Research Note 85-4 /

0

'0INFANTRY RIFLE SQUAD OPERATION ORDERS: 0 THEIR CHAR-ACTERISTICS AND ROLE IN MISSION SUCCESS

Jean L. Dyer, Robert H. Bennett and Robert H. Sulzen

Submitted by

Seward Swith, Chief

ARI FIELD UNIT AT FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

and

Harold F. O'Neil, Jr., Dicector

4 TRAINING RESEARCH LABORATORY

C-3,

__ 1AUG 1 2 1986'

U. S. Army A

SResearch Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

January 1985

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report are those cf the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Deparment of %',e Army position.

policy, or decision, unless s designated by other official documentation.
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NUMUREPO.TGOUTBERcASSION NO. 1. AECIPILNT'S CATALOG NUMSFR

Resear-eh Note 85-4%

A. TITLE (an~d Subertie) Z. TYPE OF PEPORT & PERIOD COVIýPEO

Infantry Rifle Squjad Oper~ation Orders: T'heir Resp-trch Note

Cha .racteristit~a and Role in Mission Success 4. PEfR10R. REOR NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(sj S. CONAIRACT OR GRANY NUMBER(&)

Jean L. Dyer, Robert H. Bennett, eiid Robert H.

Sul1zen

9. P~ERFORMING ORGANIZATION NA6MZ AN" AD^DRIES ig. PR~OGRAM ELEMENT. PAC)JECT. TASK .

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III SUPPLEI4I.TARv NOTES

III, KEY WOR"DS (Conthinue on reverse side. It ,uscos'ary and Identifyr by block ntumber)

Infantry squad Small groups Teama performance

Operation orders Army training Infantry training

Engagement simulation Prediction of performance Leader experience

Engagement System (MILES) Content analysis

10. A0Sr ACT V~uffraus so rouervr 6(40 it n.mevemy md IravltrnI by bI.zk rnumnbe)

.~Military ,- teams are characterized by functions that distingut.sh them from

collections of individuals. Two of these functions, orient~tion and organiza-%

torder were examined in the context of the Infantry squad lea~der's cperation

i Operation orders giver. by 54 squad leaders prior to a movement to contact

mibsion w~ere anal,-zed for content. Omissions of infoLriaacion fromi ýhe h~igher- .I

Llevel plaitoon order reflected a failure of ri.te squad lea-jex to cowmmui.icate

JA n43 EI OIOSI@~LT Uncla.,sific-d
Unclassified

S£CURI Y CLASSiFICATION OF THIS PAGE(Wnton DwtZa £nror*4

20. ABSTRACT (continued)

critical orientation and organization information. Hz-.jever, few distortions of platoon order information occurred. Although leaders emphasized

squad execution, they made few contingency plans. leader experience was the

best predictor of operation order content and quality. Leaders frequently

used operation order delivery techniques that were lik,:ly to increase

member confusion regarding the mission.

IV

The movement to contact missions were conducted using the multiple-integrated

laser engagement system (MILES) against an opposing -.nce of three. The

strongest correlatc of mission outcome was the degxe. of experience the

opposing force had acquired thiough participation in multiple nissions.

Squad leader experie7-e was a secondary predictýr, a-.A operation order content had only a smal. relationship to mission aut o..e.

It was suggested that operation order content maý; ta more strongly related

to mission progresses Than mission outcome, that ir:. of operation orders

as a mission planning tool should be stressed, and that operation order

train•rne should include techniques that will &nhbAnce the recall of platoonorder information. The study also demonsLkat'd thiat team dimensions such

as 'oL.entation and organization can be measured in a field training setting.

.... 4 .

~~,,

-i4
it, Fort .i ield Unit his succeesfully used pbychologcal aAd

educi prtin..pl÷ Lt soive Army training and assessment problems. TIhc

team rese:irch proram cf this unit focuses specifically on improving

umall-nt r;if.train .i Aald assesohment.

The ope-ation oraer is one means available to a leader for preparing i.is

unit for its m.,•-.At the small-unLt or team level the ord~er functiori t"

orient anJ or,.,afrz the t•am for its mfnssion.

This uepn:t ,.-scnts research conducted to describe the characteristics

cf Infart.y r.f:2::. :l;uad operation orders, and their relationship to squad

experivrce a-. •':,.cr. outcome. Quality of the operation orders varied, '-itf,

leadcrs orritti.. .nforation in the platoon order and/or falling to elabor.;tje

on iortentatior aiw- :r:.anizationhl information that could help the squad in

its missiorn. O*er~tin order quality was related to leader experience, buL

not to Ix., ::.1 o1 it•-o,. The results indiqate that squad leaders need

training in both the jelivery of operation orders and in using them as a

planninig to -l

%1C.

iii
ACKN )WL EDG L?1ETS

Tu'e authors thank Dave Hannaman and Jerry Freebie for collecting the

operation order and mission outcome data used in the study. Their assistnnce

was ecsential to the successful conduct and completion of the research

project.

U

3..

NJ

iv:

ivp
IKANTRY kIFLE SQUAD OPE-RATIOtJ ORC-ERS: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS hND~ kOLE IN

MISSION SUCCESS%

EXECUTTIVE S?'R

Requirement: N

the individuai 

Squad performance 

and '6-he aqzuu! 

in ARrEP 

or 

missions 

teim level. 

is influenced 

To date, the 

by m-~ny 

develo~pmenlt 

factors 

c-f

at. bctt. I

training programs has focused pri:martly~on the individual skills that iripa'at

upon squad-lev#el performance. However, in order to develop sound training

* programs for sm~all military unit-. there is a need to systenatically ex~.ine

team-level skills, in terms or the characteristics of such skills, their %1

developmenat, and the ways they impact upon team-.level perfrot mance. Two

functions that distingui.sh team¶s or sqiadS from collections of individuals are

that tearns toust be oriented toward the M~ission to be performed and must

organize themselves for the vission. Thiese functions represent team level

* skills that should be considered in training program development. There i3 a

reqireentto nvetigtethe existen-v and characteristics of such funct~.or.,

w Ith squad-level 4nits and to examine their relationship to squad perfo mnce.

Both of these functions ari reflected in the squad leader's operation order

whict was the primary focus of tthe pre-tv't study.

Procedure:

The operation, orders for 54I squad ivaders frcm. infantry uniti coni4.:ctinr.

a movement to contact mi~sion were analyzed for content. Major ivaristl..s

coded were: accuracy and compltteness of the statemsents that refl~ected

information in the plato~n order, content of addi.tional informatioli presented~

by the leader, and contingency statements. Interrater rel.iability on tiese

variables ranged from .88 to .99. Data on operation order delivery 3UC1 V!

who was briefed and use of terrain mapz were also obtained,. Eacn rif.e squar,

conducted one movement to contact mission against an opposing force of :.hree

ind.ividuals. All :ndividuals were equipped with 141LES (multiple inte~r~ted

laser engagement system) . Mission outcoqraf. was measured hy the aleebral,:

dAý.erei-~e '"~'the percentage of survivors fron the tested squi~d and the

percentage of 3urvivors from the oppfj.ing force, an bya.0t~ycrtro

which repres 'ented the percentaee of survivors on either nide and whether the

tested squad had overtaken the objeciivO. Experience da-,a oni the squad

leadtrs arnd nembers woere obtained.

Findings:

5quao leaC'era tended to onqt infor matioin in~ the platoon or~.er ratherr

distort it. Mnst additional !nformation provided by the squal leaders focusit

cn vnission cxacut-srs; -tw contin~cricy plan3 were given. Lcw l'evels of'

arienlatirbn arJ c~,,nzain; inforr.,1'ion were giveti. Sqjad r~~umLers rarel?;

aski.d cqu stions. App-oxinrately half the squad leadert briefed only 'he tea"%

le'ider. --nother --.arter briefed all zqa z~nmbers. Few lr3der3 L-cok vlcte3

duirte plp!Teon ord".';, used terrrtmn maps wnen bviecfinE, or questl'r't.I -u-jc

In-Lbers on Lheir un-derstanding er *,he~ir `A3sion responslbiliteS.

VV

Va
Multiple re(ression analyses indicated that .he best precictc.r of

operation order co,tent. was the s,4uad leader's ,;..erience, i-e., lengtih of rme

he had been a squad leader aril length of time he had served in other sqod

positions, The best predictor of mission outcome %as tht 1.n&'.h cC tim- t;.e

oppo'ning force had participated in the study. Squad leader experiercL wb -

also related to mission outcome, but operation order characteristics ham corly

s small relationship to outcome.

Utilization of Findings:

Training in the delivery of operation orders needs to stress the F:irpse

of tne order, te-hiiiques for increasing the amount of information in hi;he:

level orders that is rtlayed to the squad members, procedures for insurin,

that all e.mbers receive the same information as wtll as iniormation that- is

critical to mission success (this includes informatlon that serves orlenita*,iorand organizational functions), and procedures for insuring that members kn.ow"

their misiion responsibilities. The experience acquired by the oprosiru

force's participation in multiple missions indicates that repetition In

executing complex :luao missions, with equipment such aa, MILES, can lead t.

hieher levels of mission success and should be stressed in squad-level

trairning.

V,

-S

'I.

-S
4.INFAN~TRY RIFLE SQUAD OPERATION ORDERS: THEIR CHARACTERISTICS MIND ROLE IN _'

INTODUTIO .... ......... ..... .. . . ...

Conten .......

.14' 4t .4,. .

Operation Orders .>~K

RESUTSO ..... .... 714

Desciptn: SquadsTann o * .4..4

k ~ Prcduare and Grou

Exeimna Comarso - GroupI 4.- .. 4tn 8

OPRD ExSuapeckrouenta Varou ..... e ~.....o...............

Bprtiofng Orocdere *.................... .. o ............... 0...,.6..

MissiCmprion Group 4.. 1

Briefing~~4 ............ Prcdre 2

REULS ****.**99s***499*94******9******e***9Vii**

4*~~~~~~ .,,,. * 4 --. L% 
C-.~4 A ~.

Con en .. . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .ý.

J.1

Prediction of OPORD Characteristics 111..*........ .. .. .. . . .. 32

mission Outcome *.......000** **t *q**...* *.~....... *. 33

~ wDISCUSSION .... ***..**38

CONCLUSIONS .0O " s0000 ... 000 0 .. 41

* REFERENCES *0§.*.**.**0 ... **.....**. * ****0 **t * 42 -~

* . 4 AP'PENDICES . .. * - . .-.

APPENDIXA. Daa on Squad Experience Variables and Contn

~' APEDX .Analyses of Operation Orders ............ 46...MY.. A-4

APPENDIX 8. Definition of Categories Used in Content Analysis orf

Operation Orders 0................... 63

4'.

-. ~~~ - we;r - .

"". .5.,..

A , - .t 5

N &g*

W. ,

viii
LIST OF TLLE3

V - Vige

1. Movement to Contact Platoon Leader Operation Ordcr* ....... ........ 10

. 2. Average Agreement Coefficients for OPORD Variables ................. 11

3. Percentage of Squad Members'at Different Ranks ................... 15

4,- M. Briefing Procedure: Experimental Groups . ........

5. The Fidelity with which the Platoon OPORD Statements were Relayed by ~ *::',the Squad Leaders: Experimental Groups .............. 24

6 Briefing Procedure: Comparison Group ......... .......

7 The Fidelity with which the Platoon OPORD Statements were Relayed by

the Squad Leaders: Comparison Group .... 31.........................3l

8 Mission Outcome Percentage Difference Means Classified by Each OpPosing Force and Each Successive Week of Opposing Force's Partic~ipa- ........ tion in the Study...... ........ ...-.......... I....... 36

S..A-1 Operation Order Paragraph Definitions 'and Paragraph Content

C t o i ,...."...--.•.."...., ,

S. Operation Order Categories 'Other than Paragraph Content Categor-le. 49

""-. A3- Descriptive Statistics on Squad Member Experience: Experimental ,bnd

Comparison Groups ......... . ............ -.. 0 .50

: A-4 Results of Staoistical Tests Comparing Experimental and Comparison

51•

Groups on Member Experience Variables r 51 .. I

k-5 Behavioral Aspects of Squad Leader and Squad Members during OPO)RD:

Experimental Grus52

*1 .- l n I h t d .*"': . **e ......... * o...... * 3600e .. :".7

-6 Summary of OPORD Statements: Experimental Groups .......... 53

A-7 Relationship between the Number of Platoon OPORD Statements Relayed by the Squad Leaders and the Four Accuracy/Completeness Categories: Experimental Groups .... ...... ................. ............ ......54

A-8 Number and Content of Additional Statements in OPORD ?ahagraphs: .

Experimental s Groups .. ............................... ..... 55

A-9 Summary of OPORD Statements: Comparison Group ..................... 57

A-10 Relationship between the Number or Platoon OPORD Statements Relayed

by the Squad Leaders and the Four Accuracy/Completenets Categories:

"Comparison Group ..... .. . 0.... 

ixp

• ,,; ., -• .. , . •. ; ," . . . .. '. -. .
*-p rio 59 Sriuu 

-12 Corlto WUiV :O Otrit zuOfg Adc' D EtoiaSaementsc h!-ý MissiD Paragaphs VarA

C;,6 Zr-u ri .. f . . .. .............. .. 4 .. 4*4 614 

-A I

A_ T

*.-. - - MR ~

-- Mr

A

~'(0I's

77VX... '~
LIST or FIGURES

page

1. Number of Months in Present Rank for Squad Leaders-. Team*Leaders,

and the rypical Squad Member in Experimental Groups .................. ..

2. Numbcr of Weeks Held Present Position In Present Squad for Squad

Leaders, Team Leaders and the Typical Member in Experimental Groups

*****O, **4..*****.**S *****Ob****** ******* *** ** *7

3 Number of Months Held Present Position across All Unitr for Squad

Leaders, Team Leaders, and the Typical Squad Member in Experimental

- Groups ............. ... ***..................* . **, ... *to .* .... * * .

4. Number of Months in other Squaci Positions across All Units for " (- ~ Squad Leaders, Team Leaders. and the Ty~pical Squad Member In -~ 4

Experimental Groups *...:...:..... ....... .......... 20

.A*.- .

5 Percentage of Statements Allocated to OPOED Paragraph Within Platoon

OPORD, Platoon OPORD Information Relayed in Squad OPORD, and Addi- ~~

tional Information within the Squad OPORD for the Experimental -- *.. '

Gr up '-Pr ~ .... .... ... . .. .. 4 

.~ -. :6. Percentage of SZý.atevents Allocated to OPORD Paragraph Within Platoon

~PRD PACIPOPOD Thr-frma-tion Re~layed in Squad OPORD. and .

Additional Information within the Squad 0 OD for xhe Comparison Grou-p

7. Iutber of Squads within Eaih Mission ACCOMPlishment Category for 3

Each Sui-ce331Ve Week or tche Opposing Force's Parti.zlpaticn ill the

Stdy. ..........

