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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KENNETH B.*

(AC 45975)

Clark, Seeley and DiPentima, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of the crime of assault in the second degree,

and, under a part B information, on a plea of guilty, of being a persistent

serious felony offender, the defendant appealed to this court. The victim

did not testify at the defendant’s trial. Instead, the state introduced

evidence of the victim’s injuries through, inter alia, the testimony of S,

the emergency room physician who treated the victim on the night of

the incident. Over the objection of the defendant, two photographs of

the victim were also admitted into evidence. These photographs were

taken shortly after the assault occurred and depicted the victim with

lacerations on her forehead and lips and with blood on her face and

shirt. On the defendant’s appeal, held:

1. There was sufficient evidence to sustain the defendant’s conviction of

assault in the second degree: the jury reasonably could have concluded

that the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis of the

evidence regarding her loss of consciousness during the incident, as

this court previously has held that loss of consciousness may constitute

a serious loss or impairment of the function of a bodily organ; moreover,

contrary to the defendant’s contention, the jury was entitled to rely

on S’s testimony regarding the victim’s statement to him that she had

experienced a brief loss of consciousness because the hearsay was

admitted without objection; furthermore, the evidence was not insufficient merely because it was in conflict with or inconsistent with testimony that defense counsel elicited from S that certain medical records

indicated that the victim had denied any loss of consciousness to the

registered nurse who treated the victim on the night of the incident.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting into evidence the

two photographs of the victim: contrary to the defendant’s assertions,

the photographs were relevant because they were probative of the two

statutory (§ 53a-60 (a) (1)) elements of assault in the second degree,

namely, that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious physical

injury and that he caused the victim serious physical injury, as the

defendant’s intent could be inferred from the type of wounds inflicted,

and the photographs depicted the size and location of the lacerations,

in addition to the resulting blood loss, which were indicative of the

severity of the victim’s injuries; moreover, the trial court properly concluded that the photographs were not unduly prejudicial, despite their

graphic nature, because they tended to prove a material fact in issue,

and the trial court reasonably determined that their probative value

outweighed their prejudicial impact.

Argued October 11, 2023—officially released January 9, 2024

Procedural History

Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crime of assault in the

second degree, and, in the second part, with being a

persistent serious felony offender, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, geographical area number fifteen, where the first part of

the information was tried to the jury before Baldini,

J.; verdict of guilty; thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court, Cordani, J., on a plea of guilty to the

second part of the information; judgment in accordance

with the verdict and plea, from which the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Tamar Birckhead, for the appellant (defendant).
Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Christian M. Watson,

state’s attorney, and David Clifton, senior assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, J. The defendant, Kenneth B., appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of assault in the second degree in violation of

General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) there was insufficient evidence

presented at trial to support his conviction of assault

in the second degree, and (2) the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting into evidence two photographs

of the victim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found, and procedural history are relevant to our

resolution of this appeal. On the night of November 21,

2020, the defendant was in the apartment of his sister,

Emma S. (Emma). The victim, who is the defendant’s

adult daughter, was living with Emma during this time.

At approximately 9:45 p.m., while Emma was in her

bedroom, she heard the defendant and the victim

arguing in the living room. Emma shouted for the victim

to go into the bedroom, and when she did not, Emma

heard the argument continue and get louder.

Emma went into the living room and observed the

defendant standing over the victim, who was sitting on

the floor. The defendant was hitting the victim and

holding a small object in his left hand, which Emma

believed to be a handgun.1 Emma used a ‘‘grabber’’2

to

strike the defendant to get him off the victim. When

she told the defendant that she was going to call the

police, he left the apartment. Emma subsequently

called 911.

Officer Ryan Bailen of the New Britain Police Department arrived at the apartment to find the victim bleeding. Officer Bailen observed that there was blood on

the coffee table, blood and locks of hair on the floor

of the living room, and blood on the floor of the bathroom. A paramedic who subsequently arrived at the

scene observed that the victim was ‘‘bloodied up’’ and

‘‘[d]istraught.’’ The victim reported to the paramedic

that she was in ‘‘severe’’ pain and that she was missing

a tooth. The paramedic bandaged the victim’s wounds

and looked for the tooth.3 The victim was then transported by ambulance to the Hospital of Central Connecticut in New Britain.

