1 

Civil Defense and Homeland 

Security: A Short History of 

National Preparedness Efforts 

September 2006 

Homeland Security 

National Preparedness Task Force 
2 

Civil Defense and Homeland Security: 

A Short History of National Preparedness 

Efforts 

September 2006 

Homeland Security 

National Preparedness Task Force 
3 

ABOUT THIS REPORT 

This report is the result of a requirement by the Director of the Department of Homeland Security’s 

National Preparedness Task Force to examine the history of national preparedness efforts in the 

United States. The report provides a concise and accessible historical overview of U.S. national 

preparedness efforts since World War I, identifying and analyzing key policy efforts, drivers of 

change, and lessons learned. While the report provides much critical information, it is not meant to 

be a substitute for more comprehensive historical and analytical treatments. It is hoped that the 

report will be an informative and useful resource for policymakers, those individuals interested in 

the history of what is today known as homeland security, and homeland security stakeholders 

responsible for the development and implementation of effective national preparedness policies and 

programs. 
4 

Introduction 

From the air raid warning and plane spotting 

activities of the Office of Civil Defense in the 

1940s, to the Duck and Cover film strips and 

backyard shelters of the 1950s, to today’s allhazards preparedness programs led by the 

Department of Homeland Security, Federal 

strategies to enhance the nation’s 

preparedness for disaster and attack have 

evolved over the course of the 20th century 

and into the 21st. 

Presidential administrations can have a 

powerful impact on both national and citizen 

preparedness. By recommending funding 

levels, creating new policies, and 

implementing new programs; successive 

administrations have adapted preparedness 

efforts to align with changing domestic 

priorities and foreign policy goals. They have 

also instituted administrative reorganizations 

that reflected their preference for 

consolidated or dispersed civil defense and 

homeland security responsibilities within the 

Federal government. 

Programs were seldom able to get ahead of 

world events, and were ultimately challenged 

in their ability to answer the public’s need for 

protection from threats due to bureaucratic 

turbulence created by frequent reorganization, 

shifting funding priorities, and varying levels 

of support by senior policymakers. This in 

turn has had an effect on the public’s 

perception of national preparedness. Public 

awareness and support have waxed and waned 

over the years, as the government’s emphasis 

on national preparedness has shifted. 

An analysis of the history of civil defense and 

homeland security programs in the United 

States clearly indicates that to be considered 

successful, national preparedness programs 

must be long in their reach yet cost effective. 

They must also be appropriately tailored to 

the Nation’s diverse communities, be carefully 

planned, capable of quickly providing 

pertinent information to the populace about 

imminent threats, and able to convey risk 

without creating unnecessary alarm. 

The following narrative identifies some of the 

key trends, drivers of change, and lessons 

learned in the history of U.S. national 

preparedness programs. A review of the 

history of these programs will assist the 

Federal government in its efforts to develop 

and implement effective homeland security 

policy and better understand previous national 

preparedness initiatives. 

Pre-Cold War Period (1917-1945) 

World War I introduced a new type of attack: 

the use of strategic aerial strikes against an 

enemy’s population to degrade its ability and 

will to wage war. German aerial 

bombardment of towns in countries such as 

France, Belgium, and Poland began in August 

1914, and in the following year Kaiser 

Wilhelm authorized sustained bombing 

campaigns against military and civilian targets, 

particularly against England.1 From May 

through October of 1915, Germany launched 

seven air strikes against London alone.2 

England, like most other nations at the time, 

did not have an organized civil defense 

program to aid citizens during such attacks. 

Individuals were forced to find their own way 

to safety, often taking refuge in the city’s 

underground subway stations.3 By all 

assessments, the damage and casualty figures 

that resulted from these early bombing 

operations were comparatively insignificant, 

but they exerted a psychological toll on the 

British public.4 It became clear that civilian 

defense, involving a range of actions to 

protect the general public in the event of 

attack, would become a major fixture in future 

warfare. 
5 

Though the Axis and Allied powers continued 

to employ strategic bombing throughout 

World War I, leaders in the United States did 

not feel that the country was vulnerable to 

attack. They concentrated their public 

outreach on rallying support for the war 

effort.5 Much of this task was coordinated by 

the Council of National Defense, 

established on August 29, 1916 with the 

passage of an Army appropriations bill.6 The 

Council was a presidential advisory board that 

included the Secretaries of War, Navy, 

Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor; 

assisted by an Advisory Committee appointed 

by the President.7 Its responsibilities included 

“coordinating resources and industries for 

national defense” and “stimulating civilian 

morale.”8 

The work of the Council escalated when the 

United States entered the war in 1917. In the 

same year, the Federal government asked 

State governors to create their own local 

councils of defense to support the National 

effort.9 However, the Council’s activities 

continued to focus more on facilitating 

mobilization for the war than on protecting 

civilian resources. When hostilities ended, the 

Council shifted its efforts toward 

demobilization. Its operations were 

suspended in June, 1921.10 

For the remainder of the 1920s, the Federal 

government undertook little public outreach 

related to defense and security. However, the 

1930s saw a revival of civil defense efforts, 

when aggressive actions and arms stockpiling 

in Europe fueled international concern.11 In 

1933, President Franklin Roosevelt created by 

executive order the National Emergency 

Council (NEC) which consisted of the 

President, his Cabinet members, and the head 

of nearly every major Federal agency, 

commission, and board.12 The mission of the 

NEC included a variety of programs unrelated 

to civil defense; however, its duties also 

included coordination of emergency programs 

among all agencies involved in national 

preparedness.13 

As World War II ignited in Europe, Roosevelt 

reestablished the Council of National Defense 

in 1940.14 Once again States were asked to 

establish local counterpart councils. Tensions 

among Federal, State and local governments 

began to rise about authority and resources. 

The states claimed they were not given 

enough power to manage civil defense tasks in 

their own jurisdictions, and local governments 

asserted that State governments did not give 

urban areas proper consideration and 

resources.15 Non-attack disaster preparedness 

remained almost entirely the responsibility of 

States, while federal funding was reserved 

primarily for attack preparedness. 

 

Because of extensive civilian bombing 

campaigns in Europe, concerns about 

possible attacks against the U.S. homeland 

increased. Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New 

York City wrote a letter to President 

Roosevelt stating: 

“There is a need for a strong Federal 

Department to coordinate activities, 

and not only to coordinate but to 

initiate and get things going. Please 

bear in mind that up to this war and 

never in our history, has the civilian 

population been exposed to attack. 

The new technique of war has created 

the necessity for developing new 

techniques of civilian defense”.16

 

President Roosevelt responded to the 

increasing concern of the public and local 

officials by creating the Office of Civilian 

Defense (OCD) in 1941.17 The President 

delegated a number of responsibilities to the 

OCD by broadly interpreting civilian 

protection to include morale maintenance, 

promotion of volunteer involvement, and 

nutrition and physical education.18 The OCD 

oversaw unprecedented federal involvement 
6 

in attack preparedness. As with the Council 

of National Defense, the OCD created 

corresponding defense councils at the local 

level.19 

The issue of whether the OCD should 

emphasize protective services, typically done 

at that time by men, or social welfare services, 

typically undertaken at that time by women, 

created tension from the office’s inception.20 

Director Fiorello LaGuardia referred to 

“nonprotective” activities as “sissy stuff” and 

saw opportunities to build neighborhood 

militias. Pressured to focus on other 

nonprotective areas such as neighborhood 

support, he appointed Eleanor Roosevelt to 

expand volunteer activities.21 The two leaders, 

with their radically divergent points of view, 

exemplified a conflict over the meaning and 

purpose of civil defense that would continue 

well into the cold war era. 

OCD received criticism from Congress and 

the public on several fronts. It was called 

“pink” by influential politicians who disliked 

the program’s broad reach and social 

development programs. Some believed the 

organization’s tasks were better undertaken by 

the Department of War.22 One of OCD’s 

early leaders, James Landis, recommended 

that the organization be abolished, since the 

threat of an attack on U.S. civilians had 

receded.23 

With the end of World War II, most U.S. 

officials agreed that the risk of an attack on 

the U.S. homeland was minimal. Roosevelt 

did not take Landis’ suggestion, and the OCD 

continued to operate.24 While the OCD did 

not fulfill all of its ambitious goals, it did 

begin the development of concrete civil 

defense plans, including air raid drills, black 

outs, and sand bag stockpiling.25

Truman Administration (1945-1953) 

Soon after taking office, Harry Truman did 

follow Landis’ advice and abolished the OCD, 

reflecting the widely held belief that the 

immediate threat of war had receded. 26 

Initially, civil defense was not a high priority 

in the Truman Administration, as troops 

began to return home and other war time 

offices were diminished in scale or disbanded 

altogether. The development of the atomic 

bomb, however, had opened up previously 

unthinkable risks. Increasing hostilities with 

the Soviet Union and their pursuit of a 

nuclear bomb threatened the United States. 

In this context, Truman began to reexamine 

the national defense structure, reviewing the 

results of a set of commissions.27 In 1946, the 

U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey published its 

report evaluating the results of strategic 

bombing campaigns by imperial Germany and 

Japan against enemy civilian populations. The 

report indicated that civil defense plans could 

significantly mitigate the effects of strategic 

bombing.28 Specifically, mass evacuation 

plans for urban areas and shelters for those 

unable to leave the area could form 

components of a viable civil defense plan.29 

In 1947, the War Department’s Civil Defense 

Board, led by Major General Harold Bull, 

released a second report.30 The so-called Bull 

Report stated that civil defense is the 

responsibility of civilians, and the military 

should not be expected to get involved in 

such matters.31 According to the report, civil 

defense was best implemented locally, a 

concept referred to as “self-help”. Still, the 

document did concede that the Federal 

government could provide the majority of 

necessary resources.32 Additionally, Congress 

passed the National Security Act of 1947. 

Best known for the creation of the Central 

Intelligence Agency, the Act also created the 

National Security Resources Board

(NSRB), which was initially responsible for 

mobilizing civilian and military support, as 
7 

well as maintaining adequate reserves and 

effective resource use in the event of war.33 

Neither report resulted in substantial reforms 

to the Truman Administration’s policies 

because civil defense continued to remain a 

low priority. 34 However, as U.S.-Soviet 

relations became increasingly strained, 

President Truman began to implement civil 

defense policy reforms. These changes 

resulted, in part, from the strong 

recommendation of Colonel Burnet Beers, 

who was responsible for directing a study on 

future civil defense planning and operations 

to establish a civil defense unit in the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).35 Truman 

acted promptly on this advice, establishing the 

Office of Civil Defense Planning (OCDP), 

whose purpose was to recommend a course 

for the creation of a permanent civil defense 

agency.

36 After six months, the OCDP 

released its 300-page Hopley Report,

37 which 

called for the creation of a Federal office of 

civil defense directly under the President or 

Secretary of Defense. The report additionally 

recommended that the Federal government 

provide civil defense guidance and assistance, 

but that State and local governments handle 

most of the operational responsibilities.38 

Reactions to the Hopley Report inside and 

outside government were generally negative. 

There were concerns about the cost and scope 

of civil defense. Many people feared its 

recommendations were too far-reaching and 

made unrealistic demands on the public and 

government.39 And there were concerns 

about military control. Some civilian groups 

thought the report called for transferring what 

should be a civilian responsibility to the 

military, which could lead to a “garrison 

state.”40 

Truman ultimately chose to address the latter 

concern by assigning civil defense planning to 

the NSRB, a civilian agency.41 However, the 

NSRB did not receive the necessary resources 

or authority to carry out its mandate.42 As a 

result, the Board was moved to the 

Department of Defense (DOD), then shifted 

to the Executive Office of the President, and 

finally had its responsibilities transferred to 

the Office of Defense Mobilization in 

December of 1950. 

