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21–997 2018

S. HRG. 114–506 

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S FUNCTIONS AND 

CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO ENERGY-RELATED 

EMERGENCIES, INCLUDING IMPACTS TO CRITICAL 

ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 

FIELD HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON 

ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

AUGUST 15, 2016 

( 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska, Chairman 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

STEVE DAINES, Montana 

BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii 

ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine 

ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts 

COLIN HAYES, Staff Director 

PATRICK J. MCCORMICK III, Chief Counsel 

TRISTAN ABBEY, Senior Professional Staff Member 

Brianne Miller, Professional Staff Member 

ANGELA BECKER-DIPPMAN, Democratic Staff Director 

SAM E. FOWLER, Democratic Chief Counsel 

RICH GLICK, Democratic General Counsel 

BRIE VAN CLEVE, Democratic Science & Technology Fellow 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Page 

Cantwell, Hon. Maria, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from Washington .................................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Moniz, Hon. Ernest, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy ............................... 5 

Ezelle, Robert, Director, Washington State Emergency Management Division . 51 

Bowman, Stephanie, Commissioner, Port of Seattle (Washington) ..................... 58 

Hairston, John, Chief Administrative Officer, Bonneville Power Administration, U.S. Department of Energy ........................................................................ 63 

Rogers, Scot, Executive Vice President & General Counsel, F5 Networks, 

Inc. ......................................................................................................................... 73 

Imhoff, Carl, Manager, Grid Research Program, Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy ............................................................ 78 

Best, Dr. Lynn, Chief Environmental Officer, Seattle City Light ....................... 87 

ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED 

Best, Dr. Lynn: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 87 

Written Testimony ............................................................................................ 90 

BNSF Railway: 

Statement for the Record ................................................................................. 110 

Bowman, Stephanie: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 58 

Written Testimony ............................................................................................ 60 

Cantwell, Hon. Maria: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 1 

Chart entitled ‘‘Oil trains moving through Washington’’ .............................. 47 

Ezelle, Robert: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 51 

Written Testimony ............................................................................................ 54 

Hairston, John: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 63 

Written Testimony ............................................................................................ 65 

Imhoff, Carl: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 78 

Written Testimony ............................................................................................ 82 

Moniz, Hon. Ernest: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 5 

Clear Path IV: Energy-Focused Disaster Response Exercise Summary 

Report, April 19–20, 2016 ............................................................................ 9 

Written Testimony ............................................................................................ 24 

Rogers, Scot: 

Opening Statement ........................................................................................... 73 

Written Testimony ............................................................................................ 76 

(1) 

THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S FUNCTIONS 

AND CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO ENERGY-RELATED EMERGENCIES, INCLUDING 

IMPACTS TO CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 

MONDAY, AUGUST 15, 2016 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Seattle, Washington. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 a.m. PDT at the 

Campion Ballroom at Seattle University, Seattle, Washington, Hon. 

Maria Cantwell, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON 

Senator CANTWELL [presiding]: Today’s meeting will come to 

order. I want to thank everyone for being here today. I especially 

want to thank Secretary Moniz for traveling to the Pacific Northwest to be part of this historic field hearing. 

I want to thank Seattle University and Father Sundborg, who I 

know is not here today, for hosting us again. We were here last 

year to discuss issues with Senator Barrasso related to the fire season and some great work came out of that hearing, so I expect the 

same out of this morning’s discussion. 

First we are going to hear from Secretary Moniz and have a 

chance to discuss with him, for the official record, a variety of 

issues, mostly related to the Quadrennial Energy Review and updating our energy infrastructure. 

We will then hear from a group of Northwest experts on the second panel: Dr. Lynn Best, who is with Seattle City Light; Stephanie Bowman, from the Port of Seattle; Robert Ezelle, with the 

Washington Department Emergency Management; John Hairston, 

with the Bonneville Power Administration; Carl Imhoff, from Pacific Northwest National Lab; and Scot Rogers, with F5 Networks. 

I look forward to hearing everyone’s comments and to the discussion we are going to have today. 

I want to welcome the Secretary to the Pacific Northwest and 

thank him for coming to visit us. We are very proud of our history 

of innovation in the Northwest and the energy mix of our electricity grid. 

We have already had a busy morning. Secretary Moniz and I just 

recently visited the Bullet Foundation and discussed some of the 

smart building and zero energy building developments happening 
2 

in the Northwest. Later, we will go over to the University of Washington to see more great innovation and then to the Tri-Cities tomorrow to look at the Hanford site and Hanford issues. 

It is not every day that an Energy Secretary makes two days 

available for a particular region of the country, but I think our region deserves to have that much attention because of the challenges and the level of innovation that is happening here. 

Mr. Secretary, before I begin my formal remarks, I want to thank 

you again for making so much time for us and for your great service to our country. 

Secretary MONIZ. Thank you for hosting me. 

Senator CANTWELL. With that, we will start the hearing which, 

as I said, is really a hearing to talk about updating and securing 

our critical infrastructure and energy resources. 

The United States is experiencing a very dramatic transformation in how we produce and transport energy. Many of these 

changes are positive. A more modern grid enables greater quantities of clean sources of energy. Consumers are able to more efficiently use energy and choose low cost alternatives to meet their 

needs. 

We also know that these changes can produce greater stress on 

our energy transportation infrastructure. For example, crude by 

rail or pipeline challenges. 

The energy industry and federal and state and local governments 

must work more closely together on these to update our energy infrastructure to satisfy demands for reliable, safe and affordable energy. 

As I mentioned, many of these issues are discussed in the Secretary of Energy’s Quadrennial Energy Review, issued last year to 

communicate the many, many energy-related challenges we face. 

Today we are going to talk about three of those specific challenges, 

those that really concern us here in the Northwest. 

First, we are going to discuss the pressure that increased domestic production of oil has been placing on our rail system, everything 

from pushing commodities off the rails to issues of public security. 

The energy transformation the nation is experiencing is impacting 

the transportation infrastructure, and we, in the Northwest, know 

how much it is impacting us. 

Last year the Quadrennial Energy Review concluded that increased domestic oil production had altered transportation of liquid 

fuels and for us, in fact, from 2010 to 2015, rail shipments to the 

West have increased by 10,000 percent. That is almost a mind boggling statistic. 

We went from having almost no prior train oil traffic to having 

almost 20 trains a week going through every major population center in our state. Cities like Vancouver, Spokane and Seattle are 

very concerned about the safety of these oil trains and the high 

profile of incidents that have occurred across the nation including 

a recent derailment that happened in Mosier, Oregon. Twenty-six 

cities in our state have already passed resolutions expressing concern or just outright opposition to oil trains. This is something even 

the President, when he was here recently, heard about. 

The second issue we want to focus on, as it relates to our infrastructure, again called out in the Quadrennial Energy Review, is 
3 

the need to enhance and prevent cyberattacks. A successful attack 

on our grid, as we know in the Northwest, could have catastrophic 

outcomes. According to the University of California, Berkeley, 

power disruptions already cost our U.S. economy $96 billion annually. 

Today’s economy depends upon a well-functioning and robust 

electricity grid. As we continue to grow more reliant on the Internet to manage the grid and energy-consuming products, cybersecurity will become even more important. 

The Quadrennial Energy Review noted that in 2013, 151 different cyber incidents involving the energy sector were reported to 

the Department of Homeland Security. I know there is an ongoing 

effort by the Secretary, working with our national labs and Homeland Security and various industry, to work on preventing 

cyberattacks in the future. 

But I think we are here today to discuss the ideas that we should 

be pursuing as our information age architecture continues to grow, 

that our investment in cybersecurity should continue to grow. 

Today almost everything and everyone relies on a well-functioning 

electricity grid. Our hospitals, our first responders, our water treatment facilities, fueling stations, transportation communications, everything will be impacted by a prolonged blackout. 

As we will hear from F5 this morning, most of our investment 

to date has been focused on protecting the security of our networks. 

Much more needs to be done to invest in the security of our software systems. Software attacks are growing. State agents, acting 

on behalf of foreign governments or terrorist organizations, have 

attempted almost on a daily basis to hack into our electricity grid. 

We have heard stories that maybe the Russians are behind the 

attacks on computers at the Democratic National Committee and 

that the North Koreans were involved or perhaps involved in the 

Sony system hack two years ago. We need to redouble our efforts 

to thwart not only cyber but physical attacks against the grid as 

well and to make sure we are continuing to make investments to 

upgrade our infrastructure. 

I think the Secretary may also have some announcements about 

that today as it relates to Northwest companies and continuing to 

make that investment. But we do have many, many Northwest 

companies that, from big data to Smart Grid, are trying to help 

build out the infrastructure that will keep us ahead of some of 

these attacks. 

Finally, as the climate continues to change, more attention needs 

to be paid to the impacts of that and natural disasters, severe 

weather, all of these things, also impact our energy infrastructure. 

We know in the Pacific Northwest what a one-degree change in 

temperature means for snow melt and what a big impact it has on 

our hydro system. 

Government has an obligation to coordinate with the private sector to reduce the impacts of natural disasters on our energy infrastructure. This is especially important for us in the Northwest 

where we are susceptible to earthquakes, fires, droughts, floods 

and landslides and getting the energy system up and operating 

again is critical. 
4 

Secretary Moniz is going to, I believe, release a report today 

about the Department of Energy’s (DOE) recent Clear Path IV exercise. This exercise examined how well the Pacific Northwest energy sector might respond to a massive earthquake associated with 

a tsunami. The findings suggest that we have more to do to enhance our energy security but clearly the Federal Government 

needs to play a role in helping us get that plan into action. 

We are sitting in the middle of the Cascadia subduction zone 

which can produce very strong earthquakes and corresponding 

tsunamis, and an event of this magnitude could wipe out the infrastructure that brings electricity and fuel for a very long time. The 

Department of Energy’s findings from its Clear Path IV exercise 

are particularly illuminating. 

First, we need to help the energy sector assess the damage from 

natural disasters more quickly and more accurately to facilitate the 

restoration of service. The Pacific Northwest National Lab is developing technology on this that will help expedite those assessments. 

Second, the Federal Government needs to use its resources to enhance the effect of the state and local industry efforts to restore the 

energy infrastructure. We all know what happens when we have a 

storm and the amount of time we have tried to cut down on getting 

electricity grids back up and operational by coordinating with utilities all throughout the region. Imagine this on a much grander 

scale. 

Third, the Department of Defense and other agencies can provide 

aviation and maritime resources to transport and replace equipment such as electric transformers and hard hit areas not able to 

be reached by road. Federal agencies can also help make sure that 

we have enhanced infrastructure and coordination for the restoration of those energy sector areas. 

I look forward to hearing more about this report from the Secretary. 

We are already working on some of these ideas in Congress. We 

just recently passed out of the Senate a comprehensive energy bill, 

the first one in nine years, and this bill is now in conference. It includes important provisions for doubling our efforts on research for 

the grid and specifically targeting cyberattacks. It would fund modernization to make the grid more flexible in the cases of emergency. 

It also puts the Energy Secretary in charge of developing and implementing a response for energy emergencies. So I am so pleased 

that he is here today to discuss that. We also, in the bill, make 

sure that we continue to focus on upgrading our energy infrastructure as it relates to the grid and a workforce that it will take to 

accomplish that. 

Again, we want to welcome the Energy Secretary here today, and 

thank him for coming to the Northwest and looking at all the innovation that the Northwest has to offer. For example, we just toured 

a smart building. The Energy bill would upgrade our Smart building efforts through the Department of Energy’s help and hopefully 

reduce the amount of energy used. About 40 percent of all energy 

is consumed now in buildings. 

Mr. Secretary, again, thank you for being in the Pacific Northwest. Our hearing process is usually five minutes for opening state-
5 

ments, even for a Secretary, but today we are waving that rule. We 

are in the Northwest, and we are going to make our own rule. 

Please use whatever time you would like this morning to present 

your testimony and discuss any issues you think are relevant to today’s subjects. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST MONIZ, SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary MONIZ. Great. 

Well thank you, Senator Cantwell. I really appreciate the opportunity to address the Department of Energy’s responsibilities for 

helping the energy sector prepare and respond to a wide range of 

threats and hazards at a time, as you said, of rapidly changing energy systems, dramatically increased oil and gas production, driving exports, engaging new geographies requiring infrastructure development. Market structures are shifting. Natural gas displacing 

coal. Dramatic renewables growth. Efficiency, challenging business 

models. It’s really one of the most dynamic times, I think, we’ve 

ever seen in the energy system. And as you have said, that spills 

over into infrastructure challenges that we will discuss today. 

But I do want to take the opportunity, given the lack of a 5- 

minute clock, to also thank you for collaboration and for your leadership in this and in other issues and particularly single out your 

commitment to innovation. I think we are very well aligned on 

that. And also your leadership in emphasizing the regional nature 

of innovation and our opportunities to improve regional ecosystems 

here in the Northwest, but also across the country. We’re going to 

need that to succeed in our energy and climate goals. So again, 

thank you for all of that, not to mention a great time here in Seattle. 

So, as President Obama has pointed out, our energy and communication systems enable all other infrastructures to function. And 

of course, communications in turn, depend upon electricity. So, if 

we don’t protect the energy sector, we’re putting, essentially, every 

other sector in the economy in peril. 

When the DOE was established in 1977, the nation’s energy vulnerability was perceived mainly to be the threat of physical disruption of oil supplies. Though DOE did inherit emergency authorities 

from precursor agencies, and I’ll come back to those, the only reference to emergency response in the DOE Organization Act was direction for DOE to develop ‘‘an effective strategy for distributing 

and allocating fuels in periods of short supply.’’ So very, very narrow reference to the issues of those days. 

Now fast forward to this century, and we face a very different set 

of threats to our energy systems. In response there are now laws, 

actions and Presidential directives that are focused on threats such 

as severe weather, natural disasters, EMP, aging infrastructure, 

cyber and physical threats. So it’s a considerably broadened threat 

spectrum that we need to consider. 

We need to make energy infrastructure investments commensurate to the critical role of that infrastructure and to today’s threat 

environment. In particular, the reliance of all of our critical energy 

infrastructures on electricity places a very high premium on reli-
6 

able, modern and hardened electric grid resistant to the continually 

evolving cyber threats. 

And, I’ll come back to this later, that is why in the second installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review, that you referred to 

earlier, we are focusing on the electricity system, end-to-end, including the entire threat surface. So that is something that, I 

think, we get, we share an appreciation of that priority. 

Now DOE does have some long standing emergency authorities. 

During emergencies the Department has independent authority to 

order temporary electricity connections, to make exchanges of crude 

oil or petroleum products from our reserves, to assist entities in 

procuring necessary energy materials to maintain supply during an 

emergency and to control nuclear materials. 

We also have authorities that require a Presidential finding including orders to protect or restore the reliability of critical infrastructure, sales from the petroleum reserve, allocation of energy 

materials in the civilian market and allocation of natural gas and 

fuel switching in power plants. So those can all follow a Presidential determination. 

Finally, DOE has a consultative role for Jones Act waivers and 

a concurrence role for fuel waivers during emergencies. Now these 

authorities have been used many times. The Department has used 

its independent authority to connect temporary electricity lines, for 

example, to restore power after hurricanes like Ike, Katrina and 

Rita. After Super Storm Sandy, the Department loaned 120,000 

barrels from the Northwest Home Heating Oil Reserve, NHHOR, 

to the Department of Defense for use in emergency responder vehicles, essentially low sulfur diesel fuel. 

DOE also has had legislation and directives related to new emergency response authorities. The California electricity crisis of 2000– 

2001 actually led to the use of multiple authorities deriving from 

the Federal Power Act, the Defense Production Act and the Natural 

Gas Policy Act. 

Now with regard to new authorities and responsibilities, the 

FAST Act that you referred to, the Transportation bill, provides 

DOE with a new authority to protect critical infrastructure against 

cyber, EMP, geomagnetic disturbance and physical attack threats. 

These authorities do not apply, however, to natural disasters other 

than geomagnetic storms. So while these authorities are welcome, 

they do create an asymmetric situation for authorities for natural 

disasters and malevolent attacks even though the outcomes could 

be similar. 

The 2015 Balanced Budget Act directs DOE to establish a strategic petroleum reserve modernization program to protect the U.S. 

economy from the impacts of emergency products supply disruptions, and I will return to this later. 

Finally, in terms of new responsibilities and authorities, President Obama has addressed these issues through Presidential Policy 

Directive 21 which identifies DOE as the sector-specific agency for 

energy infrastructure, making it the federal lead for the 

prioritization and coordination of activities to strengthen the security and resilience of critical energy infrastructure. 

The DOE also serves within the Administration as the lead agency for Emergency Support Function 12 which facilitates recovery 
7 

from disruptions to energy infrastructure. During a response operation the Department works with industry and federal, state and 

local partners to assess disaster impacts on energy infrastructure, 

coordinate response to expedite restoration and to monitor and provide situational awareness of impacts to key decision-makers. The 

Department deploys responders who work directly with affected 

utilities and local officials on the ground during a disaster. Our response force is entirely voluntary and we are training right now 

nearly 100 members of our staff to be prepared to deploy for all 

hazard contingencies. 

Over the past two years our Deputy Secretary and I have led a 

deliberate effort to strengthen our emergency response capabilities 

and our critical partnerships with the energy sector. With 90 percent of the nation’s power infrastructure privately owned and operated, coordinating and aligning efforts between the government 

and the private sector is necessary to be effective in emergency response. 

Our challenge here is speed. If we have a government process 

that takes too long to share information about dynamic threats, 

then we’re going to fail to protect our infrastructure. Our solution 

is to provide tools, information and practice so that companies are 

aware of risks as soon as they’re identified. We can bring together 

information across the Department and across the government and 

then take action together. We also partnered with state, local and 

tribal governments with an updated Energy Emergency Assurance 

Coordinators MOU that I signed early this year. DOE will enhance 

robust training and exercising, bringing stakeholders together to 

plan for shared regional hazards, and I will come back to an example of that. 

One of DOE’s core missions, and you’ve said it already several 

times which I appreciate, is to support innovation and that includes innovation to help our nation’s energy security. So we are 

growing our partnerships with academia and the private sector 

and, of course, leveraging our 17 national laboratories in order to 

make our infrastructure more secure and resilient. 

At this time I will say that in this state we have one of our premier national laboratories, specific Northwest, East of the Cascades. You all should take a trip over the mountains and we will 

tomorrow, in fact, do that to visit that laboratory. Of course, it will 

require substantial additional investment over many years to expand transformational innovation that can outpace the dynamic 

threats that we face. And here I will say that across the board the 

President’s Fiscal Year 2017 budget proposes the first increment of 

energy R and D funding to meet Mission Innovation goals, specifically a doubling of our energy related R and D over a five-year period. It also proposes regional innovation partnerships and again, 

Senator Cantwell has been a leader in advocating for this approach, no doubt helped by the fact that she anticipates this area 

would have a very robust regional response given all of the intellectual and other assets in this part of the country. 

This budget will provide a very strong foundation for addressing 

the infrastructure needs discussed here as well, again, as the 

broader clean energy investments needed for our economic, environmental and security goals. 
8 

Today we are announcing $30 million of funding. That may actually have some additional funding added to it next year, but for 

today $30 million of funding for cybersecurity, including research 

and development and programs to develop energy professional education in cybersecurity. Two of the awards are in Washington 

State. They are the Schweitzer Engineering company in Pullman, 

Washington with a total of about $7.5 million for the company in 

developing its cybersecurity software products. That’s a terrific development across the board but certainly as well here in Washington State. 

Now, robust exercises are also crucial to ensure industry and 

government are better prepared to work as a team during real 

world emergencies. 

In April 2016 DOE led Clear Path IV, an interagency exercise focused on testing and evaluating energy sector response plans in a 

scenario depicting a Cascadia Subduction Zone 9.0 earthquake and 

tsunami, the so-called really big one, made famous in the New 

Yorker article. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
9 
10 
11 

DOE Clear Path IV Energy-Focused Disaster Response Exercise 

Exercise Summary Report 

1. The title of this document is Clear Path IV Energy-Focused Disaster Response Functional 

Exercise (Clear Path IV) Summary Report. The exercise overview, goals, and objectives in 

this manual reflect the information that was distributed to participants at Clear Path IV. 

2. This document is approved for public release. 

3. For more information on this exercise, please consult the following point of contact: 

Puesh Kumar 

Director, Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration 

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 

United States Department of Energy 

Phone: (202) 586-9600 

Email: Puesh.Kumar@hg.doe.gov 

Evan Musolino 

Z, Inc. Contract Support to 

Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration 

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability 

United States Department of Energy 

Phone (202) 586-5082 

Email: );.y1lnMusojj_l)Q@bgJjQ~gQY 

Handling Instructions iii U.S Department of Energy 
12 

DOE Clear Path IV Energy-Focused Disaster Response Exercise 

Exercise Summary Report 

Handling Instructions .................................................................................................................. iii 

Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... iv 

Exercise Overview ......................................................................................................................... 1 

General Information ..................................................................................................................... 3 

Introduction . . ......................................................................................................................... 3 

Exercise Overview... .. ............ 3 

Participation ................................................................................................................................ 5 

Conclusion and Recommendations .............................................................................................. 7 

Table of Contents iv U.S Department of Energy 
13 

Exercise Overview 

Clear Path IV Energy-Focused Disaster Response Exercise (Clear Path 

If) 

April 19-20, 2016 

World Trade Center (Portland, OR) (Day 1 and 2) 

Department of Energy Headquarters (Washington, DC) (Day 2) 

Clear Path IV addressed the challenges the energy sector may face during 

a catastrophic Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake and tsunami, 

focusing on the collaboration between govemment and industry during 

efforts to organize response, assess impacts to energy systems, 

communicate information to develop situational awareness and a common 

operating picture, and facilitate the delivery of capabilities across intemal 

and mutual assistance networks. 

This exercise was divided across two days of play. Day 1 was a 

discussion-based rehearsal-of-concept tabletop exercise (TTX), which 

focused on strategic-level response operations and the coordination 

between government and industry. Day 1 explored specific components of 

the energy sector's incident response, to include joint operations, fuel 

system management, power restoration, and state coordination. Day 2 was 

an operational- and tactical-level functional exercise played from the DOE 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Washington, DC, coordinated 

with simulated field operations in the Pacific Northwest, by the DOE 

headquarters' Unified Command Structure (UCS). 

UNCLASSIFIED 

Community Resilience 

Critical Transportation 

lnfrasttucture Systems 

Logistics and Supply Chain Management 

Long-Term Vulnerability Reduction 

Planning 

Public Information and Waming 

Operational Coordination 

Risk and Disaster Resilience Assessment 

Situational Assessment 

U.S Department of Energy 
14 

Exercise Overview 

Examine energy sector roles and responsibilities within response plans 

utilized for a Cascadia Subduction Zone 9.0 earthquake and tsunami, 

such as the DOE Energy Response Plan, FEMA Regional Plans, State 

Emergency Management Plans, State Energy Assurance Plans, and 

industry response plans. 

Highlight strategies to address fuel dismptions and shortages during a 

multi-state regional disaster with impacts to oil and natural gas supply 

chains and methods of transportation. 

Identify essential elements of information and determine methods and 

processes of information sharing between state, federal, and industry 

partners to best provide situational awareness and to develop a 

common operating picture to support executive and operational 

decision making and resource requirements, adjudication, allocation, 

and disposition. 

Determine effective identification of critical resources and capabilities, 

eliminate duplication of requests or delivery, and determine logistical 

requirements with commercial and governmental methods within 

multiple mutual assistance networks and systems. 

Prioritize the restoration of energy systems with state, federal, and 

industry partners with consideration to cascading impacts to 

interdependent sectors. 

Evaluate the DOE Unified Command Structure Concept of Operations 

with federal, state, and industry partners in responding to the CSZ 

disaster. 

A magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami occurs along the 

700-mile-long CSZ, causing considerable damage to Washington, 

Oregon, and parts of northern California. Effects are felt many miles 

inland, and impacts include landslides, liquefaction, and damage to 

critical infrastructure, buildings, and structures. Collateral damage 

results from fire, release of hazardous materials, failure of essential 

operating systems, and disrupted lifeline services. 

Stakeholders from federal, state, and local governments; electricity 

industry; oil and natural gas industry and key domestic and 

international partners participated in Clear Path IV Please see Figure 3 

for a complete list of exercise participants. 

U.S Department of Energy 
15 

This Clear Path IV Summary Report provides observations of exercise conduct and recommendations for the 

energy sector, both government and industry, to improve policies, plans, and procedures for energy 

emergencies. 

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity Delive1y and Energy Reliability's (OE) 

Infrastmcture Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) division hosted the Clear Path IV Energy-Focused 

Disaster Response Exercise (Clear Path IV) on April 19 and 20, 2016, in Pm1land, Oregon and Washington, 

DC. The Clear Path series is a critical component of DOE's efforts to strengthen cooperation between 

government and industry on emergency response in order to better facilitate the restoration of energy services 

the aftermath of catastrophic incidents. Clear Path IV was designed to elicit outcomes aimed at helping inform 

government and industry response plans as well as shape energy sector participation in the Cascadia Rising 

2016 exercise sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Defense 

(DOD), and the States of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho. Additionally, in the coming months, stakeholders in 

the Pacific Northwest will leverage Clear Path IV outcomes to shape the development of a FEMA Region X 

Power Outage Incident Annex, which is a regional plan for government and industry representatives on 

responding to long duration power outages. 

The exercise scenario consisted of a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami occurring along the 700-

mile long Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ), causing catastrophic damage to Washington, Oregon, and northern 

California. Simulated earthquake and tsunami effects were felt many miles inland, with landslides and 

liquefaction causing significant damage to critical infrastructure and buildings. Cascading impacts caused by 

collateral damage from fire, hazardous materials, failure of essential operating systems, and disrupted lifeline 

se1vices threatened the communities of the Pacific Northwest. 

Figure l identifies the following National Preparedness Goal Core Capabilities examined in Clear Path IV 

Sl!illltionl!f Ass.e,;ment 

Clear Path IV was designed to se1ve as an important milestone in DOE's process to reorganize its emergency 

response enterprise to align with National Incident Management System (N1MS) guidelines and better leverage 

the tremendous expertise found throughout the Department during incident response operations. A Unified 

General Information U.S Department of Energy 
16 

DOE Clear Path IV Energy Focused Disaster Response Exercise 

Exercise Summary Report 

Command Structure (UCS) was activated such that individuals from the OE, the U.S. Energy Information 

Administration (EIA), and the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) were co-located in the 

NNSA's Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to jointly coordinate response efforts. Also, Clear Path IV was 

designed to prompt DOE leadership organized under the Emergency & Incident Management Council (EIMC) 

to provide strategic direction and facilitate DOE resources for response efforts. Due to the nature of the 

incident, operations in the EOC were led by OEIISER with ISER staff taking leadership roles in the Unified 

Command Group, the General Staff (Section Chief's) and Command Staff levels, augmented with support from 

NNSA and other members of the UCS. 

Figure 2 depicts DOE's UCS as it was staffed and its operations evaluated during the functional component of 

Clear Path If' on April 20th. See footnote 2 for description of DOE offices abbreviated below. 2 

Figure 2: DOE Unified Command Structure 
17 

Approximately 200 participants from Federal, state, and local government as well as the electric sector and oil 

and natural gas industries participated in Clear Path IV over the 2-day event from Portland, OR and 

Washington, DC. 

Bonneville Power Administration 

Department of Commerce 

Departm~nt of Defense 

Department of Energy 

State of Arizona 

State of California 

State of Idaho 

Clackamas County (OR) 

Marion County (OR) 

BP 

Chevron 

Devon Energy 

Exxon Mobil 

APR Energy 

Clark Public Utilities 

Consolidated Edison 

Coos-purry 'Electric Cooperative 

E,ugene Water and Electri~ Board 

American Fuel and Petrochemical 

Manufacturers 

American Petroleum Institute 

American Public POwer AssoCiation 

ARCOS 

Civil Air PatrOl 

Edison El~ctric InStitute 

Etec;tric Infrastructure Security 

Council 

Electricity Sector Information 

General information 

Figure 3. Exercise Participants 

Federal Government 

Oepartmert of Homeland Security 

Envlronmentar Protection Agency 

Federal EO!ergency Management 

Agency 

State of Montana 

Slate of Oregon 

Oregon Army National Guard 

Multnomah County (OR) 

Washington County (OR) 

• Kinder Mor'gan 

Marathon Petroleum 

NW Natural 

Phillips 56 

ElectriC Industry 

Exelon Corporation 

NV Energy 

PacifiCorp/P'acific Power 

Pacific Gas and Elect~~c 

Portland General Electric 

Puget Sound Energy 

Key Partners 

HAMM~R Federal Traihing Center 

,National Association of Regulatory 

Utility Com,missioners 

National' Association of State Energy 

Officials 

Natiohal Eilergy Tec,hnology 

aboratory 

National Governors Association 

National Petroleum Councu 

Na1ional Rural Electric Cooperatl~e 

Unite<fStates Army Corps of ,Engineers 

Un'ited States Bureau of Reclamation 

United States Cqast Guard 

Western Area Power Administration 

State Of Utah .. 

State of Washington 

Washington Armr Nation~! Guard 

City of ~ortland (OR) 

City of Salem.(OR) 

Shell 

Tesoro 

TransCanada 

u.s. Oil and Refining Co. 

Williams 

Seattle City Light· 

Snohomish County Public Utility 

Southern California Edison 

Springfield Utility Board 

Tacoma Public Utilities 

NJ Resources 

Oregon Municipal Electric Utiliti~s 

Association 

Oregon Rural Electric ~ooperative 

Association 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

Peak Reliability 

Wes~ern Electricity Coordinating 

Council 

U.S Department of Energy 
18 

Sharing,'& Analysis Genter 

Electricity Subsector' CoOrdinating 

Council 

Israel National Emergency 

Management AUthority 

General Information 

DOE Clear Path IV Energy Focused Disaster Response Exercise 

raf Resources Canada 

Exercise Summary Report 

Pontificia Universidad Gat61ica de 

Chile 

U.S Department of Energy 
19 

As the first functional test of DOE's unified response concept, Clear Path IV was a major step forward in the 

development of an enterprise-wide emergency response concept of operations capability in DOE and across the 

energy sector. DOE validated the concept of operations governing its emergency management operations as 

DOE personnel successfully demonstrated the capacity to manage a complex natural hazard incident while 

simultaneously managing a nuclear weapon accident/incident exercise. At the same time, DOE personnel were 

able to identify important lessons to improve implementation of that concept. 