At the hospital, the victim was treated by Theodore

Sherry, an emergency room physician. Dr. Sherry

observed that the victim had a ‘‘fairly deep’’ four centimeter laceration on her forehead, had two lacerations

on her lips and was missing a tooth. Dr. Sherry used

approximately twelve sutures to close all of the lacerations and sutured the laceration on the victim’s forehead

in two separate layers. The victim reported to Dr. Sherry

that she had experienced a brief loss of consciousness.

Dr. Sherry ordered a computerized tomography scan

as a result of the victim’s head trauma, to assess if there
was bleeding in the victim’s brain or facial fractures;

the results of the scan showed neither.

As a result of this incident, the defendant was arrested

and charged, by way of a substitute information, with

one count of assault in the second degree in violation

of § 53a-60 (a) (1). After a trial, the jury found the

defendant guilty as charged. The defendant then

pleaded guilty to a part B information, which charged

him as a persistent serious felony offender in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-40 (c). The court subsequently

sentenced the defendant to fifteen and one-half years

of incarceration followed by four and one-half years of

special parole. This appeal followed. Additional facts

and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that there was insufficient

evidence to establish that he had caused serious physical injury to the victim, as required for a conviction of

assault in the second degree. We conclude there was

sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction.

‘‘In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we

apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence

in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict.

Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom

the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that the

cumulative force of the evidence established guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Luciano, 204 Conn. App. 388,

396, 253 A.3d 1005, cert. denied, 337 Conn. 903, 252 A.3d

362 (2021). ‘‘As we previously have explained, proof

beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond

all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis

of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been

found credible by the [finder of fact], would have

resulted in an acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask

whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that

would support a reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

We ask, instead, whether there is a reasonable view of

the evidence that supports the [fact finder’s] verdict

of guilty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Fisher, 342 Conn. 239, 249, 269 A.3d 104 (2022).

‘‘To convict the defendant of assault in the second

degree under § 53a-60 (a) (1), the state was required to

prove that (1) the defendant intended to cause serious

physical injury to another person, and (2) acting with

such intent, the defendant caused serious physical

injury to that person.’’ Id., 250. For purposes of that

statute, ‘‘serious physical injury’’ means ‘‘physical injury

which creates a substantial risk of death, or which

causes serious disfigurement, serious impairment of

health or serious loss or impairment of the function of

any bodily organ . . . .’’ General Statutes § 53a-3 (4).
At trial, the state presented evidence regarding the

victim’s injuries primarily through the testimony of Dr.

Sherry. Dr. Sherry testified about the ‘‘surgical intervention’’ required to close the lacerations with approximately twelve sutures and explained that, as to the

fairly deep laceration to the victim’s forehead, he ‘‘had

to suture the deeper layer first and then the superficial

layer.’’ As to the forehead laceration, Dr. Sherry testified

that he ‘‘[t]ypically’’ would expect a scar to be formed,

which would be ‘‘[t]he same length [as] the wound,’’

but that he could not say whether the victim had a scar

in the present case because he had not seen her since he

performed the surgical procedure. Dr. Sherry explained

the risks that would be present if the victim’s injuries

had gone untreated, specifically, that ‘‘any kind of external wound that’s not treated has a risk of infection.

. . . [T]he skin is an organ; the largest in the body, and

it serves many functions, one of which is . . . a barrier

against infection,’’ and, as to ‘‘cosmetic effect . . . if

it wasn’t fixed, then there would be a larger scar.’’ Dr.

Sherry further testified as to his observation that the

victim was missing a tooth and that he did not provide

any treatment related to the tooth, as it would be appropriate for the victim to follow up with a dentist. In

addition to Dr. Sherry’s testimony, the state presented

testimony from the paramedic about the victim’s missing tooth and photographic evidence of the victim’s

lacerations.