. C.
- INTRODUCTION "

Throughout much of the team/small group literature various models have

been proposed to account. for team performance (Alexander &.Cooperband, 165;

Boguslaw & Porter, 1962; Dieterly, 19718; Kent & McGrath, 1969; Kner, Berger,

Fopelka, 1980; Lowe & McGrath, 1969; Naylor & Dickinson, 1969; ShAflett, 1979;

Sorenson, 1971; Steiner. 1972; Tuckman, 1967). Although these models vary in

content and level of detail, most postulate that the nature of the individual

.• ,. team members and the team as a whole (e.g., individual ability, team + - 1:

.. ~ .,eadership, individual experience, time team has worked together), the team .

situation (e.g., task type, situational or environmental constraints), and the .';-

process the team uses to accomplish the task must all be considered in some

''interactive fashion in order to account for team performance. ... :.4._. •.. , '• , , : - . . - , . . . -" •.. . ; w.

"For at least twenty-five years researchers (Altman, 1966; Borgatta.," ;- -,4

Lanzetta, McGrath & Stordbeck, 1959; Collins, 1977: Glanzer & Glaser, 1959; "*•'t-'

"Glaser, Glanzer & Morten, 1955; George, 1977; Goldin & Thorndyke, 1980; .

, Hackman & Morris 1975; Hood & others, 1960; Miller, 1958; Nieva, Fleishman &

": '"Reick, 1978; O'Brien, 1968) have stressed the need to develop better measures

of group processes and better procedures to describe the nature of group ;

tasks. Developments in these areas require both conceptual and psychometric

efforts. Obviously, the hope is that such improvements will allow researchers E

to better understand and account for eam oupu than has een the case t.,.;

date. The present study focused upon the measurement of two aspects of the Y'{

group process -- that of orienting Le group to the task at hand wud o, .W7. '

organizing the group appropriately to accomplish the task. The extent to

-" . which these variables contributed to the prediction of group output beyond .

that provided by individual and team member experience was also examined . . .

There are many ways of characterizing the dimensions or variables that

distinguish collections of individuals from teams. Concepts such as cohesion, ,

dependency, cooperation, formal member structure, team awareness, and I " -

-task-oriented come to mind. At this date there has been m agreement within,

the research community regarding the best way of C10ssifying such

characteristics. Wieva et al. (1978) proposed four dimensions or functions F;.,

that specify what a team does lnueractively to ac opli t t's bject.ves or 71

- oals: orientation, organization, adaptation, and motivation. The ... ,

... definitions for each of these functions were as follows (p. 63-6).:

- Orientation: The processes by which information necessary to task

. accomplishment are generated and distributed to relevant team members,

including information regarding team member resources and requirements

and information about the environment's resources and demands.

Organization: Processes necessary for the group members to perform their

tasks in coordination, including the processes by which the team members

decide who iL to do what and when. .

Adaptation: Processes which occur as team members carry out accepted

strategies, make mutual adjustments, and complement each other in

accomplishing the team task (e.g., cooperation).. .;z'.

- - .(..- .aC.
"Motivation: Processes involved in defining team objectives related to

the task and energizing thn group towards these objectives.

-The present study examined orientation and organizational functions as

reflected in the Infantry rifle squad operation order (OPORD). .. ,

• Orders, . .eration 

All military units must be given an operation order prior to conducting Ps,.,

specific mission. The operation order details the coordinated actions

.:.•necessay to carry out the unit commander's concept of the military operation .

S 71-2). Operation orders are issued at all levels of command down to the

squad or section, and differ in detail and specificity depending upon the

level of command. At the squad level the order is given orally. • -At-3.i - ,

"levels of command it is important that the commander or individual in charge '•'. '

"personally explain his concept (of the operation) to subordinates in

considerable detail so that there are no misunderstandings about what they are

" "to do. Understanding how the commander enison hebatl"eig.ouh

assists them in carrying out actions on their own initiative when necessary

confident that they are operating within the framework of the commander's

concepts" (FM 71-2. p. B-3). - " -

There 3i some evidence that both the presence and content of OPJRDs are

related to combat effectiveness. in a rcviuw 09, fUS t 01cO. b.. terture .. of :

World War II and the Korean War, McKay, Gianci, Hall and Taylor (1959) found .

that communication and planning within small Infantry units were critical to ,/,.

unit success. As stated by one platoon sergeant Oevery man In the squad

should listen to his squad leaders orders with the thought In mind that he

may-have to be the squad leader before the battle Is over" (p. 4). In

- ro/anti-a orpaonatkeecis.Sott, Heliza, Hardy, and Banks

(1979) found that successful units were more likely to have delivered the

platoon leader's OPORD to all crew members than unsuccessful unit.i (83% ,

briefed In successful units Vs. 59% in unsuccessful units). In a.4ition,

unsuccessful unit~s often suffered a highi number of casualties, Including the

"leader, early in the exercise leaving , -ewa -", ,Inm nA . . . . .. L.

to proceed. • . - " , : - :: ...- . . ,

All operation orders have a formal, sequential structure, consisting of

five paragraphs: Situation, Mission. Execution, Service Support, and Command . :-"

and Signal. Each of these paragraphs can be described briefly as follows: -

Situation: Background information regarding the location, size and

. strength, composition, deployment, movement and weapon capabilities of

the enemy and friendly forces likely to be involved in the military

engagement, and information on terrain and weather.

lission: Statements regarding the task to be accomplished by the unit.

Execution; Information on how the mission is to be accomplished; the

unit's tactical plan.

2
"Service Support: Information and instructions regarding support for the '.

unit including transportation, rations, supply-resupply of ammunition and

* 'casualty evacuation. ,

Coumand and Signal: Information regarding unit commind and the operation

of signal communications.

In terms of the team functions identified by Nieva et al. (1978), each

operation order paragraph provides orientation Information for the team --, .

members, and the Execution and the Command and Signal paragraphs also provide ,-

. , orgarizational information. Obviously, the operation order does not include

all the orientation and organizational information that may be relevant to the

mission. Infantry rifle squads are not ad hoe groups; they have a history. . .

This history, which includes all the experience that they have had as a squad . -

as well as the training for individual team member positions experienced by

each member, impacts upon the squad leader's operation order, For example, .-

S standing operating procedures (SOP) that have been established within the j,

squad also serve orientation and organizational functions. If such SOP are - .- '.

well estebl13bed and applicable to the specific mission, It may not be '" -

necOssary for the squad leader to give a detailed Execution paragraph. -

However If the mission and situation are unfamiliar to the squad, the leader -

* .... may devote much time to execution, thereby focusing heavily on the orientation "-'

and organizational functions of the team. - .

and or-niat1.nz funetier3 ~ ar ee nnrtAioulrlv Imnortsant

.- " for team- buch as the Infantry rifle squad. -Infantry squads can be classified

as teams that- .ften perform emergent or unexpected, as opposed to established .,. _

, or eoutine, tasks (Boguslaw & Porter, 1962; Dyer, Tremble, & Finley, 1980). *.., -

Member actions can vary greatly from mission to mission depending upon the ; :

W dynamic interaction between the enemy and the squad Itself. the terrain, the * -

weather, etc. Thus in order to perform well the squad must be informed about :.-

.-" ,=each situation/mission that it faces and must be organized appropriately for

•it. On the other hand, In some military Units team member actions remain -

' relatively constant from mission to mission (e.g., actions of a mortar crew

"-,vary little h.=.;•:. across missions). -In such cases, the orientation and organization. . Y.. a;-.. . . . .. . * ..... .. .--- .* .- 4-4 ,•.' -

-7 -functions becomless important. " .'

-. :What constitutes a wgood" squad operation order? There would appear to

be at least two important dimensions: the OPORD content and its delivery.

- The content of the order should relay, correctly and completely, the

information given to the squad leader by the platoon leader, and should also

provide additional information necessary for accomplishment of the mission.

Henrikson et a&. (1980) identified critical elements that should be relayed

within each OPORD paragraph (e.g., Mission - what should be done, where it is

to be done, and at what time it is to be done).

Content . , . .,

Obviously, the squad leader does not want to give erroneous information .

to his squad. Frequently, squad leaders take notes While receiving the . . ,

platoon order in order to reduce the likelihood of errors when giving their .'

squad orders. Memory studies (Bartlett, 1932) have clearly shown that -

3
distortions and omissions occur during the free recall process, although there -

is some evidence that fewer distortions occur when the content to be recalled

is highly structured (Kintsch, 1977). Operation orders clearly have a

structure and thus may be less susceptible to the failings.of one's memory.

to mission 

Additional 

success. 

information 

The OPORD 

presented 

is the 

by 

last 

the 

chance 

squad 

for 

leader 

the 

may also be crucial I

squad leader to

prepare his squad prior to the mission. Thus it is important that his .. " tactical plan be clear to all members, and that contingency actions be , -, specified. Such additional information is most likely to fall in the.... ... ... ,,.

Execution and the Command and Signal paragraphs.- The amount of such

additional information may depend on the time given to prepare the OPORD,

whether or not the leader has an opportunity to conduct a recon, and the squad +..•"'

SOP. To the extent that operation orders influence, directly and/or . - ... . "

-•indirectly, squad mission success, It was expected that operation orders that ... ,

*-.correctly and completely relayed thE. information in the platoon order and that .

specified additional execution plan,&, including contingency actions, would

contribute to success. . . . . .,.".. . . . .. . .. . . . .. . .. .. . .. .. ... . . . .,

Henriksen et al. (198G) specif"ied four other actions taken by the squad leader during the OPORD that could 1ifluence the conduct of the mission. The '

leader should ask squad members to r'ecite their specific responsibilities,

graphically display the overall operation by using visual aids (ground, ,. .. r . sticks, rocks), ask subordinates to demonstrate their specific tasks, and

'..,,--conduct rehea-sals of the planned execution by deploying forces In a mock • .i~i• *

exercise.

-- •,•, . . .. . . . .. . .. . -.. .r. *.~. . L J. , .. . • .. • .. ,

-• . .z J', . - .• ,- .• • ..-. , . -- " • ... .. - • .. _ . ._ .

There are many facets to the effective delivery of an operation order, ...-.- end each squad leader has his own procedure for giving an order. Delivery .

• . style per se (e.g., dynamic vs. nondynamic vocal inflections, the use of r '

pauses) Was not examined In the study. However, it was possible to observe '';A

-the following nonverbal aspects of the operation order delivery by some of the " .....

squad leaders: whether terrain maps were used by the squad leader, who the

squad leader briefed, proximity of the leader to the individuals briered, body

orientation of the leader to the squad members, and eye contact between the

leader and squad members. - ... .. i

Ideally, each squad member should receive the same operation order. This

does occur when the leader briefs all members simultaneously and is the

"procedure taught by the US Army Infantry School. However, If the squad leader

useb another briefing procedure all members may not receive the same order.

For example, the squad leader may brief only the two team leaders and then

allow each team leader to brief his team members, or the leader may brief one

rifle team and then the other. In either Case it is unlikely that the members

within the two teams will have received the same information. Such relaying

of information can lead to distortions and omissions of message content as

demonstrated In free-rocall memory studies (Bartlett, 1932).

4
"• .. ; • .• ... , 7

Nonverbal cues may affect the effectiveness with which an OPORD is

•:. delivered arA the way in which the information is received. Research on eye •. . contact ind. -ates that it serves as a regulator or cue for verbal responses

"and that it also facilitates the understanding of verbal messages (Cary. 1978; -

Wiener, Devoe, Rubinow & Geller, 1972). In dyad conversations, bye-contactis

. often used by the speaker to emphasize points or to obtain a response from the

... l istener (Iendon, 1967). Dependent individuals have been found to rely more

heavily on eye contact than on other nonverbal and verbal cues in order to

understand messages (Neville, 1974).' Even body orientation and lean serve as

• .- important cues in conveying the interest and attitude of one Individual to

: .- ,.'-another (Mehrabian, 1969), :'. .

• .: .::•" - , -. .. .:.. • -• - : •- .... -. •': ::

These results have implications for OPORD delivery. For instance. the

very structure of the squad places members in dependent or subordinate "

positions In relation to the squad and team leaders and the importance of eye

contact to persons in such subordinate positions has been mentioned. Since

eye contact plays a regulating role in verbal interacticns, leaders should

attempt to optimize the use of these cues in delivering an operation order.

That is, the squad leader should position himself and the squad so that eye

contact can be maintained with the squad members at all times. Aside from eye -, •.

contact, squad leaders also rely on other nonverbal cues (e.g., gestures) to ,

"convey critical elements of the operation order. Whether or not eye contact "

"and body orientation strongly affect the delivery and recepti.on of an

operation order is an empirical question which warrants investigation. Some

"preliminory data on this question were collected in the present study. •..

. " Relationsh.L of Individual to Team Performance .

-,.-- .. One might expect that teams composed or highly skilled, competent, and

'.experIenced individuals would be more effective than teams composed of indiviS ,:-.-duals with low skill levels and relatively little experience. .. Unfortunately, ..

.;D.-.- studies examining such relationships within military teams are few, and the .- • .

typical findings have been no or weak relationships.""In tank crews, low .= -- , • .*.

relationships have been found between crew gunnery performance and the time

the tank commander and gunner have served together, the experience of the tank_

commander, the experience of tbe gunner, :nd pmawt .u.nner performance (Eaton & •r_ .

.-i:;j "Neff, 1978; Kress & McGuire, 1979). Yet Havron and McGrath (1961) found that

the rifle squad leader characteristics of job knowledge and intelligence were

the best predictors of squad effectiveness (r a .35 to .50).

. Indirect evidence of the importance of individual skill within team/crew

positions comes from studies of personnel turbulance or turnover within teams. ' .

"- * Eaton and Neff (1978) found a reduction in tank crew performance on structured

gunnery tasks when tank commanders and gunners were replaced by other peracnnel. In two labor itory studies (Trow, 1964; Ziller, 1963) turnover created

the greatest decreise in group performance when individuals in key positions

te.g., positions with the greatest control) were replaced. In addition. Trow

found that group performance declined when the replacement's level of intelli- -

5

.-: - ... 
r •V..'.-

genct was lower than his predecessor' s. In studying five-man teams over a

period of six days, Morgan, Coates, Alluisi, and Kirby (1978) found that wh.n

teams were composed of 40% or more untrained individuals, team performance

declined.

The lack of clear-cut relationships between individual skilllcompetency/

experience and group performance may be explained in terms of the unrelia-

•,,-- bility, invalidity, and/or insensitivity of m.ny individual and group perfor- - mance measures. Researchers may have also failed to consider moderating

variables that can influence such relationships. Gill (1979) found that the .

nature of the task influenced the ability-group performance relationship. In '"...

a highly cooperative motor task, group performance Was dominated by the lower- .,..

ability partner; the higher-abilitty partner could not compensate for the other

' partner's performance. This relationship was not as strong on a task where

* , -less cooperation was required. In a different context Jones (1974) examined -

"the :.egree to which individual performance in the protessional 3ports of

tennis, football, basketball, and baset-all predicted team outcome. Multiple .

