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At another level, the Soviet media
have published numerous distortions to
erode support for U.S. policy. For exam-
ple, an article in the December 30, 1980
Pravda falsely stated that U.S. military
advisers in El Salvador were involved in
punitive actions against noncombatants,
including use of napalm and herbicides.
In another particularly outrageous dis-
tortion, a January 1, 1981 article in the
Soviet weekly Literaturnaya Gazeta
falsely stated that the United States was
preparing to implement the so-called
centaur plan for “elimination” of thou-
sands of Salvadorans.

Campaign Against the U.S.-
Egyptian Relationship and the Camp
David Process. In the Middle East,
Moscow has waged an “active measures”
campaign to weaken the U.S.-Egyptian
relationship, undermine the Camp David
peace process, and generally exacerbate
tensions. A special feature of Middle East
“active measures” activities has been the
use of forgeries, including:

© A purported speech by a member
of the U.S. Administration which insulted
Egyptians and called for “a total change
of the government and the governmental
system in Egypt.” This forgery, which
surfaced in 1976, was the first of a series
of bogus documents produced by the
Soviets to complicate U.S.-Egyptian
relations.

¢ A forged document, allegedly pre-
pared by the Secretary of State, or one of
his close associates, for the President,
which used language insulting and offen-
sive to President Sadat and other Egyp-
tians and also to other Arab leaders, in-
cluding King Khalid of Saudi Arabia. This
forgery was delivered anonymously to the
Egyptian Embassy in Rome in April
1977.

© A series of forged letters and U.S.
Government documents, which criticized
Sadat’s “lack of leadership” and called for
a “change of government” in Egypt.
These forgeries surfaced in various loca-
tions during 1977.

© A forged dispatch, allegedly pre-
pared by the U.S. Embassy in Tehran,
which suggested that the United States
had acquiesced in plans by Iran and Saudi
Arabia to overthrow Sadat. This forgery
was sent by mail to the Egyptian Em-
bassy in Belgrade in August 1977.

@ A forged CIA report which
criticized Islamic groups as a barrier to
U.S. goals in the Middle East and sug-
gested tactics to suppress, divide, and
eliminate these groups. This forgery sur-
faced in the January 1979 issue of the
Cairo-based magazine Al-Dawa.

A forged letter from U.S. Ambas-
sador to Egypt Herman F. Eilts, which
declared that, because Sadat was not
prepared to serve U.S. interests, “we

must repudiate him and get rid of him
without hesitation.” This forgery surfaced
in the October 1, 1979 issue of the Syrian
newspaper Al-Ba‘th.

Conclusion

The Soviet Union continues to make ex-
tensive use of “active measures” to
achieve its foreign policy objectives, to
frustrate those of other countries, and to
undermine leadership in many nations.
On the basis of the historical record,
there is every reason to believe that the
Soviet leadership will continue to make
heavy investments of money and man-
power in meddlesome and disruptive op-
erations around the world.

While Soviet “active measures” can
be exposed, as they have often been in
the past, the Soviets are becoming more
sophisticated, especially in forgeries and
political influence operations. Unless the
targets of Soviet “active measures” take
effective action to counter them, these
activities will continue to trouble both in-
dustrialized and developing countries.

Published by the United States Department of
State + Bureau of Public Affairs + Office of
Public Communication « Editorial Division «
Washington, D.C. > October 1981 + This
material is in the public domain and may be
reproduced without permission; citation of this
source is appreciated.

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Special
Report No. 88

Soviet “Active Measures”

Forgery, Disinformation,
Political Operations

October 1981

es

The following paper was prepared by the
Department of State in response to
requests for information from a number
of individuals, private groups, and
Soreign governments.

In late 1979, agents of the Soviet Union
spread a false rumor that the United
States was responsible for the seizure of
the Grand Mosque of Mecca.

In 1980, a French journalist was con-
victed by a French court of law for acting
as a Soviet agent of influence since 1959.

In August 1981, the Soviet news
agency TASS alleged that the United
States was behind the death of Panama-
nian leader Omar Torrijos.

These are three examples of a stream
of Soviet “active measures” that seek to
discredit and weaken the United States
and other nations. The Soviets use the
bland term “active measures” (aktivnyye
‘meropriyatiya) to refer to operations in-
tended to affect other nations’ policies, as
distinct from espionage and counterintel-
ligence. Soviet “active measures” include:

© Written or spoken disinformation;

¢ Efforts to control media in foreign
countries;

© Use of Communist parties and
front organizations;

© Clandestine radio broadcasting;

© Blackmail, personal and eco-
nomic; and

© Political influence operations.

