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THE TACTICAL USE OF HEAVY BOMBARDMENT

IN THE NORMANDY INVASION

An Interim Report

Published by Headquarters, Anny Air Forces

Washington, D. C,

Office of Assistant Chief of Air Stafi, L.rtelligence

From Reports Prepared by Eighth Air Force

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FOREWORD

HIS is the second in a series of interim reports published

by Headquarters, Army Air Forces. The original

manuscript was prepared by Deputy Chief of Staf{, Operations, Eighth Air Force, on the basis of official records and

firsthand observation. This text has been abridged and edited

in order to provide for combat personnel in all theaters a succinct summary of the planning and execution of the tactical

usc of heavy bombardment in the invasion of Normandy.

The conscie ntious and able work of stafl personne I in

the theaters makes possible the publication of this series, the

intent of which is to cover the more important campaigns

and individual missions in all rheaters of operations.

Comments and criticisms are invited. They should be

addressed to: The Commanding General, Army Air Forces,

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligencc, Washington 25,

D. C.
Eighth Air Force Aims and Commitments 4

Transition From a Strategic to a Tactical R<;le r3

Eighth Air Force Assignments in Relation ro the OverPlanning the Operation

All Cooperation Plan

Operations z f r:ne-r7 June

Subsidiary Operations

Enemy Air Reaction

CONTENTS

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ILLUSTRATIONS

Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz Frontispiece

Eighth Air Force Over-All Plan lacing z

Angouleme Marshaling Yard J

Pre-Dawn Assembly Plan facing 8

Fighter Bombing and Strafing Operations ro

Beach Scene, Showing Craters r+-r5

rst Bombardment Division Target Area facing fi

znd Bombardment Division Target Area facrng zo

3rd Bombardment Division Target Area facing zz

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle 23

Beach Scene Landing Craft Offshore lacing zS

Le Mans Airfield After Attack 3o
ol,t tclal PHolo USAAF

Lt. Gen. Cirrl Speatz, Cor.nn-randing Cieneral, United States Strategic Air Forccs

IV
CONFIDENTIAL

The Tactical Use of

I{eavv Bombardment in the

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Planning T lze Operation

NGLAND was bulging with troops. Along the rarrow

lanes dispatch riders dashed. Tanks lumbered over the

roadsl assault craft were piled at distribution points; frequent

and elaborate exercises u'ere bcing staged. .&lreadv there had been

practice alerts, when all personnel were required to be at their bases.

Newspapers speculated, the German press and radio exulted that the

Allies had missed the most favorable tides and could not assault for

atother month. Tension ran high.

For months there had been good-natured badgering between members of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, who in turn had banded

together when assailed by ground force personnel. Now they were

beginning to realize that they were all members of a bigger team, an

outfit which woulcl soon be called upon to conduct history's greatest

military operation.

Forgotten now were diflerences between sftategic and tactical,

between ground and air, between Army and Navy, between Americans and their Allies. All were welded into one compact, devastating

fist, set to deliver the Sunday punch.

There are morc facets to the Normandy invasion than to a finely

cut diamond. Volurnes and sets of volumes will be written about it.

This booklet considers only one, the tactical employment of the

Eighth Air Force heavy bombers before and during the invasion and

the resultant change in the disposition and use of Eighth Air Force

fishters.

CONFIDENTIAL
It required careful planr.ring. Here are shown the planning steps,

with the problems which arose and demanded workable solution.

Also included is a summary of Eighth Air Force operarions frorn D

minus 4 to D plus rr.

Like the other participating componenrs, the Eighth Air Force,

commandcd by Lt. Gen. fames H. Doolittle, did its part in highly

creditable fashion.

The plan for invasion envisaged air operations on a comprehensive

and unprecede nted scale. These were divided inro rwo phases. The

aim of the first was the atrainmcnr of Allicd air supremacy and

destruction of the enemy's productive capacity to the point where,

once the projected foothold on the Continent had been secured, overwhelming matdriel superiority could be brought ro bear. The second

phase had as its objective eiTective air cooperation with the ground

assault.

A vital share in the preparatory operations was allotted to the

strategic bomber forces of the Royal Air Force and the U. S. Eighth

Air Force. In the second phasc thc Ninth Air Force and the Second

'Iactical Air Force (RAF) were in the forefronr, bur again the

strategic forces made important contributions.

On r5 April 1944 the over-all air plan for the employment of all

British-based aircraft in cooperation with the forthcoming invasion

of France was formally issued by Headquarters, Aliied Expeditionary

Air Force, having been originaily drafted some 6 weeks earlier. It

contained detailed provisions for operations and furnished the basis

for extensive preparations by the Eighth Air Force to fulfill its considerable proportion of the over-all assignments. A directive from

Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz's headquarters, USSTAF, dated 3o May ry44,

confirmed carlier informal directions requiring the rendition by the

Eighth Air Force of maximum cooperation according to provisions

of the air plan and relatcd documents.

Between r5 April and 6 fune practicallv everybody had a har.rd in

formulating the plan, which changed so often and so much its 6nal

form was only a distant relative of the original. The commanders

of all the principal air, ground, and naval forces in the theater worked

on it. Details were suggested, developed, polished by committees of

stafi representatives and technical experts. When formally published,

it represented the knowledge and opinions of men who knew their

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jobs. A brief chronology of the more important planning phases can

be traced as follows:

r. The AEAF was created on 15 November rg43, with Air Chief

Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory designated as Air Commander

in Chief. Headquarters, AEAF, was thereafter represented at the

zrst Army Group meetings, and the basic requirements of air cooperation were established, subject to the general policies already formuiated by the Combined Chiefs of Stafi.

z. A ]oint Planning Committce was formed on 15 December 1943

by Headquarters, 2rst Army Group, to consider the relationship of

air power to the assault plan, the delay of enemy reserves, coordination

with naval fire, and neutralization of coastal artillery. When Headquarters, AEAF, became fully organized and stafred, an Operations

Plans Section was constituted, which gradually took over the functions

of the foint Planning Committee.

