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20–694 PDF 2017

COAST GUARD ARCTIC IMPLEMENTATION 

CAPABILITIES 

(114–49) 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

TRANSPORTATION AND 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 12, 2016 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 

( 

Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ 

committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee, 

Vice Chair 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

ERIC A. ‘‘RICK’’ CRAWFORD, Arkansas 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

RICHARD L. HANNA, New York 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JEFF DENHAM, California 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

ROB WOODALL, Georgia 

TODD ROKITA, Indiana 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

CRESENT HARDY, Nevada 

RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

MIMI WALTERS, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

MIKE BOST, Illinois 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JANICE HAHN, California 

RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota 

ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois 

JARED HUFFMAN, California 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

BOB GIBBS, Ohio 

MARK SANFORD, South Carolina 

GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana 

CARLOS CURBELO, Florida 

DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland 

CORRINE BROWN, Florida 

JANICE HAHN, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

JULIA BROWNLEY, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon (Ex Officio) 

(III) 

CONTENTS Page 

Summary of Subject Matter .................................................................................... iv 

TESTIMONY 

Admiral Charles D. Michel, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard .................... 4 

Allison Stiller, Principal Civilian Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, U.S. Navy, Department 

of Defense ............................................................................................................. 4 

Jennifer Grover, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 4 

Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service 4 

Heather A. Conley, Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic, 

Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................................. 4 

Matthew O. Paxton, President, Shipbuilders Council of America ....................... 4 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES 

Admiral Charles D. Michel ..................................................................................... 47 

Allison Stiller ........................................................................................................... 55 

Jennifer Grover ........................................................................................................ 58 

Ronald O’Rourke ...................................................................................................... 77 

Heather A. Conley ................................................................................................... 96 

Matthew O. Paxton .................................................................................................. 103 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Admiral Charles D. Michel, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard: 

Responses to requests for information from the following Representatives: 

Hon. John Garamendi of California ......................................................... 18, 34 

Hon. Duncan Hunter of California .......................................................... 36 

Responses to questions for the record from the following Representatives: 

Hon. Don Young of Alaska ....................................................................... 52 

Hon Mark Sanford of South Carolina and Hon. Janice Hahn of California ....................................................................................................... 53 

Allison Stiller, Principal Civilian Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, U.S. Navy, Department 

of Defense: 

Responses to requests for information from the following Representatives: 

Hon. John Garamendi of California ......................................................... 20 

Hon. Don Young of Alaska ....................................................................... 40 

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(1) 

COAST GUARD ARCTIC IMPLEMENTATION 

CAPABILITIES 

TUESDAY, JULY 12, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME

TRANSPORTATION, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m. in room 

2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. HUNTER. The subcommittee will come to order. Good morning. Thanks for being here, everybody. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss the Coast Guard’s 

Arctic capabilities. The Coast Guard talks about its assets through 

descriptions such as ‘‘an asset’s capacity or capability.’’ The term 

‘‘capacity,’’ as I understand, is a quantitative term which refers to 

how much, to what scale or volume a mission can be performed by 

the asset, and the term ‘‘capability’’ refers to the kinds of missions 

an asset can perform. 

At our June hearing on Coast Guard mission needs and resource 

allocation, the GAO reported that Coast Guard assets new and old 

are not performing to capacity, creating mission gaps. In addition, 

GAO noted that the Coast Guard allocates resource hours at levels 

that are higher than actual asset usage hours—in fact, we probably 

spent about 10 or 15 minutes understanding this in the last hearing—also creating mission gaps, but potentially, a more artificial 

mission gap, depending on whether you believe the allocated resource hours are based on reality. 

The reason I make that statement is for us in Congress to understand the needs of the Service we need to understand the current 

abilities of Coast Guard assets. Not the projected ability of an asset 

to meet mission needs, but its actual ability to perform a mission 

and the kind of missions it can support. 

The Coast Guard has testified that its heavy icebreaker, the 

Polar Star, has the capacity—excuse me, has the capability of accessing any ice-covered region 24/7, 365 days of the year. It may 

have the capability, but by all accounts it does not have the capacity due to its age and maintenance needs. In fact, I think we figured out that the Polar Star can actually be on the ocean about 

180 days out of the year, so about half the year. 

The High Latitude Region Mission Analysis revealed the following Coast Guard missions—defense readiness, ice operations, 

marine environmental protection, and ports, waterways and coastal 

2 

security—in the Arctic were significantly impacted by the gap in 

mission performance. It is these gaps and the knowledge that when 

the Polar Star reaches the end of its extended service life we may 

have a period where the Coast Guard does not have a heavy icebreaker at all. 

Progress is being made on the acquisition front, with $1 billion 

in the Senate defense bill for the first ship in the Polar Icebreaker 

Recapitalization Project. It has a way to go, but it is positive 

progress. I have supported this acquisition and annual funding for 

it in House appropriations bills, as have many of my colleagues. 

I want to reiterate again that the Coast Guard and this committee are in lockstep on the need for a heavy icebreaker. But as 

we work towards the acquisition of our Nation’s first heavy icebreaker since 1978, all of us have the inherent duty to have a discussion on what we will do now and continue to do until we deploy 

the appropriate number of icebreakers over the next several decades. And we are talking a decade out, at least, for the first icebreaker that we build. 

My concerns continue to lie with current mission gaps in the Arctic, particularly defense readiness, due to the inability of assets to 

support year-round missions in the region. And I believe this is the 

responsibility that the Coast Guard and Navy should share. 

So again, what is the plan, in the short term, to fill this gap? We 

heard at the June hearing that the material assessment for the 

Polar Sea will be sent to this committee conveniently after Congress gets out this month, on July 24. Just shy of 3 years after the 

deadline mandated in statute for making a determination of whether it is cost-effective to reactivate the Polar Sea, and 6 years since 

the vessel last operated, the Coast Guard will provide the committee a report on the condition of the vessel. 

But don’t worry that the Coast Guard is moving too swiftly or 

without deliberate care. We have been assured the material assessment will not even contain a recommendation for action, simply an 

assessment on the ship. This is the start of the process to see if 

she can be reactivated. Further information will not come until the 

alternative analysis is sent to Congress at the end of the calendar 

year, so we are looking at about 7 years since the Polar Sea last 

operated, and more than—almost 4 years since Congress passed a 

law that said that the Coast Guard is going to give us an analysis 

on whether the Polar Sea can be reactivated or not, and how much 

it would cost. 

Time is ticking away and the vessels in the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet are either inoperable, aging and in need of extended 

time in dry dock, or incapable of working on ice-covered areas. Not 

a good situation to be in, but here we are. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and discussing this important topic with them. 

And lastly, I would just like to say, too, we talked to Secretary 

Stackley in the Navy and Admiral Michel, and we talked about creating a Naval-Coast Guard kind of collaboration office, a joint program office. Are we willing to do that today? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. I am going to speak on behalf of Mr. 

Stackley, but yes, we are committed to working together to put toVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
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gether a memorandum of understanding on how we would work together collaboratively on the icebreaker. 

Mr. HUNTER. Fantastic. And with that I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And this is another 

very, very important hearing on the issues of the Coast Guard and 

the Arctic. 

There is an old adage which states that failing to plan is planning to fail. Fortunately, when it comes to the Arctic region, by just 

about any measure the volume of planning initiatives undertaken 

by the Federal Government over the last several years has been 

both comprehensive in scope and substantial in number. 

The National Arctic Strategy, the Coast Guard High Latitude Regional Mission Analysis, the Army Corps Arctic Deepwater Port 

Study are just a few of the studies that have been undertaken. 

They clearly demonstrate that there is no failure to plan for what 

will be a whole-of-government enterprise for many years to come. 

But at this point what is needed, now more than ever, is decisive 

and thoughtful decisionmaking, not only within the administration 

but also here in Congress. And that is why this hearing is so very 

important today. 

Whether or not you believe that the Earth’s climate is warming 

due to increased emissions of manmade greenhouse gases, that is 

not terribly relevant. The physical reality quickly unfolding across 

the High North and Antarctic continents is extremely relevant. The 

shrinking Arctic ice coverage, the caving of Antarctic ice sheets, 

Greenland’s glaciers retreating at a pace never before recorded are 

each separately stunning developments. Taken together, however, 

they expose two unforgiving remote regions of the world in the 

midst of a rapid, wenching, systematic, environmental change. And 

if we have learned anything, we should expect the actual pace of 

environmental change in each polar region to far exceed the rates 

projected by our climate models. 

So too we must expect human use of the Arctic to accelerate 

much faster than projected. And consequently, the Coast Guard, 

the Navy, and other Federal agencies will have to grapple with 

new demands and challenges far sooner than anticipated. That is 

why we must now switch gears from planning to action. Time is 

critical, and something we can ill afford to waste. We must begin 

to make some very hard but important decisions. We must ensure 

that the United States can decisively project and resolutely protect 

its sovereign interest in the Arctic and fulfill its international obligations in the Antarctic. 

For example, if we need a new heavy icebreaker, let’s get on with 

cutting the steel and laying the keels for these new hulls now. If 

we need new Arctic deepwater ports, let us identify the sites and 

set the Corps of Engineers to work. If we need to ensure emergency 

communications and safe navigation in the Arctic, let us appropriate the funding and direct the Coast Guard to get this underway. 

All of these things and much more we need to do. But if we hope 

to shape our future in the Arctic and Antarctic, we must take decisive action before events in those rapidly evolving frontiers overwhelm our capability to respond effectively. Now is the time for us 

4 

to act, to make decisions, and to set in place the laws and money 

to get the job done. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to this hearing. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Let me introduce our witnesses today. They are Admiral Charles Michel, Vice Commandant 

of the U.S. Coast Guard; Ms. Allison Stiller, Principal Civilian Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition for the U.S. Navy; Ms. Jennifer Grover, Director of Homeland Security and Justice for the Government Accountability Office; Mr. Ronald O’Rourke, specialist in naval affairs 

with the Congressional Research Service; Ms. Heather A. Conley, 

senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic for the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Mr. Matthew 

Paxton, president of the Shipbuilders Council of America. 

Admiral, we will start with you. You are recognized. 

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL CHARLES D. MICHEL, VICE COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD; ALLISON STILLER, PRINCIPAL CIVILIAN DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 

THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION, U.S. NAVY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; JENNIFER 

GROVER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; RONALD 

O’ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE; HEATHER A. CONLEY, SENIOR 

VICE PRESIDENT FOR EUROPE, EURASIA, AND THE ARCTIC, 

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; 

AND MATTHEW O. PAXTON, PRESIDENT, SHIPBUILDERS 

COUNCIL OF AMERICA 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, thank you, Chairman Hunter, Ranking 

Member Garamendi. Thanks for the opportunity to appear before 

you today to discuss Coast Guard capabilities in the Arctic. I ask 

that my written statement be accepted as part of the official record. 

Guided by the National Strategy for the Arctic Region and our 

own Arctic strategy, the Coast Guard is responding to increasing 

mission demands in this important region. The Arctic presents 

unique opportunities and challenges to United States interests. 

U.S. security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from those supporting safe commercial and scientific 

operations to national defense. To respond to this challenge, the 

United States must have the ability to safely and reliably operate 

here year-round. 

Indeed, U.S. sovereignty and security interests in the Arctic 

hinge upon assured access, and heavy icebreakers are the only assets capable of dependably fulfilling this critical requirement for 

surface access. Yet the Coast Guard’s heavy icebreaker inventory, 

which is our entire national capability, consists of a single operational vessel, which is 40 years old, the Polar Star. This is why 

we are answering the President’s call to accelerate recapitalization 

of a new heavy icebreaker, and are planning for the construction 

of additional icebreakers. 

Mr. Chairman, the Coast Guard shares your sense of urgency for 

this new capability and is grateful to your support of our effort to 

accelerate the heavy icebreaker acquisition. As you know, this is 

5 

the Coast Guard’s immediate icebreaking priority, based on the age 

and material condition of our current fleet and our limited resources. I also take very seriously your concerns regarding the 

state of our current capability and the length of time it will take 

to deliver a new heavy icebreaker. 

The Coast Guard is committed to continue working with Congress, the Navy, and industry to address these concerns, and I 

would like to tell you what we are doing on this front. 

First, we remain committed to maintaining heavy icebreaking capability while we proceed with recapitalization. To do this, we must 

make a decision on whether to reactivate Polar Sea or extend Polar 

Star’s service life. To support this decision we just completed a 7- 

month material inspection on Polar Sea, including pulling her out 

of the water, and look forward to sharing our results with you later 

this month, formally. In accordance with the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2015 we have also commenced the necessary alternatives analysis to inform this important decision that will be 

made by the end of this calendar year. 

Based on what we know now, I can tell you that refurbishing 

Polar Sea would be a significant undertaking, and would likely far 

exceed the cost and scope of work that was needed to reactivate 

Polar Star. Second, as you know, we are committed to exploring all possible 

alternatives to best accelerate our acquisition of new heavy icebreakers. To assure continued momentum and selection of the best 

acquisition strategy, we are leveraging our strong and longstanding 

partnership with the Navy, as you noted earlier, sir. To this end, 

we are working with the Navy to develop a program plan to efficiently and effectively move the icebreaker program forward, considering mechanisms such as block buys, multiyear procurements, 

and other opportunities to acquire icebreakers as quickly and responsibly as possible. 

Similar to our experience working with the Navy to build Healy, a cooperative partnership that leverages the Navy’s expertise in designing and acquiring ships will provide mutual benefits to both 

services, and will energize the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base. 

Third, we are assessing additional Arctic needs and planning for 

construction of additional icebreakers. While multimission medium 

icebreakers such as Healy are less capable than heavy icebreakers, 

they can provide important capacity during certain seasons and 

certain ice conditions. We have recently chartered an integrated 

product team, or IPT, to define an operating concept and requirements for medium icebreakers. That IPT will survey available technologies and assets to inform the operational requirements for 

those vessels. 

Fourth, while we proceed with recapitalization of a new heavy 

icebreaker, we are fully committed to exploring ways to address 

evolving U.S. security interests in the Arctic in the near term. We 

have aggressively reached out to industry across the globe, seeking 

out the latest in icebreaking technology. While single-mission icebreakers built to commercial standards are available on the global 

market, we have not yet identified any available multimission medium or heavy icebreakers suitable for military service. However, 

we are continuing to look. Given the urgency, we are open to conVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
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sidering any suitable options that could fulfill our unique authorities and multimission requirements. 

Fifth, we are working with allies through engagements like the 

Arctic Coast Guard Forum to utilize our limited icebreaker capability to achieve better operational effect. This will include combined and joint operations with our allies. 

