COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons 

GHEBRU WOLDEMICHAEL 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* 

v. Record No. 1800-99-4 PER CURIAM 

 DECEMBER 28, 1999 

NIGIST ASFAHA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Dennis J. Smith, Judge 

 (Jahangir Ghobadi; Jahangir Ghobadi, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 (Dennis M. Hottell; David Lawrence Ginsberg; 

Dennis M. Hottell & Associates, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Ghebru Woldemichael (husband) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court affirming, ratifying and incorporating a property 

settlement agreement allegedly entered into by husband and 

Nigist Asfaha (wife) and deciding other issues. On appeal, 

husband contends that the trial court erred by: (1) affirming, 

ratifying and incorporating into its order of May 19, 1999 the 

Property Settlement Agreement dated October 5, 1996; (2) denying 

his request for a continuance of the May 19, 1999 hearing; and 

(3) making its equitable distribution determination and granting 

wife attorney's fees. In her response, wife seeks an award of 

appellate attorney's fees. Upon reviewing the record and briefs 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code 

§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
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of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial 

court. See Rule 5A:27. 

 "In reviewing an equitable distribution award on appeal, we 

recognize that the trial court's job is a difficult one. 

Accordingly, we rely heavily on the discretion of the trial 

judge in weighing the many considerations and circumstances that 

are presented in each case." Artis v. Artis, 4 Va. App. 132, 

137, 354 S.E.2d 812, 815 (1987). The judgment of a trial court 

sitting in equity, "when based upon an ore tenus hearing, is 

entitled to great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal 

unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." 

Simmons v. Simmons, 1 Va. App. 358, 361, 339 S.E.2d 198, 199 

(1986). 

Property Settlement Agreement

 Husband contends that the trial court erred when it entered 

an order on May 19, 1999 affirming, ratifying, and 

incorporating, but not merging, a property settlement agreement 

signed by the parties on October 5, 1996. Husband argues that 

the agreement was not valid and not final. We find no merit in 

husband's contention. 

 Husband did not refer to the agreement in his bill of 

complaint filed July 1, 1997. In her answer, wife prayed that 

the trial court affirm, ratify, and incorporate, but not merge, 
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the parties' agreement signed on October 5, 1996, copies of 

which were attached to her answer. Husband responded to wife's 

answer, stating that the "alleged property settlement agreement 

was unofficial, unfair, incomplete and improper." Wife did not 

refer to the agreement in her answer to husband's amended bill 

of complaint. The commissioner in chancery, who heard evidence 

on the grounds for divorce, reported that the "parties intend to 

request relief from this Court concerning outstanding property 

issues, there was no signed Property Settlement Agreement 

presented at this hearing." 

 The parties introduced evidence concerning the agreement at 

the May 19, 1999 hearing. Wife produced a copy of the agreement 

and a translation. Both parties testified, as did a third 

witness who was the "chief mediator" at the time the agreement 

was executed. Husband did not contest that he drafted the 

agreement. Evidence indicated that the parties willingly signed 

the agreement in the presence of the three "mediation members." 

The document itself, as translated, contained a listing of the 

parties' property and provided that the parties "agreed to share 

all the above equally and not to claim anything else and both 

signed the agreement." While husband alleged at the May 19, 

1999 hearing that he refused to sign the final agreement several 

days later, the evidence proved that the agreement signed by the 

parties was a final agreement. 
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 Based upon the written documents and the testimony heard by 

the trial court ore tenus, the court determined that the 

agreement was valid and enforceable. "The language of Code 

§ 20-109.1 gives the trial court discretion in determining 

whether a property settlement agreement should be incorporated 

by reference into a final decree of divorce. Absent an abuse of 

discretion, the trial court's decision must be upheld on 

appeal." Forrest v. Forrest, 3 Va. App. 236, 239, 349 S.E.2d 

157, 159 (1986). Evidence supported the trial court's decision. 

We find no error in the trial court's determination. 

Denial of Continuance

 Husband also contends that the trial court erred when it 

refused to grant his motion for a continuance made at the May 

19, 1999 hearing. In a Motion for Summary Judgment previously 

filed with this Court, wife argues that this question cannot be 

addressed without the transcript of the April 30, 1999 hearing. 