Dr. Sherry also testified that the victim had reported

a brief loss of consciousness. On cross-examination,

defense counsel elicited testimony from Dr. Sherry that

certain medical records indicated that the victim had

denied any loss of consciousness to a registered nurse

who treated her at the hospital. On redirect examination, Dr. Sherry testified that he was not present when

the victim talked to the registered nurse, and he confirmed that the victim did report directly to him that

she had lost consciousness.

The victim did not testify at trial. An inspector with

the New Britain State’s Attorney’s Office testified

regarding his efforts to serve a subpoena on the victim

and his inability to locate her despite those efforts.

After the state rested, defense counsel made an oral

motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the court

denied.

During the state’s closing argument, the prosecutor

argued that there were multiple theories under which

the jury could find that the defendant had caused serious physical injury to the victim. Specifically, the prosecutor argued that the victim’s forehead laceration and

missing tooth constituted serious disfigurement, the

laceration constituted a serious impairment of the victim’s health, and the laceration and the victim’s brief

loss of consciousness constituted a serious impairment

of the function of her bodily organs, i.e., her skin and
her brain.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence

of the victim’s loss of consciousness was insufficient

to support a finding that the victim suffered a serious

physical injury because the evidence constituted hearsay and there was conflicting evidence as to whether

the victim had in fact suffered a loss of consciousness.

The defendant also argues that there was no evidence

that the forehead laceration or missing tooth caused

serious disfigurement to the victim.4

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence that

the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis

of the evidence regarding her loss of consciousness.

Because the jury reasonably could have concluded that

the victim suffered a serious physical injury on the basis

of the evidence of her loss of consciousness, we do not

address the defendant’s remaining arguments as to the

victim’s forehead laceration and missing tooth.

This court previously has held that loss of consciousness may constitute a serious loss or impairment of the

function of a bodily organ and, thus, a serious physical

injury. See State v. Morlo M., 206 Conn. App. 660, 673–74,

261 A.3d 68 (jury reasonably could find serious physical

injury on basis of testimony that victim lost consciousness at some point during defendant’s repeated beating

of her), cert. denied, 339 Conn. 910, 261 A.3d 745 (2021);

see also State v. Miller, 202 Conn. 463, 488–89, 522 A.2d

249 (1987) (severe facial lacerations and temporary loss

of consciousness caused by strangling were ‘‘ ‘serious

physical injur[ies]’ ’’ supporting conviction of assault in

first degree); State v. Rumore, 28 Conn. App. 402, 413–

15, 613 A.2d 1328 (temporary loss of consciousness and

laceration requiring surgical stapling satisfied ‘‘serious

physical injury’’ element of assault in first degree of

elderly victim), cert. denied, 224 Conn. 906, 615 A.2d

1049 (1992). In Rumore, this court explained that § 53a3 (4) ‘‘does not require that the impairment of the organ

be permanent. The jury could properly interpret the

evidence to prove that the victim’s brain was not functioning at a cognitive level when she was unconscious

and thus was impaired.’’ State v. Rumore, supra, 415.

The defendant contends that the evidence regarding

the victim’s loss of consciousness was insufficient

because ‘‘there was no testimony aside from a hearsay

statement attributed to [the victim] that she experienced a brief loss of consciousness,’’ and there was

no direct testimony from the victim herself and other

corroborating witnesses about that loss of consciousness. It is well established, however, that ‘‘when hearsay

is admitted without objection, it is a sufficient basis, if

believed by the trier, for a finding of fact.’’ State v.

Thompson, 305 Conn. 412, 438 n.7, 45 A.3d 605 (2012),

cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1146, 133 S. Ct. 988, 184 L. Ed.

2d 767 (2013); see also Walker v. Commissioner of

Correction, 103 Conn. App. 485, 492 n.2, 930 A.2d 65,
cert. denied, 284 Conn. 940, 937 A.2d 698 (2007); State

v. Outlaw, 70 Conn. App. 160, 168, 797 A.2d 579 (2002).

Indeed, ‘‘[i]n viewing the evidence, [i]f [inadmissible]

evidence is received without objection, it becomes part

of the evidence in the case, and is usable as proof to

the extent of the rational persuasive power it may have.

