Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing

— 1 —

Through the Major General Harold J. “Harry” 

Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing, we 

remember a leader who left an indelible mark 

on us all. Over the course of a 34-year career, 

Harry brought a unique blend of technical expertise, 

business acumen and decisive leadership to the Army. 

I could always count on him to make decisions and 

tackle problems with sound logic and a clear perspective 

on what needed priority focus, especially on matters 

affecting our Soldiers. He was passionate about our 

responsibility to provide them with the best equipment 

in the world.

Harry’s service, sacrifice and tragic death on Aug. 5, 

2014, while serving as the deputy commanding general 

of Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan reminds us of the dedication, commitment and 

risk our men and women in uniform take to ensure our 

nation’s security. His distinguished career as a Soldier 

and leader in the Army is solemnly remembered not for 

how it ended, but for what it achieved.

We honor Harry’s legacy, in part, through the annual 

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for 

Acquisition Writing. Open to all, this competition is 

designed to foster a dialog on the way forward for the 

acquisition community in these challenging times. Each 

year, we invite participants to share their experiences and 

bright ideas by submitting articles, essays and opinion 

pieces in the following categories: Acquisition Reform/

Better Buying Power; Future Operations; Innovation; 

and Lessons Learned. The difficult task of selecting 

winners and honorable mentions is made easier by the 

expertise of our senior military and civilian acquisition 

leaders, who served as reviewers and judges. 

This special supplement to Army AL&T magazine showcases the 2015 winning authors and those who received 

honorable mentions. I often say that we have the greatest 

workforce anywhere, and this year’s results are another 

reminder of the tremendous talent, creativity and expertise within our community. My thanks and best wishes 

to all who participated in this competition, and my 

sincere congratulations to all whose works are included 

in the pages that follow. 

Harry was a scholar and an inspirational leader. His 

contributions to our Soldiers and the Army will be felt 

for many, many years to come. This award, and all that it 

signifies, reminds us of the tremendous debt of gratitude 

we owe him. 

Honoring a Legacy

This year’s winners of the Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing showcase the talent and creativity 

that are the hallmarks of the acquisition community to which 

MG Greene made considerable and lasting contributions

by the Honorable Heidi Shyu
— 2 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Acquisition Reform/Better 

Buying Power

Winner: Embracing Requirements Creep and 

Making Defense Acquisition Agile to Address a 

Changing World

Author: Mr. Joe Novick is the deputy product manager for the Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection 

Program within the Joint Project Manager for Protection, part of the Joint Program Executive Office for 

Chemical and Biological Defense. Mr. Jorge Hernandez also contributed to the article.

Abstract: Requirements creep should be embraced, not 

dismissed. Said differently, the ability of acquisition 

programs to adapt to new threats and environments 

should be embraced, not dismissed! The variety of 

adversaries, complex foreign policy, and the speed 

of technology expansion present an ever-growing 

number of new threats in a fiscally restrained environment. Yet defense acquisition remains rigid, only 

able to change course at prescribed junctions. While 

efforts to rapidly field responses to emerging threats 

exist, these strategies oftentimes make critical tradeoffs that increase management oversight and life-cycle 

costs in the longer term. How can defense acquisition 

become more agile to address the changing threat 

environment? Can the defense acquisition community 

embrace requirements creep while employing Better 

Buying Power to streamline acquisition? In order to 

embrace requirements creep to make weapon systems 

align better to the changing threat, fundamental 

changes to the requirements generation process and to 

the defense acquisition process are necessary. 

Honorable Mention: Is Your System Export Ready?

Author: Mr. Paul Manz currently serves as chief 

scientist for the Program Executive Office (PEO) for 

Ammunition. 

Abstract: As part of Better Buying Power (BBP) and 

its overarching set of acquisition-related imperatives, 

there has been and continues to be an increased focus 

on including defense exportability features (DEF) as 

an inherent part of all DOD systems envisioned for 

eventual export via foreign military sales (FMS) or 

direct commercial sales (DCS). Increasing our ability 

to export defense products has numerous benefits, 

including greater economies of scale that reduce costs 

for all customers (including U.S. customers), greater 

commonality and interoperability with our global 

partners, and strengthened relationships with our 

friends and allies. From a national technology and 

industry base (NTIB) management perspective, these 

benefits also include strengthening and protecting our 

own industrial base through expanded DEF-enabled 

opportunities to meet minimum sustaining rates and 

maintain profitability in an era where defense spending is decreasing and many smaller-tier companies are 

exiting the marketplace. The author has defined and 

currently uses a common communications framework 

and set of DEF-related terminologies and definitions 

that can facilitate mutual, efficient understanding 

among all stakeholders. The exportability readiness 

level (ERL) is akin to technology readiness level 

(TRL) and manufacturing readiness level (MRL), and 

captures the synergy between ERL and the usual TRL 

and MRL maturity levels desired by a program manager before they choose to integrate a new technology 

into a program of record. 

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene 

Awards for Acquisition Writing

The winners and honorable mentions are:
— 3 —

Honorable Mention: Experience-Based Qualification Standards for the Contracting Workforce

Author: Mr. Thomas H. Miller is the program manager for the U.S. Marine Corps Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected Vehicle Program.

Abstract: Winston Churchill said: “Gentlemen, we 

have run out of money; now we have to think.” This 

logic applies to the current DOD fiscal environment: shrinking budgets due to sequestration, but 

increasing operational requirements due to expanding 

global threats. DOD needs experienced, business and 

technology-savvy personnel capable of managing its 

complex, multibillion dollar programs successfully 

to provide needed capability to meet the demands of 

warfighters. It is imperative that the DOD and Army 

contracting workforce evolve to meet this demand, as 

they are the point people negotiating and administering the contracts under which most of DOD’s work 

is accomplished. However, the contracting workforce—made up of a mix of highly experienced but 

overworked senior level personnel and a recent influx 

of younger, less experienced personnel—is not well 

positioned to deal with the demands of the current 

environment, much less the increasingly demanding 

future. The author outlines a new system that ensures 

that contracting personnel are qualified, through onthe-job experience and a career path of progressively 

more demanding experiential assignments designed 

both to prepare them for their current jobs and to 

help them plan their future career progression. 

Category: Future Operations

Winner: The Sensor Computing Environment Initiative: Achieving Comprehensive Sensor Interoperability for the United States Army

Authors: Mr. Clair Guthrie is the Army’s Common Operating Environment Sensor Computing 

Environment (CE) lead, responsible for providing 

interoperability for 46 Army sensor and command 

and control systems.

Dr. Christina Bates provides contract support to 

various organizations within the Army acquisition 

and research, development, and engineering communities, including Project Manager Terrestrial Sensors 

and the Communications-Electronics Research, 

Development and Engineering Center’s Night Vision 

and Electronic Sensors Directorate.

Abstract: As our nation faces existing and emerging threats, and our Army readies itself to win in a 

complex world, improved situational awareness and 

a mastery of the battle space will become increasingly 

important. Sensor CE’s pursuit of comprehensive 

sensor interoperability, and its myriad and significant 

benefits, will be integral to the Army’s ability to access, 

apply and unlock the full potential of sensor data to 

take decisive action and ensure combat overmatch. 

Honorable Mention: Disruptive Technology: 

Managing Its Potential Impact on Future Army 

Operations

Author: CPT(P) Hassan M. Kamara is a basic 

branch armor officer, and an assistant program manager in the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Product 

Office in the Lower Tier Project Office of PEO 

Missiles and Space. 

Abstract: This paper studies the potential influence 

of disruptive technology on future Army operations 

and the Soldier from a historical perspective. It provides insight into how Army and Acquisition Corps 

leaders can hedge against technical surprise in future 

operations. The adversaries of the United States will 

continue to seek innovative ways to disrupt its technological dominance in land warfare. Shawn Brimley 

et al “Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and 

U.S. Defense Strategy” concur that “during the next 

decade, the rise of new powers and the accelerating 

diffusion of advanced technology throughout the 

international system will pose significant challenges 

to U.S. technological dominance in military affairs.” 

This raises the question: how can the U.S. Army 

manage emerging technology to prevent technical 

surprise and complications to future operations? Using the U.S. interwar period (1918-1941) as its case 

study the paper examines how emerging technology 

was managed in that era to inflict technical surprise, 

and derives lessons to help the U.S. Army hedge 

against technical surprise in future operations.
— 4 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Innovation

Winner: Acquiring the Unknown 

Author: Dr. Kurt T. Preston is the deputy director 

of the Innovation Enablers Portfolio and the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers’ Engineering Research and 

Development Center’s liaison to the Office of the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research 

and Technology. 

Abstract: This essay notes that it has been 70 years 

since “The Endless Frontier” was published. It was 

a highly successful report that, at the end of World 

War II, established the central construct of basic and 

applied research within the federal research establishment. This essay suggests that while the linear 

thinking of “The Endless Frontier” was successful in 

the industrial era, we no longer live in a linear world 

and that the assembly line analogy it represents needs 

reconsideration. 

Honorable Mention: Acquisition Courage: The 

Advent of the Army Smartphone AKA: How to Save 

a Billion Dollars and Change the Army

Author: Mr. Jason Regnier has been the deputy product manager for Nett Warrior in PEO Soldier since 

2008.

Abstract: The author details the challenges, successes 

and outside-the-box approaches behind Nett Warrior, 

including the important roles played by GEN Peter 

W. Chiarelli, then vice chief of staff of the Army, and 

the late MG Harry Greene, then deputy of acquisition 

and systems management for the assistant secretary 

of the Army for acquisition, logistics and technology. 

According to the author, the project yielded this lesson 

for product managers: have the courage yourself to 

find the champions who are willing to do the right 

thing in acquisition. It could make a billion dollar 

difference.

Category: Lessons Learned

Winner: Lessons Learned—Update of the UH60A/L Attitude Heading Reference Set (AHRS)

Author: Mr. Mark J. Jeude is chief of the Technical 

Management Division for the Improved Turbine 

Engine-Future Vertical Lift Project Office in PEO 

Aviation. 

Abstract: Field failures of the Attitude Heading Reference Set (AHRS) on fielded UH-60A/L Black Hawk 

helicopters had the potential to impact the safe operation of more than 1,000 aircraft. This led the Utility 

Helicopters Project Office to form a “tiger team” to 

quickly mitigate this risk without negatively impacting 

the ability of the aircraft to perform its mission. This 

paper looks at the successes of this tiger team, and 

identifies lessons learned that may be applied in similar 

situations.

Honorable Mention: Four Ways to Improve Contract Support Within the Operational Contract 

Support Framework: A way Forward for Operational Contract Support

Author: MAJ Eric Makepeace, U.S. Army Reserve, is 

an Army Reserve contracting officer (51C) currently 

deployed in the Horn of Africa. In 2013 he deployed 

to Jordan as the operational contracting support 

officer and helped set the theater for current operations and contingencies, using the concepts he wrote 

about in this white paper. He trained with the 45th 

Contracting Squadron/LGCAA at Patrick Air Force 

Base, FL.

Abstract: The goal for operational contract support 

should be to better serve current (phase 0) operations, 

support annual training exercises, and prepare the 

theater for contingencies (wartime or natural disaster). 

