www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 259 1 

Strategic Relevance

Over the last several years, examination of U.S. national security 

interests within the context of the global commons has emerged 

as a major policy issue in the defense community.2 At the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), there is now an awareness 

that the U.S. military will be confronted by a host of challenges “to stability 

throughout the global commons.”3 Furthermore, the Nation can “expect to 

be increasingly challenged in securing and maintaining access to the global 

commons and must also be prepared for operations in unfamiliar conditions 

and environments.”4 In response, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report

has now assigned “assured access” to the commons as a top priority for U.S. 

military forces.5

As defined by DOD, the global commons comprise the geographic and 

virtual realms of “space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace.”6

They are a subset of the broader maritime, aerospace, and cyber domains, deriving their existence from the notion of areas that are accessible to all but 

owned by none. The term global commons originated in the civilian sector, where 

it evolved as a collective label for the areas of “Antarctica, the high seas and 

deep seabed minerals, the atmosphere, and space.”7 The rationale for combining these four physically distinct entities under the rubric of global commons 

stems from their shared attribute of being “resource domains to which all nations have legal access.”8

 Unifying them into the higher level construct known 

as the global commons provides the commercial and legal communities with a 

Global Commons and 

Domain Interrelationships: 

Time for a New Conceptual 

Framework? 

by Mark E. Redden and Michael P. Hughes

Strategic Forum National Defense University

Cente

r fo

r St

rategi

c ReSEARCH

About the Authors

Captain Mark E. Redden, USN, and 

Colonel Michael P. Hughes, USAF, are 

Senior Military Fellows in the Center 

for Strategic Research, Institute for 

National Strategic Studies, at the 

National Defense University.

Key Points

◆ The global commons, viewed as 

the essential conduits of U.S. national power in a rapidly globalizing and increasingly interconnected world, have taken on an added 

degree of importance for the U.S. 

defense planning community over 

the last several years.1

◆ Increasing challenges to the U.S. 

military are making access and 

freedom of action in the global 

commons more problematic. Least 

recognized and understood of 

these planning challenges are the 

domain interrelationships within 

the commons.

◆ The traditional approach to 

military concept development 

for the global commons has been 

domain-centric (maritime, air, 

space, and so forth). This planning construct, one of geographic 

“stovepipes,” does not properly 

account for the complexities of 

domain interrelationships.

◆ A new military planning paradigm 

that properly accounts for the full 

extent of domain interrelationships is required. This paradigm 

must fully quantify these interrelationships and seek synergies and 

leverage in military operations by 

exploiting the overlap of domains.

October 2010
2 SF No. 259 www.ndu.edu/inss

methodology for addressing cross-cutting issues among 

a diverse set of geographies.

The global commons are seen as the essential conduits of U.S. national power in a rapidly globalizing and 

increasingly interconnected world. The heritage of the 

commons’ strategic importance can be traced back as 

least as far as Alfred Thayer Mahan, who highlighted the 

relationship between maritime power and the ability to 

maintain the sea lines of communications with economic 

expansion and the impact on overall national power.9

 Attainment of U.S. strategic, economic, informational, and 

military objectives is contingent upon assured access to, 

and freedom of action within, the commons. Accordingly, global commons access must remain at the forefront 

of U.S. national security imperatives.

Successful application of military power in and 

through the global commons in support of overarching U.S. national objectives is likewise dependent upon the ability of military forces to access and 

maneuver within and across the commons—to deliver power in and through the various geographies. 

While the required extent and duration of the U.S. 

military’s access to and freedom of action in the comMost Defense Department literature on the global commons does not list the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum as a core component, treating it instead as a subset of the cyber domain. 

This association is logical, given that a significant portion of information transmission, reception, and corruption (as in electronic warfare) within the cyber sphere is predicated upon 

EM phenomenon. However, there are also military applications in the EM spectrum that do 

not involve the transmission, reception, or corruption of information, such as directed energy 

weapons. This reality—coupled with the fact that the EM spectrum is physically distinct from 

the other domains, can be an independent “geography” capable of supporting standalone 

military operations, and is competitive by nature with respect to military operations—makes 

a compelling argument for separating the EM spectrum as the fifth pillar of the global commons. While the authors believe that the EM spectrum should be recognized as a unique component of the commons, this paper adheres to the generally recognized DOD list of commons 

geographies—namely, international waters and airspace, space, and cyberspace.

