United States Senate 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Carl Levin, Chairman

Tom Coburn, Ranking Minority Member

FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND

INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL

FUSION CENTERS

MAJORITY AND MINORITY

STAFF REPORT

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE

ON INVESTIGATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

October 3, 2012
SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Chairman

SENATOR TOM COBURN, M.D.

Ranking Minority Member

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

ELISE J. BEAN

Staff Director and Chief Counsel

ZACHARY I. SCHRAM

Senior Counsel

CHRISTOPHER J. BARKLEY

Staff Director to the Minority

JUSTIN J. ROOD

Senior Investigator to the Minority

KEITH B. ASHDOWN

Chief Investigator to the Minority

ANDREW C. DOCKHAM

Counsel to the Minority

DANIEL P. LIPS

Policy Advisor & Investigator to the Minority

KATHRYN M. EDELMAN

Detailee

BRENNEN BRITTON

Law Clerk

JACQUELINE JONES

Law Clerk

MARY D. ROBERTSON

Chief Clerk

10/11/12

 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

199 Russell Senate Office Building – Washington, D.C. 20510 

Majority: 202/224-9505 – Minority: 202/224-3721

Web Address: http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations
i

FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT

 IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................ 1

II. SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ..................................... 5

III. BACKGROUND ........................................................ 10

A. History. . . . .......................................................... 10

B. DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) .................................... 17

(1) Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

(2) I&A Personnel .................................................... 20

(3) Drafting Fusion Center HIRs ........................................ 22

(4) DHS Enhanced Review of HIRs ...................................... 23

C. Funding State and Local Fusion Centers .................................. 24

IV. DHS SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION

CENTERS DOES NOT GENERATE TIMELY, USEFUL INTELLIGENCE FOR

FEDERAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ............................. 26

A. Overview ........................................................... 26

B. Reporting from Fusion Centers was Often Flawed, Unrelated to Terrorism .... 31

(1) Some Reports Had “Nothing of Value” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

(2) If Published, Some Draft Reporting Could Have Violated the Privacy Act . . . . . 35

(3) Most Fusion Center Reporting Related to Drug Smuggling, Alien Smuggling, 

or Other Criminal Activity .......................................... 39

C. Terrorism-Related Reporting was Often Outdated, Duplicative, and 

Uninformative ....................................................... 40

(1) Some Terrorism-Related Reports Were Based on Older Published Accounts . . . 40

(2) Many Terrorism-Related HIRs from Fusion Centers Appeared to Duplicate a

Faster, More Efficient Information-Sharing Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

D. DHS Intelligence Reporting Officials Who Repeatedly Violated Guidelines

Faced No Sanction .................................................... 45

E. DHS Did Not Sufficiently Train Its Fusion Center Detailees to Legally and

Effectively Collect and Report Intelligence ................................ 47

F. “Two Different Chains of Command” .................................... 51

G. Short-Staffing and Reliance on Underqualified, Underperforming Contract

Employees Hampered Reporting Efforts .................................. 52

H. Reporting Officials Aren’t Evaluated on the Quality of Their Reporting ....... 54

I. A Hastily-Implemented and Poorly Coordinated Review Process Delayed

Reporting by Months .................................................. 55
ii

J. Retaining Inappropriate Records is Contrary to DHS Policies and the 

Privacy Act .......................................................... 57

K. Problems with DHS Reporting Acknowledged, But Unresolved ............... 59

V. DHS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY OVERSEE ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT

FOR FUSION CENTERS ................................................. 61

A. Overview .......................................................... 61

B. DHS Does Not Know How Much It Has Spent to Support Fusion Centers ...... 62

C. DHS Does Not Exercise Effective Oversight of Grant Funds Intended for

Fusion Centers ....................................................... 64

(1) FEMA Monitoring Reports .......................................... 65

(2) A-133 Audits ..................................................... 70

D. DHS Grant Requirements Do Not Ensure States Spend Fusion Center Funds

Effectively ........................................................... 71

(1) Using Fusion Center Funds on Chevrolet Tahoes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

(2) Using Fusion Center Funds on Rent ................................... 75

(3) Using Fusion Center Funds on Wiretap Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

(4) Using Fusion Center Funds on Computers for County Medical Examiner . . . . . 78

(5) Using Fusion Center Funds for Surveillance Equipment, Computers, 

Televisions ...................................................... 79

(6) Using Fusion Center Funds for Shifting Information Technology Needs . . . . . . 80

VI. FUSION CENTERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MEANINGFULLY 

CONTRIBUTE TO FEDERAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS ............ 83

A. Overview ........................................................... 83

B. Two Federal Assessments Found Fusion Centers Lack Basic Counterterrorism

Capabilities .......................................................... 85

(1) 2010 Assessment .................................................. 85

(2) 2011 Assessment .................................................. 88

C. Despite Promises, DHS Has Not Assessed Fusion Center Performance ......... 89

D. Some DHS-Recognized Fusion Centers Do Not Exist ........................ 90

(1) Wyoming ........................................................ 91

(2) Philadelphia Fusion Center .......................................... 92

E. Many Fusion Centers Do Not Prioritize Counterterrorism Efforts ............ 93

F. DHS “Success Stories” Do Not Demonstrate Centers’ Value to Counterterrorism

Efforts. . . ........................................................... 96

(1) Najibullah Zazi Case – CIAC ........................................ 96

(2) Faisal Shahzad Case – NYSIC ....................................... 98

(3) Faisal Shahzad Case – Florida Fusion Center ............................ 99

(4) Francis “Schaeffer” Cox Case – AKIAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
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G. Fusion Centers May Have Hindered, Not Aided, Federal Counterterrorism

Efforts. . . ........................................................... 101

(1) Russian “Cyberattack” in Illinois ..................................... 101

(2) Shooting of Representative Giffords and 18 Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

(3) Missouri MIAC Militia Report ....................................... 104

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................. 106

APPENDICES TO REPORT .................................................... 108

APPENDIX A: Excerpt from Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing 

Initiative, Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion 

Centers, September 2008

APPENDIX B: Excerpt from Department of Homeland Security, 2011 National Network 

of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012
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FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN

STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and Federal officials is crucial 

to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this objective was the 

motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars 

over the last nine years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United 

States.

1

The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers 

forwarded “intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes 

endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from 

already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism.

 Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead this initiative. 

A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found, 

however, that DHS’s work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful 

intelligence to support Federal counterterrorism efforts.

The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS officials’ public claims about 

fusion centers were not always accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion 

centers existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion centers’ “success 

stories.” At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose or acknowledge non-public evaluations 

highlighting a host of problems at fusion centers and in DHS’s own operations.

Since 2003, over 70 state and local fusion centers, supported in part with Federal funds, 

have been created or expanded in part to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly to 

detect, disrupt, and respond to domestic terrorist activities. DHS’s support for and involvement 

with these state and local fusion centers has, from the beginning, centered on their professed 

ability to strengthen Federal counterterrorism efforts. 

Under the leadership of Senator Coburn, Ranking Subcommittee Member, the 

Subcommittee has spent two years examining Federal support of fusion centers and evaluating 

the resulting counterterrorism intelligence. The Subcommittee’s investigative efforts included 

interviewing dozens of current and former Federal, state and local officials, reviewing more than 

a year’s worth of intelligence reporting from centers, conducting a nationwide survey of fusion 

centers, and examining thousands of pages of financial records and grant documentation. The 

investigation identified problems with nearly every significant aspect of DHS’s involvement 

with fusion centers. The Subcommittee investigation also determined that senior DHS officials 

 1 Congress has defined fusion centers as “a collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, State, local, or tribal 

government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing the ability of 

such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.” Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 317, 318-24 (2007). 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf.
2

were aware of the problems hampering effective counterterrorism work by the fusion centers, but

did not always inform Congress of the issues, nor ensure the problems were fixed in a timely 

manner.

Regarding the centers themselves, the Subcommittee investigation learned that a 2010 

assessment of state and local fusion centers conducted at the request of DHS found widespread

deficiencies in the centers’ basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities. DHS did not 

share that report with Congress or discuss its findings publicly. When the Subcommittee 

requested the assessment as part of its investigation, DHS at first denied it existed, then disputed 

whether it could be shared with Congress, before ultimately providing a copy. 

In 2011, DHS conducted its own, less rigorous assessment of fusion centers. While its 

resulting findings were more positive, they too indicated ongoing weaknesses at the fusion 

centers.

The findings of both the 2010 and 2011 assessments contradict public statements by DHS 

officials who have described fusion centers as “one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism 

strategy,”2 and “a major force multiplier in the counterterrorism enterprise.”3

Despite reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from 

April 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, the Subcommittee investigation could identify no reporting 

which uncovered a terrorist threat, nor could it identify a contribution such fusion center 

reporting made to disrupt an active terrorist plot. Instead, the investigation found:

 The Subcommittee 

investigation found that the fusion centers often produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate

intelligence reporting to DHS, and many produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever.

• Nearly a third of all reports – 188 out of 610 – were never published for use within 

DHS and by other members of the intelligence community, often because they lacked 

any useful information, or potentially violated Department guidelines meant to 

protect Americans’ civil liberties or Privacy Act protections.