.,correlations . between individual or subteam skill measures and team performance zranged from .75 to .93 for all the sports except basketball where the correla-

-tion was .58. Jones inferred that the lower relationship for basketbalL ;, •.;* C

indicated a contribution to team performance by factors other than individual • k*:.-

skille per se, such as coordination. .Overall, the relationships between

S... . . .i individual and team performance in Jones' study are much higher than those in . - ',- -s' the previously cited laboratory and military se'tings. This discrepancy may 4-..''j:.-

- edue to the higher reliability of Jones' measures since both predictor and

c:.riter ion variables were based on renpe~td CAMeS usually o~ver several years Of

* r. ' "- .- ay" •'.pl . ." *, . . - . ,' . -, , . -:

In the present study the primary individual performance/skill variables

. " used to predict squad outcome performance were the amount of time the squad

• .leader had been a squad l(ader, amount of time the leader had held other rifle,._

S"squad positions, time the squad members had held their present positions, and .

*,,.t-.-. the time members had held other squad positions. Since these variables were * -.

"' "not measures of knowledge or skills directly related to the squad miss1-on, '*,

.•-,-':, their association with mission outcome Was not expected to be high. Another- ?f.r

.- f-actor which could further attenuate the individual-group performance .- .-

r-el ationshipn wan t-hr nature of the mission --- movement to contact. The high

*'"*i', degree of leader-subordinate interaction (e.g.. teamwork, planning,

"communication) required on such attack missions (Shriver, Jones, Hannaman,

Griffin & Sulzen, 1979) was expected to reduce the extent to which individual

skills would predict mission outcome, as found in the Gill (1979) and Jones

(1974) studies.

--

6

Ebob.
METHOD

A total of 54 Infantry squads. consisting of seven to ten men each,

participated in the study. Forty-five of these squads came from a single

light 1n4"antry unit, representing the five companies in the unit. The three

platoon* within the five companies were randomly assigned to one of the three

"trainiing conditions described below. Thus the three squads within a given

platoon received the same training. The remaining nine squads came from a

different. light Infantry unit, and served as a comparison group. .*

- . -~The authorized composition of an eleven-man Infantry squad is as follows:."-

0 of Authorized Authorized Military *- ?~

Position Individuals *.Rank Occupationsl Ayeciality MS

¶ Squad Leader* E6 11B30 2

Team Leader 2 E5 . 11B20

Automatic Rifleman 2 E4I 11BlO0

Grenadier 2 E4I 11B20

Rifleman 4 *~.E3 11B10

Because o'~ a 4e variation.% the participatinff squads differed In varying

*degrees from this authorized structure. In addition. all squads were asked toadd a machinegun to the squad 3imulati.ig the attachment of a machinegun team

from platooni headquarters. Some squads made use of the machinegun, while

*.-others d16 not. ~L~ .~$~

S-~ .Design: Squad Training . :

The OPORD data were collected as an 3udjunct to a study that compared 1-..

-different forms Of squad and leader training. The design of this study is S e -iid, t~a3 wic necesaary to control for Dossi1ble treatment effects in

-the OPORD data analysis. . '- '

The experimental squads were randomly ansigned by platoon to one of the

three following training treatments: Leader trai.ning, MILES (multiple

integrated laser engagement system) training, or Letader and MILES training.

Leader training consisted of three Field Opposition Exercises (FOX) and three

Battle Simulation board game plays. The FOX is an abstraction of a full field

exercise in which only leaders participate. In the FOX training sessions, the

squad leader and his two fire team leaders simulated a squad for a general

trainiing session, a movement to contact exercise, and a ha~sty defense

exercise. The battle simulation training followed a similar pattern for three

training Sessions, however, only the squad leader and one of his fire team

leaders played the game. Thie squads receiving MILES trainint practiced with

MILES equipai2nt by serving as the offensive force In a hasty defense miasion.

The remaining squads received both the Leader ani MILES traininF.

7
"I - The comparison squads received no form of squad or leader training. They

were from a different Infantry unit and were not randomly assigned to the

comparison group.

The MILES was used throughout the test as a means of realtime casualty

assessment. The MILES equipment for light infantry consists of a laser

"transmitter for the primary weapon (rifle or machinegun) and two harnesses for

t.V .the soldier (a helmet harness and torso harness). The laser transmitter

attaches to the primary weapon and sends a narrow laser beam down the line of '

fire when a blank round is fired. The soldier harnesses detect laser beams

striking detectors on the harnesses and signal the soldier by buzzing with ,.. -

either a short signal indicating a near miss or a continuous signal Indicating .

a hit. To stop the hit signal, the soldier must remove a key from his laser - transmitter (disabling the transmitter) and insert it Into the torso harness. ,:. • a.,: 

' The key cannot be removed without st~arting the hit buzzer again. When • W a.,

"soldiers are to be returned to active participation, the harness must be reset f.

with n controller key. ... .

S" . , -.- " : " -

Procedure and Measures ...... ~~:~z -e . - .. :.•

Squad Background Variables . " I X •. - T4. .• AZ ,

The following demographic information was obtained on individual squad

members: rank, number of months in rank and primary military occupational.. -

speciality (MOS). Combat veteran status on the squad leaders was al2o .. ".

'obtained. Squad members were asked questions regarding their experience

within Infantry squads: number of weeks in present position within present

squad, number of months held present position In all Infantry squads, other

positions held in Infantry squads within present unit and outside of present .

-unit, number of months held each of these positions, and whether or not they .- .,.

were regularly assigned to their present squad. Members also indicated the

number of days all individuals in their present squad had worked together..

All squad members were asked to indicate the squad's standing operating -

procedures (SOP) In each of the following areas: basic load, redistribution "

. of ammunition, assignment of equipment/weapons, prearranged signals, return of -

fire, shifting of fire, rate of fire, squal movement, and sequence of command..: .-

:.-1. v The number of individuals who agreed with the squad leader's and/or team

"]leaders' responses (including the squad and team leaders themselves) was

tabulated and used as an index of SOP agreement within the squad.

OPeration Order

Content Analysis. The platoon leader read an operation order for a

movement to contact mission to the squad leaders. The platoon order was the

same for each squad leader, except for statements regarding platoon and squad

movement that had to be tailored to the specific terrain where the mission was

conducted. Leaders were given 15 minutes to prepare for the mission,

including delivery of the squad OPORD, and had no opportunity toconduct a

recon of the area.

8
• .. , .. -. - ... . * •

• .4

Individual statements within the platoon leader's operation order were

categorized according to the five standard paragraphs within an OPORD

"(Situation, M1s53on, Execution, Service Support, and Command and Sigrnal), as %

well as the specific content of the paragraph. An outline of the paragraph

content citegories is presented in Table A-I, Appendix A. Each statement

, ... within the platoon order was given a unique number that reflected the ..

r+"' paragraph content code. The platoon order and statement numbers are presented ':".

"• n Table 1. ..-

The squad leader's OPORD was recorded on a tape recorder and then .

transcribed. During the transcribing process, each OPORD was divided into

coding units for content analysis purposes. The coding unit employed il best -' .

"described as a distinct idea or 3entence. However, Identification of coding 1⁄4.,.

units was not always automatic, since the oral operation orders did not always

contain complete, formal sentences. Two raters were used to resolve any

ambiguities regarding the boundaries of a coding unit. ... .. .....

.Each unit was initially coded as reflecting either a statement give. to

"the squad leader by the platoon leader, additional information provided by the e

squad leader, or a squad member statement. Each platoon crder statement was . :

also coded for its accuracy, and accurate statements were ther coded for

completeness. Additional statements presented by the squad leader were .

categorized according to the standard five operation order paragraphs, as a - -.

"coordinating juestion, or as an additional comment. Statements within each

paragraph were also given unique paragraph content codes. Additional . -

Execution statements, provided by the squad leader were examined to determine .

. whether they specified contingency actions. All squad leader statepents that

'-..,• -addressed a specific squad memter were marked. Statements and questions by • *,-.. *;*.

"%individual squad members were coded for paragraph and paragraph content. -

'Refer to Table A-2 for definitions of these additional codes. - .. - .. :.:•.:• . .... .. .. . . .- • . .. ', .. . ; .•.. v '

A complete description of the paragraph content categories in provided in

Appendix B. Examples of the categories and codinn guidelines are also &13.

.. . - Presented. ,-" ..- - -.. . . : . * .

"Two raters coded each OPORD. Reliability indices were calculated on the

"ten variables used in the data analyses according to the agreement coefficient '-'

described by Xrippendorf (1980, p. 138-1I0). These variables are presented in

Table 2. Some of the variables were dichotomous, others involved

multiple categories. Krippendorf's agreement coefficient applies to both

"situations. It ranges between 0 and 100%, corrects for small sample sizes,

and adjusts for chance agreement; that is, a value of 65% means that the

observed rater agreements are 65% above the level expected by chance.

The agreement coefficient for each variable, averaged across all squads,

is presented In Table 2. In general, the coefficients were high, ranging from

88% to 99% with an over-all average of 95%. Any coding disagreements between

the two raters were resolved before the data were analyzed further.

9

% 'i .. . . ,_ ,,. . .
TABLE 1 *.

MOVEMENTr TO CONTACT PLATOON LEADER OPERATION ORDER

OPERATION ORDER STATEMENTS PARACRAPH-SENTENCE

Teeeyhas successfully conductod a withdrawal SI

lsnight and has broken contact. N"

The enemy fot~ce in our sector consists of light in~fantry. . S2

The enemy has not used chemical weapone so far. .. S3 . ..

The enmy is believed to have left observation posts and S4 . ~

*malpockets of reitnebhn in otir sector. ~*..

2. 2 IS51ON/EXECUTION

.(1ap Orientation. point out squad location.) - ~

The'lilatoon wili move along this route to the initial L..

-. checkpoint, ALPHA, located here. . ,, v,'

i 'We wiil stop there and await further orders. E 2 a~*i;

Y.'our squad will wiove as point squad. -:Ej' . ~ . .

4-. ~vii i;

Hove as9 quickly as possible by keeping the edge'of the l.4

furter etehan ino 00 te wods.~ .- i-. J'

woadline on your (left/right) andI Lit sight, move no .. i ~

Move iii a traveling overwatch format Ion unless In "'1

Overcome all enemy resistance vitb1A. your capability t

"'Indirect fire support is not available. " ~~¶"91

'C ' The other squad leaders have already bcen briefed

and will1 follow your squad in a platoon column.

3. SERVICE SLUPPORr

Your azmunition has been distributud. ssi

Awsmunitlon will be resupplieid at checkpoint ALPHA if necessary. SS2

4. C0t1tA~i' AND SIGNAL

*I will trail "our squad, pass a11 communications to me. CSi

verbally witho'ut a radio.

Move out of the asý;ebly area and cross your line of X

departure in 15 minutaos.

* The time. iu now-- . Do you hiv? any quest Lons? le

- 10
* TABLL 2

AVERACE INTERRATER AGREEMENT COEFFICIENTS FOX OPORI) VARIABLES -

ACRFEMMIN S~l1

OPORD VARIABlLE COEFFICIENT () SIZE

O.'."OWR! Paragrapuh in whitch statement occurred:

Situation, Mission, Execution, Service Support,

Command & Signal plus Coordinating Questions

and Other Comments 97 . 9

Origin of information for each statement* -

From platoon UPORD, additional squad leader W

information, squad member statement .*94 49 . * ~

Platoon order statauietits: Platoon order t 4

.sentence code -49 99. 

VF,

Platoon order statements: Accuracy and-

-. Comple.teness codes -- 90 49

Content of additional Situation a'ta'tements 88 i32 .j.,,*

Content of additional Pxecution statements ~ 9 49

i#K Content of additional Service Support statements. 98 .13 -

,, -Content of additional Commani and Signal statements 92 36

r ;Additional Execution statements: contingency Z

* versus noncontingency statements, 94 V49 -

- -- 1

Additional statements: Addresstrespond to

Mii.2ug4n~1 arnaind member -versus entire group 48 EC

Average agreement coefficient .95 *

Note. OPORDs weare available on 49 of the .54 squads ini the study. Agreement

coefficientS were calculated on each variable for each OPORD. Coefficients

In this table represent the average coefficietic across squads. The sam~ple

size varied across tht. variables due to the absence of certain types of

Info~rmat ion ina some OPO0RDs.
Delivery. Information on who the squad leader briefed was obtained on

all squads. It was po3sible to record other nonverbal behavior during tile

* operation order on only the nine squads from one company. The I ollowirg

Information Wa3 obtained: whether the squad leader Usea a terrain or paper

map during the OPORD, whether the squad leader took notes while the-platoonleader gave the platoon operption order, whether the squad leader had eye

contact with the squad (i.e., OPORD recipients) during squad OPORD delivery,

,whether the leader faced the squad, whether the squad uwmberx m3intained eye N

~ cotactwitn the leader, whether the squad members faced the squad leader, if

'the squad members did not face the leader whether this action represented*

voluntary behavior or whether it resulted from the Positiors3 the Sqiuad leader

instructed the members to assume, proximity of the leader to the 3quad, and

whether squad security Was maintained during the OPORI'.

mission Outcome - -

In a movement to Contact Mission at the squad level, the squad serves as ~ .

the point squad of the advance party of a larger force. The squad (offensive

force) Is to make contact with the enemy within a reasonable period of' time,

'-63asess the enemy situation, and take appropriate action. In the particular

situation examined, the enemy had broken contact with the opposing force, but

had left small 1'orces behind to harrass it. The squad was told to eliminate

ayeeyresistance within its capability. .-

Asia. I~cn .4ad 4 jf thr-ai. AndantArs from the ~

reconnaissance platoon of the Infantry unit being trained, and operated from

prepared defensive positions.- At the beginning of the Mission one memnber of

the defensive force was placed forward of the main defensive line in an

'~. observation post. Hie pulled back to the main defensive position. if he

* survived, after engaging the offensive squad and causing the 4quad to deploy.

Two groups Of three soldiers were used as OPFOR defenders in the study.

The first set of Individuals participated during the first three weeks Of t~he

study; the second during the last three weeks. The OPFOR was equipped with i'11T

two claymore mines, approximately 120 rounds of ammunition for the 1416 pvcr ~ .

a-1dA 4 per exeriae and two hand grenAdes per soldier per exercise. The

-. offensive squad members were equipped with approximately 120 rounds per

soldier, 200 rounds of ammunition for the machinegun (if Used) and two hand

* grenades per soldier. .'.. .-

Three lanes, approximately 500 meters long, were Used for the movement to

contact missions. Platoons were randomly assigned within their companies to

one of the three lanes. Thus within e.ich platoon all three squads were tested

on the same lane. A total of three days were required to test each company;

one day for each platoon with the three squads within each platoon tested on

the same day on the same lane.