The Electromagnetic Spectrum and Global Commons

mons will be determined by larger strategic factors, 

the fundamental ability to achieve them is becoming 

more problematic. New complexities in the global 

commons potentially lessen military effectiveness, 

diminishing the military’s ability to support national 

interests. Arguably, the least recognized and least understood of these complexities is the notion of domain

interrelationships: the idea that intradomain military 

operations are increasingly dependent on interdomain

dependencies.10 These domain interrelationships vary 

in scope from simple bi-domain evolutions, such as 

air operations in support of maritime operations, to 

the more typical norm in today’s military operations: 

full multidomain evolutions in which simultaneous 

access to and freedom of action throughout all the 

components of the commons are necessities. Barring 

a fundamental shift in U.S. strategic objectives, the 

military must retain the ability to operate throughout the global commons to achieve the requisite level 

of local control and superiority for mission success in 

support of national objectives. To accomplish this, the 

U.S. defense establishment must reassess the fundamental ideas and concepts regarding military power 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 259 3 

employment within the global commons in light of 

expanding domain interrelationships.

New Challenges

Responsibility for the maintenance of the global 

commons and guarantee of free access for both international trade and commerce and the projection of military 

power has for more than 60 years fallen to the U.S. military.11 As noted by U.S. Joint Forces Command’s current 

Joint Operating Environment publication, the “crucial enabler for America’s ability to project military power for 

the past six decades has been its almost complete control 

over the global commons.”12 However, over the last two 

decades, a confluence of events and emerging issues has 

begun to impact the U.S. military’s ability to gain access to the global commons, as well as its freedom of action within it. The continuing evolution of the commons 

presents the U.S. military with a host of new challenges 

and demands.

First among these challenges is the incorporation 

of new geographies into the commons. In addition to 

dealing with growing complexities in the more “mature” maritime and air components, the U.S. military is 

confronting the issue of integrating the newer domains, 

space and cyber, into its fundamental concepts of operation. The cyber domain arguably provides the most acute 

challenge; its complex and at times seemingly anarchic 

nature and the difficulty in detecting and attributing actions complicate military planning. Despite its breadth 

of use within both the civilian and defense sectors, the 

U.S. defense community’s understanding of the full impact of cyberspace on military capabilities and operations 

is modest at best.

Compounding the issue of the expanded scope of 

the global commons is their increasingly congested and 

contested nature. Driven in large part by economic and 

technological advances, barriers to commons access and 

entry have been significantly lowered, with an attendant 

rise in the number and types of actors able to exploit the 

commons. For example, space—once the almost exclusive purview of the superpowers during the Cold War 

due to high financial and technical barriers—is now routinely accessed by several dozen companies and consortia 

from various states, as well as individual entrepreneurs 

and commercial entities. Similarly, the oft-quoted price 

of access to the cyber domain can be as low as the cost of 

a laptop computer.

The dynamics making the commons more contested 

are varied and complex. At the high end, a number of 

state actors are rapidly approaching the level of a peer 

or near-peer military competitor in specific geographic 

areas. Although unable to challenge U.S. military access 

to all of the commons on a global scale and for extended 

periods of time, robust investment in conventional and 

asymmetric antiaccess and area-denial capabilities is 

positioning some countries to be able to challenge U.S. 

military access and freedom of action in bounded regions 

and for set periods of time. This is a significant issue given U.S. global interests and the military resources and 

efforts required to guarantee security of those interests 

at long distances.

Exacerbating the challenges from traditional or 

rising peer and near-peer military competitors is the 

increasing influence exerted by nonstate actors in the 

global commons. State actors typically have substantial 

incentives to keep general access to the commons unrestricted. Nonstate actors can have drastically different 

motives. Driven by such factors as economics and political ideology, nonstate actors are more likely to deny, restrict, or disrupt commons access and usage in pursuit of 

their objectives. Even a modestly sized nonstate actor can 

exert a disproportionate effect within the commons. As 

evidenced in the cyber domain, at little cost in resources 

and effort, small groups (or even individuals) can disrupt 

a confluence of events and emerging 

issues has begun to impact the U.S. 

military’s ability to gain access to 

the global commons
4 SF No. 259 www.ndu.edu/inss

and degrade Internet access and functionality for civilian, 

commercial, and government users, yielding effects that 

are of far greater value than the costs of producing them.