Perhaps equally important, Clear Path IV, in its design and conduct. represented a qualitative and quantitative 

improvement over previous editions of the Clear Path series. Prior to this most recent iteration of the Clear 

Path series, the annual DOE event was a Washint,>ton, D.C.-based hurricane response tabletop exercise. Moving 

to a functional exercise with response elements located both in the field (in Washington and Oregon) and DOE 

headquarters, Clear Path IV provided a number of opportunities to enhance mutual learning within the energy 

sector. The increased complexity of this exercise presented participants with a more demanding environment, 

driven by the catastrophic conditions of the earthquake scenario. 

Clear Path IV also succeeded in involving different participants than had been seen at previous Clear Path 

exercises. In prior Clear Paths, participants were primarily D.C.-based representatives from industry, state 

government trade associations, and federal government agencies. By hosting Clear Path IV on the west coast, 

DOE was able to involve individuals at the regional, state and local levels in addition to the aforementioned 

representatives fiom previous exercises. DOE also expanded its outreach to industry for Clear Path TV~ 

incorporating both electricity and oil and natural gas sector representatives in the planning and design of the 

exercise from the outset, to the great benefit of the exercise. 

The exercise provided a comprehensive test of the ability of energy sector representatives from both 

government and industry to respond to a catastrophic incident. DOE is continuing to work in collaboration with 

government and industry partners to ensure the lessons learned in Clear Parh IV are considered or implemented. 

DOE will conduct a series of follow-on meetings with federal interagency partners, states, electric sub-sector, 

and the oil and natural gas sub-sector to develop roadmaps for implementation to create positive change within 

the energy sector response community. The benefit of continuous engagement is to foster and enhance critical 

partnerships across the emergency management enterprise, both government and industry, while improving 

collaborative planning efforts. Continued efforts of both government and industry officials to improve the 

ability of the enef!,'Y sector to prepare for, respond to, and recover from catastrophic incidents should be guided 

by the following Recommendations: 

I. The whole community- to include the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and other federal agencies, 

state, local, and tribal governments, and industry partners- should build on the successful collaboration 

witnessed at Clear Path IV by establishing and communicating consistent incident coordination 

mechanisms, protocols, and procedures to facilitate enerh'Y restoration. 

2. DOE should enhance its ability to advocate with other federal agencies on behalf of the energy industry 

for federal assistance to facilitate information gathering and energy restoration in the aftermath of an 

event. The Department should also work in partnership with industry to inform response partners and the 

general public of the status of energy restoration to set realistic expectations. 

3. The energy sector should work with the response community to clearly articulate the physical and 

operational constraints faced by the electricity and oil and natural gas industries (e.g., predetennined 

Conclusion and Recommendations U.S Department of Energy 
20 

DOE Clear Path IV Energy Focused Disaster Response Exercise 

Exercise Summary Report 

restoration pathways or antitrust concerns) which will impact energy restoration" The whole community 

should use this enhanced knowledge to ensure these constraints do not impede the Nation's ability 

to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards" 

4" DOE and the energy industry should improve their coordination by ensuring that agencies and 

organizations providing critical services in support of energy restoration are better integrated into each 

other's planning activities and exercise evenK This will allow the community to further enhance the 

cross-sector and multi-jurisdictional collaboration that was demonstrated during Clear Path IV by 

developing and testing coordinated procedures prior to real world events" 

5" DOE should augment the human, physical, and technical resources of its Unitled Command Structure 

and its Emergency Operations Center in order to enhance its effectiveness" 

DOE has already begun to take action on the Clear Path IV recommendations, enabling the Department to 

further refine and implement the concept of operations governing its integrated emergency response enterprise. 

DOE will also continue to take a leading role in engaging with external stakeholders on important initiatives 

designed to enhance the preparedness and resiliency of the energy sector, such as the FEMA Region X Power 

Outage Incident AnneK While Clear Path IV has been recognized as a success by many within the sector, the 

real successes from the exercise will result from the implementation of the recommendations captured in this 

report" 

Conclusion and Recommendations U.S Department of Energy 
21 

One outcome of that was the importance of accelerating damage 

assessments immediately. And as you said, PNNL, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, is right now developing imagery tools to do just 

that, to bring new technology to bear on making fast assessments 

of damage so that responders can prioritize where they have to go 

in order to get not only energy up but to provide all the other services to our displaced people. 

Clear Path served to elevate energy sector participation in the 

subsequent Cascadia Rising exercise which was government-wide 

in June. That really helped the entire Emergency Management 

Team to identify resource requirements for natural disaster. 

Today, as you said, we are announcing this is a summary, the 

Clear Path After Action report. I want to say that this Clear Path 

was very important. It was the first use of our, I mentioned earlier 

the Deputy Secretary and I have been reorganizing some of the response functions, that included putting together a unified command 

structure for emergency response. This was the first use of that 

command structure. 

To give you an idea of our complexity, it deals with operations, 

planning and logistics. But with the Office of Electricity, the emergency response activity in the Office of Electricity, our national Nuclear Security Administration, our Associate Under Secretary for 

Management Performance who deals with physical security, our 

CIO cyber activity, our intelligence activity and our management 

and administration activities which includes procurement. All of 

those offices which are spread out in the Department, have now, 

we’re trying to, we are organizing under this unified command 

structure that was exercised for the first time in Clear Path IV. 

I might add that in addition, of course, to their participation, for 

the first time in the Clear Path series, we held it out in the field. 

This was headquartered out of Portland, in Bonneville, in the field 

but it was regional. And of course, that allowed us, really, to much 

more effectively bring in state and local responders into our exercise out here in the field. We also had the energy industry the first 

time, not only electricity, but the oil and gas sector. We had Canada involved and of course, multiple federal agencies. 

So this was a what you need to do so that we’re not trying to 

do it for the first time in an emergency, very effective, as I said. 

It highlighted the importance of immediate assessment. But it also 

brought to the fore other things, for example, dealing with industry. The need for waivers. There can be anti-trust issues, particularly in the oil and gas sector. We have to be prepared in advance 

so that we can do those with speed. So that was really very important, and I believe we need to do much more of this in the future. 

Now I’ll add that unique to DOE we actually own critical assets 

in the sector that we are supporting and particularly relevant in, 

again, this part of the country our preparedness and response activities for our power market administrations like Bonneville directly overlap with what we are trying to do, of course, with the 

broader energy sector. 

So, another important direction, we believe, that we are emphasizing over the last couple of years is to develop what we call enterprise-wide approaches. That unified command structure is an example of an enterprise-wide approach but the idea here, in general, 
22 

is to bring all of our resources into play, including those at our national laboratories. 

Two examples, two additional examples, of that is we have 

formed an integrated Joint Cyber Coordination Center. It’s a collaborative, intelligence-driven approach to cybersecurity to protect 

the entirety of the DOE attack surface including DMAs and we are 

working toward a consolidated emergency operations center to 

allow our unified command structure to operate out of a single facility. 

Finally, let me turn to the issue of managing our strategic energy 

resources, reserves. We already mentioned that the 2015 Balanced 

Budget Act, drawing upon a recommendation of the Quadrennial 

Energy Review (QER), supports modernizing the petroleum reserve. The petroleum reserve physical assets date back many decades, need modernization and frankly, we should also, in my view, 

revisit some of the operating procedures of the petroleum reserve. 

But the Balanced Budget Act, again, following up our QER recommendation, has two phases. Life Extension Phase II will address 

unanticipated SPR (Strategic Petroleum Reserve) related equipment failures that have been impacting the reserves operational 

readiness capability. Second, marine terminal distribution capability enhancements will add dedicated marine terminals in each of 

the SPR’s three distribution systems to address the impacts of 

changes in the U.S. midstream oil movement that have significantly reduced the effective distribution capacity of the SPR in an 

emergency. 

And just last Friday, again, these hearings have a way of focusing the mind. Just last Friday, the Department approved what’s 

called CD–0, the first stage of project management protocols which 

establishes the mission need for the marine terminal distribution 

capability. CD–0 was already passed for the modernization, the life 

extension phase, and we will soon submit a report to Congress on 

DOE’s long term strategic review of the SPR. 

So in conclusion, let me say that upon my return to DOE after 

a 13-year absence, I was struck by the imperatives of a new and 

complex mission for the Department. Almost nothing that I described in this testimony was present when I left the Department 

in January 2001. But ensuring resilience, reliability, security and 

emergency response with significant operational responsibilities is 

really a new and very important direction for the Department. And 

again, thank you for your support. 

The first installment of the QER, again, addressed these issues 

of infrastructure, resilience, reliability, safety and asset security. 

And again, many of those recommendations are in progress. Some 

of them require new statutory authority. We’ve received some statutory authority, and these will improve energy infrastructure resilience. 

The second installment, as I mentioned, is on the electricity system, end-to-end, and these are all critical for emergency response 

and for meeting our climate goals. However, the fragmentation of 

our current emergency responsibilities and assets within the Department, partly reflected in that unified command structure, does 

present a management challenge. And so, I want to say that we 
23 

continue to analyze organizational options in light of these complex, cross-cutting and evolving requirements. 

The combination of increasing responsibilities and fragmented 

management arrangements creates some risk to the Department is 

not adequately resourced to effectively carry out its responsibilities, 

and that’s an area where we look forward to working with this 

Committee and with Congress as a whole to provide an appropriately resourced energy emergency response capability as an essential component of a robust energy infrastructure supporting a 

21st century economy. 

Thank you for your graciousness in affording me the time to provide somewhat longer testimony. But it really is a broad scope of 

activities, and again, we look forward to solidifying this going forward with your help and the Committee’s. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Moniz follows:] 
24 

Testimony of Secretary of Energy Ernest Moniz 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Before the 

Committee on Energy & Natural Resources 

Subcommittee on Energy 

United States Senate Field Hearing 

Seattle, Washington 

August 15, 2016 

Thank you Senator Cantwell and members of the Committee for hosting this Field Hearing in 

Seattle. I appreciate the opportunity to address the Department of Energy's (DOE) historic, 

current, and growing responsibilities for helping the energy sector prepare for and respond to a 

wide range of threats and hazards. 

Let me also thank Senator Cantwell, the Committee and the Congress for the recent focus on 

energy emergency response in both the FAST Act and in the Balanced Budget Act of 2015. 

These actions underscore the ongoing need to modernize our approaches to, and infrastructure 

for, responding to energy emergencies in a rapidly changing threat environment and energy 

space. 

Rapidly Changing Energy Systems and Threats 

This hearing to examine the current and future Federal role in responding to energy-related 

emergencies is very timely given that the Nation's energy systems and their vulnerabilities are 

undergoing significant changes. To appreciate DOE's essential and expanded role in energy 

emergency response today and in the future, it is important to place this discussion in the context 

of these remarkable changes and to examine the authorities and resources the Department has to 

address current and rapidly-evolving threats to these systems. While most of our energy 

infrastructures are privately owned and operated, energy is foundational to the Nation's 

economic prosperity and national security. As the President has pointed out, energy and 

communications systems enable all other infrastructures to function. lfwe don't protect the 

energy sector, we're putting every other sector of the economy in peril. 

Changed Energy Profile. Let me briefly highlight the dramatically changed energy profile of 

the United States over the last decade and then discuss the evolving threat environment. The 

U.S. is now the number one producer of oil and gas in the world and we are producing more oil 

than we import for the first time in decades. Renewable energy technology deployment is rising 

and prices are falling. Energy efficiency policies and technologies are contributing to projected 

slow growth in demand for electricity, and flat or declining demand for oil. Natural gas recently 

1 
25 

replaced coal as the largest fuel source for power generation. Importantly, unconventional oil 

and gas are also being produced in unconventional locations with potential implications for the 

transportation infrastructure to move these supplies to market, including recent congestion on 

railroads, inland waterways and ports, which will continue to need to be evaluated. U.S. 

companies are also exporting oil and natural gas, with security implications for global supply 

chains. 

The April 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review (QER) concluded that in key areas, the country's 

energy and related infrastructures have not kept pace with changes in the volume and geography 

of oil and gas production. 

Furthermore, integrated North American electricity grids and energy markets have increased the 

need for joint grid security strategies. The US. has new responsibilities for protecting LNG 

export supply chains. We also remain large net crude oil importers but now are large net oil 

product exporters as well as exporters of some crude oil; thus, we remain directly tied to world 

oil markets and global oil price volatility. 

Finally, our allies and other key partners have significant energy supply and infrastructure 

vulnerabilities as was exposed by the 2014 Russian aggression in Ukraine. ln response to this 

aggression, the US. and its G-7 partners developed a set of broad and collective energy security 

principles, two of which are especially important for today' s discussion: 

• Putting in place emergency response systems, including reserves and fuel substitution for 

importing countries, in case of major energy disruptions. 

• Improving energy systems resilience by promoting infrastructure modernization and 

supply and demand policies that help withstand systemic shocks. 

A discussion of the evolving threat environment should start with the establishment of DOE in 

1977 and how its role in emergency response was described in the Department of Energy 

Organization Act. At that time, the nation's energy vulnerability was perceived to be largely 

associated with growing oil imports, a global oil cartel, the real threat of physical disruption of 

oil supplies, and the inadequacy of an effective emergency response mechanism. 

The Federal reaction to the Arab oil embargoes, the associated long gasoline lines, and the 

public's sense of extreme vulnerability led to the establishment of both the Department of 

Energy and its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). A reflection of the times, the only reference 

to emergency response in the DOE Organization Act was fundamentally about gasoline rationing 

and listed in the purposes of the Department as "[facilitating the] establishment of an effective 

strategy for distributing and allocating fuels in periods of short supply." 

It should be noted that there are other essential emergency authorities, some of which predate the 

establishment of the Department, that have guided its actions in energy emergencies today and 

will do so going forward. These will be discussed shortly. 

Changing Threat Environment. Fast forward to this century: We face a very different set of 

threats to our energy systems that guide both the structure and nature of our energy emergency 

2 
26 

responses. Energy infrastructure is extending across state and international boundaries. We are 

also now operating in a post-9/11 threat environment that provides a new context and framework 

for what we as a Department are responsible for and do in emergency response. We know that 

adversaries and homegrown actors are interested in the vulnerabilities of our critical 

infrastructures. In response, there are now a range of laws, actions, and Presidential directives 

and orders designed to protect our citizens, economy and critical infrastructures from those with 

malevolent intent. Threats include natural and manmade events such as severe weather, natural 

disasters, electromagnetic pulses (EMPs), aging infrastructure, cyber threats, and growing 

infrastructure interdependencies. Some examples are dramatic extreme weather events like 

Superstorm Sandy, natural disasters like earthquakes and wildfires, and the growing perils of 

aging infrastructure like at Aliso Canyon, along with lower level but nevertheless troubling 

occurrences such as a series of as yet unexplained attacks on exposed electricity substations, 

including the Metcalfe incident in California and the Liberty substation in Arizona. As a result, 

public consciousness has been raised about the vulnerability of our electric grid and the need for 

the U.S.to substantially raise its game in addressing those vulnerabilities. 

The threat of more devastating malevolent attacks such as EMPs underscores the vulnerabilities 

associated with the growing reliance of our society on electricity, starting with the "internet of 

things" wbere an estimated 50 billion devices or more are connected to an internet that relies on 

electricity. All of our critical infrastructures- finance, telecommunications, health care, 

industry, energy, indeed the systems we need to respond to energy emergencies- are connected 

to and often managed via the internet and they all rely on electricity. This makes our energy 

systems especially vulnerable to cyber-attacks on the grid and is why the Commander, U.S. 

Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency, in testimony before the House Select 

Committee on Intelligence in October 2014, noted that "there should be no doubt in our minds 

that there are nation-states and groups that have the capability to enter our systems ... and to shut 

down ... our ability to operate our basic infrastructures ... whether its generating power, moving 

water and fuel". 

With greater deployment of information and communication technologies to enhance the 

operational efficiency of our energy infrastructure, we are also witnessing a rise in intentional, 

malicious challenges to our energy systems. We are seeing threats continually increase in 

numbers and sophistication. This evolution has profound impacts on the security and resilience 

of the energy sector, which is why we have made cybersecurity one of our highest priorities at 

DOE. 

The QER released in April 2015 noted that over half of the cyber incidents reported to DRS's 

Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team in 2013 related to energy 

installations, with the next highest percentage in the low double digits. The reliance of all of our 

critical energy infrastructures on electricity places a very high premium on a reliable, modern 

and hardened electric grid, as well as our efforts to understand, develop and evolve our 

emergency response capability to ever-changing and evolving cyber-threats. 

In addition, we are seeing a rise in extreme weather events that are projected to increase in 

frequency and intensity. These events have regional and at times national-scale impacts on our 

3 
27 

energy infrastructures and highlight the need for comprehensive and coordinated emergency 

responses. According to the QER, billion dollar weather events, especially severe storms, have 

risen dramatically in the last 15 years and are indicators of the vulnerabilities of our energy 

systems to climate change and costly disruptions. They have stressed our response capabilities 

and resources and underscored the interdependence of our critical infrastructures. Recent DOE 

analysis examining the effects of climate change on energy infrastructure exposure to storm 

surge and sea-level rise found that vulnerabilities are likely to increase for many energy sector 

assets, including electricity. Under the highest sea-level rise scenario, by 2030 the number of 

electricity substations in the Gulf of Mexico exposed to storm surge from Category l hurricanes 

could increase from 255 to 337; by 2050 the number would rise to roughly 400. 

Further, our energy infrastructures are increasingly interdependent and all are dependent on 

electricity. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, for example, downed 85,000 utility poles, 800 

distribution substations, and thousands of miles of transmission lines. On the worst day of these 

sequential events, the Nation also lost almost 30 percent of its refining capacity. Three weeks 

after Rita hit, oil markets were still short around two million barrels a day. Hurricane Sandy 

knocked out power to 8.66 million customers. More than nine days after the storm, product 

deliveries from terminals in New York Harbor had returned to only 61 percent of pre-storm 

levels, forcing industry to seek work-arounds to resume supplies. Also during Sandy, power 

outages shut down gasoline pumps, demonstrating the interdependencies of energy 

infrastructures and our growing reliance on electricity. Within one week of Sandy's landfall, less 

than 20 percent of gas stations in New York City were able to sell gasoline. ln part, this was 

attributable to the absence of backup electrical generation at gas stations and is a further 

demonstration of the interdependencies of energy infrastructures and their growing reliance on 

electricity. Moreover, the lack of transportation fuel hindered the ability of emergency personnel 

to respond to the crises. 

Sea level rise, severe weather and storm surge are not, however, only about electricity. The Gulf 

Coast region is home to nearly 50 percent of the Nation's refining capacity, so damage to liquid 

fuels infrastructure in this region can lead to significant impacts on much of the rest of the 

country, as the Gulf supplies oil products to the Northeast, Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, and South 

Atlantic regions. Land subsidence also is a widespread issue throughout the Gulf Coast (and 

Mid-Atlantic coastal areas). During the past century, global sea-level rise has averaged about 1.7 

mm/yr, though the rate in the Gulf has been faster (at 5-l 0 mm/yr, in part due to subsidence). 

Between now and 2030, the average global sea-level rise could accelerate to as much as 18 

mm/yr in worst-case scenarios. 

Relatedly, aging energy infrastructure presents challenges to citizen safety as well as reliable 

supply of power. The recent Southern California Aliso Canyon gas leaks are a prominent 

example of the challenges the U.S. faces in managing a system that was built decades ago and 

that has not been upgraded. Another important example is our Strategic Petroleum Reserve 

(SPR), which remains an essential tools of energy emergency response as the United States is 

still a significant oil importer. lts value however- and how that value gets translated into its use 

and operations- is dramatically different than when it was created in the 1970s. U.S. 

4 
28 

dependence on this infrastructure is high, and public and private investment in it should match 

its benefits in order to ensure the resilience and responsiveness of our energy grid of the future. 

Later in this testimony I will describe progress that we have achieved, working closely with this 

Committee and other Congressional partners, in advancing the maintenance and modernization 

of the SPR. 

DOE's Emergency Authorities 

The Department of Energy has its origins in the Manhattan Project and the Atomic Energy 

Commission. Under the Atomic Energy Act, DOE has authority to acquire, transport, store, and 

dispose of nuclear material in emergency and non-emergency situations. This extends to special 

nuclear material, source material, and byproduct material, and the Department has long 

performed vital emergency preparedness and response roles in this mission space. For example, 

at the Olympics in Rio today, we have responders on the ground to address potential radiological 

incidents, in conjunction with other Federal partners and Brazilian authorities. The Department 

has been strengthened by the capabilities provided in this domain, and we have drawn upon the 

competence they have built and maintained to begin to fulfill the newer responsibilities for which 

we are now organizing ourselves. 

In the energy emergency domain, there is a range of authorities under which the Department can 

and does act. Statutes that govern DOE's emergency authorities include the Defense Production 

Act, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, the Natural Gas Act, the Federal Power Act and 

the Natural Gas Policy Act. 

DOE's authorities can be divided into categories: independent DOE authorities; DOE authorities 

requiring a Presidential finding; and authorities that require consultation with other agencies. 

• The Department has independent authority to order temporary electricity connections and 

the generation and transmission of electric energy; make exchanges of crude oil or 

petroleum products from SPR, Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve (NGSR), or Northeast 

Home Heating Oil Reserve (NEHHOR); assist entities to procure the necessary energy 

materials and services to maintain supply during an emergency or to restore their 

systems; control nuclear material and gather information. 

• Emergency authorities requiring a presidential finding include grid security emergency 

orders to protect or restore the reliability of critical electric infrastructure; sales from the 

SPR, the Northeast Gasoline Supply Reserve, the Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve; 

allocation of energy matetials, services, and facilities in the civilian market; allocation 

and certain purchases of natural gas; and fuel switching electric power plants or major 

fuel-burning installations. 

• DOE has a consultative role for Jones Act waivers and a concurrence role for fuel 

waivers. 

Examples include: 

5 
29 

Electricity Supply. The Department has used its independent authority to connect, temporarily, 

electricity lines to restore power (Hurricanes Ike, Katrina, and Rita), to require a power plant to 

continue operating to ensure grid reliability (Mirant Corp.'s Potomac River facility), to require 

specific transmission functions (Cross-Sound Cable Co. operation during the Northeast 

blackout), and to require generators to provide electricity when an Independent System Operator 

was otherwise unable to meet system demand (California energy crisis). 

Petroleum Supply. DOE's exchange authority under EPCA authorized the loan of one million 

barrels from the SPR with Marathon Oil following Hurricane Isaac in 2012; 5.4 million barrels 

with Marathon, Placid, ConocoPhillips, Citgo and Alon USA following Hurricanes Gustav and 

Ike in 2008; 9.8 million barrels following Hurricane Katrina in 2005; and 30 million barrels in 

anticipation of a heating oil shortage in 2000. After Hurricane Sandy, the Department loaned 

approximately 120,000 barrels from NEHHOR to the Department of Defense's Defense 

Logistics Agency for use in emergency operations, primarily to fuel the vehicles of emergency 

responders. 

If the President detennines that a severe energy supply interruption exists, DOE can sell crude oil 

from the SPR, home heating oil (i.e., ultra-low sulfur diesel) from the NEHHOR, or gasoline 

from NGSR. The last time a President authorized a sale in response to a domestic emergency 

was in 2005 after Hurricane Katrina when President Bush issued a finding of a severe energy 

supply interruption and directed the sale of 30 million barrels. 

Natural Gas. If the President finds that a natural gas supply emergency exists or is imminent, the 

Department has been delegated authority under the Natural Gas Policy Act through Executive 

Order 12235 to allocate natural gas to meet priority uses and authorize certain natural gas 

purchases. This authority was used in 2001 (in combination with its Defense Production Act 

authorities) to respond to the California energy crisis. 

Procurement Prioritization. In addition to authorities for responding to emergencies concerning 

the supply of electricity or liquid fuels, the President has delegated authority to DOE under the 

Defense Production Act to require perfonnance on a priority basis of contracts or orders deemed 

"necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense." This authority was used during the 

California energy crisis of2000-200l to direct entities that had recently provided a utility with 

natural gas to continue to make similar volumes available to the utility on the same payment 

schedule as before. 

Access to data .for mission delivery: DOE has information-gathering authorities to compel 

energy sector entities to provide information that is relevant to DOE activities. For example, 

under section 13 of the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, the Secretary can order "[a]ll 

persons owning or operating facilities or business premises who are engaged in any phase of 

energy supply or major energy consumption" to make available energy-related information. 

Power Marketing Administrations (PMA). The PMAs deliver power from federal hydropower 

assets, which can provide critical black start capabilities to reenergize the grid and support safe 

nuclear plant shutdown. DOE has exercised these authorities in a variety of circumstances. In 

addition, three of the four PMAs, Bonneville Power Administration, Western Area Power 

6 
30 

Administration and Southwestern Power Marketing Administration are active participants in 

utility emergency response programs. Crews and equipment are dispatched in support of 

emergency restoration and neighboring utilities. 

Recent Emergency Authorities aud Directives Related to Emergency Response 

FAST Act. Last year, Congress recognized the growing complexities of the a rapidly evolving 

landscape and enacted important new energy security measures in the Fixing America's Surface 

Transportation Act (FAST Act) (P.L. No. 114-94). Part of the FAST Act provides DOE with a 

new authority to protect and restore critical infrastructure when the President declares a grid 

security emergency. This authority allows DOE to support the energy sector preparing for and 

responding to cyber, EMP, geomagnetic disturbance, and physical attack threats. These 

authorities do not apply, however, to natural disasters other than geomagnetic storms. 

The FAST Act (Sec. 61 004) also noted the critical nature of large power transformers to the 

electricity grid. The law requires DOE in consultation with Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission (FERC), the Electricity Sub sector Coordinating Council (ESCC), Energy 

Reliability Organization (ERO), and owners and operators of critical electric infrastructure to 

submit a plan to Congress evaluating the feasibility of establishing a Strategic Transformer 

Reserve for the storage, in strategically-located facilities, of spare large power transformers in 

sufficient numbers to temporarily replace critically damaged large power transformers. 

Balanced Budget Act o.f2015. The 2015 Balanced Budget Act directly supports the findings of 

QER and states that "maximizing the energy security value of the SPR requires a modernized 

infrastructure that meets the drawdown and distribution needs of changed domestic and 

international oil and refining market conditions." The Act directs DOE to establish a SPR 

modernization program to protect the U.S. economy from the impacts of emergency product 

supply disruptions and that this program may include infrastructure and facilities to optimize the 

drawdown and distribution capacity of the SPR." Congress also authorized the sale of up to $2 

billion in SPR crude oil sales to fund the SPR modernization program subject to appropriation. 

Presidential Policy Directive 2 I. Presidential Policy Directive-21: Critical Infrastructure 

Security and Resilience identifies DOE as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for energy 

infrastructure. Within the Department, the authority and responsibility of the SSA are assigned to 

Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, and play a pivotal role in ensuring unity of 

effort between private and government partners, including the Department of Homeland 

Security, Department of Defense, and Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, to improve preparedness 

and response to all hazards in the energy sector. 

As the Energy SSA, we serve as the day-to-day Federal interface for the prioritization and 

coordination of activities to strengthen the security and resilience of critical energy 

infrastructure. This involves building, maintaining, and advancing collaborative efforts with the 

energy sector to bridge federal programs for sharing situational awareness information, modeling 

impacts, assessing vulnerabilities, conducting exercises, and promote innovation and research. 

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Emergency Support Function 12. In addition to enhancing security and reslience through our 

role as an SSA, the DOE enhances security and resilience by serving as the lead agency for 

Emergency Support Function 12 (ESF-12) under the National Preparedness System's National 

Response Framework. As the lead for ESF-12, we are responsible for facilitating recovery from 

disruptions to the energy infrastructure. During a response operation, the Department works with 

industry and Federal, state, and local partners to: 

• Assess disaster impacts on local and regional energy infrastructure; 

• Coordinate the response to expedite restoration; 

• Monitor and provide situational awareness of impacts; and 

• Provide regular situational awareness updates to key decision makers in the 

Administration and our government and industry partners. 

To achieve these operational priorities, the Department deploys responders who work directly 

with affected utilities and local officials on the ground during a disaster. The responders provide 

expertise on a variety of energy issues, and have direct access to our subject matter experts 

throughout the Department, and at our interagency partners, to coordinate the appropriate 

assistance including waivers or special permits to expedite restoration efforts. Our response 

force is entirely voluntary, and we are training nearly 100 members of our staff to be prepared to 

deploy for all hazards contingencies. 

Actions Taken Since 2014 to Increase Prevention, Resilience and Response Capabilities to 

Meet the Emerging Challenge 

Over the past two years, the Deputy Secretary and I have led a deliberate effort to strengthen our 

emergency response capabilities and our critical partnerships with the energy sector. This 

included enhanced emergency preparedness/response collaboration with the Electricity Sub sector 

Coordination Council (ESCC), the Oil & Natural Gas Sub sector Coordinating Council (ONG 

SCC), and the National Petroleum Council (NPC) for strategic planning and operational 

exercising. 

Partnering with Industry. DOE will continue to assist utility owners and operators and state 

and local officials across the country when hazards and threats emerge. With more than 80 

percent of the Nation's power infrastructure privately owned and operated, coordinating and 

aligning efforts between the government and the private sector is the only viable path to 

increased resilience and effective emergency response. 

When the power goes out, the local utility is the first to respond. Should any threat or emergency 

exceed jurisdictional resources or result in a Federal disaster declaration, DOE coordinates 

Federal resources as the lead as assigned under ESF 12. In collaboration with other Federal 

agencies, local governments, and industry, DOE facilitates access to impacted areas, actionable 

situational awareness information, regulatory waivers, and other tools to assist overwhelmed 

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jurisdictions. Together, we generate the actions that are needed to address the impact of the 

event and restore power. 

Public-private emergency preparedness and response cooperation: Building on lessons 

learned from Superstorm Sandy, DOE has worked closely with the Electricity Sub Sector 

Coordinating Council (ESCC) a national organization of major utility CEOs and industry 

associations- along with the Oil and Natural Gas Sub sector Coordinating Council (ONG SCC)-

- on a set of specific initiatives designed to strengthen the security and resilience of critical 

energy infrastructure. The Deputy Secretary and the ESCC meet at least three times per year to 

advance our work together, and focus on the sharing of relevant threat information (both before 

and during a crisis), conducting vulnerability assessments, developing and deploying new 

technologies, and exercising together. 

For example, we are partnering with the ESCC and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 

on efforts to address the effects of an EMP attack. Additionally, we are working with the ESCC 

to help focus our R&D efforts and bring new technologies to market that will strengthen the 

security of the grid. In fact, we will be hosting a joint meeting of the ESCC and government 

officials this September at our Sandia National Laboratories to focus specifically on R&D issues. 

