### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 19

- 2469
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Plaintiff

- Appell ee ,

v.

D USTIN C AYA , Defendant

- Appell ant

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin

. No. 18

- cr
- 108

- wmc

— William M. Conley , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED D ECEMBER 2, 2019

— D ECIDED A PRIL 16, 2020

____________________

Before B AUER , E ASTERBROOK , and S YKES , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Cir cuit Judge

. Dustin Caya was indicted on drug

trafficking and firearm s c harges based on evidence found in his home during a search conduct ed on the authority of section 302.113(7r) of the Wisconsin Statutes . Th e statute authorizes law

- enforcement officers to search the person , home , or property of a criminal offender serving a term of

“ ext ended supervision ”

— the period of community supervi-2 No. 19

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sion that follow s a prison term

— based on reaso nab l e susp icion of criminal activity or a violation of supervision

. Caya moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his home , arguing that the search was un lawful under the Fourth Amendment. The district judge denied the motion

. Ca ya pleaded guilty , reserv ing his right to challenge the

su ppression ruling on appeal.
We affirm the judgment

. Fourth Amendment law has long recognize d that criminal offender s on community supe rvision ha ve significantly diminished e xpectation s of privacy

. More specifically , the privacy expectations of

o ffender s on postimprisonment supervision are weak and substantially out weighed by the government’s strong interest in preventing recidivism and safely re integrating offenders into society. I ndeed, the Supreme Court has held that a law

- enforcement officer m ay search a person on parole without any suspicion of criminal activity

. Samson v. California , 547 U.S. 843, 847 (2006). In Wisconsin e xtended supervision is essentially judge

- imposed parole

. It follows that a search under section 302.113(7r), which require s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or a violation of supervision , i s constitutional ly permissible.
I . Background
O n June 1, 2018 , police officers in Prairie du Chien , Wisconsin , were summoned to a local business to check on a woman who was passed out in her parked car. Arriving at about 1:15 p.m., the officers identified the woman as Melissa Thomas and called for paramedics to transport her to the hospital. While they were waiting for the ambulance, the of ficers found a methamphetamine pipe in the car andNo. 19

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suspected an overdose

. They also noticed a child’s car seat in the vehicle. At the hospital Thomas was initially too incapacitated to respond to the officers’ questions, so the y r eturned late r that afternoon after she was medically stabilized and more responsive. She told them that she had used methamphetamine in her car t hat day. When asked where she got the meth , she said that she and Dustin , her live

- in boyfriend, obtained it together and shared it “as a family,” but she was unsure of the original source

. She told the officers that she kept her meth pipes at home . They asked about the car seat. She said she had two children , a one

- year

- old and a fourteen

- year

- old . S he was initially confused about where they were and who was caring for them. She later said that the children were at home and Dustin was supposed to be looking after them. She gave the officers her home address , and they called in a request for a welfare check o n the children.
S ergeant Todd Miller and Deputy Matthew Small of the Grant County Sheriff’s Office were dispatched to Thomas ’s home

. Caya answered the door

. He was sweating profusely, speaking rapidly, and his pupil s were constricted , suggesting that he was under the influence of drugs

. Sergeant Miller was familiar with Caya from previous contact s with him

. The sergeant also knew that Caya was on extended supervision for a felony conviction a nd therefore subject to

s ection 302.113(7 r )

. Th e statute, enacted in 2013 and colloquially referred to as Act 79, authorizes law

- enforcement officers to search the person, home, or property of an offender released to extended supervision following a term of imprisonment if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the4 No. 19

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offender is involved in criminal activity or is violatin g a condition of his supervision

. The officers asked Caya about Thomas. He said she was
not home . He assured the offic ers that he and Thomas were clean and that Thomas’s children were with their grandmother in Dubuque. Based on the ir observations and the information they had from Thomas, the officers initiated a search under the statute

. They handcuff ed Caya and did an in itial sweep of the home , locating Thomas’s one

- year

- old child in the living room and methamphetamine and loaded rifles in a bedroom

. In a second , more thorough search, the

o fficers recovered various items of drug paraphernalia, cash, several loaded rifles and handguns , and more than 350 grams of meth

