I

n his 34 years of service to the Army, MG Harold 

J. “Harry” Greene was known as a thinker who was 

always willing to share his expertise. An engineer 

by training, Greene held five graduate degrees—a 

Ph.D., three masters of science and a bachelor of science—but was adept at communicating with Soldiers 

and civilians at all levels. 

Now, several months after he was killed Aug. 5, 2014, 

while serving as deputy commanding general of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, the 

Army has chosen a select group of acquisition professionals as winners of the 2014 Major General Harold J. 

“Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing. Their 

exemplary work emulates Greene’s dedication to communicating and solving problems to make Soldiers’ lives 

better.

“Harry Greene was a Soldier, a leader, a mentor and a 

friend who inspired all of us to tackle complex problems 

on behalf of Soldiers,” said LTG Michael E. Williamson, 

principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of 

the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology and 

director, acquisition career management. “I can think 

of no better way to honor Harry’s 34 years of distinguished service than by naming this award after him.” 

Williamson noted that “the competition is designed to 

foster dialogue and discourse on the way forward for the 

acquisition community, to get people not only reflecting 

on lessons learned, but thinking about the future.” 

Competitors from across the DOD acquisition spectrum submitted articles, opinion pieces and essays on 

acquisition in four categories: Acquisition Reform/Better 

Buying Power (BBP), Future Operations, Innovation and 

Lessons Learned. Entries were judged on persuasiveness, 

clarity and strength of argument, innovation, relevance 

to the current or future environment and feasibility.

A distinguished panel of judges, including a deputy assistant secretary of the Army, a former Army acquisition 

executive, two-, three- and four-star generals and other 

defense dignitaries, selected the award winners. 

MS . MARGARET C. ROTH is the senior editor of Army 

AL&T magazine. She has more than a decade of experience in writing about the Army and more than three decades’ experience in journalism and public relations. Roth 

is a MG Keith L. Ware Public Affairs Award winner. She 

is also a co-author of the book “Operation Just Cause: 

The Storming of Panama.” She holds a B.A. in Russian 

language and linguistics from the University of Virginia.

The ACQUISITION 

MUSE

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards celebrate 

thoughtfulness and clarity in the profession

by Ms. Margaret C. Roth
— 2 —

Category: Acquisition Reform/Better 

Buying Power

Winner: The Contract Closeout Management Tool 

(C2MT): Achieving BBP by Enabling Rapid Contract 

Closeout

Authors: COL Linda R. Herbert is chief of staff for 

the Land Warfare and Munitions Directorate and 

senior program analyst in a joint specialty position, 

Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

Ms. Veronica Alexander is the director of programs 

for the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Procurement.

Dr. Christina M. Bates is a contractor supporting the 

Project Manager (PM) for Extraterrestrial Sensors in 

the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Intelligence, 

Electronic Warfare and Sensors.

Abstract: The DOD obligated more than $3 trillion 

in contracting for goods and services to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Once performance 

on a given contract is completed, it must be closed 

within a specified time or it is considered “overage.” 

Currently, DOD faces a substantial backlog of overage 

contracts requiring closeout. The Contract Closeout Management Tool (C2MT) enables rapid and 

accurate identification of contracts as “closed” within 

the given contract writing system. In December 2013, 

the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement was modified to allow for a greater population 

of contracts to be closed electronically using the new 

tool. And, due to the success of the C2MT, it is now 

broadly available for all Army agencies to use.

Honorable Mention: Contracting Officer Representative’s Inspection Reform

Author: Ms. Sherrie R. Moore is a contract specialist 

at the PEO for Simulation, Training and Instrumentation.

Abstract: Improving the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) inspection criteria and inspection 

will help the Army become a leader of reliable and 

consistent past performance assessments if strict 

compliance to standardized inspection criteria is 

followed for every inspection, including supplies and 

services; a standard software program is created that 

can be loaded onto tablets and given to CORs to help 

conduct inspections; and the software uses simple, 

quantifiable metrics to avoid subjective judgments and 

introduce consistency Armywide.

Category: Future Operations

Winner: Managing Stability Operations with Program Managers – A New Role for Army Acquisition

Author: LTC Adrian Marsh is the product manager for Ground Soldier Systems, responsible for the 

Army’s Nett Warrior program under PEO Soldier’s 

PM Soldier Warrior.

Abstract: Stability operations have many parallels 

to complex acquisition programs, including Congressional funding, multi-year endeavors, leveraging 

contractor expertise and synchronizing discrete 

projects to achieve a compounding effect. Additionally, most of the partner agencies involved in stability 

operations understand program management since 

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing

The winners and honorable mentions are:
— 3 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

they often rely on contracted efforts as the program 

execution wing of their in-theater initiatives. Despite 

these commonalities, the Army does not doctrinally 

apply program management rigor to the stability 

operations problem set. The Army’s Acquisition 

Corps, by nature of its core program management 

competencies, has the requisite skills to enable more 

effective management of future stability operations 

and can easily integrate with interagency partners. 

The branch should embrace the function, establish 

doctrine and deploy program managers to supplement military commands addressing these complex 

global operations.

Honorable Mention: Enduring Rapid Capabilities

Author: Mr. Patrick McKinney is a program integrator for rapid counter-improvised explosive device 

(IED) programs at the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). 

Abstract: In the 21st century, DOD established 

rapid acquisition entities and processes to answer 

urgent warfighter requirements and counter battlefield threats from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

With the current constrained fiscal environment, 

JIEDDO and other rapid acquisition entities must 

work with DOD and the armed services to determine how to maintain these critical rapid capabilities 

to ensure that the right ones endure to support the 

warfighter in future conflicts. This cooperation will 

reduce future risk and preserve valuable resources 

across DOD. 

Category: Innovation

Winner: Innovation in Army Acquisition 

Author: Mr. Ernest Keen is an aerospace engineer for 

the Aeroflightdynamics Directorate at the U.S. Army 

Aviation and Missile Research, Development and 

Engineering Center.

Abstract: The challenges of introducing complex 

systems into an uncertain financial and physical environment present limited opportunities for technology 

insertion in acquisition and promote risk aversion and 

atrophy of technical skill sets. The author advocates 

adoption of paradigms that encourage technology 

insertion via short iterative cycles focused on technical 

learning with elevated risk tolerance.

Honorable Mention (Tie): Look for Clarity in 

Regulations

Author: Mr. David B. Cook is an industrial engineer 

within the Program Evaluation Division of the Lower 

Tier Project Office at the PEO for Missiles and Space.

Abstract: Current Army regulatory language tends to 

exhibit a one-dimensional aspect independent of consideration of the users—the PM and PEO personnel 

responsible for implementing policy to manage weapon systems acquisition activities. Achieving some part 

of a solution requires that the Army regulation-writing 

community seek to significantly increase the involvement of project office personnel in providing suggestions as to policy accuracy, intent and direction in 

meeting overall objectives.

Honorable Mention (Tie): Software Capabilities – A 

Modular Approach

Author: Mr. Herbert Cottrell Jr. is a logistics management specialist matrixed to the Readiness Management Division at the PEO for Command, Control 

and Communications – Tactical.

Abstract: The author presents a case for documenting 

software-only capabilities using the standard force 

documentation processes.

Category: Lessons Learned

Winner: Maintaining and Developing the Contingency Contracting Force through Contracting-Driven 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Missions

Author: Maj. Garrett Bruening, United States Air 

Force (USAF), is an acquisition attorney within the Air 

Force Materiel Command’s Air Force Life Cycle Management Center Fighter-Bomber Directorate. 

Abstract: The author recommends expanding the 

humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) mission 

set to include contingency contracting professionals 

executing contracting activities in support of HCA 

objectives. Doing so could significantly combat 
— 4 —

the potential loss of contingency contracting skills 

gained during more than a decade of contingency 

operations. HCA missions share many characteristics 

with contingency contracting operations.

Honorable Mention: A Week of Rowing on Ivy Creek 

and Eleven Years of Working in Army Acquisition

Author: Ms. Chenxi Dong-O’Malley is a member of 

the Competitive Development Group/Army Acquisition Fellowship program of the U.S. Army Acquisition 

Support Center. She is currently Force Projection 

and Sustainment Portfolio manager at the U.S. Army 

Natick Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center. 

Abstract: This essay illustrates the concept of 

high-performance teaming through leadership training 

with rowing as the model of the training. Fourteen 

strangers with no rowing experience come together 

to compete in a regatta and, by the end of the week, 

demonstrate team synchronization and the strength of 

high-performance teaming. Included in this work are 

the eight secrets of inspirational leadership. 

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing Distinguished 

Judges

The Hon. Claude M. Bolton Jr., Defense Acquisition University executive in residence and former assistant secretary of the Army for acquisition, logistics 

and technology (ASA(ALT))

Dr. Leonard Braverman, senior scientist, RAND 

Corp. and former director, Institutional Army Transformation Commission

Professor John T. Dillard, academic area chair for 

acquisition, Graduate School of Business and Public 

Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

MG David A. Fastabend (USA, Ret.), former director of strategy, plans and policy, Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7

Professor Raymond D. Jones, Graduate School 

of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate 

School

Ms. Mary Miller, deputy assistant secretary of the 

Army for research and technology

MG Roger A. Nadeau (USA, Ret.), senior vice president, American Business Development Group and 

former commanding general (CG), U.S. Army Test 

and Evaluation Command

Mr. Kris Osborn, reporter, Military.com

Mr. Rickey Smith, deputy chief of staff, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command G-9

LTG Richard G. Trefry (USA, Ret.), Association of 

the United States Army (AUSA) senior fellow and 

former Army inspector general

GEN Louis C. Wagner (USA, Ret.), AUSA senior 

fellow and former CG, U.S. Army Materiel Command

LTG Joseph L. Yakovac (USA, Ret.), senior counselor, The Cohen Group and former ASA(ALT) military 

deputy and director, Army Acquisition Corps 
— 5 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Acquisition Reform/

Better Buying Power

WINNER 

The Contract Closeout Management 

Tool (C2MT): Achieving BBP by 

Enabling Rapid Contract Closeout 

We have been a nation at war for more than a decade. 