3. Of more immediate significance to the Eighth Air Force was

the formation on ro fanuary 1944 of the AEAF Bombing Committee

to plan specifically the employment of bomber aircraft. Principal

considerations were :

a. Suitability of targets for bombing

b. Relationship of bombing commitments to the scale of eflort

estimated to be available

c. Allocation of priorities to the various commitments

d. Apportionment of the available bomber efiort

Supplementing the AEAF Bombing Committee almost from the

start was the Operational Planning Cornmittee, consisting of certain

members of the first-named body plus representatives of the 2rst

Army Group and each of the air forces involved. The work of the

two committees was so closely interrelated that no scparate assessment

of their contributions toward the final detailed plans is possible. The

function of both was to transform into concise and exact operational

programs the general policies agreed upon by the air, ground, and

naval commanders. Designated to represent the Eighth Air Force

on the Operational Planning Committee was a senior operations controller, but as the earlier rneetings concerned primarily the commitments of the tactical air forces, his attendance was required only

occasionaliy until 15 April 1944. Before and during this period,

specific problems pertaining to heavy-bomber operations were often

submitted by letter to USSTAF or Eighth Air Force for solution'
By z5 May, details of the Eighth Air Force program were largely

completed. On zg May, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory requested

each heaclquarters concernerl to appoint a regular mcmber of the

committee, preparccl to meet daily. Thereafter until 3o June, the

Eighth Air Force represcrrtntive was in constant attenclance day and

night.

To facilitatc comple te understanding berwecn the Eighth Air Force

and the prir.rcipal Army headquarters, SHAEF granted permission

for direct contacr berween USSTAF and Eighth Air Force represenrativcs,, on the one hand, and American and British Army stafi officers,

on tire other. Two such meetings werc arranged, at which very

important concrete agreements r.,n ere reached. The first involve<l

the commander and stafi of the American First Army Artillery, and

the second was with stal{ ol{cers of the I and XXX Army Corps of the

British Second Army. Final coordination of air activities was achieved

through informal meetings arnoog represcrltati\ es of the various

commands.

Daily meetings of air force commanders were begun on D minus

3 and continued throughout the critical period of the invasion. Final

alterations in plans were considercd and decided upon, as well as the

transitory problems arising as the invasion forces moved inland after

the initial foothold had been secured.

Eigltth Air Force Aims and Commitments

Heavy Bombers

Before considering the tactical program irwolvcd, it is well to

summarize briefly the strareg;c role previously enacred by the Eighth

Air Force, together with RAF Bomber Command. This role.

designed to provide inclirectly for the ultimate success of the invasion,

was incorporatcd in the Con-rbined Bombcr Offensive Program, its

aim having been dcfined as "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system and

the undermining of the nloralc of the German people to a point where

their capacity for armed resistance is fatally wcakened."

Pertaining more directly to the success of the invasion was the

corollary developn-rent of a specific bombing program against the

German aircraft industr y. This program was directe d ar the attainment of virtual air supremacy and as such was indispensable to operations by grouncl forces. It was not until the surlmer of 1943 that

4
TACTICAL TAltGL,l'. A goocl conceltration of bombs on the Angoul€n-re

marshalling yard, scored by Eighth Air Force he:rvy bombcrs'

631804_45_9
the Eighth Air Force could operate in sufficient strength to execute

sustained large-scale attacks, but its eflorts in those summer months

were sufficient to keep the GAF from creating cnough front_line

strength to stop subsequent maior operations. Adverse weather

during November and December pr.u.rrr.d the cumulative bombing

necessary for complete success in such an undertaking, but production

lcvels had been affected to rhe extent that the Luftwa{Te had done rittle

more than maintain its strength during 1943.

-A more intensive campaigtl was possible during the early months

of y944, reaching a pcak of susrained cllort during the period zo-25

Irebruary and maintained, subject to tactical considerations, until the

end of May. The substantial damage ro facrories and assembly

plants, coupled r,r'ith destruction in aerial battle of German first-line

cornbat aircraft by both bombers and escorting fighters or.r a hitherto

unprecedented scale, was unquestionably the decisive factor in reduc_

ing the GAF to the point where it had no more than a nuisance value

during the critical invasion pcriod. This was attested by the remarkably low numbcr of sorties directed against the Allied beachhcads and

shipping lanes.

The following figures give some appreciation of the war of attrition

by the Eighth Air Force against the GAF. During the 6rst 6

months of r9a,4,6,8r3 bombers dropped 16,,5zz tons on aircraft factories, and 8,257 bombers dropped 2r,267.7 tons on airfields and air

parks. In the samc period r,g14 first-line enemy aircraft were

destroyed by the bombers in ae rial combat and r,682 were clestroyed

or damaged on the grorurd as a result of hombing of air parks, airfields, and factories. To these figures can be added the impressive

total accounted for by escorting fighters-r,696 destroyed in combat

and 76 in strafing attacks. Results obtained against orher srraregic

targets werc not so strikingly apparent in relation to D-day operations, but evident shortages in fuel, tanks, motor vehicles, radar

equipment, and arnmunition were traceabie, at lcast in part, to the

strategic bombing of thc Eighth Air Force and the RAF Bombcr

Command.

During April and May ry44 continuarion of attacks against strategic

objectives was necessary to prevent reconstruction and as a means of

holding the greater part of the GAF within Germany. At the same

time the first commitments directly associated with the impending

assault came into force. (There werc also attacks against installa6
tions near the French coast when the weight of Eighth Air Force

bombing was required in addition to the continual operations by

tactical air forces.) These initial commitments consisted o{ attacks

against zo marshalling yards in occupied territory and neutraiization

of all active GAF operational bases within a 35o-mile range of the

invasion beaches.

To avoid giving any clue as to the probable assault area, attacks on

both target categorics were widespread, the marshalling yards being

key points throughout the rail nctwork of western Germany, Belgium,

and northern and eastern France, and the airfield targets including

the more important bases in northern Germany. The purpose of

the Transportation Plan was primarily the destruction of repair and

maintenance facilitics and only incidentally the tearing up of trackage

and damage to locomotives and rolling stock. By these means it

was hoped to prevent the enemy from effecting rapid concentration

of men and mat&iel, cut the flow of supplies and reinforcements from

Germany, and force increasing reliance upon road transport, thus

prolnoting wastage of fuel and motor vehicles and offering targets

most suitable for fighters and fighter-bombers. Pursuant to this plan,

3,469 bombers dropped 9,520 tons on rnarshalling yards in Germany,

France, and the Low Countries during the rnonth of May. These

attacks were so successful that the Eighth Air Force was able to bomb

additional targcts not assigned in the original list.

