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DISASTER RESPONSE

Foreword

Natural and man-made disasters in the United States cause pain and heartbreak to our fellow 

citizens. Picking up the pieces of shattered lives and homes is devastating, even to the stoutest 

among us. While the military cannot repair the emotional damage, it can mitigate the effects of 

tornados, earthquakes, floods, wildland fires, oil spills, and terrorist attacks.

U.S. military response in the homeland provides overwhelmed first responders with the help 

they need after a major incident. Our ability to act quickly and effectively in response to fastmoving, deadly situations offers tremendous support to our fellow citizens. Civilian officials also 

know this assistance is short term; local and state leaders bear the responsibility of restoring their 

communities and cannot become dependent on the resources of the military. The support offered 

by the National Guard, followed by active duty units, provides a cushion for civilian leaders.

You, the staff officer, will bear the responsibility of mobilizing a unit—on very short notice—

into an area struck by disaster. You will have to work through the reception, staging, onward 

movement, and integration of your unit into a larger command structure; link into an incident 

command system with marginal communications in an austere environment; and synchronize 

your operations with a plethora of nongovernmental and governmental organizations at the 

local, state, and federal levels. Then you will execute your missions according to the laws of 

our country while maintaining personnel and equipment accountability. Defense support to civil 

authorities is complex and impacted by myriad statutes, regulations, and presidential orders. 

If it was easy, anyone could do it. This mission is yours. Once it is accomplished the military will 

exit the incident, leaving the on-scene experts to finish the job.

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DISASTER RESPONSE

Disaster Response Staff Officer’s Handbook

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter 1. The Language of Disasters and Incidents 3

Chapter 2. The Legal Framework 13

Chapter 3. The National Response Framework and National Incident 

Management System 25

Chapter 4. Department of Defense Role in Incident Response 41

Chapter 5. Emergency Support Functions 55

Appendix A. Unit Planning Considerations 77

Appendix B. Casualties 83

Appendix C. Biological Incidents 95

Appendix D. Nuclear and Radiological Incidents 105

Appendix E. Catastrophic Incidents 117

Appendix F. Terrorist Incidents 123

Appendix G. Mass Evacuation Incidents 131

Appendix H. Nongovernmental Organizations 141

Appendix I. Legal Considerations and Law Enforcement 147

Appendix J. Operations Security 159

Appendix K. Airspace Command and Control 167
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Appendix L. Search and Rescue 173

Appendix M. After-Action Reviews 183

Appendix N. Composite Risk Management 187

Appendix O. State Points of Contact 189

Appendix P. Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers 197

Appendix Q. Websites 203

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Director COL Thomas Joseph Murphy

Division Chief Larry K. Hollars

CALL Analyst Dave Futch

Author James (Marc) Williams, CALL Contractor

Editor Karen Blakeman

Graphic Artist Eric Eck, CALL Contractor

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in 

the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications) referenced in this product, such as ARs, 

FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your pinpoint distribution system.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

Introduction

Federal forces supported state and local authorities during Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Hurricane 

Katrina in 2005, and in many other natural disasters in the past decade. Navy divers assisted 

local, state and federal authorities during the Minnesota bridge collapse of 2007. In 2008, U.S. 

Army North, U.S. Northern Command’s joint force land component command, deployed a 

two-star task force to command and control federal military forces in support of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency and the state of Texas during Hurricane Ike. National Guard 

units routinely deploy to assist their states with wildland fires, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, 

tornados, and oil spills, and to prepare for large scale incidents.

Defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) within the United States is not a new mission for the 

military. Despite this, Center for Army Lessons Learned collection and analysis teams routinely 

report that tactical units do not understand the constraints placed upon them by the body of 

statutes, regulations, and presidential orders pertaining to responding to disasters and incidents 

at home. This is because the primary mission of tactical units is expeditionary warfare, and that 

has been their focus for the past eight years in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and the 

Philippines.

Military units come to a disaster with a number of strengths: disciplined and trained personnel; 

a ready fleet of vehicles, surface craft, and aircraft; the capability to operate in austere 

environments for extended periods of time; a solid logistics tail; reachback capability; long- and 

short-range communications suites; an in-place command and control system; and a detailed 

method for planning, executing, and resourcing missions. Add those strengths to an array of 

specialized units and equipment, and it is easy to see why the Department of Defense can be 

tasked.

This handbook will serve as a planning guide for staff officers in National Guard units that serve 

as reaction forces and active duty units that are designated as chemical, biological, radiological, 

nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence management response forces, or that are simply 

ordered to assist under very short notice. Included is information for all components and services 

and some of the agencies and nongovernmental organizations staff officers will encounter.

DSCA has some basic rules we can sketch out for military involvement in the United States:

•A governor must ask for help. (There are a few exceptions to this rule

•We are supporting. We are not in charg

•We can do just about anything the requesting entity can afford. (We don’t come free o

cheap.)

•We will leave once the affected region is back on its feet, so local authorities should no

become dependent on us.

•There are laws governing military response in the homeland, and we will follow the

When citizens of the United States are subjected to a natural or man-made incident and local 

authorities are overwhelmed, it is reassuring to see the arrival of a convoy of trucks or a flight of 

helicopters full of Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen who are ready to help.

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DISASTER RESPONSE

Chapter 1

The Language of Disasters and Incidents

Words have meaning and power, and as such, it is important to understand the precise meanings 

of terms used in conversation and writing. This is especially true when people are dealing with 

situations that are vague, uncertain, complex, ambiguous, and possibly lethal.

The language of disasters and incidents is different from the military terminology we use dayto-day. When a unit is mobilized to assist with a domestic operation, it is extremely important 

to understand the language used by first responders and incident commanders. This chapter will 

introduce you to this language by identifying and explaining key terminology.

Disasters, Hazards, and Incidents

The terms disaster, hazard, and incident reached their current definitions through two sources, 

one dating from before 9/11 and the other after 9/11. The older terms in the Robert T. Stafford 

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act—major disaster, natural disaster, and domestic 

disaster—are more familiar to laymen, while the newer ones in the National Response 

Framework (NRF)—incident or catastrophic incident—are elements of the more specialized 

vocabulary of emergency responders. Both older and newer terms are used, and the staff officer 

should understand how to use all of them.

Major disaster is defined by Title 42 U.S. Code Section 5122(2) as follows: 

Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind 

driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, 

snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of 

the United States, which in the determination of the President causes damage of sufficient 

severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this Act to supplement 

the efforts and available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief 

organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.

Emergency is defined by The Stafford Act as follows: 

Any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal 

assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives 

and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a 

catastrophe in any part of the United States.

Incident is defined by Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, as follows:

An occurrence, caused by either human action or natural phenomena, that requires action 

to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources.

A disaster has already occurred and caused significant damage, while a hazard, as defined by the 

NRF, is simply “something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an 

unwanted outcome.” The Northridge earthquake was a disaster, while earthquakes in general are 

hazards. All disasters or hazards fall into two general categories (natural or man-made) and most 

fall into one of a number of subcategories.
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NATURAL DISASTERS OR HAZARDS

Natural (Geological) Events

•Avalanche •Earthquake

•Landslide, rockslide, mudslide •Subsidence

•Volcanic eruption

Hydro-Meteorological Events

•Drought •Flood

•Hurricane •Severe storm

•Tornado •Tropical storm

•Typhoon •Tsunami or tidal wave

•Winter snow or ice storm •Wildfire (accidental)

Other Natural Events

•Wildfires (lightning-caused)

Table 1-1a. Types of natural disasters and hazards

MAN-MADE DISASTERS OR HAZARDS

Accidental/Unintentional Events

•Aircraft crash •Hazardous materials spill

•Nuclear accident •Oil spill

•Train derailment •Wildfire (accidental)

Intentional/Deliberate Events

Criminal

•Arson

Terrorist

•Biological attack •Chemical attack

•Explosives attack •Hijacking

•Nuclear attack •Radiological attack

Table 1-1b. Types of man-made disasters and hazards

Stafford Act Declarations

The Stafford Act commits federal resources to responding to damaging, life-threatening disasters 

when state and local efforts cannot handle them. The federal government reacts to formal state 

requests for assistance in three principal ways, the first two requiring a presidential declaration: 

1. Major disaster declaration: In response to a request from the governor of a state, 

the president makes this declaration, opening the way to a large federal commitment 

of resources, including the potential deployment of Department of Defense (DOD) 

personnel and resources. The frequency of major disasters and the costs to the federal 

government are on the rise because of:
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a. Increasing population density.

b. Increasing settlement in high-risk areas.

c. Increasing technological risks. (Hazardous substances are an example.)

Because of these increasing circumstances, one disaster causes additional disasters. For 

example, an earthquake may rupture gas lines, causing fires and chemical spills.

2. Emergency declaration: At the request of a governor, this presidential declaration 

authorizes a lesser federal commitment, limited to $5 million. 

3. Fire management assistance declaration: Authorizes the use of federal funds to 

mitigate, manage, and control fires burning on publicly or privately owned forests or 

grasslands. At the request of a governor, the regional Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) director makes the declaration, not the president. 

Figure 1-1 shows presidential disaster declarations, January 2000 through March 2007.

Figure 1-1

FEMA posts basic information about each of the individual declarations of major disasters, 

emergencies, and fires on its website at <http://www.fema.gov/hazard/index.shtm>. Figure 1-2 

shows the relationship between the severity of an event and the level of response to the event.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 1-2. Severity of events

Facts about declarations:

•With a few exceptions, states must take the initiative in requesting declaration

•Each affected state has a separate declaration, even when more than one state i

impacted by the same disaster, emergency, or fire.

•FEMA assigns a sequential number to each major disaster or emergency, followed b

the initials DR for disaster or EM for emergency.

•A small portion of declared emergencies escalate, requiring a subsequent major disaste

declaration (in the case of Hurricane Katrina, for example).

From the Stafford Act to the National Response Framework

The Stafford Act dates from a time when there was little expectation of a terrorist attack. Since 

1988 only four terrorist attacks have merited major disaster declarations, but the four were of 

such magnitude and impact they reshaped the national approach to all disasters.

•February 1993, FEMA-984-DR, New York World Trade Center explosio

•April 1995, FEMA-1048-DR, Oklahoma City explosion at the federal buildin

•September 2001, FEMA-1391-DR, terrorist attack on the World Trade Cente

•September 2001, FEMA-1392-DR, terrorist attack on the Pentago

After the World Trade Center explosion and the Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah Federal 

Building bombing in the 1990s, new terminology not found in the Stafford Act began to emerge 

relating to tools at the disposal of terrorists.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

In the new terminology, terrorists employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to cause death, 

destruction, and fear. Destruction encompasses physical wreckage and loss of life to damage to 

the society, economy, national security, and national well-being. The DOD has used a general 

definition of WMD: “weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being 

used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people.” The DOD also uses the term 

“chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosives” (CBRNE or CBRN-E) to 

encompass the full range of WMD. The NRF uses a precise definition of WMD that is spelled 

out in U.S. laws. Title 18, U.S. Code, paragraph 2332a defines WMD as:

•Any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas, bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellan

charge of more than four ounces, or missile having an explosive or incendiary charge 

of more than one-quarter ounce, or mine or similar device. 

•Any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injur

during the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or their 

precursors.

•Any weapon involving a disease organis

•Any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous t

human life.

Incidents in the NRF

The NRF employs a new term, incident, which is intended to be broader and more inclusive 

than the terms disaster and emergency. An incident is “an occurrence or event, natural or humancaused, that requires an emergency response to protect life or property.” 

Facts about incidents:

•They number tens of thousands each yea

•Most are handled solely by local first responder

•A small portion are of sufficient magnitude to require federal assistance, includin

events of great magnitude:

○

Catastrophic incide

○

Incidents of national significa

Catastrophic incidents are comparable to presidentially declared major disasters. The terms 

suggest natural and man-made events that do significant harm and overwhelm the response 

capabilities of local and state governments. The definition of catastrophic incident differs from 

that of major disaster only in that it fits more neatly within the framework of the war against 

terrorism.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Facts about catastrophic incidents

The NRF includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRF-CIA). Only the secretary of Homeland 

Security or his designee can implement this annex. Incidents covered under the annex are “any 

natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass 

casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, 

economy, national morale, and/or government functions.”

Disaster response and incident management

Responses to terrorist WMD attacks differ from responses to natural disasters. First responders 

need to deal with the effects of WMD, which may be different from effects of natural disasters. 

At the same time, the responders may have to deal with further terrorist attacks and with bringing 

the terrorists to justice. Consequence management and crisis management emerged to describe 

the manner in which to handle the needed responses.

Consequence management and crisis management

The requirements for consequence management and crisis management are combined in the 

NRF. The DOD definition of consequence management is problematic, given that it encompasses 

both natural and man-made disasters and does not focus exclusively on terrorist actions. At 

the same time, the NRF uses the terms “consequences” and “effects” interchangeably when 

considering the outcomes for both natural disasters and man-made disasters, including those 

caused by terrorists. If the staff officer encounters the term consequence management, he should 

ask for a definition.

Incident management

The NRF replaces consequence management and crisis management as separate functions with a 

single term, incident management. Incident management aims to remove the boundaries between 

consequence management and crisis management. The goal of incident management is to 

orchestrate “the prevention of, preparedness for, response to, and recovery from terrorism, major 

natural disasters, and other major emergencies.” Incident management includes prevention, 

preparedness, response, and recovery phases.

Disaster response

This handbook will use the term “disaster response” when discussing DOD participation in 

incident management for a number of reasons:

•Major disaster, which encompasses both natural and man-made catastrophes, includin

those caused by terrorists using WMD, offers the clearest definition for those instances 

in which states or other federal agencies will need the help of the DOD.

•So long as the Stafford Act remains the principal source of federal disaster respons

funding, the alternative terms (incident or catastrophic incident) are of lesser 

importance. The NRF has not replaced the term major disaster.

•Except for work of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the DOD is involved in th

response phase of incident management, not in prevention, preparedness, or recovery.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

•Incident management has superseded the terms consequence management and crisi

management, which have had a tendency to muddy the waters of clarity through varied 

usage in the past. Regardless of the term, the DOD does not manage the response; it 

only executes assigned missions.

•Disaster response or disaster relief linger in the language of the layman, while the ter

incident management has a narrow usage.

The United States: the Homeland

Hurricane Katrina was a domestic disaster, meaning that it took place within the United States. 

When the Stafford Act and the NRF use the term “United States,” they mean more than just the 

50 states. The United States, which we can also call the homeland, consists of the following, 

together with contiguous coastal zone and air space:

•The 50 states and the District of Columb

•Nonstate possessions (regarded as state

○

Insular areas in the Caribb

* Puerto Rico

* Virgin Islands

○

Insular areas in the Pacific O

* American Samoa

* Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

* Guam

•Freely associated states (not mentioned in the Stafford Act

○

Insular areas in the Pacific O

* Federated States of Micronesia

* Republic of the Marshall Islands

In terms of the NRF and disaster response, the District of Columbia, the nonstate possessions, 

and the freely associated states are states with the same rights and responsibilities accorded 

to the 50 states. The state in this broad sense is the basic geographic unit in disaster response. 

The state’s chief executive, usually the governor, must make the case for and request a federal 

response to a disaster. Within each state, local chief executive officers (for example, mayors and 

county commissioners) and tribal chief executive officers must request state and, if necessary, 

federal disaster assistance through the governor. The local and tribal officers rely on their own 

law enforcement, firefighting, and other resources to make the first response to an incident. 

The first responders always take the initial action, whether the incident is a routine, small-scale 

emergency or a major disaster that will eventually require the presence of the DOD.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Mutual aid

Disasters and emergencies can quickly exhaust or overwhelm the resources of a single 

jurisdiction, whether at the state or local level. Two primary types of mutual aid, intrastate and 

interstate, exist.

Throughout the United States, numerous regional assistance compacts exist and governors can 

apply to them for immediate help if state resources are exhausted. Nationally, the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) exists to coordinate the arrival of help so that 

inappropriate and unlicensed assistance is prevented. EMAC is approved by Congress and 

administered by the states.

During a disaster, governors have at their disposal a crucial state resource in the National Guard. 

To deploy the National Guard effectively, governors need to understand the role the Guard plays 

in their emergency response systems and to recognize other military assets that are available 

through the DOD. Military assistance can come in several varieties:

•Under state active duty and Title 32 authority, the governor is in command and contro

of the National Guard, and Posse Comitatus restrictions (such as those that would 

prohibit the use of military police to maintain law and order) do not apply.

•Under Title 10 authority, the president may federalize and deploy all or part of th

state’s National Guard, and Posse Comitatus restrictions do apply.

•Federalizing the National Guard may reduce costs for a state, but governors los

control of Guard forces when they are deployed under Title 10.

•Federal funding for some National Guard costs related to homeland defense activitie

is available if the secretary of Defense determines a National Guard component is 

necessary and appropriate.

•Several strategies exist to integrate military forces with those of the state, including th

“dual status command” in which one commander can lead both National Guard forces 

deployed under Title 10 and those deployed under Title 32.

Governors’ Powers

Governors of states are absolutely responsible for everything that happens (and fails to happen) 

within the borders of their states during a disaster. Reflecting their leading role in disaster 

response, governors are granted emergency powers to fulfill their responsibilities in extraordinary 

circumstances. These powers are established legislatively and vary from state to state. The 

powers generally include:

•Declaring an emergenc

•Suspending state regulations and statute

•Ordering evacuation

•Commandeering the use of private propert
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DISASTER RESPONSE

•Controlling access to the disaster site

•Imposing a curfe

•Rationing supplies such as food, water, and fue

•Implementing specific public health response measure

•Authorizing emergency funds without prior legislative consen

•Calling upon other states for mutual assistance through EMA

•Calling upon the federal government for assistance when state resources are exhauste

•Mobilizing the National Guar

References

Field Manual 3-28, Civil Support Operations (Final draft version 6.2), Department of the Army, 16 January 2010.

Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, Department of Defense, 14 September 2007.

Lee, Erin; Logan, Christopher; Mitchell, Jeffrey; and Trella, Joe A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security, National 

Governor’s Association Center for Best Practices, January 2007.

National Response Framework, Department of Homeland Security, January 2008.

National Incident Management System, Department of Homeland Security, December 2008.

National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Department of Homeland Security, 2009.

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Department of Defense, June 2005.

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DISASTER RESPONSE

Chapter 2

The Legal Framework

This chapter addresses the legal framework for military involvement in domestic disaster 

response missions, properly known as defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). It will address 

the federal response structure, the Stafford Act, the Posse Comitatus Act, civil disturbance 

operations, and specialized chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive 

(CBRNE) consequence management response force (CCMRF) responders. It will also touch on 

the difference between Title 10 Soldiers and Title 32 Guardsmen. It will not include counterdrug 

operations, military support to special events, or other miscellaneous missions, including military 

assistance to safety and traffic, animal and plant eradication, support to private organizations, 

etc. It also does not address the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. For rules on the use of force, law 

enforcement support, intelligence oversight, and other legal considerations, see Appendix J of 

this handbook.

In 2002, the Department of Defense (DOD) created the first combatant command, U.S. 

Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), with direct responsibility for the defense, protection 

and security of the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters including the 

Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. In conjunction with U.S. Pacific Command and 

U.S. Southern Command, DOD now has combatant commands with combined geographic 

responsibilities that cover all states and territories of the United States. In June 2005, DOD 

published the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, setting out the department’s 

vision for transforming homeland defense and support to civil authorities. The deputy secretary 

of defense directed the creation of three CCMRFs, which are essentially joint task forces, each 

manned by 4,700 military personnel and highly trained for domestic catastrophic response. In 

a clear and compelling break with past practice, the first CCMRF was immediately assigned 

to USNORTHCOM, with an expectation that the remaining two CCMRFs would be similarly 

assigned in 2010 and 2011.

If these changes are fully implemented, more than 20,000 active duty military personnel will 

soon have domestic catastrophic response as their mission focus. This military capability—

though sensible and even admirable in its operational value—raises important questions of law 

and public policy.

In Federalist 8, Alexander Hamilton presciently noted the danger in relying excessively upon 

military forces to ensure domestic security. His cautionary words remain relevant today. The 

preservation of innocent life—and liberty—requires that domestic military missions be subject to 

very close scrutiny by civilian DOD leadership, Congress, the media, and the courts. To that end, 

it is essential that military lawyers provide clear and informed guidance on domestic military 

missions, assessing the express language of applicable law, and the fundamental propriety of any 

proposed military mission when judged in the larger context of American history.

Although the brutality of the 9/11 attacks initially brought an anti-terrorism focus to DSCA 

missions, the destruction wrought by Hurricane Katrina in 2005—and the ineffective national 

response to it—served as a potent reminders that acts of nature can also have a catastrophic 

impact. Indeed, when DOD officials subsequently planned for DSCA missions in anticipation 

of a potential pandemic influenza outbreak, we soon realized that many pandemic mission 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

capabilities could build upon the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Similarly, it quickly 

became apparent that planning for contingent military missions during a pandemic had great 

relevance to foreseeable DSCA missions during a terrorist CBRNE event.

While each catastrophic event has unique characteristics, DSCA missions have a remarkable 

degree of consistency in required training, equipment, force integration, and command. In many 

ways the magnitude of a catastrophic event—as much as its cause—will define DSCA roles and 

responsibilities. Lawyers should consider the issue of scale when reviewing legal frameworks of 

relevant interagency and intergovernmental authorities. If a nuclear device were to be detonated 

on American soil, must the secretary of defense wait passively for the inevitable Stafford Act 

declaration? Can he immediately begin deploying tens of thousands of military forces—active, 

reserve, and National Guard—in a massive consequence management mission? If he can and 

must act, by what legal authority does he do so? What is his role in relation to local and state 

responses?

It has now become clear that domestic military missions assigned to DOD require unprecedented 

levels of interagency and intergovernmental cooperation in both planning and execution. 

Whether in the realm of warfighting or civil support, DOD’s roles and responsibilities can only 

be understood in a larger context of federal, state, and local integration. As a result, the legal 

issues are inherently complex, frequently contentious, and often fundamental to the security and 

civil liberty of our citizens.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents,

established a new means to federal emergency management. It centers on the practical 

requirement that all levels of government have a single, unified approach to managing domestic 

incidents. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, HSPD-5 tasked the secretary of 

homeland security to develop and administer a National Response Framework (NRF) that 

would integrate federal government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 

plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. It also tasked the secretary of homeland security 

to develop and administer a National Incident Management System (NIMS) that would unify 

federal, state, and local government capabilities to work together to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from domestic events regardless of cause, size, or complexity. The intent of the NRF 

and NIMS is to provide the structure and mechanisms for establishing national-level policy and 

operational direction regarding federal support to state and local incident managers.

HSPD-5 also reaffirmed the secretary of homeland security’s responsibility as the principal 

federal official for domestic incident management. HSPD-5 tasked the secretary of homeland 

security with coordinating the federal government’s resources in response to or recovery from 

terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies. This coordination responsibility exists 

when any one of the following four conditions applies:

1. A federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the 

assistance of the secretary.

2. The resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed and federal assistance has 

been requested by the appropriate state and local authorities.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

3. More than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in 

responding to the incident.

4. The secretary has been directed to assume responsibility for managing the domestic 

incident by the president.

HSPD-5 eliminates the previous distinction between crisis management and consequence 

management, treating the two “as a single, integrated function, rather than as two separate 

functions.” Under the NRF, the secretary of homeland security remains the lead federal official 

for the duration of the period involving federal assistance. The attorney general is the lead 

official for conducting criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), National Preparedness, complements 

HSPD-5. The purpose of the directive is to establish:

...policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to 

threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies by 

requiring a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms 

for improved delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments, 

and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, state, and local 

entities.

The directive calls on the secretary of homeland security to work with federal departments and 

agencies to conduct preparedness activities and training, as well as to develop and maintain a 

system to collect and analyze best practices. The heads of other federal departments and agencies 

are also tasked with supporting the national preparedness goal.

Executive Order 12656

Executive Order 12656, Emergency Preparedness and Response Responsibilities, assigns 

national security emergency preparedness responsibilities to federal departments and agencies, 

delegating to the Department of Homeland Security the primary responsibility for coordinating 

the efforts of, among other things, federal emergency assistance. This executive order identifies 

several agencies and departments (including Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services) 

that have active, and potentially overlapping, roles regarding nuclear, biological, and chemical 

(NBC) assessment and response. It also identifies primary and support functions to be performed 

during any national security emergency of the United States, development of plans for 

performing these functions, and development of the capability to execute those plans. See Table 

2-1.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Departments Roles and Responsibilities

Department of Agriculture Continuation of agricultural production, food 

processing, storage, and distribution; forest products; 

fires in rural areas; forestry and agricultural services, 

including control of diagnosis and control of diseases, 

pests, or biological, chemical, or radiological agents; 

livestock and poultry or their products; agricultural 

commodities and land exposed to or affected by 

hazardous agents. Support: Assist secretary of defense 

in formulating and carrying out plans for stockpiling 

strategic and critical agricultural materials.

Department of Defense Military response; national mobilization; damage 

assessment; support to civil and private sector, 

including law enforcement within authority; respond to 

all hazards related to nuclear weapons, materials, and 

devices; through the secretary of the Army, manage 

and allocate all usable waters within U.S. jurisdiction; 

stockpile of storage and critical materials. Support: civil 

and military national mobilization.

Department of Energy (DOE) Identify, analyze, assess, and mitigate hazards from 

nuclear weapons, materials, and devices; all emergency 

response activities pertaining to DOE nuclear facilities. 

Support: Advise, assist, and assess the radiological 

impact associated with national security emergencies.

Department of Health and Human Services Mobilize health industry and resources to provide 

health, mental health, and medical services; allocate 

health, mental health, and medical services’ resources 

among civilian and military claimants; reduce or 

eliminate adverse health and mental health effects 

produced by hazardous agents (biological, chemical, 

or radiological); minimize property and environmental 

damage; emergency human services, e.g., feeding, 

registration and inquiry, social services, family 

reunification, mortuary services and interment. Support: 

agricultural health services.

Department of Homeland Security Advise National Security Council on issues of 

national security emergency preparedness, including 

mobilization preparedness, civil defense, continuity of 

government, technological disasters, and other issues, 

as appropriate. Coordinate with the other federal 

departments and agencies and with state and local 

government to implement national security emergency 

preparedness policy. Support: preparing plans and 

programs, to include plans and capabilities for related 

to nuclear emergencies; promote programs for federal 

buildings and installations.

Department of Justice Interdict and respond to terrorism incidents in the 

United States; advise the president and departments/

agencies regarding national security emergency powers, 

plans, and authorities; coordinate federal government 

domestic law enforcement activities related to national 

security emergency preparedness; respond to civil 

disturbances that may result in a national security 

emergency. Support: the intelligence community in the 

planning of its counterintelligence and counterterrorism 

programs.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

Department of Transportation Meet essential transportation needs; provide direction 

to all modes of civil transportation; control civil 

transportation resources and systems; coordinate with 

state and local highway agencies in the management 

of all publicly owned or other highways, roads, streets, 

bridges, tunnels; maritime and port control, safety, law 

enforcement and security. Support: Energy to manage 

transportation resources involved in the bulk movement 

of energy materials; federal departments/agencies, 

state and local governments, and the private sector in 

developing plans to protect essential resources and 

facilities.

Table 2-1. Executive Order 12656 Roles and Responsibilities During a 

National Security Emergency

Presidential Decision Directive 39

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) details the policy of the United States in combating 

terrorism and reaffirms the lead agencies for the management of various aspects of the 

counterterrorism effort. It recognizes that states have primary responsibility in responding to 

terrorist incidents, including events, and the federal government provides assistance as required.

Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act

Title 50, chapter 40 of the U.S. Code deals with the federal government’s response to the 

proliferation of and use or threat to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD), or related materials and technologies. Title 50 U.S. Code, section 2313 

directs the secretary of defense to designate an official within the DOD as executive agent to 

coordinate DOD assistance with federal, state, and local entities. The secretary of defense has 

appointed the assistant secretary of defense for homeland defense and Americas’ security affairs 

(ASD [HD&ASA]) as executive agent. The Department of Energy (DOE) is directed to designate 

an executive agent for its NBC response. The DOD and DOE executive agents are responsible 

for coordinating assistance with federal, state, and local officials in responding to threats 

involving NBC weapons.

The Stafford Act

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act provides for assistance by 

the federal government to the states in the event of natural and other disasters and emergencies. 

The Stafford Act is the primary legal authority for federal emergency and disaster assistance 

to state and local governments. Congress’ intent in passing the Stafford Act was to provide for 

an “orderly and continuing means of assistance by the federal government to state and local 

governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which 

result from such disasters.” The Stafford Act sought, among other things, to broaden the scope of 

disaster relief programs; encourage the development of comprehensive disaster preparedness and 

assistance plans, programs, and capabilities of state and local governments; and provide federal 

assistance programs for both public and private losses sustained in disasters.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Legend

DHS: Department of Homeland Security 

EMAC: Emergency Management Assistance Compact

EOC: Emergency operations center 

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency

Figure 2-1. Stafford Act support to states

Through the Stafford Act, Congress delegated emergency powers to the president in the event of 

a major disaster or emergency. Generally, Stafford Act assistance is rendered upon request from 

a state governor provided certain conditions are met, primarily that the governor certifies that 

the state lacks the resources and capabilities to manage the consequences of the event. However, 

section 5170(a) of the Stafford Act was amended in 2006 authorizing the president, in the 

absence of a state request, to provide federal assistance. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) of the Department of Homeland Security operates under the Stafford Act, 

focusing its efforts on managing the consequences of disasters. FEMA’s actions generally are 

driven by requests from state and local governments. 

To coordinate the relief efforts of all federal agencies in both major disasters and emergencies, 

the act authorizes the president to appoint a federal coordinating officer (FCO) immediately 

after declaring a major disaster or emergency. The act also requires the president to request that 

a governor seeking federal assistance designate a state coordinating officer (SCO) to coordinate 

state and local disaster assistance efforts with those of the federal government. The FCO may 

use relief organizations, such as state relief organizations and the American Red Cross, in 

the distribution of emergency supplies, such as food and medicine, and in reconstruction or 
19

DISASTER RESPONSE

restoration of essential services, such as housing. The FCO may coordinate all relief efforts as 

long as states, localities, and relief organizations agree. The president is also authorized to form 

emergency support teams (ESTs) of federal personnel to be deployed to the area of the disaster 

or emergency. The FCO may activate ESTs, composed of federal program and support personnel, 

to be deployed into an area affected by a major disaster or emergency. These teams may also be 

called incident management assistance teams (IMATs). The IMAT is the interagency group that 

supports the FCO in coordinating the federal disaster assistance.

The Stafford Act also provides immunity from liability for federal agencies and their employees 

working in a disaster.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Consequence 

Management Overview and Authorities

A CBRNE incident is any accident or intentional event involving chemical agents, biological 

agents, radiological sources, nuclear devices, or high-yield explosives, and/or industrial materials 

that are hazardous by themselves or when mixed with other material, including hazards from 

industrial pollutants and waste, and will produce a toxic effect in exposed personnel. Any 

action taken to address the consequences of any inadvertent or deliberate release of a chemical, 

biological, radiological, or nuclear agent constitutes a CBRNE consequence management (CM) 

operation. As a general proposition, a catastrophic CBRNE event would quickly exceed the 

capabilities of local, state, and tribal governments. Consequently, CBRNE CM is normally 

managed at the federal level, with the DOD in a supporting role.

The principle of unity of effort dictates that a single authority control the efforts of the various 

responding federal assets; while DOD forces may be fully committed to CBRNE CM, they are 

not directed by the agency they support. The secretary of defense always retains command of 

federal (Title 10) military forces providing CBRNE CM. Similarly, state governors, through their 

adjutants general, control National Guard forces when performing active duty in their state role 

and when performing active duty under Title 32, U.S. Code.

Requests for DOD capabilities from state governors or other federal agencies are called requests 

for assistance (RFAs). In most cases, these requests for emergency support are written and are 

processed through the formal RFA process. The processing of an RFA varies depending upon 

the size and urgency of the incident, the level of federal involvement, and the originator of the 

request. For small-scale CBRNE incidents, and during the initial stages of larger incidents, 

a state’s emergency operations center may forward requests to the FEMA region’s defense 

coordinating officer (DCO), who, in turn, forwards the RFA to the ASD (HD&ASA). If the 

incident exceeds the capabilities of the state and local responders and the president has issued an 

emergency or disaster declaration at the governor’s request, the lead federal agency (LFA) will 

establish a joint field office (JFO), and an FCO will be designated. Following the establishment 

of the JFO, the FCO will forward RFAs from civil authorities to the Office of the Executive 

Secretary of the Department of Defense, which forwards them to the ASD (HD&ASA) and the 

joint director of military support (JDOMS) for validation and order processing, respectively. 

Once the secretary of defense approves a request for DOD assistance, JDOMS prepares an 

order and coordinates with necessary force providers, legal counsel, and the ASD (HD&ASA) 

to ensure asset priority and concurrence. The order is then issued to the appropriate combatant 

command for execution of the mission.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Every RFA must undergo a legal review. All requests by civil authorities for DOD military 

assistance shall be evaluated by DOD approval authorities against the following criteria: 

•Legality (compliance with laws

•Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces)

•Risk (safety of DOD forces

•Cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget)

•Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is in the DOD’s interest)

•Readiness (impact on the DOD’s ability to perform its primary mission

Military missions require legal authority. DOD’s CBRNE CM operations are generally executed 

under the provisions of the Stafford Act. Occasionally, the legal authority to use DOD forces 

arises from other sources. For instance, the DOD policy on immediate response addresses the 

authority delegated to DOD component or military commanders to provide immediate assistance 

to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in 

the event of imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack. Joint 

Publication 3-28, Civil Support, sanctions immediate response authority for various CBRNE 

incident related operations, such as search and rescue missions and debris removal. This policy is 

limited, restrictive, and conditional. 

DOD Entities Responsible for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or HighYield Explosive Consequence Management Operations

The ASD (HD&ASA) is responsible for DSCA, including CBRNE CM. The JDOMS produces 

military orders for DSCA, including consequence management operations. 

In 2008, USNORTHCOM designated U.S. Army North as the joint force land component 

command (JFLCC) for domestic CM operations. The JFLCC now has operational control of joint 

task force civil support (JTF-CS). The JTF-CS is a standing joint task force comprised of active, 

reserve and National Guard members from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines and Coast Guard, 

as well as civilian personnel, and is commanded by a federalized Army National Guard general 

officer. The unit’s purpose is to save lives, prevent injury, and provide temporary critical life 

support during a CBRNE incident in the U.S. or its territories and possessions. The JTF-CS is the 

only active duty military organization dedicated solely to planning and integrating DOD forces 

for CBRNE CM support to civil authorities in such a situation. In the National Guard, each state 

has a joint force headquarters that also conducts this type of mission at the state level.

Joint Task Force Civil Support 

Joint doctrine divides civil support (CS) operations into three broad categories: domestic 

emergencies; designated law enforcement support; and other activities based on the CS 

definition. Although JTF-CS is nominally linked to broader mission areas, the organization’s 

focus is far narrower; JTF-CS’ specific mission is CBRNE CM. It is a deployable command 

and control headquarters for DOD units and personnel executing CM operations in response to 

CBRNE incidents, and a source of response plans for essential DOD support. The unit’s mission 
21

DISASTER RESPONSE

is to plan and integrate DOD support to the designated LFA (usually Department of Homeland 

Security/FEMA) for domestic CBRNE CM. When directed, JTF-CS will deploy to the incident 

site and establish command and control of designated DOD forces to provide defense support of 

civil authorities to save lives, prevent further injury, and provide temporary critical life support. 

The NRF provides the coordinating framework under which JTF-CS performs its mission.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Consequence 

Management Response Force

On 1 October 2008, JTF-CS received operational control over various units assigned to the 

CCMRF. These units possess the military occupational specialties required to staff DOD’s initial 

CBRNE CM entry force. The CCMRF forces are configured into subordinate task forces with 

specific response missions, such as medical, aviation, and operational support. When called upon 

to perform a mission, JTF-CS and the CCMRF will quickly deploy to mitigate the effects of a 

CBRNE incident.

National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST)

Under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act and other authorizations by 

Congress, DOD is authorized a total of 55 WMD civil support teams (CSTs). Recognizing that 

the National Guard is forward deployed for civil support, the secretary of defense determined 

that the CSTs would be most effective if established in the National Guard. Consequently, each 

WMD-CST is composed of 22 full-time National Guard Soldiers and Airmen and contains 

five elements: command, operations, administrative/logistics, medical, and survey. The teams 

are designed to deploy rapidly to assist local first responders in the event of an intentional or 

unintentional CBRNE incident.

The mission of the state National Guard WMD-CST is to deploy to an area of operations and: 

•Assess a suspected event in support of a local incident commande

•Advise the local incident commander and civilian responder

•Facilitate requests for assistance to expedite arrival of additional state and federa

assets to help save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate great property damage.

WMD-CSTs are to be specially equipped and trained. Special equipment includes the 

mobile analytical laboratory system for NBC detection and the unified command suite for 

communications. WMD-CST capabilities are specifically designed to complement civilian 

responders. Community and state emergency management plans may directly incorporate WMDCST capabilities.

WMD-CSTs will operate under the command and control of the state governor and the adjutant 

general. Individual team members serve in a full-time, Title 32 National Guard status. They can 

support other states under the provisions of state-to-state compacts, the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact, and regional support compacts.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 2-2. WMD-CST locations

The Posse Comitatus Act

The primary statute restricting military support to civilian law enforcement is the Posse 

Comitatus Act (PCA) 18 U.S. Code, section 1385. The phrase “posse comitatus” is literally 

translated from Latin as the “power of the county” and is defined in common law to refer to all 

those over the age of 15 upon whom a sheriff could call for assistance in preventing any type of 

civil disorder. The PCA states: 

Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the 

Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as 

a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 

imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

The PCA was enacted in 1878, primarily as a result of the military presence in the South during 

Reconstruction following the Civil War. The intent of the PCA was to limit direct military 

involvement with civilian law enforcement, absent Congressional or constitutional authorization, 

in the enforcement of the laws of the United States. The PCA is a criminal statute and violators 

are subject to fine and/or imprisonment. The PCA does not, however, prohibit all military 

involvement in civilian law enforcement. A considerable amount of military participation with 

civilian law enforcement is permissible, either as indirect support or under one of the numerous 

PCA exceptions.

In addition to the PCA, 10 U.S. Code, chapter 18, Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement 

Agencies and Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with 

Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, also provide guidance in this area. Both authorities provide 

additional guidance regarding restrictions the PCA places on the military when supporting 

civilian law enforcement agencies. 

PCA applies to the Army and Air Force, but 10 U.S. Code, section 375 directs the secretary of 

defense to promulgate regulations that prohibit “direct participation by a member of the Army, 
23

DISASTER RESPONSE

Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless 

participation in such activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.” The secretary 

of defense subsequently prohibited these activities in DODD 5525.5, and, as a result, the 

restrictions placed on Army and Air Force activities through the PCA now apply to the Navy 

and Marine Corps. The PCA does not apply to the Coast Guard unless it is operating under the 

command and control of the DOD. 

The PCA also applies to reserve members of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps who 

are on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive duty training in a Title 10 duty status. 

Members of the National Guard performing operational support duties, active duty for training, 

or inactive duty training in a Title 32 duty status are not subject to the PCA. Only members of the 

National Guard in Title 10 (federal) duty status are subject to the PCA. Members of the National 

Guard also perform additional duties in a state active duty (SAD) status and are not subject to 

PCA in that capacity. Civilian employees of the DOD are only subject to the prohibitions of the 

PCA if they are under the direct command and control of a military officer.

Finally, the PCA does not apply to a member of the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps 

when they are off duty and acting in a private capacity. A service member is not in a private 

capacity when assistance is rendered to civilian law enforcement officials under the direction or 

control of DOD authorities.

Title 10 U.S. Code, sections 371–375 outline the restrictions of the PCA as they apply to 

participation by the military in civilian law enforcement activities. These restrictions are divided 

into three major categories: (1) use of information, (2) use of military equipment and facilities, 

and (3) use of military personnel. DODD 5525.5 further divides the restrictions on the use 

of DOD personnel in civilian law enforcement activities into categories of direct assistance, 

training, expert advice, operation or maintenance of equipment, and other permissible assistance.

In addition to the above categories, Title 10 of the U.S. Code, sections 376 and 377 provide 

further limitations on the provision of military support to civilian law enforcement. Title 10 U.S. 

Code, section 376 provides an overarching restriction in the event “such support will adversely 

affect the military preparedness of the United States.” The secretary of defense directed the 

secretaries of the military departments and the directors of the defense agencies to ensure that 

approval authority for the disposition of equipment to civilian law enforcement agencies is 

vested in those officials who can properly assess the impact the disposition will have on military 

preparedness and national security.

For PCA consideration in law enforcement missions, see Appendix J of this handbook.

