i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 8- 00 91 3- CR Cooper BAGHERI , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 9, Be x ar County , Texas Trial Court No. 950565 Honora ble L aura Salinas, J udg e Presiding Opinion by : Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: May 12, 2010 AFF I RMED Cooper B ag heri a

ppeals fr om his conviction f or drivingwhile intox icated, a sserting the trial
c ourt e rr e d in de nying his re qu e st fo r a lim iti ngins tr

uc tio n a s to the br e a th t e st r e su lts and e rr e d in
ru lin g on tw o c ha lle ng e s f

or c a us e duri ngvo ir

dir e . We a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt
.04

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1 ... S e e M a ta v . S ta te , 46 S. W
. 3d 902, 908- 09 (T ex . C r i m. A pp. 2001) ( ex pl ai n i n g t h at r et r og r ade e x t r apol at i on i s “ t he com put at i on back i n t i me of t he bl oo d- al cohol l eve l –t hat i s , t he es t i mat i on of t he l eve l at t he t i me of dri vi ng bas ed o n a t est res ul t f

rom s o m e l at er t i m e. ”). I n M a ta , t he cour t m ade cl ear t hat an y r et r ogr ade ex t r apol at i on t es t i mo ny was n o t re liab le un le ss it wa s b a se d o n su ff ic ie n t ch a ra c te ristic s o f t h e p a rtic u la r d e fen d a n t. I d. a t 9 1 6 -1 7
.

- 2- F ACT UAL AND P R OC EDU R A L B ACKG ROUND Ba g heri wa s arr ested for driving while intox icated in the ear ly morning on J anuar

y 1, 2006. The ve hicle B ag heri wa s driving w ent throug h a line of f lare s set up in front of a

major accident being investigated by

police, and struck one of the police ca rs par ked in the stree t. Ba g heri fa iled to stop and continued driving ; he was stopped by other off

icer s d o wn t h e ro ad
. An offic er qu e sti on e d B a g he ri , a

nd the n h and c uf

fe d h im a nd ins tr uc te d him to wa it on the sid e of the ro a d unti l the inv e sti g a tio n o f t

he ma jor a c c ide nt wa s c omp le te d. B a g he ri wa s d e ta ine d at 1: 30 a m. S ome tim e later, O ffice r Mooney

conducte d the standar d field sobriety tests on Ba g heri, whic h cause d Mooney to c on c lud e that B a g he ri wa s int oxic a te d. An int oxily zer te st wa s c on du c te d on B a g he ri a t 3: 17 a .m. and 3:19 a.m. on J anuar

y 1, 2006; the test results showed a blood a lcohol content (B AC) of 0.163 and 0.146 which is a

pproxi mately

twice the le g al limit of 0.08. Ba g heri wa s char g ed by information with driving w hile intox icated ba sed on the loss of normal use of his me ntal and phy sical fa culties by rea son of introduction of alcohol (Para g raph A ), and ha ving a n alcohol conc entration of 0.08 or more in his body

(Para g raph B ). At trial, in addition to testim ony by the investig ating office rs, t h e breath test re sults were
a dmi tte d in to e vid e nc e thr ou g h the e xpe rt te sti mony of Ge or g e Al le n M c Do ug a ll, the B re a th T e st Tec hnical Supervisor f

or B exa r C o u n t y , Texas. McDoug all testified he did not know any of the i n d i v i d u al fac tors about B ag heri ne cessa ry in order to e x trapolate and g ive a B AC at the time of dri v i n g. 1 Over

objection, McDoug all tes t i fi ed g ener ally about the rates of alc ohol absorption and04

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- 3- el i m i n at i o no v er

t i m e b as edo np o p u l at i o ns tu d i es . M cD o u gal l al s o t es t i fi edt h at t h e B AC re ad i n gs obtained fr om the bre ath test show that B ag heri c onsumed a “ substantial amount” of a lcohol befor e the samples we re taken. The court inst ructe d the jury that it could find Ba g heri guilty if it found bey ond a re asonable doubt that he had dr iven or ope rate d a motor vehic le while “intoxicated,” meaningeither he did not have the nor mal use of his mental a

nd phy sical fa cul t i es d u e t o alcohol inge stion (impairment d ef i n i t i o n ), or he ha d an alc ohol conce ntration of 0.08 or more in his body (p e r s e de fi nit ion ). Th e jur y fo un d B a g he ri g uil ty
. Th e c ourt se nte nc e d Ba g he ri to s ix mon ths in j a il plus a $2,000 fine, but suspended the sentenc e and pla ced B ag heri on c ommunity supervision for 18 months. Bag heri timely