In closing, thank you for support of our effort to accelerate the 

acquisition of a new heavy icebreaker to replace the aging Polar 

Star, as U.S. security interests in the Arctic ultimately hinge upon 

having assured year-round access. We look forward to working with 

Congress, the Navy, and industry to identify ways to responsibly 

accelerate the acquisition of a new heavy icebreaker, continue planning the construction of additional icebreakers, and explore capabilities that might be brought to bear to address our near-term concerns. 

Thank you for your support of the Coast Guard and your efforts 

to ensure our men and women in uniform have the capabilities 

they need to safely and reliably execute our vital missions. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Admiral. 

Ms. Stiller? 

Ms. STILLER. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, 

and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 

opportunity to discuss the Navy’s ongoing and continued involvement with the Coast Guard on ship design and ship construction 

programs. I request that my written statement be entered into the 

record. 

The Navy fully supports the President’s National Strategy for the 

Arctic Region and its corresponding implementation plan. The 

Navy also looks forward to working with Congress and the Coast 

Guard to answer the President’s call to accelerate the recapitalization of heavy icebreaking ships to meet our national interests in 

the changing Arctic region. 

The ‘‘U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap 2014 through 2030’’ aligns with 

the national and Department of Defense Arctic strategies, and includes a plan that directs the development of Arctic capabilities 

and capacity in step with the changing environmental conditions. 

The Navy’s four strategic objectives in the Arctic include ensuring 

U.S. Arctic sovereignty, providing ready naval forces; preserving 

freedom of the seas; and promoting partnerships. 

The Navy will continue our strong cooperative partnership with 

the Coast Guard in addition to the interagency and international 

Arctic region stakeholders to address emerging opportunities and 

challenges presented by the seasonal opening of Arctic ocean waters. The risk of conflict in the region is low, and the Arctic Council 

and other diplomatic venues provide effective means to resolve disputes between nations. However, the Navy will continue to exploit 

all opportunities that will provide our sailors with superior maritime knowledge of the Arctic. 

We will work closely with the Coast Guard to acquire the first 

heavy icebreaker in 2020, as defined by their recently approved 

Operational Requirements Document. Coupled with the congressional support, both the Navy and Coast Guard are working to deVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
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velop a program plan to efficiently and effectively move the icebreaker program forward. 

As you know, the Navy has a long history of designing and acquiring ships, and we have offered our full range of experience and 

expertise to the Coast Guard and the icebreaker program. We are 

aware of the Coast Guard acquisition team’s progress in executing 

an analysis of alternatives which, along with industry involvement, 

will inform the icebreaker acquisition strategy. 

Together we are working to understand the best way to maximize our cooperative partnership and leverage the expertise of both 

of our agencies. The Navy is committed to the success of this icebreaker program, and we offer the support of our acquisition community during the design, development, construction, test, and delivery processes. 

We stand ready to provide shipbuilding expertise in acquisition 

career fields, including program management, engineering, cost estimating, test, and manufacturing. We will provide access to facilities such as the model basin tow tank at Naval Surface Warfare 

Center to help retire technical risks during the design phase of the 

program. We will provide cost estimating support, as design tradeoffs are made. 

We will also provide lessons learned on reuse of systems and 

components in the design phase to mitigate construction and support costs. In addition, we will work with the Coast Guard and industry to identify high-risk production processes, and propose ways 

to mitigate these risks to alleviate rework during the construction. 

The Navy and the Coast Guard both stand to see the mutual 

benefit in this cooperative arrangement by using best practices to 

strengthen the shipbuilding industry base, and reduce costs in our 

Naval and Coast Guard new construction programs. The Navy 

stands alongside the Coast Guard in this endeavor to see the icebreaker program become a success. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Ms. Stiller. 

Ms. Grover, good to see you again. 

Ms. GROVER. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, 

Ranking Member Garamendi. The Coast Guard is responsible for 

carrying out its missions, including search and rescue and defense 

readiness in the Arctic waters, as in other areas. As diminishing 

sea ice may make the Arctic waters more attractive for commerce 

and tourism, the issue of Coast Guard Arctic capabilities becomes 

a more pressing issue. 

My statement today will focus on two points: first, the Coast 

Guard’s actions to address known Arctic capability gaps; and second, the Coast Guard’s polar icebreaking capabilities. 

The Coast Guard is well aware that it faces significant capability 

gaps in the Arctic, as do other organizations with operations in 

that area. For several years the Coast Guard has reported challenges, including a lack of reliable communications, limited nautical charting, and insufficient infrastructure for operating their 

aircraft and vessels. For example, there is limited aircraft infrastructure on the North Slope, and no deepwater ports on the North 

8 

Slope or near the Bering Strait for refueling and reprovisioning 

Coast Guard cutters. 

The Coast Guard is working in close collaboration with other 

Federal agencies to address these and other capability gaps. For 

example, the Coast Guard used its 2015 Arctic Shield activities to 

test navigation systems and DOD communications equipment. In a 

report on the Coast Guard’s Arctic capabilities that was conducted 

at the request of this subcommittee and being released today, GAO 

recommended that the Coast Guard begin systematically assessing 

the extent to which its actions have helped to mitigate Arctic capability gaps. The Coast Guard agreed and reported plans to begin 

doing so. 

Regarding icebreaking, the Coast Guard has initiated the process 

to acquire a new heavy icebreaker. Although the Coast Guard is 

considering all options, several factors make the purchase of a new 

icebreaker a more likely outcome than leasing one. 

For some of its missions, the Coast Guard is required to use a 

public vessel, which Federal law defines as one that the U.S. owns 

or demise charters, which is a special type of lease where the Coast 

Guard would have to crew, operate, and maintain the leased vessel. 

Also, Coast Guard vessels, whether purchased or leased, must be 

built in a U.S. shipyard. The Coast Guard has determined that no 

heavy icebreaker currently exists for purchase or lease that would 

meet its requirements, which means that one must be constructed, 

either via a Coast Guard purchase or for the purposes of a demise 

lease. 

In considering these two options it is important to note that 

OMB requires agencies to acquire assets in the least costly manner. Prior analyses by the Coast Guard suggest that a lease option 

would likely cost the Federal Government more than a purchase 

over the icebreaker’s expected 30-year service life, due to the ship 

owner’s profit rate. Previous GAO work has echoed those findings 

that outright purchase can be a less costly alternative, compared 

to long-term vessel lease due to profit rate and the expected differences in Government versus private-sector borrowing costs. 

As you have noted, while the acquisition process is underway, 

the Coast Guard risks operating for some time with no heavy icebreaker capacity. They are exploring their options, but have not 

made any bridging decisions yet. 

In conclusion, the Coast Guard has taken important steps toward 

enhancing its Arctic operations. It is taking action to address 

known Arctic capability gaps, and has initiated the acquisition of 

a new heavy icebreaker. Moving forward, the Coast Guard could 

further enhance its capabilities by better understanding the impact 

of its actions on those Arctic capability gaps, and by determining 

how to bridge the gap between the Polar Star and a new icebreaker. 

Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, this concludes 

my statement and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Ms. Grover. 

Mr. O’Rourke? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
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portunity to appear before you today to discuss Coast Guard Arctic 

implementation capabilities. 

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I would like to submit my 

written statement for the record and summarize it here briefly. 

Mr. HUNTER. Without objection. And all the witnesses’ written 

statements will be entered into the record in full. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. As requested, my testimony focuses on acquisition of polar icebreakers, and particularly on savings that could be 

realized in acquiring two polar icebreakers. I have seven points I 

would like to make. 

The first is that, given the potential requirement for up to three 

heavy and three medium polar icebreakers, a single new polar icebreaker would narrow but not necessarily close a potential gap in 

polar icebreaking capability. Any remaining gap could be further 

narrowed by a second new polar icebreaker. 

My next point is that there are various possible approaches for 

acquiring two polar icebreakers. One approach, which is a potential 

baseline or default approach, would be to build the ships several 

years apart from one another, contract for them separately, and 

purchase materials and components for them separately. 

A potential alternative approach would be to build the ships only 

a few years apart from one another, contract for them together 

under a block buy contract, and carry out a combined purchase of 

materials and components for the two ships. 

My third point is that, compared to the potential baseline or default approach, the alternative approach would compress the funding stream for the two icebreakers into a smaller number of years, 

increasing average annual funding requirements, and reduce policymaker flexibility regarding whether and when to build the second ship, what design to build it to, and what shipyard to build it 

in. It would also likely get the second ship into service sooner, more 

quickly narrowing the potential gap in icebreaking capability, and 

it could reduce the combined acquisition cost of the two ships by 

at least 5 percent, and perhaps closer to 10 percent. This could 

equate to a savings of at least $100 million or so, and perhaps closer to $200 million. 

My fourth point is that this savings of $100 million or perhaps 

closer to $200 million would be generated in three areas. First, the 

closer spacing between the ships could result in less loss of shipyard learning in shifting from the first ship to the second. Next, 

the use of a block buy contract would permit the shipyard to optimize its workforce and capital plant for a two-ship production run. 

And lastly, a combined material purchase would improve production economies of scale at material and component suppliers. 

My fifth point is that the $1 billion that the Senate Appropriations Committee has recommended for a new polar icebreaker in 

the DOD Appropriations Act would more or less fully fund the acquisition of that ship. Alternatively, with congressional approval, 

an appropriation of $1 billion could be used to partially fund a twoship acquisition. Under this scenario, the $1 billion would be used 

to develop the design, fund a combined purchase of materials and 

components for the two ships, and initiate construction on the first 

ship. The remainder of the funding for the two-ship acquisition 

would be provided in future fiscal years. 

10 

My sixth point is that if a shipyard that is awarded a contract 

to build one or more new polar icebreakers happens to be building 

other Coast Guard or Navy ships, then the addition of the icebreaker work could marginally reduce the cost of those other Coast 

Guard or Navy ships by absorbing some of the shipyard’s fixed 

overhead costs. 

My seventh and final point is that there are two options for temporarily narrowing a gap in polar icebreaking capability in the 

nearer term, prior to the entry into service of one or more new 

polar icebreakers. One would be to further extend the service life 

of Polar Star or Polar Sea; the other would be to charter one or 

more foreign polar-capable icebreakers, if such ships were available 

for charter. The United States has used both approaches in the 

past to mitigate polar icebreaking capability gaps. Whether either 

of these approaches would be feasible and cost effective in coming 

years would need to be examined. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. Thank you again for 

the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to the subcommittee’s 

questions. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. O’Rourke. 

Ms. Conley? 

Ms. CONLEY. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, it 

is a privilege to testify before you today. I would like to provide the 

subcommittee with some broader thoughts on Arctic national security challenges and their relationship to U.S. readiness and capabilities. 

While the United States has always prioritized its national security interests in the Arctic in a variety of strategic documents, 

there is a lack of consensus about what exactly constitutes national 

security in the Arctic. Some define Arctic national security in terms 

of America’s missile defense architecture in Fort Greely Air Base 

in Alaska or Thule Air Force Base in Greenland, the increased 

presence of Russian special forces and the placement of surface to 

air missiles on remote Russian Arctic islands, as well as the increased activity of Russian submarines in the North Atlantic. 

Yet for others, security in the Arctic means search and rescue operations, oil spill response, infrastructure development, greater 

maritime domain awareness, U.S. energy security. Still others view 

water, food, and human security of indigenous populations, as well 

as coastal village relocation, as security matters. 

There is so much definitional confusion about Arctic security because it encompasses all forms, all of these forms of security, from 

missile defense to search and rescue to food security. 

The Obama administration has primarily focused on the human 

and environmental dimension of the Arctic security challenge, 

which is certainly considerable. Senior officials have tended to discount or deny significant changes to Russia’s military posture in 

the Arctic, but other Arctic nations such as Denmark, Finland, and 

Norway have recognized the growing hard security threats in the 

Arctic, and have begun to make necessary adjustments to their defense budgets and force posture. 

It is clear to me that the projection of power in the Arctic today 

and in the future will be increasingly defined by both traditional 

hard power, as we are seeing in Russia’s buildup of military presVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
11 

ence in the Russian Arctic, as well as softer power of superior logistics and infrastructure capabilities, science, technology, the combined intuition of traditional and 21st-century knowledge, accurate 

predictive meteorological and ice modeling, and enhanced satellite 

communications. 

The projection of power in the Arctic will be multifaceted, and 

will require a new U.S. approach to the region. So, will a single 

heavy icebreaker meet America’s comprehensive security needs in 

the Arctic? It will not. But it will certainly enhance the U.S. operational capacity, state of readiness, and ability to respond and be 

resilient to the rapid changes in the Arctic. 

But it is also important to note that this heavy icebreaker is not 

solely intended for the Arctic. It will be utilized in Antarctica, as 

the U.S. currently lacks additional and redundant heavy icebreaker 

capabilities, should the recently refurbished 1970s-constructed 

Polar Star become inoperable when resupplying our research station in Antarctica. 

Due to limited assets above the Arctic Circle, the Coast Guard 

has at times been forced to rely on third-party responders, asked 

other countries to loan us their spare icebreaking capacity, and it 

is only by chance that the Healy, in December of 2012, was in the 

right place at the right time—and it wasn’t originally supposed to 

be—to provide icebreaking capabilities to provide emergency fuel to 

Nome, Alaska. 

As the world’s leading maritime power, the United States has 

been living on good luck and borrowed time for far too long, and 

I fear the future incident when our luck runs out. But let us be 

clear. One heavy icebreaker is not a silver bullet. It is not a substitute for enhanced satellite communications, aviation assets, 

deepwater ports, navigational aids, and internationally approved 

hydrographic mapping. It does not solve the funding challenges of 

the long-range radar sites in Alaska, which track aircraft through 

Alaskan airspace and along its borders. It doesn’t serve our emergency airfields, our halfway points for refueling. It doesn’t support 

our Missile Defense Agency operations. It does not enhance our 

military’s cold-weather fighting capabilities. It does not build a new 

U.S. Coast Guard operating base or station above the Arctic Circle, 

which would improve search and rescue. It is only one piece of the 

larger Arctic security puzzle. 

It is these extremely limited capabilities that I have just highlighted which call into question the ability of the U.S. Coast Guard 

and the U.S. Government to be able to perform basic national security tasks in the Arctic, let alone prevent future oil spills, assist in 

mass casualty events, respond to shipping accidents, acts of terrorism, ensure strong maritime law enforcement actions in the Arctic. And my fear is that our near exclusive focus on acquiring one 

heavy icebreaker will be deemed sufficient for our needed focus and 

budget on a variety of U.S. Arctic readiness initiatives. We must 

focus on the comprehensive task now. 

The Obama administration has taken a leadership role in identifying readiness and preparedness as a major task for the American 

Arctic, but it has been very slow to develop the necessary infrastructure to implement these response capabilities. 