In addition, both the ESCC and the ONG SCC are part of a working group created by DOE and 

DHS that is focused on threats to the energy sector's manufacturing supply chain, and what 

government and industry can do together to improve the security of that supply chain. Most 

importantly, we work with the ESCC and the ONG SCC to prepare for, and respond to, major 

disasters or threats to energy infrastructure. Our partnerships span information sharing, 

supporting innovation, and exercising incident response. 

The foundation of our partnerships is sharing appropriate infonnation as true partners. Our 

success depends on it. One of the challenges here is speed. It is critical that all parties share 

information about dynamic threats expeditiously to protect our nation. DOE's solution is to 

provide tools and information to companies so that they can become aware of risks as soon as 

they're identified, and can take action. 

The Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP) is a public-private partnership, 

co-funded by DOE and industry. The purpose of CRISP is to collaborate with energy sector 

partners to facilitate the timely bi-directional sharing of unclassified and classified threat 

information and to develop situational awareness tools that enhance the sector's ability to 

identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources. 

CRISP leverages advanced sensors and threat analysis techniques developed by DOE along with 

DOE's expertise as part of the National Intelligence Community to better inform the energy 

sector of the high-level cyber risks. Current CRISP participants provide power to over 75 percent 

of the total number of continental U.S. electricity sub sector customers. 

Further, as part of the Administration's efforts to improve electricity subsector cybersecurity 

capabilities, DOE and industry partners developed the Electricity Sub sector Cybersecurity 

Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) to help private sector owners and operators better evaluate 

their cybersecurity capabilities. The C2M2 evaluation helps organizations prioritize and improve 

cybersecurity activities. This is a comprehensive and credible approach that all energy sector 

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companies can use to improve their cybersecurity posture. DOE also released versions of the 

C2M2 for the oil and natural gas sub sectors and for industry at large. 

In addition, we have worked closely with the National Petroleum Council (NPC) to identify 

opportunities to strengthen emergency preparedness. At my request, the NPC conducted a 

comprehensive study on this topic and presented me, in December 2014, with an Emergency 

Preparedness Report, which included a number of recommendations for strengthening how the 

Department and the oil and natural gas industry work together to respond to emergencies. Over 

the past year, DOE has made progress implementing the recommendations contained in the 

report. For instance, DOE is now using the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and 

Incident Command System (ICS) to ensure that we can easily integrate with other emergency 

management organizations around the country. DOE's Infrastructure Security and Energy 

Restoration (ISER) team now has Energy Information Administration experts embedded in its 

emergency response organization, so they have the benetit of their insights into the oil & natural 

gas industry during emergencies. In addition, the Department is working more frequently with 

the oil & natural gas industry on disaster preparedness exercises. In fact, the NPC was one of the 

Depmtment's key partners in the development of the Clear Path IV exercise, which I will 

describe shortly. 

Partnering with the Federai/State/Localffribal Government. We are also supporting 

preparedness efforts by working to provide Federal, state, local, and tribal ofticials with 

programs and tools that help in their energy emergency preparedness activities, including, 

planning, training, tabletop exercises and research and development. 

In early February, I signed an updated Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEAC) 

Agreement with the National Association of State Energy Officials, National Association of 

Regulatory Utility Commissioners, National Governors Association, and National Emergency 

Management Association. This updated EEAC Agreement lays out concrete items to improve 

our collective ability to share information, which is essential for making sound response and 

restoration decisions during emergencies. To support this effort, DOE and state ofticials will 

develop information-sharing protocols and processes to streamline response operations. We will 

also test these processes and information-sharing mechanisms through regular drills and 

exercises. 

With the EEAC agreement in place, we are planning to enhance our state, local, tribal, and 

territorial governments program with robust training and exercising that brings stakeholders 

together to address planning for shared regional hazards. Many of today' s lifeline sectors 

depend on reliable energy supplies. A vital element of providing uninterruptable energy is 

building resilience by developing regional plans to rapidly restore energy and identify specitic 

needs to resolve energy disruptions. Lessons learned from these collaborations will be shared 

with other communities to leverage the effort across the Nation. 

The President's FY 2017 Budget Request included $15 million for a State Energy Assurance 

program to foster regional hazard preparedness. This program would focus on providing state, 

local, tribal, and territorial governments with analysis, training, and exercising of shared regional 

risk factors where entities depend on each other for energy supplies and must work together to 

resolve energy disruptions to restore energy. 

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This new program would be facilitated through competitive regional cooperative assistance 

awards to state and local partners. DOE would support planning, training, and exercising with 

expertise from across the enterprise including the HAMMER Federal Training Center and 

National Laboratories. The expertise and capability of the whole Department would be available 

to each consortium of awardees to enhance preparation and allow for real-world energy 

emergency support. Lessons learned would be shared with other communities to leverage the 

program across the nation and help improve resiliency planning. 

Supporting Innovation. One of DOE's core missions is to support the innovation that will help 

us enhance our nation's energy security today and into the future. As the sector-specific agency 

in charge of supporting and facilitating the security of our electric grid, we are focused on 

growing our partnerships with academia and the private sector and leveraging the wide-ranging 

science and technology capabilities of our 17 National Labs in order to modernize our grid and 

make it more secure and resilient. 

The Department continues to invest in long-term strategic R&D and testing capabilities 

throughout the National Laboratory complex to achieve these goals. 

Since the 2003 Northeast blackout, DOE bas been proactive in advancing technologies to 

modernize the grid by making it smarter and more adaptive to the challenges posed by a range of 

reliability concerns. Enhanced situational awareness and control capabilities enable grid 

operators to monitor the status of the grid, predict potential impacts of a threat, and respond 

accordingly to mitigate or recover from a threat. 

For example, PNNL has been developing new modeling and simulation capabilities that leverage 

data streams from synchrophasor technology to help analyze and prevent disturbances from 

growing into wide area outages. 

DOE has worked with utilities across the country to develop and deploy a network of more than 

1,300 high-speed sensors across the nation's power grid to provide real-time data on the state of 

the grid. This network helps utilities better share information and quickly detect and mitigate 

local disturbances and prevent these problems from cascading into larger systems impacts. 

DOE has also co-funded work with utilities in areas across the US to deploy high-speed 

communications and control systems that sense grid outages and re-direct power flows to 

minimize impacts on consumers. These systems also greatly help restore power after a 

disruption whether caused by a hurricane, tornado, or even cyber-related events. 

Since 2010, we have invested more than $210 million in collaborative cybersecurity research and 

development projects among industry, universities, and our National Labs. Those investments 

have led to work such as the Honeywell-led "Role Based Access Control" project. This project 

created role based access control (RBAC) technology for a Honeywell product suite. This is an 

energy delivery control system used extensively within the oil and gas industry. The new 

technology limits access to the least needed to perform a given task, helping to reduce the risk of 

unauthorized access, including by an insider. 

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Sandia National Laboratory has a cybersecurity research partnership with Chevron to develop a 

technology that will change the control system configuration moment-by-moment. This is 

especially exciting because it will make it very difficult for an adversary to map the network or 

stage an attack. It also makes it easier for responders to isolate malicious actors if they do gain 

access. 

In another project that DOE supports, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Inc. (SEL) partnered 

with Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to develop a 

commercial solution that detects tampering with the kinds of field devices that you see attached 

to utility poles, and further strengthens their cybersecurity by guarding against any unexpected 

cyber-activity. Thousands have been sold and are being used throughout the energy sector today 

in all 50 states. 

Energy storage is another key technology the DOE is supporting that helps to increase grid 

resiliency. In additional to supporting greater deployment of variable renewable energy 

resources, energy storage technologies can keep customers and communities up and running 

during outages by supplying power to affected areas. When integrated into microgrids, another 

focus area of the Department, energy storage technologies can work in tandem with distributed 

generation and other energy resources to meet the needs of critical loads such as hospitals, first 

responders, and water supplies for an extended period of time. These essential services are 

critical to the health and safety of communities during large scale outages. 

Large power transformers (LPTs) are grid components that are ripe for innovation. These critical 

assets can weigh hundreds of tons, are expensive, and are typically custom made with 

procurement lead times of a year or more. A large number of damaged transformers from a 

hazard could result in long-term outages that can cripple the economy. The QER recognized the 

risks associated with the loss of LPTs and recommended that DOE work with other Federal 

agencies, states, and industry to mitigate these risks, including assessing the development of one 

or more strategic transformer reserves. As noted, the FAST Act required DOE to submit a plan to 

Congress evaluating the feasibility of establishing a Strategic Transformer Reserve for the 

storage, in strategically-located facilities, of spare large power transformers in sufficient numbers 

to temporarily replace critically damaged large power transformers. In January, DOE-OE 

awarded the analysis project to a team led by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The team 

includes researchers from the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, Sandia National Laboratories, 

the Electric Power Research Institute, and Dominion Virginia Power. DOE's analytical 

approach is focused on identifying high voltage substations and LPTs that most a!Iect the grid's 

performance if lost. We are also analyzing the availability of spare LPTs, determining the nature 

of events that could produce significant outages, identifying equipment options, including 

numbers and types, for provisional LPT replacement, optimizing number and locations of spare 

LPTs and identifying policy options to address these issues. 

In addition, DOE is supporting modeling and testing of transformers to better understand their 

vulnerabilities to geomagnetic disturbances and electromagnetic pulses, informing new design 

requirements. A funding opportunity announcement released in June 2016 aims to stimulate 

innovative LPT designs that are more flexible and adaptable so they can be readily used in 

different locations. This solicitation promotes greater standardization which will increase the 

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ability to share transformers and accelerate recovery in the event of the loss of one or more of 

these vital pieces of equipment. 

Another example of DOE innovation is EAGLE-I (Environment for Analysis of Geo-Located 

Energy Information), which is a DOE-designed and operated web tool that automatically gathers 

electrical grid service status data from company web sites every 15 minutes, and organizes it into 

an easy-to-read picture of electrical service status nationwide. Now covering 75 percent of all 

U.S. electricity customers, it provides real-time information about the grid what is up, what is 

down, the number and location of outages, when service is restored- to DOE and, through our 

information-sharing efforts, with other Federal agencies. 

In sum, our National Labs are powerful partners working with industry to secure our energy 

infrastructure. The Department has continued to build long-term strategic research and 

development capability at National Labs and academia. As a result, DOE helped create a national 

resource for experimental work in research and analysis of trustworthy power grid systems, both 

at the DOE Labs and universities. 

The President's FY2017 Budget makes a strong first step toward our commitment to seek to 

double clean energy R&D funding under Mission Innovation, the international initiative to 

accelerate clean energy innovation. DOE's FY2017 request includes strong support for Mission 

Innovation, including a proposal for Regional Innovation Partnerships. DOE Mission Innovation 

work includes activities that support a strong foundation for addressing the infrastructure R&D 

needs discussed here, as well as activities that support the broader clean energy R&D needed for 

our economic, environmental and security goals. 

Exercising Our Plans. Robust exercises are crucial to ensure industry and government are better 

prepared to work as a team during real world emergencies, such hurricanes, earthquakes, or 

cyberattacks. DOE leads preparedness exercises at the local, state, and national levels. In 

November 2015, for example, DOE led the Federal participation in the North American Electric 

Reliability Corporation's Grid Ex III, the largest electricity sector crisis response exercise ever. 

More than 350 government and industry organizations, as well as 4,500 participants played a role 

in testing and shaping the national response plan. 

In April2016, DOE led Clear Path IV in Portland, Oregon and Washington, DC. Clear Path IV 

was an interagency exercise focused on testing and evaluating energy sector response plans to 

address modeled impacts from a scenario depicting a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) 9.0 

earthquake and tsunami. The devastation that would be caused by such an event was highlighted 

in a July 2015 New Yorker magazine article, titled "The Really Big One." As the New Yorker 

reported, a full-scale rupture of the subduction zone would cover a hundred and forty thousand 

square miles and impact an estimated seven million people. "When the next full-margin rupture 

happens," noted the New Yorker, "that region will suffer the worst natural disaster in the history 

of North America." These potential impacts help drive our decision to focus on the Cascadia 

Subduction Zone for the Clear Path IV exercise. Clear Path IV included representation from I 0 

Federal agencies, seven states, five local governments, 15 oil and natural gas companies, 18 

electric utilities, six trade associations, and four state associations with more than 175 

participants. Providing solutions to lessons learned will contribute to prepare the region to be 

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able to respond effectively to this kind of catastrophic event and improve DOE's ability to 

perform ESF #12 responsibilities. 

Clear Path IV also served to enhance the energy sector's participation in Cascadia Rising, the 

national level exercise held in June 2016. Using the same Cascadia Subduction Zone scenario, 

the sector and DOE were able to test possible solutions to issues discovered during Clear Path 

and better inform our Federal partners what requirements are expected to restore energy. The 

collaboration between the two large, functional exercises are a model for the value of progressive 

exercise development 

Exercises like Clear Path and Cascadia Rising help the entire emergency management team 

federal, state, local, and tribal governments, and industry identify needs and resource 

requirements that will be required during an actual disaster For instance, one of the lessons 

learned from Clear Path IV was the need to accelerate damage assessments immediately after a 

catastrophic event The Department is working with DHS and Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory to provide assessments through advanced algorithms that analyze aerial imagery, 

highlighting the role of science and technology solutions. To continue to fulfill our response 

mission, we innovate and provide practical solutions, including tools and new technologies, to 

facilitate quick energy restoration. 

DOE Enterprise Solutions 

Unique to DOE, we own critical assets in the sector we support. Our preparedness and response 

activities for our enterprise directly overlap with the broader energy sector with our PMA's, and 

this is why our internal and external emergency management activities must be unified. We are 

bringing together specialized talent across the Department including plants, sites, and our 

National Labs to strengthen how our team works together to respond to disasters and 

emergencies to our own assets as well as the broader energy sector 

Integrated Joint Cyber Coordination Center. We are further transforming the Department's 

cybersecurity culture and integrating cybersecurity coordination across the DOE enterprise 

through the Integrated Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center (iJC3), which is funded by 

program contributions to the DOE Working Capital Fund. The iJC3 integrates cybersecurity 

across the Department in mutual, comprehensive defense of the DOE enterprise. The iJC3 will 

unify the breadth and depth of cyber technical expertise across DOE, remove redundancy, 

increase effectiveness, and holistically document and communicate cyber threats and leverage 

cyber capabilities DOE enterprise-wide. 

The iJC3 is designed to both manage cyber risk across the Department using threat-informed 

cyber intelligence, and to mature and strengthen the Department's cyber posture and response. 

Previously independent cyber centers and specialized expertise will now be integrated in a 

collaborative, intelligence driven, enterprise distributed approach to cyber operations, defense, 

and response that engages DOE's full capabilities and protects the entirety of the DOE attack 

surface to include all program offices, national laboratories, plants, field offices, and the PMAs. 

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The iJC3 combines situational awareness of threats, operational status of networks, and 

indicators of known malicious activity to decrease discovery time and speed response time. 

DOE Unified Command Stmcture (UCS). Last year, DOE established a Unified Command 

Structure (UCS) that has increased cooperation and coordination across the entire DOE 

enterprise from our energy infrastructure team to our National Nuclear Security 

Administration, which responds to nuclear and radiological events. It ensures that the 

capabilities of the entire Department can be brought to bear in the face of any threat or scenario 

regardless of whether that scenario involves one of our DOE facilities, requiring only internal 

coordination, or a large-scale incident involving portions of our Nation's energy infrastructure, 

which requires coordination with our industry and government partners. 

Emergency & Jncident Management Council (ElM C). To provide strategic guidance and 

direction for the UCS, we have also created an Emergency & Incident Management Council 

(EIMC) that is chaired by the Deputy Secretary and meets twice a month or more frequently 

when required. This Council serves as the primary DOE strategic coordination mechanism for 

senior Department leadership and enables us to prepare for and respond during significant 

emergencies that require the coordinated efforts of our entire Department or several of its 

components. 

Consolidated Emergency Operations Center (CEOC). To advance the successful full 

implementation of our new approach that matches our evolving operational response mission, the 

Department has proposed the creation of a Consolidated Emergency Operation Center (CEOC) 

that will be designed for a full range of scenarios and incidents, and allow the UCS to operate in 

a single facility. When fully operational, the CEOC will eliminate DOE's fragmented 

emergency operations center system and provide a unified, inclusive, and effective emergency 

management enterprise modeled on best practices across the Federal government. We are 

currently working with the House and Senate Appropriations Committees to secure the funding 

and authority the Department needs to complete the development and eventual construction of 

the center. 

Emergency Response Order 151.1. We have taken action to codify our emergency 

management enhancements and how they work together to achieve coordinated and 

comprehensive response activities in a recent revision to the Department's directive governing 

Emergency Response. The revised order 151.1 that I signed out earlier this month now has a 

dedicated section focusing on energy sector response, emphasizes an all-hazards approach to 

emergency management and planning, includes the EIMC as the senior-most body for 

emergency management, and embodies enterprise-wide stakeholder engagement to leverage 

unique capabilities across the Department, including our 17 national labs. 

Deployable Crisis Expertise from National Labs 

At the invitation of state and local authorities following the massive gas leak several months ago 

at the Aliso Canyon underground gas storage facility, DOE commissioned some of its National 

Laboratories to examine safety issues associated with existing oil and gas wells and related 

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underground storage facilities. This is the kind of on-call capability that we are able to field due 

to the deep bench of science and technology expertise located in our 17 National Labs. 

Managing Federal Strategic Energy Resources. 

The April 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review recommended that DOE invest to optimize the 

SPR's emergency response capability. It further stated that DOE should make infrastructure 

improvements in the SPR and its distribution systems to optimize the SPR's ability to protect the 

U.S. economy in an energy supply emergency." Implementing an effective and comprehensive 

modernization program will ensure that DOE will be able to move high volumes of incremental 

barrels of oil rapidly to successful bidders in case of a global supply disruption, thereby 

increasing supplies in global markets and enhancing the value of the SPR for meeting the 

Nation's strategic energy needs. 

As noted, the 2015 Balanced Budget Act directly supports the findings of QER and states that 

"maximizing the energy security value of the SPR requires a modernized infrastructure that 

meets the drawdown and distribution needs of changed domestic and international oil and 

refining market conditions." The Act directs DOE to establish a SPR modernization program to 

protect the U.S. economy from the impacts of emergency product supply disruptions and that this 

program may include infrastructure and facilities to optimize the drawdown and distribution 

capacity of the SPR." Congress also authorized the sale of up to $2 billion in SPR crude oil sales 

to fund the SPR modernization program. 

We are moving forward on the SPR modernization efforts. DOE has identified two specific 

projects that will make up the SPR modernization program: 

• Life Extension Phase!!-The aging SPR infrastructure is further strained with a 

challenging budget environment that has resulted in an extensive, growing backlog in the 

SPR's major maintenance project account. As a result, unanticipated SPR-related 

equipment failures are occurring and impacting the Reserve's operational readiness 

capability. The new life extension project will modernize aging SPR infrastructure 

through systems upgrades and associated equipment replacement to ensure that the 

Reserve is able to meet its mission requirements and maintain operational readiness for 

the next several decades. On October 30, 2015, Deputy Secretary Sherwood-Randall 

approved the mission need (Critical Decision 0), the first step in DOE's project 

management process, for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, Life Extension Phase II 

Project. 

• Marine Terminal Distribution Capability Enhancements ·The SPR' s effective 

distribution capability-the reserve's ability to deliver SPR oil to domestic consumers 

without displacing commercial oil shipments-is compromised by new patterns of oil 

supply and demand among U.S. oil producers and refineries and associated changes in 

the US. midstream, including overall capacity. This has reduced the ability of the US. 

to distribute incremental volumes of reserve oil to the domestic market during certain 

future oil supply disruption scenarios. The purpose of this project is to increase the 

effective distribution capacity of the SPR through the addition of dedicated marine 

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capacity. DOE has approved Critical Decision-0, Mission Need and we anticipate being 

able to commence work on tbe NEPA analysis in January 2017, pending ability to receive 

a congressional appropriation to commence crude oil sales this fall. 

DOE will soon submit a report to Congress on DOE's long-term strategic review of the SPR, 

which will further articulate the need for modernization. 

Conclusion 

As you know, I was the Department of Energy (DOE) Under Secretary during the Clinton 

Administration. When I returned to DOE after a 13 year absence, I was struck by the imperatives 

of what is, in reality, a new and complex mission for the Department energy infrastructure, 

resilience, reliability, security and emergency response with significant operational and crosscutting aspects and requirements to ensure that these issues are effectively and appropriately 

addressed. The requisite energy system view is not reflected directly in DOE's organizational 

structure. 

Let me deconstruct this concern by first defining the key goals of this mission area for energy 

infrastructure: 

• Reliability refers to the ability of a system or its components to operate within limits so 

that instability, uncontrolled events, or cascading failures do not result if there is a 

disturbance, whether the disturbance is a disruption from outside the system or an 

unanticipated failure of system elements. Reliability is also used by industry to mean that 

a system's components are not unexpectedly failing under normal circumstances. 

• Resilience refers to the ability of a system or its components to adapt to changing 

conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruptions. To the extent that actions 

improve a system's ability to withstand disruptions, they might be characterized as 

enhancing reliability, or resilience, or both. The ability to recover from a disturbance, 

however, is specific to resilience. 

• Safety refers to achieving an acceptably low risk to life and health in the design, 

construction, operation, and decommissioning of a system. That level of risk is 

determined by taking into account the magnitude of potential consequences, the 

probability of those consequences occurring, and the costs of risk mitigation. 

• Security refers specifically to the ability of a system or its components to withstand 

attacks (including physical and cyber incidents) on its integrity and operations. It 

overlaps, in part, with the concepts of reliability and resilience. 

Each of these goals is related and has physical, temporal, operational, technology, regulatory and 

legal components. These all need to be understood from a systems perspective -- for effective 

energy emergency response, for mitigating the costs of future emergency responses and for 

diminishing the overall need for emergency response over time. 

We addressed many of these issues in the first installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review, 

which includes many analytically-supported recommendations on energy infrastructure 

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resilience, reliability, safety and asset security. Several of these recommendations are works in 

progress and some of them require new statutory authority. 

Those that are in the process of being implemented and highly relevant to this discussion 

include: 

• The development of comprehensive data, metrics, and an analytical framework for 

energy infrastructure resilience, reliability, and asset security: The purpose of this work 

will be to help inform, coordinate, set priorities for, and justify expenditures across 

Federal agencies to increase the resilience, reliability, and security of energy 

infrastructure. 

• Analyzing the policies, technical specifications, and logistical and program structures 

needed to mitigate the risks associated with the loss of transformers as part of the 

Administration's ongoing efforts to develop a formal strategy for strengthening the 

security and resilience of the entire electric grid for threats and hazards. Approaches for 

mitigating this risk could include the development of one or more transformer reserves 

through a staged process. 

• Undertaking updated cost-benefit analyses for all regions of the United States that have 

been identified as vulnerable to fuel supply disruptions. Additional or expanded Regional 

Refined Product Reserves could be supported, depending on the outcome of these studies. 

QER recommendations that require additional authorities or appropriations that are highly 

relevant to the topic oftoday's hearing, and not discussed earlier, include: 

• Funding of a multi-year program of support for state and tribal energy assurance plans, 

focusing on improving the capacity of states and localities to identify potential energy 

disruptions, quantify their impacts, and develop comprehensive plans that respond to 

those disruptions and reduce the threat offuture disruptions. As part of these plans, states 

should also assess needs for backup electricity at retail gasoline stations along emergency 

evacuation routes. 

• The establishment of a competitive grant program to promote innovative solutions to 

enhance energy infrastructure resilience, reliability, and security. A major focus of the 

program would be the demonstration of new approaches to enhance regional grid 

resilience, implemented through the states by public and publicly regulated entities on a 

cost-shared basis, incorporating lessons learned from new data, metrics, and resilience 

frameworks. An example of such a project is the NJ TRANSITGRID, which incorporates 

renewable energy, distributed generation, and other technologies to provide resilient 

power to key NJ TRANSIT stations, maintenance facilities, bus garages, and other 

buildings. Through a microgrid design, NJ TRANSITGRID will also provide resilient 

electric traction power to allow NJ TRANSIT trains on critical corridors, including 

portions of the Northeast Corridor, to continue to operate even when the traditional grid 

fails. 

• Amending the trigger for the release of fuel from NEHHOR and from the Northeast 

Gasoline Supply Reserve so that they are aligned and properly suited to the purpose of a 

product reserve, as opposed to a crude oil reserve. The authorities of the President to 

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release products from RPPRs should be integrated into a single, unified authority; these 

two facilities operate currently under different authorities. 

Implementing these recommendations will be critical for ensuring reliable, resilient safe and 

secure energy systems. They are not, however, enough. 

As I noted, we continue to analyze organizational options to improve execution in this mission 

area in light of these complex, complicated, cross-cutting and evolving requirements. 

Emergency Management responsibilities that are currently assigned to other offices within the 

Department do not have separately identifiable budgets, and are dependent upon the ability to 

draw resources from other program budgets when needed to conduct emergency management 

acti viti es. 

Within our current budget of approximately $29 billion, funding for this mission area is 

embedded in the programs that execute it and there are two discrete budget line items that 

support specific aspects of emergency management --- a budget of $9 million for the lSER 

program in the Office of Electricity and a budget of $25 million for Emergency Management and 

Operations Center within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The latter is 

primarily focused on radiological emergency issues but also plays a key role in energy-related 

emergency management The President's FY 2017 budget proposed significant increases in both 

program budgets ISER is proposed to increase from $9 million to $17.5 million, and the NNSA 

program is proposed to increase from $25.1 million to $34.8 million. 

As part of our budget planning, I have initiated a comprehensive crosscutting budget review of 

our emergency management activities to ensure the Department is prioritizing it resources to 

effectively carry out its responsibilities going forward. 

Intentional, malicious challenges and natural threats to our energy systems are on the rise. The 

manmade threats continually increase in sophistication. Our energy infrastructures are vulnerable 

to such threats, are aging, and increasingly interdependent and reliant on electricity. The 

electricity system end-to-end is the focus of the next major installment of the Quadrennial 

Energy Review, targeted for late this year. 

DOE uses its expertise in transforrnative science and technology solutions to support and 

enhance our Nation's emergency response capabilities. Through our private and public 

partnerships, we apply these solutions to prepare for emergencies, mitigate risks, and expedite 

restoration and recovery from incidents impacting the energy sector. Looking ahead, Congress 

will be a key partner in ensuring that we strengthen our prevention and response capabilities. 

19 
43 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for 

that testimony, and thank you for your work on the Quadrennial 

Energy Review—the plan for our energy infrastructure and where 

we are as a nation. That, I think, is a very good blueprint to start 

our discussions as a nation of where we need to go. 

I would like to unpack that a little bit with your testimony. To 

me, reading the report, which is voluminous and is available for 

people online, I think they can get access to it or at least the key 

recommendations. It seems to me that as you tried to allude in 

your testimony, coming back to DOE after some absence—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Thirteen years. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thirteen years, that we have several phenomenons going on. One is just this issue of we wanted to get off 

of foreign oil. We said we wanted to produce our own, and basically 

we had an infrastructure through the Gulf for importing oil and delivering it. 

Now we are in a different situation and that, in and of itself, is 

causing competition on the rails, competition even between energy 

products. There are instances where oil is pushing off coal and coal 

and oil are pushing off agriculture products and a great deal of 

complexity. How would you characterize that shift in demand on 

our infrastructure? Significant? I mean, how would you characterize for the American people how big a challenge that change has 

meant to our infrastructure and some of these security issues? 

Secretary MONIZ. Yes, and by the way, I’d like to, once again, 

thank you and congratulate you for reading the Quadrennial Energy Review on the floor of the Senate which was much appreciated. 

The increased production of oil and natural gas in the United 

States has obviously been a major story in terms of our economy 

and also environment in the sense that the natural gas boom, in 

particular, has led to a displacement of higher carbon coal with 

lower carbon natural gas producing less CO2 emissions. 

However, I mean, the big story with regard to infrastructure is 

not simply the scale, it’s the fact that it’s happening in different 

parts of the country. And so, it has changed flows completely. 

I mentioned one example here already in terms of the petroleum 

reserve modernization. We have oil flowing in opposite directions in 

many of our distribution systems which is why we need to have a 

distribution system made for the current realities. Another is that 

it used to be that oil and products flowed from the Gulf elsewhere. 

Now we have considerable flows to the Gulf. Third, we have, still 

with oil, we have an addition, as you know very, very well, flows 

going east and west without established pipeline infrastructures 

and therefore, bringing in trains substantially. 

Now it is true that oil by train has gone down very substantially 

nationally in this last year but not necessarily regionally, particularly here. But the magnitude of these changes, you mentioned up 

to 20 trains here in the Northwest. Just recently I was visiting one 

of the largest, the largest refinery complex on the East Coast in 

Philadelphia. And the changes are—clearly stress the system. 

On the one hand, that one refinery was receiving four unit trains 

per day of Bakken oil. And now suddenly, it’s dropped to one as 

they have resumed importing from Africa light oil. So, it’s really 
44 

hard to keep up with these major changes and of course, as you 

have different infrastructure we need to build out in different 

ways. 

I didn’t mention natural gas but a similar thing there is that, 

again, all gas until a decade ago, fundamentally, flowed, you know, 

mostly out of the Gulf and some in the West in the Rockies, in New 

Mexico, in Colorado, et cetera. And now you have incredible production out of Pennsylvania, part of West Virginia and Ohio. The 

infrastructure, frankly, has not yet completely caught up to that. 

So these are big strains on the system, and we are feeling it. 

Senator CANTWELL. I am glad that you characterize them as big 

strains because we definitely feel that way in the Northwest and 

this, in and of itself, I think, is a big shift. I also think that cyber 

is a big shift and change too, but we will get to that in a second. 

But on this issue, one of DOE’s responsibilities is, obviously, 

helping us understand the properties and characteristics of some of 

these products. 

One of the things that you are working on is this issue of oil volatility. I am particularly concerned about the level of volatility in 

Bakken crude, because oil shipped from the Gulf basically doesn’t 

have the same level of volatility when it is shipped. But with the 

advent of Bakken crude in the upper Midwest, we are seeing the 

volatility of the Reid Vapor Pressure, the pound per inch of pressure, well over 13 percent in some instances. 

Can you elaborate on what DOE is doing to measure that volatility and what we should be looking for to make sure that we have 

a vapor pressure that is not going to impact the level of explosions 

and derailments and things of that nature that we have seen in 

some other areas of our country? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well I certainly wish I could give you the final 

results of the study today but that still is, probably, about a year 

away. 

