U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Inspector General

C-4 Crack Cocaine

The Immigration and Naturalization Service's 

Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists:

A Review of the INS's Admissions of Mohamed Atta and 

Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of their Change of Status 

Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign Students in 

the United States

Office of the Inspector General

May 20, 2002

DRAFT
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS...............................................................................i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................1

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.......................................................... 19

I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 19

II. Organization of the Report.................................................................. 21

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND........................................................... 23

I. Organizational Structure of the INS .................................................... 23

II. Visitor Visas ...................................................................................... 25

A. Entrance of nonimmigrants into the United States ........................ 25

B. Description of visitor visa classifications ..................................... 25

C. Length of stay permitted by the visitor visa.................................. 28

1. Period of validity of the visa................................................. 28

2. Length of admission under the B-1/B-2 classification............ 28

III. Foreign Students ................................................................................ 29

CHAPTER THREE: ATTA’S AND ALSHEHHI’S ENTRIES INTO

THE UNITED STATES ..................................................................... 32

I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 32

II. The Inspection Process....................................................................... 32

A. The primary inspection process ................................................... 33

B. The secondary inspection process................................................ 35

III. Atta’s Entries into the United States.................................................... 36

A. Atta’s first entry – June 3, 2000, Newark, New Jersey .................. 37

B. Atta’s second entry – January 10, 2001, Miami, Florida................ 37

1. Processing Atta at the POE................................................... 37

2. OIG analysis........................................................................ 41

3. Effect of departure while change of status application is 

pending ............................................................................... 45
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4. Atta’s length of admission.................................................... 47

C. Atta’s third entry – July 19, 2001, Miami, Florida ........................ 49

IV. Alshehhi’s Entries into the United States............................................. 50

A. Alshehhi’s first entry – May 29, 2000, Newark, New Jersey ......... 50

B. Alshehhi’s second entry – January 18, 2001, New York, 

New York................................................................................... 52

C. Alshehhi’s third entry – May 2, 2001, Miami, Florida .................. 55

V. OIG Conclusions on the INS’s Admission of Atta and Alshehhi........... 56

CHAPTER FOUR: THE INS’S DELAYED PROCESSING OF ATTA’S

AND ALSHEHHI’S APPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE OF 

STATUS............................................................................................ 59

I. Introduction ....................................................................................... 59

II. Process to Obtain Nonimmigrant Student Status .................................. 59

III. Huffman Aviation’s Initiation of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s Applications 

for Change of Status........................................................................... 61

IV. Processing at the Texas Service Center................................................ 63

A. INS service center organization and mission ................................ 63

B. Processing and adjudication of I-539 applications for change of 

status.......................................................................................... 66

1. Pre-adjudication processing.................................................. 66

2. The adjudication process...................................................... 69

C. The TSC did not adjudicate Atta’s And Alshehhi’s I-539 

applications in a timely manner ................................................... 70

1. RAFACS history for Atta’s I-539 application ....................... 71

2. RAFACS history for Alshehhi’s I-539 application ................ 72

3. Backlogs at the TSC ............................................................ 73

4. Delay in the transmission of the school I-20 form to ACS...... 76

V. ACS’s Processing of the School Copies of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 

Forms................................................................................................ 77

A. ACS contract to process INS immigration forms .......................... 78

B. How ACS processes I-20 forms................................................... 79
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C. The mailing of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s to Huffman 

Aviation ..................................................................................... 82

D. OIG’s analysis of ACS’s processing of the I-20s.......................... 84

1. Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s were handled in the same 

manner as other I-20s received by ACS at the time................ 84

a. Atta’s I-20.................................................................... 84

b. Alshehhi’s I-20 ............................................................ 85

2. The contract requirements for handling I-20s after 

processing ........................................................................... 86

VI. OIG Conclusions Regarding the Delay in Sending the I-20 Forms to 

Huffman Aviation .............................................................................. 90

VII. Adjudication of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-539s...................................... 91

A. Requirements for approval for I-539 change of status................... 91

1. Signature requirement .......................................................... 93

2. Proof that applicant timely filed the application .................... 94

3. Evidence requirement .......................................................... 95

B. Length of stay for nonimmigrant vocational students.................... 96

C. Information that could have affected the adjudication................... 98

1. Completion of the course by Atta and Alshehhi on 

December 19, 2000.............................................................. 98

2. Lack of sufficient hours for “full course of study”............... 100

3. Departures by Atta and Alshehhi while their I-539 

applications were pending .................................................. 100

D. Production pressures and the I-539 ............................................ 101

E. OIG conclusions regarding the adjudication of Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s change of status applications .................................... 103

CHAPTER FIVE: THE INS’S FAILURE TO STOP DELIVERY OF

THE I-20S TO HUFFMAN AVIATION........................................... 105

I. Introduction ..................................................................................... 105

II. Actions of ACS and INS Employees ................................................. 105

A. Actions of ACS......................................................................... 105

B. Actions of the TSC personnel and INS Headquarters managers 

overseeing the service centers.................................................... 106

1. Retrieval of the Atta and Alshehhi files at the TSC.............. 106

2. Actions taken by TSC and INS Headquarters managers....... 109
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3. Reasons TSC and Immigration Services Division personnel 

did not stop the I-20s before they were mailed to Huffman 

Aviation ............................................................................ 110

a. TSC personnel ........................................................... 110

b. Immigration Services Division managers .................... 111

4. OIG analysis...................................................................... 113

C. Actions of INS Headquarters Enforcement Division personnel ... 116

1. Organization of Enforcement Division................................ 116

2. Events at INS Headquarters on and around September 11.... 117

3. Enforcement Division requests for information and the 

handling of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s files ............................... 118

4. Reasons stated by Enforcement personnel for not asking 

for all INS records or files related to the terrorists ............... 119

5. OIG analysis...................................................................... 120

III. The INS’s Response to OIG Criticism............................................... 122

CHAPTER SIX: THE INS’S FOREIGN STUDENT PROGRAM.............. 124

I. Introduction ..................................................................................... 124

II. Background...................................................................................... 124

A. Scope and methodology of review ............................................. 125

B. Statistics on student visas.......................................................... 126

C. The student visa application process.......................................... 127

III. Deficiencies in the Foreign Student Program..................................... 129

A. Inadequacies in the INS’s process for approving schools ............ 129

1. Legal requirements for schools to be certified to accept 

foreign students ................................................................. 129

2. The I-17 petition and the INS’s certification process ........... 132

3. Inadequate resources devoted to school approval process .... 132

4. Lack of in-person interviews and site visits prior to 

approval............................................................................ 133

5. Lack of re-certifications ..................................................... 135

6. Review of Huffman Aviation file ....................................... 136

B. Lack of security features on I-20 forms...................................... 139

C. Inadequacies in collecting information concerning student 

status........................................................................................ 140
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D. Deficiencies in the Student and Schools System (STSC) 

database.................................................................................... 141

E. Lack of enforcement ................................................................. 144

F. Lack of training for designated school officials and INS schools 

officers..................................................................................... 144

IV. Student and Exchange Visitor System (SEVIS)................................. 146

A. History of SEVIS...................................................................... 146

B. How SEVIS will work .............................................................. 150

1. Data to be collected in SEVIS concerning foreign students 

and exchange visitors......................................................... 151

2. Data to be collected concerning schools.............................. 152

3. SEVIS procedures.............................................................. 152

a. School certifications................................................... 152

b. Issuance of I-20 to foreign student .............................. 154

c. State Department access to SEVIS .............................. 154

d. Inspectors’ access to SEVIS and updating of student’s 

record that student has entered the country .................. 155

e. Updating of student’s record once student enrolls in 

school........................................................................ 155

C. Schedule for implementation..................................................... 157

V. OIG analysis of SEVIS..................................................................... 157

A. Deficiencies that SEVIS will address......................................... 158

1. Improved data collection.................................................... 158

2. Improving fraud detection and deterrence........................... 159

B. Deficiencies SEVIS will not address.......................................... 160

C. SEVIS implementation difficulties............................................. 161

1. Ensuring that approved schools are re-certified prior to the 

January 30, 2003, implementation deadline......................... 161

2. Collecting the processing fee as required by statute............. 163

VI. Conclusion....................................................................................... 164

CHAPTER SEVEN: THE INS’S PROPOSED CHANGES 

REGARDING FOREIGN STUDENTS............................................. 166

I. Introduction ..................................................................................... 166

II. Proposed Processing Changes........................................................... 166
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A. Processing the student copy of the I-20 ...................................... 166

B. Database checks before I-539s are adjudicated ........................... 168

1. Check of NIIS database...................................................... 168

2. Check of the Interagency Border Inspection System............ 169

3. Performance standards for CAOs........................................ 170

III. Proposed regulatory changes............................................................. 171

A. Proposed change: Aliens who enter the country without a 

student visa may not begin a course of study until their I-539 

petition for change of status to student has been adjudicated 

favorably. ................................................................................. 171

B. Proposed change: A visitor entering the country must articulate 

reasons that would support a length of stay longer than 30 days, 

and if the visitor cannot the default admission period will be 30 

days.......................................................................................... 173

C. Proposed change: Require prospective foreign students to 

demonstrate their intent to attend school at the time they are 

admitted on a B-1/B-2 visa in order to be eligible later to seek 

a change of status to F-1 or M-1. ............................................... 174

D. Proposed change: Require flight schools to initiate background 

and fingerprint checks when a student seeks to learn how to fly 

a plane over 12,500 pounds....................................................... 177

CHAPTER EIGHT: RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................... 178

I. Introduction ..................................................................................... 178

II. Recommendations............................................................................ 179

A. Management of the foreign student program .............................. 179

B. Recommendations that affect all foreign students....................... 179

1. Implementation of SEVIS .................................................. 179

2. Defining “prospective student”........................................... 181

3. Capturing information about part-time students................... 181

C. Recommendations that affect nonimmigrants who wish to 

change their status to that of a student........................................ 182

1. Adequate resources to ensure processing of I-539 

applications in 30 days....................................................... 182

2. IBIS checks....................................................................... 183

D. Recommendations that affect immigration inspectors ................. 183
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1. Abandonment of I-539 applications.................................... 183

2. I-193 waivers..................................................................... 184

E. General recommendations......................................................... 184

1. Performance standards for CAOs........................................ 184

2. INS policies....................................................................... 184

CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION........................................................... 186
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APPENDIX:

INS FORM I-94 (ARRIVAL DEPARTURE RECORD).............................A-1

CHART REGARDING WAIVERS AT JOHN F. KENNEDY 

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND SEAPORT.......................................A-2

INS FORM I-539 (APPLICATION TO EXTEND/CHANGE

NONIMMIGRANT STATUS)..................................................................A-3

INS FORM I-20 (CERTIFICATE OF ELIGIBILITY FOR 

NONIMMIGRANT STUDENT)...............................................................A-8

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS.......................................................... A-12
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi were 2 of the 19 terrorists who 

hijacked and crashed 4 airplanes on September 11, 2001, resulting in the deaths 

of over 3,000 individuals, the complete destruction of the World Trade Center 

Towers in New York City, and extensive damage to the Pentagon. Atta is 

believed to have been the pilot who flew the plane into the Trade Center’s 

North Tower. Alshehhi is believed to have flown the plane into the South 

Tower. Both terrorists died in the attack.

Six months later, on March 11, 2002, Huffman Aviation International, a 

small flight training school in Venice, Florida, received official documents sent 

by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) relating to Atta and 

Alshehhi. Both had taken pilot lessons at the flight school. In the spring of 

2000, both had entered the United States legally using visitor visas, and in 

September 2000 had requested that the INS change their status from that of 

“visitor” to that of “vocational student” so they could attend the flight training 

school. They did so by filing an I-539 “change of status” application with the 

INS. The documents opened by the flight school on March 11, 2002, were INS 

I-20 forms, which informed the school that Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications 

had been approved more than seven months earlier – Atta’s in July and 

Alshehhi’s in August 2001. Within a day, media across the country were 

reporting the story, and the INS came under intense criticism.

On March 13, 2002, President George Bush directed the Attorney 

General to investigate why the student status notifications were mailed to the 

flight school six months after the terrorist attacks. The Attorney General 

requested that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) investigate the 

circumstances surrounding the INS’s sending of the I-20 forms to Huffman 

Aviation, including the source of the delay in the processing of the forms and 

the failure to stop their delivery.

I. The OIG Investigation, Scope of the Report, and Conclusions

At the time the OIG received the Attorney General’s request, we had 

already begun two reviews that were substantively related to the Huffman 

Aviation incident. First, the OIG was examining the INS’s admissions of Atta 

into the United States on three separate occasions. In addition, the OIG had 

initiated a review of the process by which the INS tracks and monitors foreign 

students who enter the United States.
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In order to provide greater context to the investigation requested by the 

Attorney General, the OIG accelerated our review of Atta’s entries into the 

United States and broadened that inquiry to include a review of Alshehhi’s 

entries into the United States. In addition, the OIG completed its review of the 

INS’s foreign student tracking system. The results of both of those reviews are 

incorporated into this report along with the results of the OIG investigation 

requested by the Attorney General.

To conduct our review, we assembled a team of three attorneys, four 

special agents, and three program analysts. The OIG team conducted almost 

100 interviews of personnel from INS Headquarters; the INS Texas Service 

Center in Dallas, Texas; and the INS’s Miami, New York, Newark, and Atlanta 

Districts, including inspectors at airports in these districts. We also 

interviewed personnel from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

(FLETC); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Huffman Aviation; and 

two INS contractors involved in the processing of I-20 forms, Affiliated 

Computer Services, Inc. (ACS) and Uniband Enterprises.

This report contains three main sets of findings. First, with regard to all 

but one of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s entries into the United States, we concluded 

that the evidence does not show that the inspectors who admitted them acted in 

violation of INS policies and practices. We were unable to reach any definitive 

conclusion whether Atta’s admission in January 2001 was improper, given the 

limited record relating to the admission and the inspector’s inability to 

remember the specifics of what was said at the time. However, our review 

illustrated that, before September 11, the INS did not closely scrutinize aliens 

who were entering the United States to become students or consistently require 

them to possess the required documentation before entering the United States.

Second, with regard to the INS’s processing of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s 

change of status applications and the I-20 forms associated with those 

applications, we found the INS’s adjudication and notification process to be 

untimely and significantly flawed. Because the INS assigned a low priority to 

adjudicating these types of applications, a significant backlog existed. As a 

result, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications were adjudicated and approved more 

than 10 months after the INS received them, well after both men had finished 

their flight training course. Even after adjudication, there was another 

significant delay before the I-20 forms were mailed to the flight school 

notifying it of the approved applications. This delay occurred because the INS 

contractor who data entered the information from the forms after approval held 
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onto them for 180 days before mailing them to the school. We found that the 

contractor handled these forms consistently with its handling of other I-20 

forms and its interpretation of the requirements of its contract with the INS. 

The evidence suggests, however, that the contract was written so that the I-20 

forms would be returned to the schools within 30 days, and we criticize the 

INS for failing to monitor adequately the requirements and performance of the 

contract. 

We also criticize INS personnel for failing to consider the I-20s and 

thereby failing to make the FBI aware of the I-20s. No one in the INS took 

responsibility for locating the forms or notifying the FBI of their existence. 

While we recognize that the I-20 forms were not significant to the FBI’s 

investigation, no one from the INS told the OIG that they did not pursue the 

documents for this reason. Rather, everyone we interviewed said that they did 

not even consider the I-20s. This oversight was a failure on the part of many 

individuals in the INS.

Third, with regard to our review of the INS’s system for monitoring and 

tracking foreign students in the United States, it is clear that the INS’s current, 

paper-based system is antiquated and inadequate. The INS is developing and 

will soon implement an automated computer tracking system – the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). SEVIS will be a significant 

advance and will help address many of the failings of the current system. But 

SEVIS alone will not solve the problems of the INS’s tracking of foreign 

students. For example, the INS must review and properly re-certify the 

thousands of schools that are currently certified to enroll foreign students, must 

ensure that its employees and schools timely and accurately enter information 

into SEVIS, and must ensure that the information from SEVIS is analyzed and 

used adequately. We also believe that it is unlikely that the INS will be able to 

meet the January 30, 2003, deadline for full implementation of SEVIS. 

At the end of the report, we provide 24 systemic recommendations to 

help address the deficiencies in INS practices and procedures that we found in 

our review and in the INS’s proposed implementation of SEVIS.

II. Background

A. Immigration processes

Because immigration regulations are complex, we first set forth in the 

report a description of basic immigration terminology and processes relevant to 
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the issues we investigated. In particular, we describe the processes through 

which foreigners who want to study in the United States can enter the country 

legally. 

To enter the United States, an alien must present a valid passport and 

valid visa to an immigration inspector at designated land, sea, and air ports of 

entry (POEs). Visas are issued by the U.S. Department of State and authorize 

aliens to enter the United States for specified purposes. When an alien arrives 

at a POE, an INS immigration inspector reviews the alien’s documents and 

seeks to determine, based on the alien’s answers to questions posed by the 

inspector, whether the alien’s purpose for entering the country matches the 

purpose associated with the visa.

According to immigration regulations, aliens may enter the United States 

and attend school full time or part time through several different procedures. 

Aliens who intend to take classes but who do not intend to pursue full-time 

schooling may enter as visitors using a B-1/B-2 visitor visa provided the 

classes are “incidental” to the alien’s primary purpose of pleasure (B-2) or are 

part of a business-related purpose (B-1). 

Aliens who want to engage in a full-time course of study in the United 

States can obtain legal permission to do so in two ways. The first method, used

by the majority of foreign students, is the student visa process in which the 

applicant requests a student visa in the applicant’s country of residence. The 

State Department screens the applicant and determines whether to issue the 

visa. 

In the second method, aliens who already have entered the United States 

through other legal means, such as with a visitor visa, may ask the INS to 

change their status to students. To do so, aliens must file INS form I-539 

requesting a change of status, establish that they are enrolled in school full 

time, establish that they are in a valid status at the time of application, and 

demonstrate their financial ability to pay for the schooling. This method – the 

one pursued by Atta and Alshehhi – does not involve the State Department nor 

does it involve the issuance of a new visa. 

B. Chronology of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s entries into the United States 

and change of status applications

Atta and Alshehhi both possessed valid passports and visitor visas, issued 

at United States consulates abroad, which were valid for multiple entries into 
5

the United States. Atta first entered the country through Newark International 

Airport as a visitor in June 2000. Alshehhi first entered the country as a visitor 

also through Newark International Airport in May 2000. INS immigration 

inspectors routinely admitted them and authorized them to remain in the 

country for six months, which was the typical period of admission for aliens 

holding visitor visas. 

Atta and Alshehhi enrolled in the professional pilot’s course at Huffman 

Aviation in July 2000. In September 2000, they applied to change their status 

from visitors to that of vocational students by submitting I-539 applications to 

the INS’s Texas Service Center in Dallas, Texas. The Texas Service Center is 

one of five INS Service Centers that process and adjudicate many types of INS 

applications. Atta and Alshehhi also submitted the required INS form I-20, the 

Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student Status, which is issued by 

schools certified by the INS to enroll foreign students once students have been 

accepted to the school. The I-20 form includes two parts that reflect identical 

information about the school and the student’s proposed course of study, 

including the dates of the course of study. Once the INS approves the 

application, the adjudicator stamps both parts of the I-20. One part of the I-20, 

the student copy, is sent to the student and eventually the other part, the school 

copy, is sent to the school. After adjudication of the application, the school 

copy of the I-20 is mailed to ACS in London, Kentucky. This INS contractor 

data enters information from the I-20s for eventual uploading into an INS 

database and later mails the I-20s to the schools. The INS does not retain 

copies of the I-20s in its files.

In December 2000, while their change of status applications were 

pending, Atta and Alshehhi finished their flight training at Huffman Aviation. 

Both separately left the country in January 2001 and separately returned a few 

days later. Each was admitted into the United States by INS inspectors after 

being referred to secondary inspection. Each later left and re-entered the 

country a third time. Alshehhi left in April 2001 and returned in May 2001; he 

was admitted this last time on a visitor visa for six months, until November 

2001. Atta left in July 2001 and returned a few days later; he was admitted on 

a visitor visa until November 2001. 

On July 17, 2001, the INS approved Atta’s I-539 change of status 

application that had been filed 10 months earlier. On August 9, 2001, the INS 

approved Alshehhi’s I-539 change of status application. As noted previously, 
6

Atta and Alshehhi had finished their flight training program at Huffman 

Aviation more than six months earlier.

After the INS adjudicated Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status 

applications, it sent ACS the school copy of their I-20 forms, which ACS 

received on September 24, 2001. Consistent with its interpretation of its 

contract, ACS data entered information from the school copy of Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s I-20 forms and retained the forms. After waiting approximately 

180 days, ACS mailed the school copy of the I-20s to Huffman Aviation in 

March 2002. 

III. The INS’s Handling of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s Entries and Change of 

Status Applications

The OIG investigated several different but interrelated aspects of Atta’s 

and Alshehhi’s contacts with the INS. First, we examined their three entries 

into the United States to determine whether the INS inspectors who admitted 

them acted in accord with INS policies and policies. We also investigated the 

INS’s processing of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status applications to 

determine why the INS took over 10 months to adjudicate the applications and 

why it took another 7 months for Huffman Aviation to receive its copies of the 

I-20 forms. In addition, we examined whether the INS adjudicator who 

approved Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status applications did so 

appropriately. Finally, we investigated why the INS failed to retrieve the I-20s 

from the contractor after September 11 and before they were sent to Huffman 

Aviation.

A. Atta’s and Alshehhi’s Entries into the United States

Atta and Alshehhi each entered the United States three times. We 

reviewed each of these entries, the decisions made by the INS inspectors who 

handled their entries, and the INS policies that relate to these entries. 

On each occasion, Atta and Alshehhi entered the United States with valid 

passports and visitor visas that were good for multiple entries. The primary 

immigration inspectors who admitted them during their first and third entries 

did so routinely, without referring them to the more intensive inspection 

process known as secondary inspection. We found no indication that the 

primary inspectors were presented with or were aware of any information that 

would have caused them to refer Atta and Alshehhi to secondary inspection. 

The evidence indicates that, given the information available to the inspectors at 
7

the time of the admissions, the primary inspectors did not violate INS policies 

and practices by admitting them. 

However, during each of their second entries – Atta on January 10, 2001, 

through the Miami International Airport and Alshehhi on January 18, 2001, 

through the John F. Kennedy Airport – both were referred to secondary 

inspection. After interviews in secondary inspection, INS secondary inspectors 

admitted Atta and Alshehhi as visitors. Because the secondary inspectors knew 

that Atta and Alshehhi had filed change of status applications, the inspectors 

should have questioned them about their intent with respect to taking flight 

training courses and whether they were seeking to re-enter the United States to 

go to flight school full time. If the inspectors determined that Atta and 

Alshehhi intended to be full-time students, the inspectors should have required 

them to present student visas, which they did not have, rather than their visitor 

visas. 

On the other hand, if Atta and Alshehhi stated that they intended to attend 

classes on a part-time basis only, the inspectors could have admitted them 

based on their visitor visas. However, because the available record with 

respect to Atta is limited and the inspector had only a vague recollection of his 

interview of Atta, we were not able to conclude whether the inspector properly 

or improperly admitted Atta. The evidence with respect to Alshehhi suggests 

that the inspector’s admission of Alshehhi was not in violation of INS 

practices. 

We also considered whether Atta’s and Alshehhi’s departures while their 

I-539 applications for change of status were pending should have had an effect 

on their ability to re-enter the country. The INS’s policy is that an alien who 

leaves the country while his change of status application is pending abandons 

that application. However, abandonment of a change of status application does 

not automatically mean that an alien is inadmissible when he returns to the 

United States and seeks re-entry. The INS inspector is required to assess the 

alien’s purpose at the time of re-entry. If Atta and Alshehhi stated that they 

intended to attend school part time, they would have been admissible again 

with their multiple-entry visitor visa, regardless of their abandonment of their 

change of status applications. 

Yet, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s admissions highlighted that INS inspectors 

lack important information when assessing aliens’ eligibility for admission into 

the United States. For example, primary inspectors do not learn through 

automated checks whether an alien has a change of status application pending. 
8

Also, although both Atta and Alshehhi had completed their flight schooling by 

the time they sought to re-enter the country in January 2001, the inspectors 

who admitted them were not aware of that fact, since the INS did not collect 

this information about foreign students.

Our review of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s admissions also illustrated another 

troubling INS practice. We were consistently told by INS inspectors at the 

POEs we visited that aliens who intended to enter the United States to become 

full-time students and who lacked the required student visa would likely have 

been admitted through the waiver process. Although Atta and Alshehhi were 

not admitted through the waiver process, we found that INS managers, 

supervisors, and inspectors believed incorrectly that they have broad discretion 

to admit aliens who do not have the required passport and visa through this 

process. In fact, the law and INS policy limit the circumstances in which an 

alien who lacks the proper passport or visa can be admitted with a waiver to 

“unforeseen emergencies.” But the INS’s prevailing philosophy in dealing 

with foreign students at the POEs before September 11 was that students were 

not a concern or a significant risk worthy of special scrutiny. Therefore, INS 

inspectors and supervisors would admit students through the waiver process 

when they appeared at POEs without the proper documentation if they did not 

appear to have a criminal record or disclose any other evidence of 

inadmissibility. Thus, although the INS had clear policies on when a waiver 

was appropriate, those policies were not followed or enforced.

B. Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status applications and I-20 

forms

We examined several aspects of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications for 

change of status. Specifically, we investigated the length of time INS took to 

process Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-539 applications and I-20 forms, whether the 

change of status was properly granted, and why the I-20s were mailed after 

September 11.

1. Delay in processing

Huffman Aviation received its copies of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms 

in March 2002, more than a year and a half after the forms were submitted to 

the INS in September 2000, and approximately seven months after the I-539 

change of status applications were approved. We found that these lengthy 

delays were due to two primary causes: a significant backlog in processing I-
9

539s at the INS’s Texas Service Center and the contractor’s storage of the I20s for 180 days before mailing them to the schools.

First, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications were not adjudicated in a timely 

fashion. Historically, processing I-539 applications has been a low priority for 

the INS. By July 2001, at the Texas Service Center, which handled Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s applications, the processing time for I-539 applications reached 282 

days. Therefore, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications were not adjudicated until 

10 months after the INS received them, and many months after they had 

completed their flight training course. 

Second, after the INS adjudicated the two men’s change of status 

applications, it mailed the school copy of the I-20 forms to ACS, the contractor 

that data entered information from the forms for inclusion in INS databases. 

ACS did not mail the forms to Huffman Aviation for almost 180 days after 

receiving them in September 2001. ACS’s handling of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s 

forms was consistent with its understanding of its contractual obligations and 

with its handling of other I-20 forms it processed at that time. We found some 

evidence, however, that the INS had intended for the I-20s to be mailed to 

schools within 30 days after data entry, not 180 days. But the evidence showed 

that INS officials were not familiar with the terms of the contract and exercised 

minimal oversight of the contract. We fault the INS for failing to pay more 

attention to the performance of this contract.

2. Adjudication of the change of status applications

We found that the adjudicator who approved Atta’s and Alshehhi’s 

change of status applications did so in accord with INS policies and practices. 

But we also found that these policies and practices were flawed. Most 

important, the adjudicator did not have complete information about Atta and 

Alshehhi before adjudicating their applications. If the adjudicator had full 

information, he should have denied their applications. For example, the 

adjudicator did not learn that Atta and Alshehhi had already completed their 

flight training because the INS did not collect that information. The 

adjudicator also did not learn that Atta and Alshehhi had departed the United 

States twice while their change of status applications were still pending, which 

the INS deems to be an abandonment of the applications. Although INS 

databases contained this information, adjudicators were not required to check 

the databases before making a decision. 
10

However, it is important to note that even if the adjudicator had denied 

their change of status applications, Atta and Alshehhi were admitted into the 

United States as visitors during their third entries in July and May 2001 and 

were authorized to stay until November 2001. Therefore, even if the 

adjudicator had denied their change of status applications, that denial would 

not have invalidated Atta’s and Alshehhi’s status as visitors entitled to remain 

in the United States through September 11.

3. Failure to stop the processing and mailing of the I-20s

We do not believe that ACS was at fault for not stopping Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s forms from being mailed to Huffman Aviation. As a contractor, 

ACS takes its direction from the INS. It handled these forms consistent with 

other forms, and in accord with its understanding of the requirements of the 

contract. No one at the INS asked ACS to identify or locate Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s I-20s. Absent instructions from the INS, ACS managers had no 

independent responsibility to check its records to verify whether it possessed 

documents related to any September 11 terrorists. Moreover, ACS’s handling 

of I-20s is a clerical process that is mostly automated. For these reasons, we 

concluded that ACS bears no responsibility for failing to stop delivery of the I20 forms.

Rather, the fault lies with many INS employees who could have, and 

should have, considered the existence of the I-20 forms and brought them to 

the attention of the FBI. On September 11, two industrious Texas Service 

Center personnel had determined through database searches that the Texas 

Service Center had adjudicated Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status 

applications. The next day they retrieved the Texas Service Center files on 

Atta and Alshehhi and faxed copies of the documents to the FBI. Soon thereafter, 

the FBI requested the originals of these files, and the INS provided them to the 

FBI. 

These files did not contain the I-20s because the student copies had been 

returned to the applicants months earlier and the school copies had been sent to 

ACS for processing. Yet, no one in the INS took any action to locate the 

school copies of the I-20s, inform the FBI of their existence, or even consider 

where these forms were in the process. We believe that managers and 

personnel from the Texas Service Center where the applications had been 

processed, managers in the Immigration Services Division in INS Headquarters 

who supervised the service centers, and managers in the Enforcement Division 
11

in INS Headquarters who were involved in the terrorism investigation were at 

fault for failing to inform the FBI about the existence of the I-20s. 

When interviewed by the OIG, these INS personnel acknowledged that 

they were aware that I-20s were part of the change of status process and 

acknowledged that they did not inquire about the school copies of the I-20s 

associated with Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status file. They conceded 

that they did not think about trying to obtain the I-20s for the FBI, and they 

never informed the FBI about the existence of the I-20s before they were 

mailed in March 2002. 

Several of these INS managers told the OIG that they instructed their 

subordinates to ensure that the FBI had what it needed and suggested that their 

inaction was attributable to the fact this was an FBI case, not an INS case. 

Several individuals also stated that they were not aware that the contractor 

stored the I-20s for 180 days and therefore, even if they had thought about the 

I-20s, they would have assumed that the forms already had been mailed to the 

school. 

These arguments are unpersuasive. While we recognize that the INS’s 

failure to provide the I-20s did not hinder the FBI’s investigation, it was the 

INS’s responsibility to ensure that all its documentation relating to the 

terrorists was identified for the FBI. No one at the INS assessed whether all 

information associated with Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status files –

which was information that only the INS had knowledge of – might be useful 

to the FBI. No one thought to even inquire about the I-20s related to Atta’s 

and Alshehhi’s change of status applications or find out where they were. In 

our view, this was a widespread failure on the part of many individuals in the 

INS.

IV. The OIG’s Evaluation of the INS’s Foreign Student Program

In response to concerns about how the INS tracks foreign students, we 

evaluated the INS’s processes for admitting foreign students and for certifying 

schools as eligible to receive foreign students. We also evaluated the INS 

tracking systems for foreign students – the paper system that exists now as well 

as SEVIS, the computer system the INS is developing. 

The State Department is responsible for issuing student visas to foreign 

students who want to study in the United States. It is the responsibility of the 

INS, however, to determine which schools are entitled to accept foreign 
12

students, to inspect the documentation of persons arriving with student visas, to 

keep track of the entries and exits of foreign students, to know whether 

students are continuing to maintain their status once in this country, to facilitate 

the removal of students once their status ends, and to approve appropriate 

requests by aliens who are in the country through some other classification to 

acquire student status. Responsibility for each of these obligations is divided 

among several different offices, divisions, and branches within the INS, as well 

as among private contractors. 

In the past, the INS has not adequately handled these responsibilities. 

The INS’s foreign student program historically has been dysfunctional, and the 

INS has acknowledged for several years that it does not know how many 

foreign students are in the United States. In addition, the INS lacks accurate 

data about the schools that are authorized to issue I-20s, the students who 

obtain student visas and student status, the current status of those students, and 

whether fraud is being perpetuated in the foreign student program. 

For example, an important component of the foreign student program is 

the school certification process, which allows the INS to ensure that the school 

is legitimate and not simply an operation designed to assist foreigners to enter 

or remain in the country fraudulently. Yet, INS district offices assign the 

responsibility for approving and re-certifying schools to adjudicators or 

inspectors only as a collateral duty. We found that these inspectors and 

adjudicators – called “schools officers” – do not adequately review the schools’ 

applications for certification or re-certification. In addition, the INS rarely 

conducts site visits of schools prior to or after certification and relies primarily 

on written representations from the schools. 

An example of the result of this deficiency was the INS’s certification of 

Huffman Aviation. As part of our review we obtained and reviewed the INS’s 

file on Huffman Aviation, which was certified by the INS in 1990 to accept 

foreign students. We concluded that based on the available evidence, Huffman 

Aviation did not then nor does it currently meet the INS’s certification 

requirements because its students do not appear to be enrolled in a full course 

of study, as required by INS regulations. We believe that a site visit, which 

never occurred, would have provided the INS more accurate information with 

which to make its determination about Huffman’s certification.

In addition, INS investigators and adjudicators consistently reported to us 

that they believe that fraud with I-20 forms is prevalent. The current forms 

contain few security features and are relatively easy to counterfeit. Schools 
13

receive multiple blank forms, and many schools that are no longer approved to 

issue such forms still retain a supply of them. 

The INS’s current database for recording information about the status of 

foreign students and schools relies on information from paper forms that are 

supposed to be sent to the INS and uploaded into a database. But the 

information that is inputted into this database is incomplete and unreliable. 

Thus the database is riddled with inaccuracies. 

The INS’s implementation of its new automated system to track foreign 

students – SEVIS – will help solve some of the problems the INS has had

tracking foreign students. SEVIS will improve the data collection on students 

and schools. Schools will no longer be required to fill out forms that must be 

mailed to the INS and then sent by the INS to a contractor for data entry. 

Instead, the schools will enter information about students directly into SEVIS 

or into its own computer systems that will then upload to SEVIS. Through 

SEVIS, the INS and schools also will be able to identify more easily when a 

student’s change of status has been approved because the student’s SEVIS 

record will be electronically updated by the INS service centers once 

processing is complete. SEVIS will eliminate the current manual process in 

which the paper I-20 is returned to the school after adjudication of the change 

of status form. In addition, the INS and schools will be able to determine 

easily through SEVIS when and where a student entered the United States.

SEVIS also should help the INS detect I-20 fraud by schools and 

students. Only INS-approved schools with access to SEVIS will be able to 

create I-20 forms for students. The INS will be able to automatically decertify 

schools that violate program requirements by invalidating the school’s 

password, thereby preventing the schools from issuing I-20s. Since I-20s will 

be generated only through SEVIS, fraudulent or expired I-20s will be more 

difficult to use. In addition, any I-20s not used by the student can be 

automatically invalidated through SEVIS, preventing others from fraudulently 

using them. INS investigators also will be able to identify useful information 

through analyses of SEVIS data, such as identifying schools that have 

significant numbers of students who have been admitted longer than typical 

degree programs require.

Yet, despite the improvements anticipated with the implementation of 

SEVIS, there are many problems in the INS’s student program that SEVIS 

alone will not solve. First, the INS still must manually review and approve the 

applications of schools seeking certification or re-certification to enroll foreign 
14

students. To properly certify, recertify, and monitor schools, we believe that 

the INS should assign full-time personnel to these tasks. Unless INS personnel 

conduct on-site visits and follow up on questionable information submitted by 

schools, many current deficiencies will continue to exist. 

The INS still has no formal, mandated training program for the officials 

at each school who have the responsibility for complying with INS recordkeeping and reporting requirements, for monitoring violations of student 

requirements to the INS, and for notifying the INS of material changes in the 

schools’ programs, accreditation, and level of education offered. While school 

associations provide some training, particularly for the larger public and 

private universities, the training is not geared toward smaller schools. INS 

officials told us that many school employees who deal with the foreign student 

program are untrained and unaware of INS regulations. 

Similarly, INS personnel assigned to approve and monitor schools also 

are not provided formal training. We learned that many are uncertain as to 

what they are supposed to be looking for when certifying schools. These INS 

employees also commented on the lack of clarity in the regulations and INS 

guidelines for the approval process. The INS needs to develop a training 

program for INS and schools officers, and provide clear guidelines describing 

their responsibilities and INS requirements. 

Furthermore, for SEVIS to be effective the INS must ensure that the 

schools are complying with the requirement to timely and accurately input data 

into SEVIS. To date, the INS has not formulated any concrete plans for 

conducting or requiring verifications of the accuracy of the data that the 

schools enter into SEVIS. 

Also, while SEVIS should improve data collection, the information only 

will be useful if the INS monitors and analyzes the information and 

investigates instances of potential fraud. The INS has not determined who, if 

anyone, would perform these analyses. Enforcement to uncover school fraud 

historically has been a low priority at the INS, and investigative resources 

devoted to this issue have been limited. Although better information will be 

available on student and school fraud, it is not clear that the INS will use this 

information any more fully than in the past.

We also have serious concerns about the INS’s ability to fully implement 

SEVIS by January 30, 2003, as required by recent regulations proposed by the 

INS. Although the INS plans to have the system operating by July 1, 2002, the 
15

INS intends to re-certify all of the approximately 70,000 schools currently 

authorized to issue I-20s and is requiring re-certification as a prerequisite to 

schools gaining access to SEVIS. The INS plans to start the re-certification 

process this summer, but it is still in the process of determining how to do this 

and must publish new regulations before this re-certification process will 

begin. In addition, the INS still has to assign and train personnel to perform 

the re-certifications and notify all the schools of the re-certification procedures. 

We question whether the INS will be able to complete this huge undertaking 

before January 30, 2003.

Unless the INS addresses these and other critical issues, the impact of 

SEVIS will be minimal. 

V. Recent Changes in the INS’s Foreign Student Program

Since September 11, 2001, the INS’s focus on foreign students has 

changed dramatically. In the past, the INS’s philosophy has strongly favored 

admitting foreign students, viewing them as relatively low risk. After 

September 11, tighter regulatory controls have been proposed to make it more 

difficult for aliens to obtain student status and to more closely scrutinize 

persons entering the country who might later attempt to become students. In 

addition, on March 15, 2002, the INS implemented procedural changes that 

will result in closer examination of change of status applications for persons 

who want to become students. 

We discuss some of these proposed regulatory and processing changes in 

the report. We believe that many of these changes that address issues raised by 

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s cases will be beneficial. For example, additional 

database checks are now required to be conducted before change of status 

applications can be approved, students may not begin a course of study until 

the I-539 petition has been approved, and the INS data entry contractor now 

must send the school copy of the I-20 to the school in less than 30 days. 

In some cases, however, we do not believe that INS has fully considered 

how the changes will be implemented and the consequences of the changes on 

the INS. For example, the INS now requires adjudicators to check all I-539 

change of status applications against certain lookout databases before rendering

a final decision. We found that at the time that INS Headquarters issued this 

policy change, service center adjudicators did not have access to those 

databases at their workstations. In the last few weeks, we determined that 

adjudicators in the TSC have acquired access to and training on how to use 
16

IBIS. However, the INS has not provided guidance about what to do with the 

information learned from the checks. In addition, the INS has not analyzed 

how the new requirement will affect the length of time service center 

adjudicators are expected to take processing each application. If this is not 

adjusted, adjudicators will continue to face time pressure that will discourage 

them from conducting thorough searches or following up on possible leads. 

VI. Recommendations

At the end of the report, we make 24 systemic recommendations 

concerning various aspects of the INS’s foreign student program that were 

implicated by our review of the INS’s contacts with Atta and Alshehhi and our 

evaluation of the INS’s tracking of foreign students. Our recommendations 

address the overall management of the INS’s foreign student program, resource 

issues, SEVIS, and other program areas. 

Our review found that the INS functions without vital information about 

foreign students and aliens who have applied to change their status to that of 

students. Inspectors, adjudicators, and investigators make critical decisions 

about aliens without having access to fundamental information that could affect 

their decisions. While we recognize that the INS is a large agency handling 

many different programs and missions, the result of the fragmentation of the 

foreign student program is that there is not sufficient accountability for a 

program that admits approximately 500,000 aliens into the country every year. 

Despite implementing major changes in the foreign student program since 

September 11, however, the INS continues to operate the program without an 

overall coordinated plan. For this reason, we believe that the INS should 

consider appointing a foreign student program manager to coordinate, and be 

accountable for, immigration issues affecting foreign students.

We also make several recommendations concerning SEVIS and the 

foreign student program. We recommend that the INS more closely review the 

schools that will be permitted to accept foreign students, including the 

approximately 70,000 that must be reviewed prior to the implementation of 

SEVIS. In addition, we recommend that the INS conduct re-certifications of 

those schools at regular intervals. The INS should develop a plan for training 

both INS employees and school employees on how to use SEVIS. The INS 

should ensure that schools are entering timely and accurate information into 

SEVIS and that specific and sufficient INS personnel are responsible for 
17

analyzing the data collected in SEVIS and acting on cases of suspected fraud. 

The information is only useful if it is accurate and is used by the INS. 

We also set forth recommendations related to the INS’s proposed 

regulatory and processing changes aimed at increasing scrutiny of foreign 

students. As one example, the INS has proposed to require that aliens who 

apply to change their status to that of students be approved before they are 

eligible to enroll in classes. For this to work the INS must maintain a fast 

processing time for student change of status applications, which historically it 

has not been able to do, in order to avoid penalizing students. The INS also 

should determine how it will handle aliens who have applied to become 

students but whose applications have not been adjudicated prior to the start of 

their classes. The INS should advise I-539 applicants for student status of the 

requirement that their applications must be adjudicated prior to beginning 

school and also advise the schools of the procedure to be followed if the INS 

has not adjudicated the application prior to the start of school. 

The INS policies and guidance necessary to implement these changes 

should be expeditiously and clearly communicated to INS employees across 

the country. We have noted in this report, as well as in many other OIG 

reports, problems with INS policies not being known, written, widely 

disseminated, or uniformly enforced throughout the INS. Although INS Field 

Manuals are a logical repository for policies and procedures, the Inspector’s 

Field Manual and the Adjudicator’s Field Manual are not comprehensive or 

complete. In addition, in this and other OIG reviews, we found that 

adjudicators and inspectors often are not made aware of changes to the manuals 

because policies distributed via memoranda often never reach line inspectors 

and adjudicators. As a result, field offices develop their own practices that are 

sometimes inconsistent with INS policy or the law.

The INS must improve its systems for disseminating policy memoranda 

and for ensuring that line employees become aware of and follow these 

policies. We recommend that the INS expeditiously complete and update its 

field manuals. In addition, it should implement a more effective system for 

disseminating policies and procedures other than sending the documents to the 

head of an INS field office. Only if the INS has a system in place that ensures 

that policies and changes are received and understood can employees be held 

accountable for following them.

We believe that implementation of these recommendations will help 

address significant problems with the INS’s foreign student program, which 
18

has been dysfunctional for many years. Although the INS is revising many of 

its processes and implementing a new computer system to track and monitor 

foreign students, these changes will result in minimal improvement if the INS 

does not improve its overall management of the foreign student program.
19

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. Introduction

On September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists hijacked 4 airplanes as part of an 

attack on the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. and the World Trade Center 

Towers in New York City, New York. Three of the planes were flown into the 

buildings, resulting in the deaths of over three thousand individuals, the 

complete destruction of the Trade Center Towers, and extensive damage to the 

Pentagon. The fourth plane crashed in Southwestern Pennsylvania, killing all 

44 people onboard. Mohamed Atta, an Egyptian citizen, is believed to have 

been the pilot who flew American Airlines flight number 11 into the Trade 

Center’s North Tower. Marwan Alshehhi, a citizen of the United Arab 

Emirates, is believed to have flown United Airlines flight number 35 into the 

South Tower. Both terrorists died in the attacks.