The Airfield Plan was designed to deprive the Luftwafie of bascs

within eflective striking range of the assault beaches by destruction of

permanent installations for repair, rnaintenance, and servicing, and

by cratering runways and landing grounds to an extent that fields

would be unusable. Parked aircraft destroyed in these attacks would

constitute a further blow against the enemy's dwindling front-line

strength. It did not provc fcasible to conduct operations against all

such targets, but the most important were hit and a good percentage

v'as cfiectively neutralized. From D minus 3o and D minus 2r,

respectively, the scope of the attacks against rail and airfield targets

was considerably narrowed, but special care was taken in thc selection

of targets so as not to reveal the actual invasion area. Airfields

attacked were confined to those within a r3o-mile radius of Caen and

in the Brest'Nantes region, to compel German fighters to operate

from bases at least as far distant from the beachhead as those of the

Allied tactical forces.
In addition, it was agreed with the Naval Chief of Stal{ that thc

Eighth Air Force would undertake to attack bases for submarines and

light naval vcssels if diversion of effort from other commitments was

feasible. Oniy one such attack was undertaken, and adverse weather

prevented its successful completion.

Throughout this preliminary pcriod, wherein the original commitment against strategic objectives was modified by the Transportation

and Airfield plans as well as by the occasional attacks required against

coastal installations, the Eighth Air Force, nominally under the control of SHAEF from r4 April rg44, was allowed to retain freedom

of decision in fulfilling its varied assignments. This grcatly facilitated operations, as priorities could be carcfully balanced against

weather factors and other operational considerations by those best

qualified to cope with the problems of heavy-bomber operations. Not

until r |une rg44 did control under the 6xed scheclule proviiled for in

the over-all air plan for the invasion pass to Headquarters, AEAF.

Immediately prior to D-day (D minus j through D minus r)

Eighth Air Force operations wcre to bc twofold in nature, consisting

of final attacks against rail junctior-rs and airfields as well as missions

against coastal installations. The postponement of D-day brought

into elTcct a previously prepared schedule of targets in the same categories. Their size and thc idcntification problems which they presented made the probability of direct hits very small, and, even if hit,

the concrete emplacements were of such thickness that little harm was

likcly to rcsult. During this short period prior to D-day, bomber

forces were to bc carefully husbanded to nsure that the necessary

strength for the comprehensive D-day program was maintained.

Therefore, the operations for each day were to employ only 5o percent

of the available strength with one important exception: i{ visual conditions prevailed over Germany on either D minus 3 or D minus z,

roo percent of the efiort was to bc cxpended, 40 percent against the

usual tactical targets and 6o percent against strategic objectives within

Germany. The latter mission was designecl as a final attempt to contain enemy fighter strength for defense of Germany until the last

moment bcfore the actual landings.

The most important and by far the most elaborate D-day plans

concerned the first mission of the day, involving attacks immcdiately

prior to H-hour against 45 coastai installations betwcen the Orne and

the Vire estuaries on the Normandv coast of France. The 6 mile
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coastal strip included all assault beaches except an adjacent American

beach, designate(l as Utah, which was the responsibility of the U. S.

Ninth Air Force.

Sorne r,zoo heavy bc,mbers were to participate, flying in squadrons

of six aircraft. Following a carcfully devised system of predawn

assembly aided by searchlights, navigation lights, Aldis lamps, buncher

and splasher beacons, and Gee equipment, the aircraft were to fly

predesignated courses to the target area, bombing in successive waves

until H-hour (or thereafter attacking secondary targets well inland).

Assault craft werc to rcmain rrooo yards ol{.shore until H-hour, and a

5-minute interval was to e lapse bctween the releases by the last

wave of bombers and the initial touchdown by the assault troops.

The se safety factors represented the Iinal compromise between the

desire of the ground forces to exploit immediately the demoralization

resulting from the bombing at the risk of casualties and the inclination

of the air {orces to impose considerably greater intervals to minimize

the dangers from possible bombing errors.

Demoralization of enemy front-line defenders and disruption of

communication lines for reserve forces were the sole aims of the preassault bombing. It was understood that only a small percentage of

the actual targets would suf{er direct hits and smaller still would be

the number seriously affected. Bomb ioadings were established of

rooJb. GP, rzo-lb. fragmentation, 5ooJb. GP, and r,ooo-lb. GP, the

last for installations well clear of the beaches. Fuzing was to be

instaDtaneous to avoid cratering the beaches except for targets away

from the landing areas, where r/ro nose-r/roo tail was permissible.

Alternative plans were provided for bombing tlrrough overcast,

since it had bcen agreetl that, other factors being favorable, the ground

assault would be initiated whether or not visual bombing was possible

and, if necessary, entire ly without bomber cooperation, in which event

the Eighth Air Force was to be in constant rcadiness. Minimum

requirements for visuai attacks by heavy bombers were an S,ooofoot

cciling, 3-mile visibility, and sufficient breaks in any low cloud to

permit ready target identification. Less favorable conditions would

demand the substitution of the plan involving overcast technique.

Pinpointing of targets woukl be impossible, but since demoraiization

and immobilization of enemy forces were the principal aim, it was

considered that area bombing of the sectors wherein lay thc specific

visual targets would provide virtually the same efiect.
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Squadrons were to Ily six abreast ancl bomb on the rele ase of a

Pathfinder aircraft in one of the center squadrons. By such an

affangement deflection errors were largely neutralize d, but further

safeguards against errors in range were deemed necessary. Accordilgly, the interval between the final bombing and the initial touchdown was to be increased to ro miflutes. One other necessary cl]ange

was the instantaneous fuzing of all bombs, since the entire attack was

to be directed against the assault beaches, which must not be cratered.

Since the Ninth Air Force aircraft were not equipped for overcast

bombing, provision was needed to cover Utah beach in their stead,

should it prove impossible for even the medium bombers to operate

beneath the cloud base.

Subsequent to the assault phase, additional missions were laid on

in cooperation with the landing operarions. Targets outlined in the

over-all air plan consisted mainly oI transportation choke-points,

including severai Normandy towns through which ran important

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lines of communication. Leafet warnings were to be dropped to the

populace of these towns before bombing.

Weather, photographic, and visual reconnaissance missions, special

supply operations to the French Forces of the Interior, leaflet-dropping

sorties, and radio countermeasure flights were to be undertaken in

conjunction with the over-all ground and air activities.