The percentage of survivors on each side was Used in determining measures

of squad proficiency. As described previously. MILES allows assessment of

real-time casualties. Casualty assessment Ws aS3 follows. When an individual

was hit by either the M16 rifle or 1460 machine gun the buzzer on his MILES

equipment Was triggered, he took himself out of action, and controller

12
personnel immaediately roiioed in the player n,.7urber and the cause of the

casua~lty. Another controller kept a chronological log of ca3ualty data on a

casualty r~c-.)rd sheet. A data collector accompanyIng the 5quad plotted the

P location of the oa&ualty on data coliection maps of the specific lane and

defensive posiltouas. Casualties due to h.and gren~ades &Aid*claym~ore mines were

assessed tmmediately i~y control~lers. Expsed 3oldie'f; (not under coyer) were

*S3eB3eC a3 od~sualtit3 if they were within ;.7Ive met.".rs of an exploding S-.przatice hand grenade. The casualtyzneorlamrem.eswsatige

&~~with tine apex at the claymcre and a base or 30 m@,ters at a distance of 30

w eters. Additionally. a In meter retlius around the claymore was coniidered

lethal. Whenever a casualty oc~urrerd. each Individual examined his casualty

* card to determine the type of zusualty. Four types of casualties existed:*.

killed in action (KIA). litter casuilty, walking vouaided, and slightly ..

wounded. Slightly wounded aoldiers could continue in th,,ý exercise after a

buddy admints.-ered first aid. Only one sliaý,tly wounde0 card per squad per

exercine was used. Casuality ciý.-d3 were rar-domly distributed to members prior. $'

to the Mission.

One criterion Used to deter-mine squad proficiency was whiether or not tile

squai accomplished the M13i0sor. Mission acco'mplishmnent by the offensive sq;Jad

required that the squad havt a minimum of 38 percent survivors (four men In -*

nine and ten man squad3. three men in seven and eight man squrids, that the

defiensive force h~ave no 3urvivors, and that thrl squajd had talknn the objective

(determined Uy military Judgment)4. Mission aocomplishment by the OPPOR

deflense wiasdId :~ lent.t t,ýc survivor~s aid nreventina th 0ee f*nu 4;

iCrom taking the defens'ive positioni (military Judpent). When neither aide m-et

these criteria, then each side faU led its Mis31on.

A continUjOUs variable was alho devetloped to describe the squad's

-accomplishment of the mission. This variable was 4u1'tvintd as the difference ,

'between the percentage of offensive survivors and '?.e perczentage of defensive

WOPMO) .survivors. It resulted In & P031i~tP number less than or equal, to 100

when the percentage of offensive survivors was greater than the percentage of

defensive rurvivors, a value or zero t~ien the survival rates werea Identical ..for b~oth aid~es, and a negative value less thani or ibZual to 100 when the Oil-~

-Ce., a o' .t dern-- s~ murv.iver tms~ grae than the wnerontagre of offensive

surviyor3.

13
RESULTS

Description of Squads

Experimental Groups -- - .

Overall, a 92% return rate was obtained on the squad member

S q- ;uestionnaires (311 of 406 squad members). In terms of squad positions, a 96%

-, return occurred for the squad leaders (43 of 45 leaders), an 83% return rate

for the team leaders (75 of 90), and a 93% return rate for the remainder of -

the squad members (253 of 271). Deacriptive data on the experience of the

squads are presented separately for squad leaders, team leaders, and other

.. squad members. Since the squad size varied, it was necessary to compute squad

averages on each of the descriptive ariables In order to make the squad - S"". member data comparable across squads (i.e., the resultant value represented

"the average or "typical" squad member). The frequency distributions for these.-

averages on each variable (based on 45 squads) were then examined, and the

summary statistics on squad members are based on these distributions. The

only exception to this procedure was on the variable of rank. The percentage

of squad members at epch rank was based on indiv'dual data, not squad "averages, In later analyses the team leader data were averaged with the squad .

S-. member data due to the higher percentage of missing data on the team leaders -

and the need to minimize the number of predictor variables in regression ..

analyses. ,.-.

-Rank. The majority k65%) of the squad leaders held the rank or to ,ith _-"

the rer-ainder at the E5 level (Table 3). Twelve of the squad leaders wk .e : .:-,

combat veterans. The majority of the team leaders held the rank of £5 (61%)

.,:'with the remainder at the E4 level. The remaining squad members were at the

.4 .. ,E4 level .. or below with 49% holding Ybe rank of £4. - . ., o .'..,.

,Fiure 1 depicts the length of time squad leaders, team leaders, and the

other squad members had held their present ranks. Since the distributions ..

' were skewed, dedians are cited as the measure of central tendency. Additional :

descriptive statistics are presented in Table A-3, Appeldix A.. .Squad leaders

-.-.. had held their ranks longer than team leaders, and team leadershad held their

ranks longer than the other squad members. Several indices reflect this

"trend. For example, 78% of the squad leaders, 52% of the team leaders, and

. only 11% of the rquad members had held their present rank for more than one

* year. The median time In present rank was 17 months for squad leaders, 13

"months for team leaders, and seven months for the typical squad member.

Experience in Squad Positions. The number of weeks that squaa leaders,

teaa leaders, and other squad members had held their present positions within

their present squads is depicted in Figure 2. The median number of weeks that

a squad leader had held his position was 15, with the meximum duration being

99 weeks (refer to Table A-3, Appendix A). The majority (54;) of team leaders

had held their present positions within the squad for 16 weeks or less with a

median of 14 and a maximum of 192 weeks. However, as indicated in Figure 2

the distributions for both the squad and team leaders were U-shaped; that is,

there were two types of s3uaa and team leaders, those who had held their .. : ,r

positions for a relatively short period of time (inexperienced) and those who

14
TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF SQUAD MEMBERS AT DIFFERENT RANKS -

GROUP . kAiK --,:' SQUAD LEADERS TEAM LEADERS .. SQUAD *2[IBERS -r

Exe~n~tl El/E2 0. 0 2

Exermeta ID .4 

E3" 0 ~ -23

E4 - 236 .,9

.3#, W 

. - -

ES 33 61 ,

VE6 '65 .... 3 ,

- Compar isoii EJ/E2 ~ '0 0

E3 00

* E4 87*.1 -- x'- A

E5 9 13 .4

E6 0L..

Note, In the ezcper Imental group. percentages were basie on 43' "'uad .c..34trs,

S75 team leaders, and 25? squad memabers; in the comparison group, 9 squad

I onaAir a 15 r' avin leaders. and 57 squad mem~bers. *~'-,- 3. .. -L4

15 .- 3*--.-I ,
~61 SQUAD LEADE:RS .

- - * TEAM LEADERS

SQUAD MEMBERS.

> 4954 .*... cc1

C~~ 434 'C--

U. .. $~.%

a5 WIN

2 -C

713~

0 5 10 1t5 20 2Zb .30 3% 40 4V 50

PERCENTAGEL

FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF MON4THS IN PRESENT RANK FOR SOUAI) LEADERS. TEAM LEADERS.

AND THE TYPICAL SQUAD MEMBER IN EXPERhMENTAL GROUPS.

16
_4 1-

A. - -S.'. ~ TEAM LEADERS

SQUAD MEMBERS.r

V I'q - --

-I .k

.7-.- c*..*. .

iff

*44T

0 ''~

z 2 -72 ' * a

6 -I0 I'

FIGUR -. 'UUE OFWESHL-aEETPSIINI RSN OA O

a OA EDR.TAMLAES N H TYICA SQA MEMkER IN

EXLIMNA GROUPS. *

r1
a had held positions for a relatively long period of time (experienced). The

typical squad member generally had held his position within the squad longer

than the squad leaders or team leaders (median of 23 .-.eeks); however, the

mcximum value for any squad member (27 weeks) was less thatn the maximum for

either the squad or team leaders., -

"Although the typical squad member had held his present position withia

his present squad longer than the squad or team leaders, the length of time he

had hold his present position across all units in which he had served did not

."' show the same trend. The squad leaders had had the most experience in their

. present position (median of 24 months), with team leaders and the squad ,..

members having less, but similar periods of experience (median of 10-11

months) in their respective positions (see Figure 3 and Table A-3 in Appendix "

A). Squad leaders showed the most variability in experience, ranging from 0 .....

"-to 100 months of experience; team leaders were less variable, ranging from 0

to 64 months; and the typical squad member's experience ranged from 4 to only ,i---

24 months.

The number of other rifle squad positions held by squad members and the

"length of time in these positions across all units in which members had served ,.."

was also examined. On the average, squad and team leaders had held two other .. •

positions (see Table A-4. Appendix A), while the typical squad member had held

less than one other position. Squad leaders had spen; the most time in other .

- squad positions (median of 28 months, maximum of 120 months); team leaders had -

les8 time (median of 21 months, maximum of 77 months); and the typical squad r:""

"member had the least time (median of 5 months, maximum of 17 months). Figure

4- depicts these results. ' ---

C-mparison Group

"" Overall there was a 92% return on squad member questionnaires (81 of 88 -

squad members). All the squad leaders returned their questionnaires, 83% (15

-of 18) of the team leader questionnaires were returned, and a 93% return rate

;--. (57 of 61) was obtained from the remaining squad members. Computations for

the descriptive variables were the same as for the experimental squads. Due -

"t^ th ton' that there were only nine squads in the comparison group,

frequency distributions are not presented. -.-. "

. Rank. Eight of the nine squad leaders (89%) hold the rank of E5 with the

other one holding the rank of E4 (Table 3). Only one was a combat veteran.

"The majority of the team leaders (87%) held the rank of E4 vith the remainder

at the E5 level. Of the remaining squad members 68% held the rank of El or E2

and 28% were E3s or E4s.

The median number of months which the squad leaders had held their

present rank was ten with a minimum of one and a maximum of 21 months. The

team leaders and squad members had generally held their present ranks for a

shorter period of time (median of 6 for team leaders; median of 7, squad

members); however, the maximum duration for team leaders was 35 months (See

Table A-3, Appendix A).

18

----------
-, - ~SQUAD LEADERS

... .*.~ . . . ~TEAM LEADERS

SQUAD MEMBERS -. .

43 id

>

c 37. &2-V2

4t j

1 & cc 31369

us

25 .

A4. .......... 3

W..UAsDskP--Tn. .TEA LEADERS AN-TPC LSQ A E BRI

EXPE~lW?-NT4 L GROUPS.

19
1*7'

- ... ~ SQUAD LEADERS

.. TEAM LEADERS .- '

-- I. SQUAD MEMBERS

49-545

w4 02.~.

1.7- 14

op . It;. 

>- -lot!

-ti .. t:. 4 .. .

19-3 7421d

45 so70

0 0 I's 7 2b, 30 35 40 45 0

PERCENTAGE

FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF MONTHS IN OTHER SQUAD POSITIONS ACROSS ALL UNITS FOR SQUAD

LEADERS, TEAM LEADERS AND THE TYPICAL SQUAD MEMBER IN EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS.

_:7 ._t

20
Experience in Squad Positions. Squad leaders had held their present

positions in their present squads for a median of seven weeks (range = 1-32),

while the corresponding length of time for the team leaders and the typica

squad member was 11 weeki. A similar trend was observed with regard to the

median number of months individuals had held their present-positions across

all units; the wedian for squad leaders was three months wtilt the median

duration for team leaders and squad members was approximately five months.

Variability among the squad leaders, however, was greater than for team

2'jr -~ leaders and squad members (range, 1-Z4 months vs. 0-12 and 3-11). . .

,The number of other rifle squad positions held and the length of time

which those positions were held across all units were similar for the squad -. r

and team leaders (medians z 1.7 and 2.4 respectively), with the median time in

those positions being 18 months for both squad and team leaders. On the other ,'•:

hand, the typical squad member had held less than one other position fer a

median time of 2 months.

Experimental-Comparison Group Differences on Descriptive Variables " '

. . Since the experimental and comparison groups came from two different

active hrmy units, the experimental unit being less subject to personnel

turbulence, differences between the two groups on the experience variables - ~ were expected. The preceding summaries indacate such a trend and statistical ,

"tests showed such differences despite large within group variance on some

variables (see Table A-4 in Appendix A for a summary of the statistical test

results). In particular, the squad leaders fro• CroupC te e L3ntal heWd

" higher ranks, had held their present rank longer, and had been squad leaders ; ,

longer than the comparison group squad leaders. Experimental team leaders

likewise held higher ranks and had held the position of team leader longer .

than the comparison group team leaders. The typical squad member from the --v

"experimental groups had held his present squad position longer than his

counterpart in the comparison group.. . _

.. . ,- , - *'.?. "; :". - -. " , .tZ , - .

Standin Operating Procedures (SO) ..

"he open-ended questions on SOP were interpreted in different ways by the -..

SSquad members, resulting in little useable data. For axz=rple, it ies Ci.ear AN

that squad members often did not know what some of the SOP topics meant, e.g.-

return of fire, prearranged signals. In some cases, answers were incomplete,

making it difficult to determine squad member agreement. Despite the fact -. *"

that the SOP data were unusable they indicated that members knew relatively "

little about their squad SOP and that there was little agreement among members

who thought they knew the SOP. In some oases, this reflected lack of time to

train together) as with the squad leader who said all his squad had Just come

from basic traininZ. Another possible interpretation. of the SOP data is that

SOP did exist within the squads, but were viewed as a *way of life" rather

than RSOP." In the present study, use of open-ended questions was the only

data collection option. Interviews with randomly selected squad members would

probably provide useable data in future studies.

. 7 

21
'rOhD: Experimental Groups

Briefing Procedure

Data on briefing procedures were available on 42 of the.45 squad leaders.

Squad leaders employed five different OPORD briefing procedures. The most

common procedure of relaying the OPORD was to brief only the team leaders (50%

of the squad leaders briefed the team leaders, see Table 4). The entire squad

was briefed by 26% of the squad leaders. Each of the three other briefing

procedures was used by 5 to 9% of the squad leaders.

The additional observations made of nonverbal behavior during the OPORDs

• given to nine squads from one company indicated that only one-third or fewer -. , of these squad leaders took notes during the platoon order or used maps while .

: iving the squad OPORD (Table A-5). On the other hand, approximately 80% of

the leaders used effective briefing techniques (maintained body orientation

-.. : and eye contact with members being briefed, briefed members within talking

distance). Yet only half of the squad members reciprocated in kind by facing -

and looking at the squad leaders. In two instances such orientation was

.Mpossible since the squad leader required that the members being briefed : . surround him in circular fashion and face nutwards In order to maintain

security.

Content

"In summary, the average length of an OPORD was 22 statements (ranging

from 10 to 52), equally divided between information given In the platoon order

and additional information provided by the squad leader. Variability did

ocnur among the squads, however, with the number of platoon order -

statements ranging from 4 to 17, and the number of additional statements

: ranging from 2 to 37 (see Table A-6 in Appendix A). Figure 5 shows the

relative empha3"s given to each of the five standard OPORD paragraphs within

the platoon order itself, for the platoon order Information that was relayed .. by the squad leader, and for the additional information provided by the squad

leader. In general the emphasis was similar within each of these contexts. A

more detailed discussion of the content of each of these paragraphs follows.