Six months later, on March 11, 2002, Huffman Aviation International, a 

small flight training school in Venice, Florida, opened official documents sent 

by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) relating to Atta and 

Alshehhi. Both had taken pilot lessons at the flight school. Although Atta and 

Alshehhi had entered the United States legally in the spring of 2000 with 

visitor visas, in September 2000 they had requested that the INS change their 

nonimmigrant status from that of “visitor” to that of “vocational student” so 

they could continue attending flight training school. The documents opened by 

the flight school on March 11, 2002, were INS I-20 forms, which indicated that 

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s requests for vocational student status had been approved. 

Within a day, media across the country were reporting the story, and the INS 

came under intense criticism. 1 In a news conference on March 13, President 

George Bush stated that he was “stunned” and angry after he read about the 

incident in the newspaper. The mailing of these forms was cited by many as a 

further example of why the INS needed to be radically reformed and improved. 

 

1

 The early criticism of the INS’s actions implied that the INS had approved Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s request to change their status after September 11. In fact, the approval had 

occurred several months before the terrorist attacks. It was the notification to the school that 

arrived subsequently.
20

President Bush directed the Attorney General to investigate why the 

student status notifications were mailed after Atta and Alshehhi were 

recognized worldwide as terrorists who helped perpetrate the September 11 

attacks. By memorandum dated March 13, 2002, the Attorney General 

requested that the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conduct a “thorough 

review of the circumstances surrounding the [INS’s] sending of documents to 

the Huffman Aviation International flight school of Venice, Florida, which 

notified the school of the approved vocational student status of Mohamed Atta 

and Marwan Alshehhi six months after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001.” The Attorney General asked that the OIG’s review include “not only 

the INS’s failure to stop delivery of the notification letters but also the source 

of the seven-month delay in the processing of these notification letters.” The 

Attorney General asked that the OIG’s investigation and report of its findings 

be completed expeditiously.

At the time the OIG received the Attorney General’s request, we had 

already begun two reviews that were substantively related to the incident that 

gave rise to the Attorney General’s request. The OIG was reviewing the INS’s 

admissions of Atta into the United States. In addition, in November 2001 the 

OIG had initiated a review of the process by which the INS tracks and monitors 

foreign students who enter the United States. 

In order to provide greater context to the investigation requested by the 

Attorney General, the OIG expedited and completed its review of Atta’s entries 

into the United States. We also broadened that inquiry to include the 

appropriateness of Alshehhi’s entries into the United States. In addition, the 

OIG completed its review of the process by which foreign students enter the 

United States and are tracked and monitored by the INS. The results of these 

reviews are incorporated into this report.

To conduct our review, the OIG assembled a team of three attorneys, four 

special agents, and three program analysts. The team conducted almost 100 

interviews over a 3-week period beginning on March 18, 2002. We 

interviewed personnel from INS Headquarters; the INS Texas Service Center 

in Dallas, Texas; and the INS’s Miami, New York, Newark, and Atlanta 

Districts, including inspectors who work at airports in these districts. We also 

interviewed personnel from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 

(FLETC); the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and three private 

companies, Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (ACS); Uniband Enterprises; 

and Huffman Aviation International. 
21

II. Organization of the Report

This report is organized into nine chapters. Chapter One contains this 

introduction. Chapter Two provides an overview of the INS’s organizational 

structure as it relates to our investigation, as well as background information on 

visitor and student visas and the change of status process. 

Chapter Three details our review of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s entries into the 

United States and our analysis of the actions of the INS inspectors who 

admitted them. We first provide an overview of the inspection process by 

which a nonimmigrant enters the country, including routine questions asked by 

inspectors, a description of the computer systems used by inspectors, and the 

secondary inspection process. We examine Atta’s three entries into the United 

States, including his referral to the INS’s secondary inspection process during 

his second entry, the reasons for his admission on each occasion, and our 

analysis of those admissions. Next, we describe Alshehhi’s three entries, 

including his referral to secondary inspection during his second entry, the 

reasons for his admission on each occasion, and our analysis of those 

admissions.

Chapter Four addresses the questions regarding Atta’s and Alshehhi’s 

change of status applications and how the notifications of the decisions on 

those applications were sent to Huffman Aviation six months after the terrorist 

attacks. This chapter also describes generally the processing of INS forms 

I-539s (the application for change of status) and I-20s (the form providing 

school and course information), and traces how the INS handled the 

applications and files of Atta and Alshehhi. We also describe how private 

contractors participated in the processing of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of 

status forms. We discuss the reasons that the INS took several months to 

process Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications.

In Chapter Five, we discuss our findings and conclusions regarding the 

reasons why the INS documents were not stopped from being sent to Huffman 

Aviation after September 11, 2001.

The OIG’s evaluation of the INS’s tracking of foreign students is 

described in Chapter Six. We examine the INS’s processes for certifying 

schools as eligible to receive foreign students, the INS’s current process for 

collecting information on foreign students, and the Student and Exchange 

Visitor Information System (SEVIS), an automated system currently being 

developed by the INS to track information about foreign students.
22

In Chapter Seven, we examine the INS’s proposed changes to the federal 

regulations concerning the admission of nonimmigrants, the INS’s proposed 

changes for the foreign student program, and specific procedural and 

operational changes made by the INS in light of the events that gave rise to this 

report. In Chapter Eight, we set forth our recommendations for systemic 

improvements in the INS and its foreign student program. Chapter Nine 

summarizes our conclusions.
23

CHAPTER TWO

BACKGROUND

This chapter provides background on the organizational structure of the 

INS, basic information on the visa system, how students are admitted into the 

United States, and how nonimmigrants in the United States can change their 

status to students. 

I. Organizational Structure of the INS

The INS is currently organized into three management components –

Headquarters, three regions, and 33 districts in the United States.2 The districts 

are referred to collectively as “the field.” 

The districts are managed by a District Director, a Deputy District 

Director, and several Assistant District Directors. The districts are divided into 

various divisions such as Investigations, Inspections, Management, and 

Examinations (or Adjudications). Each division is led by an Assistant District 

Director.3 

The processing of nonimmigrants who arrive at points designated as legal 

places through which to enter the country – known as ports of entry – is 

handled by INS immigration inspectors who are stationed at airports, seaports, 

and highways throughout the United States. A district’s Inspections Division 

is responsible for overseeing the inspectors within the district. 

The INS also operates five regional service centers that process many 

types of applications formerly handled in the districts. The five service centers 

are the California Service Center, the Nebraska Service Center, the Texas 

Service Center, the Vermont Service Center, and the Missouri Service Center. 

Requests for change of status (form I-539 and the accompanying I-20) – that is, 

the applications that Atta and Alshehhi filed with the INS – are handled by INS 

 

2

 The INS has three foreign district offices in Bangkok, Mexico City, and Rome, as well 

as several other overseas offices. 

3

 The three INS regions serve as intermediary managers of the districts – the Eastern 

Regional Office, the Central Regional Office, and the Western Regional Office. Each 

regional office is led by a Regional Director and a Deputy Regional Director. Each regional 

office is also divided into divisions that are led by an Assistant Regional Director.
24

staff in four of the five service centers. The adjudication of the applications is 

handled by Center Adjudications Officers. Each of the service centers is 

headed by a Service Center Director. 

The INS is headed by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner. At 

all times relevant to this report, INS Headquarters, apart from the 

Commissioner’s immediate staff,4 was divided into four major components, 

each overseen by an Executive Associate Commissioner: Programs, Field 

Operations, Policy and Planning, and Management. Each of the four Executive 

Associate Commissioners reported to the Deputy Commissioner who, in turn, 

reported to the Commissioner. 

Of the four components (called “Offices”), the Office of Field Operations 

is most significantly involved in the day-to-day operations of the Field and has 

responsibility for implementing policies. Within the Office of Field 

Operations, the Enforcement Division is responsible for INS’s investigative 

operations, the Immigration Services Division is responsible for operations in 

the service centers and adjudicative functions in the district offices, and the 

Inspections Division is responsible for the inspections process and operations 

at the ports of entry. The Service Center Directors report through a chain of 

command to senior managers in the Immigration Services Division.

At the time of the events at issue in this review, the Office of Programs 

was responsible for policy development and integration of both enforcement 

and adjudications programs.5 The Office of Programs was divided into 

substantive areas, such as adjudications, inspections, and investigations, with 

each branch led by an Assistant Commissioner. Within the Adjudications 

Branch, the Business and Trade Section handled policy issues concerning 

student visas and change of status issues.6

 

4

 The Commissioner’s immediate staff includes the General Counsel and the Directors 

of the Office of Internal Audit and the Office of Congressional and Public Affairs. 

5

 The INS has proposed to move the policy functions of the Office of Programs to other 

offices within the INS. The policy functions for investigations, inspections, and detention 

and removal have been placed under the Office of Field Operations. The policy functions 

for adjudications have been placed under the Office of Policy and Planning. 

6

 The Office of Policy and Planning develops and coordinates long-range planning 

activities, as opposed to the more immediate matters that fell under the jurisdiction of the 

(continued)
25

An organizational chart reflecting the INS structure, as it existed in the 

summer of 2001, is located on the next page.

II. Visitor Visas

Atta and Alshehhi initially entered the country after obtaining B-1/B-2 

visitor visas from a United States consulate abroad and later applied for a 

change of status to become students once they had already entered the country. 

In this section, we provide a brief description of the visitor visa. 

A. Entrance of nonimmigrants into the United States 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that aliens may be 

admitted to the United States as nonimmigrants (that is, aliens who do not 

intend to permanently reside in the United States), for “such time and under 

such conditions as the Attorney General may by regulations prescribe.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1). Federal regulations provide that every nonimmigrant 

must present at the time of entry “a valid passport and a valid visa unless either 

or both documents have been waived.”7 8 CFR § 214.1(a)(3). Federal 

regulations also require that nonimmigrants must depart the United States at 

the expiration of their authorized period of admission or upon abandonment of 

their authorized nonimmigrant status. 8 CFR § 214.1(a)(3). 

B. Description of visitor visa classifications 

The INA defines a visitor as: 

an alien (other than one coming for the purpose of study or of 

performing skilled or unskilled labor or as a representative of 

foreign press, radio, film, or other foreign information media 

coming to engage in such vocation) having a residence in a 

foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning and 

 

(continued)

Office of Programs. The Executive Associate Commissioner for Policy and Planning is also 

responsible for advising the Commissioner on other issues that cross program lines or have 

inter-agency implications. The Office of Management is responsible for all administrative 

issues including financial, human resource, and information resource matters. 

7

 Waiver issues are discussed in Chapter Three, Section III B 2, of this report.
26
27

who is visiting the United States temporarily for business or 

temporarily for pleasure. 

8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(B). Visitors, or the “B” classification of nonimmigrants, 

are divided between visitors entering for business purposes, who are given a 

B-1 designation, and visitors entering for pleasure, who are given a B-2 

designation. 8 CFR § 214.1(a)(1)(i) and (ii). The U.S. Department of State 

issues visas to foreigners outside the United States. The visitor visa is typically 

issued as a “B-1/B-2” visa, in other words, the visa covers both business and 

pleasure categories. The INS then designates the entry as either B-1 or B-2 

once the alien states his or her purpose at a port of entry and is approved for 

admission. 

The B-1 “business visitor” visa classification allows admission of an 

alien for a broad range of activities beyond commercial enterprises. Some of 

these include: aliens employed abroad traveling to the United States for a 

training program; aliens coming to install, service, or repair machinery at a 

United States site; alien students at a foreign medical school coming to take an 

elective clerkship; aliens coming temporarily to attend an executive seminar; 

alien members of a recognized religious denomination coming temporarily and 

solely to do missionary work on behalf of the denomination; certain camp 

counselors and counselors in training; and participants in competitions for prize 

money. See INS Operations Instructions 214.2(b)8; 8 CFR § 214.2(b). 

The B-2 “pleasure” visa classification also includes several broad 

categories: aliens coming for tourism; aliens coming for health-related 

activities; aliens participating in conventions, conferences, or convocations of 

fraternal, social, or service organizations; aliens coming primarily for tourism 

but who will also engage in a short course of study; or aliens coming to attend 

courses for recreational purposes. See INS Inspector’s Field Manual 

§ 15.4(b)(2)(B). 

 

8

 The INS’s Operations Instructions provide guidance and interpretations of the 

regulations for INS employees and also provide additional information concerning the INS’s 

policies and procedures. 
28

C. Length of stay permitted by the visitor visa

1. Period of validity of the visa

The period of validity for a nonimmigrant visa is the period during which 

the alien may use the visa in applying for admission to the United States. This 

period is determined by the State Department when the visa is issued. The 

period of time that the alien is authorized to stay in the United States on a 

particular entry is determined by the INS inspector at the port of entry. The 

period of visa validity has no relation to the period of time that the inspector 

may authorize the alien to stay in the United States. 

All United States nonimmigrant visas are limited to a maximum period of 

validity of 10 years. The period of validity for particular visas is based 

primarily on reciprocity: the State Department tries to accord the same 

treatment on a reciprocal basis that a foreign country accords to nationals of the 

United States. 

Visas generally permit multiple entries, meaning that they may be used 

by the alien for unlimited entries into the United States for the period of 

admission determined by the INS for each entry. However, consular officers 

may limit the number of entries or limit the admissions to specified ports of 

entries. This is based on such factors as the alien’s financial situation and the 

stated purpose of entry. 

2. Length of admission under the B-1/B-2 classification

The standard B-2 admission is for six months.9 8 CFR § 214.2(b)(2); see 

also, INS Operations Instruction 214.2(b). Although B-2 admissions may be 

granted for up to a maximum of one year, INS policy provides that inspectors 

require aliens to demonstrate a significant reason for an admission period 

longer than six months, such as an extended course of medical treatment. 

8 CFR § 214.2(b)(1).

While B-1 business visitors also may be admitted for a maximum period 

of one year, the INS inspectors at the ports we visited told the OIG that they 

limit the length of stay of an alien with a B-1 visa to the time needed to 

 

9

 The INS is proposing to change the presumptive length of admission for a B-1/ B-2 

visa to 30 days. See Chapter Seven of this report for further discussion of this issue.
29

accomplish the stated purpose of the alien’s visit, plus a few days or weeks in 

the event that the business purpose takes slightly longer than expected. The 

INS Operations Instructions state that B-1 visitors shall be admitted only for 

the period of time that is fair and reasonable for completion of the purpose of 

the trip. 

III. Foreign Students

Foreign nationals also may be admitted to the United States as students. 

Student status may be conferred on individuals studying full time at academic 

institutions, which include language schools, or at vocational schools. Foreign 

students in the United States at academic institutions or language schools are 

designated as “F-1” students; vocational students are designated as “M-1” 

students.10 Flight schools are considered by the INS to be vocational schools.11 

 

10 The academic student is defined as a “bona fide student qualified to pursue a full 

course of study and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the 

purpose of pursuing such a course of study consistent with section 214(l) at an established 

college, university, seminary, conservatory, academic high school, elementary school, or 

other academic institution or in a language training program in the United States.” The 

vocational student is defined as “an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he 

has no intention of abandoning who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely 

for the purpose of pursuing a full course of study at an established vocational or other 

recognized nonacademic institution (other than in a language training program) in the 

United States.” 8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(f) and (m). A “full course of studies” is defined 

separately for academic and vocational students. For vocational students, a “full course of 

studies” is defined as at least 12 semester hours if the school is a community college or 

junior college, 12 hours per week if it is a postsecondary vocational or business school, 18 

clock hours of attendance a week if the dominant part of the course consists of classroom 

instruction in a vocational school, and 22 clock hours of attendance a week if the dominant 

part of the course of study consists of “shop or laboratory work.” 8 CFR § 214.2(m)(9). For 

academic students, the hours required for a “full course of studies” depend on the type of 

program (e.g., postgraduate, undergraduate, language school) that the student is taking. 8 

CFR § 214.2(f)(6). Students who do not meet these hourly requirements do not qualify for 

an M-1 or F-1 visa. However, they can be admitted under a B-1/B-2 visa if the inspector 

determines that their course of study is incidental to their primary purpose of pleasure or for 

a business related purpose. 

11 In Chapter Six of this report, we discuss general requirements in the foreign student 

program, such as the requirement that schools be certified by the INS in order to accept 

(continued)
30

If an alien intends to enter the United States as a full-time student, the 

alien must obtain an F-1 or M-1 visa from the State Department at a consulate 

outside the United States. The student visa process is described more fully in 

Chapter Six. 

Aliens possessing B-1/B-2 visitor visas may change their status to that of 

a student while in the United States. 8 USC § 1258. To change their status, the 

aliens must file INS form I-539, Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant 

Status, as well as the INS form I-20, the Certificate of Eligibility for 

Nonimmigrant Student Status. The I-20 form includes information about the 

school and the student’s proposed course of study, including the dates of the 

course of study. These forms are sent to an INS service center for processing. 

Once the INS adjudicates the case and approves it, a copy of the I-20 is sent to 

the student and eventually a copy is sent to the school.

Applicants are required to file the I-539 prior to the expiration of their 

current authorized status. 8 CFR § 248.1(b). However, the applicant may start 

school before filing an I-539.12 If the applicant files the I-539 before his or her 

current status expires and the I-539 form is still pending with the INS at the 

time the applicant’s current status expires, the applicant is still legally entitled 

to be in the United States.13 8 USC § 1182(a)(9)(B). 

Foreign students are permitted to stay in the United States for different 

lengths of time, depending on their status and course of study. Academic, or 

F-1, students are admitted for what is called “duration of status.” This means 

that there is no specific end date; the duration of status lasts as long as the 

student is “pursuing a full course of study.” The federal regulations state “[t]he 

student is considered to be maintaining status if he or she is making normal 

progress toward completing a course of studies.” Once the student completes 

his or her studies, the student is given “60 days to prepare for departure from 

 

(continued)

foreign students and a school’s obligation to notify the INS if a student is no longer enrolled 

in the school. 

12 The INS has proposed legislation to require nonimmigrants to complete the change of 

status process before they are permitted to enroll in school. We discuss this proposed 

change in Chapter Seven of this report.

13 We discuss the change of status process in more detail in Chapter Four of this report. 
31

the United States.” 8 CFR §214.2(f)(5)(i). Vocational students, or M-1 

students, are authorized to be admitted “for the period of time necessary to 

complete the course of study ... plus thirty days within which to depart from 

the United States or for one year, whichever is less.” 8 CFR § 214.2(m)(5).

Student visas are not issued with expiration dates. Rather, the inspector 

determines the length of stay at the POE based on the information on the I-20 

and writes on the I-20 either “duration of status” if the student is an academic 

student or the beginning and end dates of the course if the student is a 

vocational student. If the student acquires student status through the I-539 

process, the adjudicator fills in the length of stay on the I-20.

Normally, foreign students with student visas are permitted to leave the 

country and re-enter provided that they present the inspector with the student 

copy of the I-20 and it has been signed by an authorized school representative. 

Foreign students who have acquired student status through the I-539 process 

retain that status only while in the United States. A change of status is not a 

visa. Accordingly, if foreign students who have acquired student status 

through the I-539 process leave the United States and want to re-enter to 

continue their course of study, they must obtain a student visa at a consulate in 

their country of residence to re-enter.
32

CHAPTER THREE

ATTA’S AND ALSHEHHI’S ENTRIES 

INTO THE UNITED STATES

I. Introduction

This chapter discusses Atta’s and Alshehhi’s entries into the United 

States, the decisions made by INS inspectors who handled their entries, and the 

INS policies that relate to the actions taken by the inspectors with respect to 

these entries. Atta and Alshehhi each entered the United States three times. 

Each time, they presented a valid passport and an unexpired B-1/B-2 visitor 

visa good for multiple entries. 

In this chapter, we discuss Atta’s entries first, and then turn to Alshehhi’s 

entries. On the first and third entries, Atta was admitted through the primary 

inspection process. On the second entry, he was referred to secondary where 

he was more closely examined before being admitted. Similarly, Alshehhi was 

also admitted through the primary inspection process on his first and third 

entries and was admitted on his second entry after being referred for secondary 

inspection. Before describing the INS’s handling of these entries and our 

analysis of the INS’s actions, we provide background information on the INS 

inspection process that aliens such as Atta and Alshehhi face when presenting 

themselves for admission to the United States at ports of entry (POEs). At the 

end of the chapter, we provide our conclusions concerning the admissions of 

Atta and Alshehhi.

II. The Inspection Process

Immigration Inspectors are INS officers who work at airport, seaport, and 

land border POEs inspecting the documentation of persons as they attempt to 

enter the United States. At major airports, inspectors work shifts and are 

supervised by shift supervisors who report to an assistant port director or a 

watch commander. The assistant port directors or watch commanders report to 

a Deputy Port Director, who in turn reports to the Port Director.14 

 

14 The Port Director reports to the Assistant District Director for Inspections, whose 

office is usually located in the district office of the district that covers the geographic

(continued)
33

A. The primary inspection process

When aliens disembark from an airplane, they initially go through the 

primary inspection process. The primary inspection area is staffed by 

inspectors who ensure that the I-94 form (Arrival/Departure Record)15 is 

complete, legible, and contains current information; briefly interview aliens to 

determine the purpose of their visit and the proposed length of stay; and check 

documents presented to determine their authenticity as well as expiration dates. 

The inspector looks at the I-94, visa, and passport, as well as any other 

documents that should be presented (such as an I-20), in order to determine if 

these documents are valid, authentic, and complete. The inspector may also 

review the passport for the last exits and entries to the United States to see if 

the aliens overstayed their previous authorized admissions. To admit the alien, 

the inspector must be convinced that the alien’s purpose for entering the 

country matches the purpose for the type of visa contained in the passport.

If the passport contains a machine-readable visa or encoding on a 

passport’s biographical page, the inspector swipes the passport through an 

automated reader. 16 This initiates a number of automated checks in the 

Interagency Border Information System (IBIS), which contains “lookout” 

databases maintained by the U.S. Customs Service; the State Department; the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the Drug Enforcement 

Administration; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and other law 

enforcement agencies.17 It also includes warrants and arrests from the FBI’s 

 

(continued)

location of the airport. The Assistant District Director reports to the Deputy District 

Director, who reports to the District Director.

15 The I-94 is a two-part, two-sided perforated form. The top part of the form is used to 

record an alien’s arrival information, and the bottom part of the form is used to record an 

alien’s departure from the country. The alien records certain identifying information on 

both parts of the form. Each I-94 form contains a unique admission number printed on both 

portions that the INS uses to record and match the arrival and departure records of 

nonimmigrants. A blank I-94 is included in the Appendix at page A-1.

16 If the visa or passport is not encoded for machine reading, the inspector should enter 

the biographical data manually into the system.

17 In some instances, the automated checks against the information in IBIS occur before 

the passengers arrive in the United States. Through the Advance Passenger Information 

System (APIS), certain identifying information about airline passengers is collected from 

(continued)
34

National Crime Information Center database (NCIC) and lookouts posted in the 

INS’s National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS).

If the computer check does not indicate a “hit” and the inspector does not 

determine that there is any other reason to refer the alien for secondary 

inspection, the inspector places an admission stamp on the top and bottom of 

the I-94 and the passport. The admission stamp includes the 3-digit port code, 

the inspector’s assigned number, the current date, the classification of the visa, 

and the date until which the alien is admitted. The inspector also indicates in 

the computer system that the person has been “confirmed” or admitted via the 

primary inspection process.

The top portion of the I-94 (the arrival I-94) is retained by the inspector.18 

The bottom portion (the departure I-94) is returned to the passenger. The 

nonimmigrant must retain the departure I-94 at all times while in the United 

States. Prior to departing the United States, the passenger presents the 

departure I-94 at check-in or at the gate, depending on the airline’s policy.19

 

(continued)

airlines before the passengers arrive in the United States. The information in APIS is then 

checked against the IBIS databases. These checks are completed before the passengers land 

in the United States. If a hit or a lookout is found, this information is stored in IBIS. When 

the inspector swipes the passport, the hit or lookout is presented automatically on the 

primary inspector’s screen.

18 The arrival I-94s are collected and mailed from the POE to an INS contractor for data 

entry. The alien’s identifying information, including the admission number and the date of 

arrival, is eventually uploaded into the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), the INS’s 

primary database for tracking the entries and exits of aliens in the United States.

19 The airlines collect the departure I-94 forms and send them to INS staff at the airport. 

The INS sends the departure I-94s to a contractor for data entry, and the recorded 

information is eventually uploaded to NIIS. Before September 11, 2001, I-94 forms were 

mailed via the United States Postal Service to the contractor. Since September 11, 2001, 

these forms have been sent by express courier within two days for entry by the contractor. 

The OIG concluded in a previous review that the INS did not have an effective system in 

place for obtaining departure I-94s from airlines and that the INS should take immediate 

action to improve the collection of these forms. See “[INS] Monitoring of Nonimmigrant 

Overstays,” Report Number I-97-08, September 1997. The OIG recently completed a 

follow-up to this review and concluded that the INS still has not taken effective action to 

improve the collection of I-94s, particularly departure records; the INS does not actively 

monitor airline compliance with the requirement to provide correct and complete departure 

(continued)
35

If the primary inspector determines that the alien is subject to a “hit” in 

the computer databases or does not have a valid passport or visa, the primary 

inspector should refer the person to “secondary inspection” for further 

interview and review by a secondary inspector. The primary inspector does not 

have the authority to deny the alien’s entry. Rather, the primary inspector’s job 

is to process people as quickly as possible and to refer them to secondary 

inspection if there is any concern about their admissibility. Primary inspectors 

are expected to spend no more than 45 to 60 seconds on average with each 

passenger.

20

B. The secondary inspection process

When referring the passenger to secondary inspection,21 the primary 

inspector enters comments into the computer system indicating that a referral 

to secondary is being made and the reason for the referral. The alien is then 

taken to or directed to the secondary inspection area, which is usually adjacent 

to where the primary inspection occurred. 

 

(continued)

I-94s; and the INS has not yet implemented regulations to fine airlines that fail to collect the 

departure I-94s. See “Follow-up Report on INS Efforts to Improve the Control of 

Nonimmigrant Overstays,” Report Number I-2002-006, April 2002. 

20 Until recently, the INS was required by law to admit international passengers within 

45 minutes of their arrival at the inspection process. 8 USC § 1356(g). The INS’s 

Inspector’s Field Manual states that in order to comply with this requirement, the INS has 

established inspector-to-passenger ratios as a guide to help ensure that waiting time for 

arriving passengers does not exceed 45 minutes. The Inspector’s Field Manual states, “The 

normal staffing levels are: one inspector per 45 passengers on flights which are all aliens; 

one inspector per 100 passengers on flights which are all U.S. citizens and returning 

residents; and one inspector per 60 passengers on mixed flights.” See Inspector’s Field 

Manual § 22.1. The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001 (H.R. 

3525), which was approved by Congress and was recently signed by the President, repeals 

this section of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

21 Even without a hit in the computer databases, the primary inspector’s job is to 

determine if the alien has a valid passport, the proper visa, and that his or her purpose for 

entering the country matches the purposes allowed under the visa classification. According 

to managers and line inspectors we interviewed, the primary inspector needs only a 

suspicion of inadmissibility to send a passenger to secondary inspection.
36

At major POEs, the secondary inspection area is typically staffed by one 

or two senior immigration inspectors, a supervisory inspector, and several 

experienced inspectors. The secondary inspector re-interviews the alien, 

reviews his or her documentation, and runs additional computer checks. The 

secondary inspector has access not only to IBIS and other law enforcement 

databases but also to several additional INS databases, including the INS’s 

Central Index System (which shows whether the INS has an alien file (A-file) 

on the person), NIIS, STSC,22 and CLAIMS.23 

If the secondary inspector admits the passenger, the admission need not 

be approved by a supervisor. However, more complex cases requiring 

application and interpretation of a legal provision are normally presented to a 

supervisor for concurrence and final decision. The secondary inspector should 

note in the computer system comments addressing the referral by the primary 

inspector and the reasons the person is being admitted. 

The secondary inspector may determine that the person should not be 

admitted and that “adverse action” is warranted. Adverse action generally 

means removal or exclusion based on a violation of the INA or other federal 

statutes.24 The secondary inspector must get approval from a supervisor prior 

to taking adverse action.

III. Atta’s Entries into the United States 

Mohamed Mohamed Elamir Atta, born on September 1, 1968, was a 

citizen of Egypt. Atta held an Egyptian passport, which was valid until 

 

22 STSC is the Student and Schools System, an INS database that records information 

on the schools authorized to accept foreign students and information about nonimmigrants 

with student visas or student status. This database is discussed more fully in Chapter Six of 

this report.

23 CLAIMS is the Computer Linked Application Information Management System that 

is used primarily to record the INS’s adjudications of applications for benefits. CLAIMS is 

discussed more fully in Chapter Four of this report.

24 If the secondary inspector develops reasonable suspicion that the alien has violated 

the INA or other federal statutes, the secondary inspector can detain the alien, search the 

alien’s personal items without a warrant, place the alien under oath, and take a statement. 

Adverse action also may include temporary detention of the individual pending further 

inquiries or preparation of a criminal action.
37

May 7, 2007. On May 18, 2000, Atta was issued a B-1/B-2 visa at the United 

States consulate in Berlin, Germany. The multiple-entry visa was valid for five 

years. Atta used this passport and visa on his three entries to the United States, 

which we describe in turn. 

We show a timeline of the INS’s contacts with Atta on the next page.

A. Atta’s first entry – June 3, 2000, Newark, New Jersey

According to INS records, Atta first entered the United States on June 3, 

2000, at Newark International Airport in New Jersey, after flying from Prague 

International Airport in the Czech Republic. The OIG confirmed that a “hit” or 

a “lookout” did not appear on the IBIS screen when the inspector swiped Atta’s 

passport. Atta was admitted by the primary INS inspector without being 

referred to secondary. Atta received a B-2 admission that allowed him to stay 

in the United States for six months until December 2, 2000.

The primary INS inspector who admitted Atta had been employed with 

the INS as an inspector since April 1998. He told the OIG that he did not recall 

the inspection of Atta.

Our review of the evidence available to the inspector does not reveal any 

basis for concluding that his admission of Atta was contrary to INS policies 

and practices. Atta’s passport and visa appear to have been valid, and there 

was no information available to the inspector through lookout checks that 

would have suggested that Atta should be referred to secondary inspection.

B. Atta’s second entry – January 10, 2001, Miami, Florida

As we discuss in more detail in the next chapter, in August 2000 Atta 

(and Alshehhi) enrolled in a professional pilot course at Huffman Aviation 

International, a flight training school in Venice, Florida. He submitted an 

application to the INS (INS form I-539) requesting that his status as a visitor to 

the United States be changed to that of a student. The INS received his change 

of status form on September 19, 2000, but did not adjudicate it until July 2001. 

Atta finished his flight training at Huffman Aviation on December 19, 2000.

1. Processing Atta at the POE

On January 4, 2001, Atta left the United States from Miami International 

Airport for Madrid, Spain. Six days later, on January 10, 2001, he re-entered 

the United States at Miami Airport from Madrid. 
38

5/1

April 2000 April 2002

6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 5/1 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1

9/22/00

INS receives Atta's

I-20 form and

I-539 change of

status application

requesting a change

from visitor to vocational

student status.

6/03/00

Atta arrives at Newark

Intl Airport, NJ;

admitted as

a B-2 visitor

until 12/02/00.

1/10/01

Atta arrives in

Miami, FL; admitted

as a B-2 visitor

until 9/08/01.

7/19/01

Atta arrives at Hartsfield Atlanta

Intl Airport, GA; admitted as a

B-1 visitor until 11/12/01.

3/11/02

Huffman Aviation

receives school's

copy of Atta's

approved I-20 form.

elo

7/17/01

INS approves Atta's

I-539 change of status;

granted M-1 status

until 10/01/01.

 5/02/01

Atta attempts to

extend his companion's

period of admission at INS

Miami Deferred Inspection;

as a result, Atta's 9/08/01 admission

date is changed to 7/09/01.

8/29/00

Huffman Aviation

completes and gives

Atta INS Form I-20.

12/19/00

Atta takes the FAA

examination to obtain a

commercial pilot's license.

 7/07/01

Atta departs from Miami Intl

Airport, FL, to Zurich, Switzerland.

9/11/01

Terrorists attack

the United States.

5/18/00

Atta issued B-1/B-2

visa in Berlin, Germany,

valid for 60 months.

 7/03/00

Atta enrolls at Huffman

Aviation in Venice, FL.

1/04/01

Atta departs from Miami

Intl Airport, FL,

to Madrid, Spain.

9/24/01

ACS, Inc. in

London, KY, receives

school's copy of Atta's

approved I-20 form.
39

The OIG confirmed that a “hit” or a “lookout” did not appear on the IBIS 

screen when the primary inspector swiped Atta’s passport. After being 

interviewed by the primary inspector, however, Atta was sent to secondary. 

After an interview at secondary inspection, he was admitted as a B-2 visitor 

until September 8, 2001. 

The primary inspector who referred Atta to secondary for further 

inspection wrote in his electronic referral message, “PAX [passenger] turned in 

[an I-20 form] but has had a responce [sic], meanwhile he’s attending flight 

training school, already was in school for 5/6 months, please verify.” After 

reviewing this referral report with the OIG, the primary inspector stated that he 

thought the referral should have read “has not had a response [to his change of 

status application].” 

The primary inspector did not recall the specifics of his inspection of 

Atta. Based upon his review of the referral report during his interview with the 

OIG, he stated that he must have concluded that because Atta was in flight 

school, he needed an M-1 (vocational student) visa. We asked the primary 

inspector how he would have learned that Atta had applied for student status 

with the INS. In his initial interview with the OIG in November 2001, the 

inspector told the OIG that he thought that Atta had presented an I-20, but in 

subsequent OIG interviews conducted in March 2002, the inspector told the 

OIG that he could not recall if Atta had an I-20 with him. Because the primary 

inspector does not have access to any database with this information, we 

believe that Atta must have told the inspector that he was attending school and 

had applied for a change of status.

The secondary inspector who interviewed Atta had been an inspector for 

approximately 10 years. The secondary inspector told the OIG he did not 

remember interviewing Atta. He said that he believed he would have followed 

his normal routine, which included checking several databases, including 

NCIC, CLAIMS, and STSC, to determine Atta’s admissibility. The secondary 

inspector’s notes recorded in the referral report stated the following: “SUBJ 

applied for M-1. I.S. Adjusted status. No overstay /No removal grounds 

found.”

Based upon INS computer records and these notes, it appears that the 

secondary inspector accessed CLAIMS and determined that Atta had applied to 
40

change his status to an M-1 classification. According to the secondary 

inspector, “I.S.” means “in status,” which indicates that the secondary inspector 

concluded that Atta had not overstayed.25 In addition, the secondary inspector 

told the OIG that because he indicated “adjusted status” in the referral report, 

he likely believed that Atta’s change of status application had been approved. 

We do not know how the secondary inspector could have come to that 

conclusion because the request had not been approved at that time and INS 

databases would not have reflected the approval until many months later.

The secondary inspector told the OIG that he likely admitted Atta 

because he believed Atta was a legitimate student, had no criminal record, and 

had not been an overstay on his last visit. The secondary inspector explained 

that he must have concluded from all of the circumstances that, even though 

Atta would be attending school while in the country, Atta’s primary purpose 

was that of pleasure and that Atta therefore fit within the B-2 category. He said 

that even if he had believed that Atta had only filed for a change of status but 

had not yet been approved, he would have likely concluded that Atta was a 

legitimate student who was also entitled to be admitted as a B-2 visitor.

The secondary inspector added that even if Atta had told him that his 

primary purpose for coming into the United States on this occasion was to go 

to school full-time (in other words, that his purpose did not match the purposes 

allowed under the B-2 category), Atta would not likely have been denied entry 

for failing to have a student visa. He said that under these circumstances – that 

Atta intended to enter as a full-time student, had a B-1/B-2 visa, and evidenced 

no other basis for exclusion – he would have presented the issue to his 

supervisors. According to the secondary inspector, his supervisors would not 

have supported a recommendation to deny Atta entry since the Miami airport’s 

 

25 Even though Atta left the United States a month after his prior admission had expired, 

he did not overstay his prior admission. Because Atta had filed an I-539 on September 19, 

2000, requesting to change his status from a visitor to a student, he was authorized to stay in 

the United States while his application was pending. The Illegal Immigration Reform and 

Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996 provided for the automatic voidance of 

nonimmigrant visas in cases of overstays. But Section 212 of the INA provided that a 

person who has timely filed a request for a change of status is not considered “unlawfully 

present” and is in an authorized period of stay. 8 USC § 1182(a)(9)(B). In Section III B 3 

of this chapter we discuss the effect of a nonimmigrant’s departure from the United States 

while his or her I-539 application is pending. 
41

practice was to use a visa waiver process to admit aliens who appeared to be 

legitimate students acting in good faith who did not possess the proper 

documentation. The secondary inspector added that supervisors discouraged 

preparing a case for adverse action in cases in which supervisors were certain 

to grant a visa waiver.

According to the secondary inspector and numerous inspections 

supervisors, before September 11 foreign students typically were not 

scrutinized closely because they were viewed as beneficial to the nation’s 

schools and also were not viewed as a concern for illegally immigrating or 

working in the United States. Several INS inspectors told the OIG that the 

prevailing INS practice at that time was that students would not have been 

excluded for failing to have the proper documentation if they did not appear to 

have a criminal record or prior immigration violations. Rather, students who 

appeared to be legitimate students acting in good faith would be admitted 

through the visa waiver process. The secondary inspector who admitted Atta 

told the OIG that he did not feel compelled to admit students under an 

improper visa category. He said that it was his practice to determine, based on 

the circumstances of the particular student, whether the student could 

legitimately be admitted under the visa classification in his or her passport, 

which in this case was a B-1 or B-2 visitor.

2. OIG analysis

From the available record, it appears that the primary inspector properly 

referred Atta in this encounter to the secondary inspection process since the 

primary inspector had learned from Atta that he intended to be a student, and 

therefore the inspector had concluded that further review was necessary to 

determine whether Atta should have had a student visa.

Atta’s eligibility for entry by the secondary inspector depended on what 

Atta said was his purpose for entering the country. The secondary inspector 

explained that he must have concluded from all of the circumstances that, even 

though Atta would be attending school while in the country, Atta’s primary 

purpose was that of pleasure and that Atta fit within the B-2 category. The 

secondary inspector correctly observed that a student can be admitted under the 

B-2 category if the educational purposes are “incidental” to the pleasure 

purposes. Therefore, if the inspector believed that Atta was not intending to 

attend school full-time (that is taking less than 18 hours of class time or less 
42

than 22 hours of flying time per week), admitting Atta as a B-2 visitor would 

have been appropriate.

The fact that the secondary inspector was aware that Atta had filed for a 

change of status, however, raises the question of whether the inspector 

incorrectly considered Atta’s educational purpose as only being “incidental” to 

a pleasure purpose. Under immigration regulations, an alien cannot receive an 

M-1 visa or a change of status to an M-1 unless the alien intends to attend 

school on a full-time basis. Accordingly, the fact that Atta previously had 

requested a change of status to M-1 was at least an indicator that his purpose 

might not match the purpose for the B-2 visa thereby necessitating further 

inquiry by the secondary inspector. Because the secondary inspector does not 

recall the details of his conversation with Atta and because the written record is 

limited, we cannot reach a definitive conclusion whether the secondary 

inspector correctly or incorrectly assessed Atta’s purpose based on the 

information available to him.

However, even if the secondary inspector had concluded that Atta 

intended to attend school on a full-time basis and therefore needed a student 

visa rather than the visitor visa, Atta likely would have been admitted by the 

secondary inspector’s supervisors through the waiver process even though Atta 

was lacking the appropriate visa.26 The majority of INS inspectors and 

managers who we interviewed at the Miami POE told the OIG that even if Atta 

should have had a student visa, they likely would have admitted him through 

the waiver process.

We therefore examined the circumstances under which the INS grants 

waivers. The waiver procedure allows aliens into the country even if they do 

not possess the proper paperwork. Section 212(d)(4) of the INA and the 

accompanying regulations provide that aliens may be admitted in the discretion 

of the INS if the aliens demonstrate that they cannot present the required 

documents because of an “unforeseen emergency.” See 8 USC §1182(d)(4) 

 

26 The waiver process includes filling out INS form I-193 and paying the prescribed fee, 

which at the time was $170.00 and has since been raised to $195.00. Secondary inspectors 

can initiate the waiver process but only with advance approval from a supervisor. If a 

secondary inspector presents a case to his or her supervisor recommending adverse action, 

and the supervisor believes that a visa waiver is appropriate, the supervisor can initiate the 

waiver process. 
43

and 8 CFR § 212.1(g). The phrase “unforeseen emergency” is not further 

defined in the statute or the regulations. The phrase “unforeseen emergency” is 

described in the Inspector’s Field Manual as:

• An alien arriving for a medical emergency. 

• An alien accompanying or following to join a person arriving for a 

medical emergency. 

• An alien whose passport or visa was lost or stolen within 48 hours of 

departing the last port of embarkation for the United States.

INS officials from both the Miami and JFK POEs27 agreed that, 

according to INA § 212(d)(4), discretionary waivers for aliens are based on 

“unforeseen emergencies.”28 These officials acknowledged, however, that 

Atta’s situation would not have constituted an unforeseen emergency within

the restrictive definition of that term. The training officer at JFK stated that 

over many years, INS inspectors have stretched the regulations “to the limit.”

We found that neither port had any written policy that discussed 

scenarios that might constitute “unforeseen emergencies” that should result in a 

waiver or which discussed the limits on such waivers. INS personnel at both 

ports stated that, before September 11, 2001, their supervisors exercised 

significant discretion in granting waivers in a wide variety of circumstances. 

They said that waivers were granted when it appeared “equitable” to admit 

aliens who were not attempting to engage in fraud and who had made a goodfaith effort to comply with the INS regulations. Some officials stated that their 

primary concerns were whether the alien had a criminal history, a history of 

overstays, or appeared to be attempting to commit fraud or to immigrate 

without an immigrant visa. They said it also helped the alien’s case for a 

 

27 Because Alshehhi entered through secondary inspection at JFK Airport, we discussed 

the issue of waiver with inspectors and supervisors there as well.

28 One INS official in Miami incorrectly told the OIG that waivers also could be based 

on the Attorney General’s discretion under INA § 212(d)(3)(B). This section provides for a 

limited waiver that applies only to individuals who are inadmissible on grounds related to 

criminal records, terrorist activities, health issues, security and related grounds, controlled 

substance trafficking, membership in a totalitarian party, and other related issues. Further, 

this section contemplates approval of the waiver by a consular officer overseas, pursuant to 

INS form I-192.
44

waiver if, despite missing documents, the alien also had attempted to comply 

with legal requirements in other respects (such as by filing an application for 

extension of stay or for a change in status).

The New York Area Port Director told the OIG that there were a number 

of options for dealing with alien students who were pursuing education, had 

financial resources, and had no negative criminal or immigration history. 

These options included granting a waiver, granting a 30-day deferral for the 

student to obtain a new I-20 if the defect involved a missing I-20,29 or 

determining that the student fit within the broad scope of the B-1/B-2 

classifications. He indicated that the last option would be to refuse entry and 

send the student home. Senior inspections officials in the Miami POE agreed 

that prior to September 11, 2001, the prevailing philosophy was to “find a 

way” to admit students like Atta or Alshehhi. 30

Accordingly, even if the secondary inspector had believed that Atta 

needed an M-1 visa, which he did not possess, Atta likely would have been 

admitted through the waiver procedure then in use at the Miami POE, even 

though the practice was not in accordance with INS policy. 

