,% Research Note 85-35 ,p..-

real POTENTIAL PREDICTORS

0 OF I _ 

BATTALION TASK FORCE PERFORMANCE AT EFFECTIVENESS

THE NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER

Joseph Conroy, III, Michael L. Fineberg,

Mark A. Archer, and Patrick G. Potter

Science Applications International Corporation

for

Contracting Officer's Representative

Steve Stewart

ARI Field Unit, Ft. Leavenworth, KS

Stanley M. Halpin, Chief

Systems Research Laboratory ,-

Jerrold M. Levine, Director

P. M

-, .j JAN 0 986

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

April 1985

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

86 1 2 078
L. -

Unclassi fied I

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE BEFRE OMPLTCO FOR

1. REPORT mumdREA 2 GOVT ACCESSION 0.O0 3 dtE.*1,%T*S CAZ %_WfC

ARI Research Note 85-35

Potential Predictors of Battalion Task Force Fi' .epr Performnce Effectiveness at the National Training PftOdiECR.*3A jiSt

7. AU T.01O111, A. CONTRACT ONt GRANT ku"IR(IJ

Dr. Markp AConroy III Dr. Michael L. Fineberg SAchs Or85/1004 of Dr. Josep A.Ace Mr. Patrick G.Potter Purase Order 001

9 PEVRM.r OQQANd'A'IO. NAM AND ADDRESSl 10. PROGAAM C.ZMENt VRCJ:. TASK

Science Applications International Corporation AREA 6WORK UNIT NUMIERS

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10 SUPPLEMNTARYNOTES

Steve Stewart, contracting officer's representative for this project.

12IS KEY WON-$ OS t#. on . e-erse 4,0o .2 m*roe py' and seen'tty Or block flmoeP)

Battalion Effectiveness Conmand Group Behaviors

Conmmand Climate AMORE.

System Science

23 AGSTU AC 'Coeweuee on ,...,- $Ottde it ROC08..0 and 1600fol SO, black .mwb..

Battalion effectiveness is the focus of four groups of studies/data bases

reviewed and reanalyzed to determine their potential for predicting and understanding battalion effectiveness. Effectiveness at the National Training Center

was adopted as a commnon criterion and components for a conceptual definition of

effectiveness were proposed. Results of the reviews and reanalyses indicate

that 17 variables from the previous studies/data bases are supported as potential prediclors of effectiveness at the NTC. These are NCOs', junior officers' and

0 c:'iw , ,~.47 o ~O iiS OIIUncl ass i f ied

. . ... . . . . .* . .
Unclassified

~brigade coimanders' judgements of effectiveness, ARTEP, AGr, equipment readiness,

physical condition, training/cross training, and eight information processing

variables.

Once these variables have been validated as predictors of performance at the NTC

they can be integrated into a battery for use by the unit as a diagnostic aid

prior to training for the NTC. '' ~ k

Accession For

I--H

o- S

ii - Unclassi fied
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

EXECUTIVYE SUMMARY .. .. .... ........ ....... ES-i

1 INTRODUCTION .......... .... .. .. .. .. .. . . ....

1.3 

1.1 

1.2 

BACKGROUND 

OBJECTIVES. 

PURPOSE .. .. 

.

.. 

.. 

....... 

.. 

.. 

....... 

.. .. 

..... 

.. 

........ 

.. .. 

.. 

.. 

.. 

.. 

... 

.. 

.. 

..

1-1 

1-3

1-4

T

1.4 TASKS. .. .... ........ ........... 1-4

2 NTC EFFECTIVENESS AND RELATED DATA .. .. .. . .. . . . 2-1

2.1 BACKGROUND . *.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 2-1

2.2 APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING COMPONENTS OF

EFFECTIVENESS .. .. ....... ..... . . . . .2-3

2.3 RESULTS .. .. ....... ......... ..... 2-6

2.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. .. .. ....... .... 2-B

2.4.1 Components for a "Straw Man" Definition of

Effectiveness .. .. .... ........ ... 2-B

2.4.2 NTC Data for Assessing Effectiveness .. .. ... 2-9

2.4.3 Summnary .. .. .... .... .. .. .. .. 2-11

3 COMMAND CLIMATE DATA .. .. .. .... ........... 3-1

3.1 BACKGROUND. .. .. ...... ............. 3-1

3.2 APPROACH TO COMMAND CLIMATE DATA COLLECTION .. 3-3

3.2.1 Overview .. .. ....... ..... . . 3-3

3.2.2 Questionnaire Data .. .. ..... .... 3-4

3.2.3 Data from Unit Records. .. ....... . 3-6

3.2.4 Interview Data. .. ..... ......... 3-9

3.2.5 Summary of Data Collection. .. .... ..... 3-11

3.3 RESULTS. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 3-11

3.3.1 Previous Analyses of the Conmmand Climate

Data . . . . . . . . . .3-11

3.3.2 Analyses of the Connand Climate Data.......3-13

3.4 DISCUSSION. .. .. ....... ........ .... 3-22

4 COMMAND GROUP BEHAVIOR STUDIES .. .. ....... ..... 4-1

4.1 BACKGROUND . . . . .. ......... 4-1j

4.2 APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF COMAND GROUP BEAVIRS 4-2
L*.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(Continued)

Section Page

4.2.1 Command Group Performance in CATTS Study . . . 4-2

4.2.2 FORGE I .. .. ........ .......... 4-5 -

4.2.3 Cardinal Point II. .. .. .... ........ 4-10

4.3 RESULTS SUMMARY. .. ........ .......... 4-12

4.4 DISCUSSION . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4-13

5 ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES. .. .......... 5-1

5.1 BACKGROUND. .. .. .... ......... ..... 5-1

5.2 APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

UNIT SUBSTITUTABILITY AND CAPABILITY .. .. ....... 5-2

5.2.1 Purpose .. .. ........ .......... 5-2

5.2.2 Methodology . .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .5-3

5.2.3 Results. .. ....... . . . .. .. .. . .. .5-7

5.3 RESULTS OF THE REVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

STUDIES .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 5-7

5.4 DISCUSSION .. .. ........ .. .. .. .. .... 5-9

6 CARY ET AL. STUDY. .. ..... ........ ....... 6-1

6.1 BACKGROUND.....................6-1

6.2 APPROACH TO LIVING SYSTEMS ANALYSIS* OF ATALIONS

I N GARRISON .. ..... ........ ........ 6-2

r ~6.2.1 Methodology .. .. ........ ........ 6-2

6.3 RESULTS. .. ........ ........ .... 6-6

6.4 DISCUSSION. .. ..... ........ ........ 6-8

7 INTEGRATION AND DISCUSSION. .. ........ ....... 7-1

7.1 SUMMARIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF POTENTIAL

PREDICTORS .. .. ........ ........ ... 7-1

7.1.1 Command Climate Variables .. .. ......... 7-1

7.1.2 Command Group Behavior Variables .. ....... 7-2

7.1.3 Organizational Effectiveness Variables . . . . 7-3

7.1.4 Cary et al. Variables . .. .. .. .. .. . .7-3

7.1.5 Sunmmary. .. ..... ........ .. . . 7-4

iv
• 'L I

TABLE OF CONTENTS .""

(Continued)

Section Page

7.2 RELATIVE DEGREES OF SUPPORT FOR PREDICTORS ...... 7-4

7.2.1 Between Groups of Studies ........... 7-4

7.2.2 Within Groups of Studies .. ........... .... 7-5

7.3 RELATIONSHIPS TO SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF

EFFECTIVENESS ....... .................... ... 7-7

7.4 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A VALIDATION STUDY .. ........ . 7-10

7.5 SUMMARY ....... ....................... .... 7-11

8 REFERENCES ....... ... ........................ 8-1

Appendix A COMPONENTS FOR A DEFINITION OF EFFECTIVENESS AT THE NTC . A-i

Appendix B OBSERVABLE EVENTS AND ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION PER

MISSION AND TASK ...... .................... ... B-i

- Appendix C COMMAND CLIMATE QUESTIONNAIRE .... ............ ... C-i

Appendix D REVIEW OF COMMAND CLIMATE DATA BASE STUDIES ......... ... D-1

D.1 REVIEW OF A MODEL OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES

ON ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES ... ............. .... D-2

D.I.1 Description of Study .... ....... ..... . D-2

D.I.2 Evaluation of Study ...... .............. D-6

D.2 THE MEASUREMENT OF BATTALION EFFECTIVENESS ... ...... D-9

D.2.1 Description of Study ............. D-9

D.2.2 Evaluation of Study ...... .............. D-11

D.3 COMMANDERS' ASSESSMENT OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS

MEASURES . ............................. D-12

D.3.1 Description of Study ... ................ D-12

D.3.2 Evaluation of Study ...... .............. D-13

.. . . . . . . 4 '+.-*.-* ** - -,:.*.* Vt +. *' * .. * . . * . *: \ 2. 4. -''.- * * -..-.':. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS

_ _ (Continued)_

Section Pa ge

D.4 THE TEMPORAL DYNAMICS OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS

MEASURES .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. D-14

D.4.1 Description of Study .. .. .. ... .......- 14

D.4.2 Evaluation of Study. .. .. .. ... .. .....-15

D.5 THE MEASUREMENT OF MORALE .. .. . . ... . . ..... D-15j

D.5.1 Description of Study .. .. ... .. ...... D-15

D.5.2 Evaluation of Study . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. D-16

D.6 THE EFFECTS OF MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION ON

ORGANIZATION PERFORMANCE .. .. ... .. ....... 0-17

D.6.1 Description of Study .. .. ... .. ...... D-17

D.6.2 Evaluation of Study. .. .. .. .. ... .... D-19

Appendix E REVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS.STUDIES . . . .. E-1

E.1 DESCRIPTION OF AMORE. .. .. .. ... . .. . . .. E-2

E.1.1 General. .. .. ... .. . .. .. ... .... E-2

E.1.2 Input Data . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... E-2

E.1.3 Computer Based Simulation .. .. . .. ...... E-3

E.2 REVIEW OF STUDIES . .. .. .. .. . ... .. .. .. E-3

E.2.1 Military Organizational Effectiveness of

Forward Support Units . . . .. .. .. .. . .E-5

E.2.2 Organizational Development for Small Unit

Design Analysis . . . . .. .. .. .. .. . .E-6

E.2.3 Military Organization Effectiveness/

Readiness and Sustainability. .. . .. ..... E-9

E.2.4 Study of Sustainable Loss Rates. .. .. .... E-10

E.2.5 An Analysis of the Capability of Alternative

Division-86 155mm Howitzer Battery

Organizations . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. . .E-11

E.2.6 Design of a Battalion Combined Arms Task

Force (BCATF) .. .. ... . . .... . . . . . E-14

E.2.7 An Analysis of the Capability of the HHC,

Infantry Division (Light), and the HHC, *.

Infantry Division (Light) Brigade. .. .. .... E-15

E.2.8 Application of AMORE Methodology to Manpower,

Personnel, and Training (MPT) Front End

Analysis of New Materiel Systems .. .. ..... E-16

vi
TAL OF CONTENT

(Contnued

Section.Pag

E.. nlsso h Pooe esne n

Secio ian th einadEauto fMltr

I!Organizations .. .. ... ..... ....... E-19

vi
J .° -

LIST OF TABLES

Table

ES-i Potential Predictors of Effectiveness at the NTC .E.-... ES-9

3-1 Data Collection Events ....... .. ... .. .... 3-4

3-2 Readiness Measures ........ .................... 3-7

3-3 Command Indicators ....'for ff. . e.e.s.Me........ 3-8

3-4 Descriptive Statistics fr"fectiveness" Masures .. 3-15

3-5 Intercorrelations for Wave Three Data . ....... ..... 3-19

i3-6 Intercorrelations for Wave Four Data .. ........... .... 3-20

4-1 Process Definitions ..... .................... . 4-6

5-1 Data from Past AMORE Analysis ...... .............. 5-4

5-2 Results of Quantitative Data from Past AMORE Analysis . . . 5-6

6-1 Correlations Between Effectiveness and Processes . . ... 6-7

7-1 Potential Predictor - Criterion Relationships ... ....... 7-9

9 A-I Components for a Definition of Effectiveness at the NTC A-3

E-1 Summary of Past AMORE Analyses ...... .............. E-4

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

4-1 Aborted Decisions of High Effectiveness and Low

Effectiveness Groups ....... ................... 4-9

5-1 Graph of Linear Regression of Substitutability versus

Average Change in Remaining Capability ....... ..... 5-8

E-1 Comparison of Unit Response, Losses Limiting Unit

Capability Recovery to 60% Maximum ... ............ ... E-12

viii

• -. o° "
LIST OF ACRONYMS

AGI Annual Ceneral Inspection

AMORE Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness

ANOVA Analysis of Variance ARI Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

ARTEP Army Training and Evaluation Program

AS Assoclator

AWOL Absent without Leave

BCATF Battalion Combined Arms Task Force

BPP Battalion Performance Prediction

CAB Combined Arms Battalion

CATTS Combined Arms Tactical Training Simulation

CEOI Communications-Electronic Operation Instructions

CN Channel and Net

CO Commanding Officer

CPX Command Post Exercises

DC Decider

DCSPER Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

DE Decoder

EN Encoder

FTX Field Training Exercises

rORGE Factors in Military Organizational Effectiveness

HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company

HumRRO Hum;- 0-sou-ces Research Organization

JTOC Jun, iactical Operations Center

LSPA Lib .., Systems Process Analysis

ME Memory

MET Mission Essential Team

MOSC Military Occupational Specialty Code

N Number of Data Points

NBC Nuclear, Biological, Chemical

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NTC National Training Center

OT Output Transducer

OPSEC Operations Security

REDCON Readiness Condition

SAIC Science Applications International Corporation

TOC Tactical Operations Center

TOE Table of Organization and Equipment

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

USR Unit Status Report

ix
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the final report of the battalion performance prediction

(BPP) project whose impetus was derived from the Army's Systems Science

1 Conference of December 7-9, 1983. The conference was held in response to a

request from Ms. Amoretta Hoeber, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of

J the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition, to assess the utility of

applying systems science constructs to Army problems. One recommendation of

the conference was that basic research should be undertaken to determine the

relationship between systems science and battalion effectiveness.

For several years the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences (ARI) has been engaged in both systems science research

and research on battalion effectiveness. A major aspect of ARI's system

science research was the Cary et al. (1982) study which examined the unit

effectiveness of 35 battalions in terms of Living Systems Theory. Three

* I other groups of -studies constitute a large portion of ARI's research on

battalion effectiveness: ARI investigations of command climate variables;

several studies of command group behavior; and a host of analyses focused on

Ij organizational effectiveness. These four major lines of research can be

viewed as converging at a common focal point: battalion effectiveness

.1 measurement.

Prior to establishing a common focus for these research efforts,

no attempt had been made to critique their methodologies and integrate those

findings which prove robust enough to survive a critique. For example,

the Organizational Effectiveness studies analyzed many potential influences

on battalion effectiveness; however, the total of these studies has neither

been critiqued nor integrated relative to some common unit effectiveness

m criterion. Furthermore, neither the data from the Cary et al. study nor the

Command Climate Data Base had ever been fully analyzed. Finally, the Coml mand Group Behavior Research had never been reviewed as a potential source

K for predictors of battalion effectiveness. As a result of the compartmentalized nature of these four different groups of studies, no attempt had been

Imade to interrelate their findings in order to produce a definitive understanding of ARI's ability to predict battalion effectiveness. Therefore,

I the purpose of this BPP project was to enhance ARI's ability to understand

I and predict battalion effectiveness by further investigation of its Command

ES-1

IJ - *
Climate, Command Group Behavior, Organizational Effectiveness, and System

Science studies for potentially valid and reliable indicators of battalion I

performance effectiveness. In other words, the effort was designed to "look

across" all four categories of research, extract potentially valid predic-

* tors of battalion performance effectiveness, and "shut the door" on lines of

research that have proven fruitless.

One of the problems which made interrelating the four categories

of research difficult was that few of the studies in the four different

groups had defined battalion effectiveness similarly. Also, in many of the

studies, readiness and capability had been mistaken for effectiveness. To

remedy this and to supply some standard against which to evaluate previous I

research, performance of tactical missions at the National Training Center

(NTC) was chosen as a general common criterion of effectiveness. I " -

In order to assist ARI in developing an understanding of and

an ability to predict effectiveness at the NTC, Science Applications Inter- m

national Corporation (SAIC) undertook five highly interrelated tasks. The

first of these was the identification of potential components that could be

used in a conceptual definition of effectiveness at the NTC, and a specification of the types of data required to assess effectiveness in terms of

these components. Tasks two through five each entailed an in-depth review -

and reanalysis of one of the four groups of studies (Command Climate,

Command Group Behaviors, Organizational Effectiveness, and Cary et al.).

Finally, the predictors of effectiveness which survived critical review were -

integrated into a rudimentary prediction approach for future validation.

Components for a Conceptual Definitiom of Effectiveness

In order to be able to identify the types of data which would be [

required to assess effectiveness at the NTC, and to have a more specific

common criterion for interrelating the previous studies and identifying I

predictors of effectiveness, components which could be used to form a

specific definition of a criterion of effectiveness were identified. The

approach to identifying potential components of a conceptual definition of .

effectiveness was the classical one of identifying the performance requirements of the battalion task forces which perform at the NTC. The perform- - ance requirements were identified by the Army during detailed mission/task

ES-2
analyses in suppirt of the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) 71-2

" (U.S. Army Headquarters, 1981). These mission/task analyses resulted in the

identification of six general missions which are required for all the tactical missions of battalion task forces. These six general missions, Identified in ARTEP 71-2, were suggested as sources for a conceptual definition of . ;.

effectiveness. The six missions are:

I 1. Plan and Control Operations

2. Maintain Operations Security

3. Perform Tactical Intelligence Functions

4. Conduct NBC Defense Operations

5. Defend against Air Attack

6. Conduct Sustaining Operations

I Based on the ARTEP, SAIC further defined the six general missions in terms

*of the tasks which comprise them and the types of data required to assess

1 their accomplishment. Finally, the required types of data were compared to

the types of data collected at the NTC and the differences were noted. Most

of the types of data required to assess effectiveness are already collected

at the NTC for some of the tactical missions. The required types of data

may have to be collected for all the iactical missions at the NTC if effectiveness is to be adequately assessed. It is also necessary to establish

via empirical research, the interrelationships of these criterion components

in order to develop an effectiveness assessment model against which predic- IF

tors might be regressed.

Command Climate Studies

ARI's Command Climate Data Base is composed of organizational

climate data and some effectiveness data from a total of 71 battalions which

were surveyed over the course of approximately 26 months. Six studies of

"El the Command Climate Data Base were critically reviewed for this project, and

some of the Command Climate Data were reanalyzed.

In-depth reviews of the six studies, especially as they relate to

the prediction of effectiveness at the NTC, are reported in Appendix D. In

an attempt to address some of the questions that the six studies left

unanswered, new analyses of some of the data were conducted. The results of

ES-3

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the new analyses and those conducted during the previous studies indicate

that seven of the Command Climate variables may be potentially valid predic- I ..

- tors of effectiveness at tne NTC. The seven are listed and described

briefly below. ,.*.

0 NCOs', Junior Officers', and Brigade Commanders' Judgements

of Effectiveness. These are ratings of the effectiveness of .

their units.

ARTEP. This is the percentage of areas rated "satisfactory" -

on a unit's last ARTEP report.

0 AGI. This is the percentage of areas rated "satisfactory" on '-.-

a unit's last Annual General Inspection.

o Equipment Readiness. This is the percentage of a unit's

equipment on-hand that is rated ready. i

0 AWOL. This is the percentage of those in a unit who are I

absent from duty without leave.

NCOs', junior officers', and brigade commanders' judgements of

effectiveness were rated by senior officers as the best indicators of

battalion effectiveness (Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara, 1981), and they were all

highly intercorrelated (O'Mara, 1981). The ARTEP and AGI also were rated as .

being some of -the top indicators of battalion effectiveness (Kerner-Hoeg and

O'Mara, 1981). Equipment readiness is highly correlated with both ARTEP and -

AGI (O'Mara, 1981) and with junior officers' judgements of effectiveness as

analyses of this project revealed. AWOL was highly correlated with both

* junior officers' and NCOs' Judgements of effectiveness, and it was also

ranked by senior officers as one of the best indicators of effectiveness

(O'Mara, 1981).

Command Group Behavior Studies ,

The Command Group Behavior.studies reviewed during this project

were a three year study of battalion performance in the Combined Arms Tacti- f

cal Training Simulation (CATTS), the FORGE I (Factors in Military

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Organizational Effectiveness) study and the Cardinal Point II study. The

latter two were based on battalion staff performance in the PEGASUS simulation. All three studies used actual or ad-hoc command groups of battalions

, whose performances were rated and classified by independent observers. In

: I addition, SAIC reviewed other research efforts suggested by the COTR and

found them irrelevant to the present investigation. All three relevant 1 .studies focused primarily on the relationships between information processing behaviors of the command groups and their effectiveness as indicated by

ratings of observers and/or battle outcome scores originated by the simulations.

The results of the study based on CATTS were not robust and

revealed several problems with the reliability of the data. Nevertheless,

" they indicated that the effective transmission of information is critically Irelated to effectiveness. Command groups spent much more time gathering and

transmitting information than in making decisions and if enough information

is gathered, required decisions flow almost automatically from the information. Also important to effective command group performance is the comprehensive, accurate, timely and complete dissemination of information.

The results of the FORGE I study are similar to those of the CATTS

study. For example, the FORGE study also found that command groups must

actively seek out information and that their effective performance is

dependent upon insuring that Information is widely disseminated to all

3 appropriate personnel. In addition, the results indicated that the

processes of successful seeking and disseminating of information are more

1 important than having "good decisionmaking." This finding is congruent with

the CATTS study's conclusion that if enough information is collected, appropriate decisions almost "make themselves."

The results of the Cardinal Point II study are questionable

because of several methodological problems with the reliability of the

observers. However, they did support the notion that information processing

was more integral to effectiveness than were decisionmaking, stabilizing or I coping types of cognitive processes. In fact, they showed that acquiring, processing, transmitting and testing the validity of information were all

m I highly Intercorrelated and strongly related to effectiveness.

ES-5

.. . .
Critiquing all three studies and integrating the surviving conclusions led to the selection of the following seven variables as potential

prediccors of effectiveness at the NTC.

0 Information Seeking. The time (or proportion of communica- l ___

tions) spent actively gathering information.

o Communication Efficiency. The ability to transmit required

information in brief and explicit terms.

o Communication Accuracy. The ability to transmit information

without errors or omissions. I

o Completed Communications. The proportion of communications

that actually arrive at their intended destination.

o Communication Timeliness. The proportions of communications 1 "

received in time to achieve their intended purpose.

o Information Dissemination. The extent to which information ILis distributed to all personnel who may be able to use it.

o Decisionmaking Quality. The ability of command staff to

rapidly make appropriate command decisions.

Organizational Effectiveness Studies

These studies were all based on a methodology entitled the Analy- I

sis of Military Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE). This is a computer

assisted methodology which was basically designed to measure a unit's capa- i

bility to internally form functional teams of personnel and equipment. The

methodology is typically used to assess a unit's capability to "bounce back"

after the unit has been partially depleted of its personnel and material as

a result of combat. The most critical variables the methodology considers

as influences on a unit's capability to build teams are the degree to which I.....

members of a unit are deemed able to do each others' jobs (substitutability) and the degree to which a unit's resources are depleted. For

ES--- .-

H.I

. °.. . .. . ."°.,o-o.°...,,°.,.,..... - -,o*o. ,..... ... .... .. ."- • •
identifying predictors of effectiveness at the NTC, the construct of

jm substitutability and its components were the critical focus of the review.

Ten studies were reviewed in order to identify potential predicndtors of effectiveness at the NTC. The relationship between substitutability

and a unit's capability to form teams was determined from a regression .1 analysis of the results of these studies. The regression analysis showed

that the correlation between substitutability and a unit's capability to

form teams is .59. The results of the ten studies also indicated that four

components of substitutability were supported as potential predictors of

effectiveness at the NTC. These potential predictors are listed and defined

I below.

o Training/Cross Training. This is the degree to which enlisted personnel have skills training in their own and other

specialties.

0 Cohesiveness/Morale. This is the degree to which a unit has

high esprit de corps.

o Physical Condition. This is the average degree of physical

conditioning exhibited 'y all the members of a battalion.

o Equipment Maintenance. This is the degree to which a battalion maintains its equipment.

I Cary et al. Study

The Cary et al. study is one of ARI's few systems science studies

friof battalions. Based on living systems theory (LST), it focused on determining the relationships between many LST based processes theoretically

required of all living systems, and measures of the effectiveness of battalions in garrison. Thirty five battalions were assessed in terms of LST

processes and scores on these variables were correlated with a measure of

battalion effectiveness. Many different measures of nine processes were

found to be significantly related to the measure of battalion effectiveness.

Multiple regression analyses revealed that 96 percent of the variance of the

ES-7

S................. ............. ."-. ...... .- .-. .
effectiveness measure could be accounted for by three variables. It is

these three which were considered as potential predictors of effectiveness:

o Memory Timeliness. The timeliness of storing or retrieving 3

information within the battalion.

o Internal Transducer Accuracy. The accuracy of internal

reporting about battalion activities. I

o Associator Timeliness. The timeliness of recommendations

made for procedural changes. I.".'-.

However, the prospects of these variables being predictors of effectiveness -

at the NTC are qualified by the fact that these variables were shown to be

potential predictors of in-garrison effectiveness, not effectiveness in

* situations similar to combat. .

Conclusions U

It was concluded, based on the relative validities and generalizabilities of the four groups of studies, that the suggested predictors -

derived from the Command Group Behavior Studies were supported more strongly

as predictors of effectiveness at the NTC than were the variables derived

from the other groups of studies. Those derived from the Organizational I

Effectiveness and Cary et al. Studies are the least supported as potential

predictors. I

Finally, it was concluded that two indicators from the Command

Climate Data Base (AWOL rates and equipment readiness) were redundant with "

two variables derived from the Organizational Effectiveness Studies (cohesiveness/morale and equipment maintenance). In addition, two variables from I

the Cary et al. study (memory timeliness and internal transducer accuracy)

were redundant with two derived from the Command Group Behavior Studies

(communication timeliness and communication accuracy). The four variables I

from the Organizational Effectiveness and Cary et al. Studies were dropped

leaving 17 suggested predictors of effectiveness at the NTC for future 4

integration and validation. These are shown in Table ES-1.

ES-8 M [V7
. . . . z

w 

-- " . . .

Table ES-1. POTENTIAL PREDICTORS OF EFFECTIVENESS AT THE NTC

Command Climate Command Group Behavior

NCOs' Judgements of Effectiveness Information Seeking j Junior Officers Judgements of Effectiveness Communication Efficiency

Brigade Commanders' Judgements of Effectiveness Communication Accuracy

ARTEP Completed Communications

AGI Communication Timeliness

Equipment Readiness Information Dissemination

AWOL Rates Decision-making Quality

Organizational Effectiveness System Science

Training/Cross Training Associator Timeliness

Physical Condition

The Command Climate variables that call for judgements could be

Ii measured by using rating scales while ARTEP and AGI measures can be obtained

from units' latest reports of those types. Measures of equipment readiness

and AWOL rates can be obtained from Unit Status Reports (USR).

The Command Group Behavior variables will be more difficult to

obtain but could be derived from ratings of command post exercises (CPX) or

field training exercises (FTX) orthe written narratives of these exercises.

The Organizational Effectiveness variables could both be measured

from the USR. Training/cross training could be measured from the number of

skills qualification tests unit personnel had passed. Physical conditioning

could be measured by the percentage of unit personnel having passed their

annual physical training test.

The Cary et al. variable of associator timeliness could be

.' j measured in garrison by a questionnaire developed in the Cary et al. study.

I ES-9 '-,

i-i. ._..'. .. . ... .. .. c .C . . .. '..... : . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . .-- -*

. * . . . . . L : - . .... " .. ' . . _. - __ ." . _'_ _'
In summary, this BPP project identified and provided support for

several potential components which could be integrated in a conceptual I

definition of effectiveness at the NTC. However, these predictors will

require further development If they are to be used as a valid set of

criterion measures. In addition to providing suggestions to support the .-.

definition of effectiveness, the types of data not collected at the NTC

which would be required to assess "effectiveness" were identified. Four

sets of studies/data bases were revlewed in detail relative to the

components of effectiveness and 17 variables were identified which may

predict effectiveness at the NTC. Nine of the 17 variables are currently

and routinely collected by battalions. Before being validated, the group of

17 potential predictors should be augmented from additional sources such as

military experts. If validated against criteria of effectiveness at the

NTC, these and possibly additional predictors could be used by a battalion

in garrison to identify the types of training which would make the battalion /-'"

more effective at the NTC and in combat.

l

I

.-. ~ES-lO - '

'I .T
Section 1 "

'5INTRODUCTION ...

1.1 BACKGROUND

The impetus for this BPP project began with the Army's Systems

• Science Conference of December 7-9, 1983. The Conference was held in

response to a request of Ms. Amoretta Hoeber, Principal Deputy Assistant

Secretary of the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition, who asked

* .that the utility of applying systems science constructs to Army problems be

assessed. In her,4pe~iing address to the Conference, Ms. Hoeber asked the

participants to focus on six areas, two of which this project addresses:

* (1) the identification of problem areas in which systems science offers a

-* useful approach to solutions; and (2) the development of a plan which

r identifies system science related research requirements. As a major conclusion of the conference, the participants agreed that one of the most

important areas in which systems science may be useful is in the assessment

of unit operations/effectiveness, especially at the battalion level. In

fact, the conference recommended that basic research should be undertaken to

ascertain the relationship between systems science and battalion effectiveness.

• . -*. .,

For several years, ARI has been engaged in both systems science

7oriented research (e.g., Rusco, G. et al., 1979; Whittenburg, J., 1981) and

in research on battalion effectiveness (e.g., Carter et al., 1983). One

such study by Cary et al. (1982) examined the unit effectiveness of 35

battalions in terms of Living Systems Theory. The Cary et al. study examined several specific issues among which were the relationships between unit

effectiveness and information management. Unit effectiveness was measured

in terms of command indicators (and other measures) which are often referred

to as command climate variables. In attempting to examine the relationships

between unit effectiveness and command climate, the study generated an

enormous amount of data which had not been examined in the context of other

related efforts prior to this project.

Several years ago ARI began a large research effort which also

"r t; focused on command climate variables as predictors of battalion effectiveness (O'Mara, 1981). The effort examined 71 battalions and generated what

"'i I~-1 ""-"

... I , ' ''- •" -",, . ._. .._ .. _ ." :' i,-. --. i. -."."i.-- -. -i'"i."i••.""-""-"""- '" . . .-'.i- 2•" -"i :.-- -" .-' " .." i -•i- .i
..... ,.... ~ ..... .,..- ,.

is commonly referred to within ARI as the Command Climate Data Base. Prior

to this project, the Command Climate Data Base had not been exhaustively 1 i..

examined. More importantly, the data and relationships found in the Command

Climate Data Base had never been compared to, or considered in the light of, ..

the relationships found in the Cary et al. study. .