National Guard Status: State Active Duty, Title 32 or Title 10

National Guard Soldiers can serve in three statuses: SAD, Title 32, or Title 10. A Soldier’s status 

is the first issue that must be answered, because each status has different rules and restrictions. 

For example, SAD personnel are prohibited from using DOD intelligence resources and 

equipment while in a SAD status. National Guard personnel in a SAD status are not authorized to 

engage in DOD intelligence operations nor are they authorized to access DOD classified systems 

(SECRET Internet Protocol Router or Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System) or 

equipment (MQ-1 Predator or border sensors) for a SAD mission without authorization from the 

National Guard Bureau joint intelligence office (J2).
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

The National Guard may be called up for SAD by state governors or territorial adjutants general 

to help respond to domestic emergencies and disasters, such as those caused by hurricanes, 

floods, and earthquakes. The National Guard may also be called up for active duty by the federal 

government under Title 32 of the U.S. Code to perform training or other duties with or without 

the consent of the Soldiers. This status is traditionally referred to as Title 32. Finally, the National 

Guard may be federalized and fall under federal command and control, a status referred to as 

Title 10.

References

Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge Advocates, LTC Patrick A. Barnett, Editor, 20 July 2009, Center for 

Law and Military Operations, <http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/clamo>.

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, 18 Nov 1988, as amended.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Incidents, 28 Feb 2003.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness, 17 Dec 2003.

National Guard Domestic Operations Manual, 20 May 2008, National Guard Bureau Director of Domestic 

Operations (NGB J3/DO).

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act [The Stafford Act], 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et. seq., 

as amended by Pub. L. No. 109-295 (2007).
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DISASTER RESPONSE

Chapter 3

The National Response Framework and National Incident 

Management System

This chapter provides information about the National Response Framework (NRF) and the 

National Incident Management System (NIMS), with a focus on how NIMS provides for 

multiagency coordination through the joint field office (JFO). It identifies the key roles, 

authorities, and structures with explanation about how the joint force commander (JFC) 

integrates into the federal coordinated response. It is important to note that the NRF does not 

cover all civil support operations. It does not, for instance, cover periodic planned support. Parts 

of it, however, can be used for other non-Stafford Act incidents.

The NRF and NIMS are companion documents designed to improve the nation’s incident 

management capabilities and overall efficiency. The NRF represents a concerted national effort 

to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, 

major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize damage and speed recovery from attacks, 

major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. The NIMS provides a template for incident 

management regardless of size, scope, or cause. Use of this template enables federal, state, local, 

and tribal governments, private sector entities, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to 

work together effectively and efficiently to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from 

actual or potential domestic incidents regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Together, the NRF 

and the NIMS integrate the capabilities and resources of various governmental jurisdictions, 

incident management and emergency response disciplines, NGOs, and the private sector 

entities into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless national framework for domestic incident 

management.

The JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central point for federal, 

state, local, and tribal executives with responsibility for incident oversight, direction, and/or 

assistance to effectively coordinate protection, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 

actions. The JFO uses the scalable organizational structure of the NIMS in the context of both 

pre-incident and post-incident management activities. The JFO does not manage on-scene 

operations. Instead, the JFO focuses on providing support to on-scene efforts and conducting 

broader support operations that may extend beyond the incident site.

National Response Framework Basics

As required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the NRF establishes 

a single, comprehensive approach to domestic incident management to prevent, prepare for, 

respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The 

NRF is an all-hazards plan built on the template of the NIMS. The NIMS provides a consistent 

doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, 

size, or complexity of the incident.

The NRF, using the NIMS, provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy 

and operational direction for domestic incident management. The NRF can be partially or fully 

implemented in the context of a threat, anticipation of a significant event, or in response to an 

incident requiring a coordinated federal response. This includes events with potential national 

or long-term implications such as a public health emergency or a cyberspace incident. Selective 

implementation through the activation of one or more of the NRF elements allows maximum 
26

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

flexibility to meet the unique operational and information-sharing requirements of any situation 

and enables effective interaction among various federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, other 

civilian entities, and NGOs.

The NRF applies to all incidents requiring a coordinated federal response as part of an 

appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental 

entities. The NRF is applicable to all federal departments and agencies that have primary 

jurisdiction for or participate in operations requiring a coordinated federal response. For 

incidents requiring a coordinated federal response but of lesser severity than an incident of 

national significance, the NRF includes a comprehensive network of incident annexes and 

supplemental federal contingency plans that may be implemented by the departments and 

agencies with established authorities in coordination with the NRF framework.

The NRF is always in effect; however, the implementation of NRF coordination mechanisms 

is flexible and scalable. Actions range in scope from ongoing situational reporting and 

analysis, through the implementation of NRF incident annexes and other supplemental federal 

contingency plans, to full implementation of all relevant NRF coordination mechanisms outlined 

in the NRF base plan.

Overview of Disaster Response and Incident Management

This overview illustrates actions federal agencies will likely take to assist state and local 

governments that are overwhelmed by a major disaster or emergency. Figure 3-1 provides a 

graphic display of a federal response under the Stafford Act.
27

DISASTER RESPONSE

Figure 3-1. Federal response

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) National Operations Center (NOC) continually 

monitors potential major disasters and emergencies. When advance warning is possible, DHS 

may deploy and may request other federal agencies to deploy liaison officers (LNOs) and 

personnel to a state emergency operations center (EOC) to assess the emerging situation. A 

regional response coordination center (RRCC) may be activated, fully or partially. Facilities, 

such as mobilization centers, may be established to accommodate personnel, equipment, and 

supplies.

Immediately after an incident, local jurisdictions respond using available resources and notify 

state response elements. As information emerges, they also assess the situation and the need 

for state assistance. The state reviews the situation, mobilizes state resources, and informs the 

DHS/emergency preparedness and response/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

regional office (Figure 3-2) of actions taken.
28

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 3-2. Map of FEMA regions

The governor activates the state emergency operations plan, proclaims or declares a “state 

of emergency,” and requests a state/DHS joint preliminary damage assessment (PDA) to 

determine if sufficient damage has occurred to justify a request for a presidential declaration of 

a major disaster or emergency. Based upon the results of the PDA, the governor may request a 

presidential declaration and define the kind of federal assistance needed. At this point, an initial 

assessment is also conducted of losses avoided based on previous mitigation efforts.

After the major disaster or emergency declaration, an RRCC, staffed by regional personnel, 

coordinates initial regional and field activities.

Depending on the scope and impact of the event, the NOC, supported by emergency support 

function (ESF) representatives and DHS/FEMA support staff, carries out initial activation and 

mission assignment operations and supports the RRCC.

A federal coordinating officer (FCO), appointed by the secretary of homeland security on 

behalf of the president, coordinates federal support activities. The FCO works with the state 

coordinating officer (SCO) to identify requirements. A principal federal official (PFO) also may 

be designated as the secretary’s representative to coordinate overall federal interagency incident 

management efforts. When required, a JFO will be established.

ESF primary agencies assess the situation, identify requirements, and help states respond 

effectively. Federal agencies provide resources under DHS/FEMA mission assignment or their 

own authority.

As immediate response priorities are met, recovery activities begin. Federal and state agencies 

assisting with recovery and mitigation activities convene to discuss state needs.

National Response Framework Roles and Responsibilities

A basic premise of the NRF is that incidents are handled at the lowest possible jurisdictional 

level. In the vast majority of incidents, state and local resources and interstate mutual aid 

will provide the first line of emergency response and incident management support. The NRF 
29

DISASTER RESPONSE

provides the framework for federal interaction with state, local, tribal, private sector and 

nongovernmental entities in the context of domestic incident management to ensure timely and 

effective federal support.

Just as a lead or primary agency is designated at the federal level, a lead agency is usually 

designated at the state level.

Typically, states have established state emergency management agencies as executive agents to 

manage incident response.

•State law enforcement agencies (LEAs) can include investigative bureau personne

and state patrol officers (which in some states are distinctly different from state police 

officers).

•The National Guard (NG) may be the first military force to respond to support firs

responders when organic capabilities are exhausted and the incident response is 

elevated to the state level. In this capacity, the NG will be in state active duty or Title 

32 (U.S. Code) status under the governor’s command. As an integrated and supporting 

organization of a state’s emergency management response, the NG supports the 

incident commander in accordance with the incident command system.

•The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a Congressionall

ratified interstate agreement among the 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 

and the Virgin Islands and is administered by the National Emergency Management 

Association to provide assistance from one state to another. Generally, when a state 

requires assistance beyond its organic resources, it generates an EMAC request 

for assistance (RFA) that is sent out to the other member states. Under EMAC, the 

requesting state reimburses the supporting state(s) for all costs associated with the 

assistance. EMAC support depends entirely on voluntary assistance. There is no 

provision within the EMAC whereby one state can be compelled to support another 

state with its organic capabilities and resources. The EMAC provides the framework 

for states to rapidly assist each other with resources during emergencies, including 

dispatching NG personnel in state active duty or Title 32 U.S. Code status.

The state governor has the final commitment authority over state capabilities in any disaster 

response effort short of a federal response. Governors have the unique authority to issue a 

state emergency declaration, mobilize the state NG, and redirect state resources to emergency 

response. A governor can request federal assistance from the president when state capabilities 

prove insufficient. This request brings the resources of the federal government to bear on the 

disaster and can involve the Department of Defense (DOD).

The private sector’s role is to be a key partner in domestic incident management, particularly 

in the area of critical infrastructure protection and restoration. Private-sector entities are also 

called upon to contribute necessary items and services to the impacted area. These sources are 

important to aid in the lifesaving and recovery efforts. DHS and other federal departments and 

agencies coordinate with the private sector to effectively share information, formulate courses 

of action, and incorporate available resources to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from incidents of various types. For coordination with the owners and operators of the nation’s 

critical infrastructure, DHS and federal agencies use the mechanisms established under the 

National Infrastructure Protection Plan, including the critical infrastructure protection advisory 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

committee. Further, the secretary of homeland security uses private-sector advisory groups with 

broad representation to provide advice on incident management and emergency response issues 

impacting their stakeholders. The NRF includes an annex on private-sector coordination.

Federal government roles and responsibilities derive from HSPD-5, which assigns specific 

responsibilities to DHS and delineates the roles and responsibilities of certain other federal 

departments.

•The president is the chief executive authority regarding incidents. Under the authorit

of the Stafford Act, he declares incidents to be disasters or emergencies. He can 

delegate authority to others to act as executive agents in matters of incident response.

•Pursuant to HSPD-5, the secretary of homeland security is responsible for coordinatin

federal resources within the U.S. to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD-5 further designates the 

secretary of homeland security as the PFA for domestic incident management.

•The attorney general has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist act

or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the U.S., or directed at U.S. citizens 

or institutions abroad. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI), the attorney general, in cooperation with other federal departments and agencies 

engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities 

of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, 

and disrupt terrorist attacks against the U.S.

•The DOD has significant resources that may be available to support the federa

response to terrorist attacks, major disasters or other emergencies. The secretary of 

defense authorizes defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) operations for domestic 

incidents as directed by the president or when consistent with military readiness 

operations and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The secretary of 

defense retains command of military forces providing DSCA.

•The Department of State (DOS) has international coordination responsibilities. Th

secretary of state is responsible for coordinating international prevention, preparedness, 

response, and recovery activities relating to domestic incidents, and for the protection 

of U.S. citizens and U.S. interests overseas.

The National Response Framework Concept of Operations

The NRF, as the core plan for national incident management, also establishes national-level 

coordinating structures, processes, and protocols that will be incorporated into certain existing 

federal interagency incident- or hazard-specific plans (such as the National Oil and Hazardous 

Substances Pollution Contingency Plan) that are designed to implement the specific statutory 

authorities and responsibilities of various departments and agencies in particular contingency 

scenarios. These plans, which incorporate the coordinating structures and mechanisms of the 

NRF, provide detailed protocols for responding to incidents of lesser severity normally managed 

by federal agencies without the need for the secretary of homeland security to manage the federal 

response.
31

DISASTER RESPONSE

ESFs are the primary means through which the federal government provides assistance to 

state, local, and tribal governments or to federal departments and agencies conducting missions 

of primary federal responsibility. ESFs are an effective mechanism to group capabilities and 

resources into the functions that are most likely needed during actual or potential incidents where 

coordinated federal response is required, such as transportation, firefighting, and public health.

ESFs may be selectively activated for both Stafford Act and non-Stafford Act incidents by the 

secretary of homeland security. They may also be activated by the ESF coordinators. The ESF 

structure provides a modular structure to identify the precise components that can best address 

the requirements of the incident. For example, a large-scale natural disaster or significant terrorist 

incident may require the activation of all ESFs. A localized flood or tornado might only require 

activation of a few ESFs.

The ESF structure provides coordination of federal interagency support of a federal response 

to an incident. The ESF structure includes mechanisms used to provide federal support to 

states and federal-to-federal support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the 

Stafford Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents. The ESF structure provides mechanisms for 

interagency coordination during all phases of incident management. Some departments and 

agencies provide resources for response, support, and program implementation during the early 

stage of an event, while others are more prominent in the recovery phase. ESFs are activated 

based on the scope and magnitude of the threat or incident. Each ESF annex identifies the ESF 

coordinator and the primary and support agencies pertinent to the ESF. Several ESFs incorporate 

multiple components, with primary agencies designated for each component to ensure seamless 

integration of and transition between preparedness, prevention, response, recovery, and 

mitigation activities. ESFs with multiple primary agencies designate an ESF coordinator for the 

purposes of pre-incident planning and coordination. 

Chapter 5 of this handbook covers each ESF in detail, including the scope, purpose, and 

identification of the ESF coordinator, primary agency, support federal agencies, and DOD 

responsibilities in each. There are 15 ESFs:

•ESF #1: Transportatio

•ESF #2: Communication

•ESF #3: Public works and engineerin

•ESF #4: Firefightin

•ESF #5: Emergency managemen

•ESF #6: Mass care, housing, and human service

•ESF #7: Resources suppor

•ESF #8: Public health and medical service

•ESF #9: Urban search and rescu

•ESF #10: Oil and hazardous materials respons
32

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•ESF #11: Agriculture and natural resource

•ESF #12: Energ

•ESF #13: Public safety and securit

•ESF #14: Long-term community recovery and mitigatio

•ESF #15: External affair

Understanding the National Incident Management System

NIMS is:

•A comprehensive, nationwide, systematic approach to incident managemen

•A set of preparedness concepts and principles for all hazard

•Essential principles for a common operating picture and interoperability o

communications and information management.

•Standardized resource management procedures for coordination among differen

jurisdictions or organizations.

•Scalable and applicable for all incident

NIMS is not:

•A response pla

•A communication pla

•Something that is used only during large incident

•Only applicable to certain emergency responder

•Only the incident command system or an organizational char

•A static syste

DOD implements NRF policies and procedures as appropriate and consistent with departmental 

authorities and responsibilities. According to DOD policy, DOD organizations will adopt and 

implement procedures consistent with the NIMS and the incident command system (ICS) at 

all DOD domestic installations. Additionally, all defense coordination offices (DCOs), defense 

coordinating elements (DCEs), emergency preparedness liaison officers, and DOD incident 

commanders under the NIMS/ICS structure, and DSCA combined joint task force and joint 

task force senior staff must be knowledgeable of the NRF prior to participating in domestic 

operations. The NIMS provides a framework for managing incident response and support 

activities as depicted in Figure 3-3.
33

DISASTER RESPONSE

Figure 3-3. NIMS framework

The ICS is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident 

management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and 

communications operating within a common organizational structure that is designed to enable 

effective and efficient domestic incident management. A basic premise of ICS is that it is widely 

applicable. It is used to organize both near-term and long-term field-level operations for a 

broad spectrum of emergencies, from small to complex incidents, both natural and man-made. 

ICS is used by all levels of government—federal, state, local, and tribal—as well as by many 

private-sector organizations and NGOs. ICS is also applicable across disciplines. It is normally 

structured to facilitate activities in five major functional areas: command, operations, planning, 

logistics, and finance and administration.

Figure 3-4. Incident command system structure
34

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Unified command is an application of the NIMS/ICS used when there is more than one agency 

with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together 

through designated members of the unified command to establish their incident commanders 

at a single incident command post (ICP). In the unified command, entities develop a common 

set of objectives and strategies, which provides the basis for a single incident action plan. The 

structure for NRF coordination is based on the NIMS construct: an ICS/unified command onscene supported by an area command (if needed) and multiagency coordination entities. The JFO 

provides resources in support of the unified command and ICP(s). Acts of biological, chemical, 

radiological, and nuclear terrorism or other catastrophic events represent particular challenges 

for the traditional ICS structure. Events that are not site-specific, are geographically dispersed, or 

evolve over longer periods of time will require extraordinary coordination between federal, state, 

local, tribal, private-sector, and nongovernmental entities.

National Incident Management System command and coordination

There are four major components of NIMS: command and management, preparedness, resource 

management, and communications and information management. This section focuses on the 

three NIMS standard incident command structures making up command and management to 

identify how they work together as a system to provide the national framework for preparing for, 

preventing, responding to, and recovering from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or 

complexity. The NIMS distinguishes between command authority and coordination authority. 

Command authority is vested in the incident commander, whether a single incident commander 

or an area commander, and is exercised through the ICS. Coordination authority is vested in 

coordinating officers such as the FCO and DCO. Each coordinating officer has the authority to 

make coordinating decisions within his or her jurisdiction, whether federal, state, or local.

The incident command system

The ICS defines the operating characteristics, interactive management components, and structure 

of incident management and emergency response organizations engaged throughout the life cycle 

of an incident. Direct tactical and operational responsibility for conducting incident management 

activities rests with the incident commander. The incident command organizational structure 

develops in a top-down, modular fashion that is based on the size and complexity of the incident 

as well as the specifics of the hazard environment created by the incident. The ICS organization 

has five major functions, which are described in Figure 3-4. These are: command, operations, 

planning, logistics, and finance and administration. When needed, separate functional elements 

can be established, each of which may be further subdivided to enhance internal organizational 

management and external coordination. Responsibility for establishing and expanding the ICS 

modular organization ultimately rests with the incident commander, who bases his decisions on 

the requirements of the situation. As incident complexity increases, the organization expands 

from the top down as functional responsibilities are delegated. Concurrently with structural 

expansion, the number of management positions expands to adequately address the requirements 

of the incident. Incident command may be transferred from one commander to a succeeding one.

Multiagency coordination systems

The primary functions of multiagency coordination systems are to support incident management 

policies and priorities; facilitate logistic support and resource tracking; inform resource 

allocation decisions using incident management priorities; coordinate incident related 

information; and coordinate interagency and intergovernmental issues regarding incident 
35

DISASTER RESPONSE

management policies, priorities, and strategies. These define the operating characteristics, 

interactive management components, and organizational structure of supporting incident 

management entities engaged at the federal, state, local, tribal, and regional levels through 

mutual-aid agreements and other assistance arrangements. When incidents cross disciplinary or 

jurisdictional boundaries, or involve complex incident management scenarios, a multiagency 

coordination entity, such as an emergency management agency, may be used to facilitate incident 

management and policy coordination. The situation at hand and the needs of the jurisdictions 

involved will dictate how these multiagency coordination entities conduct their business, as well 

as how they are structured. Multi-agency coordination entities typically consist of principals (or 

their designees) from organizations and agencies with direct incident management responsibility 

or with significant incident management support or resource responsibilities. These entities 

are sometimes referred to as crisis action teams, policy committees, incident management 

groups, executive teams, or other similar terms. As stated earlier, direct tactical and operational 

responsibility for conducting incident management activities rests with the incident commander. 

Command authority does not reside in coordinating officers or coordinating entities, although 

coordinating officers may be designated with command authority. In some instances, EOCs may 

serve an additional function as a multiagency coordination entity; in others, the preparedness 

organizations may fulfill this role. Regardless of the term or organizational structure used, 

these entities typically provide strategic coordination during domestic incidents. If constituted 

separately, multiagency coordination entities, preparedness organizations, and EOCs must 

coordinate and communicate with one another to provide uniform and consistent guidance to 

incident management personnel. The JFO is the multiagency coordination center of primary 

interest to the combatant commander or the JFC.

Public information systems

These refer to processes, procedures, and systems for communicating timely and accurate 

information to the public during crises or emergency situations. Under the ICS, the public 

information officer (PIO) is a key staff member supporting the incident command structure. The 

PIO represents and advises the incident command on all public information matters relating 

to the management of the incident. The PIO handles media and public inquiries, emergency 

public information and warnings, rumor monitoring and responses, media monitoring, and other 

functions required to coordinate, clear with appropriate authorities, and disseminate accurate and 

timely information related to the incident, particularly regarding information on public health 

and safety and protection. The PIO is also responsible for coordinating public information at or 

near the incident site and serving as the on-scene link to the joint information system (JIS). In a 

large-scale operation, the on-scene PIO serves as a field PIO with links to the joint information 

center (JIC), which is typically collocated with the federal, regional, state, local, or tribal EOC 

tasked with primary incident coordination responsibilities. The JIS provides the mechanism for 

integrating public information activities among JICs, across jurisdictions, and with private-sector 

entities and NGOs. During emergencies, the public may receive information from a variety of 

sources. The JIC provides a location for organizations participating in the management of an 

incident to work together to ensure that timely, accurate, easy-to-understand, and consistent 

information is disseminated to the public. JICs include processes for coordinating and clearing 

public communications. The JIC develops, coordinates, and disseminates unified news releases. 

News releases are cleared through the JFO coordination group to ensure consistent messages, 

avoid release of conflicting information, and prevent negative impact on operations. This formal 

approval process for news releases ensures protection of law enforcement sensitive information 

or other sensitive but unclassified information. DOD supports the national-level JIC and 
36

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

contributes to the overall unified message. DOD and other agencies may issue their own news 

releases related to their policies, procedures, programs, and capabilities; however, these should 

be coordinated with the JIC.

The Joint Field Office

The JFO is a temporary federal facility established locally to provide a central point for 

coordinating federal, state, local, and tribal response to the incident. When incidents impact 

multiple states or localities, multiple JFOs may be established. In these situations, one of the 

JFOs (typically in the most heavily impacted area) may be identified to serve as the primary JFO 

and provide strategic leadership and coordination for the overall incident management effort, as 

designated by the secretary of homeland security. The JFO organizational structure is built upon 

NIMS but does not impede, supersede, or impact the ICP/ICS command structure. See Figure 

3-5 for a typical JFO established for a natural disaster. 

Figure 3-5. JFO
37

DISASTER RESPONSE

Principal federal official

The PFO is personally designated by the secretary of homeland security to facilitate federal 

support to the established ICS unified command structure and to coordinate overall federal 

incident management and assistance activities across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, 

response, and recovery. The PFO ensures that incident management efforts are maximized 

through effective and efficient coordination, and provides a primary point of contact and 

situational awareness locally for the secretary of homeland security. The secretary of homeland 

security is not restricted to DHS officials when selecting a PFO. In certain scenarios, a PFO 

may be designated by the secretary of homeland security to facilitate federal domestic incident 

planning and coordination at the local level outside the context of a specific threat or incident. A 

PFO also may be designated in a pre-incident mode for a specific geographic area based on threat 

and other considerations. In the event of a single incident with national implications or in the 

case of multiple incidents, a national-level PFO may be designated to coordinate federal response 

activities. The PFO may delegate duties to a deputy PFO, the FCO, or other designated federal 

official as appropriate after an event transitions to long-term recovery or cleanup operations.

Federal coordinating officer

The FCO manages and coordinates federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act 

disasters and emergencies and non-Stafford Act incidents. The FCO assists the unified command 

and/or the area command. The FCO works closely with the PFO, senior federal law enforcement 

official (SFLEO), and other senior officials. In situations where a PFO has not been assigned, 

the FCO provides overall coordination for the federal components of the JFO and works in 

partnership with the SCO to determine and satisfy state and local assistance requirements. 

During national or geographically widespread incidents such as a catastrophic hurricane 

impacting several adjacent states, the secretary of homeland security may, in other than terrorism 

incidents, choose to combine the roles of the PFO and FCO in a single individual to help ensure 

synchronized federal coordination. In instances where the FCO has also been assigned the role of 

the PFO, deputy FCOs may be designated to support the PFO/FCO.

Senior officials

The JFO coordination group may also include officials representing other federal departments or 

agencies.

The DCO is appointed by the DOD and serves as the DOD’s single point of contact at the JFO, 

with the exception of U.S. Special Operations Command and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) assets. RFAs originating at the JFO will be coordinated with and processed through 

the DCO. The DCO may have a DCE consisting of a staff and military LNOs to support 

activated ESFs. Specific responsibilities of the DCO include processing requirements for military 

support, forwarding RFAs to the appropriate military organizations through DOD channels, and 

assigning military liaisons to activated ESFs. RFAs originating at the JFO will be coordinated 

and processed through the DCO with the exception of requests for USACE support, NG forces 

operating under state active duty or Title 32 U.S. Code, or, in some circumstances, DOD forces 

in support of the FBI.
38

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Proactive Federal Response and Catastrophic Events

The NRF establishes policies, procedures, and mechanisms for a proactive federal response to 

catastrophic events. A catastrophic event is any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, 

which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties; damage; or disruption severely affecting 

the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government 

functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impact over a prolonged period 

of time; almost immediately exceed resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and 

private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupt governmental operations 

and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. The secretary 

of homeland security will declare all catastrophic events as incidents of national significance.

The NRF Catastrophic Incident Annex and the NRF Catastrophic Incident Supplement address 

resource and procedural implications of catastrophic events to ensure the rapid and efficient 

delivery of resources and assets, including special teams, equipment, and supplies that provide 

critical lifesaving support and incident containment capabilities. These assets may not be available 

or are in insufficient quantities in most localities. The secretary of homeland security may choose 

to activate and deploy assets prior to or immediately following any incident, to include those with 

catastrophic ramifications. For no-notice or short-notice catastrophic events when there is little or 

no time to assess the requirements of the state and local authorities, all federal departments and 

agencies and the American Red Cross (ARC) initiate actions to mobilize and deploy all resources 

by scenario type as planned for in the NRP Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue (CIS) 

addendum.

Training

Detailed training concerning NRF and NIMS is offered in independent study (IS) courses by 

FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute, <http://training.fema.gov/IS/>:

•IS-1: Emergency Manager: An Orientation to the Positio

•IS-100.a: Introduction to Incident Command System, I-10

•IS-130: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Plannin

•IS-200.a: ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incident

•IS-208: State Disaster Managemen

•IS-230: Principles of Emergency Managemen

•IS-235: Emergency Plannin

•IS-288: The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Emergency Managemen

•IS-292: Disaster Basic

•IS-547: Introduction to Continuity of Operations (COOP

•IS-700.a: National Incident Management System (NIMS)–An Introductio
39

DISASTER RESPONSE

•IS-701: NIMS Multi-agency Coordination System

•IS-702: NIMS Public Information System

•IS-703: NIMS Resource Managemen

•IS-706: NIMS Intrastate Mutual Aid–An Introductio

•IS-800.b: National Response Framework–An Introductio

•IS-860: Introduction to the National Infrastructure Protection Pla

Other training sources include:

•Center for Domestic Preparedness, <http://cdp.dhs.gov/

•Emergency Management Institute, <http://training.fema.gov/EMICourses/

•Louisiana State University, <http://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/

•National Incident Management System, <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nim

training.shtm#3>.

•New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology, <http://www.emrtc.nmt.edu/

•State Level, <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/STCourses/

•Texas A&M University, <http://teexweb.tamu.edu/

•U.S. Department of Energy, <http://www.nv.doe.gov/default.htm

References

Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support, Department of Defense, 14 September 2007.

FEMA NIMS Resource Center, www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/NIMSbriefings.shtm.

41

DISASTER RESPONSE

Chapter 4

The Department of Defense Role in Incident Response

“During a disaster, governors have at their disposal a crucial state resource in the National 

Guard. These state military forces have equipment and expertise in communications, logistics, 

search and rescue, law enforcement, and decontamination and can serve as a significant 

resource during a disaster response. When National Guard forces from disaster-impacted and 

supporting states are insufficient, federal military assets also are available through the U.S. 

Department of Defense.”

—A Governor’s Guide to Homeland Security, 2007

The use of Department of Defense (DOD) resources in disaster response efforts is always the 

last resort because the commitment of military resources detracts from national defense and the 

Constitution and federal legislation limit operations of federal armed forces on domestic soil.

Even so, a federal incident management response to a state’s request for assistance can include 

DOD resources. DOD support is called defense support to civil authorities (DSCA). All DOD 

support to disaster response is temporary with the end state being transfer of all emergency 

functions back to civilian authorities.

In addition to the legislation cited in Chapter 2, DOD directives also govern the use of DOD 

assets in supporting civil authorities. DOD assistance should be requested through an emergency 

support function (ESF) coordinator only when other local, state, and federal capabilities have 

been exhausted or when a military-unique capability is required.

Department of Defense Coordinating Officers and Entities

•Defense coordinating officers (DCOs) are military officers in the grade of O-6 (o

the civil service equivalent) who represent the DOD at joint field offices (JFOs). The 

DCO is the single DOD point of contact at the JFO. The DCO will provide operational 

control to the designated supported combatant commander or designated joint task 

force (JTF) commander. DCO contact information appears at the end of this chapter in 

Table 4-2.

•The DCO assists in planning and coordinating the delivery of all DOD disaste

response assets and resources provided to a state through the federal coordinating 

officer (FCO). Requests for DSCA originating at a JFO are coordinated with and 

processed through the DCO to the secretary of defense for approval, and then on to 

the joint directors of military support for transmission to one of the unified combatant 

commands. DCOs are designated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) regions, and one DCO is assigned to each state disaster. All DCOs and 

their associated defense coordinating elements (DCEs) undergo periodic, externally 

evaluated readiness exercises to ensure they are trained and ready.

•The DCE is the DCO’s staff. It consists of staff and military liaison officers responsibl

for facilitating DOD coordination and support. The DCE processes requirements 

for military support; forwards mission assignments through DOD channels; tracks 

expenditures; assists with reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of 

DOD resources; and assigns military liaisons to activated ESFs.
42

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•Emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs) are reserve component officers i

the pay grade of O-6 (Army, Air Force, and Marine colonels and Navy captains) who 

represent their respective service component at the state emergency operations centers 

(EOCs) and the JFO. EPLOs serve as military liaisons at the FEMA region level. They 

identify potential DOD support requirements and function as service representatives 

and advisers to the DCO as part of the DCE staff.

Joint Entities

•The following unified combatant commands are directed in DSCA efforts by Join

Publication 3-26, Homeland Security, which states that: “The combatant commanders 

responsible for homeland defense and civil support incorporate plans for civil support 

by task-organizing their commands to accomplish civil support missions as well as 

other assigned missions.”

○

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), headquartered at Peterson 

Force Base, CO, is responsible for providing resources for domestic disaster 

relief to the 48 contiguous United States, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 

Virgin Islands.

○

U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), headquartered at Camp H. M. Smi

HI, is responsible for providing resources for Hawaii; American Samoa; 

the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands; Guam; and the Freely 

Associated States of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the 

Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau.

•Joint Task Force–Civil Support (JTF–CS) is a standing military headquarters withou

assigned forces that is located at Fort Monroe, VA. JTF–CS studies city and state 

emergency plans to evaluate the potential needs of cities and determine how best to 

support a coordinating agency dealing with the consequences of a chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attack. JTF–CS plans and 

integrates DOD support to FEMA for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) events 

in the continental United States and draws on DOD capabilities including detection, 

decontamination, medical, and logistical assets. Once the secretary of defense 

authorizes military support to civil authorities, JTF–CS deploys to the incident site to 

serve as the command and control headquarters for responding DOD units.

•A JTF is constituted and designated by the secretary of defense and consists of 

combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force 

commander.

Army Overview

Army civil support spans both DSCA and National Guard civil support. Army civil support 

doctrine applies to the regular Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve. It 

guides Department of the Army civilians and contractors assigned to support Army elements 

conducting civil support operations. This doctrine does not apply to Army forces engaged in 
43

DISASTER RESPONSE

counterterrorism operations, nor does it apply to any state defense force that is not part of the 

National Guard. It also does not cover operations of the Army Corps of Engineers. The Army 

Corps of Engineers is a direct reporting unit of the Army that exists to provide civil support 

according to U.S. law and other applicable regulations.

DSCA requires Army forces to provide essential services and work with civilian authorities. 

However, domestic operational environments are quite different from expeditionary stability 

operations in terms of law, military chain of command, use of deadly force, and the interagency 

process.

Military forces called to conduct civil support operations respond under federal status or state 

status. Title 10 of the U.S. Code is the principal statute covering federal military forces. Federal 

military forces operate under the command and control of the president, the secretary of defense, 

and the supported combatant commander. State military forces (those assigned to state active 

duty under Title 32 of the U.S. Code) operate under the command and control of the governor 

through a state joint-force headquarters led by the adjutant general of the state. While federal 

and state forces operate in proximity to one another, they remain under their respective chains of 

command. Unity of command, as the military defines it, does not apply to the broader structure 

of American government when state and federal government agencies coordinate efforts. Unity 

of command applies to federal and state military forces only when the president and the governor 

formally agree to appoint a dual-status commander. In the absence of unity of command, 

achieving unity of effort in civil support operations becomes essential.

U.S. Coast Guard forces are unique in that they normally operate under Title 14 of the U.S. 

Code, serving under the Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard may, however, 

come under the operational control of DOD for some missions. In some homeland security 

missions the Coast Guard may exercise tactical control of Title 10 forces.

Figure 4-1. Range of Army civil support
44

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Status

National Guard forces in state active duty status

When a governor mobilizes the state National Guard, the forces are in state active duty status and 

under the command and control of the governor. The state government pays expenses for forces 

in state active duty status. National Guard members on state active duty conduct all missions 

according to the needs of the state and within the guidelines of state laws and statutes. National 

Guardsmen on state active duty are paid by the state and subject to the state military code, not the 

Uniform Code of Military Justice. National Guard forces in state active duty status can perform 

civil law enforcement missions in accordance with the laws and statutes of their state. Generally, 

National Guard forces assist with incident management and homeland security operations within 

the state.

National Guard forces in Title 32 status

Under certain circumstances, a governor may request that the federal government pay for the 

costs associated with a state call-up of the National Guard for responding to an emergency. When 

the secretary of defense approves, National Guard forces change from state active duty status 

to Title 32 status. (Title 32, U.S. Code, is the principal federal statute covering the National 

Guard.) Even though the National Guard forces are on Title 32 active duty and funded by the 

federal government, National Guards members remain under the command of the governor. 

The distinction between funding lines is important to the respective state and federal treasuries. 

For Army commanders, the important distinction is that National Guard units in Title 32 status 

remain under state control and therefore have authority for some missions that, because of Posse 

Comitatus Act restrictions, regular Army and Army Reserve units do not. Because National 

Guard forces in Title 32 status remain under the command of the governor and are not subject to 

restriction of the Posse Comitatus Act, they may conduct law enforcement missions.

The National Guard of one state can assist other states responding to a disaster through formal 

agreements, such as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Typically, this 

occurs in state active duty, and may transition to Title 32 status upon approval by the secretary 

of defense. When requested by the supported state’s governor and authorized by the supporting 

state’s governor under a separate memorandum of agreement, National Guard elements deploy 

to the supported state. The supporting National Guard operates under the operational control of 

the supported state’s adjutant general. Typically, deployments under an assistance memorandum 

are limited to a specific period, such as 30 days. Often military and civilian officials refer to all 

National Guard forces as “Title 32 forces” notwithstanding that some of them may be in a purely 

state active duty status, without federal funding. Table 4-1 summarizes the types of National 

Guard duty status.

State and territorial National Guard forces have primary responsibility for providing military 

support to state and local authorities in emergencies. In most civil support situations, the 

president will not federalize National Guard forces. National Guard units conduct advance 

planning with civilian responders. Together, these organizations—civilian and military—

establish coordination plans and procedures based on national policy such as the National 

Incident Management System, the National Response Framework (NRF), and national planning 

scenarios. Command and control follows the authority under which service members are ordered 

to duty: State active duty and Title 32 remain under the authority of the respective governor/

adjutant general and Title 10 under federal command and control. 
45

DISASTER RESPONSE

State Active Duty Title 32 Title 10

Command and 

control

Governor Governor President

Where Within respective state or 

territory and according to 

Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact or 

state-to-state memorandum 

of agreement

Within respective state or 

territory and according to 

Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact or 

state-to-state memorandum 

of agreement

Worldwide

Funded by State Federal funds administered 

by the state

Federal

Missions According to state law; 

includes riot control, 

law enforcement, and 

emergency response

Annual training, drills, 

and other federal military 

requirements; disaster and 

law enforcement missions, 

based on disaster and 

emergency declarations by 

the president

Worldwide training and 

operations, as assigned by 

joint commander 

Discipline State military code State military code Uniform Code of Military 

Justice

Conduct law 

enforcement

Yes (as authorized by the 

supported governor)

Yes (as authorized by the 

supported governor)

No, (Strictly limited by 

Posse Comitatus Act, 

standing execute orders, 

and DOD directives)

Pay Determined by state law DOD Financial 

Management Regulation 

Volume 7A

DOD Financial 

Management Regulation 

Volume 7.0

Travel, lodging, and 

benefits

Determined by state law Joint Federal Travel 

Regulations, chapter 10/

public law

Joint Federal Travel 

Regulations, chapter 10/

public law

Table 4-1. State Active Duty, T-32, and T-10

Federal forces (Title 10 status)

Title 10, U.S. Code, governs all federal military forces. For the Army, these forces include the 

regular Army, the Army Reserve, and all National Guard units ordered to federal Active Duty 

in Title 10 status. For the other services, Title 10 forces include all components except the Air 

National Guard unless it mobilizes for federal service. Title 10 forces are federal assets under 

the command of the president. Forces in Title 10 status are restricted from conducting law 

enforcement missions by the Posse Comitatus Act (See Chapter 2).

In a large-scale disaster, the president may direct that federal military forces support federal 

agencies, but these forces will remain under federal, not state, command. In most cases, there are 

separate federal and state chains of command assisting numerous organizations on the ground. 

Unity of effort across jurisdictions and involving multiple organizations requires significant 

effort in establishing effective communication. Duplication of effort is likely unless Title 32 

and Title 10 forces keep each other informed to ensure joint headquarters have an accurate 

assessment of the situation. The DCO serves as the vital link between the state EOC, state 

National Guard joint headquarters, federal agencies, and Title 10 military forces.
46

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Legend

C2: Command and control

C4I: Command, control, communications, computers, 

and intelligence 

CBRN: Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 

CCMRF: CBRNE consequence management response 

force

CERFP: CBRNE-enhanced response force package 

CST: Civil support team

DOD: Department of Defense

ID: Identification

Med/Tech: Medical/Technical

NG: National Guard

SA: Situational awareness

SAD: State active duty

Figure 4-2. Spectrum of response

FM 3-28, Civil Support Operations (draft released June 2010) will add two primary tasks to the 

three tasks specified in FM 3-0, Operations, February 2008. There are now five primary civil 

support tasks:

•Provide support in response to a disaste

•Support CBRNE consequence management (added task

•Provide support during a pandemic (added task

•Support civil law enforcemen

•Provide other support as require
47

DISASTER RESPONSE

The expansion to five tasks recognizes the increased emphasis placed on CBRNE response, 

particularly if terrorist groups employ WMD. The primary purposes of civil support are to save 

lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property.

Army Support

The U.S. Army is organized into six numbered armies. Fifth U.S. Army, headquartered at Fort 

Sam Houston, TX, is responsible for command and control of military support to domestic 

disaster response efforts throughout the entire continental United States. It acts as the Army 

service component command of USNORTHCOM.

Regular Army divisions can provide two or more combat brigades for a total of 10,000 to 

25,000 personnel. The brigades are capable of intratheater movement deployment using air, 

rail, and vehicular movement. Divisions have advanced command and control capabilities and 

highly trained commanders and staffs with robust sustainment. Units have CBRNE defensive 

equipment, can provide their own life support, and can be alerted and prepared for initial 

deployment within 18 to 24 hours.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or High-Yield Explosive Consequence 

Management Response Force

A CBRNE consequence management response force (CCMRF) is a brigade-level organization 

of roughly 4,500 personnel. That includes at least three task forces: medical, aviation, and 

operational. The operational assets include transportation, communications, logistics, public 

affairs, military information support operations (formerly psychological operations), intelligence, 

and specialized CBRNE detection and decontamination units.

When a CCMRF is deployed to assist with the results of a CBRNE attack or accident, it will 

do so in support of the civil authorities as specified in the mission assignment from the FCO at 

the joint field office. But there are important limitations on how the military should engage this 

mission. 

The CCMRF’s primary role in the operation is likely to focus on its specialized competence 

in biological, chemical, and radiological reconnaissance and decontamination, medical surge, 

transportation, and communication. The taskings include:

•Logistics and distributio

•Citizen evacuatio

•Support of displaced populatio

•Mortuary operation

•Clearing major transportation route

•Hazard surveying and monitorin

•Decontaminatio
48

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•Search and rescue (extraction

•Medical transpor

•Medical service

•Public affair

The DCO will work with civilian counterparts in the joint field office—the FCO and state 

coordinating officer—as well as local liaison officers to determine where and what support 

is required. The CCMRF unit will not coordinate directly with civil authorities, except when 

actually doing the work per their mission assignment.

