.

The Bolsheviki, assisted by German and Austrian prisoners of war, were resisting the advance 

of the Czecho-Slovaks, who were trying to reach 

Vladivostok. In that city on 29 June 1918, there 

were approximately 12,000 well-organized CzechoSlovaks but only about 2,500 of them, however, 

were armed or equipped.

At 0600 [on] 29 June 1918, several detachments 

of Czecho-Slovaks, Japanese sailors from their two 

warships, British Bluejackets from the [HMS]

Suffolk [55], and Chinese sailors from a gunboat, all 

armed with machine guns, hand grenades, rifles and 

other arms, completely disarmed and imprisoned 

the Bolsheviki leaders of the Soviets, and assumed 

control of the city of Vladivostok and surrounding 

region.

The struggle centered around the building occupied by the staff of the Soviet military forces situated near the railway station and just opposite the 

harbor. It had been planned to blow up this building, as a great number of the Bolsheviki and former prisoners of war were resisting the Allies with 

machine guns and one-pounders. However, this 

operation was not necessary, as the Czecho-Slovaks 

gained entrance into the building under cover of 
117

Over There

the British and Japanese machine guns set up on 

the roof of the British consulate just opposite the 

military staff building. A white flag soon appeared 

at the window and, a few minutes later, bodies of 

Bolsheviki soldiers were carried out on the bayonets 

of the Czecho-Slovaks.

The log of the Brooklyn for 29 June 1918 describes the overthrow of the Bolsheviki in the following words:

During the day the Czecho-Slovak troops 

which were encamped in and around the city, 

about 16,000 in number under the command of 

General Deitrich, occupied the city of Vladivostok and its suburbs, disarmed the Red Guard, 

prisonered the former Bolsheviki rulers, and 

many Germans and Austrians, and assumed 

control of the city pending the formation of a 

responsible government.

It had been known for several days that the 

Bolsheviki authorities along the Trans-Siberian 

Railroad had received instructions from Moscow to disarm and send to prison camps all 

Czecho-Slovak troops. On June 28, 1918, the 

local Bolsheviki authorities commenced to ship 

arms and munitions on land to be used against 

the Czech troops en route for Vladivostok. To 

prevent this the Czechs delivered an ultimatum at 9.30 A.M., that date, demanding the 

disarmament of the Red Guards,* and at 10.00 

A.M., not having received a favorable reply, 

they proceeded to occupy the city.

In most parts of the city the occupation was 

quietly done, no resistance being offered by

the Bolsheviki. The Czech forces began their 

occupation at the eastern end of the city, and 

worked westward, making prisoners of the 

Bolsheviki under arms, and any Germans and 

Austrians found. During the forenoon they 

took possession of the City Hall and Post Office, the Telegraph Office, and the Police Headquarters. In this they were assisted by a hastily 

organized company of former Russian officers 

and soldiers who had served at the front, called 

Frontoviki. The English and Japanese patrols 

* Volunteer paramilitary group made up primarily of factory 

workers, peasants, Cossacks, and some former military.

assisted in patrolling a restricted area containing their Consulates, but took no actual part 

in the occupation and subsequent fighting. At 

9.50 A.M. the English guard was increased by 

153 men from the Suffolk.

At 10.20 four Russian torpedo boats left their 

docks and stood out into stream. The crews of 

all Allied warships in the harbor immediately 

went to general quarters. The torpedo boats anchored to the eastward of the Allied Squadron, 

without attempting to leave the harbor.

At 1.30 P.M. an armed force of sixty men was 

landed from the Chinese cruiser Hai-Yung for 

protection of the Consulate, and at 5.30 a Consulate Guard of thirty Marines landed from the 

Brooklyn.

By 3.00 P.M. the Czech forces had occupied 

the city as far as the railroad station. At 2.45 

P.M. intermittent rifle and machine gun fire 

commenced in the vicinity of the Staff Headquarters Building, opposite the railroad station. 

In this building the Red Guards and Hungarians were making their stand. At 4.00 P.M. the 

firing became more violent and continued until 

6.00 P.M., when the building was taken by a 

bomb attack, and the occupants made prisoners. For the remainder of the evening the city 

was quiet, with the Czech forces in control, 

continuing their search for Germans and Austrians, and their confiscation of firearms.

On 30 June 1918, and on many subsequent 

days, large numbers of Germans and Magyars, former prisoners of war who had served with the Bolsheviki, were executed by the Czecho-Slovaks.

The United States Maintained

Strict Neutrality

The populace were very much surprised that the 

American Marines and Bluejackets did not participate in the Allied overthrow of the Soviets; but the 

United States maintained strict neutrality throughout this brief but successful revolution.

Bolsheviki Vessels Captured

At this time, there were in the harbor of Vladivostok a flotilla of Russian destroyers and a few sub-
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

marines, controlled by the Soviet forces. As soon as 

the defeat of the Bolsheviki became evident, these 

vessels attempted to put to sea. The British and 

Japanese war vessels, however, had kept them under 

surveillance and, with all guns trained on the Bolsheviki vessels, demanded by signal their surrender. 

The Bolsheviki at first demurred, but surrendered 

the next morning without any firing being necessary.

Marines Land

On the afternoon of 29 June 1918, Admiral Knight 

ordered the Marines of the Brooklyn ashore with 

instructions to protect the American consul. These 

orders were carried out by posting sentinels at the 

American consulate and patrolling the streets for 

one block in all directions from the consulate. Everything was quiet and the duty eventually became 

ordinary guard duty. This guard was maintained until a few days before the Brooklyn sailed from Vladivostok on 10 October 1918.

Marines Form Part of Allied Patrol

Shortly after 29 June 1918, an Allied patrol was 

organized and marched through the main street of 

Vladivostok night and day, with the idea of impressing the Bolsheviki. This patrol consisted of American Marines, British Bluejackets, Japanese sailors, 

Czecho-Slovak soldiers, and Chinese sailors.

About 1 July 1918, the majority of the CzechoSlovaks left Vladivostok to open up the line along 

the Trans-Siberian Railway in eastern Siberia, 

with the idea of facilitating the movement of the 

Czecho-Slovaks eastward.

Marines Stationed on Russian Island

After their first battle, about 3 July 1918, many seriously wounded soldiers were practically put in the 

hands of the Navy medical officers of the Brooklyn. 

An abandoned Russian military hospital on Russian 

Island, about five miles from Vladivostok, was selected, and about 100 German and Austrian prisoners of war were put to work cleaning and repairing 

it. About 10 American Marines from the Brooklyn, 

in [the] charge of Sergeant Allen H. Lange, acted 

as guard over these prisoners. This work was done 

in connection with the Red Cross. Sergeant Lange 

had almost complete control of the administration 

and security of these prisoners doing this construction work, and he carried out his duties in a most 

commendable manner. The Russian naval hospital 

in Vladivostok was also used and the Brooklyn surgeons assisted in the work there.

Fourth of July Celebration

Puzzles Bolsheviki

An incident of considerable interest, tinged with 

a bit of sadness yet amusing to some, occurred on 

the Fourth of July. The Allied military authorities in 

control of Vladivostok, not desirous of creating any 

feeling against the Allies, permitted the Bolsheviki 

to hold funeral exercises and the customary elaborate Russian parade in honor of those Bolsheviki 

who had been killed during the fighting on 29 June 

1918. Thousands of sympathizers and mourners 

followed the nine coffins.

The Brooklyn, as called for by Navy regulations, 

was in “full dress” and fairly smothered with flags in 

honor of the day.

Without any more knowledge of the significance of the importance of this day to Americans 

than the average American would have as to a national holiday in Russia, the Bolsheviki immediately 

leaped to the erroneous conclusion that the display 

of flags on the Brooklyn was in honor of their dead 

and due to American sympathy for their cause. This 

was but a natural inference, for America had maintained her usual strict neutrality, had not interfered 

in any way with the Soviet government, and had 

not joined in with the other forces on 29 June 1918 

to overthrow the Bolsheviki government.

At any rate, when the funeral procession and 

parade passed the American consulate guarded by 

Marines, its decorated appearance made the presumption conclusive in the Bolsheyiki mind that 

America was their friend. A command was given 

to stop the procession and America was the recipient of undeserved eulogies. Literally, thousands of 

cheers, were given for the United States of America 

by the Bolsheviki, numerous speeches were delivered in which the highest esteem and appreciation 

was expressed to the American republic and her 
119

Over There

people for their supposed condolence concerning 

the fall of the Bolsheviki government and the dead. 

The Bolsheviki gave the Marines a grand welcome 

into their organization, and it was with some difficulty that the Bolsheviki were kept outside the 

fence surrounding the American consulate.

In further explanation of this unusual incident, 

it seems that the Bolsheviki had anticipated a revolution onboard the Brooklyn, and a subsequent joining with them, because three times a day the red 

pennant (meal pennant) had been hoisted, which 

the Bolsheviki looked upon as the “Red Flag.”

Patrolling the Navy Yard

About 10 July 1918, the Marines were ordered to 

patrol the navy yard at Vladivostok. The Bolsheviki had threatened to destroy the machinery, and 

the maintenance of this machinery was necessary 

for the Allies and loyal Russians. This patrol duty 

was performed by the American Marines in conjunction with British Marines, Japanese sailors, 

and Chinese sailors; each of the foregoing taking 

a day’s duty in turn. About eight posts were established and the patrols had control of the navy yard 

as far as concerned the safety of the workmen and 

the yard. Only one incident of a troublesome nature 

occurred. One night while the British Marines had 

the duty, a drunken Russian sailor tried to rush a 

member of their guard, and the Russian was killed.

Marines Prepared at All Times to Land

During this long period, the Marines of the Brooklyn stood by ready at all times to land. A good 

example of their readiness was afforded about

1 September 1918, when at about 0200 the admiral 

received a field message from United States Army 

authorities ashore, requesting that the Marines be 

sent to the railroad station to assist the Army in an 

anticipated attack by the Bolsheviki. The log of the 

Brooklyn shows that, five minutes after the call was 

sounded, the Marines left that ship, fully equipped, 

for the scene of the expected action, only to find 

that the contemplated attack was one of their old 

friends—“a rumor.”

Marines Withdrawn

The Marines of the Brooklyn maintained the guard 

at the American consulate until a few days before 

that vessel sailed from Vladivostok on 10 October 

1918. In connection with the landing of the Marines at Vladivostok, it is interesting to note that 

such landing occurred approximately one month 

before that of the American Expeditionary Forces.

Allied Troops Arrive

Early in July 1918, the Russians set up a provisional 

government in Vladivostok. While this government 

was recognized provisionally, but not as a permanent government by the representatives of the Allies, the military council of Allies was supreme.

As soon as the official declaration by the [Supreme War] Council of the occupation of the city 

was announced, a large number of Japanese transports carrying troops arrived, while regiments of 

Czecho-Slovak soldiers were immediately dispatched to free the whole of Siberia and to secure 

communication with those Czecho-Slovaks who 

were held on the other side of the front by the Bolsheviki. These Czecho-Slovaks were former Austrian soldiers and there were in all about 60,000 of 

them in Siberia.

On every arrival of foreign military forces in 

Vladivostok, the Japanese from the nearby islands, 

the British from Hong Kong and other places, the 

French colonials from Saigon, and the Chinese, 

they were given a hearty welcome and the Russians 

seemed to be glad to see them. Of them all, however, the American troops from the Philippine Islands 

received the warmest welcome.

Meanwhile, fierce battles between the CzechoSlovaks and the Bolsheviki were in progress, and 

the casualties were large on both sides. The British, French, and Japanese troops were sent to reinforce the Czecho-Slovaks, but no American troops 

were used for this purpose, America again carefully 

guarding her neutrality. The guns were removed 

from the British cruiser Suffolk and sent forward 

to the front lines on special open cars manned and 

officered by the British under command of British 

officers.

PEACE AND OCCUPATION

123

The most optimistic could not believe that there 

was any significance to the order. How could a war 

that had been going on four years stop that way—

when 1100 came on the morning of 11 November?

“Cease firing at eleven.” Impossible!

What did time and dates mean to soldiers at 

the front? Nothing; nothing. The past was hazy 

memories and all of us knew that there would be 

one “tomorrow” too many. Time was just something 

mechanical. Even the days of the week, when we 

knew them, were mere reminders of another life. 

Whenever Fritz strafed us a little harder than usual, 

it was Cognac Smith who said, “Guess it must be 

Sunday, the way the squareheads are tossing ’em 

over today.”

That morning at daybreak, Fritz began in earnest. We knew it was 11 November because the logbook showed the day before was the 10th.

Sitting comfortably on some damp straw, we 

talked and laughed cynically. The very idea, we 

agreed, was preposterous. The war ending at any set 

time! The German stronghold of Metz was our objective, and Berlin on the Rhine, our ultimate destination. Bah! “Cease firing at eleven.” That was no 

way to end a war. Whoever heard of stopping a war 

that way—by the hands of a clock? Absurd! Impossible!

At about 0900, our batteries began to open up. 

“Give ’em hell, boys, but stop at eleven.” That was 

the order everywhere, reminding us of rookie camp 

stuff.

At least five shells were going out to every one 

that came in. It was like prolonged thunder; the 

kind that sounds when lightning blinds and cracks. 

But we were restless and even the dog-like rats 

scampering around the pots and pans didn’t stop to 

fight over the scraps that Cootie, the cook, invariably left on the floor. There was something besides 

shells in the air.

Cognac Smith swore between incoming shells, 

though every time I looked at him he was staring at 

his watch as though hypnotized.

It seemed that watches had stopped running. It 

was just 1037.

The strain of waiting until 1100 was worse than 

the shelling. We were used to that; it wasn’t so bad. 

Being in it constantly since the middle of August 

had taught us many things.

“What was Death, anyhow?” I recalled Cognac’s philosophy of the night before. “Others meet 

it every day. Then, after dark, the cursing, ghoulish 

grave-diggers shovel out a shallow hole-and that’s 

the end.” I couldn’t get his words out of my mind.

But for the thousandth time, I learned that the 

front was the place to forget—not to think. There 

came another whining, mournful shriek and a 

death-dealing, three-ten banged into the earth and 

showered tons of dirt and scrap iron.

When I could see, Smith was still clutching his 

old silver watch in his twitching hand. That watch 

must have been his grandfather’s. He took pride in 

the fact that he set it only every 60 days. It was one 

minute fast by mine.

Only 1046. Each minute was an hour.

The thought kept going through my mind, 

wouldn’t it be hell to get bumped off now, and the 

war did stop when eleven o’clock came?

Our eyes smarted from the gas, but we couldn’t 

help from staring at the face of Smith’s huge watch. 

The hand crawled to 1059—then the second hand 

seemed to go backward. What a sensation it would 

be if everything could become still—just for an 

hour, I remember thinking.

Breathing stopped when the second hand said 

only 25 seconds—then 20. Every gun was barking like a horde of enraged, prehistoric monsters. 

Smith’s hand quivered so that I could not see the 

time; or perhaps it was I who quivered too much.

I remember looking at Cootie, the cook. He 

was breathing like a creaky bellows; his eyes were 

nearly popping out and his jaw was held up by his 

helmet strap. (There were varying accounts of how 

I looked.)

Then a typhoon of oaths that would have made 

a veteran deep-sea sailor hide his head in shame: 

CEASE FIRING AT ELEVEN

by Rufus C. Burleson
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

“_____ eleven o’clock and the _____ are going 

stronger than ever. I told you so—liars—damn the 

war and the—that started this armistice stuff!”

Cognac Smith was turning into an insane demon. “Gone cuckoo,” I remember saying to Cootie. 

Poor Smith, he had been up too long.

Cootie fumbled for a cigarette; then another 

HE [high explosive] shell—and graveyard stillness. 

Disconnected pictures flashed through my mind: 

white bath tubs, coffins, soggy hob-nailed shoes, 

rocking chairs, underwear alive with cooties, flower 

gardens, women who smiled and spoke English. It 

was impossible to speak and torturous to think. It 

was all too sudden and unbelievable. There were 

vague thoughts of the day of judgment and being 

transposed from hell to heaven; of a tottering old 

man being rejuvenated into a lusty infant.

We heard a feeble shout from somewhere, but 

it wasn’t enough to awaken us. The silence became 

uncanny, as enveloping and deathly as mustard gas. 

My mind could not grasp it all. It must be death, I 

thought, but I was not conscious of pain except in 

my ears.

Trying to think was maddening. From hell to 

heaven; from death to life; the weight of years being snatched off my shoulders. Was it another miracle or just a nightmare? No, there was Cootie and 

Smith, and the odor from the damp filthy straw. A 

dying, gasping groan—unmistakable—came from a 

pile of stone and timber.

The silence became more oppressive than the 

roar of the guns—the whining, screeching incoming shells—the deathly slugs of iron after the 

burst. It seemed that we stood there for hours before we realized that it was the end. I became partly 

conscious when some doughboys outside began to 

shout.

Poor old Cognac Smith; he would have been a 

wreck if it had lasted another week. His eyes were 

still gazing at his big, silver watch.

Finally, it seemed days later, he broke the silence. 

He swore more eloquently than I have ever heard, 

before or since. He cursed the Army’s inefficiency, 

General Pershing, canned willie, the Kaiser, cooks 

that let flies get in the slum, “_____ the damn careless _____ fools _____,” his contorted face showed 

grinding teeth, “that’s the way they run this _____ 

war,” and tapping an unsteady, nicotine-stained finger on the dial of his old watch, he gasped for breath 

and growled, “their time was a whole minute slow!”
125

I am confronted with the task of analyzing and criticizing the events just prior to, during, and just subsequent to the crossing of the Meuse on the night 

of 10–11 November 1918.

There was much caustic criticism and there still 

lingers in the minds of some not a little resentment 

for the commander who ordered the actual crossing 

when an armistice was expected at any moment and 

for the apparently needless sacrifices of lives.

For either side of this argument, records, reports, 

and history furnish us with arguing points, but I 

would prefer to attempt to disabuse your minds of 

any thought that this operation was conceived with 

the idea of adding glory to any individual.

I believe that the basic principles of any battle 

can be likened in most respects to a school-yard 

fight between two boys. They have a grievance and 

decide to fight. After a long tussle, A gets the better of B, and B feeling his strength waning says to 

A, “Let’s stop and talk this over and see if we can’t 

come to an understanding,” and to himself he says, 

“When I get my breath and a little reserve strength, 

I’ll be able to lick this fellow.” Should A be a sap, or 

should he continue to drive home the attack until 

he has thoroughly beaten B? The answer is simple.

Let us get down to basic facts, and in doing so it 

is necessary to go back to 4–5 October 1918, when 

the news of the so-called false armistice was broadcast and there was rejoicing in every quarter.

To many Germans in authority, a peace based 

on President Wilson’s famous 14 demands was 

entirely acceptable, but Marshal [Paul von] Hindenburg had other ideas. It was at this time that 

he accompanied the Kaiser back to Berlin and persuaded the supreme headquarters that a levee in 

mass should be proclaimed in order to secure one 

last reserve for the defense of the frontier at the 

Grenz position. The attempt was a failure and Hindenburg’s scheme was merely to secure a peace by 

diplomacy while he held the Allies at bay and made 

their further advance so costly that they also would 

be inclined toward peace.

Whether the ruse behind these incidents was 

known at the time by the Allies, I do not know, 

but I cite it here to show that at that time the Allies placed no faith in the announced desires of the 

Germans and their every move was treated with 

suspicion. They were sparring for time and the Allies could not be fooled.

As early as 28 October, there was a meeting of 

the Allied commanders to settle upon the terms 

which would be offered the Germans when the 

time came and these terms were so exacting that it 

was not expected that they would be accepted.

From this time until the news of the Armistice 

reached the combat troops, there was constant talk 

of peace, much of which percolated into the ranks 

of the fighting men and none of which did any 

good for morale.

It remained that hostilities were continued unabated; the Germans suffering from the hammer 

blows of the combined Belgian, French, British, 

and American forces gradually fell back at the same 

time continuing their suit for peace.

On the evening of 9 November, Marshal Foch 

was in conference with the representatives of the 

German forces. Affairs in Germany were fast reaching a chaotic state and it was not known exactly who 

was in authority to conclude terms. Foch, still wary 

of the outcome of any negotiations and wishing to 

let the enemy know that there could be no further 

delay, dispatched the following telegram to Allied 

headquarters:

The enemy, disorganized by our repeated attack, 

retreats along the entire front. It is important 

to coordinate and expedite our movements. I 

appeal to the energy and the initiative of the 

Commanders-in-Chief and of their armies to 

make decisive the results obtained.

In response to this appeal from the supreme 

commander, orders were immediately issued by 

General Pershing to give the enemy no respite and, 

as plans had already been drawn which provided for 

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CROSSING OF THE MEUSE RIVER

2D DIVISION AEF ON 10–11 NOVEMBER 1918

by Lieutenant Colonel D. L. S. Brewster, USMC
126

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

the crossing of the Meuse, it does not seem to me 

that it was unusual for General [Charles P.] Summerall, commanding the V Corps, to order the carrying out of the plans. Their execution only awaited 

a favorable opportunity when the bridge material 

could be placed in position for the crossing.

It is quite true that, in some instances, attack 

orders were not carried out and half-hearted attacks 

bogged down for want of the necessary aggressiveness which latter spirit was only caused by the dissemination of false rumors. Still, other leaders were 

jubilant because, as it later developed, they had 

spared further bloodshed.

As the momentous events developed, this was 

all very well, but what would have happened if the 

entire battle line from the Swiss border to the North 

Sea and laid down on the job for want of offensive spirit? The question answers itself, for it was all 

that the German commanders in the field wanted, 

to demand a stouter resistance by their troops and 

even offensive operations, and the bloodshed would 

have been a hundred fold greater.

In the forest between Compiegne and Soissons, 

the representatives of the central powers and the 

Allies again met on 7 November. The German delegates had no authority to definitely conclude the 

terms of an armistice and it was necessary for them 

to refer the matters to Berlin for approval. Upon 

learning the demands of the Allies, a German delegate was sent to Berlin with the terms.

At 2300 on the 10th of November, a wireless 

message was received in code from Berlin, authorizing the German delegates to accept the terms 

and sign the Armistice. The decoding of the message took a considerable time and it was not until 

0500 on the eleventh when it was finished, and the 

discussions were completed sufficiently to draw up 

the terms in rough. Even at that, the final page was 

completed first in order that word could be disseminated to the fighting troops to cease hostilities in 

order that lives might not be needlessly sacrificed.

Remember this, that in spite of the fact that 

the American First and Second Armies occupied a 

front of some 80 miles, most of the units were notified before 1100 on the morning of that memorable 

day. Compare that with our present day claim for 

efficiency in communications when we determine 

that it will take some three hours for a mere brigade 

to get orders down to their companies, and here had 

been a fast moving situation where even the supply 

facilities could not keep up with advancing infantry. 

Let us now get down to the matter in hand: that 

of an analysis of the operation of 10–11 November.

The 2d Division, consisting of the 9th and 23d 

Infantry and the 5th and 6th Regiments were fresh 

from their victories at Blanc Mont. On 1 November, they had been moved by truck and marching to 

become a part of the V Corps under General Summerall. The Hagen and the Grentz positions had 

been carried and part of the Kremhilde or, better 

known Hindenburg line had fallen into our hands 

and the Germans on the night of 4–5 November 

had fallen back to the north bank of the Meuse.

German resistance to the impetuous attacks of 

the Americans was weakening and their only hope 

lay in getting the remnants of their forces to the rear 

where a new defensive line could be formed. The 

crossings of the Meuse therefore were left in the 

hands of a composite force consisting of trainmen, 

signalmen, and even clerks from division headquarters, who manned the machine gun defenses. The 

German artillery, however, was farther to the rear 

and, since it was falling back on its supply line, there 

was no dearth of ammunition.

On the sixth, the 2d Engineers under Colonel 

[William A.] Mitchell continued their reconnaissance of the river in the zone of the V Corps and 

started plans for bridging operations.

On the eighth, orders were received for the 

2d Division to affect a crossing at Mouzon and 

Latanne.

The Germans had destroyed all bridges in this 

area except one just south of Mouzon and just 

north of Latanne. The former was under machinegun and artillery fire and the latter had been partially wrecked.

The division plan contemplated a crossing at 

two points on the night of 9–10 November by the 

4th Brigade, with all artillery supporting the crossing, but the project had to be abandoned when the 

engineers failed to have the bridges ready, and it 

was not until the night of 10–11 November that 

the plans were crystallized and then only in part.

The 6th [Regiment] were in position at the 

appointed hour, having moved up under cover of 

darkness from the Bois de Limon on the ninth, but 
127

Peace and Occupation

the Germans had discovered the attempt and forced 

the engineers to abandon work on the bridge. There 

was nothing for the regiment to do but return to 

the partial security of the woods. The movement 

was called off for that night and plans immediately 

set on foot to accomplish the crossing the following 

night.

The night of 10–11 November witnessed a 

more determined effort and though the 6th [Regiment] were again foiled in their attempt, the 5th 

[Regiment] fared a little better downstream where 

two bridges were successfully thrown across. One of 

these was blown out by a direct artillery shell, but 

the other one held and in one hour the 1st Battalion 

was across. By 2330, the 2d Battalion got across and 

by the following daybreak the 89th Division was 

across.

Briefly, that is what transpired and, while it is 

useless to be harshly critical and unfair regarding 

these events and decisions made during the heat 

of battle, we must, in order to avoid like mistakes, 

study them with a critical mind in the quietness of 

our study.

European battlegrounds furnish us with a fertile field for a study of river crossings and from Napoleon’s time forward, history is replete with fine 

examples. True in those days there was no aircraft to 

detect a contemplated crossing and bridge material 

could be moved up during daylight to the points selected with little chance of discovery by the enemy.

French tactics, then as always, relied upon secrecy and deception with great attention to details and 

long and careful planning. If there was a possibility 

of the enemy detecting the movement, then plans 

were laid for crossings at numerous points and, at 

the final moment, patrols were thrown across the 

river to determine the weak spots and it was at these 

points that they pushed their main effort.

For the crossing of the Limmat [river in Switzerland] in 1799 by Massena, a total of three weeks 

was consumed in preparations and the gathering of 

materiel and boats. It required 1,000 men to carry 

37 boats from their hiding place to the bank of the 

river on the night selected for the crossing, the wagons with the bridge equipment having been kept 

under cover until the final moment when they were 

pushed rapidly to the river. Troops began to cross 

at 0445 and, by 0730, 8,000 men were on the other 

side of the river.

The crossing of the Rhine by [Field Marshal 

Gebhard] Blücher in 1813 was only successful because the point chosen was undefended, for their 

preparations were incomplete and lacking in many 

details. Likewise, the crossing at Beresina in 1812 

by Napoleon when pursued by the Russians would 

have resulted in a rout and annihilation had not the 

wary Napoleon dispatched a large force of unarmed 

stragglers toward the logical point of crossing while 

he himself took another route with the remnants of 

his army.

History is also replete with glaring examples of 

a total disregard for present day intelligence tactics. 

In other words, commanders of great repute decided 

what the enemy was going to do rather than what 

the enemy was capable of doing. This very point is 

exemplified in the crossing of the Yalu [River] by 

the Japanese in 1904. In spite of ominous warnings, 

nothing could shake the faith of the Russians that 

the crossing would take place at a certain point, and 

their dispositions were made accordingly. When the 

actual crossing took place at another point, it was 

then too late to make other dispositions, and the 

crossing was completely successful.

There are several outstanding requirements in 

crossing a stream and, in general, each depends 

upon the others.

Technical skill is important and in some cases 

may even govern. This, however, would be in the 

case where the crossing was entirely unopposed or 

very lightly defended and where speed is essential 

in getting the troops across. Boldness and a consummate skill in erecting the bridge are therefore 

requisites under these circumstances. Under practically all other conditions the factors of secrecy and 

surprise are essential, with a moderate amount of 

luck on the attacker’s side. These factors would avail 

little however if the technical skill were lacking and 

you could not “beat the enemy to the draw.”

Now let us summarize for a moment and then 

determine how the crossing of the Meuse on the 

night of 10–11 November compares with those few 

examples which I have cited, together with numerous others of which I have read in the preparation 

of this paper.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

To make an apple pie, it is first necessary to get 

some apples, and so, it is necessary that we collect 

the materiel and lay most careful plans both from 

the technical and tactical point of view.

Having accumulated the necessary materiel, it 

must be gotten to the point of crossing and kept 

from the prying eyes of enemy aviators. This done, 

we must see that the element of surprise is not lacking for without it we sacrifice much of our chance of 

success. Still further, we must arrange for adequate 

artillery support and lastly, there must be a coordinating head for the operation, that is, someone on 

the spot.

As Colonel Robinson has told you, there was 

no bridge train present with the 4th Brigade at this 

time. Three or four bridges had been constructed on 

land preparatory to launching in previous operations, but these had been left in places miles from 

the rivers and the division found itself confronted 

with a crossing and nothing to accomplish it with. 

This, in spite of the fact that everyone in the American Expeditionary Forces knew full well that the 

Germans would destroy the bridges behind them 

and that if a final defeat was to be administered to 

the Germans, bridges were a vital necessity.

The roads in rear of the Mouzon-Latanne zone 

were for the most part second-class and rendered 

almost impassable by recent rains and continuous 

traffic. The 2d Engineers were kept constantly busy 

keeping them in repair.

Orders providing for the actual construction of 

the bridges were not issued until the 8th of November. It was only possible to detail two companies of 

the 2d Engineers for this duty and it was necessary 

to assign two companies of the 9th Infantry to assist in the work. In previous operations, the French 

equipment had proved useless and it was necessary 

for the engineers to improvise bridges.

It is true that heavy bridge material was delivered at Yoncq [Ardennes], but it could not be gotten into usable shape in time for the crossing. It was 

therefore necessary for the engineers to wreck old 

German barracks in Beaumont and Latanne and 

from this source they managed to contrive a set of 

footbridges unlike any theretofore used.

On the night of 9–10 November, when the first 

crossing was ordained, the Germans discovered the 

attempt and forthwith stopped it, and the element 

of surprise was forfeited.

The crossing was postponed until the following 

night and the 6th Marines, back in the Bois de Limon, awaited the signal to start for the bridge site. 

They were due there at 2130 and, at this time, the 

artillery [that] was to fire a preparation would just 

be raising their fire to objectives further in rear. Just 

at dusk when the Marines were about to leave the 

woods and with some four miles to march, they saw 

their artillery firing on the opposite bank of the river. Only shortly after this, they witnessed the fire lift 

to targets in rear. There was just a slight mistake of 

about one hour in the barrage and had their bridging operations been successful they would have perforce made crossing without artillery support. Thus 

we see that another of the essential elements to a 

successful crossing was lost. As events transpired, it 

is fortunate that they failed to execute a crossing in 

this area.

Four hundred yards to the south, the so-called 

Latanne crossing met with greater success and, 

while the element of surprise was lacking, yet the 

artillery covering this point did not fail, that is, the 

firing on schedule.

It did not subdue the hostile machine gunners, 

nor did it have any appreciable effect on the amount 

or accuracy of the German artillery fire. It must be 

remembered, however, that the Germans were falling back on their line of supply and ammunition 

was plentiful. Certainly it was far more economical 

to expend than leave it for the Allies to capture.

One other point that may be overlooked is the 

fact that the German artillery had orders not to retire from their positions until their supported infantry had actually passed through them.

In all fairness to the artillery supporting the 2d 

Division in this operation, it was the first time they 

had all operated together as a team and it was a fast 

moving situation for the advance of the 2d Division 

had covered some 13 miles in eight days.

In short, the Americans were deprived of the 

element of surprise; for the most part, their artillery 

support was inadequate and finally, the makeshift 

bridges left much to be desired yet in spite of these 

sad deficiencies the élan of the division drove forward to ultimate success.
129

The demobilization of the 4th and 5th Brigades, 

with their attached machine gun battalions, involving approximately 14,000 men, with an aggregate 

payroll of $3,250,000, was accomplished on their 

return from overseas with a celerity and thoroughness that was all the more creditable to those organizations, and to the staff organizations concerned, 

by reason of the fact that heretofore all processes 

of demobilization in the Marine Corps had been 

confined to gradual and limited demobilization of 

individuals. Through the precedent established in 

August, it seems worthwhile that a summary of this 

demobilization be presented to the Corps to supplement the official reports that were filed at Headquarters of the Corps. Only the most optimistic

idealist can discount the probability of future wars 

that may call for the employment of the Marine 

Corps as a whole in another conflict of immensity 

and, in addition to the professional interest that the 

processes of the demobilization of organizations 

have for every officer of the Corps, the mustering out of the two brigades will not only serve as a 

model for future action, but it affords a basis for improvement and simplification. The officers directly 

concerned, both those of the line and of the staff, 

faced new conditions that intimately affect all that 

bulk of officers who had no part in the demobilization, but are curious to learn how the work was 

done.

The Initial Work

Immediately following the signing of the Armistice 

on 11 November 1918, demobilization was begun 

on a very limited scale in accordance with the orders 

then in effect. This gradual and limited operation 

was applied to individual Marines as they made application for release from the Service, and continued as such until the beginning of the fiscal year 

on 1 July 1919. From that date, the process became 

accelerated through the fact that Congress, in the 

Naval Appropriation Act approved on 11 July 1919, 

made provision for only sufficient funds to maintain 

the Corps at an average strength of 27,400, with 

the corresponding ratio of officers, for the fiscal 

year ending 30 June 1920. In anticipation of this 

limitation, plans for the rapid demobilization of 

the overseas forces were begun early in June. These 

plans contemplated the complete demobilization of 

the 4th and 5th Brigades upon their return from 

France. The actual demobilization of the brigades, 

a combined force equal to that of the Corps before our entry into the Great War, was completed 

on 13 August. Its speed and efficiency came up to 

the most sanguine hopes, for it had as its basis the 

rigid discipline and varied experience that the work 

overseas had fashioned, and the minor administrative faults failed to hamper the work of demobilization to any real extent.

The demobilization in each brigade of its duration of war men required, in actual operation, approximately one day for each regiment, beginning 

on 11 August, while the transfer of the four-year 

men, those desiring extension of enlistment, and 

the transfer of reservists to an inactive status was 

completed on 25 August.

The Preliminary Staff Work

Before the overseas troops came within effective 

range of the paperwork barrage that seems inseparable from the other horrors of war, the staff departments in Washington had much to do before the 

approach of zero hour. So soon as it was decided 

DEMOBILIZING THE BRIGADES

by Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Evans, USMC *

* The editor has received a letter from LtCol F. E. Evans, 

USMC, author of the article entitled “Demobilizing the Brigades,” in our December issue, requesting that an error in that 

article be corrected. The statement was made that “the only 

hitch in the day’s work was due to the failure in one organization, namely, the 11th Regiment, to circulate to all company 

commanders of the organization the details arranged for the 

entraining at the naval base. Due to this error a number of discharged men were sent into Norfolk with their transportation, 

and upon arrival of the trains at the base it was necessary to 

locate the men and effect their return to the base.” Col Evans 

has since been informed by the late commander of the 11th 

Regiment that this statement was incorrect, and at Col Evans’ 

request this information is made public to the readers of Marine Corps Gazette.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

that Quantico, the training ground of the brigades, 

would receive the veterans of the 4th Brigade for 

their demobilization, the post quartermaster at that 

station proceeded with the assignment of barracks 

for the men, and quarters for the officers. This involved nothing less than a complete reassignment 

of the organizations then at Quantico. As fast as 

barracks were emptied, they were policed and overhauled. Bunks, mattresses, and bedding were placed 

in the barracks assigned; ranges and latrines were 

overhauled and fuel provided. Rolling kitchens, one 

for each two companies, were stationed conveniently, and when the troops detrained hot coffee was 

ready for issue.

The general procedure of the Paymaster’s Department was based on the demobilization of an 

organization as an organization. Final settlements 

were therefore made on payrolls in place of on individual vouchers, as had been the invariable custom in the Corps. The payroll procedure was, of 

course, not practicable in peacetime with the necessity imposed by individual dates of discharge. It 

was therefore necessary for this staff department to 

begin its paperwork well in advance of the return

of the brigades. Several difficulties were encountered along this line. The recent law authorizing 

a travel allowance of five cents per mile either to 

the point of original muster-in, or to the bona fide 

home of the man, as he might elect, proved the most 

troublesome factor. Without exception, the individual elected that point which involved the greater 

mileage, a natural method of self-determination. Of 

the bona fide homes, which were selected in onethird of the total cases, many were found to be at 

considerable distances from railroad lines. Few were 

within a close radius of railroad centers. The computation of the distances to the bona fide homes 

proved vexatious and soul-trying. In every instance, 

it was necessary to verify the bona fide home as 

given by the individual from the official records, no 

mean task in itself.

The loss or absence of many staff record books 

in the 4th Brigade also made payment by affidavits 

necessary. This factor was pointed out early in the 

war when Sergeant Major John Quick, of the 6th 

Regiment, advocated that, on arrival in France, all 

service record books be forwarded by the organizations to some central office well in rear of the lines, 

where, on receipt of memoranda from the companies, they could be kept up to date and not subjected to loss by sudden moves, shell fire, and other 

accidents of war.

The loss or absence of deposit record books also 

made it necessary to make the required abstracts of 

deposits from the paymaster’s office.

The Paymaster’s Instructions

Upon the recommendation of the paymaster, the 

orders for the demobilization of the 5th Brigade, 

which also governed that of the 4th Brigade, gave 

detailed instructions to ensure the accuracy and 

completeness of all pay and service record data. 

Eight of the paymasters then overseas were made 

available for return with the oversea organizations, 

making one available for each 1,500 men. They were 

ordered to handle the final statements of all men 

to be discharged. The pay accounts of those men 

who came under the separate classification of either 

four-year men, duration-of-the-war men wishing 

to extend their enlistments, and the reservists, were 

assigned to the post paymaster at Quantico.

These general instructions were further amplified by separate orders from the paymaster to 

the chief paymaster in France. They covered such 

details as to ensure, so far as practicable, that the 

accounts of the men to be discharged be extended 

to include the date of arrival in the United States; 

that accounts be ready and audited for settlement 

on arrival at the demobilization centers; and that 

payments in all cases be made by cash unless an individual specified his desire to be paid by check. The 

paymasters were further instructed that, should they 

lack sufficient funds or did not have them to their 

credit with the Treasury Department, they should 

cable before departure, or radio after sailing, the 

amount necessary to be placed to their credit. The 

chief paymaster was also directed to assign pay officers equably to returning organizations and, where 

practicable, that the duplicate payrolls of organizations for the preceding month be made equally 

available for purposes of audit and comparison. The 

paymaster designated for the casual troops was directed to pay all returning casuals promptly on arrival for the preceding month, and that all casuals 

who extended enlistments and applied for furlough, 
131

Peace and Occupation

should be paid in full before leaving on furlough.

It is worthy of note that the only obstacle encountered in the prompt final payment of troops 

was the difficulty of getting money for the payment 

of the 5th Brigade at the Naval Base Hampton 

Roads [Virginia]. No bank in Norfolk could advance the sum necessary, and $1,300,000 in cash 

was sent down to that point in two installments under heavy guard from the Treasury Department in 

Washington.

The Adjutant and Inspector

Instructions relative to those matters of records, 

discharges, and other administrative work under 

the jurisdiction of the Adjutant and Inspector’s Department, were prepared by that department after 

consultation with the Paymaster’s Department, and 

embodied in orders to the brigades issued by the 

Major General Commandant. This order directed 

that the organizations be divided, for administrative 

purposes, into two groups:

(a) Those duration-of-the-war men desiring 

immediate discharge upon return.

(b) Those duration-of-the-war men desiring 

to extend enlistment. Four-year men. Members 

of the Marine Corps Reserve.

The first group retained their organization designation, and the second were tentatively organized 

into casual companies, one in each regiment or machine gun battalion, capable of immediate detachment from their organizations upon arrival at the 

demobilization center of Quantico, and assignment 

to duty at that post. Authority was granted to give 

60-day furloughs to all men extending their enlistment, and commanding officers were delegated

authority to effect the discharge of men without 

reference to Headquarters in all cases of oversea 

men who had enlisted between the historic dates of 

6 April 1917 and 11 November 1918.

Because of the many technicalities involved, the 

matter of placing reservists on an inactive status was 

reserved to the jurisdiction of Washington. Lists of 

all such men were, however, ordered to be cabled 

prior to sailing in order that these cases could be 

handled with dispatch. A supply of discharge certificates and extension certificates was forwarded 

through the medium of the chief paymaster. The 

instructions also covered such points as the required 

physical examination and record of health at time of 

discharge to protect both the government and the 

individual and prescribed that discharges should 

read to have been directed for “the convenience of 

the government.”

At least one officer of the staff department involved has since stated that the instructions could 

have been improved upon if the second group, or 

casual companies, had been allowed to remain unseparated from the first group. This would have

obviated the necessity of their transfer to casual 

companies which in itself entailed their being paid 

off on new payrolls [that] required not only the 

starting of new payrolls, but the creation of a new 

clerical force to effect the transfer of reservists to an 

inactive status. The number affected was held to be 

too small to warrant the method that was followed.

The Work of the Line

The units of the 4th Brigade were somewhat handicapped at the start by reason of their failure to receive direct orders as in the case of the 5th Brigade, 

but early decided not to await them but to govern 

their activities with copies of the 5th Brigade orders 

as their guide. The 4th Brigade at once faced two 

troublesome factors. The supply of blank discharge 

certificates was very inadequate. One regiment surmounted this by abstracting, while at sea, the necessary data on slips of paper for transfer to discharge 

certificates when the latter would become available 

in the United States. The other difficulty was the 

lack of the official tables of distances and the fact 

that the one available to a regiment was incomplete 

in many cases. The 5th Regiment solved this obstacle by dispatching an officer ahead to work up 

the missing data at Washington.

All organizations completed as much preparatory work as was within their power while en route 

at sea. Books were completed to date with the exception of the date of discharge. Discharges were 

not made out, as a rule, in the 4th Brigade because 

of lack of official data, and payrolls in many companies were not started for the same reason. These 

factors, however, did not interfere with or delay the 

actual demobilization.
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Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

The 4th Brigade Arrives

When the [USS] George Washington [ID 3018], 

carrying the headquarters of both the 2d Division, 

under Major General John A. Lejeune, and the 

4th Brigade, under Brigadier General Wendell C. 

Neville, arrived in New York Harbor, Lieutenant 

Colonel H. R. Roosevelt, the post quartermaster 

at Quantico, boarded her at quarantine and delivered to the brigade adjutant blueprints showing the 

troop assignments and lists showing the billeting 

capacities of the various buildings.

Following the parade of the 2d Division in 

New York, the 4th Brigade entrained for Quantico. 

Instead of the familiar “40 Hommes-8 Chevaux” 

box cars in which the brigade had been wont to entrain in France, the troops were furnished with 16 

trains for the movement, 1 of 9 baggage cars and 

the others of 1 Pullman and 14 coaches each. The 

first train left at 1845 on 8 August and the last at 

2401 [on] 9 August, arriving at Quantico at 1300 

of that date. The railroad facilities at Quantico were 

taxed to the limit by this movement, as each train 

had to be turned around and sent back to its home 

road immediately after the troops detrained. There 

were no delays as all trains were emptied within six 

minutes after their arrival.

Handling Troops at Quantico

To facilitate the work of detraining, 36 trucks, 

five Fords, and four ambulances were available at 

Quantico, and the supply detachment averaged 17 

hours daily work from that date until the end of the 

thirteenth. Between the morning of 9 August and 

midnight of 11 August, complete outfits of overcoats, winter field uniforms, hats, shoes, leggings, 

underwear, and chevrons were issued to the brigade. 

The reclamation department sorted and classified 

approximately 52,000 articles, among which may 

be noted 10,000 olive drab uniforms, 6,000 oversea caps, 8,000 suits of underwear, 7,000 pairs of 

wrap puttees, 4,000 belts, and 7,000 pairs of shoes. 

This was in addition to the salvaged mess gear and 

equipment. The post tailor shop was also taxed to its 

capacity in altering, pressing, and sewing chevrons 

and oversea devices on the new uniforms, while 

amateur tailors were equally busy transferring campaign ribbons and decorations from olive drab to a 

winter field background. The post laundry and all 

other branches of post activities also went over the 

top for new records and the post commissary and 

bakery handled the feeding of 33 separate messes 

in order to do their bit.

Requisitions for clothing had already been received from all companies in the brigade, and the 

clothing was ready for issue on the arrival of the first 

trainload. It is interesting to note that, following the 

demobilization, 25 civilian laborers found employment until 25 August in assembling, segregating, 

and loading for shipment to the Depot of Supplies 

brigade stores to a total of 33 carloads. The figures 

reported from the 5th Brigade are almost identical 

with those of the 4th [Brigade] in this and in other 

respects. The troop movement to Washington for 

the parade of the 4th Brigade, however, added to 

the activities of the post quartermaster at Quantico.

Regimental Activities

When the 4th Brigade passed the reviewing stand 

in New York and the troops marched on to the 

point of entraining, the regimental billeting officers turned out of the column and proceeded direct 

to Quantico. The billeting parties, as was the procedure in France, went out by the first troop train 

leaving for Quantico.

Immediately on the arrival of troops, they were 

marched to their assigned billets and arrangements 

made for the issue of clothing. Pay accounts were 

closed out and final settlements made by the attached paymasters. In both regiments, the method 

followed for railroad ticket requisitions practically 

coincided. Individual cards were prepared in each 

company showing the name, rank, unit, destination, and the routing requested. These cards were 

arranged alphabetically in payroll fashion and then 

delivered to the regimental demobilization entraining officer. In the meantime, company commanders, 

first sergeants, company clerks, and the pay personnel were engulfed in the details of closing out service record books, preparing or finishing payrolls, 

checkages, final discharges, etc.

The medical examination of all men to be discharged was thorough and conscientious. Before 

any man was allowed to “sign clear,” all his rights 
133

Peace and Occupation

and the need for protection of government rights 

were explained. All doubtful cases were transferred 

to hospital for further diagnosis and final action. 

In many cases, men who had been wounded were 

inclined to make light of their disabilities, and especial care was had in such cases to ensure that no 

summary action or decision was taken that meant 

their signing away rights to future relief or benefits.

The method by which the men, on their arrival, 

disposed of their equipment that was to be turned 

in for shipment to the Depot of Supplies was admirable in its simplicity, and could not have been improved upon. They were marched by companies to 

empty buildings reserved for the purpose and there 

deposited in separate piles the articles of equipment 

down to ammunition clips. Placards showing the 

articles to be deposited had been already affixed. 

The first article called for was piled up at the entrance and succeeding articles were likewise deposited along the length of the building, the last one at 

the door of exit. Combat packs and mess gear were 

turned in on the following day.

The Brigade Passes

It had been arranged that the 4th Brigade should be 

paid off and entrained in the following order: 5th 

Regiment, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, 6th Regiment. On 11 August, the railroad officials decided 

that it was beyond the range of possibility to have 

tickets ready for the entire brigade so that it could 

move on the 13th. As the result of a conference, 

however, inaugurated by the 6th Regiment, 10 extra 

ticket sellers were provided from Richmond, a new 

office was opened up in the regimental headquarters, and work was kept up throughout the night of 

the eleventh. Upon the return of the brigade from 

the parade in Washington, the railroad officials had 

despaired of being able, even with their augmented 

force, of handling the 6th Regiment on the thirteenth. The determination of the regiment to move 

out with the rest of the brigade, coupled with the 

resourcefulness and courtesy of the railroad officials, 

finally surmounted what appeared to be a hopeless 

obstacle. The plan agreed upon was to entrain the 

6th Regiment on four trains on the thirteenth, not 

more than 800 men on any but the last train, and 

to sell tickets from Washington to the various destinations of the men by reserving for them 10 ticket 

windows at the Union Station.

As the conditions differed, therefore, a short 

summary of the procedure followed by the organizations is given. In the 5th Regiment and the 6th 

Machine Gun Battalion, as soon as the men were 

paid off they were marched to improvised ticket offices. They were then regrouped according to their 

destinations to facilitate the work of the railroads. 

On the morning of departure, battalion commanders formed train groups according to destination and 

train assignment. These groups were again divided 

into carload lots, marched to the “spotted” cars, 

halted abreast of them, and at the scheduled time 

one-half of each carload lot entered by the forward, 

and the other by the rear car doors. By 1030, the 

5th Regiment had been demobilized and entrained. 

The four-year men and reservists, approximately 

350, had been transferred to the 5th Casual Reserve 

Company, bereft of their old “top” sergeants, and 

at the doubtful mercy of a newly made “top” with 

freely expressed aversions to the handling of, and 

scornful of the sensibilities of, veteran fighting men.

The first unit paid off and entrained in the 6th 

Regiment was the 1st Battalion, payment beginning 

at 0830 on the thirteenth. Each man, as he entered 

the pay office, was handed his pay in an envelope, insurance literature, discharge, and discharge button. 

As they left the office, two officers directed them to 

two improvised ticket offices, where they purchased 

tickets to Washington. The men who were routed to 

the south via Richmond were handled as casuals and 

were sold their tickets at a separate window. Their 

average per company was 10. As soon as the tickets 

were purchased, the men returned to barracks and 

packed up, all movements being made regular formations attended by all officers. The first train was 

scheduled to leave at 1100, but was sent away 20 

minutes ahead of schedule as the work proceeded 

with gratifying celerity. The post adjutant provided 

a military policeman at the end of each car, with orders to pass no one aboard without a railroad ticket. 

Battalions followed in regular order, and the time 

taken by a battalion for payment, packing up, and 

entraining averaged about 50 minutes.

There was a noticeable feeling of restraint 

among both officers and men in the famous brigade 

that increased as the last act of demobilization ap-
134

Marines and Veterans Analyze the First World War

proached. Even when the men ceased, by virtue of 

their discharge, to be members of a military unit, the 

forms of discipline were as scrupulously observed 

as at any time in the varied and brilliant history of 

the brigade. They marched to their trains several 

thousand civilians, but their march discipline was 

as correct as though they were marching into the 

line or moving from one billeting area to another. 

Discipline had become too ingrained a virtue to be 

shaken in the least by the sudden transition from 

Private John Smith, 1st Platoon, Company A, 1st 

Battalion, to John Smith, civilian, and master of 

his own fortune. By their subdued demeanor, the 

men showed the deep and lasting impression that 

the passing of the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, had 

made on them, and it is needless to state that Major General Lejeune, Brigadier General Neville, and 

the regimental and battalion officers were as deeply 

affected by the closing scenes.

With the 5th Brigade

The assignment of the naval base at Hampton Roads, 

Virginia, for the demobilization of the 5th Brigade 

simplified the earlier stages of the process for that 

organization, since no rail travel was involved. Preparatory to the arrival of the brigade Major H. N. 

Manney, as the representative of the Quartermaster’s Department, left the Depot of Supplies for 

that base. A shipment of 30,000 tons of supplies 

and stores, including camp equipage, clothing, cots, 

mosquito nets, and frames was made by the USS 

Hancock [AP 3]. The greater part of this shipment 

proved to be unnecessary for the following reasons: 

the brigade had already been outfitted with winter 

field clothing before leaving France; such articles 

of camp equipage as field ranges were not needed, 

as the naval base was thoroughly equipped, down 

to mess gear, for a strength well exceeding that of 

the brigade. As a result, when the needed articles of 

clothing were issued, a great many cases were untouched and these, with the camp equipage, had to 

be reshipped to the depot.

As fast as the troops disembarked, they were 

met by guides and marched to their assigned barracks, which had an average capacity of two platoons each. Messes were already in operation, 

transport was available, and the transfer from ship 

to base was greatly facilitated not only by reason of 

available accommodations for messing and billeting, but through the active and efficient cooperation 

made possible by the zeal and courtesy of Rear Admiral A. F. Fechteler, U.S. Navy, and his staff. Such 

minor difficulties as were incurred through the issue 

of clothing on the pier, the reshipment of unbroken 

cases, and the transfer of unissued articles in broken 

packages from the pier to the brigade storehouse, 

and the unsatisfactory work of civilian laborers were 

trying but unimportant.

Since the 5th Brigade had secured enough blank 

discharge certificates before sailing to carry out its 

paper work more satisfactorily than its sister brigade, the only difficulty experienced along this line 

was due to lack of facilities aboard ship for clerical 

work. To illustrate, however, how a seemingly trivial 

miscarriage of administration blocks the best-laid 

plans, it might be well to mention one that fell to 

the lot of the 5th Brigade. In order that men might 

receive their full mileage allowance from the point 

of demobilization to final destination, information 

was requested by cable as to the actual mileage from 

the naval base to Norfolk. This information was not 

supplied and could not be made available until the 

brigade actually arrived in the United States.

The process of demobilization on the thirteenth, 

a date that is indelibly interwoven into the history 

and vicissitudes of the 5th Brigade, was completed 

for both the 11th and 13th Regiments and the Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. The only hitch in the 

day’s work was due to the failure in one organization, namely the 11th Regiment, to circulate to all 

company commanders of the organization the details arranged for the entraining at the naval base. 

Due to this error, a number of discharged men were 

sent into Norfolk with their transportation, and 

upon arrival of the trains at the base it was necessary to locate the men and effect their return to the 

base. This, however, did not mar the successful demobilization and entraining according to the oneday schedule.

The excellent messing arrangements and quarters contributed much toward the comfort of the 

troops. Adequate motor transport, recreation provisions, and the hearty cooperation of the naval 

authorities proved a great aid to the efforts of the 

brigade, regimental and battalion officers, and the 
135

Peace and Occupation

happy combination crowned the demobilization 

of the 5th Brigade with complete success. And, of 

course, the 5th passed out of existence to the familiar strains of “Sweet Adeline,” the battle hymn 

of Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler and his 

splendid organization, which, denied the fortune of 

combat, tackled with characteristic spirit the many 

and exciting duties that were allotted to it in France.

PART II

POSTWAR ANALYSIS
“Last Night of War.”

Courtesy of F. C. Yohn, Marine Corps Archives
OVER THERE, OVER HERE

141

Private Raymond H. Stenback from Independence, 

Oregon, wrote his family that he had finally received orders for the war in France. “It is with deep 

regret that I write and tell you that I will not be 

home on that furlough for I am on my way across.” 

Like many Marines of today, Private Stenback’s 22 

June 1918 letter resounded with anxiety and moxie; 

he was ready to “get into the fight” overseas and 

willing to trade more pay for the chance. “I might 

have backed out and could have been a sergeant in 

a short time here. I would rather be a buck private 

in the rear rank over there than a sergeant here. It is 

what I enlisted for.” Private Stenback’s letters were 

not written from a traditional Marine base such as 

Quantico or Mare Island; he was with the 112th 

Company, 8th Regiment, at Fort Crockett, near the 

city of Galveston, Texas.

Major Edwin N. McClellan said it best in The 

United States Marine Corps in the World War that, 

“while the battle operations of the 4th Brigade as 

an infantry brigade of the 2d Division of Regulars overshadowed all others taken part in by Marine Corps personnel, those operations were by no 

means the only ones participated in by officers and 

men of the Marine Corps.” The Marines in Texas 

trained for war in France—or closer to home, if 

necessary. Germany clearly had made attempts to 

cause discontent between Mexico and the United 

States, particularly when German Foreign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann sent his infamous telegram to the Mexican government in January 1917, 

encouraging the Mexican government to invade the 

United States and reclaim Texas, New Mexico, and 

Arizona. Germany had also resumed its policy of 

unrestricted submarine warfare. The threat to the 

United States from the south was very real; the 

Mexican government was unstable and disjointed 

after years of revolution, but remained a major oil 

producer for the Allied powers. Fort Crockett’s

position on the Gulf of Mexico made it an ideal location for Marines to launch an amphibious operation into Mexico’s Tampico oil fields—one of the 

most crucial sources for the Allied war machine in 

Europe. Had the need arisen, Fort Crockett would 

have provided the definitive solution—United 

States Marines.

The 8th Regiment was activated at Quantico, 

Virginia, on 9 October 1917 and, just more than 

a month later, it arrived in Galveston onboard the 

USS Hancock [AP 3], after spending a week at sea 

where rumors ran wild as to its final destination. 

None of the Marines, including Private Stenback, 

believed they were staying in Texas. “We arrived 

here at Galveston, Texas, yesterday evening and 

have been busy unloading our necessary equipment 

for a short stay.” The next day, the Marines were told 

to unload the entire ship—an all-day job for nearly 

1,000 pairs of hands. Despite the exhaustive task, 

they finished the day with a four-mile march to 

their camp, where they found level ground to pitch 

their tents, eat dinner, and bed down in the chilly 

November night.

The day-to-day life of the Marines in Galveston was consumed with learning to operate machine 

guns, qualifying with different weapons on the rifle 

range, learning flag semaphore, playing baseball 

games, and swimming in the Gulf of Mexico. Private Stenback kept his family well informed of the 

daily grind: “Signal practice has kept us pretty busy 

with flags, sun glasses, and then one night a week 

we have to go out with lamps. With this system, we 

can talk two or three miles.”

The Marines shared Fort Crockett with two 

regiments of U.S. Army coast artillery that were 

headquartered at the fort. “Talk about mossbacks—there are ever so many of these coast artillery men who have never been out of this state. They 

ask us what kind of a place we come from that we 

should have such rosy cheeks and smooth complexions.” Locals were not their only source of companionship; Stenback’s company adopted a dog that 

they dubbed “Rags,” which apparently slept around. 

“Every bunk is his home when he wants to treat it 

as such.” Dogs were not the only mascots kept at 

the fort as “the company next to ours has a monkey 

for a mascot and it is sure a smart fellow and deOVER HERE! MARINES IN TEXAS DURING WORLD WAR I

by Annette D. Amerman
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Postwar Analysis

lights in climbing around on the fellows shoulders 

and hunt for something in the hair or digs down 

into the pockets for something to eat.”