Specifically, DOD expeditionary contracting strategy should address repeating requirements, support 

long-range planning, upgrade infrastructure during 

exercises, and use “reach-back” contracting resources.
— 5 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards 

for Acquisition Writing Distinguished Judges

MG Robert E. Armbruster Jr. (USA, Ret.), Defense 

Acquisition University (DAU) faculty member and 

former commander, U.S. Army Test and Evaluation 

Command (ATEC)

MG Charles A. Cartwright (USA, Ret.), DAU 

faculty member and former program manager, Future 

Combat Systems

Professor John T. Dillard, academic area chair for 

acquisition, Graduate School of Business and Public 

Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

Professor Raymond D. Jones, Graduate School 

of Business and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate 

School

Ms. Mary Miller, deputy assistant secretary of the 

Army for research and technology

MG Roger A. Nadeau (USA, Ret.), senior vice president, American Business Development Group, and 

former commanding general (CG), ATEC

COL Kurt A. McNeely (USA, Ret.), chief, Warfighter Central, Enterprise and Systems Integration 

Center, U.S. Army Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center

Mr. Kris Osborn, Managing Editor, Scout Warrior

Jeffery A. Steevens, Ph.D., senior scientist, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers’ Engineer Research and 

Development Center, Environmental Laboratory

LTG Richard G. Trefry (USA, Ret.), Association of 

the United States Army (AUSA) senior fellow and 

former Army inspector general

GEN Louis C. Wagner (USA, Ret.), AUSA senior 

fellow and former CG, U.S. Army Materiel Command

LTG Joseph L. Yakovac (USA, Ret.), senior counselor, The Cohen Group, and former ASA(ALT) military 

deputy and director, Army Acquisition Corps
— 6 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

Category: Acquisition Reform/

Better Buying Power

WINNER 

Embracing Requirements Creep and 

Making Defense Acquisition Agile to 

Address a Changing World

By Mr. Joe Novick

Joint Program Executive Office 

for Chemical and Biological 

Defense

with contributions 

from Jorge Hernandez

Requirements creep should be embraced, not dismissed. Said differently, the ability of acquisition 

programs to adapt to new threats and environments 

should be embraced, not dismissed! The variety of 

adversaries, complex foreign policy, and the speed 

of technology expansion present an ever-growing 

number of new threats in a fiscally restrained environment. Yet defense acquisition remains rigid, only 

able to change course at prescribed junctions. While 

efforts to rapidly field responses to emerging threats 

exist, these strategies oftentimes make critical tradeoffs that increase management oversight and lifecycle 

costs in the longer term. How can defense acquisition 

become more agile to address the changing threat 

environment? Can the defense acquisition community 

embrace requirements creep while employing Better 

Buying Power to streamline acquisition? 

In order to embrace requirements creep to make 

weapon systems align better to the changing threat, 

fundamental changes to the requirements generation 

process and to the defense acquisition process are 

necessary. The streamlining of the requirements and 

acquisition processes follow a waterfall (i.e., sequential/linear) approach that lacks the reflexive mechanism to address emerging requirements. While the 

capability documents are statutory for programmatic 

milestones, the requirements and acquisition processes 

are on separate but parallel paths, which can create 

frustrating bureaucratic delays when requirements are 

not met. By making acquisition programs more agile, 

program managers can deliver effective products at 

reduced costs and schedule. 

Impacting Programs of Record

The first step to interweaving the requirements process 

into the acquisition process is to eliminate threshold 

requirements for non-Key Performance Parameters 

(KPPs) in the Capabilities Development Document 

in order to accelerate tradeoffs. KPPs would remain 

unchanged in having objective and threshold values as they are the distinguishing requirements that 

systems must achieve to be effective. By eliminating 

thresholds for non-KPPs, program managers will 

have the flexibility to test to objective requirements, 

evaluate the results, and negotiate trade-offs with the 

Combat Developers and requirements communities 

on a more regular basis. It gives program managers 

the flexibility to adapt the design rapidly to changing battlefields and threats. Therefore, met/not met 

decisions for non-KPPs would no longer exist. Instead, 

trade-offs are made between the program office and 

the requirements community based on tested performance against objective requirements. Trade-offs of 

non-KPPs can be made at the lowest practical levels 

without the need to bog-down a program by wasting 

time and money going through the requirements relief 

process at the upper echelons of the DOD.

The next step is adjusting the program management 

office to quickly make changes to the system’s design and development, based on those trades or new 

requirements resulting from the changing threat 

environment. To do so, the program office would 

need to employ a “Requirements Manager” whose job 

is to translate and derive User requirements from the 

Combat Developer to the design team, and also, to 

translate technology limitations from the design team 

back to the Combat Developer. The Requirements 

Manager would have the difficult job of balancing duties as both the advocate and ombudsman for the User 

and for the design team. Coordination between the 

Combat Developer and the Requirements Manager 

would be regular and consistent, to the point where 

they will be on the same team. 

The requirements traceability matrix (RTM), managed 

by the Requirements Manager, focuses on trade space 

against the objective requirements laid out in the 
— 7 —

requirements document. Management of the RTM 

must be meticulous. The RTM will track trades made 

with specific rationales and values from test results. 

Additionally, a mechanism must exist that formally 

commits the User to trade-offs made and noted in the 

RTM. The Requirements Manager must also have a 

keen understanding of the program schedule, costs, 

and funding to evaluate the impacts of trades made 

with the Combat Developer and the design team. The 

Requirements Manager steers the system design and 

development by juggling user needs against system 

capabilities and costs through the RTM. 

The impact to contracting will result in reduced costs. 

Since the program office develops the specification 

based on objective and not threshold requirements, it 

can make use of performance incentives in cost type 

contracts for design and development. By incentivizing performance, the program office can motivate 

the contractors to meet objectives while evaluating 

trade space based on system performance observed 

during testing. Most importantly, the contractor will 

not be as constrained by design-limiting non-KPP 

requirements and can pursue more innovative designs. 

The contractor will make internal design trade-offs 

throughout development based on which incentives 

will maximize their fee. Through the Requirements 

Manager and the Contracting Officer Representative, the User priorities can be negotiated with the 

developer while minimizing changes to the statement 

of work or performance specification. The end state 

would be a lower probability of system rework, as 

requirements are not evaluated on a met/not met basis 

for non-KPPs, but rather by trading off low priority 

requirements directly with the User. The cycle of 

design rework against lower priority requirements can 

be eliminated, reducing hours (i.e., costs) on cost type 

contracts. Performance incentives promote higher 

quality designs and less rework while checking the 

contractor against poor performance.

Testing will require an increased investment up front 

that will save costs down the road. Testing to objective levels is inherently more expensive than testing 

to thresholds; however, by understanding system 

performance without met/not met criteria, formerly 

determined ‘unmet’ or ‘met with exceptions’ requirements will not require any additional testing if trades 

are made with the user and the design team. Therefore, the probability of retesting the system is reduced, 

which ultimately leads to cost savings. Also, retests 

can be designed based on more realistic metrics that 

would reduce test cost against objective metrics. The 

overall impact to test costs would depend on the 

performance of the contractor, quantity and scale of 

trades, and amount of retest.

Hurdles in Changing the Acquisition Process 

and Culture

Once we make the trades and develop and deliver new 

capabilities, how does the DOD go about meeting 

traded objective requirements? To address this issue, 

the DOD would increase the investment in Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) 

beyond full rate production. Continuing to invest in 

RDT&E through Operational System Development 

provides a mechanism for technologies that were not 

fully matured during the Science and Technology or 

Engineering and Manufacturing Development phases 

to further mature. Program managers have a reliable 

mechanism to include emerging technologies in a 

future variant of the weapon system without slowing down the initial acquisition, and a mechanism 

to embrace requirements creep without establishing 

new acquisition programs. Program offices can use 

the Operational System Development funds to focus 

on new User priorities while fielding new capabilities. THIS IS AGILITY: adapting existing systems to 

survive and win in changing threat environments. I 

challenge acquisition leaders to recognize the benefits 

of and increase the investment in Operational System 

Development funding to evolve our weapon systems.

I hear buzzwords and catch phases about how the 

acquisition community needs to “be more agile” or 

“think outside the box” without mechanisms of doing 

so. Emergent requirements often break programs regardless of their advancements in science and technology or engineering due to the rigidity and inflexibility 

of the current acquisition process. Despite their ability 

to tailor the acquisition process to specific program 

needs, program managers are held to requirements 

and processes as if they are set in stone even when 

those requirements are low priorities or made obsolete 

by changing threats and battlefields. Yet, program 

managers are unable to change course due to bureaucratic pressures and timelines. Program managers meet 

resistance when “doing outside the box” and “being 
— 8 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

agile.” DOD leadership must empower program managers to be flexible, make good trades, and make value 

decisions because they know what is best for their 

system and, with close communication with the User, 

know how the Warfighter will use it in the field.

We in the acquisition community set the bar high and 

develop capabilities beyond what we thought was possible. My recommendation does not change that and 

it aligns with the core tenants of Better Buying Power 

3.0 (particularly: Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition 

of Services, Incentivize Innovation in Industry and 

Government, Incentivize Productivity in Industry and 

Government, and Eliminate Unproductive Processes 

and Bureaucracy). The DOD will continue to push 

technology beyond what was once thought impossible 

while improving the efficiency of delivering state-ofthe-art equipment to our brave men and women on 

current and future battlefields.

__________________________________

Joe Novick began working for the Joint Program Executive 

Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) 

in 2005. Since 2007, he has continued his acquisition 

support for the JPEO-CBD with the Navy at the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division in Dahlgren, 

Virginia. He currently holds the position of Deputy Product 

Manager for the Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection 

program within the Joint Project Manager for Protection. 

Mr. Novick holds a B.S. in Biochemistry from the University of Virginia.

HONORABLE MENTION

Is Your System Export Ready?

By Paul Manz

Program Executive Office 

Ammunition

As part of Better Buying Power 

(BBP) and its overarching set of 

acquisition related imperatives, 

there has been and continues to 

be an increased focus on including Defense Exportability Features (DEF) as an inherent part of all 

DOD systems envisioned for eventual export via Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and/or Direct Commercial 

Sales (DCS). Although not an entirely new concept, 

the formal recognition of DEF under the auspices of 

BBP can be found in Section 243 of Public Law 111-

383, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2011 (FY11 NDAA) which directed the Secretary 

of Defense to “carry out a pilot program to develop 

and incorporate technology protection features in a 

designated system during the research and development phase of such system.” Since that time numerous DEF pilot projects have been sponsored by the 

International Cooperation arm of the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)/IC)) including 

the ongoing Common Joint Height of Burst Fuzing 

DEF pilot effort managed by Joint Center Picatinny 

in New Jersey on behalf of the entire Joint Munitions 

Lethality community.

Increasing our ability to export defense products has 

numerous benefits including greater economies of 

scale that reduce costs for all customers (including US 

customers), greater commonality and interoperability 

with our global partners, and strengthened relationships with our friends and allies. From a National 

Technology and Industry Base (NTIB) management 

perspective, these benefits also include strengthening 

and protecting our own industrial base through expanded DEF-enabled opportunities to meet minimum sustaining rates and maintain profitability in an 

era where defense spending is decreasing and many 

smaller tier companies are exiting the marketplace. 

Thus, DOD program managers and contractor teams 

have lots of reasons to work together to build in potential exportability “up front and early” in the system 

development life cycle. In fact, the USD(AT&L), as 

part of his BBP 2.0 guidance, identified the need for 

Milestone Decision Authorities to consider Defense 

Exportability at early acquisition milestone reviews 

including Materiel Development Decisions (MDDs), 

Milestone A, and pre-Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development (pre-EMD) reviews. 

The above set of imperatives begs the need for a common communications framework and set of DEF-related terminologies and definitions to facilitate mutual 

efficient understanding amongst all stakeholders and 

parties. To this end, I have proposed, defined, and 

currently use a notional term and concept called Exportability Readiness Level (ERL) that is akin to Technology Readiness Level (TRL) and Manufacturing 

Readiness Level (MRL). ERLs ranging from 1 to 9 are 
— 9 —

used to quantify the maturity of DEF (i.e. Exportability Readiness) associated with critical technologies 

being incorporated into systems under development. 

In my mind, there is definitely a synergy between ERL 

and the usual TRL and MRL maturity levels desired 

by a program manager before they choose to integrate 

a new technology into a Program of Record (PoR). 

The above figure is my visual attempt to capture these 

synergies overlaid on a generic system development 

life-cycle template. 