• In 2009, DHS instituted a lengthy privacy and civil liberties review process which 

kept most of the troubling reports from being released outside of DHS; however, it 

also slowed reporting down by months, and DHS continued to store troubling 

intelligence reports from fusion centers on U.S. persons, possibly in violation of the 

Privacy Act.

• During the period reviewed, DHS intelligence reporting suffered from a significant 

backlog. At some points, hundreds of draft intelligence reports sat for months before 

DHS officials made a decision about whether to release them to the intelligence 

community. DHS published many reports so late – typically months late, but 

sometimes nearly a year after they were filed – that many were considered “obsolete” 

by the time they were released. 

• Most reporting was not about terrorists or possible terrorist plots, but about criminal 

activity, largely arrest reports pertaining to drug, cash or human smuggling. 

 2 Remarks by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, National Fusion Center Conference, Denver, Colorado (3/15/2011). 3 Testimony of Caryn Wagner, “Homeland Security Department Intelligence Programs and State and Local Fusion 

Centers,” before the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the Committee on Appropriations (3/4/2010).
3

• Some terrorism-related “intelligence” reporting was based on older news releases or 

media accounts. 

• Some terrorism-related reporting also appeared to be a slower-moving duplicate of 

information shared with the National Counter Terrorism Center through a much 

quicker process run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening 

Center. 

In interviews, current and former DHS officials involved in the fusion center reporting 

process stated they were aware that “a lot of [the reporting] was predominantly useless 

information,” as one DHS official put it.4 A former reporting branch chief said that while he was 

sometimes proud of the intelligence his unit produced, “There were times when it was, ‘what a 

bunch of crap is coming through.’”5

The Subcommittee investigation also examined DHS’s management of the fusion center 

counterterrorism intelligence reporting process. The investigation discovered:

• DHS required only a week of training for intelligence officials before sending them to 

state and local fusion centers to report sensitive domestic intelligence, largely 

concerning U.S. persons. 

• Officials who routinely authored useless or potentially illegal fusion center 

intelligence reports faced no sanction or reprimand.

The Subcommittee investigation also reviewed how the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), a component of DHS, distributed hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to 

support state and local fusion centers. DHS revealed that it was unable to provide an accurate 

tally of how much it had granted to states and cities to support fusion centers efforts, instead 

producing broad estimates of the total amount of Federal dollars spent on fusion center activities

from 2003 to 2011, estimates which ranged from $289 million to $1.4 billion.

The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS failed to adequately police how 

states and municipalities used the money intended for fusion centers. The investigation found

that DHS did not know with any accuracy how much grant money it has spent on specific fusion 

centers, nor could it say how most of those grant funds were spent, nor has it examined the 

effectiveness of those grant dollars.

The Subcommittee conducted a more detailed case study review of expenditures of DHS 

grant funds at five fusion centers, all of which lacked basic, “must-have” intelligence 

capabilities, according to assessments conducted by and for DHS. The Subcommittee 

investigation found that the state and local agencies used some of the Federal grant money to

purchase:

• dozens of flat-screen TVs; 

• Sport Utility Vehicles they then gave away to other local agencies; and 

 4 Subcommittee interview of former DHS Senior Reports Officer (3/21/2012). 5 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 
4

• hidden “shirt button” cameras, cell phone tracking devices, and other surveillance 

equipment unrelated to the analytical mission of a fusion center. 

All of those expenditures were allowed under FEMA’s rules and guidance, DHS officials 

told the Subcommittee. Yet none of them appeared to have addressed the deficiencies in the 

centers’ basic information analysis and sharing capabilities, so they could better contribute to 

Federal counterterrorism efforts.

Every day, tens of thousands of DHS employees go to work dedicated to keeping 

America safe from terrorism; Federal funding of fusion centers was intended to advance that 

Federal objective. Fusion centers may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism, 

such as contributions to traditional criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster response and 

recovery efforts. In this investigation, the Subcommittee confined its work to examining the 

Federal return on its extensive support of state and local fusion centers, using the 

counterterrorism objectives established by law, Executive strategy, and DHS policy statements 

and assessments.

The investigation found that top DHS officials consistently made positive public 

comments about the value and importance of fusion centers’ contributions to Federal

counterterrorism efforts, even as internal reviews and non-public assessments highlighted 

problems at the centers and dysfunction in DHS’s own operations. But DHS and the centers do 

not shoulder sole responsibility for the fusion centers’ counterterrorism intelligence failures. 

Congress has played a role, as well. Since Congress created DHS in 2003, dozens of committees 

and subcommittees in both Houses have claimed jurisdiction over various aspects of the 

Department. DHS officials annually participate in hundreds of hearings, briefings, and site visits 

for Members of Congress and their staffs. At Congress’ request, the Department annually

produces thousands of pages of updates, assessments and other reports. Yet amid all the 

Congressional oversight, some of the worst problems plaguing the Department’s fusion center 

efforts have gone largely undisclosed and unexamined. 

At its conclusion, this Report offers several recommendations to clarify DHS’s role with 

respect to state and local fusion centers. The Report recommends that Congress and DHS revisit 

the statutory basis for DHS support of fusion centers, in light of the investigation’s findings. It 

also recommends that DHS improve its oversight of Federal grant funds supporting fusion 

centers; conduct promised assessments of fusion center information-sharing; and strengthen its 

protection of civil liberties in fusion center intelligence reporting. 
5

II. SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

The past decade has seen a proliferation of “fusion centers” in states and cities around the 

country. Congress has defined fusion centers as “a collaborative effort of 2 or more Federal, 

State, local, or tribal government agencies that combines resources, expertise, or information 

with the goal of maximizing the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, 

apprehend, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”6 Although operated by state, local or 

tribal governments, these centers typically receive significant financial and logistical support 

from the Federal Government, primarily from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).7

A failure among government officials to share timely, relevant information on terrorist 

threats was widely credited with contributing to the broader failure to protect the United States 

from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks by al Qaeda.8

As part of those reform efforts, both the Executive and Legislative branches have 

championed state and local fusion centers as critical tools for the Federal Government to share 

terrorism-related information with states and localities. In 2007, Congress designated DHS as 

the lead Federal partner for fusion centers.

 In the aftermath of those attacks, 

Congress and the White House made sweeping reforms intended to improve how officials in 

agencies at all levels of government share information to prevent future terrorist attacks. 

9

As state and local entities, the exact missions of individual fusion centers are largely 

beyond the authority of the Federal Government to determine. Many have chosen to focus their 

efforts on local and regional crime. In Nevada, the Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center 

tracks incidents of violence in schools.10

Today, DHS provides millions of dollars in Federal grant funds to support state and local 

fusion center efforts. It details personnel to the centers, and offers them guidance, training and 

However, Federal officials and lawmakers established 

Federal grant programs for the centers premised primarily on involving fusion centers in Federal

efforts to prevent another terrorist attack. They touted the centers’ ability to gather 

counterterrorism information from local sources and share it with the Federal Government; in 

turn, Federal officials were instructed to share with the centers threat information gathered and 

analyzed on the Federal level to ensure a common awareness of terrorist threats. Support for the 

centers grew, funding increased, information networks expanded, and Federal officials were sent 

to work from and assist the centers.

 6 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 317, 318-24 

(2007). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf. 7 “2011 Fusion Center Federal Cost Survey: Results,” DHS (6/2012). The Department of Justice also provides 

support to some fusion centers.

8 See “9/11 Commission Report,” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (7/22/2004), at 

400, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 9 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 317, 318-24 

(2007). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf. 10 8/31/2012 Mike Blasky, “Fusion center helps police with school violence prevention,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, 

http://www.lvrj.com/news/police-finalists-for-award-for-school-violence-prevention-168226076.html. 
6

technology. The Department promotes its support or involvement with 77 fusion centers,11

DHS funds state and local fusion centers through its Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) grant programs. DHS provides information, logistical support, technology and 

personnel to the centers through its State and Local Program Office (SLPO), part of its Office of 

Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). DHS personnel also draft intelligence reports based on 

information received at fusion centers, which the agency then processes for release through its 

Reporting Branch (RB), also a part of I&A.

located in nearly every state and most major urban areas.

12

The value of fusion centers to the Federal Government should be determined by tallying 

the cost of its investment, and the results obtained. Yet, despite spending hundreds of millions of 

dollars on state and local fusion centers, DHS has not attempted to conduct a comprehensive 

assessment of the value Federal taxpayers have received for that investment.

Several years ago, when the Department formally committed itself to supporting fusion 

centers, it made an explicit argument for how the centers would contribute to Federal

counterterrorism efforts. That argument, contained in DHS’s 2006 blueprint for engaging with 

fusion centers, provides a framework for examining fusion centers’ contributions to Federal

taxpayers. In that plan, DHS identified the benefits it expected to receive from its involvement 

with the centers. 

Known as the “State and Local Fusion Center Implementation Plan,” it emphasized the 

counterterrorism benefits to DHS of obtaining routine access to locally-derived information to 

support its mission. “Our objective is to create partnerships with . . . existing State & Local 

Fusion Centers (SLFCs) . . . to improve the flow of threat information between DHS and the 

SLFCs, and to improve the effectiveness of the Centers as a group,” Charles Allen, then DHS 

Under Secretary for Intelligence & Analysis, wrote in a memo accompanying the plan to thenDHS Secretary Michael Chertoff.13

Mr. Allen began the plan itself with a quote from the 9/11 Commission’s final report. It 

noted the panel had concluded that government officials failed to “connect the dots” prior to the 

September 11, 2001 attacks, and that “DHS was created, in part, to address that issue.”