Platoon OPORD Information. The operation order statements given to the "squad eaders by the platoon leaders were not always conveyed accurately and

completely by the squad leaders and there was considerable variability among

the individual statements in the accuracy and completeness with which they

were relayed. In addition, statements were often omitted entirely from the

order. Data on the accuracy and completeness with which each statement of the

platoon OPORD was relayed are presented In Table 5. The data account for "43

of the 45 squads, since rain ruined two OPORD audiotape. An overall analysis

of the results showed that of the 17 statements within the original OPORD only

five were relayed accurately and completely by more than 50o% of the squad

leaders. In contrast, 7 of the 17 statements were entirely omitted by more

than 50% of the squad leoders.

22
TABLE 4~

BRIEFING PROCEDURE: EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS.-.-."..

PROCEDURE 2 OF SQUADS..

Teaim Leaders Only so

All Squad Members Simultaneously26-

SEach Fire Team 9. .. .

~Team Leaders then Divisions, of Squad .- 9 .

Individual Squad Mem)hers -

Note. Percentages based on a* total of 42 squads '-, .~ "i 

4r , -4 I

-7,-

23~ 2.;;;k.
x

I 3

0

S

'.4W

up. . ...-

-. '.

SW- S u4*

*1. 

1-0 1: *"N:

1-4

4*-' O4cN4 4¶ I- -

-' .C4.-d p-I (4 c4Ise%4'.O@% %OPs ,'O 

P-4U)

OaJ *

0.0 

*% %gi

.. . 0

'4 Sb1.4 

hi id ... - - . .*: . v

* : *]&4..)

44.4 iJ

0 mr- 4fl.?N O.*40'.-4 -

4)61

1- - ___ -'

U) - -

'I *.

1-'I- 4*4'

SI - -'

It (. C U p -

a C *--" U -. .4,. J'.

rz4o

,.4000 SI -

1.4 SC U

SO - U 4' i-4-0-4 .C.L. 

Ij -- @1 GlOIdO * CIg

4-44.15 C WSW 1..Z .4Jd

@5) SI I-J4 CCSbW

U @6 UO-V)W * 9-4 Id) Sb ( I.*.4 ,-44J

4 A.CEW- A V'OU4-a.-'WI-qj

I-. .oO5S.C 4 i§O AO

IA U..O4I A S W0U(r4 .., 04.100

U *-- IdO 'a 0' a 

00CId1C4J 54101

0WLaJWSa.m0 CZ-4fracZOA 4 U) 40

0 0

'
Among the Situation statements #S2 on the enemy force composition (refer

to Table 2 for the platoon order) was communicated accurately and completely

most often (58% of the squad leaders, Table,.5). However, this statement was

omitted by 40S of the leaders. Statement IS3 (regarding the probable

nonemployment of chemical weapons by the enemy) was relayed appropriately in 1

'44% of the oases. However, it should be noted that this 4as "relayed

inaccurately by 35% of the squad leaders. This inaccuracy was most commonly

. in the form of stating that the enemy did not have chemical weapons. The

remaining two statements were distributed in a similar manner across the . ,

accuracy and completion categories with each being relayed accurately but ,

incompletely by approximately 50% of the leaders.. .

Of the four Situation statements four squad leaders (7%) relayed all

statements accurately and completely, while eight squad leaders (19%) did not

relay any statements accurately or completely. Most squad leaders (63%) Sot •'v ,

only one or two of the statements correct. Half of the leaders omitted

. . reference to at least one of the Situation statements. Seventy-two percent of

the squad leaders accurately, but incompletely, relayed one or two of the - .. :,

"Situation statements. Forty percent of the leaders made at least one

inaccurate statement. Refer to Table A-7 in Appendix A for a complete ,,,. ,..,, . breakdown of this information. " ':.

The Mission statement was communicated properly by only 58% of the squad

leaders while about one-fourth of the leaders omitted relaying this statement. '

7 e oi-j --. 1 A..v A . d -a . learge variability in the Quality

with which they were communicated. Only two statements (E3 and E9, on point

squad and move out time respectively) were relayed correctly and accurately by

more than 50% of the squad leaders (Table 5). If these two statements were -

not conveyed appropriately, they were absent from the order. The remaining

seven statements were conveyed accurately and completely by 5 to 44% of the

-,.- squad leaders. One of these statements (ES) was communicated accurately but '-

:..Incompletely by 84% of the squad leaders. This high Incompletion rate

probably occurred because this statement was the longest one in' the OPORD. . . .

". .. :. Statement E5 was relayed accurately but incompletely by 37% of the leaders . .. -

:,'."with most of these leaders failing to indicate that traveling overwatch should -

-lnot be used when 'r, contact with the enem .--- ~-

Of the nine Execution statements, the maximum number of statements

relayed accurately and completely by any squad leader was five (corresponding

to 12% of the squad leaders). Only one squad leader did not relay any

statements mccurately and completely; most leaders (58%) relayed two to three

statements correctly. Seventy-seven percent of the leaders incompletely

relayed one to two statements. Most leaders (81%) never made inaccurate -

Execution statements. However, 82% of the leaders omitted reference to three

to six of the Execution statements given by the platoon leader. A more

detailed breakdown of this data is given in Table A-7 of Appendix A.

The Service Support statements showed a negative relationship to each

other. 331 was relayed accurately and completely by 37% of the leaders while

being omitted by 63% (Table 5). In contrast S32 was relayed correctly 63% of

the time while being absent in 35% of the cas8s. Of the two Service Support .

25
,- -

statements, 30% of the leaders relayed both statements accurately and

completely while 28% omitted reference to both statements (Table A-7). The

Command and Signal statement was absent in 86% of the OPORDs (Table 5).

When analyzed as a whole- the quality with which the 9riginal OPORD was ---

relayed by the squad leader was positively related to the amount of time the

squad leader had held that position. The squad leaders with six months or

less experience omitted an average of 64% of the statements; leaders with six

to twenty-four months experience omitted about 46%; leaders with more than two

years experience omitted approximateiy 34%. Of the platoon leader statements '-"'*

relayed. 45% were relayed accurately and completely by leaders with six months

experience or less while approximately 63% were tranm iitted accurately and

completely by leaders with more than six months experience .... " -'.,""

......... '........................................... ... .".-••. '

Additional Information. Summary data on the number of additional

statements relayed in each OPORD paragraph as well as the number of

coordinating questions and other comments are depicted in Table A-6 (Appendix " -.- * ,

A). Approximately 50% of the additional statements occurred within the .... 7

Execution paragraph (see Figure 5; an average of 5.5 statements). Te -

variability among squad leaders in the number of additional statements was

also much greater for the Execution paragraph than for the other paragraphs -- (ranging from I to 22 execution statements). About 30% of these additional .

Execution statements specified contingency plans. .4 . . .. - ., • •' •. .

Within the Situation paragraph general information about the weather and

tarrir, .am usual!- added to the OPORD (Table A-8. Appendix A). The

"additional statements within the Execution paragraph most often relayed

information about tactical maneuvers and coordinating instructions. Within

the Service Support paragraph information about rations was the most common .. .•,.

tcpic of additional communication, and additional information within the

"- Command and Signal paragraph generally centered around chain of command and

.- password and challenge. . .... - .- .

. statements by Squad Members. In general, squad members talked very <•'" t "

little during the OPORD. In half of the squads no squad members talked; in

" . 25% only one statement was made. The maximum number of squad member '.:k,".

• foi-r and t.hi. occurred in only one squad. • . , ,* *.. :• •

"OPORD: Comparison Group

Briefing Procedure

OPORDs were available for analysis on six of the nine control squads.

The procedure employed by the majority of the squad leaders was to brief each

fire team. Four of the six leaders used this procedure (see Table 6). In

contrast, the most common briefing procedure used by the experimental squad

leaders was to brief Just the team leaders.

.. .

26
m.

• ,, SERVICE COM• AND

;-:._. . •. SITUATION MISSION EXECUTION SUPPORT S.... & .... " '

.,• .:< _. : - . • . "" .j - SIGNAL ,.:..•..,. L..:

., .,.•. . " :.•:•.H • " -

1- f - -° °. '" ." "" ' .

. , ,-

-":'•":••'•-.. " " pLATOON . . ... . - - - " ,--:,"•- .• .•x • ,*..',, ..

,L ° ,. i

".,.!•,•:.. !, .....o.: ... •.. .,•...-:,...• ... ,•<.,, .

.. , " .... , ":. -" 4R•, • ,,

• . . • . . . • .. , , • .- •:t(,•... •-•

SSQUAD " " ":•..•'/" -" -"

S.... :.....,_ PLATOON • 3;e i , ....... ,, • • npnnn • ;.- .... •-- "-" : "-" • S....... " " • , =•:'•i :'--:'•'•

; : ":; ... ."' " - . -...-" :-'¢1,: . !, .. .:...__/" I-.,, • .'... • ,•.,,:

S ... .' ..... .. i • .. . ..... . .. • • . ,•:

- '-•:. ".. , - " ., . :.-:. - + . .: . " -,..: : - I . '"'•!::•"-;•' 7

.•......_ .... .., . ":: .... : . . '.-',',,,- . .-• . . -. '. • . ;..•,. -. . I . ,: .-;;• :• , .: .

- '--. .... : --.. ,, . * .-'..- # I " -•l=.-• .-' S.... . " ,- i" i • ' '" " • I -' " " -""•'"' ' ," "" S.... • ": " souAo :" ];

l' ill ";"'"'" STA1EMENTsADLilTIONAL, ... • .. _ .. ... ,.• I !

• - ..

FIGURE 5. PERCENTAGE OF £TATEMI:-NT$ ALLOCAT•O TO OPORD P,•IIR,•.GRAPH

WITHIN PLATOON OPORD, PLATOON O!-'•RO INFOKMATION RELAYED IN SOUAD

OPGRD. ANO ADDITIONAl,. INFORMATION WITHIN THE SOUAD Oi'•)RD FOR "IHE

EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS.

27

• o .
TABLE 6.

BRIEFING PROCEDURE: COMfPARISON GROUP

PROCEDURE % OF SQUADS

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _6 . .- A 0- '

*Each Fire Team -6

AllI Squad Hembers Simultaneously -. 17

Tea~m Leade.rs then Divisions of Squad CS-17

Note. Percentages based on a total of 6 squads.

.7

~*..*3.~. 28 I ~ 
Content

The avera'%e length of the OPORD was 25.9 3tatements (ranging from 16 to

44). On the averagt, the number of additional statemerts and number of

statements relaying information given in the platoon crder were similar (12

v3. 13.9, sea Table A-9, Appendix A). The number of' platoon-related

statements, ranged from 8 to 17 and the number of additional statements ranged

OPORD 

from 6 

paragraphs 

to 34. Figure 

within 

6 depicts 

the platoon 

the relative 

order, the 

emphasis 

platoon 

allotted 

order relayed 

to each 

by 

of 

the

the I

squad leader, and the additional information provided by the squad leader.

Generally, the emphasis given to eanh platoon order paragraph by the leader

was similar to that in the original order. However, additional information

provided by the leader made no reference to service support or the mission. A

more detailed d3scussion of the content or each paragraph follows. ..

Platoon OPORD Information. The plat'on OPORD statements relayed by the

squad leaders illustrated a general decrease in accuracy and completeness, and

variability among the individual statements in th't accuracy and completeness .- ,

with which they were conveyed. However, in contrast to the experimental -. ::: : '

groups, the inaccuracies and omissions were ot as extensive. ualitative

descriptions of the manner in which each statement was relayed are given in

Table 7. -...

Ten of the 17 platoon order statements were relayed accurately and ,.

completely by 50% or more of the squad leaders. This finding contrasts with

the experimental groups in which only 5 of the i7 statements were coimugiiated ".

correctly by 50% or more or the leaders. . . " .

Each of the four Situation statements was relayed accurately and " completely by 50% or more of the squad leaders. Two of the six squad leaders

relayed all four Situation statements accurately and completely while two did

not relay any of the statements accurately and completely. No squad leaders ,, . accurately but incompletely relayed more than two of these statements and five

of the six leaders did not give any inaccurate statements. Refer to Table '.'-.- -

A-1O In Appendix A for a complete analysis of this information. . -: *-

"" -. ','.t -.

- The Mission statement was relayed by all six squad lchders Ev uc;tcly r y' and ,4; 

completely.

The Execution statements, as also exhibited by tLe experimental groups,.

displayed a wide variation in the quality with which they were relayed.

Statement E6 was relayed appropriately Ly five of the six squad leaders. Two

other statements were relayed correctly by three of the six leaders (E3 and

E9) and the rest were communicated accurately and completely by only one or in

one Case none of the squad leaders.

Of the nine Execution statements one squad leader relayed all but one

statement accurately and completely while the remaining five leaders relayed

only one or two statemants accurately and completely. Five of the six squAd

leaders r'layed one to three statements accurately but incompletely. One or

the leaders omitted no statements while three omitted six or the statements.

A detailed description of this information is In Table A-1O of Appendix A.

29

4. ,
†- *-SITUATION MISSION 1⁄4 XCTO . SERVICE COMMAND .1I ~SUPPORT SIGNAL

PLATOON -3

.;--ORDER L23 6 S 3 12 6 -

20 1) J PLATOO

-OPORD

~ STATEMENTSj ,

-~RELAYED 1 -/ ::- /-34.

STATMENT STAk- THER6EI

'.ADDITSONAL I-an 'ST ULATEMENTS SAT~l~i

FIGURE 6 PERCENTAGE. OF STATEMENTS ALLOCATED TO OPORO PARAGIIAPII WITHIN

PLATOON OPORO, PLATOON OPORD INFORMATION RELAYED IN SOUAD OPORD. AND

ADDITIONAL. INFORMArION WITHIN4 SOUAD OPORD FOR THE COMPARISON GROUP.

30
:4141

I- Pi C

$4

A.1 -l.0 6

II)0 0 0

v4

04 w

r

4 1

#A d-t 4'5

044 w aw W

41 C u ""a -4 .04 " is PC . 0 - : 41 4 o

9L w 0- 0 .d mI

gz 31C a -

- 0~0 40 -4 t c 0 a l 4

CL Q~ ý4 .3 J C6if"4'o U I 0 - 41 -A v-4. -4C 10- 1&.zý1 0. O LCO 41 00 c Id w.~ &j c c

6W5-41 Do4 ad. C .00 60 to4~ 44-C 0 4A -0 6 &oJ o) 41

0- 4 ~ 2~ - U - e 6 ' 0 0

-0- 4C- C'4 Ný I4 in 005.. -04- b..U

-0 *. = 0# )n t

314.
Both Service Support statements were correctly relayed by a majority of

the leaders. However, the Command and Signal statement was relayed accurately

and completely by only two of the six leaders and omitted by the remaining

four. * . .

