### The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United State s 1 

### District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 95-3927

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Southern District of Iowa. Tom Boston Johnson, Jr., * [UNPUBLISHED] * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: July 26, 1996 Filed: August 2, 1996

___________ Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________
PER CURIAM.

Inthis direct criminal appeal, Tom Boston Johnson appeals hi s conviction and resulting 89-month sen tence imposed by the district court, 1 after a jury found him guilty of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § § 841(a)(1) and 860. We affirm.
Counsel filed a brief pursuant to An ders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and was granted leave to withdraw. Counsel argues that Johnson wa s selectively prosecuted, and that insufficient ev idence supported Johnson's convictions. In a supplemental brief, Johnson argues that his conviction violat es the Double Jeopardy Clause, that police lacked a reasonable , articulable suspicion for the initial stop which led to his arrest, an d that he was stopped only because he is an African-American.

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Viewed in a light most favorable to the government, the evidence was sufficient to support Johnson's convictions. United States v. Quintanilla , 25 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir.) (standard of review) , cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 457 (1994). From the evidence presented, a reas onable jury could conclude Johnson dropped a baggie of crack he knowingly p ossessed within 1,000 feet of a school. Johnson 's intent to distribute could reasonably be inferred bythe amount of crack, the fact it was broken up into individual rocks, and testi mony that this amount was much larger than that a typical use r would possess for per sonal use. See United States v. Lopez , 42 F.3d 463, 467 (8th Cir. 1994) (listing factors which lead to reasonable inference of intent to distribute).

As to Johnson's selective prosecution claim, Johnson has not show n plainerror, because he has not produced "clear and convincing evidence" that the decision to prosecute him was motivated by a discriminator y purpose. See United States v. Armstrong , 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486-87 (1996); Fritz v. United States , 995 F.2d 136, 137 (8th Cir. 1993) (plain erro r review for issue not raised below), cert. denied , 114 S. Ct. 887 (1994).
Johnson also has not shown plain error as to his claims that of ficers had no probable cause to stop him, and that he w as stopped only because he is an Afr ican-American. Given the location of the lot where polic e officers observed Johnson drop the baggie of cra ck, the time of night, and the officers' observations of the actions of Johnson and his companions, the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Johnson for
a Terry -stop. See United States v. Dawdy , 46 F.3d 1427, 1429-30 (8th Cir. ) (rea sonable suspicion determined on totality of circumstances; listin g factor s that may lead experienced officer to stop individual), cert
. denied , 116 S. Ct. 19 5 (1995); United States v. Hawthorne , 982 F.2d 1186, 1190 (8th Cir. 1992) (although court "concerned" by Hawthorne's allegation he was targeted because he

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was young black male, relevant facts supporting Terry -stop were non-race based and sufficient to justify stop). Johnson has not raised an issue of selective enforcement , as he has not shown that the officers did not stop persons of a different race under similar circumstances, or that thei r decision to stop him was at least partially base d on his race. Cf. United States v . Bell , 1996 WL 333447, at *2 (8th Cir. June 19, 1996) (perso n claimi ng unequal enforcement of facially neutral statute must show tha t enfo rcement had discriminatory effect, and motivated by discriminator y purpose).
Johnson's double jeopardy argument i s baseless, because his sentence
was determined solely on the basis of the crack seized when he wa s arre sted, not on the prior conduct he refers to in his brief. We hav e review ed the record to determine whether any other nonfrivolous issue s exist, in accordance with Penson v. Ohio , 488 U. S. 75, 80 (1988), and have found no such issues. Johnson's motion for transcript copies is denied.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.