Based on the positive feedback I’ve received to date 

from a variety of government stakeholders across the 

acquisition, export, and policy communities as well 

as members from the NTIB, I think this notional 

ERL framework resonates with how we collectively 

conduct our acquisition business. So the next time 

you talk to your respective leaders and staff from 

Defense Export Control, Security Assistance, International Cooperation, or Higher Headquarters 

regarding DEF-related acquisition matters, you can 

use Exportability Readiness and ERLs to more easily 

communicate the risks associated with protecting 

resident Critical Program Information in your system prior to its eventual exporting via FMS or DCS. 

So, is your system export ready?

_________________________________

Paul Manz currently serves as Chief Scientist for PEO 

Ammunition located at Joint Center Picatinny in NJ. Paul 

is a multiple-certified Senior Member of the Army Acquisition Corps and certified Lean Six Sigma Black Belt with 

over three decades of experience spanning the entire materiel 

development life-cycle from science and technology through 

production and deployment. 

HONORABLE MENTION

Experience-Based Qualification 

Standards for the Contracting 

Workforce

By Thomas H. Miller

U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle 

Management Command

Winston Churchill said: “Gentlemen, we have run out of money; 

now we have to think.” This logic 

applies to the current Department of Defense (DOD) 

fiscal environment: shrinking budgets due to sequestration, but increasing operational requirements due 

to expanding global threats. DOD needs experienced, 

business and technology savvy personnel capable of 

managing its complex, multi-billion dollar programs 

successfully in order to provided needed capability to 

the demanding warfighters. It is imperative that the 

DOD/Army Contracting workforce evolve to meet 

this demand, as they are the point people negotiating 

and administering the contracts under which most 

of DOD’s work is accomplished. LTG Michael E. 

Williamson, Director, Army Acquisition Career Management, explained his objective for dealing with this 

challenge in the overall Army acquisition workforce, 

which applies to the Contracting career field as well: 

“My plan is...to have the right people in the right jobs 

with the right skills at the right time to deliver decisive-edge capabilities to our Soldiers at all times...”

The Contracting workforce—made up of a mix 

of highly experienced but overworked senior level 

personnel and a recent influx of younger, less experienced personnel—is not well positioned to deal 

with the demands of the current environment, much 

less the increasingly demanding future. The Defense 

Human Capital Initiative March 2015 report on the 

DOD Contracting workforce states that senior career 

personnel (within 10 years of retirement eligibility) 

make up 47% of the overall workforce, while early 

career personnel constitute 29% and mid-career 24%. 

Former USD AT&L Jacques Gansler emphasized the 

risk related to this situation: “...one of the biggest 

problems we have right now—the experience of the 

acquisition workforce...unfortunately, we have had an 
— 10 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

aging workforce, and they were replaced by ‘interns’ ... 

55 percent of the DOD’s acquisition workforce has 

less than five years of experience, with few mentors 

remaining to help them.” What steps are required to 

better prepare the Contracting workforce? The current 

regimen of Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification training is necessary, 

but not sufficient. 

The answer is a new system that ensures that Contracting personnel are qualified through on-the-job 

experience for the requirements of their jobs by laying 

out a career path of progressively more demanding experiential assignments designed both to prepare them 

for their current jobs and to help them plan their 

future career progression. This approach is consistent 

with the Better Buying Power (BBP) 3.0 initiative to 

“Establish Stronger Professional Qualification Requirements for all Acquisition Specialties.” As the BBP 3.0 

Sept 2014 White Paper states: “The DAWIA training 

and certification process must be supplemented to establish a stronger basis for levels of professional qualification...” How do we implement such a “Qualification Standards” system for the Contracting workforce? 

There are three (3) key steps that need to be taken:

1. The Undersecretary of Defense Acquisition 

Technology & Logistics (USD AT&L) and the 

Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) should 

agree upon and issue an overarching qualification standards policy. An example of this is the 

Key Leadership Position qualification standards 

policy that was issued in 2014. By issuing a clear 

policy emphasizing the importance of qualified 

personnel at all levels, USD AT&L will establish 

the basis for new qualification standards that will 

identify experiential requirements for Contracting jobs, as well as for a qualification standards 

system that will objectively evaluate and validate 

when an employee meets those requirements. The 

policy should identify specific strategic objectives 

and minimal requirements for the qualification 

standards system, but allow enough flexibility for 

the services to develop and implement a system 

that best meets their needs.

2. USD AT&L should concurrently work with 

the SAEs and their Defense Acquisition Career 

Managers (DACMs) to detail the minimum experience required for the various positions—from 

entry to senior level—that constitute the Contracting career field. For example, an entry level 

Contract Specialist may require experience in preand post-award surveys, simplified acquisition 

procedures, administrative modifications, and 

developing a business clearance for a purchase order; while a senior Procuring Contracting Officer 

(PCO) for a Major Defense Acquisition Program 

(MDAP) may require experience in conducting 

a best value source selection for a major weapon 

system. It’s important to have common minimum 

standards, in order to allow for portability of 

qualification records for those personnel wishing 

to pursue jobs in other service organizations. 

These standards should be published in a Contracting qualification standards “guidebook” that 

can be used both for validation of individual 

qualifications and to assist personnel in planning 

their experiential learning (generally documented 

in an Individual Development Plan (IDP)) in 

order to pursue their preferred career objectives.

3. The SAEs and DACMs should then define the 

process for how their service will assess and validate the common qualification standards, in order 

to comply with the USD AT&L overarching policy. As a minimum, the process should include: (a) 

Identification of officials that will independently 

validate qualifications based on information 

submitted by individual employees (I recommend 

that supervisors also review and concur in the 

information prior to submission by the employee); (b) A formal and informal mentoring system 

that will allow employees to work with senior 

level personnel to identify and pursue appropriate 

experiential learning opportunities; (c) On-line 

tools that will allow employees to develop IDPs 

documenting their experiential learning goals, 

utilizing a searchable qualifications standards 

guidebook, and allow for automated staffing and 

documentation of qualification requests; and (d) 

Identification of metrics and regular reporting 

in order to track progress within the Contracting workforce. USD AT&L, the SAEs, and the 

DACMs should share best practices and lessons 

learned in order to improve the overall DOD 

process over time.
— 11 —

Establishing a qualification system such as described 

above will enhance the overall effectiveness of the 

Contracting workforce by increasing the rigor of the 

DAWIA qualification experience requirements. As 

stated by Navy Acquisition Executive Sean J. Stackley: 

“...the more experienced and qualified the Acquisition Workforce (AWF), the better the decisions. 

The best acquisition outcomes are produced by the 

most experienced acquisition people—in technical 

knowledge and business acumen ... ” There will be 

challenges in implementing such a system, particularly 

in our current resource constrained environment. For 

example, providing access to some required experiences—such as participating in a Defense Acquisition 

Board (DAB)—may be difficult for some commands/

organizations; so the services will need to provide 

ways to support these requirements, such as providing 

funding for temporary details to other organizations. 

These challenges must be addressed creatively and 

overcome, as the importance of a qualification system 

that addresses the current inexperience of a large part 

of the Contracting workforce can’t be denied. As 

stated by Michael Fischetti, Executive Director of the 

National Contract Management Association: “...people are only as effective as the experience and training 

they have received ...” Now is the time to provide the 

DOD/Army Contracting workforce with the experience they need to be successful in our increasingly 

complex business environment, so that that they can 

provide the weapons and services the Warfighters 

require to be successful against the current and future 

threats they must face.

__________________________________

Thomas H. Miller is the Program Manager for the USMC 

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP). He has 32 years 

of Defense acquisition experience, including serving as a 

Procuring Contracting Officer at the U.S. Army TACOM 

Life Cycle Management Command, Warren, MI. 

Category: Future Operations

WINNER

The Sensor Computing Environment 

Initiative: Achieving Comprehensive 

Sensor Interoperability for the United 

States Army

The Challenge: Disparate 

Systems Performing Disparate Functions

As the United States Army reflects upon more than 

a decade’s worth of conflict, it faces new and myriad 

challenges. The development, acquisition, fielding, 

and sustainment of capabilities necessary to successfully engage in asymmetrical warfare have both stressed 

and strengthened the Army’s ability to do so in a 

rapid, effective, and efficient manner. Furthermore, 

the emergence of the “quick reaction capabilities” 

(QRC) paradigm enabled the Army to act quickly to 

satisfy urgent capability requirements. These successes, 

however, ushered in new and different challenges for 

the Army.

Today, the Army faces significant budget cuts and is 

expected to win in a complex world. Coupled with 

the looming fiscal constraints are the challenges resulting from more than a decade’s worth of rapid system 

procurements, including system capability overlaps 

and untapped functionality. One prominent challenge 

that emerged from the procurement and independent 

fielding of numerous Command and Control (C2) 

products was a “stovepipe” result—myriad sensors 

were deployed to meet emerging requirements, yet the 

majority of these sensors are not capable of interopMr. Clair Guthrie Dr. Christina 

Bates

PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors
— 12 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

erating with other sensors and, in turn, sharing vital 

information for increased situational awareness. 

ASA(ALT) Launches the Sensor 

Computing Environment Initiative 

In response to these challenges, and to better position 

the Army to fight and win in a complex world, the Assistant Secretary for the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)) launched the Sensor 

Computing Environment (Sensor CE) Initiative in 

late 2009. Sensor CE is part of a larger effort, led by 

ASA(ALT), referred to as the Common Operating 

Environment (COE). The COE is an approved set of 

computing technologies and standards that will enable 

the rapid development and execution of secure and 

interoperable applications across a variety of computing environments (CEs). 

Sensor CE is one of six computing environment 

initiatives under the aegis of the COE. Its overarching 

goal is to establish standards, formats, and an integration approach for the Army that enable sensors and 

systems to interact and share relevant information 

with minimal up-front investment. Effective sensor 

integration will ultimately enable sensors (and, in turn, 

their data) to be dynamically discovered and accessed 

by a Soldier, platform, and/or commander, regardless 

of “ownership” of a given sensor. This dynamic and 

rapid discovery and sharing of critical sensor data will 

improve and inform decision-making and enable decisive action, thereby making significant and positive 

contributions to the Army’s ability to fight and win. 

ASA(ALT) directed the Project Manager Terrestrial 

Sensors (PM TS) (a subordinate command of the 

Program Executive Office Intelligence, Electronic 

Warfare, and Sensors — PEO IEW&S) to lead the 

Sensor CE effort. PM TS also partners with the 

Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Command’s (CERDEC) 

Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate 

(NVESD) to develop capabilities that enable the 

Army to achieve the integration standards resulting 

from the Sensor CE Initiative. 

Traditional Approaches: Moving from Disparate Sensors to Integrated Sensors 

The “quick reaction capability” (QRC) paradigm 

ushered in a new, truncated process for acquiring and 

deploying systems to support the high operational 

tempo required for the Army to execute missions successfully in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While the 

QRC approach enabled rapid deployment of urgently needed capabilities, it resulted in significant and 

lingering challenges. For example, to support urgent 

Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and Surveillance (ISR) 

and Force Protection (FP) requirements, the Army 

fielded numerous and varied ground and air sensors. 

While these sensors proved essential for providing 

commanders with a comprehensive understanding 

of the battlefield, they were, in large part, disparate 

systems conducting disparate functions. As such, the 

information they gathered, while valuable, could not 

be shared with other sensor systems. Moreover, the 

absence of a unified, standardized sensor architecture 

resulted in the procurement and fielding of sensors 

with inherent limitations. For example, many sensors 

fielded were not capable of interacting with other sensors due to a number of factors, including proprietary, 

hardware, and software limitations. 

To achieve a degree of connectivity among the various 

sensors fielded, the Army pursued “sensor integration.” 

An integrated sensor is one that communicates and 

shares data with a given ground station primarily because they speak a common language. This is referred 

to as a “static integration.” A static integration is 

useful, yet limited in its application. For example, for 

this sensor to communicate with a different component (e.g., another sensor or ground station), a second 

integration must be established—a second language 

must be learned. 

While sensor integration improved situational awareness, it proved to be an interim, partial solution. And, 

as the operational tempo required to successfully fight 

multiple wars on multiple fronts continued to increase, the need for sensors that could readily, rapidly, 

and consistently share data became paramount. It was 

time for the Army to move toward comprehensive 

sensor interoperability.