. A federal grand jury indicted Caya for possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possessing a firearm in furtherance of that crime, and possessing a firearm as a felon. He moved to suppress the evidence recovered from his home . He argu ed that warrantless searches under Act 79

ar e unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment , and alternatively, that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion as required by the statute

. The judge rejected these arguments and denied the motion

. C aya later entered guilty pleas to the methamphetami ne c ount and t he charge of possessing a firearm as a felon ; the remaining count was dismissed

. The judge imposed c oncurrent terms of 78 months in prison

. II . Discussion Caya ’s plea agreement reserved his right to appeal the judge’s suppression ruling. H e no longer disputes the reasonable suspicion for the search . He focus es instead on h isNo. 19

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more general challenge to Act 79 searches , arguing that the Fourth Amendment prohibits law

- enforcement search es of person s on extended supervision based on mer e reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

. This argument requires a bit of background on the relevant aspects of state sentencing law

. Effective December 31, 1999, Wisconsin eliminated its old system of indeterminate sentencing , which gave the executive branch the discretion to release a prisoner to parole supervision prior to the expiration of his judicially imposed sentence . I n its place the legislature installed a system of determinate sentencing that requires judges to impose bifurcated sentenc e s with confinement and community

- supervision components

. W IS

. S TATS

. § 973.01(1) (requiring bifurcated sentences); id

. § 973.01 (6) (abolishing parole) . More specifically, a bifurcated sentence “consists of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term of extended supervision under

s. 302.113 , ” and “ [t] he total length of a bifurcated sentence equals the length of the term of confinement in prison plus the length of the t erm of extended supervision.” Id

. § 973.01(2). Both t he sentencing judge and the Department of Corrections may set the conditions of extended supervision. Id

. § 973.01(5); id

. § 302.113(7). An offender who violates a condition of extended supervision may b e returned to prison for a period not to exceed the term of extended supervision minus any time served on earlier revocation s of extended supervision

. Id

. § 302.113(9)(am). Thirteen years later the legislature adopted 2013 Wisconsin Act 79 , the provision a t issue here . It provides , in relevant part :6 No. 19

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A person released [to extended supervision] under this section, his or her residence, and any property under his or her control may be searched by a law enforcement officer at any time during his or her period of supervision if the officer reasonably suspects that the person is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a crime or a violation of a condition of release to extended supervision.
Id

. § 301.113(7r). The search of Caya’s home was conduct ed under the authority conferred by this statute. He argues that the search was unlawful under principles extrapolated from a trilogy of Supreme Court cases addressing searches of offenders on community supervision.
First, i n Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868 (1987) , the Court up held as reasonable a probation officer’s warrantless search of a Wisconsin probationer’s home under a regulation permitting the officer to conduct a search on reasonable suspicion that the probationer possesse d contraband

. Id. at 870

– 71

. The Court began by observing that “ [ a ] probationer’s home, like anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that searches be reasonable,” which normally requires a warrant based on probable cause. Id

. at 873 (quotation marks o mitted)

. The Court determined , however, that the warrantless pro bation search wa s lawful under the special

- needs exception, which applies when“special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable

- cause requirement impra cticable.” Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) ( Blackmun, J. concurring) )

. The Court reasoned that adhering to the warrant requirement would interfereNo. 19

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with the probation system’s substantial need to closely supervise and control the conduct of probationers in order to protect the community and promote genuine rehabilitation. Id

. at 874

– 75. Next, i n United States v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the Court again upheld a warrantless search of a proba tioner’s home , only this time by a law

- enforcement officer

. Because the search was conducted as part of a law

- enforcement investigation rather than for probationary purposes, t he special

- needs doctrine did not apply. Id

. at 118

– 19. The government urged the Court to uphold the search on a consent

- based rationale , noting that the defendant had signed a court document acknowledging the conditions ofhis probation, including a condition subjecting him to warrantless law

- enforcement searches. Id

. at 118.
The Court declined th at invitation and instead assesse d the rea sonableness of the search under its more general “totality of the circumstances” analysis, weighing the degree of intrusion on individual expectations of privacy against the degree to which the search “is need ed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Id

. at 118

– 19 ( quot ation marks omitted). The Court opened with an observation that “probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” Id

. at 119 (quotation marks omitted). The search condition , the Court expla ined, was clearly

re asonable given the probationary goals of rehabilitation and community protection , and the probationer was unquestionably aware of it. Id