None of this is to be mistaken for the
open, accepted public diplomacy in which
virtually all nations engage extensively.
Public diplomacy includes providing press
releases and other information to jour
nalists, open public broadcasting, and a
wide variety of official, academic, and
cultural exchange programs. By contrast,
Soviet “active measures” are frequently
undertaken secretly, sometimes violate
the laws of other nations, and often in-
volve threats, blackmail, bribes, and ex-
ploitation of individuals and groups.

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Soviet “active measures” do not al-
ways achieve Moscow’s objectives. In
some cases, Soviet operations have failed
because of ineptitude or because targeted
individuals or governments have re-
sponded effectively. However, Soviet “ac-
tive measures” have had some success,
and they remain a major, if little under-
stood, element of Soviet foreign policy.

The approaches used by Moscow in-
clude control of the press in foreign coun-
tries; outright and partial forgery of
documents; use of rumors, insinuation, al-
tered facts, and lies; use of international
and local front organizations; clandestine
operation of radio stations; exploitation of
a nation’s academic, political, economic,
and media figures as collaborators to in-
fluence policies of the nation.

Specific cases of Soviet “active
measures” included here are: the Soviet
anti-theater nuclear foree (TNF) cam-
paign in Europe; the Soviet anti-“neutron
bomb” campaign; Soviet activities in sup-
port of the leftists in El Salvador; the
Soviet campaign against the U.S.-Egypt
relationship and the Camp David process.

“Active measures” are closely inte-
grated with legitimate activities and
Soviet foreign policy. Decisions on “active
measures” in foreign countries are made
at the highest level of authority in the
U.S.S.R.—in the Politburo of the Com-
munist Party Central Committee—as are
all other important decisions of Soviet
foreign policy.

The activities are designed and exe-
cuted by a large and complex bureaucracy
in which the KGB and the International
Department of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Com-
mittee are major elements. The Interna-
tional Information Department of the
CPSU Central Committee is also deeply
engaged in such activities. Actual opera-
tions abroad are carried out by official
and quasi-official Soviet representatives,
including scholars, students, and jour-
nalists, whose official Soviet links are not

always apparent. The highly centralized
structure of the Soviet state and the
state’s pervasive control and direction of
all elements of society give Soviet leaders
impressive free use of party, government,
and private citizens in orchestrating “ac-
tive measures.”

The open societies of the industrial
democracies and many developing na-
tions, and the ease of access to their news
media, often give Soviets open season for
“active measures.” Many Western and
developing countries ignore or downplay
Soviet “active measures” until Soviet
blunders lead to well-publicized expul-
sions of diplomats, journalists, or others
involved in these activities. The Soviets
are adept at making their policies appear
to be compatible or parallel with the
interests of peace, environmental, and
other groups active in Western and de-
veloping societies.

By contrast, the Soviet Union denies
access to its mass media for foreigners
who might criticize Soviet society or the
foreign policies of the U.S.S.R.

While the United States remains the
primary target, Moscow is devoting in-
creasing resources to “active measures”
against the governments of other indus-
trialized countries and countries in the
developing world. Moscow seeks to dis-
rupt relations between states, discredit
opponents of the U.S.S.R., and under
mine foreign leaders, institutions, and
values. Soviet tactics adjust to changes in
international situations but continue, and
in some cases intensify, during periods of
reduced tensions.

“Active Measures” Techniques

The tactics and emphasis of Soviet “ac-
tive measures” change to meet changed
situations. For instance, Soviet use of
Marxist-Leninist ideology to appeal to
foreign groups often turns out to be an
obstacle to the promotion of Soviet goals
in some areas; it is now being deem-

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phasized though not completely aban-
doned. At the same time, some religious
themes—notably the Soviet assertion
that the Islamic religion occupies a favor-
able position in the U.S.S.R.—have as-
sumed greater significance, as Moscow
courts Islamic countries in Africa and the
Middle East.

Similarly, while Soviet-dominated in-
ternational front groups still are impor-
tant in Soviet “active measures” abroad,
Moscow is broadening its base of support
by using more single-interest groups and
fronts formed for particular purposes to
promote its goals.