appea led. A N A L Y SIS Li miting I nstr uc tio n. I n his fi rs t iss ue , B a g he ri argue s the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in r e fu sin g his reque st for a jury

instruction limi ting the r eleva nce of the bre ath test results to the issue of whe ther Ba g heri ha d consumed a lcohol befor e the test, a nd not as to whether

he had a BAC in excess of 0.08
a t t h e t i m e h e w a s dr i v i n g . B a g h e r i a s s e rt s t h a t , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f r e t r o g r a d e e x t r a

p o l a t i o nt e s t i m o n y, the test results wer e relevant only to the i mpairment definition of int ox ication and we re not re levant to the per se definition of intox ication, i.e. , a BAC o f 0
. 0 8 or more. B ag heri c halleng es only the admission of the breath te st r esults without a limi ting instruction; he doe s not challeng e any aspec t of McDoug all’s testimony on appea l. The State re sponds that Ba g heri’s requeste d instruction was
no t a c or re c t st a te me nt o f t

he law, and

the re fo re the c ourt

did no t e rr in d e nyingit. Whe n th e State of

fe re d th e br e a th t e st r e su lts int o e vid ence, B a g he ri ob je c te d th a t th e te st results wer e not re levant to the alleg ation in Parag raph B of the infor mation that Ba g heri ha d a B AC of 0.08 or more while he was driving the vehicle ; he ar g ued that if the r esults were admitted, they04

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2 ... T he l i m i t i ng ins t ruct i o n req uest ed b y B agheri tr acks t he l anguage used i n the d i ss ent i ng o p i ni o n i n S t ew a rt , 129 S. W
. 3d a t 99.

- 4- should b e l i m i t ed to the issue of loss of normal use of Ba g heri’s f

aculties to demonstrate he ha d consumed a lcohol, and not “to prov[e] an ac tual alcohol conc entration. . . .” The State re plied that Ba g heri’s obje ction went to the we ight of the evidenc e, not its a dmissibi lity
. The c ourt overr uled Ba g her i’s objection and a dmitted the breath test results without li mitation. At the charg e conf ere nce, B a g he ri re qu e ste d th e fo llo wi nglim iti ngins tr uc tio n w ithre sp e c t to the br e a th t e st r e su lts : During t h e course of the trial e vidence of ce rtain bre ath test results wer e admitted. The tests ar e re levant only for the limited purpose of demonstratingthat the appe llant had consume d alcohol at some time be fore the tests wer e administere d. The c ourt denied the instruction. Be cause Ba g heri pre serve d err or by objectingand re questing the limit ing instruc tion, we review the trial court’s ruling de nying the instruction to determine whe ther it was err or and, if so, w hether the er ror caused “some harm” to Ba g heri. Ma nn v . S tate , 964 S.W .2d 639, 641 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). We ag ree with the State that the limiti ng instruction reque sted by Ba g heri is not a cor

rec t state me nt o f t

he law; the re fo re , it

wa s n ot e rr or to d e ny

the ins tr uc tio n. As B a g he ri c on c e de s in his brief, the Court of Criminal Appeals has reje cted the argument that breath test results are irrele vant under the per se definition of i ntox ication i n the absence of retrograde extrapolation evidence
. See Ste war t v . S

tate , 1 2 9 S .W.3d 93, 96-97 (Tex. Crim . App. 2004) (holding that, even w ithout retrog rade extrapolation testimony , breath test r esults obta ined 80 minutes after stop were rele vant under both de finitions of intox ication beca use they provided evidenc e that def endant ha d consumed alcohol and thus tended to make it more probable she was int ox icated while driving ). 2 I n Ste war t , the Court char acte rized breat h t es t results without retrog rade extrapolation as simply one of the04

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- 5- “piec es in the evide ntiary

puzz le for the jury

to consider in dete rmining whether [t he def endant] was intox icated at the t ime [he] drove.” Id. a t 97 . F ur the r, the Court

no te d th a t a dmi ssi on

of br e a th t e st results without ex trapolation evide nce doe s not nece ssarily encour ag e the jury

to eng ag e in “its own crude retrog rade extrapolation” bec ause it is not nece ssary for the jury to deter mine the def

endant’ s prec ise BA C at the time he was driving–the jury only needs to find be y ond a re asonable doubt that ei t h er t h e d ef

en d an t ’s fa cu l t i es we re i mp ai re d o r h i s BA C wa s 0
. 0 8 o r m o re wh en h e w as dri v i n g. See id. I n addition, the Court addre ssed the probat i v e v al u e of br eath test re sults without extrapolation testimony

in State v. Me chler , holdin g t h at t h e pre judice ar ising fr om admission of breath test results o b t ai n ed 9 0 minutes after the def endant’ s arr est did not outweig h the probative value of the test results under