12 

The U.S. Coast Guard recognizes the growing concern of potential future maritime accidents in the narrow Bering Straits and the 

heightened risk factor posed by increased traffic through the Bering Straits, specifically LNG carriers from the Russian Yamal LNG 

project. 

Arctic security will be challenged this August by the Crystal Serenity, a 1,700-passenger and cruise ship which will traverse the 

ice-clogged Northwest Passage which has very limited infrastructure. 

Simply put, U.S. national security needs and challenges in the 

American Arctic far surpass existing Coast Guard implementation 

capabilities and the value added of acquiring one heavy icebreaker. 

But acquiring a heavy icebreaker is a critical step forward because 

the U.S. must be able to conduct freedom of navigation operations 

in the polar regions. 

The U.S. also needs similar icebreaking operational capability 

redundancies in its medium strength icebreakers to ensure effective law enforcement and search and rescue capabilities. 

We are in this position today because we have talked about this 

problem for many years, but did not take effective action. It is my 

hope that the acquisition of heavy icebreakers fuels greater investment in U.S. Arctic infrastructure and, hopefully, our defense capabilities as part of a multiyear and prioritized budget to improve 

U.S. national security in the Arctic. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you for that comprehensive testimony, Ms. 

Conley. 

Mr. Paxton, you are recognized. 

Mr. PAXTON. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member 

Garamendi, and members of the subcommittee, for the opportunity 

to testify this morning. 

The Shipbuilders Council of America is the largest national trade 

association representing the U.S. shipyard industry. The SCA represents 83 members—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Would you pull that mic right by—yes, thank you. 

Mr. PAXTON. Oh, yes, sir. Sorry about that. The SCA represents 

83 member shipyard facilities and 94 industry partner-member 

companies that are part of the vital supply chain that make up the 

shipyard industrial base. 

My testimony this morning will focus primarily on the capability 

and capacity of the domestic shipyard industry to build and maintain the next generation of polar icebreakers. In addition, my testimony will speak specifically to the ability of the U.S. shipyard industry to deliver polar icebreakers as specified in the Coast 

Guard’s polar icebreaker acquisition directorate. 

However, within the shipyard membership of this trade association there are differing views on how the Coast Guard might best 

acquire an updated polar icebreaker capability, so I will refrain 

from promoting any specific approaches from these specific shipyards. 

The U.S. shipyard industry is certainly up to the task of building 

polar icebreakers, and has the expertise, the capability, the critical 

capacity, and the unmatched skilled workforce to build these national assets. In fact, in a letter sent to this subcommittee nearly 

13 

5 years ago, SCA member companies urged the Congress, the Coast 

Guard, and the administration to authorize and fund our Nation’s 

future strategic icebreaking needs. 

While it is true the U.S. shipyard industry has not designed and 

constructed a heavy icebreaker in the past 40 years since delivering the Polar Star in 1976 and the Polar Sea in 1978, we have 

delivered several other icebreakers during this period. The medium 

polar icebreaker Healy was put into service in 2000, and is actually 

larger than the Polar Star and the Polar Sea. The Nathaniel B. 

Palmer, a smaller icebreaker specifically built for conducting scientific research for the National Science Foundation, was delivered 

in 1992. For icebreaking operations on the Great Lakes, the Mackinaw was delivered to the Coast Guard in 2005. In addition, the 

commercial icebreaking supply vessel, the Aiviq, was delivered in 

2012. 

These icebreakers were built in U.S. shipyards in the Pacific 

Northwest, along the gulf coast, and on the Great Lakes. I can tell 

you today there is strong interest in icebreaker construction from 

at least 10 shipyards located around the Nation, from the Northeast to California to the Northwest and again along the gulf coast 

and the Great Lakes region. This level of interest across the U.S. 

shipyard industrial base will ensure a robust level of competition 

for this project, which is certainly good for the Coast Guard and for 

the Nation. 

The same is true amongst the supplier base for the shipyards. 

The 94 industry partners of the SCA have the capabilities, equipment, and technology available to support the building of polar icebreakers. There are multiple design solutions available that will 

create a competitive environment for all potential suppliers as they 

support the shipyards. 

U.S. shipyards pride themselves on implementing state-of-the-art 

training and apprenticeship programs to develop skilled craftsmen 

and women that can build truly first-of-a-kind commercial vessels 

and the best Navy and Coast Guard in the world. 

For instance, the steel requirements for a heavy icebreaker rated 

at Polar Code 1, the highest icebreaking requirement, is a steel 

thickness in the 50 millimeter range. Presently, U.S. shipyards 

building for the commercial container ship market handle, cut, 

weld, and form steels for ships that are at the 65 millimeter range, 

and of a similar grade to the Polar Code requirement. In addition, 

many of our shipyards work in heavy steel construction beyond 

ships, building structures for nuclear power plants that are 3 to 4 

inches thick. 

These are just a few examples of the critical skills that would be 

needed to build a polar icebreaker where our industry has recent 

and relevant experience. 

As a final recommendation to the committee, to build these ships 

in a timely and affordable manner there must be precise and fixed 

Coast Guard validated requirements. There is language in the 

House 2017 defense authorization bill requiring the Coast Guard 

provide Congress and industry with validated operational requirements in the near term, and we believe this is a step in the right 

direction. 

14 

If there are validated and stable requirements in place, the time 

to construct a polar icebreaker, from the start of concept design to 

construction and then to delivery, would be roughly 71⁄2 years. 

Again, I would like to thank the subcommittee for inviting me to 

testify alongside such distinguished witnesses. As a representative 

of our Nation’s private shipyards I can say with confidence and certainty that our domestic shipyards and skilled workers are ready 

to build the next generation of Coast Guard polar icebreakers. 

Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you all. I was actually going to yield to Mr. 

Zeldin, instead of—because it is very rare that we have people here 

at all in this committee. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. HUNTER. But with that, I am going to yield to Mr. Graves. 

I will ask questions afterwards. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. Thank you all for being here today. This topic has certainly been a very hot one lately. 

I am curious. Admiral Michel, could you possibly—and if others 

want to step in on this—could you possibly describe and compare 

and contrast the icebreaking capabilities of the United States, compared to other Arctic nations? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. They vary in capability. So, for example, at the high end you have the Russian icebreaking capability, 

which is substantial. I mean they have just launched a sixth nuclear icebreaker, the most powerful icebreakers on earth. They 

have got the most powerful diesel electric icebreaker that will ever 

be in service under construction right now. They have about 40 of 

those Polar class vessels, all the way from light all the way to very 

heavy. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Are United States capabilities in the 

same league? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, we have—for the United States capability 

we have the Healy, which is a medium icebreaker commissioned in 

2000, and we have the Polar Star, which is a heavy icebreaker, the 

world’s most powerful non-nuclear icebreaker. Ship is approximately 40 years old. And then we have the Polar Sea, which is not 

currently operational—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. So is that a yes or a no? Do you consider us to be in the same league, anywhere in the same league? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, clearly not, sir, in Russian capability. We 

do match better with some of the smaller Arctic nations who do 

have single or just a few vessels. Even Canada has more capability 

than the United States currently has. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you. Ms. Stiller, do you see 

icebreaking as being primarily a Coast Guard mission? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. In fact, 14 U.S.C. 2 specifies icebreaking 

as one of the Coast Guard’s missions, especially in national defense. And there was also a memorandum of agreement between 

the Department of the Navy and the Department of Treasury back 

in the mid-sixties, which has not been amended since, but also assigns Coast Guard with icebreaking capability during peace time, 

war time, and contingency operations. 

15 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Mr. O’Rourke, do you see our capabilities as being sufficient? Do you think that we are on the proper 

trajectory in terms of changes in the Arctic and our capabilities? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I can’t tell you whether our current trajectory is 

appropriate or not. That would call for making a recommendation, 

and I can’t do that as a CRS analyst. What I can point out is what 

other people—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Your secret is safe here. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. O’ROURKE. What I can point out is that the Department of 

Homeland Security has a mission need statement that sets forth a 

need, potentially, for up to three heavy and three medium polar 

icebreakers. That is their statement of their own requirement that 

is on the books and against which Congress can measure the executive branch’s activities. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. And Ms. Grover, do you see the current—when looking at the capabilities right now, Polar Sea, Polar 

Star, the status of those vessels, and you look at the status of the 

Healy, all of which are going to have to go through, in some cases, 

full-fledged refurbishment, do you—in your testimony I think you 

described mission gaps in there. Do you see any solution that is 

being proffered at this point to address the gaps when we simply 

don’t have Arctic capabilities at all? 

Ms. GROVER. No, sir. I don’t believe there is any set plan for addressing the gaps just yet, although the Coast Guard is working on 

it. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Do you view that as being a national 

security threat, not having capabilities? 

Ms. GROVER. That is certainly not my decision to make. I understand that there are—that the Coast Guard has a set of missions 

for which they are required to be able to carry out in the Arctic, 

as in the rest of the U.S., and those include defense readiness, 

search and rescue, issues related to sovereign presence. And it 

seems like it could be difficult under some circumstances for them 

to carry those out. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Ms. Conley, did you care to comment 

on the disparity and capabilities in the Arctic of the United States 

compared to other countries? 

Ms. CONLEY. Yes, sir. It is difficult. The Russian Arctic is a completely different space than the American Arctic. The Russian Arctic is over 50 percent of the total Arctic coastline. Over 22 percent 

of Russian GDP and exports come from the Russian Arctic. That 

is why they have such extensive icebreaking capabilities. It is a 

vital commercial and economic space for them, and they have very 

ambitious plans to develop it. 

I think, for the U.S., we have to be mindful—this is about U.S. 

national security. It is not in comparison to keeping up with Russian 40 icebreakers. We need to have capabilities to serve the 

American people, to protect the United States, to search and rescue, and oil spill response. And today we don’t have the capabilities 

that we need to effectively do that. It is a strategic vulnerability 

that has been in existence for several years. I am so delighted we 

are waking up to this. 

16 

But unfortunately, the procurement plans are long, and we are 

going to have this gap with us for several years. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Sure. Last question, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Paxton, when you worked in the Senate, the most effective 

and capable staff director you worked with was who? And, remember, you are under oath. 

Mr. PAXTON. Well, I worked for several very distinguished members of that committee. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. There is only one right answer to that 

question. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. The ranking member, Mr. 

Garamendi, is recognized. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I want to get a couple things off the table. We 

have been going round and round here, just plowing the same field 

over and over again. So let’s get a couple of things off the table. 

First of all, the lease option. Ms. Grover, you said that it is not 

feasible, it is overly expensive, and not available. Please expand on 

that. 

And then, Admiral Michel, if you will deal with this. Is it viable? 

Is it not viable? Yes? No? Let’s dispose of this issue. 

Ms. GROVER. So, technically, it is feasible. The Coast Guard is required to use public vessels for some of their missions. And so, that 

means either they have to outright own the vessel, or they can operate it under a demise—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I understand that. 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Lease, right? OK. So then the question 

is can they do that more cheaply than buying it outright. And generally speaking, I would expect that purchase would be less expensive, because when you figure in the profit for the ship owner, and 

the higher borrowing class for the private sector than the Federal 

Government. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So your answer is leasing is more expensive. 

Ms. GROVER. So leasing is generally—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is there a lease—is there a ship available in the 

near term—that is in the next 3 years—available for leasing? 

Ms. GROVER. The Coast Guard believes there is not. And I don’t 

have any reason to believe differently. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. Admiral Michel? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, sir, as far as heavy icebreaking capability, there is no vessel available for lease to provide heavy 

icebreaking capability. There are vessels on the global market that 

have the characteristics of a medium icebreaker, but the Coast 

Guard has not yet found one of those vessels that is suitable for 

military service without substantial refitting. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So the answer is leasing doesn’t make any 

sense. Is that correct? 

Admiral MICHEL. Not in the current scheme of things, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Grover, is that correct? 

Ms. GROVER. Generally speaking, purchase is the—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Are any of the—— 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Way to go. 

17 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. Witnesses disagreeing with that assessment, that leasing is not an acceptable option? All right. 

Enough of leasing. 

Now, we have a gap. How can that gap be filled? Admiral? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, sir, the current plan is on the heavy side, 

is to either reactive the Polar Sea—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. July 24 you are going to give us an assessment of whether that is viable or not. 

Admiral MICHEL. We are, sir. And I will flag to you that having 

talked with my folks who took a look at that vessel, that is going 

to be a substantial endeavor, much harder to do than the Polar 

Star for a number of different reasons. And we never really fully 

appreciated that until we had the vessel out of the water, as you 

know, which became available—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK, so—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. Because of Congress’ appropriation. Then we are going to have to take a look at the—a rolling recapitalization of the Polar Star is essentially what the other alternative is until we can bridge out. We are also going to figure out 

Healy, which is going to have to be synched up with that, and we 

have got some ideas on how we are going to SLEP Healy and do 

that in segments, so that we can keep that vessel online to the 

maximum extent possible. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So you really have no plan to deal with the gap? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, the Coast Guard’s requirements set forth 

in the High Latitude Study are for three heavies and three medium 

icebreakers. Currently—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So that is your 3x3 strategy. 

Admiral MICHEL. That is what is required to meet Coast Guard 

missions, or fulfill Coast Guard missions, is three heavies and 

three mediums. Our—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. So, really—— 

Admiral MICHEL. And I have described to you essentially what 

our plan is, including the need for the construction of the new 

heavy polar icebreaker. That is integral, because we are only going 

to be able to keep the Polar Sea and Polar Star under any circumstances online for just enough to reach out to that new breaker, 

sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So I just heard you say one is not enough. We 

are going to need at least two heavy icebreakers to fulfill the mission as—— 

Admiral MICHEL. The Commandant has testified that we need at 

least two—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. Heavy polar icebreakers for selfrescue capabilities. And the President’s statement—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That then takes us to the block buy, doesn’t it? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, that is actually one of the things that—and 

we are going to work with the Navy on that, and employ some of 

their expertise, as to whether that makes sense. That is going to 

require congressional action, because we do not have authority to 

do that. 

18 

We are also going to have to take a look at that arrayed against 

the budget requests and the actions of the Congress. The President—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Yes, I don’t want to play ping pong back and 

forth between the Coast Guard and Congress. You are quite correct; we are going to have to make a decision. Are we going to commit the United States and our budget and appropriations to address the real need in the Arctic? 