 

29 Foreign students with a student visa must present not only their student visa but also 

their copy of the I-20 form in order to re-enter the country after a temporary absence. The 

second page of the I-20 form must be endorsed by an authorized school representative. If a 

nonimmigrant is in possession of the student visa but not the I-20, an inspector is permitted 

to admit the student for 30 days after completing INS form I-515. The student is required to 

obtain the necessary I-20 form or endorsement on the I-20, and to submit within the 30-day 

period the I-515, I-20, and I-94 to the INS office having jurisdiction over the school he or 

she plans to attend. Since Atta did not have a completed I-20 (his was awaiting processing), 

this procedure would not have been applicable to him.

30 The New York Port Director told us that the practice of regularly granting waivers for 

aliens who forgot visas and even passports changed drastically after September 11, 2001. 

Former Executive Associate Commissione r for Field Operations Michael Pearson issued a 

memorandum to all ports on November 28, 2001, setting forth a new policy that severely 

restricted the granting of waivers. In the Appendix at p. A-2 we show a chart reflecting the 

decline in waivers at the JFK POEs after September 11.
45

3. Effect of departure while change of status application is 

pending

We also investigated whether Atta’s (and Alshehhi’s) departures from the 

United States on more than one occasion while their I-539 applications were 

pending should have had any effect on their ability to re-enter the country. In 

the next chapter of the report, we discuss whether their departures should have 

had an effect on the adjudication of their I-539 applications. 

INS personnel consistently reported to the OIG that aliens abandon their 

I-539 application if they leave the country while the application is pending. In 

addition, the OIG obtained a June 18, 2001, memorandum from Thomas Cook, 

Acting Assistant Commissioner for Adjudications, addressed to all Service 

Center Directors, District Directors, and Officers in Charge stating:

Service officers are reminded an alien on whose behalf a 

change of nonimmigrant status has been filed and who travels 

outside the United States before the request is adjudicated is 

considered to have abandoned the request for a change of 

nonimmmigrant status. This has been, and remains, the 

Service’s long-standing policy. [31]

We sought to determine how this abandonment policy would affect the 

alien’s re-entry into the United States. We found that the fact that the alien 

previously applied for a change of status and then abandoned that application 

by leaving the country does not automatically affect the alien’s re-entry. 

According to representatives from FLETC (the training academy responsible 

for training immigration inspectors), the inspector’s job is to determine the 

alien’s intent at the time of entry, and this inspection is not necessarily affected 

by the fact that the alien previously requested a change of status and then 

abandoned that request. Inspectors and managers at the Miami and JFK POEs 

 

31 Beyond the Cook memorandum, we found no written record of this policy. The INA 

and immigration regulations do not address the effect of an alien’s departure from the 

United States on the alien’s I-539 application for a change of status or the alien’s re-entry 

into the United States when that application is still pending at the time of the departure or reentry. No one we interviewed could point to this policy in writing other than the Cook 

memorandum. The INS’s Operations Instructions and the Inspector’s Field Manual do not 

address this topic, and we were told by representatives of the Federal Law Enforcement 

Training Center (FLETC) that this policy was not in any training manuals used at FLETC.
46

also stated that the alien’s purpose at the time of entry was the determining 

factor. Inspection personnel indicated that if an alien stated that he or she was 

returning for the purpose of attending school full-time, then the alien would 

need either an F-1 or M-1 visa regardless of the status of the I-539.32 But they 

also consistently indicated that the fact that an alien has previously filed a 

request to change his or her status to that of a student does not necessarily 

require the alien at the time of the next entry to have an F-1 or M-1 visa. If the 

alien no longer intended to pursue a “full course of study,” the alien could be 

admitted on other grounds. 

We explored the abandoned I-539 issue with respect to Atta’s second 

entry, since the inspectors became aware that Atta had previously filed for a 

change of status. The secondary inspector told the OIG that he did not believe 

that Atta’s I-539 application would have been abandoned by his departure from 

the country. Although this was an incorrect statement of INS policy, the 

inspector also stated that even if the I-539 petition had been abandoned, the 

fact that Atta had filed the I-539 application was still evidence that he was 

attempting to be a legitimate student, and his analysis and approval of Atta’s 

admission would have remained the same. The other inspection personnel we 

interviewed also said that an abandoned I-539 application would not have 

changed their analysis that Atta was a legitimate student who would have 

received a waiver. 

Although Atta’s and Alshehhi’s abandonment of their I-539 applications 

would not have formed the sole basis for excluding them at the time of re-entry 

into the country, we believe their cases also illustrate the fact that INS 

inspectors lack important information when assessing an alien’s eligibility for 

admission into the United States. Primary inspectors are not made aware 

through automated checks whether an alien has a change of status application 

pending, as Atta and Alshehhi did when they each entered the country twice in 

2001. If the primary inspectors had known this, they would have had reason to 

question whether Atta and Alshehhi in fact intended to continue to be students, 

 

32 An alien must have an appropriate visa (or a waiver) at the time of entry. An 

application for a change of status is not a visa. Indeed, even an approved I-539 change of 

status is not a visa. Therefore, an alien who has never filed for a change of status, an alien 

who has filed an I-539 but abandoned the petition by departing, and an alien who has been 

granted a change of status are essentially the same for purposes of re-entry.
47

had already completed their schooling and were returning for some other 

purpose, or were entering as visitors as indicated by their B-1/B-2 visas. 

INS inspectors are also missing another piece of important information 

concerning students – whether they are, in fact, still going to school or have 

terminated their studies. The evidence shows that Atta represented to the 

primary inspector on this occasion that he had been in school for five or six 

months, and we found that the secondary inspector likely discussed Atta’s 

attendance at Huffman Aviation once the secondary inspector was aware of 

Atta’s I-539 application. But neither inspector was aware that Atta had in fact 

completed his schooling the month before in December, since the INS does not 

collect this information about foreign students.33

4. Atta’s length of admission

According to INS records in NIIS, on January 10, 2001, the secondary 

inspector admitted Atta as a B-2 visitor for 8 months, until September 8, 2001, 

rather than for the 6-month period regularly granted to B-2 visitors. It is not 

clear why Atta was admitted for this time period.34

The 8-month B-2 admission was outside of the normal admission period 

according to officials at the Miami and JFK POEs and at FLETC. We received 

contradictory information, however, regarding whether this was an error by the 

secondary inspector. Two supervisors told us that Atta should not have been 

 

33 We discuss this issue and other problems in the INS’s foreign student program in 

more detail in Chapter Six of this report.

34 Atta’s departure I-94, which we obtained from the contractor, shows a stamp 

authorizing admission until February 9, 2001. That date is crossed out and what appears to 

be another date is handwritten underneath the stamped date. The handwritten date is 

difficult to read, however, and could be interpreted as authorizing Atta’s entry until 

September 2001 or July 2001. We believe that the likely scenario is that the primary 

inspector initially authorized Atta to stay until February but then decided to send Atta to 

secondary. The secondary inspector then handwrote the actual admission date after 

interviewing Atta. Because the INS computer system reflects that Atta was authorized to 

stay until September, it appears that the handwritten date was interpreted to indicate a 

September date. The secondary inspector was unable to identify the handwriting, tell the 

date that was written on the form or recall other details to assist us in interpreting the 

handwriting. In any case, Atta’s admission date was subsequently changed to July 2001 (for 

reasons that we discuss below).
48

granted the extra two months and that the secondary inspector should have 

written on the I-94 why the extra time was being granted. Some INS officials 

said that supervisory approval was required to allow more than the 6-month 

admission. Other INS officials indicated, however, that the decision was 

within the inspector’s discretion. 

In any case, Atta’s entry period was later changed to six months. On 

May 2, 2001, Atta went to the Miami District Office to inquire about extending 

the date of admission for a companion who also had entered the United States 

on a B-2 visa on January 10, 2001, but had been given only a 6-month 

admission instead of the 8-month admission given to Atta. Once at the District 

Office, Atta spoke to an immigration inspector who normally was assigned to

work at the Miami airport, but who was working a 1-day detail at the District 

Office.

According to this inspector, Atta and his companion requested that Atta’s 

friend’s 6-month admission be extended to 8 months since Atta had received an 

8-month admission. Atta showed the inspector his and his friend’s I-94 and 

passport. The inspector told the OIG that she determined that since Atta was 

admitted to the United States with a B-2 visa, he should have been permitted to 

stay a maximum of six months. The inspector’s supervisor at the District 

Office concurred and stated that if there was a good reason for an 8-month 

visitor visa, it should have been noted on the I-94. Therefore, to correct the 

mistaken 8-month admission for Atta, the inspector made a notation on the 

back of Atta’s I-94 that an error had been made, sent this I-94 to the contractor 

who data enters information from the I-94, issued Atta a new I-94 with an 

admission date for six months until July 9, 2001, and noted in the “comments” 

section that the previous I-94 had been issued in error. 35 

 

35 When we reviewed INS records, they appeared to reflect two entries by Atta into the 

United States on January 10, 2001, which initially raised a question as to whether Atta had 

entered twice on the same day or whether a second person posing as Atta also entered on 

January 10, 2001. The NIIS printout for the first entry reflects that Atta entered with an 

admission period of January 10, 2001, to September 8, 2001 (admission number 

68653985708). The second record reflects a second entry on January 10, 2001, with an 

admission period from January 10, 2001, to July 9, 2001 (admission number 10847166009). 

However, this occurred because the inspector at the Miami District Office who changed 

Atta’s admission date failed to follow the proper procedure to ensure that the previous entry 

would be corrected, and a new entry was created in NIIS. The inspector sent the old I-94 

(continued)
49

C. Atta’s third entry – July 19, 2001, Miami, Florida

Atta left the United States again from Miami International Airport on 

July 7, 2001, headed for Zurich, Switzerland. He re-entered the United States 

on July 19, 2001, at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport, using his B-1/B-2 

visa. The OIG confirmed that a “hit” or a “lookout” did not appear on the IBIS 

screen when the primary inspector swiped Atta’s passport.36 The OIG also 

confirmed that Atta was admitted through the primary inspection process and 

was not referred to secondary.

At the Atlanta airport, Atta was inspected by a primary inspector who 

had been employed with the INS as an inspector since 1997. This inspector 

told the OIG that he did not recall the inspection of Atta. Atta was admitted for 

four months, until November 12, 2001, as a B-1 visitor. 

As noted previously, the B-1/-B-2 visa permits entry for either business 

(B-1) or pleasure (B-2) purposes. After the alien states his purpose for visiting, 

the inspector admits the alien under one of the two categories. It therefore 

appears that Atta stated some business purpose for visiting that fit within the 

B-1 category, even though his previous entries had been under the B-2 

category. The inspector did not recall Atta or why he admitted Atta for a 

business purpose, and no INS record sheds further light on the reason for Atta’s 

admission under a B-1 visa.

We also sought to determine whether the fact that Atta had recently 

entered the United States twice for six months on each occasion should have 

affected the inspection process. The OIG found no INS requirement or policy, 

 

(continued)

and the corrected I-94 to the contractor which data enters I-94s for the INS. The May 2, 

2001, transaction with Atta was data entered and then uploaded to NIIS as if it were a new 

entry by Atta. This happened because the inspector issued a new I-94 with a new admission 

number on it. To prevent two entries from occurring in NIIS, the inspector should have 

crossed out the admission number on the new I-94, made a reference to the previous 

admission number and noted that it was not a new entry.

36 The OIG obtained an FBI document indicating that Atta was issued a citation for a 

traffic violation in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on April 26, 2001, and that a warrant for his 

arrest was issued on June 4, 2001, for failing to appear in court. The evidence shows, 

however, that this information would not have appeared on the IBIS screen of the primary 

inspector.
50

written or otherwise, that an alien be referred to secondary based solely on the 

fact that the alien had departed and re-entered the United States recently on 

several occasions. We were informed by INS officials that multiple entries is 

but one factor the inspector uses in determining whether the alien appears 

suspicious or appears to be attempting to reside or work in the United States. 

Our review of the information available to the inspector does not reveal any 

basis for concluding his admission of Atta was improper. 

IV. Alshehhi’s Entries into the United States

Marwan Yousef Mohamed R-Lekrab Alshehhi, born on May 9, 1978, 

was a citizen of the United Arab Emirates. Alshehhi held a United Arab 

Emirates passport, issued January 2, 2000, and valid until January 1, 2005. On 

January 18, 2000, Alshehhi was issued a B-1/B-2 visa at the United States 

Consulate in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. This multiple-entry visa was valid 

for 10 years, until January 17, 2010. Alshehhi used this passport and visa on 

each of his three entries to the United States, which we describe in turn. 

We show a timeline of Alshehhi’s contacts with the INS on the next page 

of the report.

A. Alshehhi’s first entry – May 29, 2000, Newark, New Jersey

According to INS records, on May 29, 2000, Alshehhi flew from 

Brussels, Belgium, to Newark International Airport in New Jersey. His arrival 

I-94 listed his country of citizenship as the United Arab Emirates and his 

country of residence as Germany. 

The OIG confirmed that a “hit” or a “lookout” did not appear on the IBIS 

screen when the primary inspector swiped Alshehhi’s passport. He was 

admitted through the primary inspection process as a B-2 visitor for six months 

and was not referred to secondary inspection.

The primary inspector who admitted Alshehhi had been employed with 

the INS as an inspector since May 1997. He told the OIG that he did not recall 

the inspection.

The inspector said that when encountering an alien with a B-1/B-2 visa 

and no prior entries recorded in his passport, he would have asked questions 

concerning the purpose of the trip, the anticipated length of the trip, who the 

alien would be visiting, where he would be staying, and the length of any 

previous trips to the United States (if the alien acknowledged prior visits). The 
51

2/1

January 2000 April 2002

3/1 4/1 5/1 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1 5/1 6/1 7/1 8/1 9/1 10/1 11/1 12/1 1/1 2/1 3/1 4/1

9/22/00

INS receives Alshehhi's

I-20 form and I-539 change of status

application requesting a

change from visitor

to vocational

student status.

5/29/00

Alshehhi arrives at

Newark Intl Airport, NJ;

admitted as a B-2 visitor

until 11/28/00.

1/18/01

Alshehhi arrives

at JFK Intl Airport, NY;

admitted as a B-1 visitor

until 5/17/01.

9/11/01

Terrorists attack

the United States

3/11/02

Huffman Aviation

receives school's

copy of Alshehhi's

approved I-20 forms.

elo

12/19/00

Alshehhi takes the FAA examination

to obtain a commercial pilot's license.

 7/03/00

Alshehhi enrolls

at Huffman Aviation

in Venice, FL.

 8/29/00

Huffman Aviation

completes and gives

Alshehhi INS Form I-20.

1/11/01

Alshehhi departs from JFK Intl

Airport, NY, to Casablanca, Morocco.

 4/18/01

 Alshehhi departs from Miami Intl Airport, FL,

to Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

1/18/00

Alshehhi issued a

B-1/B-2 visa in Dubai, UAE,

valid for 120 months.

8/09/01

INS approves Alshehhi's I-539

change of status application;

granted M-1 status until 10/01/01.

5/02/01

Alshehhi arrives at Miami Intl

Airport from Amsterdam; admitted

as a B-2 visitor until 11/02/01.

 9/24/01

ACS, Inc. in

London, KY, receives

school's copy of

Alshehhi's approved I-20 form.
52

inspector said that if the alien failed to answer these questions satisfactorily or 

if the alien’s demeanor gave him any reason for concern, he would send him to 

secondary for further questioning. 37 The inspector said that Alshehhi must 

have represented that he was visiting the United States primarily for pleasure, 

since he admitted Alshehhi under the B-2 category for six months, until 

November 28, 2000. 

Our review of the information available to the inspector does not reveal 

any basis for questioning his admission of Alshehhi. His passport and visa 

appear to have been valid, and there was no information available to the 

inspector through lookout checks that would have suggested that Alshehhi 

should be referred to secondary inspection.

B. Alshehhi’s second entry – January 18, 2001, New York, New York

Alshehhi (like Atta) enrolled in Huffman Aviation’s professional pilot’s 

program in August 2000 and filed an application with the INS for a change in 

status from visitor to student, which the INS received on September 19, 2000. 

On December 19, 2000, Alshehhi (like Atta) completed his flight training 

course.

On January 11, 2001, Alshehhi departed the United States from JFK 

Airport for Casablanca, Morocco. A week later, on January 18, 2001, Alshehhi 

returned to JFK Airport from Casablanca.

During this entry, Alshehhi presented the same passport and B-1/B-2 visa 

that he used on his first entry to the United States. Therefore, Alshehhi’s 

passport should have indicated that he had departed the United States just 

seven days earlier, on January 11, 2001.

The OIG confirmed that a “hit” or a “lookout” did not appear on the IBIS 

screen when the primary inspector swiped Alshehhi’s passport. On this entry, 

however, Alshehhi was sent to secondary and was admitted through the 

secondary inspection process as a B-1 visitor until May 17, 2001.

 

37 The primary inspector told the OIG that Alshehhi’s country of citizenship, the United 

Arab Emirates, was not at the time of special interest to the INS and that, because it was not, 

Alshehhi did not warrant additional scrutiny.
53

INS computer records (the INS referral report) contain the following 

reason for Alshehhi’s referral to secondary: “SUBJ left one week ago after 

entry in May (2000). Has extension and now returning for a few more 

months.” The referral report also notes a referral code of “03 Travel 

History/Routine.” According to INS inspectors, this 03 code refers to 

nonimmigrants, and “Travel History/Routine” means that the nonimmigrant 

has no history of overstay.38

The primary inspector who handled Alshehhi told the OIG that she 

recalled this entry. She said that based upon her recollection and the referral 

report, she referred Alshehhi to secondary because his lengthy prior stay and 

short absence as reflected in his passport suggested to her that Alshehhi was 

trying to “beat” the immigration system and was attempting to establish 

residence in the United States. She said that she felt that Alshehhi was 

probably living in the United States and had not bothered to obtain a proper 

visa.

The secondary inspector who interviewed Alshehhi had been an INS

inspector for 23 years and had worked mostly as a secondary inspector since 

1990. The secondary inspector told the OIG that he had a “vague recollection” 

of handling Alshehhi on January 18, 2001. He said that he thought that 

Alshehhi was polite during his inspection and was not confrontational in any 

way.

INS records show that Alshehhi was in secondary for 30 minutes. The 

secondary inspector estimated that he interviewed Alshehhi for a total of 10 out 

of the 30 minutes. The referral report reflects the following comments by the 

secondary inspector: “Was in US gaining flight hours to become a pilot. 

Admitted for four months.”

The secondary inspector said that, although he had a vague recollection 

of Alshehhi, he did not recall the specifics of his inspection. Based on reading 

the referral from the primary inspector, the secondary inspector said he would 

have known that the primary inspector was suspicious of the length of 

Alshehhi’s stay for pleasure on his prior visit and his immediate return to the 

 

38 Alshehhi, like Atta, left the United States a little more than a month after his prior 

admission period had expired on November 28, 2000, but he did not overstay since he filed 

an I-539 on September 19, 2000, prior to the expiration of his admission period. 
54

United States after a 1-week absence. The secondary inspector said that based 

upon his own comments on the report, he also had learned that Alshehhi had 

already been attending flight school to become a pilot. The secondary 

inspector said that at a minimum he would have checked the NCIC database 

for criminal history and the NIIS database to check Alshehhi’s prior entries. 

He said that he also would have checked CLAIMS, which would have 

confirmed that Alshehhi had filed the I-539 change of status application.

Based on his review of the record available now, the secondary inspector 

pointed to a number of reasons why he did not believe Alshehhi was 

attempting to illegally work or live in the United States indefinitely. He noted 

that Alshehhi had previously been admitted to the United States under a B-2 

visa and then left the United States before he had to (given that he was 

permitted to stay in the United States while the I-539 was pending). In 

addition, Alshehhi had used the same passport and visa for both visits. The 

secondary inspector also noted that he did not see in the record any other 

indications of concern, such as being late for the course, lack of English skills, 

lack of a plane ticket to the site for the training course, or lack of money for 

school. He stated that he would not have considered the fact of Alshehhi’s two 

admissions within a short time frame as significant, since most countries now 

issue visas for 10 years and aliens are entitled to come and go as they wish, as 

long as they do not overstay. According to the secondary inspector, under the 

circumstances, he did not consider that Alshehhi’s behavior indicated an 

individual who was attempting to “play the system” and to live and work in the 

United States.

The secondary inspector admitted Alshehhi under the business visitor (or 

B-1) category. The secondary inspector indicated that he likely understood that 

Alshehhi was coming to the United States to log flight hours to become a pilot, 

not to go to school full-time. He said that the INS often admits individuals 

under B-1 visas for the purpose of attending seminars and training, including 

flight training. He said, for example, that the B-1 category is commonly used 

to admit aliens to take computer training in order to obtain a certification.

The secondary inspector’s supervisor on January 18 had been an 

immigration inspector for seven years and a supervisory inspector for more 

than four years.39 This supervisor told the OIG that he agreed with the 

 

39 The supervisor did not encounter Alshehhi on this occasion. 
55

secondary inspector concerning the appropriateness of admitting visitors for 

flight training under a B-1 visa.

The supervisor stated, however, that if Alshehhi had sought a B-1 

admission specifically to continue flight training school to obtain a certificate, 

then the B-1 was the wrong category of admission and that he should have 

been required to obtain a student visa. The supervisor stated that absent any 

evidence of prior overstays or a criminal record, the alien would likely be given 

an I-193 waiver and temporary M-1 status while he remained in the country. 

The supervisor said that he probably would have supported a waiver because of 

all of the things the student did “right,” including filing an I-539 and not 

overstaying on his previous visits. According to this supervisor, students are 

given the benefit of the doubt if possible. He said that the only way that they 

would be returned to their country would be if there were proof of malice and 

intent to deceive.

The secondary inspector admitted Alshehhi for four months, until 

May 17, 2001. The secondary inspector said that Alshehhi must have given a 

specific reason why he needed a 4-month stay in this country. According to 

the secondary inspector’s supervisor, it was the port’s policy to admit business 

visitors for a minimum of three months. He said that port policy allows for up 

to six months, at the inspector’s discretion, if the alien presents a satisfactory 

reason. 

Based on our review of the evidence available to the inspector, we 

concluded that his admission of Alshehhi was not contrary to INS practices at 

the time. 

C. Alshehhi’s third entry – May 2, 2001, Miami, Florida

Alshehhi made his third and final entry to the United States on May 2, 

2001, at Miami International Airport. He had left the United States from 

Miami on April 18, 2001, bound for Amsterdam, and he returned to Miami on 

May 2 from Amsterdam. He presented the same passport and visa as on the 

previous two entries.

The OIG confirmed no “hit” or “lookout” appeared on the IBIS screen 

when the primary inspector swiped Alshehhi’s passport. He was admitted 

through the primary inspection process as a B-2 visitor for six months, until 

November 2, 2001.
56

The primary inspector who admitted Alshehhi had been an inspector 

since 1997. He told the OIG that he did not recall the inspection, and INS 

records do not indicate anything else noteworthy about the inspection.

The inspector told the OIG that the fact that Alshehhi had made two 

previous visits to the United States and stayed for several months on each visit 

would not have made any difference in his inspection. He said that in his 

estimate at least 50 percent of the passengers that he sees have a travel history 

or pattern similar to that of Alshehhi. He said that he would not have referred 

Alshehhi to secondary absent some kind of suspicious behavior or potential 

document fraud. Our review of the information available to the inspector does 

not reveal any basis for concluding his admission of Alshehhi was improper.

V. OIG Conclusions on the INS’s Admission of Atta and Alshehhi

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s three admissions into the United States followed 

the same pattern. They each held valid passports and B-1-/B-2 visas, good for 

multiple entries into the United States. The immigration inspectors who 

admitted them during their first and third entries did so routinely, without 

referring them to secondary inspection. Understandably, the inspectors had no 

memory of their encounters with Atta and Alshehhi, given the many 

inspections they have conducted since then. From the evidence, however, it 

appears that these inspectors did not admit Atta and Alshehhi in violation of 

INS policies and practices in light of the information available to the inspectors 

at the time of these admissions. We found no indication that the inspectors 

were presented with or were aware of any information that would have caused 

them to refer Atta and Alshehhi to secondary inspection.

However, after Atta and Alshehhi both left the United States in January 

2001 and separately returned a few days later, they both were referred to

secondary inspection for further questioning. It appears that Atta was referred 

to secondary because the primary inspector believed that Atta was attending 

flight school and that Atta should be referred to secondary for further 

questioning to determine if an M-1 visa was required.

The secondary inspector stated that he believed that Atta was a legitimate 

student who had no criminal record or history of overstays. He said that he 

would have admitted Atta under the B-2 category if he concluded that Atta’s 

school attendance was incidental to a pleasure purpose. Atta’s filing of an I539 change of status application might have indicated that he was intending to 

attend school on a full-time basis. Because the secondary inspector does not 
57

recall what Atta said during the inspection and the written record is limited, we 

cannot determine what Atta represented about his school plans or whether the 

secondary inspector’s decision to admit him was improper. 

If the secondary inspector believed that Atta was returning to the United 

States to attend school on a full-time basis, the secondary inspector should 

have concluded that Atta needed an M-1 visa. INS personnel to whom we 

spoke asserted, however, that even though Atta did not have an M-1 visa, it is 

likely that he would have been admitted through the waiver process. They 

contended that because Atta had no record of prior criminal or immigration 

violations and had made a good-faith attempt to change his status to an M-1 

classification, INS supervisors likely would have admitted him through the 

waiver process.

While this appears to be an accurate assessment of how the INS treated 

applicants like Atta at the time, the legal requirements for granting a waiver to 

Atta were not met. Atta did not demonstrate “an unforeseen emergency” as to 

why he did not have the M-1 visa, which the INS regulations require for such 

waivers. Yet we were told that prior to September 11, INS inspectors did not 

typically enforce this requirement when granting waivers, so it is likely that 

Atta would have been admitted regardless of what the secondary inspector 

concluded about his school plans.

A similar analysis applies to Alshehhi’s second admission to the United 

States in January 2001, under the B-1 (business) visa classification. If 

Alshehhi stated that he intended to attend flight school full-time, he needed an 

M-1 visa for admission to the country or a waiver. On the other hand, if 

Alshehhi stated he was coming to the United State to log flight hours, he was 

admissible under the B-1 business visa that he received. The INS’s referral 

report does state that Alshehhi “was in the US gaining flight hours to become a 

pilot.” Based on our review of this evidence, we concluded that his admission 

of Alshehhi was not contrary to INS practices at the time. However, even if 

the secondary inspector had determined that Alshehhi required a student visa, it 

is likely that Alshehhi, like Atta, would have received a waiver to enter the 

United States.

The INS’s prevailing mindset in dealing with foreign students at the 

POEs until September 11 was that students were not a concern or a significant 

risk worthy of special scrutiny. Consistent with this approach, INS inspectors 

and supervisors, who incorrectly believed that they had broad discretion to 

grant waivers, would admit students through the waiver process when they 
58

appeared at POEs without the proper documentation and did not present any 

evidence of inadmissibility. Since September 11, the INS has issued guidance 

to the field restricting use of the waiver process and has also taken other steps 

to more closely scrutinize the admission of students to the United States. We 

discuss those steps in Chapter Seven of this report.
59

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INS’S DELAYED PROCESSING OF ATTA’S AND 

ALSHEHHI’S APPLICATIONS FOR CHANGE OF STATUS

I. Introduction

In this chapter of the report, the OIG addresses the first of the two 

questions presented by the Attorney General in his March 13, 2002, 

memorandum requesting our investigation:

• Why did the INS take so long to process the change of status 

applications, including the I-20 forms, of Atta and Alshehhi?

We begin with detailed information about the forms used in the change of 

status process and the circumstances that gave rise to Atta and Alshehhi filing 

change of status applications with the INS. Next we describe the processing of 

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status applications at the Texas Service 

Center, as well as the processing of the I-20 – the form that was sent to the 

contractor and returned to Huffman Aviation in March 2002. We then analyze 

the reasons that the INS took several months to process the change of status 

applications of Atta and Alshehhi.

Because it is directly related to the issue of the processing of the I-539 

applications, we also analyze whether the INS properly approved Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s change of status applications. In addition to examining each step of 

the adjudication process, we examine information that should have been 

available to the adjudicator before the adjudication was completed but was not. 

II. Process to Obtain Nonimmigrant Student Status

As we previously discussed, foreign students who want to study in the 

United States can obtain legal permission to do so in two ways. The method 

pursued by the majority of foreign students is through the student visa process. 

The State Department is responsible for issuing visas to nonimmigrants outside 

the United States who intend to become full-time students.40 Nonimmigrants 

 

40 During fiscal year 2001, the State Department issued 319,518 F visas to students and 

their dependents for the purpose of attending academic or language courses in the United 

States and 5,658 M visas to students and their dependents for the purpose of attending 

(continued)
60

may also ask the INS to change their status to students after they have entered 

the United States through other legal means.41 This method does not involve 

the State Department.

To change their status to student while in the United States, the 

applicants file INS Form I-539 (Application to Extend/Change Nonimmigrant 

Status),42 along with the appropriate fee43 and the appropriate “evidence.” (We 

show a blank I-539 form in the Appendix at page A-3.) 8 CFR § 248.3(b). 

Applicants must sign the I-539 form and submit copies of their I-94 form, a 

copy of their passport, and documentary evidence of financial support. 8 CFR 

§ 214.2(f)(i)(A) – (C). 

The student also must submit to the INS a completed I-20 form. The first 

page of the 4-page I-20 form is completed by the school and specifies the 

student’s name, date of birth, and citizenship; the school’s name, address, and 

INS school certification code; the name, length, and cost of the program for 

which the student has been accepted; the school’s English proficiency 

requirements; and information on the student’s financial resources. Page one is 

known as the “school copy” because it is eventually returned by the INS to the 

school. The second page contains a set of instructions for completing and 

filing the form. The third page is identical to the first page and also must be 

completed by the school. The last page contains signature lines, which must be 

signed by an approved school official if the student plans to leave the country 

temporarily. The last two pages constitute the “student copy,” which is 

returned by the INS to the student after the adjudication decision is rendered. 

 

(continued)

vocational or other nonacademic courses. We discuss this method of obtaining a student 

visa more fully in Chapter Six.

41 During fiscal year 2001, 28,880 aliens were approved for a change of status to student 

status. Of these, 27,848 adjusted their status to that of an academic or language student (F) 

and 1,032 adjusted their status to that of a vocational student (M). 

42 The I-539 form is used by nonimmigrants who want to either change their status or 

extend their status. The extension of status process is similar to, although not exactly the 

same as, the change of status process.

43 In September 2000 when Atta and Alshehhi submitted their I-539 applications, the 

fee for filing an I-539 was $120.00. The amount was raised to $140.00 in February 2002. 8 

CFR § 103.7(b).
61

(We show an I-20 form in the Appendix at page A-8.) Both the school copy 

and the student copy of the I-20 must be signed by the appropriate school 

official and by the student. 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(1)(i)(A) and § 214.2(m)(1)(i)(A).

Change of status application forms (form I-539) are processed and 

adjudicated at one of four INS service centers. The I-539 instructions direct 

the applicant to send the form to a particular service center depending upon 

where the applicant lives. Since Atta and Alshehhi were living in Florida, they 

were required to send their applications to the Texas Service Center. At the 

Texas Service Center, the I-539 is adjudicated by a Center Adjudications 

Officer (CAO) based on a review of the file. Unlike with some INS 

applications, no in-person interview is conducted for the adjudication of I-539s.

Once the CAO approves the change of status application, the CAO 

stamps both the student copy and the school copy of the I-20. The CAO also 

writes in the new status and the dates for which the status is being granted. If 

the applicant is an F-1 student, the CAO will write “duration of status” or 

“D/S” on the I-20s. If the applicant is an M-1 student, the CAO will fill in the 

dates of the course of study as stated on the I-20 plus 30 days.

Immediately following the approval, the adjudicator returns the student 

copy to the student through the mail. The school copy of the I-20 is mailed to 

Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (ACS) in London, Kentucky, the INS 

contractor who data enters information from the I-20s that is eventually 

uploaded to an INS database.

In 2001, under its interpretation of its contract, ACS data entered 

information from the school’s copy of the I-20 and retained the form for 180 

days. After 180 days, ACS mailed the school’s copy of the I-20 to the 

school.44

III. Huffman Aviation’s Initiation of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s Applications 

for Change of Status

According to Rudi Dekkers, the Chief Executive Officer and President of 

Huffman Aviation International, Atta and Alshehhi first appeared at Huffman 

Aviation on July 1, 2000, and spoke to Huffman’s student coordinator, who 

 

44 After March 15, 2002, the INS instituted new procedures for the processing of I-20s. 

We discuss those changes in Chapter Seven of this report.
62

provided them with information on the flight school. Atta and Alshehhi 

returned to Huffman Aviation on July 3, 2000, and enrolled in a professional 

pilot’s course. Dekkers stated that at the time that Atta and Alshehhi became 

students, approximately 75 percent of Huffman’s enrollments were foreign 

students.45 Dekkers told the OIG that to his knowledge, Atta and Alshehhi 

were the only foreign students at his school who were already in the United 

States when they applied. He said his students normally submitted applications 

from overseas.

Dekkers stated that he believed Atta and Alshehhi had previously 

attended another aviation school, so both had some piloting experience. He 

said they presented their logbooks when applying at Huffman to show proof of 

previous flight hours. According to Dekkers, he required Atta and Alshehhi to 

first take private lessons with Huffman Aviation before enrolling in the 

professional pilot’s course. He said that he did this to make sure that they were 

“serious” about the course. He added that he routinely required students to first 

take private lessons for two to three months before enrolling in a course. 

Dekkers stated that Atta and Alshehhi were ready to take the professional 

pilot’s course at the end of August 2000.

Huffman Aviation is certified by the INS as a vocational school (as 

opposed to an academic school) authorized to accept foreign students. Dekkers 

told the OIG that his policy was to issue I-20s to all of his foreign students and 

to require them to obtain M-1 visas in order to take any of his professional 

courses.

46 At the end of August, Atta and Alshehhi requested that Huffman 

Aviation’s student coordinator provide them with the appropriate INS forms to 

enable them to apply for a change of status to become M-1 students.

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms stated that the Huffman course ran from 

September 1, 2000, until September 1, 2001. In fact, their course work was 

completed by December 2000. According to Dekkers, the professional pilot’s 

 

45 Dekkers stated that currently only a small number of his students are foreign students.

46 Dekkers told the OIG that he believed that it was permissible for foreign students to 

take private flight lessons while in the country on a B-1/B-2 visitor’s visa but that he 

required students to obtain M-1 student visas or M-1 student status to be “on the safe side.” 

Because Atta and Alshehhi were not taking sufficient hours to be considered full-time 

students, they were not in fact eligible to apply for the change of status. We discuss this 

issue more fully in Section VII C 2 of this chapter of this report.
63

course can be completed in up to one year, although some students working 

diligently are able to complete the course sooner. He said that the course has 

no required beginning and end dates, and that these dates are determined by the 

student’s preference and progress. When the student has accrued a sufficient 

number of flight hours (based on Federal Aviation Administration [FAA] 

regulations), the student is eligible to take the pilot’s license test. According to 

Dekkers, a course period of one year is normally listed on the I-20 to enable 

students to finish the course at their own pace.47 The Huffman student 

coordinator told the OIG that Atta and Alshehhi specified that they wanted the 

course dates to be listed on the I-20 to run from September 1, 2000, through 

September 1, 2001.

According to INS records, the INS received Atta’s and Alshehhi’s 

change of status applications on September 19, 2000. While their applications 

were pending, Atta and Alshehhi continued taking the training course at 

Huffman Aviation through December 2000. On December 19, 2000, they 

completed the course by passing the FAA pilot’s test. According to Huffman 

records, from July 2000 through December 2000, Atta was billed for 194.4 

hours of flight instruction and 27.2 hours of pre/post flight instruction; 

Alshehhi was billed for 203.6 hours of flight instruction and 24.1 hours of 

pre/post flight instruction.

IV. Processing at the Texas Service Center

Personnel at the INS Texas Service Center (TSC) were responsible for 

processing and adjudicating Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications for change of 

status. We describe the administrative and adjudication process for these 

applications in the sections that follow. 

A. INS service center organization and mission

INS Service Centers primarily process and adjudicate applications and 

petitions that do not require face-to-face interviews with applicants. 

Atta and Alshehhi submitted their I-539 applications for change of status 

to the TSC, the service center with responsibility for processing and 

 

47 We discuss whether Huffman Aviation should be authorized by the INS to issue I-20s 

in Chapter Six of this report.
64

adjudicating applications from Florida, where both men were residing and 

attending flight school. The TSC was run at the time by Deputy Service Center 

Director Carmelo A. Ortiz. Ortiz, who became the Deputy Service Center 

Director in 1997, served as the Acting Director of the TSC for several months 

prior to the arrival of the permanent Director on September 11, 2001. In 

addition to the Director and Deputy Director, the TSC has several Assistant 

Center Directors. The positions relevant to this report are four Assistant Center 

Directors for “Adjudications” (who oversee adjudications of different kinds of 

applications) and the Assistant Center Director for the Enforcement Operations 

Division, which handles referrals from the adjudicators of potential benefit 

fraud cases.48

Many of the operations of service centers, such as the clerical functions 

associated with processing applications – including mail handling, data entry, 

and storage retrieval – are handled by a contractor. The adjudication functions, 

on the other hand, are handled by INS CAOs.

The TSC is composed of two facilities: a “headquarters” facility in 

Dallas, Texas, which houses the INS personnel, including the CAOs; and a 

warehouse in Mesquite, Texas, operated by contractor personnel who receive 

and process for eventual adjudication all applications sent to the TSC, 

including I-539s.49 In 2001, the TSC employed approximately 300 INS 

employees (including 100 CAOs) and 430 contractor employees. In fiscal year 

2001, the TSC received 919,664 applications and completed 708,344 

applications.

 

48 An organizational chart depicting the relevant positions within the TSC is on the next 

page of the report.

49 In September 2000, when the Atta and Alshehhi I-539s were received at the TSC, the 

contractor operating the Mesquite processing facility was Labat-Anderson, Inc. On July 3, 

2001, the INS entered into a contract with JHM Research and Development, Inc. (JHM) to 

handle the clerical processing of applications at the Mesquite facility. JHM began operating 

the Mesquite facility on July 7, 2001. According to the JHM Deputy Site Manager, a 

significant number of employees hired by JMH to work at the Mesquite facility formerly 

worked for Labat-Anderson at the facility. The INS has a unit at the Mesquite facility, the 

Contract Performance Analysis Unit, which is responsible for monitoring the contractor’s 

performance.
65
66

B. Processing and adjudication of I-539 applications for change of 

status 

When Atta and Alshehhi submitted their I-539s in September 2000, 

applications for change of status were processed and adjudicated at the TSC in 

the manner described below.50 A chart depicting this process is on the next 

page.

1. Pre-adjudication processing

Applicants for change of status are directed by the instructions on the 

INS forms to mail their applications to a particular post office box (depending 

on the type of form and the appropriate service center) and to attach the 

prescribed fee. Contractor personnel pick up the mail and subject it to a 

cursory review – a “slit and peek” – to determine the type of application and to 

ensure that it is accompanied by a remittance. These employees then segregate 

the applications by type, endorse the remittances for deposit, and forward the 

applications to a second group of mail room employees, known as the “set-up 

team.”

The set-up team reviews the application to ensure there are no obvious 

problems that would prevent further processing. The most frequent 

disqualifying grounds are that the TSC does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate 

the application; that the remittance is for the wrong amount; or that the 

application is not signed. If one of these problems is identified, the application 

is rejected and returned to the alien without further processing.

If none of these problems is present, the file set-up personnel assemble 

each application, remittance, and supporting documentation in a “receipt file.” 

The receipt files are transferred, oldest first, to a section called Data Entry, 

usually within one day of receipt of the application at the TSC.

 

50 With limited, minor exceptions, the process has not changed from September 2000 to 

today.
INS I–539 Change of Status Application Process

This chart depicts the process for I-539 change of status applications processed at the Texas Service Center in 2000-

2001.

Applicant submits INS I-539 application to the appropriate INS Service Center:

September 15, 2000

Mohamed Atta sends his I-539 and I-20 applications to the Texas Service Center Mesquite facility.

INS contractor mailroom receives application and reviews for signature and appropriate 

fee; if incomplete, returns to sender; if complete, date-stamps and creates receipt file:

Receipt file given to Key Entry Operator, who enters data into INS CLAIMS. Bar code 

label with unique file number is generated and affixed on file:

September 19, 2000

Atta’s application is date-stamped and a file is created.

September 22, 2000

Atta’s application is entered into CLAIMS and receipt file number produced.

Notice of receipt letter printed and sent to applicant:

September 22, 2000

Notice of receipt letter generated and sent to Atta from the Mesquite facility.

Receipt file is batched in groups of 25 and held for 2-3 days to ensure monetary fees are 

collected and tallied.

Receipt file is sent to the file room in the Work Distribution Unit (WDU):

September 25, 2000

Atta’s file is received by the WDU.

File is “called up” by a supervisor for assignment to a Center Adjudications Officer (CAO):

July 6, 2001

Atta’s file is “called up” for adjudication at the TSC.

CAO reviews the file for supporting documentation. CAO decides to approve, deny, or 

request additional evidence for each application.

July 17, 2001

CAO approves Atta’s I-539 application and sends student copy of the I-20 to Atta.

CAO returns adjudicated file to Mesquite facility where it is stored in the WDU for 90 days in 

case of inquiry about the file is received before being sent to Federal Records Center:

August 14, 2001

Atta’s file returned to the WDU.

CAO approves application and sends student copy of I-20 to the student:

CAO updates CLAIMS after approving I-539 and approval notice is generated and sent:

July 17, 2001

CAO updates CLAIMS; approval notice is automatically generated and sent to Atta from Mesquite 

facility.

CAO places school copy of I-20 in a tray, and I-20s are eventually mailed to ACS in London, 

Kentucky:

Exact date unknown

CAO places Huffman Aviation copy of I-20 in tray; I-20 is mailed by clerical employee to ACS.
68

Data entry personnel, called key entry operators, enter certain 

information from the application and the remittance directly into the INS’s 

Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS).51 

The key entry operators are responsible for separating the remittance from the 

application, 52 reviewing the file again for a limited number of grounds for 

rejection, such as the absence of a required signature, and manually keying in 

(“capturing”) specified data from the application into CLAIMS.53 After the 

requisite information is keyed into CLAIMS, the system automatically 

generates and prints a bar code label with a unique file number, which is 

affixed to the receipt file; the bar code label also records the initials of the key 

entry operator and the date of entry.54 In addition, address labels are generated 

once the data entry is completed. 

According to the Assistant Site Manager for Data Entry, on average a key 

entry operator processes an I-539 in 2-3 minutes. After the data from the 

application is keyed in and accepted by the system, CLAIMS automatically 

generates a notice on INS form I-797 to the applicant informing him or her that 

 

51 CLAIMS is an INS mainframe computer system that has been used in the service 

centers since the mid-1980s to record the receipt of various types of applications. In the 

service centers, the data entry is performed into the Local Area Network of CLAIMS. 

52 The key entry operator places the remittance in a lock box. The fee also is recorded 

in the database entry for the application. At the end of the day, the amount in the lock box is 

compared against the total amount entered on the applications processed to ensure financial 

accountability. We were told that the fees from applications processed at the TSC amount to 

approximately $12.5 million per month. 

53 The information captured from an I-539 application for change of status includes the 

date received at the TSC; the name and address of the alien; the date the alien’s present 

nonimmigrant status expires; and the admission number from the alien’s I-94 form. 

54 The bar code label containing the unique file number is used to track the receipt file 

throughout the remainder of the adjudication process. As the file proceeds from Data Entry 

through each successive stage of the process, it is checked in and out by employees who 

scan the bar code. The locations of the file as it makes its way through the process are 

stored in the Receipt and Alien File Accountability Control System (RAFACS). The 

RAFACS entries identify the date of the action and the Responsible Party Code to which the 

file was checked in or out. The Responsible Party Code may be a work station, a file shelf 

location, or an INS employee.
69

the application has been received at the TSC. These receipt notices are printed 

and mailed out within one to two days.