ARI also had sponsored research on battalion effectiveness which

focused on the behaviors of command groups. This group of studies includes

a rather large study of Command Group Performance in CATTS (Combined Arms

Tactical Training Simulation) (Carter et al., 1983). However, as with the -

previously mentioned studies, the data and conclusions of the Command Group

Performance in CATTS study and others of this type had not been fully

exploited or related to those of the Cary.et al. or Command Climate Studies.

Oct ., ,

A fourth area of research, partially sponsored by ARI and with a

focus similar to those previously mentioned, concerned investigations of

organizational effectiveness guided by an analytical approach entitled the .

Analysis of Military Organizational Effectiveness (AMORE) (cf. Conroy et

al., 1984). AMORE has been used to investigate several influences on

battalion effectiveness including some of the variables contained in the

Command Climate Data Base. However, few, if any, of the organizational

effectiveness studies had been related to any of the Command Group Behavior

Studies, the Cary et al. study or the Command Climate Data Base.

With its system science research, ARI had already begun, prior to

the Systems Science Conference, to undertake the charge established at the

Conference (i.e., to ascertain the relationship between systems science and .

battalion effectiveness). While the Command Climate, Command Group Behavior, and Organizational Effectiveness studies did not take an explicit

systems science approach, it was the similarities of the data bases/studies

which, in addition to the impetus generated by the System Science Conference, coalesced to form the seed for this BPP project. .

-.-'.-

1-2

.. . . .. . . .. . . . .
- -~--.--..,- ' .. , -'

1.2 PURPOSE

The four research areas of interest to ARI (described in Section

1.1) all had battalion effectiveness as a focus. Yet few of these studies

defined battalion effectiveness similarly. The Command Climate Studies

referred to measures of climate, status, etc., as measures of effectiveness.

The Cary et al. study used the global ratings made by battalion members

together with "performance indicators" (e.g., Unit Status Report results,

Skill Qualification Test results) and "command indicators" (e.g., Annual

General Inspection results, number of personnel actions) as measures of

effectiveness. The Command Group Performance in CATTS study employed both

* global ratings of performance and casualties as measures of effectiveness.

All of the Organizational Effectiveness studies used as measures of effectiveness the degree to which a unit had the personnel and material to form

functional teams. Upon careful examination it was found that several of the

studies from all four groups made the mistake of equating effectiveness to

readiness or capability (Sarkesian, 1980). In addition, because there was

no practical way to measure effectiveness, all the measures used in these

studies were very far removed from the performance of a unit in combat--a

I unit's ultimate criterion of effectiveness (Sarkesian, 1980).

W th the advent of the Army's National Training Center (NTC) the

measurement of genuine effectiveness in combat became a much closer possibility because the NTC is a training facility that simulates combat with

*very high fidelity. Many of those familiar with the NTC believe that with

some qualifications, it is possible to generalize results from the NTC to

S"real combat (Science Applications, Inc., 1982). With such a generalization

as a possibility, ARI saw that the adoption of effectiveness in the performance of tactical missions at the NTC as a criterion of battalion effectiveness would supply a single appropriate and unifying criterion to which the

variables investigated in the four research areas of interest could be

related. The establishment of a common criterion for effectiveness would

allow ARI to examine the variables from the four research areas with an eye

**,toward ; comparison. Thus the development of the components of a conceptual

- definition for effectiveness at the NTC also became a goal of this project.

With a focus on effectiveness at the NTC, the overall purpose of

this BPP project became one of identifying, summarizing and interrelating

1-3

. .
information on the prediction of effectiveness at the NTC, as derived from 

the four sets of studies/data bases (Organizational Effectiveness, Command 

Climate, Cary et al. and Command Group Behavior). In other words, the goal 

of this effort was to deduce potentially valid predictors of combat effectiveness from the four research areas and finally "close the door" on those 

aspects of past research which proved fruitless. 

1.3 OBJECTIVES 

The general purpose of the project is elaborated in the following 

objectives: (1) identify components for a conceptual definition of effectiveness at the NTC in order to provide a criterion for identifying potential predictors of effectiveness; and {2) identify potential predictors of 

battalion effectiveness at the NTC from the Cary et al. study, from the 

Command Climate Data Base, from the Command Group Behavior Studies, and from 

the Organizational Effectiveness Studies. The first objective was enlarged 

to include the identification of the types of data required to assess effectiveness at the NTC. All such data types may not presently be collected at 

the NTC; although the NTC focuses on training, the types of data collected 

at the NTC were not determined with a systematic, top down approach such as 

the_ Army's Instructional System Design (ISO) process. Also, during NTC 

development, the determin3tion of the data types presently collected was 

secondary to the determination of the hardware and instrumentation required 

at the NTC. 

1.4 TASKS 

The proj_ect objectives were realized by performing five complex 

and highly interrelated tasks. The first of these.tasks was to analyze the 

NTC environment and the battalion task force missions performed at the NTC 

in order to identify the components of a conceptual definition of battalion 

effectiveness at the NTC. The purpose of this was to provide a criterion 

for identifying predictors of battalion effectiveness. The components that 

could be used to define effectiveness were then used to identify the types 

of data required to assess effectiveness and to point out which of the 

required types of data are actually collected ~t the NTC. More specifically, the bas1c tasks of the performance of battalion task forces at the 

1-4 
- ................ .°-o - -

NTC were identified as were the types of data required to assess effectiveness. The types of data required to assess effectiveness were compared to L

the types of data collected at the NTC, and the similarities and differences

between the two groups were noted.

I m. The second through the fifth tasks each entailed the study and

reanalysis of one of the four research areas ,lreviously described. These

analyses were designed to identify potential predictors of battalion effectiveness at the NTC. However, data on the performance of battalions at the

NTC were not available for this project because of the brief duration of the

project, the prohibitively difficult logistics of acquiring such data, and

the sensitivity of such data. Since predictors of performance at the NTC

were to be identified without access to the data of battalions which had

performed at the NTC, SAIC's approach to identifying predictors became of

necessit., analytical; in a sense one of identifying candidates for predictors, or potential predictors. This identification of the potential predictors was based on analyses of the four studies/data bases, analyses and

extrapolations from research which relied on criteria similar to effectiveu Iness at the NTC, and some new analyses of the four studies/data bases

conducted by SAIC specifically for this Battalion Performance Prediction

Study.

The remainder of this report is divided into six sections; the

first addresses the NTC, and the next four are each primarily devoted to

one of the four research areas of interest to ARI: the Cary et al. study,

the Command Climate Data Base, Command Group Behavior Studies, and the

Organizational Effectiveness Studies. The last chapter is devoted to a

summary and integration of the potentially valid predictors into a conceptual battalion performance prediction system.

1-5 ". . .
Section 2

K NTC EFFECTIVENESS AND RELATED DATA

2.1 BACKGROUND

The first objective of this project was to develop components for

a single and unifying conceptual criterion of effectiveness which could be

used to identify predictors from the four data bases/research areas. This

objective was realized by identifying components for a "straw man" conceptual definition of effectiveness for task forces performing at the NTC. The

objective was not one of developing a full-blown evaluation system with

specific evaluation measures and weights for component parts; it was only to

establish the missions/dimensions and possibly major tasks for each tactical

S -mission. However, the objective of developing a conceptual definition of

& t effectiveness is tantamount to developing the beginnings of an evaluation

system for battalion task forces performing at the NTC.

While the evaluation components of training systems should specify

-: comprehensive pre- and post-training evaluations and examine performance at

a very fine level such as that of the individual task or behavior, evaluations conducted for "performance appraisals" or 'reviews" need not take such

a fine-grained look at performance. The purpose of performance appraisals

is usually more global--not one of providing detailed indications of remedial needs. Thus the identification of components for a conceptual definition of effectiveness at the NTC which could serve as a criterion for

predictors did not require the development of an evaluation system having a

very fine-grained level of analysis.

In addition to identifying components for a definition of effec- -

tiveness, a second NTC related objective of this project was to identify the

types of data required to assess effectiveness which are presently collected

at the NTC. The types of data required to assess effectiveness which are

not collected at the NTC were also to be identified.

The approach to identifying components for a "straw man" definition of effectiveness was the classical one of identifying the required

performances and proposing them as components which could be used in a

conceptual definition of effectiveness. The required performances resulted

2-1
6m'

from mission/task analyses. Subsequently, the tasks and the types of data

required to evaluate effectiveness were also identified. Then the NTC data

base was searched for the types of data already collected at the NTC which

are similar to the types identified as required for evaluating effectiveness. Finally, the data required were compared to the data collected and

shortfalls were noted. 6

Attempts at validly and reliably measuring battalion effectiveness

began many years ago. Earlier attempts to measure the effectiveness of a

battalion occurred in ways and at places far removed both geographically and

conceptually from combat. For example, battalions in garrison were measured

in terms of the numbers of people and things that were operational.

Obviously these are necessary for effective combat performance but they are

not sufficient. With the advent of the NTC, the use of "remote" criteria

was no longer necessary. The training environment at the NTC was designed

to provide the highest possible degree of similarity to real combat. The

primary purpose of the NTC is training for the improvement of performancethe task forces perform each tactical combat mission to the best of their

ability. Thus, effectiveness at the NTC was chosen as this project's basis

for some future criterion of effectiveness.

The NTC is a facility at Ft. Irwin, California where highly

realistic, comprehensive and intensified training for battalion task forces

is conducted. Task forces are transported to the facility and engage in 

tactical missions and reviews of their performance. Typically every month

two new task forces with their brigade command group arrive at the facility.

They engage an opposing force which attempts to mimic anticipated Soviet

Army tactics. The opposing force is a battalion size U.S. Army force

stationed at Ft. Irwin which is run by U.S. Army personnel assisted by SAIC

personnel. Most of the task forces which train at Ft. Irwin are the

combined arms type with either mechanized infantry or tank. However, some

other types of forces have trained at the NTC, such as a cavalry squadron.

The task forces select from a variety of tactical missions available to them, those tactical missions most appropriate for their training.

Although there is variability among task forces in terms of the tactical

missions they select, each of the tactical missions contains elements of '

electronic warfare, live fire and close air support.

2 -- . .

2-2>:>'i

TheNTCis a Ft failiy IrinCalforia her hihly,. -. I
II' .b .' IF.

In addition to executing their tactical missions, task forces

engage in after-action reviews (AAR) of mission performance. The reviews

*

i consist largely of the replay of computer generated representations of the

firing and movement of both the opposing force and the task forces in ,.- .;r

training.

The instrumentation at the NTC provides for the collection of data

during the execution of the tactical missions and the processing of these

data. Some data are collected at the NTC by in-the-field, observer controllers (OCs) who report their data through the instrumentation system. There

is an OC assigned to every unit of platoon size and larger. Data collected

by OCs are mostly related to the execution of specific tasks or aspects of

submissions. Much of the data are qualitative and judgemental in nature.

On the other hand, the data generated by the instrumentation system are fire

and movement type data. Most of these data are generated automatically by a

radio based multilateration system (for location), laser simulated fires, - -"

and laser sensitive receptors for registering "hits."

2.2 APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVENESS

The method used to identify components for a conceptual definition

of battalion task force effectiveness began with the standard first step of

determining what is required of the task forces in the performance of their

tactical missions. In other words, what they are supposed to do. This was

accomplished by relying on a mission/task analysis. The mission/task

analysis began with an identification of the missions, goals, and environ-

. ments which a task force could encounter at the NTC. This analysis revealed

i* that the typical situation and events for most task forces are a two week

stay at Ft. Irwin, a desert environment, where each task force engages in

approximately 10 tactical missions (e.g., defense in sector; hasty attack).

Task forces, in conjunction with their brigade headquarters and the NTC

staff, choose the tactical missions in which they will engage. Their

choices are made months prior to actually engaging in the exercises. At the

inception of the NTC, 12 different tactical missions were planned as possible missions for task forces. The original 12 tactical missions have been

increased and changed, and the process of adaptation continues. In addition, many variations of the basic set of tactical missions are now

possible. Thus any future definition of battalion. effectiveness at the NTC

2-3

~~~.. . .. ......... , ............ - •, ".- " *. ,-"-"-.,.,, .'**.. . .. '- '.~ . . .'•.-..•..•.... . . .. ".-.-.... .-.- ,.'
should be generic enough to define effectiveness for a large variety of

possible tactical missions. 4

Since effectiveness at the NTC should be measured across a wide ;\

variety of tactical missions, a mission/task analysis was required for each , ,

of them. Fortunately, the U.S. Army has performed mission/task analyses for

* -most of the tactical missions of battalion task forces. The results of

those analyses are embodied in an official Army document--Army Training and

Evaluation Plan for Mechanized Infantry/Tank Task Force (ARTEP 71-2) (U.S.

Army, 1981). The proponent of ARTEP 71-2 is the Commandant of the U.S.

Army's Infantry School. Because of the official nature of ARTEP 71-2 and

the painstaking work that went into performing the mission/task analyses,

ARTEP 71-2 was chosen to serve as the major source of components for a

conceptual definition of effectiveness for battalions at the NTC. It was

assumed that the missions, "combat-critical tasks", and standards of

performance specified for task forces in ARTEP 71-2 contain adequate and

accurate requirements for the performance of most tactical missions by -

battalion task forces at the NTC. In fact, the ARTEP states that it

provides the structure for the performance of all task force missions and .

tasks. Moreover, it provides "standards that permit evaluation of the

effectiveness of training...."

The approach taken to identifying components for a definition of

effectiveness for the wide variety of the NTC tactical missions was to

attempt to develop a single definition or scheme for evaluating effectiveness and have the scheme include fundamental tasks inherent in all 12 NTC

tactical missions. This was done because there is considerable overlap

amongst the tasks of the 12 tactical missions and having a separate evaluation structure for each tactical mission would reduce reliability and result

in too many observations and too much data.

The tasks for all battalion task force tactical missions are also

in ARTEP 71-2. The introduction to ARTEP 71-2 states that Section 1

* "contains six general missions that are applicable to all or most missions

and echelons. Missions in this section are usually conducted throughout all -

operations .... " In other words, the six general missions are really the

functions basic to all tactical missions. The six general missions (or

functions) were formulated to include all the missions and tasks critical to

2-4

....................... . ....................... . ....
L- " " %

* %

the performance of a task force. Thus, it was assumed that the basis for

any future criteria of effectiveness is contained in the six general missions. It is the six general missions listed below which are proposed as

the sources for components of a conceptual definition of effectiveness for

the NTC:

o Plan and control combat operations

o Maintain operations security (OPSEC)

o Perform tactical intelligence functions

*- o Conduct NBC defense operations

o Defend against air attack

o Conduct sustaining operations

To further specify the components for a criterion of effectiveness

for the NTC, the ARTEP's analysis of the six general missions into between

seven and seventeen "tasks" (e.g., control direct fire, control fire

support) was used. The ARTEP's mission critical tasks were analyzed to

determine if they were necessary in the NTC environment, and sufficient for

evaluating the performance of task forces at the NTC. The tasks were

U analyzed by retired field grade military officers with Masters level credentials in ORSA and years of battalion level experience. The officers expert

military opinion was augmented by NTC documentation, Field Manuals, and the

related work of the Army's Ft. Leavenworth NTC Unit Training Division (UTD),

mm contained in their "NTC Training, Recording and Reporting Plan." The UTD

plan contains a critical task listing for combined arms task forces engaged

in the defense in sector tactical mission at the NTC. The work performed by

the UTD in establishing the critical task list and deriving criteria for use

by the OC's represented a significant step forward in the measurement of

S- effectiveness. It is our recommendation that this process be carried out

for all missions at the NTC. The analysis of the ARTEP tasks revealed that

all were appropriate for consideration as NTC tactical effectiveness

measures. In addition, the ARTEP missions and tasks subsume all of the

critical tasks in the UTD plan. These conclusions were not surprising since

* . the ARTEP's six missions are general missions and, as the ARTEP states, are

"applicable to all or most missions" of the combined arms task force.

]" Rather than adopt the ARTEP tasks verbatim as a further specification of the components of effectiveness at the NTC, the tasks were rephrased

2-5

, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7 7 - 7 .47. .7. . .. -

.. .

in the form of questions that could be asked to evaluate effectiveness at

the NTC. In addition, the focuses of a few of the ARTEP tasks were combined

into single questions.

Following the identification of appropriate tasks and their trans- 4

lation into questions, the types of data required to answer the questions

were determined. The types of data required also were derived primarily

from the ARTEP 71-2. The ARTEP lists conditions and standards for each

task, and it was these that were used to help derive the required types of

data.

2.3 RESULTS

The analysis of the ARTEP tasks resulted in the identification of

components which could be included in a definition of effectiveness. The

components are presented in Appendix A (in Volume 11) and consist of the six

general missions discussed in the previous section and the 19 major tasks

required to perform the general missions. The 19 tasks are all important

and complex. One such task raises the question, "Was the unit able to

maintain orientation?" This entails an in-depth knowledge of navigation and

location. Many of the 19 tasks break the general mission down into either

planning or execution tasks. They are probably the most detailed level at

which a unit's effectiveness at the NTC should be assessed. Appendix A (in

Volume II) presents the suggested components along with the corresponding

types of data presently collected at the NTC (the process used to identify

the corresponding types of data is explained in the next paragraph).

Following the identification of the types of data required to

assess effectiveness at the NTC, the structure of the NTC Data Base was

examined to determine which of the required types of data are presently

collected at the NrtC. Four sources were tapped to understand the data

architecture and its elements:

0 SAIC requirements design specifications for the NTC software

0 SAIC requirements design specifications for an NTC research

data base system a

2-6

the o orrspodingtyps daa isexpaind inthenex paagrah),i- 1 .-
o Ft. Leavenworth UTD's NTC training, recording and reporting

0 plan

o SAIC expertise derived from developing the NTC's core instrumentation system. '

Based on an in depth review of these sources, hundreds of NTC data elements

were identified. Almost all of the types of data are recorded in realtime

and a much smaller subset is copied in to files for composing after-action

reviews. Data are produced primarily by two types of sources--instrumentation and OCs. The data produced by instrumentation is recorded automat- .

" ically and is related primarily to location, movements, weapon firings,

weapon "hits", and casualties. All of these are recorded by type of unit

and time. The data produced by the OCs is transmitted by them to the NTC

headquarters where it is recorded on tape either in-stream or in a preformatted fashion. Most of the data collected by the OCs are either

"Elements of Information" (EIs) or "Observable Events" (OEs). These are

ratings or "yes/no" type notations. For example: ..-

El

Were all key leaders at OPORD briefings?

(0 = not applicable; I = yes; 2 = no)

Did commander have a plan for limited visibility conditions?

(0 = not applicable; 1 = yes; 2 = no)

Were FRAGOs clear and concise? (rate from 1-9) L.J

OE

Did commander plan for local counter attacks? (rate from 1-9)

Were disengagements coordinated? (rate from 1-9)

Were back briefs used? (0 = not applicable; 1 = yes; 2 = no)

2-7

. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 
-,A . - "°

Els and OEs were developed for the NTC by the Ft. Leavenworth UTD whose -

efforts provided a substantial foundation for this objective of the project. L

(See Appendix B in Volume II for the OEs and Els abbreviated in Appendix A.)

The structure and types of data collected at the NTC were reviewed -

and compared to the types of data required to assess effectiveness. The

results of these comparisons are located in Appendix A. As can be seen in

Appendix A, most of the required data are already being collected at the

NTC. In fact, there are some appropriate types of data for all of the 19

major tasks and for 34 of the 48 required types of data.

2.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

2.4.1 Components for a "Straw Man" Definition of Effectiveness

As pointed out by Sarkesian (1980) there are many definitions of

battalion effectiveness and many of the definitions emphasize that a valid

measure of effectiveness should contain many elements. The six general

missions and 19 major tasks proposed as potential components are based on a

thorough and painstaking mission/task analysis performed by the Army; thus

they comprise most of the appropriate components for a definition of effectiveness for battalion task forces performing at the NTC. However, in order

to have a well defined criterion of effectiveness for evaluating task forces

and/or validating predictors, the components proposed previously (and/or

others) will have to be combined into a specific definition of effectiveness, i.e. some metric which purports to measure effectiveness.

The components proposed in this chapter have not been weighted and

thus the ones that should have large weights may appear to be unreasonably -

de-emphasized. For example, it might be valid to give both mission

accomplishment and percentage of force remaining after an exercise (or

casualties) a combined weight equal to 80% of the sum of all weights for all

components of the definition. Such a weighting is not as disproportionate

as it may seem at first glance, for traditionally military historians have

viewed effectiveness in terms of: (1) whether the assigned mission was

accomplished, and (2) whether the unit "lived to fight another day." In the

expanded AirLand Battle 2000 (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1982) -'

and in the Preface to the Army Training and Evaluation Plan (ARTEP) 71-2, it

2-8 -

. ... .
is very clear that to win the next war the U.S. Army must avoid high combat

losses in order to defeat an enemy who outnumbers U.S. forces and whose

weapons equal U.S. weapons in sophistication. AirLand Battle 2000 statesthat:

" V K."

The highly lethal battlefield of the future and the

overwhelming foice potential of our enemies argues for

avoidance of all out attrition type warfare. Victory

must be sought through maneuver, advantageous positioning of forces, use of deception, psychological efforts

to erode the enemy's will, and exposure of minimum

friendly forces to destructive weapons effects.

In a similar fashion, many current military analysts view effecr tiveness as contingent on a unit's potential to accomplish assigned missions

and whether the unit "lived to fight another day." In an ARI study at Ft.

Leavenworth, Thomas and Cocklin (1983) found support for this view in that

o several military analysts they studied, who were also retired field grade

military officers, had perceptions of unit effectiveness which overwhelmingly empnasized the components of mission accomplishment and living to

fight another day (casualties).

The components proposed in this chapter specify only the major

dimensions of effectiveness, their subtasks and the appropriate types of

data required to assess effectiveness. The development of the components

into an evaluation system would require, in addition to an appropriate

- -weighting system, the development of protocols, procedures, evaluator training, and, of course, the development of specific measures such as rating

scales or checklists.

2.4.2 NTC Data for Assessing Effectiveness

The types of data required to assess the effectiveness of battal-

* . ions at the NTC were compared to the types of data presently collected at

*, ;.i the NTC. As Appendix A (in Volume II) shows, most of the data required to ..-

* assess effectiveness are already being collected at the NTC. There are some

V" types of data presently being collected which could be used in the assessment of all 19 of the major tasks listed in Appendix A. Of these 19 tasks,

2-9

• o . - . - ~~~~~~~~~.•.. .... - .° . °. . . .. °.-.,. .. . °o.... . . . .. , oo . . . o, . * . . . . ° . .- * . ,.* * •
," o 6J

there are only five for which there are insufficient data being collected at -

the NTC to adequately assess the performance of the task. Also, there are ')

some types of data presently being collected which are similar to 34 of the

48 required types of data specified in Appendix B. Of these 34 types of

data, there are nine for which there are insufficient data being collected. " ,}

However, it may not be necessary to collect all of the required

types of data. If the missing types of data addressed effectiveness

components relegated to a very low weight in an algorithm for combining all

the elements of effectiveness, it might be feasible to overlook such data

since its low weight would not significantly influence the assessment of

effectiveness.

Several aspects of the NTC environment could influence the validity or the practicality of obtaining the data required to assess effectiveness. One of these aspects is that the Els and observable events are

collected for only the defense in sector mission. For none of the other

tactical missions are the OCs required to report Es and observable events.

Thus at present, these classes of data are not available for most exercises F

at the NTC. In addition, no check has been made of the reliability of the

OCs' data. Since the OCs have received very little training on how to make

the observations required for Es and observable events, the reliability of

their observations is questionable.

Another aspect of the NTC which may effect the data is the considerable variability in the responses of the OPFOR to each of the existing

task forces. Such variabi-lity could be statistically controlled in a study

of the validity of potential predictors of effectiveness; however, statistical control would require the study to use a very large number of task .

forces.

One other aspect of the NTC environment which could affect the

practicality of using some of the types of data is the fact that much data

is collected on-line and stored "in-stream." Many required data types are

not automatically copied to summary files but remain stored "in-stream."

These include types such as the separation distance of major pieces of

equipment.

2-10

... .. .. . ... ..... *.. . .-...... .... . ..... ... •- . - --

~~~.. ' ."......... ,. -.... "'""--"---"......'. ' ,i'.',........................... . .
2.4.3 Sumary

The objectives of this activity within the BPP project were to:

i (1) identify components which could be used in a "straw man" conceptual

I. definition of effectiveness for battalion task forces at the NTC, and (2) to

identify the types of data required to assess effectiveness which are not

collected at the NTC. The components of effectiveness identified were the

six basic missions and the 19 major tasks specified in ARTEP 71-2 as those

required for, or common to, all tactical missions for battalion task forces.

The general missions and tasks were derived from a detailed mission/task

analysis. As a further development, the types of data required to assess

effectiveness were identified. The types of data required to assess effectiveness were compared to the types of data collected at the NTC and

differences were noted.

21

..-. ,

- .. .- >QI->.2C--"s>Kfj{§k . -.. "~~
Section 3

COMMAND CLIMATE DATA

*3.1 BACKGROUJND

The command climate related objective of this project was to

identify predictors of effectiveness at the NTC from the Command Climate

Data Base. This was accomplished by analyzing all available published

research on the Command Climate Data, consulting at length with the original

-authors, and by conducting several new analyzes of the data. Apparently

thiis is the first effort to describe and integrate all available publications on the Command Climate Data.

Command climate is more universally known as organizational

r climate, embodied in those behavioral processes of an organization reflecting the organization's memoers' values, attitudes and beliefs.

Organizational climate has been described as having four major dimensions:

(1) individual autonomy, (2) degree of structure, (3) reward orientation,

and (4) maintenance (Campbell, Dunnette, Lauler, and Weick, 1970). Typical

components of these dimensions which have been studied include independence,

orientation to rules, clarity of objectives and methods, orientation to

profit or sales, and managerial support of employees.

I R Organizational climate is often regarded as being similar to, or

*the same as, organizational structure. However, organizational structure is

usually more formalized than organizational climate. Structure is often

embodied in an organization's literature, policies, practices, organization

charts, and training. Payne and Pugh (1976) make a useful and interesting

distinction between an organization's structure and its climate by suggesting that structure is analogous to terrain or such features as rivers,

valleys and mountains, whereas climate is analogous to temperature, humidity, etc. (c1i mate).

Organizational cl imate research has included numerous studies

attempting to define/refine and measure the construct. Several reliable and

respected measures of organizational climate have been produced such as rLitwin and Stringer's Organizational Climate Questionnaire (1968). Organizational climate research on the relationship of climate to other variables

3-1

- o -.
has focused primar11y on three areas: organizational structure (cf. Phesey 

and Payne, 1979), job-satisfaction (cf. Schneider and Hall, 1973), and 

personality (cf. Perv1n, 1967). Only a very small group of studies has 

focused on the relationship between climate and organizational performance 

effectiveness (cf. Andrews, 1967). 

In the U.S. Army, organizational climate has traditionally been 

referred to as command climate. It is usually considered to be reflected by 

"command indicators" or "traditional indicators" (Kerner-Hoeg and O'Hara, 

1981). These indicators include variables such as disciplinary actions, 

crime rates, and reenlistment rates. Also, these variables or composites of 

them have often been used as generic indicators of unit readiness, effectiveness (Sorley, 1980), and morale (Motowidlo et al., 1976). The distinction among these terms is relevant to this project, the purpose of which is 

to identify potential predictors of effectiveness at the NTC. It is suggested that effectiveness at the NTC should be based on performance, and 

both readiness and morale are antecedents and influences on such performance. 

The Command Climate Data Base is actually several data bases all 

composed of data col_lected by--ARI durin~ a multi-year-research effort. The 

ddta hases differ by the degree to which the data were aggregated across 

either time or organizational unit. In order to review and analyze the 

Command Climate Data, SAIC requested from the government, through the 

contracting officer's technical representative, a copy of the data and all 

reports of research involving the data. SAIC received a magnetic tape copy 

of one very aggregated data base without documentation identifying the 

variables of the data base, and a report by Bowers and Davenport (1984). 

Subsequently, on s~veral occasions, SAIC debriefed the two principal architects of the data collection effort, neither of whom presently work for ARf. 

They provided five reports of different analyses which they had performed on 

the data, some· c!escriptions of the procedures used ·in the five reports and 

verbal recall of the identities of some of the variables on the magnetic 

tupe. Since the data were collected over four years ago, corporate memory 

2nd that of the principals was insufficient to document all of the issues 

surrounding the data and its analyses. 

3-2 
It is clear that ARI intended the data for several purposes. In

general the data were supposed to provide the grist for a wealth of studies

addressing organizational or command climate issues and their relationship

to readiness or effectiveness. The data collected include types related to

either unit readiness or command (organizational) climate. " -

3.2 APPROACH TO CONHAND CLIMATE DATA COLLECTION

3.2.1 Overview

The data in the Command Climate Data Base were collected by three

different means: questionnaires administered to personnel in the units

studied (questionnaire data), forms completed by Army unit personnel which

contained standard Army measures collected routinely by the units and

contained in unit records (record data), and personal interviews conducted

by researchers (interview data). It is not SAIC's purpose in this review of

the Command Climate Data to recklessly expose flaws in the studies. It is

obviously very difficult to perform longitudinal studies in the context of

changing organizations like the Army. Rather it was our charge to find out

what valid and reliable conclusions could be drawn from the data and to k.

discuss the unsupportable observations that always result from long term --

investigations like this one.

* Data were collected on five occasions over the course of almost

three years. For the first four data collections, each separated by six

months, interview and questionnaire data were collected about the present

condition of the units and the personnel in them. -On these same occasions,

record data also were collected for the present and previous quarter, except

on the first wave when the present and previous four quarters of record data

were collected. Table 3-1 coordinates these pairings.

The first wave data were solicited from 59 battalions. At least

15 of these were dropped from the stury before wave two and they were p

replaced by eleven others to make a total of 55 battalions for wave two.

Similar events occurred in conjunction with subsequent waves, so that by the

end of the study, data had been solicited from a total of 71 battalions.

However, data do not exist for all battalions for each wave or quarter.

Analyses of the data tape supplied to SAIC reveal that there is record space

3-3

-. i -- : - i. '. -; - " -- o-- - .--. , --- -" .. i- -. --. . .- . ..-° - . -. ---.- .- ., ' . . - I .- &-'.. - -; i
for a total of 69 battalions yet there are missing data symbols recorded forall values of all variables for the last 13 battalions. In effect, the

tape contains some data on only 56 battalions at most. None of the reports

on the data base indicate the rationale used to select battalions.

Table 3-1. DATA COLLECTION EVENTS

WAVE QUARTER TYPE OF DATA

1 Record

2 Record

3 Record

4 Record

1 5 Record Questionnaire Interview

6 Record

2 7 Record Questionnaire Interview

8 Record

3 9 Record Questionnaire InterviewL

10 Record

4 11 Record Questionnaire Interview

12 Record

5 13 Record Questionnaire Interview

The next three sections further describe the methods used for

collection of the Command Climate Data and are devoted respectively to

questionnaire, record, and interview data.