Like their counterparts at Quantico, the Marines in Galveston kept active with sports—most 

notably baseball. In April 1918, the world champion 

Chicago White Sox soundly beat the Marines and 

coast artillery team. While the Marines and coast 

artillery played “a whale of a game, for amateurs,” 

they still lost 11 to 3. The Chicago Daily Tribune was 

more accepting than Private Stenback, who stated 

that it was “not anymore than could be expected.”

Gossip continued to spread that the Marines 

would leave any day for the war in France, or Cuba 

(where the 9th Regiment and 3d Provisional Brigade would depart from in 1918 to join the 8th in 

Texas). Private Stenback even heard the speculation 

of “an early move to Argentina in South America to take care of threatening German uprisings 

and to protect American interests.” Obviously, the 

minds of the Marines were on the battles across the 

ocean and not the duty they were performing in 

Texas. “Things are looking pretty serious over there 

[France] the last few days it seems and so now it is 

mighty hard to tell when they will need us. I really 

believe we are an emergency regiment.”

With the calming of troubles in Cuba, the 3d 

Provisional Brigade headquarters and the 9th Regiment boarded the USS Hancock and were sent to 

unite with the 8th Regiment in Texas in August 

1918, where they joined in the training activities 

and guard duty.

Private Stenback finally shipped over to France 

in the summer of 1918 and returned to the United 

States unscathed in 1919 after occupation duty in 

Germany. In 1971, he transcribed his letters written during World War I and turned them into a 

personal memoir titled, Raymond Howard Stenback 

as a United States Marine.

A more prominent Marine stationed at Fort 

Crockett during World War I had already made 

his mark on Mexico. Medal of Honor recipient 

Lieutenant Colonel George C. Reid joined the 8th 

Regiment in late November 1917, after a short stint 

at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Lieutenant Colonel Reid 

was aptly suited to command Marines should the 

need arise to land at Tampico; he earned his Medal 

of Honor in Mexico just three short years before 

during the capture of Veracruz. After the arrival of 

the 9th Regiment, he was promoted to colonel and 

made commanding officer of the regiment. Colonel 

Reid continued to serve in the Marine Corps after 

his duty in Texas and, upon retirement in 1930, was 

advanced to brigadier general for having been specially commended in combat.

Another noteworthy officer arrived in Texas 

onboard the USS Hancock with Private Stenback 

and the regiment in 1917. First Lieutenant Edward 

A. Craig of the 105th Company, 8th Regiment, 

lamented that he missed the “action” in France; 

however, his time would come and fame would be 

his. Lieutenant General “Eddie” Craig retired in 

1951 after commanding the “fire brigade” that was 

launched into the Pusan perimeter in the opening 

days of the Korean War.

On 10 April 1919, both regiments boarded the 

same vessel that carried them to Texas—the USS 

Hancock—this time bound for the Philadelphia 

Navy Yard. No sooner had the regiments disembarked men and equipment, than they were deactivated. Although the anticipated trouble in Mexico 

did not materialize, one might say that the presence 

of the 8th Regiment and later the 9th, with the 3d 

Brigade headquarters, deterred any possible actions 

on the part of the Mexican government. Oil continued to flow to the Allied powers and, in November 

1918, the war in Europe was over without an intervention into Mexico.
143

MARINES IN THE AZORES ISLANDS IN WORLD WAR I

DIARY OF WALTER S. POAGUE

by Antonio M. Godinho*

Wednesday, 9 October 1918

Tonight I had a flight with Ziegler at down 

in old 328, which was on its last legs. They are 

broken now, caved in. You see we had power 

enough to get in the air and at twenty-five feet 

she died and let me down. I saw a twelve-foot 

steel can buoy just ahead of me and as I wasn’t 

keen about hitting that at sixty-five miles an 

hour I slued the machine violently to one side, 

missing the buoy (landed right beside it) and as 

I was skidding when I lit, wiped off the pontoons, broke wings, propeller, oh! a swell mess, 

but it couldn’t be helped. We only got a swim.

What you have just read is an excerpt from 

Walter Smith Poague’s diary. He was a 27-year old 

Marine Corps aviator in October 1918, stationed 

with the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company in the 

city of Ponta Delgada, Azores Islands.

Poague was born in Chicago on 21 August 

1891, into the city’s “high society.” After graduating from the University of Chicago in 1914, Poague 

worked as a sales manager at the Real Estate Mortgage Department of the Woodlawn Trust and Savings Bank, where his father was the director. In June 

1917, he decided to enlist in the Marine Corps (the 

United States was officially at war on 6 April 1917).

Monday, 22 April 1918

Nowhere in this account have I detailed how I 

came to be a Marine. It is interesting and typical. When War became inevitable, I looked for 

some branch of the service, navy preferred, as 

I have always loved the sea, army least desired, 

for I feared the inefficiency of such a rapidly 

aging body. By chance, I heard of commissions 

in Marines. Somewhere I’d heard the name, but 

I had not the slightest idea what Marines were 

or their duties. Buell Patterson was going after 

the Marines, however, so I telephoned him. The 

conversation follows:

“Hello, Pat, what are Marines?”

“I don’t know. They do something on ships 

and are first to fight.”

“Sounds good to me.”

“Same here.”

“I’m going to try it.”

“So am I. Goodbye.”

And here I am. I had never seen a Marine and 

had no idea of their duties, but here I am.

As of 6 April 1917, Marine aviation was an experimental unit, with only 7 officer aviators and 43 

enlisted men. It was just a section of naval aviation, 

operating with four Curtiss AH hydroaeroplanes. 

After his enlistment, Poague trained at Quantico, 

Virginia, where, when his training was completed, 

he was commissioned a second lieutenant. His basic 

flying training lasted 10 weeks.

Lieutenant Poague was sent to Cape May, New 

Jersey, in October 1917 and stationed at the Aviation Department Flying Field. At this time on 12 

October, the aviation unit of the Marine Corps—

the Marine Aeronautic Company—was split into 

the 1st Aviation Squadron (with 24 officers and 

237 enlisted men) and the 1st Marine Aeronautic 

Company (with 10 officers and 93 enlisted men). 

On 14 October, the Marine Aeronautic Company 

was transferred to Cape May where it was equipped 

with two Curtiss R-6 floatplanes with the mission 

* Godinho lives in Faro, Portugal, and is an air navigation 

maintenance engineer with a passion for researching Portuguese aviation history. Sergio Rezendes lives in Ponta Delgada, 

São Miguel Island, Azores Islands, and is a historian at the 

Colégio do Castanheiro School, museologist, and has been vice

director of the Military Museum of the Azores for 10 years. 

Rezendes provided some of the photographs used in this story from the Francisco A. Chaves Collection from the Carlos 

Machado Museum in Ponta Delgada. Annette D. Amerman 

of the History Division, Marine Corps University, and James 

A. Ginther of the Archives and Special Collections, Alfred M. 

Gray Marine Corps Research Center, Marine Corps University, also assisted with this story. Regarding the diary entries, they 

are intact except for some minor copyediting; misspelled words 

or other grammatical issues were left, as is, to maintain a sense 

of Poague’s state of mind. The following story describes 1stLt 

Walter S. Poague’s impressions and adventures while stationed 

at Ponta Delgada, São Miguel Island, Azores Islands, in 1918.
144

Postwar Analysis

to carry out patrol duty along the coast. Lieutenant 

Poague was assigned to this unit.

Poague’s commander was Captain Francis T. 

Evans, a skilled pilot who was the first pilot to successfully execute a loop with an N-9 seaplane in 

1917. The spin-recovery maneuver of the loop became a basic element of aviation safety and earned 

Evans (retroactively) a Distinguished Flying Cross 

in 1936. Second in command was Captain David L. 

S. Brewster, and the other officers were First Lieutenant Harvey B. Mims and seven second lieutenants including Poague.

In December 1917, the Marine Aeronautic 

Company received orders to go to the U.S. Naval 

Base 13 at Ponta Delgada, Azores Islands, Portugal. Their mission was antisubmarine patrols, using 

two Curtiss N-9s and 10 R-6 seaplanes. The aircraft 

were very similar in design being both biplanes with 

two seats; the main difference was that the R-6 had 

a more powerful engine at 200 horsepower and had 

two main pontoons, while the N-9 had a 100-horsepower engine with only one main pontoon.

Why were the Marines sent to the Azores Islands? The Azores Islands are an archipelago of 

nine islands and, at that time, had two excellent 

harbors: Horta at Faial Island and Ponta Delgada 

at São Miguel Island. While Horta is considered—

even today—a better harbor in terms of winds, sea, 

and orientation, Ponta Delgada is larger and more 

populated. When the “Great War” started in Europe in 1914, Portugal remained neutral. But in 

1914, clashes broke out in the Portuguese colonies 

[that] bordered German colonies, namely in southern Angola and northern Mozambique. Though 

there was a mobilization effort by Portugal, there 

still remained no formal state of war between the 

two countries. In 1916, due to the damaging losses 

of merchant ships, England asked Portugal to seize 

all German merchant ships in Portuguese harbors. 

After some negotiations, the request was approved, 

and somewhere between 66 and 72 ships were 

seized on 23 February 1916. Germany responded 

with a formal state of war on 9 March 1916.

Due to the incidents in Africa, an agreement 

was made with England, by which the Royal Navy 

would assume the defense of Madeira and Azores 

Islands. The Portuguese Navy remained responsible 

for the defense of the mainland coast, especially the 

harbors, and for escorting merchant vessels to the 

islands of Madeira and Azores and [to] Africa. At 

the beginning of 1917, Germany declared zones 

of “unrestricted” submarine warfare, which meant 

that all civilian ships could be sunk without warning. As a result, the submarine campaign arrived in 

the Portuguese islands; at Madeira, the harbor of 

Funchal was shelled on 3 December 1916 by Germany’s U-83.

The defenses on all the islands were weak or 

nonexistent. On 4 July 1917, [a] U-155 shelled the 

harbor of Ponta Delgada, apparently attempting to 

destroy a coal depot mainly used by U.S. ships. The 

coal depot was not destroyed; however, this raid 

raised fears of a possible German submarine base in 

the Azores Islands. The Royal Navy felt that it could 

not release units due to huge submarine activity on 

the coast of England and the fighting in Europe. 

Therefore, the United States, after an agreement 

with England, assumed the defense of the Azores 

Islands. The 1st Marine Aeronautic Company was 

the first domestically equipped and trained aviation 

unit to deploy to the war. At the end of July 1917, 

destroyers arrived at Ponta Delgada with the USS 

Panther [1889] defending the harbor. However, due 

to the lack of ships in Europe, this defense force was 

sent to Europe a few months later and replaced by 

the USS Tonopah [previously the USS Nevada (BM 

8)] and some older destroyers and K-class submarines. The new mission of this defense force was no 

longer to hunt submarines but to deny the area near 

the islands to German incursions and help ships on 

their way to Europe.

On 12 December 1917, Funchal was again 

shelled by a German submarine. The United States 

knew that it was only a question of time until the 

American Expeditionary Forces arrived in Europe 

and that the Azores Islands would have a role as a 

supporting harbor. Two harbors (Feteiras and Ponta 

Delgada) had artillery to protect British radio antennas, but the airplanes of the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company were suited for this task.

Poague was transported to the Azores Islands 

by the USS Hancock, an 8,500 ton transport ship. 

The following excerpts record his thoughts during 

this transition.
145

Over There, Over Here

Tuesday, 1 January 1918

On board the Transport Hancock. We came on 

here on Friday, the 29th and I found my quarters. Now I know why they call them quarters—eighths would be better. I almost have to 

go out in the passage to clean my teeth. But 

they are very conveniently located, fresh air (at 

six degrees below zero), have a door just above, 

and the engine room just below. We’ve had bitter weather, and expect to sail in the morning 

at seven.

Last night, New Year’s Eve, I volunteered 

to load ship, which pleasant pastime continued until the small hours. What a contrast to 

last New Year’s Eve, with Bill Buckley and a 

tall girl in black at the South Shore Country 

Club. When the whistles and sirens cut loose 

at midnight, one of the men, staggering under 

a load of tin roofs (the Admiral loves tin roofs) 

remarked, “Well, this may be New Year’s to 

home folks but it’s just plain first of January to 

me.” The rest of the day was uneventful except 

for the turkey dinner.

Wednesday, 2 January 1918

By some queer courage, I turned out at seven 

to see us sail. Found the tugs alongside and 

all ready and at the last minute the word was 

passed that we do not go for twenty-four hours 

or longer, as the ice is to heavy to the destroyers 

which convoy us. So again we wait. I’m fretful 

to go and can’t bear to any more goodbyes.

Saturday, 5 January 1918

We no longer mention sailing. It is a sore subject. But it continues cold. Mornings we smoke, 

play poker, and read and yawn. After two P.M., 

we go ashore and return any time before eight 

A.M. I find these mornings rapidly become the 

perfect blanks that so much of the time I have 

been in the Service becomes, due to its inactivity and dullness. I can truthfully say we will not 

sail tomorrow.

Wednesday, 9 January 1918

Well, “we’ve done it.” We sailed at 7:20 this 

morning, in spite of ice and misgivings, and 

as I write we’re pounding southeast across the 

night Atlantic. All day we spent coming down 

the Delaware, passing Cape May, of aerial activities, at 4:30 in the afternoon. How decidedly 

different it all was from my imagination of a 

sailing—no crowds, no cheers, no fuss.

Thursday, 10 January 1918

All day we have rolled through a black blue sea, 

the wind to stern. Although she has considerable motion, it is not violent, her load is too 

heavy. On going on deck this morning, I found 

a destroyer about half a mile on each side of us, 

wallowing along in the sea. We’d picked up our 

convoy in the night. The wind still follows us, a 

northwest wind from home.

Thursday, 17 January 1918

We entered the official barred zone today and 

our attendant destroyers closed in as night fell. 

We’re running to a submarine base and I think 

a submarine fighting outfit of great value. There 

can’t be any doubt they will try to get us.

Friday, 18 January 1918

At midnight we ran into a gale, a truly new experience. I found it impossible to stay in bed, 

we rolled so. At intervals of five minutes, great 

seas broke over the deck above me washing and 

tearing, and combining with the howl of the 

wind and the shivering of the ship to produce 

an awesome effect. The waves even came down 

the ventilating funnels so badly that the kitchen 

floor was a foot deep in water. Everyone was 

awake; sleep was impossible. At midnight I 

went on watch and in the dark found seas piling up like mountains. They seem to rush down 

on our stern and pick up the ship like a chip, 

breaking over her and twisting her about. We 

have posted sentries to keep everyone off the 

decks. They would be washed away. All day the 

storm has continued with regular squalls and 
146

Postwar Analysis

driving rain. All during my watch the wind was 

entered on the log as No. 11; that is better than 

80 miles an hour.

Saturday, 19 January 1918

The very funniest thing I ever saw was this 

morning’s breakfast. A huge roll to starboard 

and the long table, fifteen chairs, men, syrup, 

scrambled eggs, everything sailed down on 

Captain Evans, who was pinned back of the 

table, his hands in his lap, his eyes staring, his 

mouth open. I laughed until my sides ached at 

his looks as he received all these things.

When Poague arrived at U.S. Naval Base 13, 

it was commanded by Admiral Herbert O. Dunn, 

who reported directly to Admiral William S. Sims, 

chief of U.S. Navy Operations in Europe. Naval 

Base 13 and the Azores Islands were strategically 

important to the United States because they served 

as a support location at Ponta Delgada, São Miguel 

Island, Azores Islands, which are in the north Atlantic about 1,446 kilometers west of Portugal. At 

the time of World War I, Ponta Delgada was the 

only city on São Miguel Island, and its harbor was 

considered small for the number of ships that arrived to refuel or to make repairs on their way to or 

from Europe. The nearest island was Santa Maria, 

50 nautical miles to the south, but had no harbor 

or bay to support seaplane operations; 90 nautical 

miles to the west was the island of Terceira; Faial Island, approximately 65 nautical miles from Terceira, had the best geography for seaplanes operations. 

Lieutenant Poague reveals his first impressions of 

the Azores Islands on 23 January 1918.

Wednesday, 23 January 1918

The harbor is full of shipping and varied, hence 

interesting. All morning I have loafed about the 

ship, but this afternoon I went ashore with Dr. 

Thompson and we rambled. I am entranced. I 

feel in these narrow streets, among these houses of every color, quaint, tiny, under a blue sky 

from “Never Never Land” that I’ve stepped 

into a dream. The cleanliness, the age of the 

place, the courtesy of the people—oh! It’s all 

out of another world from the breathless rush 

of America. I can’t describe the beauties of Del 

Gada; I can’t tell the loveliness of the street I’ve 

just passed anymore than I can describe the 

beauties which lie around the corner I have not 

yet turned. There is an atmosphere here which 

I never encountered, and how I love it. Surely 

I can work here. Surely among all this beauty 

I can “dream true.” And this is War. Why, it’s 

a picnic. I feel almost a slacker but that I have 

dangerous work to do and that I volunteered 

for anything. Surely I’m lucky-lucky.

Thursday, 24 January 1918

Today I’ve tried to work but failed, so I’ve loafed. 

The unloading of the ship is going to be a serious problem, as we are too big to get to the doc. 

We’re going to have to lighter out our entire 

cargo, which will take quite a while. The lighter 

and all the harbor boats are colorful. There is a 

little steam tug, about thirty feet, a trim little 

craft painted pink, in charge of a gray-bearded 

old pirate named Caesar. He is the rooster of 

the flock of hen lighters, brown boats, double 

decked, holding thirty tons, and what a fuss of 

crowing he does with his puffy little boat and 

his peanut steam whistle. We hope to begin 

unloading tomorrow in earnest. I stood around 

most of the day as useless and anxious to help 

as a dog at a bullfight.

Friday, 25 January 1918

A hard day’s work is done. We’ve got a pretty decent system and the unloading proceeds

faster than I’d thought. I have a title. I am “Admiral of the Mosquito Fleet” because I had the 

brilliant idea of using the ship’s boats as lighters [landing craft]. The executive officer gave 

me four big boats and a steam launch and I am 

unloading two hundred tons a day, which helps 

a lot.

Saturday, 26 January 1918

And again today we worked like [——] and 

looked like them from smut and cement dust. 

It did seem odd to be in charge of the gang 

where Rollie Harger was working—good old 
147

Over There, Over Here

Rollie—he’s [a] corporal. I’m [a] lieutenant. 

We’ve lifted sacks together and had a smoke 

during rest. Later, he, Burke (a former instructor in Cornell University) and I were heaving 

a load together, for I worked as hard as any of 

my men, all and remarked on the oddity, three 

college men, all pulling on a rope, 2,400 miles 

from home. A week should see us unloaded and 

another should see us flying. I hope so.

Sunday, 27 January 1918

By some luck we didn’t work, and this morning we went ashore to see our new campsite. It 

is on a level meadow in a curious old park up 

in the hills, facing off south towards the sunny 

warm sea. The soil is volcanic ash, red and porous, in which the heaviest rain is quickly absorbed. I find it a lovely place, with the hillsides 

overgrown with pine, cactus, and bushes which 

will flower in a few months. On the return, we 

watched Portuguese officers drilling recruits in 

civilian clothes, for all the world as we drilled 

on the campus at home last spring, except that 

although these men were very well dressed, collars, cravats, etc., every man in two companies 

with one exception was barefooted. And again 

I thought what a hideous thing War is, to take 

these simple folk from their sunny homes and 

put them into the tearing, torturing occupation 

of the trenches.

Wednesday, 30 January 1918

We’re still unloading the ship, but it is getting 

down. A whale of wind came up last night—a 

grand little place to fly in.

Friday, 15 February 1918

We’ve had a couple of machines running and 

the crowd increases. The natives seem to think 

we’re supermen. Odd, if they really knew.

Saturday, 16 February 1918

A big day in the history of this little town, for 

this morning we made the first aeroplane flight 

in the Azores. Crowds lined the streets, docks, 

water front and housetops. A municipal holiday was declared, quite a grand occasion. One 

ragged old peasant, delightful in his multicolored patches, on his little noisy donkey, said he 

got there at five in the morning. Word had been 

passed that the first flight would be at 10:30, 

but he wanted to be on time. An old lady in the 

national costume of huge blue hood and cape 

knelt in the middle of the street by the flying 

beach when the first plane went up and prayed 

continuously for the safety of its aviators until 

they returned, nearly half an hour. We sent out 

three machines and made ten flights. Everything combined to make it a success—fair blue 

weather and the ever-present element of luck.

One interesting note is the setup of operations 

to the beginning of flights compared with that of 

Curtiss HS-1s at Pauillac, France. At Ponta Delgada, the Marines installed their facilities (from tents 

to machinery shops) in 25 days; in France, with facilities already in place, it took 20 days.

After these initial flights, and according to Poague’s diary, an intense instruction period started 

for the seven young lieutenants (from flight practice 

in their new environment to operational aspects of 

their flying). They were the backbone of the unit’s 

operation. The weather was the main obstacle for 

the Marine aviators, learning how to operate in the 

seas and winds around the Azores Islands.

Tuesday, 19 February 1918

Today I had my first flight in the Azores, an 

hour hop. The most distinct reaction is the surprise at finding how instinctive flying has become. It is now two and a half months since I 

have flown, and yet the former control came to 

me as easily as ever. Flying is like swimming, 

I am sure, or skating, or riding a bicycle, in 

that once it is learned and the muscles become 

adapted, it is never forgotten. From the air this 

rolling, fertile country looks, even better than 

from the sea. We had expected bad air currents, due to the mountains, but to date haven’t

found any.
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Postwar Analysis

Wednesday, 20 February 1918

First experience at bomb dropping came this 

morning when Lieutenant Mims and I went 

up. At a certain predetermined point on the 

ground was a marker, and I flew the plane

while he dropped a dummy (practice bomb). I 

regret to record in this storehouse of truth-andfiction—that he missed the mark by more than 

enough.

Wednesday, 27 February 1918

Death came close today. I could see the hollow 

of the skull through the empty eyes. It’s such 

things that make this flying the greatest thing 

in the world. Mims and I had been up for half 

an hour and on returning, making a landing in 

a stiff breeze, were forced to keep on by a cutter 

getting in the way. A ten-foot buoy, a monitor 

and three subs loomed up before us, a hundred 

feet away, and we were going a hundred miles 

an hour. We rose and cleared the buoy by two 

feet, then facing the rock cliff had to turn so 

sharply that she side slipped on one wing to 

within eight feet of a heavy dock; after that we 

had to clear the mass of big shipping 700 feet 

away, which we cleared by perhaps five feet; and 

just a touch of any one of them would have finished us. But it was well worth it, for if we’d not 

had to turn off we would have landed at 100 

miles an hour and been tripped by a seven-inch 

cable suddenly stretched across the opening, 

and at that speed we would have broken our 

necks. A close shave—exciting and a lot of fun.

The initial excitement ends when the weather turned sour and flying was halted. As the days 

dragged on, Poague lamented his choice, pouring 

out his dismay at being posted in such a remote location.

Tuesday, 5 March 1918

A windy day as prevent us from flying and for 

nearly a week now I have done nothing. I am 

fed up. I’d give ten years for some action, something to do. I never felt such utter self-contempt 

as in this company. I am useless and I know 

it, and yet I was placed here. We all were. If I 

could make it, I’d resign and enter the British 

Naval Air Service. I’d see action there, at least, 

but there is no chance, and the Marines have 

no place where I could be transferred. I’ve got 

to stick it out. Something’s wrong, all wrong in 

this company, and I think it is idleness. Is my 

“big adventure” to be a fizzle, just a day dream?

Wednesday, 6 March 1918

The thought of and longing for action continues. With my training, I would be eagerly accepted in any naval flying service in the world. 

I’ve been looking up the British service. Action 

there, for sure, but I don’t see how I could get 

a resignation accepted to enter it. Always I encounter that stone wall. Good God! The big 

things of the world are being done by other 

men no better trained, no more eager I than I 

am. In these same hours they are fighting gloriously, which I put in pitching quoits or lying on 

my cot reading. Haven’t I a right to my share? 

Am I not fit to enter into that high camaraderie? Patience, patience, always that. And all 

the while I am idling. Someone who knew said, 

“Idleness is the rust which first destroys the finest metals.” I’ve even gone to such fool lengths 

as to look up court martial laws to find how I 

could be kicked out. But I won’t go that way, 

even for action.

Saturday, 30 March 1918

Our flying is almost forgotten. Inclement 

weather has prevent[ed] any work for two 

weeks. You see the wind hops over these mountains in swirls, which make air work suicidal.

[Wednesday], 10 April 1918

Sharp comment from the Admiral has driven 

Capt Evans to real flying and, from 4:30 A.M. 

to dark, machines have been up. A fine blue day 

has aided tremendously.

While Poague was anxious to fly and fight, his 

love and skill of writing was evident from his diary 

entries, which was quickly discovered by Admiral 

Dunn.
149

Over There, Over Here

The admiral wants to give a vaudeville show for 

the Portuguese Red Cross and I’m asked to run 

the thing. It will be great fun to get among the 

drops again and with the odor of grease paint. 

The raucous nature of vaudeville shows added a 

certain level of levity to Poague’s days.

We’ve got rehearsals in a high-ceilinged, 

barren dining room in a restaurant, from 9 in 

the morning to 11 at night. Great guns! If my 

friends in the show business at home could 

only see me trying to teach a cook, third class, 

on a submarine to be a French doll, or a mess 

attendant on the Tonopah to dance, they’d laugh 

themselves sick.

The vaudeville show consumed the majority of 

Poague’s time and offered him the ability to hobknob with the admiral, who was “very enthusiastic 

over our idea of the play.” On 5 April, the crew and 

cast had their final dress rehearsal. Poague’s talents 

were further certainly put to the test.

I am property man, assist in making up, scene 

shifter, and most important of all a combination of stage manager and electrician. With a 

blue drop with a gold eagle on it, which I had 

painted, and certain lights, I have a really beautiful effect. After two showings, the play was 

deemed a “glorious success” and received “a 

thousand sincere compliments.”

After the resounding success of the vaudeville 

show, Poague received “a most unusual proposition 

and which was very flattering” on 10 April 1918. 

He was offered the opportunity to be attached directly to the admiral’s staff and take responsibility 

for entertainment at the base, to which he “turned it 

down,” after all, as the lieutenant states in his diary, 

“I came in to fight, not to dodge.” However, just two 

days later, after much compromise, Poague accepted 

the responsibility for much of the entertainment. 

For his role, he was allowed to move into town and 

yet retain his piloting duties. “This releases me from 

officer of the day work and leaves me free except 

from flying. So now, perhaps, I’ll have time to write; 

it depends on the weather.”

Despite his newly acquired additional duties, 

Poague’s skill as a pilot was always tested. He recounted his own close encounter with death on 21 

April.

Sunday, 21 April 1918

Another close escape today for which I am 

glad, both in the closeness and in the escape 

to live more. A bad landing in the harbor gave 

me the alternative of trying another landing or 

trying to clear the fort at the end and circle to 

sea. In the second, I chose the fort and headed 

for it, knowing I had a bare chance with a missing motor to clear it. If I didn’t, it would mean 

crashing into it at ninety miles an hour. When 

I realized I was started, all nervousness left me 

and it seemed as if I (another person) said to 

myself “Well, Walt, enjoy it. It’s a good sensation,” and I know I smiled, for the cold air blast 

hurt my teeth. I record this for it is an odd experience. It did not look that I could clear the 

stone fort and when I approached it I am told 

that men on the flying beach turned away their 

heads. I missed it by between six and eight feet. 

So I’m lucky in having had one more glorious 

moment of living—and that’s what life is for. I 

am glad.

The joy of flying never left Poague—his diary is 

full of the thrills and beauty of the act, and finally, 

he is tested for his qualification as a naval aviator.

Monday, 20 May 1918

Being officer of the day now has the advantage 

of a hop at sundown and sunrise. Oh, gloriousbeauty, freedom. My observer and I made a 

hundred-mile flight tonight, going forty miles 

at sea. The unspeakable beauty of it! We flew 

halfway between the clouds charging up out of 

sunset and the sea. Up they came from the orange on the western horizon, the “cavalry of the 

sky,” and orange and rose in a haze of pink, the 

sea blue below us, far to the north the upstanding peaks this island, with clouds of white and 

purple and black level strata around the mountain tops. Up there, washed clear of all the earth 

and free from all pettiness of man, we seemed 

gods resting in our chariot with beauty, beauty, 

beauty filling our souls.
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Postwar Analysis

Tuesday, 21 May 1918

Another wonderful flight this morning at sunrise; I said goodnight to the sun and welcomed 

it this morning. Oh, surely God is good to have 

created all of this and the fates of chance kindly 

to have let me see and revel in it. This afternoon 

I went out for altitude and climbed so high 

into the sky that below me this Island, 50 by 8 

miles, was spread out a map of green and blue 

and brown, blue sea all about it. From there it 

seemed a ridiculous little thing for man to live 

upon and fortify—an impudent little thing to 

stick its head up above all this expanse of water. 

I got a little dizzy on my turns from height, the 

motor roared the wind tugged at me, and then 

the long velvet silences of my spirals down from 

that cold air to the warm surface breezes until 

my pontoons lit and I was home!

Saturday, 25 May 1918

A cloud is a beautiful thing to watch on a Summer day when you’re flat on your back on a lawn, 

but it’s no matter of jubilation when it gets 

friendly and descends to the sea in a twentyfive mile square mass of dark and wet and impenetrableness. Ask me; I know. On a sunset 

flight tonight I got about as beautifully lost as a 

man could—twenty five miles to sea, no compass getting dark—oh, it was a novel sensation. 

Everywhere was mist, heavy and baffling. Even 

at a very low altitude, the water was all but invisible and the damp, heavy darkness seemed to 

sap your courage. I do hasten to add that while 

I wasn’t cheerful, still I wasn’t scared. At last a 

friendly peak came above the low clouds and 

showed me I was forty miles wrong. When I 

did get it was quite dark and I sang as I took off 

my flying clothes.

Thursday, 30 May 1918

The flight was an interesting one, my longest 

up for two hours and went a very long way to 

sea. Far below the big ship looked like a rowboat, almost impossible to believe it was a large 

steamer. So I circled and patrolled until my gasoline got dangerously low, then I spiraled down 

to them, waved them good-by and came homeward. And they plowed westward—toward all 

that I love.

Tuesday, 4 June 1918

After a great many promises Capt Evan has at 

last decided to qualify us as “Naval Aviators.” 

It’s rather funny that after making for months 

flights alone of one hundred miles or more to 

sea in all sorts of weather and having to do circus stunts and land in this tiny harbor, we were 

not qualified for our N. A.’s. It’s not his fault, 

however, but just red tape. So today we made 

our last test, 3,000 feet altitude, spiral down and 

land within 150 feet of a target. It’s a whole lot 

harder to do than one would think. The judgment of distance is necessarily a fine one. Why, 

at 3,000 feet a target 10 feet square is hardly 

visible. I had and have had all along a good deal 

of confidence in my ability to fly a machine and 

I thought I could make it. I did on the first trial, 

being the only one of the lot to do so, hence the 

boyish bragging. Some, Hill for instance, have 

missed it by half a mile on several trials.

Despite their distance from the trenches and 

battlefields of Europe, and initially, his lack of 

knowledge about the Corps, Poague added his own 

commentary about the Marines fighting at Belleau 

Wood.

Tuesday, 11 June 1918

The huge battle rages on in France. At a fearful 

cost, the Huns are pouring out men in a vain 

attempt to force a decisive battle and are failing. 

They cannot win and this is their last attempt, 

the last powerful clutch of a drowning man as 

the waters close over his head. If, as we are told, 

the Allies have used no reserves, then the Hun 

is indeed doomed. The two regiments of Marines have lived up to the best of our traditions. 

Six thousand Marines officially are credited 

with taking 6 miles by 2 and a half of trenches 

from thirty thousand Germans and another 

thirty thousand Huns were called to stop them. 

It is as I expected. We have the finest body of 

fighting men in the world. The casualties were 
151

Over There, Over Here

heavy. Every officer in one company was killed 

and the men were led on to further victories by 

a corporal. Brave men. I think of all my friends, 

brown, white teeth flashing through the dust at 

Quantico. They died well.

In 1918, the influenza pandemic broke out 

around the world. The pandemic of 1918–19 killed 

more people than World War I (between 20 and 40 

million people) and is cited as the most devastating epidemic in recorded world history. Known as 

“Spanish Flu” or “La Grippe,” the influenza arrived 

in the Azores Islands at the end of the summer, 

where Poague and his comrades were not immune 

to its effects.

Sunday, 7 July 1918

Boynton has become very ill and has gone to 

the hospital; Brewster is sick in bed and all of us 

feel badly in greater or less degree, I included. 

Spanish influenza they call it. I think and it appears to be very painful.

Tuesday, 9 July 1918

This epidemic of Spanish influenza or grippe, 

rather, has hit Brewster, Sellon and Hill. I have 

been feeling a bit under the weather too, but 

not enough to keep me from at the play, which 

I have been typing all day.

Tuesday, 16 July 1918

I decided to stick out my time of duty as officer of the day today, in spite of feeling pretty 

fairly rotten, and did so until this afternoon. I 

went out to the hospital to get some medicine 

and the surgeon in charge looked me over, pronounced a high fever, and insisted on my going 

to bed. So I turned into a cot and they began 

throwing druggists staples into me. And then at 

ten in the evening, with the wind and rain playing fiercely, came mail! The first in nine weeks, 

and what a mail! Why it didn’t seem anything 

could be such a tonic as those letters from 

home. Mother, Dad, dear Sis, with her clever 

tender letters. I lay until after midnight reading 

them and then had hard work to calm down 

enough to sleep.

Wednesday, 17 July 1918

They have diagnosed my complaint as “something similar to grippe, probably Spanish influenza.” At all events, I feel a lot better today 

and am honestly enjoying the rest and change. 

This hospital under canvas, rows of tents, with 

the operating rooms in portable houses, would 

be a revelation to our doctors at home. But it 

is well and quietly run, the attendants are kind 

and thoughtful, and the food is good. All told, 

it is a credit, and I have the highest confidence 

in Surgeon Hepler a Newark doctor, who is in 

command. There is a corking tame rabbit too, 

who hops into your tent and sits up solemnly 

watching you eat and nibbles bread from your 

hand.

Thursday, 18 July 1918

A little weak, but otherwise “big and strong.” I 

left the hospital this morning and arrived at my 

alleged home in time to receive more mail. The 

old adage of raining and pouring holds good 

now and it is just flooding us with letters praise 

be! The little details of home life and thought 

fill my heart.

By the end of July, the submarine menace was 

considered under control by the chief of naval operations and at this time the 1st Marine Aviation 

Force arrived in France (Brest). Only one squadron remained in the United States (“D” squadron) 

at Miami. With almost the entire Marine aviation 

deployed overseas, the call for pilots to continue the 

effort of building and sustaining the major unit was 

a natural decision; several of the skilled pilots were 

transferred back to the United States. Those departing the Azores Islands were Captain Evans (with a 

total of 4.3 scouting flight hours); First Lieutenant 

Mims (3.8 hours); Second Lieutenants Hill (22.1 

hours), Sellon (29.5 hours), and Boyton (1.0 hour); 

and Gunnery Sergeant Carl Ehlers who also logged 

only one scout flight. At the officers school, the admittance terms where changed, giving now priority to the personnel who were in the ranks. Also 

returning home to become a future officer was a 

private—Christian Schilt—who became famous in 

the near future of Marine Corps aviation.
152

Postwar Analysis

The reduction of the number of pilots did not 

affect the number of scouting flights. In July, the 

total of flights was 104, from which 82 are scouting 

(78.9 hours). The small decrease of flights, comparing to the previous month, could be justified by four 

days of bad weather. It is now clear that, on a month 

with good weather, the total scouting hours were 

around 80 hours—the maximum that they could 

sustain. However, keeping up with this operational 

tempo resulted in an increase of accidents due to 

material fatigue, which the six remaining aviators 

contended with.

Summer drew to a close as Poague and his fellow aviators continued their routine—flying and 

complaining about not flying when the weather was 

uncooperative. The war news continued to pour in 

and added further misery to their lack of usefulness 

in the far reaches of the Atlantic. On 5 November 1918, Poague and Gunnery Sergeant Walton B. 

Zeigler made their way to the beach at 0600 to conduct a sunrise scout patrol. It is best to use Zeigler’s 

own words for the events that followed:

The motor and plane seemed and tested all 

O.K. But the wind was against us, as there is 

only one way to take off in that harbor. We had 

what we call a down wind of about twenty-five 

miles per hour and the sea just outside the harbor was very rough.

When we left the beach we both expected to 

take off before we passed the sea buoy, which is 

at the mouth of the harbor, but when we passed 

the buoy we were still planning.

After leaving the buoy I expected to feel it 

take off any moment, but the pontoons just 

seemed to be touching the top of the waves. 

We traveled for quite a distance when the plane 

rose several feet and then settled, and the pontoons struck the top of a wave and gave way. I 

saw one come through the right lower wing and 

I loosened my belt to jump, but we bounded 

and turned over too fast to jump.

We turned over twice and stopped with us 

hanging head down under water. I fought my 

way out between the tangled wires and wreckage and was about exhausted when I reached the 

surface, but was not hurt badly, teeth knocked 

loose and stiff neck.

I called for Mr. Poague, but received no answer, so I climbed around the wreckage and 

found him still hanging in his seat with the top 

engine panel—that is the top wing—just over 

the front seat against his chest and blocking all 

of the rear cockpit . . . He appeared dead then, 

for he did not move all the while I worked to 

get him out.

Walter Smith Poague was 27 years old at the 

time of his death—the war nearly over.* His fellow Marines fondly remembered Poague in letters 

of condolence to the young man’s family, as did 

the Portuguese with letters of appreciation for his 

services to the Red Cross. Poague’s diary is nearly 

a daily record of the unit’s actions, weather, flying, boredom, and frustration covering nearly nine 

months. It was published by his devoted father in 

an attempt to ensure that his son lived on in words 

if not in body.

* 1stLt Walter S. Poague was sealed in a copper-lined casket 

and transported back to the United States by the cruiser USS

Chicago [1885] on 21 November 1918. He was buried in Oak 

Woods Cemetery in Chicago on 21 December 1918. Poague 

died on 5 November 1918, six days before the Armistice was 

signed on 11 November 1918, officially ending World War I.
153

MARINES ALOFT IN WORLD WAR I

by James R. Nilo

On 1 July 1911, the United States Navy purchased 

its first airplane from Glenn Curtiss, who designed 

and built it at his Hammondsport, New York, factory. Less than a year later, two men wearing the 

uniform of the United States Marine Corps began 

flight training: Alfred Austell Cunningham and 

Bernard Lewis Smith. Today when flying around 

the world is safer than driving to a nearby grocery 

store, it is hard to keep in mind how dangerous flying was in those early days. In a few brief years, the 

frail doves called aeroplanes and the first aviators 

united by a common bond suddenly found themselves enemies and birds of prey shooting at each 

other in the skies over France. World War I saw the 

formation of two types of aviation: flying for peace 

and flying for war.

When the United States entered the war 

against Germany in 1917, there was no phase of her 

forthcoming industrial effort from which so much 

was expected as from the building of airplanes and 

equipment for aerial warfare. Here in America, mechanical flight was born; but other nations would 

develop the invention into an industry and a science 

that were a closed book to our people.

In August 1914, when Germany, France, and 

England went to war, Germany had about 1,000 

airplanes, France 300, and England 250. America’s 

224 planes in 1917 were nearly all obsolete in type, 

compared with the machines then in service in 

France. The U.S. Army Air Service had 65 officers 

and 1,330 enlisted personnel and civilians, two flying fields and a few serviceable planes, mostly trainers. U.S. naval aviation was as unprepared for war as 

was the Army. The strength of naval aviation with a 

Marine Corps section stood at 48 officers and 239 

enlisted men with some aviation experience. They 

had 54 aircraft of training types (mostly obsolete), 

one free balloon, one kite balloon, and one air station at Pensacola, Florida. The Marine Corps section consisted of 7 qualified pilots and 43 enlisted 

men.

Rear Admiral William Sowden Sims, USN, 

traveling incognito as a civilian aboard the merchant vessel New York, arrived in England on 9 

April, three days after the United States had declared war. He was astounded to learn that the total 

loss of British and Allied tonnage during February 

had been 536,000 tons, in March 603,000 tons, and 

that the April rate of sinking would bring the total from that month alone to nearly 900,000 tons. 

At that rate, Germany would win the war within 

six months by reducing shipping to the point 

where necessary supplies of the Allies could not be 

maintained, much less sending American troops 

to France. Unrestricted submarine warfare played 

an important part in the declaration of war by the 

United States.

The primary role of naval aviation in WWI was 

antisubmarine warfare. Submarines could be spotted from the air. The seaplane on patrol could spot 

a submarine and then summon destroyers and sub 

chasers to the scene. Thus the aircraft would indirectly bring about the destruction of the submarine.

Three weeks after the declaration of war, the 

Marine Aeronautic Company was formed at the 

Philadelphia Navy Yard. A site was selected on the 

shore of the Delaware River, and a hangar was built, 

open at both ends, one end with ramps on the water 

and the other facing the airfield. Two Curtiss R-6 

seaplanes and one obsolete Farman landplane was 

the [available] inventory of aircraft. Marine Captain 

Alfred A. Cunningham was in command. Captain 

Cunningham, who was Naval Aviator No. 5, had 

soloed after two hours and 40 minutes of instruction on 5 March 1913. Over the next six months, 

the company expanded and trained 34 officers and 

330 enlisted men.

At a halfway point between America and Europe lay the Portuguese-owned islands called the 

Azores. Soon after war was declared, the United 

States began negotiations with Portugal to establish a naval base at this strategic point. Had the 

Germans succeeded in establishing a base there or 

in utilizing the islands for supplying or refueling 
154

Postwar Analysis

submarines, they could have seriously menaced our 

troop and cargo transportation and trans-Atlantic 

lines of communication. U-boats were known to be 

operating in the area.

The Fourth of July 1917 was ushered in by 

the booming of American guns, not in the United 

States, but in the far-away Azores. A German submarine, the U-155, poured a rain of shells into Ponta Delgada, the principal city in the islands. People 

were panic-stricken; the antiquated forts were no 

defense. Their guns were not of sufficient caliber to 

cope with the enemy.

Relief came to the people of Ponta Delgada 

from an unexpected source. The U.S. naval collier 

[USS] Orion [AC 11] was in port and, three minutes after the enemy began operations, her guns 

were in action. This was a surprise for the submarine. When the shells began to fall around her, the 

Germans could not imagine where they came from. 

Orion was at a dock 2,000 yards away on the other 

side of a point of land that juts out into the harbor. She could not sail out immediately, as her stern 

had been hoisted to make repairs, but she promptly 

turned her guns on the intruder. In a few moments, 

the enemy found he was faced by a formidable foe. 

It was not long before the submarine, baffled, disappeared as the shells were getting too close. When 

American servicemen arrived in the Azores, they 

found Orion cigarettes, an Orion restaurant and theater, and even cigar boxes with a picture on them of 

the commanding officer of USS Orion, Lieutenant 

Commander J. H. Boesch—evidence of how popular the Americans had become.

Back in the states, on 14 October 1917, the 

Marine Aeronautic Company was divided into the 

1st Aviation Squadron under Captain W. M. McIlvain, USMC, and the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company under Captain F. T. “Cocky” Evans, USMC. 

Later that same day, the 1st Aeronautic Company 

was transferred to the newly established naval air 

station at Cape May, New Jersey, for training in 

seaplanes and flying boats. Three days later, the 1st 

Marine Squadron transferred to the Army field at 

Mineola, Long Island, for training in landplanes. In 

December 1917, the Marine Aeronautical Detachment was organized at the Marine Barracks Philadelphia Navy Yard, under command of Captain Roy 

S. Geiger, USMC. On 31 December 1917, Captain 

McIlvain’s 1st Aviation Squadron was transferred 

to Gerstner Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana, for advanced training in landplanes.

On 9 January 1918, the 1st Marine Aeronautic 

Company, 12 officers and 133 enlisted men, embarked on USS Hancock [AP 3] with 10 Curtiss R-6 

seaplanes and 2 N-9 seaplanes for Ponta Delgada in 

the Azores. This was the first flying unit of any U.S. 

Service to go overseas fully equipped and trained. 

A detachment of Marines was formed in Philadelphia under Captain Maurice G. Holmes to mount 

and operate two seven-inch guns to protect Ponta 

Delgada.

The Aeronautic Company developed an air 

station and, about a month after its arrival, began 

making antisubmarine patrols. The Marine company later received six Curtiss HS-2L flying boats. 

Each of these patrol boats carried a crew of two and 

had a cruising range of about 400 miles. A corporal 

who had enlisted in the Marines on 23 June 1917 

had this to say about serving with the 1st Marine 

Aeronautical Company in the Azores.

The assignment had its pleasant aspects. There 

was wonderful flying weather, people were very 

friendly, they took us right into their homes and 

did everything they could for us, so it was good 

to be there. We saw a few enemy submarines 

out there. In fact, we dropped a few bombs, but 

as far as we know we didn’t damage anything . . .

but we kept them submerged, I think.

On 5 November 1918, in the Azores, Second 

Lieutenant Walter S. Poague, USMC, was killed in 

a crash. He was the only casualty of the 1st Aeronautical Company. After the war ended on 11 November 1918, the 1st Aeronautical Company under 

Major David L. S. Brewster, who on 18 July 1918 

had succeeded Major Francis T. Evans, was ordered 

home. On 20 January 1919, the two seven-inch 

guns were turned over to the Portuguese.

But for the base in the Azores and Portugal’s 

cooperation, we would have lacked a place to refuel 

destroyers as they went across escorting convoys. 

The corporal who told about serving in the Azores, 

after returning to the states, entered flight training 

at the Marine Flying Field, Miami. On 10 June 

1919, he was commissioned a second lieutenant and 
155

Over There, Over Here

designated a naval aviator. Christian Frank Schilt 

went on to become a legend for his Medal of Honor 

exploits on 6–8 January 1928 at Quilali, Nicaragua. 

Lieutenant Schilt risked his life to make 10 flights 

into a besieged town to evacuate 18 wounded Marines and carry in a replacement commander and 

badly needed medical supplies. He retired from the 

Marines as a general on 1 April 1957.

The Marine land-based aviation force began to 

organize and train after combining the 1st Aeronautical Detachment under Captain Roy S. Geiger 

and McIlvain’s 1st Aviation Squadron on 15 April 

1918 into what would become known as the 1st 

Marine Aviation Force. This unit was to be stationed at the first-ever Marine flying school, which 

was donated by Glenn Curtiss near Miami at the 

site of his old Curtiss Flying School.

Captain Cunningham became commanding 

officer while he also served as the de facto director 

of Marine aviation. In November 1917, he would 

go to France to find a mission for Marine Corps 

aviation. Captain Cunningham sailed for France 

on 3 November 1917 and visited both British and 

French flying fields. His trip was marked by bad 

weather and sickness. When he returned home in 

January 1918, he reported to Lieutenant Commander John [H.] Towers, USN, in Washington, 

DC, in charge of naval aviation.

Cunningham felt that Marine Corps fighters 

should be assigned to defend Dunkirk: “No matter how many bombing machines we put out” to 

strike the U-boat bases in Belgium, “if there are no 

fighting machines there to protect them it is a useless sacrifice.” While in France, Cunningham had 

tried to persuade the Army to attach the Marine 

landplane squadron to the Marine brigade, then 

training in France as part of the famed Army 2d 

Infantry Division. The Army said that if the Marine 

squadron ever got to France, it would be used to 

furnish personnel to run one of their training fields, 

but that was as near the front as it would ever get.

On his trip, Cunningham had also conferred 

with the U.S. Navy officers and British naval officers who told him of a need to bomb German

submarine bases located on the Belgian coast at 

Zeebrugge, Bruges, and Ostend. With support 

from the General Board of the Navy, he presented a 

plan from which came the formation of the Northern Bombing Group. The Marines would conduct 

daylight raids and the Navy wing would conduct 

night raids using Italian-built Caproni bombers.

The 1st Marine Aviation Force, which had 

reorganized on 16 June 1918 at the Marine Flying Field outside Miami, needed personnel. Cunningham, in command, recruited officers from the 

Quantico Marine Officers Training School, and 

80 Navy-trained pilots transferred to the Marine 

Corps, wanting to get overseas sooner. The aviation force was divided into four squadrons—A (7), 

B (8), C (9), and D (10)—and began to train in 

earnest on Curtiss JN-4s (the famed Jenny), some 

Thomas-Morse Scouts, and Hall-Standards. With 

their mission established, the Marines would be 

equipped with the American-built De Havilland 

DH-4 with the 12-cylinder Liberty engine, also 

known as the “flaming coffin.” Most pilots and observers who flew the Liberty swore by the plane; a 

few swore at it.

On 14 August 1917, the Dayton-Wright Company in Dayton, Ohio, was awarded a contract to 

build the British-designed DH-4. The most objectionable feature [of the aircraft] was the unprotected gas tank in combination with a pressure-feed gas 

system since, in most cases when the gas tank was 

punctured, the DH-4 went down in flames. When 

the gas tank was punctured, not only did the hole 

remain unsealed, but the pressure on the gas line 

finally tended to force the fuel out, spraying the fuselage and making it highly flammable to the enemy’s incendiary bullets. Further danger lurked in 

every impending crash since the unprotected fuel 

tank located behind the pilot and engine might easily be crushed.

On 29 May 1917, in a suite at the Willard 

Hotel in Washington, DC, two successful engineers from the auto industry—Elbert J. Hall and 

Jesse G. Vincent—developed a design of what became America’s greatest contribution to aviation 

in WWI, the 12-cylinder, 400-horsepower Liberty 

engine. By October 1918, 46,000 engines a year 

were being produced and, when production ended, 

the following were actually built by Packard, 6,500; 

Lincoln, 6,500; Ford, 3,950; General Motors, 2,328; 

and Nordyke and Marmon, 1,000. The Liberty en-
156

Postwar Analysis

gines were still being used [until] up to 1942 mainly 

due to their availability. They were used as aircraft 

engines and tank engines in Russia and England.

The DH-4 was the only American-built aircraft 

to see combat in WWI, and the first combat sortie 

took place by the 135th Aeronautic Squadron on

9 August 1918. Finally on 18 July 1918, the 1st Marine Aviation Force embarked on USS DeKalb, the 

former German liner Prinz Eitel Friedrich, at Newport News, Virginia. She carried Marines of the 

5th Regiment to France as part of the first convoy 

in June 1917. Squadrons A, B, and C, 107 officers 

and 654 enlisted men, disembarked from DeKalb

when she moored in Brest, France, on 30 July 1918. 

Squadron D had remained in Miami to complete 

its training and fill its complement of personnel. 

When they arrived in France, the 1st Marine Aviation Force became the Marine Day Wing of the 

U.S. Navy Northern Bombing Group under the 

command of Captain David [C.] Hanrahan, USN, 

headquartered in Antingues, France. Major Roy S. 

Geiger commanded Squadron 7(A); Major William M. McIlvain, Squadron 8 (B); Major Douglas B. Roben, Squadron 9 (C); and Captain Russell

A. Presley would bring over Squadron 10 (D). 

These squadron commanders had been in France to 

establish airfields prior to the arrival of the three 

squadrons.

At a location between Calais and Dunkirk 

was Oye. This would be home to Squadrons A 

and B. Squadrons C and D would be established 

at LaFresne, some 12 kilometers southwest of Calais. Major Cunningham set up his headquarters 

at nearby LaFresne. Calais is 400 miles from the 

port of Brest. As with one of the many foul-ups of 

wartime endeavors, no transportation awaited the 

newly arrived Marines. Major Cunningham had 

to commandeer a French freight train to take his 

squadrons north to Calais. When they arrived at 

Oye and LaFresne, no airfields awaited them, much 

less aircraft.

Tents were pitched in the orchards surrounding the proposed sites of airfields, and the Marines 

were under canvas. Turning to with picks and shovels, the sugar beet fields were transformed with the 

help of a “borrowed” Navy steamroller into the first 

two Marine combat airfields.

The 72 DH-4 bombers promised by the Army 

were slow in coming. The first of these arrived on 7 

September. The planes with the wings in one crate, 

the fuselage in another, and the engine in still another (the old expression about “flying crates” was 

derived from the crates the planes were shipped in). 

The naval air station at Pauiliac, France, was where 

the planes were to be assembled and then flown to 

the Marine flying fields.

Cunningham found that the American-built 

planes would not arrive with the administrative 

foul-ups, so he turned to the British for help. The 

British, having been at war for three years prior to 

America’s entry into the conflict, had a surplus of 

airframes for the DH-9A. This plane was basically 

a modified DH-4 with the gas tank being relocated. 

However, the British were short of engines, and casualties had created a lack of trained pilots. With 

approval of U.S. Navy authorities and the Royal Air 

Force, a swap was arranged. The American Liberty 

engines had arrived with no planes to put them 

in, so for every three Liberty engines delivered to 

the British, they would return one to the Marines 

mounted in a completely equipped DH-9A.

On-the-job training began for Marine pilots 

and observers with Royal Air Force Squadrons 

217, equipped with DH-4s, and 218, flying DH9s. Marine pilots who had flown the JN-4 with its 

90-horsepower engine found the Liberty engine of 

400 horsepower made the ground shake. The Marine pilots were temporarily assigned to the British squadrons to fly three or more combat missions 

over the German lines. At the British pilots’ pool 

located at Audembert, France, Marine pilots began 

practice flights to qualify for flying bombing missions and then return to their own units.

One of these Marine pilots, Second Lieutenant Chapin Barr, died on 29 September 1918 from 

wounds received the day before on a combat raid 

over enemy territory. He was the first Marine aviator to lose his life as a result of enemy action. It was 

on 25 September 1918, flying with RAF Squadron 

218 over Belgium, that First Lieutenant Everett R. 

Brewer, pilot, and observer Gunnery Sergeant Harry B. Wershiner brought down a Fokker, the first 

enemy plane ever recorded for the Marine Corps. 

Captain F. Patrick Mulcahy, pilot, with Gunnery 
157

Over There, Over Here

Sergeant Thomas L. McCullough, observer, brought 

down a German plane also over Belgium.

On 1 and 2 October 1918, some of the earliest food-drop missions were flown by three Marine 

Corps pilots: Captain Francis P. Mulcahy, Captain 

Robert S. Lytle, and Lieutenant Frank Nelms. They 

had to fly repeated low-level runs in the face of enemy fire to deliver 2,600 pounds of food and supplies to a French regiment surrounded by German 

troops near Stadenburg.

On 5 October 1918, Squadron D arrived at 

LaFresne with 42 officers and 183 enlisted men. 

Also arriving on 5 October was the 88th Company from the 1st Marine Regiment, which was 

equipped with searchlights.

On 8 October, over Ardoye, Belgium, Second 

Lieutenant Ralph Talbot, pilot, with Gunnery Sergeant Robert G. Robinson, observer, encountered 

a flight of nine enemy planes. Refusing to flee, 

Lieutenant Talbot engaged them, and in a terrific 

battle the Marines shot down one of the enemy and 

eluded the rest.

In mid-October 1918, with the war going 

badly for the Germans, they evacuated their submarine bases in the North Sea, and thereby the U.S. 

Navy Northern Bombing Group found its mission 

changed. They offered their services to General 

John J. Pershing and the American Expeditionary 

Forces. General Pershing felt that where they were 

located they would be better able to support British 

operations in Belgium.

On 14 October 1918, Captain Robert S. Lytle

led five DH-4s and three DH-A9s of Marine 

Squadron 9, based at LaFresne, on the first allMarine air combat operation to bomb the Germanheld railway junction and yards at Thielt, Belgium. 

Without fighter escort to and from Thielt, the

Marines dropped 2,210 pounds of bombs. On the 

way back, they were jumped by 12 German fighters, 

eight Fokker D-V11s, and four Pfalz D-111s.

While flying over Pittham, Belgium, Lieutenant Talbot and his observer, Gunnery Sergeant 

Robinson, suffered engine trouble and became 

detached from their flight. Using their frequent 

tactic, the Germans zeroed in on Talbot’s DH-4. 

Talbot elected to fight against the odds. Robinson 

brought down one of the attacking fighters before 

his machine gun jammed. As he struggled to get 

it back in action, a burst of fire practically carried 

his arm away. Talbot attacked the enemy with his 

front guns, shooting one down. Robinson received 

another bullet through the stomach and collapsed 

in the cockpit. Talbot scattered the nearest formation, and with his engine failing, Talbot glided over 

the enemy trenches at an altitude of 50 feet, landing 

at the nearest Allied hospital.

Captain Lytle tried to help Talbot, but his engine failed after Lytle and his observer, Gunnery 

Sergeant Amil Wiman, brought down a German 

plane. Lytle glided his plane to a landing in the Belgian front-line trenches and beat it to safety. Later 

that night, Marine ground crews went up and dismantled the plane and took it back to base.

Lieutenant Talbot and Gunnery Sergeant Robinson each were awarded the Navy Medal of Honor. 

The gallant Talbot received his posthumously for he 

died in a plane crash nine days later, crashing into a 

bomb pit. Second Lieutenant Colgate W. Darden, 

who was in the observer’s seat, was thrown clear of 

the plane, survived, and went on to become governor of Virginia and president of the University of 

Virginia. In 1936, a U.S. Navy destroyer was named 

in Talbot’s honor. Robinson, incapacitated by his 

wounds, was retained as a first lieutenant on the inactive list.

The worldwide influenza epidemic struck the 

Marines and paralyzed operations; 21 enlisted men 

and 4 officers died, including Major Douglas B. 

Roben, commander of Squadron C. The first Marine aircraft lost to enemy action occurred on 22 

October when seven German fighters attacked Second Lieutenant Harvey C. Norman’s plane. Norman and his observer, Second Lieutenant Caleb W. 

Taylor, were killed in the crash near Bruges Canal, 

Belgium.