Soviet “active measures” involve a
mix of ingenious and crude techniques. A
brief sample of types of activities includes
the following.

Efforts to Manipulate the Press in
Foreign Countries. Soviet agents fre-
quently insert falsely attributed press
material into the media of foreign coun-
tries. In one developing country, Soviets
used more than two dozen local jour-
nalists to plant media items favorable to
the U.S.S.R. Soviets have also used the
Indian news weekly Blitz to publish
forgeries, falsely accuse Americans of
being CIA personnel or agents, and dis-
seminate Soviet-inspired documents. In
another country, the Soviets used local
journalists to exercise substantial control
over the contents of two major daily
newspapers.

Forgeries. Soviet forgeries—com-
pletely fabricated or altered versions of
actual documents—are produced and cir
culated to mislead foreign governments,
media, and public opinion. Recent Soviet
forgeries are better and appear more fre-
quently than in the past. Among
forgeries that Soviet agents have pro-
duced and distributed are bogus U.S.
military manuals and fabricated war
plans designed to create tensions be-
tween the United States and other coun-
tries. In some cases, the Soviets used ac-
tual documents passed to the KGB by
U.S. Army Sergeant Robert Lee Johnson
(who was eventually arrested and con-
victed as a Soviet agent) as models for
style and format in Soviet forgeries. In
one case, Soviet agents, seeking to dis-
rupt NATO theater nuclear force modern-
ization, circulated a forged “top secret”
letter from Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance to another Western foreign
minister.

Disinformation. Soviet agents use
rumor, insinuation, and distortion of facts
to discredit foreign governments and
leaders. In late 1979, Soviet agents
spread a false rumor that the United
States was behind the seizure of the
Grand Mosque of Mecca. In another case,

Soviet officials “warned” officials of a
West European country that the CIA had
increased its activities in the country and
that a coup was being planned. Some-
times these disinformation campaigns ap-
pear in foreign media suborned by the
Soviets, enabling Moscow to cite foreign
sources for some of the distortions and
misstatements that often appear in the
Soviet media. A recent and particularly
egregious example was the August 1981
TASS allegation that the United States
was behind the death of Panamanian
General Omar Torrijos.

Control of International and Local
Front Organizations. Moscow controls
pro-Soviet international front organiza-
tions through the International Organi-
zations Section of the International
Department of the CPSU Central Com-
mittee. Front organizations are more
effective than openly pro-Soviet groups
because they can attract members from a
broad political spectrum. Prominent
among these fronts are the World Peace
Council, the World Federation of Trade
Unions, the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth, and the Women’s Interna-
tional Democratic Federation. Moscow’s
agents use Soviet “friendship” and cul-
tural societies in many countries to con-
tact people who would not participate in
avowedly pro-Soviet or Communist or-
ganizations. The function of front,
“friendship,” and cultural groups is to
support Soviet goals and to oppose
policies and leaders whose activities do
not serve Soviet interests.

To complement organizations known
for pro-Soviet bias, the Soviets some-
times help establish and fund ad hoc front.
groups that do not have histories of close
association with the Soviet Union and can
attract members from a wide political
spectrum.

Clandestine Radio Stations. The
Soviet Union operates two clandestine
radio stations: the National Voice of Iran
(NVOI) and Radio Ba Yi, which broad-
cast regularly from the Soviet Union to
Iran and China. Moscow has never pub-
licly acknowledged that it sponsors the
stations, which represent themselves as
organs of authentic local “progressive”
forces. The broadcasts of both of these
Soviet stations illustrate the use of “ac-
tive measures” in support of Soviet for-
eign policy goals. For instance, NVOI
broadcasts to Iran in 1979-80 consistently
urged that the American diplomatic
hostages not be released, while Soviet of-
ficial statements supported the hostages’
claim to diplomatic immunity.

Economic Manipulation. The
Soviet Union also uses a variety of covert
economic maneuvers in “active measures”

operations. For example, a Soviet am-
bassador in a West European country
warned a local businessman that his sales
to the U.S.S.R. would suffer if he went
ahead with plans to provide technical as-
sistance to China. In another industrial-
ized country, Soviet agents sought to in-
crease local concern over the stability of
the dollar by driving up the price of gold.
This was to be accomplished by manipu-
lating a flow of both true and false infor-
mation to local businessmen and govern-
ment leaders. The gambit failed because
the Soviet officials who attempted to
carry it out did not fully understand the
financial aspects of the operation.

