Preventing Nepotism in the Federal 

Civil Service

A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND

THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

JUNE 2016



U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board

Susan Tsui Grundmann, Chairman

Mark A. Robbins, Member

Office of Policy and Evaluation

Director

James M. Read

Deputy Director

James Tsugawa

Project Manager

Sharon Roth

Survey Administrators

J. Peter Leeds

Allison Wiley

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................................ i

The President of the United States.............................................................................................................ii

Agencies ........................................................................................................................................................iii

U.S. Office of Personnel Management.....................................................................................................iii

Employees.....................................................................................................................................................iv

Applicants .....................................................................................................................................................iv

INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1

Purpose...........................................................................................................................................................2

Methodology..................................................................................................................................................3

CHAPTER ONE: THE CRIMINAL STATUTE.................................................................................5

Spouses Under the Criminal Statute ..........................................................................................................5

Children Under the Criminal Statute .........................................................................................................7

Avoiding Violations of the Criminal Statute.............................................................................................8

CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE ............................................... 11

Examples of Nepotism Warranting an Adverse Action .......................................................................14

Examples Where Nepotism Was Not Found.........................................................................................15

Exercising Poor Judgment.........................................................................................................................18

Deliberately Helping Someone Else Commit Nepotism......................................................................19

Avoiding Nepotism ....................................................................................................................................21

CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM...............27

Identifying a Nepotism Problem..............................................................................................................27

Certifications Regarding Relatives............................................................................................................30

Optional Form 306 (Declaration for Federal Employment)...........................................................30

Using Certifications to Ensure Appointments Are Not Influenced by Nepotism ......................33

Education and Guidance ...........................................................................................................................36

Education and Guidance Provided by the Employing Agency ......................................................37

Education and Guidance Provided by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.....................39

Fair and Open Competition ......................................................................................................................42

Holding Officials Accountable .................................................................................................................44

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................................47
The President of the United States...........................................................................................................47

Agencies .......................................................................................................................................................47

U.S. Office of Personnel Management....................................................................................................48

Employees....................................................................................................................................................48

Applicants ....................................................................................................................................................49

APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES ........................................................................................ 51

18 U.S.C. § 208............................................................................................................................................51

18 U.S.C. § 216............................................................................................................................................51

5 U.S.C. § 3110............................................................................................................................................52

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)-(c)..................................................................................................................................52

5 U.S.C. § 2301............................................................................................................................................57

APPENDIX B: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES ......59

APPENDIX C: THE EFFECTS OF NEPOTISM ............................................................................. 61

APPENDIX D: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SAMPLE DISCLOSURE FORMS ..................................65
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD i

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the Federal civil service, an official is not permitted to appoint, employ, promote, 

or advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement 

any individual who is a relative. Nepotism is prohibited by: (1) a criminal statute 

(18 U.S.C. § 208); (2) administrative statutes (5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(7) and 3110); and 

(3) the regulations for ethical conduct by Federal employees (5 C.F.R. § 2635.502). 

Each of these authorities apply to slightly different but often overlapping behaviors 

and the agency that is empowered to address the situation can vary. For example, 

while the Department of Justice would be responsible for prosecuting criminal 

conduct under title 18, an action for violating 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7) may be brought 

by the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) or the employing agency. Similarly, while 

only the criminal statute carries the possible penalty of imprisonment, the title 5 

penalties include, but are not limited to, removal, suspension, demotion, and 

debarment from future Federal employment. Agencies are authorized to address 

nepotistic misconduct through their disciplinary authority to prevent damage to the 

efficiency of the service (5 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a) and 7513(a)).

A Government-wide survey conducted by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board 

(“MSPB” or “the Board”) in 2010 shows that the extent to which employees 

perceive nepotism in their work units varies greatly by agency. Of the 14 agencies 

with at least 400 respondents, the percentage of respondents who reported they 

observed nepotism in hiring ranged from a low of 3.4 percent in one agency to a 

high of 15.9 percent in another agency. Such a difference in perceptions between 

agencies implies there may be things that agencies can do to reduce these

perceptions. The data show that when an employee perceives nepotism, the 

employee also tends to be far less likely to be engaged or motivated. Thus, the 

ramifications of nepotism can extend well beyond the individual who has been 

improperly hired or rewarded and affect the larger workforce. 

There is also a risk that when incidents become public, it will affect the public’s trust 

that the Government is free from corruption. And, of course, if less qualified 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ii PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

individuals are appointed and advanced, the work of the Government is less likely to 

be performed properly. 

The laws against nepotism have been on the books for decades, yet Inspectors 

General continue to issue reports identifying and documenting instances of 

employees hiring their relatives. The high ranks of some of those involved, and the 

extent to which human resources (HR) staff have been found complicit in assisting 

such actions, demonstrate that nepotism remains a problem that should be 

addressed. Federal employees hiring their close relatives is too fundamentally 

contrary to the idea of a merit-based system to be ignored. Below are some steps

that the President, agencies, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), 

employees, and applicants can take to reduce nepotism. 

The President of the United States

As explained in this report, new political appointees whose backgrounds do not 

include prior public service may be unfamiliar with the rules for the civil service, 

including the prohibitions regarding the employment of relatives. The transition 

between administrations may be a particularly high-risk period as – regardless of the 

outcome of the election – when there is a new President there will be a large number 

of new appointments to positions that are political in nature and thus filled by many 

individuals who do not have prior experience within the civil service. When these 

officials arrive in their new positions, it will be important for them to conduct 

themselves in accordance with the law. 

Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(c), the head of an agency is responsible for the prevention of 

prohibited personnel practices (PPPs). While some political appointees may already 

know about the rules for nepotism and the other PPPs, we recommend against 

assuming this knowledge is present. Transition plans should include preparations to 

educate political appointees about the PPPs, including nepotism, and how PPPs such 

as nepotism can be avoided. Additionally, once a new administration is in place, 

there will be inevitable turnover. As new political appointees come to serve, they too 

may require education about the PPPs, including nepotism.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD iii

Agencies

Agency leaders and those to whom they have delegated personnel authorities are 

obligated to prevent nepotism. Means by which this may be achieved include:

1. Making better use of HR staff as partners to advise employees about the 

rules and to raise concerns if personnel actions seem suspicious. 

2. Requiring additional certifications that personnel actions have not been 

improperly influenced when the agency deems such precautions necessary.

3. Educating executives, managers, supervisors, and employees about the rules 

of ethical conduct, including what it means to avoid nepotism and how they 

can achieve a merit-based workplace.

4. Ensuring that competitions for positions are as fair and open as is practical 

for the positions in question.

5. Holding employees accountable for their own conduct and for supervising 

the conduct of their subordinates.

U.S. Office of Personnel Management

OPM has delegated to Federal agencies much of the responsibility for hiring, 

including the prevention of nepotism. However, OPM should provide clear 

guidance to agencies on how they can accomplish this. The “Optional” Form 306 

(OF-306), Declaration for Federal Employment, contains information about an 

applicant supplied by the applicant, including any relatives employed by the agency. 

One purpose of the OF-306 is to preserve the integrity of the hiring process. OPM’s 

guidance regarding when the OF-306 is to be used is either incomplete, unclear, not 

followed, or has some combination of these issues. We recommend that OPM 

provide better guidance to agencies regarding the circumstances under which the 

OF-306 is required. 

As explained in the report, OPM’s guidance on some other matters involving 

nepotism is also unclear because, while purportedly still valid policy, the information
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

iv PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

is contained in a document that was sunset more than two decades ago. We 

recommend that OPM consider how it can better maintain a public, well-organized 

reference system that provides clear guidance, including distinctions between what 

OPM mandates and what it merely recommends that agencies consider. 

Employees

Employees who engage in nepotism may face possible criminal (18 U.S.C. § 208) or 

administrative sanctions (5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(7)), 1215(a), 7503(a), 7513(a)). The 

conduct that qualifies as nepotism and the penalty for such conduct can differ 

between titles 18 and 5. Ultimately, an employee is responsible for his or her own 

actions. However, for both title 18 and title 5, an employee may greatly reduce the 

risk that the penalties will be applied to him or her if the employee follows three 

steps:

1. Consultation: If a situation could pose a conflict of interest, the employee 

should consult an ethics advisor. An employee should exercise good 

judgment by not trying to judge his or her own case.

2. Disclosure: The employee should disclose the issue to a supervisor or other 

appropriate agency official so that the agency can decide the proper 

approach. An employee’s silence can damage the ability of the agency to 

trust the employee in the future. 

3. Recusal: An employee should ask to recuse himself or herself from 

involvement in the personnel action. The best way not to become entangled 

in questionable conduct is for the employee to entirely avoid involvement in 

such situations whenever possible. 

Applicants 

Regardless of the hiring authority being used, agencies will likely ask external (and 

sometimes internal) applicants whether they have a relative employed by the agency. 

It is extremely important that applicants answer such questions candidly. The 

Federal Government takes the integrity of the hiring process very seriously. Merely 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD v

having a relative employed by the same agency does not automatically disqualify an 

applicant; but an individual can be fired for unethical conduct that occurs before or 

after the appointment begins. A lack of candor or outright falsehood in an 

application can result in the person’s removal or even debarment from Federal 

service. Honesty is truly the best policy.

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 1

INTRODUCTION

In Federal civil service law, nepotism refers to assistance or favors that employees 

provide to relatives within a specific degree of closeness.

1

 In this report, the word 

“nepotism” will be used only for situations involving relatives as defined in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 3110 – a “father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, 

nephew, niece, husband, wife, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-inlaw, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepson, stepdaughter, 

stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, or half sister.” Nepotism as defined in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 3110 is a PPP under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7). As discussed in this report, a few forms 

of nepotism can qualify as criminal conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 208. 2

There is no such thing as “minor” nepotism. It is a binary state. The person either 

is or is not a relative of the official.

3

 The official either did or did not approve a 

personnel action itemized in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A).

4

 While the nature and extent 

of the nepotism is relevant to the reasonableness of a particular penalty, and whether 

 1 In contrast, the dictionary definition of the word nepotism is: “the practice among those 

with power or influence of favoring relatives or friends, especially by giving them jobs.” Compare 5 

U.S.C. § 3110, with www.oxforddictionaries.com, nepotism. 

2 United States v. Lund, 853 F.2d 242, 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Civil Service 

Reform Act of 1978 did not alter the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 208 to offenses in which a spouse 

or minor child financially benefits from the actions of a Government employee acting on the behalf 

of the Government).

3 For purposes of the nepotism statute, an official “means an officer (including the President 

and a Member of Congress), a member of the uniformed service, an employee and any other 

individual, in whom is vested the authority by law, rule, or regulation, or to whom the authority has 

been delegated, to appoint, employ, promote, or advance individuals, or to recommend individuals 

for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement in connection with employment in an 

agency[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 3110(a)(2). In contrast, the PPPs, including 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7), apply to 

“[a]ny employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any 

personnel action[.]” 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b). Section 2302 uses the same definition for “relative” as 

section 3110, but section 2302 does not require that the alleged offender meet the definition of 

official set forth in section 3110. Unless otherwise indicated, this report uses the term “official” to 

refer to an employee in a position to influence the personnel action in question. 

4 Types of positions covered by the nepotism prohibition are listed in 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(a)(2)(B), and include nearly all positions in the competitive, excepted, and senior executive 

services. 
INTRODUCTION

2 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

an act constitutes advocacy can be more subjective than an act of approval, nepotism 

laws draw sharp lines and even seemingly routine personnel actions are on the

prohibited side of the line when relatives are involved. 5

Nepotism is detrimental to a merit-based civil service. The law prohibiting the hiring 

of relatives was enacted to protect organizations and the public from the risk that 

less-qualified individuals would be given positions of responsibility merely because

an official wanted to help them get a job. The nepotism law is also intended to instill 

confidence in the American people that their civil service is not corrupt. Federal 

employees today have the responsibility to: grant applications for life-saving health 

and financial benefits; keep our air, water, food, medicine, airplanes, and roads safe; 

fight fires to protect lives and property; protect our borders and prevent terrorism; 

provide logistical and administrative support for our military; send people and 

billions of dollars of technology into space; regulate the use of nuclear reactors; 

determine when to arrest or prosecute citizens and visitors; and perform thousands 

of other tasks affecting the quality of life of hundreds of millions of Americans. As a 

result, keeping the civil service system free of corruption so that the best possible 

candidates are hired, trained, promoted, and assigned complex duties is more 

important than ever. 6

Purpose

Section 1204 of title 5 instructs that MSPB shall conduct studies of the civil service 

and, in particular, shall report to the President and Congress about the PPPs. 

 5 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a) contains a list of activities that are considered personnel actions, 

including decisions about pay, benefits, awards, duties, responsibilities, and working conditions.

6 While this report is focused on the issue of nepotism, favoritism based on personal 

relationships rather than qualifications or contributions to the efficiency of the service is also 

harmful and is contrary to the merit principles. See 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(8)(A); U.S. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, Preserving the Integrity of the Federal Merit Systems: Understanding and Addressing 

Perceptions of Favoritism (2013), available at www.mspb.gov/studies. Actions taken to grant such 

preference can qualify as a different PPP. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(6); U.S. Merit Systems Protection 

Board, Prohibited Personnel Practices: Employee Perceptions (2011), at 12-14, available at 

www.mspb.gov/studies. 
INTRODUCTION

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 3

Nepotism is the seventh enumerated PPP. 7 While this report seeks to inform the 

President and Congress about nepotism in the civil service, an additional goal is to 

educate supervisors, managers, executives, Inspectors General, HR employees, and 

other employees about nepotism so that such offenses may be avoided to the 

greatest extent possible and addressed where they still occur.

Methodology

This report relies primarily upon:

• Statutes and case law;

• Written and/or oral responses to MSPB questions in 2015 and 2016

submitted by the Public Service Commission (PSC) of Canada,

8 U.S. Office 

of Government Ethics (OGE), OSC, OPM, and Federal Chief Human 

Capital Officers (CHCOs) or agency-level HR Directors;

9

• The results of the Fair and Open Competition Survey (FOCS) – a survey of 

approximately 10,000 HR specialists and assistants conducted in 2011; and 

• The results of the Merit Principles Survey (MPS) – a survey of more than 

42,000 Federal employees conducted in 2010. 10

 7 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7).

8 The Canadian PSC is responsible for safeguarding the integrity of staffing in the Canadian 

public service and ensuring the service remains non-partisan. See http://www.psccfp.gc.ca/centres/responsibilities-eng.htm. MSPB and the Canadian PSC have a long history of 

shared communications on issues of common interest, and we thank them for their continued 

cooperation. 

9 Questionnaires were sent to 24 agencies. Eighteen agencies submitted a reply, for either 

the agency in whole or for a part of the agency. 