As such, over the past ten years alone, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) obligated in excess of three trillion 

dollars in contracting for goods and services. At any 

given time, there can be more than 500,000 overage 

contracts awaiting closure. Once performance on the 

contract is completed, contracts must be closed within 

a specified time, or they are considered “overage.” 

Some of these contracts are left over from the wars in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, while still others are the result 

of on-going contracting actions. As such, the DOD 

currently faces a substantial backlog of overage contracts 

requiring closeout. In the wake of its transition from 

wartime contracting, the Army acquisition community has continued to implement Better Buying Power 

(BPP) initiatives by developing innovative business 

tools that enable efficiencies, reduce redundancies, and 

save money while continuing to provide the very best 

support, and weapons systems to our Soldiers. One area 

that is clearly ripe for harvesting greater efficiencies is 

the closeout of overage contracts. A recent innovation 

and significant process improvement implemented by 

the Army enables a more efficient automated closeout 

of overage contracts through the use of an automated 

management tool. This unique tool, referred to as the 

Contract Closeout Management Tool (C2MT), was developed as a result of the Contract Closeout Task Force’s 

(C2TF) mission to closeout overage contracts. This 

article addresses overage contract closeout, and discusses 

the innovative use of C2MT to improve the closeout 

process by reducing opportunities for error and overall 

process cycle times. These resulting improvements have 

the real potential to save DOD, and in turn the taxpayer, billions of dollars. 

Awash in Contracts

DOD awards thousands of contracts every year to 

support military forces worldwide. A recent General 

Accountability Office (GAO) report (GAO-13-131) 

stated that the DOD obligated more than three 

trillion dollars during the past ten years on contracts. 

Once performance on the contract is completed, the 

contract must be closed in accordance with the Federal 

Acquisition Regulation (FAR) list of criteria necessary 

for closeout. While the overall closeout objectives are 

clear, the contract closure and auditing process can 

be arduous and time consuming, thus resulting in a 

significant backlog of contracts awaiting closeout. 

Within the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

the Army (Procurement) (DASA(P)), the Expeditionary Contracting Support (ECS) directorate provided 

direct support to CENTCOM-Joint Theatre Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC). The ECS 

directorate is responsible for operational contracting 

policies across the full-spectrum of declared and 

nondeclared contingency operations. It is also responsible for providing strategic oversight for operational 

contracting worldwide, to include contract closeout.

In 2012, the ECS directorate was called on to oversee 

contract closeouts of Army overage contracts. At the 

same time, the offices of the ASA(AL&T) and the 

ASA(FM&C) were assessing the status of Army overage contracts. The Army estimated there was a backlog 

of approximately 377,160 overage contracts requiring 

closeout, with an estimated value in unliquidated obligations (ULO) in excess of one billion dollars. This 

situation posed a significant risk to the Army. Simultaneously, the ASA(FM&C) was also concerned about 

the implementation of a new automated system - the 

General Fund Enterprise Business System (GFEBS 

- - the Army’s solution in response to the National Defense Appropriation Act (NDAA) of 2010 requirement 

for DOD to prepare auditable financial statements no 

later than (NLT) September 30, 2017). Consequently, 

with the advent of GFEBS, the ASA(FM&C) intendCOL Linda R. 

Herbert

Ms. Veronica 

Alexander 

Dr. Christina M. 

Bates 
— 6 —

ed to eliminate the backlog of contracts in the legacy 

system by the end of fiscal year 2014. As such, the 

DASA(P), ECS Directorate suggested the reconstitution of the C2TF in January 2013. 

Everything Requires a Contract. 

Soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) are equipped with Rifleman Radios during training 

at Fort Campbell, Ky., in March 2014. This contract will require 

closeout when all performance is completed. 

(U.S. Army photo, PEO C3T, http://peoc3t.army.mil/c3t/#)

Hit the Ground Running

The C2TF’s mission is to closeout all overage contracts, with priority given to those contracts with 

ULOs, no later than 30 September 2014. Recognizing 

that it would be difficult to close all overage contacts 

by the end of fiscal year 2014, the C2TF’s goal is to 

closeout “legacy” overage contracts, while continuing 

to track the closure of new, overage contracts.

To accomplish this significant and time sensitive mission, the C2TF planned four distinct phases: Concept 

Planning, Proof of Concept, Execution, and Process 

Validation. Each phase had clearly outlined exit criteria, with deliverables and established updates presented to both the ASA(AL&T) and the ASA(FM&C). 

To save funding for the Army, closeout priorities were 

also established for all buying commands. 

Closeout Process

Contracts may be identified for closeout through the 

use of the Army Contracting Business Intelligence 

System (ACBIS). Once identified, the contracts are 

prepared for closeout via a multi-step process as shown 

in Figure 1 (below). Once the process is completed, 

the contract is officially closed and any excess funds 

are de-obligated and returned for use by the Army. 

Timely de-obligation of the funding is essential 

because if funds are canceled, they cannot be used for 

other needed goods and services. 

The C2MT: Improving the Contract 

Closeout Process 

To reach its aggressive closeout goals, the C2TF set out 

to improve the existing process by removing excess, 

manual steps and implementing automation, where 

appropriate, to accelerate contract closeout. The Deputy 

Director, C2TF - Ms. Veronica Alexander – spearheaded the development and implementation of an 

automated scripting tool, referred to as the Contract 

Closeout Management Tool (C2MT), to enable a 

more efficient process that could mass closeout overage 

contracts. Partnering closely with the Army Business 

Center for Acquisition Systems, the scripting process was improved and a prototype C2MT tool was 

developed, enabling rapid and accurate identification of 

contracts as “closed” within the given contract writing 

system. The script also enables the automatic closure 

of contracts within specified paraameters. The original 

Figure 1: Generic DOD Contract Closeout Process 

Source: GAO report 13-131
— 7 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

scripting process involved several manual steps prior 

to running a script. Using the new tool, however, the 

new process eliminates manual steps, thereby significantly reducing cycle time and opportunities for error.

By implementing a pilot, improved scripting process, 

the C2TF achieved a successful mass automated closeout of 118,000 contracts, resulting in a savings to the 

Army of more than $111 million dollars. Following 

this successful pilot demonstration, the Army fully 

developed the C2MT tool and implemented it broadly as a best practice. Recognizing that this tool could 

potentially save billions for DOD, the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology 

and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)), Defense Procurement 

and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) modified the DOD 

regulation allowing for a greater use of this tool. And, 

in December 2013, the Defense Federal Acquisition 

Regulation Supplement (DFARS) was modified to 

allow for a greater population of contracts to be closed 

electronically, using the new tool. Due 

to the resounding success of the C2MT, it is now 

broadly available for all agencies to use effective 1 

September 2014. 

Preserving Funds; Supporting the Soldier

As of early September 2014, the C2TF has closed approximately 75% of the 377,160 legacy overage Army 

contracts. The C2TF stakeholders - which include 

the ASA(FM&C), the ASA(AL&T) DASA(P), Army 

Contracting Command (and subordinate commands), 

PEO STRI, National Guard Bureau, INSCOM, 

MEDCOM, and USACE - have all teamed together 

to work toward the Army goal of budget auditability 

by the end of September 2014. The impact to the 

Army cannot be overstated. 

The Army is currently the only DOD agency with the 

C2MT capability. In addition to enabling the Army to 

preserve hundreds of millions of dollars 

in de-obligated funding, the C2MT has also resulted 

in an estimated cost avoidance of $200 dollars per 

contract file (once a contract is electronically 

closed, the contracting office does not have to manually handle the file, and funding can be spent on other 

Army priorities). When applied across the hundreds of 

thousands of overage contracts within the Army, the 

total cost avoidance to the Army is in the billions of 

dollars range. This funding may then be reinvested in 

providing the very best support and capabilities to our 

most important and valued resource—our Soldiers. 

_____________

COL Linda R. Herbert served as the Director, Contract 

Closeout Task Force (C2TF), Director, Expeditionary Contracting Support (ECS) Directorate, DASA(P), and as the 

Deputy Commander for Operations, C-JTSCC, Baghdad, 

Iraq. She holds four master’s degrees to include Acquisition 

Material Management from the Naval Postgraduate School, 

and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Army War College. She is 

Level III certified in contracting and program management. 

Ms. Veronica Alexander served as the Deputy Director, 

Contract Closeout Task Force (C2TF), Deputy Director, 

Expeditionary Contracting Support Directorate, DASA(P). 

She holds a B.A. from Southern University, Baton Rouge, LA, 

and a master’s degree from Clark Atlanta University, Atlanta, 

GA. She is Level III certified in contracting and manufacturing career field. 

Dr. Christina M. Bates is a Lean Six Sigma Master Black 

Belt. Bates holds a B.A. in communication and sociology from 

Boston College; a MS in mass communication from Boston 

University; a JD from Boston University; and a PhD in 

communications from Arizona State University. 

HONORABLE MENTION

Contracting Officer Representative’s 

Inspection Reform

By Sherrie R. Moore

U.S. Army PEO STRI, 

Contracting Center, 

Orlando Florida

15 September 2014

Abstract

The goal of this initiative is to propose a structured 

approach to improve Contracting Officer Representative’s (COR) consensual inspection criteria and 

inspection methods Army wide. Setting standards of 
— 8 —

inspection criteria and methods has been the subject of long-standing debate. As the government is 

responsible for ensuring that acquired services and 

supplies conform to the quality and performance 

requirements of the contract, contract surveillance 

is key to ensuring contractor’s perform in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. 

With this in mind, should the acquisition community be obligated to provide detailed accurate past 

performance evaluations? Should past performance 

evaluations be standardized? What is the impact if 

past performance evaluations are not standardized? 

In 2011, recognizing the pressing need for practical 

past performance guidance, the Office of Federal 

Procurement Policy (OFPP) sampled past performance assessments from the top ten agencies who 

obligated about 94 percent of the $550 billion spent 

on federal contracts during FY 2009. Another investigation conducted in April 2009 by the Government Accountability Office published the following 

report (GAO-09-374) Federal Contractors: Better 

Performance Information Needed to Support Agency 

Contract Award Decisions. Both reports determined 

that past performance evaluations lacked sufficient 

information to support their ratings. Most contracting officials agreed that for past performance to be 

meaningful in contract award decisions it must be 

documented, relevant, and reliable. 