The precipitous decline in U.S. conventional air and 

naval platforms used to address these challenges aggravates the situation. The global commons are expansive 

in nature, with time, speed, and distance factors that at 

times can only be addressed through employment of 

large numbers of military assets. In the air and maritime 

domains, current U.S. aircraft and ship quantities are a 

fraction of the levels that existed at the conclusion of 

the Cold War. In 2009, U.S. Navy ship numbers alone 

were over 50 percent lower than they were in 1990 in 

the waning days of the Cold War.13 While technological 

advances help offset the negative aspects of force reductions, they are insufficient to address the growing challenges inherent in a more complex and dynamic global 

commons. In the cyber domain, resource challenges are 

exacerbated by the complex balance between offense 

and defense and the difficulty of attempting to innovate 

in a military field while simultaneously responding to 

the advancements of others. Unlike the maritime, air, 

and space domains, where the United States has traditionally been at the forefront of military development 

and has compelled potential adversaries to respond to 

its military initiatives, the Nation has no such advantage 

in the cyber domain.

External and internal fiscal pressures will limit the 

near- to mid-term potential for significant growth in the 

defense procurement budget. Furthermore, the shortterm requirement to balance current counterinsurgency 

and counterterrorism operations against other mission 

requirements makes the prospects for a resource-intensive solution to the challenges posed within the global 

commons unlikely. The U.S. military will not be able to 

apply overwhelming quantitative and qualitative resource 

advantages to solve global commons problems. In situations where potential adversaries may have limited strategic objectives or reduced timelines for military action 

in the commons, the problem of insufficient resources 

becomes noticeably more acute.

The last and least recognized military challenge in 

the global commons involves the rapidly developing 

interrelationships among and between the different domains and the platforms and systems operating in and 

through the related parts of the global commons. The 

phenomenon stems not from the physical attributes of 

the individual domains (and the related parts of the commons), but rather is a manifestation of how military capabilities and operations have evolved, particularly over 

the last two decades. Domain interrelationships start 

at the most fundamental levels of military operations 

and capabilities and yield effects throughout the whole 

spectrum of military power as the totality of the interrelationships is integrated across each level of warfare. 

Now more than ever, effective and efficient application 

of military power in any specific part of the global commons rests upon a foundation of simultaneous access and 

freedom of action throughout the remainder of the commons. The idea of domain interrelationships is not new. 

These interrelationships have been, to a certain degree, 

part of military planning for as long as the potential for 

multidomain military operations has existed. Rather, it is 

the breadth of the various domain interrelationships and 

the pace at which they have developed that are now the 

critical issues.

Domain interrelationships cover a wide spectrum of 

dependencies between platforms and systems and, ultimately, operations. At the low end of the interdependence 

scale are interrelationships that enhance capabilities and 

provide force multipliers. This degree of interrelationship 

does not preclude employment of military power in a 

particular domain, but helps increase the effectiveness of 

military power in the global 

commons rests upon a foundation 

of simultaneous access and freedom 

of action throughout the remainder 

of the commons
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 259 5 

platforms and systems. At the other end of the spectrum 

stand true interdependencies: interrelationships that can 

preclude operations in one domain if access to other domains is denied. Defense leaders have provided illustrative discussion on these evolving interrelationships and 

the global commons, particularly with respect to the 

space and cyber domains. However, taxonomies matter 

a great deal when distinguishing relationships that are 

interconnected (and therefore enabling) from those that 

are mutually dependent (and therefore require access to 

other domains).

Despite the increasing importance of domain interrelationships, development of military strategy and 

fundamental concepts of operations for the employment of military power within the commons has not 

kept pace. The increasingly congested and contested 

nature of the commons and the problem of declining 

U.S. conventional force levels do not necessarily lend 

themselves to quick fixes and will continue to stress 

the military’s ability to ensure continued access to the 

commons. To prevent any further reduction in the 

margins of its military superiority, the United States 

must seek to optimize its military capabilities in the 

global commons despite these constraints. The U.S. 

defense establishment must revisit the fundamental ideas and concepts regarding the employment of 

military power within the global commons in light of 

growing domain interrelationships.