 11 “Preventing Terrorism Results,” DHS website, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results, accessed 

9/19/2012. In 2010, a federal assessment could confirm at best 68 in existence. “2010 Fusion Center Baseline 

Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010) at 8, DHS-HSGAC-FC-007231. 12 “Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production,” DHS I&A Reporting Branch 

(6/25/2010), at 4, DHS-HSGAC-FC-056471. Other branches of I&A prepare analytic reports for distribution to 

fusion centers, as well as joint analytical products in conjunction with fusion center personnel. Other DHS 

components also assign representatives to fusion centers.

13 Memorandum from Charles E. Allen to Michael Chertoff, “SUBJECT: State and Local Fusion Center 

Implementation Plan” (3/16/2006), DHS-HSGAC-FC-004031.
7

“Based on the legislative mandate . . . it is DHS’s mission to ensure that we effectively 

collaborate with Federal, State, Local and Private Sector elements to share information

concerning terrorist threats,” Mr. Allen’s plan stated.14

Specifically, Mr. Allen’s plan listed nine “values accruing to DHS” from fusion center 

involvement: 

• Improved information flow from State and Local entities to DHS

• Improved situational awareness at the Federal level

• Improved access to Local officials

• Consultation on State and Local issues

• Access to non-traditional information sources

• Clearly defined information gathering requirements

• Improved intelligence analysis and production capabilities

• Improved intelligence/information sharing and dissemination capabilities

• Improved prevention, protection, response and recovery capabilities.15

In 2008, the Bush Administration also produced a list of the baseline capabilities that 

every fusion center should have to contribute in a meaningful way to Federal counterterrorism 

efforts.16

Given the substantial and growing Federal investment in state and local fusion centers, 

the Subcommittee undertook a review of their activities. The Subcommittee investigation 

initially set out to answer three questions: First, how much has the Federal Government spent to 

support state and local fusion centers? Second, based on benefits anticipated by language in 

statute, executive directives and DHS’s own 2006 plan, what has DHS received in return for its 

investment? And third, is the return worth the cost?

 

The Subcommittee immediately ran into several roadblocks in its review. First, DHS was 

unable to produce a complete and accurate tally of the expense of its support for fusion centers.17

Indeed, for years it has struggled to identify not only what money it has spent or granted to 

enhance fusion centers, but also how many personnel it has detailed to the centers.18

 14 Memorandum from Charles E. Allen to Michael Chertoff, “SUBJECT: State and Local Fusion Center 

Implementation Plan” (3/16/2006), at 6, 10, DHS-HSGAC-FC-004031.

Also, while 

15Id. at 3, DHS-HSGAC-FC-004035. For a fuller discussion of DHS’s analysis, see CRS, “Fusion Centers: Issues 

and Options for Congress,” updated January 18, 2008, at 3-6. 16 Department of Justice, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major 

Urban Area Fusion Centers,” September 2008, http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/baselinecapabilitiesa.pdf. 17 This year DHS reported what it believes it has spent on fusion centers directly, which totals $17.2 million, but that 

figure does not include DHS funds granted to state and local governments intended to support fusion centers, which 

is believed to be a significant portion of federal spending on fusion centers. “2011 Fusion Center Federal Cost 

Survey: Results,” DHS (6/2012). 18 Congress has repeatedly pressed DHS for detailed reporting on its fusion center efforts. In 2006, appropriators 

began requesting quarterly reports from DHS on its fusion center efforts. See H. Rept 109-699, H. Rept 110-181, S. 

Rept. 110-84, P.L. 110-329. However, that failed to yield consistently prompt and accurate responses from the 

department. In 2010, appropriators noted DHS “has failed to submit the quarterly reports on this activity.” H. Rept 

111-157. They criticized DHS for creating “an unacceptable lack of visibility into DHS’s intelligence programs,” 

and “disregard[ing] Congress’ explicit direction to provide timely information.” H. Rept. 111-298.
8

DHS has made attempts to assess the centers’ ability to operate, it has never evaluated the quality 

or impact of the centers’ contributions to Federal counterterrorism efforts using the 2006 criteria 

it specified.

Faced with missing, ambiguous and inadequate data, the Subcommittee investigation 

refocused its efforts, to answer three more fundamental questions: First, how well did DHS 

engage operationally with fusion centers to obtain useful intelligence, and share it with other 

Federal agencies and its own analysts? Second, how well did DHS award and oversee the 

millions of dollars in grant funds it awards states and cities for fusion center projects? Third, 

how capable were state and local fusion centers of conducting intelligence-related activities in 

support of the Federal counterterrorism mission?

Over a period of two years, the Subcommittee reviewed more than 80,000 pages of 

documents, including reviews, audits, intelligence reports, emails, memoranda, grant 

applications, news accounts, and scholarly articles; conducted a nationwide survey of fusion 

centers; and interviewed over 50 current and former DHS officials, outside experts, and state and 

local officials.

On the first issue, the Subcommittee investigation found that DHS’s involvement with 

fusion centers had not produced the results anticipated by statute, White House strategies and 

DHS’s own 2006 plan. Specifically, DHS’s involvement with fusion centers appeared not to 

have yielded timely, useful terrorism-related intelligence for the Federal intelligence community. 

In addition, the Subcommittee investigation found that DHS has not had the proper policies, 

training, personnel or practices in place to responsibly and timely receive information from state 

and local fusion centers, and make it available to its own analysts and other Federal agencies.

On the second issue, the Subcommittee investigation found that DHS did not adequately 

monitor the amount of funding it directed to support fusion centers; failed to conduct meaningful 

oversight of how state and local agencies spent grant funds DHS intended to support fusion 

centers; did not ensure the grants it made to fusion center projects were yielding the progress 

state and local officials promised; and did not attempt to determine whether the end product of its 

efforts and spending were commensurate with the level of its investment.19

On the third issue, the Subcommittee investigation found that many fusion centers lacked 

either the capability or stated objective of contributing meaningfully to the Federal

counterterrorism mission. Many centers didn’t consider counterterrorism an explicit part of their 

mission, and Federal officials said some were simply not concerned with doing counterterrorism 

work. 

 19 These failures have not gone unnoticed by Congress. In 2010, Senate appropriators explicitly stated their 

expectation “that performance metrics will be developed to judge the success of I&A’s SLFC [State and Local 

Fusion Center] program. S. Rept. 111-222. The following year, House appropriators directed DHS “to develop 

robust programmatic justification to better identify and quantify the Federal benefit and return on investment from 

the State and Local Fusion Center (SLFC) program,” and present it by February 2012. A DHS official told the 

Subcommittee in April 2012 they were still working on such an evaluation. Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen 

(4/22/2012). 
9

Despite these problems, DHS officials have been consistent in their praise for fusion 

centers as counterterrorism tools when speaking to Congress and the American public. DHS 

Secretary Janet Napolitano has described them as “one of the centerpieces of our 

counterterrorism strategy,”20 and Caryn Wagner, DHS’s top intelligence official, told Congress 

they are “a vital tool for strengthening homeland security.”21 A May 2012 report from DHS 

stated that fusion centers “play a vital role in improving the Nation’s ability to safeguard the 

Homeland.”22

But in internal assessments and interviews with the Subcommittee, knowledgeable 

officials from DHS and the intelligence community have said that most fusion centers were not 

capable of effective intelligence-sharing work, whether it is receiving terrorism-related 

information, analyzing it, or sharing it with Federal officials and others. They have also admitted

that DHS’s own practices have fallen well short of what is necessary for an effective intelligence 

enterprise.

Meanwhile, Congress and two administrations have urged DHS to continue or even 

expand its support of fusion centers, without providing sufficient oversight to ensure the 

intelligence from fusion centers is commensurate with the level of Federal investment. 

As a result, by its own estimates DHS has spent somewhere between $289 million and 

$1.4 billion in public funds23

The Subcommittee investigation did not examine the expense, performance or value of 

fusion centers to the state and local governments which own and operate them, and makes no 

finding or recommendation in this regard. Fusion centers may provide valuable local services in 

other fields, such as traditional criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster and recovery 

efforts. The Subcommittee confined its work to examining Federal support for and involvement 

in the state and local fusion centers, using the counterterrorism objectives established by law and 

White House strategy, and DHS policy statements and assessments. 

to engage state and local fusion centers in the Federal

counterterrorism mission, but has little to show for it.