From Sensor Integration 

to Sensor Interoperability 

The key distinction between sensor integration and 

sensor interoperability is the degree of commonality 

in language. Just as human beings must speak a com-
— 13 —

mon language to effectively communicate, so too must 

sensors (and their related components). For sensors to 

readily and rapidly share information, they must all 

be capable of learning and using a common language. 

With sensor integration, only some sensors speak a 

common language; sensor interoperability requires 

that all sensors speak the same common language.

The question then became, “how do we determine the 

common language?” The Sensor CE Initiative’s primary objective is to answer this question in the form of 

an overall Sensor Architecture. The Architecture will 

comprise the standards and formats—the language 

“rules”—that a given sensor (whether currently fielded 

or under development) must “learn” and use. The 

standards and formats will inform all sensor aspects, 

including sensor design (hardware and software), operation, and proprietary considerations. 

Beyond establishing what will become the Army’s 

common language for all sensors, the Sensor CE Initiative also includes the following key sensor services 

that will enable the Army to unlock the full potential 

of comprehensive sensor interoperability. 

Sensor Discovery. In order for sensors to communicate and share data across a grouping of Mission 

Command Systems, sensor users must be able to 

dynamically determine the existence, availability, and 

capabilities of Army sensor assets. The full implementation of sensor discovery will enable Army sensor 

users to advertise, discover, subscribe to, be notified 

of changes to, and disseminate sensor, geospatial, and 

other operational data, files, and services across computing environments based on a common interoperability data standard.

Sensor Full Motion Video (FMV) Dissemination. 

While the discovery, accessibility, and distribution of 

sensor data among numerous sensors is an important 

and preliminary step for the Sensor CE Initiative, 

significant focus is also directed at the quality of the 

data distributed. As such, Sensor CE is establishing 

the capability to disseminate full motion video (FMV) 

across Army formations ranging from the Enterprise 

Cloud, to Division Command Posts, and to dismounted Soldiers. PM TS brings specialized knowledge and experience to this aspect of the effort; the 

PM was responsible for the initial implementation of 

FMV in Afghanistan to enable high quality video distribution across the restricted bandwidth architectures 

and network complexities characteristic of smaller and 

remote posts. 

Sensor Alerts. Technology continues to advance our 

ability to communicate with vast audiences rapidly, 

and with relative ease. Similarly, a significant benefit of the Sensor CE Initiative will be the ability of 

numerous sensors to leverage the data shared among 

them to generate and disseminate “sensor alerts.” This 

capability provides sensor users with the ability to 

combine local information and intelligence, and 

position location information with user and network determined sensor information to improve 

awareness, define contextual significance, and inform 

understanding, decisions, and action. An example of 

a sensor alert is a request from Mission Command 

Systems for Unattended Ground Sensor (UGS) detection alerts along given roads concerning potential 

improvised explosive device (IED) emplacement. As 

such, when an UGS detects seismic activity, it sends 

an alert to a Mission Command System regarding 

the specific detection. This information may then be 

leveraged by the recipient(s) to make better and more 

informed decisions regarding a given mission.

Sensor Management. Currently, the Army is limited 

in its ability to provide sensor management consistently across Command Post and Mounted and 

Dismounted Mission Command Systems. Sensor 

management will enable any sensor operator (whether 

a primary or secondary user) to receive slew-to-cue 

messages and to steer the sensor to the precise latitude, 

longitude, and elevation requested by a Mission Command System. 

Applying Sensor CE Concepts: 

The Integrated Sensor Architecture 

NVESD’s Integrated Sensor Architecture (ISA) represents the real-world application of the tenets of the 

Sensor CE. The ISA is a middleware solution that enables dynamic discovery of sensors in a given network 

by a sensor user, regardless of a given sensor’s modality 

or ownership. The ISA is not concerned with the type 

of sensor system seeking access to the network. It only 

requires that the sensor system seeking access describe 

itself in terms of its capabilities and the kinds of data 

it will provide to the network. To enable interoperability, the ISA requires that the system use the ISA’s com-
— 14 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

mon language while on the network. These limited 

requirements are the driving factor in the ISA’s ability 

to be dynamic and to adapt to the various constraints 

inherent in a small FOB environment. Moreover, all 

data on the ISA is encrypted and a structured registration process is employed that requires sensor authentication and publication prior to gaining access to the 

network. 

The ISA has been successfully applied at various 

demonstrations and NVESD is working with several 

Army program managers to incorporate existing sensors into the ISA, thereby further enabling the sharing 

of critical sensor data for increased situational awareness and, in turn, improved decision-making.

The Future of Sensor CE

Currently, the Sensor CE Team is in the process of 

preparing for, and implementing the various sensor 

services discussed in this article. Part of this preparation entails frequent testing and demonstrations using 

live sensor systems. These tests and demonstrations 

enable the Team to further refine the Sensor CE 

standards and formats, while simultaneously assessing 

the implementation of the various Sensor CE services. 

Moreover, the Team continuously assesses the interface between the Sensor CE endeavor and the other 

Computing Environment Initiatives within the larger 

COE effort to ensure alignment is achieved, where 

required. 

As our Nation faces existing and emerging threats, and 

our Army readies itself to win in a complex world, improved situational awareness and a mastery of the battle space will become increasingly important. Sensor 

CE’s pursuit of comprehensive sensor interoperability, 

and its myriad and significant benefits, will be integral 

to the Army’s ability to access, apply, and unlock the 

full potential of sensor data to take decisive action and 

ensure combat overmatch. 

__________________________________

Mr. Clair Guthrie is the Army’s Common Operating 

Environment (COE) Sensor Computing Environment lead 

responsible for providing interoperability for 46 Army sensor 

and Command and Control (C2) systems. Guthrie holds a 

MS in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces; a MS in Systems Engineering from 

George Mason University; and a Mechanical Engineering 

BA, cum laude from West Virginia University. Guthrie has 

worked for the Army (ASA(ALT) and PEO IEW&S), Navy 

(NAVSEA and PEO IWS), and the Private Sector as Vice 

President of Engineering for Advanced Acoustic Concepts.

Dr. Christina Bates provides contract support to various 

organizations within the Army Acquisition and Research, 

Development, and Engineering Communities including 

the Project Manager Terrestrial Sensors and the Night 

Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate as a strategic 

analyst, planner, and strategic communications expert. 

Bates holds a PhD in Communication with an emphasis 

on Organizational Communication and Behavior from 

Arizona State University; a MS with distinction from 

Boston University; a JD from Boston University; and a 

BA, cum laude from Boston College. She is also a Lean Six 

Sigma Master Black Belt.

HONORABLE MENTION

Disruptive Technology: 

Managing its Potential 

Impact on Future Army 

Operations

By CPT(P) Hassan M. Kamara

Program Executive Office 

Missiles and Space 

“As we look ahead, many potential adversaries will have 

greater access to sophisticated and disruptive technologies 

that could greatly complicate our operations. We cannot 

afford to let technological change level our advantage in any 

potential conflict.” 1

–The Honorable Heidi Shyu

Introduction

This paper studies the potential influence of disruptive 

technology on future Army operations and the Soldier 

from a historical perspective. It provides insight into 

how Army and Acquisition Corps leaders can hedge 

against technical surprise in future operations. The 

adversaries of the United States will continue to 

seek innovative ways to disrupt its technological 

dominance in land warfare. Shawn Brimley and his 

co-authors concur that “during the next decade, the 
— 15 —

rise of new powers and the accelerating diffusion of 

advanced technology throughout the international 

system will pose significant challenges to U.S. technological dominance in military affairs.”2

 This raises the 

question: how can the U.S. Army manage emerging 

technology to prevent technical surprise and complications to future operations? Using the U.S. interwar 

period (1918-1941) as its case study the paper examines how emerging technology was managed in that 

era to inflict technical surprise, and derives lessons to 

help the U.S. Army hedge against technical surprise in 

future operations.

This U.S. interwar period is an excellent case for 

studying disruptive technology to gain lessons for 

the present because it is similar to the contemporary 

period in terms of military resource constraints and 

the rapid evolution of technology. John Peters and his 

co-authors agree with this comparison, and write that 

“the adversaries and the missions that the Army must 

be prepared for are more ambiguous and diverse than 

at any time since the period between the World Wars. 

Additionally, the pace of technological advance...

presents a number of challenges, including preventing 

technical surprise.”3 Peter Singer also concurs, and 

wrote that “just as submarines, tanks, and airplanes 

disrupted tactics, doctrine and organizational identity 

in the early 20th century, so today we are struggling 

with deep changes wrought by the likes of drones, 

cyber and lasers.”4

What is Disruptive Technology?

For clarity the paper defines disruptive technology 

as the type which U.S. rivals can manage to gain 

tactical, operational and even strategic capabilities— 

previously only accessible and afforded by the better 

funded U.S. military—to shift the paradigm of American arms superiority. This definition is consistent 

with Clayton Christensen’s definition of disruptive innovation as one that “allows a whole new population 

of consumers at the bottom of a market access to a 

product or service that was historically only accessible 

to consumers with a lot of money or a lot of skill.”5

Management is central to a technology becoming 

disruptive. Carey Wagen concurs in writing that disruptive technology “is defined not by the nature of the 

innovation itself, but by the way in which dominant 

organizations mismanage technology that eventually 

becomes a mortal threat.”6 In other words, in land 

operations advanced armies sometimes tend to reject 

or under-invest in certain technologies because it fails 

to meet their mission and priorities, meanwhile their 

less resourced rivals seeking to offset their superiority 

in arms exploit such technologies and change the 

paradigm of land operations.

Disruptive Technology in the Interwar Period

Disruptive technology can be managed to shift existing paradigms and complicate Army operations. This 

happened during the interwar period when emerging 

tank technology was managed by the German Army 

in a way that complicated U.S. Army and Allied 

operations in World War II (WWII). Following WWI, 

the German Army (Reichswehr), integrated emerging 

tank technology with emerging aircraft, artillery and 

communications technology into doctrinal and organizational reforms. This was done amidst the economically crippling war reparation payments and military 

sequestration mandates of the 1919 Versailles Treaty. 

According to James Corum, in Germany “the new 

technology that came out of the First World War was 

given a primary place in the new operational doctrine; 

the relatively large-scale armor operations, that is, 

tank attacks in regimental strength, were foreseen as 

being an important part of the new maneuver war.”7 

Germany circumvented Versailles Treaty restrictions 

on Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

and established the equivalent of Program Executive 

Offices in foreign countries to develop emerging tank 

technology among others. Corum wrote that through 

a special acquisition’s directorate in the General Staff 

(Special Group R or Sondergruppe R) the German 

Army funded and managed tank and aircraft programs 

in Russia—operating development and test centers 

like the one in Kazan.8 These efforts produced some 

of the highly effective battlefield systems Germany 

used to complicate allied operations in WWII like the 

Panzer MkIV tank.

In contrast, during the interwar period the U.S. Army 

struggled to manage emerging tank technology into 

something disruptive of the WWI defensive, light 

infantry centric operational paradigm. According to 

Millett and his co-authors, “Congress and the General 

Staff agreed that tanks should support infantry, the 

decisive arm in combat, so tank units joined the 

regular infantry for training. The doctrine for tank 
— 16 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

use remained wedded to the concepts (and speed) of 

infantry combat.”9 Perhaps fixated on the clumsiness 

of the nascent tanks, Army leaders had difficulty 

visualizing the technology’s disruptive potential like 

their German counterparts, so they opted for gradual 

developments grounded in the light infantry centric 

existing (WWI) operational paradigm. 