Addi~lonal Information. Summary data for the number c, additional state-

-. ments communicated in each paragraph, the number of coordinating questions,

and the number of other comments are presented in Table A-9 (Appendix A). The "&."

"largest number of additional statements occurred within the Execution pars- ".graph (average of 6.7). A similar finding was exhibited by the experimental

groups. Among these additional Execution statements, 405% were contingency

- " statements. -The mean number of additional statements within each of the other "

four paragraphs ranged from 2.7 for the Situation paragraph to zero for

-: Mission and Service Support paragraphs.

The most common additional statements in the Situation paragraph -

,:,•*. concerned general information such as weather or terrain, or the location and

deployment of friendly forces. The additional information conveyed in the

Execution paragraph generally concerned tactical maneuvers and coordinating ..

instructions. The remaining supplementary information usually referred to the :-..

chain of command (Command and Signal paragraph). The content of these

additional statements is detailed in Table A-11 of Appendix A.

Statements By Squad Members. Generally, squad members from the -

comparison group made very few statements during the OFORD. If, '1lf IILe

squads no member talked, one statement was made in two of the six squads, and ..

three statements were made in the remaining squad. -{!- 7 

S .. . -. . .- . .. . • .:.• :,- ' , •.

Prediction of OPORD Characteristics

Two variables were created to summarize the squad leader OPORDs. The

first, called OPORD quality, reflected the extent to which the squad leader. ,

relayed the platoon order to his squad. If a platoon OPORD statement was

relayed by the squad leader accurately and completely a score of two was

-assigned. if a statement was relayed accurately but incompletely a seore orf • :-:

• one was assigned, and if a statement was omitted or given incorrectly it was

given a score of zero. OPORD quality was calculated by summing these weights

across all platoon order statements. The second variable was the total number -

of additional statements provided by the leader that did not correspond to the -

platoon order statements.

The extent to which each of the OPORD summary variables could be

predicted from the experimental treatments, squad leader experience variables,

and squad member experience variables was examined. The limited number of

squads available for analysis made it necessary to reduce the number of

predictor variables. Two squad leader experience variables were selected as

representative of the total experience of the squad leader: total time as squad leader and total time in other squad positions. The other two experience variables describ-4 previously (time in present position in present ..

squad and number of other p3sitions held across all Umits) were eliminated

32
since each correlated strongly with one of these two variables (see Table

"A-12). Corresponding measures were selected to represent squad member

experience (total time in present position and total time in other squad

positions). Because of the restricted sample size, results on team leaders

were included in these two squad member measures (the previous discussion of

the experience variables examined team leaders separately'from the other squad

members).' Since the contrast of the experimental and comparison groups showed

-*some substantial differences in the experience of leaders and squad members,

indicating that. these two groups represented different populations, only the

experimental squads were Included in the prediction analysis.

• - 'A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was used with the two

-treatment variables entered first (two categorical variables, with dummy

coding), then the two squad leader experience variables, and finally the two

squad member cxperience variables. The multiple correlation (R) between OPORD - '*, : quality and the treatment variables was .13, accounting for only 1.6% of the , .OPORD quality vatiance. The most effective predictors were the two squad . .,-•

leader experience variables which Increased the multiple R to .40 and -.

Increased the amount of variability accounted for by 11.1%. This increase was

-significantly gre.ater than zero (F (2,40)s3.34, p<.05). The addition of the

squad member experience variables-increased the multiple R to .44 and

increased the total variance accounted for by only 3.7%. This final

prediction equation accounted for 19.4% of the variance in the OPORD quality

and was not significantly different from zero. (Although the multiple R

increased with each additional predictor variable, the predictor variable -

sample Size ,. --- a,-s low hith yi.lndd a fi•nal sltntficante test with

relatively low power.). ... ":": * '".- "."-".

• - .- .. 

. The regression analysis results on the number of additional OPORD

statements were similar. The multiple R for the treatment variables was .26.

"-..The squad leader experience variables Increased the R to .52 and increased the

"amount of variance accounted for by 20.3% which was significantly greater than

zero (F (2,40)=5.59, p<.01). The addition of the squad experience variables

' -Increased the multiple correlatio.n to .55 uind increased the variance accounted

for by only 2.8%. This final equation accounted for 29.9% of the variance (F

•;-, ,. (6,38):2.77, p(.05). Tbble k-13 in Appendix & summarizes the results. -, ......-

Mission Outcome

"The military criterion k'o. mis-ion accomplishment resulted in only 11 of

the 54 squads (experimental and r.omuarisin groups) successfully completing the

mission while 30 squads failed to accomplish the mission. For the remaining 13 squads both the offensive an Jefensivc unils failed the2 Mission. There

Was no effect of tr.tm•ct. type upon the mission outcome (U (6) x 7.27, p .30). However, among the comparison oquads, In uhich no treatment had been

administered, none of the nine squads successfully completed the mission

Mission accomplis'aent was negatively reloted to tne length of time that

the opposing force (OPFOR) had participated in the study, that is, as the

number of movement to contact missions in whith OFFOR participated increased

the likelihood for successful mission accomp.'s4tment by the offensive squad

decreased. Figure 7 depicts the mission accowplistluent data for each week of *

33
.3ý

4, 4f

ft . . . . - L )U 

ACCMPLSHENT',.-.

- - .-...- ~.4 -* ~ -~* - - ~ - -EITHER'

-ACCOMPLISHMET'

'I 4. MIS- SIDWON

Il koV

us

£0u_

Z t~CMLS

WEEK OF OPFOR PARTICIPATION

FIGURE 7. NUMBER OF SQUADS WITHIN EACHi MISSIUN ALLUrLMInrLWIV 1 %04 LUflI

FOR EACHI SUCCESSIVE WEEK OF THE OPPOSING FORCE'S PAR TICIPA- ION IN THE

STUDY. (TOTAL OF 54 SOUADS. 18 PER WEEK)

34
the OPFOR1s participation in the study. Nine of the 18 squads that

participated during the first week successfully accomplished the mission. In "---:

contrast, among the 18 squads participating during the final week of the OPFOR : .

experience 15 squads failed the mission and only one succeeded. The mission

accomplishment data did not differ for the two OPFOR forces. Since the

comparison squads were all tested during the second OPFOR1-s final week of - .

participation, the experimental-cromparison group mission outcome differences . .

were confounded with the degree of OPFOR participation. The failure of the " .4

... comparison squads to successfully complete any mission apparently resulted _

from the OPFOR's experience rather than from the fact that the comparison

S.squads did not receive any special leader or squad training. . .-

r , .A 

. Treatment effects on the other dependent variable, the difference in the

percentage of offensive and defensive surviors, were examined using analysis .. ,-

of variance. Three orthogonal planned comparisons were created: the mean of .

the three experimental groups vs. the mean of the comparison group, the mean

of the MILES and leader treatments vs. the combined MILES/leader treatment, -:

and the MILES treatment vs. the leader treatment. The only significant

contrast was the experimental vs. the comparison group (t (50) 2.85, p<.005) 7'--

with the comparison group scoring lower than the experimentel groups.

However, as indicated in the next paragraph, the low performance by the

comparison group reflected an experienced OPFOR, rather than a treatment

"effect for the experimental groups.

Effects of the oFFCl force and week of OPFOR participati)n upon the same

dependent variable were also examined using a two-way analysis of variance.

There was a significant m2in effect for the week of OPF0R participation (F .

(2,48) a 9.17, p<.001), no significant effect of OPFOR force, and no

significant interaction between the two variables. The means in Table 8

indicate that as the length of each OPFOCRs participation increased, the

-OPFOR's performance also increased. -These results correspond with the

military criterion results mentioned previously.

A hierarchical multiple regression analysi3 was employed to determine the

extent to which mission success could be predicted. The predictor variables.... .

"and their order of presentation into the regression equation were: the week

Of OPFOR participation (two categorical variables, using dummy coding), the

S... two squad leader experience variables used previously in the OPORD rejgre33io .,

analysis (length of time as a squad leader and length of time in other squad

positions), the two squad member experience variables used previously (length

of time in present position and length of time in other squad positions), and

the two OPOHD characteristic variables (OPORD quality and number of additional

statements). TreatmenL was omitted from this analysis since it had no effect

on the crit.,rion, and it was necessary to limit the number of predictors

because of the small sample size. Only experimental squads were included.

The multiple correlation between the OPFOR participation variables and

the mission outcome was .41. These variables accounted for more variance in

tlte mNssion outcome (17%) than the remaining predictor variables combined and

the H increase was significantly greater than zero (F (2,42) u 4.35 p<.05).

The squad leader experience variables increasld the multiple R to .48 and

incraased the amount of variance accounted (R ) for by 5.8%. The squad memuber

35

• - . - . - . . : 
TABLE 8 .

il"' SION OUTCOME PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCE MEANS CLASSIFIED BY

EACHI OPPOSING FORCE AND EACH SUCCESSIVE WEEK.OF THE .

OPPOSING FORCE'S PARTICIPATION IN THE STUDY'-

- OPPOSING FORCE ~ ~

1 - ~ :2 Mean

112.04 -.65 5.6f

'' WEK2 .~ -37.30 -23.02 -30.16 ? WEEK

3 -60.37 -82.22 -71.30 ~

PARTICIPATION Mew'n -28.54 -35.3U

Note. Scores fror. 34 to Ivu were designaced as successful mission, accomp iiz1zment by the offensive force, -33.99 to 33.99 were designated as both

defensive and offensive failure. and -34 to -100 were designa~ted as

failure to accomplish mission.

7

~ ~* A.

4-r

V.. ?6
experience variables Increased the Rt by less than 1%. The OPORD variables

Increased the multiple R to .51, increasing the variability accounted for by

3%. The final equation had a multiple R of '.51 ffnd accounted for 26% of the

variance in the dependent variable. The final R was not significantly

differvnnt from zero. These results are summarized in Tabje..4-13 in.-ppendix

A. ;.8.-

- -4.i . .

- .-..- t'-~ ~ t...C~a~1V..2dC7 *.t-4 . -: *v*.~ ,a

---------

37 '~'AS
.- - . DISCUSSION "

The data clearly show that rifle squad operation orders for a particular

mission are not alike; they differ in content and in the way in which they are

delivered. A squad leader usually did not give the same tnfo.rmation-to his

squad members as was given to him by his platoon leader. Such changes "

reflected-primarily omission rather than distortion of information. Although

it can be argued that each item of information In the platoon order does not

need to be given to the squad members, in the present study key information .r:-..,

was often omitted, e.g., the mission, nature of the enemy, route to the

objective. Additional information provided by the squad leader focused .

primarily on execution of the mission, particularly squad tactical movement,

and secondarily on general Information about the terrain and on the chain of , . :"

command. Few contingency plans were presented and/or discussed.

of In terms of the team functions postulated by Nieva et al. (1978), most

of the information in the platoon OPORD represented the orientation function.

Thus the omissions by the squad leader indicated a failure to provide all the . --

orientation that was probably necessary for effective squad functioning.

Although Most of the additional Command and Signal and Execution information,

"including contingency plans, represented the organization function (how to 1. 7

accomplish the mission and assignment of individuals to squad tasks), the

total amount of organization information was low. - .. -

What can account for the tendency of leaders to Omit information in the ....

platoon order? Most relied on memory as only an estimated one-third of the

leaders took notes. The more experienced leader3 recalled more of the platoon

order. Further analysis indicated that statements at the beginning of the

-. '•platoon order were more likely to be remembered than statements in the middle,

- or at the end, reflecting a primacy effect. One statement (E4, squad was the

point squad) in the middle of the platoon order had the lowest omission rate

" (5). It was hypot esized that the perceived importance of the statements

could partially account for those that were recalled. However, correlations

between the omission rates and importance ratings of the platoon order ... ,0.

,. statements made by two experienced Infantrymen were not significant (r = .07).,.-,-'

Another factor may be selective forgetting, in that squad leaders only recal " .

or repeat information that they think is important to their squad.: Deficiencies

in th platoon OPORD itself could have contributed to some confu3ion and

forgetting by the squad leaders. The platoon OPORD was not in standard format

.(FM 7-11B4, FM 7-11B5), omitted much information, and did not include a "true"

mission statement.- However, It was not possible to measure selective

forgetting factors in the study. Of the factors that were measured, the

experience of the squad leader and the primacy of the platoon order statements

were the best predictors of statement recall.

Although the recommended squad briefing procedure is to brief all squad

members simultaneously, this was the case for only a quarter of the leaders

from the experimental groups. Half briefed only the team leaders. Such

• procedures increase the likelihood for distortions and omissions of OPORD

information as discussed in the Introduction of the report. No leader asked

specific individuals to describe their responsibilities, a procedure that is

S often recommended (FM 7-7, Henriksen et al., 1980).

38
The content analysis of the squad orders did not reflect what one might

call the "flavor" or the orders, e.g., voice inflection, hesitations. dialects

of the squad leaders, sentence fragments, the emphasis with which points were

made. The orders did differ on such dimensions, but no attempt was made to

quantify these dimensions nor to determine their relationship to. squad leaderexperience or mission outcome.

The squad leader experience variables were the best predictors Of the

OI'ORD quality measure and the toltal number of additional statements provided

by the leader. -Interestingly, the number of months the leader had held his

~.~ present position correlated Positively and significantly with both OPORD .

variables, while the number of months the leader had held other squad

Positions correlated negatively with both variables (significantly so only for

.the additional statements variable, 'see Table A-12). The relationship

between the two experience variables themselves Was not significant. The

reason for the negative correlation is not intuitively obvious. 'On the one

hand, one might hypothesize that if a leader were familiar with many squad

positions, he would be able td' easily determine what additional information

was necessary for a particular Mission and thus relay this information to ' squad members, yielding a Positive relationship. On the other hand, he might

assume everyone "knows what he knows" and thus see no need to elaborate on the

Mission, yield Ing a negative relationship.

It was not expected that OPORD characteristics would be strongly related ,

to mission out-come, since there are many factors that can have a more direct

Influence on the outcome. In fact, the data supported this expectation. In

the present study, the prlimary factor was the skill acquired by the opposing

force during repeated exercises. A secondary factor was the experience of the

squad leader.-A. .

The lack of relationship between OPORD characteriatics and Mission

* outcome in the present study does not necessarily mean that OPORDs are

irrelevant to squad Missions. The restricted variance of the Mission outcome . .

;V measures due to the impact of the OPFOR could have reduced the relationshiP. ' 1

The shortness of the movement to contact Mission In the present study may have

re~~~hhcedo ttherc~ '~ OPORDN OPORDs may have been related to squad ~~

actions during the Mi3sion, indirectly influencing squad outcome, but such :

process measures were not made. As mentioned previously, the quality of the

OPORDs was restricted, in that few, If any, excellent orders occurred,

* Although little erroneous information was given. The limited time for OPORD

preparation and the lack of opportunity to conduct a recon could*.have accounred in

part for OPORD brevity and the relatively little attention given to mission

execution. Such restrictionocould have aleo reduced the relationship with

Mission outcome. e: N

An excellent, detailed OPORD by itself, however, does not insure squad

success, particularly if the squad members have had little or no experience in

functioning as a squad. Such training gives meaning to the squad leader's f

words. Although the OPORD certainly reflects the ability and knowledge of the

39
* squad leader, it can also reflect the experience and knowledge or the squad members. For practically every squad in the present study, members were given

the opportunity to ask questions and to clarify and discuss their role in the

mission. However, they did not do so.