This transcript was not timely filed and is not a part of the 

record on appeal. We find the record on appeal is adequate for 

us to address husband's contention on the merits and, therefore, 

deny wife's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

 We find no error in the trial court's denial of husband's 

motion for a continuance. While we do not have the transcript 

of the April 30, 1999 hearing before us, the record demonstrates 

that, by order entered that day, the trial court continued 
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wife's Motion to Incorporate Property Settlement Agreement until 

May 19, 1999. The trial court ordered husband to respond to 

wife's motion by May 7, 1999. Husband signed this order. The 

trial court also entered on April 30, 1999 a separate order 

allowing husband's counsel to withdraw and expressly providing 

"[t]here will be no continuances of any court dates set as of 

4/30/99." Husband also signed this order under the endorsement 

"Seen." In addition, as noted by the court during the hearing 

on May 19, 1999, husband had notice of wife's reliance upon the 

agreement when she filed her answer in 1997. 

 "Whether to grant or deny a continuance of a trial is a 

matter that lies within the sound discretion of a trial court, 

and its ruling will not be reversed on appeal unless it is 

plainly wrong." Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 501, 508, 450 

S.E.2d 146, 151 (1994). The record demonstrates that husband 

was present at the hearing at which the trial court continued 

the issue of the incorporation of the property settlement 

agreement. Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the 

trial court's refusal to grant husband an additional continuance 

on May 19, 1999 was an abuse of discretion. Therefore, we find 

no merit in husband's contention. 

Equitable Distribution

 Husband contends that the trial court erred by entering an 

equitable distribution order pursuant to the terms of the 
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October 1996 agreement and by awarding wife her attorney's fees. 

We find no error. See Code § 20-109.1. 

 Pursuant to the terms of the parties' agreement, the trial 

court ruled that the former marital residence was jointly held 

marital property that was to be equally divided between the 

parties. Accordingly, the trial court entered an equitable 

distribution order dividing the marital property listed in the 

agreement and remaining in the marital estate at the time of the 

hearing. 

 Husband contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

consider his testimony concerning the value of the marital 

residence. He testified that the house was listed for sale at 

$549,000. Evidence established that the house did not sell at 

that price and, in fact, that the sale price was reduced to 

$525,000 by April 30, 1998. Wife testified that the marital 

residence was worth between $480,000 and $500,000. She also 

presented evidence that the 1997 tax assessed value of the home 

was $435,530. Neither party presented a real estate appraisal 

for the residence. The trial court's determination that the 

marital residence was worth $500,000 was supported by the 

evidence presented. "We will not disturb the trial court's 

finding of the value of an asset unless the finding is plainly 

wrong or unsupported by the evidence." Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 

Va. App. 264, 275, 498 S.E.2d 437, 442 (1998). 
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 While husband also asserts that the trial court erred by 

failing to determine the value of the marital residence as of 

the time of the hearing, the record does not support this 

contention. The trial court determined the current value of the 

marital residence, limited by the scope of the evidence 

presented by the parties. 

 We find no error in the trial court's order directing 

husband to reimburse wife for his share of the mortgage payments 

made by wife since the execution of their agreement. Under the 

terms of the agreement, the parties shared equally in the loan 

for this property. Husband failed to cite any evidence in the 

record supporting his contention that wife intentionally failed 

to sell the marital residence. See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 14 Va. 

App. 53, 56, 415 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1992). Husband contends that 

"equity and spirit of equal division of assets and debts" 

reflected in the parties' agreement required wife to reimburse 

husband for mortgage and maintenance attributable to unspecified 

property possessed by husband following their separation. 

However, no other property remaining in the marital estate at 

the time of the hearing was identified in the parties' 

agreement. Husband failed to present sufficient evidence to 

warrant an award of these unspecified amounts contrary to the 

express language of the parties' agreement. 
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 Husband failed to object to the award of attorney's fees to 

wife, either in the list of objections that accompanied the 

endorsement of the June 9, 1999 order or in his Motion For 

Reconsideration. "No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 

considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was 

stated together with the grounds therefor at the time of the 

ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of 

Appeals to attain the ends of justice." Rule 5A:18. Neither 

good cause nor the ends of justice warrant our consideration of 

this objection. 

 We deny wife's request for attorney's fees incurred in this 

appeal. See O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 

S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996). 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.