Following data entry, the files are sent to a “2-day hold” area to allow the 

contractor time to ensure that the money collected by the key operators tallies 

with the amounts inputted into the system. Once the daily receipts are 

balanced and the money is deposited, the batched receipt files are scanned into 

RAFACS and are sent to the Work Distribution Unit (WDU) in the file room. 

Receipt files are stored in the WDU until they are requested or “called up” by 

INS personnel for adjudication. The files are stored in the file room in order of 

date received by the TSC mail room.

Files are “called up” by Supervisory Center Adjudication Officers 

(SCAOs), who send a work order to the WDU requesting that the contractor 

deliver a specified number and type of receipt files to the SCAO or directly to 

designated CAOs. 

The WDU fills the work order by gathering the requisite number and type 

of files (oldest files first), scanning the bar codes into RAFACS, and moving 

the files from the Mesquite facility to a small mail room operation at the Dallas 

facility, which is also run by the contractor. Contractor personnel at the Dallas 

facility deliver the mail to the person or area, including CAO work areas, 

designated in RAFACS by the Responsible Party Code. We were told that on 

average it takes one to three days from the request to the receipt of files. When 

CAOs receive the files, they acknowledge receipt by scanning the bar code 

label into RAFACS.

2. The adjudication process

CAOs at the TSC are assigned to one of several Adjudications Divisions. 

Each Division is responsible for one or more “product lines” consisting of one 

or more types of applications. In July and August 2001, when Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s applications were adjudicated, I-539s were under the Division that 

also had responsibility for naturalization applications (N-400s). 55

 

55 The service centers mainly handle only clerical processing with respect to N-400s, 

and the actual adjudication takes place in INS’s district offices. However, denials of 

naturalization applications are completed in the service centers.
70

CAOs may approve or deny an application for a change of status or 

request additional evidence. After the CAO makes the adjudicative decision, 

the CAO stamps the application and the student and school copies of the I-20 

to indicate whether the application has been approved or denied, and if 

approved, the period of stay authorized. Following adjudication, the CAO 

updates the CLAIMS database to reflect the disposition of the application.56 

The CAO then sends the student copy of the I-20 to the applicant, reflecting the 

approval and authorized period of stay.57 At the time that Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s applications were adjudicated, the CAO also forwarded the school 

copy of the I-20 to a clerical employee, who periodically sent batches of school 

I-20s to the INS contractor responsible for processing and storing the I-20. The 

CAO then returns the receipt file – now minus the I-20s – to the Mesquite 

facility for storage.

C. The TSC did not adjudicate Atta’s And Alshehhi’s I-539 

applications in a timely manner 

As indicated by the mail room’s date stamp, the TSC received Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s applications for a change of status on September 19, 2000.58 Their 

applications were adjudicated and approved on July 17, 2001, and August 9, 

2001, respectively – approximately 10 months and 101⁄2 months after receipt 

and less than 2 months before the September 11, 2001, attacks. As discussed 

below, we found that the delay in adjudicating these applications was 

principally the result of a policy decision by the INS to assign a low priority to 

the adjudication of change of status applications, which led to a substantial 

backlog in I-539 applications awaiting adjudication at the TSC. We concluded 

that the delay was not the result of any action by the contractor that had 

responsibility for processing the applications.

 

56 This update causes CLAIMS to automatically generate an approval notice (INS form 

I-797) that is sent to the applicant separately from the I-20. No such approval notice is sent 

to the school.

57 If the CAO denies the application, a denial letter stating the reasons for the denial is 

prepared and sent to the applicant. The school and student copy of the I-20 remain in the 

file.

58 CLAIMS indicates that their applications were received on September 22, 2000, 

because that is the date that the applications were entered into CLAIMS.
71

Through RAFACS we tracked the process of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s 

applications through the TSC.

1. RAFACS history for Atta’s I-539 application

• On September 22, 2000, a data entry operator created the file in 

CLAIMS.

• On September 25, 2000, the WDU received the file from Data 

Entry and filed it in the area of the WDU reserved for I-539 

applications awaiting adjudication.

• On July 6, 2001, the WDU transferred the file to the Dallas 

facility. Although the date of the work order requesting the file is 

not recorded in RAFACS, on average it took the contractor one to 

three days to fill a work order and transfer the files.

• On July 20, 2001, at 6:42 a.m., the file was checked in – i.e., 

receipt was acknowledged – by the CAO who adjudicated the file. 

It is unlikely that the file was in transit from the WDU to the CAO 

for 14 days. We were told that, much more likely, the file was 

delivered to the CAO’s work station along with numerous other 

files within a few days of being charged out of the WDU, but that 

it is a common practice of CAOs to acknowledge receipt of a 

group of files as they prepare to adjudicate them, rather than when 

the files are physically received. 

• On July 20, 2001, at 7:17 a.m., after adjudication of Atta’s 

application, the CAO indicated in RAFACS that the file was “in 

transit” back to the Mesquite facility. 

• On August 14, 2001, the WDU received the file from the Dallas 

facility and placed it in 90-day storage pending shipment to the 

Federal Records Center.59

 

59 The current CLAIMS record for Atta also indicates that his file number was accessed 

on March 12, 2002. It states that “data changed in record” occurred on that date. The OIG 

sought to determine the reason for this entry. The OIG found that a TSC CAO had learned 

about the I-20s arriving at Huffman Aviation in March 2002 and wanted to determine if she 

had adjudicated the files. She said that she accessed CLAIMS and opened the record but did 

(continued)
72

2. RAFACS history for Alshehhi’s I-539 application

• On September 22, 2000, a data entry operator created the file in 

CLAIMS.

• On September 25, 2000, the WDU received the file from Data 

Entry.

• On May 2, 2001, the file was acknowledged as received by an 

Immigration Information Officer (IIO). 60

• On August 7, 2001, the IIO transferred the file to the CAO who 

adjudicated the file.

• On August 8, 2001, the CAO who adjudicated the file 

acknowledged receipt of the file.

• On August 13, 2001, the CAO transferred the file back to the 

Mesquite facility.

The RAFACS history for the two applications reveals that the contractor 

at the Mesquite facility processed and prepared both applications for 

adjudication timely and consistent with the standard procedures in effect at that 

time. Both applications were entered into CLAIMS within three days after 

receipt at the TSC. They were received in the WDU and available for 

adjudication six days after receipt.

 

(continued)

not make any changes. She said that she pressed the wrong key in an attempt to exit the 

record in CLAIMS.

60 The OIG sought to determine the reason that the file was sent to an IIO. We were 

told that IIOs respond to telephone inquiries about applications and also adjudicate some 

less complicated applications. We were also told that while IIOs at the TSC are supposed to 

keep logs of telephone inquiries and the files that are pulled as a result of those inquiries, in 

actuality they do not. When the OIG interviewed the IIO to whom RAFACS indicated this 

file was sent on May 2, 2001, she said that it is possible that the file was assigned to her for 

adjudication and that she subsequently passed on the file because she had never been trained 

to adjudicate change of status applications for students.
73

3. Backlogs at the TSC

What is evident from the RAFACS data is that the cause of the delay in 

adjudicating the applications was that neither file was called up from the WDU 

by the INS for adjudication in a timely fashion. The Atta application sat in the 

WDU for almost ten months; the Alshehhi application sat in the WDU for 

approximately seven months and another three months passed before it was 

actually adjudicated. From the evidence available to the OIG, it appears that 

the delay in the INS’s adjudication of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications was 

typical for the TSC. The OIG reviewed 70 other I-539 change of status 

applications for vocational students that were received by the TSC in 

September 2000 and determined that they too were adjudicated in July and 

August 2001.

INS Headquarters and TSC personnel consistently told the OIG that 

adjudicating I-539 applications has always been a “low priority” at the INS and 

that this has resulted in substantial backlogs. The INS’s emphasis since 1996, 

according to INS personnel, has been on naturalization (N-400s) and 

adjustment of status (I-485) applications.61 For the past several years, 

adjudications priorities have been distributed via memorandum by the Deputy 

Executive Associate Commission for the Immigration Services Division. I-539 

applications were not on the list of priorities until fiscal year 2002 (which 

began October 1, 2001). In the priorities memoranda, target processing times 

are listed for the priority adjudications, and the forms that are not listed as a 

priority are given a target processing time of 180 days. For fiscal year 2002, 

when processing I-539s became a priority, the target processing time was listed 

as five months.

The TSC’s average processing times for I-539s have remained 

consistently high since at least 1998. Average processing time for I-539s for 

FY 1998 was 102 days; for FY 1999 it was 129 days; for FY 2000 it was 129 

days; and for FY 2001 it was 200 days. The graph on the next page illustrates 

this point. 

 

61 Adjustment of status applications are filed by immigrants seeking to change their 

immigrant status to become lawful permanent residents of the United States while change of 

status applications are filed by nonimmigrants seeking to change from one nonimmigrant 

classification to another.
74

Texas Service Center

Average Processing Time

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

200

98 99 00 01

Fiscal Year

I-539
75

The TSC’s actual processing time report for July 2001 shows that the I-539s 

being adjudicated in July 2001 had been pending for 282 days, or almost 9 

months. The OIG also found that the TSC adjudicated significantly fewer I539s in FY 2001 than in FY 2000.

As a result of the low priority given to processing I-539s at the TSC prior 

to May 2001, no group of adjudicators in the TSC Adjudications Divisions was 

dedicated solely to adjudicating I-539s. The INS does not have national 

standard operating procedures (SOPs) for processing I-539s, and each service 

center has developed its own procedures for handling them. In addition, TSC 

managers could not tell the OIG which Assistant Center Director for 

Adjudications had responsibility for I-539 applications prior to May 2001. 

TSC Managers stated that responsibility for the I-539 was shifted among 

different managers at different times. Many TSC managers told the OIG that 

prior to May 2001, I-539s were adjudicated only episodically when the backlog 

of applications grew “excessive.” When this occurred, I-539s would be 

distributed to CAOs in all the divisions and, on some occasions, to 

Immigration Information Officers. The adjudication “blitz” would continue 

until the backlog was reduced to an acceptable level. 62

In May 2001, the responsibility for I-539 applications was placed with a 

different Assistant Center Director for Adjudications, who had responsibility at 

the time for the product line that consisted of naturalization applications. She 

told the OIG that she was concerned when she reviewed the processing time 

report and saw that I-539s were taking several months to process.63 She said 

that she asked the TSC managers at the time whether she could have additional 

personnel assigned to her group to adjudicate I-539s. She said that she was 

advised that additional personnel were not available but that she could assign 

two CAOs to adjudicate I-539s on a full-time basis. According to this 

Assistant Center Director, she assigned two senior examiners full time and she 

intended for them to continue to devote all of their time to I-539 applications 

 

62 Since September 11, 2001, the INS has focused significantly more attention on I-539 

applications. The TSC has since created a permanent supervisor who is responsible only for 

I-539 applications. The INS recently lowered the target processing time for I-539s to 30 

days. For a further discussion of this issue, see Chapter Seven of this report.

63 The processing time report from April 2001 shows that the TSC was then 

adjudicating applications received in August 2000.
76

until they asked to be switched from the assignment. These two adjudicators 

processed only I-539 applications from May 2001 until December 2001. One 

of these two CAOs approved Atta’s application on July 17, 2001, and approved 

Alshehhi’s application on August 9, 2001.

4. Delay in the transmission of the school I-20 form to ACS

As mentioned previously, at the time Atta and Alshehhi’s applications 

were approved, school copies of I-20s were mailed to ACS, the INS contractor 

responsible for processing school copies of I-20s. Based on the available 

record, the OIG was unable to determine when the Atta and Alshehhi I-20s 

were mailed from the TSC to ACS in London, Kentucky. ACS received the 

school copies of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms on September 24, 2001, 

approximately 2 months and 21⁄2 months, respectively, after the I-539 

applications had been approved by the TSC.

Part of this delay was likely caused by confusion and administrative 

disorganization at the TSC. In July or August 2001, an Examinations Assistant 

was assigned to provide clerical support to the two CAOs processing the I-539 

backlog.64 E-mails provided to the OIG indicate that this employee was 

assigned to the backlog project on August 9, 2001, and that she did not begin 

mailing I-20s until August 20. Based on e-mails and interviews, we 

determined that personnel at the TSC were asked to instruct the Examinations 

Assistant in the correct procedures for mailing I-20s, but that there was some 

confusion about the correct address for ACS, the contractor in Kentucky. TSC 

personnel had sought guidance from INS Headquarters personnel on which 

address to use. A Headquarters employee provided two addresses for ACS, 

stating in an e-mail, “Its [sic] a little confusing, don’t you think?”

The Examinations Assistant inquired on August 20, 2001, as to whether a 

determination had been made as to the proper address. Some time after she 

 

64 TSC personnel were not able to describe to the OIG exactly how the I-20s were 

mailed before the Examinations Assistant was assigned the responsibility for collecting and 

mailing the I-20s. The TSC standard operating procedures in effect at the time did not 

address this issue and simply directed the CAO to send the I-20 to the contractor. We were 

told that the CAO would place the I-20 in “trays” located on two different floors of the 

building in Dallas and that the trays would be emptied periodically and the contents mailed 

to the contractor.
77

made the inquiry, she began mailing the I-20s to one of the two addresses 

provided by the INS Headquarters employee. By e-mail dated September 19, 

2001, an INS Headquarters employee advised the TSC that she had obtained 

the correct address and identified one of the two addresses previously provided. 

This address, however, was not the address to which the Examinations 

Assistant had been sending the I-20s. A TSC employee forwarded the new 

address to the Examinations Assistant, telling her, “Don’t worry about the [I20s] you have already sent to the [the incorrect address]. They’ll either figure 

it out or send them back to us.”65

V. ACS’s Processing of the School Copies of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 

Forms

In addition to the delay caused by the mailing problem, ACS, the data 

entry contractor in London, Kentucky, stored the school copies of Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s I-20s for six months after processing them before returning them to 

the school.

In 2001, ACS provided data capture, storage, and retrieval services to the 

INS for a variety of INS forms, including the school copy of the I-20 form. 

ACS received Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms on September 24, 2001, and 

extracted and processed the relevant information from those forms within 

several days. ACS then placed the forms in storage for six months, the period 

ACS believed that it was required to maintain the forms as set forth in its 

contract with Uniband.66 On March 5, 2002, based on instructions issued by 

the INS in late February 2002 (the reasons for which are discussed more fully 

below), ACS mailed several thousand I-20s to the respective schools; among 

these I-20s were forms originally completed by Huffman Aviation and 

provided to Atta and Alshehhi. Huffman Aviation reportedly received the I20s for Atta and Alshehhi on or before March 11, 2002.

 

65 The Examinations Assistant said that she presumed that the batch of I-20s sent to the 

incorrect address was forwarded to the correct address because she never received anything 

returned from the contractor. It is unclear, however, how the I-20s would have been 

returned to her since the envelope that she used for mailing contained only the gene ric return 

address for the TSC and no cover memorandum of any kind was provided with the I-20s.

66 ACS worked under a subcontract with Uniband, Inc. (later Uniband Enterprises).
78

The evidence shows that ACS timely processed the I-20 forms associated 

with Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-539 applications and placed them in storage. The 

evidence also shows that ACS operated under an understanding that its contract 

with Uniband provided that it should store the school copy of the I-20 for 180 

days after processing was completed. What is unclear, however, is whether 

Uniband’s contract with the INS – which was the basis for ACS’s contract with 

Uniband – required something other than a 180-day storage requirement in the 

processing of I-20s. We found evidence that indicates that while the INS 

contemplated a storage requirement for other INS forms processed by Uniband 

and by ACS, the INS intended that I-20s be processed and returned to the 

schools within 30 days. But based upon the record available to us, we are not 

able to conclude what the actual intent of the contract was or who, if anyone, 

made a mistake with respect to the processing of I-20s. We are concerned, 

however, that the INS, through lack of attention to the contract, permitted the 

contractor to process forms contrary to the INS’s intent. 

A. ACS contract to process INS immigration forms

ACS is based in Dallas, Texas, and provides business processing and 

information technology services to commercial and government accounts. 

With respect to government accounts, ACS has contracts with various agencies 

of the federal government, including the INS.67 Since approximately 1982, a 

wholly owned subsidiary of ACS or a predecessor company, either as a 

subcontractor or the prime contractor, has provided mail room services, 

microfilming, data capture, and document storage for multiple INS forms – in 

particular the I-20 form and some or all I-94 forms. These services have 

always been performed by ACS or its predecessor at a facility in London, 

Kentucky.68

Data captured from the forms by ACS is transmitted electronically to the 

INS for eventual upload into several INS databases: information from the I-94 

forms is eventually included in the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), 

the INS’s principal record-keeping system for nonimmigrants; and information 

 

67 In 2001, ACS had revenues of $3 billion, employed approximately 35,000 people, 

and maintained 500 offices in 35 countries.

68 The wholly owned subsidiary of ACS in London, Kentucky, is called ACS Business 

Process Solutions.
79

from the I-20 forms is eventually included in the Student and Schools System 

(STSC), which provides the INS with statistical information pertaining to 

nonimmigrant students and the schools that enroll them. However, ACS has 

not and does not enter data into these or any other INS databases directly or 

maintain any INS information systems. 

From approximately 1982 to 1996, the INS contracted directly with ACS 

to process various forms, including I-20s and I-94s. In 1996, the INS awarded 

the prime contract to Uniband, Inc., a Native American tribal-owned company 

located in Belcourt, North Dakota. Uniband subcontracted with ACS to 

provide the processing and storage functions for most of the INS forms covered 

in the prime contract – including I-20s and I-94 departure records. In 1996, the 

INS awarded Uniband a 5-year contract for processing the various forms; 

Uniband, in turn, subcontracted most of the work, including the processing of 

I-20s, to ACS.69 In October 2001, ACS became the prime contractor when the 

INS entered into a blanket purchase agreement with ACS to provide data entry 

and storage functions for several INS forms.70 No INS employees work at the 

ACS facility in Kentucky, not even an employee responsible for monitoring the 

performance of ACS.

B. How ACS processes I-20 forms

The ACS London, Kentucky, facility receives completed I-20 forms from 

INS service centers, ports of entry, and schools.71 ACS employees pick up the 

mail from the post office and deliver it to mail room employees who open the 

 

69 According to INS, the total value of this contract was approximately $100 million.

70 At the time that ACS was awarded the prime contract, ACS subcontracted the 

processing of I-94 arrival forms to Goodwill Industries in San Antonio, Texas, and to Uintah 

River Technology, LLC, a tribal-owned company in Duchesne, Utah. Under the present 

contract, the ACS facility in London, Kentucky, continues to process the I-94 departure 

forms and the I-20 forms. Because of a bid protest, ACS did not actually begin work under 

the new contract until December 18, 2001. 

71 When nonimmigrants obtain a student visa from a United States consulate, they will 

have both copies of the I-20 when they enter at a port of entry. The inspector stamps both 

the school copy and the student copy of the I-20, returns the student copy to the student, and 

sends the school copy to ACS. If a student transfers to a different school, the new school is 

responsible for issuing a new I-20 form to the student and for sending the school copy of the 

new I-20 form to ACS for data entry.
80

mail and separate the I-20s and other forms by type. Each type of form is then 

grouped into batches – I-20s are typically grouped in batches of 1000 – so ACS 

can estimate the number of each type of form received on a given day. These 

segregated batches are placed in records storage boxes, which are then dated. 

Prior to December 18, 2001, ACS was not required to log any of these mail 

receipt operations into a tracking system.72

The set-up boxes, each containing batches of a specific type of form 

received on a given day, are moved from the mail room to the document 

preparation station, where ACS employees ensure the documents are ready for 

scanning and microfilming. Prior to December 18, 2001, this was the first 

point in the process at which the boxes were logged into a tracking system. 

Document preparation employees check the forms for the required signatures 

(on the I-20, the nonimmigrant’s signature and the designated school official’s 

signature), label multiple copies of forms and attachments as such, and repair 

any rips or tears in the documents. The boxes are then logged out and sent to 

the Microfilming/Scanning section.

At the Microfilming/Scanning work station, I-20 forms and any attached 

documentation are microfilmed and image scanned.73 For each receipt date, 

ACS makes two sets of the microfilm – an original and duplicate. The 

duplicate microfilm is shipped immediately to the INS Records Management 

Branch, in Washington, D.C.; the original microfilm is held for 30 days and 

then shipped to the same place. The scanned images of the I-20s are used 

solely for processing purposes. The images are electronically transmitted to 

different computer workstations within the London, Kentucky, facility and to 

other ACS facilities for data entry. The scanned images eventually are 

 

72 For mail received after December 18, 2001, the date ACS began work under the new 

contract, information on each box set up by the mail room is entered into a tracking system 

(called the Master Control Program). The system captures the ID code of the employee 

creating the box and the date/time the forms in that box were received and processed, and 

generates a box header sheet with a bar code. The mail cannot progress to any other 

workstation in the facility until the appropriate entries are made in the tracking system. This 

tracking system is separate from the tracking system used at the TSC. Different bar code 

numbers are used at each facility.

73 Most of the other INS forms ACS receives for processing do not require 

microfilming. 
81

discarded as authorized by the contract. Following scanning, the computer 

system transmits small batches of the I-20 images to data entry operators.

At Data Entry, operators capture certain information from the forms: for 

I-20s, they enter information about the student and school, dates of expected 

attendance, type of status (F-1 or M-1), major field of study, and name of the 

designated school official. 74 If the I-20 does not reflect a valid school code, it 

is returned to the INS district office with responsibility for the school. Data 

entry operators keyed in between 800 and 850 I-20 forms each day.

After data entry, the captured information is transmitted to Quality 

Control, which randomly samples forms to ensure that data entry accurately 

captured the requisite information.75 Additionally, at this stage the computer 

system runs an automated edit check that flags certain problems.

After completion of the quality control review, the “source documents” 

(such as the school I-20s) are sent to storage; the data captured from the forms 

are transmitted in ASCII form electronically to the INS data center, 76 where 

another INS contractor, Electronic Data Systems (EDS), is responsible for 

eventually uploading the information in the appropriate INS database, such as 

NIIS and STSC. The ACS tracking system is updated to show the time spent 

in Data Entry/Quality Control and the date the information was transmitted to 

EDS. Under the terms of the 1996 contract, Uniband, and ACS, as the 

subcontractor, had five calendar days to process I-20s from point of receipt to 

data transmission to the INS data center. Under the new contract, effective 

December 18, 2001, ACS must accomplish the process in three calendar days.

 

74 ACS is not required to capture the unique receipt file number (Service Center 

Number) assigned by the service centers to I-539 applications and written on the I-20 form 

by the CAO at the time of adjudication.

75 Data entry operators in quality control actually re-key in the information from the 

scanned images. If these quality control operators key in something different for a particular 

data item than the original data entry operator keyed in, then the computer system generates 

an error message. For each error message, the quality control operator must re-key the data 

item to verify that there was not a keystroke error. If the re-key is correct, but the error 

message persists, the quality control operator must correct the original data entry operator’s 

mistake.

76 This data center is referred to as the Justice Data Center and is located in Dallas, 

Texas.
82

After the source documents are microfilmed, scanned, and data entered, 

they are stored for a specified time period, depending upon the type of form. 

The source documents were moved from the Data Entry section to an on-site 

storage portion of the facility, which maintains the documents in records 

storage boxes that specify the date received at ACS and by form type. ACS 

personnel told the OIG they understood that it is necessary to archive these 

documents for some period in case the source documents are needed for 

forensic purposes or as evidence in legal proceedings. The contract in effect at 

the time estimated that the INS would request the contractor to retrieve 6,000 

documents annually. In 2001, ACS received eight requests from the INS to 

retrieve archived documents; three of these requests were for student forms.77 

Following the prescribed storage period, ACS mails the school copy of 

the I-20 to the school. To prepare the school copy of the I-20s for mailing, the 

forms are fed into a machine that trifolds each form so that the school address 

(completed by the school) will show in an envelope window. The folded forms 

are then fed into a second machine, which stuffs the forms in an envelope and 

seals the envelope. Clerical personnel then complete a quick quality control 

check that consists of flipping through the stack of envelopes to make sure the 

address shows in the window. The envelopes are put in a mail tray and 

delivered to the Post Office.

The contract authorizes ACS to destroy most of the other source 

documents after the storage period has expired.

C. The mailing of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s to Huffman Aviation

Officials from both Uniband and ACS told the OIG that they understood 

the contract between Uniband and the INS in effect in September 2001, when 

ACS received the adjudicated Atta and Alshehhi I-20s, to require ACS to store 

the school copy of the I-20 for 180 days. They also stated that following the 

requisite storage period, the contract required ACS to return to the school, and 

not destroy, the I-20 form. As a result of these contractual requirements, they 

maintained, ACS was obligated to maintain possession of the original (school 

 

77 The eight requests required retrieval of more than 22,000 documents in storage at the 

ACS London, Kentucky, facility. A single request required retrieval of 22,904 documents.
83

copy) I-20s for Atta and Alshehhi until March 24, 2002 (180 days after the date 

of receipt, September 24, 2001).

ACS mailed the school copies of the I-20s of Atta and Alshehhi to 

Huffman Aviation as part of a mass mailing on March 5, 2002. Huffman 

Aviation received Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s on or before March 11, 2002, 

approximately two weeks before the 180-day storage requirement expired. 

This mailing was initiated at the direction of the INS. Representatives from 

ACS told the OIG that it was obligated to process all work received before 

December 18, 2001, the date its contract with the INS took effect, under the 

terms of its former subcontract with Uniband and to process all work received 

after December 18, 2001, under the terms of the new contract, which required 

ACS to return the I-20s to schools within 30 days.78 In late February 2002, 

INS representatives met with ACS at the London, Kentucky, facility to discuss 

the execution of the new contract. With respect to all forms that were being 

held in storage under the terms of the previous contract, the INS asked ACS to 

accelerate the rate at which it was sending out archived I-20s to bring its 

inventory of archived I-20s in line with the requirements of the new contract. 

In compliance with this request, ACS conducted several mass mailings of 

forms within a several day period. On March 5, 2002, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I20s were part of one of these mass mailings that included 4,000 forms and 

were therefore not maintained for the entire 180-day period.79

 

78 When ACS was awarded the new contract, Uniband – the only other company that 

made a bid for the contract – filed a protest with the INS. Between October and December 

18, 2001, while the protest was being assessed, ACS processed forms under the terms of the 

previous contract. This bid protest did not affect the processing of the Atta and Alshehhi I20s, which had been received on September 24, 2001.

79 After reviewing the draft report, the INS obtained from ACS a letter dated May 9, 

2002, in which ACS stated that it did not receive any written instruction from the INS to 

mail I-20s on March 5, 2002. The INS asserted in its written response that it was “not aware 

of any such written or oral instructions to ACS.” It is not clear to us why the INS underwent 

such effort to dispute a point that is not made in the report. We do not assert that the INS 

directed ACS to mail I-20s on March 5, 2002. INS representatives met with ACS in late 

February 2002 and discussed reducing the inventory of forms being stored under the terms 

of the previous contract by mailing them as soon as possible. In response to these 

instructions, ACS conducted several mass mailings, one of which occurred on March 5.
84

D. OIG’s analysis of ACS’s processing of the I-20s

1. Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s were handled in the same 

manner as other I-20s received by ACS at the time

The path that the Atta and Alshehhi I-20 forms took through the ACS 

facility and how long they remained at each station can mostly be determined 

from data entered into the tracking system used by ACS at the time (and with 

minor changes in place today). As explained above, the system does not track 

individual forms; it tracks “batches,” small numbers (50 or so) of the same type 

of form grouped together for processing. 

The tracking system contained the following information on the two 

batches of I-20s containing the Atta and Alshehhi forms. 

a. Atta’s I-20

Receipt at ACS 9/24/01

Start of batch scanning 9/25/01 12:27 PM

Completion of scanning 9/25/01 12:32 PM

Start of batch data entry 10/02/01 2:30 PM

Completion of batch data entry 10/02/01 3:17 PM

Start of batch quality control 

review

10/03/01 6:23 AM

Completion of batch quality 

control review

10/03/01 6:24 AM

Start of batch data transmission 10/05/01 8:10 AM
85

b. Alshehhi’s I-20

Receipt at ACS 9/24/01

Start of batch scanning 9/25/01 12:29 PM

Completion of scanning 9/25/01 12:32 PM

Start of batch data entry 10/02/01 2:32 PM

Completion of batch data entry 10/02/01 3:17 PM

Start of batch quality control 

review

10/03/01 6:23 AM

Completion of batch quality 

control review

10/03/01 6:25 AM

Start of batch data transmission 10/05/01 8:10 AM

Based on the information logged by ACS as the forms made their way 

through the process, it took ACS approximately 10 calendar days to process the 

Atta and Alshehhi I-20 forms from receipt through transmission to the INS. 

Although it took ACS twice the 5-day contract requirement to process these 

two files, the tracking system data shows that the forms were not unduly 

delayed at any stage of the process. Moreover, it appears that the delay 

resulted from an enormous volume of forms submitted to ACS following 

September 11, 2001. 80

The evidence also shows that Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms were not 

processed any differently from other I-20s submitted around that same time 

period. In each case, ACS processed the I-20s from receipt through data 

 

80 In the two weeks following September 11, 2001, ACS received more than twice the 

number of I-20s it was anticipating. For the months preceding September 2001, ACS 

received on average 46,233 I-20 forms per month. In September 2001, ACS received 

115,516 I-20s, the bulk of which was received after September 11, 2001. On a single day in 

late September 2001, ACS received approximately 19,000 I-20 forms.
86

transmission within a matter of days, stored the I-20s for 180 days, and 

returned the I-20s to the appropriate school.

2. The contract requirements for handling I-20s after 

processing

While we found that ACS did not process or store the Atta and Alshehhi 

I-20s differently from other I-20s, we found evidence that the INS had intended 

for I-20s to be mailed to schools within 30 days of processing, not after 180 

days of storage. This 30-day processing requirement appears to have been in 

the INS’s previous contracts for processing these forms. In addition, the 

language in ACS’s current contract is almost exactly the same as the language 

in the prior contract – the one in force in September 2001 – and requires ACS 

to return I-20s within 30 days of processing. Below we discuss these 

contractual requirements because we found that the INS may not have provided 

sufficient attention to this contract to ensure that the contractor and its 

subcontractor’s performance was consistent with the INS’s intent.

The 1996 contract between the INS and Uniband contained several 

provisions defining the time period the contractor was required to store 

documents following processing.81 At least one of these provisions also 

provided that following passage of the storage period, the contractor was to 

destroy the forms.82 The contract also contained a provision specifically 

requiring the contractor to return the school copy of the I-20 to the school 

within 30 days after processing.

Section C.5.1.3 of the contract, entitled “Document Storage, Retrieval 

and Disposal,” stated:

The Contractor shall store all original source documents 

for a period of 120 days, except for the Visa Waiver I-94, I-94T 

and I-92 documents. These documents shall be stored for a 

 

81 The contract between Uniband and ACS did not shed any light on this issue. It 

simply provided that “[ACS] shall provide storage/retrieval and destruction services of all 

document types, according to specific contract requirement.” 

82 Following the events of September 11, 2001, the INS directed its contractors not to 

destroy any archived documents.
87

period of one (1) year.... Original documents shall be destroyed 

within 7 days after the document’s storage period has expired.

The same section of the contract, however, contained a provision –

Section C.5.1, entitled “Document Collection and Control” – that referred to 

special processing requirements for certain specified documents:

The Contractor shall provide, implement, and maintain 

procedures to ensure the receipt, accountability, and control of 

approximately sixty million (60,000,000) documents from 

various locations ... throughout the United States and Canada. 

Samples of the forms and documents to be processed and 

specific requirements for the processing of each document are 

provided as Attachments B and C, respectively, in Section J of 

this contract.

Attachment C to Section J of the contract, entitled “Specific 

Forms/Documents Processing Requirements,” contained a provision providing 

several specific processing requirements for I-20 forms. That provision 

provided, in pertinent part:

I-20A/B, I-20M/N

Return page 1 of the I-20 to the school thirty (30) days 

after processing.

(Emphasis added.)

In July 1998, the INS issued a Task Order (what we refer to as Task 

Order No. 1) to the contract that included a Statement of Work effectively 

superseding the description of the work set forth in Section C.5 of the contract. 

The most significant change was that I-92s would no longer be stored for one 

year but for 180 days. Other forms would continue to be stored for 120 days. 

Task Order No. 1 also contained, however, a paragraph entitled “Scope of 

Work,” that repeated word-for-word the provisions in Section C.5.1 of the 

underlying contract, quoted above, which refers to the specific requirements for 

particular forms as stated in the attachments, specifically Attachment C.

The INS and Uniband modified Task Order No. 1 and thus the contract in 

August 1998. The modification changed the standard storage period for 

original source documents from 120 days to 180 days. But this modification 

did not, at least explicitly, modify or amend the provisions in the Scope of 

Work clause in Task Order No. 1, which incorporates by reference the specific 
88

requirements for particular forms as stated in the attachments, specifically 

Attachment C.

Several ACS employees acknowledged that at some point in the past, 

ACS did return I-20 forms to the schools within 30 days. These employees 

recalled that the storage requirements for I-20s changed from 30 days to 120 

days and then again to 180 days, although they did not recall when the changes 

occurred or what precipitated the changes. 

ACS representatives told the OIG that it was their understanding that the 

August 1998 modification to the contract superseded the prior storage 

requirements for all source documents and set a new storage requirement of 

180 days.83 It appears that ACS followed this interpretation for several years –

until December 2001, when ACS signed a contract with INS that, like the 1996 

contract with Uniband, specified a 30-day storage requirement for I-20 forms 

in Attachment C to the contract.

Based upon our reading of the contract and subsequent modifications, we 

believe that it was the INS’s intention that I-20 forms be returned to the schools 

in 30 days, as explicitly set forth in Attachment C to the original contract. Our 

interviews with the INS personnel who were responsible for managing the 

Uniband contract did not result in any further clarity regarding the INS’s intent 

with respect to the processing of I-20 documents, as expressed in the special 

processing requirements in Attachment C, or whether at some point that intent 

 

83 After reviewing a draft of this chapter of the report, ACS in its written response 

stated, “until we reviewed the draft report, ACS had never seen the specific language 

governing the storage of I-20 documents found in Att. C to the Uniband prime contract.” 

ACS also asserted that it adhered to the provision in the INS/Uniband contract that governed 

storage of source documents (Section C.5.1.3 discussed above) as that provision was 

modified over time. We note, however, that ACS did not destroy I-20s after the storage 

period expired as the storage provision required but instead returned the I-20s to the schools. 

The requirement that I-20s be returned to the schools was contained in the special 

processing requirements set forth in Attachment C to Section J of the INS/Uniband contract. 

In addition, ACS was aware of other specific processing requirements for the INS forms it 

handled – such as the data elements required to be captured – which were set forth in other 

attachments in Section J of the INS/Uniband contract. Furthermore, we note that ACS’s 

subcontract with Uniband specifically referenced the INS/Uniband contract Statement of 

Work and that the Statement of Work contained paragraph C.5.1, which specifically 

provided that special processing requirements for certain forms were in Attachment C. 
89

changed and the INS sought to have all forms handled by ACS processed and 

stored for 180 days.84

The management and oversight of this contract was the responsibility of 

the INS’s Office of Information Resource Management (IRM), which is a 

component of the Office of Management. IRM personnel responsible for this 

contract believed that administration of this contract should have fallen to the 

Inspections Division, and they sought to have administrative responsibility for 

the contract reassigned to Inspections.85 As a result, IRM assigned the contract 

a low priority. The Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR) 

within IRM who had responsibility for the INS-Uniband contract told the OIG 

that, because of other duties he was assigned, he exercised minimal oversight 

of the contract. He stated that he visited the Uniband facility only once prior to 

the day the contract was closed out and similarly visited the ACS facility only 

once. Neither visit was for the purpose of reviewing any specific contract 

requirements. He stated that at the time he was not familiar with the terms of 

the contract, and there is no evidence that he made any effort to monitor the 

contractor’s compliance with the provisions of the contract.86 As one 

employee who dealt with the contract told the OIG, IRM’s management of the 

Uniband contract was tantamount to “non-management.” As a result of this 

“laissez-faire” monitoring of the contractor’s performance, it does not appear 

 

84 The INS’s present contract with ACS is structured exactly the same as the 1996 

contract. The section entitled “Description of Work” contains both a general documents 

storage provision (Section 3.1.3), and a provision specifically noting that “[s]pecific 

requirements for the processing of each document are provided as Attachment C . . . .” 

(Section 3.1). Attachment C contains a provision requiring the contractor to return the 

school copy of the I-20 within 30 days after processing. Since ACS began work under the 

new contract in December 2001, it has been complying with the 30-day requirement for 

processing I-20s. 

85 Responsibility for the INS contract that was awarded to ACS in October 2001 has 

been placed in the Inspections Division.

86 The IRM employee stated that in the past, a group of INS employees was stationed at 

the facility to monitor the contractor’s performance of the contract, but that for budgetary 

reasons, the group was disbanded. Since that time, the INS has not had any personnel 

stationed at the ACS facility.
90

that the INS ever advised Uniband or ACS that its 180-day storage of I-20s was 

inconsistent with the terms of the contract.87

VI. OIG Conclusions Regarding the Delay in Sending the I-20 Forms to 

Huffman Aviation

Huffman Aviation received its copies of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms 

in March 2002, more than a year and a half after the forms were submitted to 

the INS in September 2000 and approximately seven months after the I-539 

change of status applications were approved in July and August 2001.

We found that the delay in sending the I-20 forms to Huffman Aviation 

was attributable to several causes. First, the INS did not adjudicate Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s I-539 change of status applications for approximately 10 months. 

The INS has historically placed a low priority on the adjudication of I-539 

applications, and the adjudication of these applications was significantly 

backlogged in 2001.

Second, after Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications were approved in July 

and August 2001, ACS did not receive the I-20 forms from the INS for 

approximately two months after adjudications. Processing was delayed for 

many weeks due to disorganization in the INS’s system for mailing the I-20s to 

ACS.

Third, ACS processed Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms quickly upon 

receipt in September 2001 but did not mail the forms to Huffman Aviation for 

almost 180 days. ACS’s actions were consistent with its understanding of its 

contract at the time and were consistent with its handling of other I-20 forms 

processed by ACS at the time. However, we found evidence that the INS had 

intended for the I-20s to be mailed to schools within 30 days not after 180 

days.

We are troubled by the INS’s lack of attention to its contract with 

Uniband and its lack of attention to the performance of ACS in processing 

I-20s. Even operating within a system that designated I-539s as a low priority, 

we believe that the INS’s Office of Information Resource Management, which 

 

87 After reviewing a draft of the report, the INS acknowledged that “program 

mismanagement was a factor” and asserted that it had “constructively accepted” ACS’s 

storage of I-20s for 180 days because it never objected to ACS’s actions. 
91

was responsible for monitoring the contract, should have been more familiar 

with the terms of the contract and exercised more oversight to ensure that its 

contractor was abiding by the INS’s understanding of the terms of the contract, 

especially since no INS employees worked at the ACS facility. We believe 

that the INS should have paid more attention to the performance of the 

contract.

VII. Adjudication of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-539s

In addition to investigating what caused the delay in the INS’s processing 

of the I-20s that were sent to Huffman Aviation on March 11, 2002, we 

evaluated whether the INS properly approved Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of 

status applications.

The adjudication of I-539 change of status applications consists primarily 

of a review to ensure that the applicant has submitted the proper documents 

and the proper fee. This process is not designed to screen for potential 

criminals or terrorists; it is designed to ensure that applicants can demonstrate 

that they have the financial resources to support themselves while in the United 

States. INS employees at all levels told the OIG that the INS’s philosophy 

with respect to applications for INS benefits, and specifically the change of 

status benefit, is that applicants are presumptively eligible for the benefit unless 

they affirmatively demonstrate that they are not eligible. The percentage of 

approvals for I-539 change of status applications (not including extension of 

stay applications) has been 83 percent, 88 percent, 90 percent, and 91 percent 

for fiscal years 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively, and field personnel 

told the OIG that in their experience the majority of the denials stem from an 

applicant failing to timely file the change of status application. 88

A. Requirements for approval for I-539 change of status

In the sections that follow, we discuss several issues related to the change 

of status adjudication process.

 

88 We provide a graph on the next page depicting the number of approvals and denials 

of I-539 change of status applications in the TSC in fiscal year 2001.
92

Texas Service Center FY01

I-539 Change of Status Only

0

100

200

300 400

500

600 700

800

900

1,000 1,100

1,200

1,300 1,400

1,500

1,600

1,700

Oct00Nov00Dec00Jan01Feb01Mar01Apr01May01Jun01Jul-01 Aug01Sep01

Month

# of Applications

APPROVALS

DENIALS
93

Signature requirement

When a CAO initially receives a file containing a change of status 

application for student status, the CAO should first ensure that the I-539 has 

been signed and that the two I-20s have been signed by the school official and 

by the student.89 If the forms have not been signed, the adjudicator is supposed 

to return the entire application to the applicant. However, this procedural 

requirement is not explicitly stated in the SOPs for the I-539 applications that 

were in use at the TSC at the time that Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications were 

adjudicated. TSC personnel stated that since the signature requirement pertains 

to all forms adjudicated in the service centers, it was not considered a 

requirement particular to the I-539 and therefore unnecessary for inclusion in 

the SOPs. In addition, the signature requirement is not addressed in the 

Adjudicator’s Field Manual, since the portions of the INS’s Adjudicator’s Field 

Manual that address nonimmigrants have not yet been completed.

With respect to Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-539 applications, both signed the 

I-539 forms and submitted the appropriate fee. The school copy of both Atta’s 

and Alshehhi’s I-20s were signed by an official representing Huffman 

Aviation, but not by Atta or Alshehhi.

We learned in interviews with TSC personnel that adjudicators 

consistently return I-539s that have not been signed. But with respect to the 

I-20 forms, which require the signature of the school official and the student, 

CAOs often do not return the application form to the student if the I-20 has not 

been signed by the student, only if the I-20 is not signed by the school official. 

Instead of returning the application to the student, the CAO normally makes a 

note to the student that the student copy of the I-20 must be signed, and this 

information reaches the student when the student copy of the I-20 is returned to 

the student after adjudication. According to TSC personnel, CAOs have 

adopted this practice because it is more efficient than returning the entire 

application to the student simply to obtain a signature. TSC personnel stated 

that since the student copy of the I-20 must be signed by the student to re-enter 

 

89 As stated previously, contractor clerical personnel initially review the I-539 to ensure 

that it has been signed and that the appropriate fee has been attached. The CAO’s review of 

the I-539 for the signature is the second review in the process.
94

the country, the student would eventually be required to sign the form by an 

inspector at the port of entry.

1. Proof that applicant timely filed the application

Another preliminary step that the CAO must conduct is ensuring that the 

applicant filed the application prior to the lapse of his or her current status. On 

the I-539 form, applicants state their current nonimmigrant status and the date 

that the status expires. This information can be verified by the CAO by 

reviewing the copy of the arrival I-94 submitted by the applicant. TSC 

personnel told the OIG that the TSC considers the application “received” when 

INS date stamps the application in the mail room. If the CAO determines that 

the application was not timely filed, the adjudicator will set the application 

aside in a stack of files that the adjudicator later prepares for denial. 90

In this case, Atta and Alshehhi timely filed their I-539 applications. The 

TSC received Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications on September 19, 2000, and 

they were both data entered on September 22, 2000. 91 Atta’s admission as a 

B-2 visitor on June 3, 2000, was not scheduled to lapse until December 2, 

2000. Alshehhi’s admission as a B-2 visitor on May 29, 2000, was not 

scheduled to lapse until November 28, 2000. 92

 

90 TSC personnel told the OIG that CAOs typically set aside one day of the week to 

handle denials, returns, and requests for information. With respect to denials, the CAO 

prepares a denial letter that is sent to the applicant. Denials of change of status applications 

cannot be appealed.