The New Reality of Domain 

Interrelationships

Historical perspectives on military use of the global commons from the industrial age detail a long period 

of modest advances in capability and domain interactions. Military exploitation of each new geography, 

along with its integration with the others in the context 

of military operations, was modest in scope and relatively linear in nature, occurring over extended timeframes. Despite the work of General Billy Mitchell and 

others in the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s, 

the full appreciation of airpower’s utility in maritime 

operations arguably was not realized until World War 

II, some 30 years after the initial exploitation of the 

air domain for military purposes. The advent of the information age induced a marked shift in this dynamic. 

The technology that drove the information age significantly increased the range of militarily useful tools and 

resources, enhanced intradomain capabilities, and, more 

importantly, yielded a range of previously unavailable 

interdomain military options.

At the tactical level, advocates of platforms specific 

to each individual domain have continued their relentless pursuit of intradomain dominance, while exploiting technology-based capabilities that require access 

to other domains. As an example, the F–22 represents 

the premier air superiority aircraft, with its unequalled 

radar-evading technologies, engine performance, and 

advanced avionics; it also provides additional force 

multipliers such as unique connectivity and electronic 

attack capabilities. However, the latter capabilities are 

wholly dependent upon the ability of the aircraft to access the space and cyber domains. As the DOD aircraft investment plan for fiscal years 2011–2040 points 

out, “When considering aviation investment plans, the 

Department must increasingly consider the potential 

complementary capabilities resident in the cyber and 

space domains, as well as across other aircraft types.”14

The F–22 highlights how military operations within 

the global commons are now multidomain in nature, 

with interrelationships that can simultaneously span all 

domains and blur the distinction between supported 

and supporting efforts. Adding to this complexity is 

the growing overlap between the military and civilian 

realms, with military capabilities becoming increasingly 

reliant on commercial satellite communication systems, 

the U.S. defense establishment must 

revisit the employment of military 

power within the global commons
6 SF No. 259 www.ndu.edu/inss

space-based surveillance, and cyber infrastructure for 

mission success.

With space and cyberspace serving as the bond 

between a range of military capabilities that require 

access to the commons, domain interrelationships have 

become more pervasive and complex. These interrelationships alter basic notions of force-on-force analysis. 

Drawing a parallel from cyber and telecommunications network theory, the intrinsic value of military 

platforms and systems can conceivably increase at a 

nonlinear rate with the linear addition of each new 

platform and system, in large part due to the multitude 

of interrelationships.15 A logical and corollary lesson 

is that vulnerabilities may expand at a nonlinear rate 

as well, with the associated risk to U.S. military operations increasing rapidly. Further proof of the importance of domain interrelationships exists in capabilities 

derived from exploitation of the space domain. Loss 

of space systems, whether involving the global positioning system constellation, communications systems, 

or intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets, 

would have negative effects that would cascade across 

military platforms and systems in other domains. This 

example illustrates how a limited number of key tactical level interdomain relationships can yield operational level effects.

The manner in which space and cyberspace now 

provide a means for the transmission of military power distorts traditional industrial age notions of supporting and supported domains. The increasing capacity for space and cyber to become the primary focus of 

effort within a military operation can lead to role reversals. For example, with a significant portion of the 

cyber domain relying on seabed transmission cables, 

efforts to disrupt military operations in cyberspace 

could employ maritime and air domain operations as 

supporting elements. The multi-organizational Operation Burnt Frost in 2008, which led to the destruction of a malfunctioning U.S. reconnaissance satellite, 

provides a real-world example: maritime domain operations (primarily) were conducted in support of operations in space, traditionally considered an enabling 

or supporting domain.

The Traditional Approach

Throughout history, the emergence of human activity within each of the sea, air, space, and cyberspace 

domains has produced a fundamental transformation 

in the nature of warfare and military operations. It is 

this geographic aspect of warfare, albeit on a domainby-domain basis, that has remained a cornerstone for 

the U.S. military approach to development of military 

power theory and operating concepts. The rich heritage within the U.S. defense establishment of military 

thought on security in the maritime and air domains 

attests to this fact. And while the space and cyberspace 

domains are relatively new environments for human activity, initial efforts to provide a theoretical framework 

to guide the conduct of military operations within them 

are being undertaken.16 As their transformational effects yield to military analysis, they too will undoubtedly generate their own domain-specific military power 

employment theories.