Specialized CCMRF assets

•CHEM Co (Decon): chemical company decontamination (Army

•CHEM Plt (Recon): chemical platoon reconnaissance (Army

•CHEM Plt (BIDS): chemical platoon biological integrated detection system (Army

•NBC Bio Det TM: nuclear, biological and chemical biological detection team (Ai

Force).

•CBRNE CE: CBRNE coordination element (Army

•HAMMER ACE: hammer adaptive communications element (Air Force

•AFRAT: Air Force radiological assessment team (Air Force

•DTRA CMAT: Defense Threat Reduction Agency consequence management advisor

team (DOD).

A typical aviation task force for the CCMRF will consist of the following:

•Headquarters, aviation brigad

•Aviation battalion medical lif

•Aviation battalion medica

•Aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) platoon (maintenance and supply
49

DISASTER RESPONSE

The medical task force operates with seven priorities:

•Provide public health suppor

•Provide medical augmentation to existing hospitals or other facilitie

•Provide definitive medical car

•Establish casualty collection points and emergency medical care location

•Assist with patient movemen

•Provide medical logistics suppor

•Support patient redistribution through the National Disaster Medical Syste

A CCMRF is most likely to be deployed under provisions of the Stafford Disaster and 

Emergency Assistance Act. According to joint doctrine, a Stafford Act incident is one in 

which state and local authorities declare a state of emergency and request federal assistance. 

According to the Stafford Act, the federal role in disaster response is to support the “state and 

local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage.” 

The federal government does not replace state and local authority or responsibility. The federal 

government is in a supporting role, not one of authority or responsibility, to the state and local 

agencies.

The CCMRF advances its mission by deploying its particular expertise in CBRNE consequence 

management and in providing communications, transportation, medical surge, mortuary surge, 

and other resources helpful in the aftermath of a disaster.

The CCMRF’s implicit mission is to support civil authorities in such a manner that a rapid 

recovery is enabled and public confidence is maintained or restored. The CCMRF—and every 

element of the civil support function—is focused on reinforcing the resilience of the American 

people, both those immediately affected by the incident and those outside the disaster zone.

The CCMRF will, at all times, remain under the control of the military chain of command and 

under the direction of the secretary of defense and the president. The CCMRF will, however, 

need to coordinate its activities with a wide range of players. They include state and local 

officials, owners and managers of private property, religious and civic organizations, and 

individual citizens.

CCMRF guidelines

•Develop measurable objective

•Coordinate with other organization
50

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•  Plan to hand over tasks.

•  Provide essential support to the largest number of people.

•  Know all legal restrictions and rules for the use of force.

In the case of a CBRNE event, other organizations with expertise similar to the CCMRF are

likely to be engaged. These are important sources of information for the CCMRF and assets with

which CCMRF capabilities should be tactically coordinated. These include, but are not limited

to:

•  Corporate hazardous materials units (chemical plants, refinery operations, and nuclear

power stations often have their own response capability).

•  Civilian fire service hazardous materials units.

•  National Guard WMD civil support teams.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is an Army major command assigned mission

responsibilities in major construction and other engineering support to the Army and the Air

Force, in nationwide water resource management, in engineering research and development, and

in real estate services for the Army and DOD. USACE employs approximately 34,600 civilians

and has approximately 650 military members assigned. USACE is organized geographically into

eight divisions in the United States and 41 subordinate districts throughout the United States,

Asia, and Europe. Divisions and districts are defined by watershed boundaries, not by states. In

addition, a ninth provisional division with four districts was activated 25 January 2004 to oversee

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

USACE’s mission is to provide quality, responsive engineering services to the nation including:

•  Planning, designing, building, and operating water resources and other civil works

projects (navigation, flood control, environmental protection, disaster response, etc.).

•  Designing and managing the construction of military facilities for the Army and Air

Force (military construction).

•  Providing design and construction management support for other defense and federal

agencies (interagency and international services).

In addition to the long-standing programs noted above, USACE has been called upon with

increasing frequency since the 1990s to take part in contingency operations at home and abroad.

These contingency operations include natural and man-made disasters as well as military/foreign

policy operations in support of the U.S. national interest. Contingency operations at home and

abroad became more common during the 1990s, with the frequency, duration, and the scope

increasing greatly since the events of September 11, 2001.
51

DISASTER RESPONSE

USACE and domestic incident response

USACE conducts its emergency response activities under two basic authorities: the Flood 

Control and Coastal Emergency Act (P.L. 84-99, as amended) and the Stafford Disaster 

and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended). Under the Stafford Act, USACE 

supports FEMA in carrying out the NRF, which calls on 26 federal departments and agencies 

to provide coordinated disaster relief and recovery operations. Under the NRF, the Army has 

the lead responsibility for public works and engineering missions (ESF #3, Public Works and 

Engineering).

Primary activities

•Flood control and coastal emergencies (P.L. 84 through 99, as amended). Readines

teams in USACE districts nationwide are trained, equipped, and prepared to participate 

in flood control activities. Activities include:

○

Disaster preparedn

* Participate in state and local emergency seminars and exercises.

* Inspect flood control works constructed or repaired by USACE, and 

make maintenance recommendations.

* Upon request, inspect nonfederal dams and flood control projects.

○

Flood fight

* Assist in search and rescue operations.

* Provide technical assistance and advice.

* Conduct emergency repairs to levees and other flood control projects.

* Furnish materials such as sandbags, polyethylene sheeting, lumber, 

pumps, or rocks when USACE is actively participating in a flood fight.

○

Post-flood respo

* Clear drainage channels, bridge openings, or structures blocked by 

event-generated debris.

* Clear blockages to critical water supply intakes and sewer outfalls.

* Conduct debris removal necessary to reopen vital transportation routes.
52

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

* Temporarily restore critical public services or facilities.

* Identify hazard mitigation opportunities.

○

Rehabilitat

* Repair or restore flood-control structures.

•Repair or restoration of hurricane or shore protection structures damaged or destroye

by wind, wave, or water action not of an ordinary nature.

•Public works and engineering, NRF, (ESF #3). USACE is committed to ensuring tha

its emergency management teams are well-prepared, well-equipped, and ready to 

respond instantly. When disaster strikes, response teams can be onsite within hours to 

provide immediate relief and support. Under the NRF, USACE is designated as the lead 

agency for public works and engineering. DOD can authorize USACE to provide the 

following assistance on a temporary basis:

○

Emergency services including supplying potable water, removing debr

conducting urban search and rescue, and providing emergency electrical power 

and ice.

* Technical advice and evaluations including structural analysis.

* Construction management and inspection.

* Emergency contracting.

* Emergency repair of public infrastructure and facilities such as water 

supply sources.

* Real estate support.

Planning and response teams

USACE maintains 44 planning and response teams (PRTs) stationed around the country to 

facilitate a rapid response to disasters. PRTs include the following:

•Seven ice team

•Seven water team

•Eight emergency power team

•Seven debris removal team
53

DISASTER RESPONSE

•Five temporary housing team

•One emergency access tea

•Five temporary roofing team

•Four structural safety assessment team

Deployable tactical operations system

USACE also manages a deployable tactical operations system (DTOS), which includes a national 

fleet of rapid response vehicles that are designed to deploy within 18 hours as field offices for the 

PRTs. The DTOS includes:

•Three deployable tactical operations center

•Six rapid response vehicle

•Two containerized tactical operations centers comprised of laptop computers, globa

positioning equipment, two high-frequency radios, a satellite telephone, and a digital 

camera.

Immediate Response Situations

Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency may require immediate action 

to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate property damage. When such conditions 

exist and time does not permit approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders 

and responsible officials from DOD components and agencies are authorized by DOD directive 

and pre-approval by the secretary of defense, subject to any supplemental direction that may 

be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil 

authorities consistent with the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code, Section 1385). All such 

necessary action is referred to as “immediate response.”

In addition to direct support for incident response, DOD possesses specialized capabilities 

employed in support of federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies, including firstresponder communities within those agencies. Included among these specialized capabilities 

are test and evaluation facilities and capabilities; education and exercise expertise; explosive 

detection; technical escort; medical services; the transfer of applicable technologies, including 

those developed through DOD science and technology programs; and the expertise of DOD 

personnel. The DOD homeland defense coordination office established at the Department of 

Homeland Security headquarters facilitates interdepartmental cooperation and transfer of the 

specialized capabilities to the emergency responder community.
54

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Federal Emergency Management Agency Regions

FEMA Region I Headquarters

99 High Street, 6th Floor

Boston, MA 02110

(617) 956-7501

FEMA Region VI Headquarters

800 N. Loop 288

Denton, TX 76209

(940) 898-5399

FEMA Region II Headquarters

Bldg 2700

Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703

(732) 427-1512

FEMA Region VII Headquarters

Bannister Federal Complex

Kansas City, MO 64131

(816) 926-7333

FEMA Region III Headquarters

625 Chestnut Street

Philadelphia, PA 19106

(215) 931-5765

FEMA Region VIII Headquarters

Denver Federal Complex

Denver, CO 80225-0267

(303) 235-4770

FEMA Region IV Headquarters

3003 Chamblee-Tucker Rd

Atlanta, GA 30341

(678) 530-5823

FEMA Region IX Headquarters

Bldg 370, 10th St.

Camp Parks, CA 94568

(925) 875-4465

FEMA Region V Headquarters

536 South Clark Street

Chicago, IL 60605

(312) 408-5500

FEMA Region X Headquarters

18939 120th Ave NE

Bothell, WA 98101

(425) 487-4757

Table 4-2. DCO contact information
55

DISASTER RESPONSE

Chapter 5

Emergency Support Functions

The emergency support functions (ESFs) provide structure for coordinating federal interagency 

support in a federal response to an incident. They are mechanisms for grouping functions 

frequently used to provide federal support to states and federal-to-federal support, both for 

declared disasters and emergencies under the Stafford Act and for non-Stafford Act incidents.

A complete discussion of ESFs can be found in the National Response Framework (NRF) ESF 

annexes.

ESF #1: Transportation

•Scop

○

Aviation/airspace management and cont

○

Transportation saf

○

Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastruct

○

Movement restricti

○

Damage and impact assessm

•Purpose: Transportation provides support to the Department of Homeland Securit

(DHS) by assisting federal, state, tribal, and local governmental entities, voluntary 

organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the private sector in 

management of transportation systems and infrastructure during domestic threats or in 

response to incidents. ESF #1 also participates in prevention, preparedness, response, 

recovery, and mitigation activities. ESF #1 carries out Department of Transportation 

(DOT) statutory responsibilities, including regulation of transportation, management of 

the nation’s airspace, and ensuring the safety and security of the national transportation 

system. ESF #1 is not responsible for movement of goods, equipment, animals, or 

people.

•ESF coordinator: DO

•Primary agency: DO

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U.S. Department of Agriculture (US

○

Department of Commerce (D

○

Department of Defense (D
56

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

○

Department of Energy (D

○

○

Department of the Interior (D

○

Department of Justice (D

○

Department of State (D

○

General Services Administration (G

○

U.S. Postal Service (US

•DOD responsibilities: Provides military transportation capacity from the U.S

Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) or other organizations to move essential 

resources, including DOT response personnel and associated equipment and supplies 

that have been requested and approved by the secretary of defense. USTRANSCOM 

also provides staff to the headquarters ESF #1 function and the regional ESF #1 

when requested and upon approval by the secretary of defense. Provides assets to 

complement temporarily degraded or disrupted DOT/Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) air navigation services capabilities as requested by DOT/FAA and ESF #1.

ESF #2: Communications

•Scop

○

Coordination with the telecommunications and information technol

industries.

○

Restoration/repair of telecommunications infrastruct

○

Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber technologies 

information technology resources.

○

Oversight of communications within the federal incident management 

response structures.

•Purpose: Communications support the restoration of the communication

infrastructure, facilitates the recovery of systems and applications from cyber attacks, 

and coordinates federal communications support to response efforts during incidents 

requiring a coordinated federal response. This ESF implements the provisions of 

the Office of Science and Technology Policy National Plan for Telecommunications 

Support in Non-Wartime Emergencies. ESF #2 also provides communications support 

to federal, state, tribal, and local governments. It provides support to first responders 

when their systems have been impacted, and provides communications and information 

technology support to the joint field office (JFO) and JFO field teams.

•ESF coordinator: DHS/National Communications Syste
57

DISASTER RESPONSE

•  Primary agencies: DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

•  Supporting federal agencies:

○

US

○

D

○

D

○

D

○

D

○

Federal Communications Commissi

○

G

•  DOD responsibilities:

○

Promptly notifies the communications branch director of all communicati

requirements, assets available, and assets deployed to the incident area.

○

Provides resources and capabilities to relief operations after other fede

resources and capabilities are exhausted.

○

The secretary of defense and assistant secretary of defense for homel

defense provide civilian oversight and policy direction for the use of DOD

assets in defense support to civil authorities (DSCA).

○

The joint director of military support serves as the DOD action agent 

DSCA.

○

The defense coordination office/defense coordinating element serves as 

DOD interface to FEMA and the federal coordinating officer at JFO and the

single point of contact for requesting DOD assistance.

ESF #3: Public Works and Engineering

•  Scope:

○

Infrastructure protection and emergency repa

○

Infrastructure restorati

○

Engineering services and construction manageme

○

Emergency contracting support for lifesaving and life-sustaining servic

•  Purpose: Public works and engineering assists DHS by coordinating and organizing

the capabilities and resources of the federal government to facilitate the delivery of
58

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and 

other support to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a disaster or an incident 

requiring a coordinated federal response.

•ESF coordinator: DOD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE

•Primary agencies: DOD/USACE; DHS/FEM

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

Department of Health and Human Services (H

○

○

○

Department of Labor (D

○

○

○

Department of Veterans Affairs (

○

Environmental Protection Agency (E

○

○

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (N

○

Tennessee Valley Authority (T

○

American Red Cross (A

○

Corporation for National and Community Serv

•DOD/Navy supervisor of salvage and diving responsibilitie

○

Provides expertise and conducts/supports specialized salvage/wreck remo

operations as part of a coordinated response and restoration strategy.

○

Exercises and manages regional standing emergency salvage contracts

quickly draw upon the required resources of the commercial salvage industry.
59

DISASTER RESPONSE

○

Accesses and coordinates the U.S. Navy’s hydrographic survey assets 

capabilities.

○

Coordinates salvage and wreck removal operations when reques

ESF #4: Firefighting

•Scope: Coordination of federal firefighting activities. Support to wildland, rural, an

urban firefighting operations.

•Purpose: Firefighting provides federal support for the detection and suppression o

wildland, rural, and urban fires resulting from, or occurring coincidentally with, an 

incident requiring a coordinated federal response for assistance.

•ESF coordinator: USDA/Forest Servic

•Primary agency: USDA/Forest Servic

•Supporting federal agencie

○

○

D

○

○

○

○

•DOD responsibilities

○

Assumes full responsibility for firefighting activities on DOD installati

○

Supports firefighting operations on nonmilitary lands with personn

equipment, and supplies under the terms of the current interagency agreement 

between DOD, USDA, and DOI, including the arrangement of liaisons as 

required.

○

USACE: Provides contracting services through ESF #3, Public Works 

Engineering to urban and rural firefighting forces to obtain heavy equipment 

and/or demolition services as needed to suppress incident-related fires.
60

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

ESF #5: Emergency Management

•Scop

○

Incident management and response effort coordinat

○

Issuance of mission assignme

○

Resource and human capital administrat

○

Incident action plann

○

Financial managem

•Purpose: Responsible for supporting overall activities of the federal governmen

for domestic incident management. ESF #5 provides the core management and 

administrative functions in support of national response coordination center, regional 

response coordination center, and JFO operations.

•ESF coordinator: DHS/FEM

•Primary agency: DHS/FEM

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

Department of Educat

○

○

○

○

Department of Housing and Urban Development (H

○

○

○

○

○
61

DISASTER RESPONSE

○

Department of the Treas

○

○

○

Federal Communications Commiss

○

○

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NA

○

○

Office of Personnel Management (O

○

Small Business Administration (S

○

○

U

○

•DOD responsibilities: National security; dam security (USACE); and hydrology

stream flows, and water-level data (USACE).

ESF #6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services

•Scop

○

Mass c

○

Emergency assista

○

Disaster hous

○

Human servi

•Purpose: ESF #6 coordinates the delivery of federal mass care, emergency assistance

housing, and human services when local, tribal, and state response and recovery needs 

exceed their capabilities.

•ESF coordinator: DHS/FEM

•Primary agency: DHS/FEM
62

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

Department of Treas

○

○

○

○

Social Security Administrat

○

U

○

○

Corporation for National and Community Serv

○

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVO

○

Other voluntary agency and nongovernmental support organizati

•DOD/USACE responsibilitie

○

Fulfills mass care requirements for ice and water in coordination with ESF

○

Provides assistance by inspecting mass care shelter sites to ensure suitabil

and accessibility of facilities to safely shelter victims.
63

DISASTER RESPONSE

○

Provides assistance in constructing temporary shelter facilities, includ

accessible shelters, in the affected area, as required.

○

Provides temporary housing support, such as temporary structures 

expedited repair of damaged homes (to include temporary roofing or other 

repairs that facilitate reoccupation of minimally damaged structures), as 

necessary.

ESF #7: Logistics Management and Resource Support

•Scope

○

Comprehensive, national disaster logistics planning, management 

sustainment capability that harnesses the resources of federal logistics partners, 

key public and private stakeholders, and NGOs to meet the needs of disaster 

victims and responders.

○

Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies, contract

services, etc.).

•Purpose: ESF #7 assists DHS b

○

DHS/ FEMA logistics provide a comprehensive, national disaster logist

planning, management, and sustainment capability that harnesses the resources 

of federal logistics partners, key public and private stakeholders, and NGOs to 

meet the needs of disaster victims and responders. 

○

The GSA supports federal agencies and state, tribal, and local governme

in need of resource support prior to, during, and/or after incidents requiring a 

coordinated federal response. 

•ESF coordinators: GSA; DHS/FEM

•Primary agencies: GSA; DHS/FEM

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

○

○
64

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

○

○

○

N

○

•DOD responsibilities: When requested by FEMA and approved by DOD, DO

provides subsistence, administrative supplies, petroleum products, engineering and 

construction materials, personal demand items (water and ice), major end items 

(mobile units), medical materiel, telecommunications management, and transportation 

management.

ESF #8: Public Health and Medical Services

•Scop

○

Public hea

○

Medi

○

Mental health servi

○

Mass fatality managem

•Purpose: Public health and medical services provide the mechanisms for coordinate

federal assistance to supplement state, tribal, and local resources in response to a 

public health and medical disaster, potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated 

federal response, and support during the development of a potential health and medical 

emergency. The phrase “medical needs” is used throughout this annex. Public health 

and medical services include responding to medical needs associated with mental 

health, behavioral health, and substance abuse considerations of incident victims and 

response workers. Services also cover the medical needs of members of “at-risk” or 

“special-needs” populations described in the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness 

Act and in the NRF glossary. Members of at-risk and special-needs populations may 

have medical and other functional needs before, during, and after an incident.

•Public health and medical services include behavioral health needs consisting of bot

mental health and substance abuse considerations for incident victims and response 

workers and, as appropriate, medical needs groups defined in the core document as 

individuals in need of additional medical response assistance and veterinary and/or 

animal health issues.

•ESF coordinator: HH

•Primary agency: HH
65

DISASTER RESPONSE

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

U.S. Agency for International Development (USA

○

○

U

○

•DOD responsibilitie

○

Alerts DOD National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) federal coordinat

centers (FCCs) for the Army, Navy, and Air Force and provide specific 

reporting/regulating instructions to support incident relief efforts.

○

Alerts DOD NDMS FCCs to activate NDMS patient reception plans i

phased, regional approach and, when appropriate, in a national approach.

○

At the request of HHS, provides support for the evacuation of patients 

medical needs populations to locations where hospital care or outpatient 

services are available.
66

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

○

Using available DOD transportation resources in coordination with the N

Medical Interagency Coordination Group, evacuates and manages victims/

patients from the patient collection point in or near the incident site to NDMS 

patient reception areas.

○

Provides available logistical support to public health/medical respo

operations.

○

Provides available medical personnel for casualty clearing/staging and ot

missions as needed including aero-medical evacuation and medical treatment.

○

 Mobilizes and deploys available reserve and National Guard medical uni

when authorized and necessary to provide support.

○

Coordinates patient reception, tracking, and management to nearby N

hospitals, VA hospitals, and DOD military treatment facilities that are available 

and can provide appropriate care.

○

Provides available military medical personnel to assist ESF #8 personnel w

protecting public health through the management of food, water, wastewater, 

solid waste disposal, vectors, hygiene, and other environmental conditions.

○

Provides available veterinary military personnel to assist ESF #8 person

with the medical treatment of animals.

○

Provides available DOD medical supplies for distribution to mass care cent

and medical care locations for incident victims. Reimbursement is made to 

DOD.

○

Provides available emergency medical support to assist state, tribal, or lo

officials within the disaster area and in the surrounding area. Such services 

may include triage, medical treatment, mental health support, and the use of 

surviving DOD medical facilities within or near the incident area.

○

Provides assistance, as available, in managing human remains, including vic

identification, mortuary affairs, and temporary internment of the dead.

○

Provides evaluation and risk management support through use of defe

coordinating officers, emergency preparedness liaison officers, and joint 

regional medical planners.

○

Provides available blood products in coordination with 

○

Provides medical surveillance, laboratory diagnostics, and confirmatory test

in coordination with HHS.
67

DISASTER RESPONSE

•USACE: Through ESF #3, public works and engineering, USACE provides technica

assistance, equipment, and supplies as required in support of HHS to accomplish 

temporary restoration of damaged public utilities affecting public health and medical 

facilities. In the event of a catastrophic mass fatality incident, USACE assists with the 

temporary interment of the dead.

ESF #9: Search and Rescue

•Scope: Lifesaving assistance and search and rescue (SAR) operations (urban

waterborne, inland/wilderness, and aeronautical).

•Purpose: SAR rapidly deploys components of the Federal SAR Response System t

provide specialized lifesaving assistance to state, tribal, and local authorities when 

activated for incidents or potential incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

•ESF coordinator: DHS/FEM

•Primary agencies: DHS/FEMA/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); DOI/National Par

Service; DOD/U.S. Air Force (USAF).

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

N

○

US

•DOD responsibilitie

○

DOD/USAF/Air Force rescue coordination center (AFRCC) serves as 

primary agency for ESF #9 during SAR operations for aviation-related 

incidents requiring a coordinated federal response both in open and wilderness 
68

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

areas and in the vicinity of airports and urban areas requiring the coordinated 

deployment of rescue personnel and equipment. U.S. SAR coordinators are as 

follows: 

* DOD/USAF/AFRCC is the SAR coordinator for the U.S. aeronautical 

search and rescue region corresponding to the contiguous United States.

* DOD/U.S. Pacific Command is the SAR coordinator for the U.S. 

aeronautical SAR corresponding to Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. 

possessions and territories in the Pacific.

* DOD maintains active, National Guard, and reserve components, 

facilities, and other resources that are used to support their own 

operations across the contiguous United States, Alaska, and Hawaii.

○

For incidents in which it is the primary agency, DOD/USAF/AFR

* Serves as headquarters-level ESF #9 coordinator during aeronautical 

SAR operations. 

* Provides incident reports, assessments, and situation reports.

* Provides SAR command and control experts to augment a joint task 

force joint personnel recovery center in support of incidents requiring a 

coordinated federal response.

* Facilitates resolution of any conflicting demands for aeronautical 

distress response resources and ensures coordination between DHS/

USCG and other federal, state, tribal, and local emergency response 

activities, as appropriate.

•DOD/National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)

○

Coordinates and manages the timely tasking, acquisition, analysis, and deliv

of satellite imagery or imagery-derived products as directed by the primary 

agency. Activities and sources may involve non-DOD/NGA facilities or 

resources.

○

Provides expert analysis of imagery to determine damage levels and ot

elements of essential information as needed. Additionally, DOD/NGA, as 

requested, will provide technical expertise/analysis from other imagery sources 

if such expertise resides within DOD/NGA.

○

Provides mobile geospatial intelligence to support SAR field teams or ot

DHS/FEMA field teams as directed by the primary agency. This support 

includes technical experts (specifically, imagery analysts and geospatial 

analysts) and robust communications that can assist in more focused, directed 

searches and eliminate duplicate search efforts.
69

DISASTER RESPONSE

○

Provides imagery-derived and geospatial intelligence analysis in preparation 

potential disasters or emergencies.

○

Coordinates for the release and dissemination of DOD/NGA products and d

in accordance with applicable security classifications, licensing, copyright 

agreements, and limited distribution restrictions.

•DOD/USAC

○

Provides pre-incident training for DHS/FEMA task force/ incident support t

(IST) structures specialists, as well as for DOD/USACE structures specialists.

○

At the request of DHS, deploys trained structures specialists and techni

search specialist teams to supplement urban search and rescue (US&R) task 

forces and ISTs.

○

Assists IST engineering cells and task forces with US&R effo

○

Provides structural engineering analysis, recommends hazard mitigati

recommends shoring, ascertains structural integrity and assesses whether 

buildings are safe to enter, and provides building stability monitoring.

ESF #10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

•Scope: Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) respons

and environmental short- and long-term cleanup.

•Purpose: Hazardous materials response provides federal support in response to a

actual or potential discharge and/or uncontrolled release of oil or hazardous materials 

when activated.

•ESF coordinator: EP

•Primary agencies: EPA; DHS/US

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

○
70

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

•DOD responsibilitie

○

Provides on-scene coordinators and directs response actions for releases

hazardous materials from DOD vessels, facilities, vehicles, munitions, and 

weapons.

○

Provides DSCA in response to requests for assistance during domes

incidents. With the exception of support provided under immediate response 

authority, DOD resources must obtain the approval of the secretary of defense 

before responding to requests for assistance. Details regarding DSCA and 

immediate response authority are provided in the NRF core document.

•USACE provides response and recovery assistance to incidents involving contaminate

debris, including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear contamination. The 

scope of actions may include waste sampling, classification, packaging, transportation, 

treatment, demolition, and disposal.

•The Navy supervisor of salvage, following appropriate statutory authorities, provide

technical, operational, and emergency support in the ocean-engineering disciplines of 

marine salvage, pollution abatement, and diving services.

ESF #11: Agriculture and Natural Resources

•Scop

○

Nutrition assista

○

Animal and plant disease and pest respo

○

Food safety and secur

○

Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection and restorat

○

Safety and well being of household p
71

DISASTER RESPONSE

•Purpose: Agriculture and natural resources officials support state, tribal, and loca

authorities and other federal agency efforts to provide nutrition assistance; control 

and eradicate, as appropriate, any outbreak of a highly contagious or economically 

devastating animal/zoonotic (transmitted between animals and people) disease, or any 

outbreak of an economically devastating plant-based pest or disease; ensure the safety 

and security of the commercial food supply; protect natural and cultural resources and 

historic properties resources; and provide for the safety and well-being of household 

pets during an emergency response or evacuation situation.

•ESF coordinator: USD

•Primary agencies: USDA; DO

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

National Archives and Records Administrat

○

U

○

Advisory Council on Historic Preservat

○

○

Heritage Emergency National Task Fo
72

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•DOD responsibilitie

○

Assesses the availability of DOD food supplies and storage facilities capable

storing dry, chilled, and frozen food.

○

Assesses the availability of DOD transportation equipment, material handl

equipment, and personnel for support. This responsibility is confined to the 

posts, camps, and stations within or adjacent to the affected area.

○

Assesses the availability of laboratory and diagnostic support, subject-mat

expertise, and technical assistance that may be provided.

○

Assists animal emergency-response organizations or others as requested 

appropriate. Provides resources including senior Army Veterinary Corps 

officers to function as defense veterinary liaison officers and defense veterinary 

support officers (who serve as the onsite point of contact for DOD veterinary 

functions) and other military specialists trained in foreign animal disease 

diagnosis, epidemiology, microbiology, immunology, entomology, pathology, 

and public health.

○

Provides laboratory support to assist and augment the capabilities of the U

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.

•USACE provides expertise and resources to assist in the removal and disposal o

contaminated and noncontaminated debris, to include animal carcasses and debris 

affecting natural and cultural resources and historic properties resources.

ESF #12: Energy

•Scop

○

Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restorat

○

Energy industry utilities coordinat

○

Energy forec

•Purpose: ESF #12, when activated by the secretary of homeland security for incident

requiring coordinated federal responses, is intended to facilitate the restoration of 

damaged energy systems and components. Under DOE leadership, ESF #12 is an 

integral part of the larger DOE responsibility of maintaining continuous and reliable 

energy supplies for the United States through preventive measures and restoration and 

recovery actions.

•ESF coordinator: DO

•Primary agencies: DO
73

DISASTER RESPONSE

•Supporting federal agencie

○

U

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

•DOD/USACE responsibilities: Coordinates emergency power team missions wit

power-system restoration activities to establish priorities for emergency generator 

installation.

ESF #13: Public Safety and Security

•Scop

○

Facility and resource secur

○

Security planning and technical and resource assista

○

Public safety and security supp

○

Support to access, traffic, and crowd cont

•Purpose: ESF #13 integrates federal public safety and security capabilities an

resources to support the full range of incident management activities associated with 

potential or actual incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

•ESF coordinator: DO

•Primary agency: DO
74

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•Supporting federal agencies: All federal departments and agencies possessing 

public safety and security capability.

•DOD/USACE responsibilities: Provides physical and electronic security system

assistance and expertise.

ESF #14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation

•Scop

○

Social and economic community impact assessm

○

Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and 

private sector.

○

Analysis and review of mitigation program implementat

•Purpose: ESF #14 provides a mechanism for coordinating federal support to state

tribal, regional, and local governments; NGOs; and the private sector to enable 

community recovery from the long-term consequences of extraordinary disasters. ESF 

#14 accomplishes this by identifying and facilitating availability and use of sources 

of recovery funding, and providing technical assistance (such as impact analyses) for 

community recovery and recovery planning support.

•ESF coordinator: DHS/FEM

•Primary agency: USDA; DHS; HUD; SB

•Supporting federal agencie

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

○

Department of the Treas

○
75

DISASTER RESPONSE

○

Corporation for National and Community Serv

○

Delta Regional Author

○

○

NV

•DOD/USACE responsibilities: Provides technical assistance in community plannin

and expertise in civil engineering and natural hazard risk assessment. Supports the 

development of national strategies and plans related to permanent and accessible 

housing, debris management, and the restoration of public facilities and infrastructure.

ESF #15: External Affairs

•Scop

○

Emergency public information and protective action guida

○

Media and community relati

○

Congressional and international affa

○

Tribal and insular affa

•Purpose: ESF #15 ensures that federal assets deployed to the field during incident

requiring a coordinated federal response are sufficient to provide accurate, coordinated, 

timely, and accessible information to affected audiences, including government, media, 

the private sector, and the local populace, including the special needs population. ESF 

#15 provides the resource support and mechanisms to implement the NRF incident 

communications emergency policy and procedures described in the Public Affairs 

Support Annex. Additional information about external affairs can be found in the ESF 

#15 standing operating procedure, located on the DHS/FEMA website.

•ESF coordinator: DH

•Primary agency: DHS/FEM

•Supporting federal agencies: Al

•DOD responsibilities: Depending on the nature and scope of the incident, al

federal departments and agencies support the NRF and are responsible for providing 

appropriate support for ESF #15 as required.

77

DISASTER RESPONSE

Appendix A

Unit Planning Considerations

This appendix is provided as a checklist to assist planners in defense support to civil authorities 

(DSCA) planning.

Personnel

•Deployment orders (state active duty, Title 32, or Title 10

•Personnel accountabilit

•Soldier readiness processing: Medical records, shot records, insurance documents

powers of attorney, wills, etc.

•Funding. (See below

•Mai

•Pay/financ

•Medical. (See Appendix B

•Denta

•Mortuary affair

•Automatio

•Awards standing operating procedur

Intelligence

•Intelligence preparation of the battlefield process adapted to domestic support

Adaptation includes modified combined obstacle overlay identifying no-go and slowgo routes.

•Map

•Operations security. (See Appendix J

•Physical securit

•Arms roo
78

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Operations

•Define the command relationships. To whom do I report upon arrival? For whom do 

work?

•Define the support relationships. Whom do I suppor

•Military decisionmaking process (MDMP). Specified tasks; implied tasks; limitations

constraints; intent; purpose, methods, end state; course of action. Be imaginative in 

applying MDMP doctrine to DSCA mission.

•Advance party. Include signal officer and internal logistics planne

•Battle rhyth

•Briefings/report

•Chain of command/command organization of supported incident comman

•Points of contact for subject matter expert

•Packing list

•Transportation (tactical)/convoy operation

•Mission-related training/mission rehearsal exercis

•Weapons qualificatio

•After action reviews. (See Appendix M

•Risk management. (See Appendix N

•Liaison officer

•Airspace command and control. (See Appendix K

•Internet/networkin

Logistics Internal to the Supporting Unit

•Life support: Billeting, mess, rations, water, bath and laundr

•Transportation (Administration). (See Chapter 2, “Coordinating Military Deployment

on Roads and Highways: A Guide for State and Local Agencies,” dated May 2005, 

published by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Department, 

accessed at http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/opssecurity/dev-mx/ updated 14 April 2009.)
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DISASTER RESPONSE

•Petroleum, oil, and lubricant

•Maintenance and recover

•Reception, staging, onward movement, and integratio

•Ammunition transportation and storag

Communications and Communications Security

•Coordinate with military (Air National Guard [ANG], Army National Guard [ARNG]

U.S. Coast Guard [USCG], U.S. Air Force [USAF], U.S. Navy [USN], U.S. Marine 

Corps [USMC]) and with local, state, regional, and federal agencies.

•Initial communications capabilities should be self-sufficient and interoperable wit

both first responders and local authorities. Consider wireless capability initially. When 

primary signal element arrives, phase out wireless network. Replace wireless cards 

with local area network cards or else all computers will not work.

•Plan for all means of communications: telephone (cellular or land line), radio (in al

bandwidths), Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network, SECRET Internet Protocol 

Router Network, video, video-teleconferencing.

•Do not send equipment without operator

•Do send qualified signal leaders to ensure operators and equipment are being use

properly and profitably.

•Be prepared to provide communications equipment (cell phones, radios, base sets, etc.

to first responders. Plan for a lowest common denominator communications to locals 

(i.e., hand-held radio, computer, etc.).

•Plan for extended logistical support for equipment and personnel as well a

unexpected requirements including generator support; maintenance of equipment; fuel 

requirements of vehicles, systems, and generators; and support for others’ equipment 

(i.e. charging cell phones from your power source, charging satellite phones).

•Know the power requirements for your equipment. Do you need to bring your ow

power generation?

•Communications (voice, data, video) with various emergency operations center

including military (ANG, ARNG, USCG, USAF, USN, USMC), local, state, regional, 

or federal.
80

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•Communications structure must be able to grow to meet future needs. What can b

established initially and expanded to handle a greater demand? Small deployable 

packages can be sent ahead of larger deployable command posts to meet immediate 

requirements.

•Establish reachback capabilit

•Conduct a synchronization meeting between ARNG and ANG joint communication

officers at least 24 hours prior to movement.

•Realize that geography affects signal performance. A communication system tha

worked well at one location might not work in another.

Legal and the Rules on Use of Force

See Appendix I.

Funding

In most cases the support provided is on reimbursable basis. The defense coordinating office 

receives and validates a mission assignment (Federal Emergency Management Agency form 

90-129). This form has a mission assignment number that should be listed on the tasking or 

execution orders. The mission assignment number is listed on the request for reimbursement. 

The mission is executed using the supporting unit’s operational funds. For the military to receive 

reimbursement, the supporting unit must document the support provided in a memorandum to its 

higher headquarters.

Keep an accurate record of the mission. Items to note include:

•Record of missions performe

•Rosters of personnel involve

•Travel and per diem (military and civil service

•Temporary personnel wages, travel, and per die

•Lodging cost

•Transportation costs (car and bus rentals, chartered aircraft, fuel

•Contracting cost

•Equipment provided or operated (estimated hourly costs for operation

•Material provided from regular stock (all classes of supply

•Laundry expense

•Official or morale phone call
81

DISASTER RESPONSE

Keep receipts and other supporting documents. Supporting documents include:

•Unit order

•Temporary duty (TDY) order

•TDY payment voucher

•Vehicle dispatch logs including date/time/location of in-transit repair

•Fuel card receipt

•Hand receipt

•Request for supplie

•Government credit card receipt

•Copy of contract

Demobilization

The Department of Defense (DOD) responds to disasters to temporarily perform emergency 

missions that overwhelmed state and local governments cannot handle. As the emergency passes, 

state and local governments will once again be able to perform those response and recovery 

missions, and incident commanders will begin demobilizing their commands. Recognize when 

the unit’s work is done. The final decision to conclude the DOD’s activities and presence in the 

area of operations is made by the federal coordinating officer (FCO) and the secretary of defense.

Dangers of staying too long

•State and local governments will frequently expect DOD assistance much longer than i

is actually needed.

•State and local governments may become too dependent on DOD assistance, thu

impeding long-term recovery.

•If local businesses and contractors can perform the missions and tasks assigned to th

DOD, the continued employment of DOD forces and equipment may be unnecessary 

or illegal and may rouse resentment of local citizens who may feel deprived of 

employment opportunities.

•The primary role of the DOD is to train, prepare for, and execute combat operations

Even a short absence from a focus on combat operations may degrade a unit’s 

preparedness.

End state and exit strategy tactics, techniques, and procedures

•Be attentive to measures of performance, the conditions that the DOD must meet t

declare mission success, and the end state.
82

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•Make clear to state and local governments that the DOD presence will be limite

•Agree with state and local governments on acceptable end state, usually recognized a

when state and local governments can re-establish normal operations.

•Consider using commercial vendors or contractor

•The DOD must coordinate with Northern Command and obtain the approval of th

FCO before terminating disaster response operations.
83

DISASTER RESPONSE

Appendix B

Casualties

The delivery of public health and medical support falls under emergency support function (ESF) 

#8 of the National Response Framework (NRF). The Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) serves as the primary agency and ESF coordinator for these functions. ESF # 8, however, 

is one in which the military is likely to be involved. When required, the joint regional medical 

planner office (JRMPO) of U.S. Northern Command and the defense coordinating officer (DCO) 

coordinate these services. The joint task force’s (JTF) medical planning staff must be in close 

contact with JRMPO and the DCO as they develop operational plans. There are, however, 

several acute situations the JTF will likely encounter before it has the opportunity to coordinate 

with JRMPO and the DCO. These include mass casualty operations, contaminated casualties, 

and mental health casualties. JTF planners should also be aware of National Disaster Medical 

System (NDMS). The NRF deploys the NDMS as part of the HHS, Office of Preparedness and 

Response, under ESF #8 to support federal agencies in the management and coordination of the 

federal medical response to major emergencies and federally declared disasters.

Mass Casualty Operations

Disaster situations, whether resulting from natural or man-made incidents, can quickly produce 

large numbers of casualties across a wide geographic area. Large disasters may overwhelm the 

existing health care systems and produce either a local or area-wide mass casualty (MASCAL) 

situation. MASCALs are inherently difficult to control, especially across large areas, and contain 

several major obstacles to the delivery of health care that the JTF must plan for and overcome. 

These obstacles include:

•Inappropriate care distribution. Often the first casualties to present for care ar

the least injured, who then consume all available resources, leaving the most injured 

without access to lifesaving care. To ensure that medical resources are appropriately 

allocated across the affected area, care delivery must be prioritized at both the local 

level and area-wide.

•Unequal distribution of casualties. Casualties tend to concentrate locally and the

present to the nearest health facility. This may overwhelm local facilities, while other 

facilities in the area are underused. A variation of this pattern is when casualties take 

themselves to the “preferred” or “better” hospitals, while avoiding all other, closer 

facilities.

•Non-emergency medical system responders. The emergency medical system (EMS

is the usual route of entry into the health care system for casualties. In MASCALs, 

casualties access the system through non-EMS entry points (for example: private 

means, police transport, and search and rescue [SAR]). This results in multiple, 

uncontrolled demands for health care and concentrates the demands at nontypical 

locations (at the SAR delivery point instead of the hospital, for instance). Also, 

nonlocal responders arrive to help but are not familiar with the local health system, 

adding to the overall confusion.
84

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

•Lack of interorganizational planning. During major disasters, multiple organization

are involved from both within and outside the local area. They may include local, state, 

and military personnel; public health organizations, nongovernmental organizations, 

and charitable organizations; and private citizens. The actions of these groups tend to 

be uncoordinated, with little or no interorganizational communication.

•Lack of proper needs assessment. The acute demand for care often results in a rapi

deployment of resources to the most critical and closest casualties, without an overall 

assessment of need. This “ready, fire, aim” approach leads to “wrong help, at the wrong 

time, to the wrong people” situation. Some areas will receive an overabundance of aid, 

while others may be completely neglected.