Now, icebreakers are but one. In 19 seconds I am going to raise 

the other four issues. Communications, we have not talked about 

communications much, but it is not worthwhile to have a ship up 

there that you can’t communicate with. Domain awareness, we 

haven’t talked about that, but that is another issue. Infrastructure, 

which has been discussed. Army Corps of Engineers, where are you 

with a deepwater plan? Have you even thought about it? If so, 

where and where, and how much? Icebreaking, we have gone round 

that enough times to circle the earth several times. And finally, 

your training program. These are the five critical issues that have 

to be addressed if, in fact, we are going to have any activity and 

any American presence in the Arctic. 

Icebreaking, Admiral, we need very specific information from you 

and we need it right away, because we are going to have to pass 

a law here and the appropriations, or at least the budget, to go 

with it. 

Communications, not spent time on that. We need that information. What kind of communication equipment? What kind of appropriations and monies necessary for the appropriate communications? Domain awareness, probably pretty much the same issue. 

OK, you know what I need. Admiral, when are you going to deliver it? 

[The information from Admiral Michel of the U.S. Coast Guard 

follows:] 

As noted in GAO’s report on the implementation of the Coast Guard Arctic 

Strategy, some of the gaps identified concerning communications, domain 

awareness, infrastructure, icebreaking, and training are complex, and efforts to address them will extend beyond the timeline of the 10-year Coast 

Guard Arctic Strategy or Implementation Plan. Additionally, it is important 

to note the Coast Guard is not solely responsible for mitigating all of the 

capabilities in which gaps were identified. The Arctic Executive Steering 

Committee (AESC), led by The Executive Office of the President, was created to enhance interagency coordination in order to meet the nation’s strategic objectives in the Arctic. The National Strategy for the Arctic Region 

(NSAR) and its associated Implementation Framework, recently updated in 

March of 2016, identify lead components and specific administration priorities. 

‘‘The Progress Report on the Implementation of the National Strategy for 

the Arctic Region’’ (March 2016) details the status of U.S. efforts in the Arctic, outlining the advancement of the NSAR through programs overseen by 

specified Federal entities. All relevant NSAR documents can be found at 

the following webpage: https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2016/03/09/advancing-implementation-national-strategy-arctic-region. In addition to these documents, I’d like to share some highlights of Coast Guard contributions to 

the implementation of the NSAR. 

Maintaining communications capabilities in the Arctic is a challenge the 

Coast Guard continues to address. The seasonal deployment of our assets 

to the region during Operation Arctic Shield has allowed the Service to test 

capabilities and tailor operations in the region to adapt to these challenges. 

We currently use offshore cutter-based command and control platforms, 

19 

shore-based mobile command and control platforms, and seasonal air and 

communications capabilities together to address the unique challenges associated with operating in the Arctic. 

As to maritime domain awareness in the Arctic, we have embraced a seasonal and mobile approach. This method counters the unpredictability of 

human activity by allowing us to concentrate our assets in the area they 

are most needed at any given time. 

The Coast Guard has also actively engaged other Federal, State, local, tribal, international, and private stakeholders to enhance domain awareness in 

the Arctic through cooperative effort and info sharing. We recently conducted maritime domain awareness flights along the North Slope and over 

the Arctic Ocean to monitor maritime activity, assess response asset performance, and observe environmental conditions. We have also updated carriage requirements for the Automatic Identification System (AIS), extending 

applicability to all U.S. navigable waters, including the Arctic, enhancing 

our ability to identify and track vessels. 

This seasonal and mobile approach has been effective in removing the need 

to construct, maintain, and staff permanent infrastructure in arduous and 

often remote areas. Operation Arctic Shield, featuring various combinations 

of integrated force packages operating in northern Alaska, takes place between July and September and involves a mixture of Coast Guard cutters 

equipped with flight decks, sea-going buoy tenders, aircraft, and shore 

forces. The upcoming Operation Arctic Shield 2016 (AS16) will include 

prepositioning assets at Kotzebue, Alaska, to increase our cutter and aviation presence in the region. 

With respect to icebreaking, assured access to the Polar Regions is required 

to preserve our broad and evolving national interests. Providing this capability into the future necessitates recapitalization of our polar icebreaker 

fleet. Thanks to the support we have received from Congress, we are working to accelerate the acquisition of the first new heavy icebreaker, and we 

have begun planning for additional assets. The President’s Budget for FY 

2017 included $150M in support of this program to fund critical activities 

through the detail design stage. In March 2016, the Coast Guard held an 

Industry Day with over 90 organizations participating, followed by 48 oneon-one meetings with interested vendors. A robust industry engagement 

strategy, as well as a collaborative partnership with the U.S. Navy, are essential elements of the acquisition strategy. 

Until new assets are delivered, the Coast Guard is committed to providing 

continued icebreaking capability. As part of settling on the formal bridging 

strategy, a Materiel Condition Assessment was recently completed on CGC 

POLAR SEA to thoroughly assess the condition of the vessel. This effort revealed the extent of the technical challenges that would be associated with 

any reactivation, and provided data to inform a follow-on Alternatives Analysis. The objective of this analysis is to compare a potential POLAR SEA 

reactivation to a POLAR STAR service life extension to determine the most 

prudent way ahead. The report will outline the bridging strategy to maintain heavy icebreaking capability while the Coast Guard proceeds with the 

acquisition. Preliminary steps to prepare for a Midlife Maintenance Availability on HEALY are also underway, including investigating the feasibility 

of segmented midlife maintenance projects to mitigate impacts to operations. 

Improving our capabilities in the Arctic is a priority, and providing our 

Coast Guard men and women with the training and experience necessary 

to perform at their best in any environment is a key component of this. In 

addition to the yearly Operation Arctic Shield, exercises such as Arctic Chinook allow operators to practice techniques in Arctic environments. Arctic 

Chinook is a joint USCG and USNORTHCOM sponsored exercise. It is a 

live field training exercise (FTX) of the Arctic SAR Agreement that will exercise a response construct applicable across the Arctic region. International participation and an international observer program are providing 

the opportunity for cross-training and cooperation, as well as expanding the 

network of Arctic operators. 

We have also created the Center for Arctic Study and Policy (CASP) as an 

academic center for Arctic maritime operations. The CASP builds a nexus 

20 

between operators, academics, indigenous community members, and policymakers on evolving Arctic issues. 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, sir, the icebreaker is a critical part of 

that, because that is a mobile—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No, no. No more on the icebreaker. 

Admiral MICHEL. Well—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We have gone around that game too many 

times. 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir—well, I think you are missing the point 

here, sir. That type of a mobile platform can actually help you with 

providing a communications suite that is mobile. It can also provide maritime domain awareness with its sensor packages. That is 

the beauty of buying a mobile platform, sir, rather than fixed infrastructures. You can move that to wherever you need to. And having 

a capable icebreaker—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Point well taken. Thank you. 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. Get that capability anywhere, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Beyond the mobile, do we need fixed? And if so, 

what? 

Admiral MICHEL. Right now the Coast Guard strategy is mobile 

and seasonal, because the human activity up there is very dynamic. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Stiller, Ms. Stiller, is that in the Naval strategy, 

to depend upon the Coast Guard? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, I am an acquisition professional, but I will be 

happy to take that back and get you an answer from the operations 

side. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please do, thank you. 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 

[The information from Ms. Stiller of the U.S. Navy follows:] 

In alignment with the ‘‘National Maritime Domain Awareness Plan’’ (which 

promotes global maritime security through improved understanding of the 

full spectrum of activity in the maritime domain), the Navy works with 

international allies and interagency partners, including the Coast Guard, 

sharing limited resources, to improve maritime domain awareness of the 

Arctic Ocean. 

The Navy and Coast Guard leverage each other’s capabilities in the Arctic. 

The Navy utilizes a myriad of National, Department of Defense and Coast 

Guard platforms—in space, sea, air, and on land—for Arctic communications. Coast Guard platforms, in particular, provide mobile, seasonal communication capabilities in the Arctic. The Navy will continue to deepen its 

operational relationship with the Coast Guard to support our shared interests in the Arctic, which include increasing commonality and interoperability, improving information sharing, emphasizing the use of common 

data standards, and fostering international and interagency partnerships. 

The Navy and Coast Guard will continue to cooperate to be better prepared 

to jointly provide for homeland security and/or homeland defense when operating in the Arctic. The Navy will continually assess our preparedness in 

response to changes in the Arctic environment or changes in the security 

environment. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And for Mr. O’Rourke and Ms. Grover, thank 

you for your analysis. It is very helpful. I would like to have your 

analysis on the communication and the domain awareness, also. 

I am well over my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the ranking member. 

21 

I guess, Ms. Conley, one quick question. They said that in the 

1960s the Treasury and the Coast Guard made an agreement that 

this is a Coast Guard mission. Is this a Coast Guard mission? 

Ms. CONLEY. It is a whole-of-government mission. The Coast 

Guard has a clear leadership role in providing the capabilities 

needed, but I believe that Arctic security encompasses a much 

wider lens that includes assets from the Department of Defense, in 

addition to the Department of Homeland Security. It is a full package. We just haven’t yet focused on the wider defense-related issues 

yet. 

Mr. HUNTER. I would ask the whole panel. Why is this not a 

Navy mission? Why is it not a Naval mission? Besides that somebody said it is not 60 years ago, besides that answer. 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, sir, the Navy and the Coast Guard came 

to an agreement that the Coast Guard would be the executive 

agency to provide—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Besides them coming to—besides that, tell me why. 

What is the reason it is not a Naval mission? Because you said—— 

Admiral MICHEL. I—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Wait, let me finish, Admiral. You said you can’t 

lease a ship because they are not—there is no readily available 

militarily capable vessels. So what you are saying is there is no 

other—there is no military icebreakers to military specs like a destroyer that are available right now. I think we understand that. 

If we had those available in the U.S., they would be yours, and we 

would be using them. 

There are icebreakers that can be used that aren’t to military 

spec, but I would ask you—but besides somebody coming to an 

agreement prior to today, why is it not a Naval mission? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, just to be clear, sir, I didn’t say that it 

was or wasn’t a Naval mission. I said that it was a Coast Guard 

mission, and that we took responsibility that, in the 1960s, and as 

statutorily—— 

Mr. HUNTER. And look where we are. 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. A Coast Guard mission—— 

Mr. HUNTER. And look where we are. So my question is, should 

this be a Naval mission? 

Mr. O’Rourke? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. It was a Navy mission shared with the Coast 

Guard for a period of about 20 years from the end of World War 

II until the handover in the mid-sixties, when it reverted to being 

a Coast Guard-only mission. 

The history that I have read on that situation is that it was consolidated with the Coast Guard in the 1965–1966 period because 

the Navy at that time was facing a large modernization requirement to replace the many, many ships built during World War II 

that were, at that point, aging out in very large numbers, and that 

with a concern for their ability to replace all those ships and essentially rebuild the fleet, it was that concern, according to this history, that drove the transfer over. 

As a matter of policy, Congress and the executive branch can 

agree that it can be a Navy mission, as well as a Coast Guard mission. But the history that I read suggests that it was the Navy’s 

22 

modernization needs which were coincident with the Vietnam War 

that drove the decision in the mid-1960s. 

Mr. HUNTER. Got you. So let’s talk about with the Navy involved 

in this, given the $1 billion that has been appropriated—hasn’t 

been passed yet, but the Senate has appropriated it—given the concerns we all have articulated regarding the timelines, let me ask 

you this. Could the $1 billion be used better if the Navy takes the 

lead in the acquisition, or the Coast Guard? 

Can—given where they are, in terms of their professional acquisition systems and people and history of making ships? Put it— 

make it more simple. Who is best suited, the Coast Guard or the 

Navy, to acquire and build and set up the analysis and the parameters, the requirements, for an icebreaker? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. If that question is to me, what I would say is that 

the Navy’s expertise in shipbuilding and the Navy’s expertise in 

executing block buy contracts could help the Coast Guard in an acquisition of two polar icebreakers that were to be done under a 

block buy arrangement. 

That is not to say that the Navy is better than the Coast Guard, 

but the Navy does have expertise, especially in executing block 

buys that the Coast Guard has not done previously, so that if you 

were to take that expertise and leverage it in a whole-of-government fashion, it may allow the Coast Guard to do that acquisition 

better than if the Coast Guard were attempting to do it on its own 

for the first time. 

Mr. HUNTER. Admiral, if you had—I don’t know how to phrase 

this. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Does he agree? 

Mr. HUNTER. Would you rather—yes, I mean, that is a good 

question. Do you agree with Mr. O’Rourke’s assessment? 

Admiral MICHEL. I think under any circumstances, sir, we are 

going to tap into the expertise of our Navy colleagues. 

Mr. HUNTER. That is the new joint program office that we are 

setting up. 

Admiral MICHEL. We already committed to that, sir, and that 

benefits both our agencies. 

Mr. HUNTER. When it comes to the $1 billion, how—tell me how 

the Coast Guard views getting one vessel and saying that is $1 billion for one vessel, or what Mr. O’Rourke testified to earlier, that 

if you take the $1 billion, you could save a couple hundred million 

dollars, possibly, say $200 million, build two, buy all the lead-time 

materials, could get all the blueprints and the requirements done, 

and then come back to Congress and say, ‘‘OK, we are ready to roll 

and build two of these,’’ and save a few hundred million dollars in 

the meantime? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, I am only authorized the support the President’s budget request, and that is $150 million, approximately—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But the Homeland Security—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. For the construction of a heavy 

polar icebreaker—— 

Mr. HUNTER. The Homeland Security analysis says three heavies 

and three mediums. You are not breaking any rules by saying you 

would like to build two at the same time, are you? 

23 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, I am open to any discussions. The only 

thing I can officially support is the construction of a single heavy 

icebreaker. I am happy to work with the Congress and other stakeholders on what makes sense. I am not trying to do something stupid here. But the only thing that our budget request supports is 

the construction of a single heavy polar icebreaker. 

Mr. HUNTER. What are we—what did Homeland Security come 

out with their analysis that says that they need three heavies and 

three mediums? What are we referring to there? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, that is our outstanding requirement. The 

High Latitude Study says that, in order to fulfill Coast Guard mission, the Coast Guard requires three heavy icebreakers and three 

medium icebreakers. The President’s budget request begins the recapitalization of that fleet. Our Commandant has testified we need 

at least two heavy icebreakers in order to provide self-rescue capability. And I would like to see a third, but that is going to have 

to be supported by future budget requests. 

The acquisition of those, I am sort of open to any suggestion, and 

I can sort of support on what makes sense for the acquisition of 

those very expensive assets—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But if you are only allowed to talk about building 

one, then how can you get into it with the Navy on what a block 

buy and lead-time materials would do for you, then? Are you authorized to even discuss that? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, sir, we have got an ongoing dialogue. I 

mean you and I are talking about this right—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I just asked you about it, and you said you 

can only talk about one. 