10 For more on the methodology used in the FOCS, please see our 2015 report, The Impact of 

Recruitment Strategy on Fair and Open Competition for Federal Jobs, at 2. For more on the methodology 

used in the 2010 MPS and a copy of the survey questions, please see our 2012 report, Federal 

Employee Engagement: The Motivating Potential of Job Characteristics and Rewards, at 65-67. These reports 

are available at www.mspb.gov/studies. 
INTRODUCTION

4 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 5

CHAPTER ONE: THE CRIMINAL STATUTE

Nepotism is addressed differently in different parts of Federal law. This chapter 

discusses nepotism that constitutes a crime for which imprisonment is possible. 

Chapter Two discusses nepotism punishable under administrative laws for harming 

the efficiency of the service or as a PPP.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 208, it is a crime for an employee to act “through decision, 

approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or 

otherwise,” in a matter in which the employee, employee’s spouse, or employee’s 

minor child has a financial interest. When this occurs, the individual is subject to a 

fine of up to $50,000 and/or up to 5 years of imprisonment. 11

Spouses Under the Criminal Statute

Section 208 has been the basis of a civil service nepotism case at least once. United 

States v. Lund is particularly illustrative, because some people may think of nepotism 

as the decision to hire a relative, whereas Lund discusses the applicability of the 

statute to more “minor” personnel decisions. 12

Lund, an employee of the Defense Communications Agency, allegedly married one 

of his subordinate employees and then continued to supervise her without informing 

his agency of their relationship and the inherent conflict of interest.

13 He then 

participated in three intra-agency personnel decisions in which his wife had a 

financial interest. These decisions were: (1) granting her a within-grade pay increase 

(WIGI); (2) selecting her for promotion to a higher-paying position; and (3) 

recommending her for education funded by the Federal Government. 14

 11 18 U.S.C. §§ 208(b), 216. 

12 United States v. Lund, 853 F.2d 242, 243 (4th Cir. 1988).

13 United States v. Lund, 670 F. Supp. 654, 655 (E. Dist. Va. 1987).

14 Id.
CHAPTER ONE: THE CRIMINAL STATUTES

6 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

Lund argued that he could not be indicted under the criminal statute for these 

alleged offenses and that the provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 

(CSRA), which made nepotism a PPP punishable under title 5 administrative law, 

precluded the applicability of title 18 to his situation. 15 The U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Fourth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) “applies to a federal employee’s 

participation, on behalf of the government, in any application or contract in which he 

has a conflict of interest,” and that the personnel actions in the indictment were 

covered by section 208. 16 In other words, the fact that nepotism can be punished as 

a PPP does not remove nepotism involving a spouse or minor child from being 

covered by criminal law.

Section 216 permits imprisonment for not more than 1 year for a violation of section 

208, unless the individual “willfully engage[d]” in the conduct, in which case, 

imprisonment may be imposed for a period of not more than 5 years. 

Following Lund, the Office of Government Ethics issued regulations to help 

employees and agencies understand the personnel actions covered by section 208.

17 

Ultimately, the official cannot:

1. Make determinations that individually or specially affect his own 

salary and benefits; or

2. Make determinations, requests, or recommendations that individually 

or specially relate to, or affect, the salary or benefits of any other 

person specified in section 208. 18

The regulation clarifying conduct that will not pose a conflict of interest under

18 U.S.C. § 208 also clearly states that the regulation does “not permit an employee 

 15 Id. at 244.

16 Id. at 249 (emphasis in original).

17 See 5 C.F.R. § 2640.203 (providing examples of acceptable and unacceptable activities). Cf. 

18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(2) (authorizing the Director of OGE to issue regulations exempting from section 

208 those activities that the Director deems too remote to affect the integrity of the services being 

provided). 

18 5 C.F.R. § 2640.203(d).
CHAPTER ONE: THE CRIMINAL STATUTES 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 7

to take any action in violation of any other statutory or regulatory requirement, such 

as the prohibition on the employment of relatives at 5 U.S.C. § 3110.”19

Children Under the Criminal Statute 

Section 208 specifically treats the interests of a minor child the same as the interests 

of the employee. The OGE representative that we spoke with noted that, in 

contrast, section 208 does not treat the interests of adult children as the interests of 

the employee, but that “if your own financial interests are affected by a decision 

regarding your adult child, you can run afoul of [18 U.S.C. §] 208.” Once again, the 

OGE representative stressed the importance of reporting the relationship and 

avoiding any appearance of a conflict of interest. 

A parent providing financial assistance to young adult children is common in society 

today.20 Sometimes the shared financial obligations between parents and adult 

children are formal, such as when a parent co-signs student loans with the child,21

but there can be less formal financial interests as well. We caution employees who 

may have a financial interest in the employment of their adult children – or any other 

relative – to recognize the seriousness of the rules involving nepotism where the 

finances of the child (or other relative) affect the finances of the employee. 

 19 Id. 

20 According to a Bank of America survey, approximately 4 out of every 10 adult millennials 

are receiving financial assistance from their parents. Assistance is even more common when the 

millennial is “just starting out.” Hadley Malcolm, USATODAY, “Millennials Leaning More on 

Parents,” Apr. 21, 2015, available at 

http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2015/04/21/millennials-getting-helpfrom-parents/25812211/. 

21 Robert Farrington, “Parents: Stop Taking Out Loans For Your Child’s College 

Education,” Nov. 14, 2014, available at 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertfarrington/2014/07/14/parents-stop-taking-out-loans-foryour-childs-college-education/ (explaining that when a parent co-signs a student loan, the parent is 

responsible for the debt); Tamar Lewin, “Child’s Education, but Parents’ Crushing Loans,” Nov. 11, 

2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/12/business/some-parents-shoulderingstudent-loans-fall-on-tough-times.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (discussing the difficulties facing 

parents who co-sign loans). 
CHAPTER ONE: THE CRIMINAL STATUTES

8 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

We asked agencies if there were any particular types of positions, work 

environments, or hiring situations that were most vulnerable to nepotism. One 

agency noted, “Any position could be subject to nepotism.” However, another 

agency, with repeated Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reports finding that

nepotism occurred, replied, “In our experience, entry-level and student positions are 

most vulnerable to nepotism and inappropriate advocacy.” We also asked agencies 

the extent of their agreement with a statement that “Nepotism is more likely to take 

place when filling entry-level positions than when filling other positions.” More 

agencies agreed with this statement than agreed with statements that nepotism was 

more likely to occur for: (1) journey-man level positions; or (2) higher-graded 

positions. Agencies may want to give particularly close scrutiny to positions that it 

considers to be at greater risk of nepotism. 

Avoiding Violations of the Criminal Statute

So, how can an individual avoid running afoul of section 208? The statute explains 

that the officer or employee should:

1. Inform his supervisor 22 of the matter;

2. Make a full disclosure of the financial interest; and 

3. Obtain “in advance a written determination by [the supervisor] that the 

[financial] interest is not so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the 

integrity of the services which the Government may expect from such 

officer or employee[.]” 23

We asked OGE what advice it might have for an individual whose situation could 

possibly be covered by section 208. The OGE representative recommended that 

employees remember – for personnel actions as well as other decisions – that, “your 

spouse’s financial interest is your financial interest. What affects the finances of a 

spouse or minor child affects you.” As such, where an employee is working on a 

 22 The statute specifies that the person to be notified is the “Government official responsible 

for [the individual’s] appointment to his or her position[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1). 

23 18 U.S.C. § 208(b)(1).
CHAPTER ONE: THE CRIMINAL STATUTES

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 9

personnel matter that could directly affect his or her spouse or minor child, the

employee should seek guidance from his or her ethics official.

The OGE representative recommended that people remember the saying that “no 

man should be the judge in his own case,” 24 meaning that a person inside the 

situation may not have the most impartial view of the matter and may not be the best 

person to decide if there is a conflict. This is why contacting an impartial ethics 

advisor can be particularly helpful. 25 If an employee’s conduct violates a criminal 

statute, “reliance on the advice of an agency ethics official cannot ensure that the 

employee will not be prosecuted under that statute.” 26 However, regulations provide 

that a “good faith reliance on the advice of an agency ethics official is a factor that 

may be taken into account by the Department of Justice in the selection of cases for 

prosecution.” 27

In addition to being aware of the criminal prohibitions in 18 U.S.C. § 208, OGE 

recommended that employees familiarize themselves with the General Principles of 

Ethical Conduct for Federal Employees, a copy of which is included in Appendix B. 

It may help employees to recognize situations in which a disclosure is appropriate or 

the input of an ethics advisor can assist the employee to ensure that he or she has 

avoided any impropriety.

28 

The OGE representative also reminded us that under the ethics rules set forth at 5 

C.F.R. § 2635.502:

 24 See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (explaining that “no man can be a judge in his 

own case”). 

25 5 C.F.R. § 2638.202(b) provides in part: “The head of each agency shall appoint an 

individual to serve as the designated agency ethics official and an individual to serve in an acting 

capacity in the absence of the primary designated agency ethics official (alternate agency ethics 

official).” These officials are responsible for a variety of tasks, including advising agency employees 

regarding matters that concern ethical standards. Id. 

26 5 C.F.R. § 2635.107.

27 Id.

28 The ethical principles not only instruct employees to avoid violating the law, but also to 

avoid the appearance of such a violation. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b). See Appendix B. 
CHAPTER ONE: THE CRIMINAL STATUTES

10 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

Where an employee knows that a particular matter involving specific 

parties is likely to have a direct and predictable effect on the financial 

interest of a member of his household, or knows that a person with 

whom he has a covered relationship 29 is or represents a party to such 

matter, and where the employee determines that the circumstances 

would cause a reasonable person with knowledge of the relevant facts 

to question his impartiality in the matter, the employee should not 

participate in the matter unless he has informed the agency designee 

of the appearance problem and received authorization from the 

agency designee in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section. 

The importance of disclosing conflicts of interest and avoiding involvement in such 

actions is a constant theme throughout this report. Unlike some areas of personnel

law that may be complicated, complying with 18 U.S.C. § 208 is very simple and 

clearly stated in the statute and regulations. If there is a conflict, an employee should 

disclose the conflict and take no role in the conflicted action unless the agency issues 

a specific waiver or exemption.

30 However, as noted in 5 C.F.R. § 2640.203(d), the 

provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 3110 (discussed in Chapter Two) cannot be waived.

 29 A covered relationship includes, but is not limited to, “a relative with whom the employee 

has a close personal relationship[.]” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502. 

30 18 U.S.C. § 208; 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502.
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 11

CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

While there are both criminal and civil laws pertaining to nepotism, the prohibitions 

under those laws differ, with the civil laws applying to a broader range of relatives 

and more specifically enumerated activities. Under 5 U.S.C. § 3110, an official 31 is 

not permitted to “appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, 

employment, promotion, or advancement. . . any individual who is a relative 32 of the 

public official.” Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a), additional personnel actions involving 

relatives are prohibited, including decisions about pay, benefits, awards, duties, 

responsibilities, and working conditions. 

In addition to what an official cannot do, there is a restriction preventing the 

recipient from benefiting from his or her relative violating the nepotism statute. “An 

individual may not be appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced in or to a 

civilian position in an agency if such appointment, employment, promotion, or 

advancement has been advocated by a public official, serving in or exercising 

jurisdiction or control over the agency, who is a relative of the individual.” 33 In 

other words, even if the person being hired did not commit an offense, the 

appointment still will not be allowed to stand if the appointment itself violated the 

nepotism statute. 34 

 31 An official “means an officer (including the President and a Member of Congress), a 

member of the uniformed service, an employee and any other individual, in whom is vested the 

authority by law, rule, or regulation, or to whom the authority has been delegated, to appoint, 

employ, promote, or advance individuals, or to recommend individuals for appointment, 

employment, promotion, or advancement in connection with employment in an agency[.]” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 3110(a)(2). 

32 A relative “means, with respect to a public official, an individual who is related to the 

public official as father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, nephew, 

niece, husband, wife, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, brother-in-law, 

sister-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepson, stepdaughter, stepbrother, stepsister, half brother, or 

half sister.” 5 U.S.C. § 3110(a)(3).

33 5 U.S.C. § 3110(b). 

34 See Appointments - Nepotism, Comp. Gen. No. B-204266 (Apr. 22, 1982) (1982 WL 27827), 

at *1 (explaining that an “[i]ndividual appointed in violation of anti-nepotism provisions of title 5, 

United States Code, is not entitled to retain salary received or to the payment of unpaid salary since 
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

12 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

The procedures to remove a probationer for conditions that arose prior to 

appointment (such as nepotism in the selection process) differ from those to remove 

a person who was already a Federal employee or who has completed the 

probationary period. 35 Both sets of rules differ from those for removing a 

probationer for unsatisfactory performance or conduct after appointment. 36

Nepotism as defined in section 3110 is one of 13 PPPs. A PPP occurs when an 

“employee who has [the] authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or 

approve any personnel action” performs one of the 13 enumerated actions. The 

seventh PPP is to:

appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, 

employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position 

any individual who is a relative (as defined in section 3110(a)(3) of 

this title) of such employee if such position is in the agency in which 

such employee is serving as a public official (as defined in section 

 

5 U.S.C. sec. 3110 expressly prohibits the payment of pay from the treasury where an appointment 

violates that provision of law. However, [a] waiver [of recovery] of erroneous salary payments 

received [may be] granted under 5 U.S.C. sec. 5584 [when] there is no indication that the individual 

was at fault in the matter”) (internal citations modified); Tommy H. Grantham - Nepotism, Comp. Gen. 

No. B-186453 (May 2, 1977) (1977 WL 13036), at *2 (explaining that because “the clear language of 

5 U.S.C. 3110 prohibit[s] the appointment of an individual whose appointment has been advocated 

by a public official” and therefore “prohibit[s] such an individual from being paid money from the 

treasury,” action could be initiated to recover more than 2 years of wages paid to the person whose 

appointment violated section 3110) (internal punctuation omitted); To Mr. Richard G. Kleindienst, 

Comp. Gen. No. B-163686 (Jul. 10, 1972) (1972 WL 6577), at *3 (explaining that the Congress’s 

intent in section 3110 was that “any person found to be appointed, employed, promoted or 

advanced, in violation of these provisions would be required to be removed from the payroll[.]”)

35 Compare 5 C.F.R. § 315.805, with 5 U.S.C. § 7513. While the processes differ, in both sets 

of circumstances the individual has the right to: a notice of proposed action; an opportunity to 

respond; and the option to submit an appeal to MSPB. For more on determining if an individual is 

a probationer, see U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Navigating the Probationary Period After Van 

Wersch and McCormick (Sep. 2006), available at www.mpsb.gov/studies. 