Contracting Officer Representative’s 

Inspection Reform

The government utilizes the Contract Performance 

Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) to report, 

collect and manage contractor’s performance records, 

both negative and positive. Once the data is input 

into the CPARS system, this data is then uploaded 

automatically to the Past Performance Information 

Retrieval System (PPIRS) database which is linked 

to the Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity 

Information System (FAPIIS). In accordance with 

the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Contracting Officer’s are required to check FAPIIS to ensure 

that the government does business with vendors who 

are responsible and capable of performing the work. 

In order for source selection officials to have greater 

confidence in the reliability of past performance ratings, it is imperative that: 1) contractor performance 

evaluations are recorded, 2) ratings are recorded for all 

performance areas, 3) the ratings are supported with 

a detailed narrative, and 4) the rating factors correlate 

with those reported in CPARS.

CPARS can effectively communicate contractor 

strengths and weaknesses; however, according to the 

report submitted by OFPP only four percent of the assessments sampled were found to have a rating where 

the narrative was sufficient enough to support it. A 

structured and unbiased approach to past performance 

inspection and evaluation criteria will ensure that the 

monthly inspection reports are appropriately documented to sufficiently validate the ratings provided 

and will also guarantee that the performance evaluation factors correlate directly with CPARS. Acquisitions that place an emphasis on past performance tend 

to encourage companies to perform better. Without 

accurate past performance information the Government may have to rely heavily on contractor submitted 

technical and cost factors that do not provide insight 

on possible future performance challenges. 

CPARS has the following basic evaluation areas: 1) 

Quality of Product or Service – overall performance 

and customer service, 2) Schedule – submission of 

contract deliverables, 3) Cost Control – change order 

costs and business systems, 4) Business Relations – 

partnership with the Government, responsiveness to 

Government inquiries, oversight of subcontractors and 

resolution of contract deficiencies, 5) Management of 

Key Personnel, 6) Utilization of Small Business, and 

7) other areas as needed. Even though CPARS is a uniform repository that creates a standardized contractor 

past performance report, it loses its effectiveness when 

agencies fail to report on evaluation factors or when 

evaluation factors contain limited narrative to support 

their rating. Therefore, it is imperative that steps are 

taken to reform and standardize past performance 

inspections Army wide.

There are many challenges contributing to the low 

number and quality of contractor past performance 

assessments. Some of those challenges are staff shortages, evolving requirements, training, maintaining 

monthly reports and the burden of preparing and 

entering past performance assessments into CPARS. 

If the COR’s monthly inspection criteria did not 

include one or more of the base evaluation factors in 

CPARS (Quality, Schedule, Cost Control, etc.) then 
— 9 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

recreating the narrative a year later is either impossible 

or not reliable. This may be one very important reason 

why many past performance reports contain ratings 

without a narrative. 

The Army can become a leader of reliable and 

consistent past performance assessments if strict 

compliance to standardized inspection criteria are to 

be followed for every inspection to include supplies 

and services. The standardized inspection criteria is 

the basic CPARS evaluation rating factors – Quality, 

Schedule, Cost Control, Business Relations, Management and Small Business. In addition to requiring 

strict compliance, all inspections should require a 

narrative when the rating is found to be other than 

“Satisfactory.” If a narrative is not provided, the rating should be rejected. When the Army adopts this 

philosophy, all Army past performance evaluations 

will become relative and meaningful to facilitate 

CPARS primary objective – to provide consistent, 

standardized contractor performance assessments 

used as an aid in awarding contracts to contractors 

who consistently provide quality, on-time products 

and services that adhere to contractual requirements. 

One step further –create a standard software program that can be loaded onto tablets and given to 

the COR’s to help them conduct their inspections. 

The software program will assist in the standardization of all Army COR inspection criteria as the basic 

criteria will not be allowed to be altered. Additionally, 

the software program would demand a narrative to 

follow any rating above or below “Satisfactory.” This 

software program will ensure that contractor past 

performance assessments are standardized and fully 

support the rating that is assigned. The narrative can 

be entered at the time of the inspection using the 

tablets keyboard. The software program can be written 

to utilize quantifiable and simple metrics to avoid 

subjective judgments and introduce consistency Army 

wide. 

There are many more reasons and benefits that can be 

realized by introducing a Standardized Software Program and Inspection Tablet to the Army’s acquisition 

community, such as:

The ability to schedule random inspections a month 

or more in advance. These random inspections can 

then be approved by the COR’s supervisor and/

or Contracting Officer. The COR’s Supervisor 

will have real-time access to the COR’s inspection 

schedules via their desktop. 

The tablet can help keep the COR on track when 

multiple inspections are scheduled, or when the COR 

is responsible for multiple contractors. Due to the 

tablet being a mobile device, the COR will have the 

ability to take it with them on TDY assignment or to 

document unprecedented contractor performance. 

The tablet is capable of taking pictures. Pictures can 

be worth a thousand words when trying to describe 

a contractor’s performance when it either exceeded 

or did not meet contract requirements. Eventually, it 

may be possible to upload pictures into CPARS to assist the narratives in supporting performance ratings. 

Pictures may also assist other agencies in making determinations of contractor capabilities or limitations.

The inspection results only need to be input into the 

tablet once. The software program can be used to run 

monthly or yearly reports. These reports can save time 

when used to input the narratives into the CPARS. 

The COR can provide the inspection results immediately to the contractor. The tablet is also capable 

of accepting contractor signatures showing that the 

contractor has been briefed, and whether questions 

or comments were made. Disagreements with the 

contractor over the performance assessment can be 

quickly and immediately resolved. 

Subjective or biased performance ratings can be 

eliminated as the software program can be used 

to determine the performance rating based on a 

mathematical model. For example, a mathematical 

model can be used to evaluate each factor (Quality, 

Schedule, Cost Control, etc) based upon their corresponding ratings (Excellent, Very Good, Satisfactory, 

Marginal or Unsatisfactory). The ratings are then 

compared to the total number of inspections conducted over the past year. The mathematical model 

will provide the COR with a recommended rating; 

such as Quality = Excellent, Schedule = Satisfactory, 

etc. and the corresponding narratives to ease the burden of submitting the yearly performance assessment 

into CPARS. Using a mathematical model to recommend ratings removes the subjective and/or biased 

personal opinion factor that can hinder perceptions 

and affect judgment. 
— 10 —

In conclusion, an analysis of the COR’s inspection 

process reveals several challenges facing acquisition 

professionals and the need for reform. Even though 

these challenges are massive, the Army can become 

a leader of reliable and consistent past performance 

assessments by breaking barriers and forming policies 

and procedures that standardize inspection and 

acceptance methods Army wide. 

_____________

References

The Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 

and Budget. (2011) http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/contract_perf/PastPerformanceMemo-21-Jan-2011.pdf

The Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2009).

GAO Report 09-374 at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/

d09374.pdf.

Author Biography

Sherrie R. Moore

PEO STRI, Contracting Center

Orlando, Florida

Mrs. Moore currently serves as a Contract Specialist at 

the PEO STRI Contracting Center in Orlando, Florida. 

Mrs. Moore is assigned to work on the Bradley Gunnery 

Training System.

Mrs. Moore began her career in acquisition as a Contract 

Specialist working at the Anniston Army Depot, Anniston 

Alabama. Transitioning from the Army to the Department 

of Homeland Security, Mrs. Moore became a warranted 

Contracting Officer overseeing several service contracts at the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.

Mrs. Moore earned a Masters of Business Administration 

degree from Saint Ambrose University, Davenport Iowa in 

2000. Mrs. Moore continued her education and received a 

Master’s of Science in Information Technology Management 

in 2003. 

Mrs. Moore is certified as a Level III Acquisition Professional 

through FAI as of 21 April 2011 and certified as a Level III 

Acquisition Professional through DAU as of 26 June 2014. 

Mrs. Moore has over 8 years of contracting experience with 

over 12 years of Federal Service. Mrs. Moore is a member of 

the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps as of 27 June 2014.

Category: Future Operations

WINNER

Managing Stability Operations with 

Program Managers – A New Role for 

Army Acquisition

By LTC Adrian Marsh

September 15, 2014

“There is nothing more difficult to 

take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, 

than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.” 

- Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)

Stability operations have dominated US military interventions in the two major conflicts since September 

11th, 2001 and will likely govern history’s determination 

of success or failure of each campaign. This realization 

led the Department of Defense (DoD) to define stability operations as “a core U.S. military mission, equal 

in importance to combat operations,” and to direct 

the military to prepare to lead their activities (civilian 

security and control, restoring or providing essential 

services, repairing critical infrastructure and providing 

humanitarian assistance) until successfully transitioned 

to a partner agency and/or foreign government.1

As a military planner embedded in US Embassies 

Kabul and Baghdad, I saw first-hand the difficulties 

associated with managing these tasks in an interagency 

environment under an ever-changing array of security, 

policy and host nation variables. The experience also 

demonstrated that program management functions are 

directly applicable to the stability problem set. Sharing 

this observation, the Special Investigator General for 

Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) dedicated an entire report 

entitled “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and 

Project Management,” citing the need for agencies to 

“institutionalize program management systems, procedures, policies and initiatives” learned through the Iraq 

reconstruction experience.

Despite a growing body of work by SIGIR, its Afghanistan counterpart SIGAR and others citing the 
— 11 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

importance of program management in stability operations, there is little to no discussion on which element 

within the DoD, and more specifically in the US Army, 

should be used to enable a comprehensive program management approach to organize and execute these efforts.

Within the US Army, the Corps of Engineers and 

Civil Affairs branches both play vital roles in a stability 

environment. Engineers manage construction projects 

and do so in a programmatic fashion, leveraging project 

management tools and functions. Civil Affairs provides 

cultural and civil sector (finance, health, city planning, 

etc) expertise while also managing projects to bolster 

the local economy, legitimize government and improve 

the quality of life. However, no branch holds as a core 

competency, the application of program management 

processes to assist in the coordination and management 

of cross functional and interagency programs.