No exact schedule of operations subsequent to D-day could be

prepared in advance, since the progress of the ground forces and the

nature of the enemy's reaction would be the determinants, but certain

general features of the program were decided upon. Detailed target

material, covering virtually all known potential tactical objectives in

northern France, received the required distribution well in advance

of D-day. Attacks were to be continued against road and rail transport facilities, including bridges on the Brest peninsula and across

the Loire River; enemy airfields; concentrations of enemy reinforcements and supplies; and coastal tlefcnses in the Pas de Calais sector.

Blasting of robot-bomb launciring sites was also contemplated if the

security of the British Isles called for such action.

Requests for spccific attacks were to be forwarded from Headquarters, AEAF, when the Eighth Air Force representative was in

regular attendance . It was anticipated that a number of these missions would have to be undertaken on very short notice. The interval

prior to a return to strategic bombing was dependent upon the degree

of success attained by the ground forces, and it was recognized that

even after the need of continual cooperatiorl by heavy bombers had

passed there would be periodic demands for tactical operations,

Fighters

No marked deviation from the normal escort tasks of Eighth

Air Force fighters was required until D-day. Early in rg44, following substantiai increases in fighter strength, the policy had been

inaugurated of executing strafing attacks upon completion of escort

duties. Such attacks became an accepted adjunct to high-altitude

escort and, due to the tremendous scale of activity, provided the best

possible training for ground-cooperation missions. On days when no

heavy-bomber operations were scheduled, it was often possible to

dispatch the fighters on independent bombing and strafing missions,

some in the nature of experimental attacks against airfields and

II
bridges. To a large degree, experience gleanecl from these missions

equipped fighter pilots for the job ahead.

The first fighter commirment to become effective on D-day was

the protection of Allied shipping during daylighr hours. P-38's werc

cietailed to this task because of their readily identifiable lines and also

because this 6ghter, relatively less elTective than the p-47 and the

P-5r at high altitudes, can operare without handicap at 3,ooo/5,ooo

feet, the altitude designated for these patrols. The four p-38 groups

operating under the direction of the Combined Control Cenrer ar

Uxbridge and in conjunction with Ninth Air Force P-38 groups were

to work under the l'ype 16 ground control station at Ventnorl thereafter, Fighter Direction Tender No. r3 would be stationed in midChannel and would assume control. Each of four sectors was to be

covered by one P-38 squadron, fying in 9o-minute patrols according

to a prcdetermined schedule.

On D-day the other Eighth Air Force fighters, lour P-47 and seven

P-5r groups,, were to support all American and British bombers operating during daylight hours in the vicinity of the assault area by means

of continuous area patrols east, south, and west of the beachhead,

patrols which would also serve to form a protcctive screen around

the ground forces. The cover area was bounded approximately by

the Seine on the east and the Loire on the south and, to avoid identification diffrculties, excluded the actual assault locality where Ninth

Air Forcc and Second Tactical Air Force 1ighters would be operating.

These operations were to be conducted in accordance with three

well-fonnulated plans, two for the two peak periocis of bomber effort,

dawn and late afternoon, arcl one for the intervening period of less

activity. 'l'o avoid continuous patrols the fighter groups were divided

into two units, an "A" group of two squadrons to fly during the peak

hours and a "B" group of one squadron for the in-between period.

An important secondary function, suborclinate to bomber support,

was the execution of strafing and bombing attacks at the end of area

patrols or on independently scheduled missions when the bombers

were not operating. It was expected that more emphasis would be

given to this typc of operation subsequenr to D-day. The principal

aim of such activities was the destruction of enemy road and rail transport and the interdiction of all rypes of enemy movement toward the

assault area. Target priorities were e stablished as follows:

t2
r. Eremy rail transportation

z. Enemy road transportation

3. Ammunition dumps

4. Troop concentrations

5. Airfields

Although direct control of the P-38's was to pass to the tactical

fighter forces' Combined Controi Center, the operational and executive control of the Eighth Air Force groups was to remain the responsi

bility o{ Eighth Air Force and VIII Fighter Command, which also

had the task of preparing the detailed pians for implementing the

over-all assignments.

Transition From a Strategic to a Tactical Role

Heavy-bomber operations in close cooperation with ground forces

involved a tactical concept difiering greatly ftom familiar strategic

bombing activities. Problems were posed in re lation to assemblies,

formations, routings, bomb loadings, fuzings, and overcast bombing

techniques; details of briefing and mission reporting had to be worked

out; coordination with other air forces and with naval pianners was

necessary to a far greater degree than heretofore required; aircraft

recognition and dclincation of prohibited bombing zones had to be

considered. Most important, the requirements of the ground forces

must be translated into a workable air cooperation program, and the

ground force commanders had to be thoroughly informed as to the

capabilities and the limitations of the he avy bombers. Differences

arose 4nd were generally compromised, although a few were submitted to SHAEF for final settlement. The ,rver-all plan was o{

such paramount importance that practice exercises were necessary to

setde many points, often on. a large scale and sometimcs integrated

with the execution oI operational fights. Rehcarsals of certain features of the program were undertaken to assure successful performance at the critical time. The more important problems, and the steps

taken to solve them, were:

Predatun assembly

The initial D-day bomber program called for take-ofi and assembly

during hours of darkness on an unprecedented scale. It was believed

that the use of radio aids, fares, and navigation lights would permit

r3
W!''.. ,.,...,:.1W

BEACII SCENE. In this oblique view of one of the Normandy i

spread before the
r beaches it is possible to see the blast damage resultant from the bomb carpet

ulting ground forces.
successful accomplishment, but it was deemed wise to have a trial

operation. This was conducted on r May before a regular bombing

mission. It involved nine groups oI zt aircraft each from each of the

three bombardmert divisions, with aircraft assembling in specified

areas during the hours of darkness and following designated routes to

the south coast and back to the base areas, The aircraft in each group

were dispatched in three waves, the first composed of nine-plane

squadrons and the second and third of six-plane squadrons. The

exercise was completely satisfactory, and on the basis of this test the

six-plane squadron was adopted for the D-day missions.

Routings

While the usuai consideration of route planning prevailed, the

necessity of assuring recognition of aircraft by naval vessels employed

on convoy operations resulted in placing restrictions on flights over

the shipping lanes. One of these forbade any aircraft except fighters

on shipping patrol to fly over the convoy areas from the direction of

the combat zones or the Pas de Calais. Because of this, and in connection with the use of Pathfinder equipment, it was decided to

prescribe a course for the initial D-day mission directly from the

south coast of England to the Normandy beachcs and returning south

and west of the Channel Isles.