91 Atta and Alshehhi actually enrolled in Huffman Aviation at the end of August but did 

not file their change of status applications with the INS until September 19, 2000. This was 

permissible under the law at the time because the law did not require persons who wished to 

change to student status to file the application prior to starting school. 8 CFR § 248.1(c). 

Since September 11, 2001, the INS has taken steps to change this regulation and recently 

issued a proposed interim rule to require nonimmigrants to complete the change of status 

process before beginning school. This proposed regulation change is discussed in Chapter 

Seven, Section III A of this report.

92 Alshehhi incorrectly stated on his I-539 application form that he had entered the 

country on May 9, 2000. In addition, he also incorrectly stated that his current status was 

scheduled to expire on January 17, 2010; this date was the expiration date of his B-1/B-2 

visa.
95

2. Evidence requirement

After the CAO determines that the application form was signed and 

timely filed, the CAO must ensure that the applicant has submitted the proper 

evidence as required by law and by the instructions on the I-539. To change to 

nonimmigrant student status, the applicant must submit a copy of the I-94, a 

copy of his or her passport showing that it and the visa have not expired, and 

documentary evidence of financial support in the amount indicated on the I-20.

INS regulations do not define what constitutes sufficient “documentary 

evidence of financial support.” The portions of the Adjudicator’s Field Manual 

addressing nonimmigrants have not been completed, and the Field Manual 

does not contain any guidance for adjudicators on this issue. We also found no 

reference to this topic in INS’s Operations Instructions. According to Service 

Center personnel that we interviewed, there is no centralized guidance on what 

evidence is required to be submitted or what evidence should be considered in 

adjudicating an I-539 change of status application. As a result, each service 

center has developed its own guidance. TSC personnel stated that adjudicators 

are provided with examples of documents that can be submitted, such as copies 

of bank statements, a letter from a bank, or a copy of the parents’ tax return if 

the family, but not the student, is currently living in the country. With respect 

to students from European countries, TSC personnel stated that CAOs at the 

TSC are trained that a letter or affidavit from the parents stating that they will 

support the student is also acceptable. We found that much of the 

determination is left to the discretion of the adjudicator.

If an adjudicator determines that the appropriate evidence has not been 

submitted, the adjudicator can make a request for more evidence, which results 

in the application being put on hold until the applicant complies with the 

request. The adjudicator may also deny the application. If an adjudicator 

determines that the appropriate evidence has been submitted and that the other 

requirements discussed above have been met, the adjudicator will approve the 

application. 93

 

93 According to TSC personnel, CAOs are not required to review the documents to 

determine if they might be fraudulent. Rather, adjudicators review the documents to 

determine if they are facially valid. One CAO told the OIG that it is not the role of the CAO 

to look behind or challenge the documents. However, TSC personnel also said that if the 

adjudicator notices something amiss about the copies of the documents submitted, the CAO 

(continued)
96

In this case, Atta and Alshehhi each submitted copies of their I-94s, valid 

passports, and valid visas. In addition, each submitted a bank statement record 

signed by a bank official demonstrating a joint account between Atta and 

Alshehhi with a balance on September 6, 2000, of $21,372.52. Atta and 

Alshehhi also each attached a handwritten note stating that each was being 

supported by his family and that money was being transferred to their account 

regularly. Atta and Alshehhi also submitted copies of a lease for a property 

that they were renting in Venice, Florida.

In sum, based on our review of the steps taken by the adjudicator and the 

evidence presented by Atta and Alshehhi, we concluded that the adjudicator 

approved Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-539 applications in accord with INS polic ies 

and practices. Because the I-20s were not signed by Atta or Alshehhi, 

however, the adjudicator should have returned the applications. But TSC 

adjudicators rarely returned such forms without a signature.

B. Length of stay for nonimmigrant vocational students 

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s stated that their course of study was from 

September 1, 2000, until September 1, 2001. Their admission period was 

noted on their I-20s as being from September 1, 2000, until October 1, 2001, 

which is one year plus 30 days. We investigated to determine whether this 

time period was appropriate. 

As discussed earlier in this report, foreign students are permitted to stay 

in the United States for different lengths of time, depending on their status and 

course of study. Vocational students, or M-1 students, are authorized to be 

admitted “for the period of time necessary to complete the course of study ... 

plus thirty days within which to depart from the United States or for one year, 

whichever is less.” 8 CFR § 214.2(m)(5). According to the guidance in the 

Inspector’s Field Manual, however, the admission period for an M-1 student 

 

(continued)

can send the file to the division within the service center that handles benefit fraud 

investigations – the Enforcement Operations Division. We found that in reality, 

adjudicators are discouraged from scrutinizing applications for possible fraud because of the 

pressure to produce completed adjudications. For a discussion of the production pressure 

faced by adjudicators, see Section VII D below.
97

cannot exceed one year.94 As stated earlier in this report, the portions of the 

Adjudicator’s Field Manual addressing nonimmigrants have not been 

completed.

According to the adjudicator in this case, his understanding of the law 

and INS policy was that a vocational student is entitled to be in status for only 

one year. He stated that he wrote in the end date of the admission period with 

an additional 30 days because it is the grace period that all vocational students 

are provided so that they can leave the country. He said that inspectors who 

encountered the I-20 would understand that the 30 additional days were the 

grace period only and not the time the student was considered in status. 

According to other Service Center personnel, this practice of allowing a 

vocational student whose course of study is one year an additional 30 days to 

vacate is not uncommon, and there is no INS policy prohibiting this practice.95 

INS inspectors interviewed by the OIG stated, however, that they admit 

vocational students only for one year even if the course is scheduled to last for 

one year and that no additional days are added for the “grace period.”

In sum, we found that the law permits a vocational student to remain in 

status for a total of one year and that there is no provision for an additional 

grace period after the expiration of the 1-year period. In this case, the CAO’s 

decision to include a 30-day grace period in the status period for Atta and 

Alshehhi was incorrect.

This mistake did not, however, affect the legal status of Atta and 

Alshehhi as of September 11, 2001. Even if Atta and Alshehhi had been given 

M-1 status for only one year, Atta and Alshehhi would have been in the 

country legally on September 11 based on their still valid B-1/B-2 visas. 

Moreover, Atta re-entered the United States for the last time on July 19, 2001, 

and was admitted as a B-1 visitor until November 12, 2001. Alshehhi was 

 

94 Under “Terms of Admission” for M-1 students, the manual states: “Admit as M-1 to 

the end date of the course, as specified on the I-20, plus 30 days. Do not exceed 1 year.”

95 The INS Office of General Counsel attorney responsible for handling benefits issues 

told the OIG that in her opinion the regulation regarding M-1 students is ambiguous as to 

whether vocational students whose course of study is exactly one year are also entitled to the 

30-day period within which to depart the United States that is given to all other vocational 

students.
98

admitted for the last time on May 2, 2001 as a B-2 visitor until November 2, 

2001.

C. Information that could have affected the adjudication

1. Completion of the course by Atta and Alshehhi on

December 19, 2000

According to federal regulations, students are eligible for nonimmigrant 

student status only while they are pursuing a “full course of study.” Once 

students complete their course of study, they are no longer in student status and 

must leave the country.96 8 CFR § 214.1(a)(3). We sought to determine 

whether the school or the student has any obligation to report to the INS that 

the student has completed school or terminated his or her studies for some 

other reason.

With regard to students, the law does not require them to report any 

information to the INS about their student status. Students are obligated to 

leave the United States once they are no longer in student status.

With respect to schools, the reporting obligations are not clearly set out 

in the law. Section 101 of the INA, which defines academic and vocational 

students, includes the following language about academic and vocational 

schools: “... institution[s] shall have agreed to report to the Attorney General 

the termination of attendance of each nonimmigrant [academic or 

nonacademic] student and if any such institution fails to make reports promptly 

the approval shall be withdrawn.” 8 USC § 1101(a)(15)(f) and (m).

The regulations state that the INS will provide to the schools a list of 

students at least once a year, and once the schools have this list, they are 

obligated to notify the INS of any student on the list who is no longer in school 

or taking a full course of study. 8 CFR § 214.3(g)(3). We found that the INS 

has not provided these lists to the schools since 1989 because of problems with 

the INS’s computer system that records information about students, the Student 

 

96 The regulations require that nonimmigrants must depart the United States at the 

expiration of their authorized period of admission or upon abandonment of their authorized 

nonimmigrant status.
99

and Schools System or STSC.97 Unless the INS has requested information 

about the status of students, the schools do not have any affirmative obligation 

to report this information to the INS.

We also found that when schools voluntarily provide this information to 

the INS, the information is provided to the INS district office in which the 

school is located, but the INS rarely takes any action on this information. 

Moreover, the INS has no system by which this information, if reported, is 

shared with the service centers or put into any computer system.

The course of study for Atta and Alshehhi was defined on their I-20s as 

lasting from September 1, 2000, until September 1, 2001, and the TSC CAO 

approved their student status until October 1, 2001. However, Atta and 

Alshehhi passed the required examination to obtain a pilot’s license on 

December 19, 2000, and had finished their course of studies at Huffman 

Aviation by the time the TSC CAO approved their change of status. But the 

 

97 The OIG obtained a memorandum dated May 26, 1995, from the INS Commissioner 

to the Deputy Attorney General, which describes immigration controls on foreign students in 

response to specific questions by the Deputy Attorney General. One of the questions asked 

by the Deputy Attorney General was: “How regularly (semester-by-semester, annually, etc.) 

does INS check on whether foreign students are maintaining status?” The INS’s response in 

part was: 

Current regulations provide for sending a data print-out of ‘F’ and ‘M’ 

students listed in the Service’s automated Student/School System as attending a 

school for the school to verify, correct, and return to the INS’ contractorsupported data center to update the student information on the system. This 

massive revalidation effort has been suspended since December 1989 because 

major systemic limitations and data linkage problems within the STSC systemdesign related to file structure, ability to archive, purge or otherwise merge 

duplicate data contained in form-driven files relative to most current updates, 

could not be overcome.

The INS did not take any immediate steps to correct the problem. Instead, as the INS 

indicated in the next paragraph of the memorandum, the INS initiated “a study for correcting 

the system problems with the aim of engineering a database to effectively support all student 

and school information requirements, including an assessment of the viability of the current 

STSC database and alternative recommendations to establish a reliable repository of student 

and school data.” This new computer system, the Student and Exchange Visitor Information 

System (SEVIS), is scheduled to be implemented in 2003. For a complete discussion of 

SEVIS, see Chapter Six of this report.
100

CAO had no information in the file or in any computer system by which he 

could have been aware that Atta and Alshehhi had completed the pilot’s 

program in December 2000. Had the CAO been aware of this information, he 

would have approved the application but would have allowed admission only 

between September 1, 2000, and the end of the program, plus 30 days.

2. Lack of sufficient hours for “full course of study”

An applicant is not entitled to change to student status unless the 

applicant is pursuing a “full course of study.” For vocational students, a full 

course of study requires “at least eighteen clock hours of attendance a week if 

the dominant part of the course of study consists of classroom instruction, or at 

least twenty-two clock hours a week if the dominant part of the course of study 

consists of shop or laboratory work.” 8 CFR § 214.2(m)(9)(iii). Huffman 

Aviation billing records show that neither Atta nor Alshehhi attended school 

the required 18 or the required 22 hours per week. Accordingly, they did not 

meet the “full course of study” requirement.98

Nonetheless, the CAO had no way of learning that information. Schools 

are required to certify on the I-20 that each student has enrolled in a full course 

of study to obtain the M-1 visa or the change of status to an M-1. Once 

Huffman Aviation certified Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s, the CAO had no 

reason not to accept the certification at face value. In addition, as stated above, 

the INS has not asked schools since 1989 to report students who are failing to 

take a full course of study. 

3. Departures by Atta and Alshehhi while their I-539 

applications were pending

As discussed earlier in this report, Atta and Alshehhi left and re-entered 

the United States on two occasions while their I-539 applications were 

pending. The INS’s stated policy is that nonimmigrant students abandon their 

I-539 applications if they leave the country while the application is pending 

and that the application should be denied by the adjudicator.99 Therefore, 

 

98 We discuss the issue of whether Huffman Aviation offers a full course of studies and 

should therefore be authorized to issue I-20s in Chapter Six of this report.

99 The only written record of this policy that we were able to find was contained in a 

June 18, 2001, memorandum written by Acting Assistant Commissioner Thomas Cook 

(continued)
101

according to this INS policy, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications should have 

been denied for abandonment.

The CAO who adjudicated their cases, however, was not aware that Atta 

and Alshehhi had departed the country, even though this information was in the 

INS’s computer system. A nonimmigrant’s arrivals to and departures from the 

United States are supposed to be recorded on I-94 forms, which are collected 

by inspectors when a nonimmigrant arrives into the country and are supposed 

to be collected by the airlines when a nonimmigrant departs the country. The 

airlines should send the forms to the INS to be data entered by an INS 

contractor and later uploaded into the INS’s Nonimmigrant Information 

System (NIIS).

Although adjudicators have access from their computer terminals to 

NIIS, we found that CAOs were not required at the time to check NIIS before 

making a decision on an I-539 application. Unless a copy of the I-94 was not 

attached to the application and the CAO needed to access NIIS in order to 

confirm the date the applicant arrived, CAOs normally did not check NIIS.

On March 15, 2002, after the controversy about Atta’s and Alshehhi’s 

change of status applications surfaced, the INS issued new requirements with 

respect to processing I-539s, including the requirement that NIIS be checked 

before the I-539 is adjudicated.100

D. Production pressures and the I-539

We found that while CAOs have the ability to check NIIS and refer cases 

suspected of fraud to the Enforcement Operations Division, they do not

routinely do so because of pressure to adjudicate cases quickly. For example, 

one experienced CAO told the OIG that he has not accessed NIIS regularly in 

the past because, even though it would only take approximately 30 seconds to 

 

(continued)

purporting to reiterate INS’s “long standing” policy. According to the TSC Supervisory 

CAO who is currently responsible for managing the processing of I-539s and who provides 

training to CAOs on I-539s, she did not see the Cook memorandum until March 21, 2002, 

when it was distributed to the field from INS Headquarters via e-mail.

100 We discuss the INS’s changes to the I-539 process in Chapter Seven of this report.
102

complete the transaction, it was not worth the time to do so because it would 

interfere with the CAO completing the required number of cases.

Moreover, adjudicators are evaluated based on the number of 

applications they complete. Their performance appraisal rating is based on a

point system, and adjudicators receive points for each application or petition 

they adjudicate. The number of points assigned to an application is based on 

the complexity of the type of adjudication. For example, an adjudicator 

receives 15 points for each change of status application adjudicated. Although 

denial letters and requests for evidence require significantly more time for 

adjudicators to review, they do not receive any additional points for completing 

these transactions. According to the performance work plan for CAOs in effect 

between March 2001 and April 2002, to achieve an outstanding rating, a 

journeyman CAO would be required to obtain over 1,149 points during an 8-

hour period. To obtain an excellent rating, the journeyman CAO would have 

to obtain 880 to 1,149 points. For the GS9/11 CAO, the outstanding level 

requires over 1,072 points in an 8-hour period, and the excellent rating requires 

806 to 1,072 points. If we assume an average of 1,000 points and a CAO 

adjudicating change of status applications, this would require the adjudicator to 

complete approximately 66 applications in an 8-hour day. Factoring in 30 

minutes for lunch but no breaks, an adjudicator would spend approximately 7 

minutes on each application. To achieve the required 1,000 points, the CAO 

would actually have to complete cases even faster than this average, because 

the averages are calculated with no breaks and no delays such as preparing 

denial letters or requests for information. One experienced TSC adjudicator 

told the OIG that he adjudicates approximately 75 I-539 applications per day.

The U.S. General Accounting Office also recently observed the 

production pressure faced by adjudications officers and the effect this pressure 

has on an adjudicator referring cases for fraud investigation. See “Immigration 

Benefit Fraud: Focused Approach is Needed to Address Problems,” Report 

No. GAO-02-66, January 2002, p. 5 and p. 29. The GAO stated, “Some 

adjudicators told us that because of the pressure to adjudicate cases quickly, 

they did not routinely use investigations staff to look into potentially fraudulent 

applications: doing so would take more time and reduce the number of 

applications they could review.” The OIG has also addressed the impact of the 

production pressure faced by adjudicators on the quality of adjudications in our 

July 2000 report on the INS’s “Citizenship USA Initiative,” a program in fiscal 

year 1996 that targeted reducing the backlogs in the naturalization program.
103

E. OIG conclusions regarding the adjudication of Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s change of status applications

The adjudicator who approved Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status 

application did so in accord with INS policies and practices at the time. The 

process for reviewing these applications was not designed to uncover criminals 

or potential terrorists. Rather, it was a paper-driven process that required the 

applicant to meet minimal standards to obtain the desired change of 

nonimmigrant status. Applicants were viewed as presumptively eligible unless 

they clearly demonstrated that they were not eligible. On paper, Atta and 

Alshehhi met the requirements for change of status, and the adjudicator 

routinely approved their applications.

We noted several problems with the adjudication process, however. 

First, Atta and Alshehhi had not signed their I-20 forms, which technically 

should have resulted in the applications being returned to them. However, the 

TSC had adopted a practice of bringing the missing signature to the attention of 

the student by noting it on the student copy of the I-20, which was eventually 

returned to the student after adjudication of the application. The INS should 

determine whether this practice is consistent with INS policy and then address 

this issue in national standard operating procedures and the Adjudicator’s Field 

Manual.

Second, the adjudicator approved Atta’s and Alshehhi’s admissions for 

one year plus thirty days. Federal regulations are clear that vocational students 

are permitted to remain in vocational student status for the length of their 

course of study, with a maximum of one year. The TSC practice of permitting 

vocational students whose course of study is one year an additional 30-day 

grace period may exist at other service centers. If, as it appears to us, this

practice is contrary to INS regulations and policy, the INS should take steps to 

correct this practice.

Finally, and most importantly, we found that the adjudicator did not have 

complete information about Atta and Alshehhi before adjudicating their 

applications. Although Atta and Alshehhi had finished their course at Huffman 

Aviation by the time their applications were adjudicated, the process is not 

designed to collect this information and even if it were collected, to make this 

information known to adjudicators in the service centers. Similarly, Atta and 

Alshehhi were not entitled to student status because they were not taking a 

“full course of study” as required by law, but the INS did not have any system 

for collecting or otherwise providing this information to adjudicators. In 
104

addition, the adjudicator was not aware that Atta and Alshehhi had departed the 

United States twice while their applications were pending, thus rendering their 

applications abandoned. Although the INS captures information about 

departures in its NIIS database, adjudicators were not required to access NIIS 

in every case to ensure that the applicant had not departed the United States 

while the application was pending.

In sum, while the adjudicator approved the applications in accord with 

standard INS practices and policies existing at the time, these practices and 

policies were significantly flawed. They resulted in adjudicators approving 

applications without complete information. 

The INS has since revised some of its procedures for change of status 

applications and has proposed regulations that affect the processing of these 

applications. We address these processing and regulatory changes in 

subsequent chapters of this report.
105

CHAPTER FIVE

THE INS’S FAILURE TO STOP DELIVERY OF THE I-20S 

TO HUFFMAN AVIATION

I. Introduction

In this chapter of the report, we discuss the second question specifically 

presented to us by the Attorney General:

• Why did the INS fail to stop the delivery of the school’s copy of the I20 form after Atta and Alshehhi were identified as terrorists who 

participated in the attacks of September 11, 2001?

To investigate this issue, we interviewed managers and other employees in the 

two INS components with the most relevant jurisdictions over Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s I-20s: the Immigration Services Division and the Enforcement 

Division. The Immigration Services Division had responsibility for the TSC; 

the Enforcement Division had responsibility for the investigative activity 

associated with the September 11 attacks and worked closely with the FBI. 

Both the Immigrations Services Division and the Enforcement Division fall 

within the Office of Field Operations. Below we describe the actions of INS 

employees in the aftermath of September 11 and their reasons for not retrieving 

the I-20s. Thereafter we analyze their actions and explanations.

II. Actions of ACS and INS Employees

A. Actions of ACS

Before addressing the INS’s failure to stop the delivery of the I-20s to 

Huffman Aviation, we discuss ACS’s role in this matter. We concluded that 

ACS should not be criticized for mailing out the forms. First, as a government 

contractor, ACS takes its direction from the INS. In addition, as discussed in 

the rest of the chapter, no one from the INS contacted ACS about Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s I-20s. Absent instructions from the INS, ACS had no independent 

responsibility to check its records to verify whether it possessed documents 

related to terrorists from September 11.

Moreover, the processing of I-20s is a clerical function that is mostly 

automated. Although a clerical employee would have seen the names of Atta 

and Alshehhi when he or she data entered the information from the I-20s in 

October 2001, clerical employees at ACS had no responsibility for determining 
106

whether the information they were typing was related to terrorists from 

September 11. In addition, as described earlier in this report, the mailing of the 

I-20s is a completely automated process. ACS personnel perform a quick 

quality control check that consists of making sure that the address of the school 

appears in the envelope window but do not see the name of the student when 

doing so.

For these reasons, we do not believe that ACS bears any responsibility 

for not stopping the I-20s from being mailed to Huffman Aviation.

B. Actions of the TSC personnel and INS Headquarters managers 

overseeing the service centers

Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, INS personnel 

checked their records regarding the individuals believed to be responsible for 

the attacks. By the evening of September 11, 2001, TSC personnel working on 

their own initiative determined through database searches that the TSC had 

granted M-1 student status to Atta and Alshehhi and that the receipt files were 

being stored in the Mesquite facility. The next morning, two TSC employees 

went to the Mesquite facility and retrieved the Atta and Alshehhi receipt files. 

Later that same day, TSC management and INS Headquarters personnel 

responsible for TSC operations (the Immigration Services Division) were 

aware that TSC personnel were in possession of two of the September 11 

terrorists’ files.

As this section describes, we determined that no INS manager or 

employee inquired about the location of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s or 

requested additional information about the files, such as the status of the I-20s. 

The Headquarters and TSC managers we interviewed indicated that they did 

not consider the issue of physically retrieving the I-20s. Most surprisingly, 

they told the OIG that even if they had thought about the I-20s, they were not 

aware that the I-20s were still being processed because the contractor stored the 

I-20s for 180 days before returning them to the appropriate school. 

1. Retrieval of the Atta and Alshehhi files at the TSC

The TSC’s Enforcement Operations Division consists of eight 

Investigative Research Specialists (IRS), seven of whom handle investigations 
107

into possible benefits fraud.101 One of the IRSs is a computer specialist who 

manipulates and searches INS’s computer systems for data that would be 

useful in benefits fraud investigations. The IRSs report to the TSC Assistant 

Center Director for the Enforcement Operations Division, Gary Bradford. On 

September 11, Bradford had been for several weeks the Acting Deputy Center 

Director. He was on vacation the week of September 11. Bradford did not 

return to the office until the following Monday. One of the Investigative 

Research Specialists was the Acting Assistant Center Director in Bradford’s 

absence and had been for several weeks prior to September 11.

Two of the TSC’s other IRSs stayed at work on September 11 on their 

own initiative and began running computer checks based on information they 

obtained about the terrorists from news services and the Internet. According to 

one of these IRSs, by the evening of September 11, he and his co-worker had 

determined that Atta and Alshehhi had submitted I-539 applications to the TSC 

and identified that the TSC had the receipt files of both. On the morning of 

September 12, the IRSs went to the TSC file room, located in the auxiliary 

facility in Mesquite, Texas, and retrieved both receipt files. The IRSs said they 

notified the Acting Assistant Center Director for the Enforcement Operations 

Division, who in turn notified Bradford and the Acting Service Center 

Director, Carmelo Ortiz.

The Acting Assistant Center Director told the OIG that he also e-mailed 

the TSC’s point of contact at INS Headquarters in the Enforcement Division of 

the Office of Field Operations, who is a Senior Special Agent, to inform him 

that the TSC had the files and that he would await direction from INS 

Headquarters as to what to do with the files. According to the Acting Assistant 

Center Director, he also faxed the I-539s to the Senior Special Agent’s 

attention at INS Headquarters. The Acting Assistant Center Director told the 

OIG he was never contacted by the Senior Special Agent or anyone else at INS 

Headquarters about the files. According to the Senior Special Agent, he 

responded to the Acting Assistant Center Director by e-mail and instructed him 

to fax copies of the files to INS Headquarters, and that based on this 

 

101 The TSC Enforcement Operations Division is different from the Headquarters 

Enforcement Division. The TSC Enforcement Operations Division reports to the TSC 

Center Director, who reports to the Immigration Services Division in INS Headquarters, not 

to the Enforcement Division in INS Headquarters.
108

instruction, the Acting Assistant Center Director faxed copies of the files to 

INS Headquarters on September 12, 2001. 102 Shortly thereafter, the Senior 

Special Agent faxed the documents to FBI Headquarters.

On September 24, 2001, the FBI’s Dallas Division asked the TSC for the 

original files on Atta and Alshehhi. A Dallas Division Special Agent told the 

OIG that on that same day he was assigned a lead that had originated from the 

FBI’s Norfolk Division instructing the Dallas Division to go to the TSC and 

“obtain all information” relating to Alshehhi and Atta. 103 The FBI agent told 

the OIG that he went to the TSC and contacted the IRS who had been the 

Acting Assistant Center Director, who signed over to the FBI both Alshehhi’s 

and Atta’s original receipt files.104 On September 25, 2001, the FBI agent 

forwarded by facsimile to Norfolk and other FBI offices copies of the 

documents obtained at the TSC. In the cover memorandum, the FBI agent 

summarized his original task as being to “retrieve the original INS files at the 

Texas Service Center, Mesquite, Texas, regarding [Atta and Alshehhi].”

The Acting Assistant Center Director and the other IRSs interviewed by 

the OIG stated that they did not discuss the I-20s or whether there was any 

additional information related to the files. They said that they were concerned 

with preserving the files in the event that they contained forensic evidence that 

could be used in the terrorist investigation that was being led by the FBI. The 

receipt files contained the I-539 applications and supporting documentation. 

They did not contain the I-20s because by this time, the student copies of the 

I-20s had been returned to Atta and Alshehhi and the school copies of the I-20s 

were on their way to ACS for processing.

 

102 Both the Acting Assistant Center Director and the Senior Special Agent told the OIG 

that they no longer had any e-mail messages related to this issue.

103 The lead was sent to the Dallas Division by electronic communication dated 

September 13, 2001, and indicated that a search warrant of a commercial post box 

maintained by Atta and Alshehhi revealed information that had come from the TSC.

104 TSC personnel told the OIG that, although it was unclear why, the TSC kept a copy 

of the Atta file but did not keep a copy of the Alshehhi file.
109

2. Actions taken by TSC and INS Headquarters managers 

On the morning of September 11, the INS Associate Commissioner for 

Service Center Operations, Fujie Ohata, traveled on a plane with the new TSC 

Director, Evelyn Upchurch, who was scheduled to report to the TSC on 

September 11. Ohata told the OIG that she believes that she was informed by 

Ortiz about the fact that the TSC had identified the Atta and Alshehhi files and 

that the TSC was retaining the files until they were requested by the FBI. The 

INS Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Immigration Services 

Division, William Yates, told the OIG that he knew very soon after September 

11 that the TSC had the Atta and Alshehhi files, although he could not recall 

how he became aware of this. According to Bradford, Ortiz, Ohata, and Yates, 

they all sought to ensure that the files were properly maintained and that the 

appropriate personnel knew to provide the files to the FBI. They all told the 

OIG that they did not inquire further, however, about the status of the I-20s or 

whether all records related to the files had been located and provided to the 

FBI.

The OIG also sought to determine whether anyone in the service center 

management, whether in Texas or in Washington, D.C., sought to review the 

files or have the files reviewed to determine if the cases had been adjudicated 

properly. The OIG asked the Acting TSC Director at the time, Ortiz, whether 

he discussed the disposition of the files at any meetings with other TSC 

managers, and he said that he had not. He said that he considered the files to 

be part of an investigation and that information about the files should be kept 

“confidential.” Other TSC personnel told the OIG that they heard “rumors” 

and “gossip” that the TSC had the Atta and Alshehhi files, but they were not 

officially informed of this fact. We also asked the Assistant Center Directors 

for Adjudications, including the ACD who had responsibility for I-539 

applications and who was an experienced I-539 adjudicator, whether they were 

ever asked to review the files to determine if the adjudications had been 

handled properly, and they all said that they either had not been asked or did 

not know about the files. INS Headquarters managers also told the OIG that 

they did not discuss the files further once they were assured that the files were 

being maintained properly.
110

3. Reasons TSC and Immigration Services Division personnel 

did not stop the I-20s before they were mailed to Huffman 

Aviation

None of the TSC employees involved with handling the Atta and 

Alshehhi files, none of the TSC managers, and none of the managers at INS 

Headquarters responsible for oversight of the service centers inquired about the 

location of the school copy of the I-20s associated with Atta’s or Alshehhi’s 

file. All the employees we interviewed indicated that they did not think about 

the I-20s. They provided a number of different reasons for not doing so, which 

we discuss below. Most troubling to us was the fact that none of the managers 

we interviewed was aware of the contractor’s duties or requirements with 

respect to processing the I-20s. While all the managers told the OIG that they 

were aware that the I-20s were sent to a contractor in another state, they stated 

they did not know anything about the contractor’s process for the I-20s, 

including that the contractor stored the I-20s for six months before returning 

them to the school.

a. TSC personnel

The TSC Enforcement Operations Division personnel whom we 

interviewed told the OIG that once they retrieved the files from the Mesquite 

facility, their primary focus was on making sure that the files were handled in 

such a way that any forensic evidence would be preserved. They said that they 

did what they understood was their duty, to notify INS Headquarters about the 

files and to wait for further instructions. The Acting Assistant Center Director 

at the time said that he was disappointed not to receive further instructions 

from the Enforcement Division at INS Headquarters, but that he made no 

further contact with INS Headquarters about the files.

The Assistant Center Director for Enforcement Operations, Gary 

Bradford, told the OIG that he saw no need to discuss the files further or 

conduct any further investigation based on the Enforcement Operations 

Division’s assessment that the paperwork appeared to have been properly filed 

and adjudicated. He also said that within a day or so of September 11, the 

Enforcement Operations Divisions at all the service centers staffed their offices 

24 hours per day and 7 seven days per week to respond to requests for 

information and other needs of the INS and the FBI. He said that because of 

all the activity centered around the investigation following the events of 
111

September 11, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s files receded in importance and were no 

longer a concern once the FBI had retrieved them. 

All the Enforcement Operations Division employees we interviewed 

stated that even if they had considered the I-20s, they would have believed that 

the I-20s were already at Huffman Aviation and had been accounted for by the 

FBI. They indicated that since they all knew that the cases had been 

adjudicated months earlier and since none of them were aware of the 

contractor’s processing requirements, they would have believed that the I-20s 

had long since been processed by the contractor.

Ortiz, the Acting TSC Service Center Director in mid-September 2001, 

told the OIG that he was made aware of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s files and that 

once he was confident that they were being handled appropriately, there was 

nothing else to do with respect to the files. He said that since he considered the 

files to be part of the FBI’s investigation and the terrorists were dead, he did 

not see any reason to discuss the files with the TSC’s Assistant Center 

Directors to determine whether the cases had been properly adjudicated. In 

addition, he said that his focus was on the safety of the two TSC buildings 

because of fears of further attacks and several bomb threats that resulted in 

evacuations in the days following September 11. He told the OIG that he was 

not aware of the contracting requirements with respect to the I-20s; he only 

knew that they were processed by a private company in Kentucky. 

b. Immigration Services Division managers

Fujie Ohata, the Associate Commissioner for Service Center Operations, 

landed on a plane in Dallas, Texas, the morning of September 11 because she 

was escorting the new TSC Director to her post. Ohata told the OIG that she 

learned about the files of Atta and Alshehhi the next day from Ortiz. Ohata 

said that she recalled telling Ortiz to make sure that the appropriate law 

enforcement agencies had what they needed. Ohata said that she felt 

comfortable that the files were being dealt with appropriately, which was her 

concern. She said that in the aftermath of the events of September 11, she was 

dealing with a number of issues with respect to service center employees 

throughout the country who, like her, were stranded away from their duty 

stations. She also said that she was ensuring that all of the service centers were 

up and running. 

Ohata said that she returned to Washington on Thursday, September 13, 

and that she recalls having a limited conversation with Yates about the fact that 
112

at least one of the suspected terrorists had been granted benefits by the INS 

through the TSC. She said that she informed Yates, her supervisor, that the 

TSC had located the file and was in the process of transferring it to the FBI. 

Ohata told the OIG that she did not recall any meetings at INS Headquarters 

about the files or any discussion about determining whether the files had been 

properly adjudicated. She said that she was not asked to do anything else with 

respect to the files, nor did she ask anyone to do anything else with respect to 

the files.

Ohata told the OIG that she was not aware of anything in the contract 

between INS and the contractor regarding the I-20s and a storage requirement 

of 180 days. She said that she learned only recently about this arrangement 

from INS briefings to the media.

Yates, the Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for and the person 

in charge of the Immigration Services Division, told the OIG that he was not 

sure how he was made aware of the terrorists’ files in the TSC but that he 

recalled getting telephone calls from the field about this matter. He suggested 

that since he was aware that the files were being maintained appropriately for 

law enforcement purposes, there was nothing else to do with respect to these 

files, and he did not give any further instructions about them.

He said that in the aftermath of September 11, he took his direction from 

then-Executive Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations Michael Pearson, 

who immediately established a “Command Center” at INS Headquarters for 

coordinating information. According to Yates, his first instructions from 

Pearson were to set up the service centers’ Enforcement Operations Divisions 

to operate around the clock, seven days per week. Yates said that his office 

was also asked, based upon a request from the White House, to compile a list 

of the dates, times and locations of naturalization ceremonies all over the 

United States, which he said he believed arose because Bush Administration 

officials were planning to attend naturalization ceremonies as a means to 

demonstrate support for immigrants after the September 11 attacks. According 

to Yates, this directive generated an enormous amount of work.

Yates told the OIG that he was aware that significant numbers of requests 

were made throughout the INS for original A-files and receipt files and that 

these files were provided to the particular law enforcement official or entity 

that requested the file. However, Yates said that he never received any 

instruction to collect all INS files or records with respect to the terrorists once 

they had been identified, nor did he ever issue such an order on his own 
113

initiative. According to Yates, with respect to the pulling together all of the 

files, he and other Immigration Services Division personnel took their 

instructions from law enforcement personnel, since the files were related to an 

FBI investigation.

With respect to the processing of I-20s, Yates said that he was not aware 

of the contractor’s process for handling I-20s and stated specifically that he 

was not aware that the contractor stored the I-20s for 180 days after processing 

them. He also stated that to his knowledge no one within the Immigration 

Services Division was aware that the contractor stored the I-20s for 180 days. 

Yates told the OIG that prior to the events of September 11, responsibility for 

the I-539 “product line” had never been assigned to a particular manager in the 

Immigration Services Division.105 Yates suggested that no one in the 

Immigration Services Division had any information about the processing of the 

I-20s because the contract was not managed out of the Immigration Services 

Division. He told the OIG that it was his understanding that the contract 

governing the processing of the I-20s and other INS forms was managed by the 

Inspections Division within the Office of Field Operations.106

4. OIG analysis 

No one in the TSC or the Immigration Services Division was specifically 

asked to provide every document or record relating to Atta and Alshehhi or 

was asked specifically to locate the I-20s associated with their files. Although 

the lead provided to the FBI Dallas Special Agent stated “all information” 

should be gathered, the FBI agent’s understanding was that he was going to the 

TSC to “retrieve the original INS files [of Atta and Alshehhi].” He told the 

OIG that he did not believe that he asked for every document associated with 

 

105 Yates said that since the events of September 11, an INS employee who has been 

working on various standard operating procedures was directed to expedite the completion 

of the national SOPs for I-20s.

106 According to Yates, when news of Atta and Alshehhi’s I-20s first appeared in the 

media, most managers from INS Headquarters were in San Francisco, California, for a 

Commissioner’s Conference. He said that he discussed the issue of the contract and was 

told that it was an Inspections Division contract. In fact, the contract with ACS has been 

managed by the Inspections Division only since October 2001. Prior to that time, the Office 

of Information Resource Management was responsible for the contract.
114

Atta and Alshehhi and that there was no discussion about whether he was being 

given the entire file. He said that the Acting Assistant Center Director told him 

that he had the files and that the Enforcement Operations Division had checked 

the names through all of the INS’s computer systems.

No one involved with the Atta and Alshehhi files in the TSC 

Enforcement Operations Division attempted to retrieve the I-20s or otherwise 

conducted any research about their location. We also found that neither the 

managers at the TSC nor in the Immigration Services Division issued any 

instructions about the Atta and Alshehhi files or specifically instructed anyone 

to locate the I-20s. Due to the commendable initiative of two TSC IRSs, the 

files of Atta and Alshehhi were identified and retrieved from the Mesquite 

facility within 24 hours of the attacks of September 11. In the days following 

September 11, the focus of both TSC personnel and managers and Immigration 

Services Division managers once they were aware of the files was that the 

appropriate steps be taken to provide the files to the FBI. Once TSC and 

Immigration Services Division managers were confident that the files had been 

handled appropriately, the managers considered the issue resolved and moved 

on to other matters.

We recognize that the events of September 11 created overwhelming 

demands on all law enforcement agencies, including the INS. Within several 

hours of the destruction, however, the TSC had identified an important link 

between the TSC and the terrorists involved in the attack. In our view, it was 

the responsibility of the TSC managers and their supervisors in the 

Immigration Services Division to manage their piece of this significant event in 

a thorough manner. Although the FBI may not have asked specifically for the 

I-20s or even “all files relating to Atta and Alshehhi,” we believe that INS 

managers should have taken the initiative to ensure that the FBI was either 

provided with all immigration records relating to the terrorists, including the I20s, or at least notified of the existence of the documents. The evidence shows 

that they did not.

We believe that TSC Enforcement Operations Division personnel bear 

some responsibility for failing to consider whether to retrieve the Atta and 

Alshehhi I-20s before they were mailed to Huffman Aviation. The 

Enforcement Operations personnel who located the files certainly deserve 

credit for their initiative in locating the Atta and Alshehhi files. Nonetheless, 

since they and their managers serve in an investigative function and were 

aware that the I-20 form was one of the documents used in the change of status 
115

adjudication process, they should have at least inquired as to the status of 

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s, even if they believed that they were already sent to 

the school. All TSC Enforcement Operations Division personnel we 

interviewed told the OIG that they wanted to preserve the original files for 

forensic evidence. But despite the fact that the I-20 is supposed to contain 

original signatures, none of the Enforcement Operations Division personnel 

inquired about or took any action to retrieve the I-20s. Moreover, if the Acting 

Assistant Center Director at the time and Bradford thought that the I-20s were 

already at Huffman Aviation and therefore beyond their reach, they should 

have brought this to the attention of the FBI agent who retrieved the Atta and 

Alshehhi files.

We believe that the Immigration Services Division managers – Yates and 

Ohata – as well as the TSC manager at the time, Ortiz – bear even more 

responsibility than the TSC Enforcement Operations Division personnel for 

failing to take action with respect to the I-20s. Yates, Ohata, and Ortiz told the 

OIG that their main concern was ensuring that the FBI had the information that 

it needed. At the same time, all three acknowledged that they were aware that 

the I-20 was part of the change of status adjudication process for students. To 

ensure that the FBI or other law enforcement agency were aware of all 

documents and information associated with the terrorists, they should have at 

least inquired about the status of the I-20s or directed that INS personnel take 

steps to make sure that all parts of the file and records had been collected, 

including the I-20s. While we recognize that the days following September 11 

were extraordinary, had this type of analysis occurred any time between 

September 11 and March 2002, the I-20s could have been identified, located, 

and offered to the FBI.

As the person in charge of the Immigration Services Division, Yates had 

the greatest responsibility to consider the broader implications of INS’s 

dealings with Atta and Alshehhi. Although Yates told the OIG that he was 

taking direction from Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations 

Pearson in the aftermath of September 11, we believe that it was Yates’ 

responsibility to recognize that the INS needed to identify all of its documents 

and records regarding the terrorists and to ensure that appropriate steps were 

taken to make the FBI aware of these documents. If Yates believed that it was 
116

not his place to take the initiative to address the issue, he should have at least 

raised it with Pearson.

107

More troubling than the disposition of these two particular I-20s, 

however, is the fact that no one in the Immigration Services Division or the 

TSC to whom we spoke was aware of the processing requirements of the 

school copy of the I-20 form. This information is important for several 

reasons. Service centers sometimes need to retrieve an I-20 from ACS. The 

INS’s contract allows the INS to request a certain number of records from ACS 

annually. Service center employees, particularly Enforcement Operations 

Division employees who would likely be making the requests as part of an 

investigation, should have been aware of this information and the procedure for 

making the requests. They should also have been aware of any storage 

requirements for the I-20 in order to determine the likelihood that the I-20 

would even be in the ACS facility. In addition, schools and applicants often 

call the INS to inquire about the status of their applications and forms. As part 

of their responsibility to be knowledgeable and informed when responding to 

inquiries from the public, service center employees should know what happens 

to the I-20 once it leaves the INS. The fact that no one did reflects a troubling 

lack of management and attention to detail.

C. Actions of INS Headquarters Enforcement Division personnel

In addition to the failings of TSC and ISD personnel, we evaluated the 

actions of INS Headquarters Enforcement Division personnel with regard to 

the I-20s that were mailed to Huffman Aviation. Our analysis of their actions 

is described in this section.

1. Organization of Enforcement Division

The Enforcement Division falls under the Office of Field Operations. In 

September 2001, the Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations, 

Michael Pearson, was responsible for the three regional directors, the Border 

Patrol, the Office of International Affairs, and three large divisions –

Enforcement, Immigration Services, and Detention and Removal, each of 

which is headed by a Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner. The 

 

107 We discuss Pearson’s actions in the next section of this chapter.
117

Enforcement Division was headed by the Deputy Executive Associate 

Commissioner for Enforcement, who at that time supervised three assistant 

commissioners, one for investigations, inspections, and intelligence. The 

Acting Assistant Commissioner for Investigations supervised four branch 

chiefs, each of whom was responsible for a different substantive area within 

the investigative arena.

Of the four branches, the National Security Unit (NSU) was most directly 

involved in the investigation that arose out of the events of September 11. The 

NSU is headed by Walter “Dan” Cadman. Around September 2001, it was 

comprised of several Senior Special Agents, three of who were working in the 

FBI’s Counterterrorism Division. One of the Senior Special Agents has 

responsibility for the INS agents who participate in the Joint Terrorism Task 

Force with other law enforcement agencies.

2. Events at INS Headquarters on and around September 11

Enforcement Division personnel described to us the chaotic conditions at 

INS Headquarters and the many assignments they were working in the 

immediate aftermath of the September attacks. On the morning of September 

11, Pearson activated the Operations Center at Headquarters, an emergency 

crisis center that had not previously been used. Pearson said that he also 

directed all INS enforcement branches to operate at Threat Level One. Ports of 

entry were reinforced with additional manpower. Pearson directed that a 

24-hour command center be established at each regional office.

The FBI activated its Special Incidents Operations Command (SIOC) in 

response to the attacks of September 11, and three INS agents working in FBI 

Headquarters formed the core of an INS desk that served as a full-time INS 

point of contact for the FBI agents and support personnel who were working in 

the SIOC at any given time. The flow of information between the INS field 

agents and the FBI passed through the INS’s NSU. 