3.2.2 Questionnaire Data

The questionnaire data were collected on four occasions by admin-

*istering questionnaires with 140 to 163 items. Appendix C (in Volume II)

*contains a copy of the questionnaire used for wave 4 (Bowers and Davenport,

1984). The questionnaire was changed between waves 2 and 3 and between

3-4

li" - " ' -€. .- =. - ." '- . . . . . . . . . . . . .
waves 3 and 4 so that at least three different versions were used. TwentyI two items were added to the questionnaire between waves 2 and 3. On all L

occasions it was administered to personnel assembled in large groups.

Kimmel and O'Mara (1981) indicate that all the questionnaire items ;. :

were taken from a questionnaire designed to measure organizational climate

(Taylor and Bowers, 1972). Taylor and Bowers' work relied on a measure of

climate developed by Likert (1967).

Bowers and Davenport indicate that questionnaire data was designed

to be obtained from a random sample of both officers and enlisted men from

each battalion. The subject selection process for waves 3 and 4 (none of

the reports describe the process for waves 1 and 2) was intended to produce

a sample of twenty E1-E4s, ten NCOs, and five officers from each company,

and five battalion level officers from the battalion at-large. The pointof-contact (POC) at each of the military installations involved was responsible for personnel selection. The POCs were asked to select first those

individuals whose social security numbers ended with an 8 and then those

whose social security numbers ended with a 7.

Desired sample sizes were 40 personnel per company or approximately 200 per battalion. The data given to SAIC do not indicate the number of

subjects used. However, Bowers and Davenport indicate that approximately

rE 115 personnel per battalion were surveyed on waves 2 and 4. None of the F--

reports indicate the sample sizes for wave 1.

S. .In addition to difficulties with sample size, the review of the

literature revealed that the quality of the questionnaire data is suspect

k - (Bowers and Davenport, 1984). First, neither the reliability nor the

validity of the questionnaire was ever investigated. Second, the motivation

of the participants must have been very low since they received no incentive

for completing the questionnaire, sometimes had to wait hours to receive it,

and often had to complete it under very poor conditions. These conditions

included poor lighting, the lack of writing surfaces (e.g., on a firing

range), and excessive noise. Several indicators support the contention that

motivation was low and probably affected data quality. These include

reports of laughter and excessive chatter during many of the group

administrations. Also, as an example, over 18% of the questionnaires were

3-5

......... C?........................................ .'.. . . . .
,'.. ,..

excluded from the wave 3 data because they exhibited answer patterns indica- -

tive of bogus responses. Such patterns included answering "D" to an

important question whose only choices were "A" or "B"; answering four

successive A's, then four successive B's, then four C's, etc.; and repetition of ABCDCBA. There were also several indications that most respondents

did not believe their data would remain anonymous. Finally, the administration of a second 35 item questionnaire on wave 3 added to the confusion ::

surrounding instructions (Bowers and Davenport, 1984).

Another group of influences on data quality involve the selection

of respondents. Prescribed selection procedures were not followed as the .-

distribution of the last digits of the respondents' social security numbers

reveals. The distribution was normal yet the selection procedures specified

selecting first as many personnel as possible whose numbers ended with

8, then those with 7. Several researchers were told that those selected -

were either the most available or the most "expendable." Moreover, the

selection process resulted in a sample size, on the average, equal to

roughly only 50 percent of those desired and only 15-20 percent of the

average battalion's population (Bowers and Davenport, 1984).

3.2.3 Data from Unit Records

Data from unit records were collected in five waves by supplying

battalions with forms to complete which were supposed to be returned to the

researchers. The forms requested company level information which was later "

aggregated to the battalion level. The forms were designed to obtain data

on all command climate and readiness measures typically collected by a

company. The measures (and their definitions) are listed in O'Mara (1981)

and in Tables 3-2 and 3-3. None of the reports on the Command Climate Data

reveal pertinent aspects of the unit record data such as the sample sizes,

variances, anomalies, or rules for combining it to the battalion level.

................ :.--......................................

- r .-- I:

3-6 •
r. o% .- o°.

Table 3-2. READINESS MEASURES

OVERALL READINESS A battalion's overall readiness status as

reported in the monthly Unit Status Report.

. PERSONNEL READINESS A battalion's personnel readiness status as

reported in the monthly Unit Status Report.

EQUIPMENT ON HAND An index of the degree to which a battalion

possesses all authorized equipment, a reflec- L

tion of the battalion's supply system.

* -EQUIPMENT SERVICEABILITY The maintenance status of a battalion's equipment, a reflection of the battalion's mainte- *

nance system.

EQUIPMENT READINESS The proportion of equipment a battalion

actually has on hand that is operational.

ARTEP The percentage of the missions/tasks rated

"satisfactory" during a battalion's most

recent field training exercise.

AGI The percentage of the areas rated "satisfac- L

tory" during a battalion's most recent annual

general inspection.

. WEEKS TO READINESSa The Cdr's estimate of the number of weeks

required to bring the unit up to full readiness status.

TRAINING READINESSa A Cdr's subjective estimate of the units'

overall training readiness.

a These variables were used but not defined in O'Mara (1981).

3-7.

3-7 . ' I.

• t-~4~- *.. . .. . - . .. - -. % - .. - .. - ..-.-.. .- - . . ' - . : ... .- - - , .- .- - -. , - - .-. - .. . ... - *-- *.. ,.*.' -.. ' .-
-7- 71 7.. - .

Table 3-3. COMMAND INDICATORS ~I L

ARTICLES 15 The percentage of enlisted personnel adminis- ,.

tered nonjudicial punishment (e.g., fines, "

reductions in grade) during a given month. &

COURTS MARTIAL The percentage of enlisted personnel receiving

a court martial during a given month.

AWOL The percentage of enlisted personnel who were .

involved in unexcused absences during a given

month.

DESERTIONS The percentage of enlisted personnel who

deserted during a given month.

FIRST TERM REENLISTMENT The percentage of a battalion's first-term

reenlistment objective that was achieved in a

given month.

CAREER REENLISTMENT The percentage of a battalion's reenlistment

objective for career personnel that was

achieved in a given month.

CRIMES OF VIOLENCE The percentage of a battalion's enlisted .

strength involved in crimes of violence in a

given month. F

PROPERTY CRIMES The percentage of a battalion's enlisted

strength involved in crimes against property

in a given month. -I

DRUG ARRESTS The percentage of a battalion's enlisted -

strength arrested for drug and marijuana violations in a given month.

3-8

............... ........ ... ,. .... .... . .... .... ...... .....- ,.... -
-...

3.2.4 Interview Data

Interview data are those which were obtained during discussions

with battalion, brigade, division, and assistant division commanders. Each "

interview was conducted in t he interviewee's office by a member of the

Command Climate research staff. The interviewees were asked nine questions. hl-jw

1. What is the single biggest problem for you in achieving and

maintaining the readiness of your command?

2. How have you coped with this problem?

3. What is the second largest problem in achieving and maintaining the readiness of your command?

4. How have you coped with this problem?

5. What types of indicators do you use to determine whether the

criterion (effectiveness) is achieved? .-

6. Rate the effectiveness of the battalions under you in an

eight point scale?

m 7. Rank order in terms of effectiveness the battalions under

you.

8. How accurate would an assessment of a battalion be if it were

based on (Ratings of 0-100 were requested for each

item on a list of traditional readiness and command indicators).

9. Which five of the following measures of effectiveness provide

the most complete picture of a battalion's overall effective-

* ness (the same list of measures was used as was used in

" .

l question eight).

The interview data are briefly described in two papers: O'Mara's

* (1981) paper in which no sample sizes are reported, and Kerner-Hoeg and '17

3-9 - -I.
O'Mara's paper (1981) in which it is stated that 48 battalion commanders, 28

brigade commanders, and eight general officers (presumably division comman- .

ders) were interviewed.

New analyses conducted on the data supplied to SAIC revealed that .-

the data contain single scores (not answers to nine questions) for division

commanders of 35 battalions for each wave, three and four single scores for

assistant division commanders on 27 and 38 battalions for wave 3 and 4 -

respectively, and single scores for brigade commanders on 31 and 35

battalions on waves 3 and 4. No battalion commander interview data were

identified on the tape version of the data, nor were any other interview

data for the division, assistant division or brigade commanders.

The single scores for the various commanders were computed as

described in O'Mara (1981). They involved converting the commanders'

ratings and rankings for each battalion into standard scores and then these

standard scores were "combined into a single battalion effectiveness score

for that rater" for each battalion.

The rankings from commanders were obtained on only those battalions within their command and some officers had more battalions under their

control than others. This fact caused the range of measurement to vary

across battalions. For example, one battalion could have gotten a ranking

of "3", meaning third out of five battalions; whereas, another b 'attalion

could also have gotten a "3", but been ranked third of three. No indication

is given that scores were adjusted to allow for comparability across all

battalions measured.

No procedures for selecting the interviewees were described in any

of the reports on the data analyses. Presumably, for each of the 71 battalions represented in the data base, the brigade, division, assistant division

and battalion commanders of the 71 battalions were to be interviewed. The

commanders at all levels who actually did participate in the study were the

only personnel of the target group who were probably both willing and able

to participate.

As previously mentioned, the Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara (1981) paper .

states that 48 battalion commanders were interviewed, yet none of the

3-10

. .
S -. . . . .....-... ;

battalion commanders' data appear to be on the data tape nor was a principal

author of several of the papers on the data able to identify the battalion -... 4

commanders' data. In addition, while the O'Mara (1981) paper deals with the

personal judgements" (effectiveness ratings) of Els-E4s, NCOs, junior

officers, and brigade, assistant division and division commanders, it does

not mention battalion commanders. Moreover, the list of readiness and

command indicators supplied to interviewees as stimulus material to be rated

and ranked does not contain battalion commanders judgements, but it does

contain the judgements of all the other levels of personnel dealt with in

the O'Mara (1981) paper (i.e., COs of all levels, NCOs, etc.).

3.2.5 Summary of Data Collection

The questionnaire data are based on a large sample and many .,

* interesting questions. However, the procedures used to select both battalions and personnel within battalions are of very dubious reliability. The

" . sample size as a proportion of the size of the battalion should have been

larger especially given the apparent motivational levels of the respondents.

By contrast, the unit record data are much more reliable, having L-4

.

no 

of 

select 

within-battalion 

those 

the 

supplying 

battalions 

the 

selection 

is 

data. 

circumspect 

problem 

However, 

and 

or 

the 

problem 

the 

quality 

percentage 

with 

of the 

the 

of 

motivational 

procedures 

companies 

used 

within

level 

to

H

mmm battalion responding is unknown. Nevertheless, these data appear relatively

objective, reliable, and plentiful.

The publications based on the interview data provide little clarification as to reliability and validity. No descriptions are given of the

procedures used to select commanders, their response rates, or their representativeness. Moreover, the ranking data is of questiobable reliability.

3.3 RESULTS

3.3.1 Previous Analyses of the Comand Climate Data

Available previous research on the Command Climate Data is described in six papers which are reviewed in Appendix D (in Volume II). One

of them (Davenport and Bowers, 1984) involves analyses done primarily on all

3-11

- . . ". • , . ' . - . . " _ _ . *. ' -. _' " ," " , .. . . -. ?'-, .' '.. .. . . . . ,
the types of data derived from the questionnaire. Another (Kimmel and

O'Mara, 1981) focused on a few of the types of data derived from the questionnaire. The other four papers concern data derived from either interviews, unit records or both. Five of the six papers were written by persons .-

who were members of ARI during the data collection effort and who also -

managed the data collection effort. The Davenport and Bowers paper, focusing almost exclusively on the questionnaire data, is the only one of the six

written by non-ARI personnel.

Across the six studies of the data, the results and conclusions

are sometimes in agreement and sometimes contradictory. Each will be brief- --

ly discussed with respect to the identification of predictors of battalion

effectiveness at the NTC.

Bowers and Davenport (1984). The more important findings of this

study for the prediction of effectiveness at the NTC are that company level

effects had the strongest unit-level influences on the questionnaire data.

Battali-on-level effects were insignificant. However, it should be noted

that these effects were on questionnaire data, not hard performance data.

In addition, the company level effects accounted for less than one percent

of the variance of the questionnaire data. All of these findings or lack of

variance accounted for could be related to the authors concerns about the

quality of the data.

O'Mara (1981). In determining the interrelatedness of the three

types of "effectiveness" measures, O'Mara showed that the command indicators

(e.g., Article 15, AWOL rates) and even the USR measures have very low

intercorrelations. The personal judgements show degrees of interrelatedness

ranging from low to fairly high; the higher correlations are for personal - -

judgements between individuals of similar ranks. Two of the questions the

study raised are whether it was advisable to average correlations across

waves and what the relationships are between measures in different groups

(i.e., between the personal judgements, readiness indicators and command

indicators).

Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara (1981). In assessing the validity of the

three types of "effectiveness" measures by obtaining commanders' estimates

of the measures' accuracy, the authors found support primarily for the

3-12

* . .,-. . . .

. -' -,
13 validity of the AGI, ARTEP, and both junior officers and NCOs estimates of

I the effectiveness of their battalions. These findings are bolstered by

O'Mara's (1981) finding of a high correlation (.55) between the estimates of

NCOs and junior officers.

O'Mara, Kerner-Hoeg and Balzar (1982). The most valid conclusion

of this study of the temporal dynamics of the three types of "effectiveness"

measures is that the variables appear to exhibit different rates of change.

The authors also concluded that such a finding again substantiates that the

measures are related to different underlying constructs. However, this

I .conclusion is not very strongly supported.

Kimmel and O'Mara (1981). In this study of a potential measure of

"* unit morale, the authors developed a measure that may assess satisfaction

with one's unit -but the measure does not appear to tap any of the other

- elements typically thought to comprise morale.

Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara (1980). In this study of the effects of a

change of command, the authors focused on a variable with ruch apparent

* potential as a predictor of effectiveness at the NTC. However, the authors

* concluded that the analyses revealed no effects due to change of command.

" Other more powerful analyses may yield different results.

I 3.3.2 Analyses of the Comand Climate Data

There are literally hundreds of questions for which the Command

Climate Data Base could be analyzed. Many of these questions involve the

quality of the data and others involve issues similar to those researched in

the six papers reviewed. In order to shed some light on a few of these

issues SAIC was provided a tape copy of some of the Command Climate Data

(aggregated to the battalion) and information on the identities of some of

the variables on the tape. SAIC was asked to perform appropriate new analyses of the data to determine its value and to select robust variables which

could be transformed into valid predictors of unit effectiveness.

3.3.2.1 Rationale. Under the constraints of limited resources and time,

i ti SAIC conducted some preliminary analyses of the wave 3 and 4 data. Since

* all of the Command Climate Data could not be analyzed, the data of waves 3

3-13

°. . . . .
7. 7. vr

and 4 were chosen because they appeared more complete and more reliable than

data from the other waves. The purposes of the preliminary analyses were

to determine some of the general characteristics of the data not reported by

previous studies. These included the Ns (number of data points) per variable and per correlation, the amount and type of missing data, the distribution of the data by variable including the distributions' means, variances,

*. skewness, kurtosis and probability of having been sampled from a normal

distribution. In addition to describing the data, the results of the

preliminary analyses would allow for determinations of the feasibility of

additional analyses such as correlations, and cluster and factor analyses.

3.3.2.2 Analyses and Results. Analyses were conducted on all of wave

3 and wave 4 interview data, unit record data, and the questionnaire items

about unit effectiveness. The other questionnaire data were not analyzed

because of their doubtful reliability and validity and because those data

were also excluded from all but one of the prpeIous studies of the Command

Climate Data.

The first set of analyses conducted was an attempt to determine

the general characteristics of the data. Table 3-4 contains most of the

descriptive statistics calculated. Column one of the table lists the variables used in most of the reports on the Command Climate Data. Each wave . .

3 variable is followed by the same variable for wave 4. Column two of the

table contains the number of battalions per variable and column three indicates the variance for each variable. Columns four and five contain the

skewness and kurtosis per variable and column six contains the probability

associated with the W or D statistics used to determine if the sample came

from a normal distribution. The average N for the variables is 40 and the

sample size ranges from 9 to 55. Most of the variables have moderately -

sized variances; however, 25 of the 50 variables have W or D statistics

whose probabilities are .01 or less. Since all but one of these 25 variables have either skewness or kurtosis greater than 1.0, it appears safe to

conclude that those variables do not have normal distributions.

The biggest problem associated with these data is not that many of

the variables have non-normal distributions, for most robust statistics are ...

not significantly affected by non-normality. Rather it is that the data are

Table 3-4.

3-14,-.:" "

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not appropriate for parametric, multivariant analyses because of the level

to which they are aggregated. Aggregating the data from company to battalion level reduced the Ns per variable by a factor of approximately five.

The resulting Ns per data wave are too small to produce reliable multiple

correlations or to yield reliable results from a factor analysis. The

problem of too small an N for such analyses cannot be overcome through

quadrupling the N by averaging correlations across four waves of data, for

to do so is tantamount to using the same correlations four times each. Each

wave of data was collected on approximately the same group of battalions and

some personnel may have responded in more than one wave.

Even though multivariate analyses of the data were inappropriate,

several potentially answerable questions remained. These included whether

any of the measures were highly correlated with measures of another group

(e.g., readiness indicators with command indications) and whether it was

appropriate in previous studies to average the correlations across waves.

To answer these questions, zero order correlations were computed between all

of the "effectiveness" measures and the personal judgement scores obtained

from both interviews and the questionnaire. The coefficients for these

correlations for wave 3 data are shown in Table 3-5 and in Table 3-6 for

wave 4 data. Under each coefficient is the probability of the null hypo- thesis associated with the correlation, and the number of pairs of observations used to compute it.

One of the more notable aspects of the data in the tables is the

size of the Ns--they are much smaller than those in Table 3-4 which showed

Ns per variable. The reason for this is that the Ns in Table 3-5 and 3-6

are based on pairs of observations, not total number of single observations

as are those of Table 3-4. Thus some of the correlations are based on very -

small Ns, such as the N of two for the correlation between ARTEP and AGI in

Table 3-5. In fact, the N's for all the correlations involving ARTEP range

from 5 to 9 for wave 3 and from 3 to 12 for wave 4. The Ns for AGI range

from 2 to 11 for wave 3 and from 4 to 18 for wave 4. Another notably small

group of Ns for both waves are those for equipment readiness which range

from 5 to 18 and from 3 to 20 for the two waves. The majority of Ns are 35 " -

or less.

3-18

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Although 27 of the 300 correlations of Table 3-5 and 43 of the 300

correlations of Table 3-6 are significant, few of those found to be significant in the O'Mara (1981) paper are significant for either wave 3 or 4 (of

course the correlations in the O'Mara paper have large Ns and thus smaller

standard errors). For example, the O'Mara paper listed 19 of the 21 correNo lations on readiness measures as significant and 21 of the 55 correlations

on the command indicators as significant. However, for wave 3 data, only 6

of the 21 correlations on the readiness measures are significant and only 5 *".. of the 55 correlations for the command indicators are significant. - "

Tests of the differences between wave 3 and wave 4 correlations on .

the same variables were calculated in order to assess the appropriateness of

averaging the correlations across waves. While the tests were made on

correlations based on wave 3 and 4 and not correlations for wave 1 and wave

2 data, the results are generally negative--there are few statistically

. significant differences between the correlations. Specifically, only 9 of

-- .the 300 pairs of correlations were significantly (p < .05) different. Of

these 9, only 3 were between variables whose correlations were averaged in

one of the previous studies. Moreover, one would expect more than 9 of the

300 test to yield significant results just on the basis of sampling errors.

Thus it appears appropriate to average the wave 3 and 4 correlations and , * possibly those for all waves.

p The tables of cor.relations also show some interesting and 1

potentially useful correlations between members of different groups of

"effectiveness" measures. They include the following for two of the

measures ranked and rated as two of the best indicators of effectiveness in

Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara (1981):

Junior Officers' Judgements of Effectiveness with

Equipment Readiness

Wave 3: r = .40(p <.1)

Wave 4: r = .44(p < .05)

3-21

... . . . .- ad
-°

NCOs' Judgements of Effectiveness with AWOL

Wave 3: r = .39(p < .05)

Junior Officers' Judgements of Effectiveness with AWOL 1

Wave 4: r = .37(p <.05)

Other than these, few of the measures were significantly correlated with

measures from other groups.

3.4 DISCUSSION

Based on the critical review and re-analysis of the results of the

research described, the following seven command climate variables are recom- ;a

mended as having some potential to predict the effectiveness of battalions

*. at the NTC:-.

o NCOs' Judgements of Battalion Effectiveness

o Junior Officers' Judgements of Battalion Effectiveness .

o Brigade Commanders' Judgements of Battalion Effectiveness

0 Battalion ARTEP Scores

o Annual General Inspection (AGI) Results for Battalions

o Equipment Readiness Indicator in a Battalion's USR p

0 AWOL Rates in a Battalion's USR

It must be stressed that these variables represent potentially valid predictors. To be of real value they must be subjected to rigorous validation. .

The following sections describe the operational definitions and

rationales for selecting the seven variables.

NCOs', Junior Officers', and Brigade Commanders' Judgements of

Effectiveness. The foremost reason for proposing all three of these variables as predictors is that they were rated the second, third, and fifth best

single indicators of battalion effectiveness in the Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara

(1981) study. Secondly, all three were highly and significantly intercorrelated in the O'Mara study and in the analyses SAIC calculated for both waves

3-22

3..
3 and 4. None of the other types of personal judgements were rated as

highly in the Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara study. Also, the correlations between

-. the judgements of NCOs and the judgements of others (e.g., division corn-

[ * manders) were low, as were the correlations between junior officers judgements and those given by others.

Because of their numbers per battalion, it is recommended that the

judgements of NCOs and junior officers should be obtained on a single rating

scale rather than through interviews. These scales should be Likert type

scales such as those used on the command climate questionnaire (shown in

Appendix C) although seven point scales should be used rather than five .:

point scales in order to increase variability.

Because of their rank, it is recommended that the judgements of

brigade commanders should be obtained as they were for the Command Climate -.

Data--in personal interviews. The same type of procedures should be

followed as were used for the Command Climate Data. However, the 13 point

scale used for the Command Climate Data should be reduced to a seven point

scale as that would be more reliable than one with 13 points.

ARTEP and AGI. Both of these measures were, as the previous

' . three, rated by senior officers as being some of the best indicators of a

battalion's effectiveness. ARTEP and AGI were ranked first and fourth in

. the Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara study in terms of their accuracy as indicators of

effectiveness. Based on either the wave 3 or wave 4 data, neither of these

were correlated very highly with the three previous indicators, or with each

* other. However, as the correlations of wave 4 data indicate, the number of

observations available to calculate a correlation between ARTEP and AGI were

only two and four respectively, which makes it clear why they were not

highly correlated. Moreover, the number of pairs of observations available

to calculate a correlation between ARTEP or AGI and the personal judgement

"* measures was less than 12 and sometimes as few as three. Similar size Ns

probably partially account for the lack of correlation between ARTEP and AGI

" -- in O'Mara (1981).

The operational definitions of both ARTEP and AGI are those used

* in several of the previous studies. In all these cases ARTEP was defined as

"the percentage of the missions/tasks rated 'satisfactory' during a

S ,- 3-23 -
battalion's most recent field training exercise." AGI was defined as "the

percentage of the areas rated 'satisfactory' during a battalion's most . -,

recent annual general inspection."

Equipment Readiness. This is a measure of the proportion of a

battalion's equipment on hand which is operable. Thus, in contrast to the

other equipment related measures of the USR, this measure primarily indicates the efficiency of a battalion's maintenance system. This system could

influence a battalion's long term performance in the field and at the NTC.

This measure is proposed as a predictor because it is also correlated highly

with ARTEP and AGI (.54, p < .01; .40, p <.01) in the O'Mara (1981) study

and with junior officers' judgements of effectiveness for both waves 3 and 4 -'

(.40, p < .10; .44, p < .05).

The operational definition of this measure is the same as used in

several of the previous studies. It is taken from the USR and is "the

proportion of equipment a battalion actually has on hand that is opera- -

tional."-

AWOL. This measure is proposed with less support than the I.

previous six. However, its correlations with the judgements of NCOs and

officers are impressive: .39(p < .05) in wave 3 for NCOs; and .37 (p < .05)

for officers in wave 4. Moreover, AWOL was rated as the best single indicator of a battalion's effectiveness by 18 percent of the senior officers in

the O'Mara study (1981). It probably is a reflection of a battalion's

morale and is a readily available measure which should be reliable because

of the methods used to calculate it.

The operational definition of this measure is the same as in -

several of the previous studies. It is taken from the USR and is "the

percentage of enlisted personnel who were involved in unexcused absences

during a given month."

3-24 . . . .. . . . . .
777777 7-7 ".

Section 4

A COW4AND GROUP BEHAVIOR STUDIES

4.1 BACKGROUND

One of the original objectives of this project was to analyze

the Command Group Performance in CATTS study (cf. Archer et al., 1984) to

identify potential predictors of effectiveness at the NTC. At the suggestion of the government, two other studies of command group behaviors were

included in the scope of this objective. The studies were FORGE I (Factors

in Military Organizational Effectiveness) (Olmstead et al., 1973) and Cardinal Point II (Olmstead et al., 1978). Thus this chapter contains the

results of the reviews of all three studies, a group of suggested predictors

of effectiveness at the NTC, and suggestions about how the potential predicr; tors may be operationally defined and measured.

Each of the three studies involved the observation of command

groups involved in simulated command and control exercises. In each, the

, command groups' behaviors were classified and evaluated relative to various

* -estimates of the effectiveness of the groups' performance. This review

• focuses on the nature of these relationships.

In the Command Group Performance in CATTS study, command groups

- were observed while engaged with CATTS at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas. Extensive recordings were made of the information management behaviors of battalion commanders and their staffs as they under went training at the

facility--"fighting" in a highly realistic computer-assisted simulation.

The recordings were then coded to measure the groups' behavior.

Both the FORGE I and Cardinal Point II studies were conducted by

the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) and both studies relied

on the PEGASUS simulation. This simulation used a mixture of computer and

human controllers to provide the inputs to the command group exercise. Non-

, participants rated the performance of the groups across several different

behavioral classifications and the ratings were then correlated with

experts' ratings of the groups' effectiveness.

4-1

.. °° 
'I - -- . . . . . V . . . . . . . ..

LAll

The next three sections of this chapter present a more detailed

description of each of the three studies and their findings. The following

section summarizes the results and in the final section of this chapter the

three sets of results are integrated and the variables of the studies that

have the most potential as predictors of battalion effectiveness are

delineated. In addition, methods are suggested for measuring each of the _ 4,

potential predictors.

4.2 APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF COMMAND GROUP BEHAVIORS

4.2.1 Command Group Performance in CATTS Study

(cf. Archer, Fineberg, and Carter, 1984)

The Command Group Performance in CATTS Study analyzed in detail

the activities of battalion command groups engaged in computer driven battle

simulations. All activities were recorded using video cameras, general area .

microphones, and tape recordings of telephone communications by which the

command group communicated with other echelons and with the dispersed portions of the command group (e.g., JTOC and TRAINS).

The operations orders (OPORD) and recordings for a number of

battalions were analyzed for the quality and quantity of the performance of

several behaviors, and the results of the analyses were correlated with

ratings of the command groups' effectiveness. In general, the results

indicated that selected information processing behaviors, especially those

regarding the planning and transmitting of information, may influence battalion effectiveness.

4.2.1.1 Procedures. CATTS, a high fidelity, computer-driven, battalion- -

* level simulation, which was instrumented for this study with audio/visual

recording technologies, provided the facility for this research project.

CATTS portrays the movements of both friendly and enemy units, engagements

-_ of these units, weather, and other variables which can affect the outcome of

the battle.

The members of the command group, operating within a realistic

mock-up of a Tactical Operations Center (TOC) equipped with the normal r

"* complement of communications equipment, talk to their "troops" through

4-2 .- . . • , .-.

.. . ... ... .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .. ..----. :
professional "controllers" of the simulation and role-playing subordinate

(company) commanders. The controllers of the simulation enter the battal-L

*ions staffs' orders into the computer where the battle is simulated. An

opposing force controller enters directives for the operation of the enemy

* units, and the computer provides him, as well as friendly controllers,

"feedback" on the status of the battle. The friendly controllers relay

* appropriate portions of the feedback to the battalion commander and sta

There were three major sources of data for this study: combat

outcome data generated by the computer; controllers' ratings of battalion

staffs' effectiveness; and observers' classifications/evaluations of the

* recordings of the staffs' responses to two stimulus situations or probes.

* The probes involved problems communicated to the command group and their

*responses to them. The two probes consisted of introducing jamming of

r communications, and reporting the sighting of an enemy counterattack,

* *respecti vely. The reviewers then coded the speed with which communications

* were carried out, the number of primary communication nodes involved (brigade, staff sections, battalion commander, and company commanders) and the

node pairs (or dyads), the nature and frequency of the information passed, S and the relative frequency of the different types of communications

* processed.

4.2.1.2 Results. Overall the results showed that for the battalion

* command groups to be effective in the CATTS exercise, they must be effective

* information processors. The command groups must transmit information quick-

*ly, clearly, and accurately. They must actively seek out information about

the battlefield and predict what may happen there. They must be able to

make decisions rapidly in response to incoming information. They must not -

waste time clarifying information, or discussing command decisions.

Controller ratings appear to be influenced more by "professionalism" in communication, and managerial style, rather than effectiveness of

information management. Controllers' ratings were higher as command groups

* - received more days of training, for shorter transmission times, and higher

* *quality transmissions. The controllers' ratings of command group performance were not significantly related to any of the measures of simulated

combat outcome (loss exchange ratios, relative exchange rates, surviving

maneuver force ratio differential, chat~ge in combat ratio, and weighted

4-32

* ... * . . . * . **.9 - . °--. ° . . .. . - *
IU T ... i!

'"'

force measures). In fact, all of the correlations between controllers'

ratings and the combat outcome measures were negative (although insignifi- J scant) and in one correlation the average time of transmissions was positively related to favorable loss exchange ratios but negatively related to

controllers' subjective ratings.

Battalion command groups with good simulated battle outcomes spent

much of their time communicating information. More successful groups,

distributed information widely, and spent much time seeking information

about the battle and discussing possible future developments of the battle.

They also successfully transmitted more whole messages than poor performing

command groups and had to issue fewer communizations concerning courses of

action to be taken.

4.2.1.3 Evaluation of Study. This study contained some problems which

were related to its small sample size, the complexity of the exercises, and

the lack of inter-rater reliability. The sample size was a problem because

only five battalion command groups were studied. While repeated measurements were made, such a small sample of command groups cannot be considered - Fi.

to be a representative sample. Thus, at the least, the study suffers from a Lai

lack of generalizability.

In addition, the exercises the participants engaged in were so

complex and uncontrolled that it was practically impossible to isolate the

effects of most factors. Thus there was probably a great deal of confounding of effects. Similarly, very few effects achieved statistically significant levels.

Finally, the inter-rater reliability for observers was very low.

The highest correlation coefficient for these reliability measures was .70.

Obviously such reliabilities also contributed to the dearth of significant

findings.

pt

In spite of these problems, some potentially valuable findings

were obtained. These include the observation that the effective transmission of information appears to be the most critical aspect of command group

performance. Much more time is spent in gathering and transmitting information than in making command decisions. If the commander and S3 have enough

4-4

--- 1

,°. Z _;' ' T. . '' :~z_ : '- - . X ' ''; '' . ' ' .9- . ,"" ; --p- _; k.- . ''- -. J ,_'-,"'_- ., -h.p ; ,. -' - .- ' _
.-. 9..

information, decisions appear to automatically flow from the information.