Loadings and fuzings

Extensive research was conducted to determine the types of bombs

and fuzings to be used. An AEAF Weapons Committee, with four

representatives of the Eighth Air Force, was established to consider

these questions, and several practice bombing missions were conducted, the most comprehensive being held on z6 April, in which rz

nine-plane fights wele sent to the Studland Bay bombing range to

determine the effect crf roo-, z5o-, and 5oo-lb. bombs with various

fuzings. It was learned that fragmentation and roolb. HE bombs

would be most effective against personne l, vehicles, wire entanglements, and gun positions not e mplaced. Recommendations based

on these findings were incorporated in the over-all air plan.

O aercast bombin g technique

The possibility of having to use Pathfinder instruments for initial

D-day bombing missions was considered, and. the relative merits of

both HzX and GH were weighed. On the basis of operational expet6
rience and tests the former was selected. This decision resuited from

the lower average range error to be expected from HzX as compared

with GH when the former was operating against targets located in

such a manner that water and land appeared simultaneously on thc

scope at right angles to the line of approach, the definition in such

instances being particularly clcar. This factor was an important consideration in the selection of the north-south approach. Deflection

errors did not constitute hazards on this axis of attack. The limited

number of GH aircraft available was a further consideration, since

accuracy would be seriously impaired if a very large number of units

was releasing on relatively few Pathfinders, and the possibility of

equipment failures on these few Pathfinders would have a proportionately large efiect on results.

Visibility trials

Accurate determination of earliest and iatest times practicable for

visual bornbing was of vital import to the exact establishment of

H-hour. A visibility trial was conducted by aircraft of the Eighth

Air Force, the Ninth Air Force, and the zd Tactical Air Force,

operating against simulated targets in England (an infantry platoon,

field artillery battery, coastal battery, small village, roads in open and

wooded areas, railway lines, ar-rd coastal and inland towns). Results

of this operation were forwarded to Headquarters, AEAF, on z4

May 194.1 for use in the determination of H-hour.

Briefng and interro gation

The security aspect was a primary consideration of the briefing, and

it was decided that efficiency would not be impaired if air crews were

not given the cssential information prior to the normal pre-mission

briefing. Exccption was made in the casc c-rf Pathfinder navigators

and bombardiers, who were speciaily briefed some days in advance.

At the briefing, stress was laid on the importance of avoiding premature bomb releases because of the tremendous Allied assemblage oiTshore. Normal time limits for interrogation and submitting mission

reports were revised in the interest of expediting the flow of information regarding results and observations. A system of tactical reporting was accordingly set up whereby preliminary reports were to reach

Eighth Air Force Headquarters within 45 minutes after first landings

and detailed inte lligence reports within z hours. A comprehensive staff coordination trial was held involving the issuance of

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specimen field orders, briefing for three simulated D-day missions,

fictitious take-off and landing times, and flash and intelligence reports.

Aircraft recognition and demarcation ol friendly lines

The dangers inherent in the inability of Allied units-air, sea, and

ground-to ascertain without delay the hostile or friendly character

of combat aircraft were recognize<l ancl precautionary steps w€re

taken- Prohibited zones for certain types of aircraft were established,

principally over the shipping lanes and assault area, thus allowing

naval and ground forces unrestricted freedom to fire at aircra{t other

than stated types or approaching from other than certain directions.

Another measure was the institution of distinctive markings for

aircraft. Except the {our-engine bombers, all plane s were painted

with wide alternate black and white stripes on wings and fuselage.

The converse problem of defining areas for combat aircraft in order

to avoid bombing and strafing within friendly lines was largely overcome by the adoption of a bomb line. Beyond this line (one predetermined for the 6 hours immediately after H-hour, another for

the remainder of D<lay, and thereafter subject to daily changes as

decided by air and ground stafls) ground forces ventured at their

peril and targets could be attacked at will. Behind this line no bombing or strafing was to be conducted without specific arrangement with

the ground forces, and the originator of such a request was to assume

the responsibility Ior clearing the region around the targets chosen for

atrack.

Ground lorce requiremenls

Certain adjustments in the bombing desired by Army planners were

necessary to conform to bomber capabilities. When requests for

destruction of fixed defenscs, explosion of mine fields, cutting of

underground cables, eiimination of barbed-wire entanglements or

antitank obstacles, demoralization of front-line troops, delay and disruption of reserve elements, and the blocking of transport by bombing

French towns-when such requests were submittcd by Army commanders it was necessary to point out the probable degree of success

against each type of objective and then to secure priority ratings so

that the bomber strength could be apportioned as desired by the

ground forces.

In many instances the destructive €l+ect necessary could be obtained

only by use of heavy bombs with delayed fuzings, which would cause

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2 percent of the tonnage dropped and that irr most instances little

damage would re suit. Neverthele ss, the Army requested that the

attempt be made to destroy those on the flanks of the bcachcs, believing that some emplaced positions could be put out of action' at least

temporarily, and that craters in this area would afford valuable protection to assault troops sent to capture these strong points. Otherwise it was agreed that the air cooperation should aim primarily at

the demoralization of frontline troops, with a possible bonus in the

destruction of barbed wire and other hazards. No request was made

for the elimination of underwater mines or obstacles. The Army

commanders were infonned of the possibility of gross errors causing

casualties among troops in assault craft and accepted them as a

necessary risk.

Selection ot' targcts

Certail categories of requested targets were not deemed by Eighth

Air Force to be satisfactory for heavy-bombe r attack. In three

instances the matter was submitted to SHAEF for de termination.

The first concerned marshalling yards in occupied territory, and

obiection was based on the belief that medium bombers would be

adequate, that the damage could be readily repaired and hence would

not iustify the effort expended, and that the proximity to built-up

areas would result in civilian casualties and property damage outweighing the disruption of enemy communications. The second case

involved the bombing of bridges. It was considered that the nature

of these targets would require a yery great expenditure of effort in

relation to probable damage achieved and the erection of temporary

spans could largely nullify successes gained. In thc third instance the

matter concerned choke-points in French towns which the zrst Army

Group desired to have blocked by rubble in order to delay enemy

reinforcements. The stand of the Eighth Air Force was based on

the risks to civilian lives and property. In all three cases SHAEF,

motivated by military expediency, directed that the attacks be made.