The INS Operations Center’s initial focus was to check the list of 

passengers on the four hijacked planes through INS computer systems. The 

NSU also supported the FBI’s investigation, and a team of INS agents assisted 

in conducting reviews of the several hundred aliens arrested during the 

investigation. With respect to the lists of suspected terrorists or “watch lists,” 

the NSU provided information to the INS’s Inspections Division to make sure 

that suspected terrorists did not leave the country. The INS updated 

information about the suspected terrorists as the information became known.
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In the INS’s Intelligence Division, personnel began immediately to 

assemble data about the suspected terrorists once the passenger lists had been 

obtained. They began working on a detailed timeline that would reflect and 

analyze the movements of the terrorists as well as identify associations among 

them. In addition, suspected terrorist lists containing as many as 6,000 names 

were disseminated, and efforts were made to identify information the INS had 

with respect to persons on the list and to determine if the information was 

accurate.

3. Enforcement Division requests for information and the 

handling of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s files

The Enforcement Division personnel interviewed by the OIG told us that 

there was no request or instruction from the Enforcement Division to assemble 

all files, records, or documents related to the 19 terrorists or to any terrorist in 

particular.108 In addition, Enforcement Division personnel, in particular the 

three INS agents who worked with the FBI and served as the FBI’s point of 

contact with the INS, stated that they were not aware of any request from the 

FBI for the INS to assemble all INS files, records, or documents with respect to 

the terrorists.

As discussed previously, TSC personnel located and retrieved the Atta 

and Alshehhi files on September 12, and the Acting Assistant Center Director 

from the TSC’s Enforcement Operations Division, e-mailed a Senior Special 

Agent at INS Headquarters about the files. According to the Acting Assistant 

Center Director, he e-mailed this Senior Special Agent because he was the 

service centers’ point of contact within the Enforcement Division. This Senior 

Special Agent worked in the Fraud Section, and his usual duties included, 

among other things, approving agents working undercover in fraud cases. The 

Senior Special Agent said that he did not have managerial responsibility for the 

Enforcement Operations Divisions in the service centers and did not typically 

have contact with them. The Senior Special Agent said that, although he 

normally worked in the Fraud Section, on September 11 he was doing what 

was needed in the NSU.

 

108 Pearson told the OIG that only after the I-20s of Atta and Alshehhi appeared in the 

newspaper in March 2002 did he issue a specific order that all field offices be searched for 

any additional documents related to Atta and Alshehhi as well as the 17 other terrorists.
119

The Senior Special Agent told the OIG that he recalled receiving an email from the TSC about files that the TSC had located concerning the 

terrorists. He said that he recalled e-mailing the Acting Assistant Center 

Director back and directing him to fax the documentation to him at INS 

Headquarters. The Senior Special Agent said that once he received the fax 

from the TSC, he faxed the documents to the FBI, where the documents would 

have been routed to one of the INS agents working in the FBI’s SIOC at the 

time. The Senior Special Agent said that he did not call or follow up with the 

TSC about Atta’s or Alshehhi’s documents. The Senior Special Agent said 

that he was not asked to conduct any further follow up about the documents 

that he faxed to the FBI.

4. Reasons stated by Enforcement personnel for not asking for 

all INS records or files related to the terrorists

The Enforcement Division personnel we interviewed consistently stated 

that in the initial wake of the events of September 11, their emphasis was on 

obtaining information, not documents, files, or paper, about the identities of the 

terrorists and on identifying any imminent additional attacks. Enforcement 

personnel stated that after identifying the terrorists and ensuring that no 

additional threats were forthcoming, the emphasis turned to managing the 

information related to the suspected terrorists lists and the arrests of several 

hundred aliens for immigration violations. Cadman, the director of the NSU, 

as well as other Enforcement Division personnel also stated that the 

investigation with respect to the attacks of September 11 was within the 

jurisdiction of the FBI, and that the NSU’s role was to coordinate the FBI’s 

requests for information from the INS and the responses from the field. 

Enforcement personnel also told the OIG that the NSU assessed information 

that was generated in the field and sent to the Enforcement Division mainly in 

the form of Special Incident Reports to determine what might be of value to the 

FBI.

We asked each person from the Enforcement Division we interviewed 

why, once it became known that the INS had granted student status to Atta and 

Alshehhi, efforts were not made to obtain the I-20s related to the change of 

status applications. They told us that they did not consider the I-20s or discuss 

whether they should be obtained. Looking back on their actions, they said they 

were not attempting to build a case against the terrorists, since they were dead, 

and that all necessary information concerning addresses, schools attended, and 

entries into the country was being obtained from INS databases. They stated 
120

that if there had been some question as to the identity of the terrorists or some 

other investigative need that was not being met by the information available, 

they would have made additional efforts to track down all available 

information. They acknowledged, however, that they made no reasoned 

decision not to obtain the I-20s; rather, they had not considered the issue at the 

time. Across the board, the Enforcement personnel stated that even if there had 

been a need for the information in the files or in the I-20, they were not aware 

of the processing requirements for I-20s. While most of the persons 

interviewed said that they were aware that I-20s were associated with change 

of status applications for persons requesting to become students, they stated 

that they were not aware of any of the processing steps taken to return the I-20s 

to the schools.

With respect to the Atta and Alshehhi files received by the Senior Special 

Agent in INS Headquarters, he stated that he was not aware at the time that 

I-20s were processed by a contractor and that it was his understanding that the 

I-20 was sent to the school once the case was adjudicated. He said that at the 

time, the information contained in the I-20s, such as name, address, and 

passport number, was more important than the actual files. He added that he 

believed his role was to act as a conduit of information to the FBI.

We interviewed each of the three INS agents who were working at FBI 

Headquarters at the time and asked what they thought their role was with 

respect to incoming information from the INS. One of the INS agents said that 

he was primarily involved with operational matters such as preparing for 

briefings rather than dealing with incoming information. The other two agents 

told the OIG that as they received information from the INS, they would fill 

out the proper FBI cover sheet for the information and forward it to the 

appropriate desk in the SIOC for data entry into the FBI’s database. They 

suggested that it was not part of their responsibility to assess the value or 

purpose of the incoming information.

5. OIG analysis

No one in the INS’s Enforcement Division issued any instruction to 

obtain all documents, records, or files related to the terrorists involved with the 

attacks on September 11. Nor did anyone within the Enforcement Division 

issue any instruction with respect to the particular files of Atta and Alshehhi or 

the associated I-20s, once it became known that the INS had adjudicated their 

change of status applications. Enforcement efforts at INS Headquarters 
121

focused on the interruption of any additional terrorist activity and the arrest of 

any potential terrorist conspirator. There was no emphasis on the collection of 

documents.

Several other reasons contributed to the Enforcement Division not 

retrieving the I-20s related to the Atta and Alshehhi files. Many of the 

personnel we interviewed described INS Headquarters as “chaotic” in the 

immediate aftermath of September 11. In addition, in the days that followed 

the attacks of September 11, the INS was inundated with specific requests for 

information. Approximately thirty INS detailees were used to staff both the 

NSU and the INS desks at the FBI SIOC. Across the country, up to half of all 

INS agents were assigned duties with the FBI. At both the INS service centers 

and the off-site contractor locations, personnel were working 24 hours a day, 

seven days a week, to retrieve, assemble, and forward requested data and files.

Although the INS was attempting to obtain a cumulative base of 

information regarding the terrorists, their efforts were hindered by the fact that 

there existed no infrastructure to manage investigative leads and findings. 

Likewise, there was no systematic means of coordinating either the retrieval or 

the distribution of known information. This led to inefficiency and work 

duplication, with individual employees repeatedly querying and forwarding the 

same information again to different recipients at different times. Also, because 

many of the INS’s databases did not communicate with one another, a 

multitude of computer queries was required to gather all of the known 

information on any particular alien.

However, as with our analysis of the actions of personnel from the 

Immigration Services Division and the Texas Service Center, we believe that 

this does not excuse the Enforcement Division personnel’s failure to consider 

whether all documents regarding Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status 

applications, including the I-20s, had been provided to the FBI. We believe 

that the managers of the Enforcement Division, in particular Pearson as the 

Executive Associate Commissioner of Field Operations, and to a lesser extent, 

Cadman as the head of the NSU, bear some responsibility for failing to ensure 

that the I-20s associated with the files of Atta and Alshehhi were, at a 

minimum, identified for the FBI. Although we recognize that the FBI had 

primary jurisdiction over the investigation of the terrorists acts committed on 

September 11, the fact that all 19 terrorists were aliens who had contacts with 

the INS created a greater responsibility for the INS to ensure that it was making 

the FBI aware of all of its records associated with the terrorists. While we 
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acknowledge that the aftermath of September 11 was extraordinary and that the 

immediate need of the investigative effort was for information not documents, 

at some point after the immediate crisis of September 11th had subsided it was 

incumbent upon the managers in the Enforcement Division to assess whether 

all available files and other records had been provided to the FBI. We believe 

that the direction to conduct such an analysis should have come from Pearson. 

We also believe Cadman, as the manager of the unit responsible for providing 

information to the FBI, should also have recognized the need for such action 

and at least raised the matter to his supervisors. 

Unfortunately, no one in the INS – either in INS Headquarters in the 

Enforcement Division or the Immigration Services Division, or in the TSC –

ensured that the FBI was aware of all INS documents related to Atta, Alshehhi, 

or the other terrorists. Most important, no one thought to inquire about the 

I-20s related to Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status applications or to find 

out where those I-20s were. This, in our view, was a failure on the part of 

many individuals in the INS.

III. The INS’s Response to OIG Criticism

The OIG provided officials from the INS’s Commissioner’s Office with 

the opportunity to review this report prior to its release. In addition, Yates, 

Ohata, Cadman, Pearson, Ortiz, Bradford, and the former Acting Assistant 

Center Director for the Enforcement Operations Division at the TSC reviewed 

Chapter Five. All were permitted to provide comments in response to the 

report. 

INS Commissioner James Ziglar wrote in his response that the INS’s 

failure to stop the delivery of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20s was “inexcusable” 

and said “[t]he INS does not hesitate to acknowledge this shortcoming.” Other 

INS officials called the INS’s inaction “regrettable” and “an embarrassment.” 

Nonetheless, the reviewing officials offered many reasons why they believed 

INS officials should not be criticized for failing to provide the I-20s to the FBI. 

They asserted that because the investigation was under the jurisdiction of the 

FBI and because the FBI never asked the INS for the I-20s, the INS had no 

responsibility to provide the I-20s to the FBI. Several of them also implied that 

their responsibility is diminished by the fact that the I-20s were not necessary 

to the FBI’s investigation. In addition, some reviewing officials argued that if 

INS had failed, it was the fault of others, not themselves.
123

We do not find the reviewing officials’ comments persuasive. Atta’s and 

Alshehhi’s I-20s continued to be processed after September 11, 2001, because 

none of the managers we discuss in this chapter ever considered the I-20s or 

took the appropriate managerial steps to ensure that their subordinates did. 

Although the FBI had primary jurisdiction over the investigation, INS 

employees were the only ones who were knowledgeable about the change of 

status process and therefore they had an obligation to bring the existence of 

these documents to the attention of the FBI. The FBI was not in a position to 

ask for specific documents it did not know existed. 

We agree that the absence of the I-20s did not ultimately hinder the FBI’s 

investigation. While the fact that the I-20s turned out not to be of significant 

investigative value is fortuitous, it is irrelevant to the question of whether the 

INS should have thought about them and made the FBI aware of them. In 

addition, it was clear from our interviews that the failure to alert the FBI to the 

I-20s was not the result of a reasoned decision that the I-20s had no 

investigative value. Rather, INS personnel all acknowledged that they never 

thought about the I-20s. We believe this was an unjustified failure on their 

part.
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CHAPTER SIX

THE INS’S FOREIGN STUDENT PROGRAM

I. Introduction

In this chapter, we discuss broader issues regarding the process by which 

foreign students gain admission to the United States and how the INS tracks 

and monitors them once they enter the United States. Our evaluation goes 

beyond the circumstances regarding Atta and Alshehhi. In this part of our 

review, which we began in November 2001 in response to our concerns about 

the tracking of foreign students that the events of September 11 highlighted, we 

focused on the INS’s processes for admitting foreign students and for 

certifying schools as eligible to receive foreign students. We also evaluated the 

INS computer tracking systems for foreign students – the system that exists 

now as well as the system the INS is currently developing, the Student and 

Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). We describe the deficiencies 

we observed in the INS foreign student program, the history and development 

of SEVIS, the problems in the foreign student program that SEVIS is designed 

to address, the deficiencies in the program that SEVIS will not address, and the 

implementation difficulties for SEVIS. 

II. Background

The State Department is responsible for issuing student visas to foreign 

students who want to study in the United States. It is the responsibility of the 

INS, however, to determine which schools are entitled to accept foreign 

students, to inspect the documentation of persons arriving with student visas, to 

keep track of the entries and exits of foreign students, to know whether 

students are continuing to maintain their status, to facilitate the removal of 

students once their status ends, and to approve appropriate requests by 

nonimmigrants who are in the country through some other classification to 

acquire student status. Responsibility for each of these obligations is divided 

among several different offices, divisions, and branches within the INS, as well 

as among private contractors.

The INS’s foreign student program has historically been dysfunctional. 

The INS has acknowledged for several years that it does not know how many 

foreign students there are in the United States. The INS’s foreign student 

program came under increased scrutiny after the February 1993 bombing of the 

World Trade Center when it became known that one of the terrorists was in the 
125

United States on an expired student visa. In April 1995, the Deputy Attorney 

General asked the INS to address a departmental finding that the INS needed to 

subject foreign students to thorough and continuing scrutiny, both prior to and 

during their stay in the United States. In September 1996, Congress also 

directed the Attorney General to develop and conduct a program to collect 

certain information on nonimmigrant foreign students and exchange visitors 

from approved institutions of higher education and designated exchange visitor 

programs.

109 In response to these directives and legislation, the INS plans to 

implement a new computer system, SEVIS, which is designed to collect 

information on full-time students and exchange visitors and their dependents.

A. Scope and methodology of review

In conducting this part of our review, we interviewed various INS 

Headquarters officials regarding current policies and procedures and SEVIS 

implementation, including officials from the INS’s Office of Adjudications 

(formerly located within the Office of Programs), the Investigations and 

Inspections Divisions (within the Office of Field Operations), the Office of 

Information Resources Management (within the Office of Management), and 

the INS group titled “Strategic Information and Technology Development,” 

which is responsible for coordinating between the policy groups and the 

technical groups in the INS. In the field, we interviewed intelligence research 

specialists assigned to the Enforcement Operations Divisions at the Texas and 

California Service Centers to obtain information on program fraud. We also 

interviewed the private consultant involved in developing SEVIS, the SEVIS 

liaison with the FBI, and representatives from the Department of State and the 

Department of Education. To obtain the schools’ perspectives on SEVIS, we 

 

109 Foreign participants enrolled in State Department-approved educational and cultural 

exchange programs must first obtain a J-1 visa to enter the United States. There are 

approximately 1,500 program sponsors, including universities, summer camps, hospitals, 

and private foundations. There are 13 program categories, including summer work/travel, 

high school students, trainees, au pairs, short-term scholars, professors and research 

scholars, college and university students, teachers, specialists, alien physicians, international 

visitors, professors, and camp counselors. During fiscal year 2001, the State Department 

issued 299,959 “J” visas. Although the exchange visitor program operates similarly to the 

foreign student program, the primary difference is that the State Department, not the INS, is 

responsible for approving and monitoring the sponsors of exchange visitor programs. 
126

interviewed officials from several organizations that represent schools, 

specifically the Association of International Educators, the American Council 

on Education, and the College Career Association.

During January and February 2002, we visited four INS district offices 

(Atlanta, New York, Chicago, and San Francisco) and the associated 

international airports (Atlanta Hartsfield, John F. Kennedy, O’Hare, and San 

Francisco). At these locations we interviewed INS adjudicators, investigators, 

intelligence officers, and inspectors. At each location, we also reviewed the 

files of 50 vocational, language, and flight schools, randomly selected from the 

INS’s database of approved schools, for compliance with INS regulations.110 

We also attempted to determine whether these schools were still active by 

searching through various Internet web sites, including sites maintained by 

accreditation organizations and federal and state educational approval agencies.

B. Statistics on student visas

The number of foreign students enrolled in United States schools has 

been steadily increasing over the years. During the 2000-2001 school year, 

547,867 foreign students were enrolled in colleges and universities in the 

United States. This represents an increase of 6.4 percent over the prior year, 

the largest increase since 1980. Foreign students and exchange visitors, 

however, account for a relatively small percentage of the total number of 

foreigners who visit the United States, which in fiscal year 2001 totaled 

approximately 232 million.

During fiscal year 2001, the State Department issued 319,518 F visas to 

students and their dependents for the purpose of attending academic or 

language courses, and 5,658 M visas to students and their dependents for the 

purpose of attending vocational or other nonacademic courses. During fiscal 

year 2000, 308,944 F visas were issued and 6,465 M visas were issued. During 

fiscal year 2001, the statuses of 28,880 aliens were adjusted to that of a student 

status. Of these, 27,848 adjusted their status to that of an academic or language 

student (F) and 1,032 adjusted their status to that of a vocational student (M). 

The primary original visa designations were for business (B-1), pleasure (B-2), 

 

110 We focused on these types of schools because, according to INS officials, they are 

apt to be less stable and present a higher risk for fraud.
127

or inter-company transfers (L-1). For fiscal year 2000, more than half of the F 

visas were issued to citizens of Japan, South Korea, China, India, and Taiwan. 

During this same period more than half of the M visas were issued to citizens 

of Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and Italy.

C. The student visa application process 

An alien wanting to pursue full-time academic or vocational studies in 

the United States first applies to a school that has been approved by the INS as 

eligible to receive foreign students. After the student is accepted at the school, 

the school fills out and sends to the student both the student copy and the 

school copy of the I-20.

The alien must then apply for a student visa at the nearest overseas 

United States consulate. The alien must present to the consular officer a 

current passport and photograph, both the student copy and the school copy of 

the I-20 for the school that the applicant plans on attending, and documentation 

to show that the applicant has the financial resources to pay for tuition and 

living expenses. The State Department’s Consular Lookout and Support 

System (CLASS) is queried to identify whether any negative information exists 

on the alien. The consular officer reviews the paperwork and, if necessary, 

conducts an in-person interview. 111 If approved, the consular office will issue a 

visa to the applicant that indicates the school that the student will be 

attending. 112

Upon entering the United States, aliens present to the INS immigration 

inspector their passport containing the student visa, both the student copy and 

 

111 The State Department determines on a country-by-country basis when interviews are 

required. Applicants are informed of the criteria that must be met in order to complete the 

process without an interview. In some countries, interviews are required in almost all cases. 

In all instances, consular officers can in their discretion require an interview if the 

application appears questionable or if information in CLASS indicates that follow up is 

needed.

112 Student visas are foil stickers that are placed in the appropriate page in an alien’s 

passport. Unlike the B-1/B-2 visa, the student visa does not have a period of validity. The 

length of stay is determined by the immigration inspector at the POE and is written on the 

school copy and the student copy of the I-20.
128

school copy of the I-20, and the I-94 (Arrival-Departure Record).113 The 

immigration inspector reviews the I-20, checks to see if the passport contains 

the appropriate visa, and writes the I-94 admissions number on both copies of 

the I-20. The immigration inspector also determines the length of stay from the 

I-20 and records either “duration of status” if the student has an F visa or the 

dates for which the student is being admitted if the student has an M visa. The 

immigration inspector then separates the student copy and the school copy of 

the I-20, giving the student copy to the alien and keeping the school copy. The 

INS transmits the school copy of the I-20 to ACS, where it is data entered and 

eventually uploaded to STSC.114

Foreign students are permitted to leave the United States and return after 

a temporary absence. The regulations provide that to re-enter the country, the 

alien must be in possession of the I-20, and the second page must be properly 

endorsed with the signature of the designated school official (DSO) who 

certifies that the student is leaving temporarily but will be returning to school. 

Sometimes a foreign student will arrive at the port of entry with a missing or 

incomplete I-20. If, in the judgment of the INS immigration inspector, the 

student is otherwise admissible and no bad faith was involved, an alien may 

still be admitted even if the alien is missing the I-20 or has an incomplete I-20. 

In this circumstance, the inspector must complete INS form I-515, which 

requires the student to obtain the appropriate I-20 form or the proper signature 

on the form and to return to the INS with the documentation within 30 days.

 

113 An alien who wants to enter the United States as an exchange visitor must be 

accepted to an approved exchange visitor program. Once an alien is accepted to an 

approved exchange visitor program, the sponsor provides the alien with a Form DS-2019 

(Certificate of Eligibility for Exchange Visitor Status). When applying for a visa, the alien 

presents the consular officer with the IAP-66 as proof of acceptance into the program. 

When entering the United States, the alien also presents the IAP-66 to the immigration 

inspector who, in a similar fashion to the I-20 form, separates the IAP-66 form, giving one 

copy to the alien and keeping one copy. The INS copy is sent to the Department of State, 

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, for data entry into its database system, EVIS 

(Exchange Visitor Information System). 

114 As noted previously in this report, the immigration inspector also stamps the I-94 

with the admission information and separates the I-94 into two parts. The departure portion 

of the Form I-94 is given to the student; the arrival portion of the I-94 is mailed to ACS 

where it is data entered and eventually uploaded into NIIS.
129

A flowchart depicting the student visa process is on the next page.

III. Deficiencies in the Foreign Student Program

In our review, we found many deficiencies in the INS’s current foreign 

student program, which we describe in detail below. In sum, we found that 

because of the INS’s lack of controls over the schools and students and lack of 

attention to this program, the foreign student program is highly susceptible to 

fraud, and the INS has incomplete and inaccurate data about the schools and 

students in the program.

A. Inadequacies in the INS’s process for approving schools

Although federal regulations require that schools be certified before they 

can accept foreign students, the INS’s review of schools consists primarily of a 

review of paperwork submitted by the school. We also found that INS often 

did not inquire further even when the paperwork raised obvious issues about 

the school’s ability to meet the requirements for certification. 

1. Legal requirements for schools to be certified to accept 

foreign students

Schools may be eligible to accept academic or language students (F visa 

category), vocational students (M visa category), or both. According to federal 

regulations, to be eligible to accept foreign students, a school must establish 

that:

• It is a bona fide school. 

• It is an established institution of learning or other recognized place of 

study. 

• It possesses the necessary facilities, personnel, and finances to conduct 

instruction in recognized courses. 

• It is, in fact, engaged in the instruction of students in these courses. 

See 8 CFR § 214.3(e)(1).

The certification regulations do not state that the school must offer 

classes or instruction on a full-time basis. However, by definition under the 

INA, an academic student or a vocational student is one who is pursuing a “full 

course of study,” and the regulations further define “a full course of study.” 

For vocational students, the regulations provide that a full course of study is “at 
Student Visa Process

as of July 2001

POE: Port of Entry

INS: Immigration and Naturalization Service

INS Form I-20: Certificate of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student

INS Form I-94: Arrival-Departure Record

Foreign student

applies to school(s) 

in the U.S.

School(s) accepts 

foreign student 

School(s) sends 

completed I-20 to 

foreign student

Student applies at a U.S. 

Embassy/Consulate for an 

F-1 or M-1 student visa

STUDENT MUST HAVE:

1. Visa application

2. Passport

3. Endorsed I-20

4. Financial Evidence

5. Proof of ties to home country

6. English Proficiency

State 

Department 

Consular Office 

visa decision

Foreign student 

denied student visa

F-1 or M-1 visa placed in 

student’s passport; student 

and school copy of I-20 

sealed in an envelope

Foreign student 

travels to U.S. POE

Foreign student arrives 

with student visa, 

sealed I-20, and completed 

I-94 at U.S. POE 

INS inspector 

reviews foreign 

student’s documents to 

determine admission 

YES NO

Foreign student 

enters the U.S.

Inspe ctor stamps passport, 

I-94, and both copies 

of I-20; indicates 

length of stay on 

both copies of I-20

ACS, Inc. 

data enters 

I-94s and I-20s ACS returns

the school’s 

I-20 copy to 

the school

POE sends I-94s 

and school copies 

of I-20 to ACS in 

London, KY

APPROVED

ACS stores 

I-94s for 180 

days and then 

destroys them

Inspector gives student copy 

of I-20 to student and 

staples departure I-94 in passport; 

inspector retains arrival I-94 and 

school copy of I-20
131

least eighteen clock hours of attendance a week if the dominant part of the 

course of study consists of classroom instruction, or at least twenty-two clock 

hours a week if the dominant part of the course of study consists of shop or 

laboratory work.”115 8 CFR § 214.2(m)(9)(iii). Based on our interviews with 

INS officials and on our reading of the regulations as a whole, we concluded 

that a school must demonstrate that it is at least capable of offering a full 

course of study. The school then certifies to the INS on the I-20 with respect to 

each student that the student is actually enrolled in a full course of study.

With respect to vocational schools (which include flight schools) and 

language schools, schools must meet the following requirements to obtain INS 

certification: 

• Be accredited, licensed, or otherwise approved by a state or federal 

agency.

• Submit evidence that its courses of study are accepted as fulfilling the 

requirements for the attainment of an education, professional or 

vocational objective, and are not avocational or recreational in 

character. As evidence that the petitioner meets a vocational or 

professional objective, provide letters from three employers of the 

petitioner’s graduates, on the employer’s letterhead, stating the name 

of the graduate, the school of graduation, the position in which 

employed, and the period of employment.

• Provide a copy of the school’s catalogue and, if not included in the 

catalogue, a written statement describing the size of its physical plant; 

nature of its facilities for study and training; educational, vocational, or 

professional qualifications of the teaching staff; salaries of the 

teachers; attendance and scholastic grading policy; amount and 

character of supervisory and consultative services available to students 

and trainees; and finances (including a certified copy of the 

accountant’s most recent statement of the school’s net worth, income, 

and expenses). 

 

115 As discussed in other parts of this report, aliens wanting to attend school on a parttime basis can enter the United States with a B-1/B-2 visa if their school attendance is 

“incidental” to a primary pleasure purpose.
132

2. The I-17 petition and the INS’s certification process

In order to be permitted by law to have full-time foreign students in 

attendance at their schools, a university, college, or other school must be 

“certified” by the INS. 8 CFR § 214.3(a)(1). To become certified, a school 

must submit a Form I-17 (Petition for Approval of School for Attendance by 

Nonimmigrant Students) and supporting documentation to the local INS 

district office. The school must indicate on Form I-17A the names of the 

DSOs who will be authorized to certify the foreign students who have been 

accepted to the school. Schools are required to notify the INS by submitting an 

updated Form I-17 when there are changes in ownership, address, school term, 

DSO, or the type of student for which the school was initially approved.

Once the school submits the required documentation, the INS is required 

to conduct an interview in person and under oath of an authorized 

representative of the school. 8 CFR § 214.3(d). This requirement may be 

waived by the INS district director.

Each INS district has a designated “schools officer” who is responsible 

for certifying that schools meet these requirements, although the schools 

officer may have other responsibilities. We were informed that to certify 

schools, the schools officer reviews the school’s petition and supporting 

documentation. If the schools officer has a concern about the documentation, 

the schools officer can request that the school provide additional evidence in 

support of its petition. 

Upon approval of a petition, the INS sends an approval notice to the 

school. In addition, the INS sends the I-17 to ACS. The school information is 

data entered by ACS, and this information is eventually uploaded into the 

INS’s STSC database. 

If the schools officer denies the petition, the INS must notify the school 

in writing, state the reason for the denial, and inform the school of its right to 

an appeal. 

3. Inadequate resources devoted to school approval process

We found that the INS devotes minimal resources to certifying schools 

and, as a result, does not adequately review schools to ensure that they meet the 

legal requirements for approval. We also found that the INS rarely re-reviews

schools to ensure that they are still active and still meet the requirements for 

certification.
133

At each of the four districts we visited, the schools officer was a 

collateral, low-priority duty, accounting for 5 to 20 percent of the officer’s 

time. In the Atlanta and Chicago districts, an immigration inspector serves as 

the schools officer; in the New York and San Francisco districts, a district 

adjudicator serves as the schools officer. The immigration inspectors who 

performed this function spent most of their time performing inspection-related 

duties. The adjudicators who performed the function spent most of their time 

on adjudications functions that are considered “priorities” of the INS, such as 

naturalization applications and orphan petitions.

4. Lack of in-person interviews and site visits prior to approval

In addition, despite the regulatory requirement that the INS interview in 

person and under oath an authorized representative from the school prior to 

approving the petition, we found that this requirement seemed to be enforced 

fairly regularly in the 1970s and before that time, but these interviews no 

longer occur. All four INS officers responsible for approving schools that we 

interviewed stated that they did not require these interviews. We found that, at 

least in relation to vocational and language schools, the INS was relying solely 

on the documentation submitted by the schools without performing any 

independent verifications, such as checking to see if the school is in fact 

accredited or verifying information from independent websites.

Although the regulations allow the District Director to waive the 

interview requirement, the regulations seem to contemplate that such a waiver 

would be granted on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, we did not find that the 

interview requirement had been waived in any district we visited. We believe 

that the lack of interviews stems more from the inability of the schools officers 

to devote sufficient time to the process, rather than a reasoned decision that 

interviews would not be useful and should be waived. Indeed, most of the 

schools officers to whom we spoke were not even aware that interviews were 

required.

While the regulations do not affirmatively require the INS to conduct site 

visits to schools before approving I-17 petitions, site visits were conducted 

fairly regularly in the 1970s and earlier. Yet, few if any site visits have been 

made since then in the four district offices we reviewed.

During our review, we selected a sample of 200 vocational, language, or 

flight schools from the INS’s approved-schools database (STSC) that were 

approved by personnel in the INS’s Atlanta, New York, Chicago, and San 
134

Francisco districts. For these schools we reviewed the initial I-17 petition and 

required supporting documentation submitted by the school, any subsequent I17s submitted by the schools, and any evidence contained in the file relating to 

INS actions taken.

Several of the approved schools selected in our review appeared 

questionable to us and may not have been approved had a site visit been made. 

Some examples follow:

• A vocational school was approved in February 2001 to teach press 

printing operations. The I-17 and supporting documentation provided 

by the school indicated that the school was neither accredited, licensed, 

nor approved by a federal or state agency; the school’s brochure 

advertised that students would be doing “real” jobs for “real” 

customers and that students would be paid an hourly wage based on 

their grade. A site visit by the INS seems warranted to ensure that this 

is a school, as opposed to a business, operation.

• A vocational school was approved in November 1990 to teach students 

to be wardrobe consultants, color designers, color coordinators, and 

personal stylists. The school’s catalogue indicated that the course 

consisted of five class sessions, seven to eight days each, separated by 

two to three months of home study. The documentation to support that 

the course meets a vocational or professional objective (i.e., that at 

least three graduates of the school have obtained employment in the 

particular field of study) consisted of letters from one graduate who 

now owns the school and two graduates who are self employed as 

color consultants.

• A vocational school was approved in April 1981 to teach students the 

music business. The school’s Internet website, which promises to 

provide instruction on “How to be a successful singer, band, group, or 

manager,” does not include any information on the physical location of 

the school. Based on the website, this appears to be an on-line school. 

This school claimed to be accredited, but a search of the accreditation 

organization’s website revealed that the school was not currently 

accredited by the organization.
135

5. Lack of re-certifications

Federal regulations also provide that the INS may periodically review the 

approval of a school for continued eligibility. Regular re-certifications would 

help identify schools that are no longer active or schools that are committing 

fraud. Regular re-certifications would also ensure that the approved schools 

have maintained their accreditation, licensure, or approval status. According to 

INS officials, re-certification of schools is particularly necessary for certain 

types of schools – in particular, vocational, flight, and language schools – since 

these schools tend to be transitory. For example, we found based on our 

review of the files that in one re-certification effort, the INS learned that a 

school no longer existed. When the adjudicator contacted a flight school that 

had failed to respond to the INS’s inquiries, she was told that the school no 

longer existed and that the owner, now living in Alaska, “lost his plane awhile 

back.” In another file that indicated that a re-certification had been requested, 

the INS identified a language school that had been issuing I-20 forms using 

another school’s INS-approval code number. The owner of the school had 

initially taught at the original school, which subsequently closed. When the 

owner received the re-certification notice, she admitted to the INS what she 

had been doing. Her explanation was that she had submitted the paperwork for 

INS approval but, since the process was taking so long, she decided to continue 

to use the old code number.

Based on our review, we determined that the last nationwide recertification was conducted by the INS in 1983 (when the STSC system was 

implemented). In addition, none of the INS districts we visited had been 

performing regular re-certifications. In fact, only one of the districts, San 

Francisco, had conducted any re-certifications since 1983, and this recertification effort occurred around 1990.

We also reviewed the files of the 200 schools in our sample to try to 

determine whether those schools were still active or accredited. Based on

preliminary checks we performed, including comparing the schools against a 

list of closed schools maintained by the U.S. Department of Education, we 

concluded that at least 86 of the 200 schools – or 43 percent of the schools –

were either no longer active or likely no longer active. Of the 114 active 

schools in our sample, nine schools were no longer accredited by the original 

accrediting organization they cited when they had completed their initial I-17 

petition.
136

6. Review of Huffman Aviation file

As part of our investigation into the delayed notification of Huffman 

Aviation about the student status of Atta and Alshehhi, we obtained from the 

INS’s Miami District its file containing the documentation submitted by 

Huffman Aviation requesting certification. We found, based upon our review 

of the file and our interviews with officials from Huffman Aviation, that had 

the INS conducted a site visit, it is likely that the school would have been 

denied certification. Our review of Huffman Aviation documents leads us to 

question whether its students were enrolled in a “full course” of studies, that is, 

over 22 hours per week of course work since the primary course of study was 

non-classroom work. In addition, we question whether Huffman Aviation 

should continue to be eligible to issue I-20s for foreign students to obtain 

student visas and changes of status. 

Huffman Aviation submitted its original I-17 petition on or about May 

22, 1989. Only the first page of Huffman’s original I-17 was in the file we 

obtained from the INS, although the file did contain additional supporting 

documentation. 116 The President of Huffman Aviation had submitted an 

affidavit that stated, “All students are required to attend classes daily and are 

tested on a weekly basis.” In addition, a syllabus indicated that obtaining a 

private pilot’s license would require 40 hours of flight time and 15 hours of 

“Ground school and briefings” and that the course could be completed in 

“about 45 days if you are flying every day.”

On June 2, 1989, the INS responded to Huffman and requested additional 

information, including “evidence that the school offer[ed] a ‘Full Course of 

Study.’” The INS directed Huffman to the definition of “full course of study” 

as set forth in the publication used by schools to assist in filling out the I-17 

petition. Huffman submitted a response on October 2, 1989, and included 

some of the additional information requested, but it did not submit anything 

related to the “full course of study” request for information.

 

116 A new I-17 filed in August 1999 was also in the file. Huffman Aviation indicated on 

the I-17 that it was submitting the I-17 to “update” Huffman’s records. Although it was an 

update and not a new petition, the INS, as part of its process, reviews and approves these 

types of I-17s like new I-17s. This I-17 petition was approved on October 1, 1999. 
137

On November 20, 1989, the INS wrote to Huffman, again requesting 

additional information, including “an addendum to your response to Question 

#19 that lists all courses of study and the time necessary to complete each 

course of study.” On December 21, 1989, Huffman submitted additional 

information to the INS in support of its petition, indicating that among the 

documents being submitted were “the relevant pages of our syllabus that 

demonstrates that we do have a full course of study and the hour 

requirements.”

The INS responded on February 8, 1990, and for the third time stated that 

additional information was requested with respect to, among other things, the 

school’s ability to offer a full course of study:

Please read the attached definition of ‘Full Course of 

Study’ VERY CAREFULLY. A ‘Full Course of Study’ for a 

school such as Huffman Aviation means a minimum of 18 to 22 

clock hours of attendance per week.[117] Neither the syllabus 

nor the addendum that you submitted indicate that your fulltime 

students attend the school for 18-22 clock hours per week. 

Please submit an addendum to Question 19 [on the I-17 petition] 

that lists each course of study and the time necessary to 

complete each one... If the school does not offer a ‘Full Course 

of Study’ according to this definition, the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service cannot approve the school for attendance 

by nonimmigrant students.

The addendum should be in this format:

Commercial Pilot 500 hours (300 Hours ground school 20 Weeks at 25 Hours per Week

200 hours flight time)

The flight school then submitted a letter dated February 20, 1990, that 

stated in the format requested the breakdown for each “full course of study” 

that Huffman offered:

Private Pilot 106.5 hours (66.5 hours flight training) 4 weeks at 27 hours per week

 

117 As discussed earlier in this report, 18 hours per week attendance is required for 

vocational students whose primary course of study is classroom work and 22 hours per week 

attendance is required for vocational students whose primary course of study is lab or shop 

work, i.e., non-classroom work.
138

(40 hours of ground school)

The breakdown for the “Instrument Rating” course showed that it could be 

completed in 3 weeks at 26 hours per week and that the “Commercial Pilot” 

course would be completed in 20 weeks at 22.5 hours per week. 

On June 22, 1990, the INS approved Huffman Aviation’s I-17 petition.

Based on the available evidence, we do not believe that Huffman 

Aviation offered or currently offers a “full course of study.” We interviewed 

Rudi Dekkers, the Chief Executive Officer and President of Huffman Aviation. 

He told the OIG that his courses required no formal classroom study and that 

the weekly flight time would not encompass 18 or more hours a week. Indeed, 

Dekkers told us that flying 18 hours or more per week would be “too much.”

Although the information Huffman provided in its third response to the INS 

stated in a conclusory fashion that it was meeting the INS’s requirements, the 

supplementary material that it had submitted with its application showed that it 

was not. For example, as stated above, Huffman submitted a syllabus 

indicating that obtaining a private pilot’s license requires 40 hours of flight 

time and 15 hours of “Ground school and briefings,” and that the course could 

be completed in “about 45 days if you are flying every day.” Based on our 

calculation, 55 hours over 45 days constitutes an average of 8.5 hours per 

week, far less than the 22 hours per week required by the regulations for a “full 

course of study” for vocational schools that offer primarily non-classroom 

studies. In addition, the INS file that we reviewed contained a Huffman 

Aviation document labeled “Commercial Pilot Training Course Outline.”118 

Like the course syllabus, this document stated that obtaining a private pilot’s 

license would require 40 hours of flight time and 15 hours of ground school 

and seven weeks to complete the course. The document also stated that 

obtaining a “Commercial Multiengine Instrument” rating required 25 hours of 

flight time and 15 hours of ground school, and it stated “Full-time student, 

completion in four weeks.” By our calculation, this would require 

approximately 10 hours of instruction per week. 

Moreover, in its I-17 petition submitted in 1999, Huffman Aviation 

indicated in response to Question 19, which asks for the courses of study and 

 

118 From the condition of the file, we were unable to determine when the INS received 

this document. 
139

time necessary to complete each, that its response was “Total time estimate: 

approx. 6 months.” In addition, Huffman’s petition stated that the school’s 

sessions were not based on semesters or quarters but that “students may start at 

any time.” In response to the question asking for dates of sessions, Huffman 

stated “[o]ur students register at all times of the year. Their programs are 

organized to their individual needs.”119

In addition to the requirement that Huffman Aviation must offer a “full 

course of study,” it is also required to certify on I-20s that each student is 

actually pursuing a full course of study. Huffman certified that Atta and 

Alshehhi were pursuing a full course of study and that the dates for the course 

were September 1, 2000, until September 1, 2001. But we found, based on 

Huffman’s records, that Atta and Alshehhi never logged the requisite 22 hours 

per week of instruction. 

A follow-up site visit to Huffman, based on the schools officer’s 

concerns about the school’s ability to offer a full course of study, would have 

provided the INS more accurate information with which to make its 

determination about Huffman’s certification. Such a site visit never 

occurred.120

B. Lack of security features on I-20 forms

INS investigators and adjudicators consistently reported that they 

believed that I-20 fraud is prevalent. The INS Inspector’s Field Manual alludes 

to this concern, stating, “Fraudulently issued Forms I-20 are not uncommon.”

Once a school is certified by the INS to accept foreign students, the INS 

gives the school blank I-20 forms to provide to foreign students as proof that 

they have been accepted by the school. In addition, schools are permitted to 

obtain I-20 forms from private vendors who produce the software to generate 

 

119 The INS did not request additional information before approving this I-17 petition.

120 While Huffman Aviation may not have been entitled to issue I-20s to foreign 

students to obtain student visas, Atta and Alshehhi could have continued to pursue the 

pilot’s license program on a part-time basis while in the United States on their visitor visas, 

since INS practices consider such study as being consistent with the purpose of a visitor 

visa. For a discussion of our concern about the INS’s lack of information about 

nonimmigrants taking classes on a part-time basis, see Chapter Eight.
140

the forms on a computer. The current I-20 form has no serial number or unique 

stamp. As a result, the form lacks security features and is relatively easy to 

counterfeit. Also, many schools that were once approved by the INS, but 

which have either had their approvals withdrawn or have closed, still have a 

supply of I-20 forms.

As previously noted, foreign students may leave and re-enter the country, 

but they must have the signature of a DSO on the student copy of the I-20, 

signifying that the alien is still a student and plans to return to the school after a 

temporary absence. However, immigration inspectors have no way to ascertain 

the authenticity of the DSO endorsements. I-20 holders who are no longer 

active students could easily forge subsequent DSO endorsements, enabling 

them to re-enter the country. 

An official with the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, 

which conducts investigations of visa fraud, told the OIG that falsifying I-20s 

is the most common method by which student visa fraud is committed. 

Investigators in all four INS district offices we visited told us that school 

employees with access to these forms have fraudulently issued I-20s to aliens 

for a fee to enable them to enter the United States.

Although fraud with I-20s is easy to commit, it is difficult to detect. I20s lack security features, and the State Department does not have access to 

INS databases to confirm the information listed on the I-20, such as whether 

the school is authorized to issue I-20s. Primary immigration inspectors at the 

POEs also do not have access to the STSC database to confirm any information 

on the I-20 form.

C. Inadequacies in collecting information concerning student status

To obtain student visas or student status, foreign students must be 

enrolled in a full course of study, and to be considered in status, students must 

remain enrolled as a full-time student. With respect to academic and language 

school students, federal regulations specifically provide that “[t]he student is 

considered to be maintaining status if he or she is making normal progress 

toward completing a course of studies.” 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(5). Because 

students must remain in school full time to be entitled to remain in status, the 

INS needs to know when students are taking classes part-time, quit, fail, or do 

not show up for school.
141

To receive INS certification, schools must agree to notify the INS when a 

student terminates attendance at the school or is no longer enrolled in a full 

course of study. However, the only affirmative reporting requirement is that 

the school notify the INS of terminations or other lapses in attendance when 

the INS provides the school with a list of students to identify. The INS has not 

provided this information to schools since 1989.

In addition, even when schools voluntarily report information about 

students, the INS has no way to collect or record this information. Such 

information is not systematically recorded in STSC or in any other INS 

database. Schools in the past have attempted to report to the INS students who 

were accepted by the schools and who were issued I-20s but who failed to 

show (“no-shows”). However, the INS was so overwhelmed by the reports of 

“no-shows” that it directed schools to no longer report this information. 

Since the INS does not collect information in STSC about the status of 

students, currently the only way for an INS immigration inspector at a port of 

entry to verify that a returning student is still in active status is to check that the 

I-20 presented by the student contains a current endorsement by the school’s 

DSO. Federal regulations do not require that this endorsement occur within 

any specified time before the student’s departure, and the instructions on page 

4 of the I-20 state that the endorsement is valid for six months.121 The 

immigration inspectors we interviewed said that, as a normal practice, they 

accept any DSO endorsement made within the year prior to the foreign 

student’s entry. This means that the inspector has no way of checking the 

authenticity of the DSO signature or knowing if students terminated their 

studies after the date of the signatures. The signatures can easily be forged, 

and the inspector has no way of detecting the fraud.