Texas Rule of Evidence 403. State v. Me chler , 153 S.W .3d 435, 440- 41 (T e x. Cr im. App . 200 5) . T he Cou rt re c og nize d th a t “ the int oxily zer re su lts are un do ub te dly prejudicia l to [ the def

endant], but t h ey ar e n ot unfairly prejudicia l beca

use this evidence relates direc tly to the char g ed off

ense.” Id. The Court expressly stated that the bre ath test results, without
a c c omp anyingre tr og ra de e xtra po latio n e vid e nc e , w e re re le va nt an d p ro bativ e a s to bo th t he pe r s e and impairment definitions of intox ication. Id. at 440 (test re sults indi cate d defe ndant had c onsumed alcohol and thus tended to make it more probable that he w as intox icated at time of driving unde r both per se a

nd impairment definitions of intox ication). Ba g heri a rgues that, despite Ste war t and Mec hler , the par

ticular fa cts of this case justified a limiting instruction on the brea th te st r esults to protec t B ag heri from unfair prejudice and conf usion of the issues cr eate d by

the abse nce of

retrograde extrapolation testim o n y p l u s “conf using a nd questionable” testimo n y

ab o u tp o p u l at i o ns tu d i es u n co n n ec t edt o t h e d ef en d an tan d the prosec ution’s04

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- 6- “m i s re p re s en t at i o n ” o f t h e t i m e s p an b et we en t h e st o p an d t h e br ea t h t es t
. Ba gh er i re l i es o nl an gu age in Gi gli ob ian c o v . S

tate , in which the Court ex plained ther e may be a c ase in whic h the trial cour t could re asonably

conclude the probative value of breath test r esults a

re substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice or

confusion of the issues–but held that this was not such a ca se. Gi gli ob ian c o v . S

tate , 2 10 S.W. 3d

63 7, 64 2- 43 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ) ( ho ldi ngthat B AC te st results obtained 75 minutes a fter driving had considera ble probative va lue in proving both per se a nd imp a ir me nt i nto xicatio n at the t ime of dr ivi ng ). B a g he ri a c kn ow le dg e s th a t Gigliobianco was decide d “on it s own limit ed fa cts.” See id. I n his brief, B ag heri a rgues mere ly

that g iving the reque sted limit ing instruc tion “would not nece ssarily conflict with existi ng authority .” I n a c a se de c ide d a ft e r b ri e fi ngwa s c omp le te in thi s app e a l, the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls settled the issue by

holding that a

jury instruction that stated breath t est results could be c onsidered only for “ the limited purp o s e o f showing that the individual who was tested ha d inge sted alcohol only at some point befor e the time of the test” wa s an imprope r co m m en t o n the weig ht of the evidenc e. Kir

sc h v . S tate , No. PD-0379-09, 2010 WL447437, at *6 (Te x . C ri m. App. Fe b. 10, 2010). In h o lding the instruc tion was err or, the Court empha siz ed that no Te x as statute, rule of
e vid e nc e , o r j ud ic ia l pr e c e de nt l imi ts the jur y ’s c on sid e ratio n of a

n o the rw ise a dmi ssi ble br e a th t e st result. Id. I n discussing the import of Ste war t , Mec hler and Gigliobianco , th e Court e xpla ine d th a t, “The purport of these decisions, taken toge ther, is that B AC-test results, even ab s en t ex pert retrog rade extrapolation te stimony , are often highly probative to prove both per se a nd impairment intox ication.” Id. at *4. Finally , the Court note d that a B AC result is not sufficient by itself to prove the def endant wa s driving while intox icated a ccor ding to the pe r se defi n i t i o n; in the absenc e of retrog rade extrapolation testimony , there must be other evide nce in the r ecor d to support an i n f e r e nce04