Now, just again, to make, I mean, you know this, just to make 

it clear to everyone else that the, of course, the Department of Energy does not have the regulatory authorities but right at the beginning, and I think with a lot of encouragement as well from Congress, appropriately, we were asked to partner with the Department of Transportation, and we have, to explore the science involved in the transport of oil and frankly, it would apply as well 

to other flammable liquids because there are a lot of others that 

are transported as well and to try to understand the implications 

of that science for further steps that the Department of Transportation, for example, might take. 

So the study is being carried out, is being led by Sandia National 

Laboratory. It is looking at the characteristics of the oil, volatility, 

as you say. And basically, I think, it’s a question of looking at this 

particular crude oil which has quite of bit of dissolved gasses in it. 

So looking at that, at the qualities is very important. 

However, it’s also important to understand how and when, for 

example, the oil is sampled because as you go through different 

processes the characteristics can change so that’s also part of 

what’s being looked at. And this may be able to, hopefully, lead to 

some insights into how the sampling protocols are managed which 

then can impact whether further processing is required or not. 
45 

North Dakota as a state has taken some steps in terms of processing certain of the tight oils. And so, I think—— 

Senator CANTWELL. Well I don’t think anybody in the Northwest—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah. 

Senator CANTWELL. Wants to leave it up to the State of North 

Dakota. 

Secretary MONIZ. No, no. 

Senator CANTWELL. To figure out what the standard is, so—— 

Secretary MONIZ. No, so our job is to, right now, try to do a thorough job on the science and engineering aspects. That will include 

going to combustion tests in this next phase at Sandia which has, 

by the way, a long history of doing combustion field tests and studies. 

And then I’d love to be able to accelerate it, but science takes 

time and it’s probably going to be a year until we have the final 

results. Then those have to be translated at state and federal levels 

into further action. 

Senator CANTWELL. I noticed that a Sandia National Lab report 

found that ‘‘currently used methods for assigning crude oil classifications are often inaccurate’’ and that there is not scientific agreement on the volatility of crude oils, like Bakken crude. 

How do you think we might be able to build scientific consensus, 

that we might be able to get more discussion going about this issue 

because clearly I view this as a resistance by those who think they 

can just ship Bakken crude on the cheap. I note that Wall Street 

will not finance a deal with Bakken crude at this level. They require that it has to be nine percent vapor pressure. As I said, other 

incidents of this kind of shipment never exceeded 13 percent. Now 

we are sitting here arguing over whether volatility matters or not. 

What can we do to get the rest of the scientific community, while 

we are doing this review, to help in the discussion so that we don’t 

end up with your report and then we are still doing this leg work 

after that 12-month period of time? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well first of all, I think the report you’re referring to was the Phase One report from Sandia which was basically 

a literature review. It was not original work but bringing together 

literature. And again, I believe the focus there was on the fact of 

the large amount of dissolved, non-condensable gasses. So that was 

the characteristic, I think, they were seeing. And that’s exactly 

what is driving now them in their actual scientific work in terms 

of the characterization. 

I just really can’t give a clear answer in terms of what one might 

do in terms of the, you know, I mean, prior to having the results 

for you. I understand there’s a tension between getting the science 

done right and doing it as fast as one can, but doing it right. Obviously the desire to take action clearly was not that long ago when 

the derailment in the Columbia Gorge happened just in June, I 

think it was. 

And so, again, nationally there’s been a decrease in oil shipments 

by rail. That has not been the case in the Northwest. 

And it’s also the case that, I think to be fair, I think the railroads, some of the railroads for sure, have made some pretty substantial investments really over the last year. Issues you referred 
46 

to earlier, in fact, about commodity competition in the railroads, I 

mean, that was a very stressful period in 2014/2015 when the, I 

think, frankly the whole system was, again, taken by surprise at 

the rapid increase in the demand for trains for transporting oil. 

I think that’s been somewhat sorted out in terms of the commodity issue. But your issue in terms of any intermediate regulation, I mean, the Department of Transportation clearly has taken 

some steps in terms of rail cars, speed, speeds in different places 

and the like. And yet, we still seem to have some of these 

derailments, presumably caused by track issues. 

Senator CANTWELL. We are only going to ask you to swim in your 

lane today. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah. 

Senator CANTWELL. As it relates to—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Right. 

Senator CANTWELL. Helping us on the energy verification. But I 

will say that this issue, as it relates to commodities, I don’t think 

is over, and I do think that your work on the Quadrennial Energy 

Review shows that our infrastructure cannot meet this level of demand in shipment without pushing product off. 

Again, this is probably not something that DOE can solve as it 

relates to—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Right. 

Senator CANTWELL. These issues immediately. But this issue 

of—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Right. 

Senator CANTWELL. Assessing our infrastructure, assessing our 

needs and, as you say, can shift at any moment as well. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah, it’s—— 

Senator CANTWELL. As it relates to source. 

But I go back to what you commented on that this is a pretty 

big shift for the United States of America. We wanted energy independence. Well, we’ve got it. But now we have our own safety and 

security issues right here in the Northwest with a 10,000 percent 

increase in the amount of oil train traffic coming through here. 

When we have a city council in Spokane who is saying we are 

going to fine a train for coming through period, that is their ballot 

measure. We have a chart here. 

[The information referred to follows:] 
Oil trains moving through Washingt

Trains per week by county 

atcom, 10 

Skagit, 15 

Skamania, 15 

Klickitat, 15 

Source: Department of Ecology, State of Washington, Spill Maps 

Spokane, 

Franklin, 1
48 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah, I was going to say it’s—— 

Senator CANTWELL. Just to take a second. 

So Bakken Oil comes from the upper Midwest, but it goes 

through every major metropolitan area. It goes through Spokane, 

down through the Gorge which is a very challenging, scenic area 

into the Columbia River. So the rescue operations are very challenged. Through Clark County, Vancouver and then up through 

here and all the way up to refineries. We have four refineries in 

the north part of our state. It is hitting every major city on those 

20 trains per week. 

I am sure North Dakota producers probably think that they are 

going through a very remote, rural area of their state, across also 

very remote, rural parts of the North United States, but that is not 

what happens when they get to Washington because of the Cascades. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah. 

Senator CANTWELL. They have to go through every major—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah. 

Senator CANTWELL. As somebody said on one of my recent trips 

to Spokane, just about everybody in Spokane lives two blocks from 

the railroad tracks. I mean, that is their view of how close the oil 

shipments are. 

This issue for us has become very front and center with every 

mayor, city council and community in our state as it relates to this 

safety and security issue. So we will leave this. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yes. 

Senator CANTWELL. To the next panel. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah. 

Senator CANTWELL. And discuss it more with you later. 

Secretary MONIZ. If I may just add? 

Senator CANTWELL. Yes. 

Secretary MONIZ. Just that first of all, I think, it’s very clear and 

the President has certainly been very clear in saying that we need 

to invest in our infrastructure. I mean, and we need to invest in 

infrastructure that is reliable, safe and resilient for the 21st century and not for the 20th century. 

Secondly, in terms of the movement of commodities and, again, 

you know this very well from the Quadrennial Energy Review, it 

is also issues like inland waterways where tremendous investments 

are needed to move commodities around. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well and I hope we can, with your work, we 

are separately pushing the Department of Transportation to make 

an interim finding about the volatility. We think they should be 

doing something about it now but we are also going to double our 

efforts working with you to make sure that we are getting as much 

scientific information as possible. As you said, the big shift means 

that we need to invest in infrastructure. But the big shift also 

means we need to stop and say, is this safe enough for transport? 

The 10,000 percent increase is voluminous throughout the West 

Coast. You could have this hearing in Oregon or California and you 

would have the same discussions. You would have the same city 

councils, the same people proposing resolutions on this. 
49 

So I think we need to make sure that we are making it safe as 

well, and we will continue to work with your other cabinet partners 

to make sure that we are getting that message across. 

Before we invite the next panel up though, I do want to talk to 

you about the cyber issue, this whole issue of a unified command. 

I don’t know how you would characterize this as a shift in our 

nation, but again, I would consider it a pretty big shift because now 

here we are, a big energy source. Electrification was always important, but now it is networks and handheld devices and smart appliances and all sorts of things, all connected to a grid that could, all 

of a sudden, be a target of a major attack. 

So when you talk about your unified command structure and the 

challenges of that, who are the partners? Where would the single 

entity be? How do you process information on a daily basis? 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, the unified command structure is broader 

than cyber that was for the entire, our entire emergency response 

assets. And it’s not a physical location, other than when there is 

an emergency in the emergency operations center control room 

that, again, we are trying to—which historically in the Department 

of Energy has always been run by the Nuclear Security people because of our long standing need to respond to nuclear incidents. 

But we think that we need to really integrate response across our 

threat spectrum. That would include nuclear but it includes energy 

infrastructure, cybersecurity and the like. 

Now within cybersecurity we now have this integrated Joint Cybersecurity Coordination Center. I may have missed a C, iJC3. And 

that has been—the point person, I’m putting them together, has 

been the CIO but working with all the cyber-relevant actors, and 

I want to emphasize that does include the intelligence activity. 

But very importantly, this involves bringing in the laboratory experts, the PMA experts. So the ideas that we are saying that the 

cybersecurity is really an enterprise-wide problem, and we need to 

have them all. 

It’s a virtual team. It’s not a physical center but it’s a virtual 

team bringing together all the best assets to address a cyber challenge. And I think you alluded to it, the last data I saw in 2013, 

but over half of the cyber incidents reported were on energy infrastructure. So, it’s a tremendous problem that we have. 

Senator CANTWELL. Okay. 

Secretary MONIZ. What we are doing is we are trying to bring together, again, all of our assets. 

Senator CANTWELL. Okay. 

Secretary MONIZ. It would be helpful to have this more unified 

operations center, yeah. 

Senator CANTWELL. Because you are talking about both DOD, I 

am assuming, and our other federal agencies involved in security 

efforts working in coordination. 

Secretary MONIZ. And DHS, we do a lot with DHS, in particular. 

Yeah, DHS has got a major role here. So we work with them. 

Senator CANTWELL. Again, where would you characterize this as 

a shift in energy policy, this electrification of our economy and the 

challenge of cyber? 

Secretary MONIZ. If we kind of change subjects, but relevant to 

this. If we think about our pathway toward deep de-carbonization, 
50 

let’s say on a midcentury time scale, there are two elements that, 

to me, are, kind of, part of any possible solution. 

One is real progress on the demand side, energy efficiency. We’re 

not going to get there without real demand side progress. But we’re 

also not going to get there without, essentially, a very deep de-carbonization of the electricity sector and therefore, an expansion of 

the electricity sector’s role in other parts of the economy, like transportation, for example, because then it will be drawing upon an essentially carbon-free system. 

So, electricity is only going to become more and more central to 

all of these issues. And that, of course, brings us to the whole 

threat spectrum, including cyber which we know is a very, very significant issue. And frankly, as that system itself becomes more and 

more, I would say, technologically complex it’s going to have increasing distances, for example, to bring, you know, renewables 

over large distances. It’s going to have distributed generation; it’s 

going to have storage; and, it’s going to have a whole new layer of 

detectors, sensors, control systems, maybe distributed decisionmaking to be able to balance this entire system. 

That’s all great. It offers new services. It can support the Internet of things with everything hooked up, but obviously it also opens 

up vulnerability, especially in the cyberspace. 

So I think that’s what we’re going to have to face and frankly, 

stay ahead of the attack spectrum. So it’s a huge priority for us 

and I think for the country. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well thank you, Secretary Moniz. I think 

what I am going to ask you to do is come up and join me, if you 

will, up here and we will proceed to the second panel of witnesses. 

That will also give Secretary Moniz a chance to have a little opportunity on the other side of the dais here. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. And ask some questions of our witnesses on 

these subjects and maybe even get into more of a discussion on 

some of the challenges that we face. 

Secretary MONIZ. Sure. 

Senator CANTWELL. I see General Lowenberg out in the audience. 

Thank you for being here. 

There are many others who are here today in the audience who 

are responsible for these kinds of shifts and changes and are doing 

good work in the Northwest. So thank you all for coming and talking about how we, as a region, are developing some of the solution 

services and networks that are needed. 

I introduced the panel before, but I think we are going to start 

with Mr. Robert Ezelle, who is the Washington Military Department’s Director of the Emergency Management Division. We will 

then go to Ms. Stephanie Bowman, who is with the Port of Seattle; 

Mr. John Hairston, who is with the Bonneville Power Administration; Mr. Scot Rogers from F5; Mr. Carl Imhoff from the Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory; and Dr. Lynn Best, who is with 

Seattle City Light. 

With that, Mr. Ezelle, please lead us off. 
51 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT EZELLE, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON 

STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIVISION 

Mr. EZELLE. Afternoon, Madam Chair and Secretary Moniz. 

For the record, my name is Robert Ezelle, and I’m the Washington Military Department’s Director of the Emergency Management Division. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak with 

you today about two significant events that could impact our energy infrastructure. 

First are the impacts that could occur to Washington State and 

the Pacific Northwest following a magnitude 9.0 earthquake on the 

Cascadia Subduction Zone. Second, as we’ve already been hearing, 

are some potential consequences to the energy sector from a cyber 

event. 

A rupture of the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) will cause catastrophic damages all along the West Coast from British Columbia 

to Northern California. Damage from a CSZ rupture will greatly 

exceed damage from any natural disaster our nation has seen to 

date. 

Estimates are that our transportation infrastructure, communication systems, energy distribution, water, sewage and our 

health care system will be severely compromised or inoperative. 

Bridges will collapse, roadways will be rendered impassable, the 

coast will be cut off from the I-5 corridor and Western Washington 

will be cut off from Eastern Washington. 

We anticipate electric power failing across the region from significant impacts to both transmission and distribution systems. 

Restoration will be time consuming with urban areas being without 

power for weeks to months and outlying areas potentially requiring 

a couple of years before power is restored. 

Pipelines delivering fuel, oil and national natural gas will be 

compromised and possibly destroyed. This means we’ll be left with 

only the fuel on hand in vehicles or storage tanks that have not 

ruptured. This has immediate implications to the response to a 

Cascadia event as fuel will be required for generators, response vehicles and a host of other needs. 

However, the most significant effect or impact of a CSZ rupture 

will be to the people themselves. Depending on the time of year we 

could see upwards of 10,000 fatalities from the resulting tsunami 

and from collapsed buildings and landslides. We estimate we will 

need to provide food and water to upwards of a million people immediately following the earthquake. That number will increase 

with each passing day as individual and family preparedness supplies are exhausted. 

We conducted a major exercise, Cascadia Rising 2016, from June 

7th to June 10th of this year. We gained valuable lessons learned 

that will engage our preparation activities for years to come. But 

perhaps the most important thing we drew from the exercise was 

perspective. 

Our overarching priority immediately following a CSZ event will 

be to provide for the life safety and life sustaining needs of our populous. Each day that passes increases the vulnerability and the 

need of our residents. This puts a critical imperative on restoring 

our basic infrastructure starting with transportation, communica-
52 

tions and electric power but it also greatly emphasizes the need for 

individual and family preparedness. 

Electric power is the enabling component of our 21st century 

lives. It also has key interdependencies with other critical infrastructure industries such as water and waste water services, natural gas supply and delivery and telecommunications technologies 

of all types. Without electric power our infrastructure cannot operate. 

The same goes for fuel distribution. A CSZ event will damage the 

major pipeline for delivery of jet fuel as well as natural gas pipelines and will, of course, disrupt transportation networks making 

fuel delivery by truck to existing depots all but impossible. And 

without fuel, our response efforts will grind to a halt. 

As I’ve emphasized, power and fuel are key to a successful response and recovery. Therefore, their provision and restoration has 

to be a top priority for us all. 

CR’16 emphasizes the need for detailed response or continuity of 

operations planning. This includes all levels of government from 

local through state to federal, non-governmental organizations and 

private industry so that essential services can continue to be provided in the event of a disaster. 

Additionally, our lifeline sectors whether publicly or privately 

owned must work toward building resiliency. A resilient infrastructure can either withstand a major disaster or can be quickly restored in days or weeks rather than months or years. 

We’ve been talking about the catastrophic and the need to develop strong plans to build resiliency into our critical infrastructure. I’d like to touch on a couple of hazards, and we’ve already 

spoken about them today, that are not perhaps at the scale of a 

catastrophic event, but could have severe local or widespread consequences. 

The first of these is the transport of the crude oil by rail. We’ve 

seen graphically what can go wrong if there’s an incident involving 

an oil train. This highlights the need for detailed planning, again, 

at all levels of government so that communities and states are prepared to respond when an incident occurs, such as the one near the 

Town of Mosier back in June. 

The need for the same level of planning also is required for cyber 

threats. In Washington State we’ve been hard at work there as 

well conducting cyber planning across the community of stakeholders. Organic within the Washington National Guard structure 

is a cyber protection unit whose capabilities can assess or assist 

with assessment and recommendations concerning industrial control systems. They have the expertise, relationship, security clearances and the credibility to partner and collaborate with the ICS 

community toward cyber preparedness. 

Most recently in Washington State in a proof of concept demonstration, our National Guard worked successfully with the Snohomish County Utilities District to assess their systems and provide them key suggestions on how they can harden their infrastructure against cyber penetration and exploitation. 

Madam Chair, I’d like to close by just thanking you for your tremendous support for our National Guard, particularly the attempts 

to stand up at a schoolhouse to address some of the cyber 
53 

vulnerabilities and then, of course, your long-term support of the 

National Guard. 

This concludes my testimony, and may I answer any questions? 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ezelle follows:] 
54 

Written Testimony of 

Robert Ezelle, Director, Washington State Emergency Management Division 

U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Field Hearing 

Monday, August 15, 2016 at 11:30 a.m. PDT in Seattle, Washington 

Good morning Madame Chair and members of the committee. I greatly appreciate the 

opportunity to speak with you today about two significant events that could impact our energy 

infrastructure. First are the impacts that could occur to Washington state and the Pacific 

Northwest following a magnitude 9.0 earthquake on the Cascadia Subduction Zone. Second are 

the potential consequences to the energy sector from a cyber event. 

A rupture of the Cascadia Subduction Zone will be catastrophic all along the West Coast 

from British Columbia to Northern California. In 2001, when the Nisqually earthquake struck 

Western Washington, the ground shook at a magnitude 6.8 for about 45 seconds. The damage 

from this quake totaled more than one billion dollars. Unreinforced masonry buildings 

crumbled, and damage to our infrastructure was extensive. A magnitude 9 quake on the CSZ 

will result in ground shaking in the urban area of Western Washington at about the same 

magnitude as Nisqually, but for a duration of up to 6 minutes. The duration of shaking will 

increase expected damages by many orders of magnitude. In fact, damage from a CSZ rupture 

will greatly exceed damage from any natural disaster our nation has seen to date. 

A Homeland Security Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) Study, 

completed in 2011, estimates that our transportation infrastructure, communication systems, 

energy distribution, water, sewage, and our health care system will be severely compromised or 

inoperable. For example, in Western Washington, bridges will collapse and roadways will be 

rendered impassible. The coast will be cut off from the I-5 corridor and Western Washington 

will be cut off from Eastern Washington. 

When it comes to electric power, we anticipate it failing across the region from 

significant impacts to both transmission and distribution systems. Restoration will be time 

consuming, with urban areas being without power for weeks to months and outlying areas 

potentially requiring a couple of years before power is restored. 

The pipelines delivering fuel, oil and natural gas will be compromised, and possibly 

destroyed. This means we will be left with only the fuel on hand in tanks that have not ruptured, 

be it at local gas stations, agency fuel depots, or with the military. This has immediate 

implications to the response as fuel will be required for generators, response vehicles and a host 

1 
55 

of other needs. Once local stocks are depleted, all required fuel will have to be transported into 

the region over the degraded or destroyed transportation infrastructure. I could go on and on 

about the impacts in all of the lifeline infrastructure sectors. It's a grim picture, but all the 

underlying things we rely on to live our 21 '' century lives will be gone. 

However, the most significant impact of a CSZ rupture will be to the people themselves. 

Depending on the time of year, we could see upwards often thousand fatalities from the 

resulting tsunami and from collapsed buildings and landslides. The HITRAC study estimates we 

will need to provide food and water to upwards of one million people immediately following the 

earthquake. That number will increase with each passing day as individual and family 

preparedness supplies are exhausted. 

We conducted a major exercise, Cascadia Rising 2016 (CR 2016), from June 7

1

h to lOti' of 

this year. We gained valuable lessons learned that will engage our preparation activities for 

years to come. But perhaps the most important thing we drew from the exercise was perspective. 

Our overarching priority immediately following a CSZ event will be to provide for the 

life safety and life sustaining needs of our populace. The fundamental challenge of a Cascadia 

Subduction Zone earthquake is that we, as a nation, must mount an effective response over a 

destroyed infrastructure against a ticking clock to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. We do not 

have the luxury of time to get assistance and commodities flowing into the area. Each day that 

passes increases the vulnerability and need of our residents. This puts a critical imperative on 

restoring our basic infrastructure starting with transportation, communications, and power. 

If we are to provide an effective response, detailed, integrated planning must take place in 

advance of the event. An earthquake is fundamentally different from a major hurricane in that 

one can see the hurricane coming well in advance and take the appropriate steps. An earthquake 

is a low frequency, no-notice, high consequence event that we must plan for the eventuality of it 

happening. Stakeholders at every level of government from local, tribal, county, state, and 

federal, as well as private industry and non-governmental organizations must come together to 

address the fundamental challenges that will face us when the CSZ next rips. It is only through 

this detailed level of planning that we will be able to build a modicum of preparedness that will 

help us to mount a successful response. 

In prioritizing our planning activities for the next several years, we must look to the 

following: 

1. Development of strong continuity of operations plans by all levels of government, the 

private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Contingency planning looks at what 

could be impacted by various hazards and develops plans so that essential functions can 

continue in the event of a disaster. 

2. Prioritizing the restoration of electric power and fuel 

3. Assurance of lifeline transportation routes into the affected area. This includes airfields, 

roads, rail and ports. This is absolutely critical if we are to mount an effective response 

and recovery. 

4. Planning to meet basic life safety and sustaining needs. This includes mass care and 

medical. 

2 
56 

5. Transitioning from a pull system oflogistics to a push system in which needed materials 

and supplies are automatically pushed into our area following a major disaster. 

6. Ensuring the availability and redundancy of public safety and emergency management 

communications 

7. Individual and family preparedness 

While this list is not all-encompassing, it gets to the heart of the basic challenge we have 

before us- taking care of the people who will be dramatically impacted by the disaster and 

ensuring that government and critical infrastructure are able to provide their essential services. 

I'd like to comment about planning for electric power restoration. Power is the enabling 

component of our 21 '' century lives. It also has key interdependencies with other critical 

infrastructure industries such as water and wastewater services, natural gas supply and delivery, 

telecommunications technologies of all types. Without electric power our infrastructure cannot 

operate. Power is key to a successful response and recovery. Therefore, electric power 

restoration has to be a top priority for us alL 

Much of our electric power infrastructure is privately owned; other parts of it are publicly 

owned or fall within cooperatives. Regardless of ownership, it is imperative that the industry has 

strong foundational Continuity of Operations plans so that essential services can continue to be 

provided in the event of a disaster and that the industry works toward building resiliency. A 

resilient infrastructure can either withstand a major disaster or can be quickly restored in days or 

weeks rather than months or years. Additionally, I would like to make a case that as part of our 

planning efforts, the electric power industry and stakeholders across the whole of community 

plan together to establish power restoration priorities and develop strategies so that basic life 

sustaining needs can be met and the engine of recovery can be jump-started. 

CRl6 showed the importance ofthe delivery of all types of fuel and petroleum products, 

including jet fuel, as well as providing for storage depots. A CSZ event will damage the major 

pipeline for delivery of jet fuel, as well as natural gas pipelines, and will of course disrupt the 

transportation networks making fuel delivery by truck to existing depots impossible. Without 

fuel our response efforts will grind to a halt. This is an area we need to focus on collectively in 

our lessons learned. 

I'd like to close by making a plea. A CSZ rupture threatens the entire nation. Without 

power or the ability to move supplies and services, our entire nation's economy is at risk. Given 

that, it will take resources from every level of government to mount an effective response. As a 

state and nation, we must invest in resiliency. As an emergency manager, I would much rather 

see us invest in our electric power transmission and distribution systems and our fuel pipelines 

ahead of a disaster so when it strikes, they're resilient and survive, reducing the need for even 

larger investments and last-minute workarounds after the event. It will take investments by 

private industry and at all levels of government if we are to truly build resiliency in our region. 

Organic within the Washington National Guard stmcture is a cyber protection unit whose 

capabilities can assist with assessment and recommendations concerning Industrial Control 

Systems (ICS). They have the expertise, relationships, security clearances and the credibility to 

partner and collaborate with the ICS community toward cyber preparedness. Most recently, in 

3 
57 

Washington state in a proof of concept demonstration our National Guard worked successfully 

with the Snohomish County Public Utility District to assess their systems and provide them key 

suggestions on how they can harden their infrastructure against cyber penetration and 

exploitation. 

4 
58 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, thank you. 

Ms. Bowman. 

STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE BOWMAN, COMMISSIONER, 

PORT OF SEATTLE (WASHINGTON) 

Ms. BOWMAN. Good afternoon, Senator Cantwell and Secretary 

Moniz. My name is Stephanie Bowman, a Commissioner with the 

Port of Seattle. Thank you for the privilege of being here this afternoon. 

The Port of Seattle owns and operates facilities that play a critical role in facilitating the nation’s trade. Our marine cargo facilities under the management of the Northwest Seaport Alliance are 

the fourth largest container load center in the country. Our port literally supplies goods to businesses and homes throughout the nation. 

On the aviation side, Seattle/Tacoma International Airport 

(SeaTac) served 42 million passengers in 2015 and is the fastest 

growing, large hub airport in the country. Additionally, SeaTac is 

a primary air cargo gateway for the Pacific Northwest facilitating 

the export of high value, time sensitive goods to Asia. 

The Port of Seattle facilitates—facilities serve as a lifeline to the 

residents of Alaska and Hawaii and any disruption in port operations due to a natural disaster would have serious consequences 

for those states. 

Alaska is especially dependent on our infrastructure with more 

than 80 percent of all water-borne containerized traffic that goes 

to Alaska moves across the terminals at the Port of Seattle. 

Given the critical role that the Port of Seattle plays in the regional and national economy ensuring that our facilities are resilient in the case of a disaster is a charge that my colleagues and 

I on the Port Commission take very seriously. A strong federal 

partnership is critical, and I’m grateful for the attention that you’re 

giving to this issue today. 

Port infrastructure will be essential to the regional response in 

the event of a large scale emergency. SeaTac airport is anticipated 

to be a hub for relief efforts and our maritime facilities will also 

support the response and recovery missions assuming that they are 

still operable. 

Disruption of flight operations at SeaTac will send a ripple effect 

throughout the country’s air transportation system given that our 

airport’s role as a hub for both national and international flights, 

particularly our connection to Asia. Most importantly, it could cripple our collective ability to respond to disaster. 

I wanted to speak briefly about the Port of Seattle’s emergency 

response planning. The Port of Seattle and our partners at the Port 

of Tacoma use nationally recognized best practices and utilize an 

all hazards approach to plan for and respond to any number of different emergency scenarios. Consistent application of these practices is reinforced through our robust and systemic training and exercise program that validates our ability to meet our responsibilities to the region. 

In the case of earthquakes our contingency planning is based on 

the risk associated with strong to major earthquakes. Our seaport 

facilities, as you know, Senator Cantwell, are at greater risk than 
59 

the airport because they were built on liquefaction zones and are 

more susceptible to a tsunami. 

Given the strain that will be placed on the first responders in a 

disaster, we expect that we will need to be self-sufficient with our 

emergency response at the airport or seaport for at least 14 days. 

The airport, on the other hand, will be more likely capable of 

handling moderate to full disaster relief within 24 to 72 hours, the 

level of operations at the airport with a focus of federal and military entities in the recent Cascadia Rising exercise that Mr. Ezelle 

just mentioned. 

Understandably, the magnitude of any quake will impact our 

ability to resume operations. A primary factor in successfully responding to an event is the effective coordination between the dozens of entities involved. That is why exercises such as Cascadia 

Rising are vital to enhancing the regional resilience. We are not 

going to be able to operate resilient airports and seaports without 

a strong partnership with the Federal Government. 

In addition to the critical role it will play in responding to a disaster, we are also dependent on the Federal Government to help 

fund our preparedness efforts and I wanted to speak to that very 

briefly. We ask that funding levels for these programs be maintained and that funding be awarded directly to local jurisdictions 

including ports. While there are few federal grant programs that 

focus on preparedness, the Port Security Grant Program is currently the main source of federal funding for all ports for an all 

hazards investments. 

However, many tyeps of projects necessary to support a comprehensive preparedness effort are ineligible under the Port Security Grant Program. Given this, the Federal Government, we hope, 

will—should consider creating critical infrastructure resiliency 

grant program and a national strategy to help funding decisions 

with prioritizing the nation’s gateway ports which are at greater 

risk. 

Finally, I wanted to close, shift gears for just a few moments and 

close with a personal mention of my experience in Mosier, Oregon 

and just let you know that I was at Mosier in the—for the rail 

train derailment, and I’m happy to answer any questions. It had 

a pretty significant impact on my personal view in terms of both 

emergency preparedness but most importantly in terms of the response. And after the panel is through I’m happy to answer any 

questions about that experience. 

In closing, the Port of Seattle recognizes that our infrastructure 

impacts the national economy and has a unique role to play during 

a crisis. We stand ready to strengthen our partnership with the 

Federal Government, including the Department of Energy, to safeguard our critical infrastructure and protect our communities. 

I’m happy to answer any questions. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bowman follows:] 
60 

Introduction 

Testimony of Stephanie Bowman, Commissioner, Port of Seattle 

US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Seattle Field Hearing 

August 15, 2016 

Good morning Senator Cantwell and Secretary Moniz. I am Stephanie Bowman, Commissioner of the 

Port of Seattle. Thank you for the privilege of being here with you today. 

The Port of Seattle owns and operates facilities that play a critical role in facilitating the nation's trade. 

Our marine cargo facilities, under the management of the Northwest Seaport Alliance, are the fourth 

largest container load center in the US, with more than half of our import volumes bound for the 

Midwest distribution centers. The imported cargo coming through our port literally supplies goods to 

businesses and homes throughout the country. 