Not only must each individual transmission be made accurately, completely, I.

and on time (three traditional criteria for command and control communications), but information must also be widely distributed. Particular care

must be taken in communicating coordinates, the most frequent source of

communication errors. Effective command groups should also devote as much

time as possible to actively seeking out information that might help predict

how the battle will develop.

4.2.2 FORGE I (Olmstead, Christensen, and Lackey, 1973)

The FORGE I study was conducted by the Human Resources Research

Organization (HumRRO). The study investigated organizational competence by

evaluating ten battalion command groups engaged in the PEGASUS simulation of

a South East Asia battle scenario. Transcriptions of the exercises were

coded for type and quality of communications, and effectiveness of the

groups' responses to 128 different stimulus or probe events in the exercise.

m The stated objective of the study was to develop an overall I - measure of organizational competence. Competence was measured in terms of

the effective performance of seven basic organizational processes: sensing,

communicating information, decisionmaking, stabilizing, communicating implementation, coping actions, and feedback (see Table 4-2). The results showed

I Pm that a number of the processes were strongly related to the effectiveness of

the command groups. However, there was no evidence that the seven processes

are all strongly related to a single underlying construct such as competence.

I - 4.2.2.1 Procedures. The focus of the study was organizational competence,

defined as the capacity of an organization to cope with a continuously

changing environment. Organizational competence was believed to result from

seven basic organizational processes (see Table 4-1). The project studied

U.S. Army infantry battalions because they were believed to be a prime p

example of an organization that must continually adapt to fast-changing

environmental conditions.

4 5-.

4-5"";

,.'-.-.
Table 4-1. PROCESS DEFINITIONS -

SENSING The process by which an organization

acquires and processes information about

its internal and external environments. -

COMMUNICATION INFORMATION The process of transmitting information

that is sensed to those parts of the

organization that can act upon it.

DECISIONMAKING The process of making decisions concerning actions to be taken as the result of

sensed information.

STABILIZING The process of taking actions to adjust

internal functioning and maintain organizational stability integration that might

otherwise be disrupted as a consequence

of actions taken to cope with changes in

the organization's environments.

COMMUNICATING IMPLEMENTATION The process of transmitting decisions and

decision-related orders and instructions

to those parts of the organization that

must implement them.

COPING ACTIONS The process of executing actions intended

to cope with changes in the organiza- -

tion's environments.

FEEDBACK The process of evaluating the results of

a prior action through further sensing of

the external and/or internal environ- ~

ments.

4-6

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7 77%77o'V°°

The general approach the study adopted was to simulate the activiI ~i ties of an infantry battalion engaged in a stability operation in Vietnam.

The simulation involved role-playing, in which officers played the roles of

[:.': 12 key positions in the battalion. The simulation lasted eight hours and ''':.

occurred in four phases, three of which differed in the intensity of envirI -onmental pressure. Pressure was determined by the frequency and complexity

of stimuli or probes which were presented as part of the exercise. The

scenario was designed to present 128 interrelated probes. Each probe

: -consisted of a set of inputs related to a single event, e.g., the crash of a

I-fr friendly helicopter behind enemy lines. Players were free to react spontaneously to the probes in any way they chose. The importance of each probe

was determined by the expert military judgement of three retired military

officers.

Each exercise consisted of three phases. The low pressure phase

required a slow moving routine patrolling operating. The medium intensity --

scenario began with a radical change in mission and continued with a

requirement for the planning and execution of an air assault. The high

i i intensity phase involved intense combat, a high frequency of inputs and a

host of problems that were both complex and critical to the survival of the

6 unit.

Officers comprising the command groups were selected from the nonI Nstudent officers at Ft. Benning, Georgia, who had experience in Vietnam.

" They were assigned to role-play positions in a command group which they had

held in combat. The officers selected ranged in grade from senior major to

first lieutenant. They were placed in 10 command groups of 12 men each.

Transcripts of each session were divided into sets of communications relating to each of the 129 probes. Then the frequency and quality of

each of the seven basic organizational processes which occurred during each

session were determined. The overall effectiveness of a command group's

responses to the probes were rated by matching a groups' responses to a set

of possible responses which had been previously generated and rated for

effectiveness by a panel of experts.

4-7

p"
4.2.2.2 Results. Within the limitations of the experimental design, this

study shows that the most critical process in C2 is gathering and communicating information. Of the seven processes, sensing information was the

most strongly related to effectiveness. It also was the most frequent type

of communication. Sensing information was followed closely by communicating

information sensed. Messages involving coping actions, communicating implementations, and decisionmaking were also reliably related to effectiveness, .-.

although not as strongly, and occurred only about half as frequently.

Communications involved in stabilizing and feedback did not occur frequently

enough for analysis. 7-4

According to this study the quality with which information is

communicated may be the best single predictor of command group effectiveness. A multiple regression analysis indicated that communicating information sensed accounted for 44% of the variance of effectiveness, sensing "-

information accounted for 19%, and the quality of decisionmaking for 14

percent.

Not only is the quality of decisionmaking more weakly related to

effectiveness than sensing and communicating information, but decisionmaking

also depends upon the quality of those processes. Command groups that

received low scores for both sensing and communicating information were

three times more likely to produce low quality decisions. Without good

information, it is very hard to make good decisions. I

Being able to handle high information loads was found to be a

critical feature of effective battalion command groups. Effective command

groups managed to successfully transmit almost all messages, even under high

pressure conditions. Low effectiveness groups, however, could not keep up

under high pressure. For example, while low effectiveness command groups

had only slightly more aborted decisions during the low and medium pressure

phases, under high pressure they aborted more than three times as many

decisions as high effectiveness groups. Aborted decisions were decisions

that were not followed by implementing actions (see Figure 4-1).

4.2.2.3 Evaluation of Study. The FORGE I study appears to be quite .-.

methodologically sound. Within the limits of the validity of the simulation

(which did not use existing command staffs but was rated as highly realistic

4-8

. . .. . . . . . . . . . .
14-

LOW

EFFECTIVENESS

0 12 GROUPS

010

0

o6-

z

o EFFECTIVENESS

LU4

LOW MODERATE HIGH

11 111 IV

PRESSURE PHASE

BFigure 4-1. ABORTED DECISIONS OF HIGH EFFECTIVENESS AND LOW

EFFECTIVENESS GROUPS (Olmstead et al., 1973)

4-9
L . - -....

"', "4 * "• .b

by participants) and the measurement of effectiveness (based on a large -

number of probes judged quite objectively), the results should generalize to py

performance in battle, and at the NTC. However, the broad thesis that .

"Organizational Competence is a principal determinant of the effectiveness

of organizations" (p. ix) was not substantiated. While a number of the

seven processes were related to effectiveness, there is no empirical

evidence that these particular seven processes are the best or the only way

" to categorize command group behaviors. Some other categorization scheme may

be more informative. Further, it is not clear that there is any advantage '.

gained by combining the processes into an overall competence score rather

than treating them separately.

The results of this study clearly indicate that to be effective,

command groups must aggressively seek out and effectively communicate information. While it helps to have good decisionmaking, it is more important to

" have good information and make sure that information gets to everyone who

Smneeds it. The quality of command decisions depends more upon having good

information than upon having a good decisionmaker. The importance of

" acquiring and communicating information for effective battalion performance

was clearly demonstrated, and should not be ignored. .

4.2.3 Cardinal Point II (Olmstead, Elder, and Farsyth, 1978) -

Cardinal Point II was a large training exercise performed by the

U.S. Army's 8th Infantry Division in the summer of 1978. HumRRO formed a -

* team to study the effectiveness of using Organizational Effectiveness Staff

Officers (OSEOs) to observe command group performance. The study employed a

conceptual framework similar to FORGE I. Cardinal Point II also had command

groups train with PEGASUS, but the command groups were actual, already -

* existing command staff groups.

Despite some methodological problems, the results of this study

largely replicate those of FORGE 1. Process performance scores were based

upon subjective estimates of single OESOs, and no tests of inter-rater

reliability were reported. However, as in the previous study, gathering and

transmitting information were found to be the most important predictors of

performance in the exercise.

4-10
4.2.3.1 Procedures. Data were collected on 12 battalions (seven Mechanized Infantry and five Armor) in association with Cardinal Point II training exercises. Each battalion participated in an 11-day exercise consisting

of a field training exercise, a battle simulation (PEGASUS), and live

firing. The data presented in the report were collected during the PEGASUS -. '

battle simulation phase. One weakness of the 1973 FORGE study was the use

. of "command groups" which were not already existing groups but which were

composed for the study of available but unrelated officers. In Cardinal

- Point II, however, actual, already existing command groups were used.

The framework for this study was the same as that used for FORGE L

I. The Organizational Competence processes outlined in Paragraph 4.3 were

observed by OSEOs during the battle simulation. The simulation was a two

sided, open-manual board game in which all communications were conducted

through conventional radio nets. Each iteration of the simulation required

four days to complete with each module consisting of one or more types of

*,. combat operations. One OSEO was assigned to each command group during the

four simulation modules. Upon completion of each module the OSEO debriefed

- the unit commander and rated the group on the quality of their performance

in terms of the same seven processes used in FORGE I. Performance on the

exercise was rated by four OPFOR controllers, based upon completion of

.'...mission requirements and conservation of resources.

* 4.2.3.2 Results. The primary findings of this study involve the interrelationships between the seven processes (sensing, information communication, decision-making, stabilizing, communicating implementation, coping,

* .and feedback). Examination of the intercorrelations of the processes

reveals two distinct clusters--one involving information processing and the

- other involving command and control (C2). The three processes which make up

the information processing cluster were highly correlated with each other:

sensing, information communication, and feedback. The processes that formed

the C2 cluster were: decisionmaking, stabilizing, and coping. Communicating implementations, which involves transmitting command decisions, was

equally correlated with each cluster. The quality of a group's performance

scores appeared to be determined by both its ability to communicate and the

quality of its command decisionmaking.

I41

4-11 ."-

*. . . . . . . . . .... . . . . .
-.- '..- - . , ... - ... -

The information processing variables were by far the most strongly

related to controllers' ratings of mission performance. Sensing, informa- Or;k

tion communication, and feedback were significantly related to estimates of

battalion staff effectiveness. None of the other processes were reliably

related to effectiveness.

4.2.3.3 Evaluation of Study. The use of only two OSEOs, each rating

different command groups, is problematic. First, there are major questions

about inter-rater reliability. The OSEOs' ratings had to be standardized

because one gave considerably higher ratings than the other. Neither OSEO

rated both groups, so it is impossible to verify the reliability of their

ratings. The second problem involves their making process ratings only once

at the end of each module. It is difficult to know if the observers were

actually sensitive to each of the seven processes, or just responding

according to their subjective impressions of the group's performance on one

or two general dimensions. The strength of the two clusters of variables

indicates that the OSEOs actually may have formed impressions of only two

factors--how well the command group processed information, and the quality

of their command decisions. However, despite these problems, the results of Fthis study support those of FORGE I.

Effective acquisition and communication of information is the

hallmark of an effective battalion command group. The information processing cluster was strongly related to performance. Decisionmaking ability, on

the other hand, was not reliably related to effectiveness. At the battalion

level, at least, command groups that can find out what is happening and stay

in control of the flow of communications will do the right thing, even if

they are not the most brilliant tacticians.

4.3 RESULTS SUM4ARY

The results of these three studies are remarkably consistent.

Battalion command group performance is largely dependent on effectively

gathering and transmitting information. While the quality of decisionmaking

is related to command group performance, it is largely dependent on the

quality of information available to decisionmakers and the group's ability

to manage the information flow. Is

4-12 "1
* I The ability of a battalion to properly process combat information ""

should be strongly related to its ability to function effectively. Conceptually, the command group is similar to any other information processing 1P

' system. It receives inputs, processes the information, and generates

outputs. The information inputs to a battalion include incoming intelligence and communications as well as information on standard procedures,

strategy and tactics. The i-nformation processing involves transmitting the

information to the proper recipients, transforming and correlating it into

*usable forms, storing it, and making decisions. The outputs consist of all

communications sent from the command and control group, including simple

relaying of information, requests for more information, or communicating -

command decisions.

4.4 DISCUSSION

Based on the studies reviewed, there are a number of components

which contribute to effective information processing. First, battalion

command groups must actively seek out information about their environment.

m iThe better the picture they have about what is happening around them, the

better will be their performance. This includes not only sensing enemy L__1

activities, but also learning about friendly activities, getting feedback on

the implementation of previous orders, learning more about strategy and

• planning from higher echelons, maintaining contact with adjacent battalions,

r etc. The essential element of this process is the active seeking of

information. If you wait for what you need you may not be around to use it.

Second, the quality of communication is vital. Everyone involved in the

* transmission of information must be able to communicate quickly, clearly and

concisely. To do this, all personnel involved, from the radio operator in

- the field on up, must know what to communicate, who to communicate it to,

and how to communicate the information. Particular care must be taken to

insure that messages are not lost or distorted. Coordinates and CEOI

information appears to be particularly prone to errors. An adequate division of labor may help insure that central personnel will not be overloaded

in high pressure situations. Finally, dissemination of information is

important. The more informed everyone is, the more able they will be to

facilitate information processing and decisionmaking.

4-13

o . . . . . . . . \°'
, .... - , ., ..

As the result of integrating the findings of the three studies, -

seven specific information processing variables are suggested as important -.

for battalion performance and are recommended as potential predictors of

effectiveness at the NTC. The variables are:

o Information Seeking - the time (or proportion of communications) spent actively gathering information.

o Communication Efficiency - the ability to transmit required

information in brief and explicit terms.

o Communication Accuracy - the ability to transmit information

without errors or omissions.

o Completed Communications - the proportion of communications

that actually arrive at their intended destination.

o Communication Timeliness - the proportion of communications

received in time to achieve their intended purpose.

o Information Dissemination - the extent to which information

is distributed to all personnel who may be able to use it. -

o Decislonmaking Quality - the ability of command staffs to

rapidly make appropriate command decisions.

Unfortunately, there are no readily available, objective measures

of these variables for most battalions. Command group performance is 7

evaluated both in garrison and during field training exercises (FTX) and

command post exercises (CPX). However, these evaluations generally produce

narrative feedback, not numerical estimates of specific variables which

could be used to predict NTC performance. Some additional data collection

or reduction will be needed to adequately measure these variables.

Two different approaches should yield valid indicators of battalion command groups' performance on the seven variables mentioned above. The

first method relies on existing written evaluations of a command group's

performance in CPX or FTX. These evaluations could be reviewed by trained

4-14
41

*? coders who would then rate the command group on each of the seven varidbies.

N The second approach would require observers in FTX and CPX to be trained to

recognize the performance of relevant behaviors and then to rate the command

group on each variable. • '. . ,b

othi All battalions usually have available several written evaluations

of their commaid group's performance in FTX and CPX exercises, and other

Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) events. These evaluations

provide some measures of the unit's ability to manage information and accomplish assigned tasks. A major portion of the ARTEP standards deals with

command and control performance. For example, in ARTEP 71-2 (for mechanized ;..

* ]. infantry/tank task forces), all of paragraphs 3-I-1-1 to 3-1-1-16, and

portions of paragraphs 3-1-2, 3-1-3, 3-1-6, 3-V1, and 3-VII provide specific

standards for command and control performance in a variety of situations.

r2 Major ARTEP evaluations at the battalion level take place every twelve to

eighteen months, and the written evaluation is a part of the battalion's

. records. While the methods for conducting and reporting on ARTEP exercises

are not standardized, they should provide adequate detail for trained

personnel to score the battalion on the seven suggested variables. These

scores could be based on a relatively simple rating scale (such as Unaccept-

- able, Marginal, Average, Above Average, and Excellent). The personnel

scoring the ARTEPs and similar data should be trained and tested to insure

the inter-rater _.I\reliability of their ratings.

. -Similarly, the Annual General Inspection (AGI) reports and Train-

-" ing Inspection reports from Major Command Headquarters concentrate on the

. . process of how information is managed by units in all sections. Like the

ARTEPs, these evaluations may be scored to estimate battalion performance on

the seven variables.

It would be even more desirable to have estimates of battalions'

* performances on the seven factors rated by personnel who actually observed

FTX and CPX. The Cardinal Point study demonstrated that observers could be

- quickly trained to observe command group functioning, and were well received

- by the personnel being observed. It should be possible to train personnel,

; -already involved in observing and evaluating command group functioning

-~-during training exercises, to provide additional ratings on the variables

suggested here, which could be included with their written evaluations of

4-15

.. I
the exercise. In the long run the estimates by personnel who actually

observed the command group's performance may provide the most reliable data

for predicting battalion performance at the NTC.

Summary. The performance of a battalion command group largely

depends upon its ability to gather, transmit, and distribute information.

These abilities may be assessed by measures of information processing

quality in field training exercises and simulations. Improving these

qualities should have a major impact on the battalion's performance in

battle, and at the NTC.

4-16

• . . . . °..
Section 5

ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES

5.1 BACKGROUND

One of the goals of this project was to review the relevant

Organizational Effectiveness studies based on AMORE, in order to identify -

potential predictors of effectiveness at the NTC. This chapter describes

the results of the review of such studies.

AMORE is a methodology developed to measure a unit's capability,

particularly after the unit had suffered some theoretical personnel casualties or materiel damage. AMORE was originally developed to address five

points which had been concerns associated with assessing a unit's capaI' bility. These were the needs to:

.-. . '. -

o Evaluate personnel casualties and materiel damage resulting

from an attack.

o Determine the maximum unit capability using resources remaining after attack.

o Minimize the time required to achieve maximum capability.

.;

o Present unit capability as a function of time.

o Present data on unit organizational strengths and weaknesses.

- AMORE was subsequently used to study many influences on unit capability.

AMORE is a methodology (fully described in Appendix E) which is

most useful for assessing the maximum potential capability of a unit. An

AMORE estimate of capability is usually expressed in terms of the number of F

,: mission related teams the unit could field which are essential to the

mission of the unit (Mission Essential Teams - MET). For example, a

howitzer cannon and battery the personnel might be to able fire to and field maintain five teams it. each composed of a 155 mm ' '"

5- 1..

-- ~5-1 -. ,

__* . ... *.- -' *.-- -. .- ... S
C."°... IN

AMORE is especially useful for assessing a unit's maximum potential capability after the unit has suffered casualties. The reason for this

strength of AMORE is that its methodology employs a matrix of substitutability estimates that indicate which personnel in a unit can effectively - -

substitute for one another. Thus after a unit suffers casualties, the

maximum number of METs a unit could field is determined by substituting some

personnel for those personnel critical to a MET who had been "killed." The

best substitutions throughout the unit are determined by employing a transF portation algorithm.

Because of the critical relationship of unit substitutability to

potential unit capability and thus effectiveness, the next section of this

chapter is devoted to an examination of this relationship. The reviews of

ten previous pertinent AMORE studies are contained in Appendix E and Section

5.3 summarizes the results of these reviews. Section 5.4 discusses factors __

which appear to be significant influences on a unit's residual capability

and also provides definitions for the qualitative judgements of each of the

significant factors discussed.

5.2 APPROACH TO DETERMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNIT

SUBSTITUTABILITY AND CAPABILITY

5.2.1 Purpose

The purpose of this section is to quantitatively describe the

relationship between unit substitutability and unit capability after a unit

suffers casualties (degradation). Three principal inputs drive AMORE

results: the supply of resources, mission resource requirements, and the

degree of unit substitutability. There is little that a unit commander can

do to influence his unit's supply of resources or mission resource require-

*ments for a given unit type. However, unit commanders can influence unit

substitutability. Thus a clear mathematical relationship between unit

substitutability and unit capability after degradation would help identify

potential predictors of effectiveness at the NTC.

'"

5-2

............-A.*.". - -A-T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2 Methodology

Data on unit substitutability and percent of remaining capability

after degradation were used in a regression analysis to determine the rela- L tionship between the two measures. Tables 5-1 and 5-2 provide a synopsis of

- data derived from past AMORE analyses which were used in the regression

analysis. The data of seven studies are included in Table 5-1. These were

the only pertinent studies, of many AMORE studies, which contained data of

the type needed and in a form that permitted analysis. These studies

focused on a total of 16 units, as listed in the first column of Table 5-2.

Table 5-1 provides information on the study, the type of unit, the available

"" resources and the resources required for the METs, the number of METs

defined, and the remaining capability found at various degradation levels.

- Table 5-2 lists substitutability and remaining capability at various degraIi dation levels for each study. Those data were then normalized to find the

average difference for each unit between its capability and the objective

- "*. unit degradation line, which represents decreases in unit capability equal

" to the amount of degradation applied to the unit. For example, at 20%

degradation, the objective unit degradation line falls on the 80% capability

level.

In determining the relationship between substitutability and

capability, only personnel substitutability was examined since this is the

m area in which the commander has the greatest influence on substitutability.

Substitutability as derived from past analyses was calculated using the

transfer matrices, where expert judgement was used to determine acceptable

substitutions, and time penalties reflect the time required for a substitute

to move to his new location and refamiliarize himself with his duties. This

method calculates the substitutability ratio based on the number of type

positions (by grade and MOSC), instead of the total number of personnel

available within the unit to use as substitutes.

The time to achieve maximum capability was the duration used to P

determine the percent of remaining capability after degradation, instead of

a set point in time (one hour, ten hours, etc.). This was chosen because -

most previous analyses measured remaining capability at this point. Negative numbers in the last two columns of Table 5-1 are performance points

which fall below the objective line. Additionally, all resource

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degradations beyond 40% were discounted, mainly because of the small amount

I ~of past investigation in this region, but also because resource losses below

40% result in a unit that is generally ineffective.

* - 5.2.3 Results

A linear regression was calculated using the data in Table 5-2,

where substitutability was the independent factor (X) and average change (in "

percent of remaining capability) was the dependent factor (Y). A graph

of the linear regression is presented in Figure 5-1. The expression of

the regression is Y = -21.133 + .618 X. The correlation coefficient

equals .594. Thus there appears to be a fairly strong relationship between

unit capability and unit substitutability.

This preliminary analysis only provides a first approximation of

the relationship between substitutability and resilience or unit effectiveness. Results of the effort should be used as a general guide; more

detailed analyses could be conducted for other types of units, degradation

a ranges, numbers of METs, and ratios of authorized to required resources.

5.3 RESULTS OF THE REVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES

This section summarizes the results of past Organizaticnal Effecm [ tiveness studies which used AMORE, and which focused on factors controllable

by a unit commander that can increase unit substitutability. Personnel

* substitutability is the major area of concern since the commander has little

leeway in terms of increasing the substitutability of materiel resources.

- That personnel training enhances substitutability is a finding of

almost every study. Cross-training of critical skills also was found to be

a f.-tr which Lould significantly raise a unit's level of substitutability.

All forms of reaistic operational training were seen as important, especially where they increase a unit's capability and individual confidence,

cohesiveness, morale, and esprit. The effects of cohesiveness and fatigue

on personnel incapacitation were determined in one study, and were found to

be significant. Numerous historical studies (World War II and Korean War)

were used to support the contention that a high level of cohesiveness

increases all aspects of effectiveness, including substitutability.

5-7

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Some studies pointed out that increased hardening/survivability

procedures for personnel resources (such as wearing flak jackets, or preparation of hardened positions such as foxholes under static combat conditions) can provide the commander a means of increasing effectiveness by not ",

suffering degradation. Commander's actions to reduce fatigue or battle

shock (virtual losses) also help increase effectiveness. To some extent,

the commander can make decisions which affect the self-sufficiency of

internal organizational elements to improve effectiveness. The division of

155-mm 

resources 

Howitzer 

between 

Battery 

war-fighting 

study is 

and 

an 

support 

example 

tasks 

of how 

that 

similar 

was described 

resource 

in 

can 

the 

be

i

used in different ways to increase overall effectiveness.

However, it was pointed out that commanders cannot rely on

personal control over several factors that influence personnel substitutability. Included here are the availability of excess resources, either

within the unit or as augmentation, close alignment of MOSC and grade structure authorizations within the unit, the location of resources, and materiel ""d1

design changes which effect personnel substitutability. All these factors

are decided at higher levels, and are not subject to the commanders discretion. -A

With respect to materiel, the past analyses seem consistent in

indicating that the commander's greatest influence can be gained by ensuring

* that effective maintenance actions and procedures occur. The commander can

- assert influence over certain aspects of survivability within the con-

. straints available to him, such as by the proper use of terrain and by

Sprotecting and sandbagging equipment when time permits. However, he

" generally has little or no direct control over excess resources or augmentation of his materiel supply, the degree of homogeneity of the materiel, or

design changes to improve substitutability.

5.4 DISCUSSION

Based on the review of the pertinent Organizational Effectiveness

studies which used AMORE, there appears to be four factors identified in

these studies which may predict effectiveness at the NTC. These are:

5 -9 -
0 Training/Cross Training. This is the degree to which enlisted personnel have skills training in their own and other

specialties. It could be indicated by the percentage of

personnel in the battalion who have passed two or more Skills -

Qualification Tests (SQTs).

o Cohesiveness/Morale. This is the degree to which a unit has

high esprit de corps. Several measures of this have been

proposed. According to Motowidlo (1976), many military

experts consider AWOL rates to be an indicator of cohesive- -

ness/morale.

0 Physical Condition. This is the average degree of physical

conditioning exhibited by all the members of a battalion. It *- '

could be indicated by the percentage of a battalion's personnel having passed their Annual Physical Training Test.

o Equipment Maintenance. This is the degree to which a battalion maintains its equipment. It is indicated in the Unit

Status and Identity Reports of a battalion and may also be

another indicator of Equipment Readiness.

Several other factors were identified as influences on unit capability, but

those factors (e.g., location of resources) are either not under the control

of the unit, will be determined at the NTC and thus will not be able to

predict effectiveness prior to performance at the NTC, or are too difficult

to measure.

5-10

.T1
Section 6

CARY ET AL. STUDY

*6.1 BACKGROUND

The system science related objective of this project was to

identify from the Cary et al. study, variables which may be predictors of

effectiveness at the NTC. This chapter describes such variables and their -

relationships to effectiveness.,

The Cary et al. study was based on Miller's living systems theory LI

(LST) (Miller, 1978). A basic tenet of LST is that all living systems use

matter, energy and information and have at least 19 subsystems whose

. " processes are essential for system survival.

Two of these subsystems process both matter and/or energy and

* . information, eight process matter-energy, and nine process

information. Impairment of any of these critical processes will

manifest itself in systemic pathology. It seems reasonable to

assume, then, analysis of these processes can result in a fuller

understanding of the system, its operations, and any existing

" *pathological conditions. It also seems likely that an increase in

the performance of one or more of these subsystems (in this case

the information processors) should bring about a comparable increase in the system's total condition. .. .

. As LST has evolved, a limited number of direct applications of the

theory have been realized over a wide range of disciplines. (See

Miller, 1978, for more detailed discussion.) For example, the

theory has been applied at the organism, group, and organizational

1 The review of the Carey et al. study and the refinement of its measures p

.*-. were conducted by Far West Laboratory and described in its report to SAIC

* - entitled "A preliminary investigation into the application of living

systems theory to the analysis of U.S. Army Combat Simulations" (Miller,

r. et al., 1984). This chapter is based on that report and quotes from it

are frequently'used without reference.

6-1

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levels in the social service field (Hearn, 1958). Several

researchers (Bolman, 1967; Baker and O'Brien, 1971; Burgess, -,

Nelson & Wellhouse, 1974; Pierce, 1972) have used living systems

theory as a framework for modeling, analysis, and/or evaluation of

- community mental health activities and other health delivery

systems. The theory has also been set forward as a framework for- '

assessing program effectiveness in the areas of community life r

(Weiss & Rein, 1970), the study of large-scale industrial organization (Duncan 1972), the general study of organizations (Lichtman

* & Hunt, 1971), and the explanation of certain pathologies in

organizations (Dummings & DeCotiis, 1973)..

Unlike many of the other studies discussed in this report, the

Cary et al. study focused on battalions in garrison rather than in field or

simulated combat exercises. Thus generalizing from the Cary et al. study to

- effectiveness at the NTC will be very tentative and speculative.

6.2 APPROACH TO LIVING SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF BATTALIONS IN GARRISON

6.2.1 Methodology

The Cary et al. study focused on understanding battalions in terms

of the relevant and appropriate system processes contained in LST. In order

to do this, 35 battalions were studied in terms of LST. The battalions were

characterized in terms of-LST processes and the data on processes were

- correlated with measures of battalion effectiveness (the study also

S-contained many other analyses not especially relevant to effectiveness at

the NTC). The review of the study resulted in the identification of nine

LST systems processes as relevant to the future prediction of battalion

effectiveness. These processes are described in the paragraphs below.

Input Transducer (IP) - Obtaining information from outside the

battalion. This is the process of obtaining ormation from -

sources outside the battalion as it is performed in the battalion

as a whole. Some examples of this type of information are ARs,

Training Manuals, Reassignment Orders, Supply Bulletins, Regula- . .

tions, Requisition Status Reports, Military and Civilian Course

Content, and technical publications.

6-2

-. 1.
Orr

Internal Transducer (IT) - Internally reporting about battalion

activities. This is the process of internally monitoring the

battalion, that is, observing and reporting about things that go

on within the battalion. Examples of this process are the development and coordination of unit training schedules and SOP's

submission of SIDPERS information to the PAC by companies or

individuals, and preparation of daily equipment status report

(2406 backside).

Channel and Net (CN) - Relaying information within the battalion.

This is the process of relaying informatiuii to others in the

battalion without changing its meaning. Examples of this process

include informal Face-to-Face Verbal Communications, Telephones,

Distribution Centers, and Funding Guidance from the S4 to the

companies._-,

Decoder (DE) - Making information inputs usable. This is the

process of translating and clarifying information for use within

the battalion. It addresses the process of putting information

from outside the battalion into words that are more understandable

to battalion/unit personnel, thus making the information usable

within the battalion. Examples of this process are Operation

Plans, Battalion Training SOP, Job Books, SIDPERS output, LES,

r Logistics Operations Orders and Unit Schedules.

Associater (AS) - Making recommendations for procedural changes.

This is the process of using information to develop and recommend

changes in battalion procedures. Lxamples of this process are

LOSS Projections, AGI Responses, Reviews of Priorities on Class IX

- Requisitions and Stopping Requisitions (all classes) based on over

expenditure of funds.

L Memory (ME) - Storing/retrieving information within the battalion.

This is the process of storing and retrieving information within

the battalion. Examples of this process are the use of such

things as filing cabinets, microfiche files, computer print-outs,

TAFFS, Supply Documents Registers, PLL Listing, wall shelves,

video tapes, and personal notebooks.

6-3

"%; *-*-"-"-.
.1. ~ ~~~~ -. 7 , _ L

° .7.-7o

Decider (DC) -Making decisions in the battalion. This is the

process of internally making decisions that control/guide/affect

the battalion. Examples of this process are prioritized actions,

assignments, cross-leveling of parts, cross-leveling of mechanics .. -- ".? and selecting training methods for a specific task. 16 .-'.