The fact that it was inadmissible does not prevent its

use as proof so far as it has probative value. . . .

[T]herefore . . . appellate review of the sufficiency of

the evidence . . . properly includes hearsay evidence

even if such evidence was admitted despite a purportedly valid objection.’’5

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Chemlen, 165 Conn. App. 791, 817–18, 140

A.3d 347, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 908, 140 A.3d 977

(2016). Accordingly, the jury was entitled to rely on

Dr. Sherry’s testimony, to which the defendant did not

object, regarding the victim’s statement to him that she

had experienced a brief loss of consciousness.

In addition, although the defendant elicited testimony

from Dr. Sherry regarding the victim’s inconsistent

report to a registered nurse, as reflected in the medical

records, we are mindful that ‘‘[e]vidence is not insufficient . . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent.

. . . The [jury] can . . . decide what—all, none, or

some—of a witness’ testimony to accept or reject.’’

(Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Michael T., 194 Conn. App. 598, 621, 222 A.3d

105 (2019), cert. denied, 335 Conn. 982, 242 A.3d 104

(2020). As explained previously, Dr. Sherry testified

on redirect examination, consistent with his testimony

during direct examination, that the victim reported

directly to him that she lost consciousness. On the basis

of Dr. Sherry’s testimony, we conclude that there was

sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably

could have found that the victim suffered a serious

impairment of the function of a bodily organ and, thus,

a serious physical injury.

II

The defendant next claims that the court abused its

discretion in admitting into evidence two photographs

of the victim. Specifically, the defendant claims that

the photographs were (1) irrelevant and (2) unduly prejudicial. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. At trial, the state sought to admit into evidence

two photographs of the victim during its direct examination of Officer Bailen. The photographs depicted the

victim with lacerations on her forehead and her lips and

with blood on her face and her shirt. Defense counsel

objected to the admission of both photographs on the

basis that they were ‘‘[m]ore prejudicial than probative . . . .’’

The court heard arguments from the parties outside

the presence of the jury. The state argued: ‘‘[O]ne of
the elements that the state has to prove here is serious

physical injury. I think those photos accurately depict

the injuries on the night in question. Obviously, the

jury’s not going to have the victim here to testify about

what those injuries did to her. There will be medical

personnel to talk about the medical treatment that

related to those injuries; however, the state does need

to put forward proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

the assault caused serious physical injury, and I would

report that those two photos accurately depict that

element.’’

Defense counsel argued that the photographs would

‘‘unduly arouse the jury’s emotions and cause prejudice.

As [the prosecutor] has said . . . he’s going to call the

medical [personnel] to testify to the conditions of the

lacerations. And the pictures here have blood everywhere, Your Honor. They’re not exactly explaining the

injury in itself, Your Honor. Just because there’s blood

everywhere that can arouse the jury’s emotions. I think

that the harm is serious and inflammatory.’’

The court overruled defense counsel’s objections and

determined that the photographs were admissible. The

court explained: ‘‘I find that [these photographs] would

assist in establishing elements of this offense, including

intent, causation and the issue of serious physical

injury. . . . I am mindful that the appropriate test is

relevancy, not necessity. Also, that a potentially inflammatory photograph, which I think that’s the defense’s

argument in this particular case, that both photographs

are inflammatory. Those photographs that may be characterized that way may be admitted if the court in its

discretion determine[s] that the probative value of the

photograph outweighs the prejudicial effect that it

might have on this particular jury. These photographs,

in this court’s assessment, have a reasonable tendency

to prove or disprove a material fact at issue. I do believe

that the probative value does outweigh its prejudicial

effect with respect to both photographs. I’ve considered

the case law, including State v. Lane, [206 Conn. App.

1, 258 A.3d 1283, cert. denied, 338 Conn. 913, 259 A.3d

654 (2021)], along with State v. Kelly, [256 Conn. 23,

770 A.2d 908 (2001)]. I therefore find that these photographs, both of their probative value does outweigh

[their] prejudicial effect. And I also note . . . with

regard to the number of photographs, there are two.’’