On the aviation side, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport is the nation's 13'h busiest passenger airport, 

serving over 42 million passengers in 2015. Sea-Tac is currently the fastest growing large hub airport in 

the country, experiencing double-digit growth for three consecutive years. We are the region's gateway 

to Asia, providing a critical link for our international businesses such as Boeing, Microsoft and Amazon. 

Additionally, Sea-Tac also is the primary air cargo gateway for the Pacific Northwest, facilitating the 

export of high value, time sensitive Washington State agricultural products to Asia, such as our worldrenowned cherries. 

Port of Seattle facilities also serve as a lifeline to residents of Alaska and Hawaii, and any disruption in 

port operations due to a natural disaster would have serious consequences for these states. Alaska is 

especially dependent on our infrastructure. Of all waterborne containerized traffic between Alaska and 

the lower 48 states, over 80% moves through our terminals, including food, medical supplies, building 

materials and other necessities. 

Given the critical role that the Port of Seattle plays in our region's and nation's economy, ensuring our 

facilities are resilient in the case of a disaster is a charge my colleagues and I take very seriously. We rely 

on assistance from the federal government to help support our preparedness efforts, and I am grateful 

for the attention you are giving to this issue. 

Airports and seaports are critical infrastructure 

We all should be concerned about the resiliency of the infrastructure at our nation's gateway ports. 

Port infrastructure will be essential to the regional response in the event of an emergency. Sea-Tac 

Airport is anticipated to be a hub for relief efforts, and maritime facilities also will support the response 

and recovery mission assuming they remain able to operate. Disruption of flight operations at Sea-Tac 

Airport would send ripple effects throughout the country's air transportation system, given our airport's 

role as a hub for both national and international flights, particularly our connection to Asia. Most 

importantly, it could cripple our collective ability to respond to a disaster. 
61 

Port of Seattle's emergency planning 

While there is no question we can always continue to improve, the Port of Seattle and our partners at 

the Port of Tacoma are maritime industry leaders in emergency preparedness. We utilize an all-hazards 

approach to plan for and respond to the various impacts that could result from any number of different 

emergency scenarios. Our methods are based on nationally recognized best practices, such as the 

National Incident Management System, Incident Command System and the National Response 

Framework. Consistent application of these best practices is reinforced throughout our systematic 

training and exercise program that validates that we have the right organizational infrastructure, 

equipment and systems in place to meet our responsibilities to the region. 

In the case of earthquakes, our contingency planning is based on the risks associated with strong to 

major quakes. Seaport facilities are at greater risk than the airport because they are built on 

liquefaction zones and are susceptible to the seiche effects of a tsunami. Even if our marine terminals 

are able to continue operations, it is likely road and rail access to the waterfront would be obstructed. 

Given the strain that will be placed on first responders in a disaster, we expect we will need to be selfsufficient with our emergency response at seaport facilities for at least 14 days. Sea-Tac Airport does 

not face these same risks and is expected to withstand a strong to major quake fairly well. The airport 

likely would be capable of handling moderate to full disaster relief flight operations within 24 to 72 

hours. Restoring the airport's operational capability to this level was emphasized by federal and military 

entities in the recent Cascadia Rising exercise. 

I am confident we are taking the right steps toward achieving resiliency and that we have a strong 

foundation for mounting an effective recovery effort. However, it is important to note that depending 

on the magnitude ofthe quake, restoring normal operations could take anywhere from days to years. 

Our first priority in the event of an earthquake and other disasters is the protection of human life, 

including the safety of employees, tenants, and customers. Simultaneously we would establish 

communications with Unified Command and other responding agencies and stakeholders. Next on the 

list is damage assessments, infrastructure stabilization and risk assessment for what could happen in 

subsequent aftershocks, with the primary goal being to resume operations to support relief efforts. We 

also would confirm the sustainability of response operations by obtaining food, water, and shelter. 

By far the most important factor in successfully responding to an earthquake is effective coordination 

between the dozens of entities that will be involved, and this is a core of our emergency planning. That 

is why exercises such as Cascadia Rising are vital to enhancing regional resilience. Cascadia Rising 

allowed us to test our internal communication backup systems and multi-jurisdictional coordination 

across the port, city, county, and federal levels. 

Another benefit of Cascadia Rising was that it highlighted opportunities for improvement. We have 

already started taking steps to address these issues. But one thing that is clear is that we are not going 

to be able to operate resilient airports and seaports without a strong partnership with the federal 

government. 

In addition to the critical role it will play in responding to a disaster, we also depend on the federal 

government to help fund our own individual and regional preparedness efforts. We ask that federal 

funding levels for these programs be maintained and that funding be made available directly to the 

jurisdictions that manage and maintain critical transportation infrastructure, including ports. 
62 

While there are a few federal grant programs that focus on preparedness, the Port Security Grant 

Program is the main source of federal funding for ports for all-hazards investments. The PSGP can be 

used for emergency preparedness to a limited extent, but its true purpose is reducing the risk of 

terrorism and criminal activity. Many types of projects necessary to support a comprehensive 

preparedness effort are ineligible for the program. For example, funds cannot be used to develop 

training or for firefighting equipment, let alone for other critical, expensive projects such as seismic 

retrofitting. The PGSP could be amended to allow for more resilience applications, although funding 

would need to be increased in order to avoid undermining port security priorities. 

Even better, I ask the federal government to consider creating a critical infrastructure resiliency grant 

program and a national strategy to help guide funding decisions. 

Personal experience at Mosier 

I would like to shift gears for a moment and mention briefly a personal experience that has helped 

shape my perspective on emergency preparedness. I have a home in the small town of Mosier, Oregon, 

and was one of the first on the scene when 16 rail cars carrying crude oil from North Dakota derailed on 

June 3'd, with four of those rail cars catching fire. Witnessing the response to this disaster, and knowing 

first-hand how catastrophic it could have been, has greatly influenced my thoughts on first response 

efforts. While I realize this isn't a primary focus of this hearing, I'm happy to answer any questions you 

have about this experience. 

Even though this was a relatively small event compared to some of the scenarios we have discussed 

today, I would characterize it as significant. It has solidified my commitment to the principle of 

resiliency, and I believe emergency preparedness needs to be a priority for all jurisdictions, large and 

small. 

Closing 

In closing, at the Port of Seattle we recognize the decisions we make have implications for the national 

and regional economy and that our infrastructure has a unique role to play during a crisis. The Port of 

Seattle stands ready to strengthen our partnership with the federal government, including the 

Department of Energy, on ensuring we are doing everything we can to safeguard our critical 

infrastructure and to protect our communities. 

Thank you for inviting me to participate today. I look forward to your questions. 
63 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Commissioner. 

Mr. Hairston, thank you. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN HAIRSTON, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE 

OFFICER, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. HAIRSTON. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Cantwell, Secretary Moniz, I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. My name is John Hairston. I’m the Chief 

Administrative Officer with Bonneville Power Administration. 

Bonneville is a federal power marketing administration within 

the United States of America Department of Energy which markets 

electric power from 31 federal hydroelectric projects and some nonfederal projects in the Pacific Northwest. Bonneville operates and 

maintains an extensive high voltage electricity transmission system 

that integrates with every major electric utility in the Pacific 

Northwest as well as California and Canada. 

Bonneville plays a critical role in responding to disaster affecting 

the region’s electricity grid. In my testimony today I will describe 

how Bonneville is protecting the electricity infrastructure and how 

it’s preparing to respond to a potentially massive Cascadia 

Subduction Zone earthquake. 

Bonneville has hardened its electricity transmission system and 

is investing in seismic related research for more than 20 years. We 

began assessing which areas and components of the power system 

and most vulnerable to significant damage from the earthquake 

and other natural disasters. These comprehensive assessments 

from—having informed Bonneville’s multifaceted, seismic mitigation strategy and has allowed it to prioritize where and when to 

upgrade and reinforce critical facilities and equipment. 

Electricity will be critical to the region’s recovery in the event of 

a natural disaster. Whether continuing to harden facilities, protecting power system equipment or researching the latest seismic 

mitigation tools and technology, Bonneville takes this responsibility 

of shoring up its assets extremely serious. 

As Chief Administrative Officer I oversee Bonneville’s Office of 

Security and Continuity of Operations which implements the Bonneville-wide program for physical, personnel, information and infrastructure security, emergency management and continuity of operations. This Office ensures Bonneville is resilient and able to 

quickly recover from events that cause operational impacts. With 

that goal in mind, Bonneville recently actively participated in two 

emergency planning activities. 

In April 2016 Bonneville participated in the previously mentioned Clear Path IV energy-focused disaster response exercise 

hosted by the Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery 

and Energy Reliability. The exercise scenario consisted of a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami occurring along the 

700-mile-long Cascadia Subduction Zone causing considerable damage to Washington, Oregon and Northern California. The exercise 

scenario was designed to test regional dependencies in the energy 

sector. The exercise was a positive step forward in developing the 

national energy response capability and served as an important 

forum for building and strengthening linkages between government 
64 

and industry. The exercise also identified improvements that can 

be made with respect to coordination between critical components 

that must work together to quickly respond to a catastrophic event. 

Bonneville will continue to work with the DOE Office of Electricity 

and its regional energy partners to address gaps that were identified by participating in this exercise. 

In 2016, June 2016, Bonneville participated in the largest FEMA 

exercise ever conducted in the region. Building from the energy sector-specific Clear Path IV, Cascadia Rising also simulated a 9.4 

magnitude earthquake. For our part Bonneville held a four-day exercise with its core emergency response personnel and table top exercises for field staff across the service territory. Bonneville tested 

its plan and transferred complete control of its electric grid to a 

site hundreds of miles from the potentially affected area. 

Cascadia Rising and Clear Path IV proved to be successful exercises for Bonneville in so far as they allowed employees and workers to practice their training and test our implementation plans. 

Bonneville will continue to participate in these types of emergency 

response exercises so we become well practiced and operationally 

ready to face real life situations. 

As the owner and operator of 75 percent of the region’s high voltage electric transmission system, Bonneville knows investments in 

both physical security and cybersecurity is vitally important to 

safely and reliably operating the electric grid in a modern world. 

We recently embarked on a multi-million-dollar physical security 

program for critical substations concentrating on perimeter security. This effort includes upgrading fencing, lighting and improving 

detecting systems, cameras and alarms and has led to more comprehensive security design standards for wherever substation facilities are upgraded or new substations facilities are constructed. 

In the past two years we’ve increased our staffing around cybersecurity from 12 employees to over 40 employees and implemented 

a 24/7 cybersecurity operations and analysis center. Bonneville has 

two dedicated teams to cybersecurity. One team performs forensics 

and intelligence, incident response and 24 hours a day handling of 

these type of issues. The other team performs offensive research 

and security assessments. Bonneville even conducts offensive cyber 

operations against our own network to test, drill and improve our 

detection and response. 

In conclusion, our investments to make Bonneville a more resilient organization from hardening and protecting our infrastructure 

to the time that we spend to take, to prepare and practice how we 

respond to a disaster will ultimately help us limit damages to our 

electric power system and help the region more quickly recover 

from a major disaster. 

Ranking Member Cantwell, Secretary Moniz, thank you for this 

opportunity to testify. I happily submit my written testimony for 

the record and respond to any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hairston follows:] 
65 

STATEMENT OF 

JOHN HAIRSTON 

CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER 

BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

BEFORE THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. SENATE 

AUGUST 15, 2016 
66 

Ranking Member Cantwell, Members of the Committee, [ appreciate the opportunity to 

testify today. My name is John Hairston. I am the Chief Administrative Officer of the 

Bonneville Power Administration (Bonneville). Bonneville is a Federal power marketing 

administration within the United States of America, Department of Energy, which 

markets electric power from 31 Federal hydroelectric projects and some non-Federal 

projects in the Pacific Northwest Bonneville operates and maintains an extensive high 

voltage electricity transmission system that integrates with every major electric utility in 

the Pacific Northwest, as well as with California and Canada. 

Bonneville plays a critical role in responding to any disaster affecting the region's 

electricity grid. In my testimony today, I will describe how Bonneville is protecting its 

electricity infrastructure and how it is preparing to respond to a potentially massive 

Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake. 

Bonneville's Seismic Mitigation Program 

Bonneville has been hardening its electricity transmission system and investing in 

seismic-related research for more than 20 years. We began by assessing which areas and 

components of the power system are most vulnerable to significant damage from an 

earthquake and other natural disasters. These comprehensive assessments have informed 

Bonneville's multi-faceted seismic mitigation strategy and have allowed it to prioritize 

how, where and when to upgrade or reinforce critical facilities and equipment In recent 

years, Bonneville has seismically hardened a control center, substation control houses 

(including hardening nonstructural components such as battery backup systems), 

microwave buildings, a telecommunications building and a critical equipment storage 

facility, and updated its seismic design policy for new facilities. We have also distributed 

our most critical functions among geographically diverse operating centers staffed 24/7 

with independent information technology systems. This helps ensure Bonneville can 

operate these critical control functions solely from one site if necessary. 

Protecting high-voltage transformers, an essential component to operating the electricity 

system, is also a top priority. In 2014, Bonneville completed a decades-long project, 
67 

which involved anchoring approximately 500 transformer, reactor and station service 

units in high-risk seismic hazards areas west of the Cascades, from the southern Oregon 

border to Canada. 

Bonneville also was the first in the country to deploy state-of-the-art base isolation 

technology designed to protect high-voltage power transformers during an earthquake. 

Base isolation is a growing method for protecting structures during an earthquake. As 

part of a multiyear research project funded by its Technology Innovation Office, 

Bonneville partnered with the Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 

Research (MCEER) at State University of New York at Buffalo to test the performance 

of base isolation technology and then install it on an operation unit. In September 2013, 

Bonneville moved to the deployment phase of the project, where we outfitted a 460-

kilovolt transformer with four friction pendulum base isolators. The isolators consist of 

two 24-by-24 inch steel square plates that are stacked with an articulated slider between 

the concave surfaces so that during an earthquake the plates and slider move relative to 

each other and provide isolation between the ground motion and the transformer. 

Eventually, Bonneville could retrofit transformers in high-risk areas with base isolators 

and make it a standard for transformer units installed in new substations. Base isolators 

could be a relatively inexpensive upgrade that could make the Northwest power system 

less vulnerable and save the region hundreds of millions of dollars in replacement costs. 

Electricity will be critical to the region's recovery in the event of a Cascadia earthquake. 

Whether hardening facilities, protecting power system equipment or researching the latest 

seismic mitigation tools and technologies, Bonneville takes its responsibility of shoring 

up its assets extremely seriously. 

Preparing for Disaster 

As the Chief Administrative Officer, I oversee Bonneville's Office of Security and 

Continuity of Operations, which implements the Bonneville-wide program for physical, 

personnel, information and infrastructure security; emergency management; and 

continuity of operations. This office ensures Bonneville is resilient and able to quickly 

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68 

recover from events that cause operational disruptions. With that goal in mind, 

Bonneville recently actively participated in two emergency planning activities. 

Clear Path IV 

In April 2016, Bonneville participated in the Clear Path TV Energy-Focused Disaster 

Response Exercise hosted by the US. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Electricity 

Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) in Portland, OR, and Washington, DC. The 

exercise scenario consisted of a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent tsunami 

occurring along the 700-mile long Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ), causing 

considerable damage to Washington, Oregon, and northern California. The exercise 

scenario was designed to test regional dependencies in the energy sector. 

Several objectives were identified for this exercise including examining energy sector 

roles and responsibilities within response plans such as the DOE Energy Response Plan, 

State Emergency Management Plans, State Energy Assurance Plans, and industry 

response plans and prioritizing the restoration of energy systems. 

The two-day exercise began in Portland with an examination of the regional response 

operations. Bonneville staff engaged in the tabletop exercise that examined the field 

coordination required to restore electric power and fuel supplies in the affected states. 

The afternoon session included a workshop to develop a framework for power restoration 

and recovery. 

The exercise was a positive step forward in developing the national energy emergency 

response capability and served as an important forum for building and strengthening 

linkages between government and industry. The exercise also identified improvements 

that can be made with respect to coordination between the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) and other critical federal agency components that must 

work together to quickly respond to a catastrophic event. Bonneville will continue to 

work with DOE OE and its regional energy partners to address the gaps that were 

identified by participating in this exercise. 

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69 

We believe DOE helps most with coordination and assistance with the acquisition and 

logistics of out-of-region resources (such as fuel, major critical spare parts and air assets 

to evaluate grid condition). We have learned from experience that during real-time 

events mutual assistance is helpful and welcomed. For example, Bonneville provided 

mutual assistance in response to Superstorm Sandy and sent transmission line crews and 

maintenance equipment to the east coast by military transport. During the event, DOE 

through Emergency Support Function (ESF) #12 helped expedite support by working 

with Department of Transportation and Department of Defense to facilitate inter state 

movement oflarge maintenance equipment. 

Cascadia Rising 

In June 2016, Bonneville participated in the largest FEMA exercise ever conducted in the 

region. Building from the energy sector specific Clear Path IV exercise, Cascadia Rising 

simulated a 9.0 magnitude earthquake generated by the CSZ fault. The exercise was 

designed to stress the capabilities and infrastructure of cities and counties as well as state, 

tribal and Federal resources, many whom were active participants in the exercise, to 

respond to a large-scale disruptive event. 

As part of Cascadia Rising, Bonneville held a four-day exercise with its core emergency 

response personnel and two-hour table-top exercises for field staff across our service 

territory. Certain concessions were necessary to make such an intricate and ambitious 

exercise work. The scenario created by FEMA was modified by Bonneville's continuity 

of operations staff to stress our transmission and power systems. One of the principal 

Bonneville-specific scenarios in the exercise was that no power would be available west 

of the Cascade Mountains. Bonneville exercised four separate Incident Management 

Teams, one on each day, simulated to be physically located in Spokane, Wash. These 

teams worked in close coordination with our Spokane-area Munro Control Center 

dispatchers to prioritize and execute initial assessment and response. A multi-year project 

which BPA completed to alternate facilities, technology systems and documentation of 

power and transmission activities, allowed Bonneville to effectively transfer complete 

4 
70 

control of the electric grid to a site hundreds of miles from the potentially affected area. 

In addition, we have worked with our Federal partners (US Army Corps of Engineers and 

US Bureau of Reclamation) to develop a Coordinated Continuity Plan to manage basic 

operations of the Columbia and Snake rivers from east of the Cascades if operational 

capability from the Portland area is interrupted. 

If the events of the Cascadia Rising exercise actually occur, Bonneville recognizes that it 

cannot simply rely upon its own capabilities to resolve an enonnous crisis spread across 

multiple states. Conducting successful response operations in the aftermath of a Cascadia 

Subduction Zone disaster hinges on the effective coordination and integration of 

governments at all levels- cities, counties, state agencies, Federal officials, the military, 

tribal nations- as well as non-government organizations and the private sector. That is 

one reason why the Cascadia Rising exercise so important- it helped train and test this 

whole community approach to complex disaster operations together as a joint team. 

With this in mind, Bonneville, along with Western Area Power Administration, 

Southwestern Power Administration and DOE developed an operational plan to respond 

to a national energy emergency. In addition, Bonneville is part of the Western Region 

Mutual Assistance Agreement with 44 other utilities to facilitate the rapid exchange of 

resources when responding to regional emergencies. A recent effort has produced an 

additional coalition with the utilities in our service territory as well as utilities in the 12 

western states and two Canadian provinces (British Columbia and Alberta) known as the 

Western Regional Mutual Assistance Group. This entity exists to facilitate the 

coordination of resources in the western United States and Canada to fulfill requests for a 

regional or national response event 

The purpose of the Cascadia Rising exercise was to test our coordinated plans, uncover 

issues and learn how to better manage through highly stressful situations. We learned a 

lot and identified some gaps. At the end of the exercise, Bonneville planners gathered 

recordings from exercise evaluators, participant feedback forms and field personnel 

5 
71 

discussions and identified key lessons learned. The following initial recommendations 

have emerged: 

1. Continue to understand and utilize the Incident Command System (ICS) within 

Bonneville by deploying an implementation plan and determining how different 

workgroups would interact with, report to, or make requests of the Incident 

Management Team. 

2. Continue to understand the unique challenges of Cascadia Subduction Zone 

Earthquake scenarios by identifying geographically dispersed critical resources, 

determining equipment needs and training for field crews, and exploring complex 

and technical damage assessments across large areas susceptible to aftershocks. 

3. Continue to enhance Bonneville internal and external coordination and 

collaboration. 

4. Minimize the potential for communication and information loss by testing and 

training on the various types of communication equipment available, adding 

amateur radio to expand interoperable communications capability, and assessing 

lessons learned from the impact of losing critical business systems. 

5. Continue to improve Bonneville's exercise program by developing and refining 

the test, training and exercise program, utilizing continuity coordinators to act as 

subject matter experts on planning teams to assist in developing realistic, 

increasingly more complex exercises and prioritizing employee participation. 

6. Continue to develop the Incident Management Team by enhancing the current 

recruitment program to expand the pool of potential team members and their 

geographic diversity, and increasing the level of training and number of exercises 

for incident management team members. 

6 
72 

Cascadia Rising and Clear Path IV proved to be successful exercises for Bonneville 

insofar as they allowed employees and workgroups to practice their training and test our 

implementation plans. Bonneville will continue to participate in these types of 

emergency response exercises so we become well-practiced and operationally ready to 

face a real-life situation. 

Our Most Important Asset 

We are nothing without our people our employees need to be ready and available to 

provide the critical response activities necessary to keep the Federal Columbia River 

power grid operational. In any disruption, from a winter storm to the Cascadia 

Subduction Zone Earthquake scenarios, the sooner employees feel family and property 

are safe, the sooner they can return to work. For the last four years, Bonneville has 

emphasized personal and family preparedness throughout the workforce by conducting 

interactive presentations that provide useful tips on topics such as family reunification 

plans, building an emergency kit or managing stress. We have monthly emails to 

employees with simple, incremental things they can do each month to enhance their 

readiness- on-line awareness training, and an emergency notification service to provide 

timely information or instructions- on-line resources for additional information and we 

notify each employee in writing annually of their responsibilities in a disruptive incident. 

CONCLUSION 

Our investments to make Bonneville a more resilient organization, from hardening our 

infrastructure to the time that we take to prepare and practice how we respond to disaster 

will ultimately help us limit damages to our electric power system and help the region 

more quickly recover from a major disaster. This concludes my prepared remarks. I 

would be happy to respond to any questions from the Committee. 

7 
73 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers, welcome, and thank you for being here. 

STATEMENT OF SCOT ROGERS, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 

& GENERAL COUNSEL, F5 NETWORKS, INC. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much for having me, Senator. Good 

afternoon. 

For the record my name is Scot Rogers. I’m the Executive Vice 

President and General Counsel of F5 Networks, Inc. 

Again, I want to thank the Senator and the Secretary for giving 

me this opportunity to testify and provide information to this Committee and be a part of this panel to discuss topics, we at F5 believe are of critical importance to the safety and prosperity of our 

country. But I’d first like to give you a little background on my employer, F5 Networks. 

We’re a worldwide leading developer and provider of software-defined application services. We are based here in Seattle with over 

4,300 employees worldwide and applications have become the gateway to critical and sensitive data and services. And our mission is 

to help organizations deliver the most secure, fast and reliable applications to anyone, anywhere, at any time. 

Our offerings include software products for network and application security, access management and a number of other network 

and application services. In conjunction with our customers and 

partners across a variety of fields and industries, we are closely 

watching the evolution of cyber threat landscape for organizations 

in the 21st century. 

As the Senator and the Secretary referred to repeatedly during 

their presentations that this concept of innovation and innovations 

driven here in the Northwest are creating new challenges for the 

energy infrastructure. Disruptive technology trends are dynamically altering the threat landscape for organizations operating in 

today’s world. The explosion of new software applications, the 

emergence of cloud computing and the Internet of things, combined 

with an increasingly mobile workforce are leading to dissolution of 

the traditional security perimeter. 

Legacy security architectures are no longer adequate to protect 

against the evolving threats posed by cyber criminals, activists and 

state-sponsored espionage and sabotage. To borrow from a commonly used analogy, the traditional security architectures were 

akin to building a castle and a moat to secure the king. The castle 

architectural relies upon utilizing traditional network firewalls and 

other devices on the network perimeter to monitor and block suspicious traffic at the boundary of the network. 

In today’s world envision the software application as a very mobile president traveling the world, who needs the protection of its 

Secret Service bodyguards as he travels. As the network perimeter 

or in this analogy, the castle walls, become more and more irrelevant industries need to focus on protecting the software applications that drive their business and manage their critical infrastructure as well as verifying the identities of those users who access 

those applications. 
74 

The leading technology industry firm, Gardner, estimates that 90 

percent of security investment is target at securing this network 

perimeter but only 28 percent of the attacks are focused there. 

Conversely, only ten percent of the security investment is focused 

on securing the software application itself while 72 percent of attacks are from application vulnerabilities and stolen user credentials. 

Our U.S. energy sector is not immune to these types of evolving 

threats. In particular, the Internet of things with the inclusion of 

new Smart meters, home power generation devices with connections back into the power grid and the various interfaces of the 

scattered networks creating a unique set of challenges. All these 

new Smart devices are run by new and innovative software applications whose access needs to be managed and whose data needs 

to be protected. 

And where will the state of emerging energy applications be developed and reside as the world moves to a cloud centric model? 

Again, these applications are being built and hosted outside the 

castle walls. 

All of these unsecured new devices create new threat factors of 

attack that must be mitigated. The world of our energy infrastructure, it isn’t the theft of data that is the biggest threat, but a disruption of service or destruction of its means of delivery. 

In December of last year hackers disabled portions of Ukraine’s 

power grid leaving over 200,000 residents without power for several hours. In the attack on the Ukraine’s power grid, the hackers 

used compromised user credentials to remotely log in to the 

SCADA network that controlled the grid. In this instance remote 

workers weren’t required to use two factor authentication for remote log in which allowed the attackers to hijack their credentials 

and gain crucial access to the systems that control the breakers for 

the system. 

The Department of Energy has taken steps to help secure our nation’s energy infrastructure with the issuance of its Energy Sector 

Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance containing 

recommendations for implementation of the NIST framework for 

improving critical infrastructure of cybersecurity. 

In the ever evolving world of technology it is important that organizations stay vigilant to address these exponential threats presented by new technologies and to avoid complacency. A strong 

focus on protecting not just the networks interconnected to our infrastructure but the software applications that operate and support 

that infrastructure as well as the users accessing those software 

applications it’s critical to the safety and security of our nation’s 

energy sector. 

Through utilization of web application firewalls, multifactor authentication and identity federation for secure remote access, with 

consistent policy-based access controls and security data analytics 

on user behavior, the energy sector can evolve its security architecture to address the dissolution of the network perimeter. 

With that I would like to acknowledge the Committee and thank 

them for giving the opportunity to recognize these threats that are 

emerging and note that I’m happy to answer any questions that the 

Committee may have, as well as to provide any follow-up materials. 
75 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:] 
76 

Scot F. Rogers 

EVP & General Counsel 

FS Networks, Inc. 

Testimony before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Field Hearing on Oversight of the Department of Energy's Functions and Capabilities to respond 

to Energy Related Emergencies, Including Impacts to Critical Energy Infrastructure 

Thank you Senator and Mr. Secretary for giving me an opportunity to provide information to 

this Committee and be a part of this panel to discuss topics we at FS believe are of critical 

importance to the safety of our country. 

I would first like to give you a little background on my employer, FS Networks, a worldwide 

leading developer and provider of software-defined application services. We are based here in 

Seattle with over 4,300 employees in offices around the world. Applications have become the 

gateway to critical and sensitive data and our mission is to help organizations deliver the most 

secure, fast, and reliable applications to anyone, anywhere, at any time. Our offerings include 

software products for network and application security, access management and a number of 

other network and application services. We also offer distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 

protection, application security and other application services on our cloud-based platform. In 

conjunction with our customers and partners across a variety of fields and industries, we are 

closely watching the evolution of the cyber-threat landscape for organizations in the 21'' 

century. 

Disruptive technology trends are dynamically altering the threat landscape for organizations 

operating in today's world. The explosion of new software applications, the emergence of cloud 

computing and the internet of things {loT) combined with an increasingly mobile work force are 

leading to the dissolution of the traditional security perimeter. Legacy security architectures are 

no longer adequate to protect against the evolving threats posed by cyber criminals, hacktivists 

and state sponsored espionage and sabotage. To borrow from a commonly used analogy, 

traditional security architectures were akin to building a castle and a moat to secure the king. 

This castle architecture relies upon utilizing traditional network firewalls and other devices on 

the network perimeter to monitor and block suspicious traffic on the boundary of the network. 

In today's world, envision the software application and data associated with that application as 

a very mobile president who needs the protection of his secret service body guards as he 

travels the world. As the network perimeter-or in this analogy the castle walls--become more 

and more irrelevant, industries need to focus on protecting the software applications which 

front-end their critical and sensitive data, that drive their business and manage their 

infrastructure as well as verifying the identities of those users who are accessing those 

applications. The leading technology industry research firm Gartner estimates that 90% of 

security investment is targeted at securing the network but only 28% of the attacks are focused 

here. Conversely, only 10% of security investment is focused on securing the software 

application while 72% of attacks are from application vulnerabilities and stolen user credentials. 
77 

Our U.S. energy sector is not immune from these types of evolving threats. In particular, the 

Internet of Things (loT) with the inclusion of new smart meters, home power generation 

devices with connections back into the power grid, and the various interfaces of the 

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition networks that control the grid (SCADA networks) 

create a unique set of challenges. All of these new smart devices are run by new and innovative 

software applications whose access needs to managed and whose data need to be protected. 

And where will these emerging energy software applications be developed and reside as the 

world evolves to a cloud centric model? 

All of these unsecured new devices create new threat vectors of attack that must be mitigated. 

In the world of our energy infrastructure, it isn't the theft of data that is the biggest threat, but 

disruption to the service or destruction of its means of delivery. On December 23'd of last year, 

hackers disabled portions of Ukraine's power grid leaving over 200,000 residents without 

power for several hours. In the attack on Ukraine's power grid, the hackers used compromised 

user credentials for workers logging remotely into the SCADA network that controlled the grid. 

In this instance, remote workers weren't required to use two-factor authentication for remote 

login, which allowed the attackers to hijack their credentials and gain crucial access to systems 

that controlled the breakers for the system. 