Techniques and Procedures to Overcome Obstacles to Care

•Coordinate all missions through the JRMPO, coordinate with HHS, and coordinate al

other medical assets in the area.

•Centralize command and control of all military health assets that enter the are

•Institute a systematic plan for allocation of medical care at ground zero and across th

area.

•Ensure coordinated and controlled delivery of casualties located by SAR into th

established triage system.

•Coordinate with law enforcement to maintain crowd and traffic contro

•Communicate with local hospitals to determine capacities and capabilities so tha

casualty flow from ground zero to higher levels of care can be properly directed.

Triage

The key to managing MASCAL situations is triage. Triage is the process of sorting casualties 

based on the severity of injuries and assigning priorities of care and evacuation in a situation 

with limited resources. The goal is to provide the greatest good for the greatest number of 

casualties. Medical providers at all levels of care must institute a uniformed system to classify 

casualties and assign treatment priorities.

Triage categories

Triage categories were originally developed for MASCAL management in combat environments. 

Most military medical personnel are familiar with this system. The same principles apply to 

the civilian disaster setting with the major differences being primarily terminology and priority 

assignment. Table B-1 depicts triage categories used in combat and natural disasters.
85

DISASTER RESPONSE

Triage 

Category:

Combat 

Setting

Triage 

Category:

Civilian 

Setting

Category Description

Immediate Critical This group includes those who require lifesaving surgery. 

The surgical procedures in this category should not be time 

consuming and should concern only those patients with 

high chances of survival.

Delayed Urgent This group includes casualties who are badly in need of 

time-consuming surgery, but whose general condition 

permits delay in surgical treatment without unduly 

endangering life. Sustaining treatment will be required.

Minimal Minor These casualties have relatively minor injuries and can 

effectively care for themselves or helped by nonmedical 

personnel. Care can be delayed for hours to days.

Expectant Catastrophic Casualties in this category have wounds that are so 

extensive that even if they were the sole casualty and had 

the benefit of optimal medical resource application, their 

survival would be unlikely.

Table B-1. Triage categories, combat vs. civilian casualties

Assigning triage categories

Medical personnel must rapidly assess casualties and assign triage categories. A systematic 

process should be in place to ensure proper identification occurs. A simple algorithm is suggested 

in Figure B-1 to assist with this process.

Figure B-1. Assigning triage categories
86

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Treatment priorities

When assigning treatment priorities, the first to receive care are those in most critical need 

(where there is an expectation that an intervention will prevent loss of life, limb, or eyesight) 

with minimal expenditure of time, personnel, or other resources.

In the combat setting, triage principles dictate treating casualties in the “expectant” category 

after all other wounded; thus “expectant” casualties have a high likelihood of dying. Civilian 

medical personnel, especially in the U.S., view this as an unreasonable approach. It is unlikely 

that resources would be so constrained such that the seriously wounded should have care delayed 

for any significant amount of time. It is unreasonable to expect rescuers to “condemn” expectant 

casualties when not in a tactical combat environment.

Table B-2 outlines treatment priorities for the different triage categories in the combat and 

civilian settings.

Priority Combat Casualties Civilian Casualties

1st Immediate Critical

2nd Delayed Catastrophic

3rd Minimal Urgent

4th Expectant Minor

Table B-2. Treatment priorities in a combat versus civilian MASCAL setting

Management and treatment

Every medical unit or facility that responds to a disaster situation requires a MASCAL 

plan appropriate to their unique operational needs and situation. However, there are several 

characteristics that are consistent for all MASCAL operations:

•Triage area: All casualties should flow through a single triage area. This area shoul

be close to the receiving area (landing zone, ground routes, and decontamination site), 

have one-way flow, and have clearly marked routes to the treatment areas.

•Triage officer (TO): Ideally the TO is a surgeon, but must be a person with clinica

experience in evaluating casualties. The TO performs a rapid evaluation of every 

casualty, assigns them an appropriate category, and directs them to the proper treatment 

area. The TO is assisted by personnel dedicated to identifying, tagging, and recording 

triage assignments and disposition.

•Immediate treatment area: This area is set up close to and with direct access t

the triage area and is composed of the staff and supplies necessary to administer 

immediate, lifesaving aid.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

•Non-immediate treatment area: All minor and delayed injuries are directed here

This area is staffed and supplied to treat all non-immediate injuries and to hold 

casualties awaiting evacuation to a higher level of care (i.e., a hospital).

•Morgue: This area must be set aside, climate controlled (if possible), and secured fro

view and interference.

Techniques and procedures for MASCAL and triage

•Ensure traffic flow is well marked so all casualties enter the triage area at one locatio

•No significant treatment should occur in the triage area. Casualties are sent to th

appropriate treatment area for interventions.

•An administrative recorder should walk with the TO to properly document al

casualties in a log and use an indelible marker on the casualty’s forehead to mark his 

triage category.

•Post an administrative person at the entry of the treatment areas to document an

regulate casualty flow.

•Dedicate someone to re-triage casualties as they enter each treatment are

•Have as many nonmedical augmenters as possible available to assist with casualt

transport (litter bearers, for example).

•Shift resources from the triage and emergent area to the nonemergent areas as th

casualty flow lessens.

•Ensure proper rest cycles for personnel, especially if operations continue beyond 2

hours.

•Be prepared to divert casualties to another facility as resources are exhausted o

overwhelmed.

For further, more detailed information on triage and MASCAL, see:

•Emergency War Surgery, 3rd U.S. revision, 2004, at <http://www.bordeninstitute.arm

mil/other_pub/ews.html>.

•Auf der Heide, Erik; Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination

1989, at <http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/index.htm>.

Contaminated Casualties

During disaster events, casualties may become contaminated by either a chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) attack or from exposure to hazardous 

industrial waste (such as sewage or oil spills). In these instances, casualties must be 

decontaminated before entering any treatment facility; otherwise the treatment facility itself 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

will become contaminated. First responders will decontaminate and treat the majority of these 

casualties in the initial hours after the event. However, if recovery operations continue in a 

contaminated area, there will be an ongoing need to decontaminate and treat casualties.

California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 

Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia 

National Guard units have CBRNE-enhanced response force packages (CERFPs) that will be 

useful in decontaminating civilians. The JTF’s medical assets may become involved in these 

situations.

Casualty decontamination is labor-intensive and requires augmentation personnel and 

additional or specialized equipment. It slows the process of casualty evaluation and treatment 

and is physically demanding of medical and rescue personnel. These negative impacts can be 

minimized with proactive planning.

Responders

Due to the abrupt, immediate nature of a CBRNE event, the initial responders will be local 

hazardous material (HAZMAT) units and state National Guard units. The National Guard 

has established weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support teams (WMD-CSTs), and 

CERFP. The WMD-CST mission is to support local and state authorities at domestic CBRNE 

events, identify agents and assess consequences, and advise local authorities on response 

measures and requests for military assistance. The primary missions of the CERFPs are casualty 

decontamination and triage and SAR in contaminated environments. These units will be in place 

and operational by the time federal military units arrive on the scene of a CBRNE attack.

The specific technical aspects of casualty decontamination exceed the scope of this handbook, 

but the following general concepts apply to all operations:

•Establishing the decontamination site: The casualty decontamination site should b

as near to the medical facilities as safety allows, but must not contaminate the facility. 

When establishing the decontamination site, planners must consider:

○

Wind direction and speed: While the patient decontamination site will

established in a “clean” location, the arrival of casualties and the initiation of 

decontamination procedures will create chemical vapor and liquid hazards. 

Wind direction and speed must be constantly monitored to ensure that all clean 

areas are not contaminated. If the wind direction shifts more than 30 degrees, 

the decontamination site may need to be moved.

○

Access and movement control: Access to the site must be controll

otherwise there is the possibility that “dirty” casualties and equipment will 

contaminate the “clean” areas. There should be one entry point and controlled 

and limited areas of intersection between the clean and dirty zones. All 

personnel and equipment must remain in a “dirty” zone until decontaminated.

○

Personnel and equipment: Once personnel and equipment bec

contaminated, they remain “dirty” until decontaminated. Personnel can and 

should continue to treat patients and use equipment in the contaminated area 
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for as long as possible. However, operating in this environment is physically 

demanding and will require additional personnel and the institution of strict 

work-rest cycles.

Key elements of casualty decontamination

Management of contaminated casualties is complicated. The casualties must be evaluated, and 

possibly treated and evacuated, while still contaminated. Management of contaminated casualties 

may include: 

•Dirty triage: Casualties must be triaged upon arrival to the treatment facility whil

still contaminated. The determination made at this point is not only the immediacy of 

treatment based on injury but whether the casualty needs to be treated before or after 

decontamination.

•Dirty treatment: Some casualties may require immediate treatment befor

decontamination. A treatment area with supplies and personnel must be established 

within the dirty area of the decontamination site.

•Dirty evacuation: Casualties may need to be evacuated while still contaminated. Thi

may be because the patient is minimally injured and does not need decontamination 

or treatment at the local treatment facility. This could also be because the patient has 

been stabilized while contaminated, needs further treatment, and it is a better use of 

resources to evacuate to another facility for decontamination and further treatment. In 

these cases, there must be dedicated evacuation lanes and equipment that will remain 

contaminated until the end of operations.

Techniques and procedures for contaminated casualty care:

•All deploying medical units must prepare to operate in a contaminated environmen

•Medical units should establish contact with WMD-CSTs and CERFPs prior to enterin

the area. This will allow for a smooth handoff of responsibilities and ongoing support.

•Clean versus contaminated areas should be clearly designated in the area of operation

•Clean and dirty triage and treatment sites and evacuation lanes must be create

•Only casualties requiring treatment at the medical facility should be decontaminated a

the facility. All others should be evacuated to other decontamination facilities.

•The number of personnel at the treatment site may need to be increased because o

increased personnel demands in the “dirty” areas.

•Traffic control points and guards should be pre-positioned to maintain access control t

the treatment site.

•Wind direction should be carefully monitored (stakes with streamers can be use

to accomplish this), and plans should be in place to shift the decontamination and 

treatment sites, if necessary.
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Mental Health Casualties

Disaster incidents produce strong and unpleasant emotional and physical responses in both 

victims and rescuers. Leaders must proactively institute preventive measures and apply 

appropriate psychological first aid when indicated. The symptoms of psychological stress 

that rescuers and victims may experience include: confusion; fear and anxiety; hopelessness, 

helplessness, or sleeplessness; anger; grief, guilt, or shock; aggressiveness or mistrustfulness; 

loss of confidence; physical pain; or overdedication to one’s task.

One particularly stressful activity is the handling of human remains. Working around human 

remains may produce feelings of horror, disgust, anger, or guilt. Many feel very strong emotions 

when confronted with the remains of children or when the victims remind them of loved ones.

The goal of psychological first aid is to mollify the range of emotions and physical responses 

experienced by personnel exposed to a disaster. The main tenets of care are to create and sustain 

an environment of safety, calm, connectedness to others, self-efficacy, and hope.

Techniques and procedures for psychological first aid

•Provide basic needs for food, shelter, and health car

•Listen to people’s storie

•Keep families togethe

•Provide frequent, clear, updated information to victims concerning the disaster itself

the status of relief efforts, and where and how to acquire assistance.

•Help maintain connection with friends and family. Provide responders with regula

communication with family members back home.

•Be aware of the stress levels of those around yo

•Provide responders with a rest area for sleep, hygiene, and food that is separate fro

the public and media.

•Insist on proper sleep, nutrition, and exercise among responder

•Do not force people to share storie

•Do not give simple, generalized reassurances (e.g., “everything will be OK.”

•Do not tell people how they should feel, or “why” things happened to the

•Do not make promises you cannot kee

•Do not criticize current relief efforts in front of those needing hel
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Techniques and procedures for psychological first aid during the handling of human 

remains

•Remember the greater purpose of your wor

•Wear protective clothing, take frequent breaks, and maintain hygiene, hydration, an

rest when not working.

•Talk with others around you and listen as wel

•Humor relieves stress as long as it is not too personal or inappropriat

•Limit exposure to bodies as much as possibl

•Breath through your mouth to avoid smell

•Do not focus on individual victim

•Get teams together for mutual support and encouragemen

•Provide opportunities for voluntary, formal debriefing

National Disaster Medical System

The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a federally coordinated system that augments 

the nation’s medical response capability. The overall purpose of the NDMS is to supplement an 

integrated national medical response capability for assisting state and local authorities in dealing 

with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters and to provide support to the military and 

the Department of Veterans Affairs medical systems in caring for casualties evacuated back to the 

U.S. from overseas armed conventional conflicts.

The NRF makes use of the NDMS as part of the HHS Office of Preparedness and Response 

under ESF #8 to support federal agencies in the management and coordination of the federal 

medical response to major emergencies and federally declared disasters including:

•Natural disaster

•Major transportation accident

•Technological disaster

•Acts of terrorism including WMD event

Components of the NDMS

•Medical response to a disaster area in the form of personnel, teams and individuals

supplies, and equipment.

•Patient movement from a disaster site to unaffected areas of the natio

•Definitive medical care at participating hospitals in unaffected area
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NDMS is composed of three major teams: disaster medical assistance team (DMAT), disaster 

mortuary operational response team (DMORT), and national veterinary response team (NVRT).

Disaster medical assistance team

A DMAT is a group of professional and paraprofessional medical personnel (supported by a 

cadre of logistical and administrative staff) designed to provide medical care during a disaster 

or other event. NDMS recruits personnel for specific vacancies, plans for training opportunities, 

and coordinates deployment of the team. To supplement the standard DMATs, highly specialized 

DMATs are deployed to deal with specific medical conditions such as crushing injuries, burns, 

and mental health emergencies.

DMATs are designed to be rapid-response elements that supplement local medical care until 

other federal or contract resources can be mobilized or until the situation is resolved. DMATs 

deploy to disaster sites with sufficient supplies and equipment to sustain themselves for a period 

of 72 hours while providing medical care at a fixed or temporary medical care site. The personnel 

are activated for a period of two weeks.

In MASCAL incidents, DMAT responsibilities may include triaging patients, providing highquality medical care despite adverse and austere conditions, providing patient reception at 

staging facilities, and preparing patients for evacuation.

Under the rare circumstance that disaster victims are evacuated to a different locale to receive 

definitive medical care, DMATs may be activated to support patient reception and disposition 

to hospitals. DMATs provide community resource available to support local, regional, and state 

requirements. However, as a national resource they can be federalized.

NDMS/DMAT personnel are required to maintain appropriate certifications and licensures within 

their disciplines. When personnel are activated as federal employees, licensure and certification 

are recognized by all states. Additionally, DMAT personnel are paid while serving as part-time 

federal employees and have the protection of the Federal Tort Claims Act in which the federal 

government becomes the defendant in the event of a malpractice claim.

Disaster mortuary operational response teams

DMORTs are responsible for:

•Temporary morgue facilitie

•Victim identificatio

•Forensic dental patholog

•Forensic anthropology method
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•Processin

•Preparatio

•Disposition of remain

DMORTs are composed of private citizens, each with a particular field of expertise, who 

are activated in the event of a disaster. NDMS/DMORT personnel are required to maintain 

appropriate certifications and licensure within their discipline. When personnel are activated, 

licensure and certification is recognized by all states, and the personnel are compensated for their 

duty time by the federal government as a temporary federal employee. During an emergency 

response, DMORTs work under the guidance of local authorities by providing technical 

assistance and personnel to identify and process deceased victims.

The DMORTs are directed by the assistant secretary for preparedness and response (ASPR), 

Office of Preparedness and Emergency Operations (OPEO). Teams are composed of funeral 

directors, medical examiners, coroners, pathologists, forensic anthropologists, medical records 

technicians and transcribers, fingerprint specialists, forensic odontologists, dental assistants, 

X-ray technicians, mental health specialists, computer professionals, administrative support staff, 

and security and investigative personnel.

The HHS ASPR, in support of the NDMS DMORT program, maintains three disaster portable 

morgue units (DPMUs). These DPMUs are staged at locations on the East and West coasts 

for immediate deployment in support of DMORT operations. The DPMU is a depository of 

equipment and supplies for deployment to a disaster site. It contains a complete morgue with 

designated workstations for each processing element and prepackaged equipment and supplies.

National veterinary response team

The NRF utilizes the NDMS, a part of the HHS ASPR, OPEO. Under the NRF, NDMS serves as 

a component of ESF #8. The NVRT is a cadre of individuals within the NDMS system who have 

professional expertise in areas of veterinary medicine, public health, and research. In addition to 

supporting the NRF mission requirements of NDMS under ESF #8, operational support may also 

be rendered by the NVRT to other federal partners such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) under ESF #11, Agriculture, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency under 

ESF #6, Mass Care, in the support of the Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act, 

or PETS Act. The NVRT provides assistance in identifying the need for veterinary services 

following major disasters, emergencies, public health or other events requiring federal support 

and in assessing the extent of disruption to animal and public health infrastructures. The NVRT is 

a fully supported federal program. These responsibilities include:

•Assessing the veterinary medical needs of the communit

•Medical treatment and stabilization of animal
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•Animal disease surveillanc

•Zoonotic disease surveillance and public health assessment

•Technical assistance to assure food safety and water quality hazard mitigatio

•Care and support of animals certified as official responders to a disaster or emergenc

NVRT personnel are private citizens who have been approved as intermittent federal employees 

and activated in the event of a disaster. The personnel are comprised of individuals with diverse 

expertise and include veterinarians, animal health technicians, pharmacists, epidemiologists, 

safety officers, logisticians, communications specialists, and other support personnel. These 

individuals are assigned to designated teams that train in preparation for a response. They are 

enabled by a regional cache of equipment, supplies and pharmaceuticals. Personnel are required 

to maintain appropriate and current professional certifications and licensures for their disciplines. 

As intermittent federal employees, their licensure is recognized by the states requesting 

assistance. Deployed personnel are compensated for their duty time by the federal government. 

In an emergency or disaster response, the NVRTs work using the Incident Command System. 

Teams provide assessments, technical assistance, public health, and veterinary services under the 

guidance of state and/or local authorities.
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Appendix C

Biological Incidents

The lack of U.S. capability to rapidly recognize, respond, and recover from a biological attack 

is the most significant failure identified in this report card. Deterrence of bioterrorism rests 

upon the ability of the nation to mitigate the effects of an attack. Unfortunately, there is no 

national plan to coordinate federal, state, and local efforts following a bioterror attack, and the 

United States lacks the technical and operational capabilities required for an adequate response.

—Prevention of WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] Proliferation and Terrorism Report Card, 

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, January 26, 2010

Responses to biological incidents (including naturally occurring diseases and terrorist events) 

start at the local, tribal, and state levels. They include the use of police, emergency medical 

technicians, firefighters, and National Guard assets such as WMD civil support teams and 

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive emergency response force 

packages. Once the incident has been identified as a pandemic or a terrorist event or has grown 

beyond the scope of local, tribal, and state response, federal response takes place. Actions at 

this level can be taken with or without a presidential Stafford Act declaration or a public health 

emergency declaration by the secretary of health and human services.

Excerpt from the National Response Framework Biological

 Incident Annex, August 2008

Coordinating Agency Cooperating Agencies

Department of Health and Human Services Department of Agriculture 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department of the Interior 

Department of Justice 

Department of Labor 

Department of State 

Department of Transportation 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

Environmental Protection Agency 

General Services Administration

U.S. Agency for International Development 

U.S. Postal Service 

American Red Cross

Table C-1. 
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Scope

The objectives of the federal government’s response to a biological terrorism event or to a 

naturally occurring disease outbreak with a known or novel pathogen are to:

•Detect the event through disease surveillance and environmental monitoring

•Identify and protect the populations at ris

•Determine the source of the diseas

•Assess the public health, law enforcement, and international implication

•Control and contain any possible epidemic (including providing guidance to state

tribal, territorial, and local public health authorities).

•Augment and surge public health and medical service

•Identify the cause and prevent the recurrence of any potential resurgence, additiona

outbreaks, or further spread of disease.

•Assess the extent of residual biological contamination and conduct response

restoration, and recovery actions as necessary.

The unique attributes of this response require separate planning considerations that are tailored 

to specific health concerns and effects of the disease (e.g., terrorism versus natural outbreaks, 

communicable versus noncommunicable diseases, etc.).

Special considerations

Detection of a bioterrorism act against the civilian population may occur in several different 

ways and involve several different modalities: 

•An attack may be surreptitious, in which case the first evidence of dissemination of a

agent may be the presentation of disease in humans or animals. 

•A terrorist-induced infectious disease outbreak initially may be indistinguishabl

from a naturally occurring outbreak; moreover, depending upon the particular agent 

and associated symptoms, several days could pass before public health and medical 

authorities even suspect that terrorism may be the cause.

•Environmental surveillance systems, such as the BioWatch system, may detect th

presence of a biological agent in the environment and trigger directed environmental 

sampling and intensified clinical surveillance to rule out or confirm an incident.

•Other cooperating departments and agencies may detect acts of bioterrorism o

biological incidents through their normal operations and surveillance efforts. Should 

this occur, notifications should be made according to approved interagency response 

protocols, consistent with health and law enforcement assessment processes.
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Policies

This appendix supports policies and procedures outlined in the National Response Framework 

(NRF), Emergency Support Function (ESF) #8, Public Health and Medical Services Annex; 

ESF #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response Annex; ESF #11, Agriculture and Natural 

Resources Annex; ESF #15, External Affairs Annex; the Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement 

and Investigation Annex; and the International Coordination Support Annex.

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) serves as the federal government’s primary 

agency for the public health and medical preparation and planning for and response to a 

biological terrorism attack or naturally occurring outbreak that results from either a known or 

novel pathogen, including an emerging infectious disease.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) serves as the government’s primary agency for 

outbreaks and/or attacks that may occur in animals used in the commercial production of food 

and for attacks on food processing/slaughtering facilities under its regulatory purview. In the 

event of a food or animal event, DHHS may provide additional public health and veterinary 

epidemiological assistance to USDA. Wildlife events will be placed under the purview of the 

Department of the Interior (DOI), while those involving marine animals will be managed and 

monitored by the Department of Commerce.

The secretary of homeland security is the principal federal official for domestic incident 

management. Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the secretary is responsible for 

coordinating federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, including biological incidents.

State, tribal, territorial, and local governments are primarily responsible for detecting and 

responding to disease outbreaks and implementing measures to minimize the health, social, and 

economic consequences.

The attorney general has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or 

terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States or directed at U.S. citizens 

or institutions abroad. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

the attorney general, in cooperation with other federal departments and agencies engaged in 

activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of the other members 

of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, pre-empt, and disrupt terrorist attacks 

against the United States. If any agency becomes aware of an overt threat involving biological 

agents or indications that disease may not be the result of natural causes, the Department 

of Justice must be notified through the FBI’s weapons of mass destruction operations unit 

(WMDOU).

If the threat is deemed credible by the FBI in coordination with DHHS or USDA, the 

FBI, in turn, immediately notifies the National Operations Center (NOC) and the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The Laboratory Response Network (LRN) is used to test 

samples for the presence of biological threat agents.

Once notified of a credible threat or disease outbreak, DHHS convenes a meeting of ESF #8 

partners to assess the situation and determine appropriate public health and medical actions. The 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) coordinates overall nonmedical support and response 

actions across all federal departments and agencies.
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DHHS will be supported by other federal agencies, as appropriate, during the various states of 

a biological incident response in the preparation, planning, and/or response processes and will 

perform the roles described in this annex in coordination with DHS and state partners. If the 

incident response progresses such that it requires multiagency participation, DHS will serve as 

the incident coordinator. DHHS will serve as the coordinating agency for public health issues.

If there is potential for environmental contamination, DHHS collaborates with the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) in developing and implementing sampling strategies and sharing 

results.

In the event of an outbreak of an agriculturally significant zoonotic disease or human foodborne 

pathogen, DHHS collaborates with USDA during the preparation, planning, and/or response 

processes.

Given the dynamic nature of a biological incident, DHHS, in collaboration with other 

departments and agencies, determines the thresholds for a comprehensive federal government 

public health and medical response.

Planning assumptions

In a biological incident, federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local officials require a highly 

coordinated response to public health and medical emergencies.

Disease transmission may occur from direct contact with an infected individual or animal, an 

environmental reservoir (includes contaminated surface or atmospheric dispersion), an insect 

vector, or contaminated food and water. Indirect contact transmission may also occur where 

contaminated inanimate objects (fomites) serve as the vehicle for transmission of the agent.

A biological incident may be distributed across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. This could 

require the simultaneous management of multiple “incident sites.”

The introduction of biological agents, both natural and deliberate, is often first detected through 

clinical or hospital presentation. However, there are other methods of detection, including 

environmental surveillance technologies such as BioWatch, and medical and syndromic 

surveillance systems.

Routine fish and wildlife health and disease surveillance, including investigation of wildlife 

mortality events conducted on public lands and in public laboratories, provides the opportunity 

for early detection of biological agents and acts of bioterrorism. Animal health surveillance in the 

agriculture sector provides similar opportunities.

No single entity possesses the authority, expertise, and resources to act unilaterally on the 

many complex issues that may arise in response to a nonroutine disease outbreak and loss 

of containment affecting a multijurisdictional area. The national response requires close 

coordination between numerous agencies at all levels of government and with the private sector.

The federal government supports affected state, tribal, territorial, and local health jurisdictions as 

requested or required. The response by DHHS and other federal agencies is flexible and adapts as 

necessary as the outbreak evolves. 
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The LRN provides analytical support to inform public health assessment of the potential for 

human illness associated with exposure and the scope of this kind of risk. The LRN also provides 

for definitive testing of both environmental and clinical samples, as well as limited supporting 

analysis of food samples that may be implicated as part of epidemiological investigations 

associated with incident response to cases of human illness. The Food Emergency Response 

Network (FERN) is a complementary system that integrates the nation’s food testing laboratories 

at the local, state, and federal levels into a network that is able to respond to emergencies 

involving biological, chemical, or radiological contamination of food.

Response to disease outbreaks suspected of being deliberate in origin requires consideration of 

special law enforcement and homeland security requirements.

An investigation into intentional biological threats or incidents will likely require the initiation 

of a joint criminal and epidemiological investigation. The FBI would coordinate criminal 

investigative activities with appropriate state, local and federal partner agencies, such as DHS, 

DHHS, and USDA.

Concept of Operations

Biological agent response

The key elements of an effective biological response include (in nonsequential order):

•Rapid detection of the outbreak or introduction of a biological agent into th

environment.

•Rapid dissemination of key safety information, appropriate personal protectiv

equipment, and necessary medical precautions.

•Swift agent identification and confirmatio

•Identification of the population at risk (to include animals, marine life, and plants

•Determination of how the agent is transmitted, including efficiency of transmissio

•Determination of susceptibility to prophylaxis and treatmen

•Definition of public health and medical services, human services, and mental healt

implications.

•Control and containment of the epidemic when possible, and use of mitigatio

strategies when containment is not possible (e.g., in the event of an influenza 

pandemic).

•Identification of the law enforcement implications/assessment of the threa

•Augmentation and surging of local health and medical resource

•Protection of the population through appropriate public health and medical action
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•Dissemination of information to enlist public support and provide risk communicatio

assistance to responsible authorities.

•Assessment of environmental contamination and cleanup/decontamination/prope

disposal of bioagents that persist in the environment, and provision of consultation on 

the safety of drinking water and food products that may be derived from directly or 

environmentally exposed animals, crops, plants and trees, or marine life.

•Tracking and preventing secondary or additional disease outbrea

•Administration of countermeasures when appropriate

Primary federal functions include supporting state, tribal, territorial, and local public health and 

medical capacities according to the policies and procedures detailed in the NRF and its annexes.

Outbreak Detection

Determination of a disease outbreak

The initial indication of a biological incident may be the recognition by public health and 

medical authorities that a significantly increased number of people are becoming ill.

One tool to support this process is the National Biosurveillance Integration System (NBIS). 

NBIS leverages the individual capabilities of multiple surveillance systems by integrating and 

analyzing domestic and international surveillance and monitoring data collected from human 

health, animal health, plant health, and food and water monitoring systems. This cross-domain 

analysis allows for enhanced situational awareness and potentially reduced detection time, thus 

enabling more rapid and effective biological incident response decision making.

Laboratory confirmation

During the evaluation of a suspected disease outbreak, laboratory samples are distributed to 

appropriate laboratories. During a suspected terrorist incident, sample information is provided 

to the FBI for investigative use and to public health and emergency response authorities for 

epidemiological use and agent characterization to facilitate and ensure timely public health and 

medical interventions as well as environmental cleanup.

Identification (analysis and confirmation)

The samples collected and the analyses conducted must be sufficient to characterize the causative 

agent of the outbreak. LRN and FERN laboratories fulfill the federal responsibility for rapid 

analysis of biological agents. In a suspected terrorist incident, sample collection activities and 

testing are coordinated with the FBI and with LRN members.

Suspicious substances

Since there is no definitive/reliable field test for biological agents of concern, all potential 

bioterrorism samples are transported to an LRN laboratory, where expert analysis is conducted 
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using established federal protocols/reagents. A major component of this process is to establish 

and maintain the law enforcement chain of custody and arrange for transport.

The following actions occur if a positive result is obtained by an LRN on an environmental 

sample submitted by the FBI or other designated law enforcement personnel: 

•The LRN immediately notifies the local FBI of the positive test result and informs th

appropriate public health officials. 

•The local FBI field office makes local notifications and contacts the FBI headquarter

WMDOU.

•FBI headquarters convenes an initial threat assessment conference call with the loca

FBI, DHHS, and appropriate federal, state, tribal, territorial, and local response officials 

to review the results, assess the preliminary information, and arrange for more testing.

•FBI headquarters immediately notifies DHS of the situatio

•Original samples may be sent to DHHS/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention fo

confirmation of LRN analyses.

•DHHS provides guidance on protective measures such as prophylaxis, treatment

continued facility operation, and use of personal protective equipment.

•DHHS, EPA, and cooperating agencies support the determination of the contaminate

area. EPA will assist with decisions regarding whether to shelter in place and will assist 

in decontamination of facilities and outdoor areas.

Notification

Any disease outbreak suspected or identified by an agency within DHHS or through a federal, 

state, tribal, territorial, or local public health partner as having public health implications is 

brought to the immediate attention of DHHS.

Any potentially significant biological agent, disease outbreak, or suspected bioterrorism act 

affecting or involving animals, plant health, or wildlife should involve notifications to USDA 

(animals and plant health) and DOI (wildlife).

Following these initial notifications, the procedures detailed in ESF #8 are followed. Instances 

of disease that raise the “index of suspicion” of terrorist or criminal involvement are reported 

to FBI headquarters. In these instances, FBI headquarters, in conjunction with DHHS and/

or USDA, examines available law enforcement and intelligence information, as well as the 

technical characteristics and epidemiology of the disease, to determine if there is a possibility of 

criminal intent. If the FBI, in conjunction with DHHS or USDA, determines that the information 

represents a potential credible terrorist threat, the FBI communicates the situation immediately 

to the NCTC and NOC, which notifies the White House, as appropriate. If warranted, the FBI, 

DHHS, and/or USDA and respective state, tribal, territorial, and/or local health officials will 

conduct a joint law enforcement and epidemiological investigation to determine the cause of the 

disease outbreak, the threat to public health and public safety, and the individual(s) responsible.
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In the event of an environmental detection of a biological threat agent above established agencyspecific thresholds, the responsible agency should contact DHHS, the FBI, and the NOC within 

two hours of laboratory confirmation. The FBI and DHHS, in conjunction with DHS, will 

convene an initial threat assessment conference call with appropriate officials to examine the 

public health risk posed by the detection. Coordination of assessment and response activities will 

involve officials from the impacted state, tribal, territorial, and local jurisdictions.

Activation

Once notified of a threat or disease outbreak that requires significant federal public health 

and medical assistance, DHHS requests activation of ESF #8 from the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency and convenes a meeting of the partner organizations to assess the situation 

and determine the appropriate actions.

The immediate task is to identify the affected and vulnerable population and the geographic 

scope of the incident. The initial public health and medical response includes the following:

•Targeted epidemiological investigation (e.g., contact tracing

•Dissemination of key safety information and necessary medical precaution

•Surveillance within health care settings for certain clinical signs and symptom

•Intensified collection and review of potentially related information (e.g., contacts wit

nurse call lines, laboratory test orders, school absences, over-the-counter pharmacy 

sales, unusual increase in sick animals, wildlife deaths, decreased commercial fish 

yields).

•Organization and potential deployment of federal public health and medical respons

assets to include personnel, medical and veterinary supplies, and materiel.

If there is suspicion that the outbreak may be deliberate, the FBI may establish a joint operations 

center, which may be integrated into the joint field office structure, if established, to coordinate 

investigative and intelligence activities.

Actions

Controlling the epidemic

The following steps are required to contain and control an epidemic affecting large populations: 

•DHHS assists public health and medical authorities with surveillance and coordinatio

•DHHS assesses the need for increased surveillance in state, tribal, territorial, and loca

entities not initially involved in the outbreak and notifies the appropriate officials with 

surveillance recommendations if needed.

•DHS coordinates with DHHS and state, tribal, territorial, and local officials on th

messages released to the public to ensure that communications are timely, consistent, 

accurate, and actionable.
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•The public health system is required to initiate appropriate protective and responsiv

measures for the affected population, including first responders and other workers 

engaged in incident-related activities. These measures may include mass vaccination or 

prophylaxis for populations at risk.

•DHHS evaluates the incident with its partner organizations and make

recommendations to the appropriate public health and medical authorities regarding the 

need for isolation, quarantine, or shelter in place to prevent the spread of disease.

The governor of an affected state or territory implements isolation and/or social-distancing 

requirements using state/local legal authorities. The tribal leader of a recognized tribe may also 

order a curfew, isolation, social distancing, and quarantine under tribal legal authorities. In 

order to prevent the import or interstate spread of disease, DHHS may take appropriate federal 

actions using the authorities granted by title 42 of the U.S. Code, parts 70 and 71, and U.S. Code 

21 part 1240. These measures may include state, tribal, territorial, and local assistance with the 

implementation and enforcement of isolation and/or quarantine actions if federal authorities are 

invoked.

The scope of the disease outbreak may require mass isolation or quarantine of affected 

or potentially affected persons. Depending on the type of event, food, animals, and other 

agricultural products may need to be quarantined to prevent further spread of disease. In addition, 

livestock or poultry may need to be vaccinated or depopulated, and the movement of animals and 

equipment on and off affected premises may be restricted. In this instance DHHS and USDA will 

work with state, tribal, territorial, and local health and legal authorities to recommend the most 

feasible, effective, and legally enforceable methods of isolation and quarantine.

Decontamination

For certain types of biological incidents (e.g., anthrax), it may be necessary to assess the extent 

of contamination and decontaminate victims, responders, animals, equipment, transportation 

conveyances, buildings, critical infrastructure, and large outdoor areas. Such decontamination 

and related activities take place consistent with the roles and responsibilities, resources and 

capabilities, and procedures contained in the ESF #8, ESF #10, ESF #11, and ESF #14, longterm community recovery annexes. (Note: Chemicals used for biological decontamination, such 

as those used for inactivating highly infectious biological agents such as Bacillus anthracis 

spores, must be registered for that purpose by EPA under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 

Rodenticide Act. If, during an emergency, a response entity wants to use a chemical that has 

not been registered for inactivating the specific biological agent(s) of concern, a request for an 

emergency exemption from registration must be submitted to the EPA.)

Department of Defense Responsibilities

For a list of Department of Defense responsibilities in ESF #8, Public Health and Medical 

Services; ESF #10, Oil and Hazardous Materials Response; ESF #11, Agriculture and Natural 

Resources; ESF #15, External Affairs; and ESF #14, Long-Term Community Recovery; see 

Chapter 5 of this handbook. 

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Appendix D

Nuclear and Radiological Incidents

Responses to nuclear/radiological incidents (accidental, inadvertent, or deliberate) start at the 

local, tribal, and state levels. They include the use of police, emergency medical technicians, 

firefighters, and National Guard assets such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) civil support 

teams (WMD CSTs) and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive 

(CBRNE) enhanced response force packages (CERFPs). Once identified as a terrorist event or 

once the incident grows beyond the scope of local, tribal, and state responses, federal response 

takes place. The level of federal response to a specific incident is based on numerous factors, 

including the ability of state, tribal, and local officials to respond; the type, amount, and custody 

of (or authority over) radioactive material involved; the extent of the impact or potential impact 

on the public and environment; and the size of the affected area.

Excerpt from the National Response Framework Nuclear/Radiological Incident 

Annex, June 2008.

Coordinating Agencies Cooperating Agencies

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of Homeland Security

Environmental Protection Agency

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Department of Agriculture

Department of Commerce

Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Homeland Security

Department of the Interior 

Department of Justice

Department of Labor

Department of State

Department of Transportation

Department of Veterans Affairs

Environmental Protection Agency 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Table D-1. 

Purpose

The Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex (NRIA) to the National Response Framework (NRF) 

describes the policies, situations, concepts of operations, and responsibilities of the federal 

departments and agencies governing the immediate response and short-term recovery activities 

for incidents involving release of radioactive materials to address the consequences of the event. 

The incidents may result from inadvertent or deliberate acts. The NRIA applies to incidents 

where the nature and scope of the incident requires a federal response to supplement the state, 

tribal, or local incident response.
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The purpose of this annex is to:

•Define the roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in responding to the uniqu

characteristics of different categories of nuclear/radiological incidents.

•Discuss the specific authorities, capabilities, and assets the federal government ha

for responding to nuclear/radiological incidents that are not otherwise described in the 

NRF.

•Discuss the integration of the concept of operations with other elements of the NRF

including the unique organization, notification, and activation processes and specialized 

incident-related actions.

•Provide guidelines for notification, coordination, and leadership of federal activitie

Because there are several categories of potential incidents and impacted entities, this annex 

identifies different federal agencies as “coordinating agencies” and “cooperating agencies” 

and associated strategic concepts of operations based on the authorities, responsibilities, and 

capabilities of those departments or agencies. In addition, this annex describes how other federal 

departments and agencies support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when DHS leads 

a large-scale multiagency federal response.

Scope

This annex applies to two categories of nuclear and radiological incidents: inadvertent or 

otherwise accidental releases and releases related to deliberate acts. These incidents may also 

include potential release of radioactive material that poses an actual or perceived hazard to public 

health, safety, national security, and/or the environment. The category covering inadvertent 

releases includes nuclear (commercial or weapons production) facilities; lost radioactive 

material sources; transportation accidents involving nuclear/radioactive material; domestic 

nuclear weapons accidents; and foreign accidents involving nuclear or radioactive material that 

impact the United States or its territories, possessions, or territorial waters. The second category 

includes, but is not limited to response to the effects of deliberate attacks perpetrated with 

radiological dispersal devices (RDDs), nuclear weapons, or improvised nuclear devices (INDs).

This annex applies whenever a federal response is undertaken unilaterally pursuant to federal 

authorities or when an incident exceeds or is anticipated to exceed state, tribal, or local resources. 

The level of federal response to a specific incident is based on numerous factors, including, 

the ability of state, tribal, and local officials to respond; the type, amount, and custody of (or 

authority over) radioactive material involved; the extent of the impact or potential impact on the 

public and environment; and the size of the affected area.

If any agency or government entity becomes aware of an overt threat or act involving nuclear/

radiological material/device or indications the event is not inadvertent or otherwise accidental, 

the Department of Justice should be notified through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

The attorney general has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or 

terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or 

institutions abroad, where such acts are within the federal criminal jurisdiction of the United 

States. Generally acting through the FBI, the attorney general, in cooperation with other federal 

departments and agencies engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also 
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coordinate the activities of the other members of the law enforcement community to detect, 

prevent, pre-empt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against the United States For investigations 

pertaining to nuclear/radiological incidents, the coordinating agencies and cooperating agencies 

perform the functions delineated in this annex and provide technical support and assistance to the 

FBI in the performance of its law enforcement and criminal investigative mission.

Policies

Authorities applicable to this annex include Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 

5, Management of Domestic Incidents, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act of 2006, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

The coordinating agencies may take appropriate independent emergency actions within the limits 

of their own statutory authority to protect the public, mitigate immediate hazards, and gather 

information concerning the emergency to avoid delay. Key authorities used by the coordinating 

agencies to carry out responsibilities are described below. 

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 

gives the federal government the authority to respond to releases or threatened releases 

of hazardous substances (including radionuclides) that may endanger public health or the 

environment. CERCLA also gives the federal government the authority to compel responsible 

parties to respond to releases of hazardous substances. CERCLA is implemented through the 

National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), a regulation found 

in 40 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 300. At the on-scene level, this response authority 

is implemented by federal on-scene coordinators (OSCs). OSCs may assist state and local 

governments in responding to releases, but also have the authority to direct the response when 

needed to ensure protection of public health and the environment. Four federal agencies have 

OSC authority for hazardous substance emergencies: the Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), DHS/U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department 

of Energy (DOE).