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- 7- that the def

endant wa s intox icated at the time of driving as we ll a s at the time of the bre ath test. Id. at *4-5. Her e, althoug h there was no re trog rade extrapolation evidence , the jury had other evidenc e of B ag heri’s intoxi cation to consider alongwith the breath test result s , i n cl u d i ng the offic ers’ s testimony about B ag heri’s dr iving an d s t ri king a police ca r bef ore he was stopped, his dishevele d appea ranc e, bloodshot ey es, sm ell of alcohol, slow speec h, and unst able stance whe n he steppe d out of the ve hic le , th e re su lts of his fi e ld s ob ri e ty

te sts , a nd B a g he ri ’s state me nt at th e sc e ne that he hit the police c ar be cause “it was in the wa y .” We conclude that under Ste war t , Mec hler , and Kirsch , th e br e a th t e st r e su lts we re pr op e rl y admitted without an inst ru cti on limit ing the ir rele vance solely to the impairment definition of intox ication. Acc ording ly , we ove rrule B ag heri’s f irst issue. Chal lenges for Cause. I n his second and third issues, B ag heri c ontends the trial cour t erre d in ruling on two challeng es for cause to potential jurors during voir dire in violation of article 35.16 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure . T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 35
. 1 6 (V er n on 2006). Specifica lly , Ba g heri a sserts the court err ed in denying his challeng e for cause to venire member no. 13, Candac e Mar

tinez, because she showed a bias ag ainst the defe nse by making the statement that if a person was a

rre sted for D WI then they must be g uilty
. SeeT EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a rt
. 35.16(c) (2) ( venire member ma y be cha lleng ed for

cause by defe ndant if he or

she has a

bias or prejudice ag ainst the law upon whic h the def ense is entitled to re ly). I n addition, Ba g heri a rgues the court e rre d in gr anting the State’s cha lleng e for cause to venire me mber no. 5, Alexis Mata, ba sed on her state ment that she does not judg e people and would be unable to r eac h a verdic t. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 35.16(b)( 3) (State may challeng e venire member for c ause if he or she has a bia s or pre

judice ag ainst the law upon whic h the State is entitled to rely for c onviction or04

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- 8- punis h m en t). Ba g heri a sserts he wa s harmed by both rulings be cause an objec tionable venire
m e mb e r , n o . 4 , C ar o l ynM c C an n o n , e n d e d u p o nt h e j u r

y. When review ing a

trial court’ s decision to g rant or deny a challeng e for cause based on bia s or prejudice, we look at t he entire rec ord t o deter mine if there is sufficient evide nce to support the ruling
. Fe ldm an v . S

tate , 7 1 S.W.3 d 738 , 7 44 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Ste war t v . S tate , 162 S.W .3d 269, 280 (Tex. A

pp.—San Antonio 2005, pet. ref ’d). The test is whethe r the ve nirepe rson’s bias or prejudice would substantially impair their ability

to car ry out t h ei r o ath and follow the court’s instructions in acc ordanc e with the law. Feldman , 71 S.W .3d at 743-45. B efor e a ve nire membe r
may be e xcu se d f

or c a us e on the ba sis of

bia s o r p re

jud ic e , th e law mus t be e xpla ine d a nd sh e mus t be aske d whether

she ca n follow the law reg ardle ss of her persona l vie ws. Id. To e sta bli shthat a challeng e is proper , the propone nt of the cha lleng e must show the veniremember understood the law and could not ov er co m e h er prejudice e noug h to follow the law. Id. When the rec ord shows the venire person va cillated on her ability to follow the law, we must de fer to the trial court. Moore v

. Sta te , 9 99 S.W. 2d

38 5, 40 0 (Tex
. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Br own v . S tate , 9 1 3 S. W. 2 d

5 7 7 , 5 8 0 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1996). Turning to Ba g heri ’s issue complainingof the de nial of his challeng e for cause to venire member no. 13, Candace Martinez, it appear s Ba g heri fa iled to preser ve the issue. To pr eser

ve er ror
on the denial of his c halleng e for cause , Ba g heri must show on the re cord that: (1) he a sserted a clea r and spec ific cha lleng e for cause to that venire me mber; (2) he used a pere mptory challeng e on the
c o mp la in e d

- o f v e n ir e me mb e r ; ( 3 ) h e e xh a u s te d a ll h is p e r e mp to r

y c h a ll e n g e s ; ( 4 ) h is r e quest for additional pere mptory strikes was denied; and (5) an objectionable juror sat on the jury
. Feldman , 71 S.W. 3d

a t 74 4; Ste war t , 162 S.W .3d at 280. The rec ord shows B ag heri did not use a pe remptory04

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- 9- strike on Martinez, and she ended up s i t t i n g o n the jury . Ba g heri ther efor e ca nnot show he wa s harme d by

beingforc ed to use a

pere mptory

strike to remove Martinez and then suff eringa detr iment from the loss of the strike
. Feldman , 71 S.W .3d at 743-45; Se lls v . S tate , 1 2 1 S. W. 3 d