36 Compare 5 C.F.R. § 315.804 (no advanced notice right for probationers when termination 

action is based on conduct or performance), with 5 C.F.R. § 315.805 (advanced notice and 

opportunity to respond to termination actions taken against probationers for pre-appointment 

reasons), and 5 U.S.C. § 7513 (advanced notice and opportunity to respond for adverse actions taken 

against employees).
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 13

3110(a)(2) of this title) or over which such employee exercises 

jurisdiction or control as such an official[.] 37

The head of each agency is responsible for preventing PPPs, as well as compliance 

with – and enforcement of – the civil service laws. Additionally, “[a]ny individual to 

whom the head of an agency delegates authority for personnel management, or for 

any aspect thereof, shall be similarly responsible within the limits of the 

delegation.” 38 Supervisors and managers may take an adverse action, up to and 

including removal, to discipline an official who has committed nepotism. 39

Additionally, because nepotism is a PPP, OSC may ask the Board to act to address 

an alleged violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7). The penalty imposed by the Board can 

include a removal, reduction in grade, debarment from Federal employment for a 

period not to exceed 5 years, suspension, or reprimand. 40 As explained in our 

report, Prohibited Personnel Practices: Employee Perceptions, when OSC files a complaint 

with MSPB regarding an alleged PPP, and MSPB finds that OSC has proven its case 

by preponderant evidence, 41 the employing agency has no say in the penalty that 

MSPB imposes. 42 An agency cannot protect an employee who commits a PPP, such 

as nepotism, if OSC opts to prosecute the case and the Board finds the charges 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence. In such cases, the Board, not the 

employing agency, decides the penalty. 

 37 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7).

38 5 U.S.C. § 2302(c). 

39 See, e.g., Rentz v. U.S. Postal Service, 19 M.S.P.R. 35, 37-39 (1984). The charge in Rentz was 

violating an agency policy that mirrored the language set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 3110.

40 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(3)(A)(i).

41 A preponderance of the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable 

person, considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested fact is 

more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).

42 See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Prohibited Personnel Practices: Employee Perceptions

(2011), at 14, available at www.mspb.gov/studies. 
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

14 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

Examples of Nepotism Warranting an Adverse Action

The Board has adjudicated several appeals by employees disciplined for violating the 

nepotism statute. These cases illustrate how seriously the Government takes 

allegations of nepotism and the degree to which a single instance of bad judgment 

can severely damage or end a career.

For example, in Rentz v. U.S. Postal Service, the appellant was a manager who wrote a 

Letter of Commendation for his wife’s personnel file and evaluated his wife’s 

potential for promotion. The Board held that it was irrelevant whether the 

appellant’s assessment of his wife was accurate. The only question was whether he 

used his position to support his wife’s attempts to obtain a promotion. Because he 

had done so, the Board held that the agency was justified in removing the 

appellant. 43

In Welch v. Department of Agriculture, the agency reassigned and suspended a manager 

who directed a subordinate supervisor (who was not the selecting official) to 

“prepare a written justification for the temporary appointment of” the Director’s 

son. The appellant was not in a position of authority over the selecting official, but 

the Board held that this “did not insulate the appellant from the provisions of” the 

nepotism statute. The Board found that the appellant’s involvement in the process 

constituted nepotism and that the agency was justified in suspending the appellant 

for 60 days and reassigning him to a different position. 44

In Roberts v. U.S. Postal Service, the appellant wrote a letter in which he urged his 

agency to allow his daughter to take the civil service exam, and if her grade was 

sufficient, advocated that she be hired to replace an existing employee prior to the 

expiration of that employee’s probationary period. The Board held that the appellant 

attempted to use his public office to advocate the appointment of a relative to a 

civilian position in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 3110(b), describing his actions as “the very 

 43 Rentz v. U.S. Postal Service, 19 M.S.P.R. 35, 37-39 (1984). As stated earlier, the charge in 

Rentz was violating an agency policy that mirrored the language set forth at 5 U.S.C. § 3110. 

44 Welch v. Department of Agriculture, 37 M.S.P.R. 18, 19-20, 22-23 (1988).
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 15

conduct that Congress was attempting to halt through the passage of 5 U.S.C. 

§ 3110.” 45

An individual need not be a supervisor to run afoul of section 3110. 46 In a nonprecedential decision, Chapman v. U.S. Postal Service, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) upheld a Board decision that found removal 

appropriate for an HR specialist who hired her son for a temporary position. 

“Because [the] petitioner’s act of nepotism bore directly on her duties as a Human 

Resources Specialist, it was reasonable for the Board to conclude that there was a 

sufficient nexus between petitioner’s conduct and the efficiency of the service” to 

warrant her removal. 47

Examples Where Nepotism Was Not Found

While the cases above show how easily an official can find himself or herself on the 

wrong side of the law, the cases below show that avoiding nepotism can be done. 

The key is for an official to be proactive in ensuring that he or she plays no role – no 

matter how minor – in personnel actions that could possibly involve his or her 

relatives. 48

One of the best examples of the importance of an official recusing himself or herself 

from any process involving relatives can be found in Wallace v. Department of Commerce. 

Wallace was a GS-15 supervisor who became aware that her sister was interested in a 

vacant position that fell under Wallace’s authority. Wallace notified senior 

 45 Roberts v. U.S. Postal Service, 12 M.S.P.R. 471, 475 (1982). Because of other findings, the 

Board remanded the case to the regional office to determine the appropriate penalty. Id. at 475-76.

46 See 5 U.S.C. § 3110(a)(2) (explaining that the law applies to those with the authority to 

appoint an individual). 

47 Chapman v. U.S. Postal Service, 68 F.3d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (non-precedential).

48 Public employers outside the Federal Government tend to share this view. See, e.g., 

http://www.maine.gov/bhr/rules_policies/policy_manual/6_3.htm, recommending that “relatives of 

a candidate for appointment or promotion should not take any role whatsoever in a selection process” because even 

if the selection is “technically correct, the perception of nepotism could also have a negative impact 

on all concerned.” (Emphasis in original.)
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

16 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

management that her sister was interested in applying for the vacancy and informed 

them that “she was recusing herself from any input or involvement in the hiring 

process for the position and further sought... guidance on how to ensure that a fair 

and impartial selection could occur.” When the time came to make a selection, a 

panel chose Wallace’s sister and Wallace informed those involved that Wallace’s 

supervisor would have to be the one to approve the panel’s selection as Wallace had 

recused herself. 49 

Nevertheless, the OIG received anonymous allegations that Wallace had improperly 

hired her sister and conducted an investigation in which it concluded that Wallace 

had been improperly involved in the hiring of her sister. The agency removed 

Wallace for this alleged offense. 50 Because section 3110 does not permit a person to 

remain employed if his or her appointment was made in violation of section 3110, 

Wallace’s sister was also removed. 51

Wallace and her sister appealed their removals to MSPB, and the administrative 

judge (AJ) assigned to the case concluded that by permitting the hiring process to 

take place with a selection panel composed entirely of her subordinates, Wallace had 

violated 5 U.S.C. § 3110. Accordingly, the AJ sustained Wallace’s removal and the 

cancellation of her sister’s appointment. 52

However, on petition for review, the Board reversed the decision and ordered both

appellants reinstated. The Board held that Wallace’s authority over those involved in 

 49 Wallace v. Department of Commerce, 106 M.S.P.R. 23, ¶¶ 2-3 (2007).

50 Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.

51 Id. at ¶¶ 4-6, 9. Cf. Keller v. Department of the Navy, 69 M.S.P.R. 183, 187-88 (1996) 

(explaining that a removal of an individual on the basis that the appointment was the result of 

nepotism is a removal for pre-appointment reasons and thus the individual is entitled to notice and 

the opportunity to respond before such a removal occurs). 

52 Wallace v. Department of Commerce, 106 M.S.P.R. 23, ¶ 8 (2007).
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 17

the hiring action was not – standing alone – sufficient to constitute any of the actions 

prohibited by 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(7) and 3110(b). 53

The Board noted that it previously had been the policy of the Government that a 

“relative of a public official may be appointed by a subordinate of the official if the 

official is in no way involved in the action and if the agency concerned has no 

regulations prohibiting such employment.” 54 The Board found that the agency had 

no applicable regulation and therefore the Board used the Government-wide policy 

and focused its analysis on the question of whether Wallace was, in fact, involved in 

the action. 55

The Board found persuasive the sworn statements by those closest to the hiring 

action that they knew of no involvement by Wallace and felt “no pressure, overt or 

otherwise” regarding the selection of Wallace’s sister. 56 Accordingly, the Board 

ordered Wallace’s removal canceled and her sister’s appointment reinstated. 57 

Similarly, in Alexander v. Department of the Navy, the Board found that, because the 

employee played no role in the recruitment process, a charge of nepotism was not 

supported by the evidence. Alexander inquired as to the availability of positions for 

which his daughter might apply and arranged for his daughter’s application to be 

submitted for consideration. The agency concluded that these were acts of 

“advocacy” that violated the nepotism statute. On appeal, the Board held that 

advocating for a relative means to recommend or refer a relative. The Board held 

that asking about the availability of a position is not the same as recommending that 

it be filled by a particular person. Similarly, the Board held that merely submitting an 

application for consideration, without any request as to what should be done with 

the application, did not constitute a recommendation. The Board found that there 

 53 Id. at ¶ 10. 

54 Id. at ¶ 11. 

55 Id.

56 Id. at ¶ 20. 

57 Id. at ¶ 23. 
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

18 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

was no evidence that Alexander spoke in favor of, recommended, commended, or 

endorsed the employment of his daughter by his agency. Accordingly, the Board 

concluded that the appellant had not violated the nepotism statute. 58 

Exercising Poor Judgment 

As explained earlier, OSC can file a complaint with MSPB, alleging that an employee 

committed a PPP and requesting disciplinary action against that employee. 

However, while OSC’s jurisdiction is based on the commission of a PPP, for an agency

to take an adverse action against an employee, it is not required that the employee 

specifically commit a PPP. What is required is that the agency prove by 

preponderant evidence that the efficiency of the service would be promoted by the 

adverse action. 59 This means the agency must prove it is more likely than not that 

the employee committed the charged offense and that the offense harmed the 

performance of his duties or some other legitimate Government interest. 60

A violation of the nepotism statute need not be shown in order to warrant 

disciplinary action up to and including removal; all that is necessary is for the 

conduct to be harmful. As discussed in Appendix C: The Effects of Nepotism, data 

show that there tends to be a relationship between perceptions of nepotism and 

damage to organizations.

In Reynolds v. Department of Agriculture, the appellant was a meat inspector who 

inspected a company that employed his son. The agency did not charge the 

appellant with nepotism; rather he was charged with a failure to disclose his son’s 

 58 Alexander v. Department of the Navy, 24 M.S.P.R. 621, 623-25 (1984).

59 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7503(a), 7513(a) (efficiency of the service requirement); 5 C.F.R. 

§§ 1201.3(a)(1) (the standard for an adverse action is that the action will promote the efficiency of 

the service); 1201.56(b)(ii) (action must be supported by preponderant evidence). See also Schumacher 

v. U.S. Postal Service, 52 M.S.P.R. 575, 579-80 (1992) (holding that an agency need not demonstrate a 

specific impact on the appellant’s job performance or the efficiency of the service before taking action 

against him).

60 Lamour v. Department of Justice, 106 M.S.P.R. 366, ¶ 11 (2007) (explaining the “efficiency of 

the service” requirement); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q) (defining preponderance of the evidence). 
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 19

employment with an entity that the appellant was responsible for inspecting. 61 The 

agency acknowledged that the appellant was a good performer, but claimed that the 

fact that the appellant did not realize that he had done something wrong caused the 

deciding official to believe that the appellant could find himself in another 

compromising position if he remained employed at the agency. The Board held that 

the appellant’s removal was warranted for not disclosing the conflict of interest to 

his agency. 62

The appellant in Reynolds lost his job despite being a good performer because the 

agency could not trust him to recognize conflicts of interest in the future. 63 

Fortunately, an employee does not need to judge conflicts all alone and is not 

expected to do so. The employee is expected to recognize when there is enough of a 

risk that he or she should contact an ethics advisor and make a disclosure to a 

supervisor or other appropriate official. 

Deliberately Helping Someone Else Commit Nepotism

Section 2302(b)(7) prohibits an employee from hiring or advocating for the hiring of 

his or her own relative. What about a different official who aids an employee to 

commit nepotism? According to OSC, such conduct may be prohibited by section 

2302(b)(6). 64 It is also unethical. 65

Section 2302(b)(6) prohibits employees from providing “any preference or advantage 

not authorized by law, rule, or regulation to any employee or applicant for 

employment (including defining the scope or manner of competition or the 

 61 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7) applies to a “personnel action” and does not address unconnected 

contracting decisions. However, an agency policy specifically prohibited inspectors from having a 

direct or indirect financial interest that conflicted substantially, or appeared to conflict substantially, 

with their duties. Reynolds v. Department of Agriculture, 54 M.S.P.R. 111, 114 (1992).

62 Reynolds v. Department of Agriculture, 54 M.S.P.R. 111, 112, 114-15 (1992). 

63 Id. 

64 Office of Special Counsel, Response to MSPB Questionnaire, May 29, 2015.

65 See Appendix B: General Principles of Ethical Conduct for Federal Employees. 
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

20 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

requirements for any position) for the purpose of improving or injuring the 

prospects of any particular person for employment.” This PPP includes a prohibition 

against knowingly aiding another employee who is acting contrary to the laws, rules, 

or regulations in order to improve the employment prospects of an individual. 66

Special Counsel v. Lee, while not a case involving nepotism, offers an illustration of 

how aiding an official to improperly hire or advance a preferred individual can be –

for the person providing the aid – the commission of a 2302(b)(6) offense. Lee was 

an HR advisor who “intentionally assisted” a supervisor in the manipulation of a 

hiring action to give “an illegal preference” to an individual. 67 While it was the 

supervisor who wanted to promote the particular person, the evidence showed that 

Lee knew about her improper motives when he recommended to her how to 

accomplish her goal, thereby intentionally facilitating a violation of 2302(b)(6). The 

Board held that 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(6) includes “conduct that aids and abets another 

who is violating the statute.” Lee thus ran afoul of section 2302(b)(6) because there 

was “a pattern of cooperation” between Lee and the supervisor who sought to 

promote a particular individual. 68

Ultimately, in a case brought by OSC or an appeal of an agency adverse action, the 

decision as to whether any particular conduct qualifies as aiding and abetting in the 

commission of a PPP would rest with MSPB (and its reviewing courts). It should be 

noted that MSPB cannot provide an advisory opinion for a hypothetical situation 

and must wait for issues to be presented in a ripe case.

69 However, agencies and 

employees should not take lightly the position of OSC (the agency that prosecutes 

PPPs) that helping someone to commit nepotism may qualify as a (b)(6) violation. 