Political Influence Operations.
Political influence operations are the most
important but least understood aspect of
Soviet “active measures” activities.
These operations seek to exploit contacts
with political, economic, and media fig-
ures in target countries to secure active
collaboration with Moscow. In return for
this collaboration, Soviet officials offer
inducements tailored to the specific re-
quirements or vulnerabilities of the in-
dividual involved. In 1980, Pierre-Charles
Pathe, a French journalist, was convicted
for acting as a Soviet agent of influence
since 1959. His articles—all subtly push-
ing the Soviet line on a wide range of in-
ternational issues—were published in a
number of important newspapers and
journals, sometimes under the
pseudonym of Charles Morand. The jour
nalist also published a private newsletter
which was regularly sent to many news-
papers, members of parliament, and a
number of foreign embassies. The Soviets
used Pathe over a number of years to try
to influence the attitudes of the promi-
nent subscribers to his newsletter and to
exploit his broad personal contacts.

In other cases, Soviet officials estab-
lish close relationships with political fig-
ures in foreign countries and seek to use
these contacts in “active measures” oper-
ations. Capitalizing on the host govern-
ment official’s ambition, his Soviet con-
tact claims to be a private channel to the
Soviet leadership. To play upon his sense
of self-importance and to enhance his
credibility within his own government,
the host government official may be in-
vited to meetings with high-level Soviet
leaders. The Soviets then exploit the
local official to pass a mixture of true,
distorted, and false information—all cal-
culated to serve Soviet objectives—to
the host government.

Use of Academicians and Jour-
nalists. Soviet academicians, who often
are accepted abroad as legitimate coun-
terparts of their non-Soviet colleagues,
frequently engage in “active measures.”
Unlike their free world counterparts,

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they must play two roles—their legiti-
mate academic pursuit of knowledge for
its own sake and their political activities
on behalf of the Kremlin. Soviet aca-
demicians are obliged to obey instructions
from bodies which plan and control Soviet
“active measures” activities. Similarly,
Soviet journalists often engage in “active
measures” operations in addition to serv-
ing as representatives of Soviet news
agencies. One KGB officer in an industri-
alized country used his journalistic cover
to pass forgeries, as well as to publish
numerous propaganda articles aimed at
influencing the media of the host country.

Case Studies

The Soviet Anti-TNF Modernization
Campaign in Europe. The Soviet cam-
paign in Europe against NATO TNF
modernization is a good illustration of
Soviet use of “active measures.” After a
long and unprecedented buildup of Soviet
military strength in Europe, including the
deployment of new SS-20 nuclear mis-
siles targeted on Western Europe, the
NATO ministers in December 1979 de-
cided to modernize NATO’s TNF capabili-
ties. The Soviets immediately began an
ongoing, intensive campaign to develop
an environment of public opinion opposed
to the NATO decision. (Of course, not all
opposition to the TNF modernization de-
cision is inspired by the Soviet Union or
its “active measures” activities.)

In this campaign, Soviet diplomats in
European countries pressured their host
governments in many ways. In one
European country, the Soviet ambassador
met privately with the Minister of Com-
merce to discuss the supply and price of
oil sold by the Soviet Union to that coun-
try. During the discussion, the ambas-
sador gave the minister a copy of Leonid
Brezhnev's Berlin speech dealing with
TNE. He suggested that if the host gov-
ernment would oppose TNF moderniza-
tion, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs might persuade the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Trade to grant more favorable
oil prices.

Moscow has spurred many front
groups to oppose the TNF decision
through well-publicized conferences and
public demonstrations. To broaden the
base of the anti-TNF campaign, front
groups have lobbied non-Communist par
ticipants, including antinuclear groups,
pacifists, environmentalists, and others.
In some cases, the activities of these
broad front groups have been directed by
local Communist parties. Soviets have
predictably devoted the greatest re-
sources to these activities in NATO coun-
tries where opposition to the TNF mod-
ernization decision is strongest.