7 4 8 , 7 5 8 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2003). Even if the issue was pre serve d, the re cord doe s not show the trial court a bused its discretion in denying the defe nse challeng e for c ause on Ma rtinez. Ste war t , 162 S.W .3d at 280 (a bu se of dis c re tio n sta

nd ard ). Al tho ug h Ma

rt ine z ini tia lly

state d s he wo uld

a uto matic a lly

a ssume someone who w as ar

rested f or D.W.I . was g uilty , she wa s reha bilitated during individual voir dire when the State explained there are differ ent s tandar ds for a n arr est and a

conviction. Afte r hea

ring the explanation of the law, Ma rtinez stated she would require the State to meet the highe r burden of proof be y ond a rea sonable doubt in order to f ind B ag heri g uilty , and if it f ailed to me et that highe r burden she could t hen find Ba g heri not g uilty
. Martinez indicated she understood the law , and stated she could follow it; there fore , the trial cour t did not abuse its discretion in d en ying B ag heri’s challeng e for

cause to Martinez. Se e Ad an an du s v . S

tate , 866 S
. W.2d 210, 222 (Tex. C rim. App. 1993) (if ve nirepe rs o n u l timately states he c an follow c ourt’s instructions and re nder a verdic t
a c c or din g to th e evi den c e , th e ve nir e pe rs on is n ot c ha lle ng e a

ble fo r c a us e , e ve n if

he or ig ina lly equivocated on his answer s). Finally , Ba g heri c omplains the trial court a b u s ed i t s discretion in g rantingthe State’s chal len g e fo r c a

us e to v e nir e me mbe r n o. 5, Al e xis Ma ta . Sp e c if

ic a lly , B a g he ri argue s th e State failed to mee t its burden on the challeng e for cause beca use it did not a sk Mata any questions during individual voir dire. As not ed , we l o o k at the entire rec ord to deter mine if there is sufficient evidenc e to support the cour t’s ruling
. Feldman , 7 1 S. W.3 d at 74 4. I n r e vie wi nga de c isi on to sustain a challeng e for cause , we c onsider whe ther the totality of the voir dire testimony supports the04

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- 10- trial court’ s impli ed findingof fa ct that the prospe ctive juror is unable to take the require d oath and fo l low the law a s instructed by the cour t. Ke mp v . S

tate , 8 4 6 S. W. 2 d 2 8 9 , 3 9 1 ( T ex. C rim. App. 1992). We must also be mindful of t he trial judge ’s uni que position in observing the demea nor of the venire person, a

nd g rant g reat defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s dete rmination. Id. An appe llant who complains of an e rrone ously excluded venire member must demonstrate that either: (1) the t rial cour t
a pp lie d th e wr on g le g al st and ard in g ra nti ngthe c ha lle ng e fo r c a us e ; or (2 ) t he c ourt a bu se d it s discretion in applying the corr ect leg al standar d. Kemp , 846 S.W .2d at 296. The State may

challeng e for

cause any venire person who “ has a bia s or pre judice ag ainst any phase of the law upon which the State is e ntitled to rely for c onviction or punishment.” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . a

rt . 3 5. 16 (b )( 3) . Ave nir e pe rs on wh o is un a

ble to e nte r a

fi nd ing of

g uil t w arr ants sustaining a

challeng e for

cause . Ro

y v . S tate , 891 S.W .2d 315, 326 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 1994, no pet.). A pr ospective juror who would ultimately

be guided by his or her persona l be liefs rather than by the law is unqualified to sit as a jur or. Castil lo v. State, 73 9 S. W.2 d 2 80 , 2 96 (T e x. Cr im. App. 1987). Her e, venire member no. 5 unequivoca lly stated her

persona l fee ling that, “ Idon’t like judgingpeople” and “I ’ve ne ver judg ed any body in my life.” She e x plained that she “ can’ t help but put my self in their position.” When asked by defe nse counse l, “You don’t think y ou can r eac h a
ve rd ic t?” Mata

ans we re d, “ No , I c an’ t.” B a se d on the un a mbi g uo us vo ir dir e te sti mony , w e ho ld the trial cour

t applied the law c orre ctly and did not abuse its discre tio n i n s u s t ai ning the State’s challeng e for

cause to Mata.04

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- 11- Ba sed on the for eg oing r easons, we overr ule all of B ag heri’s issues on a ppeal, a nd aff irm the tr ia l c ourt ’s jud g me nt. Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice PUB L I SH