This reductionist, bottom-up methodology arguably propagated a degree of stovepiping in strategy and 

concept development within the commons. Development tends to proceed in a linear and highly dogmatic fashion, with a focus on single domain exploitation 

preceding efforts to address the implications of domain 

overlaps and interdependencies. Much as was the case 

for air and maritime doctrine, development of concepts 

for military operations within the space domain (and 

more recently in cyberspace) appears to be following a 

similar pattern, with intradomain analysis and concept 

loss of space systems would have 

negative effects that would cascade 

across military platforms and 

systems in other domains
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 259 7 

development preceding interdomain considerations. The 

U.S. Air Force and Navy have only just begun efforts to 

better understand the implications of cyber warfare for 

air and maritime operations; these nascent efforts are 

perhaps less well developed than the modest understanding of military operations exclusive to the cyber domain 

itself.17 Bi-domain theoretical initiatives have typically 

been marked by a hierarchical conceptual approach in 

which one domain is dominant and the other exists in a 

subordinate or supporting role. While the military operating environment in and through the commons shows 

ever-increasing degrees of complexity, the theoretical 

methodologies used to address this environment have 

not kept pace.

Why a New Approach?

The traditional approach to conceptual development that begins with intradomain work followed 

by measured bi-domain expansion lags the transformational nature of current opportunities and challenges in the global commons. The implications of 

these growing challenges are not insignificant. The 

growth of cross-domain interrelationships brings 

a concomitant increase in the number of seams between the domains—seams that offer large numbers 

of both vulnerabilities and opportunities. Approaching conceptual development for the commons with a 

stovepiped, single domain–centric mindset heightens 

the risk that domain dependencies and the resulting 

seams will be inadequately addressed. Given integrated and highly interdependent domain relationships, 

degrading one system in one domain has the potential to exponentially increase degradation in all other 

systems. Serious analytical attention has not been devoted to cross-domain issues such as these, partly because a traditional stovepiped planning methodology 

is insufficient to identify and analyze the full scope 

and relevance of these issues.

Shortcomings in applying the traditional planning 

methodology to the global commons are not limited to 

the military realm. The growing reliance of military systems and operations on commercial enterprises (such as 

satellite communications and imagery) is but one possible 

insidious relationship that puts U.S. military capabilities at 

risk and that is largely unseen without a macro view of the 

complex, interactive system that is the global commons. 

The importance of operating from the global commons, 

and the increasingly complex relationships of platforms 

operating within the various domains, clearly requires a 

theoretical construct that accounts for these factors.

There appears to be a growing recognition within 

the U.S. military that the evolving nature of the global 

commons and the rapidly expanding set of domain 

interrelationships mean that traditional approaches to 

strategy and concept development may be ineffective. 

As pointed out by General Michael Moseley, former 

Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, “Since the air, space 

and cyber domains are increasingly interdependent, loss 

of dominance in any one could lead to loss of control 

in all. . . . No future war will be won without air, space 

and cyberspace superiority.”18 The very facts that DOD 

has now unified the disparate geographies into the more 

encompassing term global commons and is pursuing a new 

multidomain theoretical initiative called AirSea Battle hint 

at the prospect that the notion of the global commons may 

be more than just a new, more convenient taxonomy scheme 

and may in fact be an initial attempt to recraft the strategy and 

concept development process. The critical issue for security 

planners thus becomes finding an appropriate methodology 

for development of a military concept of operations for 

the global commons that goes beyond the domain-bydomain approach and fully considers the rich interactions 

the growing reliance of military 

systems and operations on 

commercial enterprises is but one 

possible insidious relationship that 

puts U.S. military capabilities at risk
8 SF No. 259 www.ndu.edu/inss

between domains that characterize military operations in 

the commons.

Requirements of a New 

Planning Paradigm

Strategic thought has historically demanded consideration of a problem or issue in totality in order to grasp 

the full magnitude of the situation at hand. Whether for 

grand strategy development or military operational planning, a holistic perspective is required. For grand strategy, 

the perspective is more complex but must be analyzed 

fully or the development process will be flawed. Historically speaking, conceptual strategy development has always warned of the need for consideration of the whole 

in order to comprehend the overall nature of a particular military endeavor.19 The same holds true for military 

planning when considering the need for operations conducted in any of the domains.20 Whether major combat 

operations, stability operations, or the development of 

military strategy writ large, the need for a robust consideration of the whole is necessary before development of 

any further substrategy or concept of operation.