 20 Remarks by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, National Fusion Center Conference (3/15/2011). 21 Testimony of Caryn Wagner before the House Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee of the Committee 

on Homeland Security (5/12/2010). 22 “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027, pp. v-vi. 23 Figures are based on separate estimates DHS provided to the Subcommittee. “Fusion Center Funding Report,” 

Spreadsheet, 6/22/2012, DHS HSGAC FC 058336, and “Fusion Keyword Search Solution Area Funding Report,” 

Spreadsheet, 2/24/2010, DHS HSGAC FC 057017, at 2. 
10

III. BACKGROUND

Fusion centers, few of which existed before the September 11, 2001 attacks, now number 

as many as 77, according to DHS, and operate in almost every state and many major cities in the 

country.24

A. History

Their existence has stirred up concerns about domestic intelligence gathering

practices, and questions about the Federal Government’s involvement in state and local law 

enforcement operations. To understand those concerns, and the design and execution of the 

Subcommittee’s investigation, it is helpful to understand the origins of fusion centers; the 

evolution of DHS’s engagement with the centers; how DHS supports fusion centers, particularly 

through grant funding; and how DHS gathers counterterrorism intelligence from and shares 

intelligence with state and local fusion centers.

Prior to the September 11, 2001, attacks, few states or localities operated fusion centers.

25

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), which then-President George W. 

Bush signed into law on November 25, 2002, created the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS). That law did not mandate the new agency provide support to fusion centers – indeed, it 

does not mention fusion centers at all – but it did give DHS sweeping responsibilities to gather, 

fuse and share terrorism-related information with Federal, state and local entities. Specifically, 

the law directed DHS to: 

The Department of Homeland Security, now the Federal Government’s largest supporter of 

fusion centers, had not yet been created.

• [A]ccess, receive and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, 

and other information from the Federal Government, State, and local government 

agencies (including law enforcement agencies), and private sector entities, and to 

integrate such information in order to –

(A) identify, assess, detect, and understand threats of terrorism against the United 

States and to the homeland;

(B) detect and identify threats of terrorism against the United States; and

(C) understand such threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities to the 

homeland....

• Consult with State and local governments and private sector entities to ensure 

appropriate exchanges of information, relating to threats of terrorism against the 

United States....

• Disseminate or coordinate dissemination of terrorism information and warnings 

(including some law enforcement information) to state and local entities, the private 

sector, and the public[.]26

 24 “Preventing Terrorism Results,” DHS.gov, http://www.dhs.gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results, accessed 

September 16, 2012. A 2010 assessment performed for DHS, however, documented only 68 functional fusion 

centers. “2010 Baseline Capabilities Asssessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010), DHS-HSGAC-FC-007031. 25 January 18, 2008, Rollins, John, “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research 

Service, RL34070, at 15.
11

DHS officially opened its doors in March 2003, equipped with that mandate and legal 

authority.27 Two months later, President Bush created the interagency Terrorist Threat 

Integration Center (TTIC), to centralize threat information.

28 In September, he created the 

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an interagency operation administered by the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), to consolidate the Federal Government’s many terror watchlists.29 The 

White House’s decision to create these two centers outside of DHS led some to observe that 

these entities “overlap with, duplicate . . . or even trump” the Department’s statutory intelligence 

duties, as DHS’s own inspector general put it.

30

The following year, 2004, was an important year for the growth of state and local fusion 

centers, even as developments further constrained DHS’s role in counterterrorism intelligence.

That July, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, better known 

as the 9/11 Commission, released its public report detailing the circumstances surrounding the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Among its findings, the Commission highlighted the 

failure of public officials to “connect the dots,” or share key terrorism-related intelligence in time 

to prevent the attack.31

Although the Commission did not refer to fusion centers in its recommendations, 

advocates of the centers, including DHS, have consistently interpreted the panel’s 

recommendations to improve information-sharing as a call for increased Federal support for 

fusion centers.32

The Commission’s report spurred Congress and the White House to action, passing bills 

and issuing Executive Orders which reorganized U.S. government agencies’ roles and 

responsibilities in fighting terrorism. Those moves boosted the importance of Federal-state-local 

information-sharing efforts. They also all but shifted responsibility for facilitating informationsharing, integrating intelligence, and analyzing threat information at the Federal level from DHS 

to a new Federal interagency body, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), part of the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

 26 Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 (11/25/2002). 27 DHS website, “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” http://www.dhs.gov/creation-departmenthomeland-security, accessed 9/16/2012. 28 “The Terrorist Threat Integration Center,” FBI.gov, http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2004/april/threat_043004, 

accessed 9/24/2012.

29 “New Terrorist Screening Center Established” (9/13/2003), FBI publication, 

http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2003/september/tsc091603. 30 “DHS Performance and Accountability Report, Fiscal Year 2003” (2/13/2004), 

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/PerformanceAccountabilityReportFY03.pdf, at 37. 31 July 2004, “The 9/11 Commission Report,” Chapter 13, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 

United States, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Ch13.pdf. 32As just one example, DHS pointed to the landmark document in its 2011 publication, “Implementing 9/11 

Commission Recommendations, Progress Report.” In it DHS called fusion centers a “critical feature” of the United 

States’ “strengthened homeland security enterprise” that “align with – and respond to” the 9/11 Commission’s 

recommendation of “expanding information sharing.” “Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations, Progress 

Report,” DHS, at , http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf.
12

The NCTC was created by the 2004 intelligence reform law and replaced the TTIC.

33 

The 2004 law gave the new center the responsibility for integrating and analyzing terrorist threat 

intelligence from all sources, as well as the job of assessing the terrorist threat to the United 

States. That law, and Executive Order 13356, also created a new office, the Program Manager 

for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), to help local, state and Federal agencies 

better share terrorism-related information.34

As other Federal agencies and offices took the lead in compiling and analyzing 

counterterrorism information at the Federal level, DHS’s intelligence operations began to focus 

on a responsibility that received less attention in subsequent reform laws and Executive Orders: 

information sharing with state, local and tribal partners.

At that time, DHS was working with 18 state and local intelligence and fusion centers to 

share threat-related information, and officials were working on how to best develop a 

coordinated effort to build their capabilities.35

In 2006, DHS’s then intelligence chief, Charles E. Allen, submitted a detailed fusion 

center plan to his superior, then DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, which highlighted fusion 

centers’ potential to aid Federal counterterrorism efforts.

“Harnessing domestic information is the unique DHS contribution to the national-level 

mission to protect the Homeland,” Allen’s plan read.36 He called fusion centers “critical sources 

of unique law enforcement information and threat information,” and “the natural entry point into 

the State and Local ‘systems’ for critical threat information from the National Intelligence 

Community.”37

“These centers are both suppliers and customers to DHS,” Mr. Allen wrote. “We need 

the capability to routinely harvest information and finished intelligence in a timely manner from 

State and Local sources.”38 The plan, Mr. Allen said in his cover memo to Mr. Chertoff, was 

“one of the most important endeavors the Department can undertake right now.”39

In presentations to other agencies and Congress, DHS officials stressed fusion centers’ 

value as sources of counterterrorism intelligence for the Federal Government. Robert Riegle was 

a key DHS official involved in the Department’s fusion center efforts at the time. He told the 

 33 See Executive Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg. 53599 (9/1/ 2004); “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 

Act of 2004,” P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). 34 Id. 35 See 2005 Responses to Questions for the Record submitted by DHS, for the 3/4/2004 hearing, “Department of 

Homeland Security’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Budget Proposal for Fiscal Year 2005,” 

House Committee on Homeland Security, http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/108h/22589.txt. 36 Memorandum from Charles E. Allen, “State and Local Fusion Center Implementation Plan” (3/16/2006), at 2, 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-004031. 37 Id. at 9. 38 Id.

39 Id..
13

Subcommittee he gave presentations to Secretary Chertoff, the FBI, and Congress about the 

important contributions fusion centers could make to the Federal counterterrorism effort.40

“Every single day interrogations occur, in police investigations throughout the United 

States,” Mr. Riegle recounted to the Subcommittee. “We could train people in these units . . . on 

the seven signs of terror.” Local police weren’t the only ones DHS could reach as intelligence 

sources through fusion centers, Mr. Riegle said. “We had fire [departments] – one of the few 

people who can enter your home without a warrant is a firefighter.” 41

Mr. Riegle said that he did not believe that access to state and local information was 

really a principal reason for the Federal Government to support fusion centers, but it was part of 

the pitch. “It was a selling point to the Feds,” Mr. Riegle said. “I’ve got to tell them what the 

benefits are.” 42

DHS Secretary Chertoff approved the plan in June 2006. By the end of that year, at least 

37 fusion centers had begun operations in states including Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, 

Maine, and North Carolina.