Admiral MICHEL. I didn’t say, sir, I could only talk about one. I 

said the only one I can officially support is the construction of a 

single heavy icebreaker, because that is what the President’s budget request is. I am open to discussing any type of acquisition strategy that makes sense. I sit in a pretty high position in the Coast 

Guard and in the Government, and I talk to people all the time. 

And people are interested in doing good things. So I would like to 

keep the dialogue open. 

The only thing I can officially support right now is the construction of a single heavy icebreaker, because that is the President’s 

budget request. 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, I would also point out that the SAC [Senate 

Appropriations Committee] add to the Department of the Navy is 

for a single vessel. So any authorities that, as we work together, 

we deem that we would need otherwise, we would be required to 

come back and request a legislative proposal through the system to 

ask for authorities like block buy. That is how we have typically 

done that in the Navy, as well, to bring forth the business case, per 

se, to present that to the committees to consider. 

Mr. HUNTER. So tell me explicitly. What action would you need 

Congress to take, either the House or the Senate, to be able to do 

a block buy? 

Ms. STILLER. We typically get block buy authority from our authorizers that says that we can enter into block buy authority for 

a particular class of ship, or a number of ships. 

24 

Mr. HUNTER. That would be in the—that is in the authorizing 

committee, so that would be the NDAA? 

Ms. STILLER. Typically, sir, that is how we get it. I will defer to 

the Admiral on how the Coast Guard would get their authorities. 

But yes, sir. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. It has happened both in authorization bills and 

in appropriation bills. It can be as little as a single sentence. 

Mr. HUNTER. So this could be done in conference, theoretically, 

on the—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Congress must approve each instance of a block 

buy. 

Mr. HUNTER. But I—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And Congress has done so in both authorization 

and appropriation bills. 

Mr. HUNTER. On the NDAA conference, could the language be 

changed to allow this $1 billion to go towards a block buy? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yes, it could be done in the NDAA conference, it 

could be in the conference on the DOD approps bill. And it is not 

complicated. The block buy authority for the Littoral Combat Ship 

was a single sentence in an appropriations bill that was actually 

a continuing resolution that bridged our funding for a few weeks. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does it—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE. It is not—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Does it lock them into it, or does it give them the 

option? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Typically, what the language says is that the department in question, or the secretary of that department, shall 

have the authority to contract for some multiple numbers of ships. 

It is a single—it can be as simple as a single sentence, and that 

tends to be what it has been in the instances where we have had 

it. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. Then taking that, Admiral, what does that do 

to your Presidential authorization request for just one? What if 

that gets done—let’s say that that sentence is put into the NDAA 

in conference, and it is passed in December, and—what then, concerning what the President’s request allows you to talk about? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, sir, the Congress can choose to do what 

the Congress and its will chooses to do. If it chooses to buy multiple ships or appropriate different amounts of money, the Congress 

can do that. I am only authorized to support the President’s budget 

request, which is $150 million for a single icebreaker. 

If Congress chooses to give the Coast Guard or the administration additional authority, or chooses to appropriate any number of 

vessels or types of vessels, the Congress is a co-extensive branch 

of Government, and the Congress can do that in its will through 

enacted law. 

Ms. STILLER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make one comment 

to Ron’s statement. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. STILLER. Typically, when we get block buy authority, it is 

tied to the advance procurement line within the SCN [Shipbuilding 

and Conversion, Navy] budget. It is not tied to the full funding part 

of the budget. And right now, the way it is in the SAC mark, it 

25 

is in the full funding line. So there would have to be some sort of 

discussion to address that. That is my only point. 

But we do—when we get it, we get the authority to use it if it 

makes sense. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Ms. Hahn, you are recognized. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to change the 

subject just slightly. I have learned that this fall Crystal Cruises 

is going to be taking passengers on an unprecedented cruise 

through the Northwest Passage. This ship will be accompanied by 

an escort icebreaker and a dozen expedition experts. 

So, Admiral Michel, I was going to just ask you to what extent 

has the cruise line worked with the Coast Guard to ensure the success of this voyage. And we do know that the Arctic Circle can be 

known to be a dangerous region, due to the unpredictability of the 

ice and the sea. What contingency plans have been established, in 

the event of an emergency, to make sure that these passengers are 

safe? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, ma’am. Well, we have been working with 

Crystal Cruise Lines here for a couple years on this. And I think 

Crystal understands the challenges associated with this venture, 

which actually, I think, is going to occur next month, in August. 

And we have not only been working with them, but also with the 

Canadian Coast Guard, with the Department of Defense, with local 

officials, and have mapped that out, that particular voyage, most 

of which, actually, is in Canadian waters. I think 85 percent of it 

or more is actually in Canadian waters. And the most treacherous 

parts are actually in Canadian waters. But we have bridged out 

and reached out to them. 

We did a table-top exercise the last couple months, and worked 

through all the issues on there on how you would get people out 

of there, how you would take care of the life boats, how you would 

utilize that very small—it is an icebreaker, but it has become also 

an ice management vessel, is the way that they are going to use 

it. 

But Crystal Cruise Lines is—for example, they are taking on 

board ice pilots, they are getting the latest on the ice situation that 

is up there. We think they have done pretty good homework. But 

I don’t want to underestimate the challenges of that area. There is 

almost no logistics up there. 

For example, if we needed to get another helicopter up there— 

they are only bringing very small helicopter with them. If they 

needed to get a big helicopter up there, it is estimated to take between 15 and 20 hours, if the weather is good, in order to get that 

up there. Fixed-wing aviation may be available, but even there you 

have got very limited landing areas, very environmentally sensitive 

areas. Things change up there dramatically. Even during the summer the weather is an incredible challenge. 

So, this is not an easy category for a voyage. But I think we have 

done all the legwork that we can upfront here, and we do have a 

responsible operator in Crystal, who is taking a number of additional steps in order to ensure that they have got a safe passage. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you. Well, I represent the Port of Los Angeles. 

And between Los Angeles and Long Beach, clearly we are the busiVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
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est cruise ship terminals. And that is a huge part of our economy, 

and tourism in the area. So, you know, we have heard of late of 

some tragic circumstances aboard cruise ships, even in calm and 

warm waters, so this certainly is of concern. 

Ms. Conley, I was going to ask you, just in your studies, and 

what you are predicting, what does the future hold for tourism in 

the Arctic? Is—I would love to hear your thoughts on that. 

Ms. CONLEY. Thank you. Well, we definitely see an increasing interest. In some ways, because the Arctic environment is changing 

so quickly, it is sort of creating a rush, if you will, to see this pristine environment while it is still in its current state. 

In conversations and in conferences that we have held at CSIS, 

where we have invited the cruise industry, they haven’t necessarily 

seen a huge uptick. And in fact, I think the Crystal Serenity is a 

real trail blazer. And you know, as you have been noticing, the extensive media attention on that cruise itself, in addition to our 

Coast Guard colleagues that will be following it very closely, this 

may actually spur a great deal of interest. 

The price tag is enormous per passenger, because of the extra 

safety requirements that are needed. For instance, the Russian 

tourism industry has been using their Russian icebreakers to take 

cruises up to the poles, literally, for quite some time. It is for that 

adventure ecotourism. So we are not seeing the numbers yet. It 

will be interesting to see if the Crystal Serenity does, in fact, show 

a real uptick in interest in cruising the Arctic. 

Ms. HAHN. And Admiral, how much time and effort and resources does our Coast Guard expend for this specific cruise breakthrough of the Crystal Serenity? 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, quite a lot, ma’am. This is the largest 

cruise ship that is ever going to go through this area. And, by magnitudes, the largest number of people are going to go through this 

area. So we have been working extremely closely, like I said, not 

only with the cruise lines, but everybody else who has an oar in 

the water here, on ensuring that we have got a safe voyage. 

So this has taken a lot of our time, and we take this very seriously. And I hope we always will, because that is a very treacherous area of the earth—— 

Ms. HAHN. And do we get compensated for that? 

Admiral MICHEL. Ma’am, we don’t charge people for those type 

of services. Those are Coast Guard responsibilities. The taxpayers—— 

Ms. HAHN. Because it is interesting—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. Foot the bill for the Coast Guard. 

Ms. HAHN [continuing]. As Ms. Conley pointed out, the passengers are paying—sounds like they are paying extra for extra security and some of the resources that you are so generously giving 

away. 

Admiral MICHEL. I don’t think we are—well, giving away—— 

Ms. HAHN. I mean, that is our—— 

Admiral MICHEL. This is what we do—— 

Ms. HAHN. I mean, that is our core—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. In the Coast Guard. 

Ms. HAHN. Your core mission is, of course, to keep—— 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, ma’am. 

27 

Ms. HAHN [continuing]. People safe on the high seas. But it is 

kind of an interesting world we are getting into. And as we always 

talk here, your resources are always limited, we are always trying 

to make priority choices. Sort of like contract sheriffs, you know, 

they charge other cities for their services. It would be interesting 

to look at that model some day. 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, ma’am. And we would like to invest the 

resources upfront to prevent an accident from happening, because 

if you actually have an accident and respond to it, it is a lot worse 

situation. So I would rather make the investment upfront with the 

cruise lines, see if we can buy as much risk down as possible. 

Ms. HAHN. Thank you very much. We hope it is successful. 

I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentlelady. I now yield to the former 

chairman of this committee, whose giant portrait is right behind 

everybody, Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate the 

comment. A giant portrait. It is a giant Member, I just want you 

to know that. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I was listening to the questions. And my concern to the panel is this is not new. And I don’t see much progress. 

That probably concerns me the most. And it is sort of like, you 

know, we are just spinning our wheels. We are worried about tourism now, and we are going to take and—break the ice for tourism, 

and that is well and good. But what about the security aspect of 

it? 

This administration, very frankly, is focused on the human and 

environmental dimension of the Arctic, and not on the security. 

And yet I see Russia every day growing with the established—I 

would call it headquarters. There are six new battalions in the Arctic, there is about seven new ports. This has gone on, and we are 

just sort of, oh well, it will happen some day. 

Is there anybody really thinking about the effect—I know Finland and, I believe, the other countries close by have become more 

aware of potential—not only a threat, but taking over the resources. Has there been any discussion amongst any of you about 

this problem? 

Ms. Conley? 

Ms. CONLEY. Yes, sir, thank you. We actually concluded a pretty 

significant study that examined the Russian Arctic, looking at their 

economic interest, the changes to their security posture, and we 

concluded that, in fact, over the last several years there have been 

significant shifts in Russia’s posture. 

Now, you can explain that in different ways. Because Russia has 

a very ambitious economic vision for the Russian Arctic, they believe that the northern sea route will become some day a viable 

major transit route, and there is a lot of people that are quite skeptical about that. So they were putting in place very ambitious 

projects. They have very ambitious energy projects with the Yamal 

LNG project. 

But clearly, over the last several years, they are developing using 

their military industrial complex. So when they announced previously that they would create 10 search and rescue centers across 

the Russian Arctic, that is a positive thing. We need more infraVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
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structure. But then it was announced later that those—in fact, 

those 10 centers will have dual use. They will be both operated by 

the military and civilian forces. 

They have restructured their command. They have told us that 

they will have 50 new airfields in the Russian Arctic by 2020. They 

are placing—now these are small units, but they are capable units. 

And so you are scratching your head, going, well, this is a lot of 

change. We are not—no one else is repositioning itself; why are 

they doing this? And I think they are preparing to project their sovereignty, and concentrating on both projecting that sovereignty in 

the North Pacific and the North Atlantic. 

The question for the United States is we have to evaluate this 

change and see if we must adjust our posture, enhance our security 

measures. As I mentioned in my testimony, other States have 

begun to make that shift. It is not big, it is not bold, but they are 

making those shifts. The U.S. has been studying the matter. The 

Senate Armed Services Committee has been very forward-leaning 

in arguing that and encouraging the Defense Department to create 

an operational plan for the—— 

Mr. YOUNG. I am about ready to run out of time. I love your answer, but—— 

Ms. CONLEY. Thank you. Sorry—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, I do apologize for that. 

No, I am glad you answered that. This is for the Admiral. 

Movement of Coast Guard monies to the Arctic, are you remembering the rest of the responsibilities you have under your wing: 

interception, fishing patrol, rescue? You are not going to diminish 

from that, are you? Especially district 17. 

Admiral MICHEL. No, sir. We are committed, as we have always 

been, to our responsibilities in Alaska. 

Mr. YOUNG. OK, all right. I missed Mr. Garamendi’s comments. 

I am one that believes that we are not going to get a Coast Guard 

cutter for a long time. I really don’t see the push. We need it, cutters. And I think Mr. Paxton and his shipbuilders are willing to 

build them. 

Did you make any comments on the leasing concept? Have you 

analyzed this, or it is just coming from the other side? 

Mr. PAXTON. Sir, we have no comment on the leasing side of 

things, other than we know there are vessels out there that could 

be leased, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, because I just—you know, I am concerned, Mr. 

Chairman, the next—we sit here at this committee—maybe, God 

willing, you will be here for 10 years. Hopefully, I will be, too, or 

I may be in the deep sea, I don’t know. 

But we need something to be happening. We are not having anything really—we have the Arctic Council. Big deal. What have we 

done? We have some meetings. We have some more meetings and 

some more meetings and some more meetings. And I want to know. 

Is there going to be—not just this administration, I am not banging 

this administration—oh, I love to do it. 

But is there any Arctic—real Arctic policy? Is there any—is anybody setting—do you want us to do it for you? If you do, we will 

screw it up. You guys have got the expertise in it. Is there anybody 

really coming together on what we are going to do? 

29 

Anybody can answer that. Then I am out of time, I know. Anybody can answer it. 

Ms. Grover, you look anxious to do something. 

Ms. GROVER. Well, the Arctic Executive Steering Committee was 

formed in early 2015 in part specifically for the purpose of trying 

to bring together all of the parties into a unified effort. But as for 

how that is going, I can’t say. But yes, there are a lot of different 

parties involved in a lot of different efforts. And much of it is involved in discussion and exploration in the learning phase, essentially. And I think there would—we would all benefit from some 

additional leadership and strategic leadership. 

Mr. YOUNG. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may suggest, either we set 

the policy—because none of the groups are going to get together. 

We will have meetings and meetings and meetings again. I like 

that word, ‘‘meetings.’’ And what I am saying, either we set up a 

policy or we set up a chief, period, by a legislative action. Because 

you are not going to get the Navy and the Coast Guard and the 

EPA and—all together. They won’t agree to anything. 

Maybe we need somebody to be the dominant factor, because I 

do believe the Arctic is going to be the biggest challenge we have, 

as a Nation. We are an Arctic nation, and the next 20 years is 

going to be the problem. We are so far behind right now. I look at 

the Russian fleet with its nuclear icebreakers, and I look at their 

establishments of where they put these little military base—we are 

really close to it. I can’t see Russia from my house, I can tell you 

that. But we are pretty close. 