Joint operating concepts in use today are designed to 

“identify future military problems and propose solutions 

for innovative ways to conduct operations. They are an articulation of potential future operations and describe how 

a commander, using military art and science, might employ capabilities necessary to meet future challenges.”21

The AirSea Battle operational concept is one example of 

the U.S. recognition of the growing relevance of domain 

interrelationships, and it highlights the complex nature of 

the global commons. Yet development of such concepts 

requires analysis that is not restricted to limited avenues 

of consideration (such as the air and sea domains). An 

analysis that envisions one or possibly two domains and 

considers others as enablers ignores the need to consider the totality of the global commons and the domains’ 

evolving interdependent nature. As such, we should consider the global commons from a broader perspective.

While the body of intradomain research and concept development continues to evolve, parallel efforts 

that give full consideration to interdomain issues must 

also be conducted. An updated planning paradigm 

must fully quantify domain interrelationships, properly 

articulate the nature of the supported/supporting relationship for multidomain evolutions, seek synergies and 

leverage in military operations through the exploitation 

of domain overlaps, and ensure combat effectiveness by 

mitigating risks associated with seam vulnerabilities.22

Strategists and defense planners must depart from the 

domain-centric mindset and take a broader perspective when viewing the commons. They must employ a 

holistic approach that breaks down domain stovepipes 

and treats the global commons not as a set of distinct 

geographies, but rather as a complex, interactive system.23 It must not be merely an exercise in enhancing 

“jointness” within the force, but rather must be an issue 

of formulating a conceptual framework that allows us 

to think about, and plan for, military operations in this 

dynamic arena.

A paradigm shift to a macro perspective on a complex, interactive system that would provide the proper 

framework from which to address security and stability 

within the commons is needed to consider the global 

commons writ large. A Global Commons Operational 

Concept construct properly detailing the effective employment of military power to ensure commons access 

would serve not only military interests, but also broader 

national priorities within the diplomatic, economic, and 

informational realms as well. While at first appearing 

anathema to current doctrinal thinking, the intellectual 

exercise provides many benefits:

◆ it elevates thinking beyond the specific domains and 

forces a broader perspective that better accounts for 

the AirSea Battle concept 

highlights the complex nature of 

the global commons 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 259 9 

the current reality of multidomain operations in 

the commons

◆ it forces consideration of the applicability of 

military missions (such as presence and power projection) into the newer domains of space and cyber

◆ it provides a framework to identify interrelated 

military-civilian-commercial connections that can 

affect military success.

The Way Forward

The United States must decide whether an increasingly congested, contested, and competitive global commons allows for a military strategy as straightforward as 

one that exploits a command of the commons. The answer is not self-evident. There is a clear need for a more 

detailed analysis of the global commons, along with a 

systematic determination of domain interdependencies, 

identifying the resultant risks and rewards and the appropriate means of incorporating them into military 

strategy, concepts, and doctrine.

Given current and evolving globalization and technological trends, we need a holistic paradigm to advance our 

understanding of military operations in and employing 

the global commons. This new perspective should better 

frame the nature of domain interdependencies and their 

potential impact on military power employment options. 

At a minimum, a holistic concept development methodology should quantify the nature of domain interdependencies, identify military vulnerabilities and opportunities 

associated with the domain seams, and illuminate fundamental principles of military power employment that will 

mitigate the risks associated with seam vulnerabilities and 

exploit inherent seam opportunities.

This interdependent nature is becoming clearer 

and much more pronounced. Yet the ability to operate 

freely in a secure and stable global commons is largely being analyzed using domain-specific constructs. 

Overarching questions must also be considered. What 

further research must be conducted to explore the 

interdependent relationships and maturing integraair, space, or maritime forces 

reaching across their domains 

to influence another domain must 

now consider cyberspace’s 

unique characteristics

tion of the global commons? How do we define and 

comprehend the truly interdependent relationships 

that provide critical capabilities in a globalized world? 

Which dependencies are crucial to success when operating in the commons, and which linkages are merely 

enabling support? Have a common lexicon and taxonomy been clearly defined in order to consider the 

critical nature of the systems?