Encoder (EN) - Preparing external reports and requests. This is

the process of preparing reports/requests for use outside the

battalion. Examples of this process are preparing Training Highlights, briefing for Division Training Meetings, Range Support

Requests, SIDPERS corrections, Personnel and Pay actions, Unit

Ammunition/POL Forecast and Form 2715 (Unit Readiness Report).

Output Transducer (OT) - This is the process of sending information outside of the battalion. Examples of this process are

sending Range Support Requests, training area requirements, EER/

OER, Monthly Fuel Consumption Report, Monthly Mileage Report and

Logistical Support Request (Class IX).

The review also revealed that only two of the systems descriptors ._

used to characterize the processes (or subsystems) of battalions in the

original study are relevant to effectiveness at the NTC. These are:

1. Process Performance. Process performance provides a set of

system descriptors which seek to describe each critical

information process in terms of several variables that are

especially relevant in characterizing that process. Each of

the nine information processes is characterized in terms of

importance/usefulness, accuracy, timeliness, volume, and cost

(time and effort). These variables are given common-sense

definitions and rating scales as follows:

(U) Importance/Usefulness: the extent to which information I

is relevant to the accomplishment of system goals.

rating from "00-20%" (1) to "81-100%" (5)

6 -.. 4. . ,.- ,\. .

.6-4

." 6- .". . ... 
47V.

(A) Accuracy: the extent to which information is unchanged/

undistorted as it is processed. ,..

rating from "00-20%" (1) to "81-100%" (5)

(T) Timeliness: the extent to which information is processed promptly.

rating from "00-20%" (1) to "81-100%" (5)

(V) Volume: the amount or quantity of information to be

processed.

rating from "Very low" (1) to "Very high" (5)

(C) Cost: the time and effort necessary to process the

information.

rating from "Very low" (1) to "Very high" (5) L.

Efforts to combine the five variables into a single indicator--as represented by the Process Performance Index (PPI)

used in some of the LSPA, for example--may therefore be

misleading. The PPI (Merker and Ruscoe, 1981; Peter and

Ruscoe, 1981) was defined for information processes as

follows:

PPI = Usefulness + Accuracy + Timeliness

Cost/Vol ume

The formula was an attempt to develop a single indicator of

performance which reflected both the linear nature of the

usefulness, accuracy, and timeliness measures and the curvi- L

linear nature of the volume and cost measures. Unfortunately, the composite does not necessarily work.

For example, if volume and cost are both rated about the I.

- ,.. same, the cost/volume becomes unity, and the PPI reflects

" " only the measures contained in the numerator. This result in

effect ignores two of the five process perfurmance measures.

If the volume is rated high and cost low, the denominator

becomes a major part of the PI, giving the false impression

6-5
that performance is very high when, in fact, an information

overload may be occurring. In contrast, if volume is related

low and cost high, the denominator becomes very large, thereby reducing the PPI. Although this case is not as misleading

as the one in which volume is high, it still overrepresents

one variable--cost--at the expense of the other measures.

2. Process Time. Process time represents a second perspective

used to examine the state of the system. Process time was

collected in the Job Description (JD) section of the LSPA

instruments. Process time provides a set of system descriptors which seek to describe each critical process in terms of

the amount of time actually devoted to that process. Whereas

process performance data reflect respondents' perceptions of

the battalion as a whole or at least parts of the battalion,

process time data reflect the amount of time which each

respondent allocates to the various LST processes within

his/her own job. Battalion-wide process time can be calculated by averaging individuals' times. These averages can be

calculated for the whole battalion, for areas of specialization within the battalion, or for smaller portions of these

areas--e.g., the S-3 Section.

6.3 RESULTS

Battalion effectiveness was measured by a ranking entitled BER

(Battalion Effectiveness Ranking) which is a composite of several traditional in-garrison measures of readiness and effectiveness including command

indicators (e.g., adverse personnel actions), performance indicators (e.g., .

percentage of required equipment ready) and unit personnel's perceptions of

unit effectiveness. BER was correlated with the process performance and

time measures of the nine LST processes. The correlations found significant

are shown in Table 6-1.

Since there are many significant correlations in Table 6-1, ..

multiple regression was used to determine the set of process variables which

accounted for most of the variance of BER. Before the regression analysis " ...

was performed, the BERs were transformed into ratings. "This was done by

6-6
Table 6-1. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN EFFECTIVENESS1 AND PROCESSES2

For Process Performance Indications

IP-Timel iness AS-Accuracy

IT-Useful ness AS-Timeliness

IT-Accuracy ME-Usefulness

IT-Timeliness ME-Accuracy

IT-Volume ME-Timeliness

IT-Cost ME-Vol ume

CN-Usefulness DC-Usefulness

CN-Accuracy DC-Accuracy

CN-Timeliness DC-Timeliness

CN-Volume DC-Volume

CN-Cost EN-Accuracy

DE-Usefulness EN-Timeliness

DE-Accuracy OT-Usefulness

DE-Timeliness OT-Accuracy

DE-Volume OT-Timeliness

For the Process Performance Index

CN-PPI DC-PP I

DE-PPI EN-PPI

ME-PP I OT-PPI

For Process Time

AS-TIME

DC-TIME .

Effectiveness is the Battalion Effectiveness Ranking (BER)

2 N 35 for all correlations, and all have probabilities of .001

6-7

'. *, . • . -
reanalyzing the traditional performance, command climate, and component

effectiveness perception data; standardizing where necessary, and recombining the scores (using the appropriate DCSPER weightings) into a rating score

which not only revealed the effectiveness rank of a particular battalion but

also its relative distance from the two units closest in rank to it (i.e.,

above and below)." Multiple correlation was then possible as were other

statistical methods. Regression was performed to determine the amount of

variance in the BER accounted for by a combination of process performance

variables. This approach would thereby identify the set of process

variables most significantly influencing the variability in battalion effectiveness measured by the BER. The results of that preliminary regression

are as follows:

Process Variable Multiple R R Square

ME-Timeliness 0.79874 0.63799

IT-Accuracy 0.87716 0.76941

AS-Timeliness 0.98348 0.96723

Thus the combination of these three variables accounted for 96 percent of

the variance in BER scores.

6.4 DISCUSSION

The correlations in Table 6-1 show that many LST process variables

are related to BER. However, most of these variables appear to be redundant '. ".

. in terms of accounting for variance in BER scores. Moreover, the three LST

process variables identified in the multivariate regression account for most

of the variance in BER scores and thus obviate the need to rely on any of

the other measures as predictors of BER scores.

Based on these analyses it appears as though the timeliness of the

memory process, the accuracy of the internal transd:2cing process, and the -

timeliness of the associator process might be predictive of battalion effectiveness. Furthermore, it might be useful to determine if these variables

are predictive of effectiveness at the NTC.

6-8
However, the Cary et al. study's measure of battalion effectiveness was a measure of "effectiveness" in garrison, not in combat-like situations. In addition, the LST process variables were indicators or predictors

-ii r. of the in-garrison effectiveness, and thus a second step removed from effec- ...

tiveness at the NTC. Moreover, all these variables were measured by questionnaires administered to battalion personnel--a most labor intensive and

R.

• logistically difficult endeavor. Given all these qualifications, the three

variables presented below are tentatively suggested as those from the system

science area which should be considered in conjunction with those from the

other three research areas.

0 Memory Timeliness. The timeliness with which information is

stored or retrieved within the battalion.

0 Internal Transducer Accuracy. The accuracy of internal

reporting about battalion activities.

0 Associator Timeliness. The timelines with which recommendations are made for procedural changes.

6-9

. . .. . .. . . . . . .
N. 7

Section 7

" INTEGRATION AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize and integrate the

results of the previous chapters. In addition, the potential predictors

will be rated in terms of the empirical support from the literature which

links them to combat effectiveness at the NTC. Finally, the predictors will

be individually related to the most appropriate specific elements of the

" suggested definition of effectiveness which was proposed in Section 2. Tfe

- reason for linking the potential predictors to specific elements is to

further substantiate their link to effectiveness at the NTC and to point out b

specific hypothetical relationships which would require validation.

7.1 SUMMARIZATION AND INTEGRATION OF POTENTIAL PREDICTORS

As a result of a detailed review and selected re-analysis of the

four groups of studies/data bases, several variables have been identified

which have the potential to bi valid predictors of battalion effectiveness.

The variables are presented below along with their operational definitions

* and are integrated into a rudimentary prediction approach in Section 7.3.

7.1.1 Command Climate Variables

Based on our in depth examination of the Command Climate Data and

Studies, seven variables were suggested as potential predictors of effectiveness at the NTC. They include:

NCOs' Judgements of Effectiveness. These judgements are the -

averages of three ratings made by the NCOs in a battalion. The

ratings were made on three scales related to the overall effectiveness of the battalion, the battalion compared to battalions

- ,. previously assigned to, and how many improvements the battalion

requires.

Junior Officers' Judgements of Effectiventess. These are the same -'

as for the NCOs.

7-1

,-,' '- ' '--' '. -,: ,.- '-,-.- ''.- -: -: -': ".. . - -. . . . . . " .." .-.- . . .-.- . ". . . ,''- . .. - . ..L . '.,. -' - " . , '.:
I - .- i %

Brigade Commanders' Judgements of Effectiveness. These are cornposites of ratings and rankings by brigade commanders of the..

overall effectiveness of battalions in their command. The ratings

were made on 13 point scales. The rankings were of all the ""-

battalions in their command in terms of their effectiveness. "

ARTEP. This is the percentage of the measures/tasks rated satisfactory by a battalion commander during his battalion's most

recent field training exercise. The ARTEP allows for field training in all the functional areas of a battalion.

AGI. This is the percentage of areas rated satisfactory during a

battalion's last annual general inspection.

Equipment Readiness. This is a readiness condition reported by -

battalions in their monthly Unit Status and Identity Reports. It

is the percentage of equipment on hand that is functional.

AWOL. This is the percentage of a battalion's enlisted personnel

who were involved in unexcused absences during a given month. * -

7.1.2 Comand Group Behavior Variables

A detailed review and examination of the Command Group Behavior ]

Studies has resulted in seven variables which are thought to have potential

as valid predictors of battalion performance at the NTC. These variables

are listed and defined below.

Information Seeking. The time (or proportion of communications)

spent actively gathering information.

Communication Efficiency. The ability to transmit required information in brief and explicit terms.

Communication Accuracy. The ability to transmit information without errors or omissions.

7-2

1

.............................- -. " .... , 
Completed Communications. The proportion of commu,,'catlons that

actually arrive at their intended destination.

Communication Timeliness. The proportions of communications

received in time to achieve their intended purpose.

Information Dissemination. The extent to which information is

distributed to all personnel who may be able to use it. --..

Decisionmaking Quality. The ability of command staff to rapidly

make appropriate command decisions.

7.1.3 Organizational Effectiveness Variables

Our re-examination of several Organizational Effectiveness Studies

yielded four variables which are related to the construct of substitutability and thus linked to the resiliency aspect of effectiveness. These

. variables are listed below and defined in regard to their potential as valid

" predictors of performance at the NTC.

Training/Cross Training. This is the degree to which enlisted

*. personnel have skills in their own and other specialties.

ir Cohesiveness/Morale. This is the degree to which a unit has high

esprit de corps.

* : Physical Condition. This is the average degree of physical

conditioning exhibited by all the members of a battalion.

Equipment Maintenance. This is the degree to which a battalion

maintains its equipment.

- 7.1.4 Cary et al. Variables

The review of the Cary et al. study indicated that of the many

variables which were related to or measure battalion effectiveness ingarrison, three of the variables accounted for 96 percent of the variance of

the in-garrison effectiveness measure. The three variables were:

7-3
.. . " I

is stored or retrieved within a battalion.

Internal Transducer Accuracy. This is the accuracy with which the . -

internal reporting about battalion activities occurs.

Associator Timeliness. This is the timeliness with which recom- * '-

mendations for procedural changes are made within a battalion.

7.1.5 Sumary

Of the 21 variables considered as potential predictors, four

variables are conceptually redundant - Cohesiveness/Morale and AWOL, Equip- .

ment Maintenance and Equipment Readiness, Memory Timeliness and Communication Timeliness, and Internal Transducer Accuracy and Communication

Accuracy. Because AWOL and Equipment Readiness are the accepted terms at

battalion level and conceptually redundant with the other two variables,

Cohesiveness/Morale and Equipment Maintenance will be dropped from the

group. Memory Timeliness and Internal Transducer Accuracy will also be

dropped from the group because they are redundant and more difficult to

measure than Communication Timeliness and Communication Accuracy. This

leaves a total of 17 variables which are suggested as potentially valid

predictors of performance at the NTC on the basis of careful re-examination

of the data from which they are derived.

7.2 RELATIVE DEGREES OF SUPPORT FOR PREDICTORS

7.2.1 Between Groups of Studies

All of the suggested potential predictors were selected on the

basis of an in-depth review of relevant research. However, some of the

studies comprising that research were more generalizable to the NTC than

were others, and thus some of the suggested potential predictors have more

credible support linking them to the NTC than do others. This section is

designed to identify the potential predictors with the most credible support

linking them to the possible prediction of effectiveness at the NTC.

7-4

4'

. . . . - -
o°° ... ..

Each of the four groups of studies was based on a different

research model. All but the Organizational Effectiveness Studies were

empirical. The latter relied on sets of arbitrarily created data for independent variables (e.g., estimates of the effect of cohesiveness on substitutability) whose effects on capability were determined from a model.

Pe. . I.

Although none of the studies related potential predictors to

effectiveness at the NTC, the Command Group Behavior Studies did use the

outcomes of battalion command groups engaged in combat simulations as

measures of effectiveness. This dependent variable appears to have more in

common with the effectiveness of battalions at the NTC than do the dependent

measures used in the other groups of studies. The dependent measures

focused on in the Cary et al. study were used to predict dependent measures

similar to the measures of the Command Climate Studies which are being

Im suggested as predictors of effectiveness at the NTC. Thus the potential

predictors derived from the Cary et al. study are one step more removed than

I iare those of the Command Climate Studies.

If the basic approaches of the four groups of research efforts are

m considered relative to the concept of predicting battalion effectiveness at L.

. the NTC, it is clear that the variables derived from the Command Group

S'Behavior Studies appear to be the most strongly supported as predictors of

' - effectiveness at the NTC. The second most strongly supported group of

m variables would be those derived from the Command Climate Studies especially

*.. those based on the ratings and rankings of senior officers as to the best

- indicators of effectiveness. Since the variables from the Organizational

*" Effectiveness Studies are based on arbitrarily created sets of data for

independent measures and the data for the dependent measures were derived

- from a model, it appears the variables derived from the Cary et al. study

are more strongly supported as predictors of effectiveness at the NTC than

are those from the Organizational Effectiveness Studies.

7.2.2 Within Groups of Studies p

* .. Within the groups of potential predictors derived from all but the

Cary et al. study, there is variability in terms of the amount of support

which exists linking the variables to effectiveness at the NTC (only one

7-5

*. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . ,-,.
potential predictor was suggested from the Cary et al. study). The following paragraphs describe the relative amounts of support within each groups

of potential predictors.

7.2.1.1 Command Climate Studies. The three equally and most strongly - L..

supported variables were NCOs', junior officers' and brigade commanders'

judgements of effectiveness. These three variables were rated as better

measures of effectiveness than were all but ARTEP and AGI (Kerner-Hoeg and

O'Mara, 1981). However, ARTEP and AGI were not significantly correlated

with any other variables including themselves whereas the three types of

judgements of effectiveness were all significantly and strongly intercorre1 ated.

On the basis of the ratings of the appropriateness of ARTEP and

AGI as measures of effectiveness, it appears they are the next two most

strongly supported variables. Equipment readiness derives its support from

its correlations with ARTEP, AGI and junior officers' judgements of effectiveness (O'Mara, 1981) and thus it is not as strongly supported as are

ARTEP and AGI. However, since the support for AWOL is based on a spotty

pattern of correlations and a ranking of 18 on the list of most appropriate

measures of effectiveness (Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara, 1981), it has less

support than does equipment readiness.

7.2.1.2 Command Group Behavior Studies. Not all of seven Command Group

Behavior variables received equal support in the studies reviewed. The

variables that received the most support involved the quality of communications, followed by the gathering and distributing of information, while the

effects of the quality of command decisionmaking received the least support.

Each of the three major Command Group Behavior Studies reviewed

indicate that simply being able to keep up with the flow of communications

is vital for effective command and control. The proportion of completed

communications, as well as their accuracy and timeliness were the type of

, variables that were most reliably related to battalion command group effec-

- tiveness in all of the studies. Effective command groups keep on top of

message traffic, even when the battle becomes intense. Poor battalions, on

the other hand, tend to loose control when the pace of battle becomes too

hectic, resulting in more errors and lost messages.

7-6
7-.

The importance of seeking and distributing information was also

fairly clearly demonstrated. In the FORGE I study, which appears to be the

most methodologically sound, information seeking and distributing information were found to be nearly as important as the quality of communications.

Effective battalion command groups spent more of their time actively seeking

out information, and distributed that information more widely. Both these

variables were correlated with battalion effectiveness measures in at least

one study, and the most effective command groups in all three studies were

characterized by exerting more effort to gather and distribute information.

While these two variables may not be quite as critical as the simple ability

to accurately transmit information, they do seem to be significant predictors of battalion command group effectiveness.

Of the seven predictor variables recommended here, the quality of

m | command decision making received the least conclusive support. Only one of

the studies (FORGE I) indicated that decision making quality was related to

battalion effectiveness, and in that study decision quality appears to

depend largely upon the quality of the information that went into making the

decision. In the two other studies decision quality was only related to

m U subjective impressions of effectiveness, and there are some indications that

these impressions are only weakly related to actual command group effectiveness. So while being able to make good decisions is important, decision

making appears to be largely dependent on the quality of the information

MU? that goes into making the decision.

7.2.3.1 Organizational Effectiveness Studies. There were only two variables which were suggested and retained as predictors from the Organizational Effectiveness Studies: training/cross training and physical

condition. The training/cross training variable is probably more strongly

supported simply because it appeared in a number of the studies as an

influence on unit capability. On the other hand, physical condition was

purported as being related to capability only once.

IA

7.3 RELATIONSHIPS TO SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF EFFECTIVENESS

As one additional method of attempting to relate the potential

predictors to effectiveness at the NTC, each potential predictor was

considered in terms of the specific components of the suggested definition

7-7

"* K* '.
..' -'.

--..

of effectiveness at the NTC. The identification of relationships between

the potential predictors and specific components of a definition of effectiveness, although based on analysis and therefore speculative at this time,

could serve as the genesis for specific research questions for a study to

validate the potential predictors.

As specific components of a definition of effectiveness the six

general missions were chosen to be related to the potential predictors.

Based on the tasks required to perform each mission, and the definitions of

the potential predictors, possible relationships between each potential

predictor and the general missions were considered. The results of these

considerations are indicated in Table 7-1. The left column of the table

lists the predictors, and the six general missions are listed across the top

of the table in addition to a "composite" of all the missions. An X at the

junction of a row and column indicates the potential predictor in that row

and the mission in that column are probably good candidates for validation.

As the table shows, eight of the potential predictors are indicated to be related to the "composite" which means that the potential -. predictors appear to be related to all six of the general missions. Only -

Equipment Readiness, the information processing variables and Associator

Timeliness were believed to be differentially related to some of the six

general missions. As an example of some of the relationships, consider

those for Information Seeking. Information seeking is suggested as being

related to Plan and Control Operations. This was suggested because the

controlling of operations is an iterative and corrective process obviously

enhanced by seeking information about the condition of the operations.

However, Maintain Operational Security, Conduct NBC Defense Operations, and

Defend Against Air Attack are much more a function of following the rigorous -

procedures which have been specified for these types of functions, and less

dependent on corrective actions or repeatedly seeking information about the . --'"

changing condition of the operations. Thus these three missions were not

suggested as being strongly related to Seeking Information. For similar

reasons related to the changing nature of the operations, Seeking Information was suggested as being strongly related to Conduct Sustaining Operations. For example, sustaining operations include supply and resupply

tasks which obviously are strongly related informational updates. In addition, Seeking Information was suggested as being strongly related to Perform

7 -8 ................... ,.......

. , --. , ... . *- ... -. ,-. .. . ... .. . .... * .. * . ... . * .. . . - . . . .. .. , . .* . . , . ,. , - .. , .. .- . . .. . . . .: . . .. . .-
Table 7-1. POTENTIAL PREDICTOR -CRITERION RELATIONSHIPS

CRITERIA

POTENTIAL PREDICTORS t__O

NCOS' Judgements of

Effectiveness

Jr Offs Judgements of

Effecti veness

Bde Cdrs' Judgements of

Effecti veness ___ ___

3ARTEP __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _X

AG I ____x

Equipment Readiness X X X X ____.

AWOL _______ ______ ___X

LTraining/Cross Training _ _ _X

Physical Condition x

Information on Seeking X X X

Commnunication Efficiency X X X X

Communicat ion Accuracy X X X

Completed Commiunications x X x

Commuunication Timeliness X X X X

Information Dissemination X X X X

*Decision Making Quality X X X X

-. Associator Timeliness X Xx

* 7-9
Tactical Intelligence Functions because an explicit major part of intelligence functions is seeking information about the enemy.

7.4 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A VALIDATION STUDY- :

If the variables suggested as potential predictors are to be

useful for predicting effectiveness at the NTC and thus useful for identi- *

fying the training needs of battalions, then first the variables must be

shown to be valid predictors. More useful still would be to show the -

variables to be strongly related to specific components of effectiveness,

for such specific relationships could be used to even more precisely profile

a battalion's training needs.

Before an attempt at validating potential predictors is begun,

considerable effort will have to be expended to further develop the

potential predictors into fully operational measures. Some of the potential

predictors are already in such a fully developed state. Those include the

variables derived from the Command Climate Data and the Organizational

Effectiveness Studies. On the other hand, most of the variables derived

from the Command Group Behavior Studies will require further development.

Also before an attempt is made to validate the potential

predictors, criteria of effectiveness will have to be fully developed. Many

approaches to the development of criteria of effectiveness other than the

one used in this report are possible. These other approaches could result

in criteria other than those suggested in this report. Moreover, many

criteria of effectiveness other than those suggested in this report already

have been developed (e.g., those of the UTO). Thus there are or could be

developed many criteria or sets of criteria of effectiveness. These

criteria or sets of criteria could all be used to evaluate battalion task

forces at the NTC, albeit with possibly slightly different emphases.

The predictors of effectiveness identified in this report appear

to constitute two or three different groups or sets. These, and possibly

other sets may be differentially related to some of the criteria or sets of

criteria that could be employed at the NTC. A study of the validity of

potential predictors should investigate the relationships of each potential

7-10

" "...A 
predictor to each criterion set, and the canonical relationships between

I sets of predictors and sets of criteria.

In order to use appropriate criteria of effectiveness at the NTC,

" .-" it may be necessary to identify additional types of data that should be

PL collected at the NTC and all the requisite procedures for collecting such

data. In addition, in order to be used as criteria of effectiveness, many

of the types of data presently collected at the NTC will have to be further

developed. Finally, criteria may have to be weighted and combined in an

algorithm for producing a single criterion score or figure of merit.

The actual validation of the potential predictors appears to

require a focus on battalion task forces prior to and during their exercises

at Ft. Irwin. The period immediately prior to the exercises, during which a

task force is still in garrison, could be used to collect predictor data,

which will require elaborate and precise logistics. The data collection

period for the entire study should probably span two-to-three years since

the NTC processes only approximately 24 battalion task forces per year.

Thus to obtain a large enough sample of task forces to allow for the splitting of the sample into appropriately sized validation and cross-validation

groups will require the processing of at least 60 task forces. Then,

depending on the type and components of criteria to be used, scores for each

criterion will have to be calculated and correlated with the predictors.

£ Finally, some validated predictors should be developed into a system that

battalions could use as check-ups to identify the training which would help

make them more truly combat effective.

7.5 SUMMARY

In summary, this project identified components for a conceptual -

definition of effectiveness at the NTC which will require further development if they are to be used as a valid set of criterion measures. In

addition to defining effectiveness, the types of data not collected at the

NTC which would be required to assess "effectiveness" were identified. Four

sets of studies/data bases were then reviewed in detail relative to the

components for a definition of effectiveness and 17 variables were identified which may predict effectiveness at the NTC. Nine of the 17 variables

7-11

.......
are currently and routinely collected by battalions. Before being validated, the group of 17 potential predictors should be added to from additional sources such as military experts. If validated against criteria of

effectiveness at the NTC, these and possibly additional predictors could be

used by a battalion to identify the types of training which would make the

battalion more combat effective.

7L12

I- IT:

I°-

I

I , 

• . - -

"'" 7 -12

I o
Section 8

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8-8

2,
A-1W
APPENDIX A

This appendix presents in table format, the major tasks and missions that could be used to form a criterion of effectiveness at the NTC. -

Also shown in the table are the types of data required to assess effectiveness in terms of the mission and tasks presented. Table A-1 has a left

margin in which are listed the types of data presently collected at the NTC

which are the equivalent of the "DATA CONSIDERATIONS" in the middle column

of the table. (Appendix B lists complete descriptions of most of the NTC

data by the task to which they are related.) The middle column of the table

contains the six general ARTEP missions, each one preceeded by a roman

numeral. Under each general mission are listed several "TASK(s)", each

preceeded by a letter. These are the major tasks of the ARTEP general

missions restated (and sometimes combined) in question format. Under each

task is a heading entitled "DATA CONSIDERATIONS." These are the types of

data required to assess effectiveness per TASK. In the column on the right

are listed the numbers of the missions and tasks of ARTEP 71-2 from which

the MISSIONS, TASKS, and DATA CONSIDERATIONS in the body of the table were

taken.

*:2

A-2

. Ii 1 "-

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NTC DATA TYPE 

EI: 22,23,25,72 

OE: 4413 

OE: 405,406,410,412,434, 

438,460 

EI: 10,11,33 

OE: 405,410,412,460 

EI: lOa 

OE: 406t410,412 

EI: 10 

OE: 416,442 

!l= 20,34,35,46,73 

Hiles Commo Message 

UNILOC Table * 

Ground Unit Position/ 

location Messages 

MISSIONS~ TASKS, DATA CONSIDERATIONS 

e. Plan for reorganization and service support 

f. Con1Tlunications-electronics operating instt·uc

(CEOI) and coiTTilander/corrvnand post location 

D. TASK - Did the FRAGO provide subordinate units with 

appropriate information? 

DATA CONSIDERATIONS 

1. FRAGO will include as a minimum what actions 

subordinate must innediately accomplish. 

2. FRAGO, when possible, will include changes in 

situation, task organization, control mea~ures, 

fire support plans, and service support plans. 

E. TASK- Was the unit able to maintain orientation? 

* NTC Data types with asterisks were taken from The Prototype National Training Center Rese

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i 

NTC DATA TYPE 

EI: 25,30,31 

EI: 26,27 

EI: 22,23 

EI: 31,40 

EI: 39 

MISSIONS, TASKS, DATA CONSIDERATIONS 

2. Did the unit submit requests for 

necessary support and resupply in 

accordance with unit SOP? 

3. Treatment and evaluation of casualties/ 

KIAs 

4. Reassignment of personnel 

5. Permanance of operation maintenance and 

emergency repairs 

6. Recovery and ev,aluation of damaged 

vehicles and equipment 

7.· Redistribution of supplies and a0111uniti

8. Performance of field sanitary functions 
N4

Appendix B

OBSERVABLE EVENTS AND ELEMENTS OF

INFORMATION PER MISSION AND TASK

B-1
-.- ?.

APPENDIX B

I

This appendix presents the observable events (OEs) and elements of

information (Els) per appropriate mission and task which were referred to in

abbreviated form in Appendix A. .

B--

B -2

*A
MISSION Plan and Control Operations

A' ""I '=

A. TASK -Was a warning order issued that provided subordinate units

with appropriate information?

°-...'

Observable Events

No. 432 -Unit follows troop-leading procedures /commanders

and staff actions? (0-9)

No. 433 - Commanders/S3 does detailed METT-T analysis? (0-9)

No. 435 - Unit issued warning order? (0,1,2)

No. 441 - Was alternate CP designated and activated if

required? (0-9)

Elements of Information

No. 2 - Did plan support OPORD? (0-9)

No. 3 - COR Adhered to 1/3 -2/3 planning time allocation.

(0,1,2)

No. 69 -Was 4.2 platoon leader involved in planning process

early? (0,1,2)

B. TASK -Was an adequate physical reconnaissance conducted?

Observable Events

No. 432 - Unit follows troop-leading procedures/commanders

and staff actions? (0-9)

No. 433 - Commanders/S3 does detailed METT-T analysis? (0-9)

No. 437 -Was adequate recon performed prior to the development of OPORD? (0,1,2)

No. 463 -Did the commander/S3 conduct terrain analysis

based upon OCOKA? (0-9)

Elements of Information

i " ~-,°o- i

No. 15 -Did platoon reconnoiter routes within and between

battle positions? (0,1,2)

B-3

-. ,-.- .a.. . ... Zs . -. * . . - . , .. * . , , ,
No. 28 - Adequacy of Recon Activities. (0-9)

No. 59 - Were scouts employed before offensive preparation

began? (0,1,2)

No. 60 - Did scout positions prevent direct OPFOR observa- -. -

tion? (0-9) ) ,.- '

No. 69 - Was 4.2 platoon leader involved in planning process Kearly? (0,1,2)

C. TASK - Was an OPORD/company order issued that provided subordinate

units with appropriate information?

Observable Events

No. 405 - Did commander plan for local counterattacks? (0-9)

No. 406 - Did commander plan actions in the event of reduced -

visibility conditions?

No. 422 - Were other avenues of approach identified and

refined?

No. 432 - Unit follows troop-leading procedures/commanders

and staff actions? (0-9)

No. 433 - Commanders/S3 does detailed METT-T analysis? (0-9)

No. 434 - Unit adjusts task organization based on Cdr's

METT-T analysis? (0,1,2)

No. 436 - Was a written plan w/overlay produced? (0,1,2)

No. 439 - Did commander/S3 select tentative platoon BP's?

(0-9)

No. 440 - Did plan established disengagement criteria? (0-9)

No. 441 - Was alternate CP designated and activated if

required? (0-9)

No. 445 - Did platoons emplace protective minefields in

primary BP? (0,1,2)

No. 454 - Did commander coordinate with company teams for

local security? (0,1,2)

No. 455 - Did commander plan counterattack by fire? (0,1,2)

No. 457 - Did commander plan to use TOWs at standoff ranges? . .

(0-9)

No. 463 - Did the commander/S3 conduct terrain analysis based

upon OCOKA? (0-9) -

B-4

•.* "-°

* . - .~-. ::K.c~&:.~K: .. ~ ~ ~y2&---K-. K,
No. - Cfo.may plan was tactically and doctrinally sound?

N support OPORD? (0-9)

3- Adhered to 1/3 - 2/3 planning time allocation.