Marine squadrons continued to carry out raids 

on railway centers, supply dumps, enemy airfields, 

and canals in 14 independent raids. Second Lieutenants Frank Nelms Jr. and John F. Gibbs were 

on a mission when German antiaircraft fire hit the 

DH-4 they were flying and forced them to land in 

neutral Holland. They were interned from 27 October 1918 until after the Armistice. Squadron 8 (B) 

under Major McIlvain began operations from an 
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Postwar Analysis

abandoned airfield at Knesselaere, Belgium, on 11 

November 1918 when the Armistice was signed.

A total of 57 bombing raids were participated 

in by the Marine Day Wing, dropping an estimated 

62,000 pounds of bombs, 15,140 pounds while flying with the British.

Major Cunningham remembered how cold the 

winter was in northern France and Belgium and 

that his Marines were ill-housed. Being under command of the U.S. Navy, Cunningham secured [the] 

USS Mercury in December to transport the Marines back to the States. Although overshadowed by 

the larger combat elements during the First World 

War, a handful of U.S. Marines in France made flying history. Not until 25 years later and another war 

was “The Marines’ Hymn” changed to read:

From the halls of Montezuma

To the shores of Tripoli

We fight our country’s battles

In the air, on land, and sea.
159

Headnote

Taking the offensive, the 4th Brigade helped turn 

the tide of World War I during two days of hard 

fighting in July 1918.

Belleau Wood, the 4th Brigade’s first big fight, 

had occupied most of June 1918. At the legendary 

battle, the Marines earned international recognition that they could stand and fight on a European 

battlefield. Less than three weeks later, however, the 

U.S. 2d Infantry Division and its Marine brigade 

were facing a new challenge: reversing Germany’s 

fifth major drive of 1918 by spearheading an Allied 

offensive near Soissons, France, that would prove a 

turning point in the war.

During the first week of July, the 2d Division 

had gone into reserve, holding the support line 

behind Belleau Wood and Vaux, the latter about 

three miles to the southeast.** Replacements were 

arriving, and the less-serious casualties had begun 

to return to the brigade. On 13 July, the brigade 

commander, Army Brigadier General James G. 

Harbord, was promoted to major general. Colonel 

Wendell C. “Buck” Neville, commander of the 5th 

Marines, was in the hospital, and Lieutenant Colonel Logan Feland was acting commander. Lieutenant Colonel Harry Lee led the 6th Regiment. The 

two regimental commanders pinned on Harbord’s 

second stars, and Harbord went off to Paris for five 

days’ leave.

The next day was a Sunday and, war or no war, 

also Bastille Day. Army General John J. Pershing’s 

chief of staff informed Harbord by telephone that 

he was to take command of the 2d Division, and the 

sooner the better. The sleep of the division’s doughboys was disturbed that night of 14–15 July by the 

sound of distant artillery fire from the east. From 

Reims to Château-Thierry and across Champagne 

to the Argonne, the armies of German Crown 

Prince Wilhelm were attacking. For the Germans, 

it was the fifth and final offensive of 1918—the last 

throw of the dice. Hurried along by these events, 

Harbord, early on Monday morning, drove back 

from Paris to the 2d Division headquarters, comfortably situated in the Château de Chamigny on 

the Marne.

At 1855, General Marie Emile Fayolle, commanding the Reserve Army Group to which the 

2d Division was assigned, issued an order placing 

the division at the disposal of General Charles 

“the Butcher” Mangin, commander of the French 

Tenth Army. At about 2030, a French staff officer 

arrived at Chamigny and vaguely informed the division that it would soon be moving somewhere. 

Later that evening, more specific orders arrived. 

Troops were to “embus” at 1600 the following day 

and proceed to an unnamed area subject to further 

orders. Harbord complained in his diary, “In truck 

movements of troops, the French never tell any one 

where they are going.”

Allied Commander in Chief General Ferdinand Foch had begun concentrating troops north of 

Paris to counterattack the flanks of the huge German salient reaching toward Paris. General Pershing, the overall U.S. commander, would write dryly 

in his final report, “The selection by the Germans of 

the Champagne sector and the eastern and southern faces of the Marne pocket on which to make 

their offensive was fortunate for the Allies, as it 

favored the launching of the counterattack already 

planned.” According to Pershing, French Army 

Commander in Chief Philippe Pétain’s “initial plan 

for the counterattack involved the entire western 

LEATHERNECKS AT SOISSONS

by Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)*

* BGen Simmons is a veteran of World War II, the Korean 

War, and the Vietnam War and is the director emeritus of Marine Corps History. He is also the author of the prizewinning 

novel Dog Company Six (2000) and numerous military history 

books, including The United States Marines: A History, 4th edition (2003).

** The big 2d Division included two infantry brigades: the 3d 

Infantry Brigade, with the 9th and 23d Infantry Regiments and 

the 5th Machine Gun Battalion, and the 4th Marine Brigade, 

with the 5th Regiment and the 6th Regiment and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion. Division troops included a headquarters 

troop, the 4th Machine Gun Battalion, the 2d Engineer Regiment, and the 1st Field Signal Battalion. The 2d Field Artillery 

Brigade consisted of the 12th (75mm) and 15th (155mm) Field 

Artillery Regiments and the 2d Trench Mortar Battery.
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Postwar Analysis

face of the Marne salient. The 1st and 2d American 

Divisions, with the First French Moroccan Division 

between them, were employed as the spearhead of 

the main attack, driving directly eastward through 

the most sensitive portion of the German lines, to 

the heights south of Soissons.” The operation came 

to be known as the Aisne-Marne offensive and 

lasted from 18 July until 6 August. Some 270,000 

American troops were involved.

About 1500 on Tuesday, 16 July, Harbord was 

informed that his new division headquarters would 

be in the Forêt (Forest) de Retz, and that the French 

Tenth Army, to which his own division was now assigned, was contemplating an attack. General Mangin was away from his headquarters, and Harbord 

had initially received no information on Mangin’s 

intentions for the 2d Division except that it would 

be assigned to the French XX Corps. Now, Harbord 

learned that the 2d Division, as part of XX Corps, 

was to attack on a wide front extending south from 

the vicinity of Soissons. A French operations officer 

offered to write the 2d Division attack order; however, Harbord declined with a bit of ice in his voice.

Preparing for Battle

The 2d Division commander spent the night drafting the order. The front would be approached 

through the Forêt de Retz, also known as the Forêt 

de Villers-Cotterêts. Beyond the woods, most of the 

land was planted in wheat, which then stood waist 

high. The area was dotted with villages and farmhouses built of stone from local quarries, offering 

the Germans strong defensive positions. Emerging from the woods, the division would advance 

almost due east on a frontage of about two miles. 

The first objective would be a mile-long line running through Beaurepaire farm. There, the axis of 

the attack would change from east to southeast. It 

would be an awkward maneuver. The next objective, 

another advance of a mile, would be to Vauxcastille. 

Still another mile would bring the division to the 

village of Vierzy.

Harbord expected that the principal resistance would be on his right. He gave this zone to 

the 2d Division’s 3d Brigade, which would attack 

with both its regiments—the 9th and 23d Infantry—abreast. He assigned the narrower left front to 

the 5th Regiment. The 6th [Regiment] would be in 

reserve. The wheat fields promised good tank country. Four battalions of French tanks, 54 tanks in all, 

were allocated to support the division.

While the mimeograph machine at headquarters churned out copies of the attack order, the

Marines marched from their billeting areas near 

Nanteuil-sur-Marne to the main highway, where 

they embussed in French trucks. The convoys 

moved forward in total darkness.

In the morning, the Marines tumbled out of the 

trucks northwest of Villers-Cotterêts, near spots on 

the map marked Pierrefonds, Retheuil, and Taillefontaine. Mangin’s Tenth Army was to break the 

German front between the Aisne and Ourcq rivers. 

The XX Corps was expected to penetrate deeply at 

the critical point on the western flank of the salient. 

The corps was to attack with the 1st U.S. Division 

on the left, the French 1st Moroccan Division in the 

center, and the 2d U.S. Division on the right. The 3d 

Brigade would advance with its two regiments side 

by side, the 9th Infantry on the left, the 23d Infantry on the right. The 5th [Regiment] would attack 

on the left of the 3d Brigade. A group of about 30 

French tanks was assigned to support the 5th Regiment. The 6th [Regiment], along with the 2d Engineers and 4th Machine Gun Battalion, would be 

in division reserve. A French squadron of 10 aircraft 

would support the division in the attack—or so XX 

Corps promised. To ensure surprise, there would be 

no preliminary artillery fire. The attack would begin 

with a barrage that would roll forward at the rate of 

100 meters every two minutes.

The weather—cloudy, rainy, and totally miserable—favored a surprise attack. The Forêt de Retz, 

a magnificent blanket of beech to the north and east 

of Villers-Cotterêts, concealed the approach. One 

principal highway, with a paved center and dirt 

shoulders, ran through the forest, which was crisscrossed by dirt roads. During the night on 17 July, 

after a terrible forced march through mud and rain, 

the 1st Moroccan Division and the U.S. 2d Division ended up huddled in the Retz forest.

Neville was back from the hospital in time to 

command the Marine brigade. The 5th and 6th 

[Regiments] were to reach the woods during the 

afternoon and evening. The brigade’s 6th Machine 

Gun Battalion was to arrive about 0300 on 18 July. 
161

Over There, Over Here

Traffic moving to the front, however, packed the 

main roads through the forest, and the congestion 

delayed the delivery of the attack orders. There was 

little or no time for reconnaissance or the study of 

maps. For miles, the infantry was forced to march 

in single file along a ditch dug into the clay on the 

right of the road, each man holding onto the belt or 

coattail of the man in front of him.

Colonel Feland reported to Harbord at his 

headquarters late in the afternoon and received his 

orders for the 5th [Regiment]. Not until 2200 did 

he find his regiment on the road, two miles west of 

division headquarters. More tanks, large and small, 

than the Marines had ever seen had been assembled 

in the forest along with troop after troop of French 

cavalry. There were also the Moroccans; according 

to a Marine battalion history, the North Africans’ 

“cold-blooded manner of fighting had, from early 

days of the war, struck terror in the hearts of the 

Germans.”

The weather cleared and, from midnight until 

the dawn of 18 July, the troops marched from the 

rear through the woods to their attack positions. 

Major Julius Turrill’s 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment, 

had been billeted in Crouttes, about eight miles 

southwest of Château-Thierry, from 9 to 15 July, 

“worn out, but well satisfied” from their work in 

Belleau Wood. At 2140 on 17 July, Turrill started 

his march through the Forêt de Retz in an effort to 

reach the jump-off point before H-hour. Each rifleman was carrying two extra bandoliers of ammunition. The expected French guides did not arrive to 

show Turrill the way.

The 1st Battalion was followed by the 2d and 

3d. The 2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, commanded by 

Major Ralph Keyser, would also be in the assault. 

After traveling all night, it had debussed at Brassiares at 1100 on 17 July. From there, it marched into 

the western part of the Forêt de Retz, following the 

1st Battalion.

“. . . [A]t 4 o’clock only one Regiment—the 

Ninth Infantry—was in position on the jump-off 

line,” says the wartime history of the 2d Division. 

“The attacking Battalions of the Twenty-third Infantry arrived in position at exactly 4-30, after 

double-timing for over a mile. The First and second 

Battalions of the Fifth Marines came up on the run 

just as the attack started, going from column into 

attack formation without a halt.”

Attack orders were sketchy. None of the company commanders had maps, nor were they given 

much more to go on than compass bearings of their 

direction of attack. The jump-off line for the 5th 

Regiment was about three kilometers from the eastern edge of the forest. At the jump-off time, neither 

the 8th Machine Gun Company nor the 6th Machine Gun Battalion had arrived. “Very well,” said 

some unknown optimist, “we will take the Boche 

machine guns.”

Immediately opposite the 2d Division were the 

German consolidated 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions, six infantry regiments each with an average 

effective strength of 30 officers and 1,000 men, 

and with 140 light and 200 heavy machine guns. 

They had the support of a mixed bag of light and 

medium artillery, about six battalions in all. The 

Germans were tired, their rations short, and their

morale none too good, but they had the trench-wise 

cunning born of four years of survival.

The 2d Division’s Assault

As the attack began, the 2d Division faced the 14th 

Reserve Division on its right and the 47th Reserve 

Division on its left. Initially, resistance was not 

strong. Two German battalions, one each from the 

218th and 219th Infantry Regiments, lightly held an 

outpost line. The main line of resistance was a few 

hundred yards behind, thinly manned by two battalions, one from the 138th Infantry and one from 

the 17th Infantry. The German direct support artillery was about a mile to the rear. A second, stronger 

defensive line, called the “Chaudun Position,” ran 

along the ridge east of Chaudun and through Vierzy.

Coming through the forest, Turrill reached a 

roadblock marking the proximity of the front line, 

and turned his battalion to the northeast. He deployed the 66th Company on the right and the 17th 

Company on the left, and held the 67th Company 

in support. The 49th Company came up about 10 

minutes later.

The Allied artillery fire began as Turrill’s Marines were deploying, and the Germans answered 

with their own barrage. The battalion endured the 
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Postwar Analysis

shelling for about 30 minutes, and then went forward. Without machine guns, the attack was made 

with rifles, bayonets, and automatic rifles. Keyser 

went in on the right of Turrill. His companies, 

from right to left, included the 51st Company, 18th 

Company, 43d Company, and 55th Company.

To the right, the 3d Brigade attacked over open 

ground against little resistance. By 0645, the first 

waves of the Army doughboys had advanced four 

kilometers and were crossing open fields behind a 

screen of tanks toward Beaurepaire farm. The Marine battalions, still hampered by the woods, moved 

more slowly. It had been close to 0600 before the 

assault battalions of the 5th Regiment went over 

the top. The barrage continued to roll inexorably 

forward. The first waves, going against heavy shelling and machine-gun fire, burst through the barbed 

wire interlaced amid the trees, and took the first 

German trench line, reaching the forward edge of 

the woods. The companies became scattered to the 

north and south.

Keyser’s right flank company, the 51st, attempting to maintain contact with the 9th Infantry, met 

heavy resistance. In Keyser’s center, La Verte-Feuille 

farm was taken with the help of the French tanks. 

These, to the Marines’ satisfaction, crushed most of 

the German machine-gun positions.

By sunup, Turrill had also reached the edge of 

the forest. There had been snipers in trees, and machine guns to contend with, but no serious resistance. Most of Turrill’s casualties had come from 

shells bursting in the trees. With daylight, as the 

Marines moved out into the open, German aircraft 

flew overhead, and then dove to strafe and bomb. 

More beneficially, Turrill’s line of skirmishers received the support of seven or eight light French 

tanks.

The 9th Infantry, meanwhile, overran Beaurepaire farm, defended by a second battalion of the 

219th. An entire German dressing station was captured intact and put to immediate use. With Beaurepaire farm taken, the direction of advance changed 

nearly 45 degrees—a difficult maneuver under the 

best of circumstances. The change exposed the left 

flank of the 3d Brigade to heavy fire from German 

machine guns and artillery at Maison Neuve farm. 

Nevertheless, the advance was rapid from Beaurepaire farm to Vauxcastille. Not even direct fire from 

German 77mm and 150mm artillery could stop the 

doughboys, but losses were heavy and units became 

badly intermingled.

As the advance continued, a gap opened between the 2d Division and the 1st Moroccan Division on the left, and the left of the Turrill’s line 

was enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the woods 

north of Translon farm, which the Moroccans had 

not yet taken. Turrill pushed ahead against stiffening resistance, veering into the Moroccan zone of 

action. Maison Neuve farm was on his right and the 

village of Chaudun on his left. At about 0930, the 

16th and 20th Companies came up from the 5th 

[Regiment’s] 3d Battalion, and Turrill was able to 

form a support with the two fresh companies and 

a part of the 49th Company. In the meantime, his 

own 66th and 67th Companies had reached the ravine extending from Chaudun to Vauxcastille.

By then, Keyser’s 2d Battalion had gained its 

objectives, having fought its way to the ChaudunVauxcastille ravine through heavy machine-gun fire 

with the aid of the French tanks. By midafternoon, 

the division was on its final objective, except for the 

village of Vierzy itself, which was still strongly held 

by the Germans. In and about Vierzy were fragments of all six regiments of the 14th and 47th Reserve Divisions with miscellaneous additions. Until 

now in reserve, the German 28th Division, which 

the Marines had fought in Belleau Wood, was moving all three of its regiments into the line.

Brigadier General Hanson E. Ely had established his 3d Brigade headquarters at Beaurepaire 

farm, and at 1330 Harbord ordered him to resume 

the attack, with the 5th [Regiment] as an attached 

reinforcement. About a half-hour later, Harbord 

moved his own division headquarters forward to La 

Verte-Feuille farm. At that time, elements of the 5th 

[Regiment] and the 9th and 23d Infantry Battalions held the eastern edge of the Vauxcastille ravine, 

the western edge of Vierzy, and the high ground 

north of the town. The assault battalions had halted 

there to reorganize. Regimental commanders were 

sent for, and the attack order was issued at 1630, 

setting the launching time for “as soon as possible, 

but not later than six p.m.”

Major Maurice Shearer’s 3d Battalion, 5th 

Regiment, moving in regimental reserve, had first 

occupied old French trenches to the rear of the 
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Over There, Over Here

jump-off line. Later, Shearer’s 16th and 20th Companies went forward to reinforce Turrill. His remaining company, the 47th, was used as a provost 

guard to escort prisoners to the rear and bring ammunition forward. With all his companies parceled 

out, Shearer was left with a headquarters and no 

battalion.

Until now, Marine machine guns had been of 

little help. Major Littleton W. T. Waller Jr.’s 6th 

Machine Gun Battalion caught up with the 5th 

[Regiment] at La Verte-Feuille farm at about 1500. 

His companies were then paired off with the assault 

battalions and the machine guns spread along the 

line.

The 3d Brigade, with a battalion of Marines 

attached to each of its regiments, had the mission 

of taking Vierzy, where the Germans were forming 

their new line. The 9th Infantry, on the left, was to 

pass north of the town, and the 23d Infantry was to 

take the town itself.

Major Keyser received verbal orders to join his 

2d Battalion, 5th Regiment, to the 9th Infantry.

His was to be the left assault battalion in the renewed attack. With neither tank nor artillery support, Keyser went forward at about 1900 with 

his three depleted companies in two waves on a 

500-meter front. He had advanced about a kilometer and a half when his left flank company encountered heavy machine-gun fire. The Moroccans, who 

were supposed to be on his left, had not come up. 

By dusk, the battalion had reached an old French 

trench line. German fire from machine guns hidden in the wheat was growing heavier, and Keyser, 

having neither grenades nor tank support, decided 

to stop for the night. The battalion halted in the old 

trench system and stayed there until it was withdrawn two days later. The 9th Infantry, on Keyser’s 

right, was able to advance a mile east of Vierzy before halting for the night.

Major Turrill, with the 1st Battalion, was to 

have joined the 23d Infantry’s attack, but he did 

not receive the order until 15 minutes before the 

scheduled jump-off. Knowing that he could not 

possibly meet the jump-off time with his entire 

battalion, Turrill hurriedly gathered those Marines 

closest to him, about 150 of them, from both the 1st 

and 3d Battalions, and marched with this improvised company by way of La Verte-Feuille farm to 

Vauxcastille. With this pick-up force and the three 

companies from Shearer’s 3d Battalion, Turrill went 

forward. By early evening, he had taken four-fifths 

of Vierzy, after which the 23d Infantry entered 

from the northwest and took the remainder. The 

1st Battalion and the 8th Machine Gun Company 

then went into a position to the rear of the 23d Infantry southeast of the town.

By nightfall of 18 July, the 5th Regiment held 

good positions along the ridge between Chaudun 

and Vierzy. That evening, Feland moved his “post of 

command [PC]” to Vauxcastille and in the morning 

to a large tunnel in Vierzy. The 2d Division’s line for 

the night ran nearly north-south a little more than 

a kilometer east of Vierzy, with the left bent back 

to face Lechelle. The Moroccan division was on the 

left and the French 38th Division on the right. The 

Germans failed to counterattack during the night. 

Not until late in the afternoon had the ambulances 

arrived to clear the Beaurepaire dressing station of 

all its wounded. The aid station then moved forward 

to Vierzy. According to the short history of the 2d 

Division, during the unit’s eight-kilometer advance 

that day, “Several thousand prisoners, hundreds of 

machine guns and practically all of the artillery, 

light and heavy, of two German divisions had fallen 

into our hands.”

The 6th [Regiment’s] Battle

Within the Marine brigade, the 5th Regiment had 

done almost all of the fighting on 18 July; the 6th 

Regiment, as division reserve, followed behind, 

moving up to Beaurepaire farm early that afternoon. According to Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas, 1st 

Battalion, 6th [Regiment]:

We had a very scenic day. I’ll never forget it. . . .

That day lancers and cuirassiers, the beautiful 

French cavalry, would go loping by. The artillery was displacing forward, at the gallop. On 

the side of the road the walking wounded were 

coming back. . . . About three o’clock in the afternoon, our regiment moved forward and deployed on the side of a hill. Down in front of us 

and off to the left was a line of artillery pieces as 

far as you could see standing hub to hub. I never 

saw anything like it, before or since. The word 
164

Postwar Analysis

was, “We’re going to attack.” We deployed.

. . . Then the word came, “Stand fast.” They told 

us that we were deployed too far to the rear, 

and that the 23d Infantry was on the road in 

column right behind us. They passed through 

us. As they went by you can imagine what they 

said to us. They . . . went on toward the village 

of Vierzy.

The 6th [Regiment] would soon enough have 

its chance to fight. The ground taken south of Soissons on the eighteenth far exceeded French expectations. Delighted with the success of his foreign 

troops, General Mangin ordered a resumption of 

the attack at 0400 on the nineteenth. For the 2d 

Division, the objective would be the SoissonsChâteau-Thierry road.

At 2200 on the eighteenth, Harbord had again 

advanced his headquarters, this time to Beaurepaire 

farm, but now he had outrun his communications 

and had no telephone wire to the rear. At about 

0200, a French staff officer brought him the XX 

Corps attack order for that morning, and Harbord 

summoned the 6th Regiment’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lee, to his headquarters. The night 

was fairly well over before Lee reached Harbord. 

At about 0300 on the nineteenth, Harbord learned 

that the 6th [Regiment], reinforced with the 6th 

Machine Gun Battalion, would take over the entire division front. The artillery preparation was to 

begin at 0600. Passage of lines would be at 0700. 

The 6th [Regiment] would advance on a frontage 

of about 2,300 meters. The 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers, and the 4th Machine Gun Battalion were to 

constitute the reserve. All heavy tanks remaining at 

the disposition of the division commander would 

be placed under orders of the attack commander. 

All light tanks would be held in division reserve.

The battalion commanders were called to regimental headquarters in the field south of Beaurepaire farm at about 0400, given maps, and told to 

report to Lee, who had gone forward to Vierzy to 

set up his PC in the town’s railroad station. It was 

understood that the attack would be at 0800.

Later in the morning on the nineteenth, Harbord sent a lengthy message to the commanding 

general of XX Corps. The pith of it was:

With the exception of the Sixth Marines, kept 

out of the fight as Corps Reserve yesterday, and 

the second Regiment of Engineers, which are 

armed with rifles, every infantry unit was exhausted in the fight yesterday. It was necessary, 

therefore to make the attack this morning with 

one regiment, the Sixth Marines, supported by 

a battalion of the Engineer Regiment, a force 

considered by me as inadequate to the task, but 

no other was available.

The 6th Regiment moved out at 0600. Working its way up through the Vauxcastille ravine, the

column reached Vierzy without loss. Lee, at the 

railroad station, sequentially issued orders to his 

battalion commanders as they arrived with their 

units. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Major 

John A. Hughes, was to go in on the right; Thomas 

Holcomb’s 2d Battalion on the left; and the 3d, led 

by Major Berton W. Sibley to follow in support. 

Holcomb, with a promotion from major to lieutenant colonel, was to move up to regimental second 

in command.* He had orders to turn his battalion 

over to Major Robert L. Denig, but chose to stay 

with the 2d for the attack. Denig went along as an 

observer.

The 6th [Regiment] began the passage of lines at 

0825. The terrain was much like that around Belleau 

Wood. The German positions were about a kilometer away, across open fields. The ground was practically level, with no cover, except for the waist-high 

wheat. It was now more golden than green, and the 

poppies seemed less red, as if they had faded, than 

they had on the fields approaching Belleau Wood.

As then-Sergeant Gerald C. Thomas in the 1st 

Battalion, a future four-star general, remembered 

the approach march:

We moved down into the Vierzy Ravine, and 

then went forward, past Vierzy. My battalion 

came up out of the Vierzy Ravine and deployed 

on the edge of a wheat field. The Germans, who 

were over on the right on a hill, spotted us. They 

were about 1,800 yards away, but they started 

* In 1936, Holcomb was named the 17th Commandant of the 

Marine Corps. He would serve through 1943 when, upon his 

retirement, he became the Marine Corps’ first four-star general.
165

Over There, Over Here

throwing machine gun bullets at us. . . . I could 

see Holcomb’s battalion come out of the orchard way off to our left and deploy and move 

out. . . . We lay there, and after a while we heard 

rumbling. It was the tanks. . . . When the tanks 

passed through, the command came, “Forward.” 

We got up and started going with them.

Major Sibley reached Vierzy with the 3d Battalion at about 0815, and Lee ordered him to follow the 1st and 2d Battalions at a distance of about 

1,000 yards. The 3d Battalion was to be followed by 

the 1st Battalion, 2d Engineers (Army), in reserve. 

Sibley understood that he was to be supported by 

both the 15th and 77th Machine Gun Companies. 

Sibley put all four of his companies, each in a column of platoons, on line: the 97th on the right, the 

84th at right center, the 83d at left center, and the 

82d on the left.

Standard tactics for the “square” infantry battalions of World War I called for two companies in 

the assault and two companies immediately behind 

in support. In Holcomb’s 2d Battalion, the 80th 

Company was the left-flank assault unit, with the 

96th Company following close behind in support. 

To their right, similarly disposed, were the 78th and 

79th Companies.

The 96th Company’s First Lieutenant Clifton 

B. Cates, a future Marine Corps Commandant,* recalled:

So we formed for the attack and we were supposed to have had, I think it was, eight little old 

French tanks. So there we stayed for an hour 

or an hour and a half waiting for the tanks to 

arrive. By that time, we were getting not only 

artillery fire but indirect machine gun fire. . . .

In fact, one hit the back of my shoulder. I 

thought somebody had hit me with a rock. I 

finally pulled it out and it was a red-hot bullet. 

I went over to Major Holcomb and yelled to 

him, “Well. I got the first blesse. Here’s the first 

wound,” and I handed him this bullet and he 

dropped it, it was still hot.

* Cates became the 19th Commandant, serving as such from 

1948 to 1951.

Well, anyway we finally got under way and 

started the attack with these little old tanks. . . . 

It was the most beautiful attack that I have ever 

seen. As far as you could see, up to the right, 

there were just waves and waves of men extending up two miles. . . .

The attack moved out in full view of the Germans. By then the commander of the opposing XIII 

Corps, Major General Baron Oskar von Walter, 

responding to orders from the crown prince, had 

firmed up his new line along the Château-Thierry 

road with the relatively fresh 46th Division. West of 

Tigny was the 49th Division.

The American artillery preparation was inadequate, and the battle was a hopscotch sort of affair, with the Marines crossing the wheat fields to 

reach the dubious shelter of woodlots. Because of 

the necessity of following the French tanks, the 

pace was slow. Of the 54 tanks that had begun the 

battle the day before, only 28 were still operational. 

During the morning, 11 more would be knocked 

out. With its observers overhead in “sausage” balloons, German artillery laid down a devastating fire. 

The slaughter was taken up by the waiting Maxims.

After a gain of about one kilometer, the Marine line halted. The right of the line was stopped in 

front of Tigny, the left at La Raperie, and a gap had 

opened between the 1st and 2d Battalions. At 0855, 

Sibley received a message by runner from Lee telling him to reinforce the line in the center using two 

companies in waves and two in local support. Sibley 

sent the 84th Company in to the left of the 1st Battalion and moved the 83d Company to the right of 

the 2d Battalion to fill the reported gap. The 97th 

and 82d Companies remained in support.

At 0950, Sibley reported to Lee that his attacking line was moving forward, and by 1030 his two 

assault companies had pushed forward almost to 

the Bois de Tigny north of the village, but had taken heavy casualties. At about 1100, Sibley put in the 

82d Company to connect the 83d Company with 

the 2d Battalion, and the 97th Company to bolster the 84th Company, which was then in the Bois 

de Tigny. One of Sibley’s officers reached Hughes, 

who said that he had only about 100 men left and 

that nothing less than a regiment would drive the 

Germans out of Tigny.
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Postwar Analysis

At 1215, Lee sent a runner to Sibley. “Has the 

town of Tigny been taken by our troops?” his message asked. “If you don’t know, find out. If you are 

stopped, dig in.” A half-hour later, Sibley sent runners to his companies telling them: “Hold the line 

you have now—dig in—get in touch with Cos on 

your right and left. Reinforcements coming.” But 

reinforcements were not coming and, at 1315, Sibley reported to Lee that Tigny had not been taken.

Sergeant Thomas remembered: “The Germans 

had massed their artillery on a hill about three or 

four miles off in front of us. It was all direct fire. . . . 

Our attack collapsed. The attack was over.”

By 1000, the 96th Company had reached a position about three kilometers east of Vierzy near 

Villemontoire and was digging in. The French colonials on their left flank had failed to keep up, and 

the company suffered accordingly. In the space of 

about two hours, the 96th suffered 26 killed and 56 

wounded. All the company’s officers were wounded 

early in the attack. According to Cates:

The Moroccans that were supposed to have 

attacked on our left didn’t appear at all. We 

broke the first German lines without too much 

trouble. By that time though we were catching 

billy-hell. . . . I had just remarked to this sergeant of mine close to me, “Look at Captains 

[Wethered] Woodworth and [ James F.] Robertson getting right together there. That’s bad 

business.” And I hadn’t any more than said it 

when a shell hit close to them and they both 

went down. By that time, the other lieutenants 

had all been wounded and I was the only one 

left out of the company. I tried to take charge, 

but just about that time a whole bunch of Germans jumped up out of the trench and started 

running and our men went after them like a 

bunch of coyotes. With that it was bedlam. I 

was never able to organize them again. I kept 

the attack going for about a kilometer, I guess. 

By that time, though, we were getting terrific 

fire from our left flank . . . the attack just petered out. We were up near an old sugar mill. 

And that’s where I wrote that message . . . to 

Major Holcomb. I think I said, “I have twenty 

men out of my company or out of my battalion 

and a few stragglers,” and I wound up by saying, 

“I will hold.” By that time though, I had a pretty 

bad wound across my knee.

In Hughes’ 1st Battalion, Sergeant Thomas and 

another Marine took cover behind a heavy iron roller the French had left in the wheat field, which had 

created a small depression in the ground. “About an 

hour and a half later, I looked up and there was still 

a lot going on,” Thomas recalled. “They were dropping hand grenades out of airplanes on us. . . . What 

had caused us to be slaughtered was the fact that 

the [French] division, which was supposed to have 

come up on our right, was delayed. . . . There was 

nobody on our right except German machine guns. 

. . . Maybe at noon or a little after, I was able to get 

up and peek around. That’s after the [French] came 

forward.”

The Marines had outrun their artillery support, 

and evacuating the wounded was almost impossible. At 1145, from his PC in the Vierzy railroad 

station, Lee sent the following message to Harbord:

Reports indicate growing casualties, amounting heavy, say about 30 percent. Seventy-eighth 

Company by runners say have only one platoon left. All are requesting reinforcements and

M. G. and Chauchat ammunition. First Battalion reports no French troops on right, and are 

held up 300 yards in front of Tigny. Have in line 

from right, First, Third and second Battalions; 

Reserves, Battalion Engineers, Headquarters 

Company and two companies Sixth Machine 

Gun Battalion. Have ordered line to dig in.

The 6th [Regiment’s] commander was told to 

“entrench your position and hold it at all costs.”

German artillery fire was heavy for the rest of 

the day. At 1545, Lee alerted his battalion commanders that “The Division Commander directs us 

to dig in and hold our present line at all costs. No 

further advance will be made for the present. He 

congratulates the command on its gallant conduct 

in the face of severe casualties. Let me have a sketch 

of your position and disposition. Ammunition at 

crossroads 112 southeast of Vierzy. Lee”

Throughout the day, the 5th Regiment had held 

the ground it had taken the previous day, harassed 

by enemy shelling and intermittent bombing and 
167

Over There, Over Here

strafing from German aircraft lazily circling overhead. The Marines fired their rifles and machine 

guns at the planes with no noticeable effect. At 

1400, Major Keyser received an order to report with 

his battalion once again to the 9th Infantry. But before he could execute it, the command was canceled 

and his battalion was put into the line to the right 

of the 6th Regiment.

The 1st Battalion, 5th [Regiment], was luckier. 

At 1600, Turrill was ordered to take the battalion 

into a large tunnel at Vierzy, which gave them relief 

from the German shelling and bombing. An hour 

later, Harbord received word that the 2d Division 

would be relieved by the French 58th Colonial Division. At 1840, Lee sent Buck Neville, who, as brigade commander, had been given no tactical role by 

Harbord to play in the attack, a message reading:

Am enclosing two sketches of positions of First 

and Third Battalions and a statement of the

C. O. Second. It is impossible to move from one 

position to another without drawing all sorts of 

fire. Losses are placed by Battalion Commanders at from 40 to 50 percent. Their appeals for 

doctors, ambulances, and stretcher bearers are 

pathetic. Cannot the ammunition trucks, and 

any other transportation that may appear tonight, be used to evacuate the 200 or more cases 

now in the Regimental O. S. [Dressing Station] 

under Doctor Boone? Some may be saved by 

prompt removal.

Lee was not exaggerating his losses. Of the 

2,450 men of his regiment who had made the attack, 1,300 were dead or wounded. Hughes’ 1st 

Battalion had lost 11 officers. In Holcomb’s 2d 

Battalion, only three officers remained. Sibley’s 3d 

Battalion had started off that morning with 36 officers and 850 men. At the end of the day, Sibley’s 

effective strength was 16 officers and 385 men.

At 2005, Sibley summed up the day in a message to Lee, part of which read:

Will continue holding line until we can be reenforced or relieved. . . . In front lines canteens 

are practically all empty and very few remaining 

rations. Can water and rations be sent to us or a 

relief sent? We have no flares—pyrotechnics or 

flare pistols. Have no hand grenades. Considerable amount of rifle ammunition remaining. 

Also some Chauchat. Many of their Chauchats 

out of action because of loss of men.

By then, the shelling had died down, and the 

ambulances and trucks started reaching Vierzy. At 

2030, Sibley received a message dispatched an hour 

earlier by the 6th Regiment headquarters that he 

was to send back guides to bring forward a French 

battalion. The regimental staff officer who drafted 

the message ended it with an unnecessary request: 

“Bring in all wounded when relieved.”

A Hard-Earned Rest

In Hughes’ 1st Battalion sector, the French came 

in at midnight, Sergeant Thomas recalled. By then 

he was the apparent commander of the 75th Company. “I got my 33 men. I went back to battalion 

headquarters,” he wrote. “We made stretchers out of 

blankets wrapped around rifles, and we carried the 

wounded out. Later we may have found another 35 

or 40 men at different places, but my company lost 

over 50 percent. . . . We really took a shellacking.”

In Holcomb’s 2d Battalion, it was much the 

same. “So we stayed there that night and a bunch of 

Frenchmen, I think Moroccans, I’m not sure, came 

in and relieved us,” said Gates. “We lost approximately, I would say, two-thirds of the battalion in 

that attack.”

The 58th Colonial Division completed the 

relief by 0400 on 20 July. The 2d Division was to 

move back to its starting position in the Forêt de 

Retz, where it would go into bivouac. Before moving their headquarters back to Vivières, Harbord 

and his chief of staff stood by the side of the road 

and watched the division’s two depleted brigades 

pass. “Battalions of only a couple of hundred men, 

companies of twenty-five or thirty, swinging by 

in the gray dawn, only a remnant, but a victorious 

remnant, thank God,” wrote Harbord in his diary.

After the march past, Harbord moved his HQ 

to Vivières. Here Harbord located a nice French 

house with clean beds. His orderly found him hot 

water for a shave and a good soaking in his rubber 

bathtub.
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Postwar Analysis

By late afternoon, practically of all the division 

except the artillery had gone into bivouac in the 

woods near La Verte-Feuille farm. The 6th Regiment went into bivouac near Translon farm. The 

intense shellfire had weakened the trees; there was 

a high wind; and one Marine was killed and two 

seriously injured by falling branches. The Germans 

further treated the regiment to a shelling with longrange Austrian 130mm guns. Lee sent a motorcycle 

courier to brigade headquarters asking for a more 

favorable resting place a little farther to the rear.

In the early morning hours, the 5th Regiment 

had marched back into the Forêt de Retz, about 

one kilometer behind the jump-off point that it 

had crossed two days before. The rolling kitchens—mule-drawn four-wheeled carts with woodburning stoves—were waiting. On the morning of 

the twentieth, the 45th Company reached its kitchens and had hot cakes, syrup, and coffee—its first 

hot food since the sixteenth. At first count, the 5th 

Regiment had 44 men dead, 360 wounded, and 34 

missing. The numbers increased as returns came in.

Colonel Neville* left Vierzy on the morning of 

20 July and moved the brigade headquarters to the 

campsite of his old regiment, the 5th [Regiment]. 

A day later, Harbord ordered him to displace his 

brigade to the woods south of Taillefontaine. For 

those Marines who still had shelter halves, two of 

them buttoned together made an acceptable pup 

tent. Neville set up his considerably more comfortable headquarters in the village itself.

During the evening on 21 July, General Pershing came by the 2d Division headquarters and told 

Harbord, “It appears I have to congratulate you every time I see you.” With these praises singing in 

his head, Harbord issued an effusive general order:

It is with keen pride that the Division Commander transmits to the command the congratulations and affectionate personal greetings 

of General Pershing, who visited the Division 

Headquarters last night. . . . You advanced over 

six miles, captured over three thousand prisoners, eleven batteries of artillery, over a hundred 

machine guns, minnenwerfers [sic], and supplies. . . . The story of your achievements will 

be told in millions of homes in all Allied lands 

tonight.

The Germans bombed both the brigade and 

division headquarters during the night of 21 July—

probably to the secret satisfaction of the Marines 

sleeping in the woods—but they caused no casualties. By the twenty-second, the count of prisoners 

taken in the two days of fighting reached 66 officers and 2,810 enlisted Germans. Those were the 

able-bodied ones. The number of wounded prisoners evacuated through the medical chain was unknown. Pershing, Pétain, and French Sixth Army 

commander General Jean Degoutte all hastened to 

send compliments to the division.

In its two-day battle, the Marine brigade had 

lost at least 2,000 killed and wounded, with twothirds of the loss in the 6th Regiment.* But the 

result was historic: many believe the attack of XX 

Corps south of Soissons began the general retreat 

of the Germans and moved the war toward its end. 

Said Pershing in his final report: “Due to the magnificent dash and power displayed in the field of 

Soissons by our 1st and 2d Division, the tide of war 

was definitely turned in favor of the Allies.”

On 23 July, Harbord received orders to move his 

division to the vicinity of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin,

virtually the same location it had left one long week 

earlier. By the twenty-sixth, the entire 2d had reassembled. About 2,000 replacements were absorbed 

into the brigade.

* Neville, who had earned the Medal of Honor for Veracruz, 

became the 14th Marine Corps Commandant in March 1929, 

succeeding MajGen Lejeune. In failing health, he died after 

only 16 months in office.

* Despite apparently precise numbers, casualty figures are seldom, if ever, completely accurate. Casualties for Soissons, as 

officially compiled by the Marine Corps, indicated 341 KIA, 

DOW, or MIA; 1,709 WIA; and 41 gassed, for a total of 2,091.
169

75 YEARS AGO . . . 

WITH THE MARINES AT BLANC MONT

by Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)*

Blanc Mont, not Mont Blanc, as too many presentday writers try to make it. Mont Blanc is a very tall 

mountain in southeastern France and the name of 

an expensive French fountain pen. Blanc Mont is a 

ridgeline of no great elevation in the Champagne 

region of northern France. By the time the Marines 

arrived there in October 1918, the Germans had 

been in residence for four years. In their industrious 

and efficient way, successive German garrisons had 

burrowed into the chalk-white limestone that gives 

the ridge its name, until the complex of trenches, 

dugouts, and pillboxes was as formidable as any position on the western front.

Quite probably, Major General John A. Lejeune, 

commanding the U.S. 2d Division, had never heard 

of Blanc Mont when he paid his exit call on the I 

Corps commander, Major General Hunter Liggett, 

USA, in mid-September 1918 as his division came 

out of the line at Saint-Mihiel.

Liggett told Lejeune, most confidentially, that 

a great offensive was planned for the latter part of 

the month. The American First Army was to attack 

on a front lying between the Meuse River and the 

Argonne Forest. This, in concert with an attack by 

the French Fourth Army west of the Argonne, was 

aimed at driving the Germans back from the rail 

lines that converged near the town of Mézières. If 

successful, this operation would put in peril all German armies between the Argonne and the North 

Sea. Liggett said that the 2d Division would be 

badly missed on D-day of the big attack.

On 16 September, General Henri Pétain had 

asked General John J. Pershing for three divisions 

for use in the Fourth Army attack. Pershing promised him two: the newly arrived and incomplete 

36th Division, a Texas and Oklahoma National 

Guard outfit, and the veteran 2d Division. But this 

was not known to Lejeune.

The 2d Division, as most Gazette readers will 

know, included the 4th Brigade as a counterpart to 

the 3d Brigade of Infantry. Both brigades prided 

themselves on being “Regulars.” After the successful affair at Thiacourt in the Saint-Mihiel salient, 

the 4th Brigade had marched on 20 September to a 

rest area south of Toul. On 23 September, Lejeune 

received orders directing the movement of his division by rail to an unnamed destination about 10 

hours distant, the move to begin on 25 September 

and to be completed by the 28th.

Lejeune had it revealed to him that his new division headquarters would be at Mairy-sur-Marne 

near Châlons-sur-Marne. He found it in an imposing stone château that once had been occupied by 

King James II during his exile from England (and 

whose face looked out sternly from a portrait). But 

the château, historically significant though it might 

be, had no bathroom and few creature comforts. On 

arriving on 25 September, Lejeune was directed to 

report to General Henri Gouraud, commanding 

the French Fourth Army, at his Châlons headquarters. Lejeune found Gouraud, the legendary hero of 

Gallipoli and other battles, to be a tall, erect man 

with a heavy dark-brown beard and a face bronzed 

from years of African sun. One sleeve of his uniform was empty and he walked with a pronounced 

limp from another wound. He won Lejeune’s immediate affection by pointing out that he too was 

* BGen Simmons, the long-time director of Marine Corps 

History and Museums, is presently at work on Through the 

Wheat: The U.S. Marines in World War I, a book-length history 

of Marines (2008).

From 2 to 10 October 1918, the U.S. 2d Division “hurled the Boche from Blanc 

Mont.” It was a confusing and costly struggle, but one that serves well to illustrate and 

commemorate Marine service in the war that ended 75 years ago this month.
170

Postwar Analysis

a “Marine” as indicated by his khaki uniform and 

anchor insignia of the colonial forces rather than 

the sky-blue uniform of the regular French Army.

Gouraud talked at considerable length of the 

great battle that was to begin on the following 

morning. Hanging on the wall of Gouraud’s office 

was a relief map of the front occupied by the Fourth 

Army. Gouraud told Lejeune that the French had 

learned from sad experience that the high hills east 

of Rheims were impregnable. The plan was to outflank these positions. The Fifth Army would cooperate on the west; the Fourth Army would have to 

take the high ground north of Somme-Py.

Lejeune visited Gouraud’s headquarters twice 

on the twenty-sixth. Gouraud was not there nor did 

Lejeune expect to see him. All reports coming in 

from the front were favorable. A French staff officer 

said to Lejeune, “Ca vu bien. It is always so at the 

beginning. We will wait and see.”

First elements of the Marine brigade arrived at 

Châlons that same day. As usual, the move was a 

combination of troop train, motor transport, and 

marching.

On the next afternoon, a disquieting rumor 

reached Lejeune: it was planned that the parts of 

the 2d Division would be piecemealed out to reinforce French divisions, leaving the 2d Division 

headquarters with no tactical mission. An alarmed 

Lejeune asked for and got an immediate interview 

with Gouraud. The French general stood before his 

map and described the progress of the attack. The 

French had been stopped by a strong German line 

in the vicinity of Somme-Py. North of Somme-Py 

was a curved ridge line marked on the map as Le 

Massif du Blanc Mont. Gouraud explained that the 

enemy’s main line of resistance ran along this ridge. 

He placed his hand on that part of the ridge between Medeah farm and Blanc Mont itself. If this 

ridge were taken and an advance made beyond it 

to Saint-Étienne-à-Arnes, the Germans would be 

forced to fall back to the line of the Aisne River, a 

distance of nearly 30 kilometers. He doubted, however, if his worn-out divisions, unless heavily reinforced, could take this position.

“General,” responded Lejeune, rising to the 

bait, “if the 2d Division is kept together as a unit 

and is allowed to attack on a narrow front, I am 

confident that it can take Blanc Mont Ridge in a 

single assault.”

Gouraud replied that, in fact, the 2d Division 

was not as yet attached to his army, but was being 

held in the reserve of the group of Armies of the 

Centre at the disposition of Marshal Ferdinand 

Foch and General Pétain. He would, he said, bring 

to Pétain’s attention what Lejeune had offered and 

ask him to assign the 2d Division to his command. 

Next morning, Lejeune was summoned by telephone to Gouraud’s headquarters.

“Mon general,” said Gouraud on Lejeune’s arrival. “I regret so much that you are too late to meet 

General Pétain, as he left here only a short time ago. 

. . . He was greatly pleased and has issued instructions for the assignment of the 2d Division to the 

Fourth Army. You will receive orders this afternoon 

to begin the movement of the division toward the 

front.”

The 2d Division was to proceed to the SouainSuippes area, 10 kilometers south of Somme-Py. 

The move, partly by truck and partly on foot, was to 

begin on the twenty-ninth and to be completed by 

the next day. Twenty percent of each regiment was 

left behind on division orders, twice the cadre that 

had been left behind previously and a grim portent 

of casualties to come. Brigadier General Wendell C. 

(Buck) Neville set up his 4th Brigade headquarters 

at Suippes. This put the brigade in position to reach 

the frontlines in a single day’s march.

Lejeune opened his headquarters at Suippes on 

the morning of the thirtieth. He found it a desolate 

place, behind the German lines for four years and 

“shelled frequently and bombed often.”

The approaches to Blanc Mont were held by

the French XXI Corps, the same corps under which 

the division had fought at Belleau Wood. The countryside was rolling, with some fairly steep slopes. 

Scrub pine was about all that grew here. The 2d 

Division was assigned officially to XXI Corps on 1 

October. The XXI Corps was the left center corps 

of the French Fourth Army. The XI Corps was to 

its left and the II Corps to its right. The corps commander, a Major General Naulin, directed Lejeune 

to relieve the French 61st Division and part of the 

21st [Division]. All of the front would be taken over 

by the 4th Brigade; the 3d Brigade would be in sup-
171

Over There, Over Here

port. An order issued at 1700 that evening directed 

the 2d Division to attack in the morning. Lejeune 

asked that the attack be postponed a day to allow 

the 4th Brigade a chance to do a daylight reconnaissance of its front and also to bring up all of the 

2d Field Artillery Brigade. The delay was granted.

The night of 1–2 October was clear and cold. 

Lejeune’s headquarters at Suippes was both bombed 

and shelled. Lejeune took shelter in the caves of the 

village. He did not stay long, but went back to the 

doorway of his house and spent the balance of the 

night watching the stream of traffic—his division 

moving to the front.

The line occupied by the division, which was 

about three kilometers long, began about one kilometer northeast of Somme-Py, and ran to the 

southwest to its juncture with the boundary with 

the French XI Corps about two kilometers west by 

south of Somme-Py. The 5th Regiment occupied 

the right of the sector and the 6th Regiment the 

left. The 3d Brigade was four miles to the rear in the 

vicinity of Navarin farm.

At 0800 on 2 October, Lejeune opened his 

forward headquarters in what had been the post 

of command (PC) of the [French] 61st Division, a 

collection of dugouts known as Wagram about one 

kilometer north of Souain on the Souain-SommePy Road. The staff car drive forward to Wagram 

was through “a hideously battle-scarred country.” 

The debris of battle was everywhere. As Lejeune 

described the scene in his Reminiscences:

The town of Souain was completely destroyed, 

and the whole area north of it gave full evidence of the fact that it had been continuously a battlefield for more than four years. It 

was the white chalk country, and not only was 

it a perfect maze of trenches and covered with 

a tangle of barbed wire, but the very soil was 

desiccated and pulverized. It had been shelled, 

and bombed and mined so frequently that it 

had lost all semblance of its former self. Not a 

tree was standing anywhere near Navarin Ferme, or elsewhere in its vicinity, nor was there 

even a brick on the site of the farm to show 

that buildings had once stood there. The debris 

of battle was still lying about—broken cannon and machineguns, rifles, bayonets, helmets, 

parts of uniforms, articles of military equipment, and partly buried horses; most gruesome 

of all, fragments of human bodies were often 

found. Arms and legs thrust out of the torn soil, 

and unrecognizable, long-buried human faces, 

thrown up to the surface of the ground by exploding shell, were frequently visible. The fearsome odors of the battlefield, too, were always 

present. P. C. Wagram was in the midst of the 

devastated area. It was not a home, but a horror.

The telephone system inherited from the 61st 

Division was virtually useless. Until the division 

could get in its own lines, communications forward 

of division were by motorcycle and forward of regiment dependent upon the age-old system of runners.

The front taken over by the 2d Division, only 

partially secured by the French, consisted of four 

lines, known as the Krefeld, Prussian, Elbe, and Essen trenches. The right of the 2d Division line was in 

the Essen trench. West of Somme-Py the Germans 

still held the Essen trench where it bent around a 

strongly fortified hill. The Marines soon named the 

bend in the trench line the “Essen Hook.”

The task for the 2d Division and, on its left, the 

French 21st Division, on 2 October was the cleaning up of the Essen and Elbe trenches. The French 

170th Division on the right was already well forward, but the 21st Division was dug in 150 yards 

south of Elbe trench.

“We spent another quiet day,” remembered 

Don V. Paradis of the 80th Company, 2d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], of 2 October. When the war 

began in April 1917, Paradis was an inspector with 

the Detroit Gas Company. Now he was an acting 

gunnery sergeant and a veteran of Belleau Wood, 

Soissons, and Saint-Mihiel.

Even had hot chow brought in to us after dark 

the night of October 2d. There was quite an 

odor of dead bodies blowing across No-Man’sLand, but I don’t remember that it affected anyone’s appetite.

Colonel Harry (Light Horse Harry) Lee, 

commanding the 6th [Regiment], found the Essen trench in front of his regiment abandoned by 

the Germans but controlled by fire coming from 
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Postwar Analysis

strongpoints to the west. He also learned that the 

21st Division was undecided as to whether it would 

attack or not. “If they should attack, the 6th Regiment will act in conjunction with them and occupy 

the trenches as previously planned,” reported Lee. 

Otherwise, he recommended that, for the afternoon 

of 2 October, the trench be patrolled but not occupied.

Lejeune, accompanied by his brigade commanders, was called to the headquarters of the XXI 

Corps and met its commander, General Naulin, 

face to face for the first time. Gouraud arrived and 

joined the discussion. As decided, there would be a 

frontal attack by the 4th Brigade and an oblique attack by the 3d Brigade from the advanced position 

held by the 170th Division. Lejeune returned to PC 

Wagram and called a conference of his brigade and 

regimental commanders at which the details for the 

attack were worked out.

It was well that he did, because the XXI Corps 

attack order did not reach his headquarters until 

2200 that night. It was in French and had to be 

translated. The objective for the 2d Division was the 

line extending along the road from Medeah farm 

west to Blanc Mont Ridge inclusive. The division 

order had to be written and then committed to the 

mimeograph machine. Finally, at about 0300 the 

motorcycle dispatch riders took the order off to the 

brigades.

Neville’s staff had not waited for the division 

order. The brigade order, based upon the conference 

held that afternoon, was signed at 2145. The tone 

was almost laconic:

This Brigade will attack in column of Regiments, the 6th Regiment in 1st line and the 5th 

Regiment forming the 2d line of support. . . . 

The Regiments will take the usual formation—

column of battalions—each regiment with one 

battalion in 1st line, one in support, and one in 

reserve.

The 6th [Regiment] went “over the top” that 

night in a local attack and took its share of the Essen trench with a loss of 15 Marines. This put the 

division into its attack position for the next day. 

There remained the Essen Hook about 300 yards to 

the left of the boundary separating the XXI and XI 

Corps, a very strong position of machinegun nests.

The German High Command had decided on a 

general retirement, but it was going to be a fighting 

withdrawal designed to inflict maximum casualties 

on the Allies. Ground was not to be given up unless 

ordered, and any lost ground considered essential to 

the retreat would be retaken by counterattack.

The 6th [Regiment] were to advance directly to 

the front from the positions it held. The 5th [Regiment] were to stand fast and then fall in behind in 

support of the 6th Regiment. The 3d Brigade was to 

move through the zone of the 170th Division and 

then pass through the lines of that division.

Jump-off for the general attack was at 0550 on 

3 October. Lee, busy occupying the Essen trench, 

did not receive the brigade order until 0440. Major 

Ernest C. Williams, commanding the 2d Battalion, 

6th Regiment, which would lead the attack, would 

later say that he did not have a chance to read it 

until after he had taken his objective.

The division objective was a line two-and-ahalf miles long connecting Medeah farm with the 

Blanc Mont Road. Each brigade deployed in a column of battalions, a formation Napoleon would 

have found familiar.

The 2d Field Artillery Brigade had been reinforced with French batteries and other additions 

to a total of 30 light and 18 heavy batteries. The 

artillery preparation was to be a short but violent 

five minutes. The attack was then to follow a rolling 

barrage fired by the close-in 75mm guns, the rate of 

progress to be 100 meters every four minutes. The 

155mm howitzers would continue to fire on Blanc 

Mont Ridge and the heavy longer-barreled guns 

would search out German positions to the rear.

The attack plan was deceptively simple. The 

two brigades were separated by about a mile and 

were to converge on Blanc Mont Ridge. This left a 

triangular wedge of no-man’s land uncovered. The 

Marine brigade would attack through the section of 

the line held by the 6th [Regiment]. The 6th [Regiment] would lead off on a front of about a mile. The 

5th [Regiment] would follow in support with the 

tasks of clearing out the triangle and protecting the 

flanks of the 6th [Regiment]. The Marines had confidence in the 3d Brigade on their right, but were 

doubtful that the French 21st Division on their left 

would advance at all.
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Over There, Over Here

About 2200 on the night of 2 October, Sergeant Paradis received orders that he and his section 

would lead the 80th Company up a communications trench to the next line of trenches, which was 

supposed to be empty of Germans. He was then to 

turn left and proceed down the trench until he contacted the French. The 96th Company would be on 

the 80th’s right. The 80th Company moved out at 

about midnight and Paradis soon found out where 

the stench of dead bodies was coming from.

“There was one body in the communication 

trench, two in the main trench, one I did not see 

and stumbled over,” wrote Paradis.

He heard someone coming down the trench toward him and for a frightful moment was not sure 

whether the voices he heard were speaking French 

or German. He and the French lieutenant fumbled 

with the passwords and finally made each other understood. It was 0300 by this time.

Neville’s brigade moved out in the main attack in the morning on schedule. In Harry Lee’s 

6th Regiment, Major Williams’ 2d Battalion led 

off, followed in turn by the 1st Battalion (Major 

Frederick A. Barker) and the 3d Battalion (Major George K. Shuler). The 5th [Regiment], under 

Colonel Logan Feland, had in column the 2d Battalion (Major Robert E. Messersmith), 3d Battalion 

(Major Henry L. Larsen), and 1st Battalion (Major 

George W. Hamilton). The two regimental machine gun companies and the four companies of the 

6th Machine Gun Battalion (Major Littleton W. T. 

Waller Jr.) were parceled out, as had become usual, 

one to each infantry battalion.

Opposite the XXI Corps was the German XII 

Corps under General der Kavallerie Krug von Nidda. The zone of action assigned to the Marine 

brigade was defended by the German 51st Reserve 

Division. Behind the 51st Division was the 200th 

Division. The German outpost line was held by a 

battalion of the 235th Reserve Infantry Regiment, 

down in strength to about 200 officers and men. 

The main line of resistance filled the trenches on 

Blanc Mont itself, about three kilometers to the rear 

of the outpost line.

The Germans, in response to the barrage, were 

firing phosphorus shells. Paradis remembered:

They burst like giant Fourth of July sparklers 

in the air, showering down what looked like 

red-hot iron, I led a section column of about 20 

men; we were the extreme right of our company. When we reached our objective, which was 

the very center and top of Mont Blanc [sic], I 

was to connect with the 96th Company, Capt 

[Clifton B.] Cates, on our right. Blanc Mont 

was covered with scrub pines, which reminded 

me very much of the jack pine country around 

Kalcaska, Michigan, where I grew up as a child.

Major Williams’ 2d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], 

with all four companies on line and with the 81st 

Machine Gun Company attached, advanced rapidly 

at first, against nothing but occasional machine-gun 

fire. This increased to heavier fire coming in from 

the left flank. The Marines swept aside the right 

flank battalion of the 235th Regiment and got into 

the rear of the 200th Division, the frontline units 

of which were heavily engaged by the French 21st 

Division.