T The increased ef.fectiveness achieved by' the opposing toiceffrom -L•=!.

repeated engagements indicates the strong impact of repetition with training '-

equipment such as MILES. It should be mentioned that increased familiarity "i...wth the terrain on the three test lanes probably also contributed to the

'-.-'opposing force's success. Because of the confounding of these two factors It

is impossible to determine which contributed more to the opposing force's

success. .

What changes might occur in operation orders as squads become more

experienced and combat effective? One might expect a curvilinear relationahip

"with the levels of orientation and organizational information increasing with "

experience until a point is reached where squad members have worked together long enough and standing operating procedures have been sufficiently

established so that such information exchange becomes less critical to mission - ,

s u c c e s s . * - . . . .. .

_4-0 . 1-

- ". . • .

, lt* " . . .. * - . :- *' . . - " , .

"' " "#• " "• " " " 40 - " ".• " 
N ~ . ,. .: ;**- . . CONCLUSIONS. -

"£he stit-dy was an initial atteript to measure team functionsi with-in a

mil itiary setting, specifically the di1ssemination of orientation and

organizationial inlormation within a bquad operation order, and demunstrat-Pd

that such me~asures cart be made. The low levelN of orientation and

(Irganizational irtfarwation that occurred suggest that both'squAd ieaderý- arnd,

nemboirs do XOt Use the opk-atien oirder as a vehicle for plannir,3 a mission.

-. The results. clearly indicate that it would be a wistake to assuree that squad

Sope;:aion orders for the riame mizsiou are alike in terms of content r ......

Several training nee~ds were identifieO. Vie tende-ncy of leaders to oultt

critical platoon order informaticn also suggestsi that leader training should

inc lude te-ihniquas that will enhý.nce the recall- of such information. The usel

of operation order delivery techniques that were likely to increase member

confusion regardiag t~he. tission al-so indicates the need to train ~on delivery

tech.aiques and on technitques that check members' undersanid ing of their .

miss Lori respoinsibili.ties., Use ni the OPORD aa a mistion pini~tool needs ~ to be stressed. Finally, effect of the orposing force's experience on Che tested

* squads indici~te thaL; repetition in executing complex squad missions, with

equipunent svch as MPSAS, can lead to higher levels oS. mission suceens and

should be stressed in squad-level traint.ng.

414
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45
APPENDIX A1

-ADDITIONAL DATA ON SQUAD EXPERIENCE VARIABLES AND" r* -t

CONTENT ANALYSES OF OPERATION ORDERS a

'.40

- 46
*"TABLE A-i

OPErMTION ORDER PARAGRAPH DEFINITIONS AND PARAGRAPH CONTENT CATEGORIES .

SITUATION. PARAGRAPH (S)

"The Situaition paragraph concerns the location, size and strength, comF-'-

sition, deployment, movement, time factors and weapon capabilities of the enemy

and friendly forces that are likely te be involved in a military enqagt•|ent.

"This paragraph provides the background information needed in conducting and

planning the ptoposed engagement. In general, friendly forces refer to the

"higher units of which the specific unit (unit to which the operation orý.er

is %iven) is a part and/or to parallel units.

Content of Situation Paragraph

. ." ... a. General Information (GEN)

- ' b. Location, Entmy or Friendly (EL, FL)

c. Size /Strength, Enemy or Friendly (ES, FS)

d. Composition, Enemy or Friendly (EC, FC)

e. Time of Activity, Enemy or Frriexdly (ET, FT)

f. Movement, Enemy or Friendly (EM, FH)

g. Deployment, Enemy or Friendly (ED, FD)

V ie-dly (O. FO"-

i. Other, Entsy or Friendly (EO, • ')

MI.SSION PARAGRAPH (M)

"•The Mission paragraph is a clear concise statement of the task to be

S .accomplished by the unit to which the opetation order is given; tbat is, the

oblective as well as when the mission/operation is to begin. This paragraph

usually addresses the questions of who, what, and when. No content codes

were derived for this paragraph.

• '':EMY7.UTI'•ON PAFR.G•ACR!! (E) -- .- .. ,, 

The Execution paragraph establiuhes how the mission Is to be accomplished

by the, unit receiving the operation order. It. is the unitts tactical plan and

Includes the scheic of maneuver and plan of fire mspport.

Cont ent of Execution Paragraph

: - . I -• " .. • -:"

a. Indirect Fire (IR)

b. Direct Fire (DF)

c'. Munitions (M)

'Ž, Preparation of Attack gone (P)

e. Use of obstacles (OF)

"f. Reaction to obstacles (OF)

.-S. Intelligence Rep'orting (IR)

47
TABLE A-1 continued

f

h. Tactical Haneuv er of Entire Squad (TMS)

i .Tactical Maneuver of Subgroups within a Squad (T!4ST).

J. Other Friendly Units (ObNIXT)

k. Coordinating Instructions (CI)

1. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP)

a. Other Execution Statements (EO)

SERVICE SUPPORT PAPACRAPH (SS)

The Service Support paragraph normally contains information or instructions

pertaining to trains (transportation). rations, supply-resupply, maintenance,

ar'd casualty evacuation. -

Content of Service Support Paragrokph_

a. Ammunitiort/Munitions (A) b. RAtions (R)

c. Casualty Information (C)

d. Standing operating Procedures (SOr)

e. Other Service Support Statemenets (SS.1)

f. Not Specified (HS)j

'COMMAND AND SIGNAL PARAGRAH (CS)

a .dThe Command and qignal paragraph contains irrformation regarding unit comiiand

nthe operation of signal communications.

Content of Command and Signal Paragraph

a. Coimunicat ions Electronics Operations Instructions (CE0I)

b. Password and Challenge (NW)-- .

c. Hand and Arm Signals (HA) .. *

a. Verbhal Sigriias %owl -

e. Other Signals (SO)

f. Chain of Commndnr WC

g. Comimand Post (C?)

hi. Standing Operati~ng Procedures (SOP)

48
TABLE A -2

OPERATION ORDER CATEGORIES OTHER THAN PARAGRAPH CONTEXT CATEGORIES

COORDINATING QUESTIONS (CQ) .

Coordihating questions referred to general questions regarding the unit's

understanding of the mission.-

OTdER COMMENTS (oc) *--

:,,Other comments included any additional comments not covered by the five

paragraphs of the operation order and were not coordinating questions addressed

to the squad. Such comments included introductory comments which requested the* '17

~attention of the squad. .<.*'s

ACCURACY/COHPLETENESS OF GIVEN STATEMENTS .

* Each given statement was checked for accuracy. Only accurate statements

were then~ checked for completeness. Inaccuracies reflected revisions to the

original. statemnent-s that included wrong information and critical omissions

which in turn changed the meaning of the original statement. An incomplete .

statem~ent was created by omissions of parts of the original statement which

did not distort the statement's meaning. .. .

-by: oef ini tion, the u.=ka-o of '¶acrat bu cc-p4- statements~ did

riot exist (i..e., if a statement completely relayed all the original information

-'.it uas accurate),. On the other hand, if a statement was inaccurate, there was . 1 ;j

no referent to serve as a basis for evaluating its completeness. Thus given -

statements were coded into one of three accuracy/completeness categories:

accurate and completez, accurate but incomplete, and inaccurate.

CONTINGENCY STATMENTS, EXE-CUTION PARAGRAPH .. ;

Contingency Ltatements were of the form, "If then ",indicating

*. tactical actionLb to be taken by the unit (squad) dependent upon events encoun- 4 tered during.&( t.... = i Contingncyne itatements also included statements that

indicated a change in execution might be necessary at certain times, but did not

specify the exact foxiu of the change (e.g., "If we should come in contact with

the enexiiy, I will give you instructions.")

MEMBER QUESTION/RESPONSE

Squad member's questions and responses were coded according to the paragraph

and paragraph-content codes when the 3peaker's voice was audible.

* SQUAD LEADER ADDRESS/RESPOND TO INDIVIDUAL.

Squad leader statements or questions addressed to or in response to a

specific individual were marked. These statements were coded according to the

paragraph and content codes whenever the quality of the tape allowed such

determination.

49
- .-

lu 1a 0 % rfQ-4U' in 0 -4 0%g' L.V-4- 14C- .~-f I

-1 3. 0 0;9 ; * 1 * ., *. I, . .4 0( .5 c- . 0

in .- .- 1 Sc

&M r4 17 W0 4 *n r.CM4 z N c

s-4 EJ -z 4 ml

-4 r4 r- 104 r -

*0 ~ ~ 0 ~ 4 ~~4 .9-4 9-4fsu r44-O 5

0

4) co o .q 0 " 0 . .U ,

13 0~ 0 .(4 0 M1C~ aS,-4 ~ " 0t4 0~0 C41 %

-. ~~~ .. 0. .ttf V* *q *r4. 1 v- *4 V * ca--4 *-

or -4~~4N J-4 *4~

H4 0 (%i N -4 00 ý4r40 -C.,

.9- * S * . *r .

m p4r4 - C1 4c 4V4- 0 

0 0- 1''*'- ~ ~ *00 *.

V;a -. %Z r4CO E" 

U3

40*

.E0 -I Ii 

U30 3.

41 w 4)50
C,

TABLE A-4

RESULTS ON STATISTICAL TESTS COMPARING EXPERIMENTAL AND COMPARISON

GROUPS ON MEMBER EXPERIENCE VARIABLES -.

*SQ~UAD TEAM SQUAD

EXPERIENCE VARIABLES LEADERS LEADERS MEMBERS

Rank *222 ., .~tt1 ~ 14.84** X 22.36** X -11.73

Number of Months in

Present Rank ~-W K 15.18** K-W 1.73 K-U 4.54

Number of Weeks In Present -

Position within Present Squad K-U 4.99 K-U 7.19 K-W 8.45*

Number of Months in Present

Position in All Units .;-- K-W -9.19* K-H 14.68** K-U 9.40*

Number of Other Positions

held in All Units K-W 2.02 K-U 2.71 K-U 3.58

Number of Months in Other

Positions in All Units K-U 2.53 K-W 2.12 K-U 6.57

Note. Because of the skewed dial.ributions that occurred on the continuous

* variables and the lack of homogeneous variances across groups, a Kruskal-Wallis

*. .test was used to compare-the three experimental group. and the comparison

;t t I * * l

~*p < .01 *..

51
TABLE A-5 **' W

BEHAVIORAL ASPECTS OF SQUAD LEAER AND SQUAD MEMBERS,

DURING OPORD: EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS

BkHAVIOR/ORIENTATION % OF SQUADS

-Squad leader took notes during platoon 3rdr 33

Squad leader used map K22

Eye ContactSquad leader looked at squad 89

Squad members looked at leader 56

Body Orientation 2.

-'Squad leader oriented his body toward squad 78

Squad members faced leader 56

.Squad members briefed were within 5 ft. of leader 89 -- , ~

Scuad security maintained during OPORD 78

Note. N-9 squads -

1. 41.

52
TABLE A-6

SUMMARY OF OPORD STATEMENTS: EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS

NUMBER OF STATEMENTS

* TYPE OF STATEMENT Mean Median Mode Range. St. Dev.

-PLATOON OPORD *

71 A.

Situation 3.4 3.7 4. 0-7 1.3

Mission 1.0 1.0 1 0-3 0.8

Execution 5.2 .5.1 3 * 1-9 2.1

Service Support 1.0 1.1 10-2 0.8

...Command &-Signal 0.1 0.1 . 0 0-1 0.3

Total* 10.9 11.0 8.12 4-17 3.4

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Situation 1.8 1.4 0 0-6 1.8

* Mission 0.0 0.0 0* 0-1. 0.2

Execution 5.5 4.3 3.4 1-22 4.1

Service Support 0.7 0.3 0 0-4 1.2

Command & Signal 1.7 1.2. 0 .*, .0-8 -. 1.9

Coordinating Questions 1.1 1.0 10-3 - 0.8

other Comments 0.2 0.1 0 0-2 0.8

Total 11.0 9.3 .- 5 *.2-37 6.?

TOTAL.- --.- '. 21.9 21.3 *10.13,16 1C-52 88 .

22,23

*Contingency Statements ...-..

in Execution Paragraph 1.6 1.3 1 -8s 1.

SQUAD IMEMBER STATEMENTS 0.9 0.5 0 0-4 1.0

Note. Results include statement repetitions. N-u43 squads.

53 -
"TABLE A-7

"RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF PLATOON OPORD STATEMENTS RELAYED

BY THE SQUAD LEADERS AND THE FOUR ACCURACY/COMPL.ETENESS CATEGORIES:

EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS

S.,.. , -... ; ACCURACY/COMPLETENESS CATEGORIES

"Accurate & Accurate &

Complete Incomplete Inaccurate Omitted

OPORD " I OF Squad :" Squad Squad Squad

PARAGRAPH STATEMENTS Leaders Leaders Leaders Leaders

":'# .1 ,.... 2 t 2 I 2 I 2l " '

"SITUATION 0.: 8 19 12 28 26 60 21 49 --. ,

1 2 28 19 .44 12 28 11 26 -

Totalof 2 "'. '15 -35 12 28 4 9 9 21 -

statements) 3 5 12 - 1 2 2 5

* 4 3 7 .. .... .. . ". " .

.. . ' Mean -. 1.6 1.0 0.5 0.9 . - -...

"EXECUTION 0 .1 ':2 2 5 35 81 .- --

.. 1 8 19 16 37 7 16 2 5

'2 . 12 28 17 40 1 2 4 9

(Total of 9 3 13 30 5 12 .. .. 7 16

statements) 4 4 9 3 7 - -- 8 19

. .5. , 5 12 . . . 9 21

6'"' ' " -- "11 26

7 1 2 -

8-- - ... . 1 2 "-' . ,

Mean " 2.6. 1.8 V 0.2 :4.3 .-

-SERVICE 0 13 30 43 100 42 98 13 30

SUPPORT 1 17 40 - -- 1 2 18 42

(Total of 2 2 13 30 .. .. .. .. 12 28

statements)

Mean 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0

Note. Data represent number of squad leaders stating indicated number of statements in the designated qualitative manner. N-43 squad leaders. Percentages

based on column frequency totals within each paragraph--accuracy/completeness

cell.

aThe value of 8 means that eight squad leaders (19%) did not relay any of the

four Situation statements in the platoon OPORD accurately and completely.

bThe value of 12 means that twelve squad leaders (28%) relayed only one of

the four Situation statements in the platoon OPORD accurately and cr,,tpletely.