(0,1,2)

No. 4 -Was the plan adequately communicated? (0-9)

No. 5 TF issued a complete OPORD. (0,1,2)

No. 9 -Were all key leaders at OPORD briefings? (0,1,2)

No. 10 - Was planning for the controlling/massing of fires

adequate? (0,1,2)

No. 11 - Did commander have a plan for limited visibility

conditions? (0,1,2)

I'. No. 16 - Did surveillance plan Meet commander's requirements? (0,1,2)

No. 17 - Were sufficient organic assets tasked to meet

surveillance tasks? (0,1,2)

No. 18 - Did 3-2 articulate additional intelligence require-

* .ments to Bde? (0,1,2)

No. 19 - Did Bde provide requested information/assets to the

TF? (0,1,2)

No. 22 - Was this tactical operation limited by a lack of

ir supplies? (0,1,2) 1-

No. 23 - Was this tactical operation limited by a lack of

services? (0,1,2)

No. 25 - Was the TF plan and procedures to evacuate

casualties effective? (0-9)

No. 46 -Was adequate planning conducted to integrate FA,

Mortars, CAS to support Maneuver? (0-9)

No. 47 - Was FS used to reinforce obstacles? (0-9)

No. 50 - Was smoke used effectively to screen BLUEFOR movements? (0-9)

No. 51 - Did obstacle plan support commander's concept?

(0,1,2)

No. 52 - Were engineer's efforts prioritized? (0,1,2)

No. 53 - Were maneuver assets used to support engineering -

efforts? (0,1,2)

B-5 . -. .-.
No. 70 - Were scouts given a follow-on mission? (0,1,2)

No. 71 - Did the commander clearly communicate his concept a .

of the operation? (0,1,2)

No. 72 - Did commander include all CA resources available?

(0,1,2) - .

No. 73 - Did the commander adequately plan for effective

maneuver against OPFOR weaknesses (i.e., flanks and

rear)? (0-9)

D. TASK - Did the FRAGO provide subordinate units with appropriate . -

information?

Observable Events

No. 405 - Did commander plan for local counterattacks? (0-9)

No. 406 - Did commander plan actions in the event of reduced

visibility conditions?

No. 410 - Were disengagements coordinated? (0-9)

No. 412 - Did the commander issue clear and concise fragos?

(0-9)

No. 434 - Unit adjusts task organization based on Cdr's

METT-T analysis? (0,1,2)

No. 438 - Were back briefs used? (0,1,2)

No. 460 - Did unit commander reposition weapons to avoid

suppression?

Elements of Information

No. 10 - Was planning for the controlling/massing of fires -

adequate? (0,1,2)

No. 11 - Did commander have a plan for limited visibility .-

conditions? (0,1,2)

No. 33 - Were FRAGOs clear and concise? (0-9) ,w -

*T '5

B-6

7.* 7
E. TASK - Was the unit able to maintain orientation?

Observable Events

* No. 416- Did the company know the positions of friendly

obstacles? (0,1,2)

No. 442 - Was TOC aware of tactical situation? (0,1,2) Y7

Elements of Information

No. 20 - Reaction to OPFOR obscuration? (0-9)

No. 34 - Was Bde kept informed of tactical situation? (0-9)

S-No. 35 - Did the positioning of command group facilitate -

command and control? (0,1,2)

- No. 46 - Was adequate planning conducted to integrate FA,

Mortars, CAS to support Maneuver? (0-9)

No. 73 - Did the commander adequately plan for effective

maneuver against OPFOR weaknesses (i.e., flanks and ...-.

rear)? (0-9)

F. TASK - Was the control of unit movement and fire effective?

' %

Observable Events J

No. 401 - Was planning adequate for controlling/massing of

direct fire systems? (0-9)

No. 402 - Were weapons systems positions fitted to the I '

terrain? (0-9)

No. 403 -Were individual fighting positions constructed for

primary battle positions? (0-9)

No. 407 - Were direct fire weapons position/reposition to

allow massing of fires? (0-9)

No. 409 - Was unit adequately dispersed? (0-9)

No. 411 - Did unit follow disengagement criteria? (0-9)

No. 413 - Did the commander position himself to exercise

command and control for the battle? (0-9)

No. 415 -Did the company stay in its primary battle position

too long? (0,1,2)

B-7

*~~~t . . . . . . . -1 4- 

**:-*2 * * ** -'' .. . . '-t. 
U,-

No. 416 Did the company know the positions of friendly ,

obstacles? (0,1,2)

No. 417 - Did the company support adjacent units by fire

during disengagements? (0,1,2)

No. 418 During the counterattack by fire, were firing posi- ;

tions occupied in a timely manner? (0-9)

No. 419 - During the counterattack by fire and maneuver, did

the unit move over exposed routes? (0-9)

No. 420 - During the counterattack by fire and maneuver, did - -

the unit attack against a superior force? (0-9)

No. 430 Were adequate control measures designated? (0,1,2)

No. 431 - Were weapons positioned to cover TF sector? (0-9)

No. 442 - Was TOC aware of tactical situation? (0,1,2)

No. 443 - Was screen line far enough forward? (0,1,2)

No. 456 - Did the commander rehearse counterattack? (0,1,2)

No. 458 - Were TOWs dispersed yet mutually supporting? (0-9)

No. 459 - Did the company support company teams by fire

during disengagements? (0-9)

No. 460 - Did unit commander reposition weapons to avoid

suppression? (0-9)

No. 461 - Did the unit commander reposition weapons to .'- .

maintain standoff? (0-9) ..

No. 462 -Did the commander display initiative as appropriate

during the course of the operation? (0-9)

Elements of Information

No. 6 - The unit was prepared to execute mission at

specified time. (0,1,2) -

No. 7 - How well did Commander command/control operations?

(0-9)

No. 10 Was planning for the controlling/massing of fires

adequate? (0,1,2) K

No. 12 - Effective use of time to prepare primary DP. (0-9)

No. 20 - Reaction to OPFOR obscuration. (0-9)

No. 21 - How well did unit use its direct fire assets? (0-9)

No. 35 - Did the positioning of command group facilitate

command and control? (0,1,2). -

B-8

A
L7

' I

No. 41 - How well did unit perform BDA? (0-9)

No. 42 - How well did FSO/FI3T position themselves to

support operation? (0-9)

No. 45 - Were groups and series of targets planned? (0,1,2)

No. 46 - Was adequate planning conducted to integrate FA,

PL Mortars, CAS to support Maneuver? (0-9)

No. 47 - Was FS used to reinforce obstacles? (0-9)

No. 48- Did FIST/FO call for counterbattery fires when

appropriate? (0,1,2)

No. 49 - Did FOS/FIST/FO call for SEAD as appropriate?

(0,1,2)

No. 50 - Was smoke used effectively to screen BLUEFOR movements? (0-9)

No. 54 - Were hide positions used? (0,1,2)

No. 56 - Did positions provide balance and depth? (0-9)

No. 61 - Were positions adjusted during periods of limited

visibility? (0,1,2)

No. 66 - Did mortar positions support OPORD "priorities for

fire"? (0,1,2)

No. 67 - Were "split" operations used? (0,1,2)

No. 68 Were advance parties used during scheduled displacements? (0,1,2)

II. MISSION - Maintain Operations Security (OPSEC)

A. TASK - Was an OPSEC program initiated?

Observable Events

No. 426 - Was a reaction force available and used for

countersurveillance tasks?

No. 427 - Did unit adequately communicate through OPFOR EW

activities?

B-9
Elements of Information ,

No. 7 - How well did Commander command/control operations?

(0-9)

No. 12 - Effective use of time to prepare primary BP. (0-9)

No. 13 - Was security established and maintained? (0,1,2)

No. 20 - Reaction to OPFOR obscuration. (0-9)

. B. TASK - Was the OPSEC program effective?

Observable Events

No. 409 - Was unit adequately dispersed? (0-9)

No. 414 - Did the unit practice noise and light discipline?

(0-9)

No. 419 During the counterattack by fire and maneuver, did

the unit move over exposed routes? (0-9)

No. 426 - Was a reaction force available and used for

countersurveillance tasks?

No. 427 - Did unit adequately communicate through OPFOR EW

activities?

No. 443 - Was screen line far enough forward? (0,1,2)

No. 444 - Were vehicle reflective surfaces covered? (0,1,2)

No. 452 - Were obvious firing positions occupied? (0-9)

No. 453 - Was there adequate dispersion within the BP?

Elements of Information

No. 7 - How well did Commander command/control operations? -

(0-9)

No. 13 - Was security established and maintained? (0,1,2)

No. 20 - Reaction to OPFOR obscuration. (0-9)

No. 50 - Was smoke used effectively to screen BLUEFOR movements? (0-9)

No. 57 - Did platoon make effective use of concealment?

(0-9)

No. 60 - Did scout positions prevent direct OPFOR observation? (P-9)

-.1......

-' .:- . .'' . .. ... % " . . ' .' -::2 " :: .. -.-. " . 2 '.: '2 .: -'.'.2 . : '"'..L'' :, -. L- 2-- 7 "'." -2: .:Z .".: ::'-'B-l'2 .. -.. ':-. -
III. MISSION - Perform Tactical Intelligence Functions

A. TASK - Were prisoners of war (PW), captured documents and captured

material expeditiously and correctly processed into intelligence channels?

Observable Events

No. 421 - Were the 5 "s" for handling EPW's followed? (0,1,2)

No. 428 - Did unit attempt to obtain immediate tactical

information from EPW's?

No. 429 - Were captured documents tagged?

Elements of Information

No. 8 - Did unit adequately "See the Battlefield" throughout the battle? (0-9)

No. 24 - Did unit properly process EPWs? (0-9)

No. 29 - Were wounded EPWs medically treated? (0,1,2) I INo. 73 - Did the commander adequately plan for effective

maneuver against OPFOR weaknesses (i.e., flanks and

rear)? (0-9)

ir B. TASK - Did the unit promptly and accurately report OPFOR activity

and bombing/shell ing/mortar/aircraft fire?

Observable Events

r No. 408- Were reports accurate and timely? (0-9)

Elements of Information

" No. 8 - Did unit adequately "See the Battlefield" throughout the battle? (0-9)

No. 16 - Did surveillance plan meet commander's requirements? (0,1,2)

.:. No. 18 - Did 3-2 articulate additional intelligence requirements to Bde? (0,1,2)

B-11 ,,
No. 20 - Reaction to OPFOR obscuration? (0-9)

No. 34 - Was Bde kept informed of tactical situation? (0-9) .

No. 41 - How well did unit perform BDA? (0-9)

No. 44 - Was information available from Intell sources used -

in developing fire plan? (0-9) .

No. 63 - Did scouts report OPFOR recon activities? (0-9)

C. TASK - Did the unit promptly and accurately fire a bomb/shell/

mortar/rocket/aircraft fire report?

Observable Events

No. 408 - Were reports accurate and timely? (0-9)

Elements of Information ,

No. 8 - Did unit adequately "See the Battlefield" throughout the battle? (0-9)

No. 16 - Did surveillance plan meet commander's requirements? (0,1,2.)

No. 18 - Did Bde articulate additional intelligence requirements to Bde? (0,1,2)

No. 20 - Reaction to OPFOR obscuration? (0-9)

No. 34 - Was Bde kept informed of tactical situation? (0-9)

No. 41 - How well did unit perform BDA? (0-9)

No. 63 - Did scouts report OPFOR recon activities? (0-9)

D. TASK - Were members of the unit able to distinguish friendly

vehicles and aircraft from those of the enemy? -

Observable Events

No. 408 - Were reports accurate and timely? (0-9)

............................. . . .. B-12.... ... o
rr- v- .- . " r .& rk- ..q - . .-.. . . - ; ..- .- " . . . -. -. --.. .- ---

Elements of Information

No. 8 - Did unit adequately "See the Battlefield" through- .,

out the battle? (0-9)

No. 63 - Did scouts report OPFOR recon activities? (0-9)

4L'

E. TASK -Was the unit able to operate observation posts without

being detected by the OPFOR?

I Observable Events"'"- -

No. 404 - Did commander plan to use patrols and ops for local

security?

No. 423 - Were radars positioned to "see the battlefield"?

I No. 424 - Were GSR positioned to "see the battlefield"?

Elements of Information

No. 7 - How well did Commander command/control operations?

(0-9)

No. 8 - Did unit adequately "See the Battlefield" throughout the battle? (0-9)

No. 16 - Did surveillance plan meet commander's requirements? (0,1,2)

No. 17 - Were sufficient organic assets tasked to meet

surveillance tasks? (0,1,2)

No. 18 - Did 3-2 articulate additional intelligence requirements to Bde? (0,1,2)

No. 28 - Adequacy of Recon Activities. (0-9)

No. 60 - Did scout positions prevent direct OPFOR observation? (0-9)

No. 61 Were positions adjusted during periods of limited

visibility? (0,1,2)

No. 62 - Did scouts conduct OPFOR recon activities? (0-9)

No. 63 - Did scouts report OPFOR recon activities? (0-9)

No. 64 -Did scouts neutralize OPFOR recon elements? (0-9)

B-13

I.%*°

i'..,i-. - . I - . . : I . - ' - ' - .' -'--..-....-'-v --. '.- -;.% -' . ° . .. .. - , - .. - .- ' . - .... - .- .- .: - .... i- - . -' - . .
F. TASK - Did the unit make effective use of patrolling?

Observable Events

No. 425 - Were patrols used for surveillance?

Elements of Information

No. 7 How well did Commander command/control operations?

(0-9)

No. 8 - Did unit adequately "See the Battlefield" throughout the battle? (0-9)

No. 16 - Did surveillance plan meet commander's requirements? (0,1,2)

No. 17 - Were sufficient organic assets tasked to meet

surveillance tasks? (0,1,2)

No. 18 - Did 3-2 articulate additional intelligence requirements to Bde? (0,1,2)

No. 28 - Adequacy of Recon Activities. (0-9)

No. 41 - How well did unit perform BDA? (0-9) ,- i.

No. 44 - Was information available from Intell sources used

in developing fire plan? (0-9)

No. 59 - Were scouts employed before offensive preparations

began? (0,1,2)

No. 60 - Did scout positions prevent direct OPFOR observation? (0-9)

No. 62 Did scouts dotcot OPFOR recon activities? (0-9)

No. 63 - Did scouts report OPFOR recon activities? (0-9)

No. 64 - Did scouts neutralize OPFOR recon elements? (0-9) .

No. 65 - Did scouts recon and coordinate withdrawal routes?

(0,1,2)

B-14
- . . . . .

IV. MISSION - Conduct NBC Defense Operations

A. TASK - Was the unit prepared for operations in an NBC environment?

Observable Events

No. 409 - Was unit adequately dispersed? (0-9)

Elements of Information

No. 32 - Units ability to conduct NBC defense activities.

(0-9)

No. 36 - Did supply requests reflect the units actual needs?

(0,1,2)

B. TASK - Did the unit effectively detect and respond to the NBC "

environment?

Observable Events

No. 446 - Was there a slow reaction to chemical alarm?

(0,1,2)

No. 447 - Did platoon administer proper first aid to NBC

casualties? (0-9)

No. 448 - Was designated MOPP used? (0,1,2)

No. 449 - Did platoon decontaminate individuals and

equipment? (0,1,2)

No. 450 - Were proper unmasking procedures followed? (0,1,2) -""

No. 451 - Was proper identification of agents made? (0-9)

No. 464 - Were warnings of NBC attacks properly disseminated?

(0,1,2)

Elements of Information

No. 32 - Units ability to conduct NBC defense activities.

(0-9)

B-15

B-15 . . .
t I

.1

V. MISSION - Defend Against Air Attack

A. TASK- Did the unit conduct passive and active air defense

effectively?

Observable Events

No. 415 - Did the company stay in its primary battle position

too long? (0,1,2)

No. 452 - Were obvious firing positions occupied? (0-9)

Elements of Information

No. 13 Was security established and maintained? (0,1,2)

No. 55 - Did positions of ADA assets support commanders

priorities? (0-9)

No. 56 Did positions provide balance and depth? (0-9)

B. TASK - How effective was the unit at engaging enemy aircraft?

Elements of Information

No. 7 How well did Commander command/control operations?

(0-9)

No. 55 - Did positions of ADA assets support commanders

priorities? (0-9)

No. 56 - Did positions provide balance and depth? (0-9)

VI. MISSION - Conduct Sustaining Operations

A. TASK - Did the unit use all available resources to maintain/

restore combat readiness?

Elements of Information

No. 22 - Was this tactical operation limited by a lack of

supplies? (0,1,2)

B-16
No. 23 -Was this tactical operation limited by a lack of

services? (0,1,2)

No. 26 - Was the TF plans to integrate personnel replacements adequate? (0,1,2)

°.Q .'.

No. 27 - Was the Personal Daily Summary accurate? (0-9)

No. 30 - Were all KIAs evacuated? (0,1,2)

No. 36 - Did supply requests reflect the units actual needs?

(0,1,,2)

No. 37 - Did unit prestock class V? (0,1,2)

No. 38 - Were emergency stocks of class III maintained in

combat trains? (0,1,2)

No. 39 - Did unit cross level supplies? (0.1,2)

No. 40 - Were sufficient recovery assets forward? (0,1,2)

No. 41 -How well did unit perform BDA? (0-9)

No. 58 -Were emergency stocks of class V maintained in

combat trains? (0,1,2)

B-17

No. id nit 9 rosslev..suplie?..,1,2..i.i - .

No. uffiientrecoery 0 - ere sset forard .012 "----
Appendix C

COMMAND CLIMATE QUESTIONNAIRE

C-1
APPENDIX C

The questionnaire on the following pages was used in the wave four

data collection effort of the Command Climate Data Base. _

C-2-
COMMAND CLIMATE

VERSION I

£::

This questionnaire is designed to learn more about the day-to-day life in L

your unit or section. The purpose is to allow every individual to contribute

to an accurate picture of the unit.

This is not a test and there are no right or wrong answers. If the results

are to be helpful, it is important that you respond to all statements as

thoughtfully and frankly as possible. Your ideas are important and can provide a valuable contribution. Do not simply agree with your friends or

say what you think others expect you to say.

All answers to this questionnaire are considered confidential. The completed

questionnaires will be processed by computer 'and the results summarized in

statistical form. Your individual responses will remain strictly confidential

since they will be combined with those of many other people. Any background

information that you list will be used to sort people into large groups and

will not be used to identify you personally.

Read the instructions carefully before you begin responding to the statements. j.

Thank you very much for your cooperation in completing this questionnaire.

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 ,( U.S.C. 552a) "-iTITLE OF FORM' -PESRIIG"IRCTV

PT 5203a(R2), Command Climate -- Version I AR 70-1

"" 1. AUTHORITY '"

10 USC Sec 4503

2. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE(S)

. The data collected with the attached form are to be used for

research purposes only.

3. ROUTINE USES

This is an experimental personnel data collection form developed by

the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

pursuant to its research mission as prescribed in AR 70-1. When

identifiers (name or Social Security Number) are requested, they are

to be used for administrative and statistical control purposes only.

Full confidentiality of the responses will be maintained in the

,.* processing of these data.

4. ANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE AND EFFECT ON INDIVIDUAL NOT PROVIDING

INFORMATION

Your participation in this research is strictly voluntary. Individuals are encouraged to provide complete and accurate nformation in the

interests of the research, but there will be no effect on individuals

for not providing all or any part of the information. This notice may [ be detached from the rest of the form and retained by the individual

if so desired.

FORM Privacy Act Statement 26 Sep 75 . DA Form 4368-R, 1 May 75

C-3
-;. , -. -. - Z - . - . . .- .w- .- - Z o-wr . Z,.:.. . oW W, - r r , * .

INSTRUCTIONS -

1. This questionnaire has two parts: an answer sheet and a question booklet. ,'

Ni The section that you are now reading is the question booklet. Check I.,-.

to see that you have an answer sheet. .

,,,, 2. Read each statement carefully. " -

3. As soon as you understand a statement, dec'de how much you agree with -

it. Your first impressions are more valuable than your second thoughts. :.

" 4. After you have decided on your answer, it will be recorded on the

separate Answer Sheet that indicates the amount of your agreement.

5. If no answer category exactly expresses your thoughts, use the best

answer available. Be sure to mark only one answer for each statement

and to respond to all statements.

6. Be sure to follow the answer sheet carefully. Match the numbers on the

answer sheet with the number of each statement. 4

7. Please use a pencil in completing this form.

8. Please do not make any marks on the Questionnaire Booklet.

DEFINITIONS

In filling out this questionnaire, please use the following definitions:

"Your supervisor' - the person who gives you your day-to-day work

assignments and evaluates your work.

"Your unit" - your company/troop/battery.

"Your work group" - the group of people that you work with on a day-to-day

basis.. .

C-4

S* .* . . ..,..*~~~~~~~~ *'°- *.*-. , ... . *. .. . . . . ~. ,.-'.. 
SECTION A

In this section each question has the scale printed under it. Put your answer

to these questions (numbers 1 to 6) on the answer sheets.

1. Sex

A. Male

B. Female

2. Marital Status

A. Single

B. Married, living with family

C. Married, separated from family due to lack of affordable housing

D. Married, separated from family due to other reasons.-

E. Divorced

3. Housing

A. On post - barracks

B. On post - family housing

On post - other

D. Off post - government furnished housing

E. Off post - civilian housing

4. Race/Ethnic Group

l UA. Black

B. Hispanic (Chicano, Mexican-American, Puerto Rican)

C. Native American (American Indian, Aleut)

D. White

E. Other

5. Is your present salary sufficient to provide you with a decent standard

of living?

A. I can live quite comfortably within my salary.

B. My salary is adequate to meet my needs.

C. It is difficult to live decently with my salary.

D. Trying to live within my salary imposes a great hardship on me and,

my family (If any).

E. I can get by on my salary only by going heavily in debt.

6. What is your level of education?

A. Less than high schoo)

B. High school or G.E.D. diploma

C. Some college

0. College degree

E. Advanced degree

C-5

. * ' - . .--
SECTION S

The following scale is used to indicate your agreement or disagreement with

statements (7-79).

A B C D E

Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly 4'

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

7. My job gives me the chance to learn skills that are useful outside -.

the Army.

8. In my job, I can tell how well I am doing without other people telling

me.

9. I know what I will be doing from day to day.

10. My job requires high-level technical skills. .-

11. In my job,. I have more work to do than one person can handle.

12. My job lets me use my skills and training.

13. In my job, I have to work extra hours.

14. My job lets me do the things I am good at.

15. My job keeps me too busy to take extra training programs.

16. My job gives me the feeling that I have done something important..

17. The pressures of my job spill over into my off-duty life.

18. I can see what my job has to do with others in my unit. .

19. I have full responsibility for doing certain parts of my job.

20. My job leaves me feeling tired at the end of the day.

21. Army rules and regulations make it hard for me to do my job.

22. My supervisor is willing to listen to my problem.

23. My unit gets told about important events later than other units.

24. Scheduled events like training and inspections are cancelled at the

last minute.

25. My supervisor encourages people to give their best efforts. L

26. In-my unit it is hard to get the equipment and tools I need to do

my Job.

C-6

-7--

. . . . . . . . . . - . --. . . . . . ':. -T
C SECTION B

A 8 C 0 E

Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

27. My supervisor gives me Instructions that conflict with other information *

I get. .

28. My supervisor offers new ideas for solving job-related problems.

29. The officers in my unit care about what happens to the individual

soldier in my unit.

30. My supervisor maintains high standar;s of performance.

, 31. Excessive drinking is not a problem in my unit.

32. My supervisor makes us work a lot of unnecessary overtime.

33. The soldiers in my unit let you know when they think you've done a

good job.

34. When I'm talking to my supervisor, he doesn't pay attention to what

I'm saying.

35. My unit does not have a drug problem.

36. The soldiers in my unit try to think of better ways of getting the

job done.

37. My supervisor lets other supervisors interfere with my work group.

38. My supervisor puts suggestions by the membcrs of the unit Into

operation.

39. The soldiers in my unit criticize guys who are goofing off.

40. My supervisor decides what shall be done and how it shall be done.

. 41. My supervisor makes sure his role in the company Is understood by the

men.

42. The soldiers in my unit get along with each other.

* 1 m43. Decisions are made in this unit after getting information from those

who actually do the job.

44. My unit is respected on this post.

45. My supervisor gives us big jobs late in the day and wants them done

before we leave work.

46. The senior NCOs in my unit look out for the welfare of the individual

soldier in my unit.-

- . .*C-7 .* 

* . - *- . *. *.. . . . .
SECTION B

A B C D E

Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

47. Meetings in this unit generally accomplish meaningful objectives.

48. Decisions are made in this unit at those levels where the most adequate

information is available.

49. My supervisor insists that individuals follow standard operating

procedures. W r

50. My supervisor lets individuals know what is expected of then.

51. My unit is willing to try new or improved methods of doing work.

52. There is discrimination against minorities in this unit.

53. I get a sense of accomplishment from the work I do.

54. Workload and time factors are taken into consideration in planning

our work group assignments.

55. I look forward to coming to work every day.

56. My supervisor acts without consulting the men in the unit.

57. My job helps me to achieve my personal goals.

58. Rules in this unit are enforced.

59. There is discrimination against whites in this unit.

60. This unit places a high emphasis on accomplishing the mission.

61. I want to contribute my best efforts to the unit's mission and my

assigned tasks.

62. My supervisor refuses to explain his actions.

63. The information I receive down through the chain-of-command is generally

accurate.

64. My supervisor treats the people who work for him fairly.

65. I feel safe in my unit area.

66. My possessions are safe where I live.

67. All in all, I am satisfied with the unit that I am in.

". .. .

l• ~~C-8B .--..

**""-L
[ LSECTION B

A B C D E

Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

68. 1 have a good opportunity for advancement in this unit if I do a

good job. -

69. I am satisfied with the medical and dental care that the Army provides K for me and my dependents (if any).

* ~ 70. I am satisfied with my barracks living area or housing that the Army provides for me and my dependents (if any).

71. The job I have is a respected one.

72. Considering my skills and effort I put into the work, I am satisfied

with my pay.

73. All in all, I am satisfied with my supervisor.

74. All in all, I am satisfied with the persons in my work group.

U 75. All in all, I am satisfied with the Amy compared to most other

organizations.

76. I enjoy doing the type of work that my Job requires.

77. In general, I feel that I have gotten a fair deal from the Army.

78. All in all, I am satisfied with my job.

79. The members of my work group try to do their best.

" 80. I try to do my best.

K ~81. My supervisor tries to do his best.

r_9

C-9 "c"9
• . . •- + . . . . . . . .

SECTION C

82. How well do you know how to do your Job?

A. expert

B. above average

C. average -

D. below average

E. poor

83. What is your evaluation of the overall work effectiveness of your

company/troop/battery?

A. Not effective

B. Slightly effective

C. Effective

D. Very effective

E. Extremely effective

84. Comparea to all other units that you have ever served in how effective

is your company/troop/battery?

A ---------- B ------------- C C --------------D D --------------- E

Least Effective Most Effective

85. How many improvements would it take to make this unit the most effective

company/troop/battery that you have ever served in?

A. Many improvements are needed

B. Quite a few improvements are needed

C. Few improvements are needed

D. Very few improvements are needed

E. No improvements are needed

86. Which of the following best describes your career intentions at the

present time?

A. I will stay in the Army until retirement

B. I will reenlist uDon completion of my present obligation but am

undecided about- staying until retirement

C. I am undecided whether I will reenlist

D. I will probably leave the Army upon completion of my present

obligation

E. I will definitely leave the Army upon completion of my present -

obligation

87. What type of grades did you usually get in school?

A. mostly A's -

I. mostly B's

C. mostly C's

n mostly 's

E. mostl y s

C-10

. _ _ • , . *. . • . . . . . . .. . .
SECTION C

88. What percentage of the people in your unit are involved in inter-unit

sport activities?

A. - 20%

B. 21 - 40%

C. 41 - 60%

0. 61 -80%

E. 81 - 100%

4L

89. About how frequently do members of your unit take part in military

ceremonies?

A. Once a year or less

B. 2 - 10 times a year

C. About once or twice a month

D. About once a week

E. More than once a week

90. How often do off-duty unit activities occur in your unit?

A. Never

B. 1 - 5 times a year C. 6 - lO times a year

D. Once or twice a month

E. Weekly

i 91. About how frequently do members of your unit take part in an inspection in ranks?

A. Once a year or less

B. 2 - 10 times a year

C. Once or twice a month

* , D. About once a week

E. More than once a week

92. Think of the four adults who are your best friends. (Do not include

your parents, spouse, brothers or sisters.) How many of tese people

are in your unit?

A. None

B. 1

C. 2

0. 3

E. 4

93. Think of the four adults who are your best friends. (Do not include

your parents, spouse, brothers or sisters). How many of tese people

are in the Army?

A. None

C. 2

D. 3

E. 4

C-11
SECTION D m

The following items deal with your willingness to deploy with your unit.

Please indicate how willing you would be to deploy with the unit you are ..

in right now to each of the described situations by choosing one of the

following responses:

A. Would do almost anything to avoid going.

B. Would make an effort to avoid going.

C. Would go if required.

D. Would make an effort to go.

E. Would do almost anything to go. M

94. How willingly would you deploy to a combat zone with only a small

chance of actual contact with the enemy?

95. How willingly would you deploy to combat zone with a good chance of

actual contact with the enemy?

96. How willingly would you enter battle against a smaller, ill-equipped

enemy unit?

97. How willingly would you enter battle against a determined, well-equipped

enemy unit of the same size as your unit?

98. Have you ever tried to see your company/troop/battery commander?

A. I never tried because I didn't need to.

B. I tried and was able to get to see him without any trouble.

C. I tried and was able to see him, but it was a lot of trouble.

D. I tried and could not get to see him at all.

E. Although I needed to see him, I never tried because I knew

I couldn't get to see him.

99. Are you on your first term of enlistment?

A. Yes

B. No

Please indicate your agreement or disagreement to the following items by

using the following response scale:

A B C 0 E

Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly

Disagr.e Disagree Agree Agree

100. I enlisted in the Army to obtain a steady job.

101. I enlisted in the Army to find out what to do with my life.

102. 1 enlisted in the Army to get away from money or financial problems.

103. I enlisted in the Army to travel to new places.

104. I enlisted in the Army to become eligible for veterans' benefits.

105. I enlisted In the Army to receive special training or obtain a skill.

106. I enlisted in the Army to serve my country.

107. Whites in my unit stick together.

108. Blacks in my unit stick together.

C-12

.~~~~~~~~~, ... . ... ... ..
SECTION E

For the questions in this section, please use the following scale. Note . that this is somewhat different than the scale used elsewhere.

A B C D

To a very To a little To some To a great To a very

little extent extent extent extent great extent

log. To what extent do you think our Army leaders are smart people who

know what they are doing? U.

110. To what extent do you think Army officers try to do as good a job

as they can?

111. To what extent do you think you can trust our Army leadership to do

what is right?

112. To what extent are appropriate standards of order and discipline

maintained within your unit?

113. To what extent do people in your unit do what the supervisor wants

because they respect his authority?

114. To what extent do people in your unit do what the supervisor wants

because he can give special rewards to those who cooperate with him?

115. To what extent do people in your unit do what the supervisor wants -

because he can punish or make things difficult for those who do not

cooperate?

116. To what extent do people in your unit do what the supervisor wants

because they respect his experience and good judgment?

117. To what extent do people in your unit do what the supervisor wants

because they like him as a person?

118. To what extent do people in your unit do what is expected or asked

of them because they feel they owe it to their unit and don't want

to let the unit down?

C-13 --

T.. -.- 4

--- . -. . . •• .• . .. .: c-.i 3).'. 
-. r . .*C- _rr .- . , :

SECTION E

For the next five questions, please indicate your agreement-disaqreement

according to the following scale.