. The Court had no trouble concluding that a probationer ha s a “ significantly diminished ” expectation of privacy. Id

. at 119

– 20.8 No. 19

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On the other side of the scale, the Court determined that the government ’s interests in this context are very strong: recidivism rates are high and probationers have a heightened incentive to conceal their criminal a ctivit y and d estroy incriminating evidence in order to avoid revocation and imprisonment in truncated proceedings that do not carry the right to a jury trial and other procedural protections. Id

. at 120. The p ublic

- safety concerns tipped the balance: the g overnmental interests outweighed the weak individual expectations of privacy. Id

. at 121. The Court held that a law

enforcement officer may conduct a warrantless search of aprobationer or his home or property if the search is “supported by reasonable susp icion and authorized by a condition of probation.” Id

. at 122. Finally, i n Samson v. California , the Supreme Court upheld a suspicionless law

- enforcement search of a parolee

. The search was conducted under a state law a uthorizing p arole and law

- enforcement officers to search parolee s “with or without a search warrant and with or without cause.” 547 U.S. at 846 (quotation marks omitted)

. While the analysis was quite similar to Knights , Samson went further. T he Court reasoned that because p arole is even closer to imprisonment than probation on the “continuum ” of punishment s , a parolee ha s a lo wer expectation of privacy than a probationer

. Id. at 850

. The Court also determined that the government has an “overwhelming interest” in tight superv isi on of parolee s to reduce recidivism and promote reintegration into law

- abiding society

. Id

. at 853

– 5 5. Considering the weakness of a parolee’s privacy interests and the strength of the public

- safety interests, the Court concluded that a statutorily authorized, suspicionless law

- enforcement search of a parolee is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment

.No. 19

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Samson controls this case. Formally and practically, Wisconsin’s extended

- supervision system is pa role by another name

. Extended supervision is judicially imposed parole supervi sion

— the second p art of the bifurcated sentence imposed by the court

. § 973.01 (2)

. Just as parole is ultimately limited by the length of the prison term imposed by the court, th e length of extended supervision is limited by the total length of the bifurcated sentence imposed by the judge

. § 973.01(2)(a)

. Because extended supervision in Wisconsin is judicially imposed parole, an offender on extended supervision has no greater expectation of p rivacy than a parolee. And Wisconsin’s interest in rigorous ly monitoring offenders on extended supervision is just as compelling as the government’s parole

- supervision interest s in Samson

. If, as Samson holds, a no

- suspicion search of a parolee is constitu tionally permissible, so too an Act 79 search

— predicated on reasonable suspicion

— is constitutionally permissible. Caya resists this conclusion, arguing that extended supervision is more like probation than parole. Not so, as we’ve explained. He also insists that Knights and Samson

— the cases involving law

- enforcement search es

— were narrow, fact

- bound decisions that entailed a particularized inquiry into whether the defendant had notice that he was subject to a warrantless search as a condition of his supervision. But neither decision rested on a c onsent rationale , either express or implied ; indeed, Samson and Knights were crystal clear that consent was not a decisive consideration

. Samson , 547 U.S. at 852 n.3 (“[W]e decline to rest our holding today on the consent rationale.”); Knights , 534 U.S. at 118 ( “We need not decide whether Knights ’ acceptance of the10 No. 19

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search condition constituted consent ... because we conclude that the search of Knights was reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach

... .”). Last, Caya urges us to adopt the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Hill , 776 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015). Ther e, the court held that a warrantless search of the home of three offenders on federal supervised release was unlawful. N o release condition, regulation, or statute subjected the offenders to warrantless law

- enforcement search es

. Id. at 249. Instead, t heir release conditions subject ed them only to visits by a p robation officer and to confiscation of contraband in plain view. The Fourth Circuit suggested that the absence of prior authorization made Griffin , Knights , and Samson inapplicable

. Id

. As we’ve just explained, there is reason to doubt that understanding of the Court’s decisions. But w hatever the merits of th e distinction drawn in Hill , Caya is on the wrong side of it

. He concedes that s ection 302.113(7r) authorized the search of his home . The Fourth Circuit’s decision does not help him

. The Act 79 search of Caya’s home was not unconstitutional

. The judge properly denied the suppression motion.
A FFIRMED