BORDER SECURITY

DHS Could Strengthen 

Efforts to Establish 

Collaborative Mechanisms 

and Assess Use of 

Resources

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland 

Security and Justice

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

GAO-17-495T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-495T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

April 2017

BORDER SECURITY 

DHS Could Strengthen Efforts to Establish 

Collaborative Mechanisms and Assess Use of 

Resources

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection (CBP) have implemented various mechanisms along the southern 

U.S. border to coordinate security operations, but could strengthen coordination 

of Predator B unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations to conduct border 

security efforts. In September 2013, GAO reported that DHS and CBP used 

collaborative mechanisms along the southwest border—including interagency 

Border Enforcement Security Task Forces and Regional Coordinating 

Mechanisms—to coordinate information sharing, target and prioritize resources, 

and leverage assets. GAO interviewed participants from the various mechanisms 

who provided perspective on successful collaboration, such as establishing 

positive working relationships, sharing resources, and sharing information. 

Participants also identified barriers, such as resource constraints, rotation of key 

personnel, and lack of leadership buy-in. GAO recommended that DHS take 

steps to improve its visibility over field collaborative mechanisms. DHS concurred 

and collected data related to the mechanisms’ operations. Further, as GAO 

reported in June 2014, officials involved with mechanisms along the southwest 

border cited limited resource commitments by participating agencies and a lack 

of common objectives. Among other things, GAO recommended that DHS 

establish written interagency agreements with mechanism partners, and DHS 

concurred. Lastly, in February 2017, GAO reported that DHS and CBP had 

established mechanisms to coordinate Predator B UAS operations but could 

better document their coordination procedures. GAO made recommendations for 

DHS and CBP to improve coordination of UAS operations, and DHS concurred.

GAO recently reported that DHS and CBP could strengthen efforts to assess 

their use of resources and programs to secure the southwest border. For 

example, in February 2017, GAO reported that CBP does not record mission 

data consistently across all operational centers for its Predator B UAS, limiting 

CBP’s ability to assess program effectiveness. In addition, CBP has not updated 

its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in its data collection 

system since 2014. Updating guidance consistent with internal control standards 

would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to assess effectiveness. 

In January 2017, GAO found that methodological weaknesses limit the 

usefulness for assessing the effectiveness of CBP’s Border Patrol Consequence 

Delivery System. Specifically, Border Patrol’s methodology for calculating 

recidivism—the percent of aliens apprehended multiple times along the 

southwest border within a fiscal year—does not account for an alien’s 

apprehension history over multiple years. Border Patrol could strengthen the 

methodology for calculating recidivism by using an alien’s apprehension history 

beyond one fiscal year. Finally, CBP has not developed metrics that 

systematically use the data it collects to assess the contributions of its pedestrian 

and vehicle border fencing to its mission. Developing metrics to assess the 

contributions of fencing to border security operations could better position CBP 

to make resource allocation decisions with the best information available to 

inform competing mission priorities and investments. GAO made 

recommendations to DHS and CBP to update guidance, strengthen its recidivism

calculation methodology, and develop metrics, and DHS generally concurred.

View GAO-17-495T. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or GamblerR@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Securing U.S. borders is the 

responsibility of DHS, in collaboration 

with other federal, state, local, and 

tribal entities. Within DHS, CBP is the 

lead agency for border security and is 

responsible for, among other things, 

keeping terrorists and their weapons, 

criminals and their contraband, and 

inadmissible aliens out of the country. 

In recent years, GAO has reported on 

a variety of DHS collaborative 

mechanisms and efforts to assess its 

use of border security resources. 