Principal resistance came initially from

machine-gun fires from the front, from the right 

flank where the ground between the two brigades 

was not completely covered and, most particularly, from the left flank, where the French had been 

stopped in front of the Essen Hook. Marine losses 

were light in the advance and several hundred prisoners were taken. The 6th [Regiment] met more 

resistance as they reached Somme-Py Woods. The 

support battalion came up on the lead battalion’s 

right. The objective was taken by 0830 and the reserve battalion was given the task of mopping up. 

The 5th [Regiment] now turned its full attention to 

the exposed left flank.

The infantry and artillery commands of the 

200th Division were in dugouts on Blanc Mont. 

Also on Blanc Mont was a division observation 

post manned by a Lieutenant Richert. At 0815, he 

reported to his division commander, somewhere to 

the rear in a presumably safer position, that the Jager regiments on the frontlines were holding against 

the Americans. The Jagers had twice the ordinary 

complement of machine guns, two companies of 

them in each infantry battalion.

Partly because of the flanking fire and also because of the lay of the land, the 2d Battalion, 6th 
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Postwar Analysis

[Regiment], slid to the right as it went up the slope. 

The Jagers on its left were putting up a stubborn 

defense. The gap separating the right of the 2d Battalion from the 3d Brigade also widened. Major

Barker’s 1st Battalion, with the 6th Regiment’s

machine gun company attached, went into the

gap. Major Shuler’s 3d Battalion, with the 15th 

Machine Gun Company attached, moved up behind the 2d Battalion.

The Jager regiments were still holding off the 

French 21st Division and each of the Marine battalions, in turn, as it went up the slope was enfiladed 

by machine-gun fire coming from the Essen Hook. 

By 0830, Williams’ battalion had reached the 

main line of resistance and had taken a section of 

the Medeah farm road, which ran along the ridge. 

The 3d Brigade took Medeah farm itself by 0840 

without serious loss.

The headquarters of the 2d Jager Brigade left 

the Blanc Mont position; Lieutenant Richert remained. The German division commander put his 

reserves into motion, ordering a counterattack by 

the 149th Regiment, 213th Division. At that same 

time he called on XII Corps for reinforcements. He 

was sent a battalion of the 74th Regiment. By 0920, 

the Americans were in the headquarters dugouts 

and the telephone lines to the rear went out. Sergeant Paradis remembered:

We arrived at the top just as a bunch of German prisoners came out of a large dugout. There 

were about 25, some looked to be not over 16 

years old. They were so scared that their knees 

actually knocked together. I can still hear them 

leather boots that they wore as they knocked 

together, flapped together. . . . Later in the day 

I found a Luger and a Mauser pistol under a 

bunk, in this dugout. . . . I sold them for 250 

francs when we came out of the lines.

Two of the eight Medals of Honor given to 

Marines in World War I were earned that day, both 

by members of the 78th Company, 2d Battalion, 

6th Regiment. At about 0620, Private James Kelly, 

with the advance impeded by a German machine 

gun that had escaped the barrage, charged forward, 

killed the gunner with a grenade, killed another 

crewmember with his pistol, and marched the remaining eight members back through a curtain of 

bursting shells. Shortly thereafter, Corporal John 

H. Pruitt single-handedly went against two German machine guns, killed two Germans, and captured the rest of the crews. A little later he pulled 40 

Germans out of a dugout and made them prisoners. Continuing at the front edge of the action, he 

was sniping at the retreating enemy when mortally 

wounded by shellfire.

As soon as it was broad daylight, Lejeune had 

gone to the high ground of Navarin farm to watch 

the battle. It was a hazy morning and visibility was 

poor. He could see little until Very pistol flares at 

between 0800 and 0900 signaled that the day’s 

objectives had been taken. General Naulin, from 

having been rather pessimistic, was now jubilant. 

Lejeune pointed out to him that XI Corps on the 

left flank had not crossed its jump-off line. Naulin 

nevertheless ordered Lejeune to press on. Lejeune 

demurred, [for] to press on would create a narrow 

salient that would be an invitation to disaster. He 

said that if necessary he would appeal Naulin’s order to Gouraud. A short while later, a message from 

Naulin said to consider the order as never having 

been given. Lejeune replied that he was preparing 

to advance to a point about a kilometer southeast of 

Saint-Étienne.

With the entire left flank of the brigade open, 

Major Messersmith’s 2d Battalion, 5th [Regiment], 

was brought up to extend the line to the southwest. 

The Germans were preparing (or so it seemed) to 

attack that flank, so Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion, 

5th [Regiment], was echeloned in to the left and 

rear of Messersmith’s battalion.

The one still unemployed battalion, Major 

Hamilton’s 1st Battalion, 5th [Regiment], was 

bringing up the rear of the brigade. It was given the 

task of reducing the remaining machine guns in the 

Essen Hook. The 17th Company, under Captain 

LeRoy P. Hunt, was sent to take out the guns. This 

involved entering the French 21st Division’s zone 

of action. A covered trench line got the company to 

within about 800 yards of the hook. A 37mm gun 

and several heavy machine guns were brought to 

bear on the offending German guns, knocking out 

several. Hunt then maneuvered to within 300 yards 

of the position, covering it with machine-gun fire 

while two of his platoons came in from the north 
175

Over There, Over Here

and south. The 17th Company captured the position along with 100 German prisoners. Hunt then 

handed over the position to the French and moved 

his company to the north to extend farther the left 

flank of the 5th [Regiment]. The French promptly 

lost the position to a German counterattack. Gunfire against the Marine flank resumed and would 

continue to annoy the Marines.

The Marines now had a foothold on Blanc 

Mont, but the western portion, in the zone of the 

21st Division, was still held by the Germans. General Naulin, commanding the XXI Corps, annoyed 

at the neighboring XI Corps’ inability to take the 

Essen Hook, ordered his weary 170th Division, 

which had been relieved by the 167th Division, to 

move to the west, behind the 2d Division, to cover 

the left flank. But he also cautioned that the 2d Division must not wait for the arrival of the 170th Division “before resuming the march.”

Other than that, Naulin thought the American 

performance splendid and asked the 2d Division to 

renew the attack that afternoon.

By 1400 on 3 October, the 2d Division was able 

to publish an order pronouncing the morning’s attack “a complete success,” that the 21st Division had 

passed the Essen trench, and that another French 

division [the 170th] was moving up in support of 

the 2d Division’s left. Lejeune ordered his brigades 

to continue their advance to the northwest.

Later that afternoon, XXI Corps received a 

message:

Marshal Foch has just learned of the success of 

the XXI Corps, and of the American 2d Division, attached to it. He directs that this success 

be exploited to the limit. All must press forward 

at once, without hesitation. The breach is made; 

the enemy must not be given time to repair it.

Once again, the French thought there might 

be an opportunity for a cavalry charge and breakthrough in the grand Napoleonic manner. The 

French 3d Cavalry Division was moved into position and a liaison officer arrived at 2d Division 

headquarters. No occasion for its use would be 

found.

In the 3d Brigade’s zone, the 23d Infantry 

passed through the 9th Infantry and pushed forward with the 9th following in support. The doughboys of the 23d Infantry veered a little to the left of 

their designated axis of attack and advanced about 

two kilometers in the direction of Saint-Étienne.

In the 4th Brigade, Neville ordered the 5th 

Regiment to pass through the 6th and continue the 

advance in concert with the 3d Brigade to the right 

and the French on the left. The 5th made its passage 

of lines at 1930 and almost immediately was met by 

machine-gun fire coming from the front and flanks. 

The regiment pushed forward about one-anda-half kilometers and dug in for the night under 

heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. At nightfall, 

the division held a salient one mile wide at the base, 

one-and-a-half miles deep, and only 500 yards wide 

at its rather porous apex. The 5th [Regiment] repelled two local counterattacks during the night. 

Two companies from the 6th Regiment were sent 

forward to cover the 5th’s left flank and, by morning, connections had been made with the 3d Brigade on the right and the 6th Regiment to the rear.

The 2d Division prepared to advance beyond 

Saint-Étienne but, until the French came up on 

both flanks, it was out of the question to deepen the 

salient further. Late in the evening, the French 22d 

Division, which had been designated to relieve the 

stationary 21st Division, marched into the 2d Division’s zone of action with plans to attack to the west 

in the morning.

Lee, commander of the 6th [Regiment], had 

understood that only the eastern half of Blanc 

Mont was his responsibility. During the night, a 

patched-together German reserve, consisting of a 

dismounted cavalry regiment and several Bavarian units, reoccupied the western portion of Blanc 

Mont and reinforced the lines in front of the 2d 

Division. To the left front, the town and cemetery 

of Saint-Étienne had been turned into a fortress.

This is what faced the 5th [Regiment] when it 

advanced early on the morning of 4 October. The 

regiment passed through the 6th [Regiment] in a 

column of battalions, Major Larsen’s 3d Battalion 

leading the way. Larsen went about two kilometers 

without encountering any significant resistance (the 

German line was farther to the west) and reached 

the dangling flank of the 3d Brigade. His battalion 

was able to extend the 3d Brigade line about a mile 

to the west. After a brief rest and reorganization, 

Larsen went forward again and, within a few hun-
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Postwar Analysis

dred yards, found his battalion enfiladed from both 

flanks. He pulled back to a woods reforming on a 

line with the 3d Brigade.

The other two battalions of the 5th had been 

following in support. All three battalions were now 

in rather exposed positions, taking heavy artillery 

and machine-gun fire. Essentially, the regiment was 

now holding a ridge-line position a mile southeast 

of Saint-Étienne. This relieved some of the pressure 

on the 23d Infantry, but placed the Marines in an 

even more precarious position.

The Germans chose to counterattack. Hamilton’s battalion had reached a point about half a 

kilometer southeast of Saint-Étienne when he was 

hit heavily on his left flank. He faced about and 

stopped the counterattack, but took heavy losses. At 

this point, XXI Corps ordered that the advance be 

continued to Machault. Lejeune dutifully issued a 

division order to continue the attack, but artfully 

inserted a condition that H-hour would be designated later.

Larsen fought off a counterattack from the west 

during the afternoon, but that evening, at about 

1930, several hundred Germans came at him from 

the southwest and rear, forcing him to face about to 

beat off their attack.

The blame for such flaws would be argued, 

but overall, viewed from a higher level, the attack 

should have been regarded as a great success. The 

deep penetration made by the 2d Division caused 

the German High Command to hasten the withdrawal of troops from the hills east of Rheims to 

the line of the Arnes and the Suippes. The German 

withdrawal was orderly and the Germans reacted 

violently to efforts to hasten them along.

The 200th Division, opposing the 2d Division, 

reported on 4 October that the total rifle strength 

of its three regiments was only 500, the artillery had 

lost nearly all its gunners and from 60 to 70 percent 

of its horses, the few remaining horses were worn 

out, a third of the guns were unserviceable, the division signals detachments bad losses of 25 percent, 

only 2 officers and 40 men were left of the division 

engineers, and the cavalry squadron was totally dismounted.

Lejeune consulted with Neville that afternoon 

[on] 4 October, and it was decided that the most 

pressing problem was to capture the rest of Blanc 

Mont Ridge. Lee was told to launch his attack at 

daybreak, coordinating his advance with the adjacent French units.

These arrangements had scarcely been made 

when Feland telephoned that his 5th [Regiment] 

were not only under heavy artillery fire but also virtually ringed by machine guns, especially from its 

left rear. Naulin was in Lejeune’s PC and Lejeune 

heatedly informed him that this fire was coming 

from a position reportedly taken by the French. 

Gouraud then arrived at PC Wagram. He ordered 

Naulin to keep his 22d Division in place until released by Lejeune. He then commended the 2d Division, expressing regrets for its heavy casualties.

On the afternoon of the forth, Major Shuler’s 

3d Battalion, 6th Regiment, reconnoitered in force 

and determined the extent of the enemy’s defenses, mostly machine-gun nests, on the western end 

of the ridge. Artillery was brought down on these 

defenses. Again, the French did not come up, and 

after considerable loss, Shuler’s attack was broken 

off with further action postponed until the next day.

Even so, Shuler’s attack had shaken the Germans. This part of the German line was held by the 

remnant of the 149th Infantry of the 213th Division, 

serving under the orders of the 2d Jager Brigade.

Foch wrote to Pétain on 4 October, saying that 

the Fourth Army had done fairly well, but not as 

well as he expected. He characterized 3 October as 

“a battle which was not commanded, not pressed, 

not held together.”

Naulin’s XXI Corps received this chiding in the 

form of an injunction: “Marshal Foch orders strong 

pressure in the direction already assigned; everyone 

forward, without halt.”

Lejeune received his copy of this message at 

2225 on 4 October along with the attack order for 

the next day. The 2d Division would retain its place 

in line as the left flank division of the corps.

During the night of 4–5 October, the German 

XII Corps regrouped as best it could. The remnant 

of the 200th Division stayed in the line on the right. 

The 51st Reserve Division was on the left, but was 

to withdraw its headquarters and turn over its regiments to the 213th and 17th Divisions.

For 5 October, Lejeune planned an advance in 

line of brigades with regiments in column. In the 

4th Brigade, the 5th Regiment was ordered to stand 
177

Over There, Over Here

fast. The 6th Regiment was to reorganize and then 

pass through the frontline, conforming in its advance to the movement of the French 22d Division, 

which was attacking across the front of the laggard 

21st Division from its position in the 2d Division’s 

sector.

The 6th [Regiment], in conjunction with the 

22d Division, was to clear the remainder of Blanc 

Mont itself. The morning of 5 October came and 

the attack jumped off at 0615 behind a curtain of 

powerful artillery support.

In the 6th [Regiment] zone of action, Colonel 

Lee had ordered his 3d Battalion to lead the attack. 

Shuler’s 3d Battalion, with the help of a battalion 

from the French 22d Division and some informal 

volunteers from the 170th Division, took by assault 

the remaining hard core of the defenses of Blanc 

Mont, taking at least 65 machine guns and 205 

prisoners. The attack against Blanc Mont was completed by 0900, the linkup with the 22d Division 

was solid, and the 2d Division was ready to take up 

the general advance.

To the Marines’ right, the 3d Brigade was held 

up all day in its assault of the Medeah FermeOrfeuil position by the failure of the 167th Division 

to advance. The 6th Regiment resumed the attack at 

1500, pushing forward its left and holding back on 

its right to maintain contact with the 3d Brigade. 

The 2d Battalion (Williams) led off, followed by the 

3d (Shuler) and 1st (Barker).

With the situation on the left under control, 

the 6th [Regiment] swung to the right and passed 

through the lines of the 5th [Regiment] outside 

Saint-Étienne. Fighting was severe all day. The lead 

battalion, under Williams, down to 300 men, was 

attempting to cover a front of a mile. At 1800, the 

advance stopped for the night, about a mile southeast of Saint-Étienne.

The Germans to the immediate front were the 

remnants of the 149th and 368th Infantry Regiments, both of the 213th Division. The German 

Third Army summary of operations for 5 October 

reads in part:

On October 5th the enemy again attacked 

the Py and Perthes Groups, west of the Aisne, 

after powerful artillery preparation. His attacks, made in great force, were broken up by 

the stubborn resistance of our infantry, well 

supported by the artillery. The enemy’s losses 

were heavy. . . . Captured papers describe the 

American 2d Division as an exceptionally fine 

assault division; they indicate that it was chosen 

for employment here for the reason that this 

is considered the decisive point in the enemy’s 

offensive.

Late in the day, Lejeune was informed that the 

71st Brigade, U.S. 36th Division, would be assigned 

temporarily to the 2d Division. The brigade climbed 

down from its trucks at Suippes on the afternoon of 

5 October. General Naulin, however, decreed that 

the 71st be given a day of rest before going into the 

line.

Lejeune now gave his attention to continuing 

the attack toward Machault. He moved his headquarters forward from PC Wagram to a new position in Somme-Py. On the morning of 6 October, 

the whole of the narrow 4th Marine Brigade front 

was given over to Major Shuler’s 3d Battalion, 6th 

Regiment. The bombardment, by the entire 2d Field 

Artillery Brigade, began at 0530 and, after an hour 

of pounding, Shuler’s Marines went forward behind 

a rolling barrage. They were supported on the right 

by the 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry. Hard fighting, 

which ultimately brought in nearly all of the 23d 

Infantry and parts of the 9th, carried the advance to 

the Saint-Étienne-Orfeuil road.

By now the 2d Division was about fought out. 

On the night of 6–7 October, the 71st Brigade of 

the 36th Division took over the entire division front, 

functioning temporarily as a brigade of the 2d Division. The 142d Infantry took over the 4th Brigade’s 

front while the 141st moved into the front of the 3d 

Brigade. The 5th [Regiment] and 23d Infantry went 

back to Blanc Mont Ridge; the 6th [Regiment] and 

9th Infantry stayed with the relieving units to give 

them a bit of practical instruction.

Lejeune met with Naulin the morning of 7 October. Naulin informed him that a general attack 

would take place at daybreak the next day. Lejeune 

told him that he was expecting too much of untried 

troops and urged that the 71st Brigade not go into 

the attack until it had a few days’ seasoning. Naulin 

was insistent. Final orders for the attack came at 

2045 on 7 October.
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Postwar Analysis

Lejeune gave the entire division front to the 

71st Brigade with the objective of taking the high 

ground two miles north of Saint-Étienne. The 

flanks of the 71st would be protected on the left by 

a battalion of the 4th Brigade and on the right by 

a battalion of the 3d Brigade. The 71st moved out 

with the 141st Infantry on the right, the 142d on 

the left, the regiments in column of battalions.

The Marine battalion on the 142d’s left flank 

was Major Barker’s 1st Battalion, 6th [Regiment], 

charged with maintaining contact with the French 

to the west and also with the taking of SaintÉtienne itself. The 76th Company, under Captain 

Macon C. Overton, accompanied by a few French 

soldiers, plunged into the shell-wrecked town. The 

75th Company came up on Overton’s right.

Optimistic reports received from the 71st Brigade early in the day became less so as the day wore 

on. Late in the afternoon, the fresh German 159th 

Infantry of the 14th Reserve Division counterattacked. The green 142d Infantry was in no condition 

to stand against the veteran Germans. The regiment 

fell back. Barker held at Saint-Étienne and was 

joined by the 2d Battalion, 2d Engineers. The withdrawal of the 71st Brigade had left the 75th Company, on Overton’s right, in a desperate situation. 

All the officers of the 75th Company were killed or 

wounded, but Sergeant Aralzaman C. Marsh and a 

handful of men held on to the position.

Lejeune, hearing that the 142d was falling back, 

went forward to the headquarters of the 71st Brigade and ordered its commander to reorganize his 

scrambled units and prepare for a German counterattack. He also canceled the relief of the 3d and 

4th Brigades and ordered these weary Marines and 

soldiers back into the lines.

There was no general attack on 9 October, simply small attacks to straighten the line and strengthen the connections between units. The French 7th 

Division was understood to be in a trench line a half 

mile north of Saint-Étienne and General Naulin 

was very anxious for the Americans to connect with 

it. The 71st Brigade was ordered to do this, making 

a formal attack with artillery support, if necessary, 

but the green brigade was so disorganized that no 

serious effort to do so was made.

On their side of the line, the Germans were 

withdrawing, leaving just one regiment from each 

division as rear guards. As Gouraud had predicted, 

they were retreating to the Aisne where they formed 

a new line on 13 October.

The rest of the 36th Division was now coming 

up. Because the 36th was incomplete, the 2d was 

to turn over its transport and much other equipment and leave its artillery and engineers in place. 

Command was to pass from Lejeune to Major 

General William R. Smith, USA, at 2200 on 10 

October. The 72d Brigade moved into support and 

reserve positions, the 144th Infantry relieving the 

4th Brigade and the 153d Infantry relieving the 3d 

Brigade. The relieved 2d Division units assembled 

near Navarin farm and marched to the vicinity of 

Suippes. Lejeune stayed on with the commander of 

the 36th Division for another day and then moved 

to his new headquarters, Camp Montpelier, near 

Châlons.

Major Shuler’s 3d Battalion, 6th [Regiment], 

was the last Marine battalion to hold a position 

in the Champagne sector. He was down to fewer 

than 300 men, but had been reinforced with two 

companies of the always-willing 2d Engineers. The 

3d Battalion was not relieved until the night of 10 

October. On coming out of the lines, Major Shuler 

laconically reported: “We shot the tar out of the 

Boche.” Sergeant Martin Gulberg, who had been 

wounded earlier, rejoined the 75th Company as it 

came out of the line. He wrote:

I fell in line and marched with them to some 

French barracks a few miles from Suippes, 

where we billeted for 4 days. It wasn’t the same 

old gang that I had left. There were many new 

faces, and only six of the old timers of the 2d 

Platoon were left.

From 2 to 10 October, the 2d Division had lost 

41 officers and 685 men killed, 162 officers and 

about 3,500 wounded, and 6 officers and 579 missing, for a total of 209 officers and 4,764 men. The 

division had taken prisoner 48 officers and 1,915 

men and captured 25 guns and 332 machine guns. 

The week of almost continuous fighting had cost 

the Marine brigade, at best count, 494 killed or died 

of wounds and 1,864 wounded. Officer casualties 

were particularly high. The 5th and 6th [Regiments] 
179

Over There, Over Here

were again cited by the French Army, the third citation for each. Two such citations entitled the receiving unit to wear the fourragère (or shoulder cord) in 

the red-and-green colors of the Croix de Guerre. 

The 6th Machine Gun Battalion had also met this 

requirement. About 2,000 Croix de Guerre were 

passed out to members of the 2d Division for Blanc 

Mont, and Lejeune himself was named a commander of the French Legion of Honor.

Fourragère

Marines, with wartime service in the 4th Brigade, 

could continue to wear their four-rageres, regardless 

of their future assignments. As late as the Korean 

War, officers, such as Generals Lemuel C. Shepherd and Gerald C. Thomas, could be seen wearing 

their “pogey ropes,” as other envious Marines called 

them. Present-day members of the 5th and 6th 

[Regiments] wear the cords, but must doff them 

when they leave the regiments.
180

In an article by Lieutenant Colonel Frank E. Evans, 

USMC, appearing in the December 1919 number 

of the Marine Corps Gazette, relating to the demobilization of certain Marine organizations following the close of World War I, including the 13th 

Regiment, appears the following:

Only the most optimistic idealist can discount 

the probability of future wars that may call 

for the employment of the Marine Corps as a 

whole in another conflict of immensity.

In view of the present state of world affairs it 

would appear that the statement above-quoted

was a portentous one—more noteworthy in that it 

was made at a time when the policy of demobilization, reduction, and retrenchment was the order of 

the day.

The immensity of the conflict that now envelops the world within the brief space of 22 years following the previous worldwide struggle, probably 

was not visualized at the time the above observation was made. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the 

size and scope of the Marine Corps, required for 

the gigantic conflict now raging, was even dreamed 

of 20 years ago.

Much is being written and published nowadays 

concerning the war and current affairs generally. So 

many different opinions, ideas, and theories are being advanced for the conduct of the war—often by 

amateurs with little or no military experience—that 

in the maze of it all we are apt to lose sight of some 

of the successful achievements of the Marine Corps 

in World War I—truly a war from which the Marine Corps still draws inspiration, and one which 

still serves to yield exemplary information, based on 

actual experience which, in some instances at least, 

might serve as a model and incentive for future action.

A lot has been written lauding the brilliant battle participation of the 4th Brigade in France, which 

included the 5th and 6th Regiments, in 1918, and 

deservedly so. The purpose of this essay is to present 

a brief but concise account of the organization and 

activities of the 13th Regiment—an elite military 

organization which, having had its inception rather 

late in the previous war, was denied by circumstances the high privilege of coming to grips with the 

enemy on the field of battle—but which, through 

the tireless efforts of its officers and men, rendered 

an invaluable contribution toward winning the war 

by performing essential wartime duties other than 

actual battle participation.

Critical Situation in Europe

With the coming of May 1918, and the everincreasing fury of the war, it was becoming apparent that more and more American infantry must be 

dispatched to France with all possible speed. The 

4th Brigade, which had proceeded to France soon 

after the entry of America into the war, had undergone intensive training in France, had already been 

engaged in combat with the enemy in the Verdun 

sector, and had repeatedly proven its worth in those 

early encounters.

The last big enemy offensive in France had been 

launched in the spring of 1918 and, as the Germans 

pushed ever nearer to Paris, sweeping away all opposition in their advance, the cry went up from both 

sides of the Atlantic for more Marines for service in 

France. The situation was considered to be no less 

than critical, and something had to be done without undue delay. The Marine Corps, still a comparatively small organization was hard-pressed to meet 

the demands for increased forces for duty abroad, 

after supplying detachments for all the larger vessels of the Navy, personnel for duty in Haiti and 

Santo Domingo, garrisoning of numerous posts in 

the United States and elsewhere, and other duty of 

special nature. Increases in Marine Corps strength, 

however, in the spring of 1918 permitted the raising of additional units eventually to be combined in 

a new brigade for service with the Army overseas. 

A full division was at first considered but, for want 

of time and the immediate availability of sufficient 

personnel, a brigade was decided upon.

THE 13TH REGIMENT

WORLD WAR ONE

by James C. Jenkins
181

Over There, Over Here

On 2 May 1918, Acting Secretary of the Navy 

Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a letter to the major general [Commandant] of the Marine Corps, directed 

that an additional brigade of Marines, equipped 

as infantry [and] with necessary replacements, required from time to time to keep the units up to 

their authorized strength, be organized for use with 

the American Expeditionary Forces in France. The 

order further stated that “when organized, the necessary arrangements will be made with the Navy 

Department for the transportation to France of this 

force, and the commanding officer thereof will be 

duly directed to report, upon his arrival in France, 

to the senior United States Army officer for duty.” 

And that “upon his so reporting, the force will be 

considered as detached for service with the Army, 

by direction of the President.” The record of the 

Marines in France during the weeks immediately 

following as well as the record of the brigade, thus 

ordered, during the balance of the war testify to the 

wisdom and propriety of the order, above quoted.

Organization of 5th Brigade Commenced

In compliance with the above order, plans were immediately drawn for the organization of a brigade of 

Marines (later designated as 5th Brigade, made up 

of the 11th Regiment, 13th Regiment, and 5th Machine Gun Battalion), tables of organization were 

prepared [with] Quantico, Virginia, designated as 

the place of mobilization, officers and units selected, 

necessary orders issued, and the organization commenced. The 11th Regiment, originally composed 

of artillery companies that had seen service as early 

as the year 1914 at Veracruz, Mexico, and later in 

the Haitian campaign, was primarily organized at 

Quantico in January 1918. Much, of course, had to 

be done by way of making available the necessary 

personnel, their equipment, and requirements for 

the formation of a brigade, which was to include 

the reorganization of the 11th Regiment, and the 

organization of an entirely new regiment—the 

13th—as well as a complete machine gun battalion. 

The proceedings at Quantico were described by one 

of the members present as “sort of gathering together of the clans, for the men came from far and 

near, from Parris Island, Mare Island, the tropics, 

and the various navy yards in the states. Many were 

old-timers, but the bulk of them poured in from the 

boot training camps, all hard of muscle and anxious 

to be on their way to that country, France, the very 

mention of which thrilled us.”

13th Regiment Organized

The 13th Regiment, U.S. Marine Corps, was organized at Quantico, Virginia, [on] 3 July 1918 with 

Headquarters Company and Supply Company attached. Lieutenant Colonel Smedley D. Butler was 

placed in command of this regiment with Captain 

C. D. Meginness as regimental adjutant.

Headquarters, field, and staff of the 13th 

Regiment were organized [on] 31 July 1918, and 

Companies A, B, C, and D [on] 13 August 1918. 

Company B was organized [on] 14 August 1918; 

Companies E, F, G, and H on 19 August 1918; 

Companies K, L, and M on 22 August 1918; Company I [on] 23 August 1918; and the Machine Gun 

Company [on] 1 September 1918.

Major W. P. Upshur was in command of the 1st 

Battalion; Major W. C. Powers was in command of 

the 2d Battalion; and Major John Potts commanded the 3d Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Douglas 

C. McDougal, promoted to that rank on 2 August 

1918, became second in command to Colonel Butler who was promoted to the rank of colonel on the 

same date. Major F. S. McConnell joined [on] 4 

September 1918 and relieved Captain Meginness 

as regimental adjutant. Captain Meginness was detached on the same date.

Upon the formation of the regiment and while 

things were taking shape, the men performed various and sundry duties, which included details at 

work cleaning up and improving the camp in addition to the regular routine. The men had a good deal 

of experience in carpentering, etc. A record of efficiency was attained in marksmanship by the 13th 

Regiment on the range at Quantico shortly before 

leaving for duty overseas, when 95 percent of the 

personnel won their medals, a splendid showing out 

of 3,850 officers and enlisted men.

From Quantico to France

On 13 September 1918, the 13th Regiment began 

to move from the Overseas Depot at Quantico to 
182

Postwar Analysis

the port of embarkation [at] Hoboken, New Jersey, 

in high hopes of soon having its chance at the enemy. “Never did a happier aggregation of Marines 

leave Quantico,” it was stated at the time.

Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, USMC, was ordered [on] 5 September1918 to take command of 

the brigade. General Cole and the 5th Brigade staff 

sailed from the United States in the latter part of 

September and arrived in France a few days later. 

General Cole commanded the 5th Brigade until 

9 April 1919, when relieved by Brigadier General 

Butler.

On 15 September 1918, Headquarters, field 

and staff, Headquarters Company, Supply Company, and the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 13th 

Regiment embarked onboard USS Von Steuben [ID 

3017] at Hoboken and arrived at Brest, France, [on] 

25 September 1918. The 3d Battalion arrived three 

days later onboard USS Henderson [AP 1]. Soon after arriving in France, the regiment was detached 

for duty with the Army.

While at Quantico, the quarters of the 13th 

Regiment were located in the town of Quantico 

proper. The 11th Regiment, which had been quartered on the “Hill” on the reservation just out from 

the town of Quantico, moved into the buildings 

upon their being vacated by the 13th Regiment.

Soon after arriving in France, the regiment was 

placed under quarantine for spinal meningitis [on] 

3 October 1918 but, because of the arrival of large 

contingents of Army troops at Brest, the quarantine 

was lifted to enable the regiment to perform urgent 

duties in connection with the landing and care of 

the incoming troops. After a few weeks at Brest, 

units of the 13th Regiment were assigned to duty 

in the SOS (Services of Supply).

Field and staff, 1st and 2d Battalions were organized [on] 22 and 23 October, respectively. Lieutenant Commander William Chambers, USN, joined 

as regimental surgeon [on] 5 October 1918.

After a few weeks at Brest, various units of the 

13th Regiment, as well as other components of the 

brigade, were assigned to duty in the SOS.

The 2d Battalion left Camp Pontanezen [on] 

23 October 1918 and arrived at Embarkation Camp 

No. 1, Base Section No. 1, AEF, at Saint-Nazaire, 

France, the following day. The Machine Gun Company left Camp Pontanezen [on] 29 October and 

arrived at La Pallice Barracks, La Rochelle, France, 

[on] 17 November. Headquarters Company left 

Camp Pontanezen [on] 9 November and arrived 

at Embarkation Camp No. 1, Saint-Nazaire, on 10 

November while the Supply Company left Pontanezen the same date, arrived at Saint-Nazaire on 

the 11th, and proceeded to Camp Montoir, Base 

Section No. 1, where the company arrived on 15 

November 1918. Field and Staff, 13th Regiment, 

left Camp Pontanezen [on] 7 December and arrived at Casino de Lilas, Bordeaux, France, two days 

later.

General Butler, promoted to his rank of brigadier general on 19 November 1918, soon after his 

arrival in France, assumed command of Camp 

Pontanezen. He devoted much energy to the development and administration of that great camp, 

in which he was highly successful, and “for exceptionally meritorious service” was awarded the Army 

Distinguished Service Medal, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, and the Order of the Black 

Star with grade of commander by the French government. Upon being appointed brigadier general, 

Butler was relieved of command of the 13th Regiment, and Colonel McDougal took over command 

of the regiment.

Widespread Duties in France

Like the 11th Regiment with which it was brigaded 

throughout the war, the 13th Regiment performed 

duty at various posts and stations over an extensive 

area of western and southern France in the SOS. 

Among such places were Brest, Bordeaux, SaintNazaire, La Rochelle, La Pallice, Rochefort, Montoir, Bassens (Gironde), Sursol (Gironde), Casino 

de Lilas (Bordeaux), La Teste (Gironde), Savenay, 

Saint-Loubes (Gironde), Lormont, Carbon Blanc, 

Grange Neuve, Genicart, Croix d’Hins, La Baule, 

Isle of Saint-Anne (Nantes), Penhouet, and Usine 

Brûlée.

The officers and men of the 13th performed a 

wide range and variety of duties, among such being 

provost guard, hospital center guard, camp guard, 

railroad transportation officers, commanding dock 

guard, dock guard, unloading ships, erecting tents 

at Camp Pontanezen barracks, military police, 

warehouse guards, convoying railroad trains, special 
183

Over There, Over Here

guards for shipments of commissary supplies, assistants to camp commanders at Pontanezen Camp, 

prison guards, assisting thousands of convalescent 

and sick soldiers who disembarked from the USS 

Leviathan [SP 1326] to reach Camp Pontanezen, 

Inspector General’s Department, Base Section No. 

1, stock guard, traffic police, motor transportation 

convoy guard, secret service, segregation camp, and 

railway patrol. During the great influenza epidemic 

of 1918, the 13th Regiment performed extraordinary services. Among other things, the personnel 

carried sick men and their packs up [the] long hill 

from docks to camps they had built, cooked food, 

and nursed the sick.

The 13th Regiment continued to perform the 

general duties above-noted until July 1919, when 

all units of the regiment and 5th Brigade were assembled at Camp Pontanezen.

Prior to the departure of the Marine brigades 

from France in the summer of 1919, a battalion of 

Marines, first known as “Provisional Battalion, U.S. 

Marines,” but whose designation later was changed 

to “15th Separate Battalion,” was organized at 

Camp Pontanezen for duty in connection with the 

Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite. The battalion, made 

up of selected personnel from the 13th Regiment 

(Company E and 47 enlisted men of the Machine 

Gun Company), units of the 4th Brigade, and personnel from the 12th Separate Battalion, was under the command of Major (now Major General) 

Charles F. B. Price, USMC.

The battalion, also known as the “SchleswigHolstein Battalion,” rendered honors to General 

Pershing on 1 September 1919 upon his departure 

from France and, on the same day, was inspected by 

Marshal Foch, who commended the battalion on its 

splendid appearance. A few days later, the battalion 

proceeded to Bordeaux, France, via USS Mercury

[ID 3012] and took part in the ceremonies incident 

to the laying of a foundation for the monument at 

Pointe de Grave, commemorating the entrance of 

the United States into the world war.

13th Regiment Returns

to the United States

The regimental headquarters was moved from Bassens, near Bordeaux, France, on 13 July 1919 and 

returned to Camp Pontanezen. Former locations 

of the regimental headquarters included Bordeaux, 

Base Section No. 2, where the headquarters had 

been established as early as 6 December 1918, and 

where they remained until 3 July 1919 when moved 

to the American guard camp at Bassens.

Field and Staff of the 1st and 3d Battalions 

were disbanded in France [on] 16 July 1919, while 

that of the 2d Battalion was disbanded on 20 July—

the personnel being transferred to the Regimental 

Field and Staff and Headquarters Company.

Company E rejoined the regiment on 22 July 

at Brest.

On 31 July 1919, all of the 13th Regiment, 

with the exception of Company B which was on 

duty at the “American Dock,” at Bassens, embarked 

onboard USS Siboney [ID 2999] at Brest and disembarked at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 8 August. The final parade and review of the regiment 

occurred at Hampton Roads on 9 August 1919. 

Company B, having at last been relieved from 

the duty at Bassens, arrived back at Brest on 31 July 

1919, embarked two days later onboard USS Mercury [ID 3012], and disembarked two weeks later 

at Hampton Roads, where the entire regiment was 

disbanded on 15 August 1919.

The Schleswig-Holstein Battalion, made up 

largely of personnel from the 13th Regiment as 

above stated, having returned to Camp Pontanezen, 

boarded the USS Henderson early in December,

and arrived at Philadelphia [on] 23 December 1919, 

where the “duration-of-war” men were discharged. 

A week later, the remainder of the battalion proceeded to Marine Barracks Quantico, Virginia, and 

there disbanded—the last Marine Corps unit of

the American Expeditionary Forces to return from 

Europe.

In conclusion, may it be stated that the 13th 

Regiment, rated as one of the crack units of the 

Marine Corps, throughout its existence had the 

reputation of being a highly efficient and steady 

organization, ever-ready and prompt in the performance of its numerous duties—at times extremely 

arduous. To the great disappointment of the personnel, the turn of events precluded the participation of the 13th, as also its sister regiment the 11th, 

in the big fighting in France, and the regiment was 
184

Postwar Analysis

American Expeditionary Forces Headquarters Services of Supply

22 November 1918.

From: Commanding General, SOS

To: Commanding Officer, 13th Regiment, USMC, Base Section No. 1.

Subject: Letter of Commendation.

I wish to express my extreme satisfaction at the splendid work of your Regiment as reported to me by Brig. 

General Harries. The spirit of zeal, co-operation and self-sacrifice shown by you and your men is worthy of 

the best traditions of the Marine Corps and the American Army.

At a time when your thoughts must have been with the fighting units of our Armies, as were those of all 

of us in the SOS, you helped to accomplish the work behind the lines without which the success of our combatant troops would have been impossible. You have exemplified the spirit with which I have endeavored to 

animate the entire SOS.

Please express to the officers and men of your command the very great pleasure their fine achievement has 

given me.

(Signed) J. G. HARBORD,

Major General, USA.

Headquarters, Base Section No. 5

Services of Supply

U.S. Army Post Office No. 716

16 November 1918.

From: Commanding General, Base Section No. 5.

To: Commanding General, Services of Supply. 

Subject: Acknowledging service rendered by 13th Regiment, USMC.

1. The departure from this Base Section of the final element (3d Battalion) of the 13th Regiment, USMC, 

suggests that suitable acknowledgment be made of the uncommon services rendered by that Regiment while 

stationed here.

denied the glory that attaches to actual battle participation against the enemy. A number of its members, however, did succeed in getting into the heavy 

fighting during the summer and fall of 1918 as replacements.

Even prior to its arrival in France, months of 

intensive training had imparted to the 13th Regiment a high esprit de corps and put the personnel on a mettle seldom found in the world’s best 

soldiery.

The regiment, often referred to during its early existence as the “lucky 13th,” disappointed and 

somewhat disgruntled, and at last considering itself as quite unlucky over not being permitted its 

chance at the Kaiser’s forces, nevertheless returned 

from overseas with a splendid record of achievement. For what it had accomplished in Europe, the 

13th stood high in the esteem of the government 

and people of the United States and France.

Commendations
185

Over There, Over Here

Final Press Comment in France

The following extract from an editorial of the Pontanezen Duckboard, service publication at Camp 

Pontanezen, France, during the years 1918–19, 

commenting on the 5th Brigade at [the] time of its 

departure from France for the United States, is also 

submitted:

The Fifth Brigade of Marines (11th & 13th 

Regiments and Fifth Machine Gun Battalion),

one of the oldest permanent organizations 

which came to the camp when there were not 

even tents to shelter them and duckboards were 

unheard of, are leaving us. * * * These men are 

pioneers of Camp Pontanezen and they were of 

the first to start the alleged impossible task of 

bringing the big camp up out of the mud. They 

have been an important factor in conducting 

camp activities and did their share in keeping 

up the morale and spirit of both permanent and 

transient troops. We are sorry to see them go.

* * * 

2. Arriving at the beginning of the Influenza and Pneumonia epidemic which was brought by troops from 

the United States, the Regiment (Colonel—now Brigadier General—Smedley D. Butler, Commanding) 

devoted itself to insistent labor with zeal that knew no faltering. A well trained and thoroughly disciplined 

organization, it gave forth cheerful energy in amazing quantity. It made and prepared camps for incoming 

organizations, providing every needed facility which was at hand or could be created; guided the new troops 

from the docks to their respective camp areas, carried the packs of the unfit; put new spirit into the weary; 

hauled water and rations by hand for the incoming units, and then cooked the rations; nursed the sick; in 

short, did every practicable thing to improve the morale and minister to the physical needs. Whenever music 

had value, there was the Regimental Band—day or night and much of the time without hours. Colonel Butler 

and his officers were everywhere welcoming each opportunity to lend a hand and their example was eagerly 

followed by their men. A concrete instance of performance was the pitching and trenching of five thousand 

pyramidal wall tents, the pitching and equipping and manning of kitchens, store tents, first aid stations, etc.

3. The object lesson was, and always will be, inspiring. Aside from the life-saving results achieved, there 

was an unforgettable exhibit of supreme soldierly qualities—the voluntary assumption of a great burden, an 

immeasurable spirit of self-sacrificing helpfulness and an individual smartness which was unaffected by boil, 

rain, mud or any other variety of obstacle. The 13th Regiment, USMC, is a living synonym for “the highest 

efficiency.”

(Signed) GEO. H. HARRIES,

Brigadier General, USA, Commanding.
186

FOURRAGÈRE OF THE 5TH AND 6TH REGIMENTS

by Joel D. Thacker

The French government awarded decorations for 

especially meritorious conduct in action during 

World War I to 156 American units varying in 

size from a section to a brigade. These decorations 

were the fourragère and the Croix de Guerre with 

various combinations of palms, gilt, [and] silver and 

bronze stars. The various classes of the Croix de 

Guerre were as follows:

Bronze palm: for citation in orders of the army

Gold (or gilt) star: for citation in orders of the 

corps

Silver star: for citation in orders of the division

Bronze star: for citation in orders of the brigade, regiment, or equivalent unit

The fifth citation in orders of the [French] army 

calls for the award of a silver palm, which replaces 

the four bronze palms.

Just as individuals are decorated for services 

rendered, so are the colors of an organization decorated to commemorate the deeds of the unit as a 

whole. The American unit to which such an award 

has been made is authorized by our government to 

place on its flag a streamer—one streamer for each 

award—and on each streamer, in the colors of the 

decoration, are embroidered the name or names 

commemorating the battle for which the unit was 

cited. The unit twice decorated with a Croix de 

Guerre with palm is entitled to a braided and knotted cord, called a fourragère, in the green and red 

colors of the Croix de Guerre. The fourragère becomes a part of the uniform of the unit so cited 

and all members of the organization are authorized 

to wear the decoration on the left shoulder of the 

uniform as long as they remain members of the organization. Individuals attached to the organization 

on at least two occasions in which it was cited in 

orders of the [French] army, are entitled to wear the 

fourragère at all times, regardless of whether or not 

they are serving with the unit so decorated. 

A person entitled to wear the fourragère as 

an individual decoration is authorized to wear on 

the knot thereof, above the metal point, the device 

of the division to which he was attached when he 

received his last citation, with the Marine Corps 

emblem below same, both in bronze metal and in 

miniature. Although the single cord or plain cotton 

is the regulation issue, officers generally wear the 

silk cord with the double loop.

According to Larousse’s Grand Dictionary of the 

XIX Century, the fourragère was originated by the 

Duke of Alva, a Spanish general. After a unit of his 

Flemish troops had made a rather hasty withdrawal 

from the battlefield, the duke ordered “that any further misconduct, on the part of these troops, should 

be punished by hanging, without regard for rank

or grade.” The Flemish warriors, determined to 

reestablish themselves in the good graces of their 

commander, wore—as a reminder of their disgrace—coiled around one shoulder, a rope in the 

shape of a hangman’s noose, at the end of which 

dangled a long spike. In their next battle, the Flemish fought so gallantly and well that the noose and 

spike became a mark of distinction and honor.

The French fourragère is a decoration instituted 

by Napoleon I for units [that] had distinguished 

themselves in battle. It was revived during World 

War I and was awarded by the French Ministry of 

War to organizations [that] were cited more than 

once in the French Orders of the Army. The three 

classes of the fourragère are as follows:

First: Legion d’Honneur (scarlet)

Second: Médaille Militaire (yellow and red)

Third: Croix de Guerre (with palm, green and 

red)

In 1918, Marines of the 5th and 6th Regiments 

by their heroic deeds of valor inscribed the names 

of momentous and brilliant battles on the pages of 

Marine Corps history as well as on their own regimental flags. They have the signal honor of being 

the only two regiments in the AEF to receive three 

citations—two in the orders of the army and one in 

the orders of the corps—the fourragère and Croix 

de Guerre with two palms and one gilt star.
187

Over There, Over Here

It has been said that the warrior’s fame sometimes is based on luck and the chance of war as 

much as on valor and skill. Although the 5th and 

6th Regiments had the good fortune to come upon 

the western front at critical times and in critical 

places they had the esprit de corps, the stamina and 

the ability to make the most of these opportunities.

Following initial combat experiences in the 

Toulon sector, a stricken region along the heights 

of the Meuse on the edge of the old Verdun battlefield, the 5th and 6th, together with other units 

of the Marine 4th Brigade, 2d Division, were reassembling in Normandy preparatory to entering the 

line northwest of Paris. Meantime, the enemy had 

broken through the Allied lines west of Rheims, 

making a deep salient [that] pointed like a menacing spearhead towards Paris. The exhausted French 

Army was overwhelmed and retired, fighting desperately, toward the Marne and the vital region of 

Paris.

The 2d Division was hurried toward this new 

point of danger, and by 1 June the forest-green 

columns of the Marine battalions were marching 

through the wheat fields of the Marne toward the 

advancing Germans. From 6 to 25 June, the fighting was of the most desperate character. In a series 

of bitter battles, the Marines forced the enemy back 

through the Bois de Belleau, that bloody tangle of 

brush and rocks made horrible by the reek of dead 

bodies, the unceasing crash of shells, and the whine 

and snap of machine-gun bullets. Despite heavy 

losses and almost complete physical exhaustion, the 

Marines in a final brilliant dash on 25 June killed 

or captured the last German in Belleau Wood. In 

recognition of the “brilliant courage, the vigor, spirit and tenacity” of the Marines of the 4th Brigade 

who “overcame all hardships and losses and captured the village of Bouresches and Belleau Wood” 

in June 1918, the French renamed the wood the 

“Bois de la Brigade de Marine” and the 5th and 6th 

[Regiments] were cited in French Army Order No. 

10.805 “D” and awarded the Croix de Guerre with 

palm.

On 16–17 July, the Marines moved swiftly 

northward into the area of General Mangin’s Tenth 

French Army, which had been designated by Marshal Foche to deliver a counterstroke against the 

enemy in the Marne salient, where the enemy’s last 

great offensive had been brought to a halt on 15 

July. By forced marches through the mud and rain, 

the Marine columns threaded their way toward 

the jump-off line. The congested mass of artillery, 

tanks, trucks, and infantry in the ink-black forest 

frequently caused interminable delays with the result that the troops were forced to double-time the 

last mile. The Marine battalions came up on the run 

as the attack started, going from column into attack formation without a halt. With the American 

1st and the French 1st Moroccan Divisions, the 2d 

Division formed the spearhead of the assault that 

burst from the Villers-Cotterêts Forest upon the 

enemy southwest of Soissons at dawn the morning of 18 July. Tired, hungry and thirsty, without 

adequate weapons, [and] armed only with rifle and 

bayonet, these crack troops smashed through the 

enemy’s positions in one of the most dashing victories of the war, capturing hundreds of guns and 

thousands of prisoners. For their “remarkable ardor 

and tenacity” in rolling back the enemy, the 5th and 

6th [Regiments] received their second honor when 

cited in French Army Corps Order No. 10.886 “D” 

and awarded the gilt star.

Withdrawn from Soissons [and] much depleted by casualties, the Marines rested through August 

in the Marbache sector near Nancy. In September, 

they were a part of the American First Army under 

the personal command of General John J. Pershing, which, on 12 and 13 September [and] pinched 

off the Saint-Mihiel salient, thereby releasing the 

inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination and establishing the Allied lines in a position 

to threaten Metz.

During the latter part of September, the Marines moved to the Champagne region, where General Gouraud’s French Fourth Army was making 

laborious progress against German strongholds 

[that] had stood invincible since 1914. At dawn 

on 3 October, the Marines and other units of the 

American 2d Division swept forward toward the 

Massif du Blanc Mont, the long ridge [that] dominated the valley of the Arnes and the entire country 

east of Rheims. Despite determined resistance and 

desperate counterattacks on both flanks as well as 

on the front, the 2d Division captured the strongly 

held wooded hill of Blanc Mont and the heights 

near Saint-Étienne, breaking the enemy hold on 
188

Postwar Analysis

the martyred city of Rheims and freeing the western approaches to the Argonne region. For their 

“glorious part” in the operations in the Champagne 

[sector] in October 1918, the two Marine regiments were awarded their third honor—a citation 

in French Army Order No. 14.712 “D” and the second palm.

The Marines had only a few days of rest before 

they were ordered to the Argonne to participate in 

the final phase of the great Meuse-Argonne battle. 

Attacking on 1 November, they battered down the 

strong Kriemhilde Stellung (position) and drove the 

enemy beyond the Meuse River. During the night 

of 10–11 November, 2d Division Engineers threw a 

pontoon bridge across the Meuse and the Marines 

fought their way across the river—the dramatic last 

fight of World War I.

The Marines of World War II who are privileged to wear the fourragère have excellent reason 

to be proud of their service with these two famous 

regiments.
COMMANDERS

191

HARBORD AND LEJEUNE: A COMMAND PRECEDENT

by Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Edwards, USMC

“I can give you no better command in France than to 

let you succeed General Doyen with the Marines.”

~General John J. Pershing 

This was General Pershing’s way of introducing his 

chief of staff, Brigadier General James G. Harbord, 

to his new command assignment, that of the 4th 

Brigade, one May day in 1918. Pershing might have 

added that he could give the Marines no better 

leader in view of the confidence he placed in General Harbord; a confidence born of close association 

since May [19]17. And it was this period of association that had seen the AEF in France grow from 

less than 100 men to a half million.

This first year in France had been a difficult period, not only because of the many problems involved 

in shifting a large army across the seas into a foreign 

land, but also the necessity of proving the worth of 

that army. All the French really wanted by way of 

an army from America was infantry and machine 

guns to be integrated into their own divisions. To 

convince them that America could provide something besides warm bodies was one of Pershing’s 

most trying jobs. And, by the same token, the general was not about to settle for a role in the war that 

permitted the French to rule his ranks and dispose 

of his troops without the intervention of American 

command and staff organization. France was justly 

proud of her Napoleon and de Villars and l’École 

Militaire, but so was America proud of her [Generals] Grant and Lee and fast-developing military 

tradition. Facts spoke loudly at the conference table.

Naturally, Pershing was proud of his 4th Brigade, which comprised the 5th and 6th Regiments 

with attached 6th Machine Gun Battalion, and 

formed a component of the Army’s 2d Division. 

They comprised an elite group, officered by future 

leaders of the Corps—Shepherd, Holcomb, Cates, 

Lejeune, Neville, Catlin, Hunt, Rockey, and Smith, 

to name but a few. There were luminaries of the 

sport world also: [Bert] Baston and [Earl] Martineau of Minnesota, [Harry] Lagore of Yale, [and] 

many more. Indeed, one regiment included 60 percent college men within its ranks. Little wonder 

that they made such a fine showing in early training 

with the Alpine Chasseurs (“Blue Devils”) in their 

brigade and regimental inspections, and in their 

initial deployment near Verdun before going on to 

later achievements that won them lasting fame.

Picture, if you will, the feelings that went 

through General Harbord’s mind as he journeyed to 

the command post of the 4th Brigade. The incumbent, Brigadier General Doyen, had been relieved 

for reasons of ill health (he died three months later), 

and the Marines had no brigadier for replacement. 

Harbord, as he relates in his memoirs, had misgivings as to how well he would be received by his new 

command. Here he was wearing the “Mex” rank of 

brigadier with little field experience about to take 

charge of two regimental commanders, both regulars, and each wearing a Medal of Honor. However, 

he was buoyed by Pershing’s confidence in him and 

the natural eagerness with which a staff officer reacts to a command assignment.

The warmth of the welcome from Colonel 

Wendell Neville of the 5th [Regiment] and Colonel Albertus Catlin of the 6th dispelled any doubts 

General Harbord might have had about his new assignment. His brigade staff included an administrative officer, Major Holland M. Smith, who was to 

make his mark on Pacific coral in later years.

Harbord found little time for shaking down, as 

movement orders arrived on 30 May [that] took the 

brigade into the valley of the Marne.

French refugees blocked the roads in their 

flight ahead of a steadily advancing German Army. 

These were dark days in France. Almost a million 

people had deserted Paris; the British had suffered 

a severe loss; the defeatists were crying for an honorable peace. Into the breach went the Marine brigade as part of the 2d Army Division. The French 

Army was in retreat but a typical reaction of the 

Marines was Captain Lloyd Williams’ countermand to a French order to withdraw, which history 

has recorded as, “Retreat Hell—we just got here.” 

And they stood fast.
192

Postwar Analysis

The Germans were stopped cold by accurate 

rifle and machine-gun fire since division artillery 

had not yet arrived. Then the brigade assumed the 

offensive and used up four German divisions in the 

process while capturing 1,000 prisoners. The brigade’s objectives were Belleau Wood and Bouresches. These were seized on the 6th of June, now 

recorded as the date Paris was saved. The cost of 

Marine casualties was severe with some 670 killed 

and 3,721 wounded. The 2d Battalion of the 5th 

[Regiment] came out of the fight with 7 officers 

and 350 men; [they were] all that remained of 30 

officers and 1,000 men two weeks previously. War 

correspondent Floyd Gibbons, grievously wounded 

in the same action, was permitted by a sympathetic 

censor to file his story and thus identified the Marines’ victory to an electrified America.

The thanks of a grateful French people was some 

recompense for American losses. They declared the 

Marine’s defensive stand of the Aisne-Marne one 

of the greatest in history. Citizens kissed the Marines on the streets, but official recognition came in 

yet another way—the order issued on 30 June 1918 

by General [ Jean Marie] Degoutte, commanding 

France’s Sixth Army:

In view of the brilliant conduct of the Fourth 

Brigade of the Second United States Division, 

which in a spirited fight took Bouresches and 

the important stronghold of Belleau Wood, 

stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the 

General commanding the Sixth Army orders 

that henceforth, in all official papers, the Bois 

de Belleau shall be named “Bois de la Brigade 

de Marine.”

The 5th and 6th Regiments and the 6th Machine Gun Battalion were decorated with the 

Croix de Guerre with palm to denote a citation in 

[French] Army Orders. Subsequent decorations of 

the Croix de Guerre with gilt star and palm earned 

these organizations the coveted French fourragère 

to be worn as a part of the uniform by all members. 

With th[is] success, General Pershing had received a powerful boost at the conference table with 

his French and British colleagues. No longer would 

there be doubt as to whether American troops could 

operate successfully with their own staffs and with 

sector responsibility. The man from overseas was no 

longer untried; he had fought and won.

It was indeed a proud Harbord who stepped up 

to receive his second star on the 4th of July, albeit 

saddened by the thought of leaving his gallant brigade. No doubt the memories of Sergeant Major 

John Quick, First Sergeant Dan Daly, Major Berton 

Sibley, and other heroes of the brigade were echoing 

through his mind as he bade farewell to his comradesin-arms. He had come to love the emblem of the 

globe and anchor on his collar as dearly as his 

crossed sabers of the cavalry. The surprise farewell 

from several hundred Marines to the strains of the 

“Marine Hymn” played by the 6th [Regiment’s] 

band was indeed a moving tribute.

General Harbord had found the brigade’s esprit de corps unexcelled by that of any other organization: its proof of valor unsurpassed by any 

other outfit of comparable size in history. His relationship, though brief, led him to remark, “I look 

back upon my service with the Marine brigade with 

more pride and satisfaction than on any other equal 

period of my long army career.”

This feeling of affection and respect was reciprocated by the brigade. It set the stage for Marine 

Major General John A. Lejeune to take command 

of the 2d Division on 28 July 1918 and lead that

organization to victory over the battlefields of 

Saint-Mihiel, Blanc Mont, and Meuse-Argonne. 

However, before the succession in command, General Harbord was to win his spurs as commander of 

the 2d Division at Soissons and thereby enhance his 

already fine reputation.

It was on the night of 16 July that the division 

moved into position for an attack the next morning 

at dawn, with no previous opportunity for reconnaissance. The French reckoned speed and surprise 

to be of the essence in view of the Germans strongly 

entrenched positions and great strength. The payoff 

was a brilliant victory. All three division objectives 

were captured by evening of D-day, culminating a 

five-mile advance. The attack the next day did not 

have benefit of the element of surprise but was 

nonetheless effective against determined resistance. 

A dangerous salient at Soissons was eliminated and 

another proof established for the quality of American arms, this time on a corps level.
193

Commanders

The next step up the ladder was the creation 

of an American field army. This Pershing accomplished in August; a final recognition of America as 

a fighting power capable of holding her own on any 

foreign battlefield.

The rotation of General Harbord from field 

command to the Services of Supply paved the way 

for the Marine’s General Lejeune to step up from 

the 4th Brigade to command the 2d Division; an 

historic precedent of interservice command. The 

Marine Corps had indicated a desire to form its 

own division, but Pershing would not permit his 2d 

Division team to be changed.

As a proving ground for his new First American Field Army, General Pershing chose the SaintMihiel salient, considered by the French to be

impregnable.

The Germans had come to know the 2d Division by this time and referred to them in captured 

documents as “shock troops.” Yet another captured 

document further honored the Marines with the 

appellation, Teufel Hunden (Devil Dogs). Both organizations lived up to their advance billing as they 

swept through the German defense lines on the first 

day to seize objectives [that] had been selected for 

the second day, and in the doing to capture [more 

than] 3,200 prisoners.