It is worth noting that some Officers challenged the 

management of tank technology in the U.S. Army 

during the interwar era. As a Field Grade Officer in 

the mid-1920s, Dwight Eisenhower disagreed with 

the Army’s management of tank technology. Eisenhower saw greater potential for the tank, and believed 

that “by making good use of the terrain in advance, 

tanks could break into the enemy’s defensive positions, 

cause confusion...[and] make possible not only advance by infantry but envelopments.”10 Consequently, Eisenhower and his colleague George S. Patton 

Jr. experimented with the tank and published their 

findings in the Infantry and Cavalry journals.11 Both 

future generals were reprimanded by the Commander of the Infantry School, Major General Charles S. 

Farnsworth—Eisenhower wrote that “I was told that 

my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous and that 

henceforth I was to keep them to myself. Particularly, 

I was not to publish anything incompatible with solid 

infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be hauled before 

a court-martial. George, I think, was given the same 

message.”12 

The difference in the management of emerging tank 

technology during the interwar period would adversely impact the American Soldier in the Army’s first tank 

battle with its German counterpart in North Africa. 

John Muller wrote that in the 1942 Battle of Happy 

Valley, the U.S. Army fielded the 1941 M3 Stuart medium tank, while the German Army fielded the heavy 

1939 Panzer Mk IV tanks, which had a larger 75mm 

main gun and rolled cast iron frontal armor.13

U.S. Army First Lieutenant Freeland A. Daubin Jr of 

the 1st Regiment, 1st Armored Division, wrote that 

he and “his loader picked out one particular Mk.IV 

tank ... then pumped more than eighteen rounds 

[from the Stuart’s 37mm “squirrel rifles”] at the Jerry 

[German] tank...which ricocheted harmlessly off its 

armor.” Daubin added that “the effect of the Mk. IV’s 

long 75mm gun on the Stuart” blew him out of his 

tank turret and killed his crew.14 The resource constrained German Army’s management of tank technology during the interwar period clearly complicated 

U.S. Army operations in North Africa during WWII. 

According to Muller, the Army adapted—“American armored divisions...featured far too many light 

tanks. The use of light tanks was reevaluated, taking 

the Tunisian experience into account. By the time of 

the Normandy invasion, light tanks had been drastically reduced in number and reassigned to the role of 

reconnaissance.”15

Insights from the Past

How the German and U.S. Army managed emerging 

tank technology in the interwar era to impact the paradigm of land warfare yields some insights for today’s 

Army leaders and the Acquisition Corps (AAC). This 

historic experience yields lessons for current efforts at 

managing the risk of disruptive technology to future 

army operations. 

The German Army saw great potential for emerging tank technology and so developed a doctrine to 

promote and harness both near and long term tank 

development. This resulted in superior tanks, and 

combined arms forces that shifted the paradigm of 

WWI army operations. According to Mike Sherry, the 

U.S. Army’s Armored Force commander, Maj. Gen. 

Adna R. Chaffee, noted to Congress in April 1941 

Figure 1: German Panzer Mk IV16 [that] “The success of the German armored tactics has 
— 17 —

as we know been great and has rendered obsolete the 

tactical procedures of WWI.”18

Army and Acquisition Corps leaders should continue 

to emulate this dual near and long term approach to 

managing the potential of emerging technology. In 

2012 Ms Shyu “advocated an integrated approach 

to modernization aimed at harnessing near-term 

emerging capability able to quickly benefit the force 

while also emphasizing Basic Research able to identify 

potentially paradigm-changing technologies for the 

future.”19 This approach will help guard against operational complications from adversarial use of disruptive 

technology by harnessing such technology into the 

hands of the U.S. Soldier.

The German Army proved more willing than the U.S. 

Army to boldly adjust its frame of reference for land 

warfare based on emerging military technology in the 

interwar period. Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras 

define frames of reference as “the complex knowledge structures we develop through personal and 

professional experiences that influence—and often 

limit—the way we approach issues.”20 This is vital to 

managing emerging technology. According to James 

Corum, the Reichswehr Chief of Staff Hans Von 

Seekct believed WWI proved maneuver was superior 

to firepower, and he visualized emerging technology 

turning future war into a largely mechanized, highspeed maneuver affair.21 This resulted in doctrinal 

change that fostered disruptive development of tank 

technology. 

The cognitive ability of today’s Army and Acquisition 

leaders to adjust existing frames of reference vis a 

vis the potential of emerging drone, cyber and other 

technology is key to making the latter disruptive, and 

maintaining the Army’s operational dominance. For 

the Army and its Acquisition Corps to act on obsolescence of cherished programs of record and identify and boldly mature potential paradigm-shifting 

technologies, leaders at all levels have to continue to 

cultivate the ability to change prevailing (orthodox) 

frames of reference. 

Conclusion

As a consequence of globalization and rapid technological evolution, the current and future adversaries 

of the United States will continue to gain access 

and afford technologies that could disrupt existing 

paradigms and potentially complicate U.S. Army 

operations like they did in WWII. However, with 

dynamic management of emerging technologies the 

U.S. Army can hedge against complications to future 

operations by its adversaries, and preserve its technological advantage.

____________

Endnotes

1 Heidi Shyu as quoted in “Shyu outlines strategic modernization planning 

approach,” Kris Osborn, U.S. Army, accessed 1 August, 2015, http://www.

army.mil/article/89846/

2 Shawn Brimley, Ben FitzGerald and Kelley Sayler, “Game Changers: Disruptive Technology and U.S. Defense Strategy,” Center for a New American 

Security, September 2013, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/

CNAS_Gamechangers_BrimleyFitzGeraldSayler_0.pdf, 7

3 John Peters et. al, “A Methodology For Developing Army Acquisition 

Strategies For An Uncertain Future,” RAND, last modified March 18, 

2014, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2007/

RAND_MG532.sum.pdf. 2.

4 Peter W. Singer, “Lessons on Defense Strategy from the Interwar Years,” 

Armed Forces Journal, (August 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/

articles/2013/08/strategic-defense-reform-singer.

5 Clayton Christensen, “Disruptive Innovation,” accessed August 2, 2015, 

http://www.claytonchristensen.com/key-concepts/#sthash.el6GkTaz.dpuf.

6 Carey M. Wagen, “Twenty-First Century Defense and Disruptive Innovation,” U.S. Army War College, March 22, 2012, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/

oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA563406, 3.

7 James S. Corum, “A Comprehensive Approach to Change: Reform in the 

German Army in the Interwar Period,” in The Challenge of Change: 

Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941, edited by Harold 

R. Winton and David R. Mets (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 

2000)42.

8 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans Von Seeckt and the German 

Military Reform (University Press of Kansas, 1992), 98.

9 Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski and William B. Feis, For the Common 

Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York : 

Free Press, 2012), 358-359.

10 Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I tell to Friends, (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1967), 169.

Figure 2: M3 Stuart Tank - U.S. Army17
— 18 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

11 Eisenhower, At Ease, 171-172. Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I 

tell to Friends, (New York: Doubleday & Company Inc, 1967), 172.

12 John M. Muller, “Ronsons, Zippos, Brew-Ups, and Tommycookers: The M4 

Sherman Tank and American Armored Development during World War 

II,” University of Texas at Arlington - Open Access Theses, Last modified 07 

August, 2013, https://uta-ir.tdl.org/uta-ir/handle/10106/11090, 48.

13 Freeland A. Daubin Jr.,“The Battle of Happy Valley,” quoted in Ronsons, 

Zippos, Brew-Ups, and Tommycookers: The M4 Sherman Tank and 

American Armored Development during World War II, John M. Muller, 

University of Texas at Arlington - Open Access Theses, Last modified 07 

August, 2013, https://uta-ir.tdl.org/uta-ir/handle/10106/11090, 49.

14 John M. Muller, “Ronsons, Zippos, Brew-Ups, and Tommycookers: The M4 

Sherman Tank and American Armored Development during World War 

II,” University of Texas at Arlington - Open Access Theses, Last modified 07 

August, 2013, https://uta-ir.tdl.org/uta-ir/handle/10106/11090, 50.

15 Armed Forces History Museum, “Top Ten Tanks of WWII,” 18 April, 2012, 

http://armedforcesmuseum.com/top-ten-tanks-of-wwii/.

16 U.S. Veterans Memorial Museum, “M3 Stuart,” accessed 14 August, 2015 

http://www.memorialmuseum.org/displays/tanks/item/m3-stuart.

17 Mark D. Sherry, “Armored Force Organization,” in A History of Innovation: U.S. Army Adaptation in War and Peace, edited by Jon T. Hoffman, 

Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 2009, http://www.history.

army.mil/html/books/innovation/History_of_Innovation.pdf. 51

18 Heidi Shyu as quoted in “Shyu outlines strategic modernization planning 

approach,” Kris Osborn, U.S. Army, accessed 1 August, 2015, http://www.

army.mil/article/89846/.

19 Stephen J. Gerras, Leonard Wong, “Changing Minds in the Army: Why it is 

so difficult and What to do about it,” Strategic Studies Institute - U.S. Army 

War College, October 28, 2013, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.

mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1179, 6.

20 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans Von Seeckt and the German 

Military Reform (University Press of Kansas, 1992)38.

__________________________________

CPT(P) Hassan Kamara is a basic branch Armor Officer, 

and an Assistant Program Manager in the Patriot Advanced 

Capability-3 Product Office, Lower Tier Project Office, 

PEO Missiles and Space. He commanded an Armor Company (C Company, 1-37AR, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st 

Armored Division) in Iraq, and graduated with honors from 

the U.S. Naval War College Command and Staff Course 

in March 2015. CPT(P) Kamara has a Bachelor of Arts 

in Political Science from Arizona State University. He also 

holds a Certificate in Defense Procurement and Contracting 

and a Master of Arts in Security Studies - Strategic Studies 

from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. 

Category: Innovation

WINNER

Acquiring the Unknown

By Dr. Kurt T. Preston

Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Research & Technology

Abstract: This essay notes that it has been seventy 

years since The Endless Frontier was published, a 

highly successful report that at the end of World 

War II established the central construct of basic and 

applied research within the federal research establishment. This essay suggests that while the linear 

thinking of The Endless Frontier was successful in the 

industrial era, we no longer live in a linear world and 

that assembly line analogy it represents needs reconsideration. 

“If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old.” 

–Peter F. Drucker 

2015 marks seventy years since Vannevar Bush in his 

report, the “Endless Frontier,” set out the construct of 

basic followed by applied research as the fundamental 

process for scientific innovation. As brilliant as the 

ideas were and remain to some extent, the purpose of 

his report was to convince an audience of a by-gone 

era to the merit of funding scientific research. His 

audience were the people of the industrial age where 

the assembly line was the dominant symbol of technology and efficiency. As such his theme of intellectual 

linearity resonated with their experience. Having just 

emerged victorious from World War II in large part 

due to the innovations rolling off American assembly lines, his audience was familiar with the scene of 

automobiles, tanks, and airplanes, advancing along 

sequential steps serviced by largely unrelated teams 

toward a finished product. One team would build the 

chassis, another install the drive train, another the 

engine, another the seats and interior, etc., etc., down 

the line until a car, tank, or other innovation popped 

out off the assembly line. 
— 19 —

Bush’s successful premise was that ideas advance in a 

similar assembly line manner. In his argument, innovation begins with the raw material of basic research, 

is processed into applied research, and is further 

refined by testing and evaluation. One wonders, given 

his genius, whether he understood this description of 

linearity to be suspect, but clearly his argument was 

compelling and useful. It provided those unfamiliar 

with science with an analogy sufficiently familiar to 

encourage support of scientific research. 

The analogy remains powerful to this day. It remains 

the central tenant of scientific innovation entry into 

the acquisition process and, as such, ensures that ideas 

developed within the defense laboratory structure 

wind their way down an assembly line of knowledge, 

passing from one worker or team to another until they 

arrive “fully demonstrated, evaluated, and tested” and 

ready to enter the acquisition process. 

The problem with analogies, especially powerful analogies, is that they trap the mind and thereby limit the 

examination of alternatives. We no longer live in the 

elegant world of the sequential intellectual processes 

and innovation. Disruptive innovation may especially 

be temporally non-linear. Nonetheless, the maturation 

structure of our scientific and technological development remains highly linear. The principal products of 

basic research are the experimental results reported to 

the scientific literature. The department’s laboratories 

then execute the requirements driven research that 

represents the next step on the assembly line. Finally, 

innovation may roll through the development centers 

to another person or groups of individuals and on to 

possible entry into the acquisition process. 