This statement addresses (1) DHS’s 

efforts to implement collaborative 

mechanisms along the southwest 

border and (2) DHS’s efforts to assess 

its use of resources and programs to 

secure the southwest border. This 

statement is based on GAO reports 

and testimonies issued from 

September 2013 through February 

2017 that examined DHS efforts to 

enhance border security and assess 

the effectiveness of its border security 

operations. GAO’s reports and 

testimonies incorporated information 

GAO obtained by examining DHS 

collaborative mechanisms, reviewing 

CBP policies and procedures for 

coordinating use of assets, analyzing 

DHS data related to enforcement 

programs, and interviewing relevant 

DHS officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO has previously made numerous

recommendations to DHS to improve 

the function of collaborative 

mechanisms and use of resources for 

border security, and DHS has 

generally agreed. DHS has taken 

actions or described planned actions to 

address the recommendations, which 

GAO will continue to monitor.
Letter

Page 1 GAO-17-495T 

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Homeland 

Security’s (DHS) efforts to coordinate and assess its border security 

operations. Securing U.S. borders is the responsibility of DHS, in 

collaboration with other federal, state, local, and tribal entities. Within 

DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the lead agency for 

border security and is responsible for, among other things, keeping 

terrorists and their weapons, criminals and their contraband, and 

inadmissible aliens out of the country.1 The United States international 

border with Mexico (southwest border) continues to be vulnerable to 

illegal cross-border, and DHS reported apprehending over 331,000 illegal 

entrants and making over 14,000 seizures of drugs in fiscal year 2015.

Over time, DHS and CBP have established various collaborative 

mechanisms along the southern U.S. border, including the southwest 

border and southern maritime approaches, to integrate CBP operations 

and improve interagency coordination. For example, CBP, U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (Coast 

Guard), and other stakeholders have partnered to form multiple joint task 

forces. To further support collaboration, DHS and CBP coordinate use of 

resources, including a variety of technology and assets such as aircraft. 

For example, CBP’s Air and Marine Operations (AMO) uses Predator B 

unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and other aircraft equipped with video 

and radar surveillance technology along the southwest border to conduct 

border security efforts, in part, through coordination with joint task forces.

GAO has identified best practices for implementing interagency 

collaboration—broadly defined as any joint activity that is intended to 

produce more public value than could be produced when agencies act 

alone.2 Among other things, these best practices note that agencies can 

enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by developing 

mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. In addition, we 

found that all collaborative mechanisms benefit from certain key features, 

such as implementing processes to track and monitor progress toward 

 1

See 6 U.S.C. § 211(a) (establishing CBP within DHS), (c) (enumerating CBP’s duties). 

2

GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005) 

and Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency Collaborative 

Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012).

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-495T 

short-term and long-term outcomes. With regard to assessing its progress 

and efforts to secure the border, CBP components collect a variety of 

data on their use of resources and programs. For example, CBP’s U.S. 

Border Patrol (Border Patrol) collects data that support efforts to address 

smuggling and other illegal cross-border activity along the U.S. southwest 

border through its Consequence Delivery System (CDS) program—a 

process to classify each apprehended alien into criminal or noncriminal 

categories and apply various criminal, administrative, and programmatic 

consequences, such as federal prosecution, most likely to deter future 

illegal activity. In addition, Border Patrol collects a variety of data on its 

apprehension of aliens and seizures of narcotics along the southwest 

border and on use of resources such as tactical infrastructure—fencing, 

gates, roads, bridges, lighting, and drainage—and surveillance 

technology, such as towers equipped with video cameras and radar 

technology. AMO also collects data on its use of air and maritime assets; 

for example, seizures and apprehensions provided for by support from its 

Predator B UAS and Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS) program—

fixed site unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the ground equipped with 

radar technology.

Over the years, we have reported on the progress and challenges DHS 

faces in implementing its border security efforts, including establishing 

collaborative mechanisms and assessing the effectiveness of its use of 

resources and programs along the border. My statement discusses our 

past findings on (1) DHS’s efforts to implement collaborative mechanisms 

along the southwest border and (2) DHS’s efforts to assess its use of 

resources and programs to secure the southwest border.

My statement today is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 

September 2013 through February 2017 that examined DHS efforts to 

enhance border security and assess the effectiveness of its border 

security operations (see Related GAO Products at the end of this 

statement). Our reports and testimonies incorporated information we 

obtained by examining DHS’s collaborative mechanisms established 

along the southwest border; reviewing CBP policies and procedures for 

coordinating use of assets; analyzing DHS data related to enforcement 

program and asset assists or instances in which a technological asset 

assisted in the apprehension of illegal entrants, seizure of drugs or other 

contraband; and interviewing relevant DHS officials. In addition, since 

2013, we assessed the extent to which DHS and CBP have implemented 

recommendations by reviewing supporting documentation. More detailed 

information about our scope and methodology can be found in our reports 

and testimonies. We conducted all of this work in accordance with 
Page 3 GAO-17-495T 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.