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In the Netherlands, for example, the
Communist Party of the Netherlands
(CPN) has set up its own front group—
Dutch Christians for Socialism. In
November 1980, the Dutch “Joint Com-
mittee—Stop the Neutron Bomb—Stop
the Nuclear Armament Race,” which has
ties to the CPN, sponsored an interna-
tional forum against nuclear arms in
Amsterdam, The forum succeeded in at-
tracting support from a variety of quar-
ters, which the CPN is exploiting in its
campaign to prevent final parliamentary
approval of the TNF decision.

The Soviet Campaign Against En-
hanced Radiation Weapons (ERW). The
Soviets, throughout 1977 and early 1978,
carried out one of their largest, most ex-
pensive, and best orchestrated “active
measures” campaigns against enhanced
radiation (neutron) weapons. (Again, not
all opposition to the U.S. decision to pro-
duce the enhanced radiation weapon is
Soviet inspired.)

This Soviet campaign has had two
objectives: first, to halt deployment of
ERW by NATO; second, to divide NATO,
encourage criticism of the United States,
and divert Western attention from the
growing Soviet military buildup and its
threat to Western Europe and the world.

© Phase one occurred throughout the
summer of 1977. The Soviets staged an
intense propaganda blitz against ERW
and the United States, involving numer-
ous demonstrations and protests by vari-
ous “peace councils” and other groups.
This phase culminated in a Soviet-
proclaimed international “Week of
Action.”

© Phase two began in January 1978
with Soviet propaganda exploitation of a
letter from Leonid Brezhnev to Western
heads of government warning that pro-
duction and deployment of ERW consti-
tuted a serious threat to detente. A bar
rage of similar letters from members of
the Supreme Soviet went to Western par-
liamentarians. Soviet trade union officials
forwarded parallel messages to Western
labor counterparts.

© Phase three came in early 1978
with a series of Soviet-planned confer-
ences, under different names and covers,
designed to build up the momentum of
anti-ERW pressure for the U.N. Special
Session on Disarmament of May-June
1978. These meetings and conferences,
held throughout February and March,
were organized either by the World Peace
Council or jointly sponsored with estab-
lished and recognized independent inter-
national groups.

The Soviet campaign succeeded in
complicating allied defense planning and
focusing criticism on the United States.
A top Hungarian Communist Party offi-

cial wrote that “the political campaign
against the neutron bomb was one of the
most significant and successful since
World War Two.” The propaganda cam-
paign did not end in 1978; it was incorpo-
rated into the anti-TNF effort. With the
recent U.S. decision to proceed with
ERW production, the Soviets have begun
a new barrage of propaganda and related
“active measures.”

Soviet “Active Measures” Toward
El! Salvador. Complementing their overt
public support for the leftist insurgency
in El Salvador, the Soviets have also en-
gaged in a global “active measures” cam-
paign to sway public opinion. These ac-
tivities include a broad range of standard
techniques, including forgeries, disinfor-
mation, attempted manipulation of the
press, and use of front groups. The obvi-
ous dual purpose has been to increase
support for the insurgency while trying
to discredit U.S. efforts to assist the
Government of El Salvador.

In 1980, Salvadoran leftists met in
Havana and formed the United Revolu-
tionary Directorate (DRU), the central
political and military planning organiza-
tion for the insurgents. During the same
period, the Salvadoran Revolutionary
Democratic Front (FDR) was estab-
lished, with Soviet and Cuban support, to
represent the leftist insurgency abroad.
‘The FDR and DRU work closely with
Cubans and Soviets, but their collabora-
tion is often covert.

> The FDR also supported the estab-
lishment of Salvadoran solidarity commit-
tees in Western Europe, Latin America,
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
These solidarity committees have dis-
seminated propaganda and organized
meetings and demonstrations in support
of the insurgents. Such committees, in
cooperation with local Communist parties
and leftist groups, organized some 70
demonstrations and protests between
mid-January and mid-March 1981 in West-
ern Europe, Latin America, Australia,
and New Zealand.

The FDR and DRU are careful to
conceal the Soviet and Cuban hand in
planning and supporting their activities
and seek to pass themselves off as a fully
independent, indigenous Salvadoran
movement. These organizations have had
some success in influencing public opinion
throughout Latin America and in West-
ern Europe. The effort of the insurgents
to gain legitimacy has been buttressed by
intense diplomatic activity on their be-
half. For example, at the February 1981
nonaligned movement meeting in New
Delhi, a 30-man Cuban contingent, coop-
erating closely with six Soviet diplomats,
pressed the conference to condemn U.S.
policy in El Salvador.