Given that it has been 70 years, perhaps it is time to 

entertain alternative analogies and non-linear methods 

for the development of innovation within the science 

and technology enterprise. One alternative is the idea 

of the champion innovator. Today research program 

managers generally stay within the domain of their 

particular research area for their entire career. In contrast, a champion innovation path would be a career 

path whereby bench engineers and basic research 

scientists would transition not only their ideas, but 

their person along with the innovation to the next 

development level and potentially all the way through 

the acquisition process. In this way, they would share 

their technical insight with others and pick up skills 

and knowledge along the way. Similar to an overseas 

assignment, perhaps an individual who champions an 

innovation might be given something similar to overseas return rights should their innovation fail along 

the way and they find themselves in foreign quarter 

of the acquisition enterprise and a long way from 

where they started. In the academic setting, particularly active faculty members commonly perform basic 

research, applied research, and create commercial or 

pursue commercial application through testing and 

evaluation simultaneously. In their case, the academic 

setting and the 9-month academic contract provides 

the opportunity for a soft-landing and restart if their 

idea fails to mature. 

Other constructs which bear consideration include 

fast failure, this approach would allow for increased 

opportunities to pursue so called, “wacky” ideas by 

providing seed funding and time for high risk innovation. In a sense the Army provides limited opportunities of this nature to university basic researchers 

through short term, innovating research (STIR) grants 

for less than 3-months and $50,000. Innovative fast 

failure has conceptually been around for a while, and 

is currently somewhat of a buzz word. It may also 

sound similar to in-house, laboratory independent 

research efforts. Nonetheless, current seed funding 

activities should be analyzed and reviewed with an eye 

toward optimization for high risk innovation. 

Finally, one might examine the nature of the “Pasteur’s 

Quadrant” which argues that “researchers are motivated simultaneously by expanding understanding 

and increasing our abilities (technological, including 

medicine) to improve the world.” One suspects that 

DOD researchers are already so motivated, but the 

implications of this construct in the organization of 

the research enterprise requires further examination. 

Returning to the idea of transitioning the person, as 

well as the idea, the “Pasteur’s Quadrant” idea might 

organizationally be represented by a vertical career 

path that once or twice in their career conveys the 

bench scientist or engineer through the acquisition 

process or a portion thereof. 

The bottom line is that it has been seventy years since 

the Endless Frontier was published. Perhaps the old 

model is the best model. On the other hand, perhaps 
— 20 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

it is time to think hard about new models for science 

and technology. As Drucker said, “If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old.” 

__________________________________

Dr. Kurt T. Preston is the Deputy Director of the Innovation Enablers Portfolio and the US Army Corps of Engineers, 

Engineering Research and Development Center’s Liaison to 

the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Research & Technology, ODASA (RT). He recently returned 

to federal service after two and a half years as the Associate 

Vice Chancellor for Research in the Office of Research and 

Economic Development at the University of Nebraska - 

Lincoln (UNL) where he led faculty development efforts to 

improve research competitiveness. Before joining UNL, he 

served as the Chief of the Army Research Office’s Environmental Science Division. He is a retired lieutenant colonel 

with over 20 years of combined active and reserve component duty.

HONORABLE MENTION

Acquisition Courage: The Advent of 

the Army Smartphone

(AKA: How to save 

a billion dollars and 

change the Army)

By Jason Regnier

Program Executive Office Soldier

I remember the day it happened—a sweltering day 

in 2011—even worse inside the Pentagon. The Vice 

Chief of Staff of the Army was at a systems acquisition 

review for Ground Soldier Ensemble and you could 

tell by his body language and clenched fists that he 

had something to say. We had completed page 1 of 

the 47 page briefing describing the, size, weight, power, cost and schedule status when he said:

“Stop. This is what I want.” 

GEN Chiarelli held up his smartphone. He had 

flipped ahead of the briefer to see the current stats: 11 

lbs of electronics, 12 watts burning, and all for only 

$45,000. This got a dismounted leader networked 

situational awareness and mission command (SA/

MC) system on dark rainy nights. Priceless, but too 

heavy. He looked at what a year of intense DOD-level 

competition had produced as a replacement for the 

canceled Land Warrior and did not like what he saw. 

He knew that despite being a canceled program, it was 

one of the busiest programs in the Army because the 

leaders wanted the capability. The Product Manager 

at the time, LTC Brian Cummings, had demonstrated the power of dismounted Situational Awareness/

Mission Command and kept the program in production and deployment a full year after cancellation to 

support deployed Warfighters. 

We Cannot Do That, Can We?

“Why is the system so heavy? Is this the best the military can do? Look at what commercial industry has 

done with smartphones. What is stopping us?”

The program office and the TRADOC Capability 

Manager for Soldier knew why: it was the age-old 

DOD/Army requirements and specifications for a ruggedized military computer systems capable of working 

in all environments. These key attributes ultimately 

drove the size, weight, power and cost (SWAP-C), 

which made us nervous because we knew he knew 

that. Plus, we were still only on page one of the briefing. We could tell it would be a long day.

Undaunted, GEN Chiarelli asked us to be specific as 

to what were the main requirements that drove the 

SWAP-C. We told him the environmental and electromagnetic factors drove most of it. Specifically, the system had standard systems’ requirements for it to work 

from -20C to +55C, to go underwater for 2 meters for 

30 minutes, survive a nuclear blast EMP, and....

“Stop right there,” he said. “Does the Soldier go underwater two meters for 30 minutes?”

“Well, no sir,” we replied. “That would be silly; he 

would be dead. Frankly, I’m not sure the dismounted Soldiers would do so well against a nuclear blast 

either.”

“Then why do we require it?” he asked.

“Because we always have,” was the only answer we 

could offer. We laughed to ourselves and thought that 

his heart is in the right place, but he cannot possibly 
— 21 —

change what Department of Defense requirements 

have mandated for four decades. Besides, these are 

JROC-approved requirements for Ground Soldier 

Ensemble. The Army does not get to change JROC 

requirements. But, GEN Chiarelli had a curveball to 

throw:

“You tell me what I need to change, and I’ll change it.” 

Over the Plate it Comes, What Now?

The briefing ended on page 1. It took great courage for 

a four-star general to make such a bold statement, but 

he had three things going for him. First, he was a believer in the system. Second, the Army had created the 

“Configuration Steering board” and he was looking to 

use it. Third, he was right. As the meeting ended in 

what we thought was either an opportunity or disaster, 

GEN Chiarelli had one final comment: “Good work. 

I look forward to your recommendations for requirements changes in one month.” One other recommendation from Army leadership was to change the name, 

as recent news reporters said, “it conjures an image of 

a men’s singing group.”

After the meeting, my chief engineer pointed out 

that the real issues in the requirements are related 

to the myriad DOD environmental test standards 

and regulations. I said “That’s the problem.” He said, 

“No, that’s not the problem. If they were statute, that 

would be the problem. Statues cannot be waived. 

Regulations can be waived by the right person.” GEN 

Chiarelli was the right person and he had the ball in a 

four seam grip. 

The idea that dismounted Soldiers need ruggedized 

computers for tactical use was a commonly held belief. 

Requirements for tactical computers tended to focus 

on robust exteriors, EMP hardening, and waterproofing, with less emphasis on ergonomics, user interface, 

or ease-of-use. With the introduction of smartphones, 

a radical new world of microcomputing could keep 

up with Moore’s Law at no cost to the Army, and be 

capable of supporting Soldiers in the tactical fight. 

Was that tradeoff for cost, weight and environmental 

factors worth it? Another key fact: while the Army 

had put $30 million into three competing contracts 

for a next generation Land Warrior, Google, Samsung, Motorola, and Apple had produced dual-core 

smart devices for $500. It was literally cheaper to have 

almost 100 spares for each Nett Warrior than to have 

one single unit built by the defense industry. How 

could the Army compete with that? 

The Configuration Steering Board: What’s in a 

Name?

The Army convened a Configuration Steering Board a 

few months later, in which we detailed what could be 

traded in order to get to smartphones as the basic unit. 

One thing that could not be traded was the need for 

secret certification. That presented a challenge because 

no phones were made in the US and almost all the 

code for Android and other systems was written in 

places like India, Vietnam, and China. In the newspapers were stories of hackers getting into Paris Hilton’s 

personal phone and no one seemed safe. However, if 

the VCSA could find a way to waive the requirements 

and call the environmental requirements’ bluff, we 

would still have to find a way to make the system secret. GEN Chiarelli approved the CSB briefing which 

detailed the requirement changes, the associated risks, 

limitations and most importantly the advantages of 

smartphones as a Soldier-mounted computer. The key 

was that none of the cost-drivers were listed in the 

language of the Joint Staff Approved Key Performance 

Parameters. It turns out that the Army could change 

some system attributes through a CSB, especially 

those that drove cost, weight size or the environmental 

regulation. This was his curveball.

Several months later, on the Army’s birthday, the 

Ground Soldier Ensemble’s singing career ended as 

it was renamed after COL Robert Nett, a World War 

Two Medal of Honor winner.

How About A Billon Dollar Savings?

The moment GEN Chiarelli approved the actions 

from the briefing, he personally saved the Army and 

the American taxpayers $882 million over the lifecycle, and $440 million went back to Army coffers 

that day. It was a monumental risk, and took great 

courage on his part, but he believed in the concept. 

Going this commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) route, as 

we have all been promised for years, was not without 

risk. Every Christmas, new phones came out and we 

realized it would take almost a year per specific phone 

to get it certified for secret information storage. Every 

year and a half, though, the phones (which are functionally microcomputers) were twice as good, with 
— 22 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

double the processors, memory, or speed at the same 

cost. Plus, Soldiers really do fight where it is wet, cold, 

hot, and miserable, which are places where you would 

not want to take a $500 smartphone.

The COTS smartphone offered saving in another 

key area: user interface. Google and the rest had put 

billions behind it, and based on the explosive growth, 

they know even better than the Army what they are 

doing for human factors integration. Their bottom 

line depended on it. To meet the secret capability 

requirement, the Nett Warrior system runs a sanitized, 

DOD-approved version of the Android OS, meaning 

Soldier acceptance and familiarity is high. This, in 

turn, means New Equipment Training teams can 

spend less time on the basics of smartphone operation 

and more time on the additional tactical capabilities 

of Nett Warrior. The user interface is immediately familiar to anyone comfortable operating a smartphone, 

with virtually all operations possible with pressing, 

holding, and pinching, just as with a commercial 

smartphone. 

Is there an App for That?

In addition to ease of use, the Nett Warrior program 

has released a readily available Software Development Kit (SDK), meaning a number of applications 

can be developed. The program office had promised 

the Army that Nett Warrior would truly have open 

systems interfaces, with no proprietary restrictions, 

and that we would make it available at no cost to the 

rest of the Army. A dozen other microcomputer-based 

Army systems are now taking advantage of this 

Mobile/Hand-Held Computing Environment. This, 

in turn, means the system can also be upgraded and 

expanded without a major overhaul of the software architecture. Several examples include a ballistic calculator for snipers, Machine Foreign Language Translation, 

and a Tactical Video Viewer which will stream video 

from some Soldier-carried unmanned aircraft systems 

to the team leader, allowing a powerful battlefield 

awareness at the team level.

Who is Going to Hit the Home Run?

One last critical round of courage was required was 

on the part of the Army Staff; specifically, navigation 

of the approval authorities. The Nett Warrior system 

had not yet passed the Key Performance Parameters 

due to reliance on developing external systems. The 

program was at a key production milestone that 

needed a positive legal assessment by the AAE’s staff, 

agreement across DA staff, and the MDA’s personal 

confidence and final approval. Despite lacking enough 

data to pass, and the immaturity in related systems, 

one key person was able to show the program office 

how to manage navigation through the byzantine 

bureaucratic requirements, challenging obstacles, and 

staffing process of the Pentagon. There were tense days 

as we wound down to the Low Rate Initial Production 

decision, with acrimonious debate, and, fortunately, a 

critical guiding coach. 