DHS and its components have used various mechanisms over time to 

coordinate border security operations. In September 2013, we reported 

that the overlap in geographic and operational boundaries among DHS 

components underscored the importance of collaboration and 

coordination among these components.3 To help address this issue and 

mitigate operational inflexibility, DHS components, including those with 

border security-related missions such as CBP, Coast Guard, and ICE, 

employed a variety of collaborative mechanisms to coordinate their 

missions and share information. These mechanisms had both similarities 

and differences in how they were structured and on which missions or 

 3

GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Visibility over 

Collaborative Field Mechanisms, GAO-13-734 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2013). Among 

other things, we recommended that DHS take steps to increase its visibility over how 

collaborative field mechanisms operate. DHS concurred and implemented actions to 

collect information about the mechanisms. 

DHS and CBP Have 

Established 

Collaborative 

Mechanisms Along 

the Southwest 

Border, but Could 

Strengthen 

Coordination of 

Predator B UAS 

Operations

DHS and CBP Have 

Implemented a Variety of 

Collaborative Mechanisms 

to Coordinate Border 

Security Efforts
Page 4 GAO-17-495T 

threats they focused, among other things, but they all had the overarching 

goal of increasing mission effectiveness and efficiencies. For example:

• In 2011, the Joint Targeting Team originated as a CBP-led 

partnership among the Del Rio area of Texas, including Border Patrol, 

CBP’s Office of Field Operations, and ICE. This mechanism was 

expanded to support the South Texas Campaign (STC) mission to 

disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations, and its 

membership grew to include additional federal, state, local, tribal, and 

international law enforcement agencies.4

• In 2005, the first Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST)

was organized and led by ICE, in partnership with CBP, in Laredo, 

Texas, and additional units were subsequently formed along both the 

southern and northern borders. The BESTs’ mission was to identify, 

disrupt, and dismantle existing and emerging threats at U.S. land, 

sea, and air borders.

• In 2011, CBP, Coast Guard, and ICE established Regional 

Coordinating Mechanisms (ReCoM) to utilize the fusion of 

intelligence, planning, and operations to target the threat of 

transnational terrorist and criminal acts along the coastal border. 

Coast Guard served as the lead agency responsible for planning and 

coordinating among DHS components.

In June 2014, we reported on STC border security efforts along with the 

activities of two additional collaborative mechanisms: (1) the Joint Field 

Command (JFC), which had operational control over all CBP resources in 

Arizona; and (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), 

which was a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona.5 We 

found that through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP had 

coordinated border security efforts in information sharing, resource 

targeting and prioritization, and leveraging of assets. For example, to 

coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintained an operations 

coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. 

Through the ACTT, interagency partners worked jointly to target 

individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border 

 4

CBP developed and implemented the STC to identify and address current and emerging 

threats along the border in South Texas. The STC conducts targeted operations to disrupt 

and degrade the ability of transnational criminal organizations to operate throughout the 

South Texas corridor while it simultaneously facilitates legitimate trade and travel. 

5

GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms 

along the Southwest Border, GAO-14-494 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2014).
Page 5 GAO-17-495T 

activity. The STC leveraged assets of CBP components and interagency 

partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint 

operations.