The US Army Acquisition Corps is the best suited, given its core competencies, to augment the current commonly deployed mix of forces to provide the needed 

expertise to bear on this complex problem-set. Although 

a formidable task, program management capacity must 

be part of the deployed force structure to truly achieve 

the DoD’s vision of “integrated civilian and military 

efforts” for stability operations.3

A Program View of Stability Operations:

Achieving systemic progress in a stability environment has many parallels with those found in developing and acquiring military systems; both are multiyear endeavors, requiring sustained and monitored 

progress to achieve desired effects. Additionally, 

both leverage the private sector workforce through 

the use of congressionally appropriated funds while 

being responsive to the oversight scrutiny that comes 

with their usage. The similarities are so great that 

major components of stability operations are often 

referred to as a “program” (i.e. rule of law, police 

development, and economic programs) and rightly so 

considering programs are defined as “a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to obtain 

benefits not available from managing them individually.”4 Gaining the collective benefit of infrastructure 

and capacity building programs, managed across 

interagency actors, is needed to realize the Army 

doctrinal vision of achieving a “whole-of-government 

approach” in a stability operation.5

Despite often being described as a “program,” stability 

operations are seldom managed as such or holistically across interagency lines. SIGIR found “in Iraq, 

capacity- development programs were not adequately integrated” and summarized the management as 

“a succession of diverse, largely improvised entities 

[which] ultimately managed more than $60 billion in 

US appropriations and billions more in Iraqi funds to 

execute more than 90,000 contract actions.”6

Why Acquisition Program Managers?

Acquisition program managers possess both an array 

of managerial tools and a unique understanding of governmental processes that make them well suited to assist 

in stability efforts. Program schedules, trade studies, an 

understanding of congressional appropriations, and government contracting are all necessary in both materiel 

acquisition programs as well as in stability operations.

The tools used by the Army’s program managers are 

universally accepted in the private sector as well as 

among interagency development partners. Program 

schedules, arguably one of the most valuable, establish 

task links allowing the time-phasing of events. They 

enable common program visualization which is particularly important when coordinating parallel or mutually 

supportive efforts. SIGIR concluded that “most reconstruction projects depend on other projects and must be 

properly sequenced” citing numerous cases where programs failed due to de-synchronization.7 This typically 

occurs at the intersection of infrastructure and capacity 

building projects (i.e. when a network of medical clinics 

are built without the requisite training program to adequately staff them) or on the macro level when major 

programs capacity effects are poorly coordinated (i.e. a 

ministerial finance program that fails to account for the 

funding of security sector salaries).

Integrated stability program schedules can be used to 

manage across functional and interagency boundaries 

to accurately capture key interdependencies. Schedules 

coupled with other acquisition functions, such as cost 

benefit analysis, enable informed and timely decision 

making, both vital considering “stability missions...face 

narrow windows of opportunity to produce results.”8

Acquisition professionals understand these functions 

and can adapt them to enable a shared program visualization allowing for informed prioritization of resources 

among interagency partners.
— 12 —

Acquisition program managers are also expert in the 

justification and application of appropriated funds, 

and can apply this expertise when developing comprehensive management plans with partner agencies. 

Understanding congressional appropriations, agency 

funding authorities and the budget submission process 

is necessary to truly achieve a “whole-of-government” 

approach to stability programs. The funding process is 

so important that General Petraeus referred to money 

as “my most important ammunition.”9 Understanding how various appropriated funds can be leveraged 

creates interagency program options which directly 

translate to operational impacts in a stability effort.

Finally, to execute capacity building programs, most of 

which are executed by private sector partners, requires 

a thorough understanding of contracting. Developing 

well thought out contract strategies is especially necessary when synchronizing military and interagency 

efforts to achieve a mutually desired effect. Acquisition 

program managers understand these functions and 

their involvement would greatly increase the likelihood of successful interagency cooperation in these 

mutual endeavors.

Speaking Without Translation

Clearly, management of stability operations requires 

the coordinated application of all instruments of USG 

national power to be effective.10 Unfortunately, SIGIR 

found in Iraq that “the lead agencies – DoD, State and 

the US Agency International Development (USAID) 

– sometimes coordinated but rarely integrated their 

operations: “stovepiping” is the apt descriptor.”11 One 

way to improve integration moving forward is to build 

on key commonalities found among these diverse 

agencies in a stability program.

Sister agencies approach stability operations in the 

same way acquisition program managers acquire 

systems—they leverage the private sector. Interagency 

partners rely on contractor expertise as the execution 

wing of their program initiatives, and are subject to 

the same Federal Regulations and oversight found in 

major acquisition programs. Given the similar work 

requirements, an Army program manager can easily 

work collaboratively with USAID and Department 

of State program managers on scheduling, funding, 

contracting and program considerations.

Short of the passage of a new “Goldwater-Nichols” 

mandating interagency cooperation, a shared functional program understanding can serve as a cooperative foundation between DoD and Interagency 

planners. Army acquisition program managers have 

the added benefit of understanding the operational 

planning language as well, enabling them to serve as 

a bridge between the military’s operational command 

and the interagency program management wings of 

reconstruction.

“A lesson is not truly learned until it

is incorporated.”

—SIGIR final report

Integrated program management, across interagency 

and functional lines, is a vitally important component 

to gaining “unity of effort” in a stability operation. 

The Army’s Acquisition Corps, by nature of its core 

competencies, has the requisite skills needed to enable 

more effective management of future operations. 

The branch should formally embrace the function 

and add stability program management as a skill 

identifier, institutionalize a training program, establish 

doctrine and prepare to deploy program managers 

to supplement military and interagency staffs 

addressing our US stability efforts around the globe. 

This initiative would further build on the significant 

wartime contributions of the Acquisition Corps, add 

a much needed component to achieving a “whole 

of government” approach to DoD stability efforts 

and create a more diverse and strategically relevant 

program management workforce for our Army.

_____________

Endnotes

1 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI), Number 3000.05, Stability Operations, (September 2009), 2

2 Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Iraq Reconstruction: Project and Program Management, (March, 2007), 17

3 DoD, 2

4 The Project Management Institute (PMI), The Standard for Program 

Management-Third Edition, (January 2013), 1.2

5 Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3.07 Stability, (August, 2012), 3

6 SIGIR, Learning From Iraq (March 2013) ,37

7 SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Project and Program Management , 77

8 SIGIR Applying Iraq’s Hard Lessons to the Reform of Stabilization and 

Reconstruction Operations (February2010), 3

9 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Money as a Weapons System 

Handbook (April 2009), 1

10 ADP 3.07, 3

11 SIGIR Learning from Iraq, 37
— 13 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

HONORABLE MENTION

Enduring Rapid Capabilities

By Patrick McKinney

To counter emerging asymmetric enemy threats in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, the U.S. Congress 

and Department of Defense 

(DoD) created multiple rapid 

acquisition entities (such as 

the Joint Improvised Explosive 

Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the Rapid 

Equipping Force (REF), and the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force) with 

flexible funding authorities and requirements processes to deliver solutions at the speed of war. JIEDDO 

spent tens of billions of dollars to deliver materiel and 

non-materiel solutions to defeat the improvised explosive device (IED), attack the IED network, 

and train American forces to operate in an IED 

environment. After solutions were developed and 

fielded, they transferred from JIEDDO to the armed 

services for management and funding, and the majority will not continue as enduring service programs 

of record (PoR) post conflict. Not all these wartime 

capabilities should endure, but with the current fiscal 

realities within the DoD and the lessons learned in 

combat, all partners should strive for more rapid 

capabilities to endure and become investments, not 

just purchases. 

JIEDDO was established in 2006 to lead the U.S. 

response to IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it used 

its flexible and abundant funding to develop and field 

materiel and non-materiel solutions, helped establish 

counter IED (C-IED) training, and helped focus 

the research and development community against 

the IED challenge. JIEDDO and the other rapid 

acquisition entities respond to Urgent Operational 

Needs (UONs) and Joint Urgent Operational Needs 

(JUONs) to support Warfighters in active conflict. 

The DoD requires delivery of a JUON’s solution within two years, and then once fielded and proven, a partner service makes a disposition decision (terminate, 

continue for the combat contingency, or transition to 

a PoR). Because of their rapidity, JUONs do not feet 

neatly into the traditional DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process that 

funds efforts years in advance. The Program Objectives 

Memorandum (POM) plans for capabilities at three 

to six years out, and rapid capabilities fall outside this 

“POM cycle.”

The three “traditional” JCIDS requirements documents are the Initial Capability Document (ICD), 

the Capability Development Document (CDD), 

and the Capability Production Document (CPD). 

The Operational Need Statement (ONS), UON, 

JUON and Joint Emergent Operational Need 

(JEON) enable the DoD to acquire urgent and rapid 

solutions for current and predicted contingencies, 

but they suffer from the challenges of misalignment 

with PPBE. Rapid entities have developed their 

own requirements (i.e.: the REF “10-Liner” and the 

JIEDDO Director’s requirement) but these exist outside JCIDS and operational needs. JIEDDO should 

retain its flexible and timely requirements process, 

but should also start producing CDD’s and CPD’s 

for those significant capabilities that its leaders advocate to endure. 

The JCIDS Manual, 19 JAN 2012, states that UON, 

JUON or JEON solutions do not require an ICD, 

CDD, or CPD, but that these documents may 

be required to enable sustainment and/or further 

development to enable “enduring use.” Enclosure 

13 of the Interim DoD Instruction 5000.02, 26 

November 2013, “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System,” provides guidance and a framework to 

manage rapid capabilities, and requires that a DoD 

Component conduct an assessment of a capability 

no later than one year after it enters the Operations 

and Support phase (or earlier if directed) to enable a 

disposition decision. If the PoR route is chosen, the 

Component must then determine what requirements 

documents are necessary to support the transition. 