Multidomain interdependencies result in more 

complex challenges for military planners with regard to 

time, space (geography), and force issues given a particular objective or purpose. Joint operational planning 

emphasizes the importance of time and space and the 

need to comprehend these characteristics in and across 

particular domains. There is an increasingly critical 

need to more fully understand and exploit these crossdomain interdependencies, especially with respect to 

time disparities between the cyber domain and the 

other traditional domains. For example, the nearly instantaneous speed of movement in the cyber domain is 

very different from the time and space considerations 

that govern force employment in other domains. The 

implications for force planners used to focusing on 

maritime or air domains lie in the potential to exploit 

the speed of the cyber domain and ability to employ 

cyber assets at great geographic distances to increase 

the tempo of operations faster than ships can sail or 

aircraft can fly. However, this also implies that naval 

and air assets are now vulnerable to cyber attack from 

locations far removed from the battlespace. Air, space, 

or maritime forces reaching across their domains to influence or affect a force in another domain or multiple 
10 SF No. 259 www.ndu.edu/inss

domains must now consider cyberspace’s unique characteristics of speed, rapid pace of change, and influence 

on multiple domains in addition to the more traditional 

domains and their interrelationships.

From a military perspective, further consideration of a 

holistic global commons paradigm would inform strategy 

issues in a broader sense. What further analysis must be 

undertaken that informs or affects other aspects of military strategy, such as deterrence theory? Consideration 

should also be given to exploring the development of a 

military power theory for the global commons writ large. 

In addition, there should be analysis of an integration of a 

global commons military strategy into a global commons 

security strategy, and the resultant integration with other 

elements of national power and grand strategy, to ensure a 

synergistic approach to global commons research.

A paradigm shift must occur in order to fully comprehend the emerging systems nature of the global commons, and a military strategy and concept of operations 

are needed that fully consider the increasingly interrelated 

character of the various domains. Rapid technological 

advancements and improvements in military capabilities 

will continue to increase domain interdependencies within and across the global commons. As the United States 

and international community become more reliant on the 

global commons, a clear understanding of how to conduct 

multidomain military operations is needed if the United 

States is to have an effective strategy for maintaining military and commercial access to the global commons.

Notes

1 Paraphrased from Barry Posen, “Command of the Commons: 

The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,” International Security 28, 

no. 1 (Summer 2003), 5–46.

2 Michèle A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Contested 

Commons,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135/7/1,277 ( July 

2009), 1.

3 Department of Defense (DOD), Quadrennial Defense Review 

Report (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010), 8.

4 Ibid., 103.

5 Ibid.

6 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the 

United States of America (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, 2008), 13.

7 Susan J. Buck, The Global Commons: An Introduction (Washington, DC: Island Press, 1998), 1.

8 Ibid., 6.

9 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 

1660–1783 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987), 25.

10 Throughout this paper, no distinction is made between 

the broader notion of domain interrelationships and, as a subset 

of that, commons interrelationships. The important conceptual 

point is based upon the fact that military operation interrelationships across the geographies of space, air, maritime, and cyber are 

growing in scope and complexity. Utilization of the full physical 

extent of space, air, maritime, and cyber as opposed to the more 

bounded areas encapsulated in the notion of the global commons 

has little bearing on the central tenets of this paper. The terms 

domain interrelationships and commons interrelationships may be used 

interchangeably.

11 National Defense Strategy, 16.

12 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Operating Environment, 

February 18, 2010, 63.

13 “U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels,” Naval Historical 

Center Web page, available at <www.history.navy.mil/branches/org9-

4htm#1993>.

14 Aircraft Investment Plan Fiscal Years (FY) 2011–2040, submitted with the FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, 3.

15 Franklin D. Kramer, Stuart H. Starr, and Larry K. Wentz, eds., 

Cyberpower and National Security (Washington, DC: NDU Press and 

Potomac Books, Inc., 2009), 149.

16 For space concerns, see the Space Posture Report; and for a 

framework for cyber operations, see The United States Air Force Blueprint for Cyberspace, November 2, 2009. For a comprehensive analysis 

of the cyber domain, see Kramer, Starr, and Wentz.

17 Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XXVII, 

“Collaborate & Compel: Maritime Force Operations in the Interconnected Age,” December 2008.