Additionally, as explained in the previous section, a charge of unethical conduct or 

conduct unbecoming a Federal employee can be the basis for an agency to impose an 

 66 See Special Counsel v. Lee, 114 M.S.P.R. 57 (2010), rev’d in part sub nom. Beatrez v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 413 F. App’x 298 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

67 Id. at ¶¶ 34-35. 

68 Id. at ¶¶ 25, 32.

69 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1204(h); 7703(a)(1).
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 21

adverse action, up to and including removal from service, regardless of whether that 

conduct qualifies as a particular PPP.

The General Principles of Ethical Conduct for Federal Employees are rife with 

prohibitions pertinent to the question of aiding in the commission of nepotism or 

another PPP, including, but not limited to: 

• Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and corruption to appropriate 

authorities;

• Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential treatment to any 

private organization or individual; and

• Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the appearance that 

they are violating the law or the ethical standards. 70

While many offices need cooperative relationships between officials for the agency’s 

mission to be accomplished effectively, the commission of a PPP or unethical 

conduct is not an area where an employee should cooperate. 

Avoiding Nepotism 

Whether the employee faces a possible issue under the criminal statute (18 U.S.C. 

§ 208), the administrative statute for PPPs (5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7)), the agency’s 

disciplinary authority to prevent damage to the efficiency of the service (5 U.S.C. 

§§ 7503(a), 7513(a)), or the ethics rules (5 C.F.R. § 2635.502), the means to reduce 

the risk of engaging in an impropriety tends to include: consulting an ethics advisor; 

disclosing the issue to a supervisor or other appropriate agency official; and acting to 

 70 Excerpted from the General Principles of Ethical Conduct for Federal Employees 

(5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b)).
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

22 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

recuse himself or herself from involvement in the personnel action.

71 An employee 

should not try to independently decide what is permissible in his or her own case.

In recent years, several OIGs reported that they found incidents of nepotism 

involving high-ranking officials. 72 That the OIGs could conclude that they found 

 71 The clarity (or lack thereof) of notice regarding any rules that were violated in committing 

an offense is one of the factors the Board uses to determine if a penalty is appropriate. Douglas v. 

Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981). The Board has not ruled in a case where the 

employee committed nepotism after obtaining advice from an ethics advisor that the conduct was 

permitted, and the Board cannot issue an advisory opinion. 5 U.S.C. § 1204(h). However, Special 

Counsel v. Campbell, involving a different type of prohibited activity, can illustrate the importance of 

obtaining advisory opinions as evidence of a good faith effort to act ethically. In Campbell, the 

employee consulted with an agency ethics advisor about whether running for political office would 

violate the Hatch Act (the law prohibiting employees from running for office in certain types of 

elections). The employee proceeded after being told that under his particular circumstances, his 

actions would not violate the law. However, his campaign did, in fact, violate the Hatch Act. The 

Board found that the employee’s actions in seeking and following the advice of the ethics counsel, 

although not relevant to the merits of the complaint, was a factor in mitigation and ordered the 

lightest penalty that the law permitted to issue at that time, noting it lacked the authority to reduce 

the penalty beyond that level. Special Counsel v. Campbell, 58 M.S.P.R. 170, 174 (1993), aff'd sub nom. 

Campbell v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 27 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Cf. 5 C.F.R. § 2636.103(c) (an 

advisory opinion cannot “insulate the employee from civil or disciplinary action if his conduct 

violates any [ ] laws, rule, regulation or lawful management policy or directive” outside of 5 C.F.R. 

Part 2636).

72 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Investigation of 

Allegations of Improper Hiring Practices at INTERPOL Washington, Feb. 2015 (finding that an executive 

officer used his position to instruct his subordinate to include the executive officer’s son in the 2011 

INTERPOL Washington summer internship program); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the 

Inspector General, Report Regarding Investigation of Improper Hiring Practices in the Justice Management 

Division, Jul. 2012 (finding that the HR Assistant Director advocated for her daughter’s appointment; 

the Facilities and Administrative Services Staff (FASS) Director advocated for his son’s 

appointment; the FASS Deputy Director and Assistant Director in HR Policy sought to aid each 

other’s relatives to obtain positions; the Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

for Human Resources and Administration sought employment for her son and niece; and the HR 

Director sought employment for his cousin and nephew); U.S. Department of Energy, Office of the 

Inspector General, Alleged Nepotism and Wasteful Spending in the Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable 

Energy, DOE/IG-0888, Jun. 2013 (finding that an allegation was substantiated that a senior official 

sought employment for his three children); U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector 

General, Alleged Misconduct: Dr. Shirley A. Miles, Director, Department of Defense Education Activity (Case 

No. 09L112622206), Jun. 30, 2011, at 4, 22, available at 

http://www.dodig.mil/fo/Foia/PDFs/MilesROIforreleaseRedacted.pdf (finding that the Principal 

Deputy Director and Associate Director for Education, a senior executive, “advocated for and 

caused the hiring of [a relative] in violation of 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302 and 3110”). See also David A. 
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 23

nepotism involving so many different high-ranking officials in different agencies 

speaks to a risk that may increase as the rank of the official increases. 

This may not be unique to the United States. The Canadian Public Service 

Commission (PSC) informed us that in those recent cases where the PSC found 

nepotism, it tended to occur at the Director or middle-management levels rather 

than the lower supervisory levels. There may be something inherent in higher-level 

positions that increases the risk of nepotism as the rank of the position increases. 

Possible explanations for more instances of nepotism being found at the higher 

levels, particularly in the U.S. Government, include:

1. Political appointees lacking knowledge or understanding of the civil service 

rules.

2. Influence over hiring in a larger number of positions means a greater 

potential for a match between a position in the official’s control and an 

official’s relative being interested in that position.

3. Misunderstandings by subordinates as to what the official is asking them to 

do. 

We asked respondents to the 2010 MPS the extent of their agreement with a 

statement that political senior executives in their organization respect the merit 

process when making hiring decisions, and then asked the same question regarding 

 

Montoya (Inspector General), Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 

Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations: “Exploring Alleged Ethical and 

Legal Violations at the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,” Feb. 4, 2015, at 5-6, 

available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-114-ba09-wstate-dmontoya20150204.pdf (testifying that the former: (1) Chief Human Capital Officer; (2) Deputy Chief 

Human Capital Officer; (3) Director of Human Resources; and (4) Deputy Director of Human 

Resources, each committed nepotism by advocating for the hiring of their own close relatives); 

Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, Review of Conduct by a High Ranking Official in 

the Hiring of a Trademark Organization Employee, Jul. 8, 2014, at 32, 35, available at 

http://www.oig.doc.gov/oigpublications/13-0726_unredacted.pdf (finding that a Commissioner 

violated multiple regulations when she instructed her subordinates to help the boyfriend of a relative 

to obtain employment with the agency).
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

24 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

career senior executives. While only 38.7 percent agreed with the statement 

regarding the political executives, 47.3 percent of respondents agreed with the 

statement about their career executives. 73

It may be that political appointees who lack experience under the Federal civil 

service need to be educated about the merit principles and prohibited personnel 

practices, including nepotism. The transition between presidential administrations 

may be a particularly high-risk period because when there is a new President, there 

also will be a large number of new appointments to positions that are political in 

nature and thus filled by many individuals who do not have prior experience within 

the civil service. 74 A strategy to educate these appointees about the civil service, 

including the PPPs, should be a part of any presidential transition plan. 

The second item notes that a higher-ranking position can offer more opportunities 

to commit acts of nepotism than a position with authority over fewer jobs. But, if 

the officials who are put in such positions of power are informed of the rules and 

choose to behave ethically, a larger number of opportunities for nepotism need not 

equate to more nepotism occurring. Thus, the second item may be best addressed 

through a combination of education and appointing ethical people. 

The last item, misunderstandings, may be a question of officials needing to be more 

cognizant of the importance of being clear about what they are saying and not 

assuming that others understood what the officials meant to say. 

The higher an official is in an organization, the greater the likelihood that the 

official’s questions or wishes may seem like, or be interpreted as, orders to a 

 73 Those who work closely with the executives in question tend to have a better opinion of 

them. But, the gap between opinions about political and career executives respecting the merit 

process in hiring remains (63.2% versus 70.7% agreement) for those respondents who work closely 

with career or political executives. 

74 The Plum Book, a listing of positions available for appointment by the President outside 

of the civil service, is published after each presidential election, with the U.S. House of 

Representatives and the U.S. Senate alternating the responsibility for this publication. The 2012 

edition contained a list of more than 8,000 jobs. See https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPOPLUMBOOK-2012/content-detail.html. 
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 25

subordinate. If a senior executive says, “I hope my nephew makes the referral list,” 

the executive may think he or she is simply expressing a hope, much like one might 

hope a sports team wins the game that weekend. However, to an HR specialist or 

selecting supervisor four levels down in the organization, that hope may sound more 

like a command. For instance, what does it mean if a GS-15 manager says to a 

GS-11 official involved in hiring for a position, “My niece is qualified for this job, 

right?” Does it mean that the GS-15 wants to know if the GS-15 has misread the 

qualifications standard, or does it mean that the GS-15 wants the position 

description altered or the crediting plan changed to ensure that it matches the 

qualifications of the niece?

We encourage officials to be sensitive to how expressing their interest in a position

may be interpreted by others. For a listener who is subordinate to the speaker, there 

can be a world of difference between the two statements below:

1. I know someone who is interested in the internship; what instructions do we 

give to interested candidates so that they can apply?

2. My son is interested in the internship; how does he get this job?

The first question probably would be answered by giving the same information any 

interested caller would get (which is likely instructions on how to access the public 

USAJOBS vacancy announcement). The second question may carry an implication 

that the subordinate is expected to achieve this outcome.

75 The greater the 

difference in the level of power between the speaker and the listener, the greater the 

risk may be that the listener will be uncomfortable asking for clarification or feel 

unable to refuse what he or she heard as an instruction. This may be particularly true 

in cases where the listener is responsible for providing customer service to the 

 75 See Alexander v. Department of the Navy, 24 M.S.P.R. 621, 623-25 (1984) (holding that an 

inquiry as to the availability of a position is not the same as recommending that it be filled by a 

particular person – the latter is prohibited by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7), while the former is not).
CHAPTER TWO: NEPOTISM AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE

26 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

speaker, such as an HR specialist. 76 While it may be difficult for a person of lower 

rank to ask the official to be clearer, supervisors are responsible for setting the tone 

where subordinates will feel it is safe to ask for that clarification.

Officials should be extremely careful about expressing any interest in vacancies on 

behalf of another person. It might be best for the official to make no contact at all

with anyone involved in the hiring action. However, if the official decides to make 

contact, the official should be very explicit at all times that he or she is only seeking 

publicly available information and that the inquiry is not an expression of any desire 

to appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate on the behalf of the other 

person. The official should not assume that someone else will understand the 

official’s intentions. Even an official with good intentions can be disciplined for 

poor judgment in the exercise of those intentions. 77

 76 In response to the FOCS, only 74% of respondents agreed that their supervisor would 

support them if they refused to help a customer commit a PPP. U.S. Merit Systems Protection 

Board, The Impact of Recruitment Strategy on Fair and Open Competition for Federal Jobs (2015) at 34, 

available at www.mspb.gov/studies. 

77 See, e.g., Shibuya v. Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶¶ 10, 12 (2013) (holding that 

a charge of poor judgment does not require the agency to identify any particular law, rule, or 

regulation being violated); Rackers v. Department of Justice, 79 M.S.P.R. 262, 282 (1998) (sustaining a 

charge of poor judgment despite the fact that the employee later changed his mind and did not 

follow through on the inappropriate idea), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Horney v. U.S. Forest 

Service, 29 M.S.P.R. 543, 547 (1985) (holding that while the appellant, a supervisor, did not intend the 

consequences of his actions, the agency did not err in finding that the appellant’s poor judgement 

could not be condoned), aff’d sub nom. Horney v. Department of Agriculture, 809 F.2d 789 (Fed. Cir. 

1986).
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 27

CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK 

OF NEPOTISM

This chapter discusses steps that agencies can take to reduce the potential that 

nepotism will occur. Some steps are more labor-intensive than others. Thus, for 

some options, agencies may need to assess their particular risk-levels to decide which 

methods are most appropriate. 

Identifying a Nepotism Problem

For an agency to deal effectively with the risk of nepotism, it is helpful for an agency 

to know if it has an existing problem. One potential indicator of a nepotism 

problem is perceptions by employees that they have observed nepotism in their work 

units. MPS data show that the extent to which employees perceive nepotism greatly 

varies by agency. As shown in figure 1, of the agencies with at least 400 respondents 

to the 2010 MPS, perceptions that nepotism occurred ranged from a low of 3.4 

percent to a high of 15.9 percent.

Figure 1: Percent of respondents who reported that an official in the work unit advocated 

for the appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement of a relative, by agency.

While perceptions by employees are an important warning sign that nepotism may be 

occurring, MPS data is not the only way that agencies can identify the possibility of a 

3.4%

7.5%

7.7%

10.1%

10.4%

12.4%

12.4%

13.1%

13.2%

13.5%

13.9%

14.6%

15.0%

15.9%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 18%

Commerce

Justice

Treasury

Transportation

Agriculture

Homeland Security

Veterans Affairs

Health/Human Services

Army

Defense (Other)

Navy

Air Force

Interior

Social Security
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

28 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

nepotism problem. Signs that a greater investment is needed to reduce nepotism 

also may be found in internal agency surveys (including, but not limited to, exit 

surveys) indicating nepotism perceptions or OIG reports finding repeated instances 

of nepotism or a pervasive culture of nepotism. 

Surveys can help agencies learn what is happening in different organizations, but to 

obtain information related to nepotism, the survey must offer a related question. 

Many OIG investigations rely upon an employee reporting wrongdoing, but the 

employee must choose to contact an OIG or be prompted by questions from an 

investigator. As with other types of wrongdoing, if the agency seeks this information 

and creates a culture where employees believe that reporting nepotism will result in 

change, the agency will have a better chance to get the information that it needs. 78

There are other methods that might identify nepotism that has already occurred, 

such as auditing personnel action case files. But, to most efficiently direct agency 

resources, agencies need employees who see something suspicious to report it. 

Agencies should send the message that they want to know about issues such as 

nepotism. 

It also is important for agencies not to use only one large-scale source of information 

to determine if nepotism is occurring. For example, as shown in figure 1, the 2010 

MPS survey data for the Department of Justice (DOJ) indicated that, agency-wide, 

DOJ had a lower rate of perceptions of nepotism than most other large agencies. 