43

The following year, both Congress and the White House took steps to bolster DHS’s 

involvement with fusion centers. Congress passed the “Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11 Commission Act of 2007,” which explicated DHS’s role in sharing information with state 

and local agencies,44 even as it called the Department’s outreach to those state and local officials 

“haphazard and often accompanied by less than timely results.” 45 In the law, legislators directed 

DHS to provide support and coordinate Federal involvement with fusion centers.46

In the law, Congress established a DHS State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center 

Initiative. The law directed DHS to provide to fusion centers “operational and intelligence 

advice;” conduct exercises with them; provide management assistance; and “review information

. . . including homeland security information, terrorism information, and weapons of mass 

destruction information that is gathered by State, local, and regional fusion centers; and to 

incorporate such information, as appropriate, into the Department’s own such information.”47

 40 Subcommittee interview of Robert Riegle (6/1/2012). 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Subcommittee survey of fusion centers (2010). 44 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 317, 318-24 

(2007). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf. 45 Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1 (7/25/2007), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT110hrpt259/pdf/CRPT-110hrpt259.pdf, at 304. 46 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 317, 318-24 

(2007). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf. 47 Id. at 318-24. 
14

To underscore the point, Congress urged DHS to “increase its involvement with them 

[state and local fusion centers] and appropriately incorporate their non-Federal information into 

the Department’s intelligence products.”48

The law also directed DHS to detail intelligence personnel to the centers if the centers 

met certain criteria, several of which required a center to demonstrate a focus on and 

commitment to a counterterrorism mission. Among the criteria the law suggested were “whether 

the fusion center . . . focuses on a broad counterterror approach,” whether the center has 

sufficient personnel “to support a broad counterterrorism mission,” and whether the center is 

appropriately funded by non-Federal sources “to support its counterterrorism mission.”49

Also in 2007, the Bush Administration focused on improving how officials at all levels of 

government shared terrorism-related information. That October, President Bush released his 

“National Strategy for Information Sharing: Successes and Challenges in Improving TerrorismRelated Information Sharing,” in which he called for fusion centers to be “the focus . . . within 

the State and local environment for the receipt and sharing of terrorism information, homeland 

security information, and law enforcement information related to terrorism.”50

President Bush’s 2007 report also directed the Federal government to develop for the first 

time a set of minimum operational standards for fusion centers, which would allow officials to 

determine whether a fusion center had “achieved a baseline level of capability.”

In response, in September 2008, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security 

published “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers.” The 

document outlined the basic “structures, processes and tools” fusion centers needed to have in 

place in order to functionally participate in sharing counterterrorism intelligence information 

with the Federal Government.

51

“It is recognized that at the time of writing this document, most fusion centers are in the 

process of achieving these standards and capabilities,” the 2008 report stated – underscoring how

few, if any, fusion centers then possessed all the minimum capabilities to meaningfully 

participate in counterterrorism information-sharing with the Federal Government. The report 

 The capabilities included having a governance structure, a 

staffing plan, and a privacy policy; installing sufficient physical security; developing a funding 

strategy; having a plan to provide training to intelligence analysts; and having processes and 

protocols in place to share relevant information with Federal agencies. 

 48 Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 1 (7/25/2007), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT110hrpt259/pdf/CRPT-110hrpt259.pdf, at 304.

49 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 317, 318-24 

(2007). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf. 50 October 2007 “The National Strategy for Information Sharing,” White House, available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html. 51 September 2008, “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” Department of Justice, 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/baselinecapabilitiesa.pdf. For the 

full list of baseline capabilities, please see Appendix A of this Subcommittee report.
15

stated that it expected fusion centers “to take a period of one to five years to achieve all of the 

baseline capabilities.”52

Even before the 2008 report was issued, the Bush administration had provided grants to 

fusion centers to develop their capabilities, but it also made clear that it did not believe it was the 

Federal Government’s place to sustain the fusion centers forever. “The funding . . . helps 

fledgling centers get off the ground and start to build fundamental baseline capabilities. This is 

not meant, by the way, to be sustainment funding,” explained then-DHS Secretary Michael 

Chertoff in his keynote address to the first annual National Fusion Center Conference in 2007.

53

“We are not signing up to fund fusion centers in perpetuity. But we do want to use these grants 

to target resources to help fusion centers make the capital investment and training investment to 

come to maturity. And then, of course, we expect every community to continue to invest in 

sustaining these very important law enforcement tools.”54

Control of the Executive branch changed parties in 2009. At DHS, officials criticized 

their predecessors’ efforts to support and benefit from state and local fusion centers. “DHS has 

failed to date to institute a well-coordinated, Department-wide approach to supporting and 

interfacing with state and major urban area fusion centers,” wrote Bart Johnson, then the Acting 

Undersecretary of DHS Intelligence and Analysis, to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano. “This 

shortcoming has resulted in a disjointed and ad hoc approach by DHS elements toward 

supporting and interacting with these centers.”55

Mr. Johnson proposed that the new DHS Secretary, Janet Napolitano, issue a “Secretarial 

declaration of recommitment” to the fusion center initiative. In place of previous efforts, Mr. 

Johnson envisioned “a robust Department-wide initiative to support the establishment and 

sustainment of a nationwide network of fusion centers.” Secretary Napolitano approved the 

proposal, and made fusion centers one of the Department’s top priorities.56 “Fusion centers are 

and will be a critical part of our nation's homeland security capabilities. I intend to make them a 

top priority for this Department to support them, build them, improve them and work with them,” 

she said in a July 2009 speech, after receiving Mr. Johnson’s plan.57

 52 September 2008, “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” Department of Justice, 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/baselinecapabilitiesa.pdf. Two 

subsequent DHS assessments, each with different methodologies but both purportedly based to some degree on the 

2008 list of baseline capabilities, have found most fusion centers continue to lack necessary minimum capabilities to 

support the Federal counterterrorism mission. “2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, DHS-HSGACFC-007231; “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027. 53 1/18/2008 CRS Report, “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” John Rollins, at 44, 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf. Derived from CRS transcription of Secretary Chertoff’s Keynote 

Address to the first annual National Fusion Center Conference (3/6/2007), Footnote 135. 54 1/18/2008 CRS Report, “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” John Rollins, at 44, 

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf. Derived from CRS transcription of Secretary Chertoff’s Keynote 

Address to the first annual National Fusion Center Conference (3/6/2007), Footnote 135. 55 Memorandum from Bart R. Johnson to Secretary Janet Napolitano, “Subject: DHS State and Local Fusion Center 

Initiative” (7/20/2009), at DHS-HSGAC-FC-058964. 56 Id. 57 Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Council on Foreign Relations (7/29/2009), DHS.gov, 

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/07/29/secretary-napolitanos-remarks-council-foreign-relations. 
16

The White House also publicly embraced fusion centers as part of its anti-terrorism 

strategy. In his 2010 National Security Strategy, President Barack Obama wrote: 

To prevent acts of terrorism on American soil, we must enlist all of our intelligence, law 

enforcement, and homeland security capabilities. 

We will continue to integrate and leverage state and major urban area fusion centers that 

have the capability to share classified information; establish a nationwide framework for 

reporting suspicious activity; and implement an integrated approach to our 

counterterrorism information systems to ensure that the analysts, agents, and officers who 

protect us have access to all relevant intelligence throughout the government. We are 

improving information sharing and cooperation by linking networks to facilitate Federal, 

state, and local capabilities to seamlessly exchange messages and information, conduct 

searches, and collaborate.58

Despite President Obama’s clear focus on fusion centers as counterterrorism tools, some 

Administration officials have at times shifted away from defending the centers’ value to Federal

counterterrorism efforts. In recent years, they have emphasized other possible fusion center 

functions, such as disaster recovery, or investigations of crime, sometimes even to the exclusion 

of any counterterrorism mission.

DHS Secretary Napolitano has alternated between describing fusion centers as a crucial 

part of the Department’s counterterrorism efforts, and also as centers which do “everything else.” 

In March 2009, the Secretary spoke before the National Fusion Center Conference in 

Kansas City, Missouri. Ms. Napolitano explained what she believed was the difference between 

state and local fusion centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), FBI-led groups that 

include state and local law enforcement as well as other Federal agencies and whose primary 

mission is investigating terrorist threats. Ms. Napolitano said: 

Fusion Centers are not the same as your Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF). They are 

different and they have different roles. The JTTF, as those in the audience know, is an 

FBI-driven group designed to look solely at the issue of terrorism and [the] terrorism 

dimension. The Fusion Centers are designed to look at many, many more things beyond 

that . . . . [A] serial kidnapper, a gang or organized crime syndicate in an area, a serial or 

pattern murderer all have been handled by Fusion Centers. The JTTFs have a very 

defined specific function, the Fusion Center[s] much broader, and then the Fusion Center 

also includes the capacity for response and recovery.59

 58 “2010 National Security Strategy,” White House, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 59 Remarks by Janet Napolitano before the National Fusion Center Conference (3/11/2009), DHS.gov, 

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/03/13/napolitanos-remarks-national-fusion-center-conference.
17

Ms. Napolitano concluded, “Fusion Centers to me are going to be key in how we increase 

our ability to protect the homeland.”60

In testimony before the Senate in September 2009, DHS Secretary Napolitano was even 

more direct. “I think it’s good to explain the difference between a JTTF and a fusion center. A 

JTTF is really focused on terrorism and terrorism-related investigations. Fusion centers are 

almost everything else,” Ms. Napolitano said.61 But then two years later, in a 2011 speech at the 

National Fusion Center Conference in Denver, Colorado, Ms. Napolitano called fusion centers 

“one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy.”62

In March 2012 testimony before the Senate, DHS Secretary Napolitano again stressed 

fusion centers’ work beyond counterterrorism. “Their mission is terrorism prevention, but it’s 

also much broader than that,” Ms. Napolitano said during testimony. “And as [Arizona] 

governor I started one of the first fusion centers in the country. It is an ideal place to co-locate, 

to share information. We use them in a variety of ways,” Ms. Napolitano said.