Arrangements were made to drop warning leaflets sufficiently in

advance of the last-mentioned type of attack to enable the civilians

to evacuate the threatened areas.

r9
Ouer-all Air Cooperation Plan

In order to envisage rhc scoirc of the Eighth Air Force role in the

projected over-all air effort, thc commitments, as previously enumerated, may be compared with the following aims of the entire aerial

program:

r. To attain and maintain an air situation whereby the German

Air Force is rendered incapable of efiective interference with

Allied operation

z. To provide continuous reconnaissance of the enemy's dispositions and movements

3. To disrupt enemy communications and channels of supply by

air attack

4. To support the landing and subsequenr advance of the Allied

Armies

5. To deiiver ofiensive strikcs against enemy naval forces

6. To provide air lift for airborne forces
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Deliuering The Punclt

UCH careful planning as has been related in some

detail in this narrative merited gratifying results.

In the foliowing section the operations of the Eighth Air

Force from z fune through r7 |une are examined.

D-day was the day for whicir so many thousands of

ground-force troops had been eagerly waiting. This

was the ir day to take over, which they did in magnifrcent

fashion, adding new luster to proud regimental and

divisional names. How the Eighth Air Force teamed

with thcm is shown in the succeeding pages.
Operations 2-r7 fune ry44

HIS discussion is divided into two sections, one dealing with

bombers and the other with fighters. The bomber assignment, separated into three time periods, was carried out as

follows:

D minus 4 to D rninas 1 (2-5 lune)

Within this pcriod the job of rhe Eighth Air Force was to continue

attacks against transportation and airlield targets in northern France,

and to institute a series of blows against coastal defenses, a majority

situated along the Pas de Calais coast. A 6nal eflort to contain German fighters within the Reich as late as possible by conducting a deep

penetration against strategic targets had been planned for this period,

but adversc weather interfered.

This phase of the program was performed according to plan. A

total of j,386 bombers participated in the eight missions flown and

9,387.45 tons were dropped for the loss of 14 bombers.

Substantial damage was inflicted upon airfield and rail transport

targets. Few of thc coastal defenses were seriously affected in proportion to the cflort put forth, but this had been anticipated, the more so

sincc Pathfinder technique was necessary in most instanccs. Since

deception as to the actual landing area was the primary purpose of

the attacks against this latter type of target, the operations may be

regarded as successful, for, rs far as can be ascertained, the landings

along the Normandy coast had the advantagc of complete tactical

surprise.

D-day (6lune)

The first mission was concerned primarily with ncutralization of

coastal defenses and demoralization of German frontline troops imrncdiately prior to the landings. The othe r three missions were

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OFFICIAI, ?HOTO 1ISAAF

Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Commanding Ceneral, Eighth Air Force

z5
directed at the severance of communication lines between the beachhead defenders and reserve elements, with targets consisting largely

of road choke-points in Caen and several smaller Normandy towns.

The 6rst, third, and fourth missions were accomplishecl substantiallv

as planned, employing ovcrcast technique exclusivelv in the first ancl

third and for severai targets in the final mission. The secorld mission

was not gcnerally prepared for bombing through the overcast, and

clouds over the targets prevented attacks except in the case of one

formation which bombed a secondary target on the indications o{ the

only Pathfinder aircraft participating. A total of z,698 bombers participated in the day's operations and 3,596 tons were dropped for the

ioss of three bombers.

Asse ssment of damage caused during this day's ope rations was

rendered difficult by the fact that a majority of the targets attacked

were cloud-obscured and strike photographs were therefore unrevealing. In many instances follow'up operations werc executed beforc

reconnaissance cover was obtained. 'l'he beachheads were subiected

to fire from naval guns, rockets, ancl mortars, and were bombed b1'

aircraft of other commands, with the result that a definitive evaluation

of damage was not possible. Information from surveys conducted

by air force representatives, interviews with ground personncl, and

prisoner-of-war interrogations may be summarizecl in the following

manner:

r. Thc immediate beach areas showed only limited evidence of

bomb damage, as was to be expected in view cf the extra

precautionary measures taken to avoid short bombfalls wher-r

through-the-overcast bombing technique was used. Thesc precautions included the arbitrary time delays on bomb releases.

Arcas behind the beachheacl, ranging from 3oo/4oo yards to

3 miies, revealed extelsive evidence of concentrated bombing

patterns.

z. The principal contribution made by this bombing eflort was

the de moralization of enemy troops and the disruption of signal

and transport communications, which hindered the deployment

of immediate reserves.

In regard to the limited number of targets where damage was assessable from strike or reconnaissance photographs, results varied with

cloud conditions encountered.

'jn-1
The noteworthy feature of D-day cooperation by heavy bombers was

the {act that the beaches were bombed by airplanes flying above a solid

overcast of clouds. While a carpet of bombs placecl in front of thc

advancing troops was deemed highly clesirable, the dangcr to our

own soldiers from bombs dropped without visibility of the ground

demanded most careful consideration.

Had it been necessary to make the decision several months earlier,

it is likely that such a project would have been abandoned. By the

use of through-the-overcast technique, Eighth Air Force bombers had

been known to miss targets by wide margins. However, in preparation for D-day, against the possibility that weather would prevent

visual bombing, especially selected navigators and bombardiers had

been diligently trained in HzX technique, and repeated tests had been

conducted against shoreJine targets. These tests showecl that accuracy

was possible, and that the greatest menace to the safety of friendly

troops was the danger of inadve rtent and premature bomb releases.

This risk was carefully weighed by the ground commanders against

the advantage of a bomb carpet to clear their assault path. Confronted with photographic evidence of the accuracy of bombing tests,

they elected to take the risk. This decision was a tesounding votc of

conlidence in HzX equipment and in Eighth Air Force crcws.

Briefing was precise, pointed, and personal. All watches must be

exactly synchronized; careful attention must be given to all mechanical details; the bombing must be far enough in front of the ground

forces to minimize any chance of hitting them, yet near enough to

give the bomb carpet its maximum efiectiveness. "Here are your

friends and brothers," the airmen were to1d. "You won't see them,

but they're there, depending on you. Don't hit them, but get your

bombs on that shore line!"