Yet, in 2012, DOJ’s OIG reported “the third occasion in eight years” in which the 

OIG found illegal hiring practices involving a particular division in DOJ. The OIG 

reported finding multiple acts of nepotism in 2008-2010 79 – the same period covered

 78 See U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Blowing the Whistle: Barriers to Federal Employees 

Making Disclosures, Nov. 2011, at 16-17, available at www.mspb.gov/studies (explaining that when 

deciding whether to report wrongdoing, many employees factor in the likelihood that something will 

be done to correct the issue).

79 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report Regarding Investigation of 

Improper Hiring Practices in the Justice Management Division, Jul. 2012, at 2-7. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 29

by the MPS. If DOJ limited itself to only agency-wide survey data, then it would 

have remained unaware of serious problems in one of its divisions.

An agency must perform an analysis on all of the information available to it, not just 

take a single source of information or an agency-wide result and assume it presents 

the entire picture. A single source of information can sound important warning 

bells, but it is unlikely to tell the whole tale in adequate detail.

Make Better Use of Human Resources

Customer service is considered an important competency for HR employees. 80 In 

our 2011 Fair and Open Competition Survey (FOCS), we asked HR employees if 

their supervisors would consider it “bad customer service” for an HR employee to 

report that a customer had committed a PPP. Twenty percent agreed that it would 

be considered bad customer service. Only 74 percent stated that their supervisor 

would support them if they refused to aid a customer in the commission of a PPP. 

Yet, when we asked representatives of HR Directors and CHCOs for their 

viewpoints, only one agency agreed that its HR supervisors would consider it bad 

customer service if an HR employee reported nepotism to an OIG.

It may be that most HR leaders gave us what they considered the “socially desirable” 

response or that they were unaware of how HR supervisors are perceived by their 

subordinates. In either case, because of HR’s involvement in personnel actions, 

particularly recruitment actions, HR employees are in a particularly good position to 

help agencies prevent nepotism. But, HR employees need to believe that the agency 

considers it part of HR’s job to prevent nepotism from occurring and that it is safe 

to intervene to prevent the PPP from happening. Agencies should create a culture 

where HR employees believe that if an official appears to be asking for something 

 80 OPM defines the customer service competency as follows: “Works with clients and 

customers. . . to assess their needs, provide information or assistance, resolve their problems, or 

satisfy their expectations; knows about available products and services; is committed to providing 

quality products and services.” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Multipurpose Occupational 

Systems Analysis Inventory - Close-Ended (MOSAIC), available at https://www.opm.gov/policy-dataoversight/assessment-and-selection/competencies/mosaic-studies-competencies.pdf. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

30 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

improper, the socially and politically correct thing to do will be to seek clarification 

from that official and provide any necessary education. If this does not resolve the 

problem, there must be an environment in which the HR employees will feel that 

they can safely disclose wrongdoing. 81 Intervening to prevent PPPs, including 

nepotism, is an act of service to the agency. Agencies need to establish a culture 

where HR employees will trust that management will see it as such and that doing 

the right thing will not have negative consequences for the employee. Otherwise, an 

important opportunity for the agency to prevent improprieties may be wasted.

Certifications Regarding Relatives

Optional Form 306 (Declaration for Federal Employment)

The OF-306 asks an applicant a series of questions. Question 14 on the OF-306 

asks the applicant, “Do any of your relatives work for the agency or government 

organization to which you are submitting this form?” If the answer is yes, the 

applicant is not automatically disqualified, but simply must explain the relationship 

so that the agency can ensure that the relationship did not affect the selection 

process.

We asked OPM to identify “all hiring authorities that require the use of the OF-306.” 

OPM replied that, “The OF-306 is not tied to specific hiring authorities. It is used 

when an individual is applying for Federal employment.” 82 As explained below, in 

practice, agency use of the form tends to vary by the circumstances.

We asked agencies about the circumstances under which they require applicants to 

complete an OF-306. In general, agencies reported using it for new appointments 

when the individual was not yet employed with the agency, regardless of appointing 

 81 For recommendations on creating a positive culture for whistleblowing, see U.S. Merit 

Systems Protection Board, Blowing the Whistle: Barriers to Federal Employees Making Disclosures, Nov. 

2011, at ii, available at www.mspb.gov/studies. 

82 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Response to MSPB Nepotism Questionnaire, 

Jun. 22, 2015. OPM also stated that, “The OF-306 is not required for Executive branch hiring 

conducted outside of the provisions of title 5, United States Code.” Id. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 31

authority. However, when the individual already was employed with the agency, 

agencies were less likely to use the OF-306 for a new appointment. 

The delegated examining unit (DEU) handbook and training materials state that an

OF-306 must be signed at the “time of appointment.” 83 There are no exceptions for 

individuals who are already employed with the agency. We asked agencies whether 

they require the completion of the OF-306 for DEU appointments under four 

different circumstances: (1) the individual had no prior civil service employment 

history; (2) the individual was reinstatement eligible; (3) the individual currently 

worked for a different Federal agency; and (4) the individual was currently employed 

with the hiring agency. All agencies that answered these questions reported that they 

require the OF-306 for DEU appointments under the first three sets of 

circumstances. However, of the 14 agencies that supplied a “yes” or “no” answer to 

the question regarding current employees, only 5 reported requiring the OF-306 for 

new DEU appointments, while 9 replied that they did not require it. 84

We also asked about the use of the OF-306 for Pathways Recent Graduates.

85 All 

agencies that gave a “yes” or “no” answer reported using it for individuals who: 

(1) had no prior civil service employment history; (2) were reinstatement eligible; or 

(3) currently worked for a different Federal agency. But, nine agencies reported they 

 83 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Delegated Examining Operations Handbook, 

at 79, available at http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiring-authorities/competitivehiring/deo_handbook.pdf. The training materials for agencies to obtain DEU certification state that 

the “OF 306, Declaration for Federal Employment contains a signature block with all of the 

necessary certifications. The signature on the OF 306 is required at the time of appointment.” U.S. 

Office of Personnel Management, Delegated Examining Training, Module 4-12. Our questionnaire 

to agencies did not ask if they opt to also request the form be submitted at an earlier stage, such as 

with the initial application. However, responses from agencies to other questions indicate that some 

agencies may be requesting the OF-306 as part of the initial application process. 

84 “Not sure/not applicable” was another response option. 

85 The Pathways Recent Graduates Program is an appointment into the excepted service with 

later conversion to the competitive service. It may be substantially more valuable to individuals than 

their current positions because the program is designed to provide developmental experiences. See

U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “Hiring Authorities: Students & Recent Graduates,” 

https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/hiring-authorities/students-recent-graduates/. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

32 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

did not require it for Recent Graduate appointments of current employees and only 

seven agencies reported requiring it under those circumstances.

We recommend that OPM provide clearer guidance to agencies regarding when the 

OF-306 is optional and when it is required. If OPM decides that its use is optional for new 

appointments involving current employees, agencies should assess the conditions under 

which new appointments within the same agency may still warrant the use of the 

OF-306. It also may be appropriate to use the OF-306 for reassignments or 

promotions that do not involve a new appointment. In addition to the question 

about relatives, the OF-306 asks about whether the individual has been convicted of 

a crime, whether he or she currently has any criminal charges pending, and whether 

he or she is delinquent on a Federal debt. That a person is already in a position with 

the agency does not alter the fact that a new appointment may involve different 

circumstances than the original appointment (such as a relative who is the selecting 

official for the new position or placing the individual in a position requiring a 

different degree of trust) or that the individual’s personal circumstances may have 

changed since the initial appointment.

One of the disadvantages of waiting until the “time of appointment” to learn that the 

applicant has relatives employed by the agency is that the agency is faced with an 

individual who is expected to begin work that day, yet investigating the relationship 

to determine if nepotism has occurred may take time. 86 OPM may find that a better 

practice would be to instruct agencies to have the form completed at a stage after the 

initial application but before the time of appointment when the number of applicants 

is narrowed or has been limited to just the selectee.

 86 It also may be helpful to learn other information on the OF-306 prior to the time of 

appointment, such as the applicant’s past convictions or terminations for cause from other jobs. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 33

Using Certifications to Ensure Appointments Are Not Influenced by Nepotism

The “mechanism by which an agency chooses to ensure that nepotism has not 

occurred is a matter of that agency’s internal policy.” 87 We asked agencies how they 

handle “yes” responses on question 14 of the OF-306 to ensure that nepotism is not 

occurring. Most agencies reported that they have HR review the action to see if the 

relative is in the chain of command. Only a few indicated that they check to see if 

the relative influenced the selection process. This is an important distinction, because 

5 U.S.C. § 3110 prohibits officials from acting to “appoint, employ, promote, 

advance, or advocate” for a relative. If an agency’s process does not include 

investigating the possibility that personnel actions were influenced by advocacy, then 

the agency may fail to prevent nepotism. Two agencies particularly recognize this 

risk, because when a relative is hired, these agencies require that an additional form 

be completed.

One agency, the Smithsonian Institution, 88 has a form completed by HR. The form 

inquires, “Has the relative currently employed with the Smithsonian in any way 

advocated or advanced the hire of his/her family member?” 89 The action is 

reviewed by an HR specialist and must be approved by the agency’s HR Director. 

Interviewing the selecting official would be a logical step for HR in such a process. 

(The Smithsonian also requires applicants to disclose as a part of their application

whether they have any relatives employed by the agency.)

 87 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Response to MSPB Nepotism Questionnaire, 

Jun. 22, 2015. 

88 While the Smithsonian Institution uses the civil service employment system, the 

Smithsonian considers itself an instrumentality rather than an agency. For ease of reference and 

comparison to other civil service employers, this report refers to the Smithsonian as an agency. See

http://www.si.edu/OHR/faq (explaining the relationship between the Smithsonian and Federal 

Government).

89 “The Smithsonian employs individuals in Federal Civil Service and non-Federal (Trust) 

positions.” For an explanation of trust positions and their similarity to civil service positions, see

http://www.si.edu/OHR/faq. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

34 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

The second agency, DOJ, goes a bit further with the certification process.

90 The 

applicant must certify in writing, under penalties of perjury, whether he or she has

any relatives employed by the agency. 91 Unlike the OF-306, the DOJ form also 

covers domestic partners, those with whom the applicant shares a household, and distant relatives 

with whom there is a close personal relationship. While such relationships may not be 

covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(7), they can be indicative of relationships that may 

pose ethical violations if the official becomes involved on behalf of the other person. 

There is a separate DOJ form in which the selecting official must certify in writing 

whether the selection was influenced by an employee who is a relative of – or in a 

covered relationship with – the selectee. The selecting official also must certify 

whether or not there has been contact with an employee who is a relative of – or in a 

covered relationship with – the selectee, and if there has been contact, explain why 

the contact did not affect the selection. Copies of the forms are in Appendix D.

92

DOJ’s policy requires that both of these forms be reviewed by a senior official 

uninvolved in the hiring process before a final job offer can be made. If the senior 

 90 DOJ’s process appears to be a result of the recommendations of its OIG in that OIG’s 

2012 report that found repeated acts of nepotism. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the 

Inspector General, Report Regarding Investigation of Improper Hiring Practices in the Justice Management 

Division, Jul. 2012, at Appendix A (agreeing to the recommendation by the OIG that certifications be 

used to ensure relationships between applicants and employees are disclosed).

91 The form is required for employees moving to a new position within the agency as well as 

external applicants. 

92 The Justice Management Division (JMD) within DOJ uses a form for applicants that is 

essentially the same as the form used by the rest of DOJ. We have therefore only placed the DOJ 

form in Appendix D. However, the selecting official form differs a bit, and copies of both the DOJ 

and JMD forms for selecting officials are in Appendix D. The differences in the forms may be a 

result of JMD’s role in the decision that such forms should be used in DOJ hiring. See U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report Regarding Investigation of Improper Hiring 

Practices in the Justice Management Division, Jul. 2012, at Appendix A (agreeing to the recommendation 

by the OIG that certifications be used to ensure relationships between applicants and employees are 

disclosed).
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 35

official who usually would perform this task is involved in the hiring action, an 

alternate independent official is to perform the review. 93

Agencies may want to consider using forms such as the ones being used by DOJ. 

Additionally, agencies may benefit from expanding the form signed by the selecting 

official to include checking for inappropriate advocacy for unsuccessful applicants in 

addition to the selectee. However, as with any procedure, a cost-benefit analysis 

would be wise. There are already complaints that the hiring process is overly 

burdened with procedures and paperwork; 94 but, the more vulnerable a position is to 

nepotism or ethical violations, the more appropriate it becomes to apply additional 

protections, despite the additional time and effort it may require. 

The DOJ form focuses on the selecting official. However, agencies can set their 

internal policies around their particular processes. For example, where an 

assessment or interview board is used, agencies could have members certify that: 

 93 Given how awkward it could be for a low-level HR specialist to handle any statements that 

a high-ranking official may have made an attempt at nepotism, placing a final review stage at a high 

level may be a useful precaution. The extent to which this is a suitable use of time for a highranking official may depend on any history the agency has of encountering situations in which 

individuals of higher rank appear to seek to influence the selection process. See, e.g., U.S. 

Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Investigation of Allegations of Improper Hiring 

Practices at INTERPOL Washington, Feb. 2015 (finding that an executive officer used his position to 

instruct his subordinate to include the executive officer’s son in the 2011 INTERPOL Washington 

summer internship program); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Report 

Regarding Investigation of Improper Hiring Practices by Senior Officials in the Executive Office for Immigration 

Review, Nov. 2012 (finding that the Director of the Executive Office violated the nepotism statute by 

becoming involved in the employment of his niece); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the 

Inspector General, Report Regarding Investigation of Improper Hiring Practices in the Justice Management 

Division, Jul. 2012 (finding that the HR Assistant Director advocated for her daughter’s appointment; 

the Facilities and Administrative Services Staff (FASS) Director advocated for his son’s 

appointment; the FASS Deputy Director and Assistant Director in HR Policy sought to aid each 

other’s relatives to obtain positions; the Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Attorney General 

for Human Resources and Administration sought employment for her son and niece; and the HR 

Director sought employment for his cousin and nephew).

94 See Barack Obama, Presidential Memorandum, Improving the Federal Recruitment and Hiring 

Process, May 11, 2010, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidentialmemorandum-improving-federal-recruitment-and-hiring-process (asserting that “the complexity and 

inefficiency of today’s Federal hiring process deters many highly qualified individuals from seeking 

and obtaining jobs in the Federal Government.”)
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

36 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

(1) they are not related to – or in a covered relationship with – any of the candidates 

on the referral list; and (2) to the best of their knowledge, no one who is employed 

by the agency has attempted to influence the hiring or selection process to benefit a 

relative or covered individual. If appropriate, a similar form requiring a statement 

and signature by the HR staff involved in the personnel action could be used. 95 Just 

knowing that such a form would be used may help prevent nepotism by making 

potential advocates for relatives aware that others would be required to report 

inappropriate contact about the position. 96 

When deciding whether to require forms from HR staff and selection board 

members, an agency should weigh the extra burden of completing the paperwork 

against the level of risk of corruption of the hiring process if the additional 

precautions are not used. 

