SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4589-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. 

MICHAEL C. GRAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________

Submitted February 8, 2021 – Decided October 14, 2021

Before Judges Messano and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 18-08-

1968.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated Counsel, on 

the briefs).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Frank Muroski, Deputy Attorney General, 

of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-4589-18

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SUTER, J.A.D.

Defendant Michael C. Gray appeals from the May 23, 2019 Judgment of 

Conviction, following his guilty plea under Indictment 18-08-1968 to thirddegree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance 

(CDS) (heroin), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(3). He 

alleges the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence on 

grounds that the motor vehicle stop and his arrest were unconstitutional. We 

affirm the judgment and the order denying defendant's motion to suppress 

evidence substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge David M. Ragonese in 

his written opinion. 

I.

On August 16, 2018, defendant was indicted along with four others in a 

multi-count indictment. His charges included third-degree possession of CDS 

(heroin) (Count Eleven), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1); third-degree possession 

with intent to distribute CDS (heroin) (Count Twelve), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) 

and 2C:35-5(b)(3); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons 

(Count Fourteen), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1). Following the denial of his motion 

to suppress on March 14, 2019, defendant pleaded guilty to Count Twelve. 
3

A-4589-18

Count Eleven was dismissed.1 Defendant was sentenced to a two-year term of 

non-custodial probation subject to conditions, statutory fines, and penalties. 

The facts are based on the record from the suppression hearing and as 

the parties stipulated. Detective Mathew DiDomenico testified that on 

February 25, 2018, he was working for the Camden County Police Department 

assigned to the Narcotics and Gang Unit. He was part of an undercover 

investigation of an individual known as Jamal Parker. DiDomenico testified 

that Parker used a cell phone to make sales of CDS. As part of the 

investigation, a confidential informant (CI) first made a "controlled purchase" 

of CDS from Parker. For the second purchase, the CI introduced Parker to an 

undercover detective, Detective Fesi. After that, the Detective Fesi made 

additional controlled CDS purchases. 

DiDomenico testified the investigation revealed "there were other people 

involved in this [drug] operation revolving around this same cell phone 

number." Derek Stephens was one of the distributors who used the cell phone. 

Additional controlled purchases were made throughout March 2018. All the 

purchases were made using the same cell phone number. 

1

 Count Fourteen was dismissed based on a motion by defendant that the State 

did not oppose. 
4

A-4589-18

A decision was made to begin making arrests. On March 28, 2019, 

using the cell phone, Detective Fesi contacted Stephens to make a purchase. 

Stephens arranged to meet at a McDonald's they used previously. DiDomenico 

and another detective parked in an unmarked vehicle in the Little Caesars' 

parking lot, which faced the McDonald's lot. They were wearing clothing that 

showed a police logo, which was visible by someone looking into the vehicle. 

DiDomenico testified that Stephens was driving a Nissan Altima and 

parked next to their vehicle. He was arrested and found to be in possession of 

$752. Detective Fesi made a "confirmatory call" to the cell phone number that 

was being used but it was not with Stephens, and an unidentified male 

answered. Detective Fesi wanted to complete the purchase. After asking how 

much money the undercover detective had, the male confirmed he was on his 

way in a black Nissan Altima. 

DiDomenico testified an older model silver Infiniti vehicle pulled into 

the Little Caesars' lot and parked next to them. The windows in that car were 

fully tinted. No one got out for about five minutes, and then two men 

emerged, going into the McDonald's. After ten minutes, they came out with a 

bag of food and drove out of the parking lot. DiDomenico recorded the 

vehicle's license number. 
5

A-4589-18

Detective Fesi texted the cell phone number, asking the unknown male 

where he was. In a return call, the unidentified male advised there was a 

police presence at the McDonald's, he left and was going to another location 

— the Auto Zone parking lot — and that he was driving an Infiniti. 

DiDomenico followed, stopping the silver Infiniti and arresting the two 

occupants, including defendant. 

In a search following his arrest, defendant was found in possession of 

sixty-eight wax folds containing probable heroin. The police called the cell 

phone number. A flip-phone in the Infiniti began to ring and was seized. A K9 exterior sniff of the vehicle indicated there were more narcotics in the car, 

which then was secured and towed pending a search warrant. 

On March 14, 2019, Judge Ragonese denied defendant's motion to 

suppress evidence. The court found that "probable cause crystalized for the 

arrest of the occupants of the silver Infiniti" at the moment when the unknown 

male advised he was driving an Infiniti and had left McDonald's because of a 

police presence. In his written decision, the court "[found] both the motor 

vehicle stop and arrest of defendants were supported by probable cause." The 

court considered the "detectives' expertise in these types of investigations" and 

"the facts they had developed over the course of one month," in concluding 
6

A-4589-18

they "had a well-grounded suspicion that the occupants in the Infiniti had come 

to the McDonald's parking lot to sell heroin." The trial court also found 

defendant's search after his arrest that "yielded sixty-eight blue wax folds" 

purporting to be heroin and the seizure of the cell phone were all justified 

under the search incident to arrest exception.2

On appeal, defendant raises these issues:

POINT I 

THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AS 

GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 

TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 

ART. I, PAR. 7 OF THE NEW JERSEY 

CONSTITUTION WAS VIOLATED BY THE 

ARREST AND SEARCH OF THE DEFENDANT 

WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE.

POINT II 

THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO DE NOVO 

REVIEW, AND NO DEFERENCE SHOULD BE 

GIVEN TO THE ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION 

BELOW.

2

 Defendant argues that any evidence seized after his arrest must be 

suppressed because there was no probable cause for the motor vehicle stop or 

his arrest. He does not directly challenge the search incident to arrest in this 

appeal. Because this issue was not raised in his merits brief, we deem it 

waived. Gormley v. Wood-El, 218 N.J. 72, 95 n.8 (2014).
7

A-4589-18

II.