The Dept. of Energy has taken steps to help secure our nation's energy infrastructure with the 

issuance of its Energy Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance containing 

recommendations for implementation of the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (NIST, 2014). In the ever 

evolving world of technology, it is important that organizations stay vigilant to address the 

exponential threats presented by new technologies and to avoid complacency. A strong focus 

on protecting not just the networks interconnected to our infrastructure but the software 

applications that operate and support that infrastructure as well as the users accessing those 

software applications is critical to the safety and security of our nation's energy sector. Through 

utilization of web application firewalls, multi-factor authentication and identity federation for 

secure remote access with consistent, policy based access controls and security data analytics 

on user behavior, the energy sector can continue to evolve its security architecture to address 

the dissolution of the network perimeter. 

I just want to acknowledge the Committee for recogn1z1ng the threats to our energy 

infrastructure and note that collaboration and unity of effort amongst stakeholders will be 

critical to meeting this challenge. I would also like to recognize the others on this panel who 

are here working together to address these issues. Thank you to the Committee for convening 

this hearing on such timely issues. FS would also be happy to provide any supplemental 

materials upon request following the hearing. 
78 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you. Thank you. 

Mr. Imhoff, thank you so much for being here today. Hopefully 

we will see you tomorrow as well, but thank you for being here to 

testify at today’s hearing. 

STATEMENT OF CARL IMHOFF, MANAGER, GRID RESEARCH 

PROGRAM, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. IMHOFF. I will be there tomorrow. 

Thank you very much, Senator Cantwell, for the opportunity to 

appear. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us in the beautiful Pacific Northwest. My mission today is to discuss issues 

around grid resiliency and emergency response, particularly as 

they relate to grid modernization. 

My name is Carl Imhoff. I lead the Grid Research Program at 

the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and I also cochair the Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium which is a 

membership of 13 national laboratories and over 100 industry and 

academic partners supporting DOE’s unified Grid Modernization 

Initiative. 

For more than two decades PNNL has supported power system 

resilience and innovation for the State of Washington, the Pacific 

Northwest and the nation. In that time, we lead in the delivery to 

the nation, a network of 2,000 high speed, synchrophasor monitors 

that monitor the nation 30 samples a second, 24/7. 

We’ve also delivered innovations in distributed control and demand response with the promise of delivering demand at scale and 

providing grid services faster, greener, cheaper and supported the 

nation’s largest Smart Grid demonstration in doing so. 

We’re delivering high performance computing that’s taking security tools from days to seconds to converge and helping the operators, such as Bonneville, monitor the system and avoid outages and 

so we’ve had a phenomenal long record of support to the grid. And 

we’ll continue to do so going forward. 

My assignment was to talk about the link between grid modernization and security and resilience, but before I do I have to 

frame my two key recommendations for the session. One, important 

to deliver next generation, real time tools for situational awareness, risk assessment and grid operations that transform our nation’s capacity to assess risk in real time and help mitigate outages 

with assisted support for operators in real time. Secondly, to improve the emergency response capabilities leveraging new data 

sources and new analytic tools to enhance both regional and local 

planning but also then preparation for major extreme events. 

So let me start with the highlights of why is the grid important? 

What’s changed in the landscape of the grid? And then comment 

on how can grid modernization enhance our resilience in emergency response? 

The future power system is facing substantially more complex 

conditions and risk going forward. Today we have increased storm 

frequency and intensity. We see increased interdependencies between grid systems and other critical infrastructure such as natural gas pipelines, communications and emerging market models. 
79 

New digital technology is transforming the availability of new 

consumer services at the grid edge where it also increases the attack planning and increases the cybersecurity challenge. Overall, 

the grid faces increased complexity in supply, demand and business 

models, and this is a grid that today is very important to our economy but it’s going to be more strategic into the future. 

Our current economy is increasingly digital but the consumers 

are looking for more benefits from IT and intelligent devices and 

all at the edge. Much of the past climate research is showing that 

electrification is a key to going in terms of de-carbonization. So the 

grid is essential today and it will become increasingly more strategic in the future. 

So how does a modernized grid support emergency response? Let 

me frame three options. 

First, it will deliver improved grid infrastructure resilience such 

as new distribution feeders that better resist natural and human 

threats and recover faster reducing the fundamental need for emergency response. An example is Avista Corp in Spokane which 

achieved 1.5 million avoided customer outage minutes in 2013 from 

its Smart Grid Investment Grant effort and advanced metering and 

distribution automation. They also shortened average outages by 

ten percent, experienced 21 percent fewer outages and their participation in that partnership with DOE led to an accelerated full system modernization for Vista, accelerated by probably over a decade. 

Enhanced real time tools and system visibility will reduce the 

scope of outages, shorten the time utilities need to identify the outage locations and optimize restoration planning to get the lights 

back on more quickly. An example is the use of synchophasor monitoring that would have given the Ohio operators, had they had phasor measurement units, an hour and 40-minute warning that 

Cleveland was pulling away from the rest of the system. The result 

would have been a much smaller blackout and much faster recovery at much lower cost to the taxpayers. 

Upgraded planning tools will better handle the complexity of 

variable generation and new markets and changing business models, improving emergency response planning, especially for extreme 

events such as seismic and major regional weather emergencies. 

So, how do we achieve these recommendations I offered? Delivering real time tools will help operators better understand risks 

and options to avoid outages with accuracy far beyond current 

practice. 

One promising opportunity is the delivery of near real time risk 

contingency analysis that’s basically looking at the 40,000 to 60,000 

outlets and saying if we lose certain numbers of these what does 

that do to the security of our grid? 

Today operators conduct power flow to identify and rank all system risks. We’ve accelerated this analysis with advanced computing to take the computation from days to seconds. In the case 

of the Western interconnection, this method cut the computation 

run from 26 hours to 7 seconds. This improvement gives operators 

near real time situational awareness of risks and options to mitigate outages. 

Experiments at PNNL’s control rooms, that you’ll see tomorrow, 

with grid operators showed a 30 percent improvement in their abil-
80 

ity to diagnose and respond to test cases of outages using these 

new tools. 

And an emergency—emerging advanced and planning tools is 

DOE’s commission tool to assess the risk of extremely rare but 

large cascading events and outages. We, PNNL, worked with 

ERCOT, Siemens and EPRI to develop an extreme event tool that 

transformed the utility’s ability to conduct such analyses and better 

prepares the industry to respond to the new NERC standards in 

terms of extreme events. 

An increasingly important element of improved resilience is grid 

flexibility. You get flexibility in two big ways. 

One is energy storage and also advanced distributed controls 

that the Secretary mentioned earlier. Widespread deployment of 

energy storage for multiple grid applications requires significant 

reduction of life cycle costs of energy storage and a validation of the 

value for the value propositions and multiple grid applications. 

To reduce storage costs while improving life cycle performance 

PNNL is actively engaged in research and the discovery and development of next generation materials and early PNNL R and D advances have been licensed to several companies including 

UniEnergy which is located in Washington State and is deploying 

stationary flow batteries for grid scale applications globally. 

Through DOE and Washington State Clean Energy funding we 

are partnered also with Avista, Snohomish, DUD, Puget Sound Energy, to validate the performance and use cases for field deployed 

grid storage. 

A second source of flexibility is advanced distributed control theory. Transactive control concepts, a blending of traditional controls 

and economic incentives to engage distributive resources at scale 

and beyond normal utility boundaries have been demonstrated in 

the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration Project and are 

being extended in the Clean Energy Transactive Campus Project, 

a partnership between DOE and the Department of Commerce. 

This project will help demonstrate the benefit of demand side controls across multiple buildings and campuses that can provide load 

flexibility to reduce peak demand and manage renewable ramping. 

Turning to specific emergency response tools, PNNL supports 

DOE’s Office of Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration 

(ISER) by developing technologies to aid emergency response. We’re 

launching an effort to support ISER with automated analysis of 

digital satellite imagery to quickly assess infrastructure damage. 

It’s at work today in the State of Louisiana. 

PNNL is also supporting ISER during national emergencies with 

real time visualization and communication platforms in partnership with HAMMER, the federal training center you’ll see in Richland tomorrow. 

Finally, in terms of cybersecurity response, PNNL developed a 

program that, by the end of next month, will provide cyber support 

to the utilities that generate 75 percent of the nation’s electricity. 

This is a DOE development concept in terms of cyber risk information sharing. It’s now led by NERC and industry. The sensors and 

concepts came from PNNL and we continue to provide analytics for 

that very important exercise. The next step in that journey is to 
81 

find ways to engage the small and mid-size utilities more effectively. 

So in conclusion, a modernized grid should substantially improve 

emergency response by delivering a more resilient system, providing new planning and real time tools to better identify and mitigate outage risks. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments. Thank you 

for your long leadership in terms of Smart Grid and grid modernization. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for delivering the first integrated 

grid strategy in my 30-year career in the national labs. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Imhoff follows:] 
82 

Statement of Carl Imhoff 

Manager, Grid Research Program 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 

Before the 

United States Senate 

Committee on Senate Energy and Natural Resources 

August 15,2016 

Good morning. Thank you, Senator Cantwell, and Members of the Committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss grid resilience and emergency response. 

My name is Carl Imhoff, and I lead the Grid Research Program at the Pacific Northwest National 

Laboratory (PNNL), a Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratory located in Richland, 

Washington. I also serve as the Co-Chair of DOE's Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium, 

a team of national labs that, along with industry and university partners, supports the 

Department's Grid Modernization Initiative. The consortium members include PNNL, the 

National Renewable Energy National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 

Los Alamos National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, the 

National Energy Technology Laboratory, Savannah River National Laboratory, Lawrence 

Livermore National Laboratory and the National Accelerator Laboratory at Stanford. 

For more than two decades, PNNL has supported power system resilience and innovation for the 

State of Washington, the Pacific Northwest, and the nation. Over this period, the laboratory has 

led DOE-industry collaborations in developing and deploying synchrophasor technology to help 

avoid blackouts, and developed and demonstrated transactive control concepts on the Olympic 

Peninsula in Washington and for the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid Demonstration project-the 

largest of its kind-to validate smart grid benefits and new control approaches that engage 

demand and distributed resources at scale. PNNL also delivered the first applications of high 

performance computing to deliver contingency analysis for the grid in minutes versus days, as 

well as the first real-time dynamic state estimation to open the door to the future world of 

predictive grid tools. 

Based upon PNNL's extensive experience and leadership in grid research, today I offer two 

recommendations to enhance the resilience and reliability of our nation's power grid: 

1. Improve and deliver real-time tools for situational awareness, risk assessment, and grid 

operations that transform our nation's capacity to assess risk and to mitigate outages 

caused by any hazard. 

2. Advance emergency response capabilities to enhance regional and local planning and 

preparation for large scale disaster recovery (such as possible Cascadia seismic events). 

1 
83 

Necessity of New Tools for Grid Resilience 

The power system of the future will face substantially different challenges and risks than in the 

past Today we have well-documented evidence of increased weather impacts, with both the 

frequency and magnitude of storms increasing. We also see increased interdependencies 

between grid systems and other critical infrastructures such as the natural gas pipeline system, 

communications systems, and emerging market models being developed to support clean 

distributed energy generation. In addition, increased use of digital technology is transforming 

the availability of new customer services and choice, while at the same time increasing the cyber 

security challenge. 

A modernized grid that addresses these future grid challenges must enhance emergency 

preparedness and response in three areas: 

l. Improved grid flexibility and resilience that reduces the risk and need for emergency 

response. 

2. Real-time tools and system visibility to reduce the scope of outages, shorten the time 

utilities need to identify outage locations, and optimize restoration planning to get the 

lights back on more quickly. 

3. Improved planning tools that handle the complexity of variable generation, new markets, 

and changing business models to improve emergency response planning at the local and 

regional level, particularly for extreme events such as seismic and weather emergencies. 

Recommendations for delivering these modernized grid benefits follow. 

Improve and deliver real-time tools for situational awareness and grid protection 

Delivering real-time tools to better assess risk and operate the electric system will help operators 

better understand the risks they face and options to avoid outages with accuracy far beyond 

current practice. An example is the 2003 Northeast blackout If the synchrophasor system of 

today had been in place then, operators would have had just over one-and-a-half hours advanced 

warning that Cleveland was separating from the Eastern Interconnect The likely outcome would 

have been a much smaller blackout and faster recovery. A modernized grid reduces the 

likelihood for emergency response measures and supports faster recovery should an emergency 

strike. 

Increasing efficacy and accuracy in planning and operating the grid enables utilities to better 

prepare for emergencies of all kinds, and be more nimble in response, with the goal of reducing 

the extent and duration of outages. Let me share a few efforts underway in the DOE Grid 

Modernization Initiative: 

2 
84 

1. To better enable system planning and protection, DOE's Office of Electricity 

Deliverability and Energy Reliability (OE) commissioned the development of a new tool 

to assess the risk of extremely rare but large cascading outages, which are grid blackouts 

that start with a single failure but quickly ripple out to drop large portions of a regional 

system. This tool allows grid operators to better enable system planning and protection. 

PNNL worked with the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, Siemens and the Electric 

Power Research Institute (EPRI) to develop an extreme event tool that transformed such 

analyses, and better prepares the industry to respond to the North American Electric 

Reliability Corporation (NERC) standards requiring better planning for extreme 

cascading outages. This tool is an open source resource that is scalable for use of 

advanced computation, positioning it for broad industry use in the case of extremely 

large, complex outage scenarios. The end result will be much improved risk assessment 

and planning, leading presumably to fewer large outages such as the 2003 event in the 

Northeast. 

2. Another opportunity for enhancing emergency response is improving wide-area risk 

assessment of the power system through contingency analysis. Today, power flow 

simulations are conducted to identify and rank all system risks to enable operators to 

address key system risks. This analysis typically requires one or more days at the 

interconnection level. With high performance computing platforms, PNNL has 

accelerated contingency analysis to reduce the computation time from days to seconds. 

In the case of the Western Interconnection, this method cut the computation run time 

from 26 hours to 7 seconds. This improvement gives operators near real-time situational 

awareness of risks and options to mitigate these risks. Experiments in PNNL' s control 

room with grid operators showed a 30 percent improvement in operator diagnosis of test 

outage scenarios using this new approach. 

In addition, grid flexibility is an important new development in managing the grid in real time. 

This flexibility enables the system to better protect against threats and recover more quickly. 

One example of providing greater grid flexibility to improve grid reliability, resiliency and 

renewable integration is the development and full-scale deployment of grid scale energy 

storage. Key to enabling wide spread deployment of energy storage, for multiple grid 

applications, is to realize a significant reduction in the lifecycle cost of the energy storage 

systems and validation of the value proposition for multiple grid applications. To reduce energy 

storage costs, while improving lifecycle performance, PNNL is actively engaged in research in 

both the discovery and development of next generation energy storage materials. Early PNNL 

R&D advances have been licensed to several companies, including UniEnergy 

Technologies, which is located Washington State and is deploying stationary flow batteries for 

grid scale applications globally. Through DOE and Washington State Clean Energy Funding, 

PNNL is partnered with A vista Utilities, Snohomish Public Utility District and Puget Sound 

Energy to validate performance and use-cases for field deployed energy storage technologies. At 

the national level, PNNL is partnered with Sandia National Laboratories, Argonne National 

Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Brookhaven 

3 
85 

National Laboratory and several universities to advance energy storage technologies. 

A second example of enhancing grid flexibility is advanced distributed control theory and 

concepts that enable distributed energy resource (DER) technologies to be integrated at scale 

across the grid in a way that assures continued reliability, improved resilience, and lower carbon 

emissions. Transactive control concepts, a blending of traditional and economic incentives to 

engage distributed resources, have been demonstrated in the Pacific Northwest Smart Grid 

Demonstration project, which was co-funded by DOE. These concepts are being extended in the 

Clean Energy and Transactive Campus project, a partnership with DOE and the Washington 

State Department of Commerce. Taking place at PNNL, the University of Washington and 

Washington State University, this project will help demonstrate the benefit of demand-side 

controls across multiple buildings that can provide load flexibility to reduce peak demand and 

support ramping of renewable energy resources. Finally, the Grid Modernization Laboratory 

Consortium portfolio includes research on grid architecture and distributed control to further 

advance the theory and practice of distributed control for a modern grid. This will support 

improved flexibility by enabling local resources to provide grid services during times of grid 

stress, such as coordination of multiple micro grids. 

Advance emergency response capabilities 

PNNL supports DOE's Office ofinfrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER) and 

other federal agencies in their respective energy emergency response functions through the 

development of technologies and processes to aid the response and recovery to grid interruptions. 

PNNL is launching an effort to support ISER with its situational awareness capabilities during 

national emergencies through the automated analysis of digital satellite imagery to quickly assess 

infrastructure damage, and is also providing improved platforms for the communication of 

damage assessments and restoration challenges, through its Electricity Infrastructure Operations 

Center. 

PNNL is assisting the electric industry, through NERC, with the deployment of tools and 

processes to assess the vulnerabilities in their systems and correct them. In the past year, PNNL 

helped NERC develop the first-ever Design Basis Threat for the electric industly, which is now 

being rolled out to industry to guide them in prioritizing threats and improving the protection of 

critical assets. 

Additionally, PNNL has been working with another federal sponsor on a grid restoration 

framework, based upon the Cascadia Subduction Zone scenario, which details the roles, 

responsibilities, and requirements of the multitude of government agencies and electrical 

industry service providers in the Northwest. 

And finally, PNNL is working with ISER to provide real-time assessment support and expertise 

during national emergencies through visualization and communication platforms Through 

established partnership with tbe HAMMER Federal Training Center in Richland, Washington, 

4 
86 

PNNL technologies are being transitioned to real-life applications through HAMMER's 

emergency response training of ISER responders. 

Grid Cyber Resilience 

Cyber security is a critical element of all grid-related efforts. PNNL developed the Cyber Risk 

Information Sharing Program (CRISP) with DOE and is now supporting NERC in the 

deployment of the program to utilities nationwide. The CRISP program coordinates information 

sharing between industry and with federal agencies to ensure rapid dissemination of cyber threats 

and possible remedies. By the end of September 2016, CRISP is expected to cover the utilities 

that generate 75 percent of the country's power. PNNL is also directly involved in designing and 

delivering national cyber response exercises, such as GridEX, to better train stakeholders in 

handling potential cyber events on the grid. 

Conclusion 

In conclusion, a modernized grid will substantially enhance our ability to see and operate the 

nation's power system in real time, enabling grid operators to better avoid outages and reduce the 

extent and duration of those outages that do occur. Advanced planning tools that handle the 

complexities of the future grid will also improve the assessment of risk for extreme events, 

improving emergency response planning and implementation. 

With these advanced tools developed and deployed, it is important to directly support emergency 

response agencies with data, situational awareness and analytic tools to help them better assess 

risk, plan for response, assessment of damage, and on the ground response efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Committee with information on the work PNNL 

and the Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium are doing in this important area. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you may have. 

5 
87 

Senator CANTWELL. Well thank you, Mr. Imhoff. 

I will note though, we’ve had several stops on this tour already 

and in each stop the Secretary has gone out of his way to emphasize how important the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is to 

the country. 

Secretary MONIZ. No, no, I didn’t say that. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. And to the region. 

I just want to thank him, and thank you for being here as a representative of that. 

Secretary MONIZ. He wants a raise. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, give him one. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. So, Dr. Best, thank you so much. We have 

saved the best for last. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. So thank you—— 

STATEMENT OF DR. LYNN BEST, CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL 

OFFICER, SEATTLE CITY LIGHT 

Dr. BEST. Madam Chairwoman and Secretary Moniz, I want to 

thank you on behalf of Seattle City Light for the opportunity to testify today before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. 

My name is Lynn Best, and I am the Environmental Officer for 

City Light. Seattle City Light provides reliable, renewable and environmentally responsible power to the residents of Seattle and 

neighboring communities. City Light has been greenhouse gas neutral since 2005, the first electric utility to achieve this distinction. 

My testimony today will focus on electric utility resilience in the 

face of climate change. I will cover City Lights’ recently completed 

Climate Adaptation Plan, our participation in the Department of 

Energy’s Partnership for Energy Sector Climate Resilience and two 

actual events that reflect the risks identified in the plan, the Oso 

mudslide and the Goodell Creek Fire. 

While City Light owns no fossil fuel resources and obtains 90 

percent of its power from hydroelectric resources it—we are affected by climate change. 

In 2013 as part of the resiliency strategy for our utility, City 

Light committed to researching the impacts of climate change on 

the utility and developing an adaptation plan including actions to 

minimize these impacts. City Light’s Climate Adaptation Plan evaluates how City Light is at risk from climate change, the vulnerability from our operations and infrastructure to these risks and 

the potential magnitude of the impacts. It then uses this information to help prioritize potential adaptation strategies. 

Seattle City Light is also one of 18 electric utilities in the nation 

participating in Department of Energy’s Partnership for Energy 

Sector Climate Resiliency. This partnership allows utilities to exchange knowledge and best practices as well as receive recognition 

for their achievements. This partnership also promotes investment 

in technologies and practices and policies that will enable resilient 

and modern energy system. City Light looks forward to our contin-
88 

ued collaboration with DOE and other utilities as we work together 

in this partnership. 

The importance of taking action is illustrated by two recent 

events. 

On March 22, 2014 a 300-acre landslide occurred in Oso, Washington that killed 30 people and destroyed a local community. This 

happened during a March that was the wettest in history. The 

slide which occurred to the north of City Light’s transmission line 

from the Skagit Hydro project caused minor damage to one tower 

and came within feet of causing significant damage to the line. The 

Oso slide is an example of the impacts that we are concerned about 

with climate change. As the frequency and intensity of heavy participation increases, these loose sedimentary soils are more likely 

to slide. If the Oso slide had happened on the south side of the valley our transmission lines would have been destroyed for about a 

mile, at a minimum and potentially more. 

In anticipation of this becoming an increasing risk, City Light 

has applied twice for Federal Emergency Management Act (FEMA) 

grants to retrofit six towers in this area to limit the amount of 

damage that could occur from a similar or smaller slide. 

While the proximity of Seattle City Light’s transmission line constituted a significant risk to the utility, it also provided the opportunity for us to be of assistance to the community when the main 

arterial of Washington State, Route 530 between the cities of 

Darrington and Arlington, was destroyed in the slide. A single 

lane, gravel access road that was our access road for our transmission line was used as a lifeline to bypass that section and reach 

the community of Darrington. 

The Goodell Creek fire started on August 10, 2015, and spread 

to the woods near the Skagit Hydroelectric Project a few days later. 

Seattle City Light operates three dams and power houses at Ross, 

Diablo and Gorge Reservoirs in this area. These facilities produce 

20 percent of the power consumed by our customers. 

The fire changed direction suddenly and burned under the lines 

forcing the utility to shut down transmission lines that carry electricity from the project. Spill gates at all three dams were opened 

to maintain river flows to protect fish. Within 15 minutes—with 15 

minutes of warning City Light needed to replace 20 percent of the 

power needed to serve our load. 

The inability to deliver electricity from the Skagit also cost us 

$100,000 per day. The company town of Diablo was evacuated 

quickly and Newhalem reduced to only essential personnel. City 

Light fire fighters worked to protect our assets, the power houses 

and residences and other structures. The total cost to utility was 

estimated at $5.3 million. 

Wildland fire risk is one that the utility’s climate scientists had 

identified well before the Goodell Creek fire last August. More and 

longer lasting fires have been occurring on the West side of the 

Cascades over the past few years. City Light had already completed fire wise projects to protect buildings, and while the fire 

worked its way to the projects, it stopped before damaging buildings. 

The utility also is applying for mitigation funds from FEMA as 

part of the repairs following this fire to replace the timber saddles 
89 

that were part of the Newhalem Creek plant penstock. In addition, 

we are training our fire fighters in wildfire fighting. 

In addition to the physical threat we had to move our balancing 

authority to our Boundary project. Unfortunately, Boundary has 

limited storage. It’s a run of the river project. And as a result, 

there was fear that there would not be enough water available at 

Boundary and we would have to declare a capacity emergency. 

We were able to contact our fellow utilities upstream, and we 

want to thank Avista and Pend Oreille PUD for providing water to 

allow us to continue to keep Boundary as our balancing authority. 

This was an excellent example of utilities providing assistance 

under emergency situations. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Best follows:] 
90 

Written Testimony 

Hearing of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

Subcommittee on Energy 

United States Senate 

Dr. Lynn Best 

Chief Environmental Officer 

Seattle City Light 

"Field Hearing to conduct oversight of the Department of Energy's jimctions and capabilities to respond 

to emergencies, including the impacts to critical energy injraslmcture" 

August 15, 2016 

Seattle City Light appreciates this opportunity to testif)' before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 

Committee relating to the Oversight of the United States Department of Energy's nmctions and 

capabilities to respond to emergencies, including the impacts to critical energy infrastmcture. 

Seattle City Light is tl1c 1Oth largest public electric utility in the United States. It provides reliable, 

renewable and environmentally responsible power to 750,000 Seattle area residents. City Light has been 

greenhouse gas neutral since 2005, the first electric utility in the nation to achieve that distinction. 

My testimony today focuses on tl1e Seattle City Light recently completed Climate Change Vulnerability 

Assessment and Adaptation Plan and participation in the Department of Energy's Partnership for Energy 

Sector Climate Resilience. 

Seattle City Light obtains 90% of its energy from hydroelectric resources. Temperature and precipitation 

changes can have a dramatic effect on these resources. We also depend on hundreds of miles of 

transmission lines to bring this power to the City of Seattle. In 2013, as part of its resiliency strategy, 

Seattle City Light committed to researching the impacts of climate change on the utility and developing 

an adaptation plan including actions to minimize these impacts. City Light's Climate Change 

Vulnerability Assessment and Adaptation Plan summarizes the impacts of climate change on tlle utility 

and identifies potential actions needed to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience. 

The goal of adapting or preparing for a changing climate is to ensure that Seattle City Light can continue 

to meet its mission to produce and deliver environmentally responsible, safe, low-cost, and reliable power 

as the climate changes. Electric utilities are facing an uncertain ntture, and a changing climate is one 

consideration in designing the utility ofthe future. 

Why plan for climate change now? 

To some people, climate change may seem like a far-off risk that will not affect electric utilities in the 

near-term. It can be tempting to label climate change as a "challenge for future generations," but this is 

not the case for several reasons: 

Climate change is happening now, globally and here in the Pacific Northwest. Temperatures 

have wanncd and the effects of these wanner temperatures on snowpack, heat waves, and 

extreme weather have been detected globally, nationally, and locally in Washington. 

Page l of9 
91 

• These impacts are expected to intensify and new impacts will emerge regardless of 

reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases that cause global warming. Mitigation to reduce 

emissions is critical to reducing the long-term magnitude of climate change impacts. However, 

some impacts are now inevitable because greenhouse gases that have already been emitted to the 

atmosphere will remain for decades to centuries. 

• Decisions are being made today that will shape the resources and infrastructure of City 

Light for decades into the future when the impacts of climate change will be more intense. 

Decisions are underway regarding the location and design of facilities such as substations and 

transmission lines, the conditions for operating hydroelectric projects, and the acquisition of 

power resources and fish habitat. The effects of these decisions will still be in place for decades, 

so it is important to consider the increasing risk of climate change impacts throughout the life of 

these decisions. 

Being proactive and preparing for climate change now can reduce the costs and 

consequences for City Light, its customers, and the environment. It will be easier and more 

cost-effective to consider the impacts of climate change in the planning and design of new 

infrastructure and power resources now than it will he to retrofit infrastructure or replace 

resources once the impacts of climate change intensif}·. 

United State Department of Energy Partnership for Energy Sector Climate Resilience 

The City of Seattle is one of 18 electric utilities in the nation participating in the United States 

Department of Energy (DOE) Partnership for Energy Sector Climate Resiliency (Fhe Partnership). The 

Partnership Agreement signed by the participating utilities expresses a commitment to increasing 

resilience to climate change. The utilities in the partnership collectively represent 20 percent of the 

nation's generating capacity and 25 percent of customers. Seattle City Light submitted it Climate Change 

Vulnerability Assessment and Adaptation Plan to DOE in February 2016. The next deliverable is a 

Resilience Strategy which is due to DOE in October 2016. 

The Partnership builds upon the lessons learned through previously conducted initiatives identified in the 

President's Climate Action Plan, and reflects the increasing pressures from climate change and extreme 

weather events on the electric sector in the United State. These vulnerabilities include: 

Decreasing \Yater availability, reducing available thermoelectric and hydropower generation 

capacity, impacting oil and gas production and impeding barge transport of crude oil, petroleum 

products and coal. 

Increasing temperature, which leads to an increase in electricity demand for cooling as well as 

reduces the efficiency of thermoelectric power generation. 

Increasing sea level rise and heightened intensity and frequency of storms and flooding, 

potentially damaging or disrupting coastal and offshore oil and gas facilities as well as electric 

transmission and distribution lines, and threatening inland and coastal thermoelectric facilities. 

The Partnership has been critical for establishing engagement between DOE and electric utilities that are 

committed to development and deployment of effective short- and long-term strategies for enhancing 

resilience to extreme weather and climate change. This allows utilities pursuing action on climate 

resilience to exchange knowledge and best practices, as well as receive recognition for their 

achievements. This Partnership also enhances energy security by establishing an energy system resilient 

to extreme weather and climate change and promotes i1westment in technologies, practices, and policies 

that will enable a resilient and modem energy system. 

Page 2 of9 
92 

Seattle City Light looks forward to our continued collaboration with DOE and the other utilities as we 

work together to provide a more resilient energy sector across the United States. 

Overview of City Light's Vulnerability and Risk Assessment 

The Vulnerability Assessment evaluates how City Light is at risk from climate change. The Assessment 

describes eight changes in the climate, and resulting changes in natural hazards and streamflow (sea level 

rise, wanner temperatures and heat waves, changes in extreme weather patterns, increasing risk of 

wildfires, increasing risk oflandslides and erosion, reduced snowpack and changes in runoff timing, 

higher peak flows and flood risk, and lower summer streamflows) that could affect five aspects of City 

Light's operations and infrastmcture: shoreline properties, hydroelectric project operations, 

electricity demand, transmission and distribution, fish habitat protection and restoration. (See 

attached Figure: Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment.) 

The Assessment then looks at how vulnerable of these operations and infrastmcture are to climate change 

impacts and the potential magnitude of the impact on reliability, safety, financial costs and environmental 

responsibility. (Sec attached Table) l11is Assessment is then used to identiJY key risks for City Light and 

help prioritize adaptation actions. 

Adaptation Actions 

In the plan, City Light identified potential adaption actions to reduce the impacts of climate change on the 

utility. Adaption actions are intentional changes in policies and operations, or upgrades to infrastmcture 

designed specifically to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience. 