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended)

The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) provides DOD and DOE responsibilities for protection of certain 

nuclear materials, facilities, information, and nuclear weapons under their control. The AEA 

(42 U.S. Code Sections 2011–2297 [2003]) and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (5 U.S. 

Code Sections 5313–5316, 42 U.S. Code Sections 5801–5891 [2002]) provide the statutory 

authority for both DOE and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the foundation for 

NRC regulation of the nation’s civilian use of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials 

to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, to promote the common defense and 

security, and to protect the environment. 

Executive Order 12656 of 18 November 1988

This executive order directs the secretary of energy to “manage all emergency planning and 

response activities pertaining to Department of Energy nuclear facilities.”
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Title 50, U.S. Code, War and National Defense

Title 50, U.S. Code Section 797 makes it a crime to willfully violate a regulation or order 

promulgated by the secretary of defense, or by a military commander designated by secretary of 

defense, for the protection or security of military equipment or other property or places subject 

to the jurisdiction, administration, or custody of DOD. As it applies to nuclear/radiological 

accidents or incidents, this statute provides a military commander the authority to establish 

a temporary national defense area (NDA) around an accident/incident site to protect nuclear 

weapons and materials in DOD custody. This statute is executed within the department by DOD 

Instruction (DODI) 5200.08, Security of DOD Installations and Resources. DODI 5200.08 is the 

natural, legal extension of statutory authority found in 50 U.S. Code Section 797.

Public Health Service Act

The Public Health Service Act (PHSA) directs EPA to support state and local authorities in their 

preparedness and response activities regarding public health emergencies. 

When DHS initiates the response mechanisms of the NRF, existing interagency plans that 

address nuclear/radiological incident management are incorporated as supporting plans.

For incidents not led by DHS, other federal response plans provide the primary response 

protocols. In these cases, the federal agency that is coordinating the response may use the 

procedures outlined in the NRF to coordinate the delivery of federal resources to state, tribal, and 

local governments, and to coordinate assistance among federal agencies.

Certain federal agencies are authorized to respond directly to specific nuclear/radiological 

incidents. Nothing in this annex alters or impedes the ability of federal departments and agencies 

to carry out their specific authorities and perform their responsibilities under law. 

Federal response actions will be carried out commensurate with the appropriate health and safety 

laws and guidelines.

The federal government has established protective action guidance (PAGs) for radiological 

incidents. Specific PAGs have also been established for RDD/INDs.

Federal coordination centers and agency teams provide their own logistical support consistent 

with agreed upon interagency execution plans. State, tribal, and local governments are 

encouraged to coordinate their efforts with the federal effort, but maintain their own logistical 

support, consistent with applicable authorities and requirements. 

The federal response to any nuclear/radiological incident shall be coordinated with the state, 

tribal, and local government or the federal agencies having jurisdiction over the area affected by 

the incident. In the case of tribal lands, tribal governments have a special relationship with the 

U.S. government, and federal, state, and local governments may have limited or no authority on 

specific tribal reservations. Further guidance is provided in the Tribal Relations Support Annex.

Headquarters planning and preparedness

Under existing regulations, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee 

(FRPCC) provides a national forum for the development and coordination of radiological 
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planning and preparedness policies and procedures. It also provides policy guidance for federal 

radiological incident management activities in support of state, tribal, and local government 

radiological emergency planning and preparedness activities. The FRPCC is chaired by DHS/

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

The FRPCC also coordinates research efforts of its member agencies related to state, tribal, 

and local government radiological emergency preparedness to ensure minimum duplication 

and maximum benefits to state and local governments. The FRPCC coordinates planning and 

validating requirements of each agency, reviewing integration requirements and incorporating 

agency-specific plans, procedures, and equipment into the response system.

Regional Planning and Preparedness 

Coordinating agencies may have regional offices or field structures that provide a forum for 

information sharing, consultation, and coordination of federal agency regional awareness, 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities for radiological incidents. These 

regional offices may also assist in providing technical assistance to state and local governments 

and evaluating radiological plans and exercises. 

Regional Assistance Committees (RACs) in the DHS/FEMA regions serve as the primary 

coordinating structures at the federal regional level. RAC membership mirrors that of the 

FRPCC, and RACs are chaired by a DHS/FEMA regional representative. The RACs provide 

a forum for information sharing, consultation, and coordination of federal regional awareness, 

prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities.

Situation

A nuclear/radiological incident may result from a deliberate act, an accident, or general 

mismanagement, and may center on different materials or industrial practices, including:

•Commercial nuclear facilitie

•Federal nuclear weapons facilitie

•Radioactive material sources, industrial uses, or technologically enhanced, naturall

occurring radioactive material.

•Transportation incidents involving nuclear/radioactive materia

•Domestic nuclear weapons accident

•Foreign incidents involving nuclear or radioactive material

•Terrorism involving facilities or nuclear/radiological material

The most common nuclear/radiological incidents have to do with the loss, theft, or 

mismanagement of relatively small radioactive material sources, or technologically enhanced, 

naturally occurring radioactive material, where some exposure of individuals or dispersal into the 

environment occurs. These are handled at the local level with occasional federal assistance.
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Virtually any facility or industrial practice (including transportation of materials) may be 

vulnerable to a deliberate act, such as terrorism, or an accident of some sort that could release 

radioactive material, including a fire. Major fixed facilities, such as federal nuclear weapons 

facilities, commercial nuclear fuel cycle facilities, and some nonfuel cycle industries (such as 

radiation source and radiopharmaceutical manufacturers) pose a risk of accidents and could also 

be breached in a deliberate act, such as terrorism.

Of greatest concern to U.S. security is the potential for a terrorist attack using a nuclear weapon. 

A nuclear device could originate directly from a nuclear state, be modified from pre-existing 

weapons components, or be fashioned by terrorists from the basic fissile nuclear materials. 

Even a small nuclear detonation in an urban area could result in over 100,000 fatalities, massive 

infrastructure damage, and thousands of square kilometers of contaminated land.

Planning Assumptions

Radiological incidents may not be immediately recognized as such until the radioactive material 

is detected or the health effects of radiation exposure are manifested in the population and 

identified by the public health community.

An act of nuclear or radiological terrorism, particularly an act directed against a large population 

center within the United States can overwhelm the capabilities of many local, tribal, and state 

governments to respond, and may seriously challenge existing federal response capabilities.

An act or threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism will trigger concurrent activation of the 

Terrorism Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex.

A nuclear or radiological incident may require concurrent implementation of the NCP to address 

radiological releases into the environment.

An incident involving the potential release of radioactivity may require implementation of 

protective measures, such as evacuation and shelter in place. State, tribal, and local governments 

have primary responsibility for implementing protective measures for the public.

An expeditious federal response is required to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear/

radiological incident. The federal government response to nuclear or radiological terrorist threats/

incidents includes, but is not limited to, the following assumptions:

•The response to a radiological threat or actual incident requires an integrated federa

government response.

•In the case of a nuclear terrorist attack, the plume may be dispersed over a large are

over time, requiring response operations to be conducted over a multijurisdictional and/

or multistate region.

•A terrorist attack may involve multiple incidents, and each location may require a

incident response and a crime scene investigation simultaneously.
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Responsibilities

General

Incidents will be managed at the lowest possible level; as incidents change in size, scope, and 

complexity, the response will adapt to meet requirements described in the NRF. In accordance 

with HSPD-5, “the Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal Federal official for domestic 

incident management. The Secretary is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within 

the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, 

and other emergencies. The Secretary shall coordinate the Federal Government’s resources 

utilized in response to or recovery from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other emergencies.” 

Domestic incident management includes preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering 

from terrorist attacks. When exercising this role, the secretary is supported by other coordinating 

agencies and cooperating agencies. For incidents wherein the secretary is not fulfilling domestic 

incident management responsibilities, the coordinating agency will be the responsible agency for 

domestic incident management as defined by their authorities. Such incidents include, but are not 

limited to, loss of radiography sources, discovery of orphan radiological sources, and incidents/

emergencies at nuclear facilities below the classification of general emergency, as defined by the 

cognizant coordinating agency.

•For this annex, coordinating agencies provide the leadership, expertise, and authoritie

to implement critical and specific nuclear/radiological aspects of the response, and 

facilitate nuclear/radiological aspects of the response in accordance with those 

authorities and capabilities. The coordinating agencies are those federal agencies that 

own, have custody of, authorize, regulate, or are otherwise assigned responsibility for 

the nuclear/radioactive material, facility, or activity involved in the incident.

•Cooperating agencies include other federal agencies that provide additional technica

and resource support specific to nuclear/radiological incidents to DHS and the 

coordinating agencies.

•Other federal agencies may also provide support to DHS and the coordinating agenc

in accordance with the ESF and support annexes.

Agencies

•DOD or DOE for incidents involving nuclear/radiological materials or facilities owne

or operated by DOD or DOE. 

•DOD or DOE for incidents involving a nuclear weapon, special nuclear material, an

or classified components under DOD or DOE custody.

•National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for nuclear material unde

NASA custody.

•The NRC, for incidents involving materials or facilities licensed by the NR

•DHS, generally through Customs and Border Protection (CBP), for incidents involvin

the inadvertent import of radioactive materials as well as any other incidents where 

radioactive material is detected at borders.
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•EPA or DHS/USCG for environmental response/cleanup for incidents not covere

above.

•DHS for all deliberate attacks involving nuclear/radiological facilities or material

DOD responsibilities

DOD is the coordinating agency for federal actions related to radiological incidents involving: 

nuclear weapons in DOD custody; DOD facilities, including U.S. nuclear powered ships; or 

material otherwise under DOD jurisdiction (for example, transportation of material shipped by or 

for DOD).

Under CERCLA, Executive Order 12580, and the NCP, DOD is responsible for hazardous 

substance responses to releases on or from DOD facilities or vessels under the jurisdiction, 

custody, or control of DOD, including transportation related incidents. For responses under 

these circumstances, DOD provides a federal OSC responsible for taking all CERCLA response 

actions, which includes on-site and off-site response actions (40 CFR 300.120[c] and 40 CFR 

300.175[b] [4]).

For incidents where the incident is on, or where the sole source of the nuclear/radiological 

release is from any facility or vessel under DOD jurisdiction, custody, or control, DOD is 

responsible for: 

•Mitigating the consequences of an inciden

•Providing notification and appropriate protective action recommendations to state

tribal, and/or local government officials.

•Minimizing the radiological hazard to the publi

For radiological incidents involving a nuclear weapon, special nuclear material, and/or classified 

components that are in DOD custody, DOD may establish a national defense area. DOD will 

coordinate with state and local officials to ensure appropriate public health and safety actions 

are taken outside the NDA. DOD will lead the overall response to safeguard national security 

information and/or restricted data, or equipment and material. DOD may also include lands 

normally not under DOD control as part of the established NDA for the duration of the incident.

DOD coordinates the federal response for incidents involving the release of nuclear/radioactive 

materials from DOD space vehicles or joint space vehicles with significant DOD involvement. A 

joint venture is an activity in which the U.S. government has provided extensive design/financial 

input; has provided and maintains ownership of instruments, spacecraft, or the launch vehicle; or 

is intimately involved in mission operations. A joint venture with a foreign nation is not created 

by simply selling or supplying material to a foreign country for use in its spacecraft.

In the event that DHS assumes overall management of the federal response under HSPD-5 to an 

accidental or inadvertent incident involving DOD facilities or materials, DOD will support DHS 

under the NRF and the National Incident Management System (NIMS), including acting as the 

coordinating agency for this annex. DOD will manage the response within the boundaries of the 

DOD facility or NDA.
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Specialized Teams

Department of Energy accident response group

The DOE accident response group (ARG) comprises scientists, technical specialists, crisis 

managers, and equipment ready to respond to the scene of a U.S. nuclear weapon accident to 

make the weapon safe for shipment.

Department of Energy radiological assistance program team

The DOE radiological assistance program (RAP) teams are located at various DOE operations 

offices, site offices, and national laboratories. They can be dispatched to a radiological incident 

from Regional DOE Offices in response to a radiological incident. RAP teams provide firstresponder radiological assistance to protect the health and safety of the general public, 

responders, and the environment and to assist in the detection, identification and analysis, 

and response to events involving radiological/nuclear material. Deployed RAP teams provide 

traditional field monitoring, assessment support and a search capability.

Nuclear incident response team

The nuclear incident response team (NIRT) consists of the DOE teams above and the EPA 

entities that perform support functions (including radiological emergency response functions) 

and related functions.

Advisory team for environment, food, and health

This team includes representatives from EPA, the Department of Agriculture, the Food and Drug 

Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and other federal agencies. The 

advisory team develops coordinated advice and recommendation on environmental, food, health, 

and animal health matters for the incident command/unified command (IC/UC), DHS, the joint 

federal office unified coordination group, the coordinating agency, and/or state, tribal, and local 

governments as appropriate. The advisory team provides federal advice in matters related to the 

following:

•Environmental assessments (field monitoring) required for developin

recommendations with advice from state, tribal, and local governments.

•PAGs and their application to the emergenc

•Protective Action Recommendation

•Protective actions to prevent or minimize contamination of milk, food, and water, an

to prevent or minimize exposure through ingestion. 

•Recommendations for minimizing losses of agricultural resources from radiatio

effects.

•Availability of food, animal feed, and water supply inspection programs to ensur

wholesomeness.
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•Relocation, re-entry, and other radiation protection measures prior to recover

•Recommendations for recovery, return, and cleanup issues

•Health and safety advice or information for the public and for worker

•Estimated effects of radioactive releases on human health and the environmen

•Other matters, as requested by the incident command or coordinating agency

Environmental Protection Agency radiological emergency response team

The EPA radiological emergency response team (RERT) provides resources, including 

personnel, specialized equipment, technical expertise, and labor services to aid coordinating 

and cooperating agencies and state, tribal, and local response organizations in protecting the 

public and the environment from unnecessary exposure to ionizing radiation from radiological 

incidents. The RERT provides the following:

•Monitoring, sampling, laboratory analyses, and data assessments using field emergenc

response assets.

•Technical advice and assistance for containment, cleanup, restoration, and recover

following a radiological incident. 

•Assistance in the development and implementation of a long-term monitoring plan an

long-term recovery plans.

•Coordination with fixed laboratory assets for in-depth analysis and evaluation of larg

numbers of site-specific emergency response samples.

Recovery

The term “recovery,” as used here, encompasses any action dedicated to the continued protection 

of the public and resumption of normal activities in the affected area. Recovery planning 

generally does not take place until the initiating conditions of the incident have stabilized and 

immediate actions to protect public health, safety, and property are accomplished. Upon request, 

the federal government assists state, tribal, and local governments with developing and executing 

recovery plans.

Department of Defense responsibilities

•Provides defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) in response to requests fo

assistance during domestic incidents. With the exception of support provided under 

immediate response authority, the obligation of DOD resources to support requests 

for assistance is subject to the approval of the secretary of defense. Under certain 

critical circumstances, the president or secretary of defense may direct DSCA activities 

without a specific request. Details regarding DSCA and immediate response are 

provided in the NRF core document.
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•May provide DOD and DOD-funded assets for the response to radiological incidents

to include: 

○

WMD CSTs: National Guard teams that assess a suspected WMD attack, adv

civilian responders on appropriate actions through on-site testing and expert 

reachback, and facilitate the arrival of additional state and federal military 

forces. Each team consists of 22 personnel and is equipped with personal 

protective equipment for operating in unknown hazardous environments, 

nuclear, biological, and chemical detectors, sampling/analytical systems, a 

decontamination system, and communications equipment used to reachback 

to experts via satellite. These are state assets that can be federalized. There is 

nominally one CST per state, as well as one each in Guam, Puerto Rico, the 

Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. 

○

CERFPs: National Guard elements that provide an immediate respo

capability to a governor. The CERFPs are capable of searching an incident 

site (including damaged buildings), rescuing any casualties, decontaminating 

them, and performing medical triage and initial treatment to stabilize them 

for transport to a medical facility. This includes extracting anyone trapped in 

the rubble. The CERFP is composed of four elements staffed by personnel 

from already established National Guard units. The elements are search and 

extraction, decontamination, medical, and security. The CERFP command and 

control team directs the overall activities of the CERFP and coordinates with 

the state joint task force and the incident commander. There is at least one 

CERFP in each FEMA region.

○

CBRNE consequence management response forces (CCMRF): Multiserv

(active and reserve component military) follow-on assets designed to augment 

the CSTs and CERFPs, if necessary. Specific CCMRF capabilities include, 

but are not limited to, robust command and control, technical search and 

rescue, explosive ordnance disposal, aviation evacuation, specialized medical 

response teams, and enhanced chemical, biological, and nuclear detection/

decontamination.

○

DOD advisory teams: Various teams that may deploy, either independen

or as part of the CCMRFs, that provide guidance and advice to the incident 

commander on potential health hazards, radiation injury treatment, survey 

data evaluations, population monitoring, etc. These include the consequence 

management advisory team, U.S. Air Force radiation assessment team, the 

U.S. Army’s radiological advisory medical team, and the Armed Forces 

Radiobiology Research Institute’s medical radiobiological advisory team.

DOD provides immediate assistance under Immediate Response Authority for any civil 

emergency that may require immediate action to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate 

great property damage. When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from 

higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials from DOD components 

and agencies are authorized by DOD directive, subject to any supplemental direction that may 

be provided by their DOD component, to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil 

authorities. All such necessary action is referred to as “immediate response.”
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Department of Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Responsibilities

•See the ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering Annex for additional informatio

•For RDD/IND incidents, provides response and cleanup support as a cooperatin

agency.

•Integrates and coordinates with other agencies, as requested, to perform any or all o

the following: 

○

Radiological survey functi

○

Gross decontaminat

○

Site characterizat

○

Contaminated water and debris managem

○

Site remediat
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Appendix E

Catastrophic Incidents

Excerpt from the National Response Framework Catastrophic Incident Annex 

(CIA), November 2008

Coordinating Agency Cooperating Agencies

Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

All federal departments and agencies (and other 

organizations) with assigned primary or supporting 

emergency support function responsibilities.

Table E-1.

A catastrophic incident, as defined by the National Response Framework (NRF), is any natural or 

man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, 

damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, 

national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic incident could result in sustained 

nationwide impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources 

normally available to state, tribal, local, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and 

significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that 

national security could be threatened. These factors drive the urgency for coordinated national 

planning to ensure accelerated federal and/or national assistance.

Recognizing that federal resources are required to augment overwhelmed state, tribal, and local 

response efforts, the NRF-Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) establishes protocols to identify 

and rapidly deploy key essential resources (e.g., medical teams, search and rescue teams, 

transportable shelters, medical and equipment caches, etc.) that are expected to be needed to save 

lives and contain incidents.

Upon the occurrence of a catastrophic incident, or in advance if determined by the secretary of 

homeland security, the government will deploy federal resources, organized into incident-specific 

“packages,” in coordination with the affected state and incident command structure.

Where state, tribal, or local governments are unable to establish or maintain an effective incident 

command structure due to catastrophic conditions, the federal government, at the direction of the 

secretary of homeland security, may establish a unified command structure, led by the unified 

coordination group, to save lives, protect property, maintain operation of critical infrastructure/

key resources (CIKR), contain the event, and protect national security. The federal government 

shall transition to its role of coordinating and supporting the state, tribal, or local governments 

when they are capable of reestablishing their incident commands.

Policies

A catastrophic incident will likely trigger a presidential major disaster declaration and result in 

the secretary of homeland security or a designee implementing the NRF-CIA.

All deploying federal resources remain under the control of their respective federal department 

or agency during mobilization and deployment. Some federal departments and agencies have the 

authority, under their own statutes, to deploy directly to the incident scene.
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Federal resources arriving at a National Logistics Staging Area (NLSA) remain there until 

requested by state/local incident command authorities, when they are integrated into the response 

effort.

For no-notice or short-notice catastrophic incidents, federal resources will be mobilized 

and deployed, unless it can be credibly established that an action listed is not needed at the 

catastrophic incident venue.

If during a response, it is determined that the incident is catastrophic in nature, any remaining 

actions not originally initiated from the execution schedule will be initiated.

Situation

The initial response to a catastrophic incident starts on a local level with the local, tribal and/

or state responders. However, there may be circumstances that exceed the capabilities of 

state, local, or tribal authorities in which they are unable to initially establish or maintain a 

command structure for incident response. In these instances, accelerated federal response may be 

warranted, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) will coordinate response activities until local, tribal, and/or state authorities are 

capable or have re-established their incident command structure. 

Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government

Following a catastrophic event, segments of state, tribal, and local governments as well as 

NGOs and the private sector may be severely compromised. The federal government must be 

prepared to fill potential gaps to ensure continuity of government and public- and private-sector 

operations.

Incident condition: Normal procedures for certain emergency support functions (ESFs) may 

be expedited or streamlined to address the magnitude of urgent requirements of the incident. 

All ESFs must explore economies of scale to maximize utilization and efficiency of limited 

resources. In the case of a catastrophic incident, the federal government or other national entities 

will provide expedited assistance in one or more of the following areas:

•Mass evacuations (ESF #5, Emergency Management): While primarily a state

tribal, and local responsibility, federal support may be required for large-scale 

evacuations of large numbers of people, patients in local hospitals, nursing homes, and 

extended care facilities, those with special needs, household pets, and service animals. 

Significant transportation and shelter coordination and resources may be required. 

There is likely to be significant shortage of response and casualty and/or evacuee 

reception capabilities throughout the impacted area. FEMA will support state(s) in 

evacuating pets and animals in a declared major disaster. Incident response efforts by 

state, tribal, and local governments, as well as federal agencies, frequently involve air 

operations and flights for evacuation (ESF #5), search and rescue (ESF #9), and public 

safety and security (ESF #13). In all cases, all operations must be coordinated with the 

Department of Transportation/Federal Aviation Administration, which manages the 

nation’s airspace and air traffic, before, during, and after a catastrophic incident.
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•Mass care, housing, and human services (ESF #6, Mass Care, Emergenc

Assistance, Housing, and Human Services): The ability to support the provision 

of temporary shelter, food, emergency first aid, and other essential life support to 

people, household pets, and service animals in the affected area may be complicated 

by contaminated resources or facilities and impact the ability to quickly transport 

resources into the area.

•Search and rescue (ESF #9): Resources and personnel to perform operational an

tactical activities (e.g., locating, extricating, and providing onsite medical treatment to 

victims trapped in collapsed structures) are limited. 

Decontamination

•Victim decontamination (ESF #8, Public Health and Medical Services): State

local, tribal, and territorial officials retain primary responsibility for victim screening 

and decontamination operations. ESF #8 can provide technical assistance regarding 

how they can expand their capability to meet their decontamination requirements.

•Environmental assessment and decontamination (ESF #10): Incidents involving 

chemical, biological, or radiological weapon of mass destruction (WMD) may create 

significant environmental contamination, resulting in the immediate need to generate 

information on environmental contamination levels to support emergency decision 

making to ensure both public and responder protection.

•Public health and medical support (ESF #8): There is a significant need fo

public health and medical support, including mental health services. In addition, any 

contamination requirement increases the requirement for technical assistance and 

resources.

•Medical equipment and supplies (ESF #8): Shortages of available supplies o

preventive and therapeutic pharmaceuticals and qualified medical personnel to 

administer available prophylaxis are likely.

•Casualty transportation (ESF #8): Federal resources may be required to manage th

injured, exposed victims, and deceased if their numbers are extremely high.

•Public safety and security (ESF #13): Federal resources may be required to augmen

state, tribal, and local governments in protecting the public and securing the impacted 

area. Law enforcement and emergency management officials who normally respond to 

incidents may be among those affected and unable to perform their duties.

•Public information (ESF #15, External Affairs): When state, tribal, and local publi

communications channels are overwhelmed during a catastrophic incident, the federal 

government must immediately provide resources to assist in delivering clear and 

coherent public information guidance and consistent messages to the affected areas.

•Critical infrastructure Support Annex: CIKR include the assets, systems, networks

and functions that are vital to the American way of life. A terrorist attack on CIKR 

or other natural or man-made disaster could significantly disrupt the functioning of 

government and business alike, and produce cascading effects far beyond the physical 

location of the incident.
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Planning Assumptions

•A catastrophic incident will result in large numbers of casualties and/or displace

persons. Priority is given to human lifesaving operations.

•The nature and scope of a catastrophic incident will overwhelm state, tribal, and loca

response capabilities and require immediate federal support.

•A detailed and credible common operating picture will not be achievable for 24 to 4

hours (or longer) after the incident. As a result, response activities may have to begin 

without the benefit of a detailed or complete situation and critical needs assessment.

•The nature and scope of the catastrophic incident will include major natural or manmade hazards including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yiel

explosive attacks and cyber attacks.

•A catastrophic incident has unique characteristics requiring that response plans an

strategies be flexible enough to effectively address emerging needs and requirements.

•A catastrophic incident will occur with little or no warning. Some incidents may b

well underway before detection.

•Multiple incidents will occur simultaneously or sequentially in contiguous an

or noncontiguous areas. Some incidents, such as a biological WMD attack, may be 

dispersed over a large geographic area and lack a defined incident site.

•A catastrophic incident will produce environmental impacts that severely challenge th

ability and capacity of governments and communities to achieve a timely recovery.

•Federal resources must be capable of mobilization and deployment before they ar

requested.

•Large-scale evacuations, organized or self-directed, may occu

•Existing health care systems in the impacted area are expected to be quickl

overwhelmed, requiring evacuation of existing patients. Additionally, those persons 

with special needs, including residents of nursing homes and extended care facilities, 

will require special attention during evacuation. 

•Large numbers of people will be left temporarily or permanently homeless and ma

require prolonged temporary housing.

•A large number of household pets and service animals will require appropriate care

sheltering, medical attention, and transportation.

•A catastrophic incident will have significant international dimensions, includin

impacts on the health and welfare of border community populations, cross-border 

trade, transit, law enforcement coordination, and others.
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DOD Responsibilities

•Search and rescue (with DHS/FEMA, U.S. Coast Guard, and Department of th

Interior).

•Patient movement (with the Department of Health and Human Services

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Appendix F

Terrorist Incidents

Some key understanding is required when discussing terrorist incidents in the homeland. 

According to the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) “does not have the assigned responsibility to stop terrorists from coming 

across our borders, to stop terrorists from coming through U.S. ports, or to stop terrorists from 

hijacking aircraft inside or outside the United States. Nor does DOD have the authority to seek 

out and arrest terrorists in the United States.” These responsibilities belong to the Department of 

Justice.

Excerpt from the National Response Framework (NRF) Terrorism Incident Law 

Enforcement And Investigation Annex, December 2004

Coordinating Agency Cooperating Agencies

Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of Defense

Department of Energy

Department of Health and Human Services

Department of Homeland Security

Department of State

Environmental Protection Agency

Table F-1. 

Purpose

The purpose of this annex is to facilitate an effective federal law enforcement and investigative 

response to all threats or acts of terrorism within the United States, regardless of whether they 

are deemed credible and/or whether they escalate to an incident of national significance. To 

accomplish this, the annex establishes a structure for a systematic, coordinated, unified, timely, 

and effective national law enforcement and investigative response to threats or acts of terrorism 

within the United States.

Policies

The United States regards terrorism as a potential threat to national security, as well as a violent 

criminal act, and applies all appropriate means to combat this danger. In doing so, the United 

States vigorously pursues efforts to deter and pre-empt these crimes and to apprehend and 

prosecute directly or assist other governments in prosecuting individuals who perpetrate or plan 

terrorist attacks.

To ensure the policies established in applicable presidential directives are implemented in a 

coordinated manner, this annex provides overall guidance to federal, state, local, and tribal 

agencies concerning the federal government’s law enforcement and investigative response to 

potential or actual terrorist threats or incidents that occur in the United States, particularly those 

involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or 

high-yield explosive (CBRNE) material.
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Federal Agencies

The law enforcement and investigative response to a terrorist threat or incident within the United 

States is a highly coordinated, multiagency state, local, tribal, and federal responsibility. In 

support of this mission, the following federal agencies have primary responsibility for certain 

aspects of the overall law enforcement and investigative response:

•D

•Department of Energy (DO

•Department of Health and Human Services (HH

•Department of Homeland Security (DH

•Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation (FB

•Environmental Protection Agency (EP

According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, “The Attorney General has lead 

responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or 

groups inside the United States, or directed at U.S. citizens or institutions abroad, where such 

acts are within the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the United States, as well as for related 

intelligence collection activities within the United States, subject to the National Security Act 

of 1947 and other applicable law, Executive Order 12333, and Attorney General-approved 

procedures pursuant to that Executive order. Generally acting through the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, the Attorney General, in cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies 

engaged in activities to protect our national security, shall also coordinate the activities of the 

other members of the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt 

terrorist attacks against the United States. Following a terrorist threat or an actual incident that 

falls within the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, the full capabilities of the United States 

shall be dedicated, consistent with U.S. law and with activities of other Federal departments 

and agencies to protect our national security, to assisting the Attorney General to identify the 

perpetrators and bring them to justice. The Attorney General and the Secretary shall establish 

appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between their two 

departments.”

Although not formally designated under this annex, other federal departments and agencies may 

have authorities, resources, capabilities, or expertise required to support terrorism-related law 

enforcement and investigation operations. Agencies may be requested to participate in federal 

planning and response operations and may be requested to designate liaison officers and provide 

other support as required.
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Deployment/Employment Priorities

In addition to the priorities identified in the National Response Framework (NRF), the law 

enforcement and investigative response to terrorist threats or incidents is based on the following 

priorities: 

•Preserving life or minimizing risk to health, which are the first priorities of operation

•Preventing a threatened act from being carried out or an existing terrorist act fro

being expanded or aggravated.

•Locating, accessing, rendering safe, controlling, containing, recovering, or disposing o

a WMD that has not yet functioned, and disposing of CBRNE material in coordination 

with appropriate departments and agencies (e.g., DOD, DOE, EPA).

•Apprehending and successfully prosecuting perpetrators of terrorist threats or incident

Planning Assumptions and Considerations

In addition to the planning assumptions and considerations identified in the NRF, the law 

enforcement and investigative response to terrorist threats or incidents, particularly those 

involving WMD and CBRNE material, are based on the following assumptions/considerations: 

•A terrorist threat or incident may occur at any time of day with little or no warning

may involve single or multiple geographic areas, and may result in mass casualties.

•The suspected or actual involvement of terrorists adds a complicating dimension t

incident management.

•The response to a threat or actual incident involves FBI law enforcement an

investigative activity as an integrated element.

•In the case of a threat, there may be no incident site, and no external consequences

and, therefore, there may be no need for establishment of incident command system 

(ICS) elements such as an incident command post (ICP) or a joint field office (JFO).

•An act of terrorism, particularly one directed against a large population center withi

the United States involving nuclear, radiological, biological, or chemical materials, 

will have major consequences that can overwhelm the capabilities of local, state, and 

tribal governments to respond and may seriously challenge existing federal response 

capabilities.
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•In the case of a biological attack, the effect may be temporally and geographicall

dispersed, with no determined or defined “incident site.” Response operations may be 

conducted over a multijurisdictional, multistate region.

•A biological attack employing a contagious agent may require quarantine by federal

state, local, and tribal health officials to contain the disease outbreak.

•If appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities are not available an

the area is contaminated with CBRNE or other hazardous materials, it is possible 

that response actions into a contaminated area may be delayed until the material has 

dissipated to a level that is safe for emergency response personnel to operate or until 

appropriate personal protective equipment and capabilities arrive, whichever is sooner.

Situation

The complexity, scope, and potential consequences of a terrorist threat or incident require 

that there be a rapid and decisive capability to resolve the situation. The resolution to an act 

of terrorism demands an extraordinary level of coordination of law enforcement, criminal 

investigation, protective activities, emergency management functions, and technical expertise 

across all levels of government. The incident may affect a single location or multiple locations, 

each of which may be an incident scene, a hazardous scene, and/or a crime scene simultaneously.

Command and Control

The FBI is the lead agency for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats and 

intelligence collection activities within the United States. Investigative and intelligence activities 

are managed by the FBI from a command post or joint operations center (JOC). The command 

post or JOC coordinates the necessary federal law enforcement assets required to respond to and 

resolve the threat or incident with state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies.

The FBI special agent in charge (SAC) of the local field office establishes a command post to 

manage the threat based upon a graduated and flexible response. This command post structure 

generally consists of three functional groups: command, operations, and operations support, and 

is designed to accommodate participation of other agencies, as appropriate (see Figure F-1).

When the threat or incident exceeds the capabilities and resources of the local FBI field office, 

the SAC can request additional assistance from regional and national assets to augment existing 

capabilities. In a terrorist threat or incident that may involve a WMD or CBRNE material, the 

traditional FBI command post will transition to a JOC.

When, in the determination of the secretary of homeland security, in coordination with the 

attorney general, the incident becomes an incident of national significance and a JFO is 

established, the JOC becomes a section of the JFO and the FBI SAC becomes the senior federal 

law enforcement official in the JFO coordination group. In this situation, the JOC consequence 

management group is incorporated into the appropriate components of the JFO.
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Figure F-1. FBI command post/JOC

The command group of the JOC provides recommendations and advice to the FBI SAC 

regarding the development and implementation of strategic decisions to resolve the situation. It is 

responsible for approving the deployment and employment of law enforcement investigative and 

intelligence resources. The JOC command group includes senior officials with decision-making 

authority from local, state, and federal agencies, as appropriate, based upon the circumstances of 

the threat or incident.

Specialized Teams

The domestic emergency support team is a specialized interagency team composed of subjectmatter experts from the FBI, the DHS/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DOD, DOE, HHS, and EPA. It provides guidance to 

the FBI SAC concerning WMD threats and actual incidents.

Operations Group

The operations group handles all investigative, intelligence, and operational functions related 

to the threat, critical incident, or special event. Each unit within the operations group provides 

expertise in a specific functional area that is important in the overall resolution of the incident. 

Local, state, and federal law enforcement specialty units assigned to assist with field operations 

during the threat, incident, or special event coordinate their activities with the appropriate FBI 

field operations units through the JOC. Federal government mission-specific units are designated 

to help the FBI maintain respective chains of command and coordinate activities through 

representation in the JOC.
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Operations Support Group

The operations support group units designated within the JOC are based upon the specific needs 

of the threat, critical incident, or special event. The personnel who staff these units are subjectmatter experts in a number of specialized areas. Operations support group units can include 

administrative, logistics, legal, media, liaison, communications, and information management. 

The mission of operations support group units is to support the investigative, intelligence, and 

operational functions of the JOC. The administrative and logistics units have responsibilities 

that are similar to the finance and logistics sections in the ICS. However, they are tasked with 

managing only the activities related to the law enforcement investigative, intelligence, and 

operational functions; they do not manage the administrative and logistics functions associated 

with the overall incident.

DOD Support

Requests for DOD assistance for law enforcement and criminal investigation during the incident 

come from the attorney general to the secretary of defense through the DOD executive secretary. 

Once approved, the order is transmitted either directly to the unit involved or through the 

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The FBI SAC informs the principal federal official (PFO), 

if one has been designated, when requesting this additional assistance.

Priorities

Prior to an actual WMD or CBRNE incident, law enforcement, intelligence, and investigative 

activities generally have priority. When an incident results in the use of WMD or CBRNE 

material, rescue and life-safety activities generally have priority. Activities may overlap or 

run concurrently during the incident management, and are dependent on the threat and/or the 

strategies for responding to the incident.

When an incident occurs and an ICP is established on-scene, FBI personnel integrate into the 

ICP to enhance the ability of the FBI to carry out its mandated mission (see Figure F-2). Three 

specific positions within an ICP are provided. The first FBI Special Agent (SA) or joint terrorism 

task force member responding receives an initial briefing from the incident commander or 

his/her designee and works closely with the incident commander as a member of the unified 

command. The FBI representative then informs the local field office of the current situation and, 

if necessary, requests additional assets.
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Legend:

EMS: Emergency Medical Services

Figure F-2. On-scene coordination

References

National Response Framework (NRF) Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement And Investigation Annex, December 

2004.

Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, DOD.

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Appendix G

Mass Evacuation Incidents

Excerpt from the National Response Framework 

Mass Evacuation Incident Annex, June 2008.

Coordinating Agency Cooperating Agencies:

Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Department of Agriculture 

Department of Commerce 

Department of Defense 

Department of Energy 

Department of Health and Human Services 

Department of Homeland Security 

Department of Justice 

Department of Transportation 

Department of Veterans Affairs 

General Services Administration 

American Red Cross 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

Corporation for National and Community Service

Table G-1

Purpose

The Mass Evacuation Incident Annex to the National Response Framework (NRF) provides an 

overview of mass evacuation functions, agency roles and responsibilities, and overall guidelines 

for the integration of federal, state, tribal, and local support in the evacuation of large numbers of 

people in incidents requiring a coordinated federal response.

Scope

This annex:

•Establishes the criteria under which federal support to mass evacuations is provide

•Provides a concept of operations for federal-level mass evacuation suppor

•Identifies the agencies/organizations involved in a federally supported mass evacuatio

•Defines the roles and responsibilities of federal entities in planning, preparing for, an

conducting mass evacuations in support of state, tribal, and local authorities.

•Identifies guidelines to improve coordination among federal, state, tribal, and loca

authorities when federal evacuation support is required.
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Authorities 

•Homeland Security Act of 20

•Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law 93-28

•Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, Management of Domestic Inciden

•Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 20

•Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards Act of 20

•Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) of 19

•Sections 504 and 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amend

•Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19

•Age Discrimination Act of 19

•Executive Order 13166, Improving Access to Services for Persons With Limite

English Proficiency

•Executive Order 13347, Individuals With Disabilities in Emergency Preparedne

Policies

The Department of Homeland Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (DHS/FEMA) 

will primarily augment state, tribal, and local government plans and operations and secondarily 

be capable of implementing a federally supported evacuation and/or a federalized evacuation 

when requested or required.

Under the ADA, transportation providers must permit passengers with disabilities to be 

accompanied by their service animals. 

DHS/FEMA recognizes and commits to a government-to-government relationship with American 

Indian and Alaska Native tribal governments.

Planning assumptions

Federal evacuation measures will be taken:

•When state, tribal, or local governments indicate that their resources may or hav

become overwhelmed and the governor(s) or tribal official(s) request federal assistance.

•In catastrophic incidents when state and local governments are incapacitated, and th

president directs that federal mass evacuation support is required.

State authorities in affected areas, in conjunction with authorities in other states, will decide on 

the destinations for evacuees and will regulate the flow of transportation assets accordingly.
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Federal agencies, working with state, tribal, and local governments, will ensure the governor(s) 

of state(s) receiving evacuees agree to accept these individuals prior to evacuation.

The incident may cause significant disruption to the area’s critical transportation infrastructure, 

hampering evacuation operations.

State, tribal, and local governments recognize there is substantial need to coordinate with 

federal support agencies on population movement. Federal agencies will coordinate their actions 

with state, local, and tribal governments. Federal agencies will support state, tribal, and local 

governments to ensure the governors of the states receiving evacuees from the affected states 

agree to accept these individuals prior to evacuation.

State authorities in affected areas, in conjunction with authorities in other states, will decide on 

the destinations for evacuees and will regulate the flow of transportation assets accordingly.

Federal resource requirements for a precautionary evacuation are based on the expected 

magnitude of the event and request of the governors of the potentially impacted states. State 

policies and guidelines governing household pet evacuations are utilized when incorporating 

household pet issues into evacuations. State, tribal, and local planners are aware that individuals 

may choose to not evacuate if directed to leave their animals behind.

Residents of the evacuated area will need to return to the area post-event if possible. Plans and 

methods are necessary to facilitate return of evacuated residents.

Members of the special needs population may require additional support or assistance in certain 

functional areas.

Key Considerations

•Lead time required to conduct mass evacuations: Plans may be activated as muc

as 72 hours prior to an evacuation. Resources may need to be mobilized as much as 

48 hours prior to the start of evacuations to have sufficient capacity in place once the 

evacuation order is given.

•Limits in weather forecasting: The variables in forecasting that track, intensity, an

forward speed of tropical weather systems (the most likely and frequent reason for 

evacuations) make it extremely difficult for decision makers to commit costly resources 

as much as five days before the onset of tropical storm-force winds. In some cases, 

storms at this stage are not sufficiently well formed to indicate the need for evacuation.

•Interdependencies between shelters and transportation: The transportatio

solution to a mass evacuation is based on the numbers of people needing evacuation, 

availability of privately owned transportation, numbers of evacuees with special 

mobility and medical needs, the time available to conduct operations, and the distance 

to (and availability of) shelters. It is critical to identify and predesignate general 

and special needs population shelters as close to the embarkation points as safely 

possible. The designation and distance to household pet shelters or shelters that will 

accommodate pets are equally important to the success of an evacuation.
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•Special needs of children: It is critically important to recognize the special need

of children during mass evacuations. Reunification of children separated from their 

parents will be an issue during evacuation, and consideration must be given to 

accomplishing reunification.

•Special needs populations: Accommodations must be made for the special need

of the citizens of the affected area; including assistance in communication, mobility, 

maintaining independence, and medical care.