I used to fly over it, by the way. You don’t know that, but I had 

a lot of fun. Cost them a lot of money, too. But their radar doesn’t 

work 35 feet off the deck, I want you to know that. They may not 

know that. You can fly right over there. Getting back is the problem. 

But you know, we are getting behind. And I understand why 

they are doing it, Mr. Chairman, they have got—it is the resource 

icebox of—refrigerator of the world, and we are just sitting here. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I don’t have much I wanted to say, but I 

would like to see a position where we are going to say next year 

we have a policy on the Arctic. We need icebreakers. We will make 

that decision. I just don’t think there is many people understand 

it. And we need a policy, militarily and security-wise. And just not 

on the Coast Guard’s back, it is on everybody’s back. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the extra time. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Garamendi, you are recognized. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I was just thinking about our friend from Alaska. And one of his favorite things is fish or cut bait. We are coming 

to that point, I think. And so we are going to have to make some 

decisions here and put it in place. 

Mr. Chairman, you were speaking earlier of the NDAA, and I believe that the $1 billion from the Senate is in the NDAA. Is that 

correct? I think that is correct. Senate appropriation bill. 

Mr. O’Rourke just described different ways we could come to a 

conclusion here and set the policy in place. It is very clear to me 

that the administration is not in a position to make a definitive 

policy statement. They are kind of biding their time with $150 milVerDate Aug 31 2005 15:29 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\HEARINGS\114\CG&JOI~1\7-12-1~1\20694.TXT JEAN
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lion in the various—and then laying out some strategy into the future. And that is really a result of Congress not willing to appropriate money. 

So I think in the next 3 months, as we get the information on 

the Polar Sea, and whether it can be refurbished or not, as we deal 

with the appropriation, as well as the NDAA, that we are in a 

place where we can make a decisive decision with regard to the future of the icebreakers. 

My own preference here is to use the NDAA and/or the appropriation, or both, to lay out a block buy for at least two—well, let 

me just say for two new icebreakers to be built in the next 5 to 7 

years. 

I notice, Mr. O’Rourke, you laid out a projection of expenditures 

over the next 7 years for one icebreaker. I would ask the Admiral 

Michel to lay out a projection for block buy, two icebreakers over 

the next 7 to 8 years. And also, how that timeframe can be compressed to reduce the gap that everybody has talked about and that 

apparently is a very real gap in the ability to operate in the Arctic 

and Antarctic. 

So I think we need to be very precise here. And, Mr. Chairman, 

I would encourage you in your leadership role in this to undertake 

a process that, when the NDAA is completed—the conference committee presumably is going to get underway while we are in recess—that we take up this issue, we build into that NDAA conference committee and the appropriation a specific plan. 

My recommendation, once again, is a block buy, two icebreakers 

over the next 7 to 8 years. And in the next month, careful analysis 

by this committee as to whether we can refurbish the Polar Sea to 

address the gap issue, and what it might propose—might be available to us, beyond. 

Also, it seems to me that there are the other five issues with regard to the Arctic and the Antarctic. The communications strategy, 

Admiral, I appreciate the communication—that is, the ship itself 

being communication. I think, however, that is going to be inadequate. Certainly the Navy issue is part of this. There are submarines, both ours and others, that will be operating in the area. 

So I think the communication issue needs to be fully vetted and 

brought to our attention so that if it is in our—I know both the 

chairman and I are on the House Armed Services Committee, and 

certainly that will be a piece of that puzzle, also. And domain 

awareness and communications I think are probably one and the 

same. 

Infrastructure, the Army Corps of Engineers. What are their— 

and, Admiral, if you could, brief us on the infrastructure issue 

which has been raised. Does us little good to have a heavy icebreaker in the Arctic with no fuel and no ability to get fuel, except 

to return to Seattle. 

And then finally, the training mission, which was part of your 

testimony. We will go into that in more detail, later. 

Those are the five areas. I think we must be prepared, as a committee, to make a decision and get on with it and, frankly, commit 

the United States to spending the money to get the job done. You 

know, we have got a 2-year timeframe for our contracts for every 

2 years, but I think we ought to commit the future Congress. 

31 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Sanford is recognized, 

as long as he doesn’t advocate buying Russian icebreakers. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. By the way, Mr. Chairman, I—— 

Mr. SANFORD. That is a much longer conversation—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. Am going to take my final 15 seconds—— 

Mr. SANFORD [continuing]. The Jones Act, but we will come back 

to that on another day. The—thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess, Admiral, first question would be, following up on my colleague from—well, Ms. Hahn’s question with regard to cruise lines 

in the Arctic and your sharing of resources and capacity without 

charge, I struggle with that in that there is always unlimited demand for a product that somebody else is paying for. 

Wouldn’t there be a cost-sharing arrangements that could both 

benefit the taxpayer and take care of the safety needs that the 

Coast Guard is responsible for? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, we have a, as a matter of policy, not 

charged for prevention-related services. Otherwise, what ends up 

happening is people do not engage with us to try to save money, 

and then they go out there and do stupid things that we have to 

clean up from. 

So, as a matter of policy, we don’t charge for search and rescue 

services for those reasons, sir. 

Mr. SANFORD. Understood. But I think the question one would 

have to ask is when you go into the Arctic you are going into 

harm’s way. And so to, in essence, offer incentive to go into harm’s 

way would be the equivalent down in—off the coast of South Carolina is kind of a tropical wave or tropical depression to say we will 

facilitate your ability to go out into those waters as a, you know, 

coastal disturbance is headed our way. That seems to me to invite 

some level of peril that would not be the case if they were taking 

unsubsidized risk. 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, I can’t disagree with you, that you can take 

that particular viewpoint. The Coast Guard’s viewpoint is we would 

rather engage with stakeholders upfront to buy down risk and prevent a catastrophe from happening, rather than disincentivizing 

people from engaging with the Coast Guard, and then they go out 

and do something very tragic, particularly when you are talking 

about having 1,700 people on board, sir, who probably are just paying for a vacation and don’t apprehend exactly the situation that 

they are going to get themselves into. 

Mr. SANFORD. I hear you. I would like to come back to that question. 

In the same regard, just in terms of taxpayer concerns, if I remember right the Polar Sea used to leave the Upper Midwest—excuse me, the Northwest, and take a—basically, a month-long trip 

down to the Antarctic, open up the channel for the once-a-year 

drop-off at McMurdo Station, and then take another month trip 

back. Might there not be a lower cost leasing, borrowing alternative 

to the—in essence, it is one mission—that would then free up capacity for the patrol of the Arctic, given some of our shared concerns with regard to Russian aggression or claims, et cetera? 

32 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. Well, part of the earlier discussion was 

whether, you know, leasing a vessel like that would be appropriate. 

As far as heavy icebreaking capability, there is no heavy 

icebreaking capability available for lease on earth that the Coast 

Guard is aware of, and we have looked around, sir. 

Mr. SANFORD. Does anybody else open up channels in the Antarctic, as we do, going into McMurdo? 

Admiral MICHEL. There have been three vessels that—well, there 

are a number of vessels over many years. That has been done over 

many, many decades. But I will talk here in the recent times. 

So the National Science Foundation actually chartered for a vessel called the Krasin, which is a Russian medium—almost heavy— 

icebreaker to break open that channel. They also chartered the 

Oden, which is a Swedish icebreaker, to work in that area. And 

they also chartered a vessel called the Vladimir Ignatyuk. Each one 

of those vessels, to varying degrees, was able to do that. 

For example, the Oden was able to actually work in that ice area. 

The problem with the Oden is it has very challenging open-water 

characteristics, so its ability to move down from Sweden down to 

work in that area was challenged because of its open-ocean characteristics. Plus, that vessel was actually pulled back on very short 

notice by the Government of Sweden when they had an icebreaking 

opportunity. 

The Vladimir Ignatyuk, for example, could only work in the already-cleared-out channel, and would not have been able, on its 

own, to have—actually carve that channel. So there have been vessels that have worked down there to varying degrees of success, 

none of which are as capable as either Polar Sea or Polar Star. 

Mr. SANFORD. Understood. But it could possibly be done through 

those kinds of leasing arrangement, and thereby free up 2 months 

of capacity for Polar Sea or its equivalent to be on patrol, in essence, in the Arctic. 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, like I said, sir—and Krasin, for example, 

actually did that. But Krasin is a Russian vessel. 

Mr. SANFORD. OK. 

Admiral MICHEL. And really is no opportunity for the Coast 

Guard—— 

Mr. SANFORD. One last—I see I am down to 16 seconds, so let 

me interrupt, if I might. Two things, I guess. One, Ms. Stiller had 

a question with regard to Navy versus Coast Guard roles, and any 

degree of further differentiation, as you would see it, between those 

two roles. 

And the last question would be, given the way in which different 

folks have asked the same question, which is if you were to pick 

a single linchpin—and this would be for anybody—that would 

make a difference with regard to perceived Russian aggression in 

that part of the world, it would be what? 

Ms. STILLER. Well, sir, I am on the acquisition side of the house. 

But the Chief of Naval Operations was asked back in March in 

front of the Senate Armed Services Committee about the Navy’s 

role in the Arctic, and whether we are meeting our operational missions. And we are currently, because we are doing that with undersea and air assets. So we don’t require the icebreaking capability 

33 

that the Coast Guard provides as part of their mission for our operations right now, in the near term, in the Arctic. 

Admiral MICHEL. I am not sure I exactly understand the question, but the Coast Guard is committed to this mission set. We believe that the MOU that was signed in 1965 is still the appropriate 

assignment of duties. The Coast Guard has put forth candidly our 

execution challenges. 

And our single biggest investment and our biggest recapitalization priority for this particular mission set is a heavy polar icebreaker, sir. That provides you with the access and the ability to 

actually, by presence, project sovereignty. If you can’t get there because you have been denied by the environmentals, you cannot 

project sovereignty. And that is our number-one recapitalization investment for this problem set, sir. 

Ms. CONLEY. Sir, on your last question, just on the signaling to 

the Russian Government, I would argue that the United States 

needs to recognize the shift, publicly, that has occurred, that there 

are changes in their military posture that do cause us concern. 

I think we need to arrest the withdrawal of forces, key forces 

that we are anticipating, the withdrawal of Army forces in Alaska, 

think about enhancing our force posture. It is signaling that we 

recognize this, and we are prepared to make necessary adjustments 

to our force posture, if required. 

Mr. HUNTER. The gentleman yields back. Mr. Garamendi is recognized. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Paxton, you indicated that there are 10 

shipyards that are capable of building a heavy icebreaker. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. PAXTON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And they are prepared to do so. 

Mr. PAXTON. Well, they are certainly interested, sir. At the Coast 

Guard’s Industry Day there was 10 shipyards that showed up. 

They are all members of my trade association. Whether or not they 

will be building or partnering, they want to have a say in this, or 

at least a comment on it. So yes, there is high interest. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. I want to make one thing very clear 

with regard to where I would come from on the policy of American 

built or foreign built. No way, no how will this icebreaker—one, 

two, or more—be built in a foreign shipyard. It will be made in 

America, period. 

Mr. PAXTON. Yes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Now, if we want to have a brawl, then we can 

fight about it. But it is going to be made in America, at least as 

far as I am concerned. 

With regard to the nature of the icebreaker, Admiral Michel and 

Mr. O’Rourke, you lay out in your testimony, Mr. O’Rourke, the 

various capabilities of the icebreaker. 

Mr.—Admiral Michel, I assume you have—this information 

comes from you, or from the Coast Guard. Does—have you had a 

chance to look at Mr. O’Rourke’s testimony, and particularly the 

way in which he lays out the capabilities of the icebreaker, of the 

new icebreaker, the new, heavy icebreaker? 

Admiral MICHEL. I have read his testimony, sir. I am not sure 

exactly which part you are describing. 

34 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well then, let me proceed here. Mr. O’Rourke, 

thank you for laying it out in your testimony. 

Admiral Michel, if you will take a look at that testimony and get 

back to us as quick as possible as to whether—it is appendix A of 

the testimony from Mr. O’Rourke—as to whether that is a reasonable or accurate recitation of the Coast Guard’s requirements. 

Mr. O’Rourke, where did you get that information? 

[The analysis of Admiral Michel of the U.S. Coast Guard follows:] 

The section titled ‘‘Desired Capabilities for New Polar Icebreaker’’ in Appendix A of Mr. O’Rourke’s written testimony represents a partial summary 

of the requirements delineated in the Operational Requirements Document 

(ORD), approved by DHS in January 2016. Specifically, this Appendix highlights Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) and other select elements. 

These items, when combined with the totality of operational requirements 

outlined in the ORD, describe the threshold capabilities for a new polar icebreaker. A copy of the ORD has been made available to industry for review. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. That is from the Coast Guard’s own Industry Day 

presentation and the briefing slides that they showed. So I am simply transcribing, more or less—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. 

Mr. O’ROURKE [continuing]. What was on each of those briefing 

slides. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Good. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. And I trust that I didn’t do any violence to the 

content in copying it over—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No need to go further. I thought that was the 

case. 

This document, or those—the recitation of those particular requirements would then be the foundation for a congressional authorization. Is that correct, Admiral Michel? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. Those—the capabilities that you mentioned there were actually—came from the Operational Requirements Document, which has been cleared by all the interagency 

partners setting forth those requirements, and—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. That is the type of vessel that we 

need, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. Then what I am looking at is to get 

this thing underway this year in either the appropriation or the 

NDAA. And this recitation here describes what it is we would want 

built. Are you happy with what you gave to the—or what Mr. 

O’Rourke was able to get from you? 

Admiral MICHEL. I am 100 percent happy, sir. That is exactly the 

type of vessel that we need. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. All right, then. It is up to us to give you the authority and authorization, and not wait for the administration, 

which—I guess the American public will decide what that administration will be in the future, although I have my own ideas about 

what would be best. 

I want to also deal with the infrastructure issue. It seems to me 

that that infrastructure issue is important. Ms. Conley, you lay 

out—very good, and I appreciate your testimony, because it gives 

us the larger context in which to consider these things. 

35 

On the infrastructure side, let’s have a very quick recitation of 

the kind of infrastructure. Are we talking about a deepwater port 

near or north of the strait? Admiral? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, that has been one of the things that we 

have talked about. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, no, let’s not talk about it. Is it necessary 

to have a deepwater port near or north of the Bering Strait? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, that is probably outside the Coast Guard’s 

lane. There are Coast Guard requirements for that type of a port. 

So we would very much benefit from a deepwater port that is closer—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So the answer is yes, you would need a deepwater port to fully operate in the Arctic with a heavy icebreaker. 