More recently, the Secretary of Homeland Security initiated the Southern 

Border and Approaches Campaign Plan in November 2014 to address 

the region’s border security challenges by commissioning three DHS joint 

task forces to, in part, enhance collaboration among DHS components, 

including CBP, ICE, and Coast Guard. Two of DHS’s joint task forces are 

geographically based, Joint Task Force – East and Joint Task Force –

West, and one which is functionally based, Joint Task Force –

Investigations. Joint Task Force – West is separated into geographic 

command corridors with CBP as the lead agency responsible for 

overseeing border security efforts to include: Arizona, California, New 

Mexico/West Texas, and South Texas. Coast Guard is the lead agency 

responsible for Joint Task Force – East, which is responsible for the 

southern maritime and border approaches. ICE is the lead agency 

responsible for Joint Task Force – Investigations, which focuses on 

investigations in support of Joint Task Force – West and Joint Task Force 

– East. Additionally, DHS has used these task forces to coordinate 

various border security activities, such as use of Predator B UAS, as we 

reported in February 2017 and discuss below.6

In September 2013, we reported on successful collaborative practices 

and challenges identified by participants from eight border security 

collaborative field mechanisms we visited—the STC, four BESTs and 3 

ReCoMs.7 Their perspectives were generally consistent with the seven 

key issues to consider when implementing collaborative mechanisms that 

we identified in our 2012 report on interagency collaboration.8 Among 

participants who we interviewed, there was consensus that certain 

practices facilitated more effective collaboration, which, according to 

participants, contributed to the groups’ overall successes. For example, 

 6

GAO, Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Collection of Unmanned 

Aerial Systems and Aerostats Data, GAO-17-152 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2017).

7

GAO-13-734. 

8

GAO-12-1022. We identified seven features of successful collaborative mechanisms: (1) 

Outcomes and accountability; (2) Bridging organizational cultures; (3) Leadership; (4) 

Clarity of roles and responsibilities; (5) Participants; (6) Resources; and (7) Written 

guidance and agreements. 

Collaborative Mechanism 

Participants Identified 

Practices that Enhanced 

or Served as Challenges 

to Collaboration
Page 6 GAO-17-495T 

participants identified three of the seven categories of practices as keys 

to success: (1) positive working relationships/communication, (2) sharing 

resources, and (3) sharing information. Specifically, in our interviews, 

BEST officials stated that developing trust and building relationships 

helped participants respond quickly to a crisis, and communicating 

frequently helped participants eliminate duplication of efforts. Participants 

from the STC, BESTs, and ReCoMs also reported that having positive 

working relationships built on strong trust among participants was a key 

factor in their law enforcement partnerships because of the sensitive 

nature of law enforcement information, and the risks posed if it is not 

protected appropriately. In turn, building positive working relationships 

was facilitated by another collaborative factor identified as important by a 

majority of participants: physical collocation of mechanism stakeholders. 

Specifically, participants from the mechanisms focused on law 

enforcement investigations, such as the STC and BESTs, reported that 

being physically collocated with members from other agencies was 

important for increasing the groups’ effectiveness.

Participants from the eight border security collaborative field mechanisms 

we visited at the time also identified challenges or barriers that affected 

their collaboration across components and made it more difficult. 

Specifically, participants identified three barriers that most frequently 

hindered effective collaboration within their mechanisms: (1) resource 

constraints, (2) rotation of key personnel, and (3) lack of leadership buyin. For example, when discussing resource issues, a majority of 

participants said funding for their group’s operation was critical and 

identified resource constraints as a challenge to sustaining their 

collaborative efforts. These participants also reported that since none of 

the mechanisms receive dedicated funding, the participating federal 

agencies provided support for their respective representatives assigned 

to the selected mechanisms. Also, there was a majority opinion among 

mechanism participants we visited that rotation of key personnel and lack 

of leadership buy-in hindered effective collaboration within their 

mechanisms. For example, STC participants stated that the rotation of 

key personnel hindered the STC’s ability to develop and retain more 

seasoned personnel with expertise in investigations and surveillance 

techniques.