Nearly all agencies reported that, when looking to see if nepotism occurred, HR 

performs the task. However, as explained above, DOJ has a senior reviewing official 

look at the forms. The Smithsonian reported that it has its “Office of Protection 

Services” look at the case. (This has the added advantage of ensuring that someone 

experienced with conducting investigations is performing oversight.) Agencies must 

determine which staff inside their particular agency is best suited to check for 

nepotism in such personnel actions. HR is not the only option.

Education and Guidance

Agency officials with authority over personnel matters have a responsibility under 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(c) to prevent the commission of PPPs, including nepotism. OPM has 

the responsibility under 5 U.S.C. § 1104 to ensure compliance with the civil service 

 95 To qualify for delegated examining authority, an agency “must establish written policies 

and procedures for accepting and processing applications from all applicants, including... delegated 

examining staff and their relatives or household members.” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 

Delegated Examining Training, Module 1-11 (capitalization and punctuation modified). 

96 Agencies could include a warning that a false statement may be grounds for discipline up 

to and including removal or debarment from Federal service, or even require that the signature be 

given under the penalties for perjury if the agency deems it necessary. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 37

laws, rules, and regulations. According to the agency officials who answered our 

questionnaire, agencies and OPM may be able to better meet these responsibilities 

through the use of improved education and guidance to HR staff, supervisors, 

employees, and applicants.

Education and Guidance Provided by the Employing Agency

When we asked respondents to our agency questionnaire what they thought agency 

leadership could do to better prevent nepotism, the most common answer was better 

education for supervisors and managers about what nepotism is and the 

consequences for engaging in it. OSC added that agency leadership should send “a 

message from the top that retaliation and hiring violations will not be permitted.” 97

There also were recommendations for better training for HR employees on how to 

identify nepotism and what their responsibilities are when it is found. OSC informed 

us that “OSC strongly believes that HR employees play a critical role in preventing 

PPPs. Education and training for HR employees and management on their roles and 

responsibilities in preventing PPPs is one method of empowering and educating 

these officials.” 98

No agency mentioned or suggested the idea of training non-supervisory line 

employees. However, we believe that it may be helpful if agencies inform such 

employees about nepotism via ethics training and provide them with information 

about the ability to report wrongdoing, including nepotism, to OSC or agency 

OIGs.

99

 97 Office of Special Counsel, Response to MSPB Questionnaire, May 29, 2015. 

98 Id. (Capitalization modified). 

99 Compared to many other PPPs, such as retaliation for whistleblowing activities, the rate at 

which nepotism is reported to OSC is disproportionately low to the rate at which it is perceived. 

When asked why this might be the case, OSC stated that, “There are several possible explanations 

for this, the most likely being that workers are not aware they can file nepotism complaints with 

OSC, even if they perceive it as a problem.” Office of Special Counsel, Response to MSPB 

Questionnaire, May 29, 2015. No FEAR Act training may be one opportunity for agencies to 

provide such information, as the agencies already are required by law to provide training to their 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

38 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

The appropriate frequency of the training and dissemination of information 

regarding nepotism may vary, but there are certain events that stand out as 

appropriate opportunities for particular types of education. These include:

• When a person is selected as a supervisor, manager, or senior executive

(training and information sheet).

• When a political appointee begins work (training and information sheet).

• When an official is assigned to serve on a selection board (information 

sheet).

• When an official is given a referral list (information sheet).

• When a person is hired to serve as a staffing specialist or generalist in an HR 

office (training and information sheet). 100

• When providing information to all employees on ethical behavior in general 

or the PPPs in particular (training and/or information sheet). 

For employees, such training may cover how to recognize and report nepotism (as 

well as other PPPs), and, if applicable, how to avoid committing it. Training for 

supervisors, managers, and executives should address how to recognize, report, and 

avoid nepotism. It should also communicate to these officials that when an 

employee reports what he or she reasonably perceives as nepotism, he or she must 

be protected from retaliation for making such a report. 101

 

employees regarding their rights and remedies under whistleblower protection laws. See Notification 

and Federal Employee Antidiscrimination and Retaliation (No FEAR) Act, P.L. No. 107-174, 

§§ 201-202. 

100 Not all staffing specialists or generalists involved in issuing referral lists are trained to 

issue DEU certificates. Thus, while DEU training includes nepotism, these other HR officials also 

may need training when hired and refresher training at suitable intervals. 

101 See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (protecting employees against retaliation for disclosing 

information that an employee reasonably believes evidences any violation of any law, rule, or 

regulation).
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 39

Education and Guidance Provided by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management

When we asked agencies what OPM could do to help prevent nepotism, education 

was again the most common reply. Methods identified for OPM to accomplish this 

included providing: a lesson in HR University (HRU); a list of questions and 

answers (Q&As) on OPM’s website pertaining to nepotism; and a desk guide 

covering nepotism and the other PPPs. 

While title 5 permits OPM to “delegate, in whole or in part, any function vested in or 

delegated to the Director,” the delegation comes with responsibilities for OPM. This 

includes that OPM shall: (1) “establish standards which shall apply to the activities 

of” an agency acting under a delegated authority; and (2) “establish and maintain an 

oversight program[.]” Additionally, the statute’s authorization to delegate cannot be 

“construed as affecting the responsibility of the Director to prescribe regulations and 

to ensure compliance with the civil service laws, rules, and regulations.” 102

One of the most important things that OPM could do to educate agencies would be 

to create a public, well-organized system of guidance regarding personnel matters, 

with clarity on what is recommended and what is mandatory. Until the 1990s, OPM 

issued a “Federal Personnel Manual” (FPM) which was a highly-organized, 10,000-

page book that offered guidance on agencies should implement most personnel laws 

and regulations. In accordance with the recommendations of the National 

Performance Review (NPR), the FPM was abolished and the sunset of the document 

was completed by 1994. 103 It was hoped that by ending the FPM, agencies would be 

more empowered to manage their own personnel systems. 104 Yet, the underlying 

laws that the FPM was intended to help implement remained in place.

 102 5 U.S.C. § 1104. 

103 General Accounting Office, Management Reform: Implementation of the National Performance 

Review’s Recommendations, Letter Report, Dec. 5, 1994, GAO/OCG-95-1, available at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-OCG-95-1/html/GAOREPORTS-OCG-95-

1.htm. The General Accounting Office was later renamed the Government Accountability Office. 

104 The National Performance Review Report stated: “We must enable all managers to 

pursue their missions, freed from the cumbersome red tape of current personnel rules. The 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

40 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

In 1994, the General Accounting Office (today known as the Government 

Accountability Office) (GAO), noted that: “In general, the FPM and agency 

directives provide guidance to federal managers on how to interpret and apply the 

statutes pertaining to federal employment. To the extent that they can be simplified 

and automated, they could possibly better accomplish their purposes.” 105 

Following the abolishment of the FPM, agency HR offices, facing steep cuts in 

resources, did not replace all the relevant information from the FPM with simplified 

and automated guidance. Additionally, OPM found that there were a variety of 

needs that it still had to meet, resulting in a multitude of different products. 106 For 

example, information on veterans’ preference rights today may be found in OPM’s 

VETGUIDE, OPM’s Delegated Examining Operations Handbook, and OPM’s 

regulations in title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 107 Furthermore, both the 

 

President should issue a directive phasing out the Federal Personnel Manual and all agency 

implementing directives. The order will require that most personnel management authority be 

delegated to agencies’ line managers at the lowest level practical in each agency. It will direct OPM 

to work with agencies to determine which FPM chapters, provisions, or supplements are essential, 

which are useful, and which are unnecessary. OPM will then replace the FPM and agency directives 

with manuals tailored to user needs, automated personnel processes, and electronic decision support 

systems.” Vice President Al Gore, Report of the National Performance Review, Sep. 7, 1993, available at, 

http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/stis1993/npr93a/npr93a.txt. 

105 GAO, Management Reform: Implementation of the National Performance Review’s Recommendations, 

Letter Report, Dec. 5, 1994, GAO/OCG-95-1, available at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-OCG-95-1/html/GAOREPORTS-OCG-95-

1.htm. 

106 Our Spring 2014 Issues of Merit newsletter discussed the sunset of the FPM and noted that 

today it can be difficult for OPM to organize and maintain the currency of its guidance in a 

decentralized system with complex laws. We also noted the need to distinguish between OPM’s 

binding dictates and non-binding advice and recognized that making a distinction between advice 

and mandates in the FPM was difficult. Issues of Merit, “Looking for Guidance,” Spring 2014, 

available at www.mspb.gov/studies. 

107 See Vassallo v. Department of Defense, 122 M.S.P.R. 156, ¶¶ 4, 8 (2015). The Board had 

rejected OPM’s interpretation of the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 in OPM’s 

VETGUIDE, but granted reconsideration on the basis of deference to OPM’s regulations issued in 

5 C.F.R. §§ 335.106 and 315.611 because a regulation is a different authority than a guide. See also, 

U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Veterans’ Employment Redress Laws in the Federal Civil Service

(2014), at 41 (explaining that the Delegated Examining Operations Handbook has not yet been 

updated to comport with Shapley v. Department of Homeland Security, 110 M.S.P.R. 31 (2008), and 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 41

Board and the Federal Circuit still use the FPM as “useful guidance” 108 and a 

“valuable resource” 109 to construe the meaning of OPM regulations in the absence 

of more recent interpretations issued by OPM. 

We asked OPM about the Wallace case, discussed earlier, in which the Board used the 

FPM to determine Federal policy, even though the FPM was ordered to sunset by 

1994. 110 OPM said, “The policy in the FPM is OPM’s policy unless subsequently 

changed. It is a gloss on the statute that is worthy of respect.” 111 We later noted to 

OPM that they had made this statement and asked OPM for its position on using the 

FPM in other contexts. OPM replied, “It may be considered for guidance in 

conjunction with more current guidance from OPM. To the extent it is inconsistent 

with the current statute, and the current regulations, agencies must follow the 

law.” 112 OPM also stated, “As we have previously noted, agencies and tribunals are 

free to continue to consult the FPM as to matters for which there is not superseding 

law or guidance.” 113

If the FPM remains OPM’s policy, provides useful “gloss” to statutes, and may be 

considered guidance by agencies and tribunals, then we encourage OPM to make the 

FPM – or the parts that remain most relevant – easily available to agencies once 

again. The FPM was sunsetted for its imperfections, but the laws for personnel are 

even more complicated today than they were in 1994 and technology now offers 

 

therefore contains instructions that could cause an agency to violate a veteran’s preference rights 

under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998).

108 Drury v. Office of Personnel Management, 79 M.S.P.R. 493, ¶ 8 (1998).

109 Markland v. Office of Personnel Management, 140 F.3d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

110 Wallace v. Department of Commerce, 106 M.S.P.R. 23, ¶ 11 (2007); 59 Fed. Reg. 66629 

(explaining that the majority of the FPM was subject to “sunset” in 1993, with some portions 

remaining in effect for another year to permit time to establish regulations and manuals necessary in 

the absence of the FPM).

111 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Response to MSPB Nepotism Questionnaire, 

Jun. 22, 2015.

112 U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Response to MSPB Adverse Action 

Questionnaire, Apr. 29, 2016.

113 Id. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

42 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

more options for presenting information. Agencies will be empowered to more 

easily exercise their flexibilities – an NPR goal – as well as comply with the rules if 

OPM provides a well-organized, centralized, public, automated system of guidance, 

that is regularly updated, with clarity regarding what is recommended and what is 

mandatory. Such a system also may help adjudicators to reach accurate conclusions 

about agency compliance with OPM’s rules, as adjudicators, agencies, and employees 

will all be able to operate from the same source of guidance. 

Fair and Open Competition

It is a merit principle that selection and advancement should occur “after fair and 

open competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity.” 114 As explained 

below, avoiding perceptions of nepotism and opportunities for employees to commit 

nepotism may be additional reasons to hold fair and open competitions. 

In our 2011 FOCS, we asked HR employees whether supervisors serviced by their 

offices “practice nepotism when it comes to hiring decisions (giving an unfair 

advantage to relatives).” Sixteen percent agreed that this occurred. 

We also asked HR respondents about how often positions were open for at least two 

weeks and how often they were open to all sources. We used this data to create a

vacancy announcement practices openness score, and compared those results to the 

rate of employee perceptions of nepotism from the 2010 MPS. As shown in the 

table below, 10 agencies were compared. 115

 114 5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(1). 

115 Our criteria for inclusion in the comparison group was that the agency must have at least 

100 respondents to the FOCS. This gave us 10 agencies to compare. The agencies with the highest 

and lowest rates of nepotism perceptions on the 2010 MPS reported earlier in this chapter were not 

in this comparison group because we did not have enough FOCS responses from those agencies for 

them to be included. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 43

Table 1: Comparison of Perceptions Regarding Nepotism from MPS and Openness of 

Practices from FOCS.

Percent of 2010 MPS 

Respondents 

Reporting Perception 

of Nepotism

Percent of 2011 FOCS 

Respondents Reporting 

Less Open Practices for 

Vacancy Announcements 

Interior 15.0% 29.2%

Air Force 14.6% 80.3%

Navy 13.9% 71.3%

Defense (Other) 13.5% 57.0%

Army 13.2% 54.4%

Veterans Affairs 12.4% 45.9%

Homeland Security 12.4% 42.9%

Agriculture 10.4% 30.8%

Treasury 7.7% 23.6%

Justice 7.5% 44.4%

In general, the less open the vacancy announcement practices reported on the 2011 

FOCS, the greater the rate of employee perception of nepotism for that agency on 

the 2010 MPS. Two agencies (marked with red boxes in the table), however, did not 

follow this pattern. Within the comparison group, the Department of the Interior 

had the highest rate of nepotism perceptions on the MPS, but the second lowest 

percentage of HR respondents on the FOCS reporting less open practices. DOJ had 

the lowest rate of nepotism perceptions, but its openness score would place it in the 

middle of the comparison group. 

In other words, vacancy announcement openness cannot tell the whole story

regarding fairness in competition. Rather, the data show that a vacancy 

announcement can take the agency only so far. A vacancy announcement shapes the 

pool of applicants, but it is only one step in the hiring process. From the creation of 

the duties, to the area of consideration, to the assessment of qualifications, all the 

way to the actual selection, the entire process must have integrity and be based on 

merit.

When we asked agencies what OPM could do to prevent nepotism, one agency 

suggested that OPM “closely monitor” hiring using non-competitive hiring 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

44 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

authorities and authorities that permit agencies to limit the pool of candidates, such 

as the Pathways Programs. 116 Unfortunately, OPM has very limited resources. 