Admiral MICHEL. It would be very beneficial to us, but understand, sir, that when you get up into some of those areas, that may 

be only a seasonal port because not all that stuff is going to be icefree, so you have to take that into account—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. That is a very important issue, as to where the 

port will be located. Is it seasonal or not? 

Ms. Grover, Mr. O’Rourke, Ms. Conley, what is your position on 

an infrastructure? 

Ms. GROVER. Only that it is a significant investment to develop 

infrastructure in the area. And so we would yield to the Coast 

Guard’s analysis of whether it would be worth it—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. You don’t have a position. 

Mr. O’Rourke? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. No position. I would just—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Ms. Conley, you—— 

Mr. O’ROURKE [continuing]. Highlight the fact that the— 

Mr. GARAMENDI [continuing]. Want to give us the context of 

strategy, national strategy? 

Ms. CONLEY. We urgently need more infrastructure. In addition 

to a deepwater port we need additional aviation assets, greater 

hangar space. We have to prepare for a much more significant response. And it is a comprehensive package. It needs to be a full 

strategy. 

The fact that Shell has withdrawn and the question of Alaska’s 

future energy picture has really delayed further infrastructure development that would have been a more public-private partnership. 

So now we have even taken a further step back on infrastructure 

needs. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. OK. I guess my final question here really goes 

to our staff, and that is the infrastructure issue may be beyond the 

reach of this subcommittee. But I am of the opinion that we are 

not going to be able to achieve the goals and the requirements of 

this subcommittee unless we have infrastructure in place. And that 

is both the communication, as well as the port refueling and other 

kinds of facilities. And so, we ought to spend some time on that. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. I am just going to throw 

this out here before I yield to Mr. Graves. I mean we asked for this 

information prior to the hearing, but did not receive it. We need 

the data that you have, going back from 2015 to as far back as you 

have it, for the Polar Star and the Healy, including the times the 

36 

vessels are transiting, the time the Polar Star spends in the Arctic 

and Antarctic, its time in port for maintenance work, and same for 

the Healy, its transit to the Arctic, conducting missions for operations and their time in port, please. 

Admiral MICHEL. We will get you that, sir. 

[The information from Admiral Michel of the U.S. Coast Guard 

follows:] 

From fiscal years 2007 to 2012, the USCGC POLAR STAR (WAGB–10) was 

non-operational (in commission, special) in Seattle. The cutter was reactivated in June 2013 and conducted ice trials in the Arctic during that fiscal 

year. CGC POLAR STAR then completed Operation DEEP FREEZE 2014, 

2015, and 2016 in McMurdo, Antarctica. 

Table 1: Summary of employment days for POLAR STAR, fiscal years 2013–2015 

USCGC POLAR STAR FY13 FY14 FY15 

Transit Days ....................................................................................................................... 25 61 47 

Days in Arctic .................................................................................................................... 33 0 0 

Days in Antarctic ............................................................................................................... 0 33 46 

Underway Training ............................................................................................................. 0 9 10 

Inport/Maintenance ............................................................................................................ 300 235 251 

Inport Training/Logistics .................................................................................................... 7 27 11 

Sum ............................................................................................................................... 365 365 365 

From fiscal years 2010 to 2015, USCGC HEALY (WAGB–20) was annually 

deployed to the Arctic, and conducted missions in support of the Artic Icebreaker Coordination Committee. In addition, in January 2012, HEALY 

completed a 26-day unscheduled fuel resupply of Nome, Alaska, that is accounted under ‘‘Days in the Arctic’’ in fiscal year 2012. 

Table 2: Summary of employment days for HEALY, fiscal years 2010–2015 

USCGC HEALY FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 

Transit Days ....................................................... 25 27 29 35 56 30 

Days in Arctic ..................................................... 81 71 125 61 84 57 

Days in Antarctic ................................................ 0 0 0 0 0 0 

Underway Training .............................................. 29 31 11 16 11 21 

Inport/Maintenance ............................................. 182 210 158 224 143 158 

Inport Training/Logistics .................................... 48 26 43 29 71 99 

Sum ................................................................ 365 365 365 365 365 365 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you. 

Mr. Graves, you are recognized. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

follow up on Mr. Garamendi’s last line of questioning. 

Admiral, icebreakers, as Ms. Grover noted in her testimony, it is 

not a silver bullet to addressing all of the needs of providing all the 

capabilities in the Arctic, things like oil spills, mass casualties, terrorism events. Can you explain what is being done to address other 

capabilities, meaning non-icebreaking capabilities in the Arctic, to 

provide the Coast Guard or the Federal Government with the capabilities they need to respond to some of these other events? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. Well, our presence has been largely 

mobile and seasonal. So we use the vessels, whether they be icebreakers or not icebreakers. I mean buoy tenders—we have had 

37 

our National Security Cutter up there that—we use that type of a 

mobile presence. Plus, we have also established forward operating 

bases. We have done them at Dead Horse, Barrow, Kotzebue. These 

are temporary facilities during—primarily during the summer, 

where we provide services like search and rescue, aids to navigation work, working with the local tribal people for fisheries and forest, or protection of mammals, and all those types of things, our 

presence has largely been mobile and seasonal because the human 

activity has been so dynamic. 

I know Ms. Conley mentioned about Shell. We had to move certain things when Shell was up there, but now Shell is not up there. 

So investing in permanent infrastructure up there is not where the 

Coast Guard currently is focused, although we look at that all the 

time. 

Right now we like mobile and seasonal because we can move 

where necessary to match the human activity. And that is the 

beauty of having ships that can actually operate up there, because 

they come with a command and control suite, they can help with 

oil spills, they can help with search and rescue, counterterrorism, 

border security, fisheries enforcement, and you can move them as 

the seasons and as the activities and requirements dictate. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK, thank you. Next question, Admiral, earlier we talked a lot about heavy icebreaking capabilities, 

and you have gone back and forth into medium capabilities, the 

Healy being the medium icebreaking vessel that we have right 

now. Can you talk a little bit about acquisition strategy on mediums? 

And I know the priority is the heavy, and I know your allegiance 

to the President’s budget, but could you talk a little bit, looking forward on acquisition strategy for mediums? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. So you have laid out—the High Latitude Study also calls for three medium icebreakers. We have got 

the Healy current extant, but we actually have a requirement for 

a couple others. We have an integrated product team stood up, we 

want to develop an Operational Requirements Document, an ORD, 

for medium icebreakers, just like we have done for the heavy icebreakers. And that is a recapitalization need for the Coast Guard 

moving in to the future. So we have got a plan for that, as well, 

sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. When do you anticipate budget requests for that? 

Admiral MICHEL. Oh, sir, I wouldn’t want to speculate on that. 

We don’t have the ORD done yet. And the ORD lays out those capabilities that Mr. Garamendi identified for the heavy. We have to 

have that agreement amongst the interagency partners as to what 

the interagency requirements are. So I wouldn’t want to put a 

timeline on that, sir. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK. 

Admiral MICHEL. I will agree to keep you informed as we move 

through the process. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. I would appreciate that. In fact, I am 

sure the entire committee would. 

38 

Let me go back to the first line of questioning Mr. Garamendi 

had, and there was something that was left, and I want to make 

sure I understand the ultimate conclusions. 

So Mr. Garamendi asked the panel if leasing was an option. As 

I understand, basically folks said no. However, I heard a few things 

that seemed to contradict that, and I want to make sure I understand. 

So Mr. Paxton said that there actually were medium icebreaking 

capabilities that were available. Ms. Grover said that the options 

were unaffordable. So just—I want to make sure I understand this. 

So, number one, are there private capabilities that are available 

to the Coast Guard for leasing? Just yes or no. 

Admiral MICHEL. There are none available, sir, that are suitable 

for military service without substantial refit. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK. And so then, Ms. Grover—and, 

Mr. O’Rourke, I will come to you in 1 second—Ms. Grover, in regard to your statement earlier—and I don’t want to put words in 

your mouth, but I think you said that they weren’t—I don’t know 

what word you used, but affordable to the Federal Government. 

Could you just explain where that information is from, if—earlier 

it appeared that folks were saying there weren’t even capabilities 

there. 

Ms. GROVER. Sure. It is that leasing, relative to purchase, is generally going to cost more because of profit and interest—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Sure. But also I just want to make 

clear that we have all acknowledged that there is a gap in capabilities here. And so in some cases, if there is a gap, then we may have 

to pay a premium, perhaps. And I am not verifying or confirming 

there would be a premium paid. But if we don’t have capabilities, 

then we may have to pay extra in order to fill that gap. Would that 

be fair? 

Ms. GROVER. If there were a vessel that was suitable for—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Sure, sure. 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. The Coast Guard, they could—— 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. OK. 

Ms. GROVER [continuing]. Enter a demise lease. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Great, thank you. 

Mr. O’Rourke? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Yes, I just want to emphasize that we are talking 

about two different forms of leasing here. Ms. Grover’s testimony 

was focused on a long-term lease as an alternative to purchasing 

a ship for a 30- or 40-year expected service life. There is also a separate question of whether you would want to do a short-term lease 

for temporarily filling a gap prior to the time that new U.S. icebreakers come into service. 

In my testimony I used the term ‘‘charter’’ to try and differentiate this shorter term scenario from the longer term one that Ms. 

Grover talked about. The shorter term ones would depend upon the 

availability of the ships for those shorter term charters, and the capabilities that they would bring, the prices that you would charge, 

and whether that would make sense, from our point of view. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Sure. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. We have done that in the past on at least three 

occasions since 2005, and it might be possible to do it in the future, 

39 

depending on the availability and cost effectiveness of that option. 

But those are short-term charters, as opposed to the long-term 

lease, which is an alternative to a purchase. 

So we always have to keep that in mind, and that is why we can 

sometimes get cross-talk on the issue. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Great, thank you. And I think that 

is a really important distinguishing factor here, is that we are not 

talking about leasing to supplant the ultimate acquisition of a 

Coast Guard vessel, but simply to complement this strategy where 

we have gaps that folks have identified in their testimony. 

And Mr. Chairman, if I can have a little bit of latitude, I promise 

I will shut up after this. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. Paxton, let me give you one more chance. You seem to—last 

time, for the record. CRS noted in their testimony that there may 

be cost savings as a result of building more than one vessel, or 

piggybacking on an existing Navy or Coast Guard contract that is 

underway because of the ultimate reduction in overhead costs and 

others. Could you comment on that? Because, look, let’s be clear, $1 billion for one vessel is an extraordinary figure, and I just want to understand, looking at costs 

down the road and other acquisition strategies. 

Mr. PAXTON. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Graves, for the question. 

Certainly with block buys you can get long lead-time materials, you 

can have an acquisition strategy that allows you to put workforce 

in place to manage multiple construction of vessels. So you can 

really drill down on your processes to get better cost savings in the 

long term. I believe Mr. O’Rourke mentioned if you have two ships 

you might have a savings of about $100 million. That is real savings. That is why you would want to do it that way. 

I think also, as an industry, our shipyards really strive to get 

their processes down. When you have a lead ship and you build 

just one ship, a lead ship, you don’t get your chances to get your 

processes down because it is a lead ship and you are only building 

one. Hence, it is expensive. But if we build three heavies and three 

mediums, you are going to get a cost savings there, because the 

shipyards are going to strive to get those processes streamlined, 

they are going to have long lead-time materials that they can purchase in block, and they can really drive down expenses. 

So, I think there is enormous value to the taxpayer. And also we 

have heard from all the panelists there is a national security need 

to do this. So if we are going to do it, I think we should do it in 

multiple contracts. 

Mr. GRAVES OF LOUISIANA. Thank you, Mr. Paxton, very, very 

helpful. 

And Mr. Chairman, for the record, as I recall, I think Mr. 

Paxton—on the fifth time he proposed to his wife she said yes. So 

just a—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. PAXTON. Yes, that is great. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Young is recognized. 

Mr. YOUNG. One of the deficiencies in the Arctic is the lack of 

hydrographic and coastal survey data. I know NOAA [National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] is doing this right now, 

but under title 10 the Navy has a responsibility. How far along are 

40 

we in that? And are you sharing that with the other interested parties? 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, again, I am an acquisition professional, but I 

will get you the right answer. But yes, we do partner with NOAA 

and others. In fact, we have built vessels within the SCN account 

for NOAA to do that research. 

Mr. YOUNG. But have you shared—because I know you have done 

quite a bit of work. Has that been shared now? 

Ms. STILLER. As far as I know, yes, sir. But I will get you 

that—— 

Mr. YOUNG. Would you get back to me on that? 

Ms. STILLER. Yes, sir. 

[The information from Ms. Stiller of the U.S. Navy follows:] 

Most of the Navy’s modern Arctic bathymetric data is collected by submarines. The Navy has already declassified and released as much existing 

Arctic Ocean bathymetric data as possible. In addition, the Navy has established an ongoing process through which additional Arctic bathymetric data 

is released as quickly as possible after submarines transiting the Arctic return to port. Bathymetric data released publicly by the U.S. Navy continues 

to be the main source of data used by the International Bathymetric Chart 

of the Arctic Ocean (IBCAO). 

Mr. YOUNG. I am going back to—I will get the elephant out of 

the room here, in a sense. 

During the Shell activity there were anchor-layer icebreaking-capable ships. Is that correct, Mr. O’Rourke? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. There was one that was actually built to support 

Shell’s operations, and it was a privately owned ship. 

Mr. YOUNG. That is right. It is a privately owned ship. It has tremendous capability of icebreaking power and the bow. If that could 

be retrofitted in 1 year’s time or year and a half, that would fill 

that gap. Would you be interested in that, Admiral, if that was to 

take place? 

I know you have the proposal on your desk, by the way. It has 

already been laid on your desk, and it is an automatic no. Why? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, our Commandant actually personally visited that vessel, and we are of the opinion that that vessel is not 

suitable for military service without substantial refit, and I can go 

into—— 

Mr. YOUNG. But that—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. The reasons why, sir. 

Mr. YOUNG. But wait a minute, stop. You think so. But if the 

shipbuilder said that he—‘‘I can take and meet your requirements 

with the bow that it has now, tungsten steel, heavy, and the power 

to do it,’’ see, because I—by the way, Admiral, I have been through 

this now—I have been here when we built the Healy, you know. I 

know what I am talking about. And you have always hated the 

idea of not owning the ship. But we have a gap here that has to 

be put in place. 

How are we going to do it, if you don’t accept another vessel? 

American-built, American-manned, American-maintained. Why 

can’t you accept that? Because you are not going to get a Coast 

Guard in 10 years. Why can’t you accept that? If it can’t do the job, 

you don’t pay them. Answer? 