Through sheer smarts, experience, and force of will, 

the critical player who came on the field and put his 

personal attention into getting Nett Warrior into the 

next phase was none other than MG Harry Greene, 

the ASA(AL&T) DASM at the time. He believed in 

the concept, and he believed he could convince the 

Pentagon lawyers, and he had the courage to bring it 

though. 

The Army owes a debt to both GEN Chiarelli and 

MG Greene that equals about a billion dollars overall, 

but for us, just the satisfaction of a job well done will 

be reward enough.

To my fellow product managers I offer this lesson: 

have the courage yourself to find the champions who 

are willing to do the right thing in Acquisition. It 

could make a billion dollar difference.

__________________________________

Mr. Jason Regnier has been the Deputy Product Manager 

for Nett Warrior since 2008, originally under then-LTC 

Brian Cummings, and again when BG Cummings returned 

as PEO Soldier. Mr. Regnier has been with the program 

from Milestone A through the successful Milestone C in 2012, 

which initiated the Low Rate Initial Production and three 

subsequent production decisions. Over 7,000 of the systems 

have been equipped and are in combat rotations around 

the world. The AAE recently approved a 2015 decision for 

almost 10,000 more through 2018 so he should have plenty 

to keep him busy except for an occasional Nats game.
— 23 —

Category: Lessons Learned

WINNER

Lessons Learned—Update of the UH60A/L Attitude Heading 

Reference Set (AHRS)

By Mark J. Jeude

Program Executive Office 

Aviation

Field failures of the Attitude 

Heading Reference Set (AHRS) on fielded UH-60A/L 

Black Hawk helicopters had the potential to impact 

the safe operation of over 1000 aircraft. This led the 

Utility Helicopters Project Office (UHPO) to form a 

Tiger Team to quickly mitigate this risk without negatively impacting the ability of the aircraft to perform 

its mission. This paper looks at the successes of this 

Tiger Team, and identifies Lessons Learned that may 

be applied in similar situations.

Helicopters such as the Black Hawk rely on gyros to 

provide heading and attitude references which are 

used by the pilot/co-pilot to safely operate the helicopter. The UH-60A/L Black Hawk originally used 

mechanical gyros to perform these functions. Obsolescence concerns led the UHPO and the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) to develop 

Fiber Optic Gyros (FOGs) as a replacement for the 

original mechanical gyros. The new gyros were implemented into the UH-60A/L as part of a dual Attitude 

Heading Reference Set (AHRS) installation, which 

were installed into 1042 Black Hawks by field units 

using a Maintenance Work Order (MWO).

In 2013 the UHPO started seeing an increase in the 

number of reports from the field identifying failures 

of both AHRS which affected the attitude indications 

on the pilot/co-pilot Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) and Vertical Situation Indicator (VSI). 

Loss of this critical information during Instrument 

Meteorological Condition (IMC) operations would 

create a hazard which could result in the loss of the 

aircraft. To ensure that a dual failure would not 

occur during IMC operations, the UHPO and the 

Aviation & Missile Life Cycle Management Command (AMCOM) issued a Safety of Flight message 

in May 2013 directing that all dual-AHRS equipped 

Black Hawks be converted into a more reliable “split” 

configuration (consisting of a single AHRS, a mechanical Roll Rate Gyro, and a mechanical Vertical 

Gyro). This initial phase (i.e., Phase I) of the AHRS 

risk mitigation effort was completed in February 2014, 

when the last UH-60A/L Black Hawks were reported to be in the approved, “split” configuration. The 

AHRS Tiger Team was formed in June 2013, and was 

tasked with identifying the path forward that would 

allow a quick return to the more reliable, dual AHRS 

installation; and with identifying a path forward to 

address all AHRS-related performance, reliability, 

and obsolescence issues to support the UH-60A/L 

for the rest of its life cycle. Team members included 

the Technical, Logistics, and Fleet Management staff 

from the UHPO; Northrup Grumman Italia (NGI), 

the manufacturer of the AHRS; the Aviation Engineering Directorate (AED); and CECOM’s Logistics and Readiness Center. The Tiger Team quickly 

identified the effort needing to be accomplished to 

allow the Black Hawk to continue performing its 

mission—develop a Backup Attitude Indicator (BAI) 

to provide improved system reliability, and conduct 

investigations to identify the AHRS failure modes and 

to develop appropriate fixes to address those failure 

modes (designated as Phase II); and determine the 

requirements the AHRS needed to meet to ensure 

it continued to perform safely while also addressing 

reliability, obsolescence, and other life cycle concerns 

(Phase III).

Working with the Aviation & Missile Research, Development & Engineering Center (AMRDEC) Prototype Integration Facility (PIF), the UHPO was able 

to quickly identify commercial BAIs that could meet 

the Black Hawk’s critical operational requirements; 

successfully integrate the BAI into the UH-60A/L; 

and perform testing to substantiate that the performance was satisfactory. Because of the uncertainty 

over the supportability of the commercial BAIs, the 

UHPO also worked to qualify an Emergency Standby 

Instrument System (ESIS) which would not only be 

fully provisioned, but would also be useable in the 

UH/HH-60M. This dual effort not only provided 

a BAI quickly, to address the immediate need, but 
— 24 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

also addressed the requirement that any equipment 

added to the UH-60A/L was fully qualified, reliable, 

and supportable throughout its life cycle. The BAI is 

currently operating on the UH-60L fleet of a Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) customer; the ESIS is scheduled 

to be qualified in November 2015.

Through extensive box-level evaluations and through 

flight testing, the Tiger Team was able to identify the 

failure modes that would need to be addressed to 

allow a dual AHRS configured aircraft to fly in IMC 

conditions. Testing was conducted by NGI at their 

facility; by the Communications-Electronics Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC); 

and by the UHPO through the Aviation Flight Test 

Directorate (AFTD) at Redstone Arsenal, AL. The 

testing and analysis led to the identification of the 

changes (in February 2014) that would need to be 

made to the AHRS. NGI incorporated the required 

changes into the AHRS, and provided test assets 

to CECOM which allowed final box- and aircraftlevel testing to begin at AFTD in March 2015. The 

thoroughness and accuracy of the investigation and 

redesign efforts were evident in that there were no 

critical failures or issues uncovered during the test 

program. Additional risk reduction testing started 

in June 2015, both at AFTD and by CERDEC, to 

obtain additional confidence in the updated AHRS, 

and to identify any potential field support issues prior 

to fielding of the new system. This testing is expected 

to be completed by November 2015, at which time 

the UHPO will be able to initiate fielding of the 

improved AHRS.

Phase III of the AHRS Tiger Team effort began in 

August 2015, with agreement between UHPO, AED, 

and CECOM on the requirements for the long-term 

solution. Because of the benefits realized from the 

performance of the Tiger Team on Phase II of the 

effort, the UHPO agreed to continue with the same 

team arrangement for the execution of Phase III. The 

ultimate successful execution of this Phase will ensure 

that the UH-60A/L Black Hawk will have an AHRS 

system that performs properly, allows for safe operation of the Black Hawk in IMC conditions; and 

meets the reliability and supportability levels that are 

required to allow the Black Hawk to continue meeting 

its mission requirements.

An assessment of the challenges and successes of the 

UHPO AHRS Tiger Team allows identification of 

three factors which, if given proper attention during 

the execution of efforts to address the safety of Army 

vehicles, will help ensure that the results of the efforts 

meet the expectations of the responsible office, as well 

as those of the warfighter.

The first lesson learned is to correctly identify shortterm and long-term goals. The UHPO Tiger Team 

separated the short-term goal to quickly mitigate the 

risk to the Soldier, from the long-term goal of providing a qualified, supportable system to address the 

life-cycle needs of the system. The requirements for 

Phase I were reduced to those that directly supported 

the need to immediately address the risk of the AHRS. 

Any additional requirements were placed on the later 

Phases of the effort. Because of the minimal number 

of Phase I requirements, the Tiger Team was able to 

quickly identify and implement a path forward that 

was executable. The field would have been exposed 

to the increase in risk for much longer had the Tiger 

Team attempted to first develop a “final” solution.

The second lesson learned is that the success of the 

AHRS Tiger team relied heavily on the ability to 

maintain consistent goals and objectives. Having clear 

and concise goals at the beginning of a project is helpful, but allowing stakeholders and customers to constantly change those goals throughout the effort will 

tend to keep the team from being successful. While 

it is to be expected that numerous opportunities will 

arise during the execution of an effort to revise the 

original goals and objectives, no changes should be 

made unless it can be shown that the change would 

clearly result in a benefit to achieving those goals and 

objectives. During the execution of the AHRS effort, 

the UHPO leadership engaged with stakeholders and 

customers on several occasions to remind them of the 

true goals and objectives of the effort, and to explain 

how their desired change would or would not improve the ability of the Tiger Team to achieve them. In 

almost all cases the originator of the requested change 

agreed that the change was not needed. Managing requirement “creep” in this way allowed the Tiger Team 

to operate efficiently by following the original plan 

of action, and not getting forced to make numerous 

revisions to the plan simply to satisfy desires that were 

not in keeping with the true needs of the Army.
— 25 —

Finally, a lesson about Obsolescence. When we transitioned from mechanical gyros to FOGs we consolidated the functions of five separate gyros into two units. 

While this approach was an improvement from a cost 

and reliability standpoint; it significantly increased the 

probability of total loss of attitude indications in the 

cockpit due to the consolidation in functions. No one 

did the analysis required to discover this issue until 

we started seeing dual failures in the field. This was because the program was run as an obsolescence update, 

which would normally be limited to form, fit and 

function replacement of components with no changes 

to core system architecture. The lesson learned is that 

system architectural changes must be fully analyzed 

and their impacts understood regardless of how they 

come about. Phase III of the AHRS effort is performing the detailed critical analysis of the system architecture to ensure that future changes to the AHRS 

addresses not only obsolescence but also ensures that 

the probability of loss of functionality is minimized to 

within acceptable limits.

In summary, the successes the AHRS Tiger team has 

had (and will continue to have) were made possible 

through the development of clear initial guidance; 

the discipline to manage changes to that original 

guidance; and from the empowerment and support 

provided to the Tiger Team by the leadership of the 

Project Office. The AHRS Tiger Team successes are a 

testament to the ability of a properly configured and 

managed team, even one with as diverse a membership as this team had, to achieve success in mitigating 

risks to which the warfighter is exposed, and by developing improved material that performs properly yet 

still is affordable from a weapon life-cycle perspective.

__________________________________

Mr. Mark J. Jeude has worked in Army Aviation for 

over 28 years. Mr. Jeude started in 1987 with the Aviation 

Systems Command in the Aviation Engineering Directorate, 

holding various positions including Chief, Propulsion Systems Branch, and Chief, Apache Systems Division. In 2007 

Mr. Jeude was selected as the Chief, Technical Management 

Division, Utility Helicopters Project Office, PEO Aviation, 

and in that role oversaw the technical effort associated with 

fielding of the UH/HH-60M Black Hawk, and initiation 

of the Improved Turbine Engine Program (ITEP) and the 

UH-60V (UH-60L Improved Cockpit) Program. In 2015 

Mr. Jeude was selected to be the Chief, Technical Management Division, for the new Improved Turbine Engine-Future Vertical Lift Project Office. 

HONORABLE MENTION

4 Ways to Improve Contract 

Support within the Operational 

Contract Support Framework 

A way forward for Operational Contract Support

By MAJ Eric Makepeace, U.S. 

Army Reserve

The goal for Operational Contract Support should be 

to better serve current (phase 0) operations, support 

annual training exercises, and prepare the theater for 

contingencies (wartime or natural disaster). Specifically DOD expeditionary contracting strategy should 

address repeating requirements, support long-range 

planning, upgrade infrastructure during exercises, and 

utilize “reach-back” contracting resources.