 

The climate of civil defense changed 

dramatically with the successful Soviet test of 

a nuclear weapon in August of 1949. The 

United States lost its monopoly on nuclear 

weapons and the corresponding negotiating 

power that this entailed. Local officials began 

to demand from the Federal government a 

clear outline of what they were to do in crisis 

situations.43 The Truman Administration 

received criticism from local officials, a 

worried American public, and Congress for 

not taking firm action.44 In response, in 1950, 

the NSRB generated a new proposal called the 

Blue Book, which outlined a set of civil defense 

functions and how they should be 

implemented at each level of government.45 

The Blue Book also recommended the creation 

of an independent Federal civil defense 

organization.46

Truman agreed with many of the Blue Book

recommendations, but held firm to his belief 

that civil defense responsibilities should fall 

mostly on the shoulders of the State and local 

governments.47 In response, Congress 

enacted the Federal Civil Defense Act of 

1950, which placed most of the civil defense 

burden on the States and created the Federal 

Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) to 

formulate national policy to guide the States’ 

efforts.48

As planning began, policymakers struggled to 

define what was meant by national security. A 

key question was the appropriate level of 

readiness to be attained. At what readiness 

level would people have to surrender personal 

freedoms to state control? At what level of 

security would civil defense metamorphose 

into a garrison state, undermining the 

underlying purpose of protecting individual 
8 

Duck and Cover promotional material

rights?49 The decision to assign civil defense 

responsibility to States and localities was 

intended partly as a safeguard against the 

garrison state. 

Planners also struggled with a difficult 

political question: just how much support 

should government provide? Congressional 

resistance to paying for a comprehensive 

program, and concerns about establishing 

public dependency on government, led to 

adoption of a doctrine of “self help”: 

individual responsibility for preparedness to 

minimize (not eliminate) risk.50 The idea of 

decentralized, locally controlled, volunteerbased civil defense was not new; in fact it was 

the foundation of the successful British civil 

defense effort in World War II. However, the 

decision to make self-help the basis of civil 

defense was also a political compromise, a 

way to balance conflicting views over the size, 

power, and priorities of the emerging postwar 

nation.51

The FCDA led shelter building programs, 

sought to improve Federal and State 

coordination, established an attack warning 

system, stockpiled supplies, and started a well 

known national civic education campaign. In 

1952, the FCDA joined with the Ad Council 

to release Korean War advertising to boost 

national morale.52 The FCDA specifically 

aimed to teach schoolchildren about 

preparedness, primarily through civil defense 

drills.53 In order to effectively educate the 

entire youth population, the FCDA 

commissioned a movie studio to produce nine 

civil defense movies that would be shown in 

classrooms across the nation – among them 

Duck and Cover.54 The movie, through its main 

character Bert the Turtle, showed children 

what to do when they saw “the flash of an 

atomic bomb.”55 Newspapers and experts 

generally heralded the film as a positive and 

optimistic step toward preparedness.56 The 

New York Herald Tribune, for example, called 

the film “very instructive” and “not too 

frightening for children.”57 Ultimately, the 

film was seen by millions of schoolchildren 

during the 1950s.58 The public education 

campaign throughout the decade promoted 

the idea that with preparation, a nuclear attack 

could be survivable.59

An examination of the FCDA-led shelterbuilding initiative underscores some of the 

civil defense program’s internal 

inconsistencies. The Federal Civil Defense 

Act of 1950 allocated significant funding to a 

shelter initiative. The law allowed the FCDA 

to develop shelter designs and make financial 

contributions to shelter programs. However, 

Congress stipulated that the Federal 

government could not finance the 

construction of new shelters.60 In 

communities across the country there was 

great debate over the necessity of the shelters, 

and Truman himself was not eager to spend 

government money on the program.61

 

Moreover, FCDA Administrator Millard 

Caldwell initiated a public relations fiasco 

when he misconstrued the shelter program as 

a means to protect every person in the 

country. A program that expansive was 

deemed to be too costly to receive sufficient 

political support; as a result, it never left the 

planning stages during the Truman 

Administration.62

 
9 

Contrary to the outlook offered by Duck and 

Cover and the other educational campaigns, 

early media reports about the possibility of 

nuclear war offered grim predictions 

concerning the aftermath of an attack. The 

scenarios were horrific, and the association of 

civil defense with death and destruction made 

not only home preparedness and sheltering, 

but the whole self-help preparedness concept, 

a tough sell.63

The political, fiscal, and emotional crosscurrents were reflected in civil defense 

funding. Despite ambitious funding requests, 

actual appropriations to civil defense 

remained low throughout the Truman 

Administration, and throughout the 1950s. 

For example, from 1951 to 1953 Truman 

requested $1.5 billion for civil defense, but 

appropriations totaled only $153 million – 90 

percent less than requested64. 

Despite these practical setbacks, the concept 

of civil defense as a purposeful approach to 

the protection of citizens from threats outside 

the Nation’s borders began to take shape 

during Truman’s presidency.65 Though each 

leader who followed would focus on different 

programs and approaches, civil defense 

remained an important initiative during the 

coming decades. 

Eisenhower Administration (1953-

1961)

President Dwight Eisenhower’s approach to 

civil defense was quite different from his 

predecessor’s. Eisenhower identified the 

enormous economic commitment required 

for military development as one reason not to 

undertake expensive civil defense programs.66 

Additionally, Republicans in Congress were 

eager to curtail spending, as the party had 

publicly promised to balance the budget when 

Eisenhower took office.67 Though 

Eisenhower requested less funding than 

Truman, actual appropriations were virtually 

identical to appropriations under Truman.68

In addition to economic concerns, world 

events contributed to Eisenhower’s decision 

to support a mass evacuation policy, instead 

of the shelter program initiated under 

Truman. In 1953, the Soviets detonated a 

hydrogen nuclear bomb; and shortly 

thereafter, the effects of the initial U.S. 

hydrogen explosion were released to the 

American public.69 The blast and thermal 

effects of these new fusion nuclear weapons 

were so destructive that many experts argued 

that American cities would be doomed in the 

event of a nuclear attack, regardless of 

sheltering efforts.70 As a result, new FCDA 

Administrator Frederick Peterson urged 

Congress to scale back or completely 

eliminate the shelter program.71 

 

In strongly supporting mass evacuation, 

Peterson noted that successful execution 

would depend on sufficient warning time, 

proper training for civil defense officials, and 

regular public drills.72 Many of the 

responsibilities for evacuation would be borne 

at the State and local level, which appealed to 

Eisenhower’s belief that the Federal 

government should not shoulder the entire 

burden for civil defense programs.73 Congress 

also was in favor of the shift in attention from 

shelters to evacuation.74 Yet some members, 

especially Congressman Chet Holifield of 

California, were adamantly opposed to 

reducing the shelter system.75 Holifield was 

the ranking member of the Joint Committee 

on Atomic Energy and later the chairman of 

the Military Operations Subcommittee.76 In 

support of a federally funded shelter system, 

he likened the idea of family built shelters to 

creating “an army or a navy or an air force by 

advising each one to buy himself a jet 

plane.”77 As a well publicized champion for 

shelter building, Congressman Holifield 

consistently and persuasively articulated the 

benefits of shelter building to the American 

public. 
10 

The 1954 Bravo test

Long Island shelter, circa 1955

 

In March of 1954, 

the United States 

detonated another 

thermonuclear 

bomb, called Bravo, 

on Bikini Atoll in 

the Marshall 

Islands.78 Due to a 

major wind shift, a 

large amount of 

radioactive fallout was unexpectedly released 

over a 7000 square mile area, ultimately 

poisoning the crew of a Japanese fishing boat 

in the area and even injuring personnel 

involved in the test.79 It did not take long for 

Congress and the public to turn their 

attention to the need for shelters to protect 

the citizenry from such lethal effects.80 The 

FCDA was in a tough position. They had just 

fought for evacuation policies, at the expense 

of the shelter option, and the Eisenhower 

Administration continued to support 

evacuation as the chief civil defense 

objective.81 Faced with this dilemma, FCDA 

Administrator Peterson redirected his policy 

toward an “evacuation to shelter” approach, 

whereby individuals would be evacuated from 

affected areas to shelters.82 He even proposed 

digging ditches along roadsides for those who 

could not get to shelters in time.83 

The Eisenhower Administration had just 

begun work on its massive federal highway 

program, connecting major cities and in the 

process providing a means for evacuation.84

 

Peterson clashed with the President on the 

program, arguing that Congress should divert 

some of the highway funding to support civil 

defense programs. He believed that the 

highways should be designed to lead only 30 

to 40 miles outside of major cities to rural 

“reception areas.”85 However, Peterson’s 

clout did not match the President’s, and thus 

no money was diverted from the highway 

program.86

The FCDA received extensive criticism over 

the next few years for not developing a 

feasible plan for evacuating major cities.87 

Congressman Holifield called FCDA efforts 

only a façade of civil defense programs.88 He 

also chastised the President for not taking 

more responsibility.89 At Holifield’s request, in 

1956 the House Committee on Government 

Operations held a series of hearings to discuss 

the viability of the FCDA.90 The “Holifield 

Hearings” constituted the largest examination 

of the civil defense program in U.S. history.91 

Holifield and his Committee concluded that 

the FCDA had been myopically focused on 

evacuation, which they termed “a cheap 

substitute for atomic shelter.”92 The FCDA 

responded by presenting a National Shelter 

Policy, which proposed a $32 billion program 

for “federally subsidized self-help” (e.g. tax 

incentives or special mortgage rates to shelterowning families).93 Taken aback by the cost 

of the proposal, Eisenhower convened the 

Gaither Committee (named for its first 

chairman, H. Rowan Gaither) composed of 

leading scientific, military, and business 

experts. The committee evaluated military 

readiness and concluded that the United 

States could not defend itself from a Soviet 

surprise attack on the homeland. 94 While its 

report, released in 1957, emphasized funding 

anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense systems, it 

also acknowledged that a fallout shelter 

system occupied a secondary position in 
11 

deterrence, and to that end recommended 

adopting the FCDA shelter proposal.95 

Two subsequent reports advanced similar 

ideas.96 In 1958, the Rockefeller Report, 

compiled by a board of experts and 

practitioners directed by Henry Kissinger, 

stated that civil defense was one aspect of a 

robust deterrent that should also include more 

investment in offensive military capabilities.97 

That same year, a report published by the 

RAND Corporation emphasized the 

importance of civil defense as a powerful 

component of deterrence.98

Despite these supporting reports, the FCDA 

shelter proposal continued to run counter to 

the views of top officials in the Eisenhower 

Administration. Secretary of State John 

Foster Dulles argued that the nation should 

focus resources on retaliation capabilities and 

curtail the shelter program.99 Military leaders 

also opposed the shelter program, fearing it 

would cut into defense spending.100 

Eisenhower himself remained opposed to the 

massive shelter program.101 Instead of 

pursuing the National Shelter Policy, he 

instructed the FCDA to initiate much more 

limited actions, including research on fallout 

shelters, a survey of existing structures, and 

informing the public about shelters.102 

Holifield and other legislators were outraged 

that the President would disregard the 

findings of three separate committees.103 

Supporters of the shelter system publicly 

expressed disappointment with the 

Eisenhower administration, and Holifield 

commented that civil defense was in a 

“deplorable” state during this period.104

 

Finally, in the face of strong criticism, 

Eisenhower largely dissolved the FCDA to 

make way for the short-lived Office of Civil 

and Defense Mobilization (OCDM), which 

began the bulk of its work during the 

Kennedy presidency.105

 