DoD Directive 5000.71, Rapid Fulfillment of 

Combatant Commander Urgent Operational Needs, 

24 August 2012, established the Senior Warfighter 

Integration Group (SIG) and directs the JIEDDO 

Director to provide guidance for the transition of 

C-IED capabilities into the traditional budget, 
— 14 —

requirements, and acquisition process, and though 

JIEDDO offers recommendations, the services are 

the ultimate arbiter of which programs they will 

continue or transition. 

Rapid capabilities often lack a “service requirement,” 

or they support, supplement, or compete with established PoR’s. Investments, infrastructure, bureaucracy, and entrenched interests can resist modifying or 

replacing a PoR and many rapid capabilities will not 

endure past the end of the Afghan conflict. For the 

sums paid, and the Warfighters saved, the DoD must 

address this disconnect. 

To manage the disposition process, the Army created 

the Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition 

(CDRT). Through the CDRT, the Army identifies 

“proven” rapid capabilities that are nominated for 

evaluation and an ultimate disposition decision. If a 

capability is selected as an Acquisition Program Candidate, it enters into the DoD 5000.02 acquisition 

system, competes for the POM, the Army enables 

a Full Materiel Release (FMR), and then the Army 

starts the combat development of a CDD or CPD. 

To support the Army’s CDRT process, reduce the 

follow on schedule for accepted PoR’s, and ease the 

other services’ disposition decisions, JIEDDO should 

expand its combat developer function and produce 

CDD’s and CPD’s. The JCIDS Manual recommends 

these documents to support the disposition decision, 

and if JIEDDO produced these documents earlier in 

the lifecycle, the partner services could accept these 

documents, leverage them to create service specific 

documents, or at a minimum, allow a more informed 

disposition vetting. Leaders must often make decisions with the information they have, and JIEDDO 

could provide better information to the services 

through developed requirements documents. 

The urgency and need to protect lives and limbs 

prompted the DoD to often focus on speed versus 

costs, but significant challenges for enduring capabilities are their life cycle costs, their affordability, 

and how they fit into the PPBE process. The JCIDS 

requirements documents can help make the case and 

requirement for these capabilities, but they must 

still compete in a declining budget environment. 

JIEDDO should start affordability analyses earlier 

in the lifecycle, and do a more thorough job of life 

cycle cost analysis. The current focus on one to two 

years supports combat operations, but the Congress, services, and DoD need better information to 

allow them to plan the future year defense program 

(FYDP).

DoDI 5000.02 encourages Milestone Decision Authorities (MDA’s) and Program Managers (PM’s) to 

use creative and risk managed approaches to acquisition, including more efficient or combined test and 

evaluation, but the testing requirements for a rapid 

capability often differ from those needed for a FMR 

or Milestone C Production decision. The urgent tests 

focus on safety and performance, and often do not 

determine reliability, availability, or maintainability 

(RAM), other life cycle cost drivers, the full range of 

performance and environmental factors. 

JIEDDO should work with the services to develop 

test and evaluation strategies that address both the 

rapid and enduring test requirements in a logical 

sequence. Once a system is tested for performance 

and safety, and then fielded, the test community can 

conduct RAM or other necessary tests to help inform 

the disposition decision, or a FMR decision. MDA’s, 

PM’s, and the services should be willing to accept 

a balanced test strategy that meets both urgent and 

enduring requirements. 

Before his departure, the former Deputy Secretary 

of Defense, Dr. Ashton Carter advocated for the 

continuation of JIEDDO and other rapid acquisition 

entities to ensure the experiences and lessons learned 

since 2001 are not forgotten or ignored. The current 

gap between rapid and enduring capabilities discourages smart investments, wastes people, time, and 

resources, creates significant opportunity costs, allows duplication of efforts, focuses on one combatant 

command versus the global DoD needs, and relies on 

wartime funding which may not endure. Producing 

JCIDS requirements documents earlier, conducting 

affordability and cost analyses earlier, and better 

synching immediate and enduring testing requirements will help ensure that more rapid capabilities 

endure to support the future Warfighter, and make 

better use limited DoD personnel, dollars, and time.
— 15 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

_____________

Patrick McKinney is a Program Integrator at the Joint IED 

Defeat Organization (JIEDDO). He is an Army Acquisition Corps member and is DAWIA Program Management 

Level 3 certified. He served an Army officer and deployed 

as a platoon leader to conduct convoy security in support of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom IV. He received a BA in Political 

Science from the College of the Holy Cross, a certificate in 

Business Management Principles from Northern Virginia 

Community College, and a MBA from George Mason University. The opinions in this piece are his own, and do not 

necessarily reflect those of JIEDDO, the United States Army, 

or the Department of Defense.

Category: Innovation

WINNER

Innovation in Army Acquisition

By Ernest B. Keen

Concept Design & Assessment 

Tech Area

Aviation & Missile Research, 

Development and Engineering 

Center

Aviation Development 

Directorate

As a member of the Concept Design & Assessment 

Tech Area within the Aviation Development Directorate, I am fortunate to contribute to shaping new 

innovations into actionable investments in future 

capability. I have also seen many new efforts be born, 

burn brightly, and then wither in the heat of acquisition strategies built more to survive Congress than 

make an impact on the battlefield. As a relatively 

young engineer, it is a sad likelihood that I will only 

get to see one successful major acquisition program 

in my career. Furthermore, that program will face 

budgetary “death” many times before ever supporting 

the warfighter. Aside from the first order effect of 

failing our customer, the current atmosphere promotes 

atrophy of technical skillsets and risk aversion due to 

lack of opportunities for insertion of tech innovations.

Granted that the current budgetary environment 

contributes to this growing issue, much has been 

recently made of the effect of “Joint” defense programs 

on slowing acquisition. (Reference: Lorell, Mark A., 

Kennedy, Michael, et al., Do Joint Fighter Programs 

Save Money?, RAND Corporation, 2013, Distribution Statement A – Public Release) However, it can 

be argued that this is a symptom rather than a root 

cause. Such programs may be orders of magnitude 

more complex than a single-service program, being 

executed by a workforce (and by extension an Industrial base) equipped more with process than experience. This is surely a recipe for long platform development time which is a prime indicator of platform 

acquisition cost. It is a fallacy that a good process will 

always produce a good product. Process inherently 

normalizes and sanitizes the product, trading risk for 

cost, schedule, or performance. Thus, while innovation is greatly desired in our acquisition process, we 

have not created an environment that cultivates it, 

nor long tolerates its presence without quick dividends. The following paragraphs discuss several ways 

this might begin to be addressed.

The first paradigm shift is to accept failure as an 

option. This seems a counter-intuitive statement 

against the backdrop of failed acquisition programs. 

However, it is meant to illustrate the point that cultivating technical innovation requires deliberate outlets in which risk tolerance is elevated and transfer of 

technical learning is paramount. Defense acquisition, 

and in particular rotary-wing acquisition, serves as 

the pace-setter for vital portions of the U.S. industrial base. Leveraging commercial S&T investments 

will not be sufficient to realize future defense needs. 

As such, the risk aversion implicit in current acquisition strategies is for all practical purposes mandated to prime contractors, whose next missed major 

acquisition program could easily be their last. 

There is a familiar saying “Good decisions are a 

result of experience, and experience is a result of bad 

decisions.” This is not meant to convey a cavalier 

approach to the possible consequences of failure, but 

rather that there is enormous value in failure provided 

we are prepared to learn from it. There are currently 

some avenues within the Government for exercising 
— 16 —

advanced technology development and implementation. For example, DARPA/IARPA programs deliberately search out such cutting edge problems. However, there is no infrastructure there to transition 

learning in those programs to lasting Government 

skillsets. The value of learning from previous efforts 

should be acutely noted by the Army acquisition 

community. Programs such as Comanche, Future 

Combat System (FCS), and Joint Heavy Lift offer 

many lessons that are relevant for current acquisition 

programs. There are costs associated with innovation 

failure, but they must be balanced against the very 

real cost of failing to innovate. 

The second paradigm shift is to invest heavily in 

system modeling and simulation and the workforce 

to wield those tools for maximum effect. This area 

has rightfully been the subject of Army Research & 

Development Engineering Centers (RDECs) for some 

time. This investment should continue to grow and 

be recognized for its fundamental role in promoting 

innovation. How is the Army to see technical innovation in practice if our modeling and simulation cannot 

see it in theory? We must diligently and systematically 

invest in tools that allow us to see the breadth and 

depth of systems we are seeking to influence with new 

technologies. This is key because “many of the risks 

associated with an innovation stem not from the innovation itself but from the infrastructure into which 

it is introduced.” (Reference: Merton, Robert C., 

“Innovation Risk: How to Make Smarter Decisions,” 

Harvard Business Review, April 2013)

This highlights one issue with the recent assertions 

that “Joint” programs lack value. A system may be optimized against any set of constraints, but the domain 

of those constraints is limited to what we can understand and model. Thus, the aperture through which 

we view the problem limits the degree to which it can 

ever be truly “optimal.” We must allow ourselves to 

examine how a new system can fundamentally change 

the way we operate, the way we train, and the way we 

provide support. Our aperture must be wide enough 

to bring these considerations into the design domain, 

and this requires modeling and simulation capabilities 

that are not currently integrated, or in some cases, do 

not currently exist. 

The final paradigm shift is to structure management 

for innovation. Recent articles by Forbes magazine 

have discussed the differences in management paradigms when a company truly adopts a customer-centric approach. In some older paradigms the larger 

needs of the customer may be diluted in favor of 

finding the most efficient process to provide a final 

product. “In the new paradigm, the role of managers 

is to enable self-organizing teams that are tightly focused on delighting the customer. Work is coordinated 

through dynamic linking with short iterative cycles 

and feedback from customers at the end of each cycle.” (Reference: Denning, Steve, “Do We Need Evolutionary or Revolutionary Change in Management?”, 

Forbes Magazine, November 2012) This paradigm 

cultivates revolutionary products from a more engaged 

workforce. Corresponding to the ideas presented 

above, management should provide dedicated avenues 

for innovation. They may initially be small, self-contained efforts that simply feed the existing acquisition 

process. However, application of this approach in 

large commercial enterprises has shown that improved 

return-on-investment and customer satisfaction will 

eventually dictate their widespread adoption.