In addition, in June 2014, we identified coordination benefits and 

challenges related to the JFC, STC, and ACTT.9 For example, DHS and 

 9

GAO-14-494.
Page 7 GAO-17-495T 

CBP leveraged the assets of CBP components and interagency partners 

through these mechanisms to conduct a number of joint operations and 

deploy increased resources to various border security efforts. In addition,

these mechanisms provided partner agencies with increased access to 

specific resources, such as AMO air support and planning assistance for 

operations. Officials involved with the JFC, STC, and ACTT also reported 

collaboration challenges at that time. For example, officials from 11 of 12 

partner agencies we interviewed reported coordination challenges related 

to the STC and ACTT, such as limited resource commitments by 

participating agencies and lack of common objectives. In particular, one 

partner with the ACTT noted that there had been operations in which 

partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed 

during the planning stages. Further, JFC and STC officials cited the need 

to improve the sharing of best practices across the various collaborative 

mechanisms, and CBP officials we interviewed identified opportunities to 

more fully assess how the mechanisms were structured. We 

recommended that DHS establish written agreements for some of these 

coordination mechanisms and a strategic-level oversight mechanism to 

monitor interagency collaboration. DHS concurred and these 

recommendations were closed as not implemented due to planned 

changes in the collaborative mechanisms.

In February 2017, we found that as part of using Predator B aircraft to 

support other government agencies, CBP established various 

mechanisms to coordinate Predator B operations.10 CBP’s Predator B 

aircraft are national assets used primarily for detection and surveillance 

during law enforcement operations, independently and in coordination 

with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies throughout the 

United States. For example, at AMO National Air Security Operations 

Centers (NASOC) in Arizona, North Dakota, and Texas, personnel from 

other CBP components are assigned to support and coordinate mission 

activities involving Predator B operations.11 Border Patrol agents 

 10GAO-17-152. 

11As of fiscal year 2016, CBP operated nine Predator B aircraft from four AMO NASOCs 

in Arizona, Florida, North Dakota, and Texas. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are launched and 

recovered at its NASOCs in Sierra Vista, Arizona; Corpus Christi, Texas; and Grand 

Forks, North Dakota; while the NASOC in Jacksonville, Florida remotely operates 

Predator B aircraft launched from other NASOCs. CBP’s Predator B aircraft are equipped 

with video and radar sensors primarily to provide intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance capabilities.

CBP Has Established 

Mechanisms to Coordinate 

Its Use of Predator B UAS, 

but Could Benefit from 

Documented Procedures 

for Coordinating its 

Predator B UAS 

Operations
Page 8 GAO-17-495T 

assigned to support NASOCs assist with directing agents and resources 

to support its law enforcement operations and collecting information on 

asset assists provided for by Predator B operations. Further, two of 

DHS’s joint task forces also help coordinate Predator B operations. 

Specifically, Joint Task Force – West, Arizona and Joint Task Force –

West, South Texas coordinate air asset tasking and operations, including 

Predator B operations, and assist in the transmission of requests for 

Predator B support and communication with local field units during 

operations, such as Border Patrol stations and AMO air branches.12

In addition to these mechanisms, CBP has documented procedures for 

coordinating Predator B operations among its supported or partner 

agencies in Arizona specifically by developing a standard operating 

procedure for coordination of Predator B operations through its NASOC in 

Arizona. However, CBP has not documented procedures for coordination 

of Predator B operations among its supported agencies through its 

NASOCs in Texas and North Dakota. CBP has also established national 

policies for its Predator B operations that include policies for prioritization 

of Predator B missions and processes for submission and review of 

Predator B mission or air support requests. However, these national 

policies do not include coordination procedures specific to Predator B 

operating locations or NASOCs. Without documenting its procedures for 

coordination of Predator B operations with supported agencies, CBP does 

not have reasonable assurance that practices at NASOCs in Texas and 

North Dakota align with existing policies and procedures for joint 

operations with other government agencies. Among other things, we 

recommended that CBP develop and document procedures for Predator 

B coordination among supported agencies in all operating locations. CBP 

concurred with our recommendation and stated that it plans to develop 

and implement an operations coordination structure and document its 

coordination procedures for Predator B operations through Joint Task 

Force – West, South Texas and document its coordination procedures for 

Predator B operations through its NASOC in Grand Forks, North Dakota.