41 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, our current opinion is that ship is not suitable for military service without substantial refit. 

Mr. YOUNG. See, and that is what I call, Mr. Chairman, a 

bullshit answer. Military service. 

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. YOUNG. I talk about—I am talking about moving ice. 

Mr. HUNTER. All right. Let’s get into that, if you don’t mind, Admiral. Let’s go on the mil specs. So I am reading this. The Coast 

Guard polar icebreaking mission has four parts: breaking out 

McMurdo Station and providing some show of U.S. sovereign presence in the Southern Ocean. Does that require a military vessel or 

an icebreaker? I am just asking logically—— 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, the Coast Guard only operates military 

vessels. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does that require a military vessel to do that, what 

I just said? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, the Coast Guard only operates military 

vessels. 

Mr. HUNTER. Has—does a non-military vessel ever break out the 

McMurdo station? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, it has. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. So I am going to ask it again. Does it take a 

military vessel to break out the McMurdo Station? That is a yes 

or no answer, Admiral. That is all you got to give me. 

Admiral MICHEL. No, sir, but not in Coast Guard service. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. To provide an Arctic research platform, does 

that require a military vessel? 

Admiral MICHEL. No, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Meeting the Coast Guard maritime safety, search 

and rescue, fishery law enforcement, oil spill response in the Arctic, 

does that require a military vessel? 

Admiral MICHEL. For the Coast Guard, yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does that require a military vessel, though? 

Admiral MICHEL. It—— 

Mr. HUNTER. And when you—— 

Admiral MICHEL. I think you prefaced that with Coast Guard requirements. Yes, sir. We don’t operate non-military vessels, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. I didn’t ask if you would operate non-military vessels. I am asking you can a non-military vessel provide for search 

and rescue? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Fishery law enforcement, oil spill response? 

Admiral MICHEL. Fishery law enforcement? No, sir. That requires a law enforcement vessel of the United States, a—— 

Mr. HUNTER. A law enforcement vessel—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. Military vessel. 

Mr. HUNTER. Then a military vessel. 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. Law enforcement—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But you need—— 

Admiral MICHEL. The Coast Guard vessels are both military vessels and law enforcement—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I mean what do—do you need a CIWS on this, or— 

what—do you need to shoot rockets or missiles off its surface? 

What are we talking about when you say military vessel? 

42 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, a military vessel of the United States is 

classified as a war ship under international law. It has certain 

privileges and immunities that go along with that. A military vessel of the United States is built to military specifications for military interoperability, for military survivability, for damage control—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Let me—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. For water-tight integrity—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But let me ask Mr.—— 

Admiral MICHEL [continuing]. For propulsion systems. And they 

are not built to commercial standards, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Is the Littoral Combat Ship totally built to military 

specifications? 

Ms. STILLER. Mr. Chairman? 

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. O’Rourke or Ms. Stiller, you could both answer 

that, I guess. 

Ms. STILLER. The LCS is built to Naval Vessel Rules, which includes some commercial specifications but they are militarized, so 

yes. And in fact, in the case of LCS, right now we have completed 

our Total Ship Survivability Trials on both variants, and we are 

into the Full Ship Shock Trials to prove out that we accurately met 

the design parameters for those ships. 

For the Independence variant, we have already conducted two of 

the tests. We have one more to go, and then, for the Freedom variant, we are going to conduct the test in August. But yes, sir—— 

Mr. HUNTER. I understand. I don’t want to get too deep in the 

woods on LCS. So—but I just don’t understand. One of the Coast 

Guard’s excuses for not using a leased vessel or a less expensive 

vessel is that it is not a military-type vessel, yet the Navy put a 

lot of money into a lot of ships—it is changing now, but into a 

bunch of ships—the future of the Navy was the LCS—at that time, 

and that was not a—that—they didn’t require a military vessel for 

those ships. 

So you are telling me that the Coast Guard, to break ice—I am 

just using logic here, not semantics—to break ice needs a more 

militarized vessel than the Navy does, in terms of survivability? I 

don’t understand. 

Ms. STILLER. Sir, I am going to defer to Admiral Michel here, but 

what he is talking about is we do design and build these ships to 

military standards in certain areas. And you can have a blend of 

military-commercial standards across—— 

Mr. HUNTER. That is not what he said. 

Ms. STILLER. It depends on the vessel. But I would say that it— 

but it is to the war-fighting capability and the protections you have 

as a war-fighting asset. I think that is where you are going on that. 

Admiral MICHEL. Boy, this is—I mean there is a lot in your question there, sir. 

First of all, these are multimission assets that the Coast Guard 

operates. They don’t just break ice. They assert national sovereignty, they conduct law enforcement. 

Mr. HUNTER. And I just asked you—Admiral, hold on. I just 

asked you four things, the four things that an icebreaker has to do, 

and you said it doesn’t take a military ship to do any of them. I 

43 

asked you does it take a military ship to do these four things. You 

said no, no, no, and no. 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, and that is not the totality of what a Coast 

Guard cutter does. I think we have got a misapprehension here, 

sir, on what the characteristics of these vessels are. The Coast 

Guard operates Coast Guard vessels, we don’t just—this is not a 

pickup game for the Coast Guard. We have very specific requirements for our vessels, including international law requirements for 

assertion of things like navigation rights. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. 

Admiral MICHEL. This is a very—I think maybe you—sir, and I 

am happy to—I know you think I am being nonresponsive, but I 

am not. I am happy to have this dialogue with you on what this 

vessel is. This vessel does not just break ice, just like the Polar Sea 

and Polar Star just do not break ice. Those are the assertion of national sovereignty through war ships of the United States, military 

vessels operated by an armed force of the United States, the Coast 

Guard. I think maybe we have gotten—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Got you. 

Admiral MICHEL. I think that is where our gap is, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. And again, we are never going to see one of those 

while any of us are here. Mr. O’Rourke might be around for a long 

time. 

One last thing here, and then I am going to yield to Mr. 

Garamendi and we will close. And thank you very much for giving 

us a little bit of extra time here. 

I guess the biggest question is—which we have all talked about— 

the gap, 3- to 6-year gap. We all agree we need to build a heavy 

icebreaker. Going to get $1 billion possibly coming up. That is 

going to go towards building a heavy icebreaker, maybe accelerating a medium icebreaker being bought. Will you guys even look 

at that, to go in a heavy and a medium, as opposed to two heavies? 

Admiral MICHEL. Sir, I am open for all options. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. So one potential bridging mechanism the Coast 

Guard has touted for years is the reactivation of the Polar Sea. In 

2012 this subcommittee—that is before I was here—this subcommittee had to pass law directing you to analyze the reactivation 

of the Polar Sea and provide Congress that analyzed—that analysis 

by 2013, September, almost 3 years ago, with a determination of 

whether the reactivation was cost effective. Not just an analysis on 

how messed up the boat was, but whether it is cost effective to fix 

it. 

You did the analysis, but failed to make a determination. So in 

a week or two you are going to provide this committee, once we are 

out, another analysis of reactivating the Polar Sea—Polar Star. Let 

me ask you this—Polar Star, right? Sorry, Polar Sea. 

Admiral MICHEL. Polar Sea, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Polar Sea is broken. Star is working. Are you going 

to give us a determination on the cost effectiveness on the 24th? 

Are you going to come out and say, ‘‘Here is what we see wrong 

with it, here is what it is going to cost to fix it, and we determine 

that that is too much,’’ or, ‘‘that sounds good’’? 

Admiral MICHEL. You are going to get everything but the last 

part, sir. We are going to give you the cost, we are going to give 

44 

you the materials, the engineering challenges, and so on and so 

forth. The actual alternatives analysis, that is arrayed against the 

broader problem set. That is what is due by the end of the calendar 

year. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. OK. Mr. Garamendi, I yield to you. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and your 

staff and my staff for really pushing this issue forward, and for the 

witnesses. Some of you have been here multiple times. 

I think the fundamental issue is before us, before Congress, as 

to what—and to explicitly state what it is that the administration 

is going to do. And I would propose that over the next 3 months, 

as the NDAA and the appropriation process go forward, that we 

take upon ourselves to set the policy in place. And for me, the policy that would make the most sense is one that would authorize 

and, in fact, tell the Coast Guard to build two, perhaps three, 

heavy icebreakers, or two and perhaps a medium icebreaker in a 

block buy, and to get on with it in an expeditious way, using the 

information that the Coast Guard has developed as to the capabilities of the heavy icebreaker. And perhaps also the medium icebreaker. I think that is a decision that we have to make. 

We cannot depend upon the administration. It will be a new administration, they will take some years or year or more to get their 

act together, and that is just the way it will be. Not that either are 

incapable, it is just that transition that will determine that. 

So, with that in mind, there is one additional issue, and, Mr. 

Chairman, you have made this, I think, very clear in the most recent colloquy that you had with Admiral Michel about what is military. And I notice our colleague from Alaska has left, but this issue 

of military-capable is one that we need to come to grips with here, 

because it is filling the gap issue. 

And I think—not think, I believe that we must decide how best 

to fill this gap. We don’t have that information until the 24th of 

this month. And therefore, on the 24th we will have from the Coast 

Guard their analysis of the Polar Sea and its potential. 

Ms. Grover, Mr. O’Rourke, your very quick and necessary analysis of that proposal is essential. And I would ask the chairman to 

request that you get that quickly back to us so that when we return here in September we will be able to make a decision as to 

whether to proceed with the Polar Sea or not. And we need your 

capable analysis to do that. 

I am in the mood to make a decision. You know, I know that 

both the chairman and I are up for a new contract. I think that 

both of us, hopefully, will be here to carry on. But before our new 

contract is up, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we make a decision 

and push this issue—not push it, but set it in place so that the 

next Congress and the next administration will know precisely 

what it is that they are to do. 

And with that, we have got some work out ahead of us. I look 

forward to it. Very, very important hearing, Mr. Chairman, I thank 

you for the time. And for the witnesses, I thank you for your engagement on this issue. 

And by the way, we are going to make it in America. 

Mr. HUNTER. We are going to make it in America. I would ask— 

I think what Mr. Garamendi is referring to is not the analysis of 

45 

alternatives that comes at the end of the calendar year, but what 

is wrong with the ship which comes in a week or two. I think that 

once you two look at that, I think you can beat the Coast Guard 

by months on what your alternatives analysis is. I think you can 

do that. 

It takes them—I mean it has been since 2012, so it has taken 

them 4 years to give us this much, right? Let’s try to—and maybe 

you could get us that, and we can start working this ahead of receiving whatever we receive in December 30 or 31. I take it that 

is when we will get it. That is the end of the calendar year, December 31. OK, I was right, all the way to the end. 

Admiral, I also would like you to give us, to this committee, look 

at what Ms. Grover said, that you have to have—you are not allowed to have Coast Guard on leased vessels. Was that correct? 

Ms. GROVER. Not on a short-term lease, because—— 

Mr. HUNTER. A charter, let’s call it charter, like—— 

Ms. GROVER. Yes, not a short-term lease or a charter, because of 

what the admiral was stating before, that the vessels have got to 

be able to carry out the ports, waterways, coastal security mission, 

the law enforcement mission, and a sovereign presence, which 

means a short-term charter or lease it out, because it wouldn’t 

qualify as a public vessel. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. So give me this, Admiral, if you could. Could 

you assist this committee with drafting assistance so—to know how 

we would change that, if we wanted to? OK? 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Yes, sure. Go ahead. I yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Mr. Chairman, we—at least I am of the mood 

to make some decisive decisions here, and to write law. And I 

would request drafting assistance from the Coast Guard, and—to 

achieve that goal. 

Mr. HUNTER. And, Admiral, last thing. We still haven’t talked 

about the 3-year gap. Right? You haven’t told us yet today—we 

have all talked about it, I think, but you haven’t told us how you 

are going to fill it. So I will leave the last statement to you here 

to tell us definitely how you are going to fill the 3-year gap. 

Admiral MICHEL. So what is currently on the table is a rolling 

recapitalization of the Polar Star, a reactivation of the Polar Sea, and how we are going to fit Healy into that, and that is the current 

situation, although we are out there looking for other types of vessels or capabilities that may be brought into the fight. That is what 

we currently have on the table, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. So can you plug the 3-year gap—you are telling me 

there will not be a 3-year gap in an icebreaking capability. You 

guys have it under control. Worst case scenario is what you just 

said. 

Admiral MICHEL. I think, sir, that a rolling recapitalization of 

the Polar Star is achievable. I think that it can be done within the 

operational parameters as I have described to you before—— 

Mr. HUNTER. When would that happen, 2023? 

Admiral MICHEL. It—5 to 7 years from now is the projected end 

date, so that is 2021 to 2023 under the current recapitalization. 

Under a rolling recapitalization, we can buy several more years out 

of the Polar Star. Whether we want to bring Polar Sea on is the 

46 

analysis that I owe to you, and I have got a Healy SLEP I have 

also got to deal with. 

Mr. HUNTER. So say that you—we decide to say, OK, let’s go with 

Polar Sea, put in all new engines, and update her, and put her in 

the water. When would that start? So let’s say you came out and 

you said, ‘‘We analyzed, we looked at it, it is going to be $1 trillion.’’ 

We said, ‘‘All right, here is $1 trillion. Go.’’ 

Admiral MICHEL. Well, I think—I mean we could start on the design work relatively soon, but it is going to require an appropriation. As I described before—and I am going to give you the entire 

report—that—it took us about $70 million to recapitalize Polar 

Star. This is going to be multiples of that, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. But I am talking timewise. Would it be done in 

time to fill the gap—— 

Admiral MICHEL. Absolutely, and that—— 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. By 2023? 

Admiral MICHEL. And that is part of the alternatives analysis is 

what you are going to have to do is you are going to have to time 

it so that you can recap Polar Sea so when Polar Star is coming 

off the line you have got the ability to have Polar Sea built out 

there. And all that has got to be synched up with Healy, yes, sir. 

That is the difficulty in pulling an alternatives analysis. 

I can give you a material condition of a ship relatively quickly. 

But to make the actual decisions and to get the appropriations 

lined up and all the other things, that is a complicated dance, and 

that is why it takes a while to do that, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. OK. Would you also provide us with not just drafting assistance for the leased vessels, but how we would change the 

language to do a block buy? And I would ask all of you that, if you 

have a specialty, and if you know how to do that, because we probably do, too, but it would be easier to just have you tell us, because 

you are smarter. 

Admiral MICHEL. Yes, sir. And we will work with the Navy on 

that. They have more experience than we do with that, and we 

could definitely work with you on that, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Because if we could possibly do that this year in 

conference or in something else, so that would be great. 

So, ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. So thanks for 

being here, thanks for going over 2 hours. And with that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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