If the decision to bomb ahead of our troops through overcast was

breath-taking in its boldness, the results were epochal. A short distance offshore lay the LST's and other craft carrying the invading

force. Confident of cooperation from planes they could not see, the

men of the assault wave started ashore at the prccisc instant established beforehand. Exactly on schedule the first wave of bombers

came over, laying its bombs on the shore line and proceeding inland

The entire force of bombers had to clear the attack point within 5

minutes or r-un the risk of dropping bombs on friendly forccs. Absolutely according to plan the heavy bombers performed their mission,

25
laying their carpet of bombs before the attacking Allies. So efiective

was thefu bombing, and with such a minimum of damage to friendly

force s was the operation carried out, that many live s were saved.

Ground commanders were lavish with their praise. Another milestone of modern warfare had been passed.

D plus l toD plus ll (7-17 lune)

Attacks aimed at the interdiction o{ enernv road and rail transport,

with special emphasis laid on bridges over rhe Loire and the rivers of

Brest peninsula; the denial to the Ge rman Air Force of the use of

airfields and landing grounds within efiective range of the beach,

head; and the destruction of supply sites in northern France-these

wcre the principal tasks allotted to the Eighth Air Force during the

rr days immediately following D-day. Toward the end of this

period, a resumption of strategic bombing was contemplated, but unfavorabie operating conditions over Germany resulted in prolonging

tactical oper ations, although two missions against oil refineries in Germany were possible, at Emmerich on 14 Iune and Misburg on 15 June.

Scheduled assignments were carried out by the great rnajority of

units involved in tire operations during this period, although through,

the-overcast bombing technique was frequently necessary. Participating in the 13 missions executed were 9,8or bombers; bombs dropped

totaled 2o,365.6 tons; losses were 4r aircraft.

Considerable success was achieve d toward restriction of enemy

movements by attacks on road and rail junctions, marshalling yards,

choke-points and bridges. Notable was thc destruction or severe damage caused to at least 16 rord and rail bridges across the Loire River

and rivers on the Brest peninsula. Operational airfields and landing

strips in northern France were also successfully bombed, and many

were rendered completely unserviceabie by the destruction of permanent installxtions and the postholing of runways and landing grounds.

Due principally to the necessity for empioyment o{ overcast technique,

little damage was accomplished in the operations against the supply

sites.

F i ghters

Air cooperation

The first consideration in planning daily fighter operations during

the period 2 to 17 fune was adequate escort of all hcavy-bomber

missions of the Eighth Air Force. (On D-day the escorted forces

26
included various other Allied air units.) The interdiction commitlnent, bornbing and straling of tactical targets on the perimeter of the

battle region, could bc undertaken only after the requirements for

cover of bombers had been fulfilled. In fact, the limited enerny

air reaction for the period as a whole made it possible to detail squadrons from supportillg groups to execute attacks against ground installations even bcfore the completion of their primary task, thus supplementing the bombing and strafing operations of groups which had

not been needed for support.

In the majority of instances the bomber targets were closely located

and the penetration involved was so shallow that ample escort was

provided by assigning groups to patrols in areas in which the objectives were located or through which the bombers passed en route to

and from them. On a few occasions the location of obiectives made

it necessary to assigu all available groups to close escort, and in other

instances a combination of area-type patrol and close escort was

cmployed.

Claims against enemy aircraft rcsulting from aerial combat were

r48 destroyed, 6 probably rlestroyed, and 58 damaged. Thirty friendly

fighters are known to have been lost in engagemcnts with the enemy.

lnterdiction

The VIII Fighter Command's work during the period 6 to t7

June, that of preventing or delaying enemy movements with bombing and strafing attacks on lines of communication, was highly

efiective. These operations were carried out in areas on the perimeter

of the assault zone, fighter operations over the battle area proper

being the responsibility of the Ninth Air Force and zd TAF.

Because little enemy air opposition was expected on 6 and 7 fune,

it was possible for fighter-bombers to operate on these days in small

units of one and two squadrons. This plan cnabled the harassing

attacks to be more continuously maintained and allowed the Command to operate over a wider area than would have been possible had

full groups be e n employeC. As the enemy increased his fighter

strength in France, this plan had to be abandoned because small units

would have been subject to possible heavy losses. In this connection,

full groups were employed on fighter-bomber missions on and after

8 June with either one squadron in each group as top cover for two

)n
fighter-bomber squadrons or one group covering one or two other

groups executing such attacks.

From 6 to 17 Junc, a total of 335 fighter-bomber attacks, in all

instances by units of 8 aircraft or more, were made against tactical

targets, r47 against railway rnarshalling yards, sidings, junctions, and

tracks, 87 against bridges, 38 against mobile rail transportation, z6

against road transportation, and 37 against various other targets.

During this period r,33g.3 tons o{ bombs were dropped.

The over-all results achieved by bombing and strafing operarions

are not reflected by a mere examination of ciaims for the period, which

are by no means complete. In many instances there was not sufficient

time between sorties for detailed intcrrogation, while in others the

participating groups described resuits in general terms, i. e., excellent,

good, etc., without subrnitting specific claims. The following claims

against rail and road ffansportation are believed to represent the minimum results obtained against such targets:

f)estroycd Damuged

. ... rr8 jt)

'.- 375 r,258

6o7 533

16 3r

tz 15

7ro

8o 36

These claims afiord a graphic indication of the scale of the fighter

cffort toward isolation of thc beachhead area, but a further and very

significant contribution was made by the eve r-present threat of attack

against rail and road transport which scriously impeded enemy movements by day.

Sltipping ltatrol

From 5 to ro fune the four P-38 groups of the Command were

committed to the execution of shipping patrols under the direction of

the Combined Control Center. On rr fune, three groups and, from

r2 to 15 ]une, two groups were used for this purpose. During

these r r days a total o[ 2,887 sorries were flown. None of the fighters

was lost, but five sustained Category "E" (salvage) damage.

Throughout th e entire period, no enemy aircraft was encountered over

the shipping corridor by groups of the VIII Fighter Command.

During the period 2 ro r7 June, r5,7r.3 fighters of the VIII Fighter

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Cornmand were dispatched on operational mlssiorrs and 15,o86 sorties

were flown for thc loss of r55 aircraft. Of these losses, 48 were

attributed to antiaircraft 6re,3o to enemy aircraft, and z5 to accident.