 12Joint Task Force – West, Arizona’s area of responsibility includes Tucson and Yuma 

Border Patrol sectors. Joint Task Force – West, South Texas’s area of responsibility 

includes Rio Grande Valley, Laredo, and Del Rio Border Patrol sectors. 
Page 9 GAO-17-495T 

In January 2017, we reported that Border Patrol agents use the CDS to 

classify each alien apprehended illegally crossing the border and then 

apply one or more post-apprehension consequences determined to be 

the most effective and efficient to discourage recidivism, that is, further 

apprehensions for illegal cross-border activity.13 We found that Border 

Patrol uses an annual recidivism rate to measure performance of the 

CDS; however, methodological weaknesses limit the rate’s usefulness for 

assessing CDS effectiveness. Specifically, Border Patrol’s methodology 

for calculating recidivism—the percent of aliens apprehended multiple 

times along the southwest border within a fiscal year—does not account 

for an alien’s apprehension history over multiple years. In addition, Border 

Patrol’s calculation neither accounts for nor excludes apprehended aliens 

for whom there is no ICE record of removal from the United States. Our 

analysis of Border Patrol and ICE data showed that when calculating the 

recidivism rate for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, Border Patrol included in 

the total number of aliens apprehended, tens of thousands of aliens for 

whom ICE did not have a record of removal after apprehension and who 

may have remained in the United States without an opportunity to 

recidivate. Specifically, our analysis of ICE enforcement and removal data 

showed that about 38 percent of the aliens Border Patrol apprehended 

along the southwest border in fiscal years 2014 and 2015 may have 

remained in the United States as of May 2016.

 13GAO, Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Post-Apprehension 

Consequences, GAO-17-66 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2017). Under U.S. immigration 

law, an “alien” is any person that is not a U.S. citizen or national. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1101(a)(3). According to the National Institute of Justice, recidivism refers to a person’s 

relapse into criminal behavior, often after the person receives sanctions or undergoes 

intervention for a previous crime. 

DHS and CBP Could 

Strengthen Efforts to 

Assess Use of 

Resources and 

Programs to Secure 

the Border

Border Patrol Could 

Benefit From Improving Its 

Methodology to Assess 

Effectiveness of its 

Consequence Delivery 

System Program
Page 10 GAO-17-495T 

To better inform the effectiveness of CDS implementation and border 

security efforts, we recommended that, among other things, (1) Border 

Patrol strengthen the methodology for calculating recidivism, such as by 

using an alien’s apprehension history beyond one fiscal year and 

excluding aliens for whom there is no record of removal; and (2) the 

Assistant Secretary of ICE and Commissioner of CBP collaborate on 

sharing immigration enforcement and removal data to help Border Patrol 

account for the removal status of apprehended aliens in its recidivism rate 

measure. CBP did not concur with our first recommendation and stated 

that CDS uses annual recidivism rate calculations to measure annual 

change, which is not intended to be, or used, as a performance measure 

for CDS, and that Border Patrol annually reevaluates the CDS to ensure 

that the methodology for calculating recidivism provides the most effective 

and efficient post apprehension outcomes. We continue to believe that 

Border Patrol should strengthen its methodology for calculating 

recidivism, as the recidivism rate is used as a performance measure by

Border Patrol and DHS. DHS concurred with our second 

recommendation, but stated that collecting and analyzing ICE removal 

and enforcement data would not be advantageous to Border Patrol for 

CDS purposes since CDS is specific to Border Patrol. However, DHS also 

stated that Border Patrol and ICE have discussed the availability of the 

removal and enforcement data and ICE has agreed to provide Border 

Patrol with these data, if needed. DHS requested that we consider this 

recommendation resolved and closed. While DHS’s planned actions are a 

positive step toward addressing our recommendation, DHS needs to 

provide documentation of completion of these actions for us to consider 

the recommendation closed as implemented.
Page 11 GAO-17-495T 

In February 2017, we reported on CBP’s efforts to secure the border 

between U.S. ports of entry using tactical infrastructure, including fencing, 

gates, roads, bridges, lighting, and drainage.14 For example, border 

fencing is intended to benefit border security operations in various ways, 

according to Border Patrol officials, including supporting Border Patrol 

agents’ ability to execute essential tasks, such as identifying illicit-cross 

border activities. CBP collects data that could help provide insight into 

how border fencing contributes to border security operations, including 

the location of illegal entries. However, CBP has not developed metrics 

that systematically use these data, among other data it collects, to assess 

the contributions of its pedestrian and vehicle border fencing to its 

mission. For example, CBP could potentially use these data to determine 

the extent to which border fencing diverts illegal entrants into more rural 

and remote environments, and border fencing’s impact, if any, on 

apprehension rates over time. Developing metrics to assess the 

contributions of fencing to border security operations could better position 

CBP to make resource allocation decisions with the best information 

available to inform competing mission priorities and investments.