63

B. DHS Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) runs 

the Department’s operational involvement with fusion centers.64 On one side, its State and Local 

Program Office (SLPO) acts as a service bureau to the fusion centers, dispatching liaison officers 

to fusion centers around the country, helping arrange for security clearances for state and local 

personnel, and providing other training and logistical support for the centers.65

On the other side, I&A’s Reporting Branch (RB), receives, reviews and publishes socalled “raw” intelligence obtained from fusion centers, distributing it to assist DHS and its 

Federal intelligence community partners.66

Raw intelligence is a report of an event that has not undergone analysis or necessarily 

verification, but is essentially what its name implies. It is typically a report of a single event, 

 60 Remarks by Janet Napolitano before the National Fusion Center Conference (3/11/2009), DHS.gov, 

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/03/13/napolitanos-remarks-national-fusion-center-conference. 61 Testimony of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, “Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland” (9/30/2009). 62 Remarks by DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, National Fusion Center Conference, Denver, Colorado (3/15/2011). 63 Testimony of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, “President Obama's Fiscal 2013 Budget Proposal for the Homeland Security Department” (3/21/2012). 64 I&A also oversees the intelligence activities of the Department’s component divisions. Its chief is an Under 

Secretary who reports directly to the Secretary of the Department. She is also the Department’s Chief Intelligence 

Officer, and in that capacity is responsible to the Director of National Intelligence. I&A is not responsible for the 

Department’s funding of fusion centers, which is handled through the grants division of the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA).

65 11/2011 “DHS’ Efforts to Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centers, 

OIG-12-10” DHS Office of Inspector General, at 16-17. 66 I&A publishes both “raw” intelligence reporting and “finished” analytical products. Raw intelligence is produced 

by the Reporting Branch, which receives the information from DHS personnel mostly outside the directorate, from 

personnel at component agencies, or from detailees in state and local fusion centers. The Reporting Branch also 

receives, reviews and publishes raw intelligence from DHS components.
18

creating the proverbial “dots” of intelligence. For DHS, it could be news of possible terrorist 

precursor activity, an arrest with details indicating cross-border drug smuggling, or information 

regarding a suspected terrorist traveling into or out of the United States.

Raw intelligence is expected to be fragmentary and more immediate than analytical 

products, which tend to be lengthier, draw from multiple sources, and take more time to produce. 

(1) Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs)

During the 2009-2010 period of reporting the Subcommittee reviewed, raw intelligence 

from fusion centers came to DHS in the form of an intelligence report known as a Homeland 

Intelligence Report, or “HIR.”67 Reporting of raw intelligence handled by I&A from all 

components of DHS used the HIR format.68 HIRs are the primary method DHS uses to publish

and distribute the raw intelligence it gathers to Federal intelligence and law enforcement 

agencies.69

I&A required all HIRs, regardless of where they were drafted, to meet the following 

thresholds:

1. Report information that falls within one of five authorized I&A intelligence 

activities, showing a nexus to Homeland Security issues. This includes 

information related to:

a. Terrorist threats to the homeland.

b. Priorities for protective and support measures in response to actual or 

potential threats or hazards to the homeland, including critical 

infrastructure or key resources; a significant public safety, public 

health or environmental impact; political, societal and economic

infrastructure; border security; the proliferation or use of weapons of 

mass destruction; or other potential catastrophic events including manmade and natural disasters.

c. Departmental support, such as the furtherance of law enforcement 

activities of a component.

d. General tasks directed by the Secretary of Homeland Security.

e. Specific tasks directed by statute or presidential directive.

2. Satisfy valid IC [Intelligence Community] collection requirements or DHS 

SINs [Standing Information Needs].

 67 In October 2011, DHS changed its terminology to “Intelligence Information Reports,” or IIRs, but the format was 

largely unchanged. For simplicity, this report uses the term HIRs throughout. 

68 “Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production, v. 1.1” (6/25/2010), DHS-HSGACFC-056471 69 Testimony of Caryn Wagner before the House Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee of the Committee 

on Homeland Security, “The DHS Intelligence Enterprise- Past, Present, and Future” (6/1/2011). Recently, DHS 

has partnered with DOJ on a “National SAR (Suspicious Activity Reporting) Initiative,” which encourages fusion 

centers to file reports on “suspicious activity,” which the Departments define as “observed behavior reasonably 

indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.” Those reports can be written by 

state and local personnel, and are shared through a DOJ-managed process. “About NSI,” Nationwide SAR 

Initiative, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/about_nsi.aspx. 
19

3. Contain information that is generally unavailable via open sources (i.e. 

mainstream media outlets) or from other Intelligence Community reporting.

4. Contain information that is of interest to federal organizations other than the 

reporting element.70

HIRs from fusion centers are typically composed of information drawn from local law 

enforcement records.71 They are often unclassified, but treated as “For Official Use Only” 

(FOUO), a designation DHS applies to documents to which it cannot restrict access under statute 

or regulation, but which it nonetheless believes to be “sensitive in nature.”72

An HIR does not bear the name of the official who collected the information or authored 

the report, although it does bear a numeric code which corresponds to that official’s identity. 

DHS told the Subcommittee that it considers the reporters’ identities classified, and has since 

2004.

They are generally 

two to three pages in length, not including the list of recipients which accompanies each report. 

Each HIR not only recounts an event, incident or observation, but also gives data on when that 

information was obtained, the source of the information, and codes indicating the origin of the 

report, the author, the existence of sensitive U.S. person information and why it is legal to 

include it, the date and time it was published, and what intelligence needs the report addresses. 

73 It provided the Subcommittee with a list of reporter codes, known as Field Reporter 

Numbers (FRNs) or “PREP codes,” and it provided a list of reporting officials; however, it 

declined to provide the Subcommittee any document or information in an unclassified setting 

that it believed could be used in combination with other information to discern the identities of 

the authors of specific HIRs.74

According to DHS officials, in 2007 and 2008, the Department trained state and local 

personnel, including firefighters and policemen, on how to draft an HIR.75

 70 Attachment 2: Homeland Intelligence Report Threshold, HIRWG Phase 1 Report and Recommendations, DHSHSGAC-FC-056566.

 “It’s true, state and 

local personnel were issued FRNs . . . . Yes, there are reports in the system [by authors] who are 

not Federal employees, but were trained,” said former Reporting Branch chief Keith Jones, who 

71 6/25/2010 “Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production, v. 1.1,” DHS-HSGACFC-056471, at 056498; “Reports Officer Basic Course, Student Guide, Rev 0511,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057118, at 11. 72 “‘For Official Use Only’ (FOUO) is the term used within DHS to identify unclassified information of a sensitive 

nature that is not otherwise categorized by statute or regulation.” 3/14/2011 “DHS Sensitive Systems Policy 

Directive 4300A,” DHS.gov, https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/mgmt_directive_4300a_policy_v8.pdf. In the 

13 months’ worth of reports the Subcommittee reviewed, 36 HIRs were classified, 574 were unclassified. 73“Since DHS I&A’s adoption of the DIA IIR formatting, dissemination and security standards in 2004, any 

association of an assigned FRN with the name of the corresponding DHS reporter has been considered classified 

information at its inception.” Email from DHS to the Subcommittee (7/15/2011), “Subject: Fusion Centers.” PSIDHS-72-000002. 74DHS explained that its reporters’ identities were a national security secret, because terrorists or criminals could 

seek retribution for being subjects of their reporting. “[R]eleasing the identities of Reports Officers would expose 

those Officers to retribution from or exploitation by the adversaries that are the subjects of those Officers’ reporting, 

causing serious damage to national security.” Response from DHS to the Subcommittee (8/1/2012), DHS-HSGACFC-059275. When asked about the purpose of classifying reporters’ identities, DHS I&A Under Secretary Caryn 

Wagner stated, “I don’t think we’re talking about personal danger, just, why would you need to know?” 

Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). 75 Subcommittee interviews of former Senior Reports Officer (3/30/2012) and Mark Collier (3/8/2012). 
20

left the position in 2009. “I recall feeling vaguely uneasy about it . . . people I didn’t hire writing 

reports,” Mr. Jones said.76

The Department confirmed that DHS “does not explicitly prohibit” non-Federal officials 

from filing intelligence reports, and that as recently as 2010, DHS published intelligence reports 

prepared by non-Federal officials.77 However, in a separate statement the Department

acknowledged “it would be inadvisable” to allow non-Federal officials to file intelligence 

reports, because DHS “lacks the legal authority to compel State, local, tribal, territorial, and 

private sector entities to abide by” Executive Order 12333, which regulates national intelligence 

activities.78

(2) I&A Personnel

Although DHS has funded fusion centers since it opened its doors in 2003, DHS had few 

intelligence personnel at fusion centers until recently. In 2006, when then-Under Secretary 

Allen’s plan was approved, I&A began systematically detailing “Intelligence Officers” (IOs) to 

fusion centers around the country.79

The process was gradual – Allen’s plan called for the first three dozen IOs to be in place 

by 2009. Reporting intelligence to DHS was just one of an IO’s responsibilities. IOs were also 

liaisons to DHS, arranging for training state and local personnel, helping local fusion center 

personnel get questions answered at DHS, preparing information for briefings to state and local 

officials, and more.80

In 2008, the Reporting Branch began detailing its own specialists to fusion centers.81

Reporting Branch officials sent to fusion centers are known as Reports Officers (ROs) or Senior 

Reports Officers (SROs), different from IOs primarily because their focus is solely the reporting 

of state and local intelligence back to DHS. As of May 3, 2012, DHS said the Reporting Branch 

has deployed reporting officials to 18 fusion centers around the country.82

IO and RO intelligence collection authorities are restricted by Executive Order to “overt” 

collection practices, 83

 76 Subcommittee interview of Keith Jones (4/2/2012).

which includes the acquisition of information “from . . . observation, 

77 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry (9/21/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059982. 78 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry (8/1/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059275. 79 Subcommittee interview of Robert Riegle (6/1/2012). The first DHS detailee at a fusion center was placed in 

January 2006, to the Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center, before Allen’s plan, which contained a strategy 

for detailing personnel, was approved. Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (4/16/2012). 80 “Position Description, Intelligence Operations Specialist,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-058978. 81 At first the Reporting Branch deployed contract employees provided by Federal contractors; they eventually 

replaced them with Federal employee Reports Officers. Subcommittee interview of Jonathan Wilham (3/6/2012). 82 DHS Support to Fusion Centers, as of 5/3/12, PSI-DHS-56-0021. 83 Executive Order 12333, as amended, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf.
21

government-to-government dialog, elicitation, and from the sharing of data openly acquired . . . . 