It bears noting that for all of his public 

opposition to massive sheltering programs, in 

the middle of his tenure Eisenhower secretly 

commissioned the building of an underground 

bunker in West Virginia that would serve as a 

safe haven for top members of Congress, in 

the event of a catastrophe.106 The project was 

similar in scope and intent to one initiated by 

President Truman in 1951. Called “Site R,” 

that effort involved construction of an 

Alternate Joint Communications Center in 

Raven Rock Mountain, Pennsylvania, to be 

used in case existing centers in Washington, 

DC were destroyed by an attack.107 Like his 

predecessor, Eisenhower believed it was vital 

for the government to ensure continuity of 

operations following an attack on the 

homeland. The West Virginia bunker was 

built under the five-star Greenbrier resort and 

was only placed on full alert once, during the 

Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.108 The public 

remained completely unaware of the 

operation until 1992 when the Washington Post 

broke the story.109 

Kennedy Administration (1961-1963) 

During the first year of his presidency, John 

F. Kennedy made civil defense more of a 

priority than at any previous time in U.S. 

history.110 He was also the first President to 

discuss civil defense publicly, issuing an 

appeal in the September 7, 1961 issue of 

LIFE magazine to all Americans to protect 

themselves “and in doing so strengthen [the] 

nation.”111 Kennedy continued the approach 

of his predecessors of including civil defense 

in deterrence calculations, and he believed 

that the only effective deterrent was a strong 

retaliatory capability. 112 However, he also 

believed that deterrence could fail in the event 

one faced an irrational enemy, and thus a 

strong and coordinated approach to civil 

defense was required. As he stated to 

Congress on May 25, 1961: 

 

[Civil defense] can be readily 

justifiable...as insurance for the civilian 

population in case of an enemy 
12 

The October 7, 1961 issue of 

LIFE Magazine 

miscalculation. It is insurance we trust 

will never be needed – but insurance 

which we could never forgive ourselves 

for foregoing in the event of 

catastrophe.113

He concluded by proposing “a nationwide 

long-range program of identifying present 

fallout shelter capacity and providing shelter 

in new and existing structures.”114 

To accomplish these goals, Kennedy issued 

Executive Order 10952 on July 20, 1961, 

which divided the Office of Civil Defense 

and Mobilization into two new 

organizations: the Office of Emergency 

Planning (OEP) and the Office of Civil 

Defense. OEP was part of the President’s 

Executive Office and tasked with advising 

and assisting the President in determining 

policy for all nonmilitary emergency 

preparedness, including civil defense. 

OCD was part of the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and was tasked with 

overseeing the nation’s civil defense 

program. The responsibility for carrying 

out the fallout shelter program was among 

the program operations assigned to 

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.115

 

The 1961 Berlin crisis gave Kennedy renewed 

urgency to improve US civil defense.116 The 

President emphasized the importance of 

fallout shelters as a means to save lives. 

He stressed that identifying and stocking 

existing shelters with food and medicine 

should be made a priority.117 McNamara 

explained that this approach was not a major 

departure from the Eisenhower shelter 

program; however, the scope was larger and 

thus required more money.118 The goal was to 

provide maximum protection through cost 

effective means by utilizing existing buildings. 

Some members of Congress, notably the 

ranking Republican of the House 

Appropriations Committee, John Taber, 

worked hard to limit funding to the shelter 

project. However, most underscored the 

importance of the shelter program as a 

rational response to the growing threat of a 

nuclear attack.119 Congress ultimately 

approved more than $200 million that 

Kennedy asked for the project, which was 

twice as much as Eisenhower had ever 

requested for civil defense.120 

With the appropriated funds, OCD began a 

nationwide survey of all existing shelters.121 In 

order to be designated a public shelter, a 

facility had to have enough space for at least 

50 people, include one cubic foot of storage 

space per person, and have a radiation 

protection factor of at least 100.122 The 

materials division of DOD, called the Defense 

Supply Agency, furnished shelter supplies to 

local governments, which were then 

responsible for stocking all shelters in their 

regions.123 By 1963, 104 million individual 

shelter spaces had been identified;124 and of 

those 47 million had been licensed, 46 million 

marked, and 9 million individual spaces had 

been stocked with supplies.125 

 

The President also decided to distribute 

booklets to the populace that would outline 

the purpose of the shelter program and the 

steps that every American should take during 

an attack. The booklet, created by a team of 

Madison Avenue writers, was to be sent to 
13 

The fallout shelter sign was 

introduced by DOD in 

December 1961 to indicate 

Federally-approved shelter 

space 

every household in the nation.126 In an 

unintended twist, the booklets themselves 

created new controversy. Some presidential 

aides felt that the pictures used were too 

graphic, while others felt that they indicated 

the booklet was meant only for the upper 

class.127 Ultimately the Kennedy 

Administration decided to tone down the 

content, so as not to cause unnecessary 

alarm.128 The booklets were then sent to post 

offices throughout the nation, so people could 

pick up copies. 

 

The means of 

communicating the 

Administration’s civil 

defense message to 

the public was not the 

only target of 

controversy during 

this time. Reviving a 

long-standing debate, 

some prominent 

members of Congress, 

including Albert 

Thomas, the 

Chairman of the 

House Appropriations Subcommittee in 

charge of civil defense, felt that the Federal 

government should not be undertaking such a 

massive sheltering project when civil defense 

responsibility belonged to State and local 

governments.129 Kennedy convened a 

meeting with eighteen of his top advisors at 

Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, on the day after 

Thanksgiving in 1961 to discuss the 

appropriate next steps for civil defense.130

 

There, consensus evolved that the Federal 

government’s primary role was to provide 

community shelters.131 

Johnson Administration (1963-1969) 

 

Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 

marked the beginning of a drastic cutback in 

funding of the Nation’s civil defense program. 

The topic began to fall slowly off the public 

radar, and President Lyndon B. Johnson 

allowed it to slip further by not pressuring 

Congress to pass the Shelter Incentive 

Program bill,132 which proposed to give every 

non-profit institution financial compensation 

for each shelter it built.133 

Earlier in the decade, Secretary McNamara 

had begun to describe the concept of “mutual 

assured destruction” (MAD), which essentially 

meant that the Soviet Union and the United 

States had the capacity to effectively annihilate 

one another with the weapons in their 

arsenals, such that this constituted an effective 

deterrent to offensive action.134 Congress and 

the public began to accept the doctrine of 

MAD. As a result, a growing percentage of 

the population began to wonder if civil 

defense programs could adequately protect 

citizens from a large scale nuclear attack.135 

However, when the U.S. military began 

expanding its ABM defense system, 

McNamara re-emphasized the importance of 

a shelter system because he questioned the 

wisdom of relying solely on an ABM 

defense.136 He argued that “the effectiveness 

of an ABM defense system in saving lives 

depends in large part upon the availability of 

adequate fallout shelters for the 

population.”137 The belief was that the ABM 

defense system could be beaten by detonating 

nuclear weapons upwind of large 

metropolitan areas and outside the range of 

the defensive missiles. The result would be 

radioactive fallout spreading across America’s 

cities.138 Large numbers of people would die 

from the exposure to the fallout, unless there 

were a sufficient number of shelters. 

Congress opposed financing a shelter system, 

and McNamara continued to be pessimistic 

about an ABM defense system saying, 

“Whether we will ever be able to advance the 

art of defense as rapidly as the art of offensive 

developments...I don’t know. At the 

moment it doesn’t look at all likely.”139
14 

In an ironic twist, attention to civil defense 

was also undermined by a series of major 

natural disasters that rattled the Nation. 

Hurricanes Hilda and Betsy devastated the 

Southeast, an Alaskan earthquake caused a 

damaging tidal wave in California, and a lethal 

tornado swept through Indiana on Palm 

Sunday in 1965.140 Senator Birch Bayh of 

Indiana sponsored legislation that granted 

emergency Federal loan assistance to disaster 

victims.141 The bill passed in 1966, and Bayh 

urged Congress over the next few years to 

provide even more disaster assistance to 

citizens. The concept of all-hazards assistance 

was gaining adherents, at the expense of civil 

preparedness for attack.142 

The Vietnam War struck a further blow to 

civil defense during the Johnson years. As the 

war progressed, it required increasing 

amounts of time, money, and resources.143 

Although civil defense efforts continued to 

receive modest funding, and would for the 

next twelve years, no major steps were taken 

to enhance overall capabilities.144 A 

transformation in the way the Federal 

government viewed the task of protecting the 

public had begun. 

Nixon Administration (1969-1974) 

By the time President Nixon entered office, 

public and government interest in civil 

defense had fallen precipitously from its peak 

in the early 1960s. According to the New York 

Times Index, in 1968, only four articles on civil 

defense appeared in that publication 

compared to 72 in 1963.145 However, the new 

administration did make a major contribution 

to civil defense by redefining civil defense 

policy to include preparedness for natural 

disasters. In no small measure, the President’s 

thinking resulted from the Federal 

government’s lack of preparedness to handle 

the horrific damage wrought by Hurricane 

Camille (see discussion below). Upon 

entering office, Nixon immediately tasked the 

OEP to complete a broad review of the 

Nation’s civil defense programs.146

 

In June 1970, the OEP released the results of 

its comprehensive assessment in National 

Security Study Memorandum 57. 147 The 

study concluded that the Nation’s 

preparedness for natural disasters was 

minimal to nonexistent.148 The 

Administration responded by introducing two 

of its most significant domestic policy changes 

in National Security Decision Memorandum 

(NSDM) 184. NSDM 184 recommended the 

establishment of a “dual-use approach” to 

Federal citizen preparedness programs and 

the replacement of the Office of Civil 

Defense with the Defense Civil 

Preparedness Agency (DCPA).149 President 

Nixon would later implement these 

recommendations, placing the new DCPA 

under the umbrella of the Department of 

Defense. 

For the first time in the history of civil 

defense, Federal funds previously allocated 

for the exclusive purpose of preparing for 

military attacks could be shared with State and 

local governments for natural disaster 

preparedness. This dual-use initiative 

In Time of Emergency was quietly released 

in March of 1968, when the Vietnam 

War and domestic unrest effectively 

overshadowed civil defense planning. 
15 

subscribed to the philosophy that 

preparations for evacuation, communications, 

and survival are common to both natural 

disasters and enemy military strikes on the 

homeland. From a practical perspective, the 

dual-use approach allowed more efficient 

utilization of limited resources, so planners 

could address a larger number of scenarios. 150 

Given that civil defense funding during 

Nixon’s first term barely exceeded the low 

$80 million per year level of the Eisenhower 

Administration (when adjusted for inflation), 

scarce resources likely played a part in the 

decision to adopt the new approach.151 

A series of natural disasters during Nixon’s 

tenure also increased the pressure to expand 

civil defense to include preparation and 

response to natural disasters. Several major 

hurricanes and earthquakes exposed 

significant flaws in natural disaster 

preparedness at a time when no centralized 

system for disaster relief existed.152 Perhaps 

most significantly, in August 1969 Hurricane 

Camille wreaked havoc in the greater Gulf 

Coast region, highlighting major problems 

with disaster response.153 In response, 

Congress passed the Disaster Relief Act of 

1969, which created the concept of a Federal 

Coordinating Officer (FCO). The FCO was 

an individual appointed by the President, who 

would manage federal disaster assistance onthe-spot at a given disaster area.154

The President’s decision to increase focus on 

natural disaster preparedness also aligned with 

U.S. foreign policy considerations. In order 

to reinforce the doctrine of MAD, Nixon was 

deeply involved in negotiations with the 

Soviet Union to limit defensive weapon 

capabilities. 155 The first Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks treaty (SALT I), signed on 

May 26, 1972, froze the number of strategic 

ballistic missile launchers and allowed the 

addition of new submarine ballistic missile 

launchers only as replacements for dismantled 

older launchers. 156 Perhaps most significantly, 

SALT I limited the superpowers to only two 

ABM defense deployment sites. 157 Advocates 

of SALT argued that such agreements were 

necessary because any increase in defense 

capabilities would spur another arms race for 

improved offensive capabilities. 158 The Nixon 

Administration felt that the SALT I advances 

would be jeopardized if either side continued 

to build up nuclear attack-related civil defense 

programs. This concern helped justify the 

decision to turn more attention toward civil 

preparedness for natural disasters.159

The dual use approach was attractive to State 

and local authorities. While in the past State 

and local officials had been reluctant to 

participate in nuclear attack planning, the 

ability to deal with attack preparedness in the 

context of a particular hazard in a specific area 

(e.g. floods in coastal or riverine areas, 

hurricanes in coastal areas, tornadoes in the 

Midwest and Plains States, and civil unrest in 

urban areas) encouraged new coordination 

and participation.160

 

The change of focus also garnered public 

support. The interest of the American public 

in attack planning had waned considerably. 