Adaptation Actions fall into four general strategies: (l) enhance adaptive capacity, (2) harden 

infrastmcture, (3) increase resilience, or (4) retreating from exposed locations or resources. Many of these 

adaptation strategies are being considered or implemented by electric utilities across the nation. Each 

strategy may be useful depending on the magnitude of the impacts and the criticality of the objectives or 

infrastmcturc. 

L Enhance Adaptive Capacity: Actions to enhance adaptive capacity increase the ability of the 

utility to respond to extreme weather and climatic variability or change. Actions taken by electric 

utilities to increase adaptive capacity include employing meteorologists, investing in weather or 

wildfire monitoring as well as forecasting systems, and supporting research on the impacts of 

climate change. 

2, Harden Infrastructure: Hardening involves protecting infrastmcturc in place by constmcting 

new reinforced infrastmcture or retrofitting existing infrastmcture. Examples of hardening 

include installing submersible saltwater-resistant equipment, elevating infrastructure, or building 

flood barriers around substations to protect against sea level rise and storm water flooding. In 

\Yildfire prone areas, utilities arc hardening by converting from wood to steel poles. 

3. Increase Resilience: Increasing resilience is taking action to enhance the ability of the system to 

respond or recover from disruptions associated with extreme weather or climate change. 

Increasing resilience reduces the consequences of impacts in terms of recovery time and cost. 

Examples of actions by utilities to increase resilience include enhancing vegetation management 

programs, contracting resources to be readily available for wildfire response, increasing energy 

efficiency to reduce electricity demand, and diversifYing resource portfolios to minimize risk 

from impacts to any one resource. 

4. Retreat: Retreating involves relocating a facility from an exposed location. Retreating can also 

be applied to objectives or power resources. Objectives could be abandoned if they are unlikely to 

be achievable given climate impacts. Resources could be sold if they are unlikely to provide 

sufficient benefits in a changing climate. Retreating is potentially the most extreme action and it 

Page3of9 
93 

is typically considered as a long-term solution, in response to an extreme event, or if other actions 

are unlikely to sufficiently reduce vulnerability. Retreating can be less politically or socially 

acceptable, so it may be feasible only in extreme cases. An example of a retreat action by electric 

utilities is to sell coastal property and move infrastmcture out of flood plains in areas with high 

exposure to sea level rise. 

Key Findings: Impacts and Adaptation Actions 

Below is a brief description of the impacts on hydroelectric project operations and the transmission and 

distribution system. 

Hvdroelectric Project Operations 

Seattle City Light's power resources are 90 percent hydropower, 50 percent of 

which is supplied by five hydroelectric projects ow11ed and operated by the 

utility. The remaining hydropower is purchased from Bonneville Power 

Administration· s Columbia River hydropower system. In addition to 

hydropower, City Light operates hydroelectric projects for flood control, 

instream flows for fish, reservoir recreation, and coordinates the operation of two 

projects with Seattle Public Utilities for municipal water supply. All these 

objectives are dependent on snowpack and the seasonal timing of streamflow. 

The Boundary and Skagit Projects (49 percent of power resources) and the BPA 

hydropower resources (40 percent) are located in high-elevation, snowdominated watersheds for which impacts will be slower to emerge but significant 

by mid-century. The Cedar Falls and South Fork Tolt Projects (1.5 percent) are 

located in mid-elevation, mixed-rain-and-snow watersheds that will be more 

exposed to changes in snowpack and streamflow timing in the near-tenn. 

Summary of Impacts 

Less snowpack and earlier snowmelt will affect seasonal operations of hydroelectric projects that 

arc based on historical conditions of water storage in snowpack and snowmelt timing in spring. 

• Higher peak flows could increase the frequency of spilling at hydroelectric projects in fall and 

winter for flood control, which can have financial consequences associated with lost revenue. 

Higher peak flows also challenge operations to protect fish, because more frequent spilling 

directly causes fish mortality and higher flows scour fish eggs and damage fish habitat 

downstream of the projects. 

Lower streamflow in summer will decrease water availability for reservoir recreation, instream 

flows for fish protection, and hydropower generation, leading to financial consequences for the 

utility associated with lost revenue from surplus sales and more wholesale purchases to meet 

summer demand. 

Potential Adaptation Actions 

Update and expand the utility's analyses of how operations of the Skagit a11d Boundary Projects 

could be adapted to reduce impacts associated with less snowpack, changes in the seasonal timing 

of streamflow, lower streamflow in summer, and higher peak flows in fall and winter. 

Collaborate with stakeholders to address climate change impacts during relicensing. 

Page 4 of9 
94 

Consider further diversification of Seattle City Light's power resources by increasing non-hydro 

renewable energy sources that have a seasonal pattern of generation complementary to expected 

changes in seasonal hydropower generation. 

Transmission and Distribution 

Seattle City Light owns and operates a transmission system consisting of over 650 

miles oftransmission lines and towers connected to the utility's five hydroelectric 

generation facilities. TI1c utility also owns and operates a distribution system in 

the Seattle area consisting of 14 distribution substations, 2,337 distribution circuit 

miles (1,763 overhead and 574 tmderground circuit miles), and a dmmtown 

network system of 220 underground circuit miles. Many miles of transmission 

lines pass through mral, forested areas in Western Washington with steep. rugged 

topography. Transmission to and from City Light's distribution system also 

depends on the western regional transmission system, particularly for 

transmission from the Boundary hydroelectric project in northeast Washington 

and wholesale market purchases and sales. 

Summary of Impacts 

More frequent tidal flooding and salt water corrosion of distribution equipment could reduce the 

life expectancy of equipment, increasing costs for maintenance, repair, and replacement. 

Slower outage restoration times due to more intense precipitation and more frequent major 

storms, particularly when inadequate drainage creates areas of standing water that prevent safe 

access to repair storn1-related outages. 

Increased risk of wildfires causing increase damage to transmission lines and interruptions of 

transmission and generation at hydroelectric facilities. 

Increased risk of landslides damaging transmission towers and access roads 

Increased risk of river flooding in Western Washington damaging transmission towers, erosion 

near towers, and damage to access roads. 

Potential Adaptation Actions 

Monitor and consider replacing equipment in the transmission and distribution system that is 

more sensitive to corrosion by salt water in areas that are projected to experience more frequent 

tidal flooding or will be inundated by sea water within the life expectancy of the equipment. 

Expand the use ofthc Outage Management System (OMS) to quantify trends in the impacts of 

extreme weather on outages by specifically documenting additional weather-related causes of 

outages. This information can be used in cost-benefit analysis of infrastructure upgrades to 

increase resil iencc to extreme weather. 

Raise awareness of increasing wildfire risk among staff and increase the capacity of employees to 

prepare for and respond to this risk through additional wildfire training, upgrading infrastructure 

with fire-resistant materials, and maintaining defensible space around critical infrastructure. 

Collaborate with adjacent land owners to reduce vegetation fi.Jels and wildfire hazard along the 

transmission lines and ncar critical infrastructure at the hydroelectric projects. 

Collaborate with state resource management agencies and academic institutions to map landslide 

risk along City Light's transmission line rights-of-way. 

Page5of9 
95 

Upgrade current transmission infrastmcture to be resilient to higher peak flows and flood hazard 

in locations that currently experience flood-related damage. Consider projected increases in 

flooding in the design of new transmission projects located in or near historical floodplains. 

Case Studies on Climate Impacts 

Oso Mud Slide- March 22, 2014 

The 300-acre landslide in Oso, Washington, that killed 30 people and destroyed a local community, 

occurred during a March that was the wettest in history, a condition likely exacerbated by climate change 

and the geology of the area (soft soils and logging). The slide which occurred to the north of Seattle City 

Light's transmission line from its Skagit Hydropower Project caused minor damage to one to\Yer and 

came within feet of causing significant damage to our transmission line (sec attached map). 

The Oso slide is an example of some of the impacts that we are concemed about with climate change. As 

the frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation increases, these loose, sedimentary soils are more likely 

to slide. If the Oso slide had happened on the south side of the valley, our transmission lines would have 

been destroyed for about a mile at minimum and potentially more. In anticipation of this becoming an 

increasing risk, City Light has applied twice for a Federal Emergency Management Act grant to retrofit 

six "dead-end" towers in this area to limit the amount of damage that could occur from a similar, or 

smaller, slide. We have been unsuccessful to date but look forward to more engagement from federal 

agencies on the importance of climate resiliency mitigation regarding critical infrastmcture. 

While the proximity of Seattle City Light· s transmission line constituted a significant risk to the utility, it 

also provided an opportunity for the electric utility to be of major assistance to the community when the 

main arterial, Washinj,>ton State Route 530 between the cities of Darrington and Arlington was destroyed 

in the slide. A single-lane gravel road known as the Seattle City Light Access Road was able to be used to 

bypass the section of State Route 530 blocked by the landslide. This saved the local community, 

including emergency vehicles, logging tmcks and busses transporting students, honrs of commuting and 

hundreds of additional miles on the odometer 

Photo: Oso Muds/ide Extenc ··· 2014 

Page 6 of9 
96 

until the Route 530 was reconstructed in October. 

Goodell Creek Fire- August 2015 

Multiple wildfires began on June 28, 2015, in Washington State. For the first time in Washington State 

history, officials asked residents to volunteer to assist in fighting the wildfires. By early September as 

many as 3,000 firefighters were deployed against fires that had bumed over 900,000 acres ofland and 

Photo: A steel tower ofSeatt/e City Light's 

S1wgit transmission line and dehris deposited b:v 

the landslide near Oso, TYa.'ihington in L\Jarch 

2014. 1he debris caused minor damage to a 

tmver. 

The Goodell Creek fire started on August 10, 

2015 and spread to the woods near the Skagit 

Hydroelectric project a few days later. Seattle 

City Light operates three dams and 

powerhouses at the Ross, Diablo and Gorge 

reservoirs in this area. These facilities 

produce about 20 percent of the power 

consumed by our customers and are served 

by transmission lines owned by Seattle City 

Light. The fire changed direction suddenly 

and bumed under the lines; debris from the 

fire caused the lines to start arcing, forcing 

the utility to shut down the transmission 

President Barack Obama declared the fires a federal 

emergency. 

Photo: Goodell fire near Newhalem, ff~1, August 2015 

lines that carry electricity from the hydroelectric project. Spillgatcs at all three dams were opened to 

maintain river flows to protect fish. With 15 minutes of warning, City Light needed to replace 20% of the 

power needed to serve load. The inability to deliver electricity from the Skagit cost the utility about 

$100,000 per day. The company town of Diablo was evacuated and Newhalem reduced to only essential 

personneL City Light firefighters worked to protect our assets -the powerhouses and residences and 

other stmctures in Newhalcm. While no structures were lost at Newhalcm, a fiber optic cable and several 

wood poles and the penstock for one small 

project were destroyed. Total cost to the 

utility was estimated at $5.3 million. 

Wildland fire risk was one the utility's 

climate scientist had identified well before 

the Goodell Creek fire last August. More, 

and longer lasting, fires have been occurring 

on the west side of the Cascades over the 

past few years. Seattle City has already 
97 

completed '"Firewise .. projects to protect buildings, and while the fire worked its way to one of the 

projects, it stopped before damaging the nearby buildings. The utility is also applying for mitigation funds 

with FEMA as part of the repairs following Goodell Creek to replace the existing heavy timber saddles, or 

supports, for the Newhalem power plant penstock with concrete saddles. The fire damaged five of the 

saddles and took the penstock out-of-service over the winter until the replacements could be installed. In 

addition, City Light plans to train its firefighters in wildfire fighting. 

In addition to the physical threat to the 

infrastructure at our Skagit Hydropower 

Project, during the course of the Goodell fire 

the week of August 17th, 20 15 when we had 

Phoro: Goodellfire near :Vewhalem, ff/1, August 2015 

to cease generation operations at Skagit, and de-energize the power houses and main transmission lines, 

the utility's Balancing Area Authority (BA) requirement had to be moved to the Boundary project with a 

single unit partially loaded to allow for regulation (varying generation up or down to match the variations 

in our customers' loads). Unfortunately, Boundary has only very limited storage as a "run of river" 

project. As a result of this, the water available at Boundary was limited and we projected we would nm 

out of water at Boundary and be at risk of placing the System Operations Center in a position of having to 

declare a capacity emergency with Peak Reliability due to the lack of ability to reliably carry reserves on 

behalf of our BA. However, staff anticipated this and successfully obtained water from parties upstream 

of Boundary to allow us to re-fill 

the reservoir 

successfully 

reserves at 

an excellent 

utilities 

assistance to 

an emergency 

next week City 

re-energize the 

move our 

to Skagit and 

Photo: Goodell Creek PYre .\.fap ·· 20/5 

Page8of9 

and continue to 

carry needed 

Boundary. This is 

example of 

providing 

another utility in 

situation. Early the 

Light was able to 

Skagit project and 

reserves back over 

resolve the matter. 
98 

Cyber Security Risk Management 

In addition to Climate Adaptation planning, City Light implemented programs to address cyber security 

and critical infrastmcture protection. In partnership with Seattle IT, City Light has instituted processes, 

training, and controls to protect against cyber threats and maintain reliable operations. Steps taken by City 

Light include hardening of critical City Light networks and systems: isolating command and control 

systems from the Internet or hardening security protocols where isolation is not feasible: network 

surveillance: and controlling access to systems and facilities. City Light is in compliance with the federal 

cyber security standards mandated by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, NERC. 

Finally, City Light regularly monitors cyber threats and conducts voluntary cyber security assessments 

with the intent to identify areas for continual improvement. These findings arc integrated into a work 

program that forms the basis of its cyber security program. 

Page 9 of9 
99 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Dr. Best. 

Again, thanks to all the witnesses today. You obviously represent 

the interests of our infrastructure across a variety of different 

areas in your testimony and help illuminate some of the challenges 

that we have been dealing with here in the Northwest. So thank 

you for that. 

I would like to begin with you, Mr. Ezelle, as it related to some 

of the things that you have mentioned, in regards to the National 

Guard. Obviously, you and I have worked together on Oso and on 

the two major fires that we have had in our state, so we have had 

a lot of chances to see the operations on the ground. 

In talking with you during some of those events and now hearing 

from Commissioner Bowman, I just want to ask you on this issue 

of rail response since I used to say Ports-R-Us, but I think we 

should say Ports-R-Us and Railroads-R-Us. If you have this many, 

if you are a state of our position and export opportunity, we have 

become central for pushing product. Obviously crude by rail, is a 

major shift change in what we have seen. How are you best preparing for the issues as it relates to the population centers across 

our state? 

Mr. EZELLE. Madam Chair, thanks for the opportunity to comment on that. 

The Washington State Legislature realized the criticality of this 

issue and in this biennium they allocated funding for four FTEs to 

the Washington Military Department and Emergency Management 

Division. Our specific purpose is to work with the counties and 

communities along these railroads, both the incoming rail route 

along the Columbia Gorge, but also, secondarily, the outgoing 

routes where the empties travel because the empties also have a 

hazard themselves. 

What we are doing is working with the local Emergency Planning Committees to build detailed response plans within the communities, within the counties so if there is an accident of the type 

that we saw in Mosier that our communities are ready and able to 

respond. 

Senator CANTWELL. Commissioner Bowman, did you want to add 

something about your experience from Mosier? 

Ms. BOWMAN. Absolutely, thank you. 

Maybe to put a little bit of my remarks into context, I wasn’t at 

the derailment but I was there within about three minutes of the 

derailment. And so I saw the first flames go up, and I was one of 

the first to call 911 in response. 

When after the derailment I ran down to the site, I got within 

about 200 yards of the derailment and the fire which, I think, as 

you know, Senator Cantwell, was about 300 feet from the local 

school. 

A couple of things that really stood out for me from that experience was, with all due respect to our first responders in those remote rural areas of the state, this is Oregon, but you know, it’s 

right across the river from Bingen, Washington. 

With all due respect to the first responders, they’re all volunteer 

fire fighters, they had no experience in dealing with oil fires and 

that was immediately evident. Obviously, a fire caused by oil is 

much different in terms of the way you fight it than is a fire caused 
100 

by, excuse me, anything else. The first thing that I did was call 

Burlington Northern, and I wanted to call out the Burlington 

Northern for providing expert advice in terms of what the response 

would be. 

What I learned from the experience was that we would have 

foam trailers coming out to the site. Unfortunately, the foam trailers to deal with the fire didn’t arrive. It was almost four hours before they arrived. That was probably the other big take away for 

me. 

I immediately called our CEO at the Port of Seattle and our CEO 

at the Port of Tacoma and our Fire Chief at the Port of Seattle and 

directed them to provide any and all resources to the fire that 

needed to be. 

I’m proud that the Port of Seattle provided resources to the Port 

of Portland who was unable to deploy the foam trailers that arrived 

about four hours after the fire started. You may have heard later 

that the foam—that the fire was burning so hot at that point that 

the foam was disintegrating before it could even get to the rail 

cars. 

So, I guess the biggest take away from this is that, as you probably know, Senator Cantwell, it would have been a wildfire of catastrophic proportion had there been any wind that day. It was an 

absolute miracle that there was no wind. That’s what the Columbia 

Gorge is known for, is wind, and there was no wind that day. 

There’s no way that anybody could have responded quickly 

enough. And so, the things that I would ask the Committee and the 

Federal Government to consider are a few things. 

Providing more resources in terms of training emergency responders in these rural communities. As you noted earlier, it’s 

much different than in an urban area. Having foam trailers 30 

miles apart is not adequate. They can’t get there in time. 

I would say that we need better evacuation plans. There was no 

plan in this community for evacuating. Literally, residents were 

sitting trying to figure out what to do. I was on the scene for about 

two hours. When the third car started to ignite I decided it’s time 

to go home and pack and find a way out of town. By then the freeway was shut down. The only way to leave the town was through 

a rural, gravel road that is 12 miles back into the town of Hood 

River. Had there been a wildfire that route would have been closed 

off as well. So if we’re going to have crude by rail we need to have 

better emergency response. 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you. 

As a Port of Seattle Commissioner familiar with our waterfront 

access, I know we have had the mayor on some of our hearings and 

briefings on this. He has said he would not direct first responders 

to respond to an incident in the tunnel in Seattle if such an incident happened. How do you look at that same incident happening 

anywhere in downtown Seattle? 

Ms. BOWMAN. Well certainly the Port of Seattle would offer, 

again, any and all resources. My understanding is that the Seattle 

Fire Department should be the first responder at that point. But 

I don’t believe, I’m not sure that they’ve been trained adequately. 

Senator CANTWELL. Do you, having witnessed that incident (I 

don’t know exactly where to put it on a scale, but I would say it 
101 

is not one of the most significant events that have happened), but 

can you imagine that not having catastrophic effects if the Mosier 

incident happened in Seattle? Is there a way that event could have 

happened without catastrophic effects to us? 

Ms. BOWMAN. No. 

You know, again, in the case of Mosier, it was only the fact that 

there was no wind that day. But in the city of Seattle for something like that to happen in a tunnel, but I don’t know how you—— 

Senator CANTWELL. Or anywhere on the waterfront. 

Ms. BOWMAN. Or anywhere on the waterfront. 

But it is, given my experience in Mosier, it’s something that the 

Port of Seattle is taking a much closer look at how we can better 

coordinate with the other local agencies because I don’t think it’s 

something that we’ve really adequately planned for in the past. 

We haven’t—we don’t export oil at the Port of Seattle or at the 

Port of Tacoma so we haven’t had those immediate problems, but 

certainly the trains go through the city, and we want to work with 

the railroads to make sure that there is adequate response. 

Senator CANTWELL. I think it could be greatly impacted by that 

because, obviously, the rail goes by your facilities. It is something 

I am glad you are looking at. 

On cyber I wanted to focus on Mr. Rogers. Thank you for your 

testimony. When you are talking about this perimeter issue versus 

the software attacks which I feel like is never changing. Someone 

is going to cook up a new tool a week. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. 

Senator CANTWELL. So I get what you are saying. Instead of just 

protecting the perimeter, let’s look at the overall structure and infrastructure and ways in. 

How do we create a strong defense? What are the steps and tools 

we should be taking to address this shift? And what would be the 

three or four things we should focus on? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it’s interesting. I picked up on Mr. Hairston’s 

comments about some of the efforts that they’re doing with their 

facilities. The implementation of their security operation center, for 

example, using some, I’m sure, using some of the advanced data 

analytics that are becoming common within the industry now for 

security purposes to track user behavior, to determine whether or 

not access controls are properly being utilized, to determine if a 

user is acting in a way or accessing an application they shouldn’t 

be. I think that user access piece is one really important piece of 

that. 

Secondly, the follow up to that was the use of the security analytics through having a SOC, as we like to call it in the parlance 

of the industry, the Security Operations Center. To monitor that 

traffic is becoming increasingly important because you can’t just 

have a static type of barrier to prevent attack. You need to have 

people monitoring and watching behavior on the network. 

I think actually focusing the strengths of your new perimeter 

around the application itself, wherever it may reside, increasingly 

it’s knotting your own network. It may be in a cloud somewhere, 

it may be in a hosted environment, or it may reside on an application on a device somewhere. So the ability to protect that application through use of like a web application firewall and examining 
102 

the vulnerabilities of the application itself and how you protect 

against manipulation of those vulnerabilities. 

The idea is while the moat still needs to be there for your traditional network and the wall still needs to be there, it’s not enough 

anymore. You really need to focus on a deeper level of security with 

more analytics and a more proactive approach. 

I think in the past one of the things that’s been discussed in a 

risk profile, particularly here in the U.S. with the risk from terrorism, there’s been this concept of failure of imagination. If you 

can imagine the risk, then you should be able to try to find a way 

to defend against it. Where we run into problems is we lose that 

imagination about what the next, where the next attack could come 

from. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well it is certainly asymmetric on all fronts. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. And certainly when it comes to cyber, it is 

asymmetric. 

I, again, want to thank our National Guard. The fact that we 

have a concentration of software and the Air Force and National 

Guard, they have really taken a lead on, and the University of 

Washington on this issue of creating, step by step, of really cyber 

hygiene that they believe that people should be following as well 

as helping to create a workforce that is focused on getting us the 

best and brightest in this area. 

Mr. Imhoff, what do you think about what Mr. Rogers is saying 

as it relates to approaching this more from a software perspective 

and what we need to do from the national laboratory to help with 

that effort? 

Mr. IMHOFF. So I agree with him. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. IMHOFF. There’s still some work to be done on the perimeters. We learned in the Smart Grid Investment Grants that made 

the small and mid-sized utilities just can make huge progress by 

learning basic good housekeeping in terms of maintaining your perimeter and doing training, et cetera. But we need to go beyond 

that. We need to deliver advanced analytics and part related to 

crisp that focuses on the business side of the systems. 

The other attack plan of interest is the control side of the grid. 

Part of it is design, next generation controls that are inherently resilient and have adaptive response to threats, all hazards, not just 

cyber, but the control system helps let the system down and keeps 

it from propagating throughout the control system. That’s part of 

the strategy, the other part of anticipating where we’re heading. 

We recently helped NERC put in place their first designed basic 

threat assessment, looking at cyber, which basically says who are 

the actors? What are their intentions? What tools do they have? 

What options might they deploy to help attack? 

It’s really getting into the analytics figuring out where do you 

most need the analytics? How do you prioritize your defense inside 

the perimeter, if you will? 

And as you said, that game will never end. It will constantly go 

and go and go. But that scenario where we can create more distance between us and the adversaries in terms of being more strategic and more systematic from the electric industry standpoint in 
103 

terms of how do we anticipate and prepare the defense of the analytics. 

Senator CANTWELL. I am going to turn it over to the Secretary, 

but I do want to ask since you are looking at this from our national 

lab perspective. One of the things that we have discussed here locally is the notion that we need to continue to upgrade, that some 

of the security, as was said, is in that application and if we can 

just continue to get people to upgrade there are great securities in 

that. Now, of course, we are a software state, and we like upgrades. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, let’s just say we like upgrades when 

they work. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CANTWELL. And work effectively. 

Should we be looking at this from a different mindset? I mean, 

is this a continual game of how fast can we run ahead of the hackers or is there some level that we should be trying to get people 

to adjust to as it relates to the software side of the equation? That 

good hygiene is an upgrade once a year or every two years or something of that nature because we are fixing so many of the identifiable problems. 

So any thoughts, Mr. Imhoff or Mr. Rogers, on that? 

Mr. IMHOFF. That’s a tough question. 

I think that the intent in the Grid Modernization Initiative is to 

build very strong relationships with the vendor community and try 

to embed best practice and more resilience to the point that Scot 

mentioned in the next generations of grid vendor tools that are deployed out to the systems. I think there’s a lot of room for improvement in ensuring enhanced resilience in those software systems 

that get deployed out into the future. 

One big challenge we have is in the old days most of the grid upgrades were physical assets and going into the future they’re going 

to be digital assets, very different lifetimes and the need for more 

frequent upgrade and transition, et cetera. So, that’s going to be a 

really different world that we face going forward. 

One last comment I would offer is that to unleash the innovation 

in this space we need to have access to data. We need to preserve 

the privacy in that data. We need to preserve the security issues 

around that data. 

The Department, through ARPA–E, has been investing in several 

new grid programs looking at establishing data repositories that 

are anomalized such that basically you remove the privacy issues 

in the data but you maintain the physics that make that data useful for looking at innovations. I think this notion of data repositories that are safe and secure, that are available to the innovation 

community, is a big step forward to help us unleash the innovation 

but do it in a way that protects privacy and give them data sets 

that are safe. 

I think then, we can raise the bar in terms of the quality of these 

software upgrades, that the experience of the software engineers 

and control engineers market the utilities, et cetera and you’ll see 

that tomorrow. 
104 

Senator CANTWELL. Before Mr. Rogers replies, I know the subject 

can seem very dry or very geeky in some ways, but I guarantee 

you, it’s not. 

When our own data base in the Congress was hacked, the personnel system and the security clearance of every employee that 

had a security clearance was violated. You were putting the United 

States security at great risk, and this is going to continue, to say 

nothing of the personal side of each employee whose personal data 

and information was put at risk. We, as a nation, were undermined 

by those security clearances that were given to each of those individuals. 

That is something a foreign agent can act on or take advantage 

of so getting this right is very important. While I wish the Federal 

Government was an early adopter, let’s just say, Mr. Secretary, 

they are not an early adopter. We are, kind of, a late adopter when 

it comes to technology. So I think we are a good example, if you 

will, in that regard of what is happening with a large sector of our 

society being very late to moving forward on the latest and greatest. 

So Mr. Rogers, my original question, how should we look at this? 

Is there a new timeframe we should be looking at to stay ahead 

of people just in the sense of good hygiene? 

Mr. ROGERS. I think that brings up a couple of points. 

I think there are some opportunities for good hygiene. And I 

think, as Mr. Imhoff noted earlier, that just through their studies 

they found some low hanging fruit that some of the smaller producers and infrastructure providers could do to really help the resiliency. 

I think that one of the challenges that everybody faces is we 

have this innovation. We have these growing technologies, and it’s 

the people to operate them. 

I think one of the areas, to the point of doing the upgrades, managing the infrastructure, managing the security operation centers 

and so forth, talent development is going to be critical as well. I 

think I know that there’s some efforts that have been going on that 

have been mentioned earlier that were very important to get the 

talent within the area to help run these systems. 

I know that, for example, an initiative that F5 did, is we’ve 

reached out and have been pairing with the military for training 

on our products for military veterans as they leave the service. 

I think it’s these kinds of joint public/private types of efforts that 

can really go a long ways toward, you know, developing the talent 

pool because you can have all the software in the systems in the 

world, but if you don’t have the people to operate them or the people that work in the security operations centers to monitor them, 

then you’re really behind the game. 

Secretary MONIZ. Can I comment there? 

Senator CANTWELL. Yes, so I will turn it over to you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary MONIZ. Oh, okay. 

Senator CANTWELL. You can have as much time as you would 

like. 

Secretary MONIZ. Alright. 

Senator CANTWELL. To ask any of the witnesses questions. 
105 

Secretary MONIZ. Okay, well first I want to comment on these 

last two comments a little bit in terms of your question about what 

steps need to be taken. Actually, Mr. Rogers mentioned earlier in 

the Ukraine context multifactor authentication is a nominally, 

straightforward, not always to implement approach that can help 

a lot in these situations. 

Also, Mr. Imhoff’s comment, I just wanted to make a comment 

that goes, it’s much more broad than this issue. It’s a common 

issue. It applies here. And that is as we get more and more into 

a world where large scale computation, big data analytics, machine 

learning all become part of doing business here the data access is 

over and over again a big problem. It applies as much to cancer as 

it does to cybersecurity. 

So I think this question of data access is something that the Congress may need to, kind of, deal with in a very broad sense. 

Senator CANTWELL. You mean in the repository suggestion that 

Mr.—— 

Secretary MONIZ. Well, yeah, I mean from the cancer issue, it’s 

the same thing. There’s a lot of data out there but it’s hard to get 

it, proprietary, all kinds of issues how it’s heterogeneous in editions. So it’s a big problem, a broad problem, and certainly applies 

here as well. 

Well, if I have the floor? 

Senator CANTWELL. Yes, go right ahead. 

Secretary MONIZ. First of all, terrific panel and actually I have 

questions for everybody but I will not indulge myself in that. So 

maybe quick questions and quick answers. Maybe I’ll just get three 

questions out. 

First, Mr. Ezelle, Cascadia Rising, you’re Washington National 

Guard, dot, dot, dot. What’s the first thing you think you’re going 

to do if it actually happens? 

[Laughter.] 

Secretary MONIZ. Number two, let me just ask the three questions, then go back. 

Mr. Hairston, maybe I should know this given Bonneville’s relationship to the Department, but what would be your assessment 

from Bonneville about the security and ability to respond to a problem with large power transformers, particularly I don’t mean just 

one goes out, but let’s say a coordinated action taken against them? 

And third for Dr. Best, in your adaptation plan I believe one of 

the actions put in there is so-called retreating. 

Dr. BEST. Yes. 

Secretary MONIZ. Taking facilities away from at risk places. How 

big a challenge is that? I mean, are you talking about relocating 

everything or just very small number of keynotes. 

So those are my three questions. 

Mr. EZELLE. Well Mr. Secretary, I’ll take a stab at the first one. 

I mentioned that probably the key thing that we took away from 

Cascadia Rising, at least in the emergency management division, 

was perspective. And it really, truly turned how we look at a catastrophic event on its head. 

And in terms of the first thing that we’re going to do, obviously, 

for those of us who are in state government, I think the locals, the 

first thing is going to be to, essentially, take care of ourselves and 
106 

our families. So, do I have to dig out of my house, has it collapsed 

on me, will I be able to get to work to function? 