To ensure that Border Patrol has the best available information to inform 

future investments and resource allocation decisions among tactical 

infrastructure and other assets Border Patrol deploys for border security, 

we recommended, among other things, that Border Patrol develop 

metrics to assess the contributions of pedestrian and vehicle fencing to 

border security along the southwest border using the data Border Patrol 

already collects and apply this information, as appropriate, when making 

investment and resource allocation decisions. DHS concurred with our 

recommendation and plans to develop metrics and incorporate them into 

the Border Patrol’s Requirements Management Process. These actions, if 

implemented effectively, should address the intent of our 

recommendation.

 14GAO, Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess Fencing’s 

Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for Identifying Capability Gaps, 

GAO-17-331 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2017). Ports of entry are facilities that provide 

for the controlled entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of 

entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land border location) where 

DHS officers or employees are assigned to clear passengers, merchandise, and other 

items; collect duties; and enforce customs laws; and where DHS officers inspect persons 

seeking to enter or depart, or applying for admission into, the United States, pursuant to 

U.S. immigration law. 

CBP Collects Data that 

Could be Useful in 

Assessing How Border 

Fencing Contributes to 

Border Security 

Operations but Needs 

Metrics to Assess the 

Contribution to Its Mission
Page 12 GAO-17-495T 

In February 2017, we found that CBP has taken actions to assess the 

effectiveness of its Predator B UAS and tactical aerostats for border 

security, but could improve its data collection efforts.15 CBP collects a 

variety of data on its use of the Predator B UAS, tactical aerostats, and 

TARS, including data on their support for the apprehension of individuals, 

seizure of drugs, and other events (asset assists). For Predator B UAS, 

we found that mission data—such as the names of supported agencies 

and asset assists for seizures of narcotics—were not recorded 

consistently across all operational centers, limiting CBP’s ability to assess 

the effectiveness of the program. We also found that CBP has not 

updated its guidance for collecting and recording mission information in 

its data collection system to include new data elements added since 

2014, and does not have instructions for recording mission information 

such as asset assists. In addition, not all users of CBP’s system have 

received training for recording mission information. We reported that 

updating guidance and fully training users, consistent with internal control 

standards, would help CBP better ensure the quality of data it uses to 

assess effectiveness. For tactical aerostats, we found that Border Patrol 

collection of asset assist information for seizures and apprehensions does 

not distinguish between its tactical aerostats and TARS. Data that 

distinguishes between support provided by tactical aerostats and support 

provided by TARS would help CBP collect better and more complete 

information and guide resource allocation decisions, such as the 

redeployment of tactical aerostat sites based on changes in illegal crossborder activity for the two types of systems that provide distinct types of 

support when assisting with, for example, seizures and apprehensions.

To improve its efforts to assess the effectiveness of its Predator B and 

tactical aerostat programs, we recommended, among other things, that 

CBP (1) update guidance for recording Predator B mission information in 

its data collection system; (2) provide training to users of CBP’s data 

collection system for Predator B missions; and (3) update Border Patrol’s 

data collection practices to include a mechanism to distinguish and track 

asset assists associated with tactical aerostats from TARS. CBP 

concurred and identified planned actions to address the 

recommendations, including incorporating a new functionality in its data 

collection system to include tips and guidance for recording Predator B 

mission information and updating its user manual for its data collection 

 15GAO-17-152. Tactical aerostats are relocatable unmanned buoyant craft tethered to the 

ground and equipped with video surveillance cameras. As of fiscal year 2016, CBP 

deployed six tactical aerostats sites along the U.S.-Mexico border in south Texas.