A B C D E

Strongly Slightly Neither Agree Slightly Strongly

Disagree Disagree nor Disagree Agree Agree

119. Servicemen should obey orders without question.

120. Being firm with subordinates is the best way to insure that they will

do a good Job.

121. A supervisor must keep a close check on his subordinates to see that

they are doing a good job.

122. Although a supervisor can be democratic with his subordinates, he

must still structure their work for them.

123. Subordinates prefer to be directed rather than making their own -.

decisions in their work.

124. Which of the following best describes your unit's relationship to

other units or command levels? (i.e., units above, below, or on the

same level) -

A. We have little or no relationship to other units.

B. We depend upon other units for various things, but they don't

depend on us.

C. Others depend upon our unit, but we don't depend upon them.

D. We depend upon other units and they depend upon us.

125. What do yoor exchanges with other units involve?

A. Mostly resources -- qoods and material that are delivered.

B. Mostly services performed by or for us. :

C. Mostly just information passed to or from our unit.

C-14

....... _.....-..... ............. ... .
SECTION F

Use the following scale to indicate your agreement or disagreement with

the statements below (126-160).

A B C D E

" Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

126. This unit has a real interest in the welfare of assigned personnel. b

127. Most people will not take advantage of you if they get the chance.

- 128. NCO's have an adequate chance to speak their opinion concerning reward

or punishment actions involving junior enlisted soldiers who work for

them.

129. In the Army there are no right or wrong ways to do things, only easy

and hard ways.

*130. How hard you work or how good a job you do matters more in getting

ahead than luck and who you know. L.

131. NCO's are not given enough training to do their job right.

- 132. NCO's are respected by Junior enlisted soldiers.

n 133. Most senior NCO's and officers can not be trusted. t

134. 1 have enough time off to take care of my personal and family needs.

"" 135. I feel NCO's should have the authority to give or take away passes

of their subordinates.

136. I feel that I am really accomplishing something in the Army.

*137. There are few dependable people any more.

138. There is a clear understanding in my unit of which duties are to be

performed by NCO's and which duties are to be performed by officers.

139. NCO's in my unit know they will be backed up by the chain of command

in disciplinary matters.

140. People generally receive fair treatment under the law.

141. If I were cut off from the rest of my platoon in battle, I do not

believe that they would do everything possible to fight their way *IN . +back to me.

C... ..
SECTION F

Strongly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Strongly

Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

142. NCO's do not have enough authority of their own to handle soldier

indiscipline problems.

143. There is enough emphasis on competition in this unit. - '* r

144. Most people can be trusted.

145. The Army does not eliminate undesirable NCO's. '

146. NCO's are not given enough opportunity to be in charge of the

training of their soldiers.

147. Most of the time it is very difficult to figure out what a person's

senior NCO's and officers really want.

148. PeOple in my work group work hard. - -

149. The image of the NCO corps is high.

150. There are no right or wrong ways to make money, only-easy and hard ways.

151. Most senior NCO's and officers in battle would be willing to go through

anything that they made their men go throuqh.

152. I feel NCO's should have the authority to impose extra duty or Li

restriction on their subordinates.

153. Officers fail to hold NCO's accountable when the NCO performs poorly.

154. I am working in-job areas for which I have been trained.

155. People's ideas change so much that I wonder if we'll ever have

anything to depend on.

156. The performance of outstanding NCO's is recognized and adequately

rewarded in my unit.

157. In the Army, a person usually can depend on his senior NCO's and -

officers to look out for him.

158. A person has got to always first look out for "number one" (himself).

159. Officers try to take over NCO responsibilities and do them for the

NCO.

160. There is a good working relationship among the personnel in this unit.

C-16 .

.:.-::,~~~ :. :...-"..---:.. '.': .- '----.-." --. -. .,.:...-. ... .".- ... .. '-..' " . . .-' "- .--* *:.* ..-- . . .L: -. -
Appendix D

REVIEW OF

CO~HAD CLIM4ATE DATA BASE STUDIES

Ir

0-1
APPENDIX D

This appendix contains a review of all available studies of ARI's

Command Climate Data Base. Six papers are individually reviewed. A

summarization of the results is contained in chapter three of Volume I of .

this report. -

D.1 REVIEW OF A MODEL OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES (Bowers and Davenport, 1984)

The Bowers and Davenport paper is by far the most lengthy and

- complex of the six papers written about the Command Climate Data. In its

several hundred pages it describes, in more detail than any of the other

papers, the data collection and many subsequent analyses. b .

D.1.1 Description of Study

The overall purpose of the analyses of the data reported in this

paper is a "look for the critical source/sources of variance in local Army

unit functioning as measured by leader performance and unit effectiveness.

The research question was whether the primary source/sources of inter-unit

differences were to be located at the division, brigade, battalion, or

company level; or were to be explained on the basis of the people who make

them up." To this end, the authors and some assistants performed essentially two sets of analyses.

First Procedures. The first set of analyses performed were

designed to "analyze the relative amounts of influence associated with units .

at various levels in the military hierarchy on command climate as perceived

by individuals in the lowest level units." The first analysis of the set

was a cluster analysis of the questionnaire data. The analysis was designed

to determine independent indices of unit climate. Then regression analyses

were performed to determine the amount of variance for each cluster that - *.-

each of several demographic, unit level and functional variables could

account for.":

D-2

7I ....................... .. .. ** . ... ... *. ... ... ... .... .* . .°,
- ... .

Data used for both the cluster and regression analyses were not

aggregated prior to the analysis. The cluster analyses were performed

separately for both wave three and four data but not wave two data.

Although mention is made of the similarity of the cluster analysis results

with the results of a "previous factor analysis of wave two data," no other

mention of the factor analysis is made. The regression and cluster analyses , -J

were performed on the data of 4392 wave three respondents and 4623 wave four

respondents. The regression analyses also were performed on the data of

4907 wave two respondents.

Results. Bowers and Davenport presented their most specific

results of the cluster analyses in a single table in which are listed only

the names they gave clusters and the questionnaire items which comprise each

cluster. No mention is made of differences and similarities between wave

three and wave four results. The clusters were given the following names:

Indices

a

Organizational Climate A Unit Effectiveness

Organizational Climate B Army/Unit Reference Group

Supervisory Leadership A Discipline

Supervisory Leadership B Standards Enforcement

Group Cohesiveness Military Sentiment

Job Challenge Incremental Influence

Motivation Ascribed Influence

* Loyalty to Organization Theory X Beliefs

Willingness to Deploy

Single Item Indices

Assignments Authority

Pay Unit Commitment

Career Unit Interrelationships

Standards Unit Exchange

D-3
7 7 1

Officer Only Indices

Battalion Work Effectiveness Battalion Improvements

Battalion Effectiveness,- -

The results of the regression analyses were presented for each cluster in

the form of coefficients of partial determination. Coefficients were

presented for the eight demographic variables as a group, for function, and

individually for each unit level (i.e., company, division, etc.). Each

coefficient was noted as being either significant or not and results were

presented separately for each of the three waves of data.

The authors indicated that the results pertaining to the effects

of the various levels of the unit show that the company level effects are by

far the strongest and that the division also accounts for some effect. It

- was stated that the company level effects were significant for more than 50%

of the clusters for all three waves of data.

The results pertaining to the function of the units were "seldom -

large." Generally, function accounted for approximately one percent of the

variance of cluster scores. However, the effect of function was significant

for more clusters than is the effect due to company.. -

Demographic vari.ables included sex, race, educational level,

marital status, grades in school, and housing type. The amount of variance

due to the combined effect of all of these variables was presented and each

variable was individually described as having either a significant effect or

not. Results showed that educational level and race were the two most

consistently significant variables across both clusters and waves.

The tables of coefficients of partial determination show that none

of the effects due to any of the variables accounted for even one percent of

the variance of cluster scores.

Second Procedures. The second set of analyses were performed to

determine which of the authors' "models of Army unit functioning," is the

most "effective." The models of Army unit functioning were actually "

theories or styles of management, and they were analyzed to determine which

D-4

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. - L,.-.<. ' '-- - .

- - - - "-._,-.." - - - -'_'..''" - - - ; ° ----- ._'."-- - -- . . -'.;J "-:. "-'-'-.'t "-.:-- " '- -''",-,'' - '-. ',-,''
ftwas most predictive of the data obtained from the questionnaires. The

theories initially focused on were called the "directive (traditional)

management system" and the "collaborative management system." Essentially

they were equivalent to McGregor's (1960) Theory X and Theory Y.

The models predictive capabilities were analyzed by comparing K . predictions of relationships derived from the models to the relationships

found among the data. Relationships among various "constructs" (i.e. "

factors) of the questionnaire data were induced from the models and these

* relationships were compared to those based on the data which were indicated

- by zero-order and partial correlations between the "constructs." The

derivations of the constructs were not described and the constructs are not

the same as the clusters described earlier in this section. Eight hypothe-

-, ses were induced from each of the models and each hypothesis was tested by -..

approximately 15 comparisons with the various correlations.

Second Results. The results for all but one of the hypotheses

were mixed; some supported the collaborative model and some supported the

directive model. Because some of the tests for each of the eight hypotheses

supported both of the models, neither was deemed most effective.

The next step of this set of analyses involved the estimation of

two structural equation models of Army unit functioning. The components of

m U the models were the constructs used in the previous step of the analysis.

The two models were compared to the zero-order and partial correlations

between the constructs to determine the "best fitting" of the two.

The results of the comparisons showed that neither of the models

Sexhibited a good fit. The authors stated that by subsequently relying on

the results of a multi-dimensional scaling of the questionnaire data, they

developed a new hybrid model that was an outgrowth of the previous two

models. The hybrid model was then tested and subsequently described as

having accounted for 21% of the variance of "performance" scores.

S.. The next step of the second set of analyses involved the determination of lag (i.e., x at time one with x at time two) and cross-lag (i.e.,

x at time one with y at time two) correlations between the constructs. One

hundred and eighty-four of these were calculated to further test the valid--.-

D-5
, 0y of the hybrid model. The correlations were presented and described as -

generally supporting the hybrid model. In fact, most of the comparisons of - p-:-.

the zero-order correlations between two constructs measured at the same

time, with the cross-lag correlations of the same constructs, did support

causal relationships similar to those of the hybrid model. However, the

statistical significance of the correlations was not addressed.

D.1.2 Evaluation of Study

This evaluation does not address issues concerning the reliability

and validity of the data since those issues were described earlier. Rather,

* this section addresses only the inferential analyses used to test hypotheses. The one overriding criticism of these analyses is that they were

described in such a convoluted, overly general fashion that it is most

difficult to understand them. The first set of calculations consisted of "'

*the cluster analyses and regression analyses to identify significant effects

present in the questionnaire data. This approach was basically a sound way *.- "

of answering the general research question posed in the stated purpose of

the study. Using individual clusters instead of a single score derived from

the questionnaire allowed for the determination of the specific spheres in

which the effects of the independent variables were significant.

Examination of the items that make up each cluster lead one to

believe that some factors were generated on a prior theoretical grounds,

rather than on the basis of empirical analysis. For example, all items in

the cluster labelled "organizational climate A" are positive statements

about the way in which work is structured, and all items in the factor

called "organizational climate B" are negative statements about work structure. In addition some items on the "A" measure appear to be exactly the

opposite of some items on the "B" measure. For example, one item on the "A"

measure reads, "workload and time factors are taken into consideration in

* planning our work group assignments", while an item on the "B" measure

reads, "In my job, I have more work to do than one person can handle."

Typically cluster analyses do not separate items this way since it is the

magnitudes of the correlations (or similar measures) between items which are

used as the criteria for determining clusters, not whether the correlations

are positive or negative. It is more likely that the items which tap the

same construct (such as workload demands) would have been highly intercorreD-6

............. .. -...... ........ . ... .. .... .;,-;,-. -," .'-:-" " .; .. - '- ..:- . :'. .:, " :._ ''.,' : ':,, :,' .: .' ''_ : .' :. . . . ., .,. . ,J* ,.'.-_,, _,., 
lated and, consequently, would have been integrated parts of the same

cluster. It is unclear why they were separated into different clusters.

This was also the case for the two measures of supervisory leadership.

The regression analyses performed to determine the sources of

influence are an acceptable means of doing so and the results of the

analyses are adequately and accurately described but for a few exceptions.

,_ For example, the authors state that:

"The coefficients of partial determination are quite

small for this analysis, reflecting great individual

variation within companies. This does not, however,

diminish the statistical significance or meaningfulness

I: of the differences among units, both at company and

higher levels. In other words, even though a great

deal of within-company variance exists, for most of the

factors, company means differ significantly and meaningfully."

* However, the small coefficients of determination do not reflect great

* individual variation within companies. They reflect the lack of shared

. variance between the clusters (climate variables) and the independent

variables (e.g., unit level). In fact, without variation within companies,

m no demographic effects could possibly exist.

Secondly, the authors are implying that even though the coefficients are small, company means differ significantly and thus the effect due

T.'

to company is "meaningful." Company means could differ significantly and

-- the effect due to company be very small because company is confounded with

* some of the other independent variables. The fact of the matter is that the

effects on the clusters due to the unit level variable of company or any

other variable are extremely small aad do not account for even one percent

* of the variance of cluster scores. Thus none of the effects due to any of

the variables are meaningful.

The second set of analyses consisted of a series of model tests

F * the purpose of which was to determine which of two models of management

(directive and collaborative) were more predictive. Some of ihe results

D-7

.. .. .. . . ... 
I ELI ~L * - -• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .

show support for the final hybrid model which was developed. However, the

support is very tentative and the description of the development of the A

hybrid model lessens one's faith in its predictive validity. For example,

the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) that was described as being performed to

help produce the hybrid model is mentioned in only one sentence, and it

appears to have been impossible to have generated from the command climate

* data the dissimilarity matrices required to do MDS.

More specific issues concerning the second set of analyses include

the descriptions of the data used. To begin with, only two sentences are

devoted to its description. "Measures of unit effectiveness" not obtained

from the questionnaire data are stated as being used in the analyses.

* However, the measures are never described and tables listing the components

of unit effectiveness reveal that measures labeled "effectiveness" are . --

composed of only questionnaire data. In addition, for such a self-report -4

measure of effectiveness, there exists the possibility that "halo effects"

have contaminated the data. If this occurred for many individuals, correlations between aspects of a unit (the predictors) and unit effectiveness

would be inflated, and conclusions drawn from them may be misleading. This

is almost always a problem with self-report measures of effectiveness. One 4

way to minimize halo effects is to put items concerning overall effectiveness at the end of the questionnaire. This was not done.

Also, it is never mentioned in the report how the "constructs"

were derived, which are different from the earlier clusters derived from the

earlier cluster analysis. In addition, the results of the model testing may

be unclear because of the descriptions of some of the constructs. One

example of this concerns the effects of "ascribed influence" on unit effectiveness. Ascribed influence was operationally defined as "the extent to

which the supervisor used rewards/punishments to get people to work hard."

To measure this, respondents were to report on a five-point scale the extent

to which:

1. People in your unit do what the supervisor wants because he

can give special rewards to those who cooperate with him

D-8

• "i

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- °. -' """--- ",'- ,, -- ~- .. . " "," .""..'" . .z. """ '."
2. People in your unit do what the supervisor wants because he

can punish or make things difficult for those who do not

cooperate.

Examination of the wording of these questions reveals that they do not ask

the extent to which a supervisor rewards/punishes, but rather, the extent to

.- which the supervisor's use of reward/punishment is effective in achieving

obedience among subordinates. The study's predictions referred to the

E- former, while the analyses involved the latter. Attempts to show empirical

relationships between this measure and unit effectiveness failed, even

though, the use of this form of influence may be an important predictor of

effectiveness in the Army. This same problem of translation and interpretation existed for the other two measures of supervisory style of influence,

"incremental influence" and "legitimate influence."

D.2 THE MEASUREMENT OF BATTALION EFFECTIVENESS (O'Mara,1981)

D.2.1 Description of Study

The purpose of this study is stated as an attempt to determine the

validity of a large number of measures commonly purported to measure a Army

unit's effectiveness.

Or Procedures. The study focuses on the internal consistency of

items within three separate groups of measures purported to assess the

effectiveness of Army units. The author stated that a high correlation

" among items within each group would indicate they were all measuring the

same thing and demonstrate the "concurrent validity" of the measures. The

three groups of measures included were taken from the interview, questionnaire, and unit record data. The three groups of measures were labeled:

S(1) readiness measures (e.g. ARTEP, AGI and Unit Status Report measures, see

Table 3-2 in Volume I), (2) command indicators (e.g. number of Article 15

violations, drug arrests, see Table 3-3 in Volume I), and, (3) personal

*" judgements (e.g. opinions on unit effectiveness from interview data and

questionnaire data).

*! The data were described as having been taken from assessments made

on a total of 71 battalions located in USAREUR and CONUS. The sources of

D-9

-. ******j  ** ..**.
data based on readiness measures or command indicators are standard sources

prescribed by Army regulation and routinely used on a periodic basis. The

third group of measures, personal judgements, were described as non-traditional measures created for this study. The personal judgements obtained . °

from interviews were Division Commander's, Assistant Division Commander's

and Brigade Commander's assessments of all the battalions within their

command. Each of these raters gave each battalion under his command a

rating based on a 13-point scale and performed an overall ranking of battalions within his purview. "The rating and the ranking were each converted to -*

standard scores and then combined into a single battalion effectiveness

score for that rater." From the questionnaire data were derived personal

judgement scores of service members (SMs), NCOs and officers within each of

the battalions. The scores were based on each rater's averaged response to

three items on the questionnaire (answers to each question were ratings

based on a 5-point scale). Scores "were then aggregated to produce an -

average SM, an average NCO, and an average officer estimate of battalion

effectiveness for each of the battalions." The data of waves one through

four were used.

Results. Results were reported in three correlational matrices-- - -

one matrix per group of measures. The mean for the group of 36 was .31, and

the median .26. All but two of the correlations among Unit Status Report

(USR) measures were labeled as significant and they ranged from -.10 to .86.

The author concluded that those correlations indicated that all the USR

measures reflect a general factor which supports high readiness reporting

system (REDCON) ratings. However, AGI and ARTEP were not highly correlated

and the only USR measures at least moderately correlated with ARTEP and AGI

were those pertinent to the maintenance status of equipment. The author

concluded that those relationships reflect "a unit's ability to make the -

most of what it has" as the common element among them.

For command indicators, there was only a small amount of internal

consistency. The mean for the group of 55 correlations was .11, the median

correlation .09, and almost all were less than .20. There were a large

number of correlations which were labeled statistically significant but of

* little practical utility because they were so small, and many significant

D-10

D-I 10i
correlations were due to the similarity of the measures (e.g. desertion rate

and AWOL rate). The author concluded that command indicators do not reflect

a singular construct.

The personal judgement measures showed the strongest interS.relationships. The mean of the 15 correlations was .31, and the median

* . was .29. However, "while individuals in more extreme echelons seem to hold

widely disparate views regarding what constitutes unit effectiveness,

individuals in intermediate echelons (i.e., Brigade Commanders, Battalion

Officers) partially share the perspective of both those above and those

below them in the chain-of-command."

Conclusions. The author of the paper's most significant concern

was the lack of validity among measures of unit mission capability. Of

r particular concern was the low degree of correlation between "Overall

REDCON" and ARTEPs or AGIs. The low degree of correlation between ARTEP and

AGI was explained by the fact that ARTEP scores are strongly influenced by

tactical proficiency whereas AGI scores emphasize garrison activity. With

regard to command indicators, the author firmly cautioned against the use of

*any one of these measures as indicators of unit morale or discipline due to

the lack of "concurrent validity" among the measures. The use of personal

judgements as measures of unit effectiveness was strongly encouraged particularly by those in higher echelons. The author concluded that many short-

*i comings in the use of current measures of effectiveness can be fruitfully

addressed.

D.2.2 Evaluation of Study

This paper leaves unanswered some questions pertinent to the study

methodology. (However, it should be pointed out that the study is described

in a paper presented at an annual meeting.) One of the unanswered questions

is the sample size. Aside from the fact that 71 battalions were involved,

the paper does not indicate the size of the Ns used for the correlations.

An analysis of the correlation matrices reveals that identical correlational

values in the same matrix are labeled as significant in one case and not

significant in another, thus revealing sample size differences. More importantly, correlations noted as significant at the .01 and .05 level appear to

have been deemed so partially on the basis of their Ns being approximately

D- 11
.'°• 

400. The author of the paper has indicated in an interview that the correlations are the averages of the correlations for each wave of data and there

were approximately 50 battalions per wave.

Another question concerns the differences or similarities in data

of different waves. No mention is made of tests which show that the correlations for different waves do not differ significantly and thus are appropriate to average across waves. Tests done by SAIC between wave three and

wave four data indicate that few of the correlations differ significantly

(see Section D.4.2 in this Volume for a more complete discussion). However,

SAIC was not able to test for differences between wave one and wave two

correlations.

On a larger scale is the appropriateness of the methods used to

examine the central issue of the paper--the validity of three groups of

variables which purport to measure the same construct. The author intercorrelated the variables but only with those variables within the same group

(e.g. readiness measures) and not with variables within the other two groups

(e.g. command indicators and personal judgements). Such a strategy implies

the three groups of variables measure three different constructs which is

similar to the idea the author mentioned early in the preface of the paper

(at least for readiness measures and command indicators). The preface

contained no discussion of the personal judgements or the construct they may

measure. However, it is possible that the readiness measures and the

personal judgements measure the same construct. The intercorrelations of

the variables within their respective groups did address the internal

consistency of the measures within each group. However, since there were

three different groups of measures all of which have been purported to

measure effectiveness, intercorrelations only within the three groups and

not betwee,. 'he groups, did ;iot best assess the validity (construct) of the

measures.

D-12

I.I

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D.3 COMMANDERS' ASSESSNENT OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES

I(Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara, 1981)

D.3.1 Description of Study ,'"

This study examined the relative value of the readiness measures,

the command indicators, and the personal judgements.

V'.

Procedures. A total of 84 field-grade officers' (48 Bn CO's, 28

Brigade CO's and 8 general officers) interview data were used. The data

were: (1) ratings (from 0% to 100%) for each of 22 types of information as

to "how accurate an assessment of battalion effectiveness would be if it

- were based on any single piece of information from the listed provided," and

ri " (2) the frequency with which interviewees selected each of the 22 types of

information as a 5-measure composite providing "the most complete picture of

a battalion's overall effectiveness." The types of information to be rated

were the specific readiness measures, command indicators, and personal

judgements.

Results. Both the rating and frequency types of data revealed

*. that four of the 22 measures were rated significantly higher than and

. selected much more often than the rest. The measures are: ARTEP (72.5%

accuracy rating, 75% included it in composite), Company grade officer's K

K judgement (71.2%/52%), NCO's judgement (71.0%/64%), and AGI (66.7%/57%).

* "The percentages of the fifth position items were 63.3% and 33%.

Conclusions. The authors of the paper concluded that the gap

between the percentage for the fourth ranked measure, AGI (57%), and that of

the fifth measure (33%) demonstrated the validity of the four measures if

S-used in a composite. The authors also concluded that the commanders'

responses to questions showed that they view these measures as falling into

three different categories--readiness measures, personal judgements and

command indicators. Whereas readiness measures and personal judgements were

seen to be similar in value, command indicators had substantially less merit

as indices of unit effectiveness. Recommendations were to discourage tradi-

" ,. tional use of command indicators as measures of unit effectiveness and to

encourage reliance on the options of subordinates. r

D-13

. -. . . . .. . . . . . . ".. 
. . . . ,' % - ' , '" j & ' 7 ;' % 'w 1 ." .-i, 

".. 

.- .-. ..... 

7-- 7-;- '. '

D.3.2 Evaluation of Study -

This study is the most straight forward, well written, and useful

of all those done on the Command Climate Data, especially in terms of

identifying potential predictors of effectiveness for task forces in garri- '--

son and possible at the NTC. Obtaining the indications of experienced

officers as to the most accurate measures of effectiveness is the first

logical and sound step in establishing the validity of a set of potential

predictors for the NTC. Since there is little evidence of any compromis- to

either the internal or external validity of the study, its results appear to

hold substantial value.

Only one caution is offered which concerns the potential bias of

the stimuli used in the interviews. It is obvious in the paper that the

experimenters viewed the 22 measures as existing in three groups. The paper

does not indicate that the measures were randomly listed in their presentation to evaluators. If they were not, a biased presentation of measures and

possible experimenter bias during the 1 1/2 hour interviews could well have

influenced the way that interviewees rated and selected the measures.

D.4 THE TEMPORAL DYNAMICS OF UNIT EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES

(O'Mara, Kerner-Hoeg and Balzar, 1982)

D.4.1 Description of Study

The purpose of this study was "to examine the way in which the

various measures of unit effectiveness operate across time." The authors

stated that if different measures do in fact measure the same construct,

then values obtained by these measures over time should show similar trends. r- ,

Procedures. Measures of effectiveness from 55 battalions were

used. The measures were taken from the five waves of climate data and thus

sample size varied. The typical three types of data of the previous studies

were used: readiness measures, command indicators and personal judgements.

Again, measures reported on a monthly basis were "aggregated" (presumably

averaged) into quarterly scores." There were a maximum of 13 quarters of

data for all but the personal judgements for which there were only four

samplings. For each variable, a correlation was computed between successive

D-14
measurements of the variable. For each variable correlations were computed

.I for pairs of measurements up to those separated by eight quarters (although

N. correlations for personal judgement data were computed for only the four

!: t.~waves yielding correlations for intervals of one, two and three waves). For

example, for each variable, correlations were computed between adjacent

PL quarters (e.g., between quarters one and two, two and three, three and four,

etc.). These correlations were then averaged to get a single correlation

for each variable, indicating the average correlation between measurements

separated by one quarter. Then for each variable, correlations were

computed between all measurements separated by two quarters (i.e., quarters -

one and three, two and four, etc.). These were averaged. The process was

completed for intervals of up to eight quarters.

Results. All the correlations between immediately adjacent

measurements were significant. They range from .206 to .761 with the

, average being .52. Generally the correlations between pairs of widely

separated measurements were smaller than those between more adjacent pairs

of measurements. However, for many of the command indicators, the correlations between widely separated measurements were not smaller than those

between more adjacent pairs of measurements. Also, almost all the correlations between the command indicators are statistically significant even when

the interval between measurements is as great as eight quarters.

SConclusions. The authors concluded that the differing rates of

change for different variables indicated that the variables were measuring

more than one underlying construct (i.e., unit effectiveness). They noted

that the results and conclusion are similar to those of an earlier paper

(O'Mara, 1981).

D.4.2 Evaluation of Study

Since the primary test of whether the variables measure the same

underlying construct (i.e., unit effectiveness) was to be a comparison of

the variables rates of change across time, the authors noted that the

variables did not show the same rates of change over time and thus were

measuring different underlying constructs. However, no two variables should

D--15

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,'°d

be expected to have 100 percent shared variance. Thus they could partially

measure the same construct (e.g., have 50 percent shared variance) and yet .

have differing rates of change due to their unshared variance.

D.5 THE NEASURENENT OF MORALE (Kimmel and O'Mara, 1981)

D.5.1 Description of Study ,. -

The purpose of this study was to develop a reliable and valid -j

measure of Army unit morale. Items from the command climate questionnaire

were used as the measure of morale.

Procedures. Questionnaire data were used from three of the four

waves of data. A "satisfaction" score was calculated for each respondent by

averaging his or her responses to four items on the questionnaire. A satis-

- faction score was calculated for each battalion by obtaining the average of

S-all the battalion members' satisfaction scores. These averages were

obtained for each wave of data.

An attempt was made to demonstrate that the satisfaction scores

represent affective orientation toward the organization. This was done by

categorizing all items on the questionnaire, other than the four satisfaction items, as either affectively positive, negative or neutral. The zscores of the positive and negative items were separately averaged and then

each respondents' affective orientation score was calculated as (Z+)-(Z-)/2. --

The affective orientation scores were correlated with scores from respondents' satisfaction items (not the sum of these items which was called the .-

satisfaction score). Also, satisfaction scores were analyzed by using oneway analyses of variance (ANOVA) with battalion as the independent variable.

Results. The correlations between affective orientation and the

scores on the satisfaction items were all about .40 for all three waves.-

The multiple correlation between affective orientation and all the satisfac- :

tion items was generally .80. The ANOVAs showed battalion to be a significant effect for all three waves of data (analyzed separately) and all three

levels of personnel (analyzed separately).

D-16
;.....'

Conclusions. The authors concluded that "morale can be legitimately operationalized" at the battalion level even though the measure of

morale dealt with only satisfaction.

0.5.2 Evaluation of Study

The questionnaire items measured many types of constructs as the

Bowers and Davenport (1984) paper demonstrated. However, most of the

constructs were the same as or similar to organizational climate. Since the

four satisfaction items were correlated with all of these climate-related

items in the form of the affective orientation scores, it is reasonable to

assume that the satisfaction items do in fact measure respondents' satisfaction. However, morale, as the authors pointed out, embodies more than just

satisfaction.

Another issue is the authors questionable conclusion that morale

can be operational ized at the battalion level. In other words, morale as

measured by the four items significantly differs between battalions. Notwithstanding whether or not these items measure morale, satisfaction or I organizational climate, an F value of 2.63, the average for the 9 ANOVAs

(done for three waves by three types of personnel), indicates that the

between-cell variance relative to the within-cell variance was minimal. (No

mean squares or indications of amounts of variance accounted for were

presented.) Thus the differences between battalions were only a small

fraction of the differences between individuals within battalions. This is

similar to the results of the Bowers and Davenport paper in which they

stated that only company level effects and to a lesser extent the effect of

division were significant influences on the questionnaire data; and even

S-those effects accounted for less than one percent of the variance in any of

the scores for clusters of questionnaire items. Thus, in the Bowers and

Davenport paper, battalion level effects had no influence on the questionnaire data. The ANOVAs in this morale study indicated that battalion had a

statistically significant effect, but only because the dfs used were so

large, typically 52 and approximately 500 (for officers), or 1500 (for

* NCOs), or 3700 (form enlisted personnel). Thus, the conclusion that the few

"* questionnaire items can be used to operationalize morale at the battalion

level is not very strongly supported.

D-17

........................................- *-4
D.6 THE EFFECTS OF MANAGERIAL SUCCESSION ON ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE -

(Kerner-Hoeg and O'Mara, 1980)

D.6.1 Description of Study ,.

In a review of past studies on the effects of the loss and

subsequent replacement of a manager in both industrial and sport team settings, the authors observe that managerial succession generally produces a

decrease in organizational performance. This study tested the hypothesis

that, in the military organizational context, battalion performance will

show a similar decrement in the period immediately following the change of

battalion command. In addition, the authors hypothesize that as new commander's gain experience, the initial performance decrement will gradually

disappear.