D. Deficiencies in the Student and Schools System (STSC) database

The STSC is the INS database that records information about the schools 

approved to issue I-20s, the foreign students who have enrolled in approved 

schools, and changes in identifying information about the schools or students 

 

121 The regulations provide that students are permitted a temporary absence from the 

United States and define temporary absence as five months or less for F-1 students. 8 CFR 

§ 214.2(f)(4). The INS’s Operations Instructions define temporary absence for M-1 students 

also as five months. OI 214.2(m).
142

that are provided to the INS by the submission of a new I-17 or I-20. As noted 

above, the I-20s and I-17s are sent to ACS, a private contractor in London, 

Kentucky, for data entry, and this information is eventually uploaded into 

STSC.

We found that, for several reasons, the information in STSC is unreliable 

and inaccurate. First, as stated previously, the INS does not collect certain 

information about students, such as when they quit, fail, or do not show up at 

the school from the beginning. STSC information about the schools is equally 

unreliable because, as noted previously, the INS makes little effort to assess 

whether certain schools are still accredited or even in existence. In some 

instances, we found that while information in the hard copy file indicated that a 

school was no longer in operation, there was no evidence that the INS provided 

this information to ACS, the contractor that handles the data entry. We also 

found that the INS has failed to provide to ACS updated information, such as 

new addresses and name changes of schools, when that information was 

submitted to the INS on a new I-17 by the schools.

Therefore, not surprisingly, STSC is riddled with inaccuracies. As noted 

previously, in our review of 200 files of schools we selected from STSC’s list

of “active” schools, 86 of those schools appeared to no longer be in 

operation.122 In addition, of the 114 active schools we reviewed, STSC showed 

incorrect addresses for 40 schools and incorrect names for 16 schools. Of the 

40 schools with incorrect addresses, we found documentation in eight of the 

files that showed that the INS had been informed of the new addresses. Of the 

16 schools with incorrect names, we found documentation in four of the files 

 

122 Of the 86 schools we determined were no longer active or were likely inactive, we 

found five cases in which there was a completed form in the file indicating that the INS had 

determined that the school was no longer approved to issue I-20s. This happened when the 

INS had received an I-20 from ACS that had been returned to ACS as undeliverable, 

because there was no such address for the school, or because the school had informed the 

INS that it was no longer in operation and wanted to withdraw its petition. This information 

is usually recorded on an I-702 form (School Violations and Approval Review) and sent to 

ACS for data entry and uploading into STSC. Based on our review of these five files, we 

were unable to determine when or if these forms were ever sent for data entry, since they 

were undated. We were told by personnel at one of the district offices that they did not 

complete these forms but instead simply noted in the file that the school was being 

withdrawn.
143

that showed that the INS had been informed of the school’s name change. We 

found no evidence in any of the files that ACS had been informed of any of 

these changes.123

We also found that processing errors contributed to the inaccurate 

information in STSC. Two of the schools in our sample, which STSC 

indicated were authorized to issue I-20s, were never approved and therefore 

should never have been in the STSC system. When a schools officer denies 

certification of a school, no forms are sent to ACS; however, when an 

approved school is de-certified, the INS sends an I-702 form to ACS for data 

entry. Based on our review of the schools’ files, we determined that the INS 

schools officer for both schools mistakenly sent an I-702 to ACS for data entry. 

It appears that since the schools were not in the system and could not therefore 

be withdrawn, a record for the schools was created in STSC for the schools 

based on the information on the I-702. While at the district offices, we also 

randomly selected files of schools that had been approved by the district office 

within the past two years and checked whether these schools had been entered 

into STSC. Of the 38 files we selected, 14 (37 percent) did not appear in the 

STSC database. We did not investigate whether this information was not in 

STSC because the INS failed to provide the I-17 to ACS or because ACS failed 

to enter the information.

The consensus among the schools officers, immigration inspectors, and 

investigators we spoke with during our site visits was that the STSC system 

was unreliable and therefore not useful. At all four districts we visited, the 

schools officers instead used alternate systems to track schools in their districts. 

Two had developed their own databases, and two relied on paper records, such 

as index cards.

 

123 The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001, which was 

approved by Congress and recently signed by the President, requires the Attorney General to 

provide the Secretary of State with a list of all institutions certified to issue I-20s no later 

than 30 days after the enactment of the Act. This list is intended for use by consular officers 

to verify that persons applying for student visas are submitting I-20s issued by INSapproved schools. Given the inaccuracies in the INS’s STSC database, we believe that any 

list of approved schools would not be reliable.
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E. Lack of enforcement 

According to investigators we interviewed in the four district offices we 

visited, conducting investigations of students and schools for visa fraud has 

always been a low priority. Investigations personnel stated that with only 

2,000 investigators nationwide, the INS did not have enough investigative 

resources to devote to students and schools. According to these investigators, 

their top priorities prior to September 11, 2001, were to apprehend criminal 

aliens, disband large manufacturers of fraudulent documents, dismantle antismuggling organizations, and stop worksites from employing illegal aliens. 

Foreign students and schools were generally only investigated if they fit in one 

of these categories. Since September 11, terrorism has become the top priority. 

Additional duties that investigators have recently been assigned include 

tracking down the approximately 300,000 aliens who have outstanding 

deportation orders against them and conducting background checks on airport 

employers and employees.

Foreign students who are no longer in status because they quit school or 

never showed up for school are considered overstays and can be removed from 

the United States. As discussed previously, the INS does not systematically 

collect this information about the students from the schools. Moreover, even 

when the INS has the information, it generally takes no action. Some schools 

report information about “no-shows” and “termination” to their local INS 

district offices. In the district offices we visited where an adjudications officer 

was the “schools officer,” information reported by schools was provided to 

investigative personnel for entry into the INS’s National Automated 

Information Lookout System (NAILS). But the investigative personnel did not 

enter the information into NAILS.124

F. Lack of training for designated school officials and INS schools 

officers

In addition to signing the I-20 certifying that students have been accepted 

to a full course of study and have provided proof of ability to pay, Designated 

 

124 NAILS is one of the law enforcement databases used by inspectors at the ports of 

entry to determine whether possible derogatory information about an alien exists.
145

School Officials (DSOs) are responsible for representing schools in all matters 

related to foreign students. Their duties include, among other things, 

complying with INS recordkeeping and reporting requirements; monitoring 

student activities and reporting violations to the INS, such as failure to 

maintain a full course load or engagement in unauthorized employment; and 

notifying the INS of material changes in the school’s program, accreditation, 

and level of education offered. 

Currently the INS has no formal, mandated training program for DSOs. 

While the larger school associations, such as NAFSA, provide such training, it 

is geared towards DSOs at public and private colleges and universities, not 

vocational and language schools, who, according to INS officials, need more 

training. 125 During our site visits, INS district office school adjudicators 

commented on the need for such training. They noted that the DSO function 

rotates frequently at schools and, as a result, many DSOs are untrained and 

unaware of regulations. As a result, they said, violations of the law frequently 

occurred. 

For example, the DSO who certified the I-20 forms for Atta and Alshehhi 

for use in their applications for change of status told the OIG that at that time 

she had just recently been assigned as the DSO and that she had been provided 

no training. 126 As a result, she said she was unsure of what she was doing and 

that either Atta or Alshehhi directed her on the proper procedures for filling out 

the forms.

INS personnel in district offices assigned to approve and monitor schools 

also are not provided with any formal training. Instead, they learn on the job. 

Many to whom we spoke stated that they were not sure what they were 

supposed to be looking for when they certified schools. In the district offices 

that we visited, the schools officers appeared unaware that regulations provided 

that the INS should conduct an in-person interview with a school representative 

 

125 NAFSA was originally called the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors. 

In May 1990, the name of the organization was changed to “NAFSA: Association of 

International Educators.” The acronym was retained despite the name change.

126 We also noted in our review of the INS’s Huffman Aviation I-17 file that it did not 

contain an I-17 petition listing this school coordinator as a designated school official as 

required by the regulations.
146

before approving an I-17 petition. They also commented about the lack of 

clarity in the regulations and the lack of INS guidelines for the approval 

process. The INS informed us that it is now in the process of developing 

certification procedures.

IV. Student and Exchange Visitor System (SEVIS)

The INS is currently developing a new computer system to more closely 

track information about foreign students and the schools in which they are 

enrolled. This system, the Student and Exchange Visitor System (SEVIS), is 

also designed to collect information about aliens enrolled in a State 

Department-approved exchange visitor program.127 In this section of the 

report, we first describe the history of SEVIS, including the INS’s latest 

schedule for implementation, and the visa process as it is designed to work 

under SEVIS. Next, we analyze SEVIS, including the deficiencies in the 

foreign student program that SEVIS is intended to address, some operational 

problems in the foreign student program that SEVIS will not address, and the 

impact of the implementation schedule for SEVIS.

A. History of SEVIS

After the INS’s foreign student program came under criticism when it 

was discovered that one of the terrorists involved in the February 1993 

bombing of the World Trade Center was in the United States on an expired 

student visa, the director of the Department of Justice’s Office of Investigative 

Agency Policies sent a memorandum to the Deputy Attorney General citing 

concerns regarding possible terrorism and alien criminal activity. This 

September 24, 1994, memorandum specifically mentioned the need to subject 

foreign students to thorough and continuing scrutiny before and during their 

stay in the United States. On April 17, 1995, the Deputy Attorney General 

asked the INS Commissioner to address this issue. This led to the formation of 

an INS task force in June 1995 to conduct a comprehensive review of the F, M, 

 

127 As noted previously, currently the State Department ma intains a database called the 

Exchange Visitor Information System (EVIS), which functions similarly to STSC. Paper 

forms are data entered into EVIS. Once SEVIS is introduced, the INS also will be 

responsible for maintaining all of the information about foreign exchange visitors in SEVIS, 

although the State Department will remain responsible for approving the sponsors that 

participate in the foreign exchange program.
147

and J visa processes. Besides the INS, the task force included members from 

the State Department and the United States Information Agency, and experts in 

the administration of international student programs.

The resulting task force report, issued on December 22, 1995, identified 

some of the same deficiencies in the foreign student program we discussed in 

this chapter of the report, including deficiencies in the tracking and monitoring

of foreign students; weak and ineffective data systems; the ineffective district 

office practice of assigning student/schools responsibilities as a collateral duty; 

the lack of a system to monitor or audit schools; and the lack of clarity in 

school approval requirements. The task force recommended, among other 

things, that the INS collect and monitor information electronically about 

foreign students through the issuance of student registration cards that would 

contain biometric identification information through fingerprints and that 

students be required to notify the INS whenever they changed their student 

program, such as transfers, change of major, or other event.

On September 30, 1996, Public Law 104-208, the Illegal Immigration 

Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was enacted. It directed 

the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to develop 

and conduct a program to collect certain information on nonimmigrant foreign 

students and exchange visitors from approved institutions of higher education 

and designated exchange visitor programs. The information to be collected 

included the alien’s name, address, date of birth, visa classification, student 

status, course of study, academic disciplinary actions taken, and termination 

dates and reasons. Schools had already been required by the INS since 1983 to 

manually collect this data; IIRIRA mandated that the information was to be 

collected electronically where practicable. IIRIRA also mandated that the INS 

implement the system by January 1, 1998, use a phased-in approach (starting 

with students and exchange visitors from at least five countries, with full 

expansion within four years), and establish a fee of less than $100, which 

would be paid by the foreign students and collected by the schools, so that the 

program would be self-funded.

In June 1997, the INS developed a computer program as a pilot project, 

the Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students 

(CIPRIS), to test the concept of an electronic reporting system. CIPRIS was 

tested at the Atlanta Hartsfield Airport, the INS Atlanta District Office, the 

Texas Service Center, and 21 educational institutions in Georgia, Alabama, 

North Carolina, and South Carolina. The most significant difference between 
148

the old process and CIPRIS was that schools provided information about 

themselves and their students directly into INS computer systems instead of the 

INS relying on information from forms being data entered after the fact by 

contractors. In addition, the new process, which was later changed, was 

intended to involve the issuance of student registration cards that would 

contain additional identifying information about the student such as 

fingerprints and photographs that were collected by the schools.128 

CIPRIS, and later SEVIS, encountered significant opposition from 

several associations representing schools, particularly the Association of 

International Educators, which represents 8,000 foreign student advisors at 2-

year and 4-year public and private institutions; the American Council on 

Education, which represents 1,800 college presidents at 2-year and 4-year 

public and private institutions; and Teachers of English to Speakers of Other 

Languages, which has 14,000 members. Schools objected to foreign students 

being subjected to monitoring; to schools being subjected to the burden of 

collecting fingerprints and photographs of students for the registration cards; 

and to schools being required to collect the processing fee from students, most 

of whom would still be in their home countries when the fee would have to be 

collected.

The CIPRIS pilot program officially ended in October 1999. However, 

the program continued after that date as a prototype pending the development 

of a nationwide system. Around the time that the CIPRIS program ended, the 

INS decided to abandon the idea of student registration cards and the collection 

of fingerprints and photographs. The INS decided to drop the biometric card 

requirement and instead use a “bar code” to be placed on the I-20 form issued 

to the student.

According to the INS, the CIPRIS pilot system was designed from its 

inception as a “throw-away” program whose purpose was just to test the 

feasibility of electronic reporting. In July 2001, the name of the program was

changed to SEVIS to distinguish between the two systems, which, although 

they functioned similarly, were substantially different in design. Schools 

 

128 Although IIRIRA mandated that the INS collect information about foreign students 

attending only colleges and universities (not vocational or language schools), the INS 

decided to include all foreign students in its new program.
149

participating in the CIPRIS program were provided with separate computers to 

operate CIPRIS; SEVIS participants would access the system through the 

Internet with user passwords.

In December 1999, the INS published a proposed regulation setting the 

foreign student processing fee at $95. The INS received over 4,000 comments 

to the regulation. On February 22, 2000, twenty-one U.S. Senators wrote to the 

INS requesting a postponement of the fee rules. The INS, the Department of 

State, and school representatives submitted proposed legislative changes for fee 

collection to Congress in April 2000. Public Law 106-396, enacted on October 

30, 2000, required that foreign students and exchange visitors pay the fee 

directly to the INS (through the Attorney General) prior to applying for a visa, 

rather than requiring schools to collect the fee and transmit it to the INS.

Since the INS was relying on fee collections to fund SEVIS, the delays in 

establishing the fee process affected the timing of the implementation of 

SEVIS. And despite the changes in fee requirements, the school associations 

continued their opposition to SEVIS. On August 2, 2001, with the support of 

the school associations, H.R. 2779 was introduced to halt the implementation 

of SEVIS altogether. 129 NAFSA issued a press release supporting the proposed 

bill and stating that the implementation of SEVIS would: (1) send an 

unwelcoming message to international students and exchange visitors by 

singling them out for monitoring; (2) be costly for schools since its reporting 

requirements would require overhauls of university information systems; and 

(3) place an unacceptable financial burden on applicants.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks drew renewed attention to 

foreign students. On October 26, 2001, Public Law 107-56, the Uniting and 

Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 

and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the USA PATRIOT Act) was enacted. 

Section 416 of this law mandated that SEVIS be fully implemented before 

January 1, 2003. 

 

129 The House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary referred H.R. 2779 to the 

Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims on September 10, 2001. No further action was 

taken and, as discussed in this chapter, Congress later passed legislation strengthening 

SEVIS.
150

The USA PATRIOT Act also required SEVIS to include information on 

the foreign student’s port of entry and date of entry, and it re-defined schools 

required to be in SEVIS to include flight schools, language training schools, 

and vocational schools.130 The law provided $36.8 million in funding for 

SEVIS implementation. Because of this funding, the Office of Management 

and Budget required the INS to delay implementation of any student fees until 

the appropriation has been expended.

In contrast to their prior opposition, both NAFSA and the American 

Council on Education (ACE) issued public statements after the events of 

September 11 supporting SEVIS implementation. We contacted 

representatives of NAFSA, ACE, and the Career College Association, which 

represents 950 schools that provide vocational programs, to discuss SEVIS 

with them. All expressed support for SEVIS. While they described some 

concerns related to the monitoring of students, they said that school 

associations have accepted the inevitability of implementing SEVIS and are 

now focused on opposing the fee and the proposed method of collection.

131

B. How SEVIS will work

According to the INS, SEVIS will electronically record data about 

schools and foreign students, primarily by schools entering information directly 

into SEVIS or by batch processing that will occur through interaction between 

a school’s computer systems and SEVIS. Schools will select the method they 

 

130 As noted above, Congress also recently approved the Enhanced Border Security and 

Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001, which formally amends IIRIRA to require the INS to 

collect additional information about students, information which the INS already plans to 

collect once SEVIS is implemented. The Act also requires the State Department to obtain 

additional information from student visa and exchange visitor applicants and requires the 

INS to conduct periodic reviews of schools, which we discuss in more detail later in this 

chapter. It also establishes requirements affecting the State Department, INS-approved 

schools, and the INS for dealing with foreign students that must be implemented within a 

specified number of days of the Act and that must remain in effect prior to the full 

implementation of SEVIS. The transitional program requirements for the INS include 

notifying schools when a foreign student has entered the United States – which the INS 

currently accomplishes by sending an I-20 to the school – and, as discussed earlier in this 

chapter, providing the State Department with a list of INS-approved schools.

131 We address the issue of fee collection in greater detail in Section V C 2.
151

want to use. The INS will not have to rely on schools and students submitting 

forms to the INS. Since SEVIS will be Internet-based, schools that enter 

information directly into SEVIS will not be required to obtain additional 

hardware or software.132

1. Data to be collected in SEVIS concerning foreign students 

and exchange visitors

SEVIS will collect data on all full-time foreign students (F and M visa 

status) and exchange visitors (J visa status) and their dependents. Each student 

and exchange visitor’s SEVIS record will include the following:

• Form I-20 and Form DS-2019 information.

• Personal information, including name, place and date of birth, country 

of citizenship, and current address in the United States.

• Whether the student is full- or part-time.

• Date the student’s studies began.

• Number of course credits completed each year.

• Transfers and extensions of course of study.

• Degree program and field of study.

• Information on practical training and other employment, including 

beginning and ending dates.

• Date studies ended and the reasons why.

• Date the visa was issued and the visa classification. 

• Academic disciplinary actions taken against the student due to criminal 

convictions. 

• Current academic and program status of the student.

• Dependent names and current addresses.

 

132 For the schools that will transfer information electronically through their computer 

systems, some adjustments to their computer systems will be necessary for the 

communication with SEVIS.
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2. Data to be collected concerning schools

Once a school completes an I-17 petition, SEVIS will record the 

following data concerning schools approved to issue I-20s:

• Identifying information from the schools.

• Names of DSOs.

• Whether the school is an academic school, vocational school, or 

language school or is authorized to accept foreign students in all of the 

above visas categories.

• Programs for which the school is approved to issue I-20s.

• Licensing or accreditation status.

• Degrees offered.

• Average number of classes, students and teachers.

• Annual costs of schooling.

• Whether the school is approved to issue I-20s or whether that approval 

has been withdrawn.

3. SEVIS procedures

a. School certifications

Schools will be able to complete and submit their request for certification 

(Form I-17) electronically to their local INS district office. A petitioning 

school will initially be provided with a temporary password to enable the 

school to enter the I-17 information electronically. SEVIS will not accept 

incomplete I-17 applications or information that falls outside of certain 

parameters. An electronic alert would notify the INS district office that the 

petition has been filed. The petitioning school, however, will still have to mail 

the necessary documentation to support the petition. 133 The adjudicator at the 

 

133 SEVIS will not eliminate the INS’s need to maintain paper files and to track hard 

copies of documents. The INS will have to ensure that it can match the supporting 

documentation to the electronic I-17 information if the supporting documentation is not 

submitted with an I-17. It is unclear whether the INS will keep a paper record of the I-17 in 

a file for each school.
153

INS district office would then conduct a review to determine whether the 

school meets INS’s criteria. Once the school’s petition and supporting

documentation has been reviewed, the adjudicator will note in SEVIS whether 

the school has been approved. If the school is approved, the DSOs at the 

school will be provided with logon IDs and passwords, which will enable them 

to access SEVIS. Schools will also be able to electronically update their I17s.134

Each DSO will be provided with a unique logon ID, which will help 

promote accountability. The INS is also considering establishing a DSO 

certification program. All DSOs would be required to take training before 

receiving their SEVIS passwords.

According to INS officials, schools will also be required to be re-certified 

after a set period of time. According to INS Headquarters officials, vocational 

and language schools will be required to be re-certified more frequently than 

public schools, colleges, and universities. The INS had not yet determined 

when or how often schools will need to be re-certified.

Under SEVIS, once the re-certification time frame is determined, the 

schools’ logon IDs will be set to expire unless the required re-certification 

occurs. E-mail alerts will be sent to the schools several months before the 

expiration date to remind them to re-certify. The INS will also be able to 

decertify a school that violates INS regulations by electronically invalidating 

the school’s password.135 This will prevent the school from issuing any 

additional I-20s and will therefore effectively exclude them from the program.

 

134 Unlike the former process that required schools to submit a new I-17 petition that 

had to be re-approved by the INS, schools will be able to make certain changes to their I-17 

information, such as new DSOs, new addresses, or new school names, without approval 

from the INS.

135 According to the INS, it had not yet decided how it will carry out this process of 

decertifying or invalidating a school, such as whether the district office will have the 

authority and capability to terminate the school’s password and access to SEVIS or whether 

the district office will be required to make a recommendation that would then be carried out 

by INS Headquarters or some entity other than the district office. 
154

b. Issuance of I-20 to foreign student

Under SEVIS, when an alien applies to the school and is accepted, the 

school will, as before, be responsible for issuing an I-20. But rather than 

requiring the school to type the relevant information onto a hard copy of the 

student and school copies of the I-20, SEVIS will generate an electronic I-20. 

The DSOs will enter the I-20 data directly into SEVIS, if the real-time method 

is used. Under the batch method, schools will enter information for the forms 

directly into their own data entry systems, which will communicate with 

SEVIS. Once the applying student’s information is entered into SEVIS by the 

school, the system will generate an I-20 form that contains a bar code number 

that is unique to that student. The school will send this form to the student, as 

it currently does.136

c. State Department access to SEVIS

Foreign students will present this bar coded I-20 to their local consulate, 

along with the other required documentation, when applying for a student visa. 

After the visa is issued, the student’s name, address, passport number, and 

other information will be captured in CLASS when the consular officer scans 

the bar coded I-20 into CLASS.137 The date of issuance of the visa and the 

location of the consulate office issuing the visa will be uploaded from CLASS 

to SEVIS, which will then update the student’s SEVIS record to indicate the 

location where the visa was issued and the date the visa was issued. 

Before issuing the visa, the consular officer will have access to basic 

SEVIS information through CLASS. Consular officers will also be able to 

access the full SEVIS record through the Internet, if they need to do so. In this 

way, the consular officer will be able to verify the legitimacy of the I-20.138

 

136 Since this process will create the record regarding the student, there will no longer be 

a “school copy” of the I-20s collected by inspectors at POEs and transmitted to ACS for data 

entry. 

137 The technical means for accomplishing this process have not yet been finalized.

138 Consular officers will be provided passwords to access SEVIS through the Internet. 
155

d. Inspectors’ access to SEVIS and updating of student’s 

record that student has entered the country

Upon entering the United States, the student will present the bar coded I20 to the INS immigration inspector. The INS plans for the primary 

immigration inspector to scan or data enter the bar code, which will then access 

the unique number for the I-20 to ensure that it is valid. If the I-20 is not valid 

or there is some other indication of a problem, the inspector will be notified, 

and the student should be referred to secondary. The secondary immigration 

inspectors will be able to directly access the full SEVIS records. According to 

INS officials, the technical process to achieve the record checking and problem 

notification has not yet been determined, although it is anticipated that SEVIS 

will be integrated with IBIS (Interagency Border Inspection System). 

This process will also be designed so that the student’s SEVIS record will 

automatically be updated to indicate the student’s port of entry and the date of 

entry when the inspector swipes the I-20.

e. Updating of student’s record once student enrolls in 

school

Once the student registers at school, the school will update the student’s 

SEVIS record either by directly entering the information into SEVIS or by the 

school’s computer system automatically notifying SEVIS of the student’s 

enrollment once the school’s computer system has been updated. If the 

student’s SEVIS record does not reflect a registration within 30 days of the 

student’s entry into the United States, an e-mail alert will automatically be sent 

to the school. Thereafter, if the student does not register and SEVIS is not 

updated within a set period of time after the notification (date unknown), the 

student will be considered out of status and removable. The system is designed 

so that the I-20 will then be invalidated electronically, and the student’s record 

will show that the student is out of status.139 

 

139 Since students can be accepted to more than one school, students can be in 

possession of multiple I-20s. When obtaining a student visa, the student is required to select 

a specific school. The visa records the name of the school the student is planning to attend. 

Once a visa is issued to the student for a particular school, all extraneous I-20s will be 

invalidated once CLASS uploads to SEVIS. The other I-20s should also be invalidated once 

(continued)
156

While the student is attending school, the school will be responsible for 

updating SEVIS with the required data relating to the student’s status, such as 

when the student quits school or otherwise terminates attendance, changes 

majors, or changes addresses. Eventually, the INS plans to transfer to SEVIS 

information related to changes of status maintained by the service centers, 

information about reinstatements, and information about employment 

maintained by the district offices. The INS also plans to integrate SEVIS with 

the entry-exit system currently under development, which would enable the 

SEVIS record to be updated with the student’s movements in and out of the 

United States.140 

The INS and other authorized users of SEVIS, will be able to extract 

information from the SEVIS database. Authorized users will be provided with 

passwords to enable them to access SEVIS to search for information on 

specific students. The INS’s Office of Information Resources Management 

can also generate specific reports from SEVIS for users. Analyses of SEVIS 

data can be performed using any of the parameters contained in the SEVIS 

record. 

We were told that the INS is planning on generating periodic reports of 

students who fail to show up at school, but the INS has not yet determined who 

in the INS will receive these reports, how frequently the reports will be 

generated, or what action will be taken as a result of the reports. However, 

SEVIS access through logon IDs and passwords can be provided to INS district 

offices for investigations and enforcement use, allowing real-time queries and 

reports on demand.

 

(continued)

the student fails to enroll in the schools that were not selected by the student. This will not 

delete the record, but will make the extraneous I-20 unusable. 

140 Since IIRIRA mandated the development of an automated entry and exit control 

system, the INS has been working on an automated entry-exit system that would involve the 

electronic recording of entries and exits rather than the collection of the paper I-94s that are 

later data entered into NIIS. The Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management 

Improvement Act of 2000 (PL 106-215) amended IIRIRA to set new deadlines, establish 

reporting requirements, identify those authorized to access the system, authorize funding, 

and establish a task force to implement the new entry-exit system. The new deadlines for 

the entry-exit system vary depending on the type of POE. Full implementation is required 

by December 31, 2005.
157

C. Schedule for implementation

The USA PATRIOT Act mandates that SEVIS be fully implemented 

prior to January 1, 2003. The INS currently plans to have SEVIS available to 

real-time users on July 1, 2002, and to batch users sometime in the fall of 2002. 

In addition, the INS plans to have overseas consulate posts and the INS ports of 

entry connected to SEVIS by December 2002. However, few users will be 

actually using SEVIS in 2002. While SEVIS will be available in 2002, the INS 

has recently proposed regulations that will require SEVIS to be fully 

operational and actually in use by January 30, 2003.

Currently, the only schools that will be able to access SEVIS once it is 

available will be schools that used the previous CIPRIS system and a small 

number of schools in the Boston area that are part of a pilot program. They 

have been converted to SEVIS and are currently using SEVIS to issue I-20s. 

However, as discussed in detail in Section V C 1 of this chapter, the INS has 

issued proposed regulations that would require all schools (approximately 

72,000) that want to apply for SEVIS access to be re-certified by the INS 

before they can use SEVIS and begin issuing I-20s. The proposed regulation 

provides for a cutoff date of January 30, 2003, by which schools that have not 

been re-certified will be unable to issue I-20s.141 

For SEVIS to be fully functional, the INS must determine how the 

district offices will record in SEVIS the approval of student reinstatements and 

student employment authorizations. In addition, the service centers, which 

approve changes of status for students, must also be able to access SEVIS. 

Recently, the INS moved its planned implementation date for linking its 

service centers and district offices to SEVIS from the spring of 2003 to January 

30, 2003, to comply with the proposed regulation. 

V. OIG analysis of SEVIS

Once fully implemented, SEVIS will enhance the INS’s data collection 

abilities greatly. However, the tracking and monitoring of foreign students will 

continue to be significantly flawed, unless the INS devotes the necessary 

 

141 The January 30, 2003, implementation date does not pertain to exchange visitor 

program sponsors. The Department of State will issue separate regulations establishing a 

compliance date for all exchange visitor programs.
158

resources to ensuring that the schools are providing accurate information; 

ensures that the schools are all properly re-reviewed before access to SEVIS is 

provided; ensures that a process is in place to analyze the information captured 

by SEVIS; ensures that adequate investigative resources are made available; 

and requires schools to be re-certified at reasonable intervals. In addition to 

any technical difficulties that may be faced in implementing SEVIS, the INS 

also faces major obstacles to implementing SEVIS before the current date 

proposed – January 30, 2003. Below we describe deficiencies in the foreign 

student program that SEVIS will address, the problems that SEVIS will not 

address, and the implementation difficulties that SEVIS faces.

A. Deficiencies that SEVIS will address

SEVIS as designed will improve data collection, reduce fraud, enhance 

data analysis, and enhance enforcement capabilities. Specific improvements 

are described below.

1. Improved data collection

Since I-17 petitions and I-20 forms will no longer be completed and 

processed manually, the INS’s data records for students and schools under 

SEVIS should be more accurate. Information on schools applying to the INS 

for permission to accept foreign students will be entered directly into SEVIS by 

the schools. In addition, once approved, schools will be able to directly enter 

any changes to their records. Moreover, SEVIS will require schools to be recertified at specified intervals, which means that school records will be updated 

by the INS even if the school does not update its own records. With respect to 

student information, I-20s will not be generated unless all necessary 

information is provided, which means that SEVIS should contain more 

complete information.

The INS will also be able to collect information about the status of 

students, such as whether the student is still a full-time student, where the 

student lives, and the type of program in which the student is enrolled. The 

INS will not need to rely on this information being provided in paper format, 

since schools will update student records individually or through batch 

processing.

Schools will easily be able to identify when a change of status has been 

approved because the student’s SEVIS record will be updated by the INS 

service centers once processing is complete. SEVIS will eliminate the current 
159

manual process in which the paper I-20 is returned to the school once approval 

has been granted. In addition, schools will be able to determine through 

SEVIS when and where a student entered the United States. 

2. Improving fraud detection and deterrence

SEVIS will enhance the INS’s ability to detect and decrease fraud in the 

foreign student program. First, because schools will be able to generate I-20s 

only through SEVIS, only INS-approved schools with access to SEVIS will be 

able to generate I-20s. Accountability over DSOs will be improved, since each 

DSO will be provided with a unique password, enabling the INS to identify 

who is performing certain transactions. The INS will be able to electronically 

de-certify a school that violates program requirements by invalidating the 

school’s password, thereby preventing the school from continuing to issue I20s. SEVIS will also require schools to be re-certified at specified intervals. If 

this re-certification does not occur, SEVIS will automatically cancel the 

school’s passwords.

With respect to students, the fact that I-20s will be bar coded will greatly 

enhance the INS’s ability to detect fraud. Because I-20s will be generated with 

a bar code only through SEVIS, students will have more difficulty generating 

fraudulent I-20s. In addition, State Department consular officers and INS 

immigration inspectors will be able to determine the validity of the I-20 

presented by an alien because I-20s generated by SEVIS will contain a unique 

bar code that will be scanned at overseas consular posts and United States ports 

of entry. Students who enter the United States after their course has begun will 

be identified as a “no-show” through SEVIS at the port of entry and can be 

refused entry. In addition, any I-20s not used by the student will be 

invalidated, preventing others from fraudulently using them. Inspectors also 

will be able to identify through SEVIS whether a returning student is in active 

status and will thus be able to deny entry to students who are not in active 

status.

SEVIS will assist in the detection of fraud engaged in by students at 

academic and language schools where students are permitted by law to stay in 

the United States as long as they are making progress toward their degree 

program. Investigators will be able to search SEVIS to identify students who 

have been in the same program for a lengthy period of time or identify schools 

that have a significant number of students who have been in school longer than 

the typical degree program requires. 
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B. Deficiencies SEVIS will not address

Despite the improvements anticipated with the implementation of SEVIS, 

there are many problems in the INS’s student program that SEVIS will not 

address.

For example, the INS plans to re-approve all of the schools currently 

authorized to issue I-20s before they will be able to access SEVIS, as well as 

require regular re-certifications of the approved schools in the future. But as 

previously discussed, the INS does not currently devote adequate resources to 

approving schools and reviewing previously approved schools. As a result, 

schools officers do not conduct site visits before approving schools, and 

schools are rarely re-reviewed once they are approved. To properly certify, recertify, and monitor schools, full-time INS personnel devoted to managing the 

foreign student program will be needed. In addition, the process for approving 

schools that will be eligible to receive foreign students will still be a manual 

process. Unless schools officers are required to conduct on-site visits and 

follow up questionable information submitted by schools, many deficiencies 

that currently exist will continue.

Also, as discussed earlier in this report, DSOs are often not 

knowledgeable about their responsibilities and the requirements concerning 

students’ eligibility to obtain student visas. The INS is currently considering 

developing an on-line DSO certification training program, which DSOs would 

be required to take before receiving a SEVIS password. This initiative would 

help to improve the process, but it will need to be implemented well before 

January 30, 2003, when the INS plans to implement SEVIS fully, and the INS 

will have to provide continual training because DSOs change frequently.

While improved data collection will enhance the student program, the 

information will only be useful in the detection of fraud if the INS devotes 

resources to monitoring the information and investigating instances of potential 

fraud. Although the SEVIS database will help identify potential fraud, such as 

schools with a large number of students with invalid I-20s or students with 

invalid I-20s having visas issued from the same city, the INS has not 

determined who, if anyone, would perform these analyses. To fully use 

SEVIS’s capabilities, the INS needs to assign personnel and establish policies 

and procedures to address this analytic function. Moreover, as discussed 

previously, enforcement to uncover student and school fraud has been a low 

priority and investigative resources devoted to this issue have been limited. 

Although better information will be available to investigators on student no-
161

shows and terminations, it is not clear that the INS will use this information 

any more fully than it has in the past.

The INS officials we interviewed consistently reported that the success of 

SEVIS depends on the accuracy of the data in the system. To date, the INS has 

not formulated any concrete plans for conducting or requiring independent 

verifications of the data that the schools enter into SEVIS. The INS has had 

discussions with officials in the Department of Education and the Department 

of Veterans Affairs to determine whether their auditors could include sample 

verifications of SEVIS data into audits that these organizations routinely 

conduct of schools. However, this would only cover schools that receive 

federal funds from those two agencies. We believe independent reviews 

conducted at regular intervals are essential to ensure that schools have proper 

internal controls to deter and detect fraud and that schools enter foreign student 

information into SEVIS completely, accurately, and timely. 142

C. SEVIS implementation difficulties 

1. Ensuring that approved schools are re-certified prior to the 

January 30, 2003, implementation deadline

Because the INS’s current database, STSC, is inaccurate, incomplete, and 

outdated, the INS is requiring all INS-approved schools to reapply and be recertified by INS district offices before allowing the schools access to SEVIS. 

The INS recently issued proposed regulations imposing a cutoff date of 

January 30, 2003, by which schools that have not been re-approved will be 

unable to issue I-20s.

As a result, approximately 72,000 INS-approved schools will need to be 

re-certified by January 30, 2003. The INS plans to start the re-certification 

process this summer, but it is still in the process of determining how to do this. 

As of the end of April 2002, re-certification procedures had been developed but 

not yet finalized. Once the procedures are finalized, they must be published as 

proposed regulations in the Federal Register, with a 60-day comment period. 

In addition, the INS still has to assign and train personnel to perform the re-

 

142 As noted earlier, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001 

requires the INS to conduct periodic reviews of INS-approved schools to ensure they are in 

compliance with record-keeping and reporting requirements.
162

certifications and notify all the schools of the need and procedures for recertification.

The INS is currently proceeding as if all 72,000 re-certifications will be 

completed in time for the January 30, 2003, implementation date. This would 

require the INS to approve approximately 8,000 schools per month if it began 

the re-certification process in early May 2002. It appears unlikely that the INS 

could meet such a demanding schedule.

First, the INS has to ensure that all schools are notified of the recertification requirement. Since our review found that not all INS-approved 

schools had been entered into the STSC system and many of the school 

addresses on the STSC are incorrect, sources other than STSC are necessary 

for notification. Although school associations have been diligent about 

publicizing SEVIS, many schools, particularly the smaller language and 

vocational schools, are not members of these associations.

In addition, full-time adjudicators and investigators will be needed to recertify so many schools. Currently, re-certifications are performed by 

adjudicators and inspectors as a collateral duty. The INS must also develop 

adequate written guidelines on conducting the re-certifications and provide 

adequate training to those responsible for performing the re-certifications and 

making site visits. Our review found that none of these important steps had 

been completed. 

Although the re-certification process will be time consuming, it is 

essential for the INS to ensure that SEVIS is implemented properly, not just 

quickly. Any attempts to shortcut the re-certification process will result in 

potentially fraudulent schools retaining access to the system. At the same time, 

we believe that the INS should acknowledge that not all of the schools can be 

re-certified before January 30, 2003, and provide for this inevitability, 

including deciding whether schools without approval will be permitted to 

continue issuing paper I-20s to foreign students.143

 

143 After reviewing the draft report, the INS in its written response signed by the INS 

Commissioner stated, “I acknowledge the challenge of implementing this system under our 

proposed timelines, but unlike your conclusion, I am confident the INS’s dedication to this 

significant effort will result in us accomplishing our January 30, 2003 goal.” The INS did 

not provide any specifics as to how it would reach its goal.
163

2. Collecting the processing fee as required by statute

Congress mandated that the SEVIS program be self-funding. The INS 

had planned to charge foreign students and exchange visitors a $95 processing 

fee. As discussed earlier, school associations strongly opposed both the 

imposition of a fee and the method by which the fee was to be collected. 

Initially, the schools were required to collect the fee on behalf of the INS. In 

2000, IIRIRA was revised to transfer the collection responsibility to the INS, 

and the fee was required to be collected before the student was issued a visa.

The INS initially requested that the State Department collect the fee on 

behalf of the INS. The State Department already has effective procedures in 

place to collect fees overseas. For example, the State Department imposes a 

machine-readable visa processing fee on visa applicants. Payment of this fee 

can occur in several ways, depending on the consular post. At some locations, 

the visa applicant pays the fee at the consular post. At other locations, the visa 

applicant pays the fee at a designated bank, obtains a receipt, and presents the 

receipt at the consular post as proof of payment when applying for a visa.

However, the State Department has objected to collecting the fee on 

behalf of the INS. The State Department official who serves as the SEVIS 

liaison to the INS gave us various reasons for the State Department’s 

objections, including reciprocity concerns (other countries could, in turn, 

charge United States students a similar processing fee to study overseas), 

workload burdens (although the INS indicated willingness to pay the State 

Department an administrative fee), and legal concerns (only certain 

government agencies have the authority to maintain bank accounts 

overseas).144

 

144 In another situation, however, the State Department must collect a fee from visa 

applicants and transmit it to another agency. The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in October 

2001, requires the FBI to provide the State Department with access to certain criminal 

databases contained in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). A Notice of 

Proposed Rule published in the February 25, 2002, Federal Register indicates that when a 

consular officer determines that a visa applicant may have a criminal record indexed in 

NCIC, the applicant will be required to submit fingerprints and pay a specified processing 

fee to the State Department. This fee, along with the fingerprints, will be forwarded by the 

State Department to the FBI.
164

In lieu of having the State Department collect the fee, the INS is 

requiring applicants to make payments either by mail to a bank or on-line. All 

payments need to be made in United States currency. School association 

representatives told us that, although they philosophically oppose the 

imposition of a fee on foreign students, they are more concerned about the 

method of collection. Both the NAFSA and the ACE representatives we 

contacted expressed concerns about the length of time it would take to process 

the payment by mail (the bank has said it will take approximately four weeks) 

and the lack of accessibility of some overseas students (particularly those in 

developing countries) to the Internet, credit cards, United States currency, or 

reliable mail systems. They see this as a barrier to students attending schools 

in the United States. NAFSA prefers to have the State Department collect the 

fee, and it does not believe the State Department has provided any credible 

reason not to do so. We also believe that requiring the State Department to 

collect the fee, while permitting it to retain an appropriate fee for doing so, 

would be the most efficient and equitable solution.

VI. Conclusion

The INS’s foreign student program has suffered from a lack of attention 

for many years, and as a result, the INS lacks accurate data about the schools 

that are authorized to issue I-20s, the students who obtain student visas and 

student status, the current status of those students, and whether fraud is being 

perpetuated in the foreign student program. The INS’s implementation of 

SEVIS will help solve some of the problems in the foreign student program, 

but it will not cure all of the problems in the INS foreign student program. The 

INS must not only implement an effective electronic method tracking foreign 

students, it must also devote adequate resources to managing the entire foreign 

student program.

We believe that it is not likely that the INS will be able to fully 

implement SEVIS by January 30, 2003, as it contends it will. For full 

implementation of SEVIS, all schools must be re-certified; inspectors, 

adjudicators in the districts and the service centers, consular officers, and 

DSOs at a minimum must be trained how to use SEVIS and what to do in the 

event that the new system is not fully functioning; and students currently in the 

system with valid I-20s must be accounted for in SEVIS. If, as we believe it 

will be, full implementation of SEVIS is delayed beyond January 2003, the 

INS will continue to operate a system in which it knows little about the schools 

and students that participate in the foreign student program.
165

Even after SEVIS is implemented, we believe the INS must devote 

adequate resources to managing critical aspects of the foreign student program 

in addition to SEVIS and its operations. This requires full-time, well-trained 

personnel to carry out the important function of approving and re-certifying 

schools. The INS should establish detailed procedures and guidance to ensure 

that schools are properly approved, and re-certified and de-certified when 

necessary. The INS must also decide which office will be responsible for 

analyzing the information collected in SEVIS and provide that office with 

guidance about its role and how analyses should be completed to effectively 

monitor foreign students and schools. Similarly, the INS must devote 

resources to verifying the accuracy of information entered into SEVIS. Also, 

once potential fraud is identified, the INS must devote resources to investigate 

that fraud. If the INS does not devote sufficient personnel to address the 

approval and re-certification of schools, to analyze the data collected in SEVIS, 

and to investigate potential fraud, the impact of SEVIS will be minimal.
166

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE INS’S PROPOSED CHANGES REGARDING

FOREIGN STUDENTS 

I. Introduction

After the firestorm of criticism that resulted from media reports that the 

INS had mailed notification to Huffman Aviation approving the student status 

of two of the September 11 terrorists, the INS implemented several processing 

changes with respect to I-20s and change of status applications. In addition, 

after September 11, a number of regulatory changes were proposed that would 

affect foreigners who want to attend school in the United States and the INS’s 

processing of I-539 change of status applications. We discuss below the 

processing changes that have been implemented in the last few weeks and our 

observations about the likely effects of these changes. We also address the 

proposed regulatory changes. Although we do not address all of the proposed 

changes, which continue to be considered, we discuss some of the more 

significant proposals.

II. Proposed Processing Changes

A. Processing the student copy of the I-20 

On March 15, 2002, INS Headquarters issued to the field via e-mail new 

instructions concerning the processing of I-20s. Service centers were 

instructed that after adjudicating an I-539 and stamping the I-20 as approved, 

the adjudicator must retain in the receipt file a copy of the school’s I-20, send 

the original school copy to the school within five days of adjudication, send the 

student’s I-20 to the student within five days of adjudication, and mail a copy 

of the I-20 stamped “copy” to ACS within five days of adjudication. INS 

Headquarters issued another memorandum to the field three days later, on 

March 18, 2002, with the same instructions, although the memorandum does 

not require that a copy of the I-20 be retained in the service center’s receipt 

file.