18 General T. Michael Moseley, USAF, “The Nation’s Guardians: 

America’s 21st Century Air Force,” Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

White Paper, Washington, DC, December 29, 2007, 2.

19 Colin Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 1999), 23.

20 Joint Publication ( JP) 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, December 26, 2006), III–17.

21 Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept, Version 2.0, 

December 2006, 1.

22 At the operational level of war, the concepts of leverage and 

synergy are defined and placed as critical concepts in warfighting capabilities. In accordance with JP 5–0, leverage seeks, “in the context of 

joint operation planning, a relative advantage in combat power and/or 

other circumstances against the adversary across one or more domains 

(air, land, sea, and space) and/or the information environment sufficient to exploit that advantage.” Synergy, “achieved by integrating and 

synchronizing the actions of conventional and unconventional forces 

and capabilities in joint operations and in multiple domains[,] enables 

Joint Force Commanders . . . to maximize available capabilities and 

minimize potential seams or vulnerabilities.”

23 “Simply defined, a system is a complex whole, the functioning 

of which depends on its part and the interaction between those parts. 

Simple systems can be characterized as having a few subsystems that 

are involved in only a small number of highly structured interactions. 

They tend not to change much over time, being relatively unaffected 

by the independent actions of their parts or by environmental influences. Extremely complex systems, at the other end of the spectrum, 
www.ndu.edu/inss SF No. 259 11 

The Center for Strategic Research within the Institute for 

National Strategic Studies provides advice to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 

unified combatant commands through studies, reports, 

briefings, and memoranda. The center conducts directed 

research and analysis in the areas of strategic and regional studies and engages in independent and leading-edge 

research and analysis in related areas.

The Strategic Forum series presents original research 

by members of NDU as well as other scholars and 

specialists in national security affairs from the United 

States and abroad. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the 

contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 

Defense Department or any other agency of the Federal 

Government. Visit NDU Press online at www.ndupress.edu.

Christopher J. Lamb

Director

Center for Strategic Research

Phillip C. Saunders 

Director of Research

Center for Strategic Research

Dr. Hans Binnendijk 

Director

INSS

Institute for National Strategic Studies

can be characterized as having a large number of subsystems that are 

involved in many more loosely structured interactions, the outcome 

of which is not predetermined. Such systems adapt and evolve over 

time as they are affected by their own purposeful parts and by the 

turbulent environments in which they exist.” See Michael C. Jackson, 

Systems Thinking: Creative Holism for Managers (New York: Wiley, 

2003), 3, 19.
12 SF No. 259 www.ndu.edu/inss

Reforming the Inter-American 

Defense Board

John A. Cope

(No. 258, August 2010)

Somalia’s Endless Transition: 

Breaking the Deadlock

Andre Le Sage

(No. 257, June 2010)

Prioritizing Strategic Interests 

in South Asia

Robert B. Oakley and T.X. Hammes

(No. 256, June 2010)

Africa’s Irregular Security 

Threats: Challenges for U.S. 

Engagement

Andre Le Sage

(No. 255, May 2010) 

Strengthening the IAEA: 

How the Nuclear Watchdog 

Can Regain Its Bark

Gregory L. Schulte

(No. 253, March 2010)

U.S.-Mexico Homeland Defense: 

A Compatible Interface

Victor E. Renuart, Jr., and Biff Baker

(No. 254, February 2010)

Avoiding a Crisis of Confidence 

in the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent

John P. Caves, Jr.

(No. 252, January 2010)

U.S.-Cambodia Defense 

Relations: Defining New 

Possibilities

Lewis M. Stern

(No. 251, December 2009)

North Korea: Challenges, 

Interests, and Policy

James J. Przystup

(No. 250, November 2009)

Burma in Strategic Perspective: 

Renewing Discussion of Options

Lewis M. Stern, George Thomas, and Julia 

A. Thompson

(No. 249, October 2009)

Unity of Effort: Key to Success 

in Afghanistan

Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond

(No. 248, September 2009)

Radicalization by Choice: ISI and 

the Pakistani Army

Robert B. Oakley with Franz-Stefan Gady

(No. 247, August 2009)

Other titles from 

NDU Press For online access to NDU Press 

publications, go to: ndupress.ndu.edu