Causes o{ the losses in 5z ir-rstances are unknown. Total claims against

enemy aircraft were 2or destroyed, 6 probably destroyed, and 8z

damaged, of which number r48 destroyed,, 6 probably destroyed,

and 58 clamaged resulted from aerial combat and 53 destroyed and

z4 damaged from attacks on enemy airfields.

Subsidiary Operations

In addition to thc maior operational roles cxccuted by Eighdr Air

Force bombers and fighters, other units performed important complementary functions. These consisted of weather and photographic

reconnaissance missions, leaflet-dropping operations, radar-jamming

flights, and special supply drops to the French Forces of the Interior.

There r,vere 5or sorties fown and seven losses in the course of these

operations, which dircctly or indirectly contributed to the success of

the over-all undertaking.

Enemy Air Reaction

Calculations that enemy air opposition to the initial landings would

not be on a heavy scale were borne out by the Luftwaffe's behavior.

Our ground forces were both surprised and gratified at their rclativc

frecdom from air attacks.

It is of interest to examine just what thc GAF was doing for several

days before the invasion started, and then during the assault phase:

Daun 28 May-Dawn 4lune

During the night of z8-zg May some 70 enemy aircraft, consisting

of Ju-88's, fu-r88's, Me-4ro's, and FW-rgo's, operated against Britain.

There was an armed reconnaissance of the Sussex coast by ro FW-rgo's

and Me-4ro's, and 5o fu-88's and fu-r88's carried out minelaying

operations between Teignmouth and Start Point. There were ro

Me-4ro's on intruder patrols over East Anglia. Bombs fell on

Wordring, Hovc, Lymc Rcgis, Torquay, and Paignton areas.

An armed reconnaissance of the castern Channel was carried out

by some 9o |u-88's, fu-r88's and Me-4ro's on the night of z9r3o May,

and minelaying and a bombing attack took place in the Falmouth

29
TACTICAI- TARGET. Le Mans Airfield, hit by Eighth Air Force heavy

bombers in conjunction with the Normandy assault.
area early on 30 May. Despite uery larcrable tacather during the

early part of the wee\, the absence of ftnown ouerland reconnaissance

aircraft west of Portsmouth aas most noticeable- In uietu ol the increasing imminence of Allied landing operations, this lacft of interest

in couering soath coast regions as a uhole was remarllable,

Strong fighter reaction was provoked by major Aliied raids on

central and eastern Germany and Poland. The main efiort was

made on the z8th, when about 45o single-engine and 5o twin-engine

fighter sorties were flown, of which approximately 2oo were encountered near Dessau and the remainder in the Magdeburg and Strasbourg localities. It is estimated that 3oo/35o sorties were flown on

z9 and 3o May. The reactions to attacks on France, Belgium, and

western Germany remained negligible . Only slight reaction was

aroused by RAF Bomber Command night missions to targets in

France and Be lgium.

Bombs fell at Falmouth and scattered points berween Hampshire

and Sussex on r |ung. Possibie intrucler operations on the night of

-3r May-r fune were carried out by about 15 ME-4ro's, six of which

were overland and dropped bombs in the Norwich region.

FW-zoo's from Trondheim carried out long-range reconnaissance

on 5 days of the week, and |u-zgo's from southwest France on one

d"y. Other reconnaissance activity was gene rally on a low scale. Of

two |u-88 reconnaissance aircraft observed ir-r the Orkneys-shetlands

area on the 3oth, onc was destroyed east of Kirkwall and the other

came overland at Lerwick. Two Mc-rog reconnaissance aircraft were

destroyed south of the Isle of Wight on the z9th.

Dawn 4 lune-Dawn 11 lune

If more evidence is needed that the Allied landings in Normandy

achieved complete tactical surprise, consider that there was no appreciable air opposition until the night of 61 lune,, when some ry5longrange bomber sorties are estimated to have becn flown against shipping

olT the Cherbourg coast and against targets on the beachheads, including 55 sorties by aircraft carrying torpedoes and radio-controlled

bombs. All available types of aircraft were used, including torpedocarrying units from the south of France, but the attacks, especially

those on shipping, appear to have been a complete failure.

Sirnilar operations, including minelaying, were carried out on the

following night, although the scale of effort fell od to about 160

3r
sorties and to roo or fewer on succeeding nights, prt,bably bccause of

bad weather.

Both long-range bomber and torpedo-bomber operations were conspicuously ineffcctive. The scale of effort was possibly below that

anticipated due to unexpected weakncss of the long-range bomber

force; there had been no evidence of long-range bomber activity by

dayiight. r rTSmall intruder opcrations were carried out off ancl over East Anglia

on the night of 7-8 and ro-r r, with an estimated ro aircraft participating in each. Day and night reconr-raissance was flown over the

btachheads and the Channel, with fairly regular cover of the Straits

and thc Thamcs estuary as far as the Sul{olk coast, and over the

southern part of the North Sea.

Ft-rr at least four nights of that week, fu-zgo's operated over the

Atlantic, probably in search of convoys, to the wcst of the Bly of

Biscay, but no attacks were reported.

Thc main GAF fighter activity was concentrated against landing

operations; little opposition was encounte red by Eighth Air Force

heavy bombers. There was no immediate fighter reacti.on on 6lune,

when prouisional e stimate s amounted to only about 70 sorties against

the Allied beachlteads. However, the tempo increased on 7 June

with the arrival of sizable SEF reinforcr:ments, and thc estimatecl

scalc of efiort rosc to about 3oo sorties, of which 6of 7o were ground

attacks. Estimated sorties on 8 fune amoun ted to g5i55o in the

battle area, including 75/roo ground attacks, and on 9 func, despite

adverse weather conditions for most of the day, the GAF delivered

some 5oo sorties, including rro/rzo ground attacks. These fell ofi on

ro June, with 6o17o ground attacks out of a total of z6ofzTo sorties.

There are strong indications that after four days of fairly intensive

single-engine fighter operations and Allied night and day bcmbing of

bases, enemy strength was considerably reduced and serviceability

was probably not higher than jo pcrcent. In any event, it is ridiculous

to think that the reaction encountered was anything like the force

that could have been employed had the GAF high command electcd

to make a finish fight of it.

Some day the Luftwaffe's historians may publish their side of the

story, may tell us why the opposition to the Normandy invasion was

so weak. That account will be eminently worth reading.

U. S. COVERNI\!ENT PRJNIIII6 OFFICEI I94I