This was the first guidance on the processing of I-20s that INS 

Headquarters had issued in the last several years. These changes were simple 

to implement and immediately addressed the significant problem of I-20s not 

being returned to schools in a timely manner. The ease with which the change 

was implemented – via e-mail throughout the INS within days of when the 
167

controversy over Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status applications arose –

further demonstrates that the part of the I-539 process that dealt with the I-20s 

had not been managed effectively prior to this crisis.

This new procedure places responsibility for completing the process with 

the adjudicator and provides some measure of accountability if the I-20s are 

not returned in a timely manner. However, to help the adjudicator complete 

this task, the INS should require address labels for ACS and for the school to 

be pre-printed and in the file or otherwise accessible to the adjudicator. This 

occurs currently with the student’s address and allows the adjudicator to simply 

apply the label to the envelope containing the student’s copy of the I-20.145 In 

addition, INS Headquarters should clarify whether a copy of the I-20 is 

required to be kept in the service center’s receipt file.

The INS’s change in procedures did not address the return of school I-20s 

that are collected at the POEs when foreign students enter the country, which 

constitutes the overwhelming majority of I-20s. For this reason, we sought to 

determine what steps were being taken to expedite the return of these I-20s 

from ACS to the schools. The INS had determined that the POEs do not have 

the resources to copy the I-20s, mail the copies to ACS, and mail the originals 

to the schools. The INS therefore instructed the POEs to send to ACS daily via 

overnight mail all I-20s collected at the POE, and ACS has agreed to process 

and return the I-20s in less than the 30 days currently required by the 

contract.146 To effect both the processing of the copies received from the 

service centers and the originals received from the POEs, we found that the 

INS has begun the process of modifying its contract with ACS.147

 

145 Based on the confusion we found in INS Headquarters and the TSC about the proper 

address for ACS, we recommend that the INS ensure that all INS employees have the 

correct address for ACS.

146 We also found that ACS has approximately 140,000 I-20s that it is currently holding 

in storage at the instruction of the INS while the INS decides whether it should review the 

records to determine if any other I-20s should be pulled from the process and not returned to 

the school. To ensure that the 140,000 I-20s currently being held by ACS are not 

excessively delayed, the INS should expeditiously determine the criteria needed to assess the 

I-20s and complete the review process once it decides to review the I-20s.

147 During our recent interviews at ACS (which occurred after the changes went into 

effect), we were told by some of the operators that they only processed originals. We were 

(continued)
168

B. Database checks before I-539s are adjudicated

In the INS Headquarters memorandum to the field dated March 18, 2002, 

the INS introduced processing changes not only for I-20s but also for the 

adjudication of I-539 applications. The memorandum directs that before 

adjudication, all I-539s must be checked against certain INS databases. As 

discussed previously, in the past, adjudication of I-539 change of status 

applications consisted primarily of a review of documents to ensure that the 

applicant timely filed the application and submitted the appropriate documents. 

No databases were required to be queried for possible derogatory information, 

such as a criminal history or departures since the application had been filed. 

The INS now requires that in every case the adjudicator must check the 

Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) and the Interagency Border 

Inspection System (IBIS) and that the file must reflect evidence that the check 

has occurred. Below we discuss each new requirement individually and our 

assessment of its implementation and impact on the adjudications process.

1. Check of NIIS database

With respect to NIIS, adjudicators must now query NIIS for all I-539 and 

I-129148 applications and include a copy of the printed record in the file or an 

indication in the file that NIIS was checked and no record was found. INS 

guidance also states that the I-94 admission number of the applicant must be 

 

(continued)

concerned that this meant that the ACS operators were not aware that the service centers 

were now sending copies to ACS for processing. We suggested to INS Headquarters 

personnel that they ensure that ACS was implementing the changes that INS had announced 

and that ACS was not waiting for the contract modification to be put into place. INS 

personnel told us on April 12, 2002, that ACS was processing the copies being sent from the 

service centers. ACS personnel told us that they had not been notified of the change in 

procedures until April 8, 2002 (approximately three weeks after the changes went into 

effect), when a senior ACS manager called INS to find out why they were getting so many 

copies of the I-20. 

148 I-129 applications are applications used by employers seeking either an extension of 

stay for a previously admitted nonimmigrant on an employment-related visa or a change in 

status for a nonimmigrant who seeks an employment-based status. The dependents of the 

person holding the nonimmigrant employment-related visa who seek to change or extend 

their status must file I-539 applications.
169

entered into the “I-94 Number” field in CLAIMS prior to final adjudication. 

The guidance also states that if the NIIS record establishes that a departure 

from the United States occurred after the I-539 was filed, the I-539 application 

should be considered abandoned and must be denied.

We believe that requiring the adjudicator to check NIIS before approving 

a change of status application is a prudent step. Whether this new requirement 

is effective, however, depends on the extent to which NIIS data is 

comprehensive, accurate, and timely. A prior OIG review in September 1997 

revealed that NIIS suffers from several systemic problems that limit the 

effectiveness of the database. See “Immigration and Naturalization Service 

Monitoring of Nonimmigrant Overstays,” Report Number I-97-08, September 

1997. In particular, we found that information about departure records is not 

always entered into NIIS and that the information that is uploaded is not 

always accurate. We recently completed a follow-up review in which we 

found that the INS had not improved the collection of I-94 departure records 

and that NIIS data is still unreliable. See “Follow-up Report on INS Efforts to 

Improve the Control of Nonimmigrant Overstays,” Report Number I-2002-006, 

April 2002. The requirement to check NIIS will only be effective if the NIIS 

data is accurate.

2. Check of the Interagency Border Inspection System

The INS’s March 18 memorandum requires adjudicators to check all I539 applications through IBIS before rendering a final decision. 149 The 

memorandum also requires adjudicators to include a notation on the application 

with the results of the IBIS check and the date the check was performed. At 

the time that the March 18 memorandum was issued, adjudicators in the TSC 

did not have access at their workstations to IBIS and were not trained on how 

to use it. In the last few weeks, however, adjudicators at the TSC have been 

 

149 After reviewing the draft report, a senior INS Headquarters official informed the 

OIG that service centers had been conducting IBIS checks of several types of applications, 

including I-539s, since January 2002 and provided the OIG with an INS Headquarters 

memorandum to the field dated November 15, 2001. Although the November 15 

memorandum required IBIS checks on certain applications processed in the service centers, 

the memorandum did not include I-539 applications. The OIG confirmed with the TSC that 

IBIS checks on I-539 applications have been performed only in the last several weeks.
170

provided with user accounts on IBIS and have received training on how to use 

it.

150

In addition to access to IBIS though, CAOs must have guidance about 

what to do with the information uncovered through the IBIS check. The March 

18 memorandum states that “[I]n the event that the IBIS check results in a 

positive hit, the issue must be resolved prior to the case being approved” and 

“additional instructions on resolution of positive hits will follow under separate 

cover.” As of May 10, 2002, the INS had not issued any further instructions on 

how to resolve the issue. I-539 application processing has been slowed down 

significantly since March 18 while the service centers were waiting for access 

to and training on IBIS for CAOs. The processing continues to be affected 

while they await guidance from INS Headquarters on how to resolve cases in 

which a “hit” appears in IBIS. In the interim, thousands of applications are 

continuing to be received, and backlogs are growing. 151 As discussed below, 

with regulatory changes that will require the INS to maintain a 30-day 

processing time for I-539s, it is crucial for the INS to resolve the IBIS issues 

expeditiously.

3. Performance standards for CAOs

As noted previously, service center adjudicators did not routinely check 

NIIS, in part because there was no requirement or practical incentive to do so. 

In fact, the production pressure faced by CAOs created a disincentive to 

checking NIIS. Requiring CAOs to now make two copies of the I-20s, to mail 

the school copy of the I-20, to complete a NIIS check and put a printout in the 

file, and to check IBIS and put a printout in the file will add to the time it takes 

to process each application. While each check may only take a few minutes, 

provided CAOs have access to everything they need (such as address labels 

and IBIS), adjudicators are expected to process each application in 7 to 10 

minutes, and a small increase in time on each application may have a 

 

150 In the TSC, a significant percentage of CAOs work from home, but due to security 

restrictions IBIS cannot be placed on their workstations at home. The INS is attempting to 

acquire access for CAOs who work at home.

151 While I-539 applications consist of only six percent of the total applications 

processed by the service centers, the INS adjudicated 305,124 I-539 applications in FY 

2001.
171

significant impact in total. If the performance ratings for CAOs do not account 

for the added time to process applications, CAOs will continue to have a 

disincentive to conduct thorough searches and follow up on possible leads. 

III. Proposed regulatory changes

The Department of Justice and the INS have proposed and are 

considering additional proposals for regulatory changes in light of the events of 

September 11. Below we address some of the proposals that most directly 

affect the INS’s interactions with foreign students. The proposed regulations 

that we discuss reflect an important shift in philosophy in the INS’s treatment 

of nonimmigrant students and visitors. As a practical matter, foreign students 

who wanted to avoid the consular process for obtaining a student visa could 

enter the United States through some other means and not receive close 

scrutiny when filing an application for a change of status. The proposed 

regulations appear to be aimed at more closely assessing the intent of 

nonimmigrants and their purposes for entering the country and providing the 

INS with greater control over the ability of aliens to change their nonimmigrant 

status. The question remains whether this change in philosophy can be 

effectively implemented by inspectors at ports of entry and adjudicators at the 

service centers.

A. Proposed change: Aliens who enter the country without a 

student visa may not begin a course of study until their I-539 

petition for change of status to student has been adjudicated 

favorably. 

In the past, federal regulations specifically allowed a nonimmigrant to 

begin taking classes before acquiring student status from the INS.152 A recent 

interim rule eliminates this provision. The new rule provides that 

nonimmigrants admitted in B-1 or B-2 status after the effective date of the rule 

will not be permitted to enroll in school unless the INS has notified the 

nonimmigrants that their change of status application has been approved.

 

152 Section 248.1(c) of Title 8 stated: “A nonimmigrant applying for a change to 

classification as a student under sections 101(a)(15)(F)(i) or 101(a)(15)(M)(i) of the Act is 

not considered ineligible for such a change solely because the applicant may have started 

attendance at school before the application was submitted.”
172

The previous rule avoided penalizing students and schools for INS delays 

in adjudication of change of status applications. Because of those delays, 

adjudication in many cases only ratified a change of status that had already 

occurred. However, mandating that a change of status application be 

adjudicated before a student is permitted to begin class should be accompanied 

by a timely decision by the INS on the application. Recognizing this, the INS 

has stated its commitment to making timely decisions in 30 days or less.

While this proposed regulation has been in the drafting process for the 

last several months, the INS has made considerable efforts toward decreasing 

the processing times for I-539s to 30 days. I-539s have been designated one of 

the “priorities” for the INS in FY 2003. In January and February 2002, service 

centers were reporting processing times between 17 days and slightly more 

than 3 months.

Although the INS recently directed significant resources toward the I-539 

program and has decreased processing times significantly, we are concerned 

that once this current “crisis” with respect to I-539s has subsided, the 

processing times may rise again.153 The only way to avoid an increase in 

processing times is for the INS to ensure that sufficient numbers of 

adjudicators are available to adjudicate I-539 applications and that they are 

given the necessary access to IBIS, training, and guidance. We are concerned 

that the INS will not be able to achieve such a massive and sustained change in 

processing.

If the INS is not able to process change of status applications timely, 

students may miss the start of their desired course of study. The INS then has 

to either authorize the students to remain in the country until the next term, 

which may be longer than authorized by their original admission, or require 

 

153 We noted in a prior report that the INS sometimes resolves a crisis in one area by 

transferring resources from other areas. In the OIG’s report on the INS’s 1996 

naturalization initiative called “Citizenship USA” (CUSA), a progr am that was designed to 

address huge backlogs in the naturalization program, we described the effect that INS’s 

emphasis on completion of naturalization cases had on other INS benefit programs, such as 

the adjustment of status program (the process through which an applicant becomes a legal 

permanent resident in the United States and obtains a “green card”). We found that the 

adjustment of status program, which had significant backlogs at the time, suffered during 

CUSA because of the INS’s extraordinary emphasis on naturalization.
173

students to depart when their original status expires (or risk being an overstay) 

and apply again from abroad through the Department of State. This could 

impose a financial hardship on some students or result in schools allowing 

students to start classes before they receive the I-20 notifying them the student 

has been approved. We believe the INS must consider how these students will 

be handled and what alternative arrangements will be made, rather than waiting 

for problems to arise and attempting to address them in an ad hoc fashion.

B. Proposed change: A visitor entering the country must articulate 

reasons that would support a length of stay longer than 30 days, 

and if the visitor cannot the default admission period will be 30 

days.

The proposed regulations, as we understand them, would also reduce the 

maximum admission period for visitors from one year to six months, would 

eliminate the 6-month minimum admission period for B-2 visitors that 

currently exists, would establish a default admission period of 30 days, and 

would set a 6-month maximum for all extensions of B visas. These proposed 

changes, although not explicitly related to nonimmigrants who want to become 

students in the United States, will likely affect those students and change of 

status applications that relate to those students. Before we discuss that impact, 

we first address the proposed change and its implementation in the INS.

The OIG was advised that while the proposed change sets 30 days as a 

default for tourists, it also gives immigration inspectors at POEs the discretion 

to authorize a stay that is “fair and reasonable” for a period up to a maximum 

of six months. When immigration officers have broad discretion and little 

guidance on how to exercise that discretion, policies vary considerably among 

POEs, service centers, and district offices. Failure to provide clear and detailed 

guidelines to assist inspectors in exercising their discretion will likely result in 

authorized lengths of stay that vary considerably among POEs and may induce 

“forum shopping” among nonimmigrants. In addition, if the purpose of the 

regulation is to ensure that the majority of visitors are admitted for 30 days or 

less, then inspectors must be given guidance about what statements of intent 

will be acceptable for admitting the nonimmigrant past the 30-day default. 

Without sufficient guidance, a vague statement of the purpose by the visitor 

could be deemed acceptable and the exception would swallow the rule.

The proposed change may decrease significantly the number of foreign 

students who enter with visitor visas and pursue an education on a part-time 
174

basis, since it is difficult to complete college classes or other schooling in 30-

day increments. In addition, the proposed change could reduce the number of 

I-539s filed by nonimmigrants seeking to change their visitor status to that of 

students. It would be difficult for a person who entered the country with the 

intent of visiting temporarily to find a college or school, to apply to the school, 

and to be accepted during the 30-day period. A visitor in this situation would 

have to return home and apply for a student visa through the consular process 

to become a student.

Finally, according to the prefatory language to this proposed regulation, 

the INS implemented the 6-month minimum admission period several years 

ago to reduce the number of I-539s filed to obtain an extension of stay. The 

30-day presumptive admission period will likely result in a significant increase 

in the number of I-539s filed for an extension of stay, thereby increasing the 

pressure on the INS to ensure that adequate resources are maintained for the I539 program to keep processing times to a minimum. 

C. Proposed change: Require prospective foreign students to 

demonstrate their intent to attend school at the time they are 

admitted on a B-1/B-2 visa in order to be eligible later to seek a 

change of status to F-1 or M-1.

As discussed in other parts of this report, when nonimmigrants enter the 

country, their purpose for being here is supposed to match the type of visa they 

hold. In other words, individuals who enter with the intent to become full-time 

students in the United States should obtain a student visa before coming to the 

United States. At the same time, the law allows nonimmigrants to come for 

one purpose, such as pleasure, then change their minds and decide to attend 

school. Also, individuals are allowed to come with the intent of visiting for the 

purpose of selecting a school or educational program.

According to the INS, it prefers that nonimmigrants acquire student 

status through the consular process in the person’s home country. The 

Department of State is by design the principal route for aliens seeking 

nonimmigrant visas, and consular officials are better suited to scrutinize the 

alien’s intentions than an inspector at a port of entry or a service center 

adjudicator.

The INS has therefore proposed requiring prospective students to 

demonstrate their intent to become students at the time they are admitted on 

B-1/B-2 visas, in order to be eligible to acquire a change of status. The effect 
175

of this proposed change would be to create a new visa category for 

nonimmigrants entering the country as prospective students. While this

proposed change would assist the INS in identifying those visitors who are 

likely to later file change of status applications asking to be students, it is 

unlikely to substantially assist in the effort to keep out aliens who are intent on 

avoiding the screening process provided by the State Department.

As we understand the proposed process, three scenarios are possible: (1) 

a foreign student is accepted to a school in the United States and obtains an M1 or F-1 visa through a consulate outside the United States; (2) an alien enters 

the United States as a visitor but decides to become a student and files an 

application for a change of status; if the alien did not indicate upon entry that 

he or she might become a student, then the application would be denied; and 

(3) a foreign student who enters as a visitor indicates at the time of entry that 

he or she is a “prospective student”; if the student files a request for a change 

of status, it will likely be granted. With respect to this last scenario, if the goal

is to ensure that most foreign students are screened by the State Department, 

then allowing a large number of individuals in this category would undermine 

this goal. 154

We are unable to evaluate this proposal fully because we do not know the 

intent behind the proposal. Whatever the intent behind the proposal, however, 

the INS should define “prospective student” to achieve the intent. The INS 

should also decide whether aliens must submit documentation in support of 

their assertion that they are prospective students, such as acceptance letters or 

offers of scholarships, or whether something less will suffice, such as a 

statement that they have been accepted to a school. 155 Guidelines must also be 

 

154 Another possibility is to have the State Department issue a new visa category for 

“prospective students” that would cover individuals who are likely to become students, but 

who, for various reasons, want to visit the United States before they enroll at a particular 

school. Visitor visas can already be noted with “prospective student,” but many people have 

visas that are valid for several years and might not know when they obtained the visa that 

they wanted to go to school in the United States. A new visa category for prospective 

students would ensure State Department screening and would allow true prospective 

students to obtain student status while avoiding the financial burden of leaving the United 

States after a school is selected in order to obtain a student visa.

155 Although the proposed regulation states that aliens who have been accepted to a 

school and have an I-20 must present the I-20 to the inspector, the regulation does not state 

(continued)
176

provided to inspectors regarding issues such as whether the entering alien must 

volunteer the information about prospective student status or whether the 

inspector is required to ask the question. Even more important, for this 

proposed process to work at all, there must be some system in place for 

ensuring that the inspector’s determination that the alien meets the “prospective 

student” definition is consistently recorded on the I-94 and for ensuring that 

this information is provided to the I-539 adjudicators should the prospective 

student later file for a change of status.156

We note that while INS officials stated that the INS prefers that 

nonimmigrants acquire student status by obtaining a student visa through the 

consular process, the law provides for several exceptions to the requirements 

that nonimmigrants present valid visas at each entry. For example, Canadian 

nationals and aliens residing permanently in Canada who are from countries 

deemed to have a “common nationality” with Canada are not required to 

present a visa when entering the United States.157 According to the INS, 54 

countries have a “common nationality” with Canada, including India and 

Pakistan. This exception means that aliens from Canada who will be students 

in the United States are not required to obtain or present student visas to enter 

the United States.158 

 

(continued)

what other evidence, if any, will be acceptable for aliens to establish “prospective student” 

status.

156 The back of the I-94 arrival form has a box labeled “prospective student,” which can 

be marked by the inspector at the time of entry. According to ACS, this information is data 

entered and is captured in NIIS. However, we found that adjudicators were not familiar 

enough with NIIS to know how to access this information.

157 This exception is in addition to the INS’s Visa Waiver Program, another avenue 

through which large numbers of foreigners enter the United States without visas. The Visa 

Waiver Program permits aliens from 28 countries to enter the United States without visas for 

business (B-1) or tourism (B-2) purposes. Aliens from countries designated as part of the 

Visa Waiver Program entering for the purpose of going to school full time are required to 

obtain a student visa. 

158 Schools in the United States issue I-20s to students from Canada who are accepted 

by the schools, and according to the INS website, Canadian students are required to present 

the I-20s at the border. Neither the law nor the Inspector’s Field Manual, however, is clear 

about whether aliens from Canada who are entering the United States to attend school full 

(continued)
177

D. Proposed change: Require flight schools to initiate background 

and fingerprint checks when a student seeks to learn how to fly a 

plane over 12,500 pounds.

As we understand this proposed regulation, flight schools and other 

providers of flight instruction will be required to initiate a background check 

for all students who enroll in programs to learn how to fly a plane over 12,500 

pounds and that instruction cannot begin until the background check has been 

completed. Currently, foreign students are issued I-20s after they have been 

accepted to a school but before instruction begins. Once foreign students have 

been issued I-20s, they are eligible to apply for a student visa or a change of 

status. If foreign students apply for a change of status before the background 

check is completed, then the INS must ensure that the results of the background 

check are obtained before the application is adjudicated.

 

(continued)

time are required to present an I-20 upon entry. Section 15.3(g) of the Inspector’s Field 

Manual states: “Students or trainees who are nationals of [Canada] may be admitted upon 

presentation of a valid identity card and a passport (for identification purposes).” If 

Canadian students do not present I-20s at the border – which means school copies of I-20s 

are not collected and sent for data entry – the INS has no means of identifying or tracking 

Canadian students. Even once SEVIS is implemented and the I-20 information is directly 

entered into SEVIS, the INS will not be able to track information about the status of 

Canadian students unless they are required to present an endorsed I-20 to enter the United 

States on each occasion.
178

CHAPTER EIGHT

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Our review found that the INS functions without vital information about 

foreign students and nonimmigrants who have applied to change their status to 

that of students. Inspectors, adjudicators, and investigators are making critical 

decisions about aliens without having access to fundamental information that

would affect their decisions. We also found that the INS has failed to 

adequately manage or pay sufficient attention to the foreign student program 

for many years. One of the factors inhibiting a coordinated approach to the 

foreign student program is that management of the program is fragmented. We 

found that responsibility for foreign students is divided among several different 

offices and programs in the INS and that no one person or office in the INS had 

a complete understanding of the requirements for foreign students and the 

processes through which they are permitted to enter and study in the United 

States. While we recognize that the INS is a large agency handling many 

different programs and missions, the result of this fragmentation is that there is 

not sufficient accountability for a program that admits approximately 500,000 

aliens into the country every year.

Since September 11, 2001, the INS’s need to focus attention on foreign 

students has changed dramatically. In the past, the INS’s philosophy has 

strongly favored admitting foreign students and viewed them as relatively low 

risk. As a result, INS procedures allowed students to avoid screening processes 

and to remain in the country essentially unmonitored. Since September 11, 

however, there appears to have been a shift in philosophy regarding foreign 

students. Tighter regulatory controls have been proposed to make it more 

difficult to achieve student status and to scrutinize persons entering the country 

who might later attempt to become students. Also Congress has mandated that 

the INS implement its automated tracking system for students and schools, 

SEVIS, by January 1, 2003. And, since March 15, 2002, the INS has 

implemented procedural changes that will result in greater scrutiny of change 

of status applications for persons who want to become students. Despite these 

major changes affecting the foreign student program since September 11, 

however, the INS continues to operate the program without an overall plan for 

coordinating the various parts of the program.
179

II. Recommendations

In this chapter, we make numerous programmatic recommendations that 

we believe will improve the foreign student program and increase the INS’s 

knowledge about foreign students. Before we discuss these recommendations,

however, we set forth our recommendations concerning the INS’s management 

of the foreign student program.

A. Management of the foreign student program

Our experience with the INS is that changes are sometimes made to fix 

one aspect of a program that is in crisis but that insufficient attention is paid to 

the consequences for other parts of the program. The fragmentation of 

management over the foreign student program contributes to that result. We 

believe that the INS should consider whether a foreign student program 

manager should be appointed to coordinate, and be accountable for, 

immigration issues affecting foreign students. We recognize that the INS has 

many other nonimmigrant categories in addition to students, and it may not be 

feasible to have a program manager for only foreign students. But the policy 

and practices affecting foreign students is a critical challenge facing the INS. 

Currently, those issues are handled by many different offices within the INS, 

resulting in inconsistent policies, lack of accountability for the program, and 

failure to carefully and systematically consider the impact of changes on the 

program.

B. Recommendations that affect all foreign students

1. Implementation of SEVIS

The INS plans to implement SEVIS by the end of January 2003. In order 

for SEVIS to be successful, the INS should ensure that all schools are reviewed 

and approved before allowing the schools access to SEVIS. Failure to do so 

will, among other consequences, result in the new SEVIS system containing 

the same flawed, inaccurate data as its current system. Yet, the INS is 

woefully behind in accomplishing this mammoth task. Given the improbability 

that it will be completed by January 2003 (since the required proposed rule 

change has not yet been published), the INS should decide soon on an 

alternative plan, including determining how it will proceed in January 2003 if 

schools are not re-certified, a reasonable time schedule for re-certifying the 

schools, and an implementation plan for achieving the timetable. Regardless of 
180

the time pressure, we believe that the INS should not proceed without 

reviewing all of the schools currently authorized to issue I-20s.

Any re-certification plan must also resolve who will be responsible for 

conducting the re-certifications, provide adequate written guidelines on 

conducting the re-certifications, and provide adequate training to those 

responsible for performing the re-certifications. We believe that the recertification process should include site visits and follow-up on questionable 

information submitted by schools.

Sufficient resources must be devoted to the re-certification process. We 

believe that the INS should establish a unit within each district office 

responsible for conducting on-site verifications of the INS-approved schools. 

Full-time schools officers will be needed, instead of personnel who have the 

responsibility as a collateral duty. These units could conduct the initial 

certifications (in connection with the transfer to SEVIS) and re-certifications 

that should be established at regular intervals thereafter. The INS must 

continue to monitor and review the schools, since schools lose accreditation, 

change their objectives, and sometimes engage in fraud. The INS should 

ensure that audits are conducted of approved schools to determine whether 

proper internal controls are in place and that data is being entered into SEVIS 

completely, accurately, and timely. 

In addition, the INS should decide what office or division will be 

responsible for analyzing the data that is collected in SEVIS. To fully use 

SEVIS’s capabilities, the INS needs to assign personnel and establish policies 

and procedures to take advantage of this analytic function. We believe fulltime field positions in INS adjudications, intelligence, and investigations will 

also be necessary to monitor foreign student and school activities to identify 

those students who are no longer enrolled or who may be engaging in fraud.159 

The information is only useful if it used by the INS.

To ensure that adequate personnel are available to devote to re-certifying 

and monitoring INS-approved schools and foreign students, we recommend 

 

159 Congress, through the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 

2001, has mandated that the INS increase the number of investigative and associated support 

personnel. The Reform Act requires the addition of at least 1,000 investigators and support 

personnel over the next five years.
181

that the INS establish fee-based positions funded out of the processing fee that 

will eventually be charged to foreign students.

The INS must also develop a plan for training both INS employees and 

school employees on how to use SEVIS. Having all of the schools certified 

and approved to use SEVIS will not be effective without adequate training. 

The INS should develop a timetable for implementing training and an 

implementation plan for carrying out the training. 

SEVIS cannot work unless the necessary offices and personnel are 

connected to SEVIS, including service centers, POEs, district offices, and 

consular posts. Without these connections, information about foreign students 

and schools will be incomplete since changes of status, visa issuances, 

employment authorizations, reinstatements, and entries and exits will not be 

captured. The INS should devote the resources necessary to ensure that all 

offices are connected to and are able to use SEVIS as quickly as possible.

2. Defining “prospective student”

The INS is proposing regulations that would require visitors to have 

declared that they are prospective students at the time they entered the country 

in order to be eligible to change their status at a later date. For this regulation 

to be meaningful, the INS must first determine what the regulation is designed 

to achieve. If the objective is to reduce the potential for persons to avoid the 

State Department screening process by entering as a visitor and then changing 

to a status of longer duration, the INS must evaluate what requirements will 

accomplish that objective and, just as important, the logistics of the new 

process. The INS, working with the State Department, should also define 

“prospective student.” The INS should decide whether aliens will be required 

to submit documentation in support of their assertion that they are a 

prospective student, such as acceptance letters or offers of scholarships, or 

whether something less will suffice, such as a statement that they have not yet 

applied to any schools but plan to after visiting several. It is equally important 

for the INS to ensure that change of status adjudicators in the service centers 

are aware of how to access the “prospective student” information recorded in 

NIIS. 

3. Capturing information about part-time students

The law as it currently stands allows visitors to attend classes on a parttime basis. The INS, however, does not currently collect information about 
182

these students or otherwise monitor them, nor does it plan to collect this 

information once SEVIS is implemented. Schools that offer courses on a parttime basis will not be included in SEVIS unless they also have full-time 

programs and want to be certified to accept foreign students. These include 

schools such as flight schools and trucking schools, which often do not provide 

the minimum number of course hours per week that would place the school 

under the INS’s monitoring system for full-time students. 

To increase the effectiveness of its monitoring of and collecting 

information about foreign students, part-time students should also be 

monitored. While we recognize that collecting information about every visitor 

who enrolls in a class or a short course of study would impose a significant 

burden on the INS, we believe that the INS should take steps to determine what 

information about these students and schools should be collected. 

C. Recommendations that affect nonimmigrants who wish to change 

their status to that of a student

1. Adequate resources to ensure processing of I-539 

applications in 30 days

The INS must ensure that it devotes the resources necessary to maintain a 

fast processing time for I-539 change of status applications in order to avoid 

penalizing foreign students. Equally important, however, the INS must 

determine how it will handle nonimmigrants who have applied to become 

students but whose applications have not been adjudicated prior to the start of 

their classes. The INS should advise I-539 applicants for student status of the 

requirement that their applications must be completed prior to beginning school 

and also advise them of the procedure to be followed if the INS has not 

completed their application prior to the start of school. This procedure should 

also be communicated to the schools.

Currently, the INS has no formal procedure for schools to contact the 

service centers about pending I-539 applications. While some service centers 

designate an employee as a point of contact, it is a collateral duty and is not 

clearly defined. The INS should, as part of its overall management of foreign 

students, designate a person or an office within the service centers with the 

responsibility of communicating with schools and establish a procedure for 

accomplishing this objective.
183

2. IBIS checks

The INS should develop clear and specific guidance for service center 

adjudicators on how information from IBIS checks will affect the adjudication 

decision, including information about previous overstays, immigration 

violations and criminal histories. The adjudicator should be informed about 

what steps to take if it is not clear that the applicant is the subject of the “hit” or 

“lookout” in IBIS.

D. Recommendations that affect immigration inspectors

1. Abandonment of I-539 applications

Aliens who have applied for change of status or upon whom student 

status has been conferred are deemed to have abandoned their application or 

their student status when they leave the country. In other words, they are not 

permitted to return for the primary purpose of attending school without getting 

a student visa from a United States consulate. Yet, primary inspectors at the 

POEs currently have no way of determining whether aliens are improperly 

using a B-1/B-2 visa as a means of avoiding the State Department process, 

unless aliens volunteer to the inspectors that they have applied for or received a 

change of status. 

Accordingly, the INS should ensure that primary inspectors have 

adequate information to verify the alien’s statement of intent to the inspector. 

SEVIS should be designed so that the primary inspector will be notified as part 

of the routine check performed at the POEs that an alien has filed an I-539 to 

become a student or has already been conferred student status through the I539 process. A secondary inspector can then evaluate whether the student is 

improperly attempting to enter the country using a B-1/B-2 visa or whether he 

or she is no longer attending school and is perhaps a legitimate visitor.

We also believe that the instructions to the I-539 application should 

inform applicants that if they leave the country while their application is 

pending, they will be considered to have abandoned the application. Likewise, 

the instructions should inform the applicants that once the new status is 

conferred, they lose that status if they leave the country and will be required to 

obtain student visas to re-enter.
184

2. I-193 waivers

The INS should restate its policy with respect to I-193 waivers and 

ensure that primary inspectors understand and consistently enforce the waiver 

policy and its limitations. Although currently all waivers must be approved by 

an assistant district director, the deputy district director or the district director, 

this policy could be relaxed in the future. Once this occurs, the Inspections 

Division in the district offices will again be responsible for issuing and 

deciding waivers and will need to be better informed about the circumstances 

under which these waivers are acceptable. Clear guidance should be re-issued 

to inspectors about what is considered an emergency that can result in the 

issuance of a waiver.

E. General recommendations

1. Performance standards for CAOs

The INS’s current performance standards for CAOs were prepared when 

changes in nonimmigrant classifications and extensions of stays were 

adjudicated based on a paper review designed to ensure that proper 

documentation had been properly filed. The INS is now requiring IBIS checks 

for all I-539 applications and several other applications, which suggests a shift 

toward more of a screening process for certain types of benefits rather than 

simply eligibility based on meeting documentary requirements. As a result, the 

INS should also change CAOs’ performance standards to allow more time to 

review files and seek additional information. At a minimum, in light of the 

new processing requirements described in this report, we recommend that the 

INS reconsider the performance standards for CAOs and adjust the standards to 

accommodate the additional time that will be spent by CAOs implementing 

these new processing requirements.

2. INS policies

We have noted in this report and in other reports problems with INS 

policies not being known, written, widely disseminated, or uniformly enforced. 

Although the INS’s field manuals are a logical repository for policies and 

procedures, the Inspector’s Field Manual and the Adjudicator’s Field Manual 

are not comprehensive or complete. In addition, we found that adjudicators 

and inspectors are not made aware of changes to the manuals, if they are even 

aware of them and what they contain. Policies distributed via memorandum to 
185

the field often never reach line inspectors and adjudicators. As a result, field 

offices develop their own practices that are sometimes inconsistent with INS 

policy or the law.

The INS’s systems for disseminating policy memoranda and changes and 

for ensuring that line employees become aware of and are required to enforce 

these policies needs improvement. We recommend that the INS expeditiously 

complete and update its field manuals. In addition, it should implement a more 

effective system for disseminating policies and procedures other than sending 

the documents to the head of a field office. Only if the INS has a system in 

place that ensures that policies and changes are received and understood can 

employees be held accountable for not following them.

In order to assist our tracking and monitoring of these recommendations, 

we set them out numerically in the Appendix at A-12.
186

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

The INS suffered a firestorm of criticism when it was disclosed that six 

months after the September 11 terrorist attacks Huffman Aviation received 

forms notifying it that terrorists Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi had 

received approval to change their status to that of students. Although the forms 

were only a notification of a decision that had been made several months 

before September 11, the mailing of these forms raised troubling questions 

about the INS’s handling of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of status 

applications. More importantly, it raised serious concerns about the INS’s 

ability to monitor and track foreign students in the United States.

The OIG therefore expended significant resources to review the 

circumstances surrounding the sending of the forms to Huffman Aviation, 

including the source of the delay and the failure to stop delivery of the forms 

after September 11. We also examined the INS’s admissions of Atta and 

Alshehhi into the United States, and we expedited our broader review of the 

INS’s tracking and monitoring of foreign students who come to the United 

States, including SEVIS, the INS’s new computerized student tracking system.

With regard to all but one of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s entries into the United 

States, we concluded that the evidence does not show that the inspectors who 

admitted them acted in violation of INS policies and practices. We were 

unable to reach any definitive conclusion whether Atta’s admission in January 

2001 was improper, given the limited record relating to the admission and the 

inspector’s inability to remember the specifics of what was said at the time. 

We found that before September 11, the INS did not closely scrutinize aliens 

entering the country to become students and did not uniformly require foreign 

students to present the required documentation before entering the United 

States. 

Our review of the INS’s processing of Atta’s and Alshehhi’s change of 

status applications revealed significant problems. First, the INS did not handle 

their applications in a timely way, taking more than 10 months before 

adjudicating the applications. As a result, Atta’s and Alshehhi’s applications 

were not adjudicated until well after they had finished their flight training 

course. Second, the INS adjudicator who approved their applications did so 
187

without adequate information, including the fact that Atta and Alshehhi had left 

the country two times after filing their change of status applications, which 

meant they had abandoned the applications. Even after approval of the 

applications, Huffman Aviation was not notified for seven months because the 

INS allowed an INS contractor to wait 180 days before mailing notification 

forms to schools. We found that the INS failed to adequately supervise the 

contract and was inattentive to the contract’s requirements.

We are critical of the INS’s failure to alert the FBI to the existence of 

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s I-20 forms after the September 11 attacks. Although the 

INS quickly determined on September 11 that it had already approved Atta’s 

and Alshehhi’s change of status applications and it gathered the change of 

status files for the FBI, no one in the INS located – or even considered – the 

notification forms that were being processed by the INS contractor. As a 

result, the forms continued to be processed and were later routinely mailed to 

Huffman Aviation. In our judgment, this was a widespread failure by many 

individuals in the INS. 

Atta’s and Alshehhi’s case also highlights important weaknesses in the 

INS’s handling of foreign students. Historically, the INS has devoted 

insufficient attention to foreign students, and its current, paper-based tracking 

system is inefficient, inaccurate, and unreliable. SEVIS, the new Internetbased system the INS is developing, has the potential to dramatically improve 

the INS’s monitoring of foreign students. But we found that it will not solve 

all the problems in the INS’s monitoring system. 

Unless the INS devotes sufficient resources and effort to effectively 

implement and use the SEVIS system, many problems will continue to exist. 

Among other things, the INS must ensure that it fully reviews the schools 

certified to enroll foreign students, make certain that accurate and timely 

information is entered into SEVIS, provide and enforce clear guidance for INS 

officers and schools about their responsibilities and the procedures related to 

foreign students, require that school officials and INS employees are trained 

properly on these requirements and procedures, and ensure that information in 

SEVIS about schools and students is effectively used by the INS to detect and 

deter abuse. 

In this report, we offer 24 recommendations to help address the problems 

that Atta’s and Alshehhi’s cases highlighted and that our review of the INS 
188

foreign student program revealed. We believe that these recommendations will 

improve the usefulness of SEVIS and help address the serious deficiencies we 

found in this review. While many of these recommended changes will require 

additional resources, we believe these efforts are necessary for the INS to 

improve its handling and monitoring of foreign students. 

________________________

Glenn A. Fine

Inspector General
A-1
A-2

Statistics provided by JFK inspections personnel reflect the drastic recent 

decline in nonimmigrant waivers for air and sea passengers after September 11, 

2001:

Month JFK Airport JFK Seaport

10/00 65 35

11/00 84 0

12/00 116 44

01/01 152 63

02/01 126 72

03/01 111 38

04/01 130 64

05/01 122 58

06/01 132 58

07/01 141 44

08/01 128 34

09/01 136 22

10/01 54 0

11/01 40 0

12/01 23 0

01/02 7 1

02/02 0 0

03/02 0 0
A-3
A-4
A-5
A-6
A-7
A-8
A-9
A-10
A-11
A-12

LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The INS should consider whether a foreign student program 

manager should be appointed to coordinate, and be accountable 

for, immigration issues affecting foreign students. 

2. The INS should review and approve all schools currently 

authorized to issue I-20s before allowing the schools access to 

SEVIS. Given the improbability that it will be completed by 

January 2003 (since the required proposed rule change has not yet 

been published), the INS should decide soon on an alternative plan, 

including determining how it will proceed in January 2003 if 

schools are not re-certified, a reasonable time schedule for recertifying the schools, and an implementation plan for achieving 

the timetable.

3. The plan to re-certify all schools prior to implementing SEVIS 

must also resolve who will be responsible for conducting the recertifications, provide adequate written guidelines on conducting 

the re-certifications, and provide adequate training to those 

responsible for performing the re-certifications and making site 

visits.

4. The INS should establish a unit within each district office 

responsible for conducting on-site verifications of the INSapproved schools. Full-time schools officers will be needed, 

instead of personnel who have the responsibility as a collateral 

duty. 

5. The INS must continue to monitor and review the schools, since 

schools lose accreditation, change their objectives, and sometimes 

engage in fraud. 

6. The INS should ensure that audits are conducted of approved 

schools to determine whether proper internal controls are in place 

and that data is being entered into SEVIS completely, accurately, 

and timely. 

7. The INS should decide what office or division will be responsible 

for analyzing the data that is collected in SEVIS. To fully use 

SEVIS’s capabilities, the INS needs to assign personnel and 
A-13

establish policies and procedures to take advantage of this analytic 

function. 

8. To ensure that adequate personnel are available to devote to recertifying and monitoring INS-approved schools and foreign 

students, the INS should establish fee-based positions funded out 

of the processing fee that will eventually be charged to foreign 

students.

9. The INS must also develop a plan for training both INS employees 

and school employees on how to use SEVIS. The INS should 

develop a timetable for implementing training and an 

implementation plan for carrying out the training. 

10. SEVIS cannot work unless the necessary offices and personnel are 

connected to SEVIS, including service centers, POEs, district 

offices, and consular posts. The INS should devote the resources 

necessary to ensure that all offices are connected to and are able to 

use SEVIS as quickly as possible.

11. The INS is proposing regulations that would require visitors to 

have declared that they are prospective students at the time they 

entered the country in order to be eligible to change their status at a 

later date. For this regulation to be meaningful, the INS, working 

with the State Department, should define “prospective student.” 

12. The INS should decide whether aliens will be required to submit 

documentation in support of their assertion that they are 

prospective students, such as acceptance letters or offers of 

scholarships, or whether something less will suffice, such as a 

statement that they have not yet applied to any schools but plan to 

after visiting several. 

13. The INS should ensure that change of status adjudicators in the 

service centers are aware of how to access the “prospective 

student” information recorded in NIIS. 

14. To increase the effectiveness of its monitoring of and collecting 

information about foreign students, the INS should consider 

whether part-time students should also be monitored. While we 

recognize that collecting information about every visitor who 

enrolls in a class or a short course of study would impose a 
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significant burden on the INS, we believe that the INS should take 

steps to determine what information about these students and 

schools should be collected. 

15. The INS must ensure that it devotes the resources necessary to 

maintain a fast processing time for I-539 change of status 

applications in order to avoid penalizing foreign students who are 

waiting for their applications to be adjudicated before starting 

school. 

16. The INS must also determine how it will handle nonimmigrants 

who have applied to become students but whose applications have 

not been adjudicated prior to the start of their classes. 

17. The INS should advise I-539 applicants for student status of the 

requirement that their applications must be completed prior to 

beginning school and also advise them of the procedure to be 

followed if the INS has not completed their application prior to the 

start of school. This procedure should also be communicated to 

the schools.

18. The INS should, as part of its overall management of foreign 

students, designate a person or an office within the service centers 

with the responsibility of communicating with schools and 

establish a procedure for accomplishing this objective.

19. The INS should develop clear and specific guidance for service 

center adjudicators on how information from IBIS checks will 

affect the adjudication decision, including information about 

previous overstays, immigration violations and criminal histories. 

Adjudicators should be informed about what steps to take if it is 

not clear that the applicant is the subject of the “hit” or “lookout” 

in IBIS.

20. SEVIS should be designed so that the primary inspector will be 

notified as part of the routine check performed at the POEs that an 

alien has filed an I-539 to become a student or has already been 

conferred student status through the I-539 process so that primary 

inspectors can verify the alien’s statement of intent to the 

inspector. 
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21. Instructions to the I-539 application should inform applicants that 

if they leave the country while their application is pending, they 

will be considered to have abandoned the application. Likewise, 

the instructions should inform the applicants that once the new 

status is conferred, they lose that status if they leave the country 

and will be required to obtain student visas to re-enter.

22. The INS should restate its policy with respect to I-193 waivers and 

ensure that primary inspectors understand and consistently enforce 

the waiver policy and its limitations. Clear guidance should be reissued to inspectors about what is considered an emergency that 

can result in the issuance of a waiver.

23. The INS should change service center adjudicators’ performance 

standards to allow more time to review files and seek additional 

information. At a minimum, in light of the new processing 

requirements described in this report, the INS should reconsider 

the performance standards for service center adjudicators and 

adjust the standards to accommodate the additional time that will 

be spent by these adjudicators implementing the new processing 

requirements.

24. The INS should expeditiously complete and update its field 

manuals. In addition, it should implement a more effective system 

for disseminating policies and procedures other than sending the 

documents to the head of a field office.