○

Service animals: The ADA defines service animals as any guide dog, sig

dog, or other animal trained to provide assistance to an individual with a 

disability including, but not limited to, guiding individuals with impaired 

vision, alerting individuals with impaired hearing to intruders or sounds, 

providing minimal protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair, or fetching 

dropped items. Service animals have access to the same facilities as their 

humans.

○

Other animals: The requirements for transporting and arranging for shel

and care of animals when they need to be relocated from their homes are of 

significant importance.

○

Household pets: Planning for and accommodating household pets a

component of mass evacuations is critical. History demonstrates that many 

residents will refuse to evacuate or resist rescue if they are forced to leave 

their household pets behind. Through contracts with bus and air carriers, DHS/

FEMA will evacuate service animals accompanied by owners or keepers, 

consistent with federal laws and within the terms and conditions of relevant 

transportation contracts. According to Emergency Support Function (ESF) 

#6, Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing and Human Services will 

encourage state, tribal, and local entities to plan for the co-location of pet 

shelters near general populations when possible during federal evacuations 

to receiving cities and states. ESF #6 personnel will provide coordination of 

animal owner identification, tracking, reunification, and social support. ESF #6 

personnel will also coordinate pet issues, including pet evacuation, care, and 

sheltering, with appropriate government and nongovernment support agencies. 

ESF #8, Public Health and Medical Services, will assist in providing emergency 

veterinary care for sheltered and rescued animals, epidemiological monitoring 

and reporting of emergency-related animal health issues, and management of 

bites and injuries to humans. ESF #15, External Affairs, allows for coordination 

between ESF #15 personnel and state, tribal, and local authorities to ensure that 

animal evacuations, response instructions, and status updates are communicated 

appropriately and in a timely manner.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

○

Environmental contamination: Evacuation efforts may be impacted w

they are taken in response to a large-scale hazardous materials (HAZMAT) 

incident. Evacuation decision makers should consult with available HAZMAT 

officials as appropriate regarding the location of embarkation sites and 

evacuation routes.

○

Victim decontamination: State, tribal, and local officials retain prim

responsibility for victim screening and decontamination operations when 

necessary in response to a HAZMAT incident. Federal resources are limited and 

are coordinated through ESF #8.

•Events with and without warning: The concept of operations applies to events fo

which there are warnings (including hurricanes and flooding) as well as events for 

which there are no warnings (such as industrial accidents and terrorist attacks).

•Critical infrastructure: A mass evacuation could present a range of implication

for many of the critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) sectors both within 

the impacted areas and across the nation. The evacuation could directly affect CIKR 

operations, supply lines, and/or distribution systems. See the NRF CIKR Support 

Annex for details.

Concept of Operations 

Situation

The conduct of evacuation operations is generally a state, tribal, and local responsibility. 

However, there are circumstances that exceed the capabilities of these jurisdictions to support 

mass evacuations. When practical and possible, precautionary mass evacuation support is 

provided before an event to move citizens away from a potential incident when warning is 

available and after an event when conditions are such that it is unsafe for citizens to remain in the 

area. In instances where federal support is required, DHS/FEMA will coordinate federal support 

with the state/tribal government.

General

Federal support to mass evacuation operations will be provided at the state/tribal level and 

scaled to the incident. Evacuation from a single state may be supported from the state emergency 

operations center, regional response coordination center (RRCC), or a joint field office. 

Multistate incidents could be coordinated from an RRCC. Large-scale evacuations resulting 

from a catastrophic event will require national-level coordination. Regardless of the scale of the 

incident, coordination among numerous command entities will be required to carry out the major 

functions of evacuation operations. 
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Functions

Federal mass evacuation support will require the cooperation of many different ESFs:

•ESF #1 provides transportation technical assistance and analysis for evacuatio

operations and evacuation route conditions.

•ESF #3 ensures debris removal and clearance of evacuation route

•ESF #5 provides situational awareness of and coordination of mass evacuation effort

•ESF #6 provides information and coordination in the non-medical mass care aspect

required for mass evacuations, including housing and human services.

•ESF #7 provides goods/services to support evacuation efforts and transportatio

services.

•ESF #8 provides supplemental assistance to state, tribal, and local governments i

identifying the public health and medical needs of victims.

•ESF #11 provides information and coordination for the evacuation of household pets

•ESF #13 provides support of state, tribal, and local public safety and security measure

(e.g., crowd control, traffic direction, and control of contra flow lanes used in 

evacuations).

•ESF #15 ensures that sufficient federal assets are deployed to the field to provid

accurate, coordinated, and timely information to affected audiences.

Coordination and Communications

A mass evacuation, by its scope, may result in evacuees crossing jurisdictional lines. When 

federal evacuation support is required, the existing federal coordinating structures will be used to 

provide coordination of the operation.

All facilities and related support necessary for operations are sourced through the following ESFs 

when they are activated and requested to do so.

Transportation

The transportation function is responsible for ensuring the evacuation of all affected populations 

by providing resources to transport those individuals and households that do not have the means 

to self-evacuate and ensuring sufficient transportation assets, including accessible transportation 

assets, are available.

DHS/FEMA maintains contracts capable of providing bus and aviation evacuation support 

and can contract more. If commercial transportation is not available, additional transportation 
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assistance may be requested from the Department of Defense (DOD) and other federal 

departments. When DHS/FEMA requests DOD support, DOD may provide support on an asavailable basis when approved by the secretary of defense.

DHS/FEMA is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources are available for evacuation 

efforts, including but not limited to ensuring fuel and basic vehicle service are available along 

evacuation routes and vehicle location devices are available for federal evacuation vehicles.

DHS/FEMA, in conjunction with ESF #1, is responsible for coordinating evacuation routes 

with state, tribal, and local agencies and, in particular, determining the status of transportation 

infrastructure to be used for evacuation.

ESF #1 will facilitate coordination regarding the impact of outflow of persons and traffic on the 

entry of response teams and supplies into the affected area.

DHS/FEMA supports mass evacuations through several activities, including processing and 

coordinating requests for the movement of goods, equipment, and responders through ESF #7.

DHS/U.S. Coast Guard, in cooperation with ESF #1, coordinates planning and executing of 

evacuations across bodies of water.

Fuels

The fuels function ensures that adequate fuel supplies are available in an evacuation. 

Considerations include availability of fuel for individuals who are self-evacuating, availability 

of fuels for government-supplied transportation vehicles, and provision of fuel to emergency 

response vehicles along evacuation routes. DHS/FEMA coordinates with:

•State, tribal, and local governments and ESF #12 to ensure that adequate supplies o

fuels are pre-positioned along evacuation routes.

•ESF #12 and state, tribal, and local governments to ensure that special arrangement

are made for fuel staging or deliveries along evacuation routes.

•ESF #12 and ESF #13 to set up and regulate the use of separate refueling sites for th

use of emergency responders during an evacuation.

The Department of Energy, ESF #12, or other authorized government entities may initiate 

various waiver requests or actions by other federal agencies to facilitate evacuation, including:

•Driver-hour waivers from the Department of Transportation (DOT

•Truck weight-limit waivers from state DOT

•Jones Act waivers from the Department of Commerce or DH

•Fuel-quality waivers from the Environmental Protection Agenc
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Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services

The ESF #6 mission is to provide sheltering/housing, feeding, bulk distribution of essential 

items, and family reunification support and resources to individuals and households that do not 

have the personal resources or access to personal resources to meet these needs. In an evacuation, 

this function must be carefully coordinated with agencies providing evacuation services.

•DHS/FEMA coordinates with state, tribal, and local entities, as well as the suppor

agencies under ESF #6, to ensure adequate shelter and care facilities, including those 

for individuals with special needs, are available for receiving evacuees.

•ESF #6 will provide support to state, tribal, and local evacuation efforts by facilitatin

requests for food and shelter supplies, and security in support of mass evacuations.

•ESF #6 will work with state lead agencies for mass care prior to, during, and after a

incident to identify potential host states.

DHS/FEMA voluntary agency liaisons (VALs) will coordinate with voluntary agencies affiliated 

with National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD), other nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs), and private-sector entities for federally supported evacuation in affected 

and receiving states.

Public health and medical support

The medical care and special needs requirements of evacuees must be identified and appropriate 

support provided. This support includes oversight of specialized transportation for evacuees 

with medical and functional needs, care for evacuees whose needs cannot be accommodated in 

general population shelters, and monitoring support for individuals at pickup points.

•ESF #8 supports state, tribal, and local health care authorities by providing medica

support at staging areas and pickup points to perform triage of citizens prior to 

evacuation.

•ESF #8 will coordinate medical support with special needs shelters as requeste

•ESF #8 supports state, tribal, and local governments in the evacuation of patients

including those in hospitals, hospices, and nursing homes as well as individuals who 

are identified at evacuation centers as having medical problems. ESF #8 is responsible 

for the evacuation of patients who are treated within the National Disaster Medical 

System (NDMS) en route to, from, or at field facilities.

•ESF #6 will coordinate emergency first aid, and ESF #8 will coordinate emergenc

medical care with state, tribal, and local agencies at the staging areas and pickup points.

•ESF #8 will support ESF #11 to coordinate with state, tribal, and local government

to provide veterinary emergency first aid and care at evacuation staging areas/pickup 

points. Additionally, animals will be screened at staging areas/pickup points to confirm 

health status and to identify potential carriers of zoonotic diseases.
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Public safety and security

State and local law enforcement agencies have primary responsibility for public safety and 

security during a mass evacuation. State, tribal, and local law enforcement agencies will be 

conducting operations in accordance with their evacuation plans and protocols. However, they 

could rapidly become overwhelmed and require logistics or operational support from within 

their states, from other states pursuant to mutual aid and assistance compacts, or from the federal 

government through ESF #13.

ESF #13 may involve assisting state, tribal, and local governments with the following 

evacuation-related functions:

•  Security assessments of pre-identified transportation facilities.

•  Site security at designated evacuation locations.

•  Traffic control and/or transportation security duties.

•  Screening of evacuees for prohibited weapons.

•  Force protection.

•  General planning and technical assistance.

In addition, ESF #13 coordinates with state, tribal, and local authorities to ensure security 

and traffic/crowd control are provided at staging areas/pickup points and evacuation vehicles

if requested. It may also provide requested support in such areas as public safety, security 

assessment, access control, and specialized security resources. On federal property, ESF #13 

coordinates with federal agencies to provide security for shelter facilities for evacuees.

Department of Defense Responsibilities

Provide evacuation support for patient movement under the NDMS on an as-requested/asavailable basis when approved by the secretary of defense. After activation of NDMS, DOD may 

assist ESF #8 in the transportation of patients with specific medical needs on a by-request/asavailable basis. DOD regulates all patients moved by them under NDMS. As such, DOD utilizes 

a tracking system under U.S. Northern Command for tracking the subset of patients moved by

NDMS. If commercial transportation is not available, (upon approval by the secretary of defense) 

DOD may also provide additional transportation assistance for general evacuation under ESF #1.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Responsibilities

•  Provides logistics resources to support the preparation and execution of ESF #3 

activities.

•  As part of its execution of ESF #3 responsibilities, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

(USACE) may provide assistance with the establishment of field offices when

requested by DHS/FEMA.

•  Provides support to repair damages to roads, bridges, and other structures along 

evacuation routes.
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Figure G-1. Mass evacuation process flow
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Appendix H

Nongovernmental Organizations

This appendix refers to domestic nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that will assist within 

the United States. It does not address international NGOs that assist with stability, security, 

transition, and reconstruction operations.

Overview

NGOs are often referred to as private voluntary organizations, nonprofits, charities, and 

humanitarian aid organizations. Each is unique with different objectives, missions, operating 

procedures, and capacities. Many are religiously oriented, regionally based, technically 

specialized, or community-based organizations. Most are small, though some are well known 

with international umbrellas and national chapters.

NGOs respond to natural and man-made disasters and are essential to providing relief. They 

are founded, developed, and managed by civilians who are highly professional and trained, 

skilled, and educated in disaster management, public health, logistics, technology, water 

sanitation, communications, medicine, geology, sociology, and psychology. NGO staffs are from 

different backgrounds and training, usually with a small professional staff augmented by on-call 

volunteers.

Some are for-profit; some are not-for-profit. Their funding comes from numerous sources, 

including government agencies, grants, private contributions, and gifts-in-kind from companies 

or other organizations.

NGOs and the Military

NGOs and the military should not work against each other in disasters if they want to maximize 

utility and functionality. Each has a role that is complementary, not contrary, to the other. 

Communications can be achieved and in some cases, coordination between NGOs and military 

units can be achieved.

NGOs however, are not required to coordinate with the military and may prefer to remain 

autonomous for the following reasons:

•Some NGOs maintain large communications capabilities, and may use the sam

technologies as military units when there is no local infrastructure.

•NGO professionals often have more field experience in domestic disaster relief than th

military.

•NGO professional staffs tend to be highly educated with decades of experienc

applicable to disaster response.
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Coordination in a disaster between NGOs and the military should not be equated to command 

and control. Military command structure is usually very different from the work structures of 

civilian organizations, and the interface of the two is sometimes challenging. The Center for 

Lessons Learned recommends identifying a liaison within the NGO community to help manage 

the interface.

Domestic Disaster Response NGOs

Many NGOs focus only on disaster response. This means they arrive at the earliest possible time 

during or after an emergency, implement emergency response programs, and leave shortly after 

the first stages are complete. They focus on being nimble and efficient and operating with very 

little red tape.

Amateur Radio Emergency Service (www.fcc.gov/pshs/services/amateur.html) 

Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES) is an organization of amateur radio operators 

overseen by the American Radio Relay League. ARES amateur radio operators train to provide 

communications during emergencies. ARES has formal agreements to provide communications 

for several national nonprofits, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and with state 

and local emergency management organizations.

AmeriCares (www.americare.org) 

AmeriCares responds to disasters to help reduce suffering and restore health to communities 

throughout the country. AmeriCares has reached out to thousands of Americans affected by 

weather-related emergencies, including Hurricane Katrina, tornadoes in the Midwest, California 

wildfires, flooding in the Northwest and the mile-wide tornado that destroyed almost all of 

Greensburg, Kansas. AmeriCares responds in times of disease outbreaks and man-made disasters. 

On 9/11, AmeriCares sent an emergency medical team to the site of the World Trade Center 

attacks.

American Red Cross (www.redcross.org)

Since its founding in 1881 by Clara Barton, the American Red Cross (ARC) has been the nation’s 

premier emergency response organization. In addition to providing aid to victims of national 

disasters, it is part of a worldwide movement that offers neutral humanitarian care to the victims 

of war. 

Catholic Charities USA (http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/NetCommunity/Page.

aspx?pid=305) 

The disaster response section of Catholic Charities USA provides assistance to communities by 

addressing the crisis and recovery needs of local families. Catholic Charities agencies emphasize 

ongoing and long-term recovery services for individuals and families, including temporary 

housing assistance for low-income families, counseling programs for children and the elderly, 

and special counseling for disaster relief workers.
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Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (www.crwrc.org). 

Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) disaster response services volunteers 

help clear debris, assess needs, and rebuild homes after disasters strike. CRWRC volunteers, 

known as “the green shirts,” are visible and respected throughout many disaster-affected 

communities.

Church World Service (www.churchworldservice.org). 

In disaster preparedness, response, and recovery in the U.S., Church World Service (CWS) works 

with and through local faith-based and community organizations. CWS has been instrumental 

in helping communities along the U.S. Gulf Coast recover following devastating hurricanes, 

has partnered with local organizations that helped families rebuild following flooding in the 

Midwest, and has worked with groups that organize and build networks to prepare and plan for 

disaster before it strikes.

Convoy of Hope (http://www.convoyofhope.org/go/what/disaster_response) 

Convoy of Hope is a “first responder” organization in disaster relief. With a fleet of tractortrailers, a 300,000-square-foot warehouse, a ham radio network, a high-tech mobile command 

center, and well-planned points of distribution model, Convoy of Hope has become an active and 

efficient disaster relief organization. It also has a program to educate communities to prepare for 

and respond to disasters.

Focus Humanitarian Assistance/Aga Khan Development Network (www.akdn.org/focus.

asp). 

Since 1994, Focus Humanitarian Assistance (FOCUS) has provided a full spectrum of 

emergency response activities from first response to extended relief and recovery support. 

When FOCUS responds to a disaster, it is able to call upon a prepositioned pool of volunteers 

from within the Ismaili Muslim community in the country of the intervention. Harnessing local 

manpower for packaging, delivering, and distributing humanitarian relief provides integral 

support to staff on the ground and ensures that those in direct contact with affected communities 

are soundly equipped with local knowledge of the terrain, culture, and language.

Habitat for Humanity (www.habitat.org) 

Habitat’s disaster response focuses on the housing needs that arise from natural disasters and 

humanitarian emergency conflicts. Habitat offers expertise in technical information, program 

design and implementation, and disaster response policies, protocols and procedures. Habitat 

also provides support and informational resources for disaster mitigation and preparedness, 

helping communities in disaster-prone areas protect themselves against future threats.

Hands On Disaster Response (www.hodr.org) 

Hands On Disaster Response (HODR) is a United States-based, volunteer-driven, nonprofit 

organization with 501(c)3 certified NGO dedicated to timely disaster response and relief. 

Its mission is to apply volunteer resources to aid survivors on natural disasters. HODR has 

responded to 14 disasters, including five in the United States.
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International Critical Incident Stress Foundation (www.icisf.org) 

The mission of the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, Inc. is to provide leadership, 

education, training, consultation, and support services in comprehensive crisis intervention and 

disaster behavioral health services to the emergency response professions, other organizations, 

and communities worldwide.

International Relief Teams (www.irteams.org) 

International Relief Teams (IRT) offers both immediate and long-term relief to disaster victims. 

IRT’s skilled reconstruction teams repair the homes of uninsured, low-income families and 

elderly residents who have sustained damage from hurricanes and floods in the United States.

Medical Teams International (www.nwmedicalteams.org) 

Medical Teams International is a Christian, global health organization whose mission is to 

empower communities to live full and healthy lives. It works with grassroots organizations, 

churches, and ministries of health to ensure projects fit seamlessly into local contexts. Medical 

Teams International volunteers, staff and supporters assist people suffering from disaster, 

conflict, and poverty in 70 countries. While the work of Medical Teams International focuses 

primarily on developing countries, it continues to respond to large-scale disasters in the United 

States.

National Emergency Response Team (http://nert-usa.org/) 

National Emergency Response Team is committed to the establishment of independent and 

joint ventures to conceive, develop, and implement disaster response services and educational 

programs that coordinate publicly available resources during a crisis situation. 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (www.nvoad.org) 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) is a forum where organizations 

share knowledge and resources throughout the disaster cycle—preparation, response, and 

recovery—to help disaster survivors and their communities. NVOAD is a consortium of 

approximately 50 national organizations and 55 state and territory equivalents. During major 

incidents, NVOAD typically sends representatives to the Department of Homeland Security/

FEMA National Response Coordination Center to represent the voluntary organizations and 

assist in response coordination.

Operation USA (www.opusa.org) 

Operation USA is an international relief agency that helps communities at home and abroad to 

overcome the effects of disasters, disease, and endemic poverty by providing privately funded 

relief, reconstruction, and development aid. Working with grass-roots partners on the ground, 

Operation USA provides material and financial assistance in the face of a disaster and works to 

combat the effects of systemic poverty. Operation USA listens to community voices to determine 

the best ways to assist and stays in the field after many other organizations have left. Operation 

USA supports long-term projects that promote education and health services, sustainable 

development, leadership building, income generating activities, and advocacy for vulnerable 

people worldwide.
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Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (www.fcc.gov/pshs/services/amateur.html) 

Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) provides radio communication for civil 

defense purposes. It is administered by local, county, and state civil defense organizations and is 

supported by FEMA as well as the Federal Communications Commission. The rules that apply 

to RACES are in Section 97.407 of the Commission’s Rules. All communications transmitted in 

RACES must be specifically authorized by the civil defense organization for the area served and 

only certain types of civil defense communications may be transmitted.

Salvation Army (www.salvationarmyusa.org) 

The Salvation Army disaster response programs include spiritual ministry, counseling, 

identification/registration, mobile feeding, congregate feeding, financial assistance, shelter, 

donated materials, basic commodities (food, water, health and sanitary needs, baby and child 

care products, medicines, bedding, etc.), reconstruction, services for volunteers, and advocacy.

Save the Children (www.savethechildren.org) 

The mission of Save the Children is to create lasting, positive change in the lives of children 

in need in the United States and around the world. For domestic disasters, Save the Children’s 

domestic emergencies unit has rapid emergency disaster initiative teams to provide essential 

programs to several communities in need during and after a disaster.

World Emergency Relief (www.wer-us.org) 

World Emergency Relief (WER) offers relief aid for impoverished disaster-struck communities, 

such as those suffering from earthquakes or hurricanes. WER offers disaster-struck communities 

three types of aid relief: (1) Emergency relief addresses basic needs in the first month after a 

disaster. WER’s emergency relief is primarily practical aid in the form of gifts-in-kind such as 

food, clothing and medical supplies; (2) Sustained aid occurs after 45 to 60 days, when supply 

pipelines are reasonably restored; and (3) Development normalizes and improves communities, 

which involves sustainability programs.

References

Lynn Lawry and Grey Frandsen, Guide to Nongovernmental Organizations for the Military, 2d ed., Center for 

Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), Uniformed Services University of Health Sciences 

(USUHS), originally written by Grey Frandsen, Fall 2002; edited and rewritten by Dr. Lynn Lawry, Summer 2009. 

Used by permission of Dr. Lawry.

Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization 

Coordination during Joint Operations, Vol. I and II; Joint Staff, 17 March 2006.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, the White House, 28 February 

2003.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-21, Public Health and Medical Preparedness, the White House, 18 

October 2007.

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Appendix I

Legal Considerations and Law Enforcement

The content of this appendix was extracted from LTC Patrick A. Barnett, (Ed), Domestic 

Operational Law Handbook for Judge Advocates, Center for Law and Military Operations, 20 

July 2009. It was accessed at <http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/clamo>.

Posse Comitatus Act Restrictions

Restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) as they apply to participation by the military in 

civilian law enforcement activities are outlined by Title 10 U.S. Code (U.S.C), Sections 371-

375. These restrictions are divided into three major categories: (1) use of information, (2) use 

of military equipment and facilities, and (3) use of military personnel. Department of Defense 

Directive (DODD) 5525.5 further divides the restrictions on the use of Department of Defense 

(DOD) personnel in civilian law enforcement activities into categories of direct assistance, 

training, expert advice, operation or maintenance of equipment, and other permissible assistance. 

See Figure I-1, below.

In addition to the above categories, 10 U.S.C. Sections 376 and 377 provide further limitations 

on the provision of military support to civilian law enforcement. 10 U.S.C. Section 376 

provides an overarching restriction in the event “such support will adversely affect the military 

preparedness of the United States.” The secretary of defense directed the secretaries of the 

military departments and the directors of the defense agencies to ensure that approval authority 

for the disposition of equipment to civilian law enforcement agencies is vested in those officials 

who can properly assess the impact the disposition will have on military preparedness and 

national security.

Title 10 U.S.C. Section 377 requires civilian law enforcement agencies to reimburse DOD 

for support provided as required by the Economy Act or other applicable law. Civilian law 

enforcement agencies do not have to provide reimbursement for support under this statute if the 

support: (1) is provided in the normal course of military training or operations, or (2) results 

in a benefit to DOD that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained 

through military training or operations. Waiver authority for reimbursements not required by 

law resides with personnel. This authority may be delegated to the secretaries of the military 

departments and the directors of the defense agencies (or designees) on matters within their 

approval authority.
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Figure I-1. PCA restrictions from 10 U.S.C. Sections 371-375 and DODD 5525.5

Use of Information Collected During Military Operations

The use of information collected during military operations is codified in Title 10 U.S.C. Section 

371 and implemented by the secretary of defense in Enclosure 2 of DODD 5525.5. The sharing 

of intelligence information has taken on crucial importance after September 11, 2001. The 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 tasked the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 

with establishing procedures to share information with local, State and Federal entities. The 

president is to ensure that the procedures apply to “all agencies of the Federal Government.” 

Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 371, the secretary of defense may provide information collected 

during the normal course of military operations to federal, state, and local law enforcement 

agencies if the information is relevant to a violation of federal or state law under the jurisdiction 

of these officials. The secretary of defense shall, to the maximum extent possible, take into 

account the needs of civilian law enforcement officials when planning and executing military 

training and operations. Further, Section 371 provides that the secretary of defense shall ensure, 

to the extent consistent with national security, that intelligence information held by DOD and 

relevant to drug interdiction and other civilian law enforcement matters is promptly provided to 

the appropriate civilian law enforcement officials.

Enclosure 2 of DODD 5525.5 implements the above guidance with some additional restrictions. 

Military departments and defense agencies are generally encouraged to provide law enforcement 

officials any information collected during the normal course of military operations that may 

be relevant to a criminal violation. While the secretary of defense shall take into account the 

needs of civilian law enforcement officials when planning and executing military training 

and operations in accordance with 10 U.S.C. Section 371 above, the planning or creation of 

missions or training for the primary purpose of aiding civilian law enforcement officials is 

prohibited. Law enforcement officials may accompany regularly scheduled training flights as 
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observers, but point to point transportation and training flights for civilian law enforcement 

officials are not authorized. Additionally, the handling of all such information must comply with 

DODD 5240.1, Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect U.S. Persons; DODD 

5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with 

the Department of Defense; and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD 

Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons.

Use of Military Equipment and Facilities

The loan or lease of military equipment to civilians is a difficult legal area. Each military service 

has implemented its own regulations in addition to DODD 5525.5. The Army Regulation on 

point is AR 700-131. 10 U.S.C. Section 372 and Enclosure 3 of DODD 5525.5 address the 

use of military equipment and facilities by civilian law enforcement authorities. Section 372(a) 

allows the secretary of defense to make available equipment (including associated supplies and 

spare parts), base facilities, and research facilities of the DOD to any federal, state, or local 

civilian law enforcement official for law enforcement purposes. The provision of equipment 

and facilities must be made in accordance with all other applicable law. Enclosure 3 of the 

DODD implements this provision and allows military departments and defense agencies to 

make equipment, base facilities, or research facilities available to federal, state, or local law 

enforcement authorities if the assistance does not adversely affect national security or military 

preparedness.

Approval authority under DODD 5525.5 varies based on the type of equipment requested, the 

reason for the request, and whether the equipment will be loaned or leased. The following is a list 

of the approval authorities for various types of equipment and facilities: 

•Approval authority for military assistance in civil disturbances is governed by DOD

3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances.

•Approval authority for assistance to the government of the District of Columbia i

governed by DODD. 5030.46, Assistance to the District of Columbia Government in 

Combating Crime.

•Approval authority for training, expert advice, and personnel to operate and maintai

equipment shall be made in accordance with Enclosure 4 of DODD 5525.5.

•Approval authority for assistance from DOD intelligence components is governed b

DODD 5240.1 and DOD 5240.1-R.

•DODD 5525.5 places approval authority for arms, ammunition, combat vehicles

vessels, and aircraft with the secretaries of the military departments and the directors 

of the defense agencies; however, DODD 3025.15 subsequently reserved approval 

authority to the secretary of defense.

•Approval authorities for loan or lease of other equipment or facilities are the secretarie

of the military departments and the directors of the defense agencies unless the 

authority has been retained at a higher level. The authority of the secretaries of the 

military departments and the directors of the defense agencies may be delegated.
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Service regulations supply additional guidance. For example, security bonds are often required 

before the loan or lease of equipment. Approval authorities may vary depending upon the 

implementing service regulation.

10 U.S.C. Section 372 provides additional guidance for chemical and biological incidents. 

Under Section 372(b), the secretary of defense may make training facilities, sensors, protective 

clothing, antidotes and similar items available to federal, state, or local law enforcement or 

emergency response agencies to prepare for or respond to an emergency involving chemical or 

biological agents. Before making these materials available, however, the secretary of defense 

must make a determination that the items are not reasonably available from another source.

Participation of DOD Personnel in Civilian Law Enforcement Activities

The federal courts have enunciated three tests to determine whether the use of military personnel 

violates the PCA. If any one of these three tests is met, the assistance may be considered a 

violation of the PCA. The first test is whether the actions of military personnel are “active” or 

“passive.” Only the direct, active use of military personnel to enforce the laws is a violation 

of the PCA. The second test is whether the use of military personnel pervades the activities of 

civilian law enforcement officials. Under this test, military personnel must fully subsume the role 

of civilian law enforcement officials. The third test is whether the military personnel subjected 

citizens to the exercise of military power that was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in 

nature. A power “regulatory in nature” is one which controls or directs. A power “proscriptive 

in nature” is one that prohibits or condemns. A power “compulsory in nature” is one that exerts 

some coercive force.

As previously mentioned, in implementing the guidance contained in 10 U.S.C., Chapter 18, 

DODD 5525.5 divides the PCA restrictions regarding the use of military personnel to assist 

civilian law enforcement into five categories: (1) direct assistance, (2) training, (3) expert advice, 

(4) use of DOD personnel to operate or maintain equipment, and (5) other permissible assistance.

DOD personnel involvement in support to civilian law enforcement will often be subject to 

intense scrutiny, such as occurred following the First Army’s and the 82d Airborne Division’s 

support in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and prior to that, the standoff between the 

Branch Davidians and the federal government in Waco, Texas. In advising commanders on the 

permissible use of military personnel in support of civilian law enforcement activities, JAs must 

also consider possible legal ramifications of PCA violations. Evidence may be excluded from use 

at trial and the military may be sued.

Direct Assistance

Prohibited direct assistance

Direct assistance and participation by military personnel in the execution and enforcement of 

the law is the heart of the prohibition of the PCA. Impermissible direct assistance by military 
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personnel in civilian law enforcement activities is codified in 10 U.S.C. Section 375 and 

is implemented as DOD policy by DODD 5525.5. Prohibited direct assistance by military 

personnel includes: 

•Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activit

•A search or seizure

•An arrest, apprehension, stop and frisk, or similar activity

•Use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercove

agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.

Permissible direct assistance

There are several forms of direct assistance by military personnel that are permitted under 

the PCA. The first type of permitted direct assistance is action taken for the primary purpose 

of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States. This category is often 

referred to as the “Military Purpose Doctrine” and covers actions the primary purpose of which 

is to further a military interest. While civilian agencies can receive an incidental benefit, this 

section should be construed narrowly and cannot be used as a subterfuge for getting around 

the PCA. For example, the scheduling of a military exercise for the sole purpose of benefiting 

a civilian law enforcement agency is contrary to the intent of the military purpose doctrine. 

Military actions under the military purpose doctrine include:

•Investigations and other actions related to enforcement of the Uniform Code o

Military Justice (UCMJ).

•Investigations and other actions that are likely to result in administrative proceeding

by DOD, regardless of whether there is a related civil or criminal proceeding.

•Investigations and other actions related to the commander’s inherent authority t

maintain law and order on a military installation or facility.

•Protection of classified military information or equipmen

•Protection of DOD personnel, DOD equipment, and official guests of the DOD

•Such other actions that are undertaken primarily for a military or foreign affair

purpose.

It is important to note that use of military forces in the defense of the U.S. is not support to 

civilian law enforcement agencies. Rather, it is homeland defense under the president’s authority 

as commander in chief under Article II of the Constitution. The use of military forces in a 

national defense role is not subject to the PCA and other restrictions on military participation in 

law enforcement.
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Emergency authority

A second type of direct assistance that may be permitted is action that falls under the “emergency 

authority” of the United States. These actions are taken pursuant to the inherent authority of the 

federal government under the Constitution. Actions permitted in accordance with this authority 

are those necessary to preserve public order and to carry out governmental operations within 

U.S. territorial limits, or otherwise in accordance with applicable law. In such circumstances, 

force may be used if necessary.

“Emergency authority” is reserved for extremely unusual circumstances. Further, it will only 

be used under the guidance of DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances

(MACDIS). DODD 3025.12 states: “Military Forces shall not be used in MACDIS unless 

specifically authorized by the president, except in the following emergency circumstances:

•“When the use of military forces is necessary to prevent loss of life or wanto

destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning and public order. 

That “emergency authority” applies when sudden and unexpected civil disturbances 

(including civil disturbances incident to earthquake, fire, flood, or other such calamity 

endangering life) occur, if duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the 

situation and circumstances preclude obtaining prior authorization by the president, or 

•“When duly constituted state or local authorities are unable or decline to provid

adequate protection for federal property or federal governmental functions, federal 

action (including the use of military forces) is authorized, as necessary, to protect the 

federal property or functions.”

Presidential approval is not a prerequisite to the use of military forces in these two limited 

circumstances. However, DOD officials and military commanders must use all available means 

to obtain presidential authorization through their appropriate chains of command while applying 

emergency authority.

Civil disturbance statutes

The third type of permitted direct assistance by military forces to civilian law enforcement is 

action taken pursuant to DOD responsibilities under the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. Sections 

331-334. These statutes contain express exceptions to the PCA and they relate to the use of 

military forces with respect to insurgency, domestic violence, or conspiracy that hinders the 

execution of state or federal law in specified circumstances. Actions under this authority are 

governed by DODD 3025.12. The Insurrection Act permits the president to use the armed forces 

to enforce the law when:

•There is an insurrection within a state, and the state legislature (or governor if th

legislature cannot be convened) requests assistance from the president.

• A rebellion makes it impracticable to enforce the federal law through ordinary judicia

proceedings.

•An insurrection or domestic violence opposes or obstructs federal law, or so hinder

the enforcement of federal or state laws that residents of that state are deprived of their 

Constitutional rights and the state is unable or unwilling to protect these rights.
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Title 10 U.S.C. Section 334 requires the president to issue a proclamation ordering the insurgents 

to disperse within a certain time before he can use the military to enforce the laws. The president 

issued such a proclamation during the Los Angeles riots.

Other statutory authority

There are several statutes, other than the Insurrection Act, that provide statutory authority for the 

military to assist civilian law enforcement agencies in executing the laws. These statutes permit 

direct military participation in civilian law enforcement, subject to the limitations within the 

respective statutes. This section does not contain detailed guidance. Specific statutes and other 

references must be consulted before determining whether military participation is permissible. 

These statutes include the following:

•Prohibited transactions involving nuclear material (18 U.S.C. Section 831

•Emergency situations involving chemical or biological weapons of mass destructio

(10 U.S.C. Section 382).

•Assistance in the case of crimes against foreign officials, official guests of the Unite

States, and other internationally protected persons (18 U.S.C. Sections 112, 1116).

•Protection of the president, vice president, and other designated dignitaries (18 U.S.C

Section 1751 and the Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976).

•Assistance in the case of crimes against members of Congress (18 U.S.C. Section 351)

•Execution of quarantine and certain health laws (42 U.S.C. Section 97)

•Protection of national parks and certain other federal lands (16 U.S.C. Sections 23, 78

593). 

•Enforcement of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (16 U.S.C

Section 1861[a]).

•Actions taken in support of the neutrality laws (22 U.S.C. Sections 408, 461-462)

•Removal of persons unlawfully present on Indian lands (25 U.S.C. Section 180)

•Execution of certain warrants relating to enforcement of specified civil rights laws (4

U.S.C. Section 1989). 

•Support of territorial governors if a civil disorder occurs (48 U.S.C. Sections 1422

1591). 

•Actions in support of certain customs laws (50 U.S.C. Section 220)
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Rules for the use of Force for Federal Forces

The Standing Rules for the Use of Force (SRUF) provide the operational guidance and establish 

fundamental policies and procedures governing actions taken by DOD forces performing civil 

support missions (e.g., military assistance to civil authorities and military support for civilian law 

enforcement agencies) and routine service functions (including antiterrorism force protection) 

within the U.S. and its territories. It also applies to land-based homeland defense missions 

occurring within the U.S. and its territories. The SRUF also apply to DOD forces, civilians and 

contractors performing law enforcement and security duties at all DOD installations worldwide, 

unless otherwise directed by the secretary of defense. The SRUF supersede Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.02, Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) for DOD Personnel 

Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the 

United States, the rules for the use of force in the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot),

and the use of force guidance contained in DODD 5210.56, Enclosure 2.

The SRUF apply to Title 10 forces performing missions both for homeland defense and defense 

support to civil authorities. These rules do not apply to National Guard forces in either state 

active duty or Title 32 status. JAs should coordinate with their National Guard counterparts when 

operating in a joint environment to confirm the RUF the National Guard is using.

Service members need to understand the legal, policy and practical limitations for the use of 

force. The use of force for domestic mission accomplishment is constrained or limited by federal 

law and the SRUF.

While there are some very significant differences, the development, training, and application 

of the RUF and the rules of engagement for overseas contingency operations can be similar. 

The SRUF provide the template for training RUF for domestic operations. Development of 

hypothetical scenarios will assist in posing the ultimate question of whether or not the service 

member may use force, up to and/or including deadly force, against someone or something. 

Often in training scenarios, the solution is not found in the applicable RUF but rather in the rules 

for when a service member can use force in self-defense and identifying either a hostile act or 

demonstration of hostile intent. It is imperative to ensure commanders, as well as the service 

members who execute the commander’s plans, understand the potential limits on self-defense 

when operating as part of a unit. Unit commanders always retain the inherent right and obligation 

to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unless 

otherwise directed by the unit commander, service members may exercise individual self-defense 

in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. When individuals are assigned and 

acting as part of a unit, individual self-defense becomes a subset of unit self-defense, and the unit 

commander may limit individual self-defense by members of the unit.

Use of force practice is one of the few areas in which the legal competence of the JAs can 

potentially have life or death consequences for service members and civilians. Therefore, it is 

imperative that JAs understand and apply legal and practical considerations when practicing in 

this area. This chapter will discuss the role of JAs in use of force, the practical realities involved 

in use of force incidents that are often not included in legal references, the legal standard for 

Federal use of force, the existing Army policies on use of force, the potential legal liability 

involved in use of force, as well as other issues.
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Training

Many service members have not been trained on domestic law applicable to the use of force 

and, as a consequence, do not understand many of the policy requirements imposed by DOD 

and Department of the Army decisions. Additional key concepts such as hostile act and hostile 

intent are often misapplied or used interchangeably. As such, it is critical that JAs understand the 

terminology and are capable of training these concepts in a straightforward manner. In addition, 

very few service members receive training on the RUF or the legal and policy aspects of the 

investigations and litigation that may follow a use of force incident. This increases the challenge 

for JAs preparing units for domestic operations.

The JA must also consider the nature of the threat that our service members might face. Service 

members have to try to differentiate between aggressors employing various levels of force 

threats, those who do not present a direct threat but against whom force is authorized, and 

innocent civilians.

An attacker will generally have the service member at a disadvantage. He will almost always 

have the initiative and sometimes will have the element of surprise. One of the accepted 

principles of violent confrontations is that the attacker’s “action” will defeat a “reaction” of 

comparable speed by the service member.

SRUF will normally include the following:

•  Force is used only as a last resort.

•  Deadly force is to be used only when all lesser means have failed or cannot be 

reasonably employed, only in limited purposes.

•  Deadly force extends to the defense of other non-DOD personnel who are in the 

vicinity and the use of deadly force is directly related to the assigned mission. This 

includes the prevention of murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault.

•  Deadly force may be used to protect assets vital to national security, national critical 

infrastructure, and inherently dangerous property (missiles, rockets, ammunition, etc.).

•  Service members may use deadly force when it appears reasonably necessary to 

prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided there is probable cause to believe that 

the prisoner committed or attempted to commit a serious offense. Serious offense is 

defined as one that involves imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm or an

offense that would pose an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to DOD 

forces or others in the vicinity.

•  Verbal warnings are mandatory for a fleeing criminal but not necessarily for an

attacking one.

•  The individual right of self defense may be restricted.

Service members, their leaders, and the planners who draft the RUF for domestic operations face 

potential personal liability for any unlawful use of force by a service member during a domestic 

operation. This includes federal and state civil and criminal proceedings after an incident. In 
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addition, such incidents are often accompanied by a variety of investigations that can result 

in adverse administrative consequences. Service members could be held criminally liable for 

unconstitutional or illegal use of force before a court-martial, a Federal District Court, and in 

some cases a state court. Service members and commanders involved in use of force incidents 

will probably have less legal and practical protection than their counterparts in Federal law 

enforcement. The case law defining the role of service members using force during homeland 

security operations is extremely limited.

Rules for the Use of Force for the National Guard

The National Guard is a state government entity, except when called or ordered to federal 

active duty. The effect of this Constitutionally-derived status is perhaps greatest in the RUF 

for the National Guard. The policies of the DOD and service regulations governing RUF apply 

to elements of that Department, but not to the states. As a result, the law that is the basis for 

National Guard RUF is the criminal law of the state in which a National Guard unit is performing 

the mission.