Overview

The U.S. military relies heavily on local contracting at 

overseas locations, just as it does for U.S. bases and it 

should apply the same successful contracting strategies 

in order to implement the Operational Contracting 

Joint Concept (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). The Department of Defense (DOD) needs to improve its expeditionary contracting strategy and manage the portfolio 

of contracts with a holistic view to improve quality, 

reduce administration and the potential for errors, and 

reap the benefits of economies of scale and best practices. Operational Contract Support (OCS) has three 

functional areas: support integration, contracting support, and contractor management (JP 4-10 Operational 

Contract Support, 2014). The goal for OCS should be 

to better serve current (phase 0) operations, support 

annual training exercises, and prepare the theater for 

contingencies (wartime or natural disaster). Specifically, DOD expeditionary contracting strategy should 

address repeating requirements, supporting long-range 

planning, upgrading infrastructure during exercises, 

and utilizing “reach-back” contracting resources.
— 26 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

1. Manage Repeating Requirements with Flexible Contracts

All bases large or small require similar services and 

supplies. These repeating requirements can be grouped 

and managed within roughly twenty (20) categories 

of commonly-used services and supplies, with one 

contract per region flexible enough to handle surges:

1. Life Support (Billeting, Meals, Laundry, Showers, Toilets, Hazmat, HVAC, Vector Control, 

etc.)

2. Power Generation (often separate from life 

support)

3. Water, Bottled

4. Water, Bulk (Supply & Delivery, Storage)

5. Fuel (Supply & Delivery, Storage, Fuel Coupons)

6. Barriers (Concrete T-walls, HESCO containers)

7. Cell Phones

8. NTVs (Rental Cars)

9. Trucking (Line Haul) and Bussing

10. Material Handling Equipment (MHE) and 

Heavy Equipment (bull dozers, etc.)

11. Force Protection (lights, Cameras, Dogs, Scanning equipment)

12. Shipping (DHL, FedEx)

13. Class IV Building Supplies (Wood, Electrical 

parts, gravel)

14. IT / Automation

15. Field Service Reps (Vehicle / Equipment Maintenance)

16. Gym Equipment

17. Furniture

18. Medical Equipment and Supplies

19. Other

Flexible contract types include Blanket Purchase 

Agreements (BPAs), Indefinite Contracts (IDIQ, 

IDID), and Basic Ordering Agreements (BOAs) (FAR 

Part 16). A flexible contract has a single parent contract managed by one Service/DOD entity’s contracting office. The beauty is that from this single contract, 

hundreds of orders for this item/service can be placed 

without the administrative burden of establishing a 

new contract.

In the parent contract there is a catalog or menu of 

items pre-negotiated for price, terms, and conditions. 

Orders can be placed for any item in the catalog for 

any service. Each order can come from any government service that transfer funds to the contracting 

officer. One rental car flexible contract can be established for an entire country and managed by the Lead 

Service for Contracting1. Then all other services can 

place orders against that rental car contract for their 

needs ( FAR Part 17.5 Interagency Acquisitions and 

Economy Act). The Army can establish an IDIQ 

contract and issue the first two (2) orders for Army 

vehicles, the 3rd order for Air Force vehicles, the 4th 

for Special Operations. Each order can have different 

catalog items, different dates, and different contacts. 

Additional items can be added to the catalog at any 

time through a contract modification to the base contract, so the Navy can have its favorite generator and 

the Air Force can have its favorite.

Reducing the number of overlapping contracts 

by multiple Services means less overall setup time 

(Procurement Acquisition Lead Time or PALT) which 

can take from several months to over a year to put a 

new service contract in place because of government 

contracting checks and balances.

Smaller services like the Marines and Special Operations just don’t have the timeline or bandwidth to 

write new contracts, so often they are under-supported or end up overpaying with government credit cards.

Global contracts already exist for several of these 

Contracting Categories and deploying units can order 

from these the same as if a local unit was the administrator. TRANSCOM has port stevedore contracts 

1

Lead Service for Contracting (LSC) and Lead Service for Contracting Coordination (LSCC) are two organizational constructs outlined in JP 

4-10 Operational Contract Support.
— 27 —

with MHE and line haul trucking. DLA-Energy has 

a fuel contracts that include the ability to order and 

place portable storage tanks within the area. The Army 

Corps of Engineers (USACE) has a global generator 

contract.

Flexible contracts also reduce the need to use Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) with the 

host nation military. ACSA has become a blight on acquisitions and is often frowned upon by the US State 

Department for its association with corruption and 

overpaying. ACSA is also a sore spot for the host-nation military who feel the US Military is overtaxing 

them for last minute logistical support.

By focusing on one common product or service, 

DOD can promote quality and install a feedback loop 

and bring best practices forward to every location 

and communicate lessons-learned back to contracting 

everywhere. Categories can be run like a program 

(and even a command) where one cell or Center of 

Excellence manages all Life Support Contracts everywhere (or Rental Cars or Heavy Equipment etc.), and 

contracting personnel in the field become liaisons to a 

more proficient support team back in CONUS.

With the U.S. specifying high quality products and 

services in their solicitations and contracts from 

lessons learned, local contractors will adapt quickly 

or lose work. Local companies want to “westernize” 

their processes and add high-quality projects to their 

portfolio, so they can take part in more high-profile 

and higher-revenue contracts.

2. Support Long-Range Planning

Expeditionary contract management should be treated 

like a program with hundreds of contracting projects 

to achieve the goal of setting the theater for contingencies. CONUS Air Force bases already have long 

range “Straddle Programs” that forecast the bases 

infrastructure needs 3 years, 7 years, 20 years into 

the future. They use a monthly planning meeting 

between Civil Engineering, Contracting, and Operations to manage the list of hundreds of future projects. 

Projects must meet design, approval and funding 

milestones in order to receive Fiscal Year funding and 

the list is re-prioritized at every meeting. Contingency 

locations should utilize engineering assets like USACE 

forward teams (FEST-A) and J4 Engineers to come 

up with long-range infrastructure goals. Then, this 

regionally-focused engineering team should break 

those massive “rebuild the airport” projects into 

manageable projects that meet current operational and 

training exercise needs; thus passing the bona-fide rule 

that contracting2 can only support existing requirements. Projects should be designed to come in lower 

than Military Construction (MILCON) spending 

threshold to eliminate the need to for congressional 

approval and USACE oversight (5-years minimum 

lead time). It would be difficult to justify rebuilding 

another country’s airport, but a plausible smaller 

project would be to build a new ramp and hangar and 

that better supports current flight operations and the 

annual special operations training exercise conducted 

jointly with the host nation.

A monthly meeting between USACE Engineers, J4 

Engineers, Operational Contract Support (OCS), 

Operations, and J8 Budgeting should be established 

to prioritize infrastructure projects and place them on 

the Fiscal Year Spend-Plan during Phase 0 operations. 

The first months of a new Patriot Battery deployment 

are expected to be austere, but after months and years, 

this emplacement should have the benefits of strategic 

planning to become more livable as well as more effective with drainage, gravel, overlapping protection barriers, HVAC, non-potable water well, better dinning 

facility, solar powered security lights, guard towers, 

RAID towers, MHE, on-site Field Service Reps, etc.

3. Exercise Contract Support During Exercises 

Exercises should also include exercising contract support planning and surging of existing contracts. Units 

should train the ability to “plug into” existing flexible 

contracts for logistical support. Trained units should 

write an Annex W Operational Contract Support to 

their operations order and submit for redlines to the 

Lead Service for Contracting and the Operational 

Contract Support Integration Center (OCSIC) (JP 

2

The Bona Fide Needs Rule is one of the fundamental principles of federal appropriations law. Simply stated, a “fiscal year appropriation may 

be obligated only to meet a legitimate, or bona fide, need arising in, or in some cases arising prior to, but continuing to exist in, the fiscal year 

for which the appropriation was made.” (The underlying statute is 31 U.S.C. § 1502(a)—HHS.gov)
— 28 —

Major General Harold J. “Harry” Greene Awards for Acquisition Writing

4-10 Operational Contract Support, 2014).

4. Utilize Reachback Contracting Resources

Deployed contracting and OCS personnel should utilize “reach-back” resources from ACC, DCMA, DLA, 

the Reserve, and others. These organizations have 

established reach-back cells and capabilities to support 

the small number of deployed acquisition professionals. Army Contracting Command (ACC-Rock Island) 

supports Life Support contracts and close-outs (Jake 

Adrien and Andrea Kalb, 2014). The Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA) supported 

Iraq and Afghanistan wars with contract negotiations 

and administration. JCASO teams from DLA have 

assisted commands with temporary staff augmentation to implement OCS and stand up an Operational 

Contract Support Integration Center (OCSIC).

The Army Reserve has two contracting battalions and 

a detachment of DCMA personnel under the 977 

Sustainment Command ready to deploy as Contingency Contract Teams. Most of these personnel are 

working as GS civilians in government contracting 

with qualifications and experience that surpass most 

active-duty contracting officers. Reserve Contracting 

Officers are capable, ready, and willing to assist the 

war-fighter and the overwhelmed, deployed expeditionary contracting officer.

Summary 

Current expeditionary contracting is a mixed bag 

with some overseas bases excelling while others are 

under-supported and without surge capacity in their 

contracts and therefore without surge capacity in 

their logistical support and infrastructure. The goal 

for OCS should be to better serve current (phase 0) 

operations, support annual training exercises, and prepare the theater for contingencies (wartime or natural 

disaster).

____________

References

FAR Part 17.5 Interagency Acquisitions and Economy Act. (n.d.). FAR 

Subpart 17.5-Interagency Acquisitions . Retrieved from https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/current/far/html/Subpart%2017_5.html

AACoE. (n.d.). Army Acquisition Center of Excellence (AACoE). Retrieved 

from http://asc.army.mil/web/organization/aacoe/

DLA-Energy. (n.d.). Bulk Petroleum Contract Awards . Retrieved from 

http://www.energy.dla.mil/bulk_petroleum/Pages/Contract_Awards.aspx

DPAP. (n.d.). Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy. Retrieved from 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/

FAR Part 16. (n.d.). Types of Contracts. Retrieved from Federal Acquisition 

Regulation: http://farsite.hill.af.mil/

Jake Adrien and Andrea Kalb. (2014, 6 17). Finding Closure. Retrieved 

from Army Contracting Command -- Rock Island: http://www.army.mil/

article/150681/Finding_Closure/

JCASO. (n.d.). Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO). 

Retrieved from http://www.dla.mil/JCASO/Pages/default.aspx

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2013, October 7). Operational Contract Support 

Joint Concept. Retrieved from Program Support, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense: http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/ocs/joint_concept/

OCS_Joint_Concept_Exec_Summary_public_Oct2013.pdf

Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2014). Joint Publications 4-10 Operational Contract 

Support. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JP 4-10 Operational Contract Support. (2014). Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Sandbook. (2013). CCR 415-1. United States Corpse of Engineers (USACE).

USTRANSCOM. (n.d.). Contracts. Retrieved from http://www.transcom.

mil/foia/contracts.cfm

William Cooley and Brian Ruhm. (2014). A Guide for DOD Program 

Managers. Defense Acquisition University (DAU).

__________________________________

MAJ Eric Makepeace is an Army Reserve Contracting 

Officer (51C) currently deployed in the Horn of Africa 

(HOA). In 2013 he deployed to Jordan as the Operational Contracting Support Officer and helped set the theater 

for current operations and contingencies, using the concepts he wrote about in this whitepaper. He trained with 

the 45th Contracting Squadron, Patrick AFB Florida 

(The largest base contracting budget in the Air Force). An 

MIT graduate, MBA, PMP, and EIT, MAJ Makepeace 

has a diverse background in IT and construction project 

management with hundreds of projects in dozens of states 

and countries. Africa will allow him to put his contract 

planning concepts into action again.