In summary, the current pace of defense acquisition 

produces several self-reinforcing problems such as 

atrophy of Government technical skillsets and risk 

aversion. The growing complexity of defense systems 

and increasingly competitive budgetary environment 

indicate the problem will continue to worsen. Additional process rigor and oversight are not solutions. 

Means should be sought for inserting new technologies via short iterative cycles focused on technical 

learning with elevated risk tolerance. A technically 

sound, engaged Government workforce is needed to 

maintain U.S. Army dominance on the battlefield.

_____________

Biographical Statement - Ernest B. Keen

E-mail: ernest.b.keen.civ@mail.mil

Phone: (757) 864-6272

Ernest has 10 years of experience working in defense aviation, both as a civil servant and a contractor. He began his 

career with the Advanced Airborne Systems Design group 

at NAWCAD, Patuxent River supporting Joint acquisition 
— 17 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

activities and design tool development. After moving to 

the Hampton Roads area of Virginia, he joined AVID, 

LLC supporting UAS design for the Future Combat System 

and leading SBIRs for MDA, NASA, and the Army. He 

has worked with the Army’s Concept Design & Assessment 

Tech Area for the past 3 years supporting Future Vertical 

Lift, the Joint Multi-Role Tech Demonstrator, and mass 

properties tool development for conceptual design. He has 

a Master’s Degree in Aerospace Engineering from Virginia 

Tech. He is Level III certified in Engineering.

HONORABLE MENTION (TIE)

Look for Clarity in Regulations

(Facilitating the Project Manager’s 

Correct Interpretation of Regulations for 

Measuring and Achieving Compliance)

By David Byron Cook

Areas of Emphasis: Interagency. (Addressing solutions for 

navigating the current environment; Discussing the ‘Way 

Ahead’ from an acquisition 

perspective).

15 September 2014

Biographical Sketch: David B. Cook is an Industrial Engineer in the Program Evaluation Division of the Lower Tier 

Project Office (LTPO); Program Executive Office-Missiles 

and Space, located on Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL. 

Mr. Cook’s primary background is that of working in Program Management directorates of the Army Project Office, beginning in 1987 with the Javelin Project Office, the Common 

Missile Project Office, and currently, the LTPO. Prior to these 

assignments, he began his Industrial Engineering career in 

1983 with the Quantitative Analysis Branch of the Production & Procurement Directorate under the authority of what 

was then the Army Missile Command at Redstone Arsenal.

The opinions expressed herein are my own, and are not to be 

considered an expression, official view or endorsement by the 

Department to the Army.

_____________

I. Introduction.

Given the premise that Army Acquisition is operating within a new environment, the Program Executive Officer (PEO), and the Project Manager (PM) 

as the materiel developer, must still navigate within 

the regulatory and statutory framework that guides 

and directs management activities of materiel solution 

analysis, development, production, fielding, sustainment, and disposal of weapon systems. Within the 

ever increasing amount of information directed to 

the PM level, the goal and mindset of regulation 

writers should be to use language that conveys a clear 

understanding for Project Office personnel charged 

with implementation, and therefore, one which best 

facilitates the mutually desired outcome of all parties 

to meet the Warfighters’ requirements. Achieving 

this goal will require some level of innovation on the 

part of the Army regulation writing community and 

allowance for application of a more critical thinking 

process from requirements’ definition through to 

accurate translation by Project Office personnel into 

an implemented and verified action.

II. Statement of Issue.

Regulations (and statutes) tend to exemplify a strong 

propensity toward an institutionalized talking-down 

approach, rather than talking-through the process 

from the PM’s perspective, without consideration as to 

how those charged with implementing guidance will 

translate and interpret a requirement. Regulations and 

policy memorandums should be void of statements 

that carry either no meaning, are confusing, have 

conflicting guidance, include terms/initiatives which 

have been superseded, and/or cannot be defined with 

respect to the PM’s ability to measure, track, prove, 

demonstrate, and/or be held accountable for compliance, except on an equivalently vague basis. If there 

is not a complete understanding of the regulatory requirement, then the burden is placed upon the reader 

to provide an exact interpretation. Acquiring accountability from the PM is a difficult task if no meaningful 

metric can be defined from which compliance could 

be measured.

III. Discussion of Deficiencies.

The above premise—exact translation of regulatory 

specified direction and clarity of language to enable 

demonstration of compliance—is supported by more 
— 18 —

than just anecdotal evidence. While the clarity of 

Army regulatory language has significantly improved 

in recent years, certain associated deficiencies currently 

exist in the AR 70-1, “Army Acquisition Policy,” dated 

22 July 2011. Among those are, “throw-away” statements which contain a number of easily correctable 

logic failures and which the writer(s) substituted in 

place of sufficient and relevant detail.

A. These “Throw-away” Statements Include:

• Use of vague language and direction. That is, 

“,...the approach is intended to cause the developers, 

from the outset, to consider all elements of the 

product life cycle,...”? [What groups represent the 

“developers”? What does “cause” and “consider” 

mean in terms of a definitive action to be taken by 

whoever the developers are?]

• Use of phantom enforcement of “guidelines” 

which are essentially unverifiable (with 

repetitive direction wandering around 

the subject and in only a three-sentence 

paragraph). That is, “The MDAs must rigorously 

address core issues”,...,“and there are certain 

core management issues that must be formally 

addressed, ... .” The core management issues 

that MDAs must address are the following:, ... 

.” [There’s no question as to the relevance and 

importance of the core management issues 

listed in the AR 70-1, but there is also no 

vehicle which provides a definitive statement as 

to method of “addressing”, or really, validating 

those issues other than as may be implied by 

the acquisition strategy (since the method of 

addressing cannot conflict with current approved 

format, or appropriate length, for an acquisition 

strategy) or through a number of other program 

documents required for milestone decisions.]

• The (nearly) ubiquitous, “Obey All Rules!”

That is, in reference to PM’s responsibilities, 

“Evaluate assigned programs for compliance with 

statutory and Army regulatory acquisition requirements.” [Whom does this direction serve? Or 

what purpose can it serve? It is as if the intention 

were one of expecting the PEO/PM to be able 

to provide, whenever demanded, an immediate 

credible response that proves instantaneous and 

comprehensive verification of compliance with 

all directed procedures for any program? And the 

phrase, “evaluate for compliance”, is not sufficiently meaningful. Just following the entirety 

of guidelines specified within the AR 70-1 is a 

monumental task, in addition to this AR’s referenced ‘Required and Related’ publications which 

include applicable statutes, regulations, policies, 

procedures, and standards consistent with the 

management of acquisition programs.]

• The well-kept secret. The phrase, “and so 

forth”, is referenced four times in the current 

AR 70-1. [There are acceptable instances where 

producing an exhaustive list per subject is 

limited by a document’s purpose and cannot be 

stated; however, when identifying a particular 

requirement to be executed by the PEO/PM 

where the exact procedure is not known, then 

the colloquial reference should be omitted. The 

use of “etc.” is not recommended for the same 

reason. Why obfuscate the direction when a 

more direct statement could be provided?]

B. Other Logic Deficiencies:

Additionally, a number of outright assumptions are 

stated, as if doing so makes those factual and that 

an equivalent automatic outcome will result. Typically included are a lot of words with no discernible 

execution path coupled with the use of embedded 

truisms. The definition of ‘Evolutionary Acquisition’, 

using undefined terms and colloquial language, is 

notable among these and translating a meaning 

requires a certain degree of clairvoyance, as particularly evident in the last two sentences below. That 

is, “Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred approach 

to satisfying capability requirements. The objective is 

to balance the requirements and available capability with resources and technologies to put operational 

capabilities into the hands of the user quickly. To this 

end, PMs will use appropriate enabling tools, including a modular open systems approach, to ensure access 

to the latest technologies and products. The right tools 

will ensure affordable and supportable modernization 

of fielded assets.” “Right tools?” One may question 

whether or not the writer(s) could explain the overall 

intent of these statements and the respective process 
— 19 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

by which, ‘access to technologies and products yields 

a capability of ensuring affordable and supportable 

modernization efforts’? If the conclusion is “no”, 

then perhaps the evolutionary acquisition definition 

needs a revision appropriate to its respective critical 

nature and/or with sufficient elaboration such that a 

discernible and executable direction could be defined 

and implemented. Simplicity is not the essence of 

these two statements specifically referenced or the 

definition.

Certain other issues tend to be pervasive which include: (a) An expression of many responsibilities and 

duties without adequate cross-walking, and a general 

lack of efficient organization (not necessarily limited to the AR 70-1); (b) Incessant use of colloquial 

language interspersed with personal pronouns used 

to describe objects (events, processes, documents, 

and similar items). The issue is not just that a less 

than appropriate method of expression is used, but 

that the practice hinders or eliminates the possibility 

of making a more relevant, accurate, and concise 

statement, or argument; and (c) Use of outdated 

terminology or procedures which are presented in 

the context as being current but are in conflict with 

previous publications. Additionally, a regulation that 

is being updated should be globally checked to verify 

that all references to any outdated terminology/procedures have been removed.

IV. Addressing Solutions for Change.

It is certain that regulations of a particular quality 

do not (necessarily) inhibit the expertise, capability, 

and/or resourcefulness of competent PEO/PM personnel—those regulations simply provide an authoritative methodology/guideline for the capable professional to execute per an intended objective. The 

suggestion is offered that the Army should allow the 

PEO/PM more than a cursory involvement whenever the opportunity to review proposed updates to 

Army Acquisition regulations is anticipated. That 

timeline should be known well in advance so that 

the reviewers could be of more relevant assistance 

in providing suggestions as to accuracy, intent, and 

direction. Compliance with regulations, such as the 

AR 70-1, requires considerable effort on the part of 

PEO/PM to effectively manage programs; therefore, 

shouldn’t the Army regulation writing community 

seek to facilitate that objective by carefully reviewing 

entirety of document for accurate intent and clarity?

The opinions expressed herein are my own, and are 

not to be considered an expression, official view or 

endorsement by the Department to the Army.