Most National Guard operations in support of civil authorities are in support of state civil 

authorities and are undertaken on a state-funded basis, usually referred to as “state active 

duty” (SAD). These types of operations include relief from natural disasters, quelling of or 

providing security during civil disturbances and assistance to civil authorities during other 

state emergencies, such as strikes at state institutions. An exception would be the 2001/2002 

National Guard airport security mission (hereinafter airport security mission). This operation was 

performed in Title 32 status. As explained in detail in Chapter 2, both SAD and Title 32 statuses 

are non-federal statuses, to which state law applies. All 54 States and territories secured airports 

with National Guard personnel and applied its own criminal law. Consequently, over 50 different 

RUF were used in the airport security mission. Although most RUF addressed similar subjects, 

the specific implementation of these subjects varied from state to state.

When the National Guard executes Title 32 or SAD mission that utilizes RUF, the subjects 

appropriate for the RUF are derived from the mission operation plan or operation order 

(OPLAN/OPORD). The RUF covers core state criminal law subjects such as the right of self 

defense, including the retreat doctrine, necessary warning, proportionality, and location issues, 

for instance the defender’s home or work place. The RUF should also address the right to carry 

and discharge firearms, the authority of National Guard personnel as peace officers (based on 

state law), and the authority for apprehension, search, and seizure. Whether, and the extent to 

which, these basic RUF subjects are included in a given OPLAN/OPORD is a mission-dependent 

decision.

Subjects appropriate in all RUF include:

•Authority to modify the RUF. If adjutants general have delegated that authority t

subordinate commanders, then the RUF must clearly state which part(s) of the RUF 

may be changed, in what manner and by whom. If the RUF contain no delegation of 

authority, then either the adjutant general or state-level task force commander retain the 

authority. If authority to change the RUF is wholly denied, including the authority to 

further restrict the RUF, then that should also be made clear.

•Right of self-defense, even if the Guardsmen are unarmed, based on mission analysi

and state law.
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•Right to defend other

•Duty to retrea

•Use of deadly force to prevent escape

•Requirement or limit of warnings prior to employment of deadly force in self-defens

•Requirement for the use of proportionalit

•Arming order

•Special orders (optional

○

Train

○

Military bearing and appeara

○

Immun

○

Standards of cond

○

Treatment of civili

○

Saf

○

News me

○

Discussion of mission with oth

○

Handling of suspicious persons, vehicles, and activit

 Additional References

10 U.S.C. Section 331-335, The Insurrection Act.

10 U.S.C. Section 2667, Leases: Non-Excess Property of Military Departments.

18 U.S.C. Section 231, Civil Disorders.

18 U.S.C. Section 1382, Entering Military, Naval, or Coast Guard Property.

18 U.S.C. Section 1385, The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA).

28 U.S.C. Section 1346, 2671-2680 – The Federal Tort Claims Act.

31 U.S.C. Section 1535, Agency Agreements.

Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.

DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances, 04 February 1994.

DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, 18 January 1997.

DODD 5111.13, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs.

DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 15 January 1986.
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Joint Pub 3-28, Civil Support (14 September 2007).

Army Regulation 700-131, Loan and Lease of Army Materiel (23 August 2004).

National Guard Regulation 500-1/ANGI 10-8101, National Guard Domestic Operations (13 June 2008).

FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (06 October 2008).

FM 3-19.15, Civil Disturbances (18 April 2005).
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Appendix J

Operations Security

Operations security (OPSEC) in the military is usually approached from the point of view of 

deploying to or operating within a combat zone. Because of this, many definitions and concepts 

of OPSEC, when applied to a domestic incident, may seem belligerent or even paranoid. As an 

open society, the United States demands open access to information, especially when dealing 

with a serious incident. This has to be balanced against the need to protect our forces as well as 

citizens.

OPSEC is a subset of information operations (IO). While IO has an offensive piece best suited 

to combat, there is defensive IO that protects and defends friendly information, command and 

control systems, and information systems. Effective defensive IO assure friendly commanders 

an accurate common operational picture based not only on a military perspective, but also 

on nonmilitary factors that may affect the situation (Field Manual [FM] 3-13, Information 

Operations (IO): Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).

Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.3, Operations Security, describes OPSEC as “a methodology that 

denies critical information to an adversary. Unlike security programs that seek to protect 

classified information, OPSEC measures identify, control, and protect generally unclassified 

evidence that is associated with sensitive operations and activities.” This is critical information.

Critical Information

Critical information is information important to the successful achievement of U.S. 

objectives and missions, or which may be of use to an adversary of the United States. Critical 

information consists of specific facts about friendly capabilities, activities, limitations (includes 

vulnerabilities), and intentions needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as 

to degrade friendly mission accomplishment. Critical information is information that is vital 

to a mission that if an adversary obtains it, correctly analyzes it, and acts upon it will prevent 

or seriously degrade mission success. Critical information can be classified information or 

unclassified information. Critical information can also be an action that provides an indicator 

of value to an adversary and places a friendly activity or operation at risk. The term “critical 

information” has superseded the term “essential elements of friendly information (EEFI)” 

according to FM 3-13, EEFI now refers to critical information phrased in the form of a question 

to protect classified and sensitive information.

Sensitive Information

Sensitive information is information requiring special protection from disclosure that could 

cause compromise or threat to national security or to an Army organization, activity, family 

member, Department of the Army civilian or Department of Defense contractor. Sensitive 

information refers to unclassified information while sensitive compartmented information refers 

to classified information. Examples that may be deemed sensitive include but are not limited to: 

personal information; structuring; manning; equipment; readiness; training; funding; sustaining; 

deploying; stationing; morale; vulnerabilities; capabilities; administration and personnel; 

planning; communications; intelligence, counterintelligence, and security; logistics; medical; 

casualties; and acquisition plans.
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Operations Security Defined

Army Regulation 530-1, Operations Security, defines OPSEC as a process of identifying critical 

information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and 

other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be 

interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to 

adversaries.

c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the 

vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation.

So what threats exist for DOD forces providing defense support to civil authorities within the 

United States?

Domestic threats: Domestic adversaries are not as readily identifiable because they are part of 

the local population. They may not have a formal intelligence collection service but they will 

have the advantage of detailed knowledge of the area and the people where they live and operate. 

The information domestic adversaries seek and obtain is readily available as open-source and 

unclassified information.

Criminals: The criminal threat is not as readily identifiable. Criminals will collect open-source 

and unclassified information that is publicly available; information they can obtain through 

means such as money or coercion, and information they can obtain from insiders in the unit 

or organization they target. The supporting criminal investigative unit may be able to assist 

both in identifying crime-conducive conditions that increase the risk of compromise of critical 

information and in mitigating or eliminating the criminal threat.

Hackers: A hacker is a highly skilled computer programmer who specializes in computer 

and network systems security. Some hackers apply their skills for legitimate uses; others have 

malicious intent motivated by ideology, criminal intent, revenge, thrill-seeking, or bragging 

rights. Malicious hackers can easily obtain information on computer systems and networks and 

have the skills to penetrate through sophisticated defenses. Hackers are extremely difficult to 

identify because they are able to remain hidden and anonymous through the vast expanse of 

the Internet. For these reasons, critical and sensitive information on publicly accessible Internet 

websites are easy targets for hackers and must not be posted on unclassified computers and 

networks.

Insiders: The insider threat consists of personnel who work inside the unit or organization. 

Insiders constitute the most dangerous threat because they have access to information for 

which they are cleared and because they can perform critical actions within the organization. 

Insiders who pose a threat are also very difficult to identify if they have taken steps to keep their 

collection activities unnoticed. For these reasons, sensitive and critical information should only 

be shared with personnel who need to know.

Internet: In recent years, the Internet has become a growing source of open-source information 

for adversaries of the United States. Websites, especially personal websites of individual Soldiers 
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(including blogs and pages on other social media sites), have the potential of posing significant 

vulnerability. Other forms of open-source information include public presentations, news 

releases from units or installations, organizational newsletters (both for official organizations and 

unofficial organizations, such as alumni or spouse support groups), and direct observation.

Social media: Sites such as Twitter and Facebook can become sources of information 

dissemination— accurate or inaccurate—to Soldiers, family, and the public faster than the chain 

of command does. News sources may also pose a threat; with 24-hour news services constantly 

demanding data, inaccurate, incomplete, and out-of-context stories can run almost instantly.

Terrorists: Terrorist actions range from gaining unauthorized access to command and control 

systems to physical attacks against commanders and decision makers. Terrorist groups have been 

identified as using commercial information systems—especially computer bulletin boards—to 

pass intelligence and technical data across international borders.

Methods of attack (FM 3-13) can include:

•Unauthorized access, either through insiders gaining physical access or throug

firewalls being penetrated.

•Malicious software (computer viruses, logic bombs, bypass programs, Trojan horses

etc.).

•Electromagnetic deception (manipulative, simulative, and/or imitative electromagneti

deception).

•Electronic attack (jamming, electromagnetic pulse, directed energy attacks

•Physical destructio

•Perception management (misinformation, deception, propaganda, etc.

The Center for Army Lessons Learned has actively collected observation, insights, and lessons 

learned (OIL) in three major domestic operations: The G-8 Summit in 2004, hurricanes Katrina 

and Rita in 2005, and Operation Jump Start in 2006. In each of the three operations, credentialing 

of personnel has been noted as a finding. At the G-8 Summit, the U.S. Secret Service developed 

a common credentialing process. This process started two months before the event and continued 

until two days before the president’s arrival. All agencies and personnel involved in the event 

required credentialing by the Secret Service. This process was important as a final check to verify 

the trustworthiness of personnel and to establish a common basis for trust between agencies. 

Problems with this process included: 

•The lead time required to get credentials. Personnel added to the task force in the las

couple of weeks were less likely to receive the credentials due to the length of time it 

took the Secret Service to process them. The Secret Service took a minimum of 48 hrs 

to process credentials with the proper information clearance verification and digital 

picture. 

•Some personnel were disqualified from credentialing and thus from participatio

because of the results of recent Secret Service checks. In some cases, people had recent 
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or outstanding arrests or warrants. In other cases, the Secret Service seemingly obtained 

incorrect information that led to refusal to issue credentials. Georgia Army National 

Guard (GANG) officials ran independent checks on soldiers who believed they were 

refused based on false information and in some cases verified that the information the 

Secret Service had was false. The request for credentials was resubmitted.

•Very limited contact between GANG and Secret Service representatives. Becaus

of the limited contact GANG personnel had with the Secret Service credentials 

representative, coordination was more difficult as was resolving issues related to 

credentials refused or missing.

This challenge resurfaced in Operation Jump Start when CBP required clearances from Guard 

personnel separate from their DOD security clearances. The lesson “take ways” from this 

experience are: 

•Identify and forward the names of Soldiers who will need credentials as early in th

process as possible.

•Develop a process allowing Soldiers who were initially disqualified to be re-evaluate

and resubmitted. This should include running independent police checks.

•Personnel from out-of-state and from other components should be notified o

credentialing requirements early.

Operations Security Planning Considerations (JP 3-13.3)

1. The commander plays the critical role. OPSEC planning guidance must be provided 

as part of the commander’s IO planning guidance to ensure that OPSEC is considered 

during the development of friendly courses of action (COAs).

2. OPSEC is an operations function, not a security function. OPSEC planning is 

performed by the operations planners. The planners are assisted by the organization’s 

OPSEC officer and appropriate planners from other staff elements. Intelligence support, 

as early as possible in the planning process, is particularly important in determining the 

threat to friendly operations and assessing friendly vulnerabilities.

3. Joint task forces (JTFs) should establish a fully functional IO cell. The JTF staff 

(including the IO cell and OPSEC officer) develops IO plans that are passed to all 

elements of the JTF.

4. Planning must focus on identifying and protecting critical information. Denying 

all information about a friendly operation or activity is seldom cost effective or realistic.

5. The ultimate goal of OPSEC is increased mission effectiveness. By preventing an 

adversary from determining friendly intentions or capabilities, OPSEC reduces losses to 

friendly units and increases the likelihood of achieving mission success.

6. OPSEC is one of the factors considered during the development and selection of 

friendly courses of action. COAs will differ in terms of how many OPSEC indicators 

will be created and how easily those indicators can be managed by OPSEC measures. 
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Depending upon how important maintaining secrecy is to mission success, OPSEC 

considerations may be a factor in selecting a COA.

7. OPSEC planning is a continuous process. During all phases of an operation, 

feedback on the success or failure of OPSEC measures is evaluated based on measures 

of effectiveness and the OPSEC plan is modified accordingly. Friendly intelligence and 

counterintelligence organizations, communications security (COMSEC) monitoring, and 

OPSEC assessments are the primary sources for feedback information and are continuous 

throughout the OPSEC planning process.

8. The public affairs officer participates in OPSEC planning to provide assessments 

on the possible negative effects of media coverage and all other public release of 

information by members of the command and for the coordination of OPSEC measures 

and public affairs ground rules to minimize those effects. The public affairs office (PAO) 

ensures that the media pool, media clearances, media releases, and authorization of 

video transmissions are within established OPSEC measures. The PAO also ensures the 

command (internal) information program addresses OPSEC and ground rules for the 

release of information (officially or unofficially) by military members through the internet 

and other communications mediums subject to public access or monitoring. See JP 3-61, 

Public Affairs, for more details.

OPSEC process

The five-step OPSEC process includes:

•Identification of critical informatio

•Analysis of threat

•Analysis of vulnerabilitie

•Assessment of ris

•Application of appropriate OPSEC measure

For detailed explanations of the OPSEC process, see Chapter 3 of FM 3-13.

Physical Security

Physical security consists of protective measures to deny unauthorized personnel access to 

specific areas, facilities, material, or classified information.

•By denying access, physical security measures can be an OPSEC measure. However

physical security measures can become compromised (for example, personnel routinely 

and predictably leaving a facility unattended, easily seen sensors, changing military 

police patrols at set times, reacting predictably to alarms and being careless or lazy in 

implementing physical security measures).

•OPSEC can support physical security by identifying those actions and information tha

would be indicators that an adversary could exploit.
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Force Protection

Force protection consists of actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against all 

DOD personnel (Service members, DOD civilians, DOD contractors, and family members), 

resources, facilities and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat 

the adversary or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. OPSEC plays a vital role in the 

following ways:

•  OPSEC can identify indicators of routine actions observable by a terrorist that 

represent vulnerability both in a tactical environment and in garrison.

•  OPSEC can assist in determining measures to negate effective terrorist collection of 

information needed for planning.

•  OPSEC can identify indicators and recommend OPSEC measures to protect possible or 

existing vulnerabilities in protective measures.

•  OPSEC can assist traditional security disciplines in ensuring their protective measures 

are in the right place at the right time.

•  OPSEC develops critical information that identifies what must not be allowed to appear

in the public domain to prevent collection by a terrorist.

An example of force protection would be actions taken by JTF Zia during Operation Jump 

Start in New Mexico. Army National Guard Soldiers deployed to the southwest U.S. border 

initially were housed in local hotels with no security. Local gangs had been identified as possible

adversaries, so the JTF commander instituted force protection requirements that included 

removing uniforms as soon as returning to the hotel and traveling in groups of at least four 

Soldiers. Later, a forward operating base was built, and Soldiers were centrally housed with 24-

hour security.

Communications Security (AR 530-1)

Measures and controls taken to deny unauthorized persons information derived from 

telecommunications and ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications. (Note: This is 

different from the joint definition (from JP 6-0) of “The protection resulting from all measures

designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the 

possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their 

interpretation of the results of such possession and study.”)

An example of COMSEC is from the National Guard’s weapons of mass destruction civil 

support teams (WMD CST). These specialized units arrive on an incident scene with their 

own robust communications suite, capable of operating on military or civilian first responder

communications networks. Per FM 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team 

Operations, December 2007, the commander has the discretion to determine whether or not

encryption should be used during WMD-CST response operations. (Note: According to AR 25-2, 

Information Assurance, WMD-CSTs are not required to be encrypted when conducting activities 

with civil agencies.)
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Computer security

Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information 

processed and stored by a computer. 

References

AR 530-1, Operations Security (OPSEC), 19 April 2007.

FM 3-13, Information Operations (IO): Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003.

FM 3-11.22, Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Team Operations, December 2007.

JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006.

JP 3-13.3, Operations Security, 29 June 2006.

JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 8 July 2008.

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Appendix K

Airspace Command and Control

Airspace command and control (AC2) as defined in Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 

(Pam) 525-7-3 replaces Army airspace command and control (A2C2), which was primarily 

a planning and integration process. AC2 is the dynamic integration of all airspace users in 

accordance with the commander’s intent, priorities, and risk guidance.

History

On 29 August 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall. In less than 48 hours the scope of 

that Category 3 storm overwhelmed Gulf Coast state and local response capabilities. When 

Hurricane Rita, a Category 4 storm, made landfall on 24 September 2005, the regional situation 

deteriorated. The Department of Defense (DOD) participated in an unprecedented disaster 

response effort supporting the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead 

federal agency.

U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) exercised its homeland defense responsibilities and 

established two disaster response joint task forces (JTFs): Katrina (JTF-K) commanded by First 

Army, Fort Gillem, GA, and Rita (JTF-R) commanded by Fifth Army, Fort Sam Houston, TX. In 

addition, 1st Air Force, Tyndall Air Force Base (AFB), FL was designated to perform command 

and control for Air Force assets supporting air operations in and around the Katrina joint 

operating area. To exercise this responsibility, 1st Air Force established the 1st Air Expeditionary 

Task Force (1st AETF), Tyndall AFB, FL, to be the Air Force service component of JTF-Katrina. 

When Fifth Army stood up JTF-Rita, 1st AETF became JTF-R’s Air Force service component.

1st AETF was responsible for coordinating and integrating relief operations with local, state, 

and federal agencies. It established air expeditionary groups (AEGs) at Louis Armstrong New 

Orleans International Airport, LA; Alexandria, LA; Keesler AFB, MS; Jackson, MS; and 

Maxwell AFB, AL. These AEGs supported forward-deployed Airmen on the periphery of the 

disaster area.

1st Air Force

With its headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base in the community of Panama City, FL, 1st Air 

Force (Air Forces Northern [1AF/AFNORTH]) is one of five numbered air forces assigned to Air 

Combat Command. It has sole responsibility for ensuring the air sovereignty and air defense of 

the continental United States (CONUS), U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. As the CONUS 

Region (CONR) for the binational North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), 

CONR provides air defense in the form of airspace surveillance and airspace control.

As the USNORTHCOM air component, AFNORTH is the senior agency in the United States 

Theater Air Control System (USTACS) and is specifically responsible for the land areas of 

the continental United States, U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the surrounding seas out 

to approximately 500 nautical miles. When tasked, it conducts homeland defense and defense 

support of civil authorities (DSCA) operations in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility. The 

DSCA mission is to use air assets to defeat terrorism; support local, state, regional, and federal 

emergency service agencies; and to protect the American people and their way of life.
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Organization

AFNORTH is a U.S. Air Force component headquarters/numbered air force consisting of a 

command element, air staff, personal, staff and air and space operations center (AOC).

Special designations

Additional authorities may be delegated by the commander, USNORTHCOM to the AFNORTH 

commander to fulfill special responsibilities in air domain operations, including the following:

•Combined force air component commander (CFACC): The CFACC is responsibl

for planning, tasking, and directing air and space capabilities from multiple services 

and coordinating activity with interagency air capabilities.

•Airspace coordination authority (ACA): The ACA is responsible for coordinatin

and deconflicting air traffic. This responsibility is almost always retained by the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA). All airspace planning must be coordinated with and 

approved by the FAA as the ACA. AFNORTH collaborates directly with FAA on 

military airspace planning.

•Space coordinating authority (SCA): The SCA is responsible for collecting an

linking any space requirements (imagery, communications, GPS, etc) and ensuring 

space products are effectively and efficiently disseminated.

•Collections operations manager (COM): The COM for imagery analysis an

assessment is responsible for collecting and linking federal, state and military imagery 

requirements to specific imagery platforms and ensuring imagery products are 

effectively and efficiently disseminated.

Combined Air and Space Operations Center

The Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) executes combined NORAD air 

missions in accordance with bilateral Canada-US NORAD agreements.

•CAOC airspace management team: Within a typical CAOC, the airspac

management team is a component of the command and control planning team. Due to 

the complexity of integrating military operations with civilian operations in the national 

airspace system (NAS), an existing airspace control system, and constant DOD FAA 

coordination, the airspace management team is separate from the C2 team within the 

combat plans division (CPD). The airspace management team consists of military and 

civilian air traffic controllers responsible for coordinating and integrating the airspace 

control system with the FAA. In recognition of the FAA’s statutory responsibility, 

military air operations are designed to coexist with civilian operations and have as little 

impact on the NAS as possible.

•Airspace coordination plan (ACP): The airspace plans team develops an

coordinates the ACP with the FAA. The ACP document, which is approved by the joint 

force commander, provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace 

control system in the airspace control area. The plans team coordinates airspace 

requests and matters affecting military aircraft control with the FAA, the International 
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Civil Aviation Organization, military units, foreign agencies, and other applicable 

federal and state agencies. The team receives, processes, and deconflicts airspace 

control measure requests to develop the airspace control order. The airspace control 

order implements the airspace coordination plan, which provides the specific details of 

the approved request for airspace coordinating measures.

•Air traffic control: Airspace control increases mission effectiveness by promoting th

safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with high-volume aircraft operations while 

placing minimal restraints upon the airspace users. Regardless of AFNORTH’s airspace 

control measures, all flights are conducted under standard federal air regulations. 

The FAA uses temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) to regulate entry into the airspace. 

These TFRs define the restricted airspace and outline the requirements for operating 

within it. The CAOC uses and incorporates positive control elements of the NAS and 

procedural control capabilities of theatre battle management core systems (TBMCS) 

computers to maximize flying safety in the airspace control area. The ACP and airspace 

control order (ACO) are in no way intended to supersede air traffic control procedures 

or instructions. Aircraft operating within Class B, C, D, and terminal radar service 

area (TRSA) airspaces will operate in accordance with air traffic control airspace class 

requirements. The ACP and ACO are additional guidance and procedures ratified by the 

airspace coordination authority regulating participating DOD aircraft. 

•Operations airspace team: The operations airspace team is responsible fo

coordinating and managing all airspace management activities. The team monitors 

flying activities to ensure that airspace control measures are compatible with mission 

requirements. They coordinate with internal and external C2 agencies on airspace 

control issues, requests, and problems. This team is the focal point for disseminating 

ACO changes. Team members monitor and disseminate airfield navigational aids, and 

air traffic control facility status and information reports consistent with FAA reporting. 

Team members also facilitate immediate coordination with the host nation (normally 

the FAA) on airspace control issues, requests, and problems within the airspace control 

area.

CAOC air mobility division

In coordination with the director of mobility forces–air, the air mobility division (AMD) plans, 

coordinates, tasks, and executes the theater air mobility mission. This includes air refueling and 

airlift support to Operation Noble Eagle and civil support missions such as hurricane hunters, 

Modular Aerial Spray System (MASS), and the military airborne firefighting system (MAFFS). 

During contingencies, this mission expands to provide the joint forces air component commander 

(JFACC) /combined forces air component Commander (CFACC) with a single air mobility 

picture in the USNORTHCOM area of operations (AOR) including state-directed Air National 

Guard (ANG) forces (Title 32) and federally directed active duty forces (Title 10). By providing 

this information, the AFNORTH AMD is able to ensure continuity and synchronization, prevent 

duplication of effort, enhance safety, and promote efficiency of assets across the entire air 

mobility spectrum of operations.

Airlift control team

The airlift control team (ALCT) is the source of intratheater airlift expertise within the AMD. 

The ALCT brings intratheater airlift functional expertise to plan, task, and coordinate intratheater 
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airlift operations for the commander of Air Force forces. The ALCT has three responsibilities: 

planning, tactics development, and long-range requirement determination. In the AFNORTH 

AOR, virtually all airlift missions are planned by the Air Mobility Command (AMC)/Tanker 

Airlift Control Center (TACC) at Scott AFB, IL with coordination through the ALCT. DSCA 

missions, including hurricane hunters, MASS, and MAFFS, provide exceptions. For DSCA, the 

ALCT provides planning efforts and coordination with individual units and lead civilian agencies 

to achieve desired goals while also incorporating in the USNORTHCOM air tasking order 

(ATO).

Aeromedical evacuation control team

The aeromedical evacuation control team (AECT) is responsible for aeromedical evacuation 

operational planning, scheduling, tasking, and assisting the air mobility control team with 

execution and monitoring. The AECT coordinates airlift support and evaluates available air 

mobility airframes assigned to or transiting the theater for possible tasking to meet theater 

aeromedical evacuation (AE) requirements.

The AFNORTH CAOC/AMD does not have a standing AECT. During contingency operations, 

when aeromedical evacuation is required, AMD augmentation is typically provided by AMC to 

form an AECT at the AFNORTH AOC for the purpose of providing the JFACC with a single air 

mobility picture. In cases where augmentation is not available, the AMD ensures coordination 

between AFNORTH/surgeon general and the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center 

at Scott AFB, IL to coordinate and accomplish any USNORTHCOM-directed aeromedical 

evacuations.

Regional air movement coordination center

The AFNORTH regional air movement coordination center (RAMCC) is part of the joint 

concept of operations for air mobility during crisis response. The RAMCC stands up during 

contingencies to provide management of airflow into and out of designated airfields for the 

purpose of maximizing personnel and cargo throughput. It coordinates with military C2 elements 

(contingency response group [CRG], contingency response element [CRE], and contingency 

response team [CRT]) present at the airfields to determine maximum on-ground limitations and 

factors that affect airflow. The RAMCC then coordinates with the FAA, TACC, NGB, and ALCT 

to determine and issue slot times for aircraft transiting the contingency airfield.

Airbase and airfield opening: Contingency response group, element, and team 

Cross-functional contingency response groups (CRGs), contingency response elements 

(CREs) and contingency response teams (CRTs) are designed to rapidly deploy—without 

formal request—to support the openings of airbases or airfields or to extend existing airfield 

infrastructure. Both the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and the ANG have 

units that provide teams that vary in size from 12 to 113 members, depending on the support 

required. Their capabilities include airfield assessment, airfield operations, C2, aerial port, 

aircraft maintenance, air traffic control, intelligence, security, fuels, supply, contracting, and 

finance. AMC has six CRG units located at two contingency response wings; the 615th at Travis 

AFB, CA and the 621st at McGuire AFB, NJ. The ANG has two CRGs: the 123rd CRG at 

Louisville, KY and the 108th CRG at McGuire AFB, NJ.
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The CRG/CRE is under the operational control (OPCON) of USTRANSCOM, but OPCON may 

be shifted to the USNORTHCOM commander after initial deployment when a formal support 

relationship is mandated by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Once deployed, CRG/CRE can selfsustain for five days after which resupply is required. Units should be relieved by follow-on 

forces no later than 45 days from the CRG/CRE arrival date regardless of status. Early planning 

and submission of a request for forces for follow-on air expeditionary forces are essential.

Mobile aeromedical staging facility

A mobile aeromedical staging facility (MASF) is a rapid-response, patient-staging facility used 

across the spectrum of conflict. The MASF provides the ability to receive, process, and support 

patients awaiting AE.

How to Request/Access AFNORTH Air Mobility Support

Request through deployed air component coordination element (ACCE) team, Air Mobility Division (AMD) 

liaison officer, or emergency preparedness liaison officers or by contacting the Director, Mobility Forces– Air 

DIRMOBFOR– Air or AMD chief by phone or email.

Toll free: (800) 896-8806 (Tyndall Base Operator)

AFNORTH DIRMOBFOR–Air: (850) 283-5350, DSN 523-5350, e-mail: afnorthdirmobfor@tyndall.af.mil

Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) chief, AMD: (850) 283-5098/5858, DSN 523-5098/5858

CAOC Tanker/Airlift Duty Officer: (24/7/365) (850) 283-5549/5741, DSN 523-5549/5741, e-mail: 601aoc.amd@

tyndall.af.mil

Table K-1

How to Request/Access Airspace Planning Capabilities

Air Space Planning: (850) 283-8654, DSN 523-8654

601 Air and Space Operations Center/Combat Plans Air Space Division: (850) 283-5837/5860, DSN 523-

5837/586.

Table K-2

Contingency Response Air Support Schedule

Purpose

During hurricanes Katrina and Rita, conducting traditional command and control of DOD 

forces during contingency operations became problematic because availability of secure 

communications was limited. The large number of non-DOD forces operating in the area made 

the air picture more complex. To assist with collaboration and coordination, the CAOC Combat 

Plans Division implemented the following procedures for ATO and contingency response air 

support schedule (CRASS) processes.

CRASS philosophy

The CRASS is not a “tasking” document. It serves as a visibility document intended to 

maximize visibility of air operations in the disaster area or joint operations area (JOA) among all 

participants. 
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Communication formats

Classified means will be used to disseminate taskings for aircraft assigned, attached or operating 

in support of the JFC as determined through consultation with component commanders. JFACC 

normally exercises OPCON of U.S. Air Force forces and tactical control of any Navy, Army, 

and Marine aviation assets made available to the JFACC. All taskings will be coordinated by 

the JFACC and published in an AFNORTH ATO. According to Joint Publication (JP) 3-30, 

Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, inclusion of component air assets in the ATO 

does not imply any command or tasking authority over them. The responsibility for planning, 

coordinating, and developing ACP/ACO and operating an airspace control system also rests with 

the JFACC. Classified AFNORTH ATO, as well as amplifying information (ACP/ACO/special 

instructions [SPINS]) will be developed and published by 601 CPD. All information is available 

on Theater Battle Management Core Systems (TBMCS)/web browsers on releasable to Canadian 

and U.S. forces (RELCAN) and SECRET Internet Protocal Router (SIPR) networks through 601 

CPD website and updated according to the ATO cycle.

Unclassified means will be utilized to disseminate CRASS and amplifying information (ACP/

ACO/special instructions [SPINS]). CRASS will enable increased SA of all aircraft (including 

non-DOD) operating in the JOA. The CRASS includes all interagency missions, as well as 

planned flying by other agencies (including Title 32 ANG, etc). The fidelity of this product 

depends on the information provided by non-DOD agencies and organizations. It will be 

published using a common application (Excel) to ensure data access. It requires increased 

coordination with state emergency operations centers (EOCs), law enforcement agencies and 

other agencies to ensure accuracy.

While compliance with the ACO/ACP/SPINS is not mandatory, non-DOD agencies are 

encouraged to provide inputs to the CRASS worksheet. All information will be updated in 

accordance with the classified ATO cycle. CAOC CPD will coordinate with state EOC and 

other agencies to ensure fullest dissemination of required documentation and increased support 

of JFACC mission. Required information is published on the AFNORTH public domain 

Internet website: <AFNORTH.US/sample/CRASS%20Contingency%20Response%20Air%20 

Support%20Schedule/Forms/AllItems.aspx>.

The website address will also be published on any FAA Notices to Airmen created in response to 

the contingency.

References

Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) Air Support Handbook, Headquarters First Air Force/Air Forces 

Northern (1AF [AFNORTH]), 1 January 2009.

TRADOC Pam 525-7-3, The United States Army Concept Capability Plan for Airspace Command and Control for 

the Future Modular Force, Version 1.0, 20 April 2009.

AFNORTH Fact Sheet, <http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/afctsheet.asp?id=4107>, August 2008.
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Appendix L

Search and Rescue

National Search and Rescue Committee

The National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) is a federal-level committee formed 

to coordinate civil search and rescue (SARs) matters of interagency interest within the United 

States. Its members include:

•Department of Defense (DOD

•Department of Commerc

•Department of Transportatio

•Department of the Interio

•Department of Homeland Securit

•Federal Communications Commissio

•National Aeronautics and Space Administratio

The NSARC developed the National Search and Rescue Plan, which divided the United States 

into search and rescue regions (SRR) and assigned SAR coordinators for each. They are:

•United States Air Force: Recognized SAR coordinator for the United State

aeronautical SRR corresponding to the continental United States other than Alaska.

•United States Pacific Command: Recognized SAR coordinator for the United State

aeronautical SRR corresponding to Alaska.

•United States Coast Guard: Recognized SAR coordinator for all other U.S. aeronautica

and maritime SRRs. This includes the state of Hawaii as well as waters over which the 

United States has jurisdiction, such as navigable waters of the United States.

During a Stafford Act incident, the DOD may provide SAR support following a request by 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), directed by a joint director of military 

support and approved by the secretary of defense. However, local commanders may also provide 

SAR support when an imminently serious threat to public health and safety exists and time does 

not permit prior approval. Within the United States, the Title 10 air support to civil operations 

falls under the control of 1st Air Force/Air Force North (1AF/AFNORTH). On the ground, urban 

SAR is conducted by specialized units of both government and nongovernmental organizations. 

In the National Response Framework (NRF), SAR falls under Emergency Support Function 

(ESF) #9. See Chapter 5 of this handbook for more on the ESFs.
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Aeronautical Search and Rescue

1AF/AFNORTH rapidly responds to nonmilitary threats. Under its defense support to civil 

authorities (DSCA) mission, the organization assists civilian agencies before and during 

emergencies, natural or man-made disasters, and other DOD-approved activities. This role 

provides the ability to save lives, relieve suffering, prevent property damage, and provide 

humanitarian assistance where and when it is needed most in the United States.

Operating with the 601st Air Operations Center, the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center 

(AFRCC) serves as the U.S. inland SAR mission coordinator and is the single agency 

responsible for coordinating on-land federal searches. These SAR operations can be conducted 

anywhere in the 48 states, Mexico, and Canada. The AFRCC has direct ties to the Federal 

Aviation Administration alerting system and the U.S. Mission Control Center. The joint forces 

air component commander (JFACC) establishes a joint personnel recovery center (JPRC), as 

required. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP), flying as the Air Force Auxiliary (AFAUX), is a significant 

partner in SAR and other DSCA missions.

Air Force Rescue Coordination Center

The United States Air Force (USAF) is designated by the National Search and Rescue Plan 

(NSP) as the SAR coordinator for the U.S. aeronautical SRR corresponding to the continental 

United States other than Alaska. The secretary of the Air Force has delegated this responsibility 

through headquarters Air Combat Command/commander (CC) to 1 AF/CC. The AFRCC 

coordinates federal SAR services, ensuring timely and effective lifesaving operations. 

Additionally, the AFRCC conducts advanced SAR planning instruction, through the National 

SAR School, to federal, state, and local agencies as well as to volunteer SAR organizations 

and controllers. The AFRCC is an active duty squadron integrated into the 601st Air and Space 

Operations Center at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL.

The AFRCC is responsible for coordinating all federal inland commercial, military, and 

interstate aeronautical SAR in the contiguous United States and assists Mexico and Canada when 

requested. The responsibilities include: 

•Initiating searches for missing/overdue aircraft (including all DOD, commercial, an

interstate aircraft or intrastate aircraft, if requested by the state). 

•Managing all inland emergency beacon searches: 121.5, 243.0 and 406 megahert

(MHz) emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) on aircraft, emergency positionindicating radio beacons (EPIRBs) for maritime environment, and personal locator 

beacons (PLBs) that are used in all environments. (Hikers, mountain climbers and 

anyone else who has the capability of getting lost could use a PLB.) 

•Brokering federal assets to support state and local SAR operations (including missin

person searches, medical evacuation, organ transport, transport of ground SAR units, 

and special capabilities). 

NSP: It is the policy of the signatory federal agencies to provide an NSP for the United 

States for coordinating SAR services to meet domestic needs and international commitments. 
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Implementing guidance for this plan is provided in the International Aeronautical and Maritime 

Search and Rescue (IAMSAR) Manual and the National Search and Rescue Supplement (NSS) 

and supporting addenda. The NSP describes the U.S. SAR organization, key authorities, 

responsibilities, primary principles, and policies within the SAR system. The NSP is solely 

intended to provide internal guidance to all signatory federal agencies. State organizations retain 

established SAR responsibilities within their boundaries for incidents that are primarily local or 

intrastate in character. As such, the AFRCC maintains memorandums of agreement between each 

state governor and 1 AF/CC that establish SAR responsibilities between the designated Inland 

SAR coordinator and each state. A memorandum of understanding exists between the governor’s 

designated state SAR coordinator and AFRCC/CC (the SAR mission coordinator) on how the 

SAR responsibilities are conducted in each state.

Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC): According to Operation Order 08-01, the 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) commander designated the JFACC as the supported 

personnel recovery commander and establishes the NORTHCOM JPRC in the 601st Air and 

Space Operations Center to plan and execute joint DOD (Title 10) personnel recovery for 

NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility and DSCA in support of state catastrophic incident SAR 

(CIS) operations. The JPRC plans, coordinates, and executes joint CIS missions, coordinates 

CIS procedures published in the air tasking order (ATO) and special instructions, reviews theater 

plans, and coordinates joint training and exercises.

ESF #9: The Department of Homeland Security/FEMA activates ESF #9 when an incident 

is anticipated or occurs that may result in a request for a unified federal SAR response to 

an impacted area. DOD is one of the four primary federal partners for ESF #9. Following a 

presidential disaster declaration, the designated lead primary agency for ESF #9 coordinates 

federal SAR response with federal, state, tribal, territorial, and locally designated SAR 

authorities to integrate federal SAR resources and support the requesting state.

Global Area Reference System (GARS): GARS is a standardized area reference system used 

across DOD and CAP which can be used to deconflict deliberate SAR operations. It is based on 

the standard latitude and longitude system to provide an integrated common frame of reference 

for joint force situational awareness and facilitate air-to-ground coordination, deconfliction, 

integration, and synchronization. This area reference system provides a common language 

between the components and simplifies communications. It is important to note that GARS 

is primarily designed as a battle-space management tool and not to be used for navigation or 

targeting.

GARS design: GARS divides the surface of the earth into 30-minute by 30-minute cells. 

Each cell is identified by a five-character designator, such as 006AG. The first three characters 

designate a 30-minute wide longitudinal band. Beginning with the 180-degree meridian and 

proceeding eastward, the bands are numbered from 001 to 720, so that 180 E to 179 30 W is 

band 001; 179 30 W to 179 00 W is band 002; and so on. Additional information and GARS 

grids can be downloaded from the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency website at <http://

earth-info.nga.mil/GandG/coordsys/grids/gars.html.>

The AFRCC and JPRC are available for SAR planning support advice and assistance 24 hours a 

day, every day at 800-851-3051, (850) 283-5955, or DSN 523-5955.
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Civil Air Patrol Air Force Auxiliary

The CAP, a volunteer civilian SAR organization, provides SAR services as an official auxiliary 

of the USAF and represents the primary SAR resource available to the civil sector. Under the 

NRF, FEMA is the primary agency for ESF #9.

When tasked by the Air Force, CAP, in its AFAUX role, can support federal state and local 

authorities, performing various reconnaissance, emergency services, homeland security and 

disaster relief missions. CAP has over 55,000 volunteers and a fleet of 550 aircraft nationwide 

(including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands) available for tasking, generally with a 4-hour 

response time.

With advanced coordination, CAP/AFAUX forces can be postured to a responsive alert status 

with a capability to launch within minutes. For nonimmediate response incidents, it is imperative 

to plan ahead and make requests early enough to ensure timely approval of requests through the 

normal AFNORTH ATO process.

CAP/AFAUX capabilities include:

•Aerial imaging: Provides the ability to image, transmit, and download high resolutio

digital photos from airborne platforms via e-mail. Provides short-notice, in-flight 

disaster and damage assessment as well as ongoing visual reconnaissance.

•Airborne visual reconnaissance: Conducts visual airborne reconnaissance of isolate

locations, border and coastal areas, ports and harbors, and critical infrastructure, 

including nuclear power plants, gas pipelines, reservoirs, etc. to help identify 

suspicious activity.

•Satellite link airborne dynamic retasking: Satellite links provide the ability t

contact aircraft in order to retask/request different photo orientation or mission 

changes.

•Light air transport/air taxi: Provides transport of human blood or organs, equipment

passengers, or search dog teams to austere/remote airfields.

•Air and ground fleet availability: Maintains a fleet of over 550 aircraft, 940 groun

vehicles and trained crews available for SAR.

•Communications support: An extensive communications network that provide

very high frequency (VHF) and high frequency (HF) capability as well as aerial 

communications relay platforms. The network includes over 5,000 fixed land VHF 

radio stations and 10,000 mobile radios, as well as a nationwide HF network.

•Personnel: A cadre of more than 650 chaplains is available for weekly religiou

services or general support. Trained ground crews to provide damage assessment 

and mitigation, disaster recovery, and limited security to augment civil and military 

authorities.
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•Law enforcement support: Ability to take law enforcement or VIP personnel aloft fo

visual reconnaissance of areas of interest when legal requirements are met.

•Sensor adaptability: Capable (with sufficient advanced coordination) of carryin

various customer-supplied sensor packages aloft.

CAP/AFAUX assets

•Aircraft: Five hundred and fifty light civil aircraft, including Cessna C-172, C-182

and C-206 models, as well 16 Gippsland GA-8 eight seat aircraft, are strategically 

placed throughout the nation.

•Satellite digital imaging system- (SDIS)- equipped aircraft: One hundred C-182 ar

aircraft equipped with SDIS and are used to transmit still-frame digital pictures in near 

real time and direct voice communications from the aircraft.

•Aircraft equipped hyperspectral system: The 16 Gippsland GA-8 is equipped wit

airborne hyperspectral imaging systems for complex or sophisticated target detection.