54
-n ".. V C4 

~. W'

040

P6 4I

inLn C .*S*tý- % O 0 00co -4a % T r- r-O C)

00' l' ,- 

CA C

0 Q$

41r 4-

A ill A 4 a P Aj

r.~~~0 r.a 4

$4I 2 Q P C P a 0 411.

WO J Wr4 4 41 co41 w

X N0 H 0 U U ~ P-4SW

4IUaU41 W 0 w uc -4 ý.4

-r40 Li " v40 .-. 46 w '00 00 P,"4 or."4Io 04J1.iM.a C WJ ý4 v4~

-. 550vr 1,$ auu

v $.. w& =* w 0 .* a -" 
A i.* t It 11 1

&6. V ~ 4f- -- to 

N) two.

- -4J

thi

c- S1- %N0 1C -C 00. 

s-a ccn U-m co %D.i*M 4% -40 0

0 r %C 0- 00C o 00 -0 0f %w

U -H P4 4J

~~E" J "4' 

93 Q .0U

566
TABLE A-9

SUMHMARY OFl OPORD STATEMENTS: COMPARISON GROUP

NUMBER OF STATEMENTS

TYPE OF STATEMENT Mean Median Mode Range St. Dev.

PLATOON OPORDSituation .3-3 3.5 4 2-4 1.0

Misi:1.3 .5 None 1-2 0.5

Execution 5.2 4. - .1

Service Support 1.7. 1.8 2 0-3 1.8

Command &. Signal -. 0.3 .0.3 00-1 0.5

Total .j12.0 10.5 10 8-17 3.2

ADDITIONAL INFORMATTON

Situation .2.7 1.5 0 0-7 3.1

Mission - - - -

Executaion 6.7 4.5 2 2-19 6.4

Service Support --- -

Command & Signal 2,2 1.5 . 1 1-4 1.3

Coordinating Questions 1.8 1.5 1 1-4 1.2

Other Comments 0.5 0.5 011 0-]. 0.6

Total 13.9 10.0 6 6-34 10.6

TOTAL 25.9 -23.5 None 16-44 10.3

'Contingency Statements .2: *.r.

J n Execution Paragraph ~ 2.7 1.0 0.1 0-11 4,2

Note. Resulte include statement repetitions. K 6 squads.

57

Eftommmboom
: -• s- .. ... .-

A-10 .TABLE 

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF PLATOON OPORD STATEMENTS RELAYED

BY THE SQUAD LEADERS AND. THE FOUR ACCURACY/COMPLETENESS CATEGORIES:

COMPARISON GROUP - . -

ACCURACY/COMPLETENESS CATEGORIES "

.. ..- Accurate & Accurate -

•-Complete Incomplete Inaccurate Omitted

. ... Squad Squad Squad Squad

OPORD or Leaders Leaders Leaders Leaders

PARAGRAPH STATEMENTS f z # z 1 "

SITUATION 0 2 33 3 50 5 83 3 50>'

" 1 - -- 1 17 1 17 1 17

(Total of 2 1 17 2 33 -- -- 2 33

4 3 1 1 7 - - - - -'- - -

Statements 4 2 33 .. .. . .. . . ."-,

Mean 2.2 0.8 0.2 0.8

ECXECUTION 0 -- -- 1 17 3 50 1 17

1 2 33 2 33 3 .50 -- --

(Total of 9 2 3 50 1 17 -- -- --

Statements) 3 -.-- 2 33 . .-- 1 17

4... .. .. -- .. .. 1 17

? :6 ..... 3 50

* " Mean 2.7 1.7 0.5 4.1

SERVICE 0 1 17 6 100 6 100 4 67

SUPPORT 1 1 17 -- -- -- -- 1 17

.(Total of 2 2 4 67 .. .. .. .. 1 17

Statements)

Mean 1.5 0 0 0. 5

Note. Data represent number of squad le ders stating indicated number of

statements in the designated manner. Percentages are based on column totals.

N - 6 squad leaders.

58
'*1~~~~ 5l 1 1 1( II'4I~ 

111r SIl I r4ciL

CL4

PC (D 0 C. 0.3c Man 0 0 0 0ww

C) 0 cr r -4 -4r4F4r_ - - 94r -

V-4 U3

im0 41 I .

.a 4,1

Inn

0000i r41r0 0O O0e'! - car

0 o Cc: IO0%0000 c ~ ra tow- >r. r

0. w4 V4 0 6A~4, 0 r4 r444- cs .

4j4

%00 4J .')

to .0 sn

**i P4 48 U0 0. -d dc 9"

T- -a9 CF a T 4V - 1 uV0

wl - 0 cdW'

00 OPHAJhO.O .. r ~

59U 4 '.
0 l

U) 4 1

A44

v41

V4

P-4 W.-u-u

0 00

CAw

v f *- 4 4-''

41 00

*i 04Z

C6 0

w0 0

*~of

ki. 

0& 4- V3 1j i:01 .4 -z44 

A

W v

:Z >1 U~ 0 C604

~44-4 S4

0 ) 0 0

0014 0a0t

0 41

600
1-40 %n ur, a Lt U, a n% Cr ga~o N

w r-4 0 I C) 0 

a -. t .1

0 C 00

0% 4 F- r-4 cq

.~rl w4 ,I 0 0 inO

toI Ia 4 a 

MN 04 044~ 4 oO

-0'C1 mN (4 0~

CrN ON f- -T 47 t

r4- C" C4

a.. F I

1-44

aas

""4a u

z H

to V4 %-4

0J cuw 4J 

41L r.. m ot

a 61c V V1 u 1 00$ 4 4
TAB3LE A-13

RECRESSI0H ANALYSIS RESULT.3-

CRITF.A TON PREDICTOR l resFfo

VARIA3LE 'VARI.ABLES R R2 in R k Increase

OPORD - Treatments .13 .016 1.6 F(2.42) 0.34

Quality Sqd Ldr Exp .40 .157 14.1 F(2,40) 3.34*

Sqd Member Exp .44 .194 3.7 F23)-0.02

Overall Regression

Equation F (6,38) - .3

-Add~ltional Tý-eatments ~. .26 .067 6.7 F(2,42) -1.53 '

Statements Sqd Ldt Exp '.52 .271 20.3 F (2 40) - 5.59** .

.***..SqJ Member Exp .55 .299 2.8 1P(2,38) 0.76 -

Overall Regression. . -.

Equation V. I(6,38) 2.77* .i

Mission OFFOR Week .41.,.171 17.1F(2,42)m 4.35*

:rOutcome: :*Sqd Ldr Exp . .48 '.2O 59F(2,40) -1.5~4

r?-ercent~age Sqd Member Up ~ .4 .231 01723)-00

n4ffOPORD Char -. 5 .. 16 3.1 F(2.36) 0.76

Oera~tioersho -.- (8,36) 1.60

6?.
APPENDIX B

- ....DEFINITION OF CATEGORIES USED INCONTENT ANALYSIS OF

-. . - - OPERATION ORDES

631
S.... ~. . ,• :-

APPENDIX B h -'-

"DEFINITION OF CATEGORIES USED IN CONTENT ANALYSIS OF OPERATION ORDERS

SITUATION PARAGRAPH (S)

The situation paragraph concerns the location, size and strength, , composition, deployment, movement, time factors, and weapon capabilities of -"

the enemy and friendly forces that are likely to be involved in a military

engagement. This paragraph provides the background information needed in

conducting and planning the proposed engagement. In general, the term

"friendly forces refers to the higher units of which the specific unit (unit to .

"which the operation order is given) is a part and/or to parallel units. -.

General Information (GEN): General information refers to such topics as

weather, nature of the terrain, specific terrain features, and the location of

"tactically significant landmarks. Example: "Checkpoint Charlie is located ,

"here.." .,.

The following content areas were applied to both enemy and friendly

forces, with separate codes used for each.

*,..- -. Location (EL, FL)" Location refers to where enemy and friendly forces .:. •.

are known to be or will be. Statements that referred to location of the squad ,,

itself were also coded as friendly location (e.g., "we are located here" -. -

leader points to a terrain map).

Size/Strength (ES. FS): Size is a unit description like battalion, com- - ,

pany, platoon, or squad; strength is a relative measure of the force capability (e.g., a company at half strength due to casualties). Such statements

"provide an account of the relative size/strength of the forces that will be

involved in the impending engagement. Example: "The friendly forces are -" ".our!-.elves, 13t squad, 3rd platoon, and 2nd and 3rd squads.* : .. .:r.:j'.:

Composition (EC, fC): Refers to military branch (eg., Infantry, Armor, " "

'Field Artillery, Air cavalry, Engineers) or a combination of varlous t-ranc1h&Ae3, :;'e;

therefore composition statements describe the type of unit(s) which comprise

the enemy and friendly forces. Examples: *Enemy consists or 1i4ht Infantry"

and "Enemy is from Motorized Rifle Regiment.*

Time of Activity (ET, FT): Timing of movements by friendly or enemy

forces. Both beginning and ending times as well as duration of movement are

included in this definition.

M4ovement (EN, FM): Refers to recent, ongoing, or suspected movement of

enemy and/or friendly forces.

"Deployment (ED. FD): A description of how forces are distributed within a.

a given general location, pertains to stationary, advancing or retreating forces. Example: "Enemy has left OPs and LPs" and "Ist. and 2nd squads are on . I

our left flank."

64

I
-Weapons (EW, FbI): Information in addition tou force c.omposition that

describes specific and/or special weapon capabilities such as CBR or unusual

weapons. Both indirect and direct fire capabilities are included.

Other (EO, FO): Other situation statements not covered by the above

categories. -

MI3SION PARAGRAPH (W -,

The Mission paragraph Is a clear, concise statement. of the task to be

accomplished by the unit to which the OPORD is given; that is, the objective,

as Well as when the M1ssion/operation is to begin. This paragraph usually 'ý.addresses the questions of who, what, and when. NO subcategories Were

employed In this paragraph. When statements began "our Mission is" but the

content was clearly not concerned With Mission but with execution, the

statements were coded for their true content. An example Of such a statement is "Our mi5sion Is to be point squad for the platoon.*

EXECUTION PAIIAGRAPH (E)

The execution paragraph establishes how the Mission is to be accomplished

by the unit receiving the OPORD. It Is the unit's tactical plan and Includes

the scheme of manuever and plan of fire support.

(a indirect Fire (ILF);1 aeet r-ferr!nw to us'e of indirect fire

(rtillery, mortars) during the tactical operation (e.g., "Blom mortar team

will provide sUppressive fire as the unit approaches an enemy OP").

Direct Fire (OF): Statements referring to Use of direct fire weapons

during the tactical ')per:.ition, e.g., use of N60, automatic rifle, Dragoni, LAW.

Munitions (M): Statements referring to use of munition during the

tactical operation, e.g., claymuores, handgrenades. -

Preparation of Attack Zone (PI. Referi t~o act pns takenpiroth

tactical operatiorn that prear thec terraln/environment for friendly assault/defense (e.g., use-of Indirect fire, chemicals, smoke, fire fi-on

gunshi ps)

Obstacles, Use of (013): Reference to use or preparation of obstacles

such as minefields, bunkers, concertina wire by the unit.

Obstacles, Rteaction to (OR): Reference to hov unit is to react when

encountering enemy obstacles (e.g., danger areas, minefields). This category excludes references to intelligence reporting of obstacle location and

condition, as these are included under intelligence reporting.

Intellilence keporting (IR): Refers to reporting of the enemy situation

during the tactical operation (e.g., "Once you have spotted the OP, report its3

location to me.*)

65
9, 0,

Tactical Maneuver of Entire Squad (TMSW): General comments that refer to

the movement of the entire squad (e.g., We'll move out in that direction,

keeping within 100 meters of the road." "Move out as quickly as possible.").

Tactical Maneuver of Squad with reference to coordinated movement. of

subdivisions within the squad such as fire teams (TMST): Such statements may

include use of the terms fire and maneuver, traveling overwatch formation, and

bounding overwatch formation which imply coordinated movement between fire

teams. Other statements may refer explicitly to coordinated movement (e.g., "Alpha team lead out with Bravo team 50 meters behind.").

Other Friendly Units (OUNIT): Information regarding tactical plan for

other friendly units at the same level or the next higher echelon. In the

present study, this referred to other squads uithin the platoon and to the

platoon as a whole.

Coordinating Instructions (CI): Coordinating instructions are instructions regarding the general behavior/demeanor of the squad. These are usually of a nontactical nature and are given prior to misson departure. Examples:

"If you are ready prior to LD time, you move out." "If there are no questions, I want you to go back and brief your people right quick." "We move out

in 5 minutes."

Standing Operating Procedures (SOP): Reference to use of standing

operating procedures during execution of the mission.

Execution Other (EO): Any other statemeits not covered by the above

"categories, e.g., "Keep your heads down." When statements served to embellish

other execution stat.ments, they were coded in the appropriate category rather

than as Execution Other.

SERVICE SUPPORT PARAGRAPH (SS)

The Service Support paragraph normally contains information or

instructions pertaining to transportation, rations, supply-resupply, maintenance, and casualty evacuation.

Ammunition/Munitions (A): Reference'to any ammunition/munition -- its

supply, location, distribution, etc.

Rations (R): Reference to food and medical supplies

Casualty Information (C): Reference to report of casualties and plans

for casualty evacuation

Standing Operating Procedures (SOP): Reference to SOP in any of the

above area3

Not Specified (No): Infurmation inadequate - could not determine what

type of service support was being referenced

66
t - Other (SSO): Other statements regarding Service Support not covered by " the above categories

COMMAND AND SIGNAL PARAGRAPH (CS)

This paragraph contains information relative to command and the4operation

of siSnal 'communications.

"m : Communications Electronin.s Operations Instructions (CEOI): Operating

-eanctions on use or nonuse of radio equipment (e.g., "OK, we have no radio

"capability")

-.-~- , Password and Challenge (P4): Any combination of two specific words; one

Is the password and the other is the challenge. The time period when a

specific password/challenge is in effect may also be given.

Hand and Arm Signals (HA). Reference to use of hand and arm signals

(what type of signals and when signals are to be used).

*-Signals, Verbal (SY): Reference to use or verbal communication within

the unit, excluding radio, electronic communications e.g., CEOI.

'Signals, Other (SO): Signals other than radio, verbal, and hand/arm;

includes such signais as flares and gun blasts

C: ,. f -ren^- 1n uhn Is in charge should some ill fate of c~sa- ' : . . C.... .. ..... . _'

befall the present leader(s).. The responsibility for the mission then becomes

this person's responsibility. The category also included reference to the

location of any person involved in the chain of command (e.g., "The platoon ,-' """ leader, SGT Mason, will be with me.)" . '-

Command Post (CP)" Location of command posts for pertinent units. For

the squad the CP would be the Company and Battalion CPs.

Standing Operating Procedures (SOP): Reference to SOP for commands and

signals.

7- '

67 ÷

'p