Procedures. The authors defined the independent variable as the

number of months that a particular battalion commander had been in his

position at the time battalion performance was assessed. The authors

obtained data from "approximately 60 battalions located in the continental

United States between May and November 1978." The dependent measures were

the usual twenty-one different measures divided into three groups: readiness indicators, command indicators, and personal judgements. The authors

report that they averaged each battalion's scores for each type of data

"into quarterly figures to enhance reliability," and categorized each score

in terms of one of the monthly intervals (total of 15) of the independent

variable. The categorizations were based on the central month of the

quarter for which the data was collected. The group of personal judgement

measures was both interview and questionnaire data obtained from five

sources in the following two different ways: (1) The Division Commander,

Assistant Division Commander and Brigade Commander were interviewed and each

yielded a standard score for each battalion under his direct authority. The

standard score was derived from a rating of the battalions using a 13 point

scale (A+ to F) plus a ranking of the battalions within his purview), (2)

Battalion Officers and Battalion Non-commissioned officers (10% sample)

questionnaire data was used to obtain their average score across three

questions. A one-way ANOVA was used to test for an effect of managerial

(commander) succession.

D-18

- I
Results. The authors reported that the independent variable had a

, I!significant effect on only one of the 21 dependent measures. This finding

was discounted as a chance occurrence.

Conclusions. The authors concluded that because of the high

!W degree of "bureaucratization" in the Army, there are a number of significant

factors which buffer a battalion's performance from the fact that its

commander has changed: preponderance of rules and regulations precludes

dramatic innovation in procedures; stability of an organizational goal to

- maintain combat readiness is not altered by the commander; rotation of the

commander on a routine (18 months) basis reinforces stability because it

* provides a stable expectancy for change of CO, helps in planning, smoothes

the transition and is not perceived as reflecting on the goodness or badness

of battalion performance.

r

D.6.2 Evaluation of Study

The large size of the data base used in this study and the sources

* of the dependent measures (i.e. Unit Status Reports and soldier/officers

judgements) contribute to the external validity of the study. However, the

authors appear to have obscured whatever information the data may have

contained about the effects of managerial succession. First of all, by

averaging the monthly data into quarterly scores, the authors lost their

I best chance to observe an effect due to succession. The authors speculated,

"* the effect of a change of command is most likely to be evidenced immediately

after the change of command occurs. Thus by combining into one score the

S.- first, second and third months of dependent measures following a command

change, the evidence for an effect got diluted.

Secondly, since "change" or "difference" scores were not used, the

within-cell variances of the ANOVAs are much greater than they had to be and

thus it was much more difficult to observe between-cell differences.

Thirdly, as McCleary and Hayes (1980) point out, an ANOVA does not

control for the trend each battalion exhibited before the change of command ...

occurred. This idea is similar to the reason for using "change" or "differ- .

S[.ence" scores when trying to measure change over time. However, the most

powerful means of testing for the effect of a command change is through the

D- 19
-A~

use of an auto -reg res s ive -integrated-moving-average modeling process (c.f.

McCleary and Hayes, 1980; Glass, Wilson and Gottman, 1975). Ly

J-1

D-20
Appendix E

REVIEW OF ORGANIZATION&L EFFECTIVENESS STUDIES

E-1
. -. b?; . "

APPENDIX E

This appendix contains a review of all pertinent and available

previously published studies of organizational effectiveness which were

based on AMORE. Ten studies are reviewed following a description of the .,

AMORE methodology.

E.1 DESCRIPTION OF AMORE

E.1.1 General

The AMORE methodology is a flexible, computer-based, analytical

process designed tr be used to assess the capability of a unit to perform

its missions. The most fundamental use of the methodology is to examine the

ability of a unit to be able to form organizational increments of capability

after its original resources have been degraded. The methodology usually

entails two phases: development of input data and use of computer based

simulation. -

E.1.2 Input Data

The development of input data requires a careful and detailed

examination of missions, capabilities, Organizational and Operational (O&O)

concepts and the resources provided in the appropriate Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE's) for the unit selected for analysis. As part of

the input data, and as one of the basic underpinnings of the methodology,

the unit of analysis is divided into Mission Essential Teams (METs). METs

are supposed to be equal increments of unit capability and are the minimum -

essential personnel and materiel resources required to form each increment.

Transfer matrices are then developed for both personnel and

materiel. Transfer matrices define allowable substitutions between personnel (and materiel) which are often theoretically made after a unit's personnel or materiel have theoretically suffered casualties. Each personnel

skill and materiel item is selected to fill its own position first and will

not be selected to fill another position unless such selection would result

in the unit being able to form another MET.

E-2
5 Other input data include the degree(s) of casualties (often called

degradations) the unit will theoretically be subjected to. Personnel

* degradations can be considered to be due to combat losses, losses due to

*sickness, leave, drugs, or other reasons. Materiel degradations include

P combat losses and unavailability due to reliability, availability, and

-maintainability factors. Input data also include the commander's assessment

time which is the time required for a commander to assess the situation,

make his decision and issue guidance or orders about substitutions.

E.1.3 Computer Based Simulation

Once the input data are developed, AMORE software is used to

stochastically apply degradations of interest to the personnel and materiel

fof the unit. The software then employs a transportation algorithm to most

efficiently make substitutions among remaining personnel and materiel. Then

", I.°"

the software determines the number of METs which the unit can form. Output

also includes an identification of which resources prevent the organization

from forming a greater number of METs. Since casualties are stochastically

applied, the whole sequence of applying casualties, making substitutions and

determining the number of METs which can be built is performed many times

and the average number of METs which can be formed is calculated.

m nUnder many circumstances, the ability of the unit to form METs as

a function of time following degradation is also of interest, e.g., when

unit productivity (work out ut for a specified time horizon) or materiel

availability are of particular interest. In these cases the formation of

METs as a function of time is calculated.

E.2 REVIEW OF STUDIES

In the context of the AMORE methodology, the capability of a unit

can usually be increased by decreasing its mission requirements or by

increasing its critical resources. Increased availability of materiel and

personnel resources can be achieved in several ways such as an increase in

the number of personnel authorized for a unit, or non-critical personnel and

Snmateriel can be replaced by critical personnel and materiel. Also, person-,

nel can be cross-trained, and equipment can be modified so as to be usable

E-3
I -- ,- - ." .-

for multiple purposes. In addition, actions can be taken to increase the _

survivability of resources.

However, most of the changes suggested above require TOE changes

and/or equipment modification and both of these require Department of the

Army approval. Thus, if any changes such as those suggested above were made

they would probably be made to all units which might go to the NTC and thus

such changes or variables would not be predictors of effectiveness at the

NTC. The principal course of action available to the commander for increas- -

ing a unit's potential capability after degradation and thus enhancing unit

effectiveness is to increase the degree to which his personnel can substitute for one another. The factors which influence substitutability are

identified in the reviews which follow. Table E-1 is a synopsis of the past

AMDRE analyses reviewed.

Table E-1. SUMMARY OF PAST AMORE ANALYSIS

Date of

Study Title of Study

Aug 79 Military Organizational Effectiveness of Forward Support ....

,% 79 Organizational Effectiveness for Small Unit Design Analysis

Sep 79 Military Organizational Effectiveness/Readiness and

Sustainabil ity

Apr 81 Study of Sustainable Loss Rates

Jul 82 An Analysis of the Capability of Alt. Division-86 155mm.

Howitzer Battery Organizations

Apr 83 Design of a Battalion Combined Arms Task Force (BCATF)

Feb 84 An Analysis of the Capabilities of the HHC Inf. Div. (Light)

and HHC Inf. Div. (L) Brigade

Apr 84 Application of AMORE Methodology to Manpower, Personnel,

Training Front-End Analysis of New Material Systems . - -

E-4

-1

-. '. .- - .' '. .-'-.: : -'.... v .'''-. .,' '. ., . -. .' " . . .. . - .. .- .- ... . .- i'
Table E-1. SUMMARY OF PAST AMORE ANALYSIS (continued)

Date of

Study Title of Study

Jun 84 Analysis of the Proposed Personnel and Equipment for RPV

Nov 84 Improvements of the AMORE Methodology as an Aid in the Design

and Evaluation of Military Organizations

* E.2.1 Military Organizational Effectiveness of Forward Support Units

(Robinson, March, Murphy, and Strickland, 1979)

E.2.1.1 Description of Study

Procedures. The dual purposes of this study were to quantify the

Maintenance Battalion Forward Support Company's capability after a range of

casualties were applied, and to find practical ways to improve its survivait bility. Insights to improved capability were also developed.

The company's anatomy (structure, resources, mission priorities)

was examined in detail and its missions were seen as primarily teing team

maintenance (provide tailored teams to service battalion types) and centralized maintenance (support the teams and provide higher echelon, :entralized

maintenance activities). Capability was measured as a function of the

number of battalions (independently for field artillery, armor, and mechanized infantry) the company could support for each level of degradation.

The following five factors were examined in terms of their cost effectiveS. ness to increase the unit's capability after degradation: (1) damage level

variation, (2) increased cross training, (3) equipment redundancy, (4)

personnel hardening, and (5) materiel hardening.

E-5

"_,'_.' : ..' ,: .=' ,,' . .. : .-.. ' . .. "-.j." . .. .'. -. : . -, '. . ". . . ' .. " .. .. , .,-_
* * , * -. - . -- -ofl **...

Results. The analysis revealed that hardening selected Items of

equipment is the most cost-effective way of improving the capability of the 4

company. Early recovery of capability was not significantly Improved by

increased cross training due to inability of the unit to reorganize itself

and bring reassigned personnel to a level of proficiency within the time . "

period investigated. Only personnel and equipment hardening provided

significant improvement in early recovery. .

The unit's ability to support battalion types, and its relative

sensitivity to air versus artillery also were quantified. For the FA

battalions (best support at all levels of degradation), the study found that

mission capability was enhanced when decentralized teams were used to "-

support the firing elements. The results also suggested the need for additional transportation lift and materiel handling equipment and an improved

repair parts processing system, in addition to selective hardening of

materiel items. Numerous critical skills were identified in the study

depending on type of unit supported and level of degradation. An inexpensive improvement can be achieved by cross training automotive mechanics in

critical skills, especially field artillery mechanic (45L) and instrument

and fire control repairmen (41C). The electronic devices repairmen (35E)

was found to be most critical at all casualty levels for Infantry Battalion

" support. In terms of equipment, repair parts were found to be critical at

". all damage levels, but the electronic shop van also became critical as

severity of damage increases. This order was found to vary somewhat for

artillery unit support.

E.2.1.2 Evaluation of Study

Observations that have implications for the current analysis are --

that AMORE techniques should be extended to determine the leverage to be

gained by changes in the locations and levels of service for the various

maintenance functions.

E.2.2 Organizational Development for Small Unit Design Analysis -

(Robinson, March, Murphy, and Strickland, 1979)

E-6 ....

E-6 '':
-. -- - ." "T ".- -- k P -a r..~. T rtA -X _7 T- f .- - - ,--A

E.2.2.1 Description of Study 4 "

unit' in Procedures. This study researched the anatomy of company level

iunits in order to identify alternative force designs to maximize capability.

Findings are presented which provide insights to organizational development,

and include discussion of training, organization, mission, human factors,

materiel, support, and other factors that impact resiliency. Major emphasis

was placed on the tank, mechanized infantry, and forward support companies, .

and the 155 mm SP artillery battery.

Results. Important insights resulting from this analysis include -

the following:

o Organizations which are designed to have a 40% or greater

balanced substitutability of personnel are robust. At lower

percentages of substitutability, after degradation the units

are able to form fewer and unacceptable numbers of METs. A

difference in substitutability (40% versus 25%) can make the

difference between units that can continue to fight and those

which must be replaced.

",-" o Substitutability of materiel is generally much lower than ,

that for personnel. For example, materiel substitutability

i of five to ten percent is typical. This explains why the

unit effectiveness is very dependent on materiel availability

and indicates the high leverage obtainable by defeating key

materiel items. Due to the dominant effect of materiel

losses, typical organizations can absorb approximately 30%

more personnel casualties than materiel damage without

further restricting the organizational capability.

0 Both combat reaction and continuous combat (fatigue) induce

additional casualties or virtual casualties. However, for

organizations that have an adequate level (40%) of substitutability the impact of such degradation can usually be

absorbed.

E-7

-. . . ..... . -... .... ..- ° _.......... .... ... .... .-.... -- ..-.-.- -...-.- ';-,
L r.

.. .-. p* ...

o In combat environments where high levels of personnel ,

casualties are expected (i.e., tactical nuclear or chemical)

substitutability of skills should be structured at levels

above 40%.

o Preliminary investigation of the impact of the lack of cohesiveness reveals that it can degrade the organizational

capability by the equivalent of 15% additional casualties.

Any means to enhance unit cohesiveness is clearly of value.

o Historically, certain organizations are more dependent on the

accomplishment of a series of functions to perform their

mission. Basic or primary teams in such organizations must

depend on other organizational elements to be effective. A

good example is an artillery battery. In other instances

there are organizations which contain more self sufficient

elements (e.g., tank companies). The value of self sufficiency is made evident by the AMORE analysis. Accordingly,

every attempt should be made to provide self sufficiency for

units to achieve maximum resiliency.

Further analyses were conducted based on the observations of past

human factors studies. Each of four factors plus the added factor of damage

levels were examined at two levels. These important factors are shown

.. below, along with the change in tank unit effectiveness that resulted when

each was applied.

Change in Number of

Factor Tank Crews Recovered

A - Denial of Responsibility (Fatigue) -3.6

B - Cohesiveness -2.4

C - Tradeoffs within Unit (6 Spaces) 40.5

D - Unit Strength Reduction (9 Spaces) -1.2 '

E -Increased Personnel Incapacitation -2.7

The effects of fatigue (A) and cohesiveness (B) were in corporated by ,

making adjustments to the substitutability matrix. -

E-8

. .. . .. ... .. .. . ..... . . . ..

• .. . . "..........._......._..... % ... % ... °• ........ ... ,2.# ..... •.
-. :7 1 77" ,- 

*p .h. .% r, ,., K .....

The relative ranking shows that the fatigue factor has about a 1/3

greater impact than the 15% increase in personnel incapacitation. The

cohesiveness factor has about the same impact as the change in personnel

incapacitation. Tradeoffs within the unit have a minor impact and unit

strength changes have some impact. These last two factors show the type of

results that can be expected when units have high degrees of substitutability among personnel.

E.2.2.2 Evaluation of Study

This study was extremely useful in providing a description of

factors that effect substitutability, and providing a measure of quatification for each. A summary of factors which enhance unit capability on the

r- battlefield was developed and are listed below:

1. High substitutability of personnel and materiel.

2. Minimum number of essential skills or materiel items per

function.

3. Reduced probability of kill for both materiel and personnel.

4. Self sufficient organizational elements.

5. Appropriate levels of cohesiveness.

6. Good SOP's for training and implementation of reconstitution.

E.2.3 Military Organization Effectiveness/Readiness and Sustainablity

(Ross, Murphy, March, Robinson, and Tullington, September 1979)

E.2.3.1 Description of Study F

Procedures. The purpose was to provide insights to improve U.S.

. Army unit readiness and replenishment policies by illuminating the relation-

* : ships between resources and unit readiness and capability. The AMORE

methodology was applied to armor, mechanized infantry, and artillery, r

- battalions and to the Forward Support Maintenance Company to determine their

capability to recover from the effects of a range of combat damage. The

units were examined at three readiness levels and at full TOE capability,

and were measured against four levels of combat degradation. Insights to

improve readiness and replenishment policies are provided.

E-9
Periods of time following combat degradation were evaluated. The

sustainability ratio was defined as the ratio of percent loss in combat, .

capability to the percentage of lost resources. The smaller the ratio, the '

more sustainable the unit using its internal resources. A ratio of 1.0 or

less was generally considered acceptable in past AMORE analyses.

Results. This study found that current policy (the statistical

readiness categories) does not provide an accurate basis for estimating unit

combat capability. Use of the AMORE methodology and the concept of the -

sustainability ratio was found to provide better indicators of readiness.

The study also described key limiting factors. The key limiting factor for

line companies was normally material, whereas personnel was usually the

limiting factor for support companies.

Considerable emphasis was placed on ways to enhance personnel

readiness. It was determined that considerable leverage could be achieved

by prioritizing unit personnel replacements based on skills critical to

sustainability and unit reconstitution. It was found that random replacement procedures, or procedures geared to strict TOE percentages ignores the

criticality to combat effectiveness of certain positions.

The study also assessed the relationship of human factors to

combat capability under conditions of continuous combat. The research 3

attempted to quantify the effects of stress, fatigue, sleep loss, and

"combat reaction" on individuals, and the resultant impact on organizational

capability. The study found that degradation due to human factors can

seriously impact combat effectiveness. The AMORE methodology was found to

7 be able to employ appropriate human factor inputs and evaluate the resultant

impacts. For example, the Service Battery of the FA Battalion was found to -

be able to reconstitute to about 98% of TOE personnel capability following

10% personnel casualties. But when expected "combat reaction" (for a unit

experiencing combat for the first time) casualties are considered, reconsti- - .

tuted effectiveness drops to about 80 to 85%. These types of inputs all

have major implications in terms of substitutability.

E-10

'-,
* E.2.3.2 Evaluation of Study

This study established some clear relationships between degrading

factors and unit sustainability. It helped to quantify the effect of

factors such as morale, leadership, confidence, cohesiveness, and others on .

i unit capability. It provided an excellent first step in establishing

factors that preclude restoration of combat capability following degradation, and recommended that further study be initiated to quantify alternative means (such as cross training, redundancy, or hardening) to recover

from such degradation. b

" E.2.4 Study of Sustainable Loss Rates (Ross, 1981)

E.2.4.1 Description of Study

Procedures. This effort investigated the response of a selected

cross-section of U.S. Army unit types to losses of personnel and materiel,

to determine the ability of the units to sustain operational capability

levels of following degradation. AMORE was used to calculate unit capability as a function of time over a wide range of degradation levels.

. Results. Capability contour charts were developed to show the

maximum recovery levels that a unit could attain after sustaining particular mi losses of personnel and materiel. For example, after 20% loss of materiel

and 17% loss in personnel, the Data Processing Unit can only recover to a

60% capability.

Figure E-1 shows differences and commonalities among units whose

losses limit their maximum recovery to 60 percent. The sustainability ratio

(ratio of capability loss in percent to percent loss of personnel or

material) is superimposed, and shows the difference between units. A ratio

of 1.0 or less has generally been used to define a robust unit. The smaller

the ratio, the more inherently sustainable the unit is after degradation.

E.2.4.2 Evaluation of Study

t' .Application of the AMORE methodology was found to enable determination of those skills, materiel items, and doctrinal and training changes

E-11

- -. -,-.
'7--7. 

'.

..... orward Supper: Company ........... Mdical Company, Clearing

.....Ord Ammunition Cc, GS,/DS

Data Processing Unit

07=

% %~

.2C .3 .4

r FRAC'rzONAL MIATERXEL LOSS

4.0 2.0 1A33 i0c.8

Sustainability Ratio

Figure E-1. COMPARISON OF UNIT RESPONSE, LOSSES LIMITING UNIT

CAPABILITY RECOVERY TO 60% MAXIMUM

E12
* ,i.:,

key to raising unit productivity. AMORE was found to have potential appli- Ication in areas such as readiness, training, doctrine, system acquisition,

human factors, manpower authorization criteria, force development, replen-

* .' ishment priorities, contingency analysis, and other cases.

E.2.5 An Analysis of the Capability of Alternative Division-86

155= Howitzer Battery Organizations

(Robinson and Hannon, 1982)

E.2.5.1 Description of Study

Procedures. A baseline and six alternative battery organizations

were examined to determine the preferred alternative for a battery to accomplish high intensity continuous combat operations. METs were defined as

I ~ consisting of a howitzer crew plus a slice of the command, control, and

support resources needed for effective operations. The study concentrated

on organization of the howitzer section (eight sections per battery).

Organizational alternatives were based on the results of an ARI effort

(using field measurement of task time data and use of the Crew Performance

Model) that demonstrated the advantages of using two crews of five personnel

each to replace the current 10-man section. The two crews would alternate

. -between warfighting and support tasks such as replenishment of supplies,

risk reduction efforts, and rest and hygiene requirements. This would

I ~permit roughly equal combat mission capability while significantly increasing the amount of time available for support tasks, and greatly reducing

idle time on the part of members of the 10-man crew. Minor changes in

equipment or procedures could further improve times using the new organization.

"- Substitutability factors for personnel were determined using past

AMORE guidelines with substitution based on the 3 digit Military Occupational Specialty Code (MOSC) skill group, with time delays depending on the

type and sophistication of the skill, differences in career fields, and the

.**degree of leadership or supervisory skill and experience required. Equip-

-. '. ment substitutability was based on the ability of one item to substitute for

another, with time added depending on the type and extent of modifications

required.

E-13

.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

• ..... -.. .,. •. . .. .. . ........... **
.* .,+-.-*. .. T.

. _N.4 . .

... ,-...

Results. The AMORE model substantiated that the current organization was unsatisfactory compared to that of two teams of four or five men

each. It was also demonstrated by simulation that training, cohesiveness,

leadership, and procedural matters can influence substitutability.

E.2.5.2 Evaluation of Study

This study provides useful insights into components of substitutability at the crew or small section level, and at the level of significant

organizational interactions, and provides useful measures of the relative

influence of various components of substitution.

E.2.6 Design of a Battalion Combined Arms Task Force (BCATF)

(Hannon, Robinson, and Stenstrom, 1983)

E.2.6.1 Description of Study

Procedures. This study attempted to develop an organizational

design methodology based on AMORE and demonstrate the methodology by using

the BCATF. An alternative BCATF organization was developed which replaces

twc different types of organizations (armored and mechanized battalions)

with two of the same type organizations (BCATF). The tank, mechanized

infantry, and headquarters companies (consisting of scout and mortar

platoons, combat and field trains, and command post) were separately evaluated due to their dispersed geographical locations during operations. The

units were evaluated against sustained operations and two levels of surge

combat conditions (15%, 30%, and 40% personnel losses, respectively). The

level of substitutability was significantly higher in the tank and mechanized infantry companies than in the other BCATF elements. The tank company r7

met or exceeded the design criteria for all three combat condition levels. - -

As a final test, one tank platoon was detached and a mech platoon with

associated support personnel was attached to determine the capability of a .. --

tank heavy company. This modification failed to meet personnel design

criteria under sustained combat conditions. Additional maintenance personnel, cross training, reorganization of the MET and doctrinal changes in the

employment of maintenance personnel offer potential for alleviating the

shortfall. Analysis of the mech company yielded similar results and factors.

E-14 -1
Results. Use of the AMORE methodology provided the following

insights into substitutability and capability of these important combat

units:

o While personnel strength is greater than the average of the

al two old organizations, it can probably be reduced by further

refinement, especially in the scout and mortar platoons.

0 Major factors that influence substitutability for the BCATF

are its organizational concept, and the geographical dispersion of units during operations (especially in cases where a

"slice" of capability is provided for each location).

E.2.6.2 Evaluation of Study

This analysis provided valuable insight into the design and the

effectiveness of task-organized units and headquarters elements. The conclusions that headquarters organizations are less capable due to divided

capabilities and dispersed geographical locations leads to the assessment

that detailed scrutiny is required to improve the substitutability and

resilience of such organizations.

E.2.7 An Analysis of the Capability of the HHC, Infantry Division

(Light), and the HHC, Infantry Division (Light) Brigade

(SAI, 1984)

E.2.7.1 Description of Study

Procedures. This study used AMORE to determine an optimal unit

organizational structure for the headquarters companies. The study identified critical personnel skills and material items for inclusion in the

optimal design.

Results. The Brigade HHC had a moderate degree of substitutability due to the variety of MOSCs normally present in a headquarters unit.

Nevertheless, the unit was quite robust, due partly to the availability of E numbers of personnel above MET requirements. High materiel substitutability

can be attributed to the presence of many items in excess of minimum MET

E-15
J .- w .4

requirements, and to several groups of similar equipment items (such as

radios, generators, and trucks).

The Division HHC is able to build many METs even after 20 percent ", -

degradation, but after higher levels of degradation its ability to do so ,."

drops off sharply. This is due to a fairly large population of each type of

personnel, and a wide range of different types of personnel. As degradation

increases, skills are not available to transfer from one area to another.

An exception is the G-2 function which degrades rapidly since it incorporates a wide variety of skills and disparate grade levels. It appears -

that cross training and combining tasks within MOSC's can significantly

improve the substitutability level of the organization.

E.2.7.2 Evaluation of Study

As in other studies, it was determined that the intelligence

capability of the unit (especially for division headquarters) was most

sensitive to personnel losses. Cross-training in this and other sections

could alleviate part of the problem. However, even cross training is not a complete solution due to variations in intelligence position grade strucetures and functions. Materiel substitutability for these organizations

appears very positive (reliant).

E.2.8 Application of AMORE Methodology to Manpower, Personnel, and

Training (MPT) Front End Analysis of New Materiel Systems

(Helmuth and Conroy, 1984)

E.2.8.1 Description of Study

Procedures. The objective of this7 study was to develop a methodology for applying AMORE to manpower, personnel, and training front-end

analysis of new materiel systems.

However, several other issues pertinent to NTC were dealt with.

These began with the choice of the Division Support Weapon System (DSWS) as

an illustrative example of a new materiel system in an early stage of

development, and compared to its predecessor, the M109 series 155-mm self- .

propelled howitzer. The unit baseline was the Division-86 Howitzer Battery.

E-16

_.. ... . . . . . . . . . . ** ... S * ~S
-- - -. U . °- ".o. 

Also the effectiveness of both units was calculated using an 8 MET organization with degradation levels of 12.5, 25, and 37.5 percent. Critical

personnel skills and equipment items were identified, and then new designs

' were developed to increase efficiency. Based on identification of critical

and high-leverage skills, changes to material systems were postulated that

P m could eliminate critical task requirements. Materiel design changes in this

study included: an automatic loader, a device to remotely check firing

data, and built-in maintenance diagnostic equipment. The effects of these

items were reflected by making necessary changes to the unit MET and substitutability matrices. AMORE was then run to determine the influence on MET

requirements.

Results. The pertinent results revealed that an increase in cross

training was found to increase the percent of substitutability. On the .

Sr negative side, use of new equipment items that reduce personnel requirements

were sometimies found to reduce unit capability when working in degraded

environments when more personnel are desired for support tasks. It was

Sm observed that the methodology can and should be used early in the develop-

- ment cycle of new equipment acquisitions, to include the source selection

process.

*-.' E.2.8.2 Evaluation of Study

H* This study shows that substitutability is a critical data input

*. for assessing unit response to degradation and shows how to quantitatively

* -assess degradation resulting from factors such as material design changes,

*' " fatigue, and reduced levels of teamwork (provided that valid input data is

developed). It also shows how equipment designed to reduce supervisory,

maintenance, and communication requirements has a generally positive effect

on capability, while reductions in crew size often have a minimal effect on

capability, as it results in a larger starting population of personnel with

non-homogeneous skills, and also reduces the number of personnel needed to

perform support tasks.

". E-17 .. . .o .

. . . . *... . ......... .... . * . -.... ... ..... .
-4

E.2.9 Analysis of the Proposed Personnel and Equipment for the Remtely -

Piloted Vehicle (Hannon, Welp, and March, 1984)

E.2.9.1 Description of Study

Procedures. The purpose of this study was to use the AMORE

methodology to design the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) platoon. The unit

mission and Organizational and Operational (O&O) concepts were analyzed, and

organizational design criteria were established, to include desired levels

of capability following degradation.

Results. Substitutability criteria for personnel and materiel

were discussed in detail. Platoon personnel have a high degree of substitutability, and this degree can be further increased with cross training for

RPV operator/ mechanic and generator repairmen (MOS 52D). There are thir- - .

teen materiel items within the platoon for which no substitutions are

possible. These items could be added to the unit authorization, but this

would require additional personnel for an additional MET, or would require

personnel and materiel assets for maintenance, storage, transportation and

other requirements. A preferred alternative is classification of the items

as maintenance float to be stocked at DS or GS level maintenance, with

procedures in place for rapid accession of these items when required.

Based on the current authorization of personnel and equipment, the : -

unit is highly capable. This is not true with regard to materiel. After

about 15 percent degradation, equipment falls rapidly to about 55 percent of

original capability.

E.2.9.2 Evaluation of Study

This study provides insights into the effect of changing the

ordering in which METs are formed and using different ratios of type METs to

enhance resiliency. Also, several factors were identified which influence

substitutability. For personnel, training, especially cross training and

on-the-job training, was emphasized. For materiel, the availability of

replacement equipment as float items was described as a major factor. Additionally, organizational factors were discussed as having an impact on ,

substitutability. For example, change in the percentage of type and order

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of METs can help achieve the greatest effectiveness in the shortest time.

Also, consideration must be given to the substitutability of organizations

for each other (i.e., CLRS reverts to FCS function when RPV launch and

recovery capabilities is lost).

All these have implications for measureably increased substitutability, therefore unit capability, based on minutes of aerial vehicle

coverage per day. These factors have implication for other type organizaE.2.10 Improvement of the AMORE Methodology as an Aid in

the Design and Evaluation of Military Organizations

(Hannon, Fineberg, and Helmuth, 1984)

E.2.10.1 Description of Study

* Procedures. This research was conducted to examine the AMORE

methodology and recommend improvements to it for use as an aid in organiza- m tional effectiveness and design. The study closely examined the concepts of

the mission essential team (MET), the type of capability that AMORE k.

- measures, the type and size of units to which AMORE can be validly applied,

and how it can be best used in the force design process.

m Results. The study concluded that it was valid to use functional

analysis to divide a unit with homogeneous capabilities into METs of

approximately equal capability as a yardstick for measuring a unit's ability

to reconstitute following the application of degradation. Command and

control and internal support functions should be included with the first

team of the element since without them the element could not be a viable

operational entity. It was concluded that multiple METs should be defined

* :for any unit. The first is the sustained operations MET which would include

most if not all of the TOE resources. The second is the intense operations

MET which realigns functions and associated resources not required to bring

immediate combat power to bear on the enemy and makes available those

resources for substituting. In each of the foregoing METs, the unit operational elements retain authorized strength and design capability. To

" develop reconstitution alternatives, it is also instructional to define METs

at various reduced operational strength and capability levels. It was also

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concluded that it is necessary to standardize the development of a substitutability solution, recognizing that it will be desirable to conduct excursion analyses with alternative substitutability solutions.

An examination of the AMORE measure and the types of organizational analyses to which AMORE can be applied validly was conducted as the ..

second research objective. It was concluded that AMORE measures neither "

unit capability nor effectiveness but, rather, measures the increments of

capability (METs) which can be reconstituted following degradation. This

measure was defined as: -

R % of Teams Formed

Z of Remaining Resources

where R = resilence. Since the AMORE measure is unit resilience, it was 6

suggested that consideration be given to changing the process name from

Analysis of Military ORganizational Effectiveness (AMORE) to Analysis of

Military Organizational REsilence (AMORE). In addition to measuring unit

resilience, AMORE can also provide insights with regard to unit readiness.

However, it was concluded that AMORE, by itself, should not be applied to 9 -.

* the force design process.

E.2.10.2 Evaluation of Study

Observations stemming from this study indicate a need for a method

to state unit mission capabilities quantitatively, in terms of unit performance requirements, standards, and conditions. A standardized procedure for

conducting functional analyses is also needed, and should consider duties,

tasks, and time sequences in developing unit resoure requirements and MET

structures. Finally, a more standard method for defining generally -allow-'.

"" able substitutions is needed.

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