[T]he sources involved normally are aware of the general collection activity[.]”84

While DHS produced a memo explaining I&A’s collection authorities and fourteen 

collection categories, DHS officials told the Subcommittee the Department has no written 

guidance or training to explain to ROs and IOs what specific intelligence collection practices are 

allowable or prohibited under those authorities.

85

Harold Vandover was chief of the I&A Reporting Branch from December 2009 to 

September 2011. He now helps DHS develop training for its intelligence officers. Mr. 

Vandover told the Subcommittee that I&A does not allow IOs and ROs to recruit people to be 

human intelligence sources for them. They cannot instigate a conversation for the purpose of 

collecting information, according to Mr. Vandover. They are generally limited to reviewing 

documentation such as databases, arrest reports and other law enforcement records. Mr. 

Vandover said they can participate in interviews conducted by state and local officials at their 

fusion center, but cannot request those interviews, and can only ask questions in order to clarify 

information already solicited.86

As of May 3, 2012, DHS had detailed Intelligence Officers to 66 state and local fusion 

centers in addition to the 18 Reports Officers. Eleven fusion centers had no DHS I&A personnel 

of any kind on site to identify potentially useful intelligence and report it to headquarters, 87

During the period of review, IOs drafted their own HIRs and submitted them to 

headquarters, where ROs in the Reporting Branch would review the drafts, edit them and 

shepherd them through a multi-office review process. The Reporting Branch was ideally situated 

to spot problems with reporting from IOs. However, the IOs worked for the State and Local 

Program Office (SLPO), a separate entity from the Reporting Branch. This division created a 

cleft in the chain of command, wherein the Reporting Branch was responsible for the quality of 

the reporting, but not the quality of the reporter. When an IO routinely submitted useless or 

inappropriate reporting, the Reporting Branch had no authority to take corrective personnel 

action. It could only notify SLPO officials that the IO was not adhering to Department

guidelines.

hampering those centers’ ability to contribute to the Federal counterterrorism mission.

88

 84 DHS written response to Subcommittee inquiry (8/24/2012) DHS-HSGAC-FC-059584. The Department stated it

generally follows the definition of “overt collection” from the CIA’s Glossary of Intelligence Terms and Definitions 

(June 1989): “The acquisition of intelligence information from public media, observation, government-togovernment dialogue, elicitation, and from the sharing of data openly acquired; the process may be classified or 

unclassified; the target and host governments as well as the sources involved normally are aware of the general 

collection activity, although the specific acquisition, sites, and processes may be successfully concealed.” 85 Subcommittee interviews of Harold “Skip” Vandover (8/22/2012) and DHS Office of General Counsel

(8/12/2012); DHS written response, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059275; Memorandum from Charles E. Allen and Matthew 

L. Kronisch to All Employees, Detailees, and Contractors Supporting the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, 

“SUBJECT: Interim Intelligence Oversight Procedures for the Office of Intelligence & Analysis,” (4/3/2008) DHSHSGAC-FC-047637. 86 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 87 DHS Support to Fusion Centers (5/3/2012), PSI-DHS-56-0021. 88 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012).
22

(3) Drafting Fusion Center HIRs 

When DHS personnel at a state or local fusion center obtain information that they believe 

might assist the homeland security mission, they draft an intelligence report, known during the 

period of Subcommittee review as a Homeland Intelligence Report (HIR).89 Until October 2011, 

reporters filed draft HIRs as Microsoft Word documents and transmitted them to headquarters 

via unclassified email.

90 The Department has since switched to using an intelligence reporting 

system developed by the Defense Department, and sharing drafts via a secure network.

91

At DHS’s Washington, D.C. headquarters, an I&A Reports Officer (RO) received the 

documents when they arrived. He or she reviewed the draft against the source documents to 

ensure everything necessary was present, conducted additional research as warranted, revised the 

draft, and forwarded it to a Senior Reports Officer for review.

 

92

I&A Reports Officers worked their way through the queue of draft HIRs, typically 

reviewing each one in order of when it was received, officials said. According to Reporting

Branch officials, ROs often had to make extensive edits, including rewriting the entire HIR, 

adding codes and formatting before the document was ready for publication to the intelligence 

community.

93

Once the draft was complete, the ROs sent the final, peer-reviewed draft to a Senior 

Reports Officer (SRO), who reviewed the document and its changes. If the SRO approved the 

final draft, the RO placed it in a shared folder for oversight review.

 89 DHS now calls HIRs Intelligence Information Reports (IIR). In this report, the terms are used interchangeably, 

however HIR primarily refers to reporting during the review period. During the period reviewed by the 

Subcommittee, IOs drafted HIRs. In July 2011, DHS refined the roles of ROs and IOs, stating that ROs primarily 

draft IIRs, and IOs should pass tips and leads to ROs for drafting into a report. Memorandum from Christopher 

Button and Michael Potts, “Subject: Management of I&A Personnel at State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers” 

(7/29/2011), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059289. 90 Subcommittee interview of Keith Jones (4/12/2012).

91 Subcommittee interview of Charles Robinson (7/18/2012); DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry (8/30/2012), 

PSI-DHS-67-0001; “Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production, v. 1.1,” DHS, 

(6/25/2010) DHS-HSGAC-FC-056477. In the uncommon case of a draft HIR that was classified, it was transmitted 

via the Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), a Secret-level classified network. Email from DHS to the 

Subcommittee (8/30/2012), PSI-DHS-67-0001. Because DHS classifies its reporters’ identities, its procedure 

requiring reporters to email draft reports via unsecure networks may represent improper handling of classified 

information.

92 6/25/2010 “Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production, v. 1.1,” DHS, at DHSHSGAC-FC-056478.

93 Subcommittee interviews of Senior Reports Officer (3/1/2012), Senior Reports Officer (3/20/2012), and Keith 

Jones (4/2/2012). 
23

(4) DHS Enhanced Review of HIRs 

Prior to April 2009, I&A did not systematically send draft HIRs to be reviewed by the 

DHS Office of Privacy and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.94 However, in April 2009,

news outlets reported on a DHS intelligence product which suggested that anti-abortion groups, 

anti-immigration groups, and groups “rejecting Federal authority in favor of state or local 

authority” could be considered “rightwing extremist” groups potentially capable of acts of 

terror.95 Media articles about the intelligence report brought sharp criticism of DHS, particularly 

from conservative groups and civil libertarians.96

In response to public outcry over the report, DHS Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute 

ordered I&A to ensure certain types of intelligence products were reviewed and approved by 

officials from DHS’s Privacy Office (PRIV), Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), 

I&A’s Office of Intelligence Oversight (I/O), and the DHS Office of General Counsel (OGC) 

before release.97

Following Ms. Lute’s directive, I&A Reporting Branch officials coordinated with these 

four offices, and within weeks they instituted a new procedure.98 Under the new procedure, after 

receiving a draft nomination from DHS personnel in the field, a Reports Officer at headquarters 

assigned it a tracking number; placed the draft, and any accompanying materials, in a shared 

folder on the DHS electronic network; and alerted officials at the reviewing offices (PRIV, 

CRCL, I/O, OGC) that a new draft nomination was available for review.99

Reviewing officials from each office read the material and submitted their comments in 

emails to I&A, advising publication or cancellation, asking questions, or recommending 

alterations to the draft. All four offices reviewed and approved a draft before it was published; 

an objection from any reviewer caused a report’s cancellation.

From 2007 to early 2010, DHS Deputy Under Secretary for Operations James Chaparro

oversaw much of I&A’s operations. Mr. Chaparro had serious concerns about how the enhanced 

multi-office review process was implemented. In his eyes, it was “putting a tremendous 

workload on [the offices] without commensurate resources. You can see exactly what’s going to 

happen. It’s going to slow the process down.”100

 94 Both entities are oversight offices located outside of I&A.

95 “Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and 

Recruitment” (4/7/2009), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059277. 96 See, e.g., “Soon, We’ll All Be Radicals,” ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-andliberty/soon-well-all-be-radicals (4/16/2009); Transcript of “Hannity,” segment “Joe the Plumber at Atlanta Tea 

Party,” http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,516835,00.html (4/15/2009). 97 Email from MGMTExecSec, “Subject: Management Action Directive: Coordination of Intelligence Products”

(4/17/2009), DHS-HSGAC-FC-047649. 