HONORABLE MENTION (TIE)

Software Capabilities – A Modular 

Approach

By Herbert Cottrell Jr.

The Army’s Common Operating Environment (COE) initiative introduced an approved set 

of computing technologies and 

standards that enable secure 

and interoperable applications 

to be rapidly developed and 

executed across a variety of Computing Environments 

(Command Post, Mounted, etc). The COE, coupled 

with the evolution in acquisition program requirements, is changing the way the Army develops and 

fields capabilities.

As programs adjust, the ‘materiel solutions’ developed 

to meet new Capability Development Document/

Capability Production Document (CDD/CPD) 

requirements are often software-only solutions. Since 

the hardware solutions for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems are becoming 

increasingly based on commercial items, this leaves the 

true capability at the software level. In effect, software 

is becoming the “new” capability. Another way to view 

this change is that the “agnostic” hardware “conveys” 

the actual capability to the user. This approach leaves 

us with gaps in how we currently document software; 

a resourceful and innovative use of existing processes 

should be implemented to successfully capture these 

capabilities.

Issue 1 - Basis of Issue 

Any Basis of Issue (BOI) for hardware is currently 

supported in the Army logistics system – more specifically, utilizing the Basis of Issue Plan Feeder Data 
— 20 —

(BOIPFD) process and the follow-on actions of Basis 

of Issue Plan (BOIP) and Line Item Number (LIN) 

development. These processes traditionally support 

tangible items of materiel. However, the current 

overall trend is toward generic, or agnostic, hardware capable of hosting different software. The force 

documentation system does not currently accommodate developing and formalizing a BOI for these less 

tangible, software-only capabilities. This situation 

leaves any distribution of software to miscellaneous 

and nebulous methods that are not standardized and 

do not have Army visibility. Requirements that drive 

the de-coupling of hardware and software open up 

possibilities along with concerns. Hardware with more 

power and efficient software solutions lends itself to 

a potential “one to many” relationship; therefore, the 

software needs to be documented in a methodical and 

coordinated method. The overriding questions are – 

where does it go, who gets it and how do we ensure 

Army visibility?

Issue 2 – Authorization and Funding

Authorizations are the way capabilities and requirements are documented on the unit’s Modified Table of 

Organization and Equipment (MTOE), utilizing the 

BOIP and LIN processes. Currently, no such construct is utilized to identify and authorize software-only capabilities. The result is neither Commanders 

nor the Department of the Army (DA) have clear 

visibility of software capabilities that they do with 

hardware. This leaves a potential second order effect of 

not having a “by the book” approach during Changes 

of Command or equipment transfers between units. 

These problems are growing as more capabilities are 

changing to software-only.

Significant unit support costs are associated with software, whether for training or organic support. Unit 

Operations & Maintenance funding to support software-only capabilities is not currently being captured 

or authorized. 

From a program management standpoint, there is 

no method to create program funding tracking using 

Standard Study Numbers (SSN). In some cases, software-only programs are Acquisition Category (ACAT) 

1AM Major Automated Information System (MAIS), 

so not having this ability is counterintuitive to standard practices.

Army procurement and distribution of software 

licenses could also benefit from such standardization 

and visibility. The cost for software licenses across the 

Army is a substantial investment – one that continues 

to grow. Adjustments to the current force documentation process could provide the mechanism to accurately 

track, analyze and compile the license requirements, 

distribution and cost. As an example, support equipment and manpower resources are documented through 

the BOIPFD process. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants 

(POL) consumption and power requirements are calculated through this process to ensure we have adequate 

supply at the requisite echelons. The associated stakeholders and subject matter experts within the Army are 

able to assess, compile and document the requirements 

in the BOIP. Authorizations are a key part of responsibility. Tremendous resources are expended for software, 

so it should be traceable, accountable and officially 

authorized based on approved requirements. 

Issue 3 - Force Documentation

As programs become software-only, the Operator and 

Maintenance man-hours are not being captured in the 

Direct Productive Annual Maintenance Man-hours 

(DPAMMH) (also known as Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC)) section of the BOIPFD, creating assumptions that could lead to a “false positive” 

for Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) reductions. In other words, the number of hours required 

to operate and maintain a system in the field will not 

be cataloged in the requirements documents normally 

associated with systems, and therefore any analysis of 

manpower will be short critical MOSs. 

Hardware dependencies for operations of software-only capabilities are not recorded for Associated 

Support Items of Equipment (ASIOE), which could 

lead to an equipment shortfall.

Training on software intensive systems is complex and 

unique. Failing to document training requirements 

and associated costs could decrease unit readiness.

Systems morphing to software-only may also be divesting hardware, which also needs to be documented.

Modular Approach

Acquisition, in a constrained fiscal environment, 

needs to be more responsive and cost effective, which 

requires agile processes. For a process to be agile, it 
— 21 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

must be flexible, but without losing order. A modular 

approach allows flexibility within current force documentation disciplines. If software and hardware are 

“modular,” current acquisition logistics requirements 

and processes can be more efficient and effective. Since 

LINs are the “building blocks” for Army capabilities, 

separate LINs for both software and generic hardware 

would allow for a modular approach, while the BOIP 

process brings order and discipline. 

The ability to have a modular approach with discipline 

is a win for cost and schedule. Stated another way, if 

software and agnostic hardware have LINs, a building 

block approach to develop a capability via integration 

is possible.

Integration

As the Army moves toward more common cross-program hardware systems, the ability to distribute, authorize and document software-only capabilities could 

be supported by modifications to the current processes. Software should be able to have its own LIN to tie 

the documentation together, solving many of the previously stated issues. A LIN allows for software to be 

treated as a “tangible item,” giving it equal footing as a 

capability. Additionally, a LIN could provide a method to track readiness, enforce Information Assurance 

(IA) and update compliance and potentially track software license distribution. BOIPFD could document 

software to be handled as a tangible item of property 

that is accountable, and it does have the mechanism 

to document software capabilities with minor changes. 

Utilizing an existing, standard Army process retains 

integration with current logistics systems and could 

be a very positive solution leveraging a known process 

that provides discipline, standardization and overall 

integration.

Recommendation

The Basis of Issue Plan (BOIP) process should be 

adapted to manage software capabilities as tangible 

assets. LINs, as the modular constructs for capabilities, allow flexibility in acquisition processes. This 

would require new thinking and basic tools to make 

it happen – and the return on the investment would 

be high. First, the Army should develop a unique software LIN construct that can be created and tracked 

via the standard systems. Then, the software LIN can 

be documented via the BOIP process – an existing 

process that can work for software-only with minor 

modifications.

Bottom line, the issue of how to track and support 

software-only capabilities is growing for the Army. 

Acting now through the modification and use of 

standard processes and systems will be a major step 

forward in seeing these issues mitigated. It will provide 

a platform to support the COE initiative and stage us 

for successful program implementation and follow-on 

support.

_____________

Herbert Cottrell Jr. is a Logistics Management Specialist in the Readiness Management Division Logistics & 

Sustainment Branch of Program Executive Office Command, Control and Communications – Tactical (PEO 

C3T). He holds a B.A. in Computer Information Systems 

from Georgian Court University and an AAS in Business 

Administration from Ocean County College. Cottrell is a 

member of the U.S. Army Acquisition Corps (AAC), Level 

III certified in Life Cycle Logistics, Level II Certified in 

Program Management and is an Army-certified LSS Black 

Belt. He can be reached at herbert.g.cottrell.civ@mail.mil or 

443.395.6850. 

Category: Lessons Learned

WINNER

Maintaining and Developing the

Contingency Contracting Force 

Through Contracting-Driven 

Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 

Missions

By MAJ Garrett J. Bruening, 

USAF

From Packard to Gansler, 

from the Commission on 

Wartime Contracting to the 

investigations concerning Iraq 
— 22 —

and Afghanistan reconstruction, report after report, 

finding after finding, says the same thing: a competent and professional acquisition workforce is vital to 

acquisition excellence. Unfortunately, the entire joint 

force did not achieve excellence in contingency contracting. Instead, we all learned contingency contracting the hard way. And now the longest contingency 

contracting learning experience draws to a close. We’ll 

need those skills again. But absent another conflict, 

how can we maintain those skills? How do we develop 

those skills? And how do we do it inexpensively?

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) missions 

accomplished through the contingency contracting 

force could be a great answer to these questions. HCA 

missions involve military personnel carrying out HCA 

activities in conjunction with military operations. We 

typically think of HCA missions as healthcare providers and engineers practicing their trade in underserved areas outside the United States. Healthcare 

providers treat patients in challenging conditions, like 

they might in a contingency environment. Engineers 

construct basic buildings and facilities, like they might 

at a forward operating base. Could HCA missions 

provide similar training benefits to the contingency 

contracting force? I think the answer is yes. 

Persuasive reasons support using contracting-driven 

HCA missions to develop the contingency contracting force. First, HCA contracting work tracks contingency contracting work well. For example, HCA 

requirements can be small and under the one million 

dollar simplified acquisition threshold for acquisitions 

outside the United States. The Gansler report stated 86 

percent of contingency contracting actions in Afghanistan were under the one million dollar simplified 

acquisition threshold. Thus, contracting-driven HCA 

work would exercise contracting skills similar to those 

the contingency contracting force would use in contingency contracting. Second, HCA contracting work 

involves many of the same marketplace challenges 

the contingency contracting force would experience 

in a contingency environment. Differences in language, culture, communication, currency, economics, 

politics, and more exist both in HCA and contingency 

contracting. Experiencing and resolving these challenges, without the life or death pressures of combat, 

will help the contingency contracting force prepare 

for contingency contracting. Finally, HCA missions 

present a lower risk profile, creating space for the 

contingency contracting force to work through and 

resolve any mistakes made or issues generated. A delay 

awarding a well digging contract or trouble in managing a school construction contract, while unfortunate, 

represent a materially different concern to that of a 

deployed warfighter not getting necessary supplies and 

services. 