There was little enthusiasm for ambitious 

shelter building projects or evacuation drills.161 

A number of historians attribute this lack of 

interest to a diminished perception of risk, 

psychological numbing to the destruction of 

nuclear weapons, and a growing belief that 

civil defense measures would not ultimately be 

effective in the event of nuclear war.162

 

Planning for natural disasters was perceived to 

In 1972, the United States and the Soviet 

Union signed the SALT I treaty, an 

important arms control measure. 
16 

be more effective, less resource intensive, and 

able to deliver tangible benefits at the State 

and local level. 

Nixon’s broad policy changes were 

accompanied by equally sweeping 

organizational changes. Following the 

replacement of the OCD with the DCPA, 

another major reorganization took place. In 

1970 and 1973, Reorganization Plans 1 and 2 

abolished the Office of Emergency Planning 

and delegated its functions to various 

agencies.163 Executive Order 11725 of 1973 

solidified the new organizational structure by 

distributing preparedness tasks to a wide 

variety of new agencies including the 

Department of Housing and Urban 

Development (HUD), the General Services 

Administration, and the Departments of the 

Treasury and Commerce.164 In total, the new 

bureaucratic structure placed responsibility for 

disaster relief with more than 100 federal 

agencies.165 Not surprisingly, this 

reorganization is perhaps best known for its 

ineffectiveness.166

Despite the suggestion of great activity, real 

progress on civil defense, both in the 

traditional sense and its new dual-use 

direction, was limited during the Nixon 

Administration. One illustrative example is 

the signing into law of the Disaster Relief Act 

of 1974 (Public Law 93-288). While the 

Disaster Relief Act sought to remedy 

bureaucratic inefficiencies and provide direct 

assistance to individuals and families 

following a disaster,167 funding remained low, 

with levels comparable to spending in the preKennedy years. The Act did succeed in 

involving State and local governments in all 

hazards preparedness activities168 and 

provided matching funds for their 

programs.169 However, soon the federal 

government’s emphasis on all-hazards 

preparedness would lessen. 

Ford Administration (1974-1977) 

At first, the Ford Administration supported 

its predecessor’s approach to dual-use 

preparedness. In March 1975 President Ford 

strongly endorsed the policy, stating: “I am 

particularly pleased that civil defense planning 

today emphasizes the dual use of 

resources...we are improving our ability to 

respond...to national disasters...”170 

However, less than a year later, the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) rescinded 

DOD’s use of civil defense funding for 

natural disaster mitigation and 

preparedness.171 Civil defense was returned to 

the original orientation of nuclear attack 

preparedness, as seen during the Truman and 

Eisenhower years. 

There were several motivations for this policy 

change. Perhaps most importantly, the 

United States had just resumed its intelligence 

observations of Soviet civil defense after a 

five year break.172 Reports from these 

operations detailed significant Soviet progress 

in civil defense, compared to relatively small 

U.S. efforts. Massive Soviet expenditures 

(estimated at $1 billion per year in 1977) on 

preparedness initiatives, such as evacuation 

plans, contributed to a growing concern that 

the United States was falling behind.173 

Whereas in the United States, civil defense 

was considered “an insurance policy,” the 

Soviets considered it a “factor of great 

strategic significance.”174 The most alarmist 

American commentators concluded that the 

entire U.S. nuclear arsenal could not inflict 

significant damage on the Soviet Union, due 

in large part to its increased civil 

preparedness.175

Developments in Cold War diplomacy likely 

also contributed to the temporary end of allhazards planning. Gradually the doctrine of 

MAD was replaced with new ideas, such as 

limited nuclear strikes against strategically 

important military and industrial targets, 
17 

rather than population centers. As early as 

January 10, 1974 Secretary of Defense James 

Schlesinger stated during a press conference 

that “the old policy [of MAD]...was no 

longer adequate for deterrence” and should be 

replaced by “a set of selective options against 

different sets of targets.”176 Over the next 

decade, these ideas of flexible targeting and 

limited retaliation developed into the policy of 

“flexible response.”177 Flexible response was 

based on the idea that both the Soviet Union 

and the United States had the capability for 

small-scale nuclear attacks that could be 

answered by similarly-sized acts of retaliation 

by the other side.178 Theoretically, instead of 

massive retaliation against population centers, 

targets would be specific, highly-strategic 

sites.179 Since some of these sites could be 

civilian in nature, some level of civil defense 

and nuclear attack preparedness was deemed 

necessary. Thus, U.S. policy makers renewed 

their attention on civil defense, as a means of 

protecting against targeted highly-strategic 

attacks.180 

One result was a new initiative called the 

Crisis Relocation Plan (CRP). Begun in 

1974 by Secretary of Defense James 

Schlesinger, the CRP favored a strategy of 

evacuation rather than sheltering. Directed by 

the DCPA, CRP evacuation planning was 

conducted at the State level with Federal 

funds and encompassed all of the necessary 

support for relocation, food distribution, and 

medical care.181 Under the CRP, urban 

residents would be relocated to rural host 

counties, with a target ratio of “5 immigrants 

for every native.”182 The focus on 

preparedness through the CRP was continued 

throughout the Ford Administration by 

incoming Secretary of Defense Donald 

Rumsfeld, who strongly opposed the dual-use 

approach. Rumsfeld believed that the Federal 

government should address only attack 

preparedness, while peacetime disasters were a 

State and local responsibility.183 

Though Administration officials and 

policymakers defended the CRP as a set of 

simple and highly effective procedures, the 

program suffered widespread criticism.184 The 

Plan’s reliance on a relatively long warning 

time (1 to 2 days), compared to the shorter 

notice necessary for sheltering, meant it could 

only be effective in a situation of rising 

tensions in which the launch of missiles 

against the country could be predicted. 

Additionally, vocal critics from Congress and 

the public doubted the feasibility of such 

large-scale evacuations through bottlenecked 

transportation routes. 

Organizationally, the fragmentation of civil 

defense responsibilities begun under Nixon 

became increasingly apparent. Nixon’s 

reorganization plans prescribed that the bulk 

of the responsibility for civil defense fall to 

three different agencies: the OEP would 

advise the President, HUD’s Federal 

Disaster Assistance Agency would manage 

disaster relief, and the DCPA would 

coordinate State and local preparedness 

efforts.185 Though these bureaucratic changes 

were not complete until the Carter 

Administration, some Congressional 

committees were already beginning to 

investigate the problem of disjointed civil 

defense. In 1976, the House Armed Services 

Committee recommended that an office 

within the Executive Office of the President 

(EOP) be tasked to manage civil defense, 

Public relations officer 

presenting a crisis 

relocation plan. 
18 

while the Joint Committee on Defense 

Production recommended combining the 

three agencies into one body.186 These 

recommendations, coming during the final 

months of the Ford Administration, were 

evaluated in the subsequent Carter 

Administration. 

Overall civil defense funding during Ford’s 

tenure did not change significantly from the 

Nixon years. With the implementation of the 

CRP, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger made 

modest increases in the 1975 budget to 

develop city evacuation plans and implement 

population defenses.187 However, as in 

previous Administrations, civil defense still 

competed for funding against more traditional 

military expenditures, and the 1975 increases 

were nullified the following year in favor of 

spending on offensive military capabilities.188 

In sum, despite ambitious claims of progress 

by the Ford Administration, civil defense 

programs within the United States remained 

less than effective. U.S. nuclear deterrence 

plans still emphasized offensive capabilities. 

In its evaluation of the state of civil defense in 

1976, the Congressional Research Service 

unconditionally labeled the efforts “a 

charade.”189 It would be another five years 

before significant progress was made.

Carter Administration (1977-1981) 

Upon taking office, President Carter 

immediately began a review of the disjointed 

system of bureaucracies that managed civil 

defense. An interagency study led to 

Presidential Review Memorandum 32 in 

September of 1977.190 The study concurred 

with the 1976 recommendations of the House 

Armed Services Committee and Joint 

Committee on Defense Production that the 

various civil defense agencies must be 

combined into one coherent agency in direct 

contact with the White House.191 In response, 

Carter issued Presidential Directive (PD) 41 in 

September of 1978, which sought to clarify 

the Administration’s view of civil defense. 

However, it did not offer any particular plan 

for implementation.192 According to PD 41, 

civil defense was an element in the strategy to 

“enhance deterrence and stability”. Civil 

defense still did not become a priority for the 

Administration, which concluded that it was 

not necessary to pursue “equivalent 

survivability” with the Soviet Union.193 

Meanwhile, in the midst of a lengthy debate 

regarding the creation of a single disaster 

preparedness agency, an unprecedented 

civilian nuclear accident unfolded on March 

28, 1979 at the nuclear energy plant on Three 

Mile Island, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.194 

By highlighting the slow response, poor localFederal coordination, and miscommunications 

that occurred; the accident dramatically 

demonstrated the need for more effective 

disaster coordination and planning.195 

Partially in response to the near nuclear 

disaster, on July 20, 1979 the Administration 

issued Executive Order 12148, which 

established the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead 

agency for coordinating Federal disaster relief 

efforts. FEMA absorbed the Federal 

Insurance Administration, the National Fire 

Prevention and Control Administration, the 

National Weather Service Community 

Preparedness Program, the Federal 

Preparedness Agency of the General Services 

Administration, and the Federal Disaster 

Assistance Administration activities from 

HUD, and combined them into a single 

independent agency. At the time, the creation 

of FEMA represented the single largest 

consolidation of civil defense efforts in U.S. 

history. 
19 

Conflicting official statements, skepticism 

about the nuclear industry, and even 

unfamiliar terminology fed the 

sensationalist media frenzy surrounding 

the Three Mile Island accident. 

Despite the reorganization and move toward 

greater mission clarity, civil defense planning 

on the ground did not change dramatically. 

Practical plans continued to reflect traditional 

civil defense programs and did not adopt the 

dual-use approach, though Carter did urge 

FEMA to direct more of its efforts to coping 

with peacetime disasters.196 Evacuation 

continued to be the focus of Federal planners, 

and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown 

reaffirmed his predecessor’s crisis relocation 

strategies.197 When FEMA assumed 

responsibility for citizen preparedness, the 

agency called on civil defense planners 

nationwide to create area-specific CRPs. 198 

The decision to continue to pursue evacuation 

as the primary civil defense policy was 

influenced by several factors. Well-funded 

and extensive Soviet evacuation programs 

continued to worry key U.S. decision makers, 

including Brown.199 Evacuation also made 

sense in the context of continued resource 

limitations. According to a 1979 FEMA 

report, since effective and cost-efficient 

sheltering in large cities had proven difficult, 

“the U.S. nuclear civil defense program 

developed into an evacuation program...as a 

low-cost survival alternative.”200

 

It is likely that the Carter Administration’s 

focus on evacuation was also affected by Cold 

War diplomacy. The continuing SALT 

negotiations created a conflict between the 

desire to advance U.S. civil defense, and the 

desire to avoid upsetting the delicate strategic 

balance required for successful threat 

reduction negotiations. With this balance in 

mind, maintaining the status quo by 

continuing to support evacuation policies may 

have been deemed the best option.201 

Though the creation of FEMA and the goals 

of PD 41 signaled renewed interest in civil 

defense, funding throughout the Carter 

Administration remained historically low. 