After the jury returned to the courtroom, the court

explained that the photographs were admitted as full

exhibits. Officer Bailen testified that the photographs

accurately depicted the victim’s appearance on the

night of November 21, 2020.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the applicable

standard of review. ‘‘Our standard of review for evidentiary matters allows the trial court great leeway in deciding the admissibility of evidence. The trial court has

wide discretion in its rulings on evidence and its rulings
will be reversed only if the court has abused its discretion or an injustice appears to have been done. . . .

The exercise of such discretion is not to be disturbed

unless it has been abused or the error is clear and

involves a misconception of the law. . . . In addition,

[e]very reasonable presumption should be made in

favor of the correctness of the court’s ruling in

determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane, supra, 206 Conn. App. 14.

On appeal, the defendant first claims that the photographs were irrelevant.6 Section 4-1 of the Connecticut

Code of Evidence provides that ‘‘ ‘[r]elevant evidence’

means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination

of the proceeding more probable or less probable than

it would be without the evidence.’’ This court has noted

that ‘‘[r]elevant evidence is evidence that has a logical

tendency to aid the trier in the determination of an

issue. . . . One fact is relevant to another if in the

common course of events the existence of one, alone

or with other facts, renders the existence of the other

either more certain or more probable. . . . Evidence

is not rendered inadmissible because it is not conclusive. All that is required is that the evidence tend to

support a relevant fact even to a slight degree, [as] long

as it is not prejudicial . . . . In determining whether

photographic evidence is admissible, the appropriate

test is relevancy, not necessity.’’ (Citation omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane, supra,

206 Conn. App. 14–15.

At trial, the state bore the burden of proving beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to cause

the victim serious physical injury and caused the victim

serious physical injury. See General Statutes § 53a-60

(a) (1). The two photographs at issue are probative

as to both statutory elements. As to the first element,

because ‘‘[i]ntent to cause . . . serious physical injury

may be inferred from the . . . type of wound inflicted,’’

the photographs have probative value to show intent.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane,

supra, 206 Conn. App. 15; see also State v. Best, 337

Conn. 312, 320, 253 A.3d 458 (2020) (‘‘[t]he extent and

severity of injuries often are used as indirect proof of

intent’’); State v. Osbourne, 162 Conn. App. 364, 372,

131 A.3d 277 (2016) (photographs depicting victim’s

blood loss and bloody clothing were relevant to issue

of ‘‘whether the defendant possessed the requisite

intent of the crime charged’’). As to the second element,

the photographs depict the size and location of the

lacerations on the victim’s face, in addition to blood

loss resulting from those lacerations, which were indicative of the severity of those injuries. State v. Best,

supra, 318 (amount of blood loss suffered by victims

immediately after shooting was indicative of severity

of wounds and had tendency to prove that wounds
were grievous enough to cause death of one victim and

serious physical injury to other victim); State v. Lane,

supra, 15 (photographs depicting black eye and surgical

wounds were indicative of severity of injuries and had

tendency to prove that injuries were sufficiently severe

to constitute serious physical injury); State v. Osbourne,

supra, 371–72 (photographs depicting blood loss and

bloody clothing were relevant, among other reasons,

to establish that victim suffered physical injury).

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion in determining that the photographs were

relevant.

We next address whether the trial court properly

concluded that the photographs were not unduly prejudicial. Section 4-3 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence

provides that ‘‘[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if

its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice or surprise, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,

waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative

evidence.’’

The defendant argues that the photographs are

unduly prejudicial because they are ‘‘graphic’’ and gory,

as they depict the victim ‘‘moments after the incident,

covered in blood . . . .’’ He contends that the photographs served only ‘‘to disgust and inflame the jur[ors],

deterring them from carefully considering whether the

state had met its burden.’’ As our Supreme Court noted

in Best, however, even gruesome photographs can be

admissible if they tend to prove or disprove a material

fact. State v. Best, supra, 337 Conn. 323–24. ‘‘[P]hotographs [that] have a reasonable tendency to prove or

disprove a material fact in issue or shed some light upon

some material inquiry are not rendered inadmissible

simply because they may be characterized as gruesome.