Defendant argues the Infiniti was stopped without a reasonable 

suspicion, and there was no probable cause for his arrest. He contends he was 

not part of the previous controlled drug buys, the description of the vehicle on 

the phone (Altima) did not match the vehicle at the scene (Infiniti), there was 

no corroboration at the scene to initiate his arrest, and the police relied on an 

anonymous tip to stop the Infiniti. 

Our review of the denial of a suppression motion is limited. State v. 

Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011). "When reviewing a trial court's decision to 

grant or deny a suppression motion, [we] 'must defer to the factual findings of 

the trial court so long as those findings are supported by sufficient evidence in 

the record.'" State v. Dunbar, 229 N.J. 521, 538 (2017) (quoting State v. 

Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 262 (2015)). "We will set aside a trial court's findings 

of fact only when such findings 'are clearly mistaken.'" Ibid. (quoting 

Hubbard, 222 N.J. at 262). "We accord no deference, however, to a trial 

court's interpretation of law, which we review de novo." Ibid. (quoting State 

v. Hathaway, 222 N.J. 453, 467 (2015)). 

Both the Federal and State constitutions protect citizens against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, 
8

A-4589-18

¶ 7. "An arrest without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure in violation 

of both the Federal and State Constitutions." State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 

281 (2014). 

The standards for determining probable cause to arrest and probable 

cause to search are identical. State v. Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 92 (1998). 

"Probable cause exists if at the time of the police action there is 'a wellgrounded' suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed." State v. 

Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001) (quoting State v. Waltz, 61 N.J. 83, 87 

(1972)). A court must consider whether the totality of the facts and 

circumstances presented to the arresting officer would support "a [person] of 

reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 

committed." State v. Sims, 75 N.J. 337, 354 (1978) (quoting Draper v. U. S., 

358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959)). 

"Probable cause requires 'a practical, common-sense decision whether, 

given all the circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or 

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" State v. Demeter, 124 

N.J. 374, 380-81 (1991) (quoting Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). An 

officers actions must be considered in light of "the specific reasonable 
9

A-4589-18

inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 

experience." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 

We agree with the trial judge there was probable cause to stop the 

Infiniti and arrest its occupants, including defendant. The month-long 

investigation revealed that one phone number was being used by more than 

one person to sell drugs. On March 28, 2019, the phone was used to set-up a 

drug purchase at a specific McDonald's. This location had been used in the 

past in this investigation. Stephens — a known distributor — came to the 

McDonald's based on a call to the cell phone number. He was arrested. 

Shortly after, the detective called the cell phone again and arranged a buy at 

the same location. This time, an Infiniti with fully tinted windows arrived and 

parked next to the police. After the occupants purchased food, they left and 

the police texted the cell phone number. The same male voice called back 

indicating he was moving the location because of a police presence at the 

McDonald's and he was in a silver Infiniti. This validated his location and use 

of the cell phone, that he had left the McDonald's and identified the vehicle he 

was using. The Infiniti that had been in the McDonald's was then stopped and 

the occupants were arrested. 
10 A-4589-18

Although each of these facts standing alone may be insufficient, when 

combined, we are satisfied under the totality of the circumstances, that they 

"reinforce or augment one another and become sufficient to demonstrate 

probable cause." State v. Zutic, 155 N.J. 103, 113 (1998) (citing Gates, 462 

U.S. at 233). Probable cause requires only "a fair probability" of criminality. 

State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 214 (2002) (quoting Demeter, 124 N.J. at 380-

81).

Defendant treats the stop and arrest in isolation from their context. The 

vehicle was not stopped for a motor vehicle violation. The vehicle was 

stopped and the occupants arrested because the police had a well-founded 

suspicion the occupants were involved in the drug distribution ring under 

investigation.

The probable cause to stop in this case was that the Infiniti came to the 

same McDonald's after contact was made to the cell phone used by the drug 

ring, left because of a police presence, identified that the seller was driving an 

Infiniti, and arranged another location for the sale. Defendant was an occupant 

of the vehicle. It was not necessary for defendant to have been identified 

previously in the investigation in order to arrest him. On-scene corroboration 

also was not needed because his arrest was not simply based on an informant's 
11 A-4589-18

tip. See Sullivan, 169 N.J. at 213 (providing that because "a tip is hearsay, 

police corroboration of that information 'is an essential part of the 

determination of probable cause'" (quoting Smith, 155 N.J. at 95)). 

It was not determinative of the probable cause issue that the caller said 

he would be in a black Altima but the vehicle stopped was an Infiniti. 

DiDomenico testified that drug dealers commonly did this to avoid detection. 

The court did not err by considering the police officer's "common and 

specialized experience." Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 362 (2000) 

(quoting State v. Contursi, 44 N.J. 422, 431 (1965)). Although DiDomenico 

was not qualified to offer an expert opinion on this issue, his testimony was 

based on his personal observations and experience. See N.J.R.E. 701 

(providing "[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony 

in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it (a) is rationally 

based on the perception of the witness; and (b) will assist in understanding the 

witness' testimony or determining a fact in issue."). 

Defendant's arrest was not made based on an anonymous tip — in this 

case the unknown male voice who answered the phone. The cell phone that 

the unknown voice answered was being used for multiple drug sales. The 

person who answered confirmed his location, the police presence and vehicle 
12 A-4589-18

type. All the facts combined to provide the police with a well-grounded 

suspicion that the Infiniti and its occupants were part of the drug distribution 

ring centered around a single cell phone number. The vehicle was stopped, 

and the occupants arrested on that basis. 

Affirmed.