The 1980 request for $108 million was less 

than adequate for implementing the new 

plans.202 In the following year, Congress did 

not meet a higher request for funding, instead 

choosing to allocate funds to other 

priorities.203 As had been the case many times 

before, funding levels did not match the 

ambitious plans for program improvement. 

In keeping civil defense funding low, 

Congressional leaders had little public 

opposition to fear. In contrast to generally 

widespread public participation and 

acceptance in the peak years of civil defense 

during the early stages of the Cold War, most 

people by this time had little faith that any 

government civil defense planning could 

lessen the impact of nuclear war.204 Some 

local communities refused outright to 

cooperate with Federal civil defense mandates 

because they did not believe the CRPs would 

be effective if a nuclear attack were to 

occur.205 This public attitude would continue 

throughout the remainder of the Cold War 

period. 
20 

Reagan Administration (1981-1989) 

It would appear that Ronald Reagan entered 

office with the intention of building upon the 

civil defense foundations set by his 

predecessors. In December 1981, Congress 

acted dramatically in favor of the dual-use 

approach by amending the 1950 Civil Defense 

Act. In this milestone decision, all future civil 

defense funds would be allotted for natural 

disasters, as well as attacks on the 

homeland.206 The amendment did stipulate 

that funding and planning for peacetime 

disasters could not overtly detract from attack 

preparedness programs. Nevertheless, dualuse preparedness was promoted with much of 

the same language and reasoning as it was 

during the Nixon Administration. 207

Though Reagan was in favor of the dual-use 

approach, his civil defense strategy was largely 

a continuation of Carter’s. In the midst of 

deliberations regarding the 1982 budget, the 

National Security Council (NSC) compiled 

National Security Division Directive (NSDD) 

26, which spelled out the objectives of 

Carter’s Presidential Directive 41 and was 

designed to promote deterrence, improve 

natural disaster preparedness, and reduce the 

possibility of coercion by enemy forces.208 

The unclassified version of NSDD 26 states: 

“it is a matter of national priority that the 

United States have a Civil Defense program 

which provides for the survival of the U.S. 

population.”209 However, NSDD 26 went 

further than PD 41 by stipulating a concrete 

deadline in 1989 for plans to protect the 

population, and it mandated that civil defense 

leaders investigate and enhance protection 

measures for critical industries in case of 

attack.210 Furthermore, NSDD 26 for the first 

time supported research into the development 

of strategies to ensure economic survival in 

the event of a nuclear attack.211 However, 

drawing upon the CRPs of his predecessors, 

Reagan continued to promote evacuation as 

the primary strategy for civil defense. During 

this period nuclear preparedness became a top 

priority for FEMA.212

Congress and the Administration came into 

conflict in February 1982, when the President 

requested $4.2 billion for a seven-year plan to 

massively boost civil defense programs.213 

Congress did not react positively to this 

request, particularly because it seemed to be 

part of Reagan’s hawkish stance on Cold War 

diplomacy.214 For example, the House 

Committee on Appropriations criticized 

FEMA’s dependence on evacuation planning 

at the expense of other preparedness 

programs and suggested that more attention 

be paid to peacetime disaster preparation. 

Expressing their disagreement with FEMA’s 

plans, Congress allocated only $147.9 million 

to cover FEMA’s 1983 budget, about 58% of 

what the agency had requested.215 In 1984 

and 1985, Congress again blocked requests for 

funding increases.216

In 1983, FEMA responded to the 

Congressional push for more peacetime 

disaster preparation with plans for an 

Integrated Emergency Management System 

(IEMS) to develop full all-hazard 

preparedness plans at the Federal level.217 

Under the IEMS, State civil defense planners 

would facilitate the development of multihazard preparedness plans based on threats 

faced by specific localities.218 According to 

the IEMS, this all-hazards approach included 

“direction, control and warning systems which 

are common to the full range of emergencies 

from small isolated events to the ultimate 

emergency – war.”219 Despite this innovative 

attempt to integrate civil defense and disaster 

preparedness concerns, Congress was not 

sufficiently convinced that the IEMS would 

effectively address the management of allhazard preparedness, and therefore never met 

requested FEMA funding levels. 
21 

1983 Time Magazine cover 

story reports on SDI. 

Labeled “Star Wars” by 

critics, the initiative was a 

firm departure from 

previous policies. 

Cold War diplomacy continued to play a role 

in civil defense decisions under Reagan. 

President Reagan 

supported neither the 

doctrine of mutual 

assured destruction nor 

the détente that had 

been a centerpiece of 

the Carter 

Administration.220 On 

March 23, 1983 Reagan 

openly rejected mutual 

assured destruction 

with his speech 

proposing the 

Strategic Defense 

Initiative (SDI). SDI 

focused on using ground-based and spacebased systems to protect the United States 

from attack by strategic nuclear ballistic 

missiles.221 SDI flew in the 

face of the 1972 SALT I agreement banning 

strategic defenses, and it 

demonstrated a shift towards more proactive 

and aggressive defensive measures. 

The final years of the Reagan Administration 

saw a number of actions intended to allay 

concerns regarding non-attack preparedness. 

The Meese Memorandum (Executive Order 

12656), signed in 1986, delegated lead 

response roles to certain Federal agencies, 

depending on the type of disaster.222 On 

November 23, 1988 the Disaster Relief Act of 

1974 was amended to become what is now 

known as the Stafford Act, resulting in a 

clearer definition of FEMA’s role in 

emergency management. The Act defined the 

disaster declaration process and provided the 

statutory authority for Federal assistance 

during a disaster. The agency’s role in disaster 

response would be tested and debated in the 

years to come. 

Bush Administration (1989-1993) 

In the year after George H.W. Bush took 

office, several natural disasters challenged the 

Nation’s nascent approach to all-hazards 

preparedness. On March 24, 1989, 11 million 

gallons of crude oil spilled into Prince William 

Sound in the Gulf of Alaska from the Exxon 

Valdez oil tanker.223 It was the largest oil spill 

in U.S. history, and the Administration was illprepared to manage an environmental crisis of 

such large scale. Instead of using FEMA 

through the Stafford Act to coordinate the 

response, Bush invoked the Federal Water 

Pollution Control Act, under which the 

Environmental Protection Agency and Coast 

Guard managed the event. The 

Administration drew much criticism for the 

poor response.224

On September 13, 1989, Hurricane Hugo 

struck the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and 

South Carolina, inflicting significant damage. 

This time Bush chose to send Manuel Lujan, 

Secretary of the Interior, to assess the damage 

and provide additional executive oversight.225 

FEMA’s participation in the response was 

plagued by shortages of properly trained 

personnel, communication problems, and a 

lack of coordination.226 Within a month of 

Hurricane Hugo, the Loma Prieta earthquake 

struck northern California causing an 

estimated $6 billion in damage. Already 

stretched thin from dealing with the 

Hurricane Hugo recovery, FEMA’s response 

continued to be hindered by coordination and 

staffing problems. Again, President Bush 

appointed a Cabinet-level representative, 

Secretary of Transportation Samuel Skinner, 

to oversee recovery operations, and again 

FEMA’s contribution to response and 

recovery was judged inadequate.227 

The dissatisfaction with FEMA’s response to 

the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Hurricane Hugo, 

and the Loma Prieta Earthquake led FEMA 

to begin developing the Federal Response 
22 

Plan (FRP) in November 1990.228 Drawing 

from the Incident Command System and 

Incident Management System framework, the 

FRP defined how 27 Federal agencies and the 

American Red Cross would respond to the 

needs of State and local governments when 

they were overwhelmed by a disaster. The 

plan used a functional approach to define the 

types of assistance (such as food, 

communications, and transportation) that 

would be provided by the Federal government 

to address the consequences of disaster.229 

By the second year of the Bush 

administration, significant political changes 

were occurring. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989, 

followed shortly by the collapse of the Soviet 

Union and the fall of communist 

governments across Eastern Europe. The 

Cold War had come to a rapid and 

unanticipated end, and the threat of a strategic 

nuclear attack on the United States diminished 

significantly almost overnight. As a result, 

civil defense in the traditional sense was no 

longer a major priority for emergency 

planners or Congress. With the recent 

onslaught of natural and man-made disasters 

top-of-mind, FEMA planners began to adopt 

the idea of a true all-hazards approach to 

disaster preparedness. In March of 1992, 

President Bush signed National Security 

Directive 66 instructing FEMA to develop a 

multi-hazard approach to emergency 

management, combining civil defense 

preparedness with natural and man-made 

disaster preparedness.230

 

Testifying before the Armed Services 

Subcommittee Hearing on Civil Defense on 

May 6, 1992, Grant Peterson, Associate 

Director for State and Local Programs at 

FEMA, reported that: 

[T]he President has approved a 

new civil defense policy...The 

new policy acknowledges 

significant changes in the range 

of threats, and eliminates the 

heavy emphasis on nuclear 

attack. The policy recognizes the 

need for civil defense to address 

all forms of catastrophic 

emergencies, all hazards, and the 

consequences of those hazards. 

The new policy increases the 

emphasis on preparedness to 

respond to the consequences of 

all emergencies regardless of their 

cause. All-hazards consequence 

management recognizes that 

regardless of the cause of an 

emergency situation, certain very 

basic capabilities are necessary to 

respond and that planning efforts 

and resources should be focused 

on developing the capabilities 

necessary to respond to all the 

common effects of all hazards.231

In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit south 

Florida and the central Louisiana coast. 

President Bush once again appointed a 

Cabinet-level representative, Secretary of 

Transportation Andrew Card, to coordinate 

Federal relief efforts.232 Unfortunately, this 

additional oversight did not result in 

improved performance as “government at all 

levels was slow to comprehend the scope of 

the disaster.”233 And despite the presence of 

the FRP, FEMA and the other agencies 

involved in the response and recovery faced 

the same kinds of coordination and logistical 

problems they had three years prior. FEMA 

was strongly criticized by Congress for its 

poor performance. 

As a result of this criticism, FEMA was 

instructed by Congress to contract with the 

National Academy of Public Administration 

(NAPA) to conduct a study of the Federal, 

State, and local level capacity to respond to 

major natural disasters.234 Issued in February 

1993, NAPA’s assessment, Coping With 

Catastrophe, detailed the obstacles facing 

emergency management at all levels of 

government and made recommendations to 

improve FEMA’s ability to prepare and 
23 

respond to disasters. NAPA concluded that, 

“a small independent agency could coordinate 

the federal response to major natural 

disasters...but only if the White House and 

Congress take significant steps to make it a 

viable institution.”235 Because of the timing of 

the report, it was left to the Clinton 

Administration to evaluate the findings and 

implement changes to make FEMA more 

effective. 

Clinton Administration (1993-2001) 

Upon taking office, President Bill Clinton 

appointed James Lee Witt director of FEMA. 

Witt, the former Director of Emergency 

Management for the State of Arkansas, 

immediately reorganized FEMA.236 He 

created three functional directorates 

corresponding to the major phases of 

emergency management: Mitigation; 

Preparedness; Training and Exercise; and 

Response and Recovery.237 In February of 

1996, Clinton elevated the FEMA directorship 

to Cabinet-level status, improving the line of 

communication between the Director and the 

President.238

The shift in emergency preparedness towards 

an all-hazards approach allowed FEMA to 

focus on addressing natural disasters without 

having to fear negative political reactions 

from advocates of civil defense.239 The 

Agency’s Mitigation Directorate, for example, 

focused many of its early programs on 

hazards such as flooding and earthquakes.240 

At the same time, however, recognition of the 

threat of terrorist attacks inside the United 

States was beginning to emerge. In 1993, 

Congress included a joint resolution in the 

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 

that called for FEMA to develop “a capability 

for early detection and warning of and 

response to: potential terrorist use of chemical 

or biological agents or weapons; and 

emergencies or natural disasters involving 

industrial chemicals or the widespread 

outbreak of disease.”241 

As evidenced by this resolution, Congress was 

becoming increasingly concerned about the 

threat posed by terrorist organizations and 

technological disasters. Much of this concern 

resulted from the World Trade Center 

bombing earlier that year, in which 6 people 

were killed and 1,042 were wounded. The 

blast left a five story deep crater and caused 

$500 million in damages. 

In November 1994, the Federal Civil Defense 

Act of 1950 was repealed and all remnants of 

civil defense authority were transferred to 

Title VI of the Stafford Act.242 This 

completed the evolution of civil defense into 

an all-hazards approach to preparedness. 

FEMA now had the statutory responsibility 

for coordinating a comprehensive emergency 

preparedness system to deal with all types of 

disasters. Title VI also ended all Armed 

Services Committee oversight over FEMA 

and significantly reduced the priority of 

national security programs within FEMA. 

Money authorized by the Civil Defense Act 

was reallocated to natural disaster and allhazards programs, and more than 100 defense 

and security staff members were reassigned.243

The period between 1995 and 1996 saw a 

series of major terrorist attacks launched 

domestically and abroad, which further 

influenced U.S. preparedness policies. In 

March 1995, the Japanese religious cult Aum 

Shinrikyo released sarin nerve gas on five 

separate cars of three different subway lines in 

Tokyo. Twelve people were killed and 

thousands were injured. One month later, 

Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols 

detonated a truck bomb at the Alfred P. 

Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, 

killing 169 people. On June 25, 1996 the 

Khobar Towers, a U.S. military facility in 

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia was bombed, killing 19 

Americans.244

 
24 

These events had a profound effect on U.S. 

lawmakers and the Administration.245 Two 

days after the bombing of the Khobar 

Towers, the Senate adopted an amendment 

aimed at preventing terrorists from using 

nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in 

the United States.246 In September Congress 

passed the NDAA for fiscal year 1997, which 

included the Defense Against Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Act commonly known as 

the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act.247 This Act 

required DOD to provide civilian agencies at 

all levels of government training and expert 

advice on appropriate responses to the use of 

a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) against 

the American public. Lawmakers originally 

planned to have FEMA lead the training and 

provide equipment; however, FEMA officials 

had testified that only DOD had the necessary 

knowledge and assets .248 

As a result of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici 

legislation, Metropolitan Medical Strike Force 

Teams were created, as well as a domestic 

terrorism rapid response team, whose purpose 

was to aid State and local officials in WMD 

response.249 Three years later, WMD 

preparedness was transferred from DOD to 

the Office of Domestic Preparedness

(ODP) within the Department of Justice 

(DOJ).250 In 1999, DOD also established 10 

National Guard Rapid Assessment and Initial 

Detection (RAID) teams, which served to 

provide technical expertise and equipment to 

deal with a WMD attack.251 The unanticipated 

result of these actions was a new 

fragmentation of responsibility for civilian 

preparedness programs. Despite its overtures 

toward all-hazards preparedness, many of 

FEMA’s efforts remained focused on natural 

disasters. Meanwhile, DOD through its 

RAID teams, and DOJ through ODP, 

became increasingly involved in preparations 

for and responses to WMD threats. 

Apart from these efforts, as the century came 

to a close, a new concept of homeland 

security began to emerge. Presidential 

Decision Directive (PDD) 62, signed in May 

1998, created the Office of the National 

Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure 

Protection, and Counter-Terrorism within 

the Executive Office of the President. This 

office was designed to coordinate counterterrorism policy, preparedness, and 

consequence management.252

Later that same year, President Clinton issued 

PDD 63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection. 

PDD 63 established principles for protecting 

the nation by minimizing the threat of 

smaller-scale terrorist attacks against 

information technology and geographicallydistributed supply chains that could cascade 

and disrupt entire sectors of the economy.253 

In the absence of a centralized authority for 

homeland security, Federal agencies were 

designated as lead agencies in their sector of 

expertise. The lead agencies were directed to 

develop sector-specific Information Sharing 

and Analysis Centers to coordinate efforts 

with the private sector. PDD 63 also required 

the creation of a National Infrastructure 

Assurance Plan. 

At the same time, the U.S. Commission on 

National Security in the 21st Century, 

chartered by DOD, and known as the HartRudman Commission, began to reexamine 

U.S. national security policies.254 One of the 

Commission’s recommendations was the 

creation of a Cabinet-level National 

Homeland Security Agency responsible for 

planning, coordinating, and integrating 

various U.S. government activities involved in 

“homeland security”. The commission 

defined homeland security as “the protection 

of the territory, critical infrastructures, and 

citizens of the United States by Federal, State, 

and local government entities from the threat 

or use of chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, cyber, or conventional weapons by 

military or other means.” Legislation toward 

this end was introduced on March 29, 2001, 

but hearings continued through April of 2001 

without passage of the legislation.255

 
25 

Another influential commission formed 

during the latter stages of the Clinton 

Administration was the Gilmore Commission, 

chaired by Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore. 

The Commission, officially known as the 

Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capabilities for Terrorism 

Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

developed and delivered a series of five 

reports to the President and Congress 

between 1999 and 2003.256 Of the Gilmore 

Commission's 164 recommendations, 146 

were adopted in whole or in part257, including 

creation of a fusion center to integrate and 

analyze all intelligence pertaining to terrorism 

and counterterrorism and the creation of a 

civil liberties oversight board.258 However, the 

impetus to implement many of these 

recommendations only occurred following the 

series of devastating attacks on the U.S. 

homeland that occurred during the initial 

months of the next administration. 

Bush Administration (2001-Present) 

The initial months of George W. Bush’s 

presidency saw a general continuation of 

existing homeland security policies. Prior to 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

OMB summarized homeland security as 

focused on three objectives: counterterrorism, 

defense against WMD, and the protection of 

critical infrastructure.259

 

The new Administration did implement 

changes that affected how national security 

and homeland security policies would be 

generated. The Administration abolished the 

system of ad hoc interagency working groups 

used by Clinton to address homeland security 

issues and replaced them with Policy 

Coordination Committees within the National 

Security Council. A Counterterrorism and 

National Preparedness Policy 

Coordinating Committee was established 

that was composed of four working groups: 

Continuity of Federal Operations, 

Counterterrorism and Security, Preparedness 

and WMD, and Information Infrastructure 

Protection and Assurance.260 The goal of this 

reorganization was to create a more 

formalized structure to deal with threats to 

the homeland. 

Then came the September 11, 2001 terrorist 

attacks. In their wake, there was nearuniversal agreement within the Federal 

government that homeland security required a 

major reassessment, increased funding, and 

administrative reorganization. In October 

2001, the White House Office of Homeland 

Security was established via executive order 

to work with Executive departments and 

agencies to develop and coordinate the 

implementation of a comprehensive national 

strategy to secure the United States from 

terrorist threats or attacks.261 President Bush 

chose Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge to 

lead the new Office. In March 2002 another 

executive order created the Homeland 

Security Advisory Council to advise the 

President on homeland security matters. The 

Council, located within the Executive Office 

of the President, is comprised of leaders from 

State and local government, first responder 
26 

Homeland Security Advisory System 

communities, the private sector, and 

academia. 

In his 2002 State of the Union address, the 

President announced the establishment of the 

USA Freedom Corps to promote a culture 

of service, citizenship, and responsibility in 

America. Under the Freedom Corps 

initiative, the White House established 

Citizen Corps within FEMA to engage 

individual citizens through education, training, 

and volunteer service to make communities 

better prepared to prevent, protect, respond, 

and recover from all-hazards. Citizen Corps 

involved Americans in programs such as 

Community Emergency Response Teams, 

Fire Corps, Neighborhood Watch, Medical 

Reserve Corps, and Volunteers in Police 

Service. 

Then on March 12, 2002, the Homeland 

Security Advisory System (HSAS) was 

created to communicate with the American 

public and safety officials using a threat-based, 

color-coded system, so protective measures 

can be implemented to reduce the likelihood 

or impact of an attack on the homeland.262 

Because raising the threat condition can have 

detrimental economic, physical, and 

psychological effects on the nation, the 

Federal government can place specific 

geographic regions or industry sectors on a 

higher alert status, as the specificity of threatbased intelligence permits.263

 

. 

The Bush Administration also began to 

develop a number of strategic documents and 

statements that outlined the President’s vision 

for protecting the nation. These included the 

National Security Strategy, the National 

Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), 

and the National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

The NSHS was released by the Office of 

Homeland Security, and its purpose was “to 

provide a framework to align the resources of 

the federal budget directly to the task of 

securing the homeland” against terrorist 

attack.264 The NSHS was a comprehensive 

strategic document that advanced six critical 

mission areas: intelligence and warning, 

border and transportation security, domestic 

counterterrorism, protecting critical 

infrastructure, defending against catastrophic 

terrorism, and emergency preparedness and 

response. Importantly, the NSHS gave the 

proposed Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) “a central role” in 

implementing the NSHS and directed the new 

department to “serve as the primary federal 

point of contact for state and local 

governments, the private sector, and the 

American people.”265 

As these strategic plans were being developed, 

Congress continued to push for more 

substantial reorganization of the Federal 

agencies involved in homeland security. A 

bipartisan group of Senate and House 

members proposed an ambitious new 

Department of Homeland Security. The 

President submitted his own plan for the 

creation of a homeland security department 

on June 6, 2002. The Homeland Security Act 

of 2002 established the new Department on 

November 25, 2002, and the President named 

Ridge its first Secretary in January 2003. 
27 

The official seal of DHS was 

unveiled on June 19, 2003 

As the head of a Cabinet-level department, 

Ridge obtained increased budgetary authority 

and control over many of the agencies 

involved in homeland security. In the largest 

government reorganization since the creation 

of DOD in the late 1940s, DHS inherited 

approximately 200,000 people from 22 

Federal agencies, and an initial budget of $37 

billion.266 

One of the first major initiatives of the newly 

created DHS was the release of its citizen 

preparedness website, Ready.gov, in February 

2003. The Ready Campaign began a national 

public service advertising campaign produced 

by The Ad Council in partnership with DHS 

designed to educate and empower Americans 

to prepare for and respond to natural disasters 

and potential terrorist attacks.267

 

DHS also began addressing priority issues of 

transportation, border, and port security. 

Steps to bolster aviation security included 

deploying newly trained federal screeners at 

airports and placing thousands of federal air 

marshals on flights to protect passengers and 

crew.268 Also, Ridge oversaw a significant 

expansion of the Container Security Initiative. 

In less than a year, the United States was 

working with allies in 17 international ports to 

inspect and secure the thousands of 

containers of cargo that arrive daily at U.S. 

shores.269

Understandably, much of the Department’s 

initial work focused on addressing the threat 

of domestic terrorism. However, the DHS 

mandate encompassed the full range of 

disasters and attacks, and all-hazards 

preparedness soon became a top priority as 

well. Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive-8: National Preparedness (HSPD-8), 

issued in December 2003, defined 

preparedness as encompassing “threatened or 

actual domestic terrorist attacks, major 

disasters, and other emergencies.” 270 HSPD8 also spelled out the need for DHS to take a 

leading role in creating a National 

Preparedness Goal; coordinating Federal, 

State, local, and private sector efforts to 

encourage active citizen participation in 

preparedness; and developing a 

comprehensive plan to provide accurate and 

timely preparedness information to citizens.271

The National Preparedness Goal was first 

released in interim form on March 31, 2005. 

It presented preparedness as a coordinated, 

national effort involving every level of 

government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and individual 

citizens, and called for the development and 

strengthening of capabilities that would 

address the full range of homeland security 

missions (prevention, protection, response 

and recovery). 

Under Ridge, DHS took a fresh look at the 

way Federal, State, local, tribal and private 

sector resources work together to deal with 

emergencies. A new National Response Plan 

(NRP) was developed to replace the earlier 

Federal Response Plan, and the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) was 

introduced to provide a common framework 

for incident management. A National 

Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructures and Key Assets was also 

developed, officially recognizing the role of 

the private sector and the need for 

partnerships between government and the 

private sector in protecting the nation. The 

structure for such partnerships was further 

detailed in the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan, issued in June 2006.
28 

Preparedness took on even greater 

prominence within the Department under 

Ridge’s successor, Michael Chertoff. Shortly 

after taking office in February 2005, Chertoff 

initiated a Second Stage Review of the 

Department’s organization, operations, and 

policies. The following six-point agenda 

resulted from the review: increase 

preparedness with a focus on catastrophic 

events; strengthen border security and interior 

enforcement and reform immigration 

processes; harden transportation security 

without sacrificing mobility; enhance 

information sharing with our U.S. 

government and private sector partners; 

improve DHS financial, human resource, 

procurement and information technology 

management; and realign the DHS 

organization to maximize mission 

performance.272 The review also resulted in 

the creation of a new Directorate of 

Preparedness and further integration of 

preparedness activities. 

The Nation’s preparedness received another 

serious test when on August 29, 2005, 

Hurricane Katrina made landfall along the 

Mississippi and Louisiana coasts. The storm 

was followed by levee failures in New 

Orleans, and caused unprecedented 

devastation. With virtually the entire 

Mississippi coast leveled by storm surge, and 

much of the city of New Orleans under water, 

the Federal, State, and local response proved 

inadequate to the unprecedented catastrophic 

challenge. The National Response Plan, 

aimed at coordinating the response to major 

disasters, was less than one year old when the 

hurricane hit. It had not been fully trained 

across all agencies and levels of government, 

and had never been tested in a major event. 

The White House, Senate, and House of 

Representatives’ investigative reports written 

in the months following the hurricane’s 

landfall cited numerous shortcomings in 

response efforts. 

State and local level preparedness for the 

disaster also proved to be flawed. President 

Bush, recognizing the importance of having 

adequate plans in place, demanded a 

nationwide review of the status of 

catastrophic planning. DHS and the 

Department of Transportation were tasked to 

conduct the review in major urban areas 

across the country. 

The results were released on June 16, 2006. 

The Review determined that disaster planning 

for catastrophic events in the United States 

suffers from failure to account for the full 

scope of catastrophic events; outmoded 

planning processes, products, and tools; and 

inadequate attention to coordination. 

While recognizing the importance of Federal 

leadership and coordination, DHS and the 

Bush Administration continue to stress that 

State and local governments must be the first 

line of defense against disaster and attack. 

DHS administers grant programs that since 

2003 have provided over $2.1 billion to States 

for interoperable communications equipment, 

planning, training, and exercises.273 In total, 

DHS has awarded $18 billion in grants to 

State and local governments to improve 

preparedness levels.274 DHS has also 

provided counterterrorism training to more 

than 1.2 million emergency response 

personnel from across the country on a range 

of incident response issues such as incident 

management, unified command, and public 

works protection and response.275 Finally, the 

Department has conducted more than 400 

exercises at the Federal, State, and local level 

to improve preparedness for and response to 

terrorist attacks and natural disasters.276 

Conclusion 

The history of civil defense and homeland 

security in the United States has been one of 

frequent policy and organizational change. 
29 

The changes have been driven by many 

factors including an evolving threat 

environment, major natural disasters that have 

resulted in immense destruction, and the 

specific preferences of presidential 

administrations. One of the most important 

recent drivers, the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, led directly to increased 

funding and focus on homeland security, and 

specifically the creation of DHS. However, 

just a few years later, the scale of the 

devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina 

showed that the country remains vulnerable to 

natural disasters, as well as to manmade 

accidents. 

Civil defense began with the desire to involve 

Americans in the protection of their fellow 

citizens and critical infrastructure from 

destruction at the hands of our enemies, and 

evolved over time to encompass coordinated, 

professional efforts, involving all levels of 

government, the private sector, and citizens, 

to address a wide range of disaster and attack 

scenarios. As the nation’s population growth 

and economic development have put more 

and more people, property, and infrastructure 

at risk, and as the political importance of 

national preparedness has grown, the scope of 

preparedness efforts is likely to continue to 

expand. 
30 

Endnotes

 

1

 “Strategic Bombing in World War I – Germany.” Electronic 

Encyclopedia of Civil Defense and Emergency Management. 

Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.richmond.edu/~wgreen/ECDstratbombIge.html 

2

Ibid.

3

 Thomas J. Kerr (1983). Civil Defense in the U.S., Bandaid for a 

Holocaust? (Westview Press, Inc., 1983). P. 10. 

4

 “Strategic Bombing”. Electronic Encyclopedia. 

5

 Kerr. 11. 

6

 “Records of the Council of National Defense”. The National 

Archives. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fedrecords/groups/062.html

7

 “Council of National Defense”. Washington Watchdog. Retrieved 

6/2006 from 

http://www.washingtonwatchdog.org/documents/usc/ttl50/ch1/se

c1.html 

8

 “Records of the Council of National Defense”. 

9

 “World War I- Council of Defense”. Nevada State Library and 

Archives. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/DOCS/NSLA/archives/archival/spboard

s/cdwwi.htm 

10 “Records of the Council of National Defense”. 

11 Kerr. 13. 

12 “Text of Executive Order 6443A: November 17, 1933”. The 

Creation of the National Emergency Council. Retrieved 6/2006 

from 

http://www.uhuh.com/laws/donncoll/eo/1933/EO6433A.TXT 

 “Text of Executive Order 6899: October 31, 1934”. The American 

Presidency Project. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14769&st=&st

1= 

13 Ibid.

14 Kerr. 13. 

15 Kerr. 14. 

16 Elwyn A. Mauck (1946). Civilian Defense in the United States: 1940-

1945. (Unpublished manuscript by the Historical Officer of the 

Office of Civilian Defense, July 1946). P. 55. 

17 Allida Back, June Hopkins, et al. (Eds.) (2003). Teaching Eleanor 

Roosevelt. (Hyde Park, New York: Eleanor Roosevelt National 

Historic Site 2003). Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.nps.gov/elro/glossary/office-civilian-defense.htm 

18 Ibid.

19 Kerr. 16. 

20 Laura McEnaney (2000). Civil Defense Begins at Hom: Militarization 

Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties. (Princeton University Press 2000). P. 

16 

21 McEnaney. 17. 

22 Kerr. 16-17. 

23 Kerr. 18. 

24 Kerr. 19. 

25 “Office of Civilian Defense”. Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic 

Site. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.nps.gov/elro/glossary/office-civilian-defense.htm 

26 Lawrence J. Vale (1987). The Limits of Civil Defence in the USA, 

Switzerland, Britain and the Soviet Union. (Macmillan Press 1987). P. 58. 

27 B. Wayne Blanchard (1986). “American Civil Defense 1945-1984: 

The Evolution of Programs and Policies.” Federal Emergency 

Management Agency Monograph Series, National Emergency Center 

Emmitsburg, Maryland: Vol. 2: Issue No. 2 (July 1986). P. 1-29. 

28 Kerr. 19. 

29 Kerr. 20. 

30 Kerr. 21. 

31 Vale. 59. 

32 Ibid.

33 “Text of the National Security Act of 1947”. Retrieved 6/2006 

from http://www.iwar.org.uk/sigint/resources/national-securityact/1947-act.htm 

 

34 Kerr. 22. 

35 Ibid.

36 “SEMP Biot #243: What is Civil Defense?” Suburban Emergency 

Management Project. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.semP.us/biots/biot_243.html 

37 Kerr. 23. 

38 Ibid.

39 Kerr. 24. 

40 “SEMP Biota #243: What is Civil Defense?” 

41 Kerr. 24. 

42 Kerr. 25. 

43 Ibid.

44 Kerr. 26. 

45 Ibid. 

46 Vale. 59. 

47 Blanchard. 3. 

48 Kerr. 27-28. 

49 McEnaney. 20. 

50 McEnaney. 25. 

51 Ibid.

52 Andrew D. Grossman (2001). Neither Dead nor Red. (Routledge 

2001). P. 41-42. 

53 JoAnne Brown (1988). “A is for Atom, B is for Bomb: Civil 

Defense in American Public Education, 1948-1963”. The Journal of 

American History: Vol. 75, No. 1. (June 1988). P. 68-90. 

54 “Duck and Cover”. CONELRAD. Retrieved 06/2006 from 

http://www.conelrad.com/duckandcover/cover.php?turtle=04 

55 Ibid. 

56 Ibid. 

57 Ibid.

58 “Librarian of Congress Adds 25 films to National Film Registry”. 

Library of Congress. Retrieved 06/2006 from 

http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2004/04-215.html 

59 Laura McEnaney. “Interview: The Message of Self-Help”. PBS 

Special: The American Experience-- Race for the Superbomb. 

Retrieved 06/2006 from 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/interv

iew/mcenaney03.html 

60 Kerr. 47. 

61 Ibid.

62 Blanchard. 3. 

63 McEnaney. 28 

64 McEnaney. 25 

65 Kerr. 30. 

66 Kerr. 60. 

67 Vale. 61. 

68 “Chart of Civil Defense Budgets and Appropriations”. The 

American Civil Defense Association Alert. November 1984. 

69 Blanchard. 7. 

70 Blanchard. 7. 

71 Kerr. 61. 

72 Kerr. 64. 

73 Blanchard. 4. 

74 Ibid.

75 Kerr. 67. 

76 Ibid.

77 “View from the Bunker: Stock Up”. Chico State. Retrieved 

06/2006 from 

http://www.csuchico.edu/pub/inside/archive/03_04_03/01_bunke

r.html 

78 Kerr. 68. 

79 “The Bravo Test”. PBS Special: The American Experience-Race 

for the Superbomb. Retrieved 06/2006 from 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/peopleevents/pandeAME

X51.html 

80 Vale. 61-62. 

81 Blanchard. 5. 

82 Kerr. 77. 

83 Ibid.

84 Kerr. 78. 
31 

 

85 Ibid.

86 Kerr. 79. 

87 Kerr. 82. 

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid. 

90 Ibid.

91 Kerr. 94. 

92 Kerr. 99. 

93 Vale. 62-63 

94 Blanchard. 6. 

95 Kerr. 107-108. 

96 Ibid.

97 Kerr. 110-111. 

98 Vale. 62-63. 

99 Kerr. 108. 

100 Kerr. 109. 

101 Vale. 62. 

102 Kerr. 112-113. 

103 Kerr. 113. 

104 Kerr. 116. 

105 Grossman. 54. 

106 “Greenbrier: Five Star Fallout Shelter”. CONELRAD. Retrieved 

06/2006 from 

http://www.conelrad.com/groundzero/greenbrier.html 

107 “Site-R Raven Rock Alternate Joint Communications Center 

(AJCC) 

Alternate National Military Command Center”. Global Security. 

Retrieved 06/2006 from 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/facility/raven-rock.htm 

108 “Greenbrier: Five Star Fallout Shelter”. 

109 Ibid.

110 Blanchard. 7. 

111 “Preparing for Doomsday—Letter from President Kennedy, 

September 1961”. CNN. Retrieved 06/2006 from 

http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/experience/the.bomb/j

fk.essay/ 

112 Kerr. 118. 

113 Department of the Army (1971). “Activities and Status of Civil 

Defense in the United States”. Report by the Comptroller General. 

October 26, 1971. Retrieved 06/2006 from 

http://archive.gao.gov/f0302/095495.pdf 

114 Ibid.

115 “SEMP Biot #244: What is Civil Defense?” Suburban Emergency 

Management Project. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.semP.us/biots/biot_244.html 

116 Kerr. 119. 

117 Ibid.

118 Kerr. 120. 

119 Kerr. 121. 

120 Blanchard. 7. 

121 Blanchard. 8. 

122 Donald W. Mitchell (1966). Civil Defense: Planning for Survival and 

Recovery. (Industrial College of the Armed Forces 1966). P. 44. 

123 Mitchell. 47. 

124 SEMP Biot #244: What is Civil Defense?” 

125 Ibid.

126 Kerr. 123. 

127 Kerr. 124. 

128 Ibid.

129 Blanchard. 9. 

130 Kerr. 123. 

131 Kerr. 125. 

132 Kerr. 132. 

133 Kerr. 133. 

134 Robert McNamara (1967). “Mutual Deterrence”. Speech in San 

Francisco. September 18, 1967. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml 

135 Kerr. 138. 

136 Blanchard. 13. 

137 Ibid.

 

138 Ibid.

139 Kerr. 137. 

140 Ted Steinberg (2000). Acts of God. (Oxford University Press 

2000). P. 174-175. 

141 Steinberg. 175. 

142 Ibid.

143 Blanchard. 15. 

144 Kerr. 142. 

145 Kerr. 134. 

146 Kerr. 146. 

147 Blanchard. 17. 

148 “US Disaster Plans Cited as Inadequate”. The Washington Post. 

149 Kerr. 146. 

150 John Dowling. “FEMA: Programs, Problems, and 

Accomplishments” in John Dowling and Evans Harnell (Eds.). Civil 

Defense: A Choice of Disasters. 1987, P. 37. 

151 Blanchard. 19. 

152 Steinberg. 175. 

153 Steinberg. 177. 

154 “129 - Special Message to the Congress on Federal Disaster 

Assistance”. The American Presidency Project. Retrieved 9/2006 

from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2479 

155 William Kincade (1978). “Repeating History: The Civil Defense 

Debate Renewed”. International Security, Volume 2, Number 3, winter. 

1978, P. 100. 

156 Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty I. Atomic Archive. Retrieved 

6/2006 from 

http://www.atomicarchive.com/Treaties/Treaty8.shtml

157 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States of America 

and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Treaty Text (May 26, 

1972). Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/text/abm2.htm 

158 Blanchard. 18. 

159 Ibid. 

160 Russell Dynes and E.L. Quarantelli. “The Role of Local Civil 

Defense in Disaster Planning”. Report Series #16, University of 

Delaware Disaster Research Center, 1975. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.udel.edu/DRC/preliminary/rs16.pdf 

161 Kincade. 105. 

162 Paul Boyer (1984). “From Activism to Apathy: The American 

People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980”. The Journal of American 

History. Vol. 70, No. 4. March 1984. P. 830. 

163 “Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security 

Organization: Historical Developments 

and Legislative Options”. Congressional Research Service. April 

2006. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33369.pdf 

164 Executive Order 11725 (1973). Federal Register. Vol. 38, June 29, 

1973, P. 17175. 

Retrieved 6/2006 from http://www.archives.gov/federalregister/executive-orders/1973.html 

165 George Haddow and Jane Bullock (2003). Introduction to Emergency 

Management. 2003. P. 5. 

166 “Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security 

Organization: Historical Developments”. 

167 Richard Nixon (1974). “Statement About the Disaster Relief Act 

of 1974”. May 22, 1974. Retrieved 9/2006 from 

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4218 

168 Clarke, Mission Improbable.

169 “Tennessee Civil Defense and Emergency Management History”. 

Tennessee Civil Defense. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.tnema.org/Archives/EMHistory/TNCDHistory5.htm 

170 Clarke, Mission Improbable.

171 Kerr. 147 

172 Kincade. 109. 

173 Paul Hodge (1977). “Plans for City Evacuation in Case of Nuclear 

War Studied”. Washington Post. January 20, 1977. 

174 Major Thad Wolfe (1979). “Soviet—United States Civil Defense 

tipping the strategic scale?” Air University Review. March/April 1979. 

175 Kincade. 109. 
32 

 

176 James R. Schlesinger (1974). "Flexible Strategic Options and 

Deterrence" (Excerpts from the Press Conference of U.S. Secretary 

of Defense James R. Schlesinger on January 10, 1974. Survival. 

March/April 1974. P. 86-90. 

177 Kerr. 151-152. 

178 Ibid. 

179 “The Hanford Site: Historic District”. US Department of Energy. 

June 2002. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.hanford.gov/doe/history/docs/rl-97-1047/Chp1.pdf 

180 Kerr. 152. 

181 Blanchard. 20. 

182 David Winsock (1977). “No Title”. The Associated Press. October 

8, 1977. 

183 Kerr. 147. 

184 Hodge. “Plans for City Evacuation”. 

185 Kerr. 148. 

186 Ibid. 

187 Kincade. 108. 

188 Kincade. 114. 

189 Wolfe. “Soviet—United States Civil Defense”. 

190 William Lanouette (1978). “The Best Civil Defense may be the 

Best – or Worst – Offense”. The National Journal. September 9, 1978. 

Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.org/documents/prmemorandums/pr

m32.pdf 

191 Ibid. 

192 Blanchard. 21. 

193 William Lanouette (1978). “Waiting for a Signal”. The National 

Journal. November 11, 1978. 

194 Tom Raum (1979). “Washington Dateline”. Associated Press. May 

16, 1979. 

195 Haddow. 5. 

196 Haddow. 5. 

197 Kerr. 159. 

198 Blanchard. 21. 

199 William Odom. “The Origins and Design of Presidential 

Decision-59: A Memoir” in Henry Sokolski (Ed.). Getting MAD: 

Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origin and Practice. Strategic 

Studies Institute. November, 2004. P. 178. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB585.pdf 

200 Clarke, Mission Improbable. 

201 Kerr. 161. 

202 Kerr. 160. 

203 Kerr. 165. 

204 Lanouette. “The Best Civil Defense”. 

205 Reginald Stuart (1982). “Some Local Officials Refuse to Plan 

Mass Relocation in an Atom Threat”. New York Times. May 12, 

1982. 

206 Blanchard. 22. 

207 Louis Giufrrida (1984). “We Are Better Prepared for Tomorrow’s 

Disasters: Interview with Director of FEMA”. U.S. News & World 

Report. March 19, 1984. 

208 Blanchard. 22. 

209 Dowling. 38. 

210 Blanchard. 22. 

211 Vale. 78. 

212 “FEMA Plan for Revitalizing Civil Defense”. GAO 8. 

213 “FEMA Plan for Revitalizing Civil Defense”. GAO 1. 

214 Kerr. 166. 

215 “FEMA Plan for Revitalizing Civil Defense”. GAO 6. 

216 Vale. 78. 

217 Blanchard. 23. 

218 Ibid. 

219 “History of Federal Disaster Mitigation: Evolution of FEMA”. 

Congressional Digest. November 2005. 

220 John Lewis Gaddis (2002). Strategies of Containment: A Critical 

Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War. 2005. 

P. 352. 

221 John Dowling and Evans M Harrell (1987). Civil Defense: A Choice 

of Disasters (1987). P. 86. 

 

222 Richard Sylves and William Cumming (2004). “FEMA’s Path to 

Homeland Security: 1979-2003”. Journal of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Management. 2004. 

223 Claire B Rubin et al (2003). “Major Terrorism Events and Their 

U.S. Outcomes (1988-2001).” Natural Hazards Research Working 

Paper #107. Natural Hazards Research and Applications 

Information Center, University of Colorado, (March 2003). 

Retrieved 6/2006. 

224 Ibid. 

225 R. Steven Daniels. “Transforming Government: The Renewal and 

Revitalization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency”. 

(Birmingham: U of Alabama, 2000). P. 12. 

226 B. Henry Hogue and Keith Bea (2006). “Federal Emergency 

Management and Homeland Security Organization: Historical 

Developments and Legislative Options.” Washington, D.C.: United 

States Congressional Research Service, (April 19, 2006). P. 15. 

227 Daniels. 12. 

228 “Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need 

to Improve the Nation’s Response Strategy.” United States General 

Accounting Office. May 25, 1993. P. 3; 

“Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and Local Responses to Natural 

Disasters Need Improvement.” United States General Accounting 

Office. March 1991. P. 22. 

229 Ibid. 

230 National Security Directive 66. “Civil Defense.” The White 

House: Washington. March 16, 1992. 

231 “Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1993 – H.R. 5006: Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee 

Hearing on Civil Defense.” Committee on Armed Services House of 

Representatives, 102nd Congress. Washington, D.C.: United States 

Printing Office. May 6, 1992. P. 3. 

232 B. Henry Hogue and Keith Bea (2006). “Federal Emergency 

Management and Homeland Security Organization”. P. 15. 

233 National Academy of Public Administration Panel (1993). 

“Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management 

System to Meet People’s Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters”, 

(February, 1993). P. 1. 

234 Hogue and Bea. “Federal Emergency Management”. 

235 National Academy of Public Administration Panel. P. IX. 

236 Daniels. P. 13. 

237 Hogue and Bea. 18. 

238 Sylves and Cummings. 6. 

239 Patrick S Roberts (2004). “Reputation and Federal Emergency 

Preparedness Agencies, 1948-2003.” American Political Science 

Association, Annual Meeting. September 2004. P. 18. 

240 Ibid 19. 

241 Claire B. Rubin et al. “Major Terrorism Events and Their U.S. 

Outcomes (1988-2001).” Natural Hazards Research Working Paper 

#107. Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information 

Center, University of Colorado. Appendix A. 

242 Roberts. 19. 

243 Ibid. 19. 

244 Rubin. Natural Hazards Research Working Paper #107. 

245 “Remarks by Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., House of Representatives, 

Regarding Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 

1996.” United States Congressional Record. June 17, 1996 

246 Eric P Larson and John E Peters (2001). “Preparing the U.S. 

Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options.” 

RAND. 2001. P. 13. 

247 Rubin. Natural Hazards Research Working Paper #107.

248 Ibid. Appendix A. 

249 Larson and Peters. 15. 

250 Ibid.

251 “Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and 

Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using 

Weapons of Mass Destruction”. United States Department of 

Defense. United States General Accounting Office (January 1998). 

Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/wmdresponse/ 

252 “Combating Terrorism”. 
33 

 

253 Presidential Decision Directive 63: Critical Infrastructure 

Protection, May 22, 1998. 

254 Hogue and Bea. 18. 

255 Ibid. 19. 

256 RAND National Security Research Division. “Gilmore 

Commission”. Retrieved 8/2006 from 

http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/ 

257 Wikipedia. “Gilmore Commission”. Retrieved 8/2006 from 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilmore_Commission 

258 Congressional Research Service. “9/11 Commission 

Recommendations: New Structures and Organizations.” Retrieved 

from http://www.mipt.org/pdf/CRS_RL32501.pdf 

259 Tom Lansford. “Homeland Security from Clinton to Bush: An 

Assessment”. Retrieved 6/2006 from 

http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mil m0KVD/is 4 3/ai 

n6142014 

260 Ibid.

261 Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security. 

White House. October 8, 2001. 

262“ Threats & Protection: Homeland Security Advisory System.” 

United States Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved 9/2006 

from http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29 

263 Ibid. 

 

264 National Strategy for Homeland Security, The White House 

Office of Homeland Security, July 2002, p. viii. 

265 Ibid. p. 5. 

266 “Assessing the Department of Homeland Security”. Brookings 

Institution. July 2002. 

267 “About Ready.” Ready.gov. Retrieved 9/2006 from 

http://www.ready.gov/america/about/ 

268 “Secretary Tom Ridge on the One-Year Anniversary of the 

Department of Homeland Security.” United States Department of 

Homeland Security. February 23, 2004. 

269 Ibid. 

270 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-8. December 17, 

2003. 

271 Ibid. 

272 “Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR 

Initiative.” Congressional Research Service. Harold C. Relyea & 

Henry B. Hogue. August 19, 2005. 

273 “Just the Facts, Survey by the US Conference of Mayors.” United 

States Department of Homeland Security. July 26, 2006. 

274 Ibid. 

275 “Select Homeland Security Accomplishments for 2005.” United 

States Department of Homeland Security. December 20, 2005. 

276 Ibid. 
34

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