. . . The question is not solely whether the evidence

is gruesome, disturbing or otherwise inherently prejudicial but whether its prejudicial nature is undue or unfair,

a question that requires the trial court to undertake

the relativistic assessment of probative value versus

prejudicial effect . . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lane, supra, 206

Conn. App. 16.

Thus, contrary to the defendant’s contention, the photographs at issue in the present case are not rendered

inadmissible simply because they may be characterized

as ‘‘graphic’’ or gory. The court reasonably determined

that the probative value of the photographs, depicting

injuries sustained by the victim, outweighed their prejudicial impact. See State v. Best, supra, 337 Conn. 316,

325 (concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, on balance, probative value of

photographs depicting bloody interior of car outweighed their prejudicial effect); State v. Osbourne,

supra, 162 Conn. App. 375 (‘‘although the photographs
admitted into evidence depicted blood found at the

scene and the victim’s bloody clothing, the trial court’s

determination that they were more probative than prejudicial [did] not constitute an abuse of discretion’’).

Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not abuse

its discretion in admitting into evidence the challenged

photographs.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of

victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victim or others through

whom the victim’s identity may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 At trial, Emma testified that she did not remember seeing anything in

the defendant’s hand and she did not remember telling the police that the

defendant had a gun. A redacted copy of a written statement that Emma

had provided to the police subsequently was admitted into evidence as a

full exhibit, which contained Emma’s report that the defendant had been

holding what she believed to be a small handgun.

2 At trial, Emma described the object that she identified as a ‘‘grabber’’

as a metal stick that she uses to pick up items and demonstrated to the

prosecutor its approximate length by showing him the cane she had with

her on the stand.

3 At trial, the paramedic testified that she did not find the tooth at the

apartment, but she believed someone located the tooth in the victim’s bra

when the victim subsequently was taken to the hospital.

4 Specifically, the defendant argues that (1) there was no evidence that

the forehead laceration left a scar, as the victim did not testify at trial and

Dr. Sherry testified only as to the risk of a scar, and (2) ‘‘there was no

evidence as to [the victim’s] age, suggesting that [the missing tooth] could

have been a baby tooth that would ultimately be replaced by an adult tooth

or that it was a wisdom tooth that would have otherwise been extracted.’’

5 To be clear, the defendant did not object to Dr. Sherry’s testimony and

does not claim on appeal that the testimony was inadmissible.

6 The state contends that the defendant did not raise a relevancy objection,

and, therefore, he failed to preserve this claim for appellate review. ‘‘[T]he

standard for the preservation of a claim alleging an improper evidentiary

ruling at trial is well settled. . . . In order to preserve an evidentiary ruling

for review, trial counsel must object properly . . . [by] articulat[ing] the

basis of the objection so as to apprise the trial court of the precise nature

of the objection and its real purpose . . . . [T]he determination of whether

a claim has been properly preserved will depend on a careful review of the

record to ascertain whether the claim on appeal was articulated below with

sufficient clarity to place the trial court on reasonable notice of that very

same claim.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taylor G., 315

Conn. 734, 769–70, 110 A.3d 338 (2015). At trial, the defendant objected to

the admission of the photographs on the basis that they were ‘‘[m]ore

prejudicial than probative . . . .’’ He did not raise a separate relevancy

objection, nor did he argue that the photographs had no probative value.

See State v. Best, 337 Conn. 312, 317 n.1, 253 A.3d 458 (2020) (defendant

functionally preserved relevancy claim where he argued that photographic

evidence was devoid of any probative value). Nevertheless, the defendant

subsequently argued that the photographs were ‘‘not exactly explaining the

injury in itself,’’ which is the same claim he makes on appeal. The state

addressed the relevancy of the evidence in response to the defendant’s

objection, arguing that the photographs were probative of the victim’s injuries, and, in the court’s ruling, it specifically addressed the relevancy of the

photographs, which ‘‘eliminate[s] any concerns that the trial court was not

on notice of the argument.’’ State v. Streit, 341 Conn. 170, 187 n.14, 266

A.3d 864 (2021). We therefore conclude that the defendant functionally

preserved his relevancy claim. See State v. Best, supra, 317 n.1.