•Ground equipment: CAP has over 850 seven-, 12-, and 15-passenger vans, 4x4s, an

long-bed pickups, as well as 90 dedicated communications vehicles with limited allband capability.

•Nationwide radio communications system: Comprised of over 15,000 CAP-owne

base, mobile, and portable two-way radios, the national & regional HF radio networks 

provide survivable, infrastructure-independent command and control communications 

that are not dependent on satellite/cellular telephone systems. There are over 500 VHF 

radio repeater stations located strategically throughout the country, as well as 1,400 

airborne, mobile, and hand-held direction finder (DF) units.

Sensor descriptions 

•Direction finder (DF): The DF is designed to locate emergency locator beacons o

downed aircraft or emergency position indicating radio beacons from ships in distress. 

It can receive emergency signals on 121.5 MHz (old civil frequency), 243 MHz (old 

military frequency), and 406 MHz (new universal frequency).

•SDIS: Point-to-multipoint transmission of aerial digital photography is delivered inflight via satellite communications. An SDIS functional unit is comprised of an aircraf

equipped with a photo window, a digital camera, laptop computer, aircraft satellite 

telephone equipment and a trained three-person crew. Since images are sent directly to 

a customer’s computer, no specialized ground equipment is needed. A photo is attached 

to a standard Microsoft Outlook e-mail, allowing for text information (latitude or 

longitude coordinates, time stamp, site identification, conditions, etc.) to accompany 

photos. The near real-time nature of SDIS images has proven effective in SAR; disaster 

response and damage assessment; environmental impact damage, destruction appraisal, 

and tracking; and facility security reconnaissance, among many other tasks.
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•Airborne real-time cueing hyperspectral enhanced reconnaissance (ARCHER)

ARCHER is the most sophisticated unclassified hyperspectral imaging system 

available. It has direct applications for SAR, counterdrug; disaster relief, and impact 

assessment, and homeland security. ARCHER is a non-invasive reflected light 

technology that uses three separate methods for target identification:

○

Spectral signature matching: Evaluates reflected light against a library

spectral signatures to identify specifically-targeted objects.

○

Anomaly detection: Compares reflected light against a continuously calcula

background spectrum. Anomalies are flagged as potential targets for further 

evaluation.

○

Change detection: Executes a pixel-by-pixel comparison of current im

against ground conditions that were obtained in a previous mission over the 

same area. Scene changes are identified, and new, moved or departed targets are 

highlighted for evaluation.

How to Request/Access CAP/AFAUX Capabilities

(SAR/Life-saving missions include emergency blood, organ and tissue transport.)

AFRCC (24/7/365): Toll free: (800) 851-3051; DSN 523; commercial: (850) 523-5955

All Other Mission Requests

(Includes immediate response missions to prevent human suffering or to mitigate great property damage.)

CAP National Operations Center 24/7/365 on-call duty officer available: Toll free: (888)-211-1812, Ext 300

AFNORTH CAP liaison officer, normal duty hours only: Toll free: (800) 896-8806 (Tyndall operator); 

commercial: (850) 283-5880: DSN 523

Combined Air Operations Center senior operations duty officer, 24/7/365: Toll free: (800) 896-8806 (Tyndall 

operator): commercial: (850) 283-5573

Urban Search and Rescue

Urban search-and-rescue (USAR) involves the location, rescue (extrication), and initial medical 

stabilization of victims trapped in confined spaces. Structural collapse, transportation accidents, 

mines and collapsed trenches can lead to victims being trapped.

Urban search-and-rescue is considered a “multihazard” discipline, as it may be needed for a 

variety of emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes, typhoons, storms and 

tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents, terrorist activities, and hazardous 

materials releases. The events may be slow in developing, as in the case of hurricanes, or sudden, 

as in the case of earthquakes.

If a disaster event warrants national USAR support, FEMA will deploy the three closest task 

forces within six hours of notification and additional teams as necessary. The role of these task 

forces is to support state and local emergency responders’ efforts to locate victims and manage 

recovery operations.

Each task force consists of two 31-person teams, four canines, and a comprehensive equipment 

cache. USAR task force members work in four areas of specialization: search, to find victims 
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DISASTER RESPONSE

trapped after a disaster; rescue, which includes safely digging victims out of tons of collapsed 

concrete and metal; technical, made up of structural specialists who make rescues safe for the 

rescuers; and medical, which cares for the victims before and after a rescue.

Today there are 28 national task forces staffed and equipped to conduct round-the-clock SAR 

operations following earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, hurricanes, aircraft accidents, hazardous 

materials spills, and catastrophic structure collapses. These task forces, complete with necessary 

tools and equipment and required skills and techniques, can be deployed by FEMA for the rescue 

of victims of structural collapse. A task force is totally self-sufficient for the first 72 hours of a 

deployment.

What the task force can do:

•Conduct physical SAR in collapsed building

•Provide emergency medical care to trapped victim

•Use SAR dog

•Assess and control gas, electric service and hazardous material

•Evaluate and stabilize damaged structure

Urban Search and Rescue Task Force Locations

State Number Organization

Arizona AZ-TF1 Phoenix

California CA-TF1 Los Angeles City Fire Department

CA-TF2 Los Angeles County Fire 

Department

CA-TF3 Menlo Park Fire Department

CA-TF4 Oakland Fire Department

CA-TF5 Orange County Fire Department

CA-TF6 Riverside Fire Department

CA-TF7 Sacramento Fire Department

CA-TF8 San Diego Fire Department

Colorado CO-TF1 State of Colorado

Florida FL-TF1 Miami-Dade Fire Department

FL-TF2 Miami Fire Department

Indiana IN-TF1 Mairon County

Maryland MD-TF1 Montgomery County

Massachusetts MA-TF1 City of Beverly

Missouri MO-TF1 Boone County Fire Protection 

District

Nebraska NE-TF1 Lincoln Fire Department

Nevada NV-TF1 Clark County Fire Department

New Mexico NM-TF1 State of New Mexico
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

New York NY-TF1 New York City fire, emergency 

medical service, and police

Ohio OH-TF1 Miami Valley Urban Search and 

Rescue

Pennsylvania PA-TF1 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Tennessee TN-TF1 Memphis Fire Department

Texas TX-TF1 State of Texas Urban Search and 

Rescue

Utah UT-TF1 Salt Lake Fire Department

Virginia VA-TF1 Fairfax County Fire and Rescue 

Department

VA-TF2 Virginia Beach Fire Department

Washington WA-TF1 Puget Sound Task Force

Table L-2. Urban Search and Rescue Task Force Locations.

Detailed procedures for USAR can be found in FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue Response 

System in Federal Disaster Operations manual, January 2000. This and other resources are 

available at <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/usr/resources.shtm.>

Army support

Figure L-1.

The 911th U.S. Army Technical Rescue Engineer Company (911th EC) is the only unit of its 

kind in the U.S. Army. 911th EC is comprised of combat engineers trained in technical rescue 

tasks, specializing in rescue techniques for victims trapped in collapsed buildings.

On order, 911th EC deploys and conducts technical rescue operations in support of military and/

or federal contingencies in the National Capital Region. When not training or engaged in rescue 

missions, the unit provides limited engineer support to the Military District of Washington.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

The 911th EC trains with state, local and federal agencies to include FEMA USAR teams, to 

develop and maintain the most advanced skills in the field.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) USAR mission is to provide efficient and effective 

physical and technical support to the FEMA mission response effort under ESF #9. This includes 

developing, training, and equipping USACE structural engineers to operate as support to the 

FEMA USAR task forces and the FEMA USAR incident support team (IST) engineering cell. 

The USAR program also provides training for all FEMA USAR structures specialists.

Additional USACE mission priorities include:

•Provide technical assistance to local jurisdictions regarding rescue effort

•Provide technical assistance to military personnel who provide light to heavy USA

support.

•Provide technical support to other agencies (such as the Federal Bureau o

Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 

National Institute of Standards and Technology, etc.)

USACE provides USAR training courses for structures specialists (StS) from both USACE and 

FEMA. In addition, other agencies attend this course, such as the Army’s 911th EC, state, and 

regional task forces, and foreign countries involved with USAR.

StS design shoring systems to stabilize structures for rescuers to gain safe access to the victims. 

The StS are trained in Rescue Systems 1 (a basic rescue skills course). They also receive 

instruction in structural collapse patterns, hazard identification and building monitoring, rapid 

assessment of buildings, building triage and marking systems, advance shoring, and shoring 

calculations. Mission durations are short and usually 6 to 10 days.

USACE StS Cadre is an essential component of USAR task forces and the IST with the ability 

for fast deployment in a life saving mission. The StS brings engineering expertise to the USAR 

task force. Responsible for evaluating the immediate structural conditions at the incident and 

recommending the appropriate hazard mitigation, the StS serves a vital function to the task 

forceWhile supporting an incident, StS interact with local fire and rescue squads and state task 

forces. They conduct entry into partially collapsed spaces in support of the operations of rescue 

specialists. StS support includes evaluation of structures hazards within the partially collapsed 

structure, recommendations for shoring of those spaces and efficient breaching of obstructions.

Recent Lessons Learned

In a Vigilant Guard exercise, November 2009 in Tonawanda, NY, USACE StS worked a rubble 

pile problem with the New York National Guard civil support team and chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive [CBRNE] enhanced response force packages 

(CERFPs) as well as local responders. Lessons learned included:

•Even though exercises may include a simulated collapse structure event, exercis

planners must realize the “pile” will be “live.” This requires real-world decisions 
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

about participant safety and the need to mitigate potentially hazardous conditions. 

This requires the real world use of monitoring tools to evaluate if a suspect structure is 

stable or not.

•  Operations should run 24 hours to allow for night work, shift changes, and coordination 

challenges.

•  Receiving teams (rescue squads; CERFPs; etc.) were unaware of the StS role and 

required a detailed explanation and continual advocacy for education and involvement. 

An StS liaison should be dedicated to CERFP teams working the same incident.

•  The Rino global positioning system devices were difficult to use while crawling

through pile.

•  The wireless building-monitoring system needs to be ruggedized.

•  USACE training to StS, FEMA USAR teams, and state USAR teams means all have a 

common reference and uniform terminology of the disaster response environment.

Points of Contact 

For additional information regarding the USACE USAR program, contact one of the following 

subject-matter experts:

•  USACE Emergency Management, South Pacific Division: (415) 503-6616 FAX: (415)

503-6647.

•  USACE Emergency Management, South Pacific Division Chief: (415) 503-6610 FAX:

(415) 503-6647.

References

Defense Support to Civil Authorities Air Support Handbook, Headquarters First Air Force/Air Forces Northern (1AF 

[AFNORTH]), 01 January 2009.

Domestic Operational Law Handbook for Judge Advocates, LTC Patrick A. Barnett, Editor, 20 July 2009, Center for

Law and Military Operations, <http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/clamo>.

DOD 4515.13-R, Air Transportation Eligibility, (November 1994), through change 3, April 9, 1998. paragraph C5.7;

See also ESF #9.

AFNORTH Fact Sheet, <http://www.1af.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4107>, August 2008.

FEMA at <http://www.fema.gov/emergency/usr/>.

Urban Search & Rescue Mission Overview, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Office of Homeland Security, Civil

Emergency Management, June 2007.

National Search and Rescue Plan of the United States, National Search and Rescue Committee, 2007.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

Appendix M

After Action Reviews

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3150.25D, Joint Lessons Learned Program, 10 

October 2008, provides information for policies, reporting procedures, and responsibilities for 

members of joint task forces responding to incidents. It defines the after action review (AAR) as 

“a panel of representatives from major participating units in an operation, exercise, experiment, 

or event led by a facilitator to review observations recorded for validation.” It defines a lesson 

learned as “results from an evaluation or observation of an implemented corrective action that 

contributed to improved performance or increased capability. A lesson learned also results from 

an evaluation or observation of a positive finding that did not necessarily require corrective 

action other than sustainment.”

Commanders and staffs at all echelons are responsible for collecting relevant observations, 

insights, and lesson learned (OIL) using both formal and informal methods. Army Regulation 

(AR) 11-33, Army Lessons Learned Program: System Development and Application, 17 October 

2006, established the AAR system and lessons learned process. Paragraphs 2-3, 2-4, and 2-5 

require commanders of active duty, Guard, and Reserve commands, Army service component 

commands, direct reporting units, and assigned units (brigade or larger) to submit unit-level 

AARs and other lessons-learned material to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) for 

review, analysis, dissemination, and archiving. This is to be completed no later than 90 days after 

returning to home station after an incident. AR 11-33 also requires commanders to assist CALL 

collection and analysis teams when they arrive in their operational area during or following an 

incident.

The Army will collect relevant OIL, AARs, tactics, techniques, and procedures and other records 

from Army operations, major collective training exercises, and experiments to identify issues that 

impact Soldier and unit performance. By analyzing the data, the Army determines how to sustain, 

enhance, and increase its preparedness for future operations. The process is illustrated in Figure 

N-1. CALL is responsible for archiving unit AARs and developing products for dissemination to 

training units so that future training will incorporate best practices.

Army Training Circular 25-20, A Leader’s Guide to After-Action Reviews, 30 September 1993, 

provides thorough guidance on preparing an AAR. The U.S. Army conducts AARs for both 

training exercises and operations and provides a standardized format to identify:

•Unit-identified problems with the commander’s solutio

•Better ways of doing business (no changes required to current doctrine, training

organization, material, and leadership).

•Commander-identified problems that require Headquarters, Department of the Arm

Training and Doctrine Command action to solve.
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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Figure M-1. Deliberate lessons learned process

In the National Response Framework there are numerous requirements to conduct AARs.

•ESF #8 requires the regional, field, and joint field office logistics managemen

structure to participate “in the development of after action reports and remedial action 

management program inputs to headquarters to correct deficiencies or publicize best 

practices.”

•ESF #8, on completion of the incident, prepares summary after action and lesson

learned reports. These reports identify key problems, indicate how they were solved, 

and make recommendations for improving response operations. ESF #8 will request 

input and coordinate the preparation of the after action and lessons learned reports with 

all supported and supporting agencies.

•ESF #12 directs the Department of Energy to contribute to AAR
185

DISASTER RESPONSE

•The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Annex states that when a

incident is complete, “incident-related activities transition back from response to steady 

state. Concurrently, the after action report is prepared.”

•The demobilization portion of the CIKR Annex further states, “After action report

are developed following an incident to detail operational successes, problems, and key 

issues affecting management of the incident. After action reports include appropriate 

feedback from all Federal, State, tribal, local, nongovernmental, and private-sector 

partners participating in the incident.” It also provides Department of Homeland 

Security procedures for completing an AAR.

The National Incident Management System requires all preparedness organizations to “conduct 

after action reviews to strengthen future preparedness.” It also requires all plans to incorporate 

AARs, lessons learned, and corrective actions.

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DISASTER RESPONSE

Appendix N

Composite Risk Management

Composite Risk Management (CRM) is a decision-making process used to mitigate risks 

associated with all hazards that have the potential to injure or kill personnel, damage or destroy 

equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. The primary premise of CRM is that it 

does not matter where or how loss occurs because the result is the same—decreased mission 

effectiveness. The guiding principles of CRM are:

•Integrate CRM into all phases of missions and operations. Effective CRM requires th

process be integrated into all phases of mission or operational planning, preparation, 

execution, and recovery.

•Make risk decisions at the appropriate level. As a decision-making tool, CRM is onl

effective when the information is passed to the appropriate level of command for 

decision. Commanders are required to establish and publish approval authority for 

decision making. This may be a separate policy, specifically addressed in regulatory 

guidance, or addressed in the commander’s training guidance. Approval authority for 

risk decision making is usually based on guidance from higher headquarters.

•Accept no unnecessary risk. Accept no level of risk unless the potential gain or benefi

outweighs the potential loss.

CRM is a decision-making tool to assist the commander, leader, or individual in identifying, 

assessing, and controlling risks to make informed decisions that balance risk costs (losses) 

against mission benefits (potential gains).

•Apply the process cyclically and continuously. CRM is a continuous process applie

across the full spectrum of Army training and operations, individual and collective dayto-day activities and events, and base operations functions. It is a cyclic process that is 

used to continuously identify and assess hazards, develop and implement controls, and 

evaluate outcomes.

•Do not be risk averse. Identify and control the hazards; complete the missio

Composite Risk Management Steps

CRM is a five-step process:

•Step 1: Identify hazard

•Step 2: Assess hazards to determine ris

•Step 3: Develop controls and make risk decision

•Step 4: Implement control

•Step 5: Supervise and evaluat
188

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Steps 1 and 2 are assessment steps, and Steps 3 through 5 are management steps.

When the CRM is overlaid with the troop-leading procedures, the result is as shown in Figure 

N-1.

Figure N-1. CRM and troop leading procedures

To maintain continuity with mission tasks and requirements, it is necessary to track the CRM 

process in a standardized manner. Many tools are available that can be tailored to portray CRM 

information to suit a particular mission, situation, operation, or event. When time and situation 

allow, the Army standard CRM worksheet (Department of the Army Form 7566, Composite Risk 

Management Worksheet) or an electronic version will be used to document the CRM process.

Key Definitions

Hazard: A condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage 

to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation. A hazard may also be a situation 

or event that can result in degradation of capabilities or mission failure. Hazards exist in all 

environments—combat operations, stability operations, base support operations, training, 

garrison activities, and off-duty activities.

Danger: Exposure or vulnerability to harm or risk, the balance between the chance or probability 

of a hazardous incident, and the result of the hazardous incident.

Risk: Probability and severity of loss linked to hazards.

Risk management: The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from 

operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits.

Reference

Field Manual 5-19, Composite Risk Management, Department of the Army, August 2006.
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DISASTER RESPONSE

Appendix O

State Points of Contact

This appendix provides points of contact for National Guard key military support personnel and 

units in each of the states and territories. The director of military support (DOMS), the joint 

operations center (JOC), and the adjutant general (TAG) phone numbers are provided, when 

available. The table also shows the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) region 

to which each state or territory belongs, the name and phone numbers of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) civil support teams (CSTs), and whether there is a chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive enhanced response force package (CERFP) in the 

state. If a state has more than one WMD-CST, the city is annotated. 

STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

AK DOMS 317-384-4229 (907) 428-6229

X JOC 317-384-4365 (907) 428-6365/7335

TAG 317-384-4003 (907) 428-6003

103rd WMD-CST (907) 980-6093

AL DOMS 363-7207 (334) 271-7207

IV JOC 363-7753 (334) 213-7753

TAG 363-7200 (334) 271-7200

46th WMD-CST (334) 954-3400

AR DOMS 962-5475 (501) 212-5475

VI JOC 962-5471 (501) 212-5471

TAG 962-5001 (501) 212-5001

61st WMD-CST (501) 212-4262

AZ DOMS (602) 267-2774

IX JOC 853-2583 (602) 267-2583/2428/2562

TAG 853-2712 (602) 267-2712

91st WMD-CST (602) 267-2953

CA DOMS 466-3200 (916) 267-3200

IX JOC 466-3440 (916) 854-3440

TAG 466-3500 (916) 854-3500

(Hayward) 95th WMD-CST (CERFP) (510) 780-0683

(Los Alamitos) 9th WMD-CST (562) 413-1516

.
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STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

CO DOMS 250-1595 (720) 250-1595

VIII JOC 250-1290 (720) 250-1290/1911

TAG 250-1500 (720) 250-1500

8th WMD-CST (CERFP) (303) 994-3846

CT DOMS 636-7837 (860) 524-4824

I JOC 636-7951 (860) 524-4951

TAG 636-7953 (860) 524-4953

14th WMD-CST (860) 627-6095

DC DOMS 325-8734 (202) 685-8734

III JOC 325-8776 (202) 685-8776

TAG 325-9798 (202) 685-9798

33rd WMD-CST (202) 685-9955

DE DOMS 440-7085 (302) 326-7085

III JOC 440-7835/7002 (302) 326-7002

TAG 440-7001 (302) 326-7001

31st WMD-CST (302) 326-7566

FL DOMS 822-0430 (904) 823-0430

IV JOC 822-0459 (904) 823-0459

TAG 823-0101 (904) 823-0101

(Stark) 44th WMD-CST (CERFP) (904) 682-2401

(St. Petersburg) 48th WMD-CST (727) 437-5930

GA DOMS 753-3968 (678) 569-3968

IV JOC 753-3911 (678) 569-3911

TAG 338-6001 (678) 569-6001

4TH WMD-CST (CERFP) (678) 569-3733

GU DOMS (671) 735-0433

IX JOC 315-344-2323 (671) 734-082

TAG (671) 735-0400

94TH WMD-CST (671) 647-1972/1970
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DISASTER RESPONSE

STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

HI DOMS (808) 733-4263

IX JOC (808) -733-4263

TAG (808) 733-4246

93rd WMD-CST (CERFP) (808) 479-8687

IA DOMS 431-4541 (515) 252-4541

VII JOC 431-4710 (515) 252-4710/11

TAG 431-4020 (515) 252-4020

71st WMD-CST (CERFP) (515) 334-2803/4

ID DOMS 272-5755 (208) 272-5755/4151

X JOC (208) 422-5755

TAG 272-5242 (208) 272-5242

101st WMD-CST (208) 272-4283/4278

IL DOMS 555-3577 (217) 761-3577

V JOC 555-3941/3945 (217) 761-3941/3945

TAG 555-3500 (217) 761-3500

5th WMD-CST (CERFP) (708) 824-5926

IN DOMS 369-2204 (317) 247-3204

V JOC 369-2320 (317) 247-3320

TAG 369-2559 (317) 247-3559

53rd WMD-CST (317) 247-3300x5081

KS DOMS 720-8193 (785) 274-1193

VII JOC 720-8117/8126 (785) 274-1117/1126/1821

TAG 720-8001 (785) 274-1001

73rd WMD-CST (785) 861-4088

KY DOMS 667-1580 (502) 607-1580

IV JOC 667-1636/6803 (502) 607-1636

TAG 667-1558 (502) 607-1558

41st WMD-CST 741-4542 (502) 364-9542
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STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

LA DOMS 435-5534 (318) 290-5534

VI JOC 435-5262 (318) 290-5262

TAG 435-3858 (318) 641-3858

62nd WMD-CST (225) 319-4779/4781

MA DOMS 256-6802 (508) 233-6802

I JOC 256-7213 (508) 233-7213

TAG 256-6552 (508) 233-6552

1st WMD-CST (CERFP) (508) 233-7575

MD DOMS (410) 702-9063

III JOC 496-9000 (410) 702-9000

TAG 496-6020 (410) 576-6097

32nd WMD-CST (301) 677-0018

ME DOMS 626-4551 (207) 626-4551

I JOC 626-4429 (207) 626-4429

TAG 476-4271 (207) 626-4271

11th WMD-CST (207) 877-9623

(207) 873-9591

MI DOMS 623-5619 (517) 483-5619

V JOC 623-8031/8032 (517) 481-8031

TAG 623-8083 (517) 481-8083

51st WMD-CST (269) 731-6531

MN DOMS 825-8916 (651) 268-8916

V JOC 825-8860/8861 (651) 268-8860/8861

TAG 825-8924 (651) 268-8924

55th WMD-CST (CERFP) (612) 713-2836/8

MO DOMS 555-9599 (573) 638-9599

II JOC 555-9803 (573) 638-9803

TAG 555-9710 (573) 638-9710

7th WMD-CST (CERFP) (573) 329-9024
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DISASTER RESPONSE

STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

MS DOMS 293-6313 (601) 313-6313

IV JOC 293-6193 (601) 313-6193

TAG 293-6232 (601) 313-6232

47th WMD-CST 293-1575/1866 (601) 313-1575/1866

MT DOMS 324-3166 (406) 324-3166

VIII JOC 324-3000/3170 (406) 324-3000/3170

TAG 324-3010 (406) 324-3010

83rd WMD-CST 324-3099 (406) 324-3099

NC DOMS 582-9118 (919) 664-6118

IV JOC 582-9531 (919) 664-6531

TAG 582-9101 (919) 664-6101

42nd WMD-CST (252) 752-7506

ND DOMS 373-2174 (701) 333-2174

VII JOC 373-2906 (701) 333-2906

TAG 373-2001 (701) 333-2001

81st WMD-CST (701) 333-6904

NE DOMS 279-7395 (402) 309-7395

VII JOC 279-7400 (402) 309-7400

TAG 279-7099 (402) 309-7099

72nd WMD-CST (CERFP) 279-7559 (402) 309-7559

NH DOMS 684-9555 (603) 227-1555

I JOC 684-9555 (603) 227-1555

TAG 684-9200 (603) 225-1200

12th WMD-CST 684-9836 (603) 225-1836

NJ DOMS 445-9095 (609) 530-7095

II JOC 445-9010 (609) 530-7010

TAG 445-7957 (609) 530-6957

21st WMD-CST (609) 562-0059
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STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

NM DOMS 867-8585 (505) 474-1585

VI JOC 867-9770 (505) 474-2770/2771

TAG 867-8210 (505) 474-1210

64th WMD-CST (505) 771-7802

NV DOMS 530-7895 (775) 887-7895

IX JOC 530-7200 (775) 887-7200

TAG 530-7302 (775) 887-7302

92nd WMD-CST (702) 643-4277

NY DOMS 489-6110 (518) 786-6110

II JOC 489-6104 (518) 786-6104

TAG 489-4502 (518) 786-4502

(Scotia) 2nd WMD-CST (CERFP) (518) 786-3432

(Ft. Hamilton) 24th WMD-CST (518) 337-7469

OH DOMS 346-7424 (614) 336-7424

V JOC 346-7551 (614) 734-7551

TAG (614) 336-7070

52nd WMD-CST (CERFP) (614) 336-6636

OK DOMS 628-5587 (405) 228-5587

VI JOC 628-5061 (405) 228-5061

TAG 628-5201 (405) 228-5201

63rd WMD-CST (405) 306-9526

OR DOMS 355-2800 (503) 584-2800

X JOC 355-2800 (503) 584-2800

TAG 355-3991 (503) 584-3991

102nd WMD-CST 

(CERFP)

(503) 584-3124

PA DOMS 491-8648 (717) 861-8648

III JOC 491-8932 (717) 861-8932

TAG 491-8500 (717) 861-8932

3rd WMD-CST (CERFP) 491-2623 (717) 861-2623
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DISASTER RESPONSE

STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

PR DOMS

II JOC (787) 723-7700/11

TAG 

22nd WMD-CST (787) 289-1611

RI DOMS 247-4123 (401) 275-4123 / 247-4123

I JOC 247-4139 (401) 275-4139

TAG 247-4102 (401) 275-4102

13th WMD-CST (401) 392-0821

SC DOMS

IV JOC 583-4045/6 (803) 806-4045/6

TAG 583-4217 (803) 806-4217

43rd WMD-CST (803) 806-3772

SD DOMS 747-6772 (605) 737-6722

VIII JOC 747-6032 (605) 737-6032

TAG 747-6702 (605) 737-6702

82nd WMD-CST (605) 430-9620

TN DOMS 683-0750 (615) 313-0750

IV JOC 683-7590 (615) 313-7590/3

TAG 683-3001 (615) 313-3001

45th WMD-CST (615) 355-3618

TX DOMS 954-5591 (512) 782-5591

VI JOC 954-5544 (512) 782-5544

TAG 954-5705 (512) 782-5705

6th WMD-CST (CERFP) 954-1912 (512) 782-1912

UT DOMS 766-4108 (801) 523-4108

VIII JOC 766-4400 (801) 432-4400

TAG 766-4401 (801) 523-4400

85th WMD-CST
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STATE

FEMA REGION

POSITION DSN COMMERCIAL

VA DOMS (804) 328-3013

III JOC (804) 236-7704/5

(434) 292-8650/6

TAG (434) 371-2526

34th WMD-CST (CERFP) (434) 294-1321

VI DOMS 727-7771 (340) 712-7771

II JOC 727-7788 (340) 712-7740

TAG 727-7710 (340) 712-7710

23rd WMD-CST (340) 719-8341/7333

VT DOMS 636-3342 (802) 338-3342

I JOC 636-3050 (802) 338-3050

TAG 636-3124 (802) 338-3124

15th WMD-CST 636-3534 (802) 338-3534

WA DOMS 323-8677 (253) 512-8677

X JOC 323-8130 (253) 512-8130/ 

8131/8773

TAG 323-8201 (253) 512-8201

10th WMD-CST (253) 512-8063/7633

WI DOMS 745-8410 (608) 245-8410

V JOC 745-8400 (608) 245-8400

TAG 724-3001 (608) 242-3001

54th WMD-CST 745-8430 (608) 245-8430

WV DOMS 623-6464 (304) 561-6464

III JOC 623 6444 (304) 561-6496/44/55

TAG 623-6316 (304) 561-6316

35th WMD-CST (CERFP) (304) 201-3150/2

WY DOMS 388-5288 (307) 772-5288

VIII JOC 388-5112 (307) 772-5112

TAG 388-5234 (307) 772-5234

84th WMD-CST (307) 772-5029
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Appendix P

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers

Emergency preparedness liaison officer (EPLO) is a generic term referring collectively to service 

and other Department of Defense (DOD) agency personnel who coordinate military assistance to 

other federal agencies and state governments. 

These positions are established to:

•Coordinate resources as required, typically through the Federal Emergenc

Management Agency (FEMA) mission assignment process.

•Maintain effective communication between the DOD components, DOD, and othe

state and/or federal governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations.

•Promote mutual understanding among various organizations tasked with providing an

coordinating emergency support functions in civil emergency situations.

•Serve as a subject-matter expert on service-specific capabilities, limitations, and lega

authorities.

Regional Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer

Regional EPLOs (REPLOs) are reservists assigned to the FEMA regions with the same areas of 

responsibility as their respective defense coordinating officers (DCOs). They may backfill for 

DCOs who have been deployed. REPLOs direct their efforts toward planning and coordinating 

defense support to civil authorities (DSCA) activities. They serve as subject matter experts for 

the regions and their respective services and are highly trained in request for assistance and 

mission assignment development.

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) plans to assign one senior reserve officer (O-5) billet at each 

FEMA region. During nondisaster periods, USCG EPLOs fall under the command and control 

of the USCG district that encompasses the FEMA region. Upon activation, the USCG EPLO 

typically reports either to the FEMA regional response coordination center or the joint field office 

for the declared disaster.

State Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer 

At the state level, state EPLOs (SEPLOs) can perform duties in state emergency operations 

centers (EOCs). SEPLOs are the subject matter experts in their states; they serve as DOD 

liaisons for DSCA to state and federal agencies and maintain situational awareness within the 

state. Their purpose is to build relationships on a daily basis.

EPLOs are also referred to as NEPLOs (Navy), AFEPLOs (Air Force), or MEPLOs (Marine 

Corps). Regardless of title, their functions and responsibilities to their DCOs are the same as 

described above.
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REGION STATE POSITION PHONE

I CT Liaison Officer (781) 928-0160

I MA Liaison Officer (978) 796-3784

I ME Liaison Officer (207) 992-4042

I NH Liaison Officer (603) 885-5667

I RI Liaison Officer (207) 892-1314

I Chief REPLO (781) 266-9317

I Assistant REPLO (617) 626-8032

II NJ Liaison Officer (646) 996-8137

II NY Liaison Officer (215) 697-6046

II NY Assistant Liaison Officer (315) 952-8408

II PR Liaison Officer (787) 707-4172

II VI Liaison Officer (787) 977-5820

II Assistant REPLO (732) 532-9660

III DC Liaison Officer (610) 834-3467

III DE Liaison Officer (610) 591-6882

III MD Liaison Officer (215) 345-2665

III PA Liaison Officer (717) 214-6658

III VA Liaison Officer (757) 688-1649

III VA Assistant Liaison Officer

III WV Liaison Officer

III Chief REPLO (703) 235-2894

III Assistant REPLO (215) 656-6693

IV AL Liaison Officer (251) 460-7891

IV AL Assistant Liaison Officer (334) 687-1986

IV FL Liaison Officer

IV FL Assistant Liaison Officer (210) 569-2448

IV GA Liaison Officer (404) 886-5342

IV GA Assistant Liaison Officer

IV KY Liaison Officer (502) 454-2948

IV MS Liaison Officer (901) 224-5434

IV MS Assistant Liaison Officer (601) 214-3504

IV NC Liaison Officer (919) 456-3902

IV SC Liaison Officer (864) 597-4351

IV TN Liaison Officer (865) 986-1300

IV Chief REPLO (404) 353-0806

IV Assistant REPLO (404) 464-4301
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REGION STATE POSITION PHONE

V IL Liaison Officer (616) 229-1465

V IN Liaison Officer (502) 458-4147

V IN Assistant Liaison Officer (317) 510-7279

V MI Liaison Officer (312) 408-5342

V MN Liaison Officer

V OH Liaison Officer (513) 569-4682

V WI Liaison Officer (312) 408-5331

V Chief REPLO (952) 294-5908

V Assistant REPLO (612) 713-3995

VI AR Liaison Officer (501) 604-1943

VI LA Liaison Officer (501) 771-7805

VI LA Assistant Liaison Officer (337) 531-9869

VI NM Liaison Officer (915) 521-7433

VI NM Liaison Officer (706) 394-3153

VI OK Liaison Officer

VI TX Liaison Officer (210) 221-0437

VI TX Assistant Liaison Officer (210) 225-5254

VI Chief REPLO (903) 963-5600

VII IA Liaison Officer (515) 993-6925

VII KS Liaison Officer (620) 778-3075

VII MO Liaison Officer (318) 485-3128

VII Liaison Officer (816) 283-7066

VII Chief REPLO (913) 651-3300

VII Assistant REPLO (816) 340-4341

VIII CO Liaison Officer (303) 739-7421

VIII MT Liaison Officer (406) 522-6272

VIII ND Liaison Officer (701) 740-3168

VIII SD Liaison Officer (605) 353-8500

VIII UT Liaison Officer

VIII WY Liaison Officer

VIII Chief REPLO (303) 862-2067

IX AZ Liaison Officer (520) 378-2511

IX Northern CA Liaison Officer (916) 795-9177

IX Southern CA Liaison Officer (562) 795-2162

IX Southern CA Assistant Liaison Officer (562) 795-2289

IX Chief REPLO (916) 704-1001

IX Assistant REPLO (916) 322-6905
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REGION STATE POSITION PHONE

X ID Liaison Officer

X OR Liaison Officer

X WA Assistant Liaison Officer (206) 389-6011

X Chief REPLO (509) 372-6260

Table P-1. Title 10 REPLOs and SEPLOs

USCG EPLOs, not being Title 10 forces in most instances, have statutorily different authorities 

and capabilities that differ significantly from the DOD services and the National Guard (when 

under Title 10 or Title 32).

EPLOs do not perform the traditional roles of selected reserve (SELRES) members at a unit. 

EPLOs provide close coordination with their respective district EPLO coordinators and are 

assigned to foster the exchange of information, promote cooperation and communication, and 

coordinate the planning and implementation of USCG contingency plans with federal (especially 

Department of Homeland Security organizations), state, and local emergency preparedness 

partners. EPLOs will maintain a close relationship with assigned FEMA regions. When a joint 

field office team is deployed the EPLO is able to serve as a USCG point of contact assigned 

to the FEMA region. The EPLO can introduce the team to appropriate officials and get it 

established.

FEMA regions and USCG districts do not coincide geographically (Figure P-1). The structure is 

managed as follows:

•USCG EPLOs are assigned to each distric

•A SELRES commander (05) is assigned as the EPLO for each of FEMA’s 10 regiona

offices.

•Districts 1 and 8 have a SELRES (06) assigned as district EPLO coordinator becaus

more than one FEMA regional office exists within each of those district boundaries.

•The district EPLO coordinator has responsibilities for Districts 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, an

17 and may be assigned to an active duty member of the district planning division 

(DX) or district response division (DR); this is not intended to be a full-time equivalent 

position. 

•The FEMA region EPLO reports directly to the district EPLO coordinator in a “direc

reporting” relationship. The district EPLO coordinator works for the DX or DR 

division, depending upon the district commander’s preference.

Details concerning USCG EPLOs can be found in Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer 

(EPLO) Roles and Responsibilities Guidebook, (CG-5334), USCG Office of Disaster and 

Continuity Operations, December 2009.
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Figure P-1. FEMA-USCG district map

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Appendix Q

Websites

Government Websites

For information about the National Incident Management System (NIMS): http://www.fema.gov/

emergency/nims/index.shtm.

For training on NIMS: http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nims_training.shtm.

For information about the National Response Framework (NRF): http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

interapp/editorial/editorial_0566.xml.

For training on the NRF: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS800b.asp.

For information about the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA): http://www.fema.

gov/.

For training offered by FEMA: http://www.training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/.

Federal Highway Administration Emergency Transportation Operations: http://www.ops.fhwa.

dot.gov/eto_tim_pse/index.htm.

General News and Information

Alertnet by Reuters (emergency news from Reuters wire service and other organizations): www.

alertnet.org.

ReliefWeb (largest humanitarian portal with updated news and information on emergencies 

directly from Nongovernmental organizations, and government aid agencies): www.reliefweb.int.

Disaster News Network (facilitates information sharing on disaster response among responders; 

covers preparedness, environmental hazards, and terrorist disasters): www.disasternews.net. 

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (National VOAD or NVOAD). This 

organization provides a forum for organizations to share knowledge and resources throughout 

the disaster cycle—preparation, response, and recovery—to help disaster survivors and their 

communities. National VOAD is a consortium of approximately 50 national organizations and 

55 state and territory equivalents. During major incidents, it typically sends representatives to 

the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/FEMA National Response Coordination Center to 

represent the voluntary organizations and assist in response coordination. The website is: www.

nvoad.org.

Natural Hazards Center: The mission of the Natural Hazards Center at the University of 

Colorado at Boulder is to advance and communicate knowledge on hazards mitigation and 

disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. Using an all-hazards and interdisciplinary 

framework, the center fosters information sharing and integration of activities among 
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researchers, practitioners, and policymakers from around the world; supports and conducts 

research; and provides educational opportunities for the next generation of hazards scholars and 

professionals. The website is: www.colorado.edu/hazards.

Training Sources

•U.S. Army North training modules for defense support to civil authorities (DSCA)

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence 

management response force; emergency preparedness liaison officer; and defense 

coordination office/element are available at: https://www.usarnorth.org/public/index.

cfm.

•Center for Domestic Preparedness: http://cdp.dhs.gov

•Emergency Management Institute: http://training.fema.gov/EMICourse

•Louisiana State University: http://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu

•National Incident Management System: http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/nim

training.shtm#3.

•New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology: http://www.emrtc.nmt.ed

•State Level: http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/STCourse

•Texas A&M University: http://teexweb.tamu.ed

•U.S. Department of Energy: http://www.nv.doe.gov/default.htm

Detailed training concerning NRF and NIMS is offered as independent study (IS) courses by 

FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (http://training.fema.gov/IS/):

•IS-1: Emergency Manager: An Orientation to the Positio

•IS-100.a: Introduction to Incident Command System, I-10

•IS-130: Exercise Evaluation and Improvement Plannin

•IS-200.a: ICS for Single Resources and Initial Action Incident

•IS-208: State Disaster Managemen

•IS-230: Principles of Emergency Managemen

•IS-235: Emergency Plannin

•IS-288: The Role of Voluntary Agencies in Emergency Managemen

•IS-292: Disaster Basic
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•IS-547: Introduction to Continuity of Operation

•IS-700.a: National Incident Management System (NIMS), an Introductio

•IS-701: NIMS Multiagency Coordination System

•IS-702: NIMS Public Information System

•IS-703: NIMS Resource Managemen

•IS-706: NIMS Intrastate Mutual Aid: An Introductio

•IS-800.b: National Response Framework: An Introductio

•IS-860: Introduction to the National Infrastructure Protection Pla

Unclassified Imagery Access Portals

United States Geological Survey Hazard Data Distribution System:

•Open Access: http://hdds.usgs.gov/hdd

•Restricted Access: http://edcftp.cr.usgs.gov/disaster_restricted/200808_Hurricane_Ik

data.

•Official users with need to know may contact the Air Forces Northern (AFNORTH

(601 IRD) PED Team for log in information.

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) Disaster Imagery Management System (common access 

card required for the portal, User Name and Password required for the server): https://operations.

noradnorthcom.mil/sites/NNCJ2/NNCJ22/DSCA/DIMS/default.aspx.

DHS’s Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) (registration required): https://

government.hsin.gov/default.aspx.

NORTHCOM: http://www.northcom.mil/.

AFNORTH Exercise Webpage: https://operations.noradnorthcom.mil/sites/afnorth/Exercises/

default.aspx.

AFNORTH public contingency webpage: http://www.afnorth.us or http://1afnorth.region1.ang.

af.mil/default.aspx.

U.S. Army North (USARNORTH)/Fifth Army: http://www.arnorth.army.mil/public/.

U.S. Coast Guard Homeport: http://homeport.uscg.mil/mycg/portal/ep/home.do.

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CSI is a military history think tank that produces timely and relevant military history and contemporary 

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Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) 

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