Beyond developing the contingency contracting force, 

contracting-driven HCA missions could develop the 

supporting elements of the acquisition team. Contracting-driven HCA missions will need contracting 

officer representatives and other inputs from a requiring activity. These personnel will gain experience in 

assessing needs, generating market research, translating requirements into statements of work or performance work statements, monitoring contractor performance, and much more. Contracting-driven HCA 

missions will also require supporting financial and 

legal elements. Similarly, these elements will, too, gain 

experience relevant to future contingency contracting 

missions. The more these supporting elements of the 

acquisition team experience the contracting-driven 

HCA mission’s situations, challenges, and issues, the 

more prepared they will be to support the contingency 

contracting force. 

Contracting-driven HCA missions could also develop 

the contingency contracting force’s ability to work in 

an interagency and multinational environment. HCA 

missions are closely aligned with combatant commander objectives, the chief of mission for the country 

involved, the United States Agency for International 

Development, the host country, and many more. The 

panoply of players in the contingency environment 

will likely be similar. The relationships made and experiences earned during relatively low-risk and low-visibility contracting-driven HCA missions can lay the 

foundation for future interagency and multinational 

aptitude and teamwork during high-risk and high-visibility contingency contracting missions.

In a constrained budgetary environment, one could 

ask if we should allocate funding toward these contracting-driven HCA missions. After all, why should 

tax dollars be spent building roads in foreign lands 

when they could be spent building roads stateside 

– or even not be spent at all. To this, I would say 
— 23 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

not investing in the contingency contracting force is 

penny-wise and pound-foolish. The Commission on 

Wartime Contracting found “[a]t least $31 billion, 

and possibly as much as $60 billion, has been lost to 

contract waste and fraud in America’s contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.” While people may 

debate what the actual and final figure really is, no one 

can gainsay that many billions were lost. Sprinkling a 

few tens of millions around the globe to create real-life 

training environments for those we will entrust to 

spend many more billions later on is a sound investment by any account. And America would gain a 

prestige bonus to boot.

One may also question if the law defining HCA, 10 

U.S.C. § 401(e), really allows contracting-driven 

HCA. I think the answer is yes. Contracting-driven 

HCA can promote the United States and host countries’ security interests while providing and developing the contingency contracting force’s operational 

readiness skills. Our contingency contracting force 

should train by doing, no different than how pilots fly, 

sailors sail, doctors heal, or engineers build. Combine 

our prior contingency contracting challenges with the 

inherent similarities between the HCA and contingency contracting and I think you have a powerful 

argument for training. If we start small and focus on 

contracting for traditional HCA activities, like basic 

medical care and basic infrastructure, we can build 

confidence in ourselves and others while developing a 

record of compliance. 

State-side experience and Defense Acquisition University courses will only get us so far. Whether learning to 

ride a bike, cleaning an M4, or soliciting and awarding contracts, real experience will always be the best 

teacher. HCA missions represent an excellent “training range” for the contingency contracting force to 

maintain and develop contingency contracting skills. 

Contracting-driven HCA missions can help create 

the competent and professional acquisition workforce 

that achieves acquisition excellence both on and off 

the battlefield. And THAT’S a force multiplier for 

warfighters of today and tomorrow. 

Biographical Sketch: Maj Garrett J. Bruening, Judge 

Advocate, United States Air Force (LL.M., Government Procurement Law, The George Washington 

University Law School (2013); J.D., The University

of South Dakota School of Law (2006); M.B.A., 

The University of South Dakota School of Business 

(2004); B.S.B.A, The University of South Dakota 

School of Business (2003)) is an acquisition attorney 

at the Research and Specialized Contracting Branch, 

Air Force Materiel Command Law Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. At the time of this writing, Maj Bruening served as the Deputy Command 

Judge Advocate for the CENTCOM Joint Theater 

Sustainment Contracting Command. 

HONORABLE MENTION

A Week of Rowing on Ivy Creek and 

Eleven Years of Working in Army

Acquisition

By Ms. Chenxi Dong-O’Malley

On a hot and humid spring 

day in Charlottesville, Virginia, 

I walked down a windy dirt 

pathway from the University 

of Virginia (UVA) boathouse 

toward the Ivy Creek shore 

where two narrow row boats 

were docked. For the first time in my life I was going 

to row against another team in a “regatta” in a team of 

eight people whom I’ve only met four days ago. 

I was at a leadership training course “Leading Teams 

for Growth and Change” at Darden Business School 

at UVA through Competitive Development Group 

Army Acquisition Fellowship in May 2014. The main 

teaming exercise was rowing in teams with students in 

the class. 

On the first day, in the classroom training session, the 

main coach, who is the president of Team Concepts 

Inc., shared with everyone eight secrets of inspirational leadership and explained that rowing is all about 

synchronization of people on the boat to achieve the 

“swing.” Swing is that everyone rowing in the same 

motion with oars in and out of the water at exact same 

moments, in which case a team rows as if it is one 

person rowing with strength of eight. The concept of 

swing sounds easy, however it would usually take years 
— 24 —

of training for a team to acquire the perfect synchronization. How would we row to compete with less than 

one week training with a team consisting of people 

with broad range of heights and weights? The coach 

had asked us a simple question of what we are trying 

to get out of this experience, regardless everyone on 

the team should have that same goal, to win the race, 

to build a high-performance team, or to simply have 

fun. My team had discussed and made a common goal 

that everyone agreed upon for the week. 

Before we got on the water, we practiced on the 

ergometer machine to warm up to simulate rowing 

motion, the coaches watched our rowing pace and 

determined the order of everyone’s placement in the 

boat based on what he observed as everyone’s strengths 

and weaknesses. He had put me in the stern seven, 

which is one of the two leading positions where rowers 

behind me have to follow my pace. I wasn’t the tallest 

or the strongest person on the team. As I was puzzled, 

the coach explained that if he was looking for the right 

rowing pace for the team given everyone’s physical 

condition. Putting the strongest and fastest rower 

in that position would lead a team of inexperienced 

rowers to chaos. It is not about the individual strength 

but the power of the whole team as one at a consistent 

pace everyone would be able to do. 

After the warm up, it was time to get on the water. 

It took no time for us all to realize that everything 

anyone does on the narrow boat affected the entire 

team, a wiggle could throw off the balance of the boat, 

one stroke too fast could cause bad currents to mess 

up other team members’ strokes and possibly lose grip 

of the oar when fighting the bad currents. We had to 

learn to trust our teammates that everyone was capable 

to do their parts. From the moment we stepped into 

the boat and pushed away from the dock, to the training time that half of the team practiced synchronization of rowing while the other half helped to balance 

the boat with oars at the right depth of water, and to 

a simple task of turning the boat around, we needed 

to think of ourselves as an arm or a leg of one person. 

We followed the cadence called by the coxswain or 

the individual in front to ensure the oars were in and 

out of water at the exact same moment. We learned to 

leverage each other’s existing strengths and accommodate and work with each other’s weaknesses and turn 

weaknesses into strengths. Only when all was in place, 

we could become the high performance team achieving the goal we originally set for ourselves. 

As the week went on, both teams grew stronger 

and got more familiar with rowing techniques and 

developed greater level of understanding on individual 

roles of the team. There were really hard times where 

I almost lost my oar to the water when I caught in 

a bad current when another teammate threw off the 

boat balance or rowed out of sync. There were also 

the bright shining moments that the boat felt like a 

feather when we achieved “swing.” Those moments 

reminded me that my team could perform well upon 

training and improving the cohesiveness of the team. 

The bright moments provided me confidence and encouragement not to give up and let down other team 

members. When I finally experienced the “swing” 

moment, it really struck me that in the world of the 

acquisition workforce, or anywhere else where team 

work is required, the easiest, most efficient process for 

anything to get done is when everyone on the team 

has common goals and can function in synchronization with collective capabilities and skills. 

On the race day, which was only the fifth day since the 

first time we all started rowing, both teams performed 

like professional rowers. The boats flew skimming 

the surface of the water. Every single one of us tried 

our absolute best to establish the synchronization and 

togetherness of our teams. Both teams had moments 

when one of the team members got caught in a bad 

current but all quickly recovered to match up the 

teams. My team did not win the race at the end, but 

that did not matter to any of us – because we have 

improved from not knowing how to get in the row 
— 25 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

boat correctly in the beginning to actually rowing as a 

team achieving moments of “swing,” and the common 

goal we set for ourselves was to build a high-performance team and learn through the experiences during 

the week, have fun, and most of all we all learned a 

valuable life lesson we would not have anywhere else. 

Today as I am back to my daily work in the world of 

technology development for our Warfighters, I often 

reflect on my week at Darden and see how I can apply 

the lessons learned and leadership/teambuilding tools 

to my current position to ensure that I can be an 

effective leader to myself and people around me. From 

our Warfighters fighting in combats to an Integrated 

Product Team in the Acquisition workforce, regardless 

how much experience one has or in depth an individual’s knowledge is on a team, there would be no meaning to the leader of the team if team members are not 

committed to the mission/goal and do not want to 

be part of the team, and no meaning to the team if 

everyone works on a different path without synchronization. The eight secrets of inspirational leadership 

to build and lead high performance team shared by 

the main coach at the beginning of the training and I 

would like to share with everyone are

One – everyone wants to be part of something bigger 

than themselves 

Two – everyone wants to feel valued

Three – define the performance objective

Four – ennoble the effort

Five – empower individuals within team synergy

Six – emphasize personal responsibility

Seven – celebrate the journey

Eight – positive engaged energy.

_____________

Ms.Chenxi Dong-O’Malley’s academic background is in 

Chemical Engineering. She has been in acquisition workforce 

since 2003 starting in individual chemical and biological (CB) protection science and technology area at Natick 

Soldier Research, Development and Engineering Center 

(NSRDEC). In 2006, she worked as a systems engineer 

supporting individual CB protective equipment for Product 

Manager - Clothing and Individual Equipment under the 

Program Executive Office for Soldier. She was selected for the 

Competitive Development Group Army Acquisition Fellowship under the Army Acquisition Support Center in 2012 

and has been working in different development assignment 

positions for the past two years. Her current position is at the 

Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research 

and Technology) office to support Soldier Portfolio and work 

as the liaison of NSRDEC to ASA(ALT).