From FY 2010 to FY 2014, the number of audits of DEUs performed by OPM 

dropped from 168 to 114. While greater oversight of other hiring programs to 

ensure fair and open competition within the rules of those authorities may be 

beneficial, it is important that the DEU audits not be unduly harmed as a result.

Nevertheless, to the extent that OPM’s resources allow it, greater auditing of hiring 

under non-competitive authorities could be beneficial for the prevention of PPPs, 

including, but not limited to, nepotism. 117

Holding Officials Accountable

While OSC has the authority to prosecute PPPs,

The head of each agency shall be responsible for the prevention of 

prohibited personnel practices, for the compliance with and 

enforcement of applicable civil service laws, rules, and regulations, 

and other aspects of personnel management. . . Any individual to 

 116 On March 25, 2016, OPM announced that it would “conduct a Governmentwide study 

on the use of excepted service hiring authorities, excluding those covered by the Pathways Programs.” 

(Emphasis added). OPM intends to “assess excepted service staffing activities, subject to title 5 

provisions, with regard to their effectiveness and compliance with law, regulation, and merit system 

principles.” U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Memorandum from Ana A. Mazzi, Deputy 

Associate Director, Merit System Accountability and Compliance (Mar. 25, 2016) available at, 

https://www.chcoc.gov/content/upcoming-governmentwide-study-excepted-service-hiringauthorities. In light of concerns that have been expressed about Pathways, we recommend that 

OPM reconsider its decision to exclude Pathways from this study. Additionally, the expressed 

purpose of the study includes assessing compliance with merit system principles and the law. There 

is a merit system principle that opposes favoritism (5 U.S.C. § 2301(b)(8)(A)), and a PPP prohibiting 

the tailoring of the scope of competition to favor a particular candidate (5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(6)). 

Thus, we recommend that OPM also consider including in its study competitive service authorities 

that have restricted applicant pools, such as the Veterans Employment Opportunity Act (VEOA). 

117 Nearly all PPPs touch on fair and open competition, including the prohibitions against: 

discrimination; soliciting or considering recommendations not based on personal knowledge of the 

applicant’s qualifications; rejecting applicants based on political activity; obstructing the right of a 

person to compete; influencing a person to withdraw from competition; granting preferences or 

advantages in competition not authorized by law; failure to hire in reprisal for past whistleblowing 

activity or past appeal or complaint activity; discrimination for factors unrelated to successful 

performance on the job; violation of veterans’ preference rights; or other actions that violate a law, 

rule, or regulation that implements the merit system principles. See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b).
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 45

whom the head of an agency delegates authority for personnel 

management, or for any aspect thereof, shall be similarly responsible 

within the limits of the delegation. 118

Many of the positions that give an individual the responsibility to prevent PPPs also 

are positions that place the individual in a position to commit PPPs – namely those 

individuals to whom “the agency delegates authority for personnel management.” 119 

We asked OSC, if an individual who engages in nepotism is an executive, ethics 

officer, or HR officer, to what extent does OSC believe the individual’s position 

should play a substantial role in determining the appropriate penalty for the 

infraction? OSC replied that “those with greater knowledge of – and responsibility 

for – enforcing these rules have a greater obligation to comply. The individual’s 

position and their working knowledge of PPPs should play a substantial role in 

determining the appropriate penalty.” 120

This is consistent with the Board’s Douglas factors, which state that when 

determining the appropriate penalty to impose, factors that agencies should consider

include: the relationship of the offense to the employee’s position, duties, and 

responsibilities; the employee’s job level and type of employment (including any 

supervisory or fiduciary role); and the clarity with which the employee was on notice 

of the rules. 121 

Nepotism is: a serious offense that strikes at the heart of a merit-based civil service;

harmful to the engagement and morale of the workforce; 122 damaging to the ability 

of an agency to effectively accomplish its mission; 123 and a violation of law. 124

 118 5 U.S.C. § 2302(c).

119 Id.

120 Office of Special Counsel, Response to MSPB Questionnaire, May 29, 2015 (punctuation 

and capitalization modified). 

121 Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).

122 See Appendix C: The Effects of Nepotism. 
CHAPTER THREE: WHAT AGENCIES CAN DO TO REDUCE THE RISK OF NEPOTISM 

46 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

Agencies are responsible for protecting the efficiency of the service from these 

harms. Agency leaders must send the message that nepotism will not be tolerated, 

and, when necessary, act on that message through appropriate discipline, up to and 

including demoting offenders to remove their supervisory authority, removal from 

service, and even debarment from service if the circumstances warrant. 125 

 123 Approximately 70 percent of agencies responding to our questionnaire strongly agreed 

that nepotism is harmful to an agency’s ability to effectively perform its mission while less than 10 

percent disagreed at all. 

124 5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(7), 3110.

125 As noted in our recent report on due process, agency leaders determine the level in the 

organization at which decisions about discipline will occur. U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 

What is Due Process in Federal Civil Service Employment? (2015), at 42, available at 

www.mspb.gov/studies. A culture of nepotism should not be allowed to create immunity that 

prevents responsibility for nepotism. It may be necessary for agency leadership to think carefully 

about where the authority should reside for proposing and deciding upon such disciplinary actions. 
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 47

CONCLUSION

Nepotism is a serious offense that damages the ability of the civil service to operate 

effectively, efficiently, and based upon merit. It also is unethical, illegal, and in some 

cases, criminal. The President, employing agencies, OPM, employees, and applicants

all play a role in keeping nepotism out of the civil service. Below we discuss 

measures that each can take to limit the potential for nepotism to occur. 

The President of the United States

Under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(c), the head of an agency is responsible for the prevention of 

PPPs. While some political appointees may already know about the rules for 

nepotism and the other PPPs, we recommend against assuming this knowledge is 

present. Transition plans between presidential administrations should include 

preparations to educate political appointees about the PPPs, including nepotism, and 

how PPPs such as nepotism can be avoided. Additionally, once a new 

administration is in place, there will be inevitable turnover. As new political 

appointees come to serve, they too may require education about the PPPs, including 

nepotism.

Agencies

Agency leaders and those to whom they have delegated personnel authorities are 

obligated to prevent nepotism. Means by which this may be achieved include:

1. Making better use of HR staff as partners to advise employees about the 

rules and to raise concerns if personnel actions seem suspicious.

2. Requiring additional certifications that personnel actions have not been 

improperly influenced when the agency deems such precautions necessary.

3. Educating executives, managers, supervisors, and employees about the rules 

of ethical conduct, including what it means to avoid nepotism and how they 

can achieve a merit-based workplace.
CONCLUSION 

48 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

4. Ensuring that competitions for positions are as fair and open as is practical 

for the positions in question.

5. Holding employees accountable for their own conduct and for supervising 

the conduct of their subordinates.

U.S. Office of Personnel Management

OPM has delegated to Federal agencies much of the responsibility for hiring, 

including the prevention of nepotism. However, OPM should provide clear 

guidance to agencies on how they can accomplish this. OPM’s guidance regarding 

when the OF-306 is to be used is either incomplete, unclear, not followed, or has 

some combination of these issues. We recommend that OPM provide better 

guidance to agencies regarding the circumstances under which the OF-306 is 

required. 

OPM’s guidance on some other matters involving nepotism (such as subordinates 

hiring relatives of their supervisors) is also unclear because, while purportedly still 

valid policy, it is contained in the FPM – a document that was sunset more than two 

decades ago. There were reasons for the sunset of the FPM, including concerns that 

it resulted in HR offices being more inflexible. However, one of the best attributes 

of the FPM was a central and organized source of guidance. We recommend that 

OPM consider how it can take advantage of changes in technology since the 

abolishment of the FPM in 1994 to maintain a public, well-organized reference 

system containing helpful guidance with clear distinctions between what OPM 

mandates and what it merely recommends that agencies consider. Nepotism policies 

are just one area that could benefit from such a system.

In the meantime, OPM might consider creating a nepotism Q&A section on its 

website, an HRU class on nepotism, or other educational materials. 

Employees

Employees who engage in nepotism may face possible criminal (18 U.S.C. § 208) or 

administrative sanctions (5 U.S.C. §§ 2302(b)(7)), 1215(a), 7503(a), 7513(a)). The 
CONCLUSION

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 49

conduct that qualifies as nepotism and the penalty for such conduct can differ 

between titles 18 and 5. Ultimately, an employee is responsible for his or her own 

actions. However, for both title 18 and title 5, an employee may greatly reduce the 

risk that the penalties will be applied to him or her if the employee follows three 

steps:

1. Consultation: If a situation could pose a conflict of interest, the employee 

should consult an ethics advisor. An employee should exercise good 

judgment by not trying to judge his or her own case.

2. Disclosure: The employee should disclose the issue to a supervisor or other 

appropriate agency official so that the agency can decide the proper 

approach. An employee’s silence can damage the ability of the agency to 

trust the employee in the future. 

3. Recusal: An employee should ask to recuse himself or herself from 

involvement in the personnel action. The best way not to become entangled 

in questionable conduct is for the employee to entirely avoid involvement in 

such situations whenever possible. 

Applicants 

Regardless of the hiring authority being used, agencies will likely ask external (and 

sometimes internal) applicants whether they have a relative employed by the agency. 

It is extremely important that applicants answer such questions candidly. The 

Federal Government takes the integrity of the hiring process very seriously. Merely 

having a relative employed by the same agency does not automatically disqualify an 

applicant; but an individual can be fired for unethical conduct that occurs before or

after the appointment begins. 126 A lack of candor or outright falsehood in an 

 126 See 5 C.F.R. §§ 315.803-805. 
CONCLUSION 

50 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

application can result in the person’s removal or even debarment from Federal 

service. 127 Honesty is truly the best policy. 

 127 The Board has specifically found that intentional misrepresentations in application 

documents raise serious doubts regarding an individual’s honesty and fitness for employment and 

are sufficient to support a negative suitability determination, even where only one incident of 

falsification is at issue. McClain v. Office of Personnel Management, 76 M.S.P.R. 230, 241 (1997) (finding 

that separation and debarment was an appropriate result when the individual intentionally falsified 

an answer on the OF-306). See Christopher v. Department of the Army, 107 M.S.P.R. 580, ¶¶ 17, 20 

(finding that removal may be warranted when an employee revealed only some but not all requested 

information on his application forms), aff’d, 299 F. App’x 964 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 51

APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 208

(a) Except as permitted by subsection (b) hereof, whoever, being an officer or employee of the 

executive branch of the United States Government, or of any independent agency of the United 

States, a Federal Reserve bank director, officer, or employee, or an officer or employee of the 

District of Columbia, including a special Government employee, participates personally and 

substantially as a Government officer or employee, through decision, approval, disapproval, 

recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise, in a judicial or other 

proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, 

charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he, his spouse, 

minor child, general partner, organization in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, general 

partner or employee, or any person or organization with whom he is negotiating or has any 

arrangement concerning prospective employment, has a financial interest— [s]hall be subject to the 

penalties set forth in section 216 of this title. 

(b) Subsection (a) shall not apply— 

(1) if the officer or employee first advises the Government official responsible for 

appointment to his or her position of the nature and circumstances of the judicial or other 

proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, 

controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter and makes full disclosure 

of the financial interest and receives in advance a written determination made by such 

official that the interest is not so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of 

the services which the Government may expect from such officer or employee;

(2) if, by regulation issued by the Director of the Office of Government Ethics, applicable to 

all or a portion of all officers and employees covered by this section, and published in the 

Federal Register, the financial interest has been exempted from the requirements of 

subsection (a) as being too remote or too inconsequential to affect the integrity of the 

services of the Government officers or employees to which such regulation applies. . .

18 U.S.C. § 216

(a) The punishment for an offense under section 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, or 209 of this title is the 

following: 

(1) Whoever engages in the conduct constituting the offense shall be imprisoned for not 

more than one year or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both. 

(2) Whoever willfully engages in the conduct constituting the offense shall be imprisoned for 

not more than five years or fined in the amount set forth in this title, or both. 

(b) The Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropriate United States district court 

against any person who engages in conduct constituting an offense under section 203, 204, 205, 207, 

208, or 209 of this title and, upon proof of such conduct by a preponderance of the evidence, such 

person shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for each violation or the amount 

of compensation which the person received or offered for the prohibited conduct, whichever 

amount is greater. The imposition of a civil penalty under this subsection does not preclude any 

other criminal or civil statutory, common law, or administrative remedy, which is available by law to 

the United States or any other person. 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES 

52 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

5 U.S.C. § 3110

(a) For the purpose of this section—

(1) “agency” means—

(A) an Executive agency; 

(B) an office, agency, or other establishment in the legislative branch; 

(C) an office, agency, or other establishment in the judicial branch; and 

(D) the government of the District of Columbia; 

(2) “public official” means an officer (including the President and a Member of Congress), a 

member of the uniformed service, an employee and any other individual, in whom is vested 

the authority by law, rule, or regulation, or to whom the authority has been delegated, to 

appoint, employ, promote, or advance individuals, or to recommend individuals for 

appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement in connection with employment in 

an agency; and 

(3) “relative” means, with respect to a public official, an individual who is related to the 

public official as father, mother, son, daughter, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, first cousin, 

nephew, niece, husband, wife, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, 

brother-in-law, sister-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepson, stepdaughter, stepbrother, 

stepsister, half brother, or half sister. 

(b) A public official may not appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, 

employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position in the agency in which he is 

serving or over which he exercises jurisdiction or control any individual who is a relative of the 

public official. An individual may not be appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced in or to a 

civilian position in an agency if such appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement has 

been advocated by a public official, serving in or exercising jurisdiction or control over the agency, 

who is a relative of the individual. 

(c) An individual appointed, employed, promoted, or advanced in violation of this section is not 

entitled to pay, and money may not be paid from the Treasury as pay to an individual so appointed, 

employed, promoted, or advanced. 

(d) The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe regulations authorizing the temporary 

employment, in the event of emergencies resulting from natural disasters or similar unforeseen 

events or circumstances, of individuals whose employment would otherwise be prohibited by this 

section. 

(e) This section shall not be construed to prohibit the appointment of an individual who is a 

preference eligible in any case in which the passing over of that individual on a certificate of eligibles 

furnished under section 3317(a) of this title will result in the selection for appointment of an 

individual who is not a preference eligible. 