After two weeks’ rest the division again went 

into action on 28 September in the Champagne offensive. It was in seizing the Blanc Mont ridge and 

breaching the Hindenburg Line that the Marines 

and doughboys of the 2d had some of the toughest 

fighting of the entire war. It took five days of battle 

to clear the Germans out of Rheims, and the division suffered nearly 5,000 casualties in the process 

of using up nine enemy divisions. This victory was 

one of the most decisive of the war. It was a proud 

General Lejeune who, on 11 October, addressed 

his command: “To be able to say when this war is 

finished, ‘I belonged to the 2d Division, I fought 

with it at the battle of Blanc Mont ridge,’ will be 

the highest honor that can come to any man.” As 

if to lend emphasis to his words, General Lejeune 

established the star and Indian-head insignia for his 

organization so that its members might always be 

identified. This symbol has been perpetuated to the 

present time.

Official recognition for their achievement at 

Blanc Mont came for the entire division in a citation in French Army Orders.

Unfortunately, an organization cannot rest long 

on its laurels when there is still a war in progress. 

[For] 1 November became yet another dog day for 

the weary 2d Division, and the battle of MeuseArgonne was effectively joined. This action destroyed the last stronghold of the Hindenburg Line 

in a six-mile advance that sent the enemy in full 

retreat and contributed in no small measure to the 

final collapse that resulted in an armistice on the 

11th [of November].

Praise came from many quarters for the work 

done by the 2d Division. General Lejeune’s brilliant 

leadership won for him the DSM [Distinguished 

Service Medal] and the French Legion of Honor. 

The inevitable statistical comparisons—most casualties suffered, most prisoners captured, most artillery captured—all revealed the star and Indian head 

at the top of the list of American divisions.

A period of occupation duty followed before 

General Lejeune was to take the division home. His 

relinquishment of the command on 3 August 1919 

ended this unique but happy association of Marine 

command over an essentially Army organization 

and established a precedent of interservice cooperation so successfully launched by his comrade-inarms, General Harbord.
194

BATTALION COMMAND “OVER THERE”

THE 5TH REGIMENT, 1917–18

by Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., USMC (Ret)

When war was declared on Germany in April 

1917, the U.S. Army was tasked to form a division 

to be the first American troops sent to France. It 

was a decision that put the Marine Corps’ most recent recruiting slogan, “First to Fight,” in immediate jeopardy. After much lobbying, the Corps was 

finally authorized in late May to send a regiment 

with this division. With all four of its existing regiments committed to expeditionary duty in Haiti 

and Santo Domingo, the Corps quickly organized 

the 5th [Regiment] at the Philadelphia Navy Yard 

by calling together permanently organized, numbered companies that were the building blocks of 

the Corps expeditionary forces. But with fewer than 

20 of the Corps’ 59 majors available in the states, 

finding the best men to command the three battalions was an immediate problem, as the regiment 

was formed on 7 June and had to sail on the 14th.

The three who got the jobs were “old hands”—

officers commissioned around the turn of the

century [table 1]. All had served on sea duty, expeditionary duty, and at stateside and overseas barracks. [Major Frederic M.] Wise had seen action 

against the Boxers around Tientsin in 1900 and 

later in Haiti; [Major Julius S.] Turrill was in Cuba 

in 1906; and [Major Charles T.] Westcott served in 

Santo Domingo. Of the three, only Turrill had received formal schooling and was a graduate of both 

Table 1. World War I battalion commanders, 5th Regiment

1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion

Deployment to France Maj Julius S. Turrill

Maj Edward A. Greene

Maj Frederic M. Wise Maj Charles T. Westcott

Maj Edward W. Sturdevant

Verdun

(16 March–14 May)

Maj Julius S. Turrill Maj Frederic M. Wise Maj Benjamin S. Berry

Belleau Wood

(1–26 June)

Maj Julius S. Turrill Maj Frederic M. Wise

Maj Stover Keyser

Maj Benjamin S. Berry

Capt Henry L. Larsen

Maj Maurice E. Shearer

Soissons

(18–19 July)

Maj Julius S. Turrill Maj Stover Keyser Maj Maurice E. Shearer

Saint-Mihiel

(12–16 September)

LtCol Arthur J. O’Leary Maj Robert E. Messersmith Maj Maurice E. Shearer

Blanc Mont

(3–10 October)

Maj George W. Hamilton Maj Robert E. Messersmith Maj Henry L. Larsen

Meuse-Argonne

(31 October–

11 November)

Maj George W. Hamilton

Capt Leroy P. Hunt

Capt Charley Dunbeck Maj Henry L. Larsen
195

Commanders

the Army’s School of the Line and the Staff College (unusual for one so junior). After nearly nine 

months in France, Turrill and Wise retained their 

commands, but Westcott was reassigned to take 

command of an Army battalion. Major Benjamin 

S. Berry replaced him shortly before the regiment 

received its first combat assignment under French 

command in a quiet sector near Verdun.

These were the men in command of the battalions when the 5th [Regiment] deployed before 

Belleau Wood on 1 June for five days of desperate 

defensive action in which each of them rendered 

distinctive service. The regiment went into the attack on 6 June, and the battle that followed marked 

the end of relative stable command in the battalions 

of the 5th [Regiment]. Berry was severely wounded 

leading an assault in his sector. His second in command, Captain [Henry] Larsen, led the battalion until relieved by Major [Maurice] Shearer, the author 

of the famous report that concluded the battle on 

26 June, “Woods now U.S. Marine Corps entirely.”

The colorful “Fritz” Wise was the next to be 

replaced. On 23 June, after an altercation with the 

brigade commander, he was evacuated and treated 

for combat fatigue. Major [Ralph S.] Keyser, a recent aide to Major General Commandant [George] 

Barnett, took over until Wise returned and was in 

command along with Turrill and Shearer for the 

next offensive, the action at Soissons on 18–19 July.

Following Soissons, the Marine brigade was 

assigned to rest areas and quiet sectors for nearly 

two months. Wise returned from hospitalization to 

reclaim his battalion, but he and Turrill were soon 

promoted to lieutenant colonels and transferred. 

Shearer remained with the 3d Battalion. On the eve 

of Saint-Mihiel, the first “all-American” battle of 

the war, the 1st and 2d Battalions were commanded 

by newly promoted Lieutenant Colonel [Arthur 

J.] O’Leary and Major [Robert E.] Messersmith. 

O’Leary was commissioned in 1900 and Messersmith in 1909—a notable difference in experience. 

Both, however, had records of good assignments. 

Messersmith had taken part in the 1912 campaign 

in Nicaragua and then been retained with the Legation Guard in Managua.

For its next operation, the 5th [Regiment’s] 

parent division was back under French command to 

take the “impregnable” German position at Blanc 

Mont. It proved to be one of the hardest battles of 

the war. Two newly promoted veterans of all the 

fighting since Verdun were now in command of the 

1st and 3d Battalions: Major [George] Hamilton, 

who had distinguished himself at Belleau Wood, 

and Major [Henry] Larsen, who had briefly taken 

charge during Belleau Wood.

The Marine brigade remained under French 

command for two more weeks and then camions arrived to take them back to the American First Army, 

which had been fighting for a month in the MeuseArgonne. By the evening of 31 October, the 5th 

[Regiment] was in attack positions for what proved 

to be the final phase of the campaign and of the war. 

Hamilton and Larsen remained in command of the 

1st and 3d Battalions, but in the 2d Battalion there 

was a new commanding officer, Captain Charley 

Dunbeck. As commander of the battalion’s “lucky” 

43d Company, Dunbeck had been in every battle, 

but he was not the typical young officer. Enlisting at 

age 18 in 1903, he was one of the first promoted to 

Marine gunner when that rank was first established 

in March 1917. Three months later, he received his 

temporary promotion to captain.

The regiment jumped-off in a column of battalions at 0530 on 1 November to lead the attack 

against the German Kriemhilde Stellung, another 

“impregnable” defense. They breached this and the 

reserve fortifications, advancing an unprecedented 

nine kilometers. On 6 November, the Marines reverted to reserve, enduring only the freezing rains 

until moving into positions to force a crossing of 

the Meuse on the night of 10 November. Here they 

experienced both an unusually heavy German bombardment and increasing rumors of an imminent 

armistice. With Major Hamilton coordinating the 

two assault battalions, and Captain [Leroy] Hunt 

in temporary command of the 1st Battalion, the 

1st and 2d made their crossings and continued the 

attack until 1100 the next morning when the Armistice took effect. While battalions in other regiments had held back from the crossing that night 

in expectation of the Armistice, the 2d Battalion 

followed Dunbeck’s simple order, “Men, I am going 

across that river, and I expect you to go with me.”

Eight months of combat, including five major battles against Europe’s finest, had given the 

Marine Corps its most severe test. Had its officers 
196

Postwar Analysis

measured up in battalion command? We have seen 

their success under the most difficult conditions 

and have noted that Wise, Turrill, and O’Leary 

were from groups commissioned in 1899 and 1900; 

Berry, Shearer, and Keyser in 1904 and 1905; and 

Messersmith in 1909. For the last six weeks of the 

war, battalion commanders Hamilton and Larsen 

were classmates commissioned in August 1913, 

while Dunbeck had even briefer commissioned service but long enlisted experience. Had their prior 

service prepared them for this command? Years of 

sea duty and expeditionary service, where iron discipline, personal leadership, and periodic leaps into 

the unknown were the norm, had given these officers a sound foundation based on the cool, selfconfident ability to lead men in the face of danger. 

In many ways, this was all they really required since 

battalion command was largely a matter of personal 

example and personal leadership. Communication 

was by runner; an adjutant and a second in command made up the battalion’s operational staff; and 

supporting artillery was under higher level control. 

A battalion commander had to control 1,000 men 

in his four rifle companies—with perhaps a 180-

man machine gun company thrown in. He had to 

get them to unknown locations with inadequate 

maps and information, deploy them properly with 

incomplete instructions and insufficient time, and 

attack Europe’s best troops, suffering 50 percent or 

higher casualties but persevering until victorious. 

Those the Marine Corps picked met the challenge, 

and many of them went on to very successful careers. 
197

BATTALION COMMAND “OVER THERE”

THE 6TH REGIMENT, 1917–18

by Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., USMC (Ret)

As the men of the just-arrived 5th Regiment

(see MCG [Marine Corps Gazette], September 

1997, p. 112) celebrated Independence Day of 1917 

in France, the Marine Corps made final plans for 

another regiment to join them there. One week later, on 11 July 1917, the 6th Regiment was formed 

for the first time at Quantico, Virginia. With far 

fewer experienced officers, NCOs, or prior service 

Marines than the 5th [Regiment] had received the 

month before, the new regiment took more than 

two months to ship out its first battalion for France 

[table 1].

A good man was chosen to lead it. Major John 

Arthur “Johnny the Hard” Hughes had led Marines 

in action in the Philippines, at Veracruz where he

received the Medal of Honor, and in the Dominican Republic where he suffered a painful leg

wound in 1916 that was not completely healed. 

Intensive training readied the 1st Battalion, which 

embarked on 23 September and landed in France 

on 4 October.

Next overseas was the 3d Battalion, commanded 

by Major Berton W. Sibley, who also had served in 

the Philippines and twice with expeditions to Cuba. 

He joined the 6th [Regiment] on 14 August and 

sailed for France with his battalion on 24 October. 

The final battalion took longer. Major Thomas Holcomb took command of the 2d Battalion in August 

but they did not sail until January 1918, arriving at 

Saint-Nazaire on 6 February. An “old China hand” 

Table 1. World War I battalion commanders, 6th Regiment

1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion

Deployment to France Maj John A. Hughes Maj Thomas Holcomb Maj Berton W. Sibley

Verdun

(16 March–14 May)

Maj John A. Hughes Maj Thomas Holcomb Maj Berton W. Sibley

Belleau Wood

(1–26 June)

Maj Maurice Shearer

Maj John A. Hughes

Maj Franklin B. Garrett

Maj Thomas Holcomb Maj Berton W. Sibley

Soissons

(18–19 July)

Maj John A. Hughes Maj Thomas Holcomb Maj Berton W. Sibley

Saint-Mihiel

(12–16 September)

Maj Frederick A. Barker Maj Ernest C. Williams Maj Berton W. Sibley

Blanc Mont

(3–10 October)

Maj Frederick A. Barker Maj Ernest C. Williams Maj George K. Shuler

Meuse-Argonne

(31 October–

11 November)

Maj Frederick A. Barker

Maj George A. Stowell

Maj Ernest C. Williams Maj George K. Shuler
198

Postwar Analysis

and distinguished rifle shot, Holcomb had been director of marksmanship and before that aide to the 

Commandant. (See MCG, August 1997, p. 88.)

These three commanders trained their men at 

Quantico, then in France, and led them through 

their first defensive combat in a quiet sector of the 

front near Verdun during March and April 1918. 

In May, Major Hughes was briefly hospitalized 

and the 1st Battalion was led by a newly promoted 

company commander, Major Maurice E. Shearer, 

when the regiment was committed to action at Belleau Wood on 2 June. Hughes returned to claim 

his command on 5 June, and Shearer replaced a 

wounded battalion commander in the 5th [Regiment] two days later.

Hughes lasted eight days in Belleau Wood and 

then was replaced by Major Franklin B. Garrett, 

a recent graduate of the American Expeditionary 

Forces General Staff College who had commanded 

a company in Haiti for 20 months. Garrett retained 

command for a month until Hughes once more returned from the hospital to lead the battalion in the 

great counteroffensive action at Soissons on 18–19 

July. On 30 July, Hughes was relieved by Major 

Frederick A. Barker, another seasoned officer who 

had three years Army enlisted service before his 

commissioning in the Marine Corps in 1904. Barker, who had seen action as a company commander 

in Haiti in 1915 and in the Dominican Republic in 

1916, would continue with the battalion for another 

three months.

Holcomb retained command of the 2d Battalion through Belleau Wood and Soissons, but in 

August he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and 

reassigned as second in command of the regiment. 

His replacement was another veteran of the 1916 

fighting in the Dominican Republic, Major Ernest 

C. Williams. Although Williams had less than 10 

years commissioned service, he was a proven leader 

who had won the Medal of Honor leading an assault that captured a key fortress in the Dominican 

campaign.

Sibley lasted the longest of the three original 

battalion commanders, but fragmentation wounds 

and temporary blinding by mustard gas during the 

action at Saint-Mihiel brought his command tour 

to an end in mid-September. His relief was justpromoted Major George K. Shuler, commissioned 

in 1910 and a veteran of the Veracruz landing. 

Shuler proved to be a skillful combat leader. During 

the next offensive at Blanc Mont, his French citation for the Croix de Guerre read, in part, “After a 

minute reconnaissance of Blanc Mont he attacked, 

took the position, capturing 85 machine guns, 234 

men, and 4 officers.” His American citation concluded, “Fearless, aggressive and able, he twice accomplished moves of vital importance with brilliant 

success.”

Although the 6th [Regiment] had borne the 

brunt of the Marine brigade’s heavy fighting at 

Saint-Mihiel, it was a situation where the Germans 

were conducting a fighting withdrawal. At Blanc 

Mont, it was a different story. The Germans occupied heavily fortified positions that they had held 

against all French attacks since September 1914. 

They had every intention of continuing to hold but, 

at 0550 [on] 3 October 1918, the 6th [Regiment] 

led the assault and within two hours had occupied 

the position. There were fierce counterattacks and 

continued fighting until 6 October, but the Marines 

had set a new standard of tactical skill. Later in the 

month, the regiment shifted to the Meuse-Argonne 

sector and prepared for the final offensive.

Here the 6th [Regiment] endured cold rains, 

artillery, and air bombardment as they prepared for 

the attack on the last German defensive line south 

of the Meuse River. Barker, Williams, and Shuler 

still led the battalions as they jumped-off with 

Army light tank support at 0530 [on] 1 November. 

With adequate time for reconnaissance, planning, 

and detailed dissemination of orders, their success 

was complete, and they advanced an unprecedented 

nine kilometers the first day. Skillful tank-infantry 

work resulted in the outflanking and capture of a 

number of enemy positions. Sickness, however, was 

beginning to cause as many losses as enemy action 

and, by the night of 2 November, Barker, suffering 

from both [exposure to mustard] gas and influenza, 

was unable to function and was evacuated.

His relief was Major George A. Stowell, another recently promoted company commander who 

had been commissioned in 1913 and then taken 

part in the Veracruz landing in 1914 and combat 

in both Haiti in 1915 and the Dominican Republic 
199

Commanders

in 1916. The new major had been employed during 

the attack as commander of the “liaison battalion,” 

a composite of one Marine and one Army infantry 

company whose mission was to maintain contact 

between the Marines and the Army division on 

their flank.

The regiment completed offensive operations 

on 4 November and prepared for a crossing of the 

Meuse, first on the 8th, then the 9th, and finally at 

2130 [on] 10 November, but this too was delayed 

by events; midnight of the 10th found them still in 

assembly areas near the river. Despite a detachment 

of 40 Marines sent to assist them, Army engineers 

were unable to complete the bridges in this sector. 

As dawn approached on the eleventh, Shuler, now 

the senior battalion commander, conferred with the 

other two battalion commanders and led the move 

away from the river out of observed German fire. 

Here the men dropped into an exhausted sleep and 

the Armistice took effect a few hours later.

The 6th [Regiment] had been organized exactly 

16 months before and had seen five officers command its 1st Battalion and two each [command] its 

2d and 3d Battalions. In spite of very heavy losses 

in both officers and men, the last eight months of 

combat had led to greatly increased tactical skill at 

all levels of command.

The trench raids of the Verdun sector had given 

way to the confused and violent fighting within 

Belleau Wood, followed by the forced marches and 

lack of information during the multidivision counterattack at Soissons. The next three large offensives 

saw increasingly competent performance at brigade 

and higher levels and consequently more opportunity for proper tactical planning. The men the Marine Corps chose to lead its battalions proved equal 

to their tasks in all respects, both the young majors 

who led their men into Belleau Wood in June and 

the seasoned captains of 1917 who later succeeded 

to command.
200

BATTALION COMMAND “OVER THERE”

6TH MACHINE GUN BATTALION

by Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., USMC (Ret)

The 5th [Regiment] was initially organized and sent 

to France with one machine gun company of Lewis 

guns for each infantry battalion, but later policy 

required one machine gun company with each infantry regiment and a four-company machine gun 

battalion for each brigade. Consequently, a twocompany machine gun battalion was formed in August 1917 at Quantico and, on arrival in France in 

January 1918, absorbed two now-excess companies 

from the 5th [Regiment] and was designated the 

6th Machine Gun Battalion.

There cannot have been much question as to 

who would command this battalion. For some years, 

newly promoted Major Edward B. Cole had been 

unchallenged as the Corps most prominent machine gun expert. Commissioned in 1904, he had 

frequent expeditionary deployments, including the 

Veracruz operation. For the last year, he had been 

working with Headquarters Marine Corps perfecting tables of organization and equipment for machine gun units. It was during this time that the 

“Cole cart” was put in service based on his modification of a design used by German naval infantry. 

His most important contribution was service on the 

War Department Machine Gun Board in 1916, after which he led the Marine Corps’ large-scale procurement of the Lewis machine gun.

The Lewis was an excellent, highly portable, aircooled gun then in production in the United States 

for the Allies, but for some reason shunned by the 

Army. By March 1918, a complex of logistical factors caused the American Expeditionary Forces to 

transfer the Marine brigade’s Lewis guns to the Air 

Service (that desperately needed them) and to substitute old French Hotchkiss guns.

The battalion’s first combat employment in the 

Verdun sector in France provided good individual 

training but little in the way of tactical choice, as 

the gun crews simply manned the same positions 

the French had been occupying for years. But the 

experience it provided of enemy artillery bombardments, trench raids, and tactical movement at night 

was good preparation for the challenges ahead.

Belleau Wood was the first great test as the 

four companies of the battalion employed for “battery fire” against the German advance. This was a 

technique of long-range fire perfected by the British and was highly effective in the initial defensive 

phase of the battle. With the shift to the offensive 

on 6 June, companies were attached to the infantry battalions, and Major Cole’s job became much 

more difficult. With the confused fighting inside 

the woods, machine gun units became intermingled 

and lost contact with supported troops. Cole’s answer was personal leadership at the line of contact, 

and 10 June found him leading a small party of Marines in the assault of a German machine-gun nest. 

Severely wounded by a German grenade, Cole died 

of [his] wounds eight days later.

His replacement was the battalion’s senior company commander, recently promoted Major Littleton W. T. Waller Jr. Commissioned in 1907, Waller 

was the son of the Corps’ most famous expeditionary Marine and a veteran of the Veracruz landing. 

As the fighting in the woods continued, the battalion was continually engaged with all companies 

committed. Only on 5 July were these exhausted 

men relieved by Army gun crews. They enjoyed 11 

days of comparative rest preparing a new defensive 

line in the rear before orders came for a 16-kilometer night march to meet trucks that would take 

them to the front.

This next operation, the great counterattack at 

Soissons, gave the battalion its most demanding 

physical ordeal. After nine hours on trucks, the battalion marched to its bivouac area where it received 

orders to countermarch to join the 5th [Regiment] 

for an attack at 0435 [on] 18 July. Carrying guns 

and the extra ammunition ordered for this operation, the troops marched in rain through the night, 

catching up with the supported troops only after 

H-hour. They continued on until consolidation on 

the first objective at 1500. They moved out again at 

1700, this time in support of Army troops of the 

3d Brigade. Spending the night with a reserve mission, they jumped-off with the 6th [Regiment] at 
201

Commanders

0800 the following morning, two companies in support and two companies moving with the infantry. 

Extremely heavy casualties continued through the 

day, but they consolidated a position for the night 

and were relieved by French troops at 0200 on 20 

July. Hopes for a hot meal were in vain, German 

planes having bombed and strafed the battalion’s 

field kitchens the day before. Major Waller later 

noted that this led the battalion to fabricate special mounts on their caissons for antiaircraft fire, 

stating: “Had we had this disposition during the 

Soissons drive, we might have accounted for several Boche planes, provided, of course, that the four 

mules hitched to the caissons felt so disposed.”

The battalion spent two weeks in a rear area, 

two weeks in fortifications on a quiet sector of the 

front, and two weeks at a division machine gun 

school. This latter was badly needed because most 

of the replacements had no machine gun training, 

and many junior men had been promoted to more 

responsible jobs for which they lacked adequate 

knowledge.

The training was particularly important since 

these Marines were about to engage in their first 

well-planned and well-prepared operation—the attack to eliminate the Saint-Mihiel salient. Major 

Waller later stated: “The intelligence maps of the 

Boche lines were wonderful; we knew the location 

of every PC [CP], dressing station, dump, machine 

gun position, artillery position. . . . All these points 

we had studied for days ahead, and the machineguns were placed where we could best harass these 

points.” The entire battalion was in position for 

overhead, indirect battery fire beginning at 0500 

[on] 12 September, which continued for nearly an 

hour until masked by advancing friendly troops. 

Moving by bounds to follow the advance, the guns 

were on the final objective by the end of the day. 

There they remained for three days, experiencing 

only harassing fire and ineffective counterattacks.

In the next operation, Blanc Mont, there was 

less preparation time and far less advance information, despite the fact that the French had been 

trying to take the position since 1914. Marines relieved French troops under fire there before dawn 

2 October and attacked at 0500 the next day. As 

machine gun companies moved with their supported infantry battalions, there was not much the battalion commander could do to influence the action 

other than to ensure that his units were well supplied with ammunition. Although a six-kilometer 

advance was achieved the first day, for the machine 

gunners, Blanc Mont was a series of dogged, bitter encounters fought mainly by platoons. Six more 

days of artillery shelling and heavy counterattacks 

followed until the Marines were finally relieved on 

10 October.

On 24 October, Major Waller was transferred 

to be the 2d Division’s machine gun officer. The 

senior company commander, Major Matthew H. 

Kingman, took command of the battalion. Kingman was commissioned in 1913 and had just 

completed his first tour of sea duty when war was

declared in April 1917. He sailed to France with the 

5th [Regiment] in June in command of one of the 

machine gun companies and was promoted to captain in October 1917. Wounded during the 6 June 

attack at Belleau Wood, Kingman returned in time 

to lead his company at Soissons; he was promoted 

to major in September.

Returning to the U.S. First Army in the 

Meuse-Argonne, the Marines were involved in 

another well-planned, deliberate attack. On the attack frontage of three kilometers, the 2d Division 

massed all three of its machine gun battalions for 

a total of 255 guns firing overhead fire when the 

troops jumped-off at 0530 [on] 1 November. This 

continued for two hours before the guns moved out 

by company to follow their supported battalions. 

They continued in the attack for five more days, 

reverted to reserve, and made the final attack—an 

opposed crossing of the Meuse—the night of 10 

November. Two companies made it across, but one 

of these which had only five guns remaining serviceable had four of them knocked out by German 

fire in the crossing. The war was over and the long 

march into Germany was soon to begin. Ironically, 

this march was made with the excellent Browning 

water-cooled machine gun, which would be one of 

the Corps’ prime infantry weapons for the next 40 

years, but was just days late to see action in France.

All three of the men who commanded the battalion had performed with distinction and were 

heard from in subsequent years. In Major Cole’s 

case, this consisted of having a destroyer named 
202

Post-War Analysis

for him in 1919 and earning eternal praise from all 

Marines for his wonderful cart, which hauled everything from weapons and ammunition in combat 

to wall lockers in garrison. Waller left the Marine 

Corps after the war but retained reserve status. Recalled in 1941, he ultimately commanded Marine 

bases in the Pacific as a brigadier general, the first 

Reserve officer to attain that rank. Kingman had 

extensive duty in Haiti and Nicaragua, was promoted to brigadier general in 1942, commanded 

the San Diego training center, and served with the 

OSS prior to retirement in 1944.
203

REGIMENTAL COMMAND “OVER THERE”

1917–18

by Colonel Gerald C. Thomas Jr., USMC (Ret)

When war was declared in 1917 the senior line officers of the Corps were—with a single exception—a 

block of [U.S.] Naval Academy graduates commissioned from 1883 to 1897, after which the Navy 

had decided it could no longer provide officers to 

the Corps. Below them was another large block 

of officers commissioned from civil life during the 

Spanish-American War; the initial commanders of 

the first two regiments to go to France came from 

the first group while their successors came from the 

second. Three of the most promising colonels—Joseph H. Pendleton, John A. Lejeune, and Eli K. 

Cole—had just been promoted to the new rank of 

brigadier general, but 11 others were in the United 

States available to command the 5th [Regiment] 

when it was formed in June 1917.

The job went to the second senior of these,

Colonel Charles A. Doyen, a classmate of the 

Commandant, Major General George Barnett, 

conveniently on duty at Washington, DC. The 57-

year-old Doyen, who over the years had commanded three expeditionary regiments and two brigades 

in the Philippines and Caribbean, was an obvious 

choice based on both seniority and field experience. 

Three months after arrival in France, Doyen 

was promoted to brigadier general, and soon took 

command of the 4th Brigade. He was relieved by a 

member of the Spanish-American War generation, 

Lieutenant Colonel I. Hiram Bearss. Bearss, one of 

the Corps’ notable warriors, was too junior to retain 

such a plum and, on 1 January 1918, was relieved by 

future Commandant Colonel Wendell C. Neville.

Ten years younger than Doyen, but still from 

the Naval Academy block (commissioned 1892), 

Neville had a brilliant record. He had been breveted 

for heroism at Guantanamo in 1898, commended 

for bravery under fire against Boxers in China in 

1900, and awarded the Medal of Honor [for] leading the assault regiment at Veracruz in 1914. His 

skill and example would be sorely needed in the 

months ahead.

By January 1918, two battalions and the regimental headquarters of the 6th [Regiment] were 

in France with the third battalion due to arrive the 

next month. Formed at Quantico in July 1917, the 

6th [Regiment] was commanded by the Corps’ most 

recent graduate of the Army War College, Colonel 

Albertus W. Catlin. The 49-year-old Catlin was a 

classmate of Neville, had considerable expeditionary duty, and he too had been awarded the Medal 

of Honor at Veracruz.

Both Neville and Catlin faced similar challenges as the Marine brigade intensified training, experienced defensive combat under French command 

near Verdun, and in May had a new brigade commander. Doyen was sent home in bad health, took 

command of the training base at Quantico, and died 

there of influenza five months later. His relief was 

Brigadier General James G. Harbord, USA, who 

had been Pershing’s chief of staff and, coincidentally, Catlin’s classmate at the War College the year 

before. Harbord was a good brigade commander, 

but he had little time to get ready. Belleau Wood 

was at hand, waiting to provide as severe a test of 

both formal command methods and personal leadership as man could devise. Catlin escaped most of 

it. As the defenders shifted to the attack on 6 June, 

Catlin was forward observing and was shot through 

the lung. His war was over, but he survived to be 

promoted to brigadier general and served until [he] 

retired in December 1919, publishing a picturesque 

personal memoir, With the Help of God and a Few 

Marines.

His relief was the regiment’s second-incommand, Harry Lee. At age 46, Lee was an

athletic, commanding presence, and a direct descendant of the dashing Light Horse Harry Lee of 

Revolutionary War fame. He acted the part. From 

1892 to 1898, he served in the National Guard 

where he made a name as a boxer and wrestler, receiving a wartime Marine commission in August 

1898. With much sea and expeditionary duty, he 

had seen action in the 1912 Nicaraguan Campaign 

and in Haiti. On his first day in command, he needed all his resources. Faced with a confused situation, Lee soon was operating in his usual manner, 
204

Postwar Analysis

winning the loyal devotion of subordinates and the 

warm approval of his seniors.

Astute and observant, an example of his style 

was seen in the next great battle at Soissons where 

his 3d Battalion led the attack against suddenly 

heavy resistance approaching Tigny. This was a key 

point at which to consolidate our gains or from 

which the Germans could counterattack. With 55 

percent casualties in four hours, the battalion could 

not advance, and Lee’s runner-delivered, scribbled 

message was characteristic: “Has Tigny been taken? 

If you don’t know, find out. If stopped, dig in.” Thus 

he anticipated precisely the division’s order of four 

hours later.

Soissons also brought a new commander to the 

5th [Regiment] as Neville took command of the 

Marine brigade. Unlike the 6th [Regiment] where 

the second-in-command had been kept in the rear 

to maintain communications and to supervise logistical support, the second-in-command of the 

5th [Regiment], Logan Feland, had been active 

throughout the fighting at Belleau Wood coordinating the battalions in contact. For these actions, 

he had already been awarded the Distinguished 

Service Cross, and Harbord later wrote:

He was the principal reliance of Gen Neville 

. . . and of myself . . . when an officer of Field 

Rank . . . was needed in any critical place or 

moment . . .

He never failed me in any instance, and I attribute a very substantial portion of the fame 

so worthily won by the Marine Brigade to the 

efficiency of Logan Feland.

A company commander with the 3d Kentucky 

Infantry during the Spanish-American War, Feland 

was commissioned a Marine Corps first lieutenant 

the following year and had the usual expeditionary 

assignments, including Veracruz. Chosen to be one 

of the two Marine officers with General John J. Pershing’s advance party, he managed to spend the last 

six months of 1917 observing French infantry operations and then, a 48-year-old lieutenant colonel, 

joined the 5th [Regiment] under Neville in January 

1918.

Lee and Feland found war was changing; for 

the first time, the Marines came under complete 

American command for the next operation. Preparations for the Saint-Mihiel attack were thorough. 

On 3–5 September, the regimental commanders had the opportunity to walk their formations 

through “division terrain and maneuver exercises.” 

They also were given the unprecedented opportunity for both map and physical reconnaissance of 

the objective and precious time for complete briefings of leaders at all levels. The following week’s attack went well with the 5th [Regiment’s] casualties 

limited to 136 enlisted while the 6th [Regiment’s] 

losses were 16 officers and 483 enlisted men. Problems still came from other causes as Army tanks on 

their first operation suffered control and mechanical problems and failed to keep up with the infantry, 

and the 6th [Regiment] suffered from the “friendly 

fire” of the adjacent division’s artillery.

The Blanc Mont battle was another challenge 

for Lee and Feland as the Marines encountered the 

famous French language barrier while conducting 

a night relief of troops in contact on 2 October. 

Daylight was spent in planning how to occupy attack positions still outposted by German troops and 

under fire of German strong points. Attacking at 

first light on 3 October, all obstacles were overcome, 

and Blanc Mont was another notable victory for the 

Marines.

By the final operation in the Meuse-Argonne, 

the American First Army was functioning well and 

the Marine regiments received orders for their next 

attack a full week in advance! Formal “aerial” support was added to normal engineer and artillery, 

and the two Marine regiments had the direct support of the 1st Provisional Tank Company—by now 

all that was left of Patton’s light tank brigade that 

had supported them at Saint-Mihiel less than two 

months before. Their success was complete, and the 

war was over.

Eight months of combat against Europe’s finest 

had validated the Marine Corps as fully capable on 

the modern battlefield, and command of the Corps’ 

two most famous regiments made Lee and Feland 

marked men. In 1920, they were both promoted 

to brigadier general over several colonels who had 

been wartime brigadiers but reverted to permanent 

rank after the war.

Feland became the first director of General 

Lejeune’s new Operations and Training Division at 

Headquarters Marine Corps, a significant reform 
205

Commanders

of that somewhat moribund headquarters and its 

first major structural change since 1798. Lee went 

on to become military governor of the Dominican 

Republic, the only Marine to hold a job previously 

reserved for Navy flag officers. Both enjoyed continued success during the 1920s and, in April 1927, 

Feland was chosen to lead the Marine occupation 

of Nicaragua where he remained, except for a fourmonth stateside tour, until March 1929. Feland was 

looked on by many as the logical successor to General Lejeune, but it was not to be as the next three 

commandants came from the group of Naval Academy graduates commissioned before the SpanishAmerican War. He retired in 1933 and Lee, who 

was highly regarded as a trainer, died while in command at Quantico in 1935.

PART III

ANNOTATED ORDER OF BATTLE
“5th Marines at Champagne.”

Courtesy of Capt John W. Thomason Jr., Marine Corps Archives
209

At the outbreak of the First World War in August 

1914, the German cruiser SMS Cormoran (1909) 

sought refuge in the harbor of Guam from two 

Japanese men-of-war. Once inside the harbor, the 

ship and its crew were interned and under the control of the U.S. naval commander, who was also the 

governor of Guam. The crew and ship were partially 

disarmed and the crew was allowed to continue living on the ship. The failure to fully disarm the vessel caused considerable anxiety for many months 

preceding America’s entry into the war, until it was 

finally completely disarmed in March 1917.

In the early morning of 7 April 1917, a cutter from the Cormoran was ashore for provisions 

when the German officer-in-charge heard that the 

United States had declared war on Germany. The 

officer immediately attempted to carry the news 

back to his commanding officer on the cruiser. At 

the same time, a small American boat was already 

headed toward the cruiser with an American officer aboard to demand the official surrender of the 

ship. In an attempt to stop the German cutter, the 

American officer ordered a warning shot fired—the 

first American shot of the war. Defiant to the last, 

the Germans scuttled the Cormoran instead of surrendering it to the Americans.

To this day, the name of the person who actually fired the first shot remains in question. The 

accepted version is that the governor sent his executive officer, Commander Owen Bartlett, with a 

boarding party of Marines and sailors to take possession of the cruiser. Bartlett’s party, chugging toward the Cormoran in a steam launch, noted a small 

party of Germans departing the ship in a small 

boat. Bartlett ordered Corporal Micael B. Chockie 

to fire a warning shot.*

However, the Washington Post and the Marines’ 

Bulletin, which were published within months of 

the actual incident, indicated that it was “Major 

Ethelbert Talbot,” from one of the shore batteries, who commanded a small boat of Marines and 

thus ordered “Corporal Cordrey” to fire the warning 

shot. A review of the muster rolls reveals that “Major Talbot” was in fact First Lieutenant Ethelbert 

Talbot—a company officer with 40th Company, 

Marine Barracks, Naval Base Guam. Interestingly, 

Corporal Chockie was also assigned to the 40th 

Company. Further confusing the situation is the 

identification of Corporal Thomas Cordrey as a 

member of 41st Company, Marine Barracks, Naval 

Base Guam. The only answer to the question, “Who 

fired the first shot?”—a U.S. Marine. Therefore, including the Marines in Guam in this order of battle 

is only fitting.

* BGen Edwin H. Simmons and Col Joseph H. Alexander, 

Through the Wheat: The U.S. Marines in World War I (Annapolis, 

MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 8.

WORLD WAR I

ORDER OF BATTLE
210

Annotated Order of Battle

Combat Forces

4th Brigade

The 4th Brigade was activated on 24 October 1917 

at Bourmont, Haute-Marne, France, as part of the 

U.S. Army’s 2d Division. It consisted of the 5th and 

6th Regiments as well as the 6th Machine Gun 

Battalion. The companies forming the battalions 

were as follows:

5th Regiment

1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion

17th (A) Company 18th (E) Company 16th (I) Company

49th (B) Company 43d (F) Company 20th (K) Company

66th (C) Company 51st (G) Company 45th (L) Company

67th (D) Company 55th (H) Company 47th (M) Company

8th Machine Gun Company

Supply Company

Headquarters Company

6th Regiment

1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion

74th (A) Company 78th (E) Company 82d (I) Company

75th (B) Company 79th (F) Company 83d (K) Company

76th (C) Company 80th (G) Company 84th (L) Company

95th (D) Company 96th (H) Company 97th (M) Company

73d Machine Gun Company

Supply Company

Headquarters Company

6th Machine Gun Battalion

15th (A) Company 77th (C) Company

23d (B) Company 81st (D) Company

*See p. 235 for full detail of this organization

Organizational Standing 4th Brigade

October 1917 - November 1918
211

Annotated Order of Battle

The brigade participated in the following campaigns during the war: Aisne, Aisne-Marne, SaintMihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Toulon-Troyon, Château 

Thierry, Marabache, and Limey. On 17 November 

1918, the brigade (as part of the 2d Division) commenced its march to the Rhine, passing through 

Belgium and Luxembourg. The German frontier 

was reached on 26 November 1918 and crossed 

on 1 December; the Rhine was reached on 10 December and crossed on the 13th. The brigade settled down to its occupation duty in Germany with 

headquarters successively established at Margut, 

Bellefontaine, Arlon, Useldange, Berg, Eppeldorf,

Neuerburgh, Waxweiler, Prüm, Büdesheim, Wiesbaum, Antweiler, Neuenahr, Burgbrohl, Rheinbrohl, and Hönningen.

The duties of the 4th Brigade with the Army 

of Occupation in Germany were uneventful, the 

outstanding features being the establishment of a 

Rhine River patrol, manned and commanded by 

Marines; an extended visit, inspection, and review 

by the secretary of the Navy; and the operation of 

the 2d Division, including the Marines, made about 

the middle of June 1919 in which an advanced position was taken as a part of the concentration of the 

Third Army immediately preceding the signing of 

the treaty of peace by the Germans.

Headquarters of the 4th Brigade during the 

greater part of the occupation of Germany was at 

Niederbieber while, during the last operation when 

the advanced position was taken just prior to Germany signing the peace treaty, it was at Herschbach. 

On the date the treaty was signed, the 5th Regiment, with headquarters at Hatenfels, occupied the 

most advanced position ever occupied by Marines 

in Germany. Just before departing from Germany, 

the headquarters was at Niederbieber and, with the 

exception of Brest, France, this was the last headquarters the brigade had in Europe. Upon arriving 

at Quantico, the brigade was deactivated on 13 August 1919.

5th Regiment

Late in May 1917, President Wilson directed the 

secretary of the Navy to issue the necessary orders 

detaching for service with the Army a force of Marines to be known as the 5th Regiment and, within 

16 days, the regiment, completely organized and 

ready for active service, was sailing for France.

The rapid organization, equipping, and embarkation of the regiment was the product of considerable forethought. Major General Commandant 

George Barnett had strongly contended that Marines should be sent to Europe’s western front. Accordingly, he conducted liaison with various War 

Department agencies to collect the information 

necessary to organize and equip a Marine expeditionary force. General Barnett’s efforts began to 

bear fruit when, on 16 May, the secretary of war 

asked President Wilson for a Marine regiment 

equipped as infantry for duty in France. Anticipating approval, General Barnett recalled overseas 

troops and organized them into the 5th Regiment.

President Wilson had directed that the 5th 

Regiment was to serve as part of an Army force, 

so the regiment was assigned to the 1st Division 

upon its arrival in France. Service as part of the 

1st Division consisted of training for most of the 

regiment, but included providing units for lines of 

communication (Services of Supply) duty. In September 1917, the regiment was reassigned to the 2d 

Division and later to the 4th Brigade, which was 

activated on 24 October.

The 5th Regiment participated in the following 

campaigns during the war: Aisne, Aisne-Marne, 

Saint-Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Toulon-Troyon, 

Château Thierry, Marabache, and Limey. After 11 

November 1918, the regiment remained in Europe 

Members of the 5th Regiment practice grenade throwing 

with their French trainers in Menaucourt, France.

Signal Corps Photograph Collection,

Military History Institute
212

Annotated Order of Battle

to occupy the German Rhineland. The regiment returned to the United States in August 1919 and was 

deactivated on the 13th of the month.

6th Regiment

A little more than a month after the United States 

declared war, on 14 May, the Marine Corps leased 

6,000 acres at Quantico, Virginia. On 14 June 1917, 

the 5th Regiment sailed for France and full attention could be focused on forming and training the 

6th Regiment.

Recruiting new enlisted men proved to be no 

problem after war was declared. An unusually high 

quality of men presented themselves for enlistment, 

and many successful business and professional men 

were among their number. The recruiting of new 

officers proceeded more slowly. Many outstanding 

men from the enlisted ranks were promoted to officers, both at the beginning and during the war. 

Many made careers of the Corps after the war and 

became distinguished officers, some of whom even 

reached the rank of four-star general. Consequently, 

when the 6th Regiment was organized on 11 July 

1917 at Quantico, more than half the Marines were 

college men with a large number of athletes among 

them. Two-thirds of one company came straight 

from the University of Minnesota—300 students 

enlisted together, for example. Trained and ready, 

the 6th Regiment together with the 6th Machine 

Gun Battalion arrived in France on 31 October 

1917. It was assigned to the 4th Brigade upon arrival.

The 6th Regiment participated in the following 

campaigns during the war: Aisne, Aisne-Marne, 

Saint-Mihiel, Meuse-Argonne, Toulon-Troyon, 

Château Thierry, Marabache, and Limey. After 11 

November 1918, the regiment remained in Europe 

to occupy the German Rhineland. The regiment returned to the United States in August 1919 and was 

deactivated on the 13th of the month with the 5th 

Regiment.

6th Machine Gun Battalion

The 5th Regiment was initially organized and sent 

to France with one machine gun company of Lewis 

guns for each infantry battalion, but later policy 

required one machine gun company with each infantry regiment and a four-company machine gun 

battalion for each brigade. Consequently, a twocompany machine gun battalion was formed on 17 

August 1917 at Quantico, and was designated as 1st 

Machine Gun Battalion, but on 20 January 1918, 

after arrival in France, it was redesignated as the 6th 

Machine Gun Battalion. The newly redesignated 

battalion absorbed two now-excess companies from 

the 5th Regiment.

The Lewis automatic rifle (fitted with a tripod 

and carried on a “Cole” cart) was an excellent, highly 

portable, air-cooled gun then in production in the 

United States for the Allies, but the Marines were 

required to turn them over to the Army; they were 

replaced by the old French Chauchat guns. Other 

equipment used by the battalion included eight 

caissons (two to each company; standard American 

infantry caissons), escort wagons, rolling kitchens, 

ration carts, water carts, and medical carts.

The battalion participated in the same battles 

alongside the Marines of the 5th and 6th Regiments 

and, after the Armistice was signed, the battalion 

was tasked to occupy the Rhineland. The 6th Machine Gun Battalion embarked onboard the USS 

Santa Paula (ID 1590) and arrived in New York on 

5 August 1919. Three days later, the battalion took 

part in the parade in New York City before being 

moved south to Quantico. Along with the other 

Marines, they participated in the Washington, DC, 

parade on 2 August 1919 and subsequently deactivated the next day.

Sentry on duty at the 6th Regiment headquarters.

Marine Corps History Division
213

Annotated Order of Battle

3d Provisional Brigade, Fort Crockett, Texas

While the battle operations of the 4th Brigade overshadows all others that took part in the First World 

War, those operations were by no means the only 

ones participated in by Marines around the globe 

and yet still engaged in the fight against German 

aggression. The 3d Provisional Brigade was headquartered in Cuba for the majority of its activation. 

But as things settled there, the brigade along with 

the 9th Regiment was relocated to Galveston, Texas, where the 8th Regiment was already stationed in 

August 1918.

Due to Germany’s attempt to draw Mexico 

into the affairs of the United States and its declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, the threat 

from the south was very real. The Mexican government was unstable and disjointed after years of 

revolution, but remained a major oil producer for 

the Allied powers. Galveston’s Fort Crockett was 

positioned on the Gulf of Mexico, which made it 

an ideal location for Marines to launch an amphibious operation into Mexico’s Tampico oil fields had 

the need arisen.

While at Fort Crockett, Marines were occupied 

with learning to operate machine guns, qualifying 

with various types of weapons, learning flag semaphore, playing baseball and swimming in the Gulf 

of Mexico, as well as guard duty. The brigade was 

deactivated in April 1919.

8th Regiment

The outbreak of hostilities between the United 

States and Germany in 1917 resulted in the original activation of the 8th Regiment. American entry 

into World War I in April of that year led to an 

immediate expansion of the Marine Corps. A number of regiments were brought into existence for use 

not only in Europe but also in areas outside the war 

zone. A total of 14 Marine regiments were on active 

duty by late 1918. Most never served in Europe but 

were deployed either in the Caribbean or remained 

stationed in the United States. One such organization that did not see combat, bearing the designation 8th Regiment, was activated as an infantry unit 

at Quantico on 9 October 1917.

The new regiment initially consisted of four 

units: Headquarters, 105th, 106th, and 107th Companies. The last three companies had come from 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, a few days earlier. On 

13 October 1917, the 103d, 104th, 108th, 109th, 

and 110th Companies joined the regiment after arriving from Mare Island, California. The last two 

companies of the regiment—the 111th and 112th 

Companies—were organized at Quantico on 22 

October. When completely manned, the regiment 

consisted of approximately 1,000 officers and enlisted men.

The first orders that the 8th Regiment received 

after its creation in 1917 indicated that it would not 

Marines of the 3d Provisional Brigade stationed at Fort Crockett, Galveston, Texas.

Library of Congress
214

Annotated Order of Battle

be deployed to France but would be sent instead to 

Texas for a possible thrust into Mexico. Relations 

between the United States and Mexico had deteriorated to a low state. In the years preceding America’s 

entry in World War I, open hostilities had erupted 

between the two countries. German intrigues in 

Mexico, actual or imagined, only heightened American anxiety over Mexico once the United States became a belligerent. Allied dependence on Mexican 

oil fields exaggerated fears that the Germans might 

take advantage of chaotic conditions in Mexico to 

disrupt the flow of oil from Tampico, the principal 

area of production. Thus, the 8th Regiment was ordered to Fort Crockett near Galveston, Texas. Had 

it been necessary, the regiment was to move swiftly, 

make an amphibious landing on the Mexican Gulf 

Coast, and seize the Tampico oil fields.

The regiment’s duties in Texas were primarily 

those of a typical garrison force. In addition, it embarked on a training program designed to ensure its 

readiness to intervene in Mexico should the order 

be given. Orders for the 8th Regiment’s redeployment from Texas eventually arrived from Washington in early spring 1919. On 10 April, personnel 

and equipment were embarked onboard the USS 

Hancock (AP 3), the same vessel that had brought 

the regiment to Fort Crockett a year and a half before. The ship immediately sailed and, within two 

weeks, reached Philadelphia where the regiment 

and its supplies were unloaded. The following day, 

25 April, the 8th Regiment went out of existence.

9th Regiment

The 9th Regiment originated during the great expansion of the Marine Corps during World War I. 

Created as one of the two infantry regiments of the 

Advanced Base Force, it was assigned to duty in the 

Carribean as a mobile force in readiness. It was activated on 20 November 1917 at Quantico and in 

December was bound for Cuba.

Cuba entered World War I on the Allied side 

soon after the entry of the United States, but insurgent bands left over from a recent rebellion still 

roamed the countryside, threatening the sugar crop 

vitally needed by the Allies for the war effort. The 

9th Regiment remained in Cuba to quell the dissidents until matters cooled enough to leave.

After the situation in Cuba improved, on 31 

July 1918, the 9th Regiment was withdrawn and 

sent to Texas to aid the 8th Regiment in forstalling 

the possible disruption by German agents of vital 

Mexican oil. Through the end of the war, the regiment remained at Fort Crockett, spending their 

time training and guard duty. With the end of the 

war, the need for the regiment evaporated, so the 

regiment embarked on 10 April 1919 aboard the 

Hancock for Philadelphia. It was deactivated on 25 

April.

Aviation Forces

On 6 April 1917, the Marine section of naval aviation consisting of 5 officers and 30 enlisted men 

was stationed at the Naval Air Station Pensacola, 

Florida, as part of the complement of that station. 

During April, May, and June 1917, the Marine aviation section was transferred to a combination land 

and water station for Marine fliers at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, Pennsylvania, and the training of

personnel for land flying began. The official designation of this organization was the Marine Aeronautic Company. Training in observation balloons 

was done in addition to the heavier-than-air work.

On 12 October 1917, this Marine Aeronautic 

Company, then consisting of 34 officers and 330 

enlisted men, was divided into the First Aviation 

Squadron, consisting of 24 officers and 237 enlisted 

men, and the First Marine Aeronautic Company, 

consisting of 10 officers and 93 enlisted men. On 14 

October 1917, the First Marine Aeronautic Company was transferred to Cape May, New Jersey, and 

took over the naval air station there.

On 17 October 1917, the First Aviation Squadron was transferred from the Marine Flying Field, 

Philadelphia Navy Yard, to the Army training field 

at Mineola, Long Island, where instruction and 

training were carried out in land flying. On 31 December 1917, this organization was transferred to 

Gerstner Field, Lake Charles, Louisiana, for advanced training.

In March 1918, the Marine Flying Field in 

Miami, Florida, was established and, on 21 March 

1918, the First Aviation Squadron was transferred 

to that field from Lake Charles. Four Marine 

squadrons of land-fighting planes and a headquar-
215

Annotated Order of Battle

ters company were organized to operate under the 

Navy as the Day Wing of the Northern Bombing 

Group.

1st Marine Aviation Force and Day Wing, 

Northern Bombing Group, France

On 13 July 1918, the 1st Marine Aviation Force, 

consisting of Squadrons A, B, C, and Headquarters 

Company, left Miami. The units were embarked onboard the USS De Kalb (ID 3010) at New York City 

for France on 18 July. This organization consisted 

of 107 officers and 654 enlisted men and, when 

Squadron D joined in October 1918, it consisted 

of 149 officers and 842 enlisted men. On 30 July 

1918, the Day Wing disembarked at Brest, France, 

and proceeded to its aerodromes between Calais 

and Dunkirk, where they established camp and prepared the aerodromes for use. The personnel of the 

Day Wing were completely organized and ready for 

service two weeks after their arrival in France. Some 

of the planes and equipment of this organization 

arrived at Pauillac, France, before the organization 

did. Squadron D, consisting of 42 officers and 188 

enlisted men, arrived at the Le Franc aerodrome on 

5 October, completing the four squadrons of the 

Day Wing.

During the month of October, additional 

planes were delivered to the Day Wing. To prevent 

the personnel who were completely trained and 

ready for action when they reached the front on 2 

August 1918 from getting badly out of practice, the 

commanding officer requested permission from the 

British aviation forces in the vicinity for Marine 

aviators to operate with their squadrons until the 

Marine’s planes were delivered. As many Marine 

pilots as could be accommodated were operating 

with British squadrons until the end of the war, and 

were highly complimented by the British officers. 

The Day Wing carried out 14 independent raids far 

behind the enemy lines, did considerable damage, 

and brought back valuable information. The organization participated actively and creditably in both 

offensives on the Flanders front.

While in Europe, the Marine fliers served with 

the 217 and 218 (bombing squadrons), Royal Air 

Force (Great Britain); and with pursuit, observation, and bombing squadrons of the French Flying 

Corps.

Early in December 1918, the Day Wing received orders to return to the United States and 

embarked on 6 December 1918 onboard the USS 

Mercury (ID 3012) at Saint-Nazaire, France, arriving at Newport News, Virginia, on 21 December 

1918.

1st Marine Aeronautic Company,

Ponta Delgada, Azores

On 7 December 1917, the First Marine Aeronautic Company, then consisting of 12 officers and 133 

enlisted men, was ordered to Naval Base 13, Ponta 

Delgada, Azores, arriving there on 21 January 1918. 

This company was the first completely equipped 

American aviation unit to leave the United States 

for service in the war.

This organization operated an antisubmarine 

patrol station of 10 R-6 seaplanes, 2 Curtiss N-9 

seaplanes, and later 6 Curtiss HS-L flying boats 

until the station was ordered abandoned on 24 

January 1919; the company was ordered to return 

to the United States, arriving at the Marine flying 

field in Miami, Florida, on 15 March 1919.

Marine airplane mechanics working on a Curtiss HS-2L in 

Ponta Delgada, Azores.

Hugh Squires Personal Papers Collection,

Marine Corps Archives
216

Annotated Order of Battle

Ships Detachments, Naval Base

Detachments and Miscellanea

Foreign Expeditionary Detachment, Naval 

Base Number 13, Ponta Delgada, Azores

Early in November 1917, Rear Admiral Herbert O. 

Dunn was ordered to the Department of the Navy 

for temporary duty prior to assuming command of 

the U.S. naval base in Ponta Delgada, Azores. During this time, he focused his energies in obtaining 

permission from the Portuguese government to establish a headquarters on shore, to land a detachment of Marines and a Marine aviation unit, to 

establish a supply department with storehouses on 

shore, and to allow the transfer of Navy supplies to 

and from ships to be carried on without assessing 

customs duties. A request was also made to land and 

mount six- or seven-inch guns for the protection 

of the base; however, the Portuguese government 

refused to grant the landing of the large weapons 

unless they were manned and controlled completely 

by the local military.

On 9 January 1918, the Hancock sailed from 

Philadelphia with Admiral Dunn and staff, as well 

as one company of Marines with equipment, one 

Marine aviation unit with aircraft and accessories, 

two seven-inch guns, and miscellaneous cargo for 

the base. While the concessions for the variety of 

requests made in late 1917 were approved, the remaining issue was the placement of the seven-inch 

guns for the defense of the base.

Permission to land the guns was finally verbally 

given; the Marines would mount and man the guns 

initially, but would train the local military in their 

maintenance and operation and eventually turn 

over the responsibility as soon as practical. The guns 

were landed and two locations were chosen—one 

gun pointed toward western Ponta Delgada for the 

protection of the city and the other was mounted 

about eight miles west of Ponta Delgada to protect 

the British wireless station that was being built at 

the time.

As soon as the guns were ready, instruction and 

drills began for Portuguese officers and enlisted 

men; however, it soon was decided that the local 

military was not proficient enough, nor would it 

ever be, to man the weapons alone. Nevertheless, 

repeated requests were received from the local military authorities to turn the weapons over to them, 

and the situation became tenuous.

On 15 April, General José Augusto de Simas 

Machado arrived from Lisbon; recently appointed 

high commissioner of the Azores, his authority extended over all islands. The issue of the guns was 

promptly settled; General Machado, after consultation with the Marine detachment commander,

decided that the Marines would retain complete 

Tents and other buildings of the 1st Marine Aeronautic Company, Ponta Delgada, Azores.

Still Pictures Branch, National Archives
217

Annotated Order of Battle

control of the weapons and responsibility for manning the batteries.*

The company was disbanded on 14 September 

1919; the final commanding officer, First Lieutenant John D. Lockburner, remained in Ponta Delgada as ordnance and communications officer until 

mid-December 1920.

136th Company, Naval Base Number 29, 

Cardiff, Wales

A small, but vital base was built at the Welsh port 

of Cardiff. A few weeks after the American Expeditionary Forces began to arrive in France, General 

Pershing’s staff discovered a shortage of coal. The 

British had none to spare, and a severe coal shortage existed in France. Admiral William S. Sims recommended the establishment of a base at Cardiff 

to handle the shipments of coal to France and requested a flag officer to command the base and the 

coal carriers. Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of 

Naval Operations, designated Cardiff as Naval Base 

Number 29.**

* “Historical Sketch of U.S. Naval Base, Ponta Delgada, Island 

of St. Michaels, Azores,” 15 February 1919, Azores Geographic 

File, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

** William N. Still Jr., Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (Gainesville: University of Florida 

Press, 2007), 97.

Marine Detachment, Lafayette

Radio Station, France

Originally named the Liberty Radio Station,  the 

Lafayette high-power radio station was situated in 

the village of Croix d’Hins, about 15 miles from 

Bordeaux. The construction of the station was the 

responsibility of the U.S. Navy in conjunction with 

the French. The construction of this station was 

deemed necessary after the United States entered 

the war, particularly due to the extremely heavy and 

increasing volume of trans-Atlantic traffic being 

handled by the ocean cables.

Work on the station began on 28 May 1918 and 

was far advanced when the Armistice was signed, at 

which time all worked stopped as it appeared that 

the facility was no longer needed. Later, however, 

the French government requested that the station 

be completed as an after-war measure. The station 

was completed on 21 August 1920.** **

* Ibid., 556fn69.

** Cdr Stanford C. Hooper, USN, “The Lafayette Radio Station and Its Relation to the United States Naval Communication Service and the World War,” Journal of the American Society 

of Naval Engineers 33, no. 3 (April 1921): 383–430.

Marines man the massive gun in Ponta Delgada, Azores. 

Marine Corps History Division
218

Annotated Order of Battle

Office of the Chief Paymaster,

U.S. Marines, France

In obedience to orders dated 2 October 1917 and 

in compliance with provisions of GHQ General 

Orders no. 38(2), 17 September 1917, the “Office 

of the Chief Paymaster, U.S. Marines, France,” was 

established in Paris, France, on 5 October 1917. 

Major Davis B. Wills was chief paymaster from the 

establishment of the office until it was abolished on 

30 August 1919.

Division 9, Atlantic Fleet, with British

Grand Fleet, Scapa Flow and Firth of Forth

Division 9 of the Atlantic Fleet, composed of the 

USS New York (BB 34) (flagship), Wyoming (BB 

32), Florida (BB 30), and Delaware (BB 28), was 

detailed for service with the British Grand Fleet, 

rendezvoused on 24 November 1917 in Lynnhaven Roads, Chesapeake Bay, and sailed for its destination the following day. The division took the 

northern passage and was 13 days en route, 4 days 

of which were spent in holding its own against a 

90-miles/hour gale off the Newfoundland coast. 

On 7 December 1917, the American battleships 

anchored with the British Grand Fleet in Scapa 

Flow, Orkney Islands, after a rousing reception, and 

on 26 December were designated the Sixth Battle 

Squadron of the British Grand Fleet.

The arrival of the U.S. division reduced the deficiencies in the Grand Fleet in several ways. 

Having a shortage of trained personnel, the 

Royal Navy, with the arrival of the U.S. ships, 

was able to pay off older battleships to release 

those crews for duty on destroyers. In addition, 

the arrival of the U.S. battleships gave the British enough capital ship strength to protect the 

Scandinavian convoys with a heavy covering 

force. The Admiralty probably would not have 

done so without the added measure of battleship superiority.*

From the time of its arrival to 29 November 

1918, this squadron—with the addition of the USS 

Texas (BB 35) in February 1918, and the substitution of the USS Arkansas (BB 33) for the Delaware

in July 1918—operated with the British Grand 

Fleet, basing most of the time in Scapa Flow and 

the remainder of the time in the Firth of Forth (Ro-

* Jerry W. Jones, U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 25.

Lafayette Radio Station. 

Still Pictures Branch, National Archives
219

Annotated Order of Battle

syth). The squadron took its regular turn at convoy 

duty, patrol duty, target practice, and fleet exercises 

with all the other squadrons of the British Grand 

Fleet. The squadron was at sea an average of 8–10 

days each month and followed the procedure of the 

Grand Fleet in all respects, even going so far as to 

shift to the British method of signaling.

Division 6, Atlantic Fleet, Castletown

Brehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland

Division 6, composed of the USS Utah (BB 31) 

(flagship), Nevada (BB 36), and Oklahoma (BB 37), 

was based on Berehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland. During the summer of 1918, the German Navy was severely criticized by the German press and taunted 

by the Allied press. It had become evident that the 

enemy submarines were powerless to prevent the 

transport of large numbers of troops and a great 

amount of material. It was learned from intelligence 

sources that, for these reasons if no other, the enemy 

contemplated an effort to send out battle cruisers to 

attack convoys, particularly troop convoys.

Because of the possibility that one or more German battle cruisers might slip out to sea and 

assail Allied convoys in the Atlantic, the Navy 

Department decided to send Battleship Division of the Atlantic Fleet to Berehaven, Ireland. 

Berehaven, on Bantry Bay, was situated close to 

the shipping lanes between the United States 

and ports in France and southern Britain. It was 

also close to Queenstown, Ireland, where most 

of America’s destroyers were stationed, making 

it an ideal location for a base from which the 

battleships could guard the convoys.*

In anticipation of such possible action by the enemy, and to further strengthen the protection of 

the convoys, the battleships Utah, Nevada, and 

Oklahoma were based at Berehaven, arriving on 

23 August. They were kept in readiness to put to 

sea on four-hours’ notice.** This division made two 

trips into the channel, escorting convoys when en-

* Ibid., 100.

** United States Office of Naval Intelligence, Information Concerning the U.S. Navy and Other Navies (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1925), 43.

emy submarines were reported in the vicinity. The

Nevada joined the American battleships of Division 9 the day after the surrender of the German 

Fleet off Rosyth, near Edinburgh.

Asiatic Fleet, Vladivostok, Siberia

The Marines of the USS Brooklyn (CA 3), flagship 

of the Asiatic Fleet, participated in the activities 

around Vladivostok, Siberia, in 1918. In June 1918, 

Vladivostok and practically all of Siberia was under the control of the Bolsheviki. The Bolsheviki, 

assisted by German and Austrian prisoners of war, 

were resisting the advance of the Czecho-Slovaks, 

who were trying to reach Vladivostok. In that city, 

on 29 June 1918, there were approximately 12,000 

well-organized Czecho-Slovaks, only about 2,500 

of whom were armed or equipped. On the foregoing date, the Czecho-Slovaks in the city took it over 

from the Bolsheviki after a three-hour battle near 

the city center and, on the afternoon of that day, 

Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, commander in 

chief of the Asiatic Fleet, ordered a detachment of 

American Marines ashore to guard the American 

consulate and to act as part of an Allied force composed of British, Japanese, Chinese, and CzechoSlovaks to patrol the city.

RAdm William L. Rogers and his staff onboard the USS 

Albany in Vladivostok, Russia. From left to right: LtCdr T. 

J. Bright, Cdr J. E. Gill, Capt Alvin Althouse, Adm Rogers, 

LtCol Eli T. Fryer, LtCdr Earl F. Smith, Lt ( Junior Grade) 

F. V. Martinek, and Lt H. C. Davis.

Signal Corps Photograph Collection,

Military History Institute
220

Annotated Order of Battle

In July 1918, Marines from the Brooklyn acted 

as guards over German and Austrian prisoners of 

war on Russian Island, about five miles from Vladivostok, while Marines from the same vessel constituted part of an Allied military force of American 

and British Marines, Japanese and Chinese bluejackets, and Czecho-Slovak soldiers, which was organized to prevent a threatened strike and disorder 

among the workmen in the Russian navy yard at 

Vladivostok.

The USS Albany (CL 23) was at Vladivostok on 

2 April 1919 until relieved by the USS New Orleans 

(CL 22) on 25 July 1919. Each of these ships, while 

they were anchored off Vladivostok, kept a small 

guard of Marines at the U.S. Naval Radio Station 

on Russian Island.

Marine Detachment, U.S. Naval Radio

Station, Russian Island, Vladivostok, Siberia

The Albany was anchored off Vladivostok on 2 

April 1919 and provided a small guard of Marines 

at the United States Naval Radio Station on Russian Island. The Albany was relieved by the New Orleans on 25 July 1919. The detachment transferred 

to Marine Barracks at Naval Station Cavite, Philippines, when the radio station was turned over to the 

Russian government on 19 November 1922.

American Naval Planning Section, London

The section was created in accordance with telegraphic instructions on 19 November 1917 by 

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Benson. Benson stated that he believed that “plans satisfactory 

to both countries can not [sic] be developed until 

we virtually establish a strict planning section for 

joint operations here (in London), in order that the 

personnel therein may be in a position to obtain 

latest British and allied information and to urge as 

joint plans such plans as our estimates and policy 

may indicate.”* The section was officially formed in 

London on 26 December 1917 at the headquarters 

of the force commander for U.S. naval forces operating in European waters as part of his staff.

* United States Office of Naval Intelligence, The American Naval Planning Section in London (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1923), 489.

American Rest Camp, Southampton, England

Numerous “rest camps” were established in England and France during the war. The camp located 

in Southampton, England, was primarily used as a 

“lay-over” for those troops just arriving from the 

United States. These troops were, after a short stay, 

then forwarded to the fighting forces in France.

Virgin Islands, Marine Barracks St. Thomas 

and All Marines Ashore in Virgin Islands

A few days prior to our actual declaration of 

war, the transfer of the Virgin Islands from the 

possession of Denmark to the United States 

was completed, and a battalion of Marines, acting as an occupying force, helped to take them 

over. One company (21st Company) established a garrison at Christiansted on St. Croix 

(29 Mar 1917) and two companies (14th and 

56th Companies) went to St. Thomas (21 April 

1917). The islands had been purchased largely 

to prevent their falling into the hands of the 

Germans, who it was feared might use them as 

submarine bases for operations in the western 

Atlantic. The Navy Department was constantly 

in fear of such a possibility even after the United States had taken possession of the islands.

“Without this 45-horsepower tractor, I do believe our 

casualties would have been greater than what the people at 

the front are suffering,” a Marine stated in reference to the 

dangerous work of moving the massive guns into place in 

rugged and remote locations throughout the Virgin Islands.

Still Pictures Branch, National Archives
221

Annotated Order of Battle

About one year later a small base defense 

force, equipped with searchlights and fixed naval guns, was organized and sent to the islands, 

where they established defenses which they 

maintained throughout the remainder of the 

war.*

Services of Supply

5th Brigade

The 5th Brigade was activated to cope with emergencies in World War I and was organized during 

the summer of 1918 at Quantico, Virginia. It consisted of the 11th and 13th Regiments and the 5th 

Brigade Machine Gun Battalion. The companies 

of the brigade were designated by letters instead of 

numbers to conform to Army standards.

The Fifth Brigade of Marines was sent to 

France without previously being assigned as 

* Clyde H. Metcalf, A History of the United States Marine Corps 

(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1939), 451.

part of an infantry division by the War Department. Practically all combat troops sent 

overseas were organized and received some 

training as units of divisions before leaving the 

United States. When Pershing was notified of 

the departure of the Fifth Brigade for France, 

it was not quite clear to him just how it should 

be used. He cabled the War Department, who 

advised him that the Brigade was not assigned 

to any regular division or other organization 

and was to be used as he saw fit. At the time of 

its arrival in France the commanding general 

of the S.O.S. (Service[s] of Supply) was much 

in need of dependable troops for guard duty 

and upon his request the Fifth Brigade was assigned to the S.O.S. (September 23, 1918) with 

the restriction that it should not be used for replacements nor for labor purposes. When the 

Brigade Commander, Brigadier General Eli K. 

Cole, arrived in France he was transferred to 

St. Aignon with his headquarters and assigned 

to the 41st Division—a depot division for the 

advanced training of replacements. Cole was 

Organization of the 5th Brigade; it did not serve together as a single brigade while in France.

Courtesy of author

Organizational Standing 5th Brigade
222

Annotated Order of Battle

given command of the division late in October 

which position he held until January 1919.*

One of the most prominent accomplishments 

of the Marines of the 5th Brigade was the administration of Pontanezen Camp at Brest, France, 

which turned out to be one of the largest embarkation camps in the world to that date. The camp 

was responsible for the reception, entertainment, 

and departure of large numbers of officers and enlisted men on their way back to the United States. 

The brigade returned to the United States in the 

summer of 1919 and was demobilized at Hampton 

Roads, Virginia, in August 1919.

The 5th Brigade was constructed as follows:

11th Regiment

1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion

Company A Company E Company I

Company B Company F Company K

Company C Company G Company L

Company D Company H Company M

Machine Gun Company

Supply Company

Medical Detachment

Headquarters Company

13th Regiment

1st Battalion 2d Battalion 3d Battalion

Company A Company E Company I

Company B Company F Company K

Company C Company G Company L

Company D Company H Company M

Machine Gun Company

Supply Company

Medical Detachment

Headquarters Company

5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion

Company A, Company B, Company C, Company D

11th Regiment

Activated at Quantico on 3 January 1918, Colonel 

George Van Orden commanded the 11th Regiment during its entire existence. The regiment was 

an outgrowth of the Mobile Artillery Force and 

was meant to be an artillery regiment. More infan-

* Ibid., 466.

trymen were needed in France and, with the 5th 

Brigade formed, Van Orden requested the regiment be converted to infantry. His plea coincided 

with the request from Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt for more infantry in 

France. In anticipation of the eventual conversion 

to infantry, the 11th Regiment underwent intensive 

infantry training at Quantico throughout the summer of 1918. On 5 September 1918, the regiment 

was officially designated an infantry regiment and 

joined the 5th Brigade; it set sail for France on 28 

September.

Upon arrival in France, the 11th Regiment was 

split up, with several units spread all over the country. Units of this regiment performed duty at various 

times at the following places: Brest, Tours, Montierchaume (Indre), Havre, Gièvres (Loir-et-Cher), 

Marseilles, Toulon (Bouches-du-Rhône), Miramas 

(Bouches-du-Rhône), Issoudun (Indre), La Pallice, 

La Rochelle (Charente Inférieur), Mehun (Cher), 

Saint-Aignan-Noyers, Romorantin (Loir-et-Cher), 

Marans, Nevers, Aigrefeuille, Barmant, Somme, 

Châteauroux (Indre), and Camp Covington (Camp 

Carret) near Marseilles, Paris (Headquarters Detachment, American Peace Commission).

Aerial photograph of only a portion of Camp Pontanezen, 

near Brest, France.

Smedley D. Butler Papers, Marine Corps Archives
223

Annotated Order of Battle

The officers and enlisted performed duties of 

various kinds, among such being: post commanders, post and assistant post adjutants, personnel 

adjutants, regulating officers, assistant to the depot

engineer, receiving officers, entertainment officers, 

assistant post chaplain, police officers, prison officers, camp guards, dock guards, commanding officers of troops, police sergeants, inspectors of the 

guard, district fire marshals, post welfare officers, 

district athletic officers, assistant provost marshals, 

fire patrol officers, fire marshals, transportation 

guard service, guard duty over prisoners, quartermaster property guard, interpreters, etc.

In early July 1919, the 11th Regiment returned 

to Brest and, on 29 July, it embarked aboard the 

USS Orizaba (ID 1536) for home. It disembarked 

at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 6 August and was 

deactivated there just five days later.

13th Regiment

The 13th Regiment was organized at Quantico, 

Virginia, 3 July 1918, with Headquarters Company 

and Supply Company attached. Colonel Smedley 

D. Butler commanded the 13th Regiment from the 

date of its organization until 19 November 1918, 

on which date Lieutenant Colonel Douglas C. McDougal assumed command and remained its commanding officer until it was demobilized.

Like the 11th Regiment, the units of this regiment performed duty in the various posts in the 

Services of Supply, among such places being Brest, 

Bordeaux, Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle, La Pallice, Rochefort, Montoir, Bassens (Gironde), Sursol 

(Gironde), Casino-de-Lilas (Bordeaux), La Teste 

(Gironde), Beau Desert (Gironde), Nantes, SaintSulpice (Gironde), Savenay, Saint-Loubes (Gironde), Lormont, Carbon Blanc, Grange Neuve, 

Genicart, Croix d’Ilins, La Baule, Isle of SaintAnne (Nantes), Penhouet, and Usine Brûlée.

The officers and men performed duties of

various kinds, among such being provost guard, 

hospital center guard, camp guard, railroad transportation officers, commanding dock guard, dock 

guard, unloading ships, erecting tents at Pontanezen Barracks, military police, warehouse guards, 

convoying of railroad trains, special guards for shipments of commissary supplies, assistants to camp 

commander at Pontanezen Camp, prison guards, 

inspector general’s department, Base Section No. 1, 

Marines of the 13th Regiment departing Quantico for France.

James Kaercher Papers, Marine Corps Archives
224

Annotated Order of Battle

stockade guard, traffic police, motor transportation 

convoy guard, dock guard secret service, segregation 

camp, and railway patrol.

When the regiment arrived, Camp Pontanezen 

was in the midst of the influenza epidemic. Transport 

ships began to arrive with great numbers of dead and 

dying onboard. The regiment was used to assist the 

troops in debarking from the transports. The Marines carried the men’s packs up the long hill and 

even carried the men themselves. They built camps, 

cooked food, and nursed the sick. For their efforts 

and great accomplishments, the regiment received a 

letter of commendation from Major General Harbord, the Services of Supply commanding general.

The regimental headquarters was moved from 

Bassens, near Bordeaux, France, on 13 July 1919 

and returned to Camp Pontanezen. Former locations of the regimental headquarters included Bordeaux, Base Section No. 2, where the headquarters 

had been established as early as 6 December 1918, 

and where they remained until 3 July 1919, when 

moved to the American Guard Camp at Bassens. 

Field and Staff of the 1st and 3d Battalions were 

disbanded in France on 16 July 1919, while that of 

the 2d Battalion was disbanded on 20 July, with the 

personnel being transferred to the Regimental Field 

and Staff and Headquarters Company.

5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion

This battalion performed duty at Camp Pontanezen 

during its entire stay in France.

Camp Pontanezen, Base Section No. 5,

Services of Supply

Base Section No. 5 was built around the port of 

Brest, which was the most important port of debarkation for personnel in France as it was the only 

deep-water port available to American forces.* 

Camp Pontanezen was one of the camps within 

Base Section No. 5 and was commanded by now 

Brigadier General Butler from 19 November 1918 

to 8 April 1919.

* Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff, Organization of the Services of Supply: American Expeditionary Forces, 

monograph no. 7 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921), 22–23.

Camp Pontanezen was first opened in December 1917 by 95th Company, 6th Regiment; 

half the company was used as guards upon arrival. 

Camp Pontanezen was located about three miles 

from Brest and occupied the area surrounding the 

Pontanezen Barracks—a stone barracks built in the 

time of Napoleon—and covered an area of about 

650 acres. At peak, the camp was capable of holding 

80,000 men, consisting of 15,000 permanent and 

65,000 transient troops.

Consisting of about 1,100 buildings and broken down by use, they were as follows:

• 450 barracks, capacity 112 men each

• 62 officers quarters, capacity 2,200 officers

• 31 bathhouses

• 30 washrooms

• 39 mess halls and kitchens

• 15 troop mess halls

• 122 latrines

• 9 infirmaries

• 44 office buildings

• 283 buildings for shops, recreation, warehouses, stables, etc.

Tented areas consisted of about 6,000 tents that 

were well floored, strongbacked, and well-secured. 

Each tent held six men.

One of the entrances of Camp Pontanezen. 

Signal Corps Photograph Collection,

Military History Institute
225

Annotated Order of Battle

Guard Companies, Services of Supply

The use of the entire 5th Brigade by the SOS did 

not satisfy the wants of that tremendous organization for dependable guard units. Only part 

of the Marines who were evacuated for illness or 

wounds from the 4th Brigade recovered sufficiently 

to return to their organizations. Upon being discharged from hospitals, other men who were able 

to perform guard duty were organized into guard 

companies—some permanently assigned, others

temporarily pending further classification. The first 

of these companies was organized on 23 July 1918, 

and became a prisoner of war escort company.

Twelve guard companies of 2 officers and approximately 100 Marines were formed from Marine Corps personnel discharged from hospitals at 

various times during October and November 1918, 

and were sent to guard SOS establishments in various parts of France. Eleven other companies, designated Guard Companies Nos. 62 to 72, inclusive, 

were formed during the first three months of 1919 

and performed various guard duties until July 1919, 

when they were disbanded and their personnel returned to the United States with the 5th Brigade.

Training and Replacement Units

Overseas Depot, Quantico, Virginia

In addition to giving the enlisted men general 

training at Quantico in preparation for overseas and 

other duty, the Overseas Depot was established on 

19 May 1918 for the double purpose of organizing and training units of the Marine Corps for service with the American Expeditionary Forces. The 

Overseas Depot consisted of an administrative staff 

and the various sections:

• The specialists’ schools for the technical training of the infantry and machine gun, and the 

coordination of these specialists’ arms;

• The tactical department for the instruction 

and training of overseas units in new tactical 

principles; and

• The enlisted staff school for the training of 

first sergeants, mess sergeants, cooks, company 

clerks, armorers, etc.

Two French and four Canadian officers, who had 

abundant experience fighting in Europe, were assigned as advisors of the commanding officer.

The basic independent unit of organization was 

the platoon, and the platoon therefore became the 

principal training unit. In the organization of this 

unit, the scheme followed was to assure to each a 

certain nucleus of enlisted instructors trained in 

the various specialties, in addition to the platoon 

commanders, who were qualified to carry on the instruction along approved lines within the unit. This 

nucleus was taken from the graduates of the specialists’ schools of the depot. When four such platoons had been formed, they were assembled into a 

company. The company headquarters, trained in the 

enlisted staff school, was added to the four platoons 

and the company organization was turned over to 

the company commander complete in all details. 

Battalions were likewise formed by the consolidation of companies. In every instance, the platoon, 

Two Marines pose for a photo outside the Overseas Depot 

sergeant major’s office at Quantico.

Harry Grothjahn Papers, Marine Corps Archives
226

Annotated Order of Battle

company, and the battalion carried out a regular 

schedule of drills and instructions under the supervision of the depot, but all administrative details 

were left in the hands of the company and the battalion commanders. These training schedules were 

made up in the tactical department, were approved 

by the commanding officer, and were based on the 

most approved methods in effect at the time. In the 

cases of the formation of regimental organizations, 

of which there were two formed during the existence of the Overseas Depot, the battalions were 

turned over to the regimental commander upon 

being formed and, in this case, direct supervision 

by the depot ceased, but all facilities on hand, such 

as material, officers acting in an advisory capacity, 

training areas, etc., directly attached to the depot, 

were placed at the disposal of the regimental commanders who were at all times in active liaison with 

the depot.

About 85 percent of the troops forming the detachments arriving at the Overseas Depot for service in France had undergone not less than 8, or 

more than 12 weeks’ training at the regular recruit 

depots of the Marine Corps. The preliminary training received at these recruit depots was such as to 

prepare the men for general service throughout the 

Marine Corps, and resulted in the men being well 

disciplined, considering the short time they had 

been in the Service. This facilitated the more advanced and specialized training they were to receive 

at the Overseas Depot. These detachments were 

composed entirely of qualified riflemen, having undergone during the recruit period a most thorough 

and comprehensive course in the use of the rifle. 

Upon the arrival of these detachments, they were 

organized as outlined above, and the commissioned 

personnel were assigned to the units from the officers’ school. The schedule and drills and instructions 

were provided them and were carried out under the 

supervision of specially selected officers of the tactical department of the Overseas Depot, including 

the foreign officers. This training continued until 

the units departed for France. The Overseas Depot 

was redesignated as Field Training Depot by reason 

of altered functions on 11 March 1919.

The following units were organized by the 

Overseas Depot: 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th, and 

11th Separate Battalions; 2d and 3d Machine Gun 

Battalions; 5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion; 2d 

and 3d Separate Machine Gun Battalions; and the 

11th and 13th Regiments. They amounted to approximately 16,000 officers and enlisted men. The 

7th and 8th Separate Battalions were organized and 

sent to France from Marine Barracks Parris Island, 

South Carolina.

The following table shows the names of the replacement organizations sent to the American Expeditionary Forces, dates of sailing and arrival, and 

names of vessels (table 1).

Barracks built on the hill overlooking the Potomac River at Quantico. 

Aldoph M. Lewin Jr. Papers Collection, Marine Corps Archives
227

Annotated Order of Battle

Marine Barracks Parris Island, South Carolina

The barracks, at what is known today as Parris Island, was activated on 25 October 1915 as Marine 

Barracks Port Royal, South Carolina. Two months 

after the declaration of war on Germany on 22 June 

1917, the post was redesignated as Marine Barracks 

Parris Island. The post was named after Colonel 

Alexander Parris, who was one of the most conspicuous citizens of South Carolina in the 1700s. 

Through the early years of the post, the second “r” 

was often dropped believing it in error. The name 

was corrected with the redesignation of the post on 

3 May 1919.

With the entry of the United States into World 

War I, an enormous expansion of the installation at 

Port Royal became necessary. In the course of the 

war, this expansion took place not only in the number of men trained, but also the variety of instruction given, and the physical plant in which these 

operations were conducted was likely enlarged.

On 6 April 1917, there were 835 men in training at the post; this rose to a peak of 13,286 during the war but had receded to 4,104 on the day 

of the Armistice. The course of instruction lasted 

eight weeks; the first three weeks were devoted to 

instruction and practice of close-order drills, physical exercise, swimming, bayonet fighting, personal 

combat, wall-scaling, rope climbing, etc. Weeks 

four and five were where recruits perfected drills, 

trained in boxing and wrestling, and were taught 

interior guard duties and exercised. The last three 

weeks were spent on the rifle range.

On 21 April 1917, the Bureau of Yards and 

Docks awarded a contract for the construction of 

approximately 233 temporary buildings that were 

completed in March 1918. These structures provided accommodations for 5,000 men, but much of 

the accommodations were tents. During the latter 

half of 1918, an additional 288 buildings were constructed, affording quarters for 4,100 enlisted, officers’ quarters, piers, and other necessary structures.*

* Elmore A. Champie, A Brief History of Marine Corps Recruit 

Depot: Parris Island, South Carolina (Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1962), 5.

Battalion Date Embarked

(United States)

Date Disembarked 

(France) Vessel

1st Replacement 5 February 1918 25 February 1918 Von Steuben (ID 3017)

2d Replacement 14 March 1918 27 March 1918 Henderson (AP 1)

3d Replacement 22 April 1918 __ May 1918 Henderson

1st Machine Gun

Replacement 26 May 1918 8 June 1918 Henderson

1st Casual Replacement 26 May 1918 8 June 1918 Henderson

2d Casual Replacement 30 June 1918 9 July 1918 Henderson

3d Separate 13 August 1918 26 August 1918 Henderson

4th Separate 13 August 1918 26 August 1918 Henderson

5th Separate 17 August 1918 27 August 1918 Von Steuben

6th Separate 17 August 1918 27 August 1918 Von Steuben

1st Separate Machine Gun 21 August 1918 2 September 1918 De Kalb (ID 3010)

7th Separate 20 October 1918 3 November 1918 Pocahontas (ID 3044)

8th Separate 20 October 1918 3 November 1918 Pocahontas

9th Separate 27 October 1918 9 November 1918 Henderson

Table 1. Replacement organizations
228

Annotated Order of Battle

Diplomatic Couriers and Marine

Detachment, Naval Headquarters

Couriers

From the outbreak of the World War in August 1914 through 1917, all United States 

diplomatic mail and confidential dispatches 

had been transported from London and Paris 

to the other European capitals in a haphazard 

and insecure manner. With the possibility of 

diplomatic correspondence either not arriving 

at its intended destination or being compromised, the State Department in cooperation 

with the Navy Department and Headquarters 

Marine Corps arrived at a wartime expedient 

that called for the accompaniment of the sacks 

of diplomatic mail with an armed Marine guard 

in civilian clothes.*

* Leo J. Daugherty III, The Marine Corps and the State Department: Enduring Partners in United States Foreign Policy, 1798–

2007 ( Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2009), 65.

Occupation Forces

Company E, Composite Regiment,

Third Army

In April 1919, the 4th Brigade was directed to select 

a special company. Officers and enlisted were to be 

chosen for their war records and soldierly qualities. 

Each of the 11 infantry brigades received a similar 

directive. The companies were assembled at Coblenz, where they were formed into the three battalions of the Third Army’s Composite Regiment.

Captain Clifton B. Cates commanded Company E with First Lieutenant Merwin H. Silverthorn 

as his second-in-command. It became Company 

E of the 2d Battalion, also commanded by a Marine officer, Major Frederick A. Barker, commander 

of the 1st Battalion, 6th Regiment, after Soissons. 

Cates recalled in an oral history interview the conditions of choosing the men of the unit, “We had 

I think about twelve or fourteen lieutenants and 

about 400 enlisted men that were already handpicked. The first requirement was they had to be 

five feet ten inches tall and they had to have been 

in combat operations and they had to be in good 

shape physically.”**

In June 1919, after working up to near perfection in drill and ceremonial routine, “Pershing’s 

Own,” as the Composite Regiment was nicknamed, 

left Coblenz for Paris and an interesting summer. 

The Summer Olympic Games missed a quadrennial 

during the war. The Allied Armies, with the U.S. 

Army acting as the moving spirit, made up for it in 

part by staging the Inter-Allied Games. Pershing 

Stadium was formally opened on 22 June by General Pershing and Premier Georges Clemenceau, who 

reviewed the regiment that subsequently performed 

guard and ceremonial duties during the games.

Then Independence Day ceremonies commenced and, 10 days later on Bastille Day, marked 

proud moments for Cates and 100 of his Marines as 

they marched in the great victory parade. Although 

the regiment was at reduced strength on that occasion, the order of march was the same. The Marines 

were just behind the massed colors and standards 

* Gen Clifton B. Cates intvw with Benis Frank, 1967 (Oral 

History Collection, History Division, Quantico, VA), 38.

Diplomatic passport of Gunner Joseph J. Franklin,

a diplomatic courier during World War I.

Joseph J. Franklin Papers, Marine Corps Archives
229

Annotated Order of Battle

of the 36 regiments of the Third Army as they 

passed through the Arc de Triomphe and down the 

Champs-Élysées to the Place de la Concorde.

After the victory parade in Paris, Cates’ Company E accompanied General Pershing to London. 

Guard officers acted as personal hosts to the American officers. After a splendid few days that included 

an inspection by the Prince of Wales in Hyde Park 

and marching in another victory parade on Empire 

Day,* the regiment crossed the English Channel 

again to embark on the USS Leviathan (SP 1326) 

and return home with Pershing. On 19 September 

1919, Company E was detached and transferred to 

Marine Barracks Washington, where, on the 20th, 

Cates paid and discharged his men.

* The first Empire Day took place on 24 May 1902, the birthday of Queen Victoria of England. It was not officially recognized as an annual event until 1916.

Provisional Battalion

(Schleswig-Holstein Battalion)

Prior to the departure of the Marine brigades from 

France in the summer of 1919, a battalion of Marines, first known as Provisional Battalion, U.S. 

Marines, but whose designation later was changed 

to the 15th Separate Battalion, was organized at 

Camp Pontanezen for duty in connection with the 

Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite; a mission for which 

the battalion was never used. The battalion, made 

up of selected personnel from the 13th Regiment 

(Company E, and 47 enlisted men of the Machine 

Gun Company), units of the 4th Brigade and personnel from the 12th Separate Battalion, was under 

the command of Major Charles F. B. Price.

The battalion, also known as the SchleswigHolstein Battalion, rendered honors to General 

Pershing on 1 September 1919 upon his departure 

from France and, on the same day, was inspected by 

Marshal Foch, who commended the battalion on its 

splendid appearance. A few days later, the battalion 

proceeded to Bordeaux, France, via the USS Mercury (ID 3012) and took part in the ceremonies laying the foundation for the monument at Pointe de 

Grave, commemorating the entrance of the United 

States into the World War.**

Marine Detachment, Rhine River Patrol, 

Third Army Water Transportation Service

The duties of the 4th Brigade with the Army of 

Occupation in Germany were uneventful, the 

outstanding features being the establishment of a 

Rhine River Patrol, manned and commanded by 

Marines.***

Since one of the conditions of the Armistice 

did not allow German police in the occupied zones 

to carry weapons, the Third Army took responsibility for policing the river with patrol boats. Under the 

direction of the Inter-Allied Waterways Commission, the Allied armies controlled the commercial 

traffic and navigation on the rivers in their zones. 

* James C. Jenkins, “The Thirteenth Regiment—World War I,” 

Marine Corps Gazette 26, no. 4 (November 1942): 224.

** Maj Edwin N. McClellan, “The Fourth Brigade of Marines 

in the Training Areas and Operations in the Verdun Sector,” 

Marine Corps Gazette 5, no. 1 (March 1920): 363.

GySgt John P. Steele, diplomatic courier, as seen in Russia. 

Still Pictures Branch, National Archives
230

Annotated Order of Battle

They were also therefore required to patrol the

rivers.

The British and French brought their own boats 

on the Rhine for this purpose, but the American’s 

used confiscated German patrol boats. Because of 

the potential for running into armed criminals and 

smugglers, Marines from the 5th and 6th Regiments were assigned as boat crew and to man the 

deck cannons and machine guns. The American 

river patrol fleet consisted of 14 vessels and was 

manned by 8 officers and 190 enlisted Marines. The 

largest of these riverboats was the Preussen (1903), 

which was also used by Major General Joseph T. 

Dickman, commanding general, Third Army, on his 

inspection tours of the bridgehead. Preussen had a 

working crew of 29 Marines and 6 Germans and 

was heavily armed with two 37mm cannons and six 

machine guns.

The Mosel was the second largest of the vessels 

and was used as a supply boat, carrying provisions 

for the patrol stations and troops stationed along 

the river. It was poised, had the need come to fruition, to provide humanitarian aid to Cochem, Germany, in 1919 when it was nearly cut off by rising 

river waters. In addition to the Preussen and Mosel, 

Marines commanded the following other ships as 

well: SS Rhein, SS Borussia (1912), SS Elsa, SS Albertus Magnus, SS Frauenlob, and SS Rheingold, as 

well as three stations and at least six or seven smaller vessels manned by Marines.

France Map Detachment, Saint-Étienne-àArdennes, France

Initially the idea of Major Charles D. Barrett, the 

France Map Detachment was created to survey 

the battlefield of Belleau Wood and then create a 

large-scale relief map. Since First Lieutenant Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. had studied civil engineering at 

college and was well versed in topography, Barrett 

asked him to return to France and assist. Shepherd 

recalled, “Barrett obtained authority to carry out his 

proposal to make a relief map of Belleau Woods. 

Upon the disbandment of the Brigade at Quantico 

we organized a mapping detachment consisting of 

four officers who were familiar with map making 

and six enlisted men to be rodmen and automobile drivers. We obtained transits, drawing boards 

and other engineering equipment from the Marine 

Corps Schools and within two weeks we sailed back 

to France.”*

During an oral history interview in 1967, Shepherd further explained the detachment’s mission:

Since Major Barrett was an accomplished 

Cartographer he envisioned making a topographical map from which a relief map could 

be reproduced in plaster-of-paris. The scale of 

the map was 1 to 100 or one inch on the map 

represented one hundred feet on the ground. 

Such a large scale map would show every terrain feature in detail—woods, fields, farms and 

individual houses in the villages included in the 

area. Since the only relief map of any size in 

existence at the time was the one of the Gettys-

* Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd intvw with Benis Frank, 1967 

(Oral History Collection, History Division, Quantico, VA).

Capt Gaines Moseley stands on the bridge of the SS Moselle

while patrolling the Rhine River during the occupation of 

Germany. Sgt Guy Stiller can be seen in lower right.

Marine Corp History Division
231

Annotated Order of Battle

burg battlefield made many years previously, we 

became pioneers in the field of relief maps before the project was completed and originated 

several unique techniques in their construction. 

The France Map Detachment, as our unit was 

officially named, consisted of Major Barrett in 

command, Captain [Samuel C.] Cumming operated the transit and I did the sketching. The 

two enlisted men were used as rodmen. Barrett, 

with a draftsman, transferred the topographical 

sketches the two parties made in the field to 

a master map in his office. In addition to the 

sketching parties, Barrett took along an enlisted 

artist who made colored drawings of the houses 

platted on the map and a warrant officer by the 

name of Gustav [A.] Brodstrom modeled the 

houses in clay and painted them to correspond 

to the original dwellings. The terrain Major 

Barrett assigned to be mapped included all of 

Belleau Wood and an area of equal size to the 

west which included Hill 142 and Le Mares 

Farm where the Fifth Marines had stopped the 

German attack prior to the Fourth Brigade assault on Belleau Wood. The mapping of the area 

took about three months. Following our return 

to Quantico it took six months to complete the 

relief map which was about sixteen feet square.*

Army Units Commanded by Marines 

(battalion or larger)

As the U.S. forces rapidly mobilized and deployed 

to France, the need for officers was readily apparent. 

General Pershing and the AEF Headquarters filled 

those vacancies with capable officers, regardless of 

Service. Believing Marines were wholly capable as 

soldiers and officers, several were used to fill the 

gaps.

Women Marines

By July 1918, the demands of the war hit an all-time

high; the heavy fighting and mounting casualties 

abroad were increasing an already acute shortage of 

trained personnel. As fast as men could be spared, 

they were sent to join Marine units at the front in 

* Ibid.

France. When it was discovered that there was a sizable number of battle-ready Marines in the United 

States still doing clerical work who were urgently 

needed overseas, the Corps turned in desperation to 

the female business world.

Major General Commandant George Barnett, 

in an effort to determine how many men could be 

released, dispatched memorandums to the offices 

of the Quartermaster, Paymaster, and Adjutant and 

Inspector asking for an analysis by the directors of 

each as to the feasibility of using women as replacements for male troops. In every case, it was agreed 

that there were areas in which women with clerical 

skills could be used on an immediate basis. Interestingly enough, although it was estimated that about 

40 percent of the work at headquarters could be 

performed equally well by women, it was believed 

that a larger number of women than men would be 

needed to do the same amount of work.

Women Marines post recruiting posters in New York. 

From left: Pvts Minette Gaby, May English, and Lillian 

Patterson.

Marine Corps History Division
232

Annotated Order of Battle

General Barnett wrote a letter to the secretary 

of the Navy on 2 August 1918 requesting authority to enroll women in the Marine Corps Reserve 

for clerical duty at Headquarters Marine Corps 

and at other Marine Corps offices in the United 

States where their services might be used to replace 

men who may be qualified for active field service. 

In a letter dated 8 August 1918, Secretary Josephus 

Daniels gave his official approval to the request and 

authority was granted to enroll women as Marines. 

Overnight the word was spread via newspapers 

and enthusiastic Marines and, on 13 August 1918, 

women by the thousands flooded into recruiting offices across the country. The Marine Corps had very 

definite ideas as to the type of women it wanted 

as members of the Corps. Recruiting officers were 

instructed to enroll only women of excellent character, neat appearance, and with business or office 

experience. While the greatest need was for stenographers, bookkeepers, accountants, and typists, applicants who had considerable experience handling 

correspondence and general office work and could 

show evidence of exceptional ability in this line 

were given consideration.

Recruiting orders stipulated that women reservists were to be between 18 and 40 years of age, 

but that an applicant slightly younger than 18 years 

of age, who is in every respect very desirable, may 

be enrolled with the consent of her parents. In addition, each applicant was required to submit to

a thorough physical examination before her final 

acceptance. While this seemed a simple task, it presented unusual problems as the enlistment requirements established by naval medical regulations were 

designed for men only. Medical officers, it seems, 

were as uneasy with the situation as were the women 

applicants when it came time for the examination. 

In an effort to establish a policy guiding medical

officers, Headquarters Marine Corps released a “circular” on 14 August 1918 giving detailed instructions as to the enlistment requirements expected.

The women selected for duty with the Marine Corps were enrolled as privates in the Marine 

Corps Reserve, Class 4, for a period of four years. 

Each applicant was required to furnish three letters 

of recommendation and, if possible, was given an 

interview with the head of the office in which she 

was to be assigned.

The muster roll for Headquarters Marine Corps 

dated January 1919 shows the distribution of women reservists to the various departments as follows: 

In addition to doing the clerical and routine office work at the recruiting stations the women were 

also used as recruiter’s aides. They were reported to 

be very impressive with their “trim and snappy appearance and their business-like attention to their 

work.”* The women were effectively used for publicity in bond drives and rallies, photographs, and 

as members of recruiting teams touring the country 

with Marine Corps exhibits.

In most cases, the male Marines were very protective of the women and helped them as much as 

they could in the performance of their jobs. Although some of the women came up against negative attitudes harbored by Marines who felt that 

the Corps “stepped down” when it enrolled women, 

most of the female reservists, regardless of where 

they were stationed, felt that they were treated as 

equals.

With the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918, the urgent need for the support of 

female labor gradually decreased and, finally on 15 

July 1919, orders were issued by the Major General 

* Capt Linda L. Hewitt, USMCR, Women Marines in World 

War I (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 

Headquarters Marine Corps, 1974), 29.

Office Sergeant Corporal

Private 

First 

Class

Private

Adjutant and 

Inspector

(BGen

Charles H. 

Lauchheimer)

1 16 17 54

Quartermaster

(BGen

Charles L.

McCawley)

1 0 8 44

Paymaster

(BGen

George

Richards)

0 3 6 19
233

Annotated Order of Battle

Commandant for the transfer of “all reservists on 

clerical duty at Headquarters . . . to inactive status 

prior to 11 August 1919.” With traditional Marine 

Corps pomp and circumstance, a great ceremony 

was arranged on the occasion of their departure 

from the Corps back into civilian life. Major General Barnett accompanied by his complete staff and 

the Marine Corps band reviewed the women for the 

last time on the White House lawn. As the women 

completed their final pass-in-review, Josephus Daniels stepped up to give the farewell address. Disenrollment from the Marine Corps Reserve (inactive 

status) took place at a steady but gradual rate, and 

eventually all women were discharged, although 

this was as late as 1922 in some cases.*

Marine Corps Reserve

On 29 August 1916, Congress passed the Naval 

Appropriations Act, which gave statutory authority to establish the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. The 

Marine Corps Reserve was patterned after the Naval Reserve Force and consisted of five classes of 

personnel:

• Fleet Marine Corps Reserve

• Marine Corps Reserve A

• Marine Corps Reserve B

• Marine Corps Reserve Flying Corps

• Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve

In addition to the five classes of Reserves, the act 

also contained provisions for the Naval Militia and 

the National Naval Volunteers.

The extent to which individual Marine Corps 

Reserves were involved in World War I is not clearly documented. The role of the Reserves in France 

is obscure, partly because official records often combined Regulars, “For the Duration” Regulars, and 

Reserves.

The Reserve members of the Corps who fought 

in France did so with distinction and sacrifice. Of 

the 8,248 enrolled, the casualty statistics record the 

following:

* Ibid., 41.

Officers Enlisted

Killed 7 155

Died of other causes 8 61

Three officers and 18 enlisted men were cited for 

gallantry.**

Naval Medical Personnel

To discuss the Marines in World War I and not 

mention those brave men who served, lived, and 

died with the Marines would be a blatant oversight. 

The medical personnel, surgeons, corpsmen, and 

others served a vital and indispensable role of preserving life wherever necessary and possible.

Throughout the Corps, naval medical officers 

and hospital corpsmen were attached to recruiting 

stations as physical examiners. They “entered into 

the general Marine Corps spirit” and were kept 

busy examining the thousands of recruits.

On 15 May 1917, Lieutenant William L. 

Mann Jr. (Medical Corps), USN, was ordered to 

Quantico as the post surgeon; he was the medical 

pioneer in the huge construction and training program that grew up out of nothing in a matter of 

weeks. Training for active field service and the actual distribution of medical personnel to the new war 

strength organizations (companies, battalions, and 

regiments) were conceived and worked out by the 

post administrative staff under Lieutenant Mann.

Battalion dispensaries and post sick quarters 

were built, equipped, and occupied. Large numbers 

of troops were inspected for communicable diseases upon arrival in trains from all over the United 

States. Sick call, physical inspections, problems of 

quarantine, mass vaccination, and training of new 

medical personnel, sanitary inspections, and mosquito control—all were accomplished while organizing a huge war camp with full war strength

regiments during a period of significant transition. 

In addition to caring for the induction health inspections and the regular medical care of the Marines, Lieutenant Mann was also responsible for 

* Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1, The Marine Corps 

Reserve: A History, 1916–1966 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1966), 10.
234

Annotated Order of Battle

2,000 civilian workmen employed in the construction of the camp.

Once overseas, the general duties of the medical personnel were those incident to the health and 

comfort of the Marines—billet hygiene and sanitation. Wherever the Marines were assigned, at least 

one representative (typically a hospital corpsman) 

was to be found. This person’s responsibility was the 

care of the health of his Marines. He not only gave 

treatment to the sick, but he took all necessary precautions to prevent illness.

The attached medical personnel for each regiment consisted of 7 medical officers, 3 dental surgeons, and 48 hospital corpsmen. Generally, the 

medical detachments of regiments were distributed 

as follows:

Regimental Headquarters—Regimental Aid Station

Surgeon (senior medical officer)

Assistant

Dental surgeon (senior dental officer)

Chief pharmacist’s mate (senior)

Hospital corpsmen (six to eight)

Battalion Headquarters—Battalion Aid Station

Surgeon

Assistant

Dental surgeon (if available)

Chief pharmacist’s mate

Hospital corpsmen (five to seven)

Each Company

Hospital corpsmen (two to four)

Where the Marines bled and died, so did the medical personnel:

Navy Medical Personnel Total Hospital Corps 

Casualties

5th Regiment 128

6th Regiment 122

6th Machine Gun Battalion 27

Total 4th Brigade 277

The 331 officers and men of the Medical Department serving in the actual combat in France 

received 648 decorations and awards—a stunning 

207 percent. Six Medals of Honor were awarded to 

naval medical personnel for their actions while serving with the Marines; two were dental surgeons.*

* George G. Strott, The Medical Department of the United States 

Navy with the Army and Marine Corps in France in World War 

I: Its Function and Employment (Washington, DC: Bureau of 

Medicine and Surgery, Department of the Navy, 1947), 170.
235

APPENDIX A

COMMAND LIST

Combat Forces

4th Brigade, France

23 October–9 November 1917 BGen Charles A. Doyen

9 November–8 December 1917 LtCol Hiram I. Bearss (Acting)

8 December 1917–9 April 1918 BGen Charles A. Doyen

9–11 April 1918 Col Wendell C. Neville (Acting)

11 April–7 May 1918 BGen Charles A. Doyen

7 May–15 July 1918 BGen/MajGen James G. Harbord,*

U.S. Army

15–17 July 1918 LtCol Harry Lee (Acting)

17–26 July 1918 Col Wendell C. Neville (Acting)

26–29 July 1918 BGen John A. Lejeune

29 July 1918–2 March 1919 Col/BGen Wendell C. Neville*

2–14 March 1919 Col Logan Feland (Acting)

14 March–11 May 1919 BGen Wendell C. Neville

11 May–16 June 1919 Col Harry Lee (Acting)

16–17 June 1919 BGen Wendell C. Neville

17–22 June 1919 Col Harold C. Snyder (Acting)

22 June–12 July 1919 BGen Wendell C. Neville

12–23 July 1919 Col Harry Lee (Acting)

23 July–3 August 1919 BGen Wendell C. Neville

5th Regiment

7 June–10 July 1917 Col Charles A. Doyen

11–16 July 1917 Maj Logan Feland

17 July–1 August 1917 Col Charles A. Doyen

* Indicates promotion to the next higher grade while serving in the billet.
236

Appendix A

2 August 1917 LtCol Logan Feland (Acting)

3 August–23 October 1917 Col Charles A. Doyen

24–29 October 1917 Maj Frederick M. Wise

30 October–31 December 1917 LtCol Hiram I. Bearss

1 January–7 July 1918 Col Wendell C. Neville

8–25 July 1918 LtCol Logan Feland

26–27 July 1918 Col Wendell C. Neville

28 July 1918–20 March 1919 Col Logan Feland

21 March–13 August 1919 Col Harold C. Snyder

5th Regiment Base Detachment

20–30 June 1917 Capt Tracy G. Hunter Jr.

Commanding Headquarters Company

(no detachment commander listed)

1 July–7 September 1917 LtCol Hiram I. Bearss

8 September–24 November 1917 Maj Edward A. Greene

25–30 November 1917 Capt Bailey M. Coffenberg

1 December 1917–23 January 1918 Capt Tracy G. Hunter Jr.

6th Regiment

11 July–15 November 1917 Col Albertus W. Catlin

16 November 1917–15 January 1918 Maj Frank E. Evans

16 January–6 June 1918 Col Albertus W. Catlin

7 June–12 July 1918 LtCol Harry Lee

13–15 July 1918 Maj Thomas Holcomb

16 July 1918–12 August 1919 LtCol Harry Lee

6th Machine Gun Battalion

17 August 1917–10 June 1918 Maj Edward B. Cole

10–21 June 1918 Capt George H. Osterhout

21 June–24 October 1918 Maj Littleton W. T. Waller Jr.

24 October 1918–31 July 1919 Maj Matthew H. Kingman

3d Provisional Brigade (Fort Crockett, Texas)

29 August 1918–8 March 1919 BGen James E. Mahoney
237

Command List

8th Regiment

1 February 1918–25 April 1919 Col Laurence H. Moses

9th Regiment

18 August 1918–25 April 1919 Col George C. Reid

Aviation Forces

1st Marine Aviation Force and Day Wing, Northern Bombing Group

1 September 1918–7 December 1918 Maj Alfred A. Cunningham

1st Marine Aeronautic Company, Ponta Delgada, Azores

1 October 1917–18 July 1918 Maj Francis T. Evans

19 July 1918–1 April 1919 Maj David L. S. Brewster

Ships Detachments, Naval Base Detachments, and Miscellaneous

Marine Barracks, Naval Station Guam

6 April–28 September 1917 LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley

29 September 1917–27 July 1918 Maj Edward B. Manwaring

28 July–12 November 1918 Capt/Maj Ralph J. Mitchell*

7th Company, General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces

1–12 February 1918 Capt John C. Foster

13 February–25 March 1918 1stLt Edward L. Burwell Jr.

26 March–2 April 1918 Capt John C. Foster

3 April–10 October 1918 1stLt/Capt Edward L. Burwell Jr. 

Foreign Expeditionary Detachment, Naval Base Number 13, Ponta Delgada, Azores

6 December 1917–21 November 1918 Capt Maurice G. Holmes

22 November–14 December 1918 Capt William H. Haggerty

15 December 1918–14 September 1919 1stLt John D. Lockburner**

136th Company, Naval Base Number 29, Cardiff, Wales

30 September 1918–2 May 1919 Capt/Maj John M. Tildsley*

3 May–24 July 1919 Capt Judson H. Fitz-Gerald

** Company disbanded on 14 September 1919. Lockburner remained in Ponta Delgada as ordnance and communications officer 

until mid-December 1920.
238

Appendix A

Marine Detachment, Lafayette Radio Station

2 April 1919–28 February 1920 Capt Edward B. Hope

Marine Detachment, Naval Headquarters, London, England

6 September 1917–22 June 1918 1stSgt Otto N. Roos

23 June–14 October 1918 1stLt/Capt Vincent E. Healy*

Marine Detachment, Headquarters Naval Aviation Forces/Naval Forces in France

2 January 1918–9 October 1918 Capt Charles P. Gilchrist

10 October 1918–5 February 1919 1stLt/Capt Joseph P. Gargan*

6 February 1919–19 April 1919 1stLt Albert B. Sage

20 April 1919–15 January 1920 1stLt James W. Flett

16 January 1920–31 July 1920 1stSgt Walter A. Rawnsley

Marine Detachment, U.S. Embarkation Office, Liverpool, England

1 December 1917–24 May 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse

Marine Detachment, U.S. Debarkation Office, Liverpool, England

25 May–22 September 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse

Marine Detachment, Camp Rochambeau, Tours, France

1 February–31 March 1919 LtCol Charles T. Westcott

Office of the Chief Paymaster, U.S. Marines, France

4 October 1917–30 August 1919 Capt/Maj Davis B. Wills*

Division 9, Atlantic Fleet, with British Grand Fleet, Scapa Flow and Firth of Forth

Division Senior Marine: Maj Nelson P. Vulte

Division 6, Atlantic Fleet, Castletown Brehaven, Bantry Bay, Ireland

Division Senior Marine: Maj Leon W. Hoyt

Asiatic Fleet, Vladivostok, Siberia

25 August 1915–17 July 1917 Col Carl Gamborg-Andersen

18 July 1917–24 April 1918 LtCol Louis McC. Little

25 April–2 May 1918 Maj Paul E. Chamberlin

2 May–24 June 1918 Capt Archie F. Howard

24 June 1918–13 November 1919 Maj/LtCol Eli T. Fryer*
239

Command List

Marine Detachment, U.S. Naval Radio Station, Russian Island, Vladivostok, Siberia

24 February 1920–22 September 1920 1stLt Judson H. Fitz-Gerald

23 September 1920–6 March 1921 1stSgt Richard H. Harnett

7 March 1921–29 April 1921 Sgt Oscar Laemmert

30 April 1921–15 August 1922 1stSgt James M. Davis

16 August 1922–19 November 1922 1stSgt Earl C. Harrah**

American Naval Planning Section, London

26 February–24 November 1918 LtCol/Col Robert H. Dunlap*

14 September 1918–March 1919 Col Louis McC. Little

American Rest Camp, Southampton, England

1 October 1917–28 February 1918 Maj Julius S. Turrill

Marine Detachment, 2d Supply Train, 2d Division, U.S. Army

6–20 August 1919 1stLt Carl J. Norstrand

Virgin Islands

Marine Barracks St. Thomas and all Marines ashore in the Virgin Islands

21 April 1917–3 May 1919 Maj/LtCol Jay M. Salladay*

4 May 1919–1 June 1921 Maj/LtCol Raymond B. Sullivan*

Services of Supply Forces

5th Brigade

5 September 1918–31 March 1919 BGen Eli K. Cole

1–9 April 1919 Maj Charles D. Barrett (Acting)

9 April–12 August 1919 BGen Smedley D. Butler

11th Regiment

20 August 1917–11 August 1919 LtCol/Col George Van Orden*

13th Regiment

3 July–19 November 1918 Col Smedley D. Butler

19 November 1918–12 August 1919 LtCol Douglas C. McDougal

** On 19 November 1922, the detachment transferred to Marine Barracks Naval Station Cavite, Philippine Islands, upon the turning over of the U.S. Naval Radio Station, Russian Island, Vladivostok, to the government of Russia.
240

Appendix A

5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion

28 September–7 November 1918 Maj Ernest A. Perkins

8–11 November 1918 Capt Franklin A. Hart

11 November 1918–12 August 1919 Maj Allen H. Turnage*

Camp Pontanezen, Base Section Number 5, Services of Supply

19 November 1918–8 April 1919 BGen Smedley D. Butler

Marine Guard Battalion #1

6 February–24 July 1919 Maj L. H. Miller

Training and Replacement Units**

Overseas Depot, Quantico, Virginia

19 May 1918–11 March 1919 Maj Philip H. Torrey

Marine Barracks Parris Island, South Carolina

25 October 1915–11 February 1917 Capt Elias R. Beadle

12 February–18 December 1917 Col Thomas C. Treadwell

19 December 1917–25 January 1918 Maj Elias R. Beadle (Acting)

26 January–1 September 1918 BGen Eli K. Cole

2 September–12 November 1918 BGen John T. Myers

Marine Training Battalion

20 June 1918–25 August 1918 1stLt David R. Kilduff

1st Training Regiment

7 September–December 1918 Col Louis M. Gulick

1st Training Battalion, 1st Training Regiment

8 September–6 October 1918 Capt Arnold W. Jacobsen

7–12 October 1918 Vacant

13 October–18 November 1918 Maj Harold L. Parsons

Training Battalion, 1st Training Regiment***

9 September–10 November 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse

11–18 November 1918 Maj Adolph B. Miller

19–30 November 1918 Maj Harold L. Parsons

** Locations in France unless otherwise noted.

*** On 9 September 1918, the battalion was redesignated from 6th Separate Battalion.
241

Command List

1st Training Machine Gun Battalion, 1st Training Regiment**

11–26 September 1918 Capt Thomas M. Luby

26 September–16 October 1918 Capt Pink H. Stone

1st Replacement Battalion

8 January–10 June 1918 Maj Ralph S. Keyser

2d Replacement Battalion

20 February–13 September 1918 Maj Harold C. Snyder

3d Replacement Battalion

2 April–31 May 1918 Maj Richard P. Williams

12th Replacement Battalion

27 May–28 July 1919 Maj Ross E. Rowell

1st Machine Gun Replacement Battalion

8 May–27 August 1918 Maj Arthur J. O’Leary

1st Casual Replacement Battalion

10 May–30 June 1918 No battalion commanders listed

2d Casual Replacement Battalion

18–28 June 1918 2dLt Augustine Healy

29 June–31 July 1918 Capt Reginald R. Hogan

3d Separate Battalion

12 July–31 August 1918 Capt Rupert M. Purstan

4th Separate Battalion

13 July–6 August 1918 Capt Edward M. Reno

7 August–7 September 1918 Capt Arnold W. Jacobsen

5th Separate Battalion

17 July–1 August 1918 Vacant

1–3 August 1918 Capt Paul C. Marmion

4–6 August 1918 Vacant

7 August–6 September 1918 Capt Clarence N. McClure

** On 8 January 1918, the battalion was redesignated from Training Battalion, 6th Regiment.
242

Appendix A

6th Separate Battalion**

6–30 August 1918 Capt Kirt Green

1–8 September 1918 Maj Edmond H. Morse

7th Separate Battalion

19 October 1918–Unknown Maj Epaminondas L. Bigler

Maj Miles R. Thacher

8th Separate Battalion

19 October 1918–Unknown Maj Epaminondas L. Bigler

Maj James L. Underhill

9th Separate Battalion

22 October–19 November 1918 Maj Edwin N. McClellan

1st Separate Machine Gun Battalion

1 August–10 September 1918 Capt/Maj Thomas Luby*

Diplomatic Couriers and Marine Detachment,

Naval Headquarters Couriers

Diplomatic Couriers

Gunner Edward Driscoll GySgt Charles W. Harwood

SgtMaj/Gunner Edward* GySgt Paul Henninger

Rowland (Ret) GySgt George J. Kelley

1stSgt/Gunner Joseph J. Franklin* GySgt William O’Grady

Gunner Otto N. Roos GySgt Donald G. Oglesby

SgtMaj Frank Frazier GySgt William R. Sands

1stSgt Michael Fitzgerald GySgt John P. Steele

1stSgt Michael Maloney GySgt George H. Barrett

1stSgt Willard W. Sibert GySgt Daniel W. Brosman

GySgt Thomas C. Baisden Sgt Edward Conwill

GySgt Earl M. Christy

Naval Headquarters Couriers

Sgt Christopher Thedorf Sgt Marcellin Hoeveler

Sgt Jack W. Evans Sgt Ray Trulock

** On 9 September 1918, the battalion was redesignated as 2d Training Battalion.
243

Command List

Sgt Edward Conwill Cpl Lester H. Auerbach

Sgt Lester E. Duval Cpl Jim Wheeler

Sgt Louis N. Flatten

Occupation Forces

Company E, Composite Regiment, Third Army

23 July–20 September 1919 Capt Clifton B. Cates

Provisional Battalion (Schleswig-Holstein Battalion)

23 June 1919–13 March 1920 Maj Charles F. B. Price

Marine Detachment, Rhine River Patrol, Third Army Water Transportation Service

18 December 1918–13 March 1919 Capt Robert H. Shiel

14 March–8 July 1919 1stLt/Capt Lloyd A. Houchin*

Ships and Stations of the Rhine River Patrol

SS Mosel (1872) Capt Gaines Moseley

SS Preussen (1903) 1stLt William L. Harding Jr.

SS Rhein (1899) 1stLt Harold W. Whitney

SS Borussia (1912) 2dLt Guy D. Atmore

SS Elsa (1906) 2dLt Morris C. Richardson

SS Rheingold 2dLt Morris C. Richardson

SS Albertus Magnus 2dLt George R. Rowan

SS Frauenlob 2dLt James E. Stanners

Stadt Dusseldorf Station 2dLt Elmer L. Sutherland

Andernach Station 2dLt John T. Thorton

Remagen Station 2dLt Vernon Bourdette

France Map Detachment, Saint-Éttienne-à-Ardennes, France

17 May 1920–13 January 1921 Capt Samuel C. Cumming

1st Group Capt Lemuel C. Shepherd

2d Group 1stLt Lother R. Long
244

Appendix A

Army Units Commanded by Marines

(battalion or larger)**

2d Division

26 October–8 November 1917 BGen Charles A. Doyen

28 July 1918–15 July 1919 MajGen John A. Lejeune

41st Division (1st Depot Division)

29 October–26 December 1918 BGen Eli K. Cole

2d Brigade, 1st Division

22 July–8 August 1917 Col Charles A. Doyen

14–18 August 1917

26–28 August 1917

8th Brigade, 4th Division

15–24 January 1919 Col Frederick M. Wise

51st Brigade, 26th Division

15–24 October 1918 Col Hiram I. Bearss

9–23 November 1918

64th Brigade, 32d Division

9–25 July 1918 BGen John A. Lejeune

82d Brigade, 41st Division

21–26 December 1918 LtCol Pagsley M. Rixey

59th Infantry, 4th Division

5 September–31 December 1918 Col Frederick M. Wise

17th Field Artillery, 2d Division

30 October 1918–8 February 1919 Col Robert H. Dunlap

102d Infantry, 26th Division

26 August–14 October 1918 Col Hiram I. Bearss

25 October–8 November 1918

24 November–7 December 1918

** Dates listed are only those during which a Marine was in command of the Army unit.
245

Command List

1st Battalion, 15th Field Artillery, 2d Division

24 August 1918–21 January 1919 Maj Edward H. Brainard

1st Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Division

1 May–7 July 1918 Maj Robert L. Denig

3d Battalion, 9th Infantry, 2d Division

26 February–30 April 1918 Colonel Hiram I. Bearss

30 July–3 October 1918 Maj Robert L. Denig

3d Battalion, 30th Infantry, 3d Division

May 1918–June 1918 Maj Edward W. Sturdevant

3d Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3d Division

April 1918 Maj Harry G. Barlett

3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, 3d Division

April 1918–7 July 1918 Maj Robert E. Adams

1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, 26th Division

Summer 1918 Maj Charles T. Westcott

1st Battalion, 365th Infantry, 92d Division

July–September 1918 Maj Edward W. Sturdevant

247

APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AND ABBREVIATIONS

This appendix can be found on the supplementary microfilm reel for the World War Casualties within the Muster 

Rolls of the Marine Corps. It is reproduced in its entirety.

(*) indicates further description at end.

AA Antiaircraft or Army Artillery

AAA Antiaircraft Artillery

AAB Antiaircraft Battery

AAS Antiaircraft Service or Army Ambulance Service

AASC Army Air Service Commander

AC Army Corps or Air Corps

ACA American Civil Administration

ACS Army Candidates School or Aero Construction Squadron

AC of S Acting (Assistant) Chief of Staff

ADC Aide-de-Camp

Adj Adjutant

Adm Admitted (to hospital, etc.)

AEC American Embarkation Center1 or American Education Center (AEF University)

AEF American Expeditionary Forces2

AEFU American Expeditionary Forces University

AF in F American Forces in France3

AF in G American Forces in Germany4

AG Adjutant General

AGD Adjutant General’s Department

AGO Adjutant General’s Office

AIS Army Infantry Specialists (School)

Amb Ambulance

AMC American Military Cemetery

A of O Army of Occupation (in Germany)

1

 Established 3 January 1919 at Le Mans; disestablished on 16 July 1919.

2

 In some instances, AEF was made singular. For our purposes, it will be made plural.

3

 Created 22 August 1919 to function beginning 1 September 1919 in place of general headquarters (GHQ).

4

 On 2 July 1919, Third Army was deactivated and staff and troops remaining in Germany on and after 3 July 1919 were designated 

as AF in G.
248

Appendix B

APC Air Production Center5

APM Assistant Provost Marshall

APO American Post Office*

APOD American Post Office Department

ARC American Red Cross

ARCMH American Red Cross Military Hospital

Arr Arrived

Art Artillery

AS Advanced Section6 or Air Service

ASC Army Service Corps7 or Air Service Camp

Asgd Assigned

ASS, Fr. H American Statistical Section, French Hospitals

ATM Acting Town Mayor

ATS Antitetanic Serum (administered) or Army Transportation Service8

AW Articles of War

AWL Absent with (official) Leave

AWOL Absent without Official Leave

BAS Battalion Aid Station or Brigade Ambulance Service

BEF British Expeditionary Forces

BH Base Hospital

Bn Battalion

BORU Bordeaux Overseas Replacement Unit

BR Bedridden (naval classification of patients received on naval transports for the United 

States)

BS Base Section (a geographical division of the Services of Supply)*

BX Bordeaux

CAC Coast Artillery Corps

Cal Caliber

CAO Chief Aviation Officer

CASC Corps Air Service Commander

CAS Chief, Air Service

CSM Cerebro [Cerebral] Spinal Meningitis

Cav Cavalry

CC Casual Camp or Casual Company or Convalescent Center or Convalescent Camp or 

Company

5

 Opened winter of 1917–18 at Romorantin, France.

6

 Established 4 July 1917 with headquarters (HQ) at Nevers; on 17 September 1917 in Is-sur-Tille; on 1 November 1917 in 

Neufchâteau, Belgium; on 20 January 1918 in Langres, France; on 15 June 1918 in Nogent-en-Bassigny; on 23 October 1918 in 

Neufchâteau; and on 12 June 1919 in Is-sur-Tille.

7

 Established 22 August 1918 and furnished detachments for various special services in the AEF.

8

 Established 18 October 1917 and combined with Transportation Service on 18 December 1917.
249

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

C&C Casualties and Changes (a record form of AGO)

C-in-C Commander-in-Chief

CCO Casual Camp, Orleans

CDH Contagious Disease Hospital

CEO Chief Engineer Officer

CFO Casual from Command

C fr C Casual from Command

CG Commanding General

CGS Chief, Gas Service

CH Camp Hospital

Cl. Colonial (French)

Class. Cp. Classification Camp

Clf. Cp. Classification Camp

cm Centimeter

CMT Chief, Motor Transport

COC Casual Officers’ Camp

COD Casual Officers’ Depot9

CO Commanding Officer

CORD Casual Officers’ Replacement Depot

Conc. HC Convalescent Hospital Center

C of S Chief of Staff

CPO Central Post Office

CPWE Central Prisoner of War Enclosure

CQM Chief Quartermaster

CRO Central Records Office10

CWS Chemical Warfare Service11

D Duty

DAH Disordered Action of Heart

DC Dental Corps

DCD Dismounted Cavalry Division

DCI District Criminal Investigation

DCR Division of Casualty Replacement

DD Detached Duty or Depot Division*

Del. Delivered

DG Director General

DHQ Division Headquarters

DI Infantry Division (French)

9

 Opened at Blois, France, on 18 January 1918 as a depot for classification and distribution of casual officers arriving from the 

United States and from organizations in the AEF. Another COD was established at Gondrecourt on 22 February 1919.

10 Organized on 20–21 May 1918 at Saint-Pierre-des-Corps, but was moved to Tours on 15 September 1918.

11 Created on 28 June 1918 from the Gas Service.
250

Appendix B

Dis.Bks. Disciplinary Barracks

D of P District of Paris12

D of ST Director of Storage and Traffic

DRC Dental Reserve Corps or Daily Report of Changes

D of W Died of Wounds

DWC Duty with Command

E East

EC Engineer Corps or Embarkation Camp

ED Extra Duty

EH Evacuation Hospital

EM Enlisted Man

Eng. Engineers

Ent. Entered (hospital or on record)

EO Embarkation Order or Embarkation Office

EPD Extra Police Duty

ER Expert Rifleman

FA Field Artillery

FAS First Aid Station

FC Fracture, compound

FCC Fracture, compound, comminuted

FH Field Hospital

FM Field Message

Fme. Farm (French)

Fne. Fountain or spring (French)

FO Field Orders

Fr French

Fr. From

FS Fracture, simple

FSR Field Service Regulations

FUO Fever of unknown origins

GAC Group of Armées of Center (French)

GAE Group of Armées of the East (French)

GAF Group of Armées of Flanders (French)

GAN Group of Armées of the North (French)

GAR Group of Armées of Reserve (French)

GC Group de Combat or combat group, fighting unit

GCM General Court Martial

Gd. Co. Guard Company

Gd. Div. Grand Division, a railway operating unit of the Transportation Service

12 On 6 May 1918, geographical boundaries defined as comprising Departments of the Seine and Seine-et-Oise.
251

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

GH Gas Hospital or General Hospital (in United States)

GHQ General Headquarters

GIA Gassed in Action

GISD General Intermediate Storage Depot (at Gièvres)

GPA General Purchasing Agent

GPC German Prison Camp

GQG Grand Quartier General (French GHQ)

GRS Graves Registration Service

GS General Staff or Gas Service

G-1 Administrative Section, General Staff

G-2 Intelligence Section, General Staff

G-3 Operations Section, General Staff

G-4 Supply Section, General Staff

G-5 Training Section, General Staff

GSW Gunshot wound

H Hour

HA Hospital Ambulance

HC Hospital Center

HE High Explosive

HES High Explosive Shell

HFA Heavy Field Artillery (in orders)

HOE Evacuation Hospital (French)

HT Hospital Train

H Tr. Hospital Train

IA In action

ICT Infected Connective Tissue (British)

IIB Initial Information Blank

ILOD In Line of Duty

Inf. Infantry or Infirmary or Information

IS Intermediate Section13 or Intelligence Section

ISD Intermediate Salvage (or Storage) Depot

IWS Infantry Weapons School

JAG Judge Advocate General

JHG Justice Hospital Group (hospitals located in or near Justice Barracks, near Toul)

KIA Killed in action

km Kilometer = 1,000 meters

L In line of duty

L Bn Labor Battalion

13 Created on 13 August 1917 by territorial organization of the Line of Communication with HQ at Nevers.
252

Appendix B

L of C Line of Communication14

LS Liaison Service

M Meter or Morphine (administered)

MC Medical Corps or Marine Corps

Mar.Tr.Bn. Marine Training Battalion

Mar.Tr.Rgt. Marine Training Regiment

Med. Medical

Med.Seg.Cp. Medical Segregation Camp

Ment. Mental (naval classification of patients received on naval transports for the United 

States)

MG Machine Gun

MGB Machine Gun Bullet

MG Bn Machine Gun Battalion

MH Mobile Hospital

MIA Missing in Action

Mil. Military

Mil.Sp.Co. Military Specialists Company

MM Motor Mechanics or Marksman

mm Millimeter

MORS Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop

MP Military Police

MPC Military Police Corps

MPES Military Postal Express Service15

MR Monthly roster or muster roll

MR Bn Marine Replacement Battalion

MRC Medical Reserve Corps

MR Park Motor Reception Park

MS Co. Military Specialists Company

MSD Motor Supply Depot

MSTU Machine Shop Truck Unit

MTC Motor Transport Corps16

MTS Motor Transport Service17

N North

NA National Army

NASN No Army Serial Number

14 Established on 5 July 1917 (see Services of Rear).

15 Created on 9 May 1918 for handling official and personal mail for the AEF, eventually operating 169 field and mobile post offices 

and railway mail service.

16 Established on 11 July 1918 as a separate service of Services of Supply (see MTS).

17 Established on 8 December 1917 as a separate service under QMC and included Service of Utilities on 16 February 1918 and 

Service of Utilities, which disolved on 11 July 1918.
253

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

NBH Navy Base Hospital

NDR No Disability Rating or Notifiable Disease Reported

NG National Guard

NSN No Serial Number

NSR No Service Record

NYD Not Yet Diagnosed

O Slight

O in C Officer in Charge

OCE Office of Chief Engineer

OLA Over Leave, Absent

OR Operations Report

Ord. Ordnance

O&T Observation and Training or Observation and Treatment

PA Personal Adjutant (statistical officers were so designated in GHQ GO #187, dated 25 

October 1918)

PAL Prisoner at Large

PC Post of Command

PBH Provisional Base Hospital

PBHU Provisional Base Hospital Unit

PH Post Hospital

PLM Paris-Lyon-Méditerranée (Railway)

PMG Provost Marshal General

POD Post Office Department

Pont.Bks. Pontanezen Barracks (near Brest)

PORR Paris-Orleans Railroad

POW Prisoner of War

Prov. Provisional

PUO Pyrexis Unknown Origin (Trench fever)

PW Penetrating Wound (British) or Prisoner of War

PWIB Prisoners of War Information Bureau18

QGA Quartier Général d’Armée (Army Headquarters)

R Roster

RA Regular Army

RC Reserve Corps

RD Replacement Depot19

Rel. Released

Repl. Replacement

18 Established on 1 July 1918.

19 The 1st RD was organized at Saint-Aignan on 30 December 1918 to take the place of the 1st DD, which was abolished on 9 

July 1919.
254

Appendix B

Reptd. Reported

Rheu. Rheumatism or rheumatic

RIO Regimental Intelligence Officer

RMS Railway Mail Service

RO Regulating Officer/Office

Ros. Roster

Rptd. Reported

RR&C Renting, Requisition, and Claims (Service)20

RRD Regional Replacement Depot21

RR Op. Bn. Railroad Operating Battalion

RSO Regimental Special Order

RTO Railway Transportation Officer/Office

S Severe or South

SAA Small Arms Ammunition

San.Tr. Sanitary Train

SC Signal Corps

SCD Surgeon’s Certificate of Disability

SD Special Duty

Seg. Segregation

SIW Self-inflicted Wound

SO Special Orders

SOP Senior officer present

SOR Services of Rear22

SOS Services of Supply23

Sp.Tr.Bn. Special Training Battalion

“S&S” Stars and Stripes, official AEF newspaper24

Stat.Sect. Statistical Section

St. Saint (French)

Ste. Sainte (French)

S of U Service of Utilities25

SW Shell Wound

TB Tuberculosis

TC Transportation Corps or Tank Corps

TD Transportation Department26

20 Established on 22 April 1918 under Services of Supply.

21 Established on 15 January 1919 at Chelles, Toul, and Revigny.

22 On 16 February 1918, L of C is reorganized as Services of Rear (see SOS).

23 SOR is redesignated Services of Supply on 13 March 1918 and abolished on 1 September 1919.

24 Authorized on 8 February 1918.

25 Established on 16 February 1918 to include Transportation Department, Motor Transport Service, and Forestry Service; disbanded on 11 July 1918.

26 Established on 14 September 1917.
255

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

TFW Temporary Foreign Warrant

TM Bty Trench Mortar Battery

Tr., Trs. Transferred

Trans. Transferred

TS Transportation Service27

TSST Training School for Sanitary Troops

TTW Through and through wound (British)

TW Temporary Warrant

TY Target Year

UD Utilities Detachment

Unasgd. Unassigned

USR United States (Army) Reserve

USTP United States Troops, Paris

VC Veterinary Corps

VDG Venereal disease, gonorrhea

VDH Valvular Disease of the Heart

VDS Venereal disease, syphilis

VLC Venereal Labor Camp

Ven.Lab.Cp. Venereal Labor Camp

VO Verbal Orders

VOCOH Verbal Orders, Commanding Officer, Hospital

VRC Veterinary Reserve Corps

WD Walking, Dressing (naval classification for patients received on naval transports for 

United States) or War Department

WDB War Damage Board28

WIA Wounded in Action

WND Walking, No Dressing (naval classification for patients received on naval transports for 

United States)

WRI War Risk Insurance

WRS War Risk Section29

27 Created on 14 September 1917 as a separate service and was included in Service of Utilities on 16 February 1918.

28 Established on 19 January 1919 to evaluate damages caused by AEF in France. On 1 February 1919, jurisdiction extended to 

Serbia, Romania, Greece, Italy, Great Britain, and Belgium.

29 Created on 7 January 1918 and charged with War Risk Insurance administration in AEF.
256

Appendix B

American Post Offices

701 Saint-Nazaire 734 32d Div

702 Paris 734-A Champlitte

703 Gondrecourt 735 La Rochelle

704 La Valdahon 735-A Rochefort

705 Bordeaux 736 Aix-les-Bains

705-A Genicart 736-A Annecy

705-B Pauillac 736-B Chamonix

706 Chaumont 737 Cosne

707 Mailly 738 Châteauroux

708 Nevers 739 77th Div.

709 26th Div. 740 3d Div.

710 2d Div. 741 Mehun

711 Coëtquidan 742 82d Div.

712 Is-sur-Tille 743 35th Div.

713 Gièvres 744 28th Div.

713-A Romorantin 745 5th Div.

714 Langres 746 4th Div.

715 42d Div 747 Sorcy

716 Brest 748 27th Div.

717 Tours 749 30th Div.

718 Saumur 750 33d Div.

719 Haussimont 751 Boulogne

720 Bourbonne-les-Baines 752 Marseille

721 Dijon 752-A Hyères

722 La Courtine 752-B Cannes

723 Clermont-Ferrand 752-C Monte Carlo

723-A Châtel-Guyon 752-D Menton

724 Issoudun 753 Limoges

725 Saint-Maixent 754 3d A.C.

726 Blois 755 78th Div.

727 Saint-Aignan 756 80th Div.

728 Bar-sur-Aub 757 Nogent-en-Bassigny

729 1st Div. 758 Liffol-le-Grand

730 Châtillon-sur-Seine 759 1st A.C.

731 Neufchâteau 760 Le Havre

731-A Colombey-les-Belles 761 89th Div.

732 Vittel 762 Le Mans

733 Angers 763 37th Div.

764 Épinal 905 84th Div.
257

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

765 29th Div. 906 87th Div.

766 92d Div. 907 Bar-le-Duc

767 Nantes 908 Sougy

768 Cherbourg 909 Beaune

769 5th A.C. 910 Château-du-Loir

770 90th Div. 911 Libourne

771 79th Div. 912 34th Div.

772 Verneuil 913 Bar-sur-Aube

772-A Decize 914 Les Souhesmes

773 Saint-Amand-Montrond 915 Nancy

774 1st Army HQ 916 86th Div.

775 4th A.C. 917 Châtenay-sur-Seine

776 91st Div. 918 2d Army

777 6th Div. 919 Rimaucourt

778 Le Courneau 920 Châlons-sur-Marne

779 Meucon 921 Saint-Dizier

780 Mars-sur-Allier 922 Angoulême

781 Vichy 923 Grenoble

782 Château-Thierry 924 Le Blanc

783 6th A.C. 925 Cour-Cheverny

784 Toul 926 Autun

785 Allerey 927 3d Army HQ

786 Clamecy 928 La Valbonne

788 6th D.D. 929 Joinville

790 4th D.D. 930 Treves, Germany (Advance GHQ)

791 81st Div. 931 8th A.C.

792 7th A.C. 932 9th A.C.

793 7th Div. 933 Nice

794 Périgueux 934 Coblenz, Germany

795 88th Div. 935 Vannes

796 36th Div. 936 Thionville

797 Orleans 937 Pau

798 Mesves-sur-Loire 938 83d Div.

799 Saint-Malo 939 Savenay

827 31st Div. 940 Rennes

828 38th Div. 946 Berlin, Germany

831 8th Div. 947 Le Fayet-Saint-Gervais-le-Bains

902 Bourges 951 Luxembourg

903 Vitrey 953 Poitiers

904 39th Div.
258

Appendix B

Base Sections

BS #1: Organized as Base Port #1 on 21 June 1917 and designated BS #1 on 13 August 1917 with 

headquarters at Saint-Nazaire.

BS #2: Organized on 8 September 1917 with headquarters at Bordeaux.

BS #3: Organized on 13 August 1917 with headquarters at Le Havre. BS #3 was redesignated on 

27 November 1917 as BS #4.

BS #4: See above

BS #5: Organized on 10 November 1917 with headquarters at Brest.

BS #6: Organized on 30 May 1918 with headquarters at Marseille.

BS #7: Organized on 28 June 1918 from part of BS #2 with headquarters at La Pallice.

BS #8: Organized on 11 October 1918 with headquarters at Padua, Italy.

BS #9: Organized on 8 April 1919 with headquarters at Antwerp, Belgium.

Depot Divisions

1st DD: The 41st Division was Replacement Division, I Corps, from 20 December 1917 to 14 

January 1918 at La Courtine; Base and Training Division, 1st Corps, from 15 January to 4 

March 1918; Depot Division, 1st Corps, from 5 March to 12 July 1918, and also served as 

the replacement division for the entire AEF from 11 April to early August 1918; 1st Depot 

Division, AEF, from 13 July to 26 December 1918. On 15 January 1918, activities were 

transferred from La Courtine to the Saint-Aignan-Noyers area (see 1st RD).

2d DD: The 83d Division was so designated and concentrated in the Le Mans area on 30 July 1918; 

it was relieved by the American Embarkation Center 15–31 December 1918.

3d DD: The 76th Division was 3d DD from 3 August to 7 November 1918, and was located in the 

Saint-Amand-Montrond area.

4th DD: The 85th Division was so designated on 28 July 1918 and moved to the area of Pouillysur-Loire, Sancerre, and Cosne; from 14 August to 29 October 1918, it served as Depot 

Division, Intermediate Section; and from 30 October 1918 to 12 January 1919, it was the 

Regional Replacement Depot, Second Army, in the Toul area.

5th DD: The 35th Division was so designated on 14 August 1918 and moved to the Chârost and 

Mehun-sur-Yèvre area southwest of Bourges; it was relieved on 19 October 1918.

6th DD: The 40th Division was so designated on 16 August 1918 and moved to the La Guerchesur-l’Aubois area; on 4 November 1918, it moved to the Revigny area, only to be relieved 

on 4 December 1918.
259

APPENDIX C

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

General Histories

Churchill, Winston. The World Crisis, 6 vols. New York: Scribner, 1931.

Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999.

Marshall, S. L. A. World War I. New York: American Heritage Press, 1971.

Tuchman, Barbara W. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.

Marine Corps-related Articles and Books

Akers, Herbert H., Charles F. Hurlbut, and John MacRitchie. History of the Third Battalion, Sixth Regiment, 

U.S. Marines. Hillsdale, MI: Akers, MacRitchie & Hurlbut, 1919.

American Battle Monuments Commission. American Armies and Battlefields in Europe. Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1938.

American Battle Monuments Commission. 2d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944.

Androit, R. Belleau Wood and the American Army: The 2d and 26th Divisions, June and July 1918. Translated by 

W. B. Fitts. Washington, DC: Belleau Wood Memorial Association, 1925.

Antrim, Ray P. Where the Marines Fought in France. Chicago: Park and Antrim, 1919.

Asprey, Robert B. At Belleau Wood. New York: Putnam, 1965.

Axelrod, Alan. Miracle at Belleau Wood: The Birth of the Modern U.S. Marine Corps. Guilford, CT: Lyons 

Press, 2007.

Barnett, B. J. “Blood and Wheat.” Leatherneck 25, no. 12 (December 1942): 16–17, 54–59.

———. “Valley of the One Legged Heinie.” Leatherneck 26, no. 4 (April 1943): 22–24, 45–47.

Boggs, Charles W., Jr. “Marine-Aviation: Origin and Growth.” Marine Corps Gazette 34, no. 11 (November 

1950): 68–75.

Boswell, Rolfe. Leathernecks: Our Marines in Fact and Picture. New York: Thomas Y. Cromwell Company, 

1943.

Brannen, Carl Andrew. Over There: A Marine in the Great War. College Station: Texas A&M University 

Press, 1996.

Brewster, D. L. S. “An Analysis of the Crossing of the Meuse River.” Marine Corps Gazette 25, no. 1 (March 

1941): 22–23, 51–52.

Camp, Dick. The Devil Dogs at Belleau Wood: U.S. Marines in World War I. Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 

2008.
260

Appendix C

Cates, Clifton B. History of the 96th Company, 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, United States Marine Corps, 4th 

Brigade, 2d Division, A. E .F. Washington, DC: Historical Section, USMC, 1935. Mimeographed.

Champie, Elmore A. A Brief History of the Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, 1891–

1962. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1962.

Clark, George B., ed. His Time in Hell: A Texas Marine in France: The World War I Memoir of Warren R. Jackson. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2001.

Cowing, Kemper F., comp. “Dear Folks at Home — —”: The Glorious Story of the United States Marines in 

France as Told by Their Letters from the Battlefield. Edited by Courtney R. Cooper. Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin, 1919. 

Coyle, W. R. “Parris Island in the War.” Marine Corps Gazette 10, no. 3 (December 1925): 187–91.

Culp, John W. With the U.S. Marines at Paris [sic] Island Training Station: A Pictorial Souvenir. Parris Island, 

SC: Marine Publicity Bureau, 1918. 

Cunningham, Alfred A. “Value of Aviation to the Corps.” Marine Corps Gazette 5, no. 3 (September 1920): 

221–33. 

Curtis, Thomas J., and Lothar R. Long. History of the Sixth Machine Gun Battalion, Fourth Brigade, U.S. 

Marines, Second Division, and Its Participation in the Great War. Neuwied, Germany: Sixth Machine 

Gun Battalion, 1919.

Daugherty, Leo J., III. The Marine Corps and the State Department: Enduring Partners in United States Foreign 

Policy, 1798–2007. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2009.

Ebbert, Jean, and Marie-Beth Hall. The First, the Few, the Forgotten: Navy and Marine Corps Women in World 

War I. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002. 

Edwards, H. W. “Harbord and Lejeune: A Command Precedent.” Marine Corps Gazette 37, no. 7 ( July 

1953): 12–15. 

Edwards, W. Atlee. “The U.S. Naval Air Force in Action, 1917–1918.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 48, 

no. 11 (November 1922): 1863–82.

Ellis, Earl H. “Liaison in the World War.” Marine Corps Gazette 5, no. 2 ( June 1920): 135–41.

Emmons, Roger M. “The First Marine Aviation Force.” Pts. 1 and 2. Cross and Cockade Journal 6, no. 2 

(Summer 1965): 173–86; 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1965): 272–92.

Evans, Frank E. “Demobilizing the Brigades.” Marine Corps Gazette 4, no. 4 (December 1919): 303–14.

Field, Harry B., and Henry G. James. Over the Top With the 18th Company, 5th Regiment, U.S. Marines: A 

History. Rodenbach, Germany: [1919?]. 

Flagg, James Montgomery. Roses and Buckshot: An Autobiography. New York: Putnam, 1946.

Gibbons, Floyd Phillips. And They Thought We Wouldn’t Fight. New York: George H. Doran, 1918. 

Golaz, Andre, trans. “Belleau Woods, June 1918.” Revue Historique de l’Armée [special issue] (1957): 54–65. 

Gulberg, Martin Gus. A War Diary. Chicago: The Drake Press, 1927. 

Harbord, James G. “A Month in Belleau Wood in 1918.” Leatherneck 11, no. 6 ( June 1928): 10–12, 54.

Harraden, C. Gordon, and Raymond H. Stedman. The Second Division, American Expeditionary Forces, 

1917–1919. Neuwied, Germany: 2d Division (Regular), 1919. 
261

Selected Bibliography

Hewitt, Linda L. Women Marines in World War I. Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1974. 

Historical Branch, War Plans Division, General Staff. Organization of the Services of Supply, American Expeditionary Forces. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1921.

History of the Second Battalion, Fifth Marines. Quantico, Virginia: 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, 1938. Mimeographed.

Jones, Jerry W. U.S. Battleship Operations in World War I. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

A List of the Officers and Enlisted Men of the United States Marine Corps, Who Lost Their Lives While Serving Overseas During the World War. Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1918. Mimeographed.

Lynch, Charles, Joseph H. Ford, and Frank W. Weed. The Medical Department of the United States Army in the 

World War, Vol. VIII: Field Operations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1925. 

McClellan, Maj Edwin N. “The Aisne-Marne Offensive.” Pts. 1 and 2. Marine Corps Gazette 6, no. 1 (March 

1921): 66–84; 6, no. 2 ( June 1921): 188–227.

———. “American Marines in the British Grand Fleet.” Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 2 ( June 1922): 147–68.

———. “American Marines in Siberia During the World War.” Marine Corps Gazette 5, no. 2 ( June 1920): 

173–81.

———. “The Battle of Blanc Mont Ridge.” Pts 1, 2, and 3. Marine Corps Gazette 7, no. 1 (March 1922): 

1–21; no. 2 ( June 1922): 206–11; no. 3 (September 1922): 287–88. 

———. “A Brief History of the Fourth Brigade of Marines.” Marine Corps Gazette 4, no. 4 (December 

1919): 342–68.

———. “Capture of Hill 143, Battle of Belleau Wood, and Capture of Bouresches.” Marine Corps Gazette

5, no. 3 (September 1920): 277–313; 5, no. 4 (December 1920): 371–405.

———. “Operations of the Fourth Brigade of Marines in the Aisne Defensive,” Marine Corps Gazette 5, no. 

2 ( June 1920): 182–214.

———. The United States Marines in the World War. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920. 

McCrea, C. L. “How the Navy Designed and Built the World’s Heaviest Field Piece: The Bureau of Ordnance Brings Out an Entirely Novel Type of Mount for a Seven-Inch Navy Gun for the U.S. Marines.” Proceedings 45, no. 7 ( July 1919): 1159–69. 

Mackin, Elton E. Suddenly We Didn’t Want to Die: Memoirs of a World War I Marine. New York: Presidio 

Press, 1996.

“Mademoiselle Verdun of the Second Division.” Leatherneck 11, no. 8 (August 1928): 6. 

Metcalf, Clyde H. A History of the United States Marine Corps. New York: Putnam, 1939.

Mortensen, Mark. George W. Hamilton, USMC: America’s Greatest World War I Hero. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2011.

Mowry, William J. “The Greatest Day.” Marine Corps Gazette 47, no. 7 ( July 1963): 32–36. 

Nelson, Havelock D. “Lucky Leatherneck.” Leatherneck 22, no. 12 (December 1939); 24, no. 5 (May 1941). 
262

Appendix C

Office of Naval Intelligence. The American Naval Planning Section. Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1923.

Office of Naval Intelligence. Information Concerning the U.S. Navy and Other Navies. Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1919.

Otto, Ernst. The Battle at Blanc Mont, October 2 to October 10, 1918. Translated by Martin Lichtenberg.

Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1930.

———. “The Battles for the Possession of Belleau Woods, June 1918.” Proceedings 54, no. 11 (November 

1928): 941–62.

Owen, Peter F. To the Limit of Endurance: A Battalion of Marines in the Great War. College Station: Texas 

A&M University Press, 2007.

Pickel, Virginia A. “Women Marines.” Marine Corps Gazette 40, no. 11 (November 1957): 64–67.

Rentfrow, Frank H. “Beyond the Call.” Leatherneck 22, no. 3 (March 1939): 10–11, 55.

Reserve Officers of Public Affairs Unit 4-1. The Marine Corps Reserve: A History 1916–1966. Washington, 

DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1966.

Rossano, Geoffrey. Stalking the U-Boat: U.S. Naval Aviation in Europe during World War I. Annapolis, MD: 

Naval Institute Press, 2010.

Rossano, Geoffrey, and Thomas Wildenberg. Striking the Hornet’s Nest: Naval Aviation and the Origins of 

Strategic Bombing in World War I. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2015.

Russell, James C., and William E. Moore. The United States Navy in the World War: Official Pictures Selected 

from the Files of the Navy Department, the War Department and the United States Marine Corps, with 

Supplemental Photographs from Unofficial Sources. Washington, DC: Pictorial Bureau, 1921.

Schubert, R. H. “A Critical Analysis of Flank Protection, Second Division (A. E. F., France) 3 October to 9 

October 1918.” Marine Corps Gazette 25, no. 4 (November 1941): 56, 58, 111–13.

Second Division Association, U.S. Army. Commendations of Second Division: American Expeditionary Forces, 

1917–1919. Cologne, Germany: 1919.

Simmons, Edwin H., and Joseph H. Alexander. Through the Wheat: The U.S. Marines in World War I. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

Spaulding, Oliver Lyman, and John Womack Wright. The Second Division, American Expeditionary Force in 

France, 1917–1919. New York: The Hillman Press, for the Historical Committee, Second Division 

Association, 1937.

Stallings, Laurence. The Doughboys: The Story of the AEF in World War I, 1917–1918. New York: Harper & 

Row, 1966.

Still, William N., Jr. Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I. Gainesville: 

University Press of Florida, 2007.

Thomason, John W., Jr. Fix Bayonets. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926.

———. “The Marine Brigade.” Proceedings 54, no. 11 (November 1928): 963–68.

———. “Second Division Northwest of Château Thierry, 1 June–10 July 1918.” Washington, DC: National 

War College, 1928. Unpublished manuscript.
263

Selected Bibliography

U.S. Army. 2d Division. The Second Division: Syllabi of the Histories of Regiments and Separate Organizations. 

From Dates of Organization to June 1, 1919. Vol. 2, Pt. 4. Germany: Coblenzer Volkszeitung, [1919?]. 

U.S. Army. Historical Division. United States in the World War, 1917–1919. 17 vols. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948.

U.S. Navy Department. Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. The Medical Department of the United States Navy 

with the Army and Marine Corps in France in World War I: Its Function and Employment. Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1947.

U.S. War Department. Army War College. Historical Section. Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces 

in the World War: American Expeditionary Forces, Divisions. Washington, DC: Government Printing 

Office, 1931.

U.S. War Department. Army War College. Second Division Historical Section. Records of the Second Division (Regular). 9 vols. Fort Sam Houston, TX, and Washington, DC: 1924–28. Mimeographed.

U.S. War Department. Army War College. Second Division Historical Section. Translations of War Diaries 

of German Units Opposed to the Second Division (Regular) 1918. 4 vols. Washington, DC: 1930–32. 

Mimeographed.

U.S. War Department. Battle Participation of Organizations of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, 

Belgium and Italy, 1917–1918. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920.

U.S. War Department. General Staff. War Plans Division. Historical Branch. Blanc Mont (Meuse-ArgonneChampagne), monograph no. 9. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1920.

Waller, L. W. T., Jr. “Machine Guns of the Fourth Brigade.” Marine Corps Gazette 5, no. 1 (March 1920): 

1–31.

Record Repositories—Federal and State

American Expeditionary Forces Siberia. Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA.

Manuscript Collections. Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA.

Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, and College Park, MD.

Records of the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I). National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, and College Park, MD.

Reports of Military Service. North Carolina Office of Archives and History, Raleigh, NC.

World War I Service Cards of Massachusetts Naval Militia. Military Records of the Massachusetts Adjutant General, Worcester, MA.

World War I Service Cards. Missouri State Archives, Jefferson City, MO.

World War I Veteran’s Surveys. Military History Institute, Carlisle, PA.

Personal Papers Collections

Butler, Smedley D., Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Quantico, 

VA.
264

Appendix C

Cates, Clifton B., Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Quantico, 

VA.

Feland, Logan, Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Quantico, VA.

Harbord, James G., Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Holcomb, Thomas, Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Quantico, 

VA.

Lejeune, John A., Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

Squires, Hugh, Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Archives and Special Collections, Quantico, VA.

Oral History Interviews

Allen, John A., 24 July 1962. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History Division, 

Quantico, VA.

Cates, Clifton B., 11 April 1967. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

Darden, Colgate W., 24 September 1969. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA.

Fredey, Richard B., 25 October 2001. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA.

Gaspar, Walter S., 23 August 1975. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.

Gould, Cyril, November 1965. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History Division, 

Quantico, VA.

Jenson, Albert L., 9 June 1997. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History Division, 

Quantico, VA.

Paradis, Don V., 17 September 1973. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA.

Shepherd, Lemuel C., 27 July 1966. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History 

Division, Quantico, VA.

Smith, Edna L., 7 May 1981. Oral History Collection, Archives Section, Marine Corps History Division, 

Quantico, VA.

Photographs

Great War Primary Document Archive. “Photos of the Great War.” www.gwpda.org/photos/.

Library of Congress. “Prints and Photographs Online Catalog.” http://www.loc.gov/pictures/.

Naval History and Heritage Command Digital Photographs. http://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections

/photography.html.

Photographic Files, Historical Reference Branch, Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, VA.
265

APPENDIX D

PERSONAL AND UNIT AWARDS

AND DECORATIONS

The European custom of decorating heroes of another nation was a new experience for the military Services 

involved in World War I. The United States, with the Medal of Honor as its sole decoration at the time, 

was unprepared, but also had no appropriate award to recognize a level heroism of less than that merited 

by the Medal of Honor and no decoration to reward the myriad acts of meritorious noncombat service that 

the war spurred.

The U.S. Army shared this dilemma and, with the aid of President Woodrow Wilson and Congress, 

instituted its Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) and Distinguished Service Medal (DSM) in 1918 with 

clear guidelines for the award of the DSC for combat heroism and the DSM award for distinguished noncombat duty in a position of great responsibility. Both awards were made available in time for activities taking place during World War I. Parallel awards were created a year later for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, 

months after the Armistice and amid the massive demobilization of our forces.

Medal of Honor

Eight Medals of Honor were awarded to U.S. Marines for actions in the Great War; five recipients received 

both Navy and Army versions. Another six were awarded to naval medical personnel for service with the 

Marines.

Name Rank Date

Louis Cukela* Sergeant 18 July 1918

Ernest A. Janson* Gunnery Sergeant 6 June 1918

John J. Kelly* Private 3 October 1918

Matej Kocak*† Sergeant 18 July 1918

John H. Pruitt* Corporal 3 October 1918

Robert G. Robinson Gunnery Sergeant 8 and 14 October 1918

Fred W. Stockham† Gunnery Sergeant 13–14 June 1918

*Double recipient; one U.S. Navy and one U.S. Army.

†Killed in action.
266

Appendix D

Navy Cross

The creation of the Navy Cross and the Navy Distinguished Service Medal was fraught with controversy, 

ambiguity, and confusion. As enacted on 4 February 1919, the Navy Cross was the Navy’s third-highest 

award and could be awarded for both combat heroism and for other distinguished noncombat service. 

Many, for instance, were earned for extraordinary diving and salvage feats. Originally third in precedence 

behind the Medal of Honor and the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, more than one Navy Cross recipient regarded the award as a “snub” in lieu of the Distinguished Service Medal. Twenty-three years later, on 

7 August 1942, Congress placed the Navy Cross just beneath the Medal of Honor, and limited its award to 

combat-only recognition.

At least 392 Navy Cross medals were awarded to Marines; many of these men also received the Distinguished Service Cross. Captain Percy D. Cornell and Corporal Robert Slover received two separate awards 

of the Navy Cross for their actions in the war.

Distinguished Service Cross

The Distinguished Service Cross was established by President Wilson on 2 January 1918. General Pershing, commander-in-chief of the Expeditionary Forces in France, had recommended that recognition other 

than the Medal of Honor be authorized for the U.S. armed forces for service rendered in a similar fashion 

to that awarded by the European armies. The request for establishment of the medal was forwarded from 

the secretary of war to the president in a letter dated 28 December 1917. The act of Congress establishing 

this award (Public Law 193, 65th Congress) dated 9 July 1918 is contained in Title 10 United States Code 

(USC) 3742. Establishment of the Distinguished Service Cross was promulgated in War Department General Order No. 6, dated 12 January 1918.

The first design of the Distinguished Service Cross was cast and manufactured by the U.S. Mint at 

Philadelphia. The die was cast from the approved design prepared by Lieutenant Aymar E. Embry, Engineer 

Officer Reserve Corps. Upon examination of the first medals struck at the mint, minor changes were recommended to add to the beauty and attractiveness of the medal. Due to the importance of the time element 

involved in furnishing the decorations to General Pershing, 100 of the medals were struck from the original 

design and numbered 1–100. These medals were furnished with the provision that the crosses be replaced 

when the second design was complete, which would also be numbered 1–100.

At least 357 Distinguished Service Cross medals were awarded to Marines for this period. Many of 

these men also received the Navy Cross medal for the same actions.

Distinguished Service Medal

The Distinguished Service Medal was authorized by presidential order on 2 January 1918 and confirmed 

by Congress on 9 July 1918. It was announced by War Department General Order No. 6, dated 12 January 

1918, with the following information concerning the medal:

A bronze medal of appropriate design and a ribbon to be worn in lieu thereof, to be awarded by the President to any person who, while serving in any capacity with the Army shall 

hereafter distinguish himself or herself, or who, since 6 April 1917, has distinguished himself or herself by exceptionally meritorious service to the Government in a duty of great 

responsibility in time of war or in connection with military operations against an armed 

enemy of the United States.

An act of Congress on 9 July 1918 recognized the need for different types and degrees of heroism and 

meritorious service and included such provisions for award criteria. The current statutory authorization for 

the Distinguished Service Medal is Title 10, United States Code, Section 3743.
267

Personal and Unit Awards and Decorations

Among the first Distinguished Service Medals awarded for World War I were those to the commanding officers of the Allied armies:

France: Marshals Ferdinand Foch and Joseph Joffre

General Henri Pétain

Great Britain: Field Marshal Douglas Haig

Italy: General Armando Diaz

Belgium: General Cyriaque Gillain

United States: General John Pershing

The Navy Distinguished Service Medal was established by an act of Congress (Public Law 253, 65th 

Congress) approved on 4 February 1919. The medal was designed by Paul H. Manship (1885–1966). The 

first person to receive the Navy Distinguished Service Medal was Brigadier General Charles A. Doyen, 

USMC, who received the medal posthumously on 13 March 1919. 

Between the Army and Navy versions of the medal, 32 were awarded to Marines.

Silver Star Citation/Medal

The Citation Star was established as a result of an act of Congress on 9 July 1918 (65th Congress, Sess II, 

Chapter 143, page 873) and was promulgated in War Department Bulletin No. 43 dated 1918. A letter from 

General [Henry] Jervey, Office of the Chief of Staff, dated 26 February 1926, states that: The Secretary of 

War directs as follows—The following is the amended version of paragraph 187 of Army Regulation:

No more than one Medal of Honor or one Distinguished Service Cross or one Distinguished Service Medal shall be issued to any one person, but for each succeeding or act 

sufficient to justify the award of a Medal of Honor or Distinguished Service Cross or 

Distinguished Service Medal, respectively, a bronze oak leaf cluster, shall be issued in lieu 

thereof; and for each citation of an officer or enlisted man for gallantry in action, published 

in orders from headquarters of a force commanded by a general officer, not warranting the 

issue of a Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross or Distinguished Service Medal, 

he shall wear a silver star, 3/16 inch in diameter, as prescribed in Uniform Regulations.

Army Regulation 600-40, paragraph 48, 27 September 1921, specified that the Citation Star would be 

worn above the clasp on the ribbon of the service medal for the campaign for service in which the citations 

were given.

On 19 July 1932, the secretary of war approved the Silver Star medal to replace the Citation Star. This 

design placed the Citation Star on a bronze pendant suspended from the ribbon design. The star was no 

longer attached to a service or campaign ribbon.

At least 3,076 Marines received the Silver Star medal or Silver Star citation for actions in World War 

I. Many were recipients of multiple medals or citations.

World War I Victory Medal

The Victory Medal was awarded to Marine Corps units that were on active duty between 6 April 1917 and 

11 November 1918 or that served on shore in northern Russia or Siberia between 13 November 1918 and 

30 March 1920. Campaign periods for which campaign stars are awarded are as follows:
268

Appendix D

Campaign period Dates

Aisne Operation 1–5 June 1918

Aisne-Marne Operation 18–20 July 1918

Saint-Mihiel Operation 12–16 September 1918

Meuse-Argonne Operation

29 September–10 October

21–22 October

25 October–11 November 1918

Toulon-Troyon sector 18 March–13 May 1918

Chateau-Thierry sector 6 June–16 July 1918

Marabache sector 6–16 August 1918

Limey sector 10–11 September 1918

West Indies 6 April 1917–11 November 1918

Siberia (Vladivostok) 12 November 1918–7 December 1919

France, 5th Brigade 6 October 1918–7 December 1919

Aviation, 1st Marine Aviation Force (Northern 

Bombing Group) 30 July–6 December 1918

The Maltese Cross was awarded to officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and Medical Corps who 

served in France during World War I but did not participate in any engagements; this included those Marines assigned to the 5th Brigade.

Army of Occupation of Germany Medal

The Army of Occupation of Germany medal was awarded to units and men of the Armed Services of 

the United States who served ashore in Germany or Austria-Hungary during the period of occupation at 

any time between 12 November 1918 and 11 July 1923. From 12 November 1918 to 25 December 1919, 

Marines formed part of the Allied Forces stationed in Germany or territory formerly held by Germany to 

enforce the terms of the Armistice.

Croix de Guerre and French Fourragère

The French government awarded decorations for especially meritorious conduct in action during World 

War I to 156 American units varying in size from a section to a brigade. These decorations were the four-
269

Personal and Unit Awards and Decorations

ragère and the Croix de Guerre with various combinations of palms and gilt, silver, and bronze stars. The 

various classes of the Croix de Guerre were as follows:

Bronze palm: for citation in orders of the army

Gold (or gilt) star: for citation in orders of the corps

Silver star: for citation in orders of the division

Bronze star: for citation in orders of the brigade, regiment, or equivalent unit

A fifth citation in orders of the army calls for the award of a silver palm, which replaces the four bronze 

palms.

Just as individuals are decorated for services rendered, so are the colors of an organization decorated to 

commemorate the deeds of the unit as a whole. The American unit to which such an award has been made 

is authorized by the U.S. government to place on its flag a streamer—one streamer for each award—and 

on each streamer, in the colors of the decoration, are embroidered the name or names commemorating the 

battle for which the unit was cited. A unit twice decorated with a Croix de Guerre with palm is entitled 

to a braided and knotted cord, called a fourragère, in the green and red colors of the Croix de Guerre. The 

fourragère becomes a part of the uniform of the unit and all members of the organization are authorized to 

wear the decoration on the left shoulder of their uniform as long as they remain members of the organization. Individuals attached to the organization on at least two occasions in which it was cited in orders of 

the army are entitled to wear the fourragère at all times, regardless of whether or not they are serving with 

the unit so decorated. A person entitled to wear the fourragère as an individual decoration is authorized to 

wear on the knot thereof, above the metal point, the device of the division to which he was attached when 

he received his last citation, with the Marine Corps emblem below same, both in bronze metal and in miniature. Although the single cord of plain cotton is the regulation issue, officers generally wear the silk cord 

with the double loop.

The French fourragère is a decoration instituted by Napoleon I for units that had distinguished themselves in battle. It was revived during World War I and was awarded by the French Ministry of War to 

organizations cited more than once in the French Orders of the Army. The three classes of the fourragère 

are as follows:

First: Légion d’Honneur (scarlet)

Second: Médaille Militaire (yellow and red)

Third: Croix de Guerre (with palm; green and red)

In 1918, the heroic deeds of Marines from the 5th and 6th Regiments inscribed the names of momentous battles on the pages of Marine Corps history as well as on their own regimental flags. They have the 

honor of being the only two regiments in the AEF to receive three citations—two in the orders of the army 

and one in the orders of the corps—the fourragère and Croix de Guerre with two palms and one gilt star. 

271

APPENDIX E

RESERVE DECORATIONS

MARINES AWARDED VALOR AWARDS

IN WORLD WAR I

by Colonel Walter Ford, USMC (Ret)*

The following list includes those Marines who were in the Marine Corps Reserve at the time of the action, 

or who entered the Corps via a Marine unit of the Naval Militia or the National Naval Volunteers.**The 

awards are listed alphabetically by type of award given, beginning with the awards of highest precedence. 

This content was sourced with the assistance of Mr. Doug Sterner, Home of Heroes.com.

Ancestry.com’s online database advanced the research into the U.S. Marine Corps muster rolls for 1893–

1958 to confirm the source of entry of these heroic leathernecks. Another cross-checking reference came from 

Jane Blakeney’s Heroes: U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955 (1957). Blakeney, who after service in the Marine 

Corps Reserve (F) during World War I and immediately thereafter, continued her contributions at Headquarters Marine Corps until retirement as the head of the Marine Corps’ Decorations and Medals Branch.

Talbot, Ralph

Medal of Honor

Citation:

The President of the United States of America, in the name of Congress, takes pride in presenting the Medal of Honor (Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Ralph Talbot, United 

States Marine Corps, for exceptionally meritorious service and extraordinary heroism while 

attached to Squadron C, First Marine Aviation Force, in France. Second Lieutenant Talbot 

participated in numerous air raids into enemy territory. On 8 October 1918, while on such 

a raid, he was attacked by nine enemy scouts, and in the fight that followed shot down an 

enemy plane. Also, on 14 October 1918, while on a raid over Pittham, Belgium, Second 

Lieutenant Talbot and another plane became detached from the formation on account of 

motor trouble and were attacked by 12 enemy scouts. During the severe fight that followed, 

his plane shot down one of the enemy scouts. His observer was shot through the elbow 

and his gun jammed. Second Lieutenant Talbot maneuvered to gain time for his observer 

to clear the jam with one hand, and then returned to the fight. The observer fought until 

shot twice, once in the stomach and once in the hip and then collapsed, Second Lieutenant 

Talbot attacked the nearest enemy scout with his front guns and shot him down. With his 

observer unconscious and his motor failing, he dived to escape the balance of the enemy 

* This list was compiled by Col Ford in the course of his research on a forthcoming article on the Marine Corps Reserve.

** Note that, in some instances, the individuals listed were in Reserve status due to Selective Service Classifications. For our purposes, 

they include Class 1, which identified them as “Members of the Armed Forces of the United States, the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, or the Public Health Service”; Class 4, which identified them as “Conscientious Objectors Available 

for Noncombatant Military Service Only”; or Class 5, which identified them as “Conscientious Objectors to All Military Service.”
272

Appendix E

and crossed the German trenches at an altitude of 50 feet, landing at the nearest hospital to 

leave his observer, and then returning to his aerodrome.

Death:

Killed in aircraft accident on 25 October 1918

Source of Entry: 

Former U.S. Navy Reserve Flying Corps (ensign); disenrolled to be commissioned in the Marine Corps 

Reserve Flying Corps, Class 5

Barr, Chapin C.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Chapin C. Barr (MCSN: 0-1916), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as a Pilot in the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), at the front in France. On 26 September 

1918, while on an air raid over enemy territory, Lieutenant Barr was attacked by a superior 

number of enemy scouts. In the fight which ensued he behaved with conspicuous gallantry 

and intrepidity, and despite having been mortally wounded, he drove off the enemy and 

brought his plane safely back to the aerodrome.

Source of Entry:

Ensign in the Navy Reserve Flying Corps

Bower, George

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant George Bower (MCSN: 0-98), United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism while serving with the 81st Company, 6th Machine Gun Battalion, 6th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Thiaucourt, France, 15 

September 1918. Aiding an infantry platoon, which had been forced to withdraw because 

of heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, Lieutenant Bower, while suffering from severe 

wounds, kept his guns in position, consolidating his location, and preventing the danger of 

an enemy counterattack.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4
273

Reserve Decorations

Cornell, Percy Duryea

Navy Cross (First Award)

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Captain Percy Duryea Cornell (MCSN: 0-187), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d 

Division, A. E. F. in action near St. Etienne, France, 4 October 1918. Captain Cornell courageously led his company through heavy artillery and machine-gun fire in the attack on 

a strongly defended enemy position. His company held the exposed flank and later, when 

the battalion withdrew, he skillfully covered the other shifting units while exposed to heavy 

enemy fire.

Navy Cross (Second Award)

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting a Gold Star 

in lieu of a Second Award of the Navy Cross to Captain Percy Duryea Cornell (MCSN: 

0-187), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession 

while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in 

action on 18 July 1918, shortly after his company had jumped off in an attack against the 

enemy’s strongly organized position in the Bois de Ritz, southwest of Soissons. Seeing the 

advanced wave of the adjoining company being annihilated, and hearing the sudden outburst of machine gun fire coming directly from his front, Major Cornell, without thought 

of self, or the consequences, shouted to the men of his platoon to follow, and dashed toward 

the sound of the deadly fire followed by those few of his men who heard him, and, with 

their assistance silenced the machine gun. By this heroic act and rare presence of mind he 

saved the lives of many who would otherwise have been cut down.

Personal Awards:

Two Navy Crosses (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (WWI)

Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Two Purple Hearts

Source of Entry:

Company B, Texas National Naval Volunteers

Dietrich, Carl R.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Carl R. Dietrich (MCSN: 0-1378), United States Marine Corps, for 

exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service while serving with the 4th Brigade 

(Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Soissons, St. Mihiel, Champagne and the 
274

Appendix E

Argonne, France. Throughout the operations of the 4th Brigade Marines First Lieutenant 

Dietrich was indefatigable in his attention to duty. He was frequently sent on important 

missions in the transmission of orders, establishing liaison and location of elements of the 

command, under extremely difficult and dangerous circumstances. Days and nights without 

sleep, Lieutenant Dietrich has always proved himself reliable, efficient and of great value 

and assistance.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Feigle, William M.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Sergeant William M. Feigle (MCSN: 93428), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the Headquarters Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 

2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Beaumont, France, 10 November 1918. When an ammunition train was passing through a town, one of the trucks was struck by a shell and set 

on fire. The blazing truck was abandoned and, knowing that it soon would explode and kill 

all those in the vicinity, Sergeant Feigle jumped on the truck and drove it to the outskirts 

of the town, thereby saving the lives of at least thirty-five people.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Company B, Texas National Naval Volunteers

Glendinning, Henry P.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant Henry P. Glendinning (MCSN: 0-2431), United States Marine 

Corps, for extraordinary heroism in action while serving with the Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, American Expeditionary Forces, on 3 and 4 October 1918, in the Blanc 

Mont region of France. Lieutenant Glendinning showed fine qualities of command as well 
275

Reserve Decorations

as remarkable valor and an absolute disregard of danger. He directed the advance of his men 

and personally saw to it that the wounded were promptly evacuated.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Haws, Edward H.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Private Edward H. Haws (MCSN: 105079), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 96th Company, 6th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, 

A. E. F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, October 2–9, 1918. Throughout eight days of 

fighting, Private Haws fearlessly and tirelessly carried messages between his company and 

battalion headquarters, through heavy machine-gun and artillery fire.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Hewitt Jr., Charles Wilmer

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Corporal Charles Wilmer Hewitt, Jr. (MCSN: 81440), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 45th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Chateau-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918, 

Killed in action, Corporal Hewitt gave the supreme proof of the extraordinary heroism 

which will serve as an example to hitherto untried troops.

Death:

Killed in action

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)
276

Appendix E

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Humphreys Jr., Albert E.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Albert E. Humphreys, Jr. (MCSN: 0-2593), United States Marine 

Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with 

the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, 

October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Husted, Chester Seth

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Private Chester Seth Husted (MCSN: 106854), United States Marine 

Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 6th Machine-Gun Battalion, 6th 

Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, 5 October 

1918. Displaying great courage and disregard for his own safety, Private Husted volunteered to carry an important message through a heavy machine-gun barrage, losing his life 

in attempting to carry out this mission.

Death:

Killed in action

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Two Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4
277

Reserve Decorations

Israel, Frederick

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant Frederick Israel (MCSN: 0-468), United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. 

E. F. in action near St. Etienne, France, 4 October 1918. Second Lieutenant Israel twice 

volunteered and carried messages to the front line along a road swept by machine-gun and 

shell fire.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Jones, Harold A.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant Harold A. Jones (MCSN: 0-1494), United States Marine Corps, for 

distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First 

Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, 

and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition 

dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Justesen, William A.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Private William A. Justesen (MCSN: 108059), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d 
278

Appendix E

Division, A. E. F. in action near Vierzy, France, 19 July 1918. Private Justesen displayed 

exceptional bravery in charging three machineguns with the aid of a small detachment of 

his comrades, killing the crews and capturing the guns, which were immediately turned on 

the Germans, thereby opening the line for the advance of his company, which had been 

held up by the enemy’s fire.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Laughlin, George McC.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant George McC. Laughlin (MCSN: 0-1524), United States Marine Corps, 

for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the 

First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active 

operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, 

October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Legendre, James Hennen

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant James Hennen Legendre (MCSN: 0-1531), United States Marine 

Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action on the Lucy-Torcy Road, France, 6 June 1918. Second Lieutenant 

Legendre displayed exceptional bravery in organizing and leading a party of volunteers 

through heavy machine-gun fire for the purpose of securing two wounded men on the 

Lucy-Torcy, Road.
279

Reserve Decorations

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Lindgren, Everette (Edward) E.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant Everette (Edward) E. Lindgren (MCSN: 0-2779), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 

2d Division, A.E.F. in action near St. Etienne, France, 4 October 1918. During an attack on 

a strong enemy position, under terrific machine-gun and artillery fire, Second Lieutenant 

Lindgren led his platoon to the support of the platoon operating on his left, rallying men 

from another company, who had become separated from their organizations, to his support. 