98 Email from Jonathan Wilham to Timothy Bailey, Ole Broughton, et al, “Subject: Vetting of DHS HIRs”

(5/5/2009), DHS-HSGAC-FC-047651. 99 Id. 100 Subcommittee interview of James Chaparro (6/28/2012). 
24

As Mr. Chaparro predicted, the new review process, when it met with a steady flow of 

poorly-written, sometimes inappropriate reporting, slowed I&A’s intelligence publishing by 

months. “It was horribly inefficient,” Ken Hunt, a Privacy Office official involved in the review 

process, told the Subcommittee. “I remember conversations about the inefficiencies.”101 For the 

better part of almost three years – from early 2009 to late 2011 – DHS reporting was delayed,

sometimes by months.

102

C. Funding State and Local Fusion Centers

DHS has funded state and local fusion center operations primarily through its Homeland 

Security Grant Program (HSGP), administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA). Through the HSGP, FEMA provides roughly $800 million annually to states and 

municipalities for the broad purpose of “building and sustaining national preparedness 

capabilities.”103

HSGP funds can be used by states and urban areas for items as diverse as body armor, 

respirators, diving fins, mass casualty transport vehicles, reference databases, boats, planes, and 

refrigerators;104 for training on a wide variety of topics; for preparedness exercises; and for 

special event planning.105 Recipients can even use HSGP funds for costs like construction, 

physical security upgrades, rent and salaries, in proscribed circumstances. They can also use 

HSGP funds to support a fusion center.106

FEMA awards the funds to a designated agency in each state, known in FEMA parlance 

as the State Administrative Agency (SAA). Each year, FEMA determines how much each SAA 

 101 Subcommittee interview of Ken Hunt (2/27/2012). 102 HIRs from fusion centers published in June 2009 were published on average nearly three months after the 

information contained therein had been acquired, the Subcommittee investigation found. The delay persisted 

through April 2010, the end of the period of reporting the Subcommittee reviewed.

 A March 9, 2011 memorandum suggests that in late 2010 DHS cut the publication lag to an average of 14 days, 

but by the date of the memorandum a second backlog had developed. The backlog likely included – and impacted –

reporting from DHS components, as well. Memorandum from Harold “Skip” Vandover to Mike Potts, “SUBJECT: 

Reporting Backlog” (3/9/2011), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059705.

 Documents indicate the backlog persisted through most of 2011. Email from Harold “Skip” Vandover to 

Donald Torrence, “Subject: RE: UPDATED HIR Triage Definitions” (5/3/2011), DHS-HSGAC-FC-050748 (“I 

intend to monitor the backlog to see how it is coming down before I take more drastic measures”). Email from 

Harold “Skip” Vandover to Jonathan Wilham, et al, “Subject: S&L HIR “Surge” (8/24/2011), DHS-HSGAC-FC050751 (“As it stands right now, there are over 500 HIRs waiting to be reviewed and published . . . we are 

continuing to slip further behind.”) 

 A November 2011 document indicates a significant backlog was still present at that time – 307 draft reports 

were waiting for publication, 267 of which were more than 10 days old. “DHS Reporting Branch Weekly 

Passdown” (11/10/11), DHS-HSGAC-FC-056589. 103 DHS website, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) Frequently Asked Questions 

(FAQs),” http://www.fema.gov/pdf/government/grant/AFG.pdf. Before 2008, DHS also funded fusion centers 

through its Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), which no longer exists as a separate 

program.

104 FEMA Preparedness Grants Authorized Equipment List, https://www.rkb.us/mel.cfm?subtypeid=549, accessed 

9/24/2012.

105 FEMA Homeland Security Grant Program, Program Guidance and Application Kits, 2007- 2011. 106 Id. 
25

will receive in HSGP funds according to a risk-based formula set out in statute.107

States determine how much of their FEMA preparedness grant funding they will direct to 

fusion center projects. As explained below, DHS does not track the exact amount each state and 

municipal recipient directs to each fusion center in their jurisdiction.

It informs 

each state of the amount it will receive. Then, the SAAs prepare and submit an application to 

FEMA that identifies and justifies the broad areas in which they plan to spend the grant funds 

FEMA has already committed to providing them.

After FEMA reviews and approves these applications, also known as “investment 

justifications” (IJs), it disburses grant funds to the states. Each SAA then distributes portions of 

the funds to specific projects, including those meant to support fusion centers, through the state 

and local agencies responsible for implementing those projects. Once an SAA allocates grant 

funds to an individual project, FEMA expects that SAA to compile progress reports on the 

project. Those reports, known as the Biannual Strategy Implementation Reports (BSIRs), are 

filed every six months. They are intended to track the expenditure of grant funds.108

 107Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P. L. No. 110-53, § 2004 (e) (2007), 

codified at 6 U.S.C. § 605 (e).

BSIRs are 

not used to conduct program oversight. BSIRs reviewed by the Subcommittee provided only a 

high level overview of grantees’ spending.

108 DHS, Homeland Security Grant Program, Program Guidance and Application Kit, Fiscal Years 2007-2009.
26

IV. DHS SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL

FUSION CENTERS DOES NOT GENERATE TIMELY, USEFUL

INTELLIGENCE FOR FEDERAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

• Reporting from fusion centers was often flawed, and unrelated to terrorism. 

• Some reports had “nothing of value.” 

• If published, some draft reporting could have violated the Privacy Act. 

• Most fusion center reporting related to drug smuggling, alien smuggling or other criminal activity. 

• Terrorism-related reporting was often outdated, duplicative and uninformative. 

• DHS intelligence reporting officials who repeatedly violated guidelines faced no sanction.

• DHS did not sufficiently train its fusion center detailees to legally and effectively collect and report 

intelligence. 

• Short-staffing and reliance on contract employees hampered reporting efforts. 

• Reporting officials aren’t evaluated on the quality of their reporting.

• A hastily-implemented and poorly coordinated review process delayed reporting by months.

• Retaining inappropriate records is contrary to DHS policies and the Privacy Act.

• Problems with DHS reporting are acknowledged, but unresolved.

A. Overview

“Fusion centers are and will be a critical part of our nation’s homeland security 

capabilities. I intend to make them a top priority for this Department to support them, build 

them, improve them and work with them,” DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said in a speech 

before the Council on Foreign Relations in July 2009.109

At a March 4, 2010 Congressional hearing, DHS Undersecretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis Caryn Wagner praised fusion centers as “the linchpin of the evolving homeland 

security enterprise,” “a proven and invaluable tool,” and “a major force multiplier in the 

counterterrorism enterprise.”110

Central, effective, vital to the Federal counterterrorism mission: that was how DHS 

officials have envisioned and explained fusion centers’ importance to the Department and their

efforts to protect the country from another terrorist attack.

In 2006, the Department’s intelligence chief penned a master plan for how DHS should 

use fusion centers to contribute to the U.S. intelligence community. “Harnessing domestic 

information is the unique DHS contribution to the national-level mission to protect the 

Homeland,” wrote Charles Allen, then Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in the 

Department’s strategy for systematic engagement with fusion centers. “We need the capability 

 109 Remarks by Secretary Napolitano at the Council on Foreign Relations (7/29/2009), 

http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/speeches/sp_1248891649195.shtm. 110 Testimony of Caryn Wagner before the House Subcommittee on Homeland Security of the Committee on 

Appropriations, “Homeland Security Department Intelligence Programs and State and Local Fusion Centers,” 

(3/4/2010).
27

to routinely harvest information and finished intelligence in a timely manner from State and 

Local sources.”111

Congress and the White House handed DHS the responsibility and authority to share 

terrorism-related information with state, local and tribal governments; in 2007, both Congress 

and the White House made clear they agreed with Mr. Allen’s plan that such information-sharing 

should happen via state and local fusion centers.

But five years and hundreds of millions of dollars later, DHS has struggled to turn this

vision into a reality. Even as DHS officials and others have used public appearances to 

emphasize fusion centers’ alleged contributions to counterterrorism intelligence efforts, the facts 

have not supported the weight of their claims.

The Subcommittee’s two-year investigation found that DHS’s support of fusion centers 

has yielded little, if any, benefit to Federal counterterrorism intelligence efforts. After reviewing 

13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from 2009 to 2010, the 

Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the centers forwarded

“intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering

citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published 

public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism.

While there were times when he was proud of the quality of reporting coming out of 

DHS’s Reporting Branch, former branch chief Harold “Skip” Vandover told the Subcommittee, 

“there were times when it was, ‘what a bunch of crap is coming through.’” 112

“A lot of [the reporting] was predominantly useless information,” one former Senior 

Reports Officer, who worked in the Reporting Branch from 2006 to 2010, told the 

Subcommittee. “You had a lot of data clogging the system with no value.”113 Overall, the 

former official estimated 85 percent of reports coming out of the Reporting Branch were “not 

beneficial” to any entity, from Federal intelligence agencies to state and local fusion centers.114

Of the 610 reports reviewed, the Subcommittee investigation identified dozens of 

problematic or useless HIRs – dated, irrelevant, potentially violating civil liberties protections, 

even drawn from older