And so, that really drove home to us the fact that we need to 

have extremely detailed response plans. So for every emergency 

support function whether it’s transportation, whether it’s communications, whether it’s power, all integrated because, you know, 

what happens in transportation is going to affect what happens in 

ESF12. It’s going to affect what happens in ESF6 and 8. 

And so all of our detailed planning needs to be to an extreme 

level of granularity but then the big take away that we have is that 

those plans need to be run by somebody else because a significant 

number of us, who are, we are, who the state may be planning on 

responding are going to be victors. 

And so, it’s a case of really, truly putting together that planning, 

have somebody else outside of our area to be able to run those initial few days of the response until those of us who are in the area 

can dig out and then start establishing our capability and then 

starting to take it back. 

Hopefully that answers your question. 

Secretary MONIZ. Yeah, interesting, yeah. I figure just chaos basically. 

Mr. HAIRSTON. Alright, Mr. Secretary, in terms of the second 

question in respect to our ability to address an attack on a number 

of substations and subsequently the impact on transformers, it’s interesting. 

I think we’re growing in our ability to be able to respond. I think 

you might be aware the industry has done a lot of coordination on 

looking at spare transformer parts, what we can do to, maybe, leverage the number or the amount of inventory that’s existing. 

But, you know, being able to respond or replace transformers is 

a difficult measure. It takes months, if not years sometimes, to get 

the replacement transformers. So that’s why it is important for the 

industry to work together. 

The other thing is that and these are so expensive you’re not 

going to make that type of capital investment and have those types 

of, you know, that type of inventory sitting on the bench, so to 

speak. So, you know, we’ve got what is called a Spare Transformer 

Equipment Program that’s industry-wide, that would get a lot more 

involvement, and I think, positions us to be able to respond. 

I know there’s been some thought of a, I want to say, the strategic transformer reserve program that’s been, again, part of the 

FAST Act, that contemplates being able to respond in terms of a 

disruptive event. I think that would be a good complement to the 

existing program. So that’s something that I think is worth definitely exploring for the industry. 

Secretary MONIZ. Good. We’ll have a report on that. You’re probably working on it. Some people from BPA at least are working on 

it for Congress this year. 

Mr. HAIRSTON. Yes. 

Dr. BEST. Okay, retreating. 

So, I want to point out that retreating was the fourth of four different strategies that we put forward. We also said it was a strategy, sort of, of last resort because of the consequences of it. 

Mostly what we’ve looked at—— 
107 

Secretary MONIZ. That’s why I asked about it. 

Dr. BEST. Yeah, yeah. 

So we’ve looked at hardening of infrastructure like we are looking at the Oso-type landslide situation. We’re looking at increasing 

resilience, like fire wise, for our facilities. 

But we looked at retreating where you have a facility that is in, 

say, a flood plain that you know is going to be repeatedly at risk. 

And luckily for Seattle right now it doesn’t look as if Seattle City 

Light has critical infrastructure in the areas that are going to be 

flooded in the city. And so, we’re looking at the, what I would say, 

lesser infrastructure in those areas. 

But I think also this is a reason why it’s so important to work 

on climate preparation now because the decisions utilities are making now will last for 20, 30, 40, sometimes 50 years. And if we do 

the, make the right decisions now we can greatly reduce the impacts on our customers, on the utility and also on the environment. 

And so, I would say that one of the reasons for highlighting that 

in the plan is to say we really don’t want to be put in the position 

of having to move massive infrastructure or desert it and recreate 

it somewhere else. 

So I think that’s one of the reasons that to be aware that you 

can’t harden everything necessarily and you want to be careful 

about where you put things. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, I would just add to that, Dr. Best. 

I know we are going to wrap up here but if your other utility associates were here today they would be singing the same song as 

it relates to our wildfires and the amount of transmission that 

burned up and the costs that are now left with utilities to try to 

replace that in many parts of our state. Millions of dollars of infrastructure in an afternoon just gone. So figuring this out is really, 

really important for us. 

I just want to thank the panelists and again, the Secretary, for 

your testimony. You have given us some good ideas to think about. 

As a summation point from my side I definitely am hearing and 

sensing both from you, Mr. Secretary, but also from our witnesses, 

that we are both making preparatory plans and we are both thinking of these challenges but we need to somehow marry them together. The state and local and fed need to figure out how we continue to have this discussion and marry our solutions so we can 

give the American people our best efforts on these challenging new 

energy problems. 

I just thank everybody for being here today to give us that insight, and again, you, for traveling to the Northwest. 

Again, this subject is probably something we would like to put 

off to another day, but the realities of it are that they are affecting 

us right now. So I thank you for your willingness to come here and 

do that. 

I don’t know if you have any concluding remarks you would like 

to make? 

Secretary MONIZ. No, just to thank you for the hearing and 

thank the witnesses because there’s some very interesting information there. We’ll follow up. 

Senator CANTWELL. Great. 

Thank you all very much. 
108 

Secretary MONIZ. Thank you. 

Senator CANTWELL. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:39 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.] 
(109) 

APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED 
110 

BNSF Railway Response 

Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee 

Field Hearing to Conduct Oversight of the U.S. Department of Energy's Functions and 

Capabilities to Respond to Energy-Related Emergencies, Including Impacts to Critical 

Energy Infrastructure 

Monday, August 15, 2016 

BNSF provided the attached letter to the Senate Energy Committee and to Secretary Moniz from 

BNSF Chairman Matthew Rose prior to the August 15 field hearing to Conduct Oversight of the 

U.S. Department of Energy's Functions and Capabilities to Respond to Energy-Related 

Emergencies, Including Impacts to Critical Energy Infrastructure. This letter was an update on 

BNSF's safety record, specifically the measures it has taken toward the safety of crude-by-rail, 

and its significant investment in capacity expansion. 

BNSF seeks to clarify the record created at the hearing regarding freight rail. First, the record 

did not recognize the railroad industry's safety record and the significant steps taken to enhance 

the safety of crude-by-rail by railroads on their own and also as facilitated by the U.S. 

Department of Transportation and Congress. Second, the hearing record did not acknowledge 

the significant investments that have been made by the freight rail industry. Specifically, it was 

asserted at the hearing that crude-by-rail is moving at the expense of other traffic on the rail 

network, and that other commodities were being "pushed off' because capacity is constrained. 

The seriousness with which BNSF takes safety, and its historic level of investment to ensure 

best-ever service, particularly on Washington's "Great Northern" line, prompts this statement to 

correct the inaccurate impression as reflected in the record of the hearing. 

BNSF Network 

BNSF operates one of the largest freight rail systems in North America with approximately 

32,500 route miles in 28 states and also operates in three Canadian Provinces. BNSF has 

approximately 42,000 employees and operates about 1,200 trains per day. Total volume for all 

types of freight hauled by BNSF last year was 10.3 million units, the most of any railroad. 

BNSF employs approximately 4,000 people in Washington with an annual payroll of more than 

$309 million, and operates major rail yards in Auburn, Bellingham, Centralia, Everett, Pasco, 

Seattle, Spokane, Tacoma, Vancouver, Wenatchee, Wishram and Yakima. We also operate 

shops in Seattle, Spokane and Vancouver, two intermodal facilities in Seattle and one in 

Spokane. BNSF currently owns and operates more than 1,300 miles of track in Washington, 

moving more than 1.5 million carloads of freight through the state on annual basis. 

BNSF and the rail industry are currently experiencing the safest years on record, showing 

significant improvement over the past decade. Over the last 10 years BNSF has seen a reduction 

of nearly 50 percent in mainline derailments, which is consistently better than the rail industry 

average. 
111 

Continued robust investment in infrastructure has played a direct role in this success, along with 

the deployment of technology and safe operating practices, which involve rules compliance and a 

commitment to safety by BNSF's employees. Safety is the foundation of our business, so it is 

the most important thing we do. 

Technology has played a significant role in this success. As BNSF testified before the Senate 

Commerce Committee in 2015, BNSF employs numerous technologies on the railroad to reduce 

risk and drive continuous safety improvement. Below are examples of the spectrum of 

technologies being deployed on the network. Combined, they produce a body of data which 

BNSF mines through big data analytics tools, created in partnership with IBM, to detect 

conditions which could produce an incident, and ultimately predict and prevent them. These 

technologies include: 

• Track geometry vehicles that utilize sophisticated electronic and optical measuring 

devices to monitor all aspects of track infrastructure 

• Rail defect detection systems that utilize ultrasonic technology to detect internal rail 

defects 

• Wheel temperature detectors, using infrared technology, to identify wheel bearing fatigue 

• Machine Visioning systems to inspect freight cars in passing trains for defects 

2 
112 

• Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)-drones-for supplemental visual track & bridge 

inspections in a variety of conditions. BNSF is one of three companies awarded 

Pathfinder Program status by the FAA for extended track integrity flights. 

Positive Train Control (PTC) is another significant safety technology being deployed across the 

BNSF network. BNSF expects to be in compliance with the deadline established by Congress in 

the Surface Transportation Extension Act of 2015. 

In addition to rail technology and investment in rail infrastructure, BNSF also focuses on the 

development of a Safety Culture of Commitment by all BNSF employees which is a critical 

element of the company's approach to overall risk reduction. 

Crude-by-rail safety has been an important focus of the private sector (railroads and shippers) 

and public policy makers. An oversight exercise of critical energy infrastructure should be 

informed by these significant efforts. Attached is an overview of these actions. In summary, one 

of the most significant points is that BNSF has been able to work with its customers to get the 

newest, safest tank cars on the railroad as quickly as possible. As of August 2016, BNSF has 

eliminated its use of legacy DOT-Ill cars for crude transport in unit trains, a direct result of this 

collaborative effort. 

Another significant point is the extent to which BNSF continues to work with first responders 

and communities on emergency preparedness. In Washington alone, BNSF has held 

approximately 95 emergency response training sessions since 2014 and sponsored more than 250 

first responders to attend a three day crude oil training at the Transportation Technology Center, 

Inc. (TTCI) and at Texas A&M. In addition, BNSF has more than 30 responders in Washington 

and a number of fire and spill trailers, both in-house and through contractors, in the Pacific 

Northwest. 

Investment and Rail Service 

The situation in which we find our service now is completely different than that of two years 

ago, which was not recognized at the hearing. Shippers in Washington, and across the BNSF 

network, are experiencing best-ever service. This is confirmed in Surface Transportation Board 

service filings and, more importantly, by customers themselves. 

Over the last three years alone, BNSF capital investment has reached historic levels, particularly 

on Washington's "Great Northern" line. Over that time, BNSF has invested more than $550 

million in Washington and $3.5 billion in our rail lines connecting the Midwest to the Northwest. 

Since 2000, BNSF has invested $53 billion in capital across its network, and $15.3 billion over 

the last three years. 

These recent investments allowed BNSF to add about 1,000 miles of Centralized Traffic Control 

(CTC), 16 sidings and extended 24 sidings. Over 200 miles of double-track will be added to the 

network. Essentially, the Great Northern Corridor has been transformed to the functional 

capacity equivalent of the Los Angeles to Chicago Transcon Corridor, the busiest route on the 

BNSF network. The Great Northern Corridor now has two main lines on nearly 50 percent of 

the route between the Pacific Northwest and Chicago. 

3 
113 

In 2016, BNSF plans to spend $4.2 billion on capital projects across its network to support 

maintenance and expansion. This includes $2.8 billion for network maintenance, $300 million 

for continued implementation of positive train control, and $600 million for locomotives, freight 

cars and other equipment acquisitions. This includes the acquisition of 150 locomotives under a 

minimum purchase agreement with the manufacturer. In addition, we plan to invest $500 million 

on various capacity expansion projects, primarily a continuation of projects that were started in 

2015. 

~--

These investments increase the competitiveness of all BNSF customers and there is ample 

capacity to move all of BNSF' s current business as well as significant growth in the future in any 

segment ofBNSF business. For Washington State, this means more capacity for Washington 

shippers-grain, Boeing fuselages, and Washington lumber products to name a few-and 

Washington ports. We have already moved record levels of soybeans to Northwest ports through 

July. 

It was asserted at the hearing that crude-by-rail and coal are moving at the expense of other 

traffic on the network. This has never been the case, despite the importance of crude movements 

to the Pacific Northwest region. 

4 
114 

While the percentages of crude oil shipments moving on the BNSF increased significantly from 

525 crude oil loads in 2010 to 53,000 in 2015, this was simply a reflection of the fact that prior to 

20 I 0, BNSF and the rail industry handled very little crude. However, to put this more into the 

proper context, movements of crude on the BNSF network represented merely five percent of 

total rail traffic at its height in 2014. Citing 10,000 percent increases in crude is, therefore, 

misleading in terms of its potential impact to the rail network. This can also be seen in 

comparison to total Washington freight traffic below. 

State 

- &PI I 

El 12&91 

11£1 • II LIE &L 

&91 •alii! I 

_, HZ I 

Ell a&LUIIIII Ill II 

1&9&9&91121111111111111&91121111121£121&1212121212121212211l~1111~'1a1 

200,000 600.000 800.000 i ,000.000 1200,000 1.400.000 1,600,000 

m ConS<Hll€f Products w 1ndustrial 

5 
115 

According to the U.S Energy Information Administration, Washington is a principal refining 

center serving Pacific Northwest markets. This refining provides gas for our cars, jet fuel for 

airplanes, and fuel for the maritime and industrial sectors of the state. In fact, Washington is 

among the top 10 states in the nation in jet fuel consumption. Bringing crude-by-rail from North 

Dakota is the most economical way for Washington refineries to fulfill this demand. In other 

words, BNSF is moving this commodity because Washington's economy requires it and using 

U.S. product keeps fuel prices lower than bringing crude into the Puget Sound by super tankers 

from places like the Middle East and Nigeria. Consumers ultimately benefit at the pump. 

BNSF's network velocity is tracked through filings at the Surface Transportation Board and 

information is also made available by the Association of American Railroads (AAR). All sectors 

of business are experiencing excellent service. Specifically, agriculture shuttle turns per month 

to the Pacific Northwest have recovered from a low of 1.9 in December 2013 and are running at 

almost 3.0. We communicate frequently with our customers and have not heard concern about 

our performance. If there is a customer that believes we are not providing service that meets 

their expectations, we would like to hear from them. 

BNSF's network is an important part of the $28.5 billion rail-related economic activity in the 

state, much of it trade-related-the backbone of the region's economy. The statements at the 

hearing would give the impression that Washington's economy is currently plagued with unsafe 

freight movements of a product no one wants, resulting in serious congestion for all other 

commodities. This is false rhetoric, and does not serve the Northwest's reputation as a 

competitive center for international trade. BNSF welcomes a discussion on the safety and 

capabilities of a supply chain that allows the U.S. and Washington goods to be competitive in 

markets across the globe. However, characterizations of freight rail should be fair, and BNSF 

will make every effort to ensure that the public, policy makers and its customers have accurate 

information. 

6 
116 

RA/L.WAY 

August 12, 2016 

The Honorable Maria Cantwell 

United States Senate 

Washington, DC 20510 

Dear Senator Cantwell: 

MATTHicw K RosE Executive Chmrnwn BNSF Railway Company 

P.O. Box 961052 

Fort Worth, lX 76161-0052 

2650 Lou Monk Drive 

Fort Wm1h, lX 76131-2830 

817.867.6100 

817.352.7430 Fax 

I write to provide you with information that I hope will be helpful as you engage in a public 

dialogue about freight rail at the Senate Energy Committee hearing, and elsewhere. 

BNSF Railway's significant investment over the last several years, particularly on our Northern 

Tier and specifically in Washington, has expanded network capacity and fluidity. BNSF is 

providing best-ever service to all its customers. In April 2015, you cited the Department of 

Energy Quadrennial Energy Review's (QER) assertion that service disruptions were causing 

delays in agticulture shipments. That finding \vas obsolete before the QER was even printed, 

and BNSF moved record levels of agricultural products in 2015. As you and 1 have discussed, 

the end of 20 l3 and 2014 was a difficult period for BNSF service as volumes across 

commodities spiked. BNSF struggled to carry peak levels offreight and worked to maintain the 

integrity of its network operations for all customers. 

The situation in which we find ourselves now could not be more different. After three years of 

unprecedented levels of ncnvork investment, much of it directed to the lines that connect 

Washington to the Mid-West, BNSF's customers are experiencing the benefit of expanded 

capacity. BNSF has invested more than $3.5 billion in the northern lines over the last three 

years alone. These investments arc an important part of our ability to move record agriculture 

exports to Pacific Northwest (PNW) ports again this year, and our efforts to attract domestic 

intennodal business to the Puget Sound market to take trucks off the highways in partnership 

with our tmcking customers. Significantly, tl1is investment is critical to PNW ports, with whom 

we partner to attract export and import freight business. Our commitment to operating a safe, 

efficient and reliable network helps Washington remain the path for \vorld trade, and it is an 

important part of the $28.5 billion rail-related economic activity in the state. 

I also want to provide you with an update on rail safety. BNSF's safety record improves each 

year thanks to our investments, but also because of the utilization of technology that allows us 

to continually reduce risk in every category of safety. TI1is is tme of cmde-by-rail movements, 

as well. BNSF rc!,>ularly exceeds federal standards in pursuit of risk reduction consistent with 

real-time network operations. Most crude oil routes on BNSF are inspected up to four times per 

week, more than twice the inspection frequency required by the Federal Railroad 
117 

Administration (FRA), and our busiest main lines can be inspected daily. which includes our 

route through the Columbia River Gorge along the Washington side. 

BNSF has testified before you and the Senate Commerce Committee regarding its use of big 

data analytics to improve safety outcomes related to equipment, locomotives and track. BNSF 

utilizes a myriad of detection technologies along key routes on our network which send 

thousands of messages daily as they monitor for early signs of potential problems that could 

cause premature wear or failure. (Detectors are placed even more closely together in places like 

the Gorge to ensure potential issues are elevated as quickly as possible.) BNSF believes that 

this technology and the related analytics provide the means to take our very good safety record 

to the next level of targeted risk reduction. 

Our commitment to safety includes enhanced coordination with Washington's first responder 

and safety community. Last year, BNSF trained upward of 10,000 public emergency 

responders, with nearly 900 of these responders from Washington, on how to safely respond to 

hazmat incidents. Also, in the last three years, BNSF has sponsored more than 250 Washington 

first responders at a three-day specialized crude-by-rail training in Colorado and at Texas A&M. 

BNSF has specialized equipment and hazmat responders staged across its network to deal with 

hazmat and crude oil incidents, including firefighting and spill cleanup. During a hazardous 

materials incident, BNSF responders will be responding in unison with public responders, based 

on planning for combined efforts to achieve the most effective incident response. In 

Washington, BNSF has resources and equipment staged in Everett, Seattle, Vancouver, 

Longview, Bingen, Wishram, Pasco and Spokane and has 32 Hazmat Technician Level 

Responders located in Everett, Pasco, Seattle, Spokane, Vancouver and \Venatchee. 

New, advanced teclmologies are also improving coordination between BNSF and response 

agencies. Two new technologies- AskRail and SECURETRAK- provide immediate access to 

real-time data about individual rail cars, cargoes, and location information for first responders. 

The AskRail mobile app, developed by the rail industry, provides first responders with carspecific data for hazmat contents and railroad contacts during an incident. BNSF's 

SECURETRAK, which is a real-time, web-based Geographic Information System tracking 

program, is available to state and/or regional emergency centers. 

I am attaching several PowerPoint slides that illustrate the points made above. I appreciate the 

opportunity to update you on BNSF's operations in Washington and, as always, am available 

tor continued discussion. 

Sincerely, 

4~/£~~ Matthew K Rose 

cc: The Honorable Lisa Murkowski 

The Honorable Ernest Moniz 

2 
118 

Attachment 2 

Crude-by-Rail Actions 

Congressional and Executive Actions 

August 2013: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) Emergency Order No. 28 

Establishing Additional Requirements for Attendance and Securement of Certain 

Freight Trains and V chicles on Mainline Track or Mainline Siding Outside of a Yard 

or Tenninal (https://v\1\\\ .fra.dot.gm/cLib/dctaiis/L04719) 

August 2013: FRA Safety Advisory No. 2013-06 

• Preventing Unintended Movement of Freight Trains and Vehicles on Mainline Track 

or Mainline Siding Outside of a Yard or Terminal 

http :1/w\\ vv. fra.dot.gov/cLib/dctails/L04 720 

September 20!3: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) publishes 

Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking public comment on a proposed rule 

coJnoretlensl\'e improvements to rail safety of flammable liquids. 

November 20!3: PHMSA-FRA Safety Advisory No. 2013-07 

Safety and Plans for Class 3 Hazardous Materials Tr:msnorted 

February 2014: U.S. DOT Emergency Order No. DOT- OST-2014-0025 

Requires stricter standards to transport crude oil by rail including increased internal 

rail inspections (at least one additional above FRA requirements) and at least two 

geometry car inspections each year on crude oil routes 

Febmary 2014: U.S. DOT-Rail Industry Voluntary Agreement 

Additional special handling for key trains include: 

o Lower Speeds: Municipal speed restriction of 40 mph for Key Trains 

carrying crude oil in DOT-111 through High Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs) 

o Increased Trackside Safety Technology: Additional Hot Bearing Detectors 

(HBD) on cmde oil routes (max 40 mile spacing) 

o Risk-Based Traffic Routing Technology: Use of Rail Corridor Risk 

Management System (RCRMS) to determine the most safe and secure routes 

for crude trains of 20 or more loaded cars 

o Increased rail detection frequencies on Key Train routes 

o Rail Industry committed $5M to develop and deliver cmde-specific training 

to First Responders at Transportation Technology Center Inc. 
119 

May2014: 

May2014: 

July 2014: 

April2015: 

April2015: 

April2015: 

April2015: 

o Rail Industry commits to develop an inventory of emergency response 

resources 

(!illml/w"" .tmnsportation.gov!bricfing-room/l.Qttcr-association:gmerican-ra_i.lm:;g:!_'l.) 

FRA Safety Advisory No. 2014-01 

Recommendations for Tanks Cars Used for the Transportation of Petrolemn Cmde 

Oil by Rail urging shippers and carriers to avoid the nse of DOT -111 for Bakken '·to 

the extent possible." 

(https:!/w\\w.fw.dotggv/c\eib/dct:Jils/L052221!Jll z5 "D ISO lSD !SA kcmdc) 

U.S. DOT Emergency Order No. DOT-OST-20 14-0067 

Required each railroad to notify and provide to each State Emergency Response 

Commission (SERC) a reasonable estimate ofthc nnmber of cmde oil trains per week 

that move each 

U.S. DOT releases comprehensive mlemaking proposal to improve the safe 

transportation oflarge quantities of flan1mable materials by rail, including a Notice of 

Proposed Rulemaking for enhanced tank car standards, an Advanced Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking seeking to expand oil spill response planning requirements for shipments of 

flammable materials, and a report summarizing the analysis of Bakken cmde oil data 

gathered by PHMSA and FRA. 

FRA Emergency Order No. 30 

• Establishing a Maximum Operating Speed of 40 mph in High-Threat Urban Areas for 

Certain Trains Transporting Large Quantities of Class 3 Flammable Liquids. (BNSF 

already exceeded this EO) 

FRA Safety Advisory No. 2015-01 

Mechanical and Wheel Impact Load Detector Standards for Trains 

Amounts of Class 3 Flanunable 

FRA Safety Advisory No. 2015-02 

Information Requirements Related to the Transportation of Trains Carrying Specified 

Volumes of Flammable Liquids asks for infom1ation to be readily available and 

to the FRA within 90 minutes of an incident. 

PHMSA Safety Advisory No. 15-7 

• 
120 

May 2015: DOT announces Final Rule -Enhanced Tank Car Standards and Operational Controls for 

High-Hazard Flammable Trains 

To strengthen the safe transportation of flammable liquids by rail including tank car 

standards, operational controls, and new standards. 

November 2015: FRA Safety Advisory No. 2015-05 

Addressing Rail Head Surface Conditions Identified during the Internal Rail 

Inspection Process 

FRA recommends that each track owner: (7) Review its current engineering 

instmctions to ensure that the procedures are consistent with the industry 

standard for rail replacement and repair, particularly in track over which 

passengers or large quantities of ethanol, cmde oil, or other hazardous materials 

arc transported. 9 -

December 2015: Congress passes the FAST Act which includes 

numerous provisions supported freight related to rail safety 

generally, emergency response and the safe transport offlan1mable liquids 

by rail. 

Phase-Out of All Tank Cars Used to Transport Class 3 Flammable Liquids. Adds 

a new section that would require ALL railroad tank cars used to transport Class 3 

flammable liquids to meet the DOT -11 7 or DOT -117R specifications, regardless 

of train composition. Provides for a phase-out schedule for: 

o tank cars carrying Class 3 flammable service, including cmde oil (1 January 

2018 for non-jacketed DOT-111 tank cars, 1 March 2018 for jacketed DOTIll tank cars. 1 April2020 for non-jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars, and 1 May 

2025 for jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars): 

o (2) for tank cars carrying ethanol (1 May 2012 for non-jacketed and jacketed 

DOT Ills, 1 July 2023 for non-jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars, and 1 May 

2025 for jacketed CPC-1232 tank cars: 

o (3) for transport of Class 3 flammable liquids in Packing Group I (other than 

those specified under (1) and (2) the deadline is 1 May 2025: and for 

o ( 4) Class 3 flammable liquids in Packing Groups II and III (other than those 

already covered above) the deadline is I May 2029. 

o Deadlines for (3) and (4) may be extended by the Secretary of Transportation 

for up to 2 years upon a finding of insufficient shop capacity. 

Thermal blankets. Requires w/in 6 months that the Secretary issue regulations to 

require that each tank car built to meet DOT -117 specs and each non~jacketed tank 

car modified to meet the DOT -117R specs be equipped with an insulating blanket at 

least Yz '·thick. 

Top Fitting Protections. Requires legacy tank car retrofit fittings for pressure relief 

valves. 

Study and Testing of ECP brakes. Requires the Comptroller General to conduct an 

independent evaluation ofECP brakes. Specifics requirements of that study. Requires 

report w/in 18 months. Requires US DOT to conduct testing pfECP brakes with NAS 

and specifies conditions of that testing framework. Requires w/in 6 months after 

receiving results of that testing whether ECP benefits outweigh costs. If ECP brakes 
121 

July 2016: 

arc justified, then US DOT published reasons for that determination. If not, then ECP 

brake system requirements are repealed. 

Comprehensive Oil Spill Response Plans. Requires w/in 6 months that the Secretary 

issue regulations to require any RR carrier transporting a Class 3 t1ammablc liquid to 

maintain a comprehensive oil spill response plan. Specifies contents of that plan. 

USDOT may provide a copy of a redacted version of that plan to persons requesting 

it in writing. Protections from disclosure related to FOIA requests. Requires 

Secretary to consult with States to detem1ine whether there are specific concerns that 

should be taken into account when developing regulations called for in the bill for 

railroad carriers to maintain comprehensive oil spill response plans. 

Infommtion on High Hazard Flammable Trains. Requires w/in 90 days that the 

Secretary issue regulations to require railroads to provide infonnation on high-hazard 

t1ammable trains to State emergency response commissions consistent with EO 

Docket DOT-OST-20 14-0067 and include appropriate protections from public 

release of proprietary infonnation and security-sensitive information (includes 

categories described in sec. 1520.5 (a) oftitlc 49). 

PHMSA issues notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on oil spill response plans and 

information for high-hazard t1ammable trains. 

*In addition, several annual appropriations bills included the following crude-by-rail related provisions: 

Mandated comprehensive oil spill response plans 

Provided funding for a new Short Line Railroad Safety Institute for safety training for short line 

railroads transporting crude and ethanol 

• Provided additional funding for new hazardous materials and rail safety inspectors 

• Provided eligibility for cmde-by-rail training and response through the emergency preparedness 

fund 

Additional Voluntary Actions 

August 2013: Rail industry voluntary risk-reduction procedures: Long standing best practices for 

special handling of Key Trains extended to cmde and ethanol shipments 

Key Train Definition: One or more /oodv ofTJH,PJH materials. 20 or more lank 

load1· a( any hazardous materials 

Special handling for key trains: 

Lower Speeds: Nationwide speed restrictions of 50 mph for all key trains 

Unattended Trains: 

o Crude oil trains left unattended require specific job safety briefing 

between train crew and train dispatcher 

o Locomotive Cab Securement: Key Trains left unattended have reverser 

removed and cab doors locked 

• BNSF: More restrictive handling of tracksidc equipment detection exceptions 

and 'emergency braking' events 
122 

Æ 

November 2013: The Association of American Railroads (AAR) again urges DOT to improve federal 

tank 

car regulations and require all tank cars transporting hazardous flammable liquids such 

as crude oil be retrofitted or phased out of crude service. 

This follows actions beginning in August 2009 that began discussions and 

processes to upgrade industry tank car standards that would exceed the safety 

standards ofDOT-llls. The AAR fonnally petitioned PHMSA to implement 

tougher tank car specifications for DOT -Ill tank cars used for crude oil and 

other hazardous materials (hazmat) in March 2011. h1 August 2011, in the 

absence of any announcement by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), 

the AAR Tank Car Committee adopts industry construction specifications for 

new tank cars and the stronger CPC-1232 design becomes the standard for all 

tank cars built after October 20 II. 

October 2014: TI1e rail industry releases its AskRailTM (www.AskRail.us) mobile application, which is 

an additional tool for emergency responders to access tank car information when 

responding to an incident. 

March 2015: BNSF-spccific Voluntary Actions for additional special handling for key trains: 

Lower Speeds: 35 mph for all cmdc oil trains through municipalities of lOOk or 

larger 

Increased Trackside Safety Technology 

o HBD spacing of I 0 miles on crude routes that parallel critical waterways 

o Key Train stopped by HBD must set-out the indicated car 

o Key trains with Levell! Wheel Impact Load Detector (WILD) defect (120-

140 Kilopound (Kips)) will be handled as a Level I defect (immediate seton!) 

Increased rail detection frequencies and increase the rail detection testing frequencies 

along critical waterways (BNSF currently at 2x FRA frequency: going to 2.5x with 

this change) 

Emergency Response Training 

The Rail Industry is constantly working with first responders as part of its ongoing commitment to the 

safety of the communities we serve all across the country and have been doing so for decades through a 

number of different sources. BNSF alone has trained more than 65,000 emergency responders since 

1996. In past years BNSF trained an average of 3,500 local emergency responders each year in 

communities across the network.