Although severely wounded, he remained in action until the position was consolidated.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

McGraw, John K.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Sergeant John K. McGraw (MCSN: 171704), United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism in the line of his profession. On 28 October 1918, there had been 

received at the aerodrome of Squadron C, First Aviation Force, attached to the Northern 

Bombing Group (USN), in France, 1500 live bombs in individual wooden crates. An aeroplane piloted by Lieutenant Ralph Talbot crashed into this pile of live bombs, caught fire 

and was completely burned. The fire spread to the crates of bombs and an explosion was imminent. Sergeant McGraw impressed the nearest men into service and dragged the burning crates of bombs off the pile while other men rolled them in the mud until the fire was 

extinguished. Sergeant McGraw’s presence of mind and courage undoubtedly prevented 

a serious explosion, which would unquestionable have resulted in the destruction of the 

entire aerodrome and probable loss of life as well, and it is believed that this action should 

be appropriately recognized.
280

Appendix E

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Fleet Marine Corps Reserve, Class 1

Messinger, Elias J.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Private Elias J. Messinger (MCSN: 108067), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, 

A. E. F. in action near Vierzy, France, 19 July 1918, Private Messinger with three other soldiers captured a machine gun which was holding up the 55th Company of Marines, killing 

the entire crew. To accomplish this hazardous and daring work it was necessary for them to 

expose themselves to the fire of this gun.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Norman, Harvey C.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Harvey C. Norman (MCSN: 0-3040), United 

States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as a Pilot in the First Marine Aviation 

force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), at the front in France. While 

on a bombing raid into enemy territory, 22 October 1918, Lieutenant Norman became 

separated from the other planes of his formation, owing to heavy fog and while so cut off 

was attacked by seven enemy scout planes. In the engagement which ensued he behaved 

with conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity, continuing the fight against overwhelming odds 

until he himself was killed and his plane shot down.

Death:

Killed in action
281

Reserve Decorations

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Olsen, Eynar F.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Eynar F. Olsen (MCSN: 0-1608), United States Marine Corps, for 

distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First 

Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, 

and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition 

dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Peterson, Herman A.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Herman A. Peterson (MCSN: 0-3115), United States Marine Corps, 

for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the 

First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active 

operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September,

October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5
282

Appendix E

Platt, Jonas Henry

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Jonas Henry Platt (MCSN: 0-770), United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. 

E. F. in action near the Bois-de-Belleau, Château-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918. Seriously 

wounded in the leg early in the engagement, First Lieutenant Platt continued to direct, the 

operations not only of his platoon but of another. He charged and drove off the crew of an 

enemy machine-gun, supervised the disposition and digging in of a large part of his company, and yielded command only when exhausted from pain and loss of blood.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Company, 2d Battalion, Ohio Naval Militia, Cleveland

Reath, Thomas R.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Sergeant Thomas R. Reath (MCSN: 83996), United States Marine 

Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 43d Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in action on 12 June 1918, in Belleau Woods, France. Sergeant 

Reath’s Company was under a heavy and devastating fire of artillery and machine guns. 

The Company Commander was endeavoring to send an important message to his Battalion Commander. Several messengers had been sent; none had returned all having been 

killed or wounded in the endeavor to pass the intervening open ground. Knowing all this, 

Sergeant Reath volunteered to try to get the message through. In the performance of his 

duty he was killed.

Death:

Killed in action

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (WWI)

Two Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4
283

Reserve Decorations

Richmond, Clarence L.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Private Clarence L. Richmond (MCSN: 108937), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 43d Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d 

Division, A. E. F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, October 3–5, 1918. Private Richmond 

unhesitatingly went through the heaviest machine-gun and artillery fire dressing and carrying wounded. Disregarding his own safety, he refused to take rest or food while there were 

wounded needing attention.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Robillard, Fred S.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Fred S. Robillard (MCSN: 0-3225), United States Marine Corps, for 

distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First 

Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, 

and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition 

dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Sieg, Robert E.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Private Robert E. Sieg (MCSN: 109056), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary 

heroism while serving with the 43d Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. 
284

Appendix E

F. in action near Blanc Mont, France, October 3–5, 1918. Private Sieg unhesitatingly went 

through the heaviest machine-gun and artillery fire dressing and carrying wounded. Disregarding his own safety, he refused to take rest or food while there were wounded needing 

attention.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Simpson, Roy Hobson*

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 

1918, takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross (Posthumously) to Private Roy Hobson 

Simpson (MCSN: 81727), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while 

serving with the Forty-Seventh Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., 

in action during the attack on the Bois-de-Belleau, France, 12 June 1918. Private Simpson 

carried a message from Battalion to Company headquarters directly across the face of enemy fire. Shot through the chest he continued running and called out, “I must deliver this 

message,” struggling forward for 50 feet more in his heroic effort to carry out his mission 

before falling dead.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Somers, Vernon L.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Vernon L. Somers (MCSN: 0-3370), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 

2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Château-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918. Killed in action, 

* Erroneously reported as killed in action, Simpson was captured by the Germans and held at Rastatt, Baden, Germany. He was 

released on 6 December 1918 and returned to his unit via Switzerland and Vichy, France, on 16 January 1919. This information is 

based on the Revised Muster Roll, 47th Company, 5th Marine Regiment, June 1918.
285

Reserve Decorations

Second Lieutenant Somers gave the supreme proof of that extraordinary heroism which 

will serve as an example to hitherto untried troops.

Death:

Killed in action

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Two Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Synnott, Joseph A.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Joseph A. Synnott (MCSN: 0-3434), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 5th Regiment (Marines), 

2d Division, A. E. F. in action at Château-Thierry, France, 6 June 1918. Killed in action, 

Second Lieutenant Synnott gave the supreme proof of that extraordinary heroism which 

will serve as an example to hitherto untried troops.

Death:

Killed in action

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Former enlisted Marine (gunnery sergeant); he was commissioned in the Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Taylor, Caleb W.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to Second Lieutenant Caleb W. Taylor (MCSN: 0-3443), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism as an Observer in the First Marine Aviation 

Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN) at the Front in France. While 

on a bombing raid into enemy territory on 22 October 1918, Lieutenant Taylor became 

separated from the other planes of the formation on account of fog, and was attacked by 
286

Appendix E

seven enemy scout planes. Despite the overwhelming odds he fought with great gallantry 

and intrepidity until he was killed and his plane shot down.

Death:

Killed in action

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (chief quartermaster); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, 

Class 5

Thayer Jr., Sidney

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Sidney Thayer Jr. (MCSN: 0-3451), United States Marine Corps, for 

extraordinary heroism while serving with the 55th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 

2d Division, A. E. F. in action near Beaumont, France, 11 November 1918. After being 

wounded, Lieutenant Thayer remained with his company until its objective had been 

reached, refusing evacuation until rendered unconscious by loss of blood.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Three Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Thomason Jr., John W.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Major [then Second Lieutenant] John W. Thomason Jr. (MCSN: 0-985), United States 

Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 49th Company, First Battalion, 5th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F. in the Battle of Soissons. When a 

German machine gun nest held up a Marine advance on 18 July 1918, Major Thomason 

and one of his men fearlessly advanced on the position and killed thirteen of the enemy.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)
287

Reserve Decorations

Source of Entry:

Company C, Texas National Naval Volunteers, Marine Corps Branch, Houston

Weaver, John H.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant John H. Weaver (MCSN: 0-3546), United States Marine Corps, for 

distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First 

Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, 

and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition 

dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Whiteside, John R.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pride in presenting the Navy Cross 

(Posthumously) to First Lieutenant John R. Whiteside (MCSN: 0-3585), United States 

Marine Corps, for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while 

serving with the First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group 

(USN), in active operation cooperating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during 

September, October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine 

bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Death:

Killed in flying accident on 23 January 1919

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (chief quartermaster); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, 

Class 5
288

Appendix E

Whiting, Donald N.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Donald N. Whiting (MCSN: 0-1771), United States Marine Corps, 

for distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the 

First Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active 

operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, 

October, and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (ensign); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Wilmer, Pere

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Major Pere Wilmer (MCSN: 0-3620), United States Marine Corps, for meritorious and 

distinguished service near Vierzy, France, 19 July 1918. As Battalion Commander, Second 

Battalion, 6th Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., Major Wilmer showed great 

courage and an utter disregard of danger in crossing with his battalion an exposed terrain of 

a distance of three kilometers under intense artillery and machine-gun fire. Major Wilmer 

led his men on by his example.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Originally commissioned in January 1906; resigned in January 1913; and then reappointed in the Marine 

Corps Reserve on 1 August 1917

Wilson, Claggett

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Claggett Wilson (MCSN: 0-3622), United States Marine Corps, for 

exceptionally meritorious and distinguished service during the campaigns of St. Mihiel, 

Champagne, and the Argonne, France. First Lieutenant Wilson was in charge of the Head-
289

Reserve Decorations

quarters Detachment of the 4th Brigade, 2d Division, A. E. F., and was responsible for its 

efficient functioning under extremely difficult, and at times, dangerous circumstances. Days 

and nights without sleep, particularly during the campaigns of the Argonne, when the 

roads were at times impassible, First Lieutenant Wilson displayed unusual foresight and 

energy in getting rations and transportation through on scheduled time. In the duties of 

Aide-de-Camp to the Brigade Commander he proved himself of great value and assistance.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Wright, Arthur H.

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to First Lieutenant Arthur H. Wright (MCSN: 0-3667), United States Marine Corps, for 

distinguished and heroic service as an Aviator of an aeroplane while serving with the First 

Marine Aviation Force, attached to the Northern Bombing Group (USN), in active operation co-operating with the Allied Armies on the Belgian Front during September, October, 

and November, 1918, bombing enemy bases, aerodromes, submarine bases, ammunition 

dumps, railroad junctions, etc.

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Zinner, Fred Joseph

Navy Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Cross 

to Second Lieutenant Fred Joseph Zinner (MCSN: 0-1096), United States Marine Corps, 

for extraordinary heroism while serving with the 17th Company, 5th Regiment (Marines), 

2d Division, A. E. F. in action near St. Etienne, France, October 4, 1918. While attacking a strongly held enemy position, under heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, Second 

Lieutenant Zinner rallied men of another company, who had become separated from their 

organization, to his support. With these reinforcements, his platoon was able to relieve a 

very critical situation.
290

Appendix E

Personal Awards:

Navy Cross (WWI)

Distinguished Service Cross (same action as Navy Cross)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Nelms Jr., Frank

Navy Distinguished Service Medal

Citation:

The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Navy Distinguished Service Medal to Second Lieutenant Frank Nelms Jr., United States Marine 

Corps, for extraordinary heroism as a pilot in the First Marine Aviation Force, at the front 

in France, where he participated in numerous air raids into enemy territory. On 28 September 1918 while on such a raid, he was attacked by a superior number of enemy scouts, and 

is believed to have destroyed an enemy plane. On 2 October 1918, when word was received 

that a body of French troops had been cut off from supplies for two days by the enemy, and 

it was decided to feed them by aeroplane, food was loaded in planes and Lieutenant Nelms 

flew over the besieged troops at an altitude of only one hundred feet and dropped the food 

where these troops could get it. This performance was repeated three times, each time under 

intense fire from rifles, machine guns and artillery on the ground.

Personal Awards:

Navy Distinguished Service Medal

Source of Entry:

Former U.S. Naval Reserve Force (ensign); then commissioned in Marine Corps Reserve, Class 5

Gest, Sydney G.

Distinguished Service Cross

Citation:

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 1918, 

takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Private Sydney G. Gest 

(MCSN: 843331), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving 

with the Forty-Third Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., in action 

in the Bois-de-Belleau, France, 11 June 1918. The attacking line of the Forty-Third Company being held up at one point by the fire of an enemy heavy Maxim machine gun, Private 

Gest, in the face of the machine-gun fire, crawled around the flank and, undaunted by 

grenade and rifle fire, rushed the gun crew’s nest, killing the enemy gunner and four others 

as they attempted to escape.
291

Reserve Decorations

Personal Awards:

Distinguished Service Cross (WWI)

Silver Star Citation (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

Thomas, Fred

Distinguished Service Cross (First Award)

Citation:

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 

1918, takes pleasure in presenting the Distinguished Service Cross to Second Lieutenant 

Fred Thomas (MCSN: 0-1833), United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism 

while serving with the Sixteenth Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. 

E. F., in action near Chateau-Thierry, France, 25 June 1918. Second Lieutenant Thomas 

commanded the left flank platoon of his company, which was subjected to heavy fire from 

enemy machine-guns and trench mortars. When further advance in the face of the fire 

became impossible, he went forward alone, located the machine-gun positions, and then 

organized a flank attack on the emplacements, putting out of action four guns, one of 

which he himself captured. In this exploit his command suffered 40 per cent casualties and 

captured twenty-one prisoners. Reforming the remnants of his platoon, he moved forward 

through the enemy’s barrage and to his objective, which he consolidated and held in the 

face of three counterattacks in five hours.

Distinguished Service Cross (Second Award)

Citation:

The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress, July 9, 

1918, takes pleasure in presenting a Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster in lieu of a Second Award 

of the Distinguished Service Cross to Second Lieutenant Fred Thomas (MCSN: 0-1833), 

United States Marine Corps, for extraordinary heroism while serving with the Sixteenth 

Company, Fifth Regiment (Marines), 2d Division, A. E. F., in action near St. Etienne, 

France, 4 October 1918. While endeavoring to re-establish a large company front, which 

had become disconnected, Second Lieutenant Thomas encountered a large number of the 

enemy filtering through our lines. By strategic maneuvers he formed a strong resistance, 

causing heavy casualties on the enemy and forcing their retreat, after he himself had been 

seriously wounded.

Personal Awards:

Two Distinguished Service Crosses (WWI),

Navy Distinguished Service Medal (same action as the Distinguished Service Cross) (WWI)

Four Silver Star Citations (WWI)

Source of Entry:

Marine Corps Reserve, Class 4

293

Adams, Robert E. (Maj, USMC), 245

Adjutant and Inspector’s Department, 131, 231–33

Aerodromes, 70, 72, 215

Aircraft

American

 Caproni (Ca. 1) night bombing plane, 72, 155

 Curtiss AH hydroaeroplane, 143

 Curtiss HS-1 flying boat, 147, 215

 Curtiss HS-21 flying boat, 154

 Curtiss JN-4 (Jenny) biplane, 155–56

 Curtiss N-9 floatplane, 144, 156, 215

 Curtiss R-6 floatplane, 143–44, 153–54, 215

 De Havilland DH-4 plane, 155–57

 De Havilland DH-A9 plane, 157

 Hall-Standard, 155

 Thomas-Morse S-4 Scout biplane, 155

 Wright 35-horsepower plane, 71

British

 Dayton-Wright DH-4 plane, 155

German

 Fokker D-V11 fighter plane, 52, 156–57

 Pfalz D-111 fighter plane, 157

Airfields, 156–58

Air Service, British Naval, 148

Air Service, U.S. Army, 153, 199

Allied Military Council, 116

American Expeditionary Forces (AEF), xiii, 44, 59, 71, 94, 

98, 101, 103, 111–13, 119, 125, 128, 144, 157, 

181, 183, 186, 190, 197, 199, 215, 223–24, 229

Armentières, France, 21, 101

Armistice, 39, 49, 57–58, 67, 72, 108, 110, 113, 116, 

125–26, 129, 152, 157–58, 193, 195, 199, 212, 

217, 227, 229, 232, 265, 268

Army of Occupation, 109, 211, 229, 268

Army Line, 48, 103

Army, U.S. See also citations

corps

 Fifth Army, 107–8

 Signal Corps, 52

divisions

 1st Division

 2d Brigade, 73, 244

 2d Division, xiii, 43, 46, 49–52, 57–58, 77, 79–81, 

89, 92–97, 100–1, 103, 105–12, 126, 128, 132, 

134, 141, 159–64, 167–79, 187–88, 190–93, 201, 

210–11, 239, 244–45

 17th Field Artillery, 244

 4th Division

 8th Brigade, 244

 59th Infantry, 244

 26th Division

 51st Brigade, 244

 102d Infantry, 244

 32d Division

 64th Brigade, 244

 41st Division

 82d Brigade, 244

Army War College, 43, 203

Artillery, 21–24

Atmore, Guy D. (2dLt, USMC), 243. See also Rhine River 

Patrol

Auerbach, Lester H. (Cpl, USMC), 243

Australia, 88

Austria, 117, 119, 268

prisoners of war, 116, 118, 219–20

Aviation Department Flying Field, 143

Azores Islands, xiii, 72, 143–52, 153–54, 215–17, 237. See 

also Poague, Walter S.

Barker, Frederick A. (Maj, USMC), 173–74, 177–78, 

196–97, 228

Barlett, Harry G. (Maj, USMC), 245

Barr, Chapin C. (2dLt, USMC), 156, 272

Barracks, Marine Corps

La Pallice, 182

Naval Base Guam, 209, 237

INDEX
294

Index

Barracks (continued)

Naval Station Cavite, Philippines, 115, 220, 239

Parris Island, SC, 37–39, 226–27, 240

Philadelphia Navy Yard, 154

Pontanezen, 224–25

Quantico, 99, 183

St. Thomas, 220, 239

Barrett, Charles D. (Maj, USMC), 109, 230–31, 239

Barrett, George H. (GySgt, USMC), 242

Bartlett, Owen (Cdr, USN), 209

Bathrick, Donald U. (2dLt, USMC), 60

Battles

Aisne, 111

Aisne-Marne, 111

Blanc Mont, 105, 169–79, 191–94, 204

Belleau Wood, 77–93, 194, 199, 230

Château-Thierry, 77, 111

Meuse-Argonne, 111, 188, 191–92, 194

Saint-Mihiel, 111, 191, 194

Soissons, 159–68, 204

Toulon, 111

Wytschaete-Messines, 21

Bases, Marine Corps

Mare Island, CA, 76, 141, 181, 213

Parris Island, SC, 37–39, 70, 73, 76, 181, 226–27

Quantico, VA, 33–36, 73, 99, 132, 141, 181–83, 196

Base Section

No. 1, 182–84, 223

No. 2, 183, 224

No. 5, 184, 224

Bastille Day, France, 159, 228

Bavaria, 16–17, 91, 175

Beadle, Elias R. (Capt, USMC), 240

Bearss, Hiram I. (LtCol, USMC), 99, 203, 235–36, 244–

45

Berkeley, Randolph C. (LtCol, USMC), 237

Berry, Benjamin S. (Maj, USMC), 193–95

Bettes, James J. (1stLt, USMC), 69

Bigler, Epaminondas L. (Maj, USMC), 242

Blanc Mont, France, 54–56, 94, 96, 105–7, 111, 126, 

169–79, 187, 191–97, 201, 204

Bluejackets, British, 69, 115–18, 218

Boche, 45, 48–52, 56–58, 161, 178, 201. See also aircraft; 

small arms

Boesch, J. H. (LCdr, USN), 154

Bois de Belleau, France, 101–3, 187, 192

Bois de Limon, France, 126, 128

Bois de Retz, France, 49, 103

Bolshevik, 115–19, 219

Bou-des-Bois, France, 100

Bourdette, Vernon (2dLt, USMC), 243

Bouresches, France, 47, 78–84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 101–2, 

111, 187, 191

Bower, George (2dLt, USMC), 272

Bradman, Frederick L. (Col, USMC), 69

Brainard, Edward H. (Maj, USMC), 245

Brest, France, 69, 99–100, 109, 151, 156, 182–83, 211, 

215, 222–24. See also Camp Pontanezen

Brewer, Everett R. (1stLt, USMC), 156

Brewster, David L. S. (Maj, USMC), 125, 144, 151, 154, 

237

British Marines, 64, 66, 119, 220. See also Bluejackets

Brosman, Daniel W. (GySgt, USMC), 242

Bruges, Belgium, 71–72, 155, 157

Brumbaugh, Rolland E. (Maj, USMC), 68

Bundy, Omar (MajGen, USA), 99–100

Bureau of Military Information, 115

Burwell, Edward L., Jr. (1stLt, USMC), 237

Butler, Smedley D. (BGen, USMC), 135, 181–82, 185, 

222–24, 239–40

Camps

American Guard, 35

Artillery, 35

Bois de l’Évêque, 50–51

Cabaud, 107

Convalescent, 29

Embarkation, 182

Marchand, 55

Montoir, 182

Montpelier, 178

Pontanezen, 182–83, 185, 222–24, 229, 240

Rest, 220, 239

Cape May, NJ, 143, 145, 154, 214

Capron, Paul A. (Maj, USMC), 60

Casualties, 49–50, 55, 101, 111, 168, 192–93, 204, 234

Cates, Clifton B. (1stLt, USMC), 165–66, 173, 191, 228–

29, 243
295

Index

Catlin, Albertus W. (Col, USMC), 99–100, 102, 191, 

203, 236

Cavite, Philippines, 114–15, 220, 239

Cellerier bombs, 18

Chamberlin, Paul E. (Maj, USMC), 115–16, 238

Chambers, William (LCdr, USN), 182

Chaumont, France, 44, 100

Chockie, Micael B. (Cpl, USMC), 209

Citations, 112

American, 265–69

 Army of Occupation of Germany Medal, 268

 Distinguished Service Cross, 112, 204, 265–67

 Distinguished Service Medal, 100, 182, 193, 265–69

 Maltese Cross, 268

 Medal of Honor, 265

 Navy Cross, 266

 Silver Star Citation/Medal, 267

 World War I Victory Medal, 267–68

British

 Distinguished Service Order, 112

French Army

 Croix de Guerre, 112, 179, 186–87, 192, 198, 268–

69

 Fourragère, 111, 179, 186–88, 192, 268–69. See also

5th Regiment; 6th Regiment

 Legion of Honor, 112, 179, 186, 193, 269

 Médaille Militaire, 112, 186, 269

Italian, 112

Montenegro, 112

Coffenberg, Bailey M. (Capt, USMC), 236

Cole cart, 44, 199, 212

Cole, Edward B. (Maj, USMC), 99, 102, 200, 203, 236

Cole, Eli K. (BGen, USMC), 182, 202, 221, 239–40, 244

Commendations, 184–85

Conwill, Edward (Sgt, USMC), 242–43

Cornell, Percy D. (Capt, USMC), 266, 273

Cowin, Clifford C. (1stLt, USMC), 69

Coyle, Randolph (Maj, USMC), 60

Craig, Edward A. (1stLt, USMC), 142

Croix d’Hins, France, 113–14, 182, 217. See also Lafayette 

Radio Station

Cuba, 142, 194, 197, 213–14

Cukela, Louis (Sgt, USMC), 265

Cumming, Samuel C. (Capt, USMC), 231, 243

Cunningham, Alfred A. (Maj, USMC), 70, 153, 155–56, 

158, 237

Curtiss Flying School, Miami, FL, 155

Curtiss, Glenn, 153, 155

Czecho-Slovaks, 116–19, 219

Daly, Dan (1stSgt, USMC), 191

Darby, James B. (2dLt, USMC), 66

Darden, Colgate W. (2dLt, USMC), 157

Davis, James M. (1stSgt, USMC), 239

Davis, William H. (Capt, USMC), 69

Deaths, 101, 111

Defensives

Aisne, 101, 111, 191

Champagne-Marne, 103

Noyon-Montdidier, 103

Degoutte, Jean (Gen, French Army), 80–81, 102, 168, 192

del Valle, Pedro A. (Capt, USMC), 63

demobilization, 104, 110, 129–35, 180, 265. See also 4th 

Brigade; 5th Brigade

De Neale, George C. (Maj, USMC), 69

Denig, Robert L. (Maj, USMC), 164, 245

de Pierrefeu, Jean, 77. See also Sector I: Three Years at Great 

General Headquarters

depots, 258

Field Training, 226

Overseas, 181, 225–26, 240

Recruit, 35, 226

Supplies, 132–34

Denby, Edwin, 37

Detachment couriers, 228, 242

Dickman, Joseph T. (MajGen, USA), 230

Dietrich Carl R. (1stLt, USMC), 273–74

Doyen, Charles A. (Col, USMC), 97, 99–100, 191, 203, 

235–36, 244, 267

Dunbeck, Charley (Capt, USMC), 194–96

Dunkirk, Scotland, 71, 155–56, 215

Dunlap, Robert H. (Col, USMC), 239, 244

Dunn, Herbert O. (RAdm, USN), 146, 148, 216

Ehlers, Carl (GySgt, USMC), 151

Ellis, Earl H. (Maj, USMC), 100, 105, 109

Ely, Hanson E. (BGen, USMC), 162

Emery, Charles I. (Capt, USMC), 65
296

Index

Essen Hook, 95, 171–75. See also trench warfare

Étrépilly, France, 87

Evans, Francis T. (Capt, USMC), 144, 146, 148, 151, 154, 

237

Evans, Frank E. (LtCol, USMC), 129, 180, 236

Farms

Beaurepaire, 169, 162–64

Issonge, 103

La Loge, 103

La Verte-Feuille, 162–63, 168

Les Brusses, 86–87

Les Mares, 78

Maison Nueve, 162

Medeah, 170, 172, 174

Navarin, 171, 174, 178

Rochette, 83

Translon, 162, 168

Fayolle, Marie Emile (Gen, French Reserve Army), 159

Fechteler, A. F. (RAdm, USN), 134

Feigle, William M. (Sgt, USMC), 274

Feland, Logan (LtCol, USMC), 98, 104, 110, 159, 161, 

163, 173, 176, 204–5, 235–36

Field Service Regulations, 27

Firing post, 13. See also trench warfare

Fitz-Gerald, Judson H. (Capt, USMC), 237, 239

Flett, James W. (1stLt, USMC), 238

Flying fields

Cape May, NJ, 143

Marine Flying Field, Miami, FL, 72, 154–55, 214

Parris Island, CA, 70, 73

Philadelphia, PA, 71, 214

Quantico, VA, 70–71, 73

San Diego, CA, 70, 73

Foch, Ferdinand (Marshall, French Army), 77, 103, 105–

6, 125, 159, 170, 175–76, 183, 229, 267

Foot soldier, 5–20

Forests

Argonne, 57, 106, 169

 Belleau Wood, 45, 48, 77–93, 100–2, 111, 150, 159, 

161–62, 164, 170–71, 187, 192, 194–95, 197–

201, 203–4, 230–31. See also 5th Regiment; 6th 

Regiment

Belval, 108

Retz, 160–61

Veuilly, 78

Villers-Cotterêts, 160–61, 187

Fort Crockett, Galveston, TX, 141–42, 213–14, 236

Foster, John C. (Capt, USMC), 237

Fourragère, French, 111, 179, 186–88, 192, 268–69. See 

also citations

Fredericksburg, VA, 34

French Army orders, 102, 104, 106, 187–88, 192–93

French Flying Corps, 215

French High Command, 77, 103

French Ministry of War, 186, 269

Fryer, Eli T. (Maj, USMC), 116, 238

Furor Teutonicus (or Teutonic Fury), 88

Gally, Benjamin W. (1stLt, USMC), 60

Gamborg-Andersen, Carl (Col, USMC), 238

Gargan, Joseph P. (Capt, USMC), 238

Garrett, Franklin B. (Maj, USMC), 197–98

Geiger, Roy S. (Capt, USMC), 154–56

General orders, 67, 99–100, 104, 108, 168, 218, 266

German High Seas Fleet, 64, 67–68

German submarines, 61–64, 67, 144, 154–55

German Supreme Command, 90–91, 93

Gerstner Field, Lake Charles, LA, 154, 212

Gest, Sydney G. (Pvt, USMC), 290

Gibbs, John F. (2dLt, USMC), 157

Gilchrist, Charles P. (Capt, USMC), 238

Glendinning, Henry P. (2dLt, USMC), 274–75

Gouraud, Henri (Gen, French Army), 105, 169

Greene, Edward A. (Maj, USMC), 194, 236

Grove, Conrad S., III (2dLt, USMC), 115

Gulberg, Martin (Sgt, USMC), 178

Gulick, Louis M. (Col, USMC), 240

Hagen Division, 91, 126

Haggerty, William H. (Capt, USMC), 237

Haiti, 73, 75, 180–81, 194, 198, 202–3

Hall, Elbert J., 155. See also Liberty engine

Hall, William C. (2dLt, USMC), 66

Hamilton, George W. (Maj, USMC), 173–74, 176, 194–96

Hanrahan, David C. (Capt, USN), 156

Harding, William L., Jr. (1stLt, USMC), 243
297

Index

Harbord, James G. (MajGen, USMC), 80, 100, 103, 105, 

159–62, 164, 166–68, 184, 191–93, 203–4, 224, 

235

Harbor, Vladivostok, 115–17

Harnett, Richard H. (1stSgt, USMC), 239

Harrah, Earl C. (1stSgt, USMC), 239

Hart, Franklin A. (Capt, USMC), 240

Hart, Jack S. (1stLt, USMC), 47

Harwood, Charles W. (GySgt, USMC), 242

Haws, Edward H. (Pvt, USMC), 275

Healy, Augustine (2dLt, USMC), 241

Healy, Vincent E. (Capt, USMC), 238

Henninger, Paul (GySgt, USMC), 242

Hewitt, Charles W., Jr. (Cpl, USMC), 275

Hills

Hill 126, 83

Hill 133, 83

Hill 142, 78, 101, 111, 231

Hill 164, 78

Hill 169, 80

Hill 181, 83

Hill 190, 87

Hill 192, 83

Hill 201, 78

Hill 204, 78, 84

Hilliard, Jack B., xi, xiv. See also An Annotated Bibliography 

of the United States Marine Corps in the First World 

War

Hindenburg line, 107, 126, 193

Hoeveler, Marcellin (Sgt, USMC), 242

Hogan, Reginald R. (Capt, USMC), 241

Holcomb, Thomas (Maj, USMC), 164–67, 190, 197–98, 

236

Holmes, Maurice G. (Capt, USMC), 154, 237

Hope, Edward B. (Capt, USMC), 238

Houchin, Lloyd A. (Capt, USMC), 243

Howard, Archie F. (Capt, USMC), 115, 238

Hoyt, Leon W. (Maj, USMC), 69, 238

Hughes, John A. (Maj, USMC), 164–67, 197–98

Humphreys, Albert E., Jr. (1stLt, USMC), 276

Hunt, LeRoy P. (Capt, USMC), 174–75, 191, 194–95

Hunter, Tracy G., Jr. (Capt, USMC), 236

Husted, Chester S. (Pvt, USMC), 276

Hymn, Marine Corps, 158, 192

Imperial German Staff, 101

Infectious diseases, 28, 32

Israel, Frederick (2dLt, USMC), 277

Jacobsen, Arnold W. (Capt, USMC), 240–41

Jagers, 173–74

Janson, Ernest A. (GySgt, USMC), 265

Japan, 67, 115–19, 127, 219–20

Jellicoe, John R. (Adm, USN), 61

Jeschke, Richard H. (1stLt, USMC), 60, 66

Jones, Charles M. (Capt, USMC), 60

Jones, Harold A. (2dLt, USMC), 277

Justesen, William A. (Pvt, USMC), 277–78

Kelley, George J. (GySgt, USMC), 242

Kelly, John J. (Pvt, USMC), 174, 265

Kerensky, Aleksandr F., government of, 115

Keyser, Ralph S. (Maj, USMC), 161–63, 167, 194–96, 

241

Keyser, Stover (Maj, USMC), 194

Kilduff, David R. (1stLt, USMC), 240

Kingman, Matthew H. (Maj, USMC), 54, 107, 201–2, 

236

Kinyon, Keith E. (Capt, USMC), 69

Knight, Austin M. (Adm, USN), 115, 217

Kocak, Matej (Sgt, USMC), 265

Laemmert, Oscar (Sgt, USMC), 239

Lafayette Radio Station, 113–14, 215–16, 238

Lange, Allen H. (Sgt, USMC), 118

Larousse’s Grand Dictionary of the XIX Century, 186. See also

French citations

Larsen, Henry L. (Maj, USMC), 173–76, 194–96

Lauchheimer, Charles H. (BGen, USMC), 232

Laughlin, George McC. (1stLt, USMC), 278

Lay, Harry R. (Maj, USMC), 97, 100, 105

Leatherneck, 38, 159–68

Lee, Harry (LtCol, USMC), 102–3, 159, 164–68, 171–

73, 175–77, 191, 203–5, 235–36

Leffincourt, France, 57, 97, 107

Legendre, James H. (2dLt, USMC), 278

Lejeune, John A. (Gen, USMC), 94–96, 100, 104–6, 108, 

110, 132, 134, 168, 170–72, 174–79, 191–93, 

203–5, 235, 244

Liberty engine, 155–56. See also Marine Corps aviation

Liggett, Hunter (MajGen, USA), 169
298

Index

Limey, France, 51, 211–12, 268

Lindgren, Everette E. (2dLt, USMC), 279

Little, Louis McC. (LtCol, USMC), 115, 238–39

Lockburner, John D. (1stLt, USMC), 217, 237

Long, Lother R. (1stLt, USMC), 243

Loopholes, 8–10, 19. See also trench warfare

Lowell, Roy D. (Capt, USMC), 65

Luby, Thomas M. (Capt, USMC), 241–42

Lucy-le-Bocage, France, 78, 83

Lynnhaven Roads, VA, 60, 218

Lytle, Robert S. (Capt, USMC), 157

Machado, José Augusto de Simas, 216

Mahoney, James E. (BGen, USMC), 236

Major, H. E. (Capt, USMC), 21, 102

Mangin, Charles (French Army), 159–60, 164, 187

Mann, William L., Jr. (Lt, USN), 233

Manney, H. N. (Maj, USMC), 134

Manship, Paul H., 267. See also Navy Distinguished Service

Medal

Manwaring, Edward B. (Maj, USMC), 237

Mare Island, CA, 76, 141, 181, 213

Marine Corps aviation forces

1st Marine Aeronautic Company, 143–44, 154, 215–

16, 237

1st Marine Aviation Force, 70, 151, 155–56, 215, 237, 

268

 Squadron A, 155, 215

 Squadron B, 155, 215

 Squadron C, 155, 215

 Squadron D, 151, 155, 215

 Headquarters Company, 215

Marine Aeronautic Company, 143–44, 153–54, 214–

215, 237

First Aviation Squadron, 214

Marine Corps Reserve, xiv, 131, 233, 271

Marine Corps units [in descending order]

brigades

 3d Provisional Brigade, 142, 213, 236

 4th Brigade, xi, xiii, 43–59, 71, 79, 94–112, 126, 

128, 130–34, 141, 159, 169–72, 175–80, 183, 

187, 191, 193, 203, 210–11, 225, 228–29, 234–36

 5th Brigade, 110, 129–32, 134–35, 181–83, 185, 

221–22, 225

regiments

 5th Regiment, 43–44, 48, 54, 81, 97–100, 104, 106, 

109–10, 131, 133, 156, 160–63, 166, 168, 171–

72, 175–76, 194–96, 210–12, 234–36

 1st Battalion, 45, 55, 78, 81, 86, 98–100, 127, 

133–34, 161, 163–67, 173–74, 178, 181, 

194–96, 198, 210

 17th Company, 161, 174–75, 210

 49th Company, 161–62, 210

 66th Company, 161, 210

 67th Company, 161, 210

 2d Battalion, 45, 78, 81, 86–87, 100, 161–63, 167, 

173–74, 194–95, 198, 210

 18th Company, 162, 210

 43d Company, 162, 194, 210

 51st Company, 162, 210

 55th Company, 162, 210

 3d Battalion, 45, 82, 162–63, 167, 173–74, 194–

95, 210

 16th Company, 54, 210

 20th Company, 54, 210

 45th Company, 54, 168, 210

 47th Company, 210

 8th Machine Gun Company, 58, 161, 163, 210

 Headquarters Company, 210

 Supply Company, 210

 6th Regiment, 49–50, 57–58, 97, 99–100, 102, 104, 

106, 110–11, 126, 130, 133, 159, 163–64, 167–

68, 171–77, 180, 186–91, 197–99, 212, 224, 228, 

234, 236

 1st Battalion, 45, 99–100, 127, 133, 163–67, 173–

74, 178, 197–99, 210, 228

 74th Company, 210

 75th Company, 167, 178

 76th Company, 178

 95th Company, 224

 2d Battalion, 45, 82, 84, 99–100, 110, 127, 165, 

171–74, 177, 197–98, 210

 78th Company, 174, 210

 79th Company, 210

 80th Company, 165, 171, 173, 210

 96th Company, 165–66, 173

 3d Battalion, 45, 82, 84, 99–100, 174, 176–78, 

197–99, 210

 82d Company, 165, 210

 83d Company, 165, 210
299

Index

 84th Company, 165, 210

 97th Company, 165, 210

 73d Machine Gun Battalion, 99, 210

 Headquarters Company, 210

 Supply Company, 210

 8th Regiment, 141–42, 213–14

 103d Company, 213

 104th Company, 213

 105th Company, 142, 213

 106th Company, 213

 107th Company, 213

 108th Company, 213

 109th Company, 213

 110th Company, 213

 111th Company, 213

 112th Company, 141, 213

 Headquarters, 213

 9th Regiment, 142, 214, 237

 11th Regiment, 129, 134, 181–82, 222–23, 239

 1st Battalion, 220

 Company A, 134, 222

 Company B, 222

 Company C, 222

 Company D, 222

 2d Battalion, 222

 Company E, 222, 228, 243

 Company F, 222

 Company G, 222

 Company H, 222

 3d Battalion, 222

 Company I, 222

 Company K, 222

 Company L, 222

 Company M, 222

 Headquarters Company, 222

 Machine Gun Company, 222

 Medical Detachment, 222

 Supply Company, 222

 13th Regiment, 134, 180–85, 222–24, 229, 239

 1st Battalion, 222

 Company A, 181, 222

 Company B, 181, 222

 Company C, 181, 222

 Company D, 181, 222

 2d Battalion, 181–82, 222

 Company E, 181, 183, 228

 Company F, 181, 222

 Company G, 181, 222

 Company H, 181, 222

 3d Battalion, 181–82, 184, 222

 Company I, 181, 222

 Company K, 181, 222

 Company L, 181, 222

 Company M, 181, 222

 Headquarters Company, 181

 Machine Gun Company, 181, 228

 Medical Detachment, 181

 Supply Company, 181

battalions

 5th Brigade Machine Gun Battalion, 221–22, 224, 

226, 240

 Company A, 222

 Company B, 222

 Company C, 222

 Company D, 222

Marine Day Wing, 156, 158

Marine Replacement Battalions [in order of deployment]

1st Replacement Battalion, 227, 241

2d Replacement Battalion, 227, 241

3d Replacement Battalion, 227, 241

1st Machine Gun Replacement Battalion, 227, 241

1st Casual Replacement Battalion, 227, 241

2d Casual Replacement Battalion, 227, 241

3d Separate Battalion, 227, 241

4th Separate Battalion, 227, 241

5th Separate Battalion, 227, 241

6th Separate Battalion, 227, 242

1st Separate Machine Gun Battalion, 227, 242

7th Separate Battalion, 227, 242

8th Separate Battalion, 227, 242

9th Separate Battalion, 227, 242

Marmion, Paul C. (Capt, USMC), 241

Marsh, Aralzaman C. (Sgt, USMC), 178

Massif de Notre-Dame-des-Champs, France, 106

McCawley, Charles L. (BGen, USMC), 232

McClellan, Edwin N. (Maj, USMC), xiii–xiv, 141, 229, 

241. See also United States Marines in the World War
300

Index

McClure, Clarence N. (Capt, USMC), 241

McConnell, F. S. (Maj, USMC), 181

McDougal, Douglas C. (LtCol, USMC), 181–82, 239

McGraw, John K. (1stSgt, USMC), 279

McIlvain, W. M (Capt, USMC), 154–57

Medical service and personnel, 28–32, 233–34, 265

Menaucourt, France, 98

Messersmith, Robert E. (Maj, USMC), 173–74, 193–95

Messinger, Elias J. (Pvt, USMC), 280

Meuse-Argonne, France, 57, 107–9, 111, 188, 192–95, 

197–98, 201, 204, 211–12

Miller, Adolph B. (Maj, USMC), 240

Miller, David H. (Maj, USMC), 69

Miller, L. H. (Maj, USMC), 240

Mims, Harvey B. (1stLt, USMC), 144, 148, 151

Mitchell, Ralph J. (Maj, USMC), 237

Mitchell, William A. (Col, USA), 126

Montreuil-aux-Lions, France, 47, 103

Morse, Edmond H. (Maj, USMC), 238, 240, 242

Morse code, 39

Moseley, Gaines (Capt, USMC), 228, 243

Moses, Laurence H. (Col, USCM), 237

Mulcahy, F. Patrick (Capt, USMC), 156–57

Myers, John T. (BGen, USMC), 240

Naix, France, 98

Napoleon, Bonaparte, 26, 127, 172, 175, 186, 191, 224, 

269

Naval Academy, U.S., 203, 205

Naval Air Stations

Cape May, NJ, 154, 214

Miami, FL, 73

Pauiliac, France, 156

Pensacola, FL, 71, 214

Naval Appropriation Act, 129, 233

Naval Base

Guam, 209

Hampton Roads, VA, 131, 134

No. 13, Ponta Delgada, Azores Islands, 72, 144, 146, 

215–16, 237

No. 29, Cardiff, Wales, 217, 237

Navy Department, U.S., 70, 113, 181, 219–20, 228

Navy units, U.S. [in descending order]

fleets

 Asiatic Fleet, 115, 219, 238

 Atlantic Fleet

 Division 6, 68, 219, 238

 Division 9, 60–61, 68, 218–19, 238

groups

 Northern Bombing Group, 72, 155–57, 215, 237, 

268

 Day Wing, 72, 156, 158, 215, 237

Navy Yard

Philadelphia, PA, 97, 142, 153–54, 193, 214

Vladivostock, Siberia, 119, 220

West Indies, South America, 39

Nelms, Frank, Jr. (Lt, USMC), 157, 290

Neville, Wendell C. (BGen, USMC), 99, 102–5, 109–10, 

132, 134, 159–60, 167–68, 170, 172–76, 191, 

203–4, 235–36

Nicaragua, 155, 195, 202, 205

Nolan, Joseph L. (2dLt, USMC), 69

Norman, Harvey C. (2dLt, USMC), 157, 280

Norstrand, Carl J. (1stLt, USMC), 239

observation posts, 8–9, 173. See also trench warfare

Occupation forces, 228–30, 243

offensives

Aisne-Marne, 103–4, 111, 160

Belgian, 72, 215

Belleau Wood, 91, 93, 199

Blanc Mont, 198

Champagne, 193

Chemin des Dames, 89

Lys, 101

Meuse-Argonne, 107–9, 111, 198

Rheims, 101

Saint-Mihiel, 105, 111

Soissons, 91, 111, 159, 195

Somme, 101

Ypres-Lys, 72

Oglesby, Donald G. (GySgt, USMC), 242

O’Grady, William (GySgt, USMC), 242

O’Leary, Arthur J. (LtCol, USMC), 193–95, 241

Olsen, Eynar F. (1stLt, USMC), 281

Ostend, Belgium, 71–72, 155

Osterhout, George H. (Capt, USMC), 102, 236

Overton, Macon C. (Capt, USMC), 178

Owen, David H. (Capt, USMC), 69
301

Index

Paris, France, 77, 91, 99, 101, 110, 159, 180, 187, 191–

92, 218, 222, 228–30

Parris Island, SC, 37–39, 70, 73, 76, 181, 226–27, 240

Parsons, Harold L. (Maj, USMC), 240

Paymaster’s Department, 130–31

Peiper, Louis F. (2dLt, USMC), 69

Perkins, Ernest A. (Maj, USMC), 240

Pershing, John J. (Gen, USA), 97–98, 100, 103, 110, 

124–25, 157, 159, 168–69, 183, 187, 191–93, 

221, 228–29, 231, 266–67

Pétain, Henri (Gen, French Army), 77, 98, 102, 104, 107, 

168, 170, 176, 169, 267

Peterson, Herman A. (1stLt, USMC), 281

Platt, Jonas H. (1stLt, USMC), 282

Poague, Walter S. (Lt, USMC), 143–52, 154

Pointe de Grave, 183, 229

Ponta Delgada, Azores Islands, 72, 143–44, 146–47, 154, 

215–17, 237

Potts, John (Maj, USMC), 181

Powers, W. C. (Maj, USMC), 181

Presley, Russell A. (Capt, USMC), 156

Price, Charles F. B. (MajGen, USMC), 183, 229, 243

Provisional battalions, 183, 229, 243. See also SchleswigHolstein Battalion

Pruitt, John H. (Cpl, USMC), 174, 265

Purstan, Rupert M. (Capt, USMC), 241

Quantico, VA, 33–36, 70, 73, 99, 110, 130–32, 141–43, 

151, 155, 181–83, 197–98, 200, 203, 205, 211–

14, 217, 221–25, 230, 240

Quartermaster’s Department, USMC, 35, 130, 132, 134, 

223, 231–32

Quick, John (SgtMaj, USMC), 130, 191

Rawnsley, Walter A. (1stSgt, USMC), 238

Reath, Thomas R. (Sgt, USMC), 282

Reid, George C. (LtCol, USMC), 142, 237

Reno, Edward M. (Capt, USMC), 241

Rheims, France, 21, 94, 101, 105, 170, 176, 187–88, 192

Rhine River Patrol, 229–30, 243

Richards, George (BGen, USMC), 232

Richmond, Clarence L. (Pvt, USMC), 283

Richmond, VA, 33, 133

Rivers

Aisne, 96, 105, 107, 160, 170

Potomac, 33–34

Meuse, 58, 107–8, 111, 125–28, 169, 188, 197–98

Moselle, 105, 111

Rhine, 109, 127, 211, 229–30, 243

Suippe, 106

Yalu, 127

Rixey, Pagsley M. (LtCol, USMC), 244

Roads

Blanc Mont, 172

Bouresches-Belleau, 88

Bouresches-La Roche-Vaux, 80

Chaussere-Romaine, 53

Paris-Metz, 47

Route Nationale, 53, 55

Saint-Ètienne-à-Arnes, 56, 170

Saint-Ètienne-Orfeuil, 177

Saint-Ètienne-Somme-Py, 54, 171

Soisson-Château-Thierry, 164

Souain-Somme-Suippes, 53

Torey-Belleau, 92

Roben, Douglas B. (Maj, USMC), 156–57

Roberson, Robert G. (GySgt, USMC), 265

Robillard, Fred S. (1stLt, USMC), 283

Robinson, Robert G. (GySgt, USMC), 157

Rodman, Hugh (RAdm, USN), 60, 68

Roos, Otto N. (1stSgt, USMC), 238, 242

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 66, 181, 222

Roosevelt, H. R. (LtCol, USMC), 132

Rosyth, Scotland, 61, 64–69, 219

Rottman, Gordon L., xi. See also U.S. Marine Corps World 

War II Order of Battle

Rowan, George R. (2dLt, USMC), 243

Rowell, Ross E. (Maj, USMC), 241

Royal Air Force, British, 156, 215

Rupertus, William H. (Capt, USMC), 60, 66

Russia, activity during war, 88, 115–19, 127, 156, 219, 

267

Sage, Albert B. (1stLt, USMC), 238

Saint-Mihiel, France, 43, 51–52, 57, 105, 111, 169, 171, 

187, 192–95, 197–98, 201, 204

Saint-Nazaire, France, 98–99, 182, 197, 215, 223

Salladay, Jay M. (LtCol, USMC), 239

Sands, William R. (GySgt, USMC), 242
302

Index

Sanitation, 28–32, 234. See also trench warfare

Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 73, 75, 180, 194

Saps, 10. See also trench warfare

Scapa Flow, Orkney Islands, 60–68, 218, 238

Schilt, Christian F. (Lt, USMC), 151, 155

Schools

American

 Army School of the Line, 195

 Army Service School, 25, 27

 Marine Corps Officers’ Training School, 35, 50, 151, 

155, 226

 Marine Flying School, 155

 Quantico, VA, 34–35, 225

British

 Artillery School, 21

 Machine Gun School, 57, 201

French

 Artillery School, 22

Schleswig-Holstein Battalion, 183, 229, 243

Schleswig-Holstein plebiscite, 183, 229

Sector I: Three Years at Great General Headquarters, 77

Sectors

Blanc Mont, 105, 107, 111

Champagne, 106, 111, 159, 178, 188

Château-Thierry, 100–3, 111, 268

Limey, 268

Marbache, 49, 105, 111, 187, 268

Meuse-Argonne, 107, 111, 198

Saint-Mihiel, 111

Somme-Py, 94, 171

Toul, 100

Toulon, 111, 187, 268

Verdun, 49–50, 100, 180, 195, 198–200

Selective Service Classifications, 271

Services of Supply, xiii, 51, 182, 184, 193, 211, 221–25, 

239–40

Shearer, Maurice E. (Maj, USMC), 162–63, 194–98

Shepherd, Lemuel C., Jr. (Gen, USMC), 179, 191, 230, 

243

Sherman, Alien R. (2dLt, USMC), 69

Shiel, Robert H. (Capt, USMC), 243

Ships

American

 Albany (CL 23), 219–20

 Arizona (BB 39), 69

 Arkansas (BB 33), 65–66, 68, 218

 Aztec (SP 590), 69

 Brooklyn (CA 3), 115–19, 219–20

 De Kalb (ID 3010), 99, 156, 227

 Delaware (BB 28), 60–66, 218

 Florida (BB 30), 60–66, 68, 218

 George Washington (ID 3018), 69, 110, 132

 Hancock (AP 3), 97–98, 134, 141–42, 144–45, 154, 

214, 216

 Henderson (AP 1), 97–100, 182–83, 227

 Leviathan (SP 1326), 110, 183, 229

 Mayflower (PY 1), 69

 Mercury (ID 3012), 158, 183, 215, 229

 Nevada (BB 36), 68, 144, 219

 New Orleans (CL 22), 220

 New York (BB 34), 60–68, 153, 218

 Oklahoma (BB 37), 69, 219

 Orion (AC 11), 154

 Orizaba (ID 1536), 223

 Panther (1889), 144

 Pennsylvania (BB 38), 69

 Rinjdam (ID 2505), 110

 Santa Paula (ID 1590), 110, 212

 Seattle (ACR 11), 98

 Siboney (ID 2999), 183

 Texas (BB 35), 63–68, 218

 Tonopah (BM 8), 144, 149

 Utah (BB 31), 69, 219

 Von Steuben (ID 3017), 99, 110, 182, 227

 Wilhelmina (ID 2168), 110

 Wyoming (BB 32), 60, 62–69, 218

British

 Barham (1914), 64, 68–69

 Blanche (1909), 60

 Cardiff (D 58), 68

 Constance (1915), 60

 Iron Duke (1912), 61

 Malaya, 68

 Oak (1912), 65

 Queen Elizabeth (1913), 61, 68

 Suffolk (55), 116–17, 119

 Valiant (1914), 68

 Warspite (03), 68
303

Index

German

 Albertus Magnus, 230, 243

 Borussia (1912), 230, 243

 Cormoran (1909), 209

 Elsa (1906), 230, 243

 Frauenlob, 230, 243

 Mosel (1872), 230, 243

 Preussen (1902), 230, 243

 Rhein (1899), 230, 243

 Rheingold, 230, 243

Shuler, George K. (Maj, USMC), 173–74, 176–78, 197–

99

Siberia, Marines in, 115–19, 219–20, 230–39. See also

Vladivostok Harbor

Sibert, W. L. (MajGen, USA), 98

Sibley, Berton W. (Maj, USMC), 164–67, 191, 197–98

Sieg, Robert E. (Pvt, USMC), 283–84

Simpson, Roy H. (Pvt, USMC), 284

Sims, William S. (VAdm, USN), 64, 69, 146, 153, 217

Small arms

American

 Browning Machine Gun, 43, 58–59, 202

 Browning Automatic Rifle, 43–44

 Lewis Automatic Rifle, 44, 200, 212

British

 Vickers water cooled guns, 57, 59

French

 Chauchat gun, 166–67, 212

 Hotchkiss heavy gun, 44, 58–59, 200

Smith, Bernard Lewis (Capt, USMC), 153

Smith, Holland M. (Maj, USMC), 100, 191

Smith, William R. (MajGen, USA), 178, 191

Small Problems for Infantry, 25

Snow, Frank P. (1stLt, USMC), 63, 66

Snyder, Harold C. (Col, USMC), 104, 110, 235–36, 241

Soissons, France, 45, 49, 77, 91, 101, 103–4, 111, 126, 

159–68, 171, 187, 192, 194–95, 197–201, 204, 

228

Somers, Vernon L. (2dLt, USMC) 284–85

Somme-Py, France, 53–54, 94, 105–6, 170–71, 173, 177

Souain-Suippes, France, 105, 170

Spanish-American War, 204–6

Stanners, James E. (2dLt, USMC), 243

Steele, John P. (GySgt, USMC), 229, 242

Stenback, Raymond H. (Pvt, USMC), 141–42

Stockham, Fred W. (GySgt, USMC), 265

Stone, Pink H. (Capt, USMC), 241

Stowell, George A. (Maj, USMC), 196–97

Studies in Minor Tactics, 1915, 25

Sturdevant, Edward W. (Maj, USMC), 193, 245

Submarines, German, xiii, 61–67, 71, 98, 141, 144–45, 

149, 151, 153–55, 157, 213, 215, 219–20. See also

antisubmarine warfare

Suippes, France, 53, 56, 105, 107, 170–71, 176–78

Sullivan, Raymond B. (LtCol, USMC), 239

Summerall, Charles P. (Gen, USA), 126

Supreme War Council, 77, 119

Sutherland, Elmer L. (2dLt, USMC), 243

Synnott, Joseph A. (2dLt, USMC), 285

Taillefontaine, France, 48, 104, 160, 168

Talbot, Ralph (2dLt, USMC), 15, 271–72, 279

Taylor, Caleb W. (2dLt, USMC), 157, 285–86

Thacher, Miles R. (Maj, USMC), 242

Thayer, Sidney, Jr. (1stLt, USMC), 286

Thomas, Gerald C. (Sgt, USMC), 163–64, 166–67, 179

Thomason, John W., Jr. (Maj, USMC), 286

Thorton, John T. (2dLt, USMC), 243

Tildsley, John M. (Maj, USMC), 237

Tomosaburo, Kato (RAdm, Japanese Navy), 115

Torrey, Philip H. (Maj, USMC), 240

Toul, France, 100, 105, 169, 187

Towers, John H. (LCdr, USN), 155

Training Area

Bourmont, 98–100

Gondrecourt, 98

Trans-Siberian Railway, 117–18

Treadwell, Thomas C. (Col, USMC), 240

Treasury Department, U.S., 130–31

Trenches

Blanc Mont, 173

Dusseldorf, 54

Elbe, 171

Essen, 171–75, 95. See also Essen Hook

Gottingue, 53

Krefeld, 171

Prussian, 171

Somme-Py, 94, 105–6
304

Index

Trenches (continued)

Stuttgart, 53

Verdun, 44, 49–50, 198

Trulock, Ray (Sgt, USMC), 242

Turnage, Allen H. (Maj, USMC), 240

Turrill, Julius S. (Maj, USMC), 161–63, 167, 193–94, 239

Underhill, James L. (Maj, USMC), 242

United States Congress, 69–70, 129, 233, 265–67. See also

citations

U.S. Marine Corps World War II Order of Battle, xi

Upshur, W. P. (Maj, USMC), 181

Van Orden, George (Col, USMC), 220, 239

Veracruz, Mexico, 142, 181, 197–98, 200, 203–4

Verdun, France, 44, 50, 100, 109, 111, 180, 187, 191, 

194–95, 197–200, 203

Vincent, Jesse G., 155. See also Liberty engine

Vivières, France, 103, 167

Vladivostok Harbor, Siberia, 115–19, 219–220, 238–39, 

268

von Conta, Richard (Gen, German Infantry), 77–78, 80, 

91, 93

Vulte, Nelson P. (Maj, USMC), 60, 66, 238

Waller, Littleton W. T., Jr. (Maj, USMC), 102, 107, 163, 

173, 200–2, 236

Washington, DC, 110, 114, 155, 204, 212

War Department, U.S., 71, 200, 211, 221, 266–67

Warfare

Antisubmarine, xiii, 71–72, 144, 153–54, 215. See also

Marine Corps aviation forces

Chemical, xi

Trench, xi, 5–22, 35, 89

Weaver, John H. (2dLt, USMC), 287

Wentworth, Sidney W. (Capt, USMC), 68

Wershiner, Harry B. (GySgt, USMC), 156

Westcott, Charles T. (LtCol, USMC), 194–95, 238, 245

Wheeler, Jim (Cpl, USMC), 243

Whiteside, John R. (1stLt, USMC), 287

Whiting, Donald N. (1stLt, USMC), 288

Whitney, Harold W. (1stLt, USMC), 243

Willcox, Jullian P. (Maj, USMC), 60, 64

Williams, Ernest C. (Maj, USMC), 172–74, 177, 198

Williams, Lloyd (Capt, USMC), 191

Williams, Richard P. (Maj, USMC), 241

Wills, Davis B. (Maj, USMC), 218, 238

Wilmer, Pere (Maj, USMC), 288

Wilson, Claggett (1stLt, USMC), 288–89

Wilson, T. Woodrow, 69, 77, 125, 211, 265–66

Wiman, Amil (GySgt, USMC), 157

Wise, Frederick M. (Maj, USMC), 194–96, 236, 244

Women Marines, 231–33

Wright, Arthur H. (1stLt, USMC), 289

Wytschaete-Messines ridge, 21

Yorktown, VA, 60, 66

Ypres, Belgium, 16, 21, 72, 91

Zeebrugge, Belgium, 71–72, 155

Zeigler, Walton B. (GySgt, USMC), 152

zigzags, 8, 10, 18–19. See also trench warfare

Zimmerman, Arthur (German Foreign Secretary), 141

Zinner, Fred J. (2dLt, USMC), 186–87

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