CBP Has Taken Actions to 

Assess the Effectiveness 

of Its Predator B UAS and 

Aerostats for Border 

Security, but Could 

Improve Its Data 

Collection Efforts
Page 13 GAO-17-495T 

system; and making improvements to capture data to ensure asset 

assists are properly reported and attributed to tactical aerostats, and 

TARS, among other actions.

In March 2014, we reported that CBP had identified mission benefits for 

technologies under its Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan—

which included a mix of radars, sensors, and cameras to help provide 

security for the Arizona border—but had not yet developed performance 

metrics for the plan.16 CBP identified mission benefits such as improved 

situational awareness and agent safety. Further, a DHS database 

enabled CBP to collect data on asset assists, instances in which a 

technology—such as a camera, or other asset, such as a canine team—

contributed to an apprehension or seizure, that in combination with other 

relevant performance metrics or indicators, could be used to better 

determine the contributions of CBP’s surveillance technologies and inform 

resource allocation decisions. However, we found that CBP was not 

capturing complete data on asset assists, as Border Patrol agents were 

not required to record and track such data. We concluded that requiring 

the reporting and tracking of asset assist data could help CBP determine 

the extent to which its surveillance technologies are contributing to CBP’s 

border security efforts.

To assess the effectiveness of deployed technologies at the Arizona 

border and better inform CBP’s deployment decisions, we recommended 

that CBP (1) require tracking of asset assist data in its Enforcement 

Integrated Database, which contains data on apprehensions and seizures 

and (2) once data on asset assists are required to be tracked, analyze 

available data on apprehensions and seizures and technological assists, 

in combination with other relevant performance metrics to determine the 

contribution of surveillance technologies to CBP’s border security efforts. 

DHS concurred with our first recommendation, and Border Patrol issued 

guidance in June 2014 and Border Patrol officials confirmed with us in 

June 2015 that agents are required to enter this information into the 

database. These actions met the intent of our recommendation. DHS also 

concurred with our second recommendation, and as of September 2016 

has taken some action to assess its technology assist data and other 

measures to determine contributions of surveillance technologies to its 

 16GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed to 

Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness, GAO-14-368 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

3, 2014). 

CBP Uses Other Assets to 

Provide Security at the 

Arizona Border, and 

Would Benefit from 

Reporting and Tracking 

Asset Assist Data
Page 14 GAO-17-495T 

mission. However, until Border Patrol completes its efforts to fully develop 

and apply key attributes for performance metrics for all technologies to be 

deployed under the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, it will 

not be well positioned to fully assess its progress in determining when 

mission benefits have been fully realized.

Chairwoman McSally, Ranking Member Vela, and members of the 

subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

answer any questions you may have.

For further information about this testimony, please contact Rebecca 

Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition, contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals making key 

contributions to this statement included Kirk Kiester (Assistant Director), 

as well as Stephanie Heiken, David Lutter, Sasan “Jon” Najmi, and Carl 

Potenzieri.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 15 GAO-17-495T 

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Assess 

Fencing’s Contributions to Operations and Provide Guidance for 

Identifying Capability Gaps. GAO-17-331. Washington, D.C.: February 

16, 2017.

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen Collection of 

Unmanned Aerial Systems and Aerostats Data. GAO-17-152. 

Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2017.

Border Patrol: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of PostApprehension Consequences. GAO-17-66. Washington, D.C.: January 

12, 2017.

Border Security: DHS Surveillance Technology Unmanned Aerial 

Systems and Other Assets. GAO-16-671T. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 

2016.

Southwest Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Assess 

Resource Deployment and Progress. GAO-16-465T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 1, 2016.

Border Security: Progress and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Implement 

and Assess Infrastructure and Technology. GAO-15-595T. Washington, 

D.C.: May 13, 2015.

Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative 

Mechanisms along the Southwest Border. GAO-14-494: Washington, 

D.C.: June 27, 2014.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan: Additional Actions Needed 

to Strengthen Management and Assess Effectiveness. GAO-14-368. 

Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2014.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: 

November 4, 2011.

Related GAO Products

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