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)-(c)

(a)

(1) For the purpose of this title, “prohibited personnel practice” means any action described 

in subsection (b). 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 53

(2) For the purpose of this section—

(A) “personnel action” means—

(i) an appointment; 

(ii) a promotion; 

(iii) an action under chapter 75 of this title or other disciplinary or corrective 

action; 

(iv) a detail, transfer, or reassignment; 

(v) a reinstatement; 

(vi) a restoration; 

(vii) a reemployment; 

(viii) a performance evaluation under chapter 43 of this title; 

(ix) a decision concerning pay, benefits, or awards, or concerning education 

or training if the education or training may reasonably be expected to lead to 

an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action 

described in this subparagraph; 

(x) a decision to order psychiatric testing or examination; 

(xi) the implementation or enforcement of any nondisclosure policy, form, or 

agreement; and 

(xii) any other significant change in duties, responsibilities, or working 

conditions; 

with respect to an employee in, or applicant for, a covered position in an agency, and in the case of 

an alleged prohibited personnel practice described in subsection (b)(8), an employee or applicant for 

employment in a Government corporation as defined in section 9101 of title 31; 

(B) “covered position” means, with respect to any personnel action, any position in 

the competitive service, a career appointee position in the Senior Executive Service, 

or a position in the excepted service, but does not include any position which is, 

prior to the personnel action—

(i) excepted from the competitive service because of its confidential, policydetermining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character; or 

(ii) excluded from the coverage of this section by the President based on a 

determination by the President that it is necessary and warranted by 

conditions of good administration; 

(C) “agency” means an Executive agency and the Government Printing Office, but 

does not include—

(i) a Government corporation, except in the case of an alleged prohibited 

personnel practice described under subsection (b)(8) or section 

2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); 

(ii)
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES 

54 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence 

Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance 

Office; and 

(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency or unit 

thereof the principal function of which is the conduct of foreign 

intelligence or counterintelligence activities, provided that the 

determination be made prior to a personnel action; or 

(iii) the Government Accountability Office; and 

(D) “disclosure” means a formal or informal communication or transmission, but 

does not include a communication concerning policy decisions that lawfully exercise 

discretionary authority unless the employee or applicant providing the disclosure 

reasonably believes that the disclosure evidences—

(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or 

(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 

substantial and specific danger to public health or safety. 

(b) Any employee who has authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any 

personnel action, shall not, with respect to such authority—

(1) discriminate for or against any employee or applicant for employment—

(A) on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, as prohibited under 

section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e–16); 

(B) on the basis of age, as prohibited under sections 12 and 15 of the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 631, 633a); 

(C) on the basis of sex, as prohibited under section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards 

Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 206 (d)); 

(D) on the basis of handicapping condition, as prohibited under section 501 of the 

Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791); or 

(E) on the basis of marital status or political affiliation, as prohibited under any law, 

rule, or regulation; 

(2) solicit or consider any recommendation or statement, oral or written, with respect to any 

individual who requests or is under consideration for any personnel action unless such 

recommendation or statement is based on the personal knowledge or records of the person 

furnishing it and consists of—

(A) an evaluation of the work performance, ability, aptitude, or general qualifications 

of such individual; or 

(B) an evaluation of the character, loyalty, or suitability of such individual; 

(3) coerce the political activity of any person (including the providing of any political 

contribution or service), or take any action against any employee or applicant for 

employment as a reprisal for the refusal of any person to engage in such political activity; 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 55

(4) deceive or willfully obstruct any person with respect to such person’s right to compete 

for employment; 

(5) influence any person to withdraw from competition for any position for the purpose of 

improving or injuring the prospects of any other person for employment; 

(6) grant any preference or advantage not authorized by law, rule, or regulation to any 

employee or applicant for employment (including defining the scope or manner of 

competition or the requirements for any position) for the purpose of improving or injuring 

the prospects of any particular person for employment; 

(7) appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, 

promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position any individual who is a relative (as 

defined in section 3110(a)(3) of this title) of such employee if such position is in the agency 

in which such employee is serving as a public official (as defined in section 3110(a)(2) of this 

title) or over which such employee exercises jurisdiction or control as such an official; 

(8) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, a personnel action with respect to 

any employee or applicant for employment because of—

(A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee 

or applicant reasonably believes evidences—

(i) any violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or 

(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 

substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, 

if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is not specifically 

required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of 

foreign affairs; or 

(B) any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency 

or another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such 

disclosures, of information which the employee or applicant reasonably believes 

evidences—

(i) any violation (other than a violation of this section) of any law, rule, or 

regulation, or 

(ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 

substantial and specific danger to public health or safety; 

(9) take or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, any personnel action against any 

employee or applicant for employment because of—

(A) the exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, 

or regulation—

(i) with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8); or 

(ii) other than with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8); 

(B) testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any 

right referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii); 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES 

56 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

(C) cooperating with or disclosing information to the Inspector General of an 

agency, or the Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions of law; or 

(D) for refusing to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a law; 

(10) discriminate for or against any employee or applicant for employment on the basis of 

conduct which does not adversely affect the performance of the employee or applicant or 

the performance of others; except that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit an agency 

from taking into account in determining suitability or fitness any conviction of the employee 

or applicant for any crime under the laws of any State, of the District of Columbia, or of the 

United States; 

(11)

(A) knowingly take, recommend, or approve any personnel action if the taking of 

such action would violate a veterans’ preference requirement; or 

(B) knowingly fail to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action if the failure 

to take such action would violate a veterans’ preference requirement; 

(12) take or fail to take any other personnel action if the taking of or failure to take such 

action violates any law, rule, or regulation implementing, or directly concerning, the merit 

system principles contained in section 2301 of this title; or 

(13) implement or enforce any nondisclosure policy, form, or agreement, if such policy, 

form, or agreement does not contain the following statement: “These provisions are 

consistent with and do not supersede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee 

obligations, rights, or liabilities created by existing statute or Executive order relating to (1) 

classified information, (2) communications to Congress, (3) the reporting to an Inspector 

General of a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or mismanagement, a gross waste of 

funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety, or 

(4) any other whistleblower protection. The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, 

sanctions, and liabilities created by controlling Executive orders and statutory provisions are 

incorporated into this agreement and are controlling.”

This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the withholding of information from Congress 

or the taking of any personnel action against an employee who discloses information to Congress. 

For purposes of paragraph (8), (i) any presumption relating to the performance of a duty by an 

employee whose conduct is the subject of a disclosure as defined under subsection (a)(2)(D) may be 

rebutted by substantial evidence, and (ii) a determination as to whether an employee or applicant 

reasonably believes that such employee or applicant has disclosed information that evidences any 

violation of law, rule, regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of 

authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety shall be made by determining 

whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the essential facts known to and readily 

ascertainable by the employee or applicant could reasonably conclude that the actions of the 

Government evidence such violations, mismanagement, waste, abuse, or danger. 

(c) The head of each agency shall be responsible for the prevention of prohibited personnel 

practices, for the compliance with and enforcement of applicable civil service laws, rules, and 

regulations, and other aspects of personnel management, and for ensuring (in consultation with the 

Office of Special Counsel) that agency employees are informed of the rights and remedies available 

to them under this chapter and chapter 12 of this title, including how to make a lawful disclosure of 

information that is specifically required by law or Executive order to be kept classified in the interest 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 57

of national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs to the Special Counsel, the Inspector General of 

an agency, Congress, or other agency employee designated to receive such disclosures. Any 

individual to whom the head of an agency delegates authority for personnel management, or for any 

aspect thereof, shall be similarly responsible within the limits of the delegation.

5 U.S.C. § 2301

(a) This section shall apply to—

(1) an Executive agency; and 

(2) the Government Printing Office. 

(b) Federal personnel management should be implemented consistent with the following merit 

system principles: 

(1) Recruitment should be from qualified individuals from appropriate sources in an 

endeavor to achieve a work force from all segments of society, and selection and 

advancement should be determined solely on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and 

skills, after fair and open competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity. 

(2) All employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and equitable treatment 

in all aspects of personnel management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, 

religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping condition, and with proper 

regard for their privacy and constitutional rights. 

(3) Equal pay should be provided for work of equal value, with appropriate consideration of 

both national and local rates paid by employers in the private sector, and appropriate 

incentives and recognition should be provided for excellence in performance. 

(4) All employees should maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the 

public interest. 

(5) The Federal work force should be used efficiently and effectively. 

(6) Employees should be retained on the basis of the adequacy of their performance, 

inadequate performance should be corrected, and employees should be separated who 

cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required standards. 

(7) Employees should be provided effective education and training in cases in which such 

education and training would result in better organizational and individual performance. 

(8) Employees should be—

(A) protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan 

political purposes, and 

(B) prohibited from using their official authority or influence for the purpose of 

interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for election. 

(9) Employees should be protected against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information 

which the employees reasonably believe evidences—

(A) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or 

(B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial 

and specific danger to public health or safety. 
APPENDIX A: RELEVANT STATUTES 

58 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

(c) In administering the provisions of this chapter—

(1) with respect to any agency (as defined in section 2302(a)(2)(C) of this title), the President 

shall, pursuant to the authority otherwise available under this title, take any action, including 

the issuance of rules, regulations, or directives; and 

(2) with respect to any entity in the executive branch which is not such an agency or part of 

such an agency, the head of such entity shall, pursuant to authority otherwise available, take 

any action, including the issuance of rules, regulations, or directives; 

which is consistent with the provisions of this title and which the President or the head, as the case 

may be, determines is necessary to ensure that personnel management is based on and embodies the 

merit system principles. 
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 59

APPENDIX B: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR 

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

(1) Public service is a public trust, requiring 

employees to place loyalty to the Constitution, 

the laws and ethical principles above private 

gain. 

(2) Employees shall not hold financial 

interests that conflict with the conscientious 

performance of duty. 

(3) Employees shall not engage in financial 

transactions using nonpublic Government 

information or allow the improper use of such 

information to further any private interest. 

(4) An employee shall not, except as 

permitted by subpart B of this part, solicit or 

accept any gift or other item of monetary 

value from any person or entity seeking 

official action from, doing business with, or 

conducting activities regulated by the 

employee’s agency, or whose interests may be 

substantially affected by the performance or 

nonperformance of the employee’s duties. 

(5) Employees shall put forth honest effort in 

the performance of their duties. 

(6) Employees shall not knowingly make 

unauthorized commitments or promises of 

any kind purporting to bind the Government. 

(7) Employees shall not use public office for 

private gain. 

(8) Employees shall act impartially and not 

give preferential treatment to any private 

organization or individual. 

(9) Employees shall protect and conserve 

Federal property and shall not use it for other 

than authorized activities. 

(10) Employees shall not engage in outside 

employment or activities, including seeking or 

negotiating for employment, that conflict with 

official Government duties and 

responsibilities. 

(11) Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, 

abuse, and corruption to appropriate 

authorities. 

(12) Employees shall satisfy in good faith 

their obligations as citizens, including all just 

financial obligations, especially those—such as 

Federal, State, or local taxes—that are 

imposed by law. 

(13) Employees shall adhere to all laws and 

regulations that provide equal opportunity for 

all Americans regardless of race, color, 

religion, sex, national origin, age, or handicap. 

(14) Employees shall endeavor to avoid any 

actions creating the appearance that they are 

violating the law or the ethical standards set 

forth in this part. Whether particular 

circumstances create an appearance that the 

law or these standards have been violated 

shall be determined from the perspective of a 

reasonable person with knowledge of the 

relevant facts.

Source: 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101(b).
APPENDIX B: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

60 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 61

APPENDIX C: THE EFFECTS OF NEPOTISM

In MSPB’s 2011 report on the prohibited personnel practices, we noted that seeing a 

PPP has an effect on the motivation and engagement levels of employees directly 

affected by the action as well as employees who observe the action without being 

directly affected. 128 MSPB defines engagement as a heightened connection between 

employees and their work, their organization, or the people they work for or with. 

The greater an employee’s level of engagement, the more likely it is that the 

employee will go above and beyond the minimum required and expend discretionary 

effort to provide excellent performance. 129 Motivation interacts with engagement, as 

motivation drives what employees do, how they do it, how hard they will try, and how

long they will persist in a given endeavor. 130

As shown in figures 2 and 3 on the next page, data from the 2010 MPS show that 

engagement levels and reports of motivation are lower when employees report a 

perception of nepotism. 131

 128 U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Prohibited Personnel Practices (2011), at 37, available at 

www.mspb.gov/studies.

129 For more on the advantages of having an engaged workforce, please see our 2008 report, 

The Power of Federal Employee Engagement, available at www.mpsb.gov/studies. 

130 U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Federal Employee Engagement: The Motivating Potential of 

Job Characteristics and Rewards (2012), at 3, available at www.mspb.gov/studies. 

131 The engagement levels in figure 2 were calculated based upon a respondent’s combined 

responses to MSPB’s engagement questions, which form the engagement scale. For a copy of the 

questions that form the engagement scale, see U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, Prohibited 

Personnel Practices (2011), at 37, available at www.mspb.gov/studies. The reported motivation levels 

in figure 3 come from respondents’ responses to a single question on the MPS asking employees 

whether they feel highly motivated in their work. 
APPENDIX C: THE EFFECTS OF NEPOTISM

62 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE

Figure 2: Levels of engagement among those respondents who agreed that they perceived 

that an official in the work unit advocated for the appointment, employment, promotion, or 

advancement of a relative.

Figure 3: Levels of agreement that the employee feels highly motivated among those 

respondents who agreed that they perceived that an official in the work unit advocated for 

the appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement of a relative. 

18%

55%

44%

41%

37%

41% 41%

8%

15%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Nepotism Occurred Nepotism Did Not Occur All MPS Respondents

Highly Engaged Somewhat Engaged Not Engaged

51%

78%

71%

21%

13% 16%

28%

9%

13%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Nepotism Occurred Nepotism Did Not Occur All MPS Respondents

Agree Motivated Neither Agree nor Disagree Motivated Disagree Motivated
APPENDIX C: THE EFFECTS OF NEPOTISM

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 63

Our agency questionnaire asked whether the respondents agreed with the statement, 

“When nepotism occurs, it is harmful to an organization’s morale.” While the 

strength of agreement varied by agency, no agency disagreed. 132 We also asked if 

they agreed with the statement, “When nepotism occurs, it is harmful to an 

organization’s ability to effectively perform its mission.” While the strength of 

agreement again varied by agency, no agency disagreed. 133

Officials who desire that their organizations run efficiently and effectively should 

take steps to ensure that nepotism does not occur. Disciplining the offender is only 

one method available to agencies; prevention is better.

 132 Two-thirds of respondents strongly agreed with this statement regarding morale. 

133 Over half of respondents strongly agreed with this statement regarding effective 

performance of the mission. 
APPENDIX C: THE EFFECTS OF NEPOTISM

64 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 65

APPENDIX D: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SAMPLE DISCLOSURE 

FORMS
APPENDIX D: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SAMPLE DISCLOSURE FORMS 

66 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
APPENDIX D: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SAMPLE DISCLOSURE FORMS

A REPORT BY THE U.S. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD 67
APPENDIX D: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SAMPLE DISCLOSURE FORMS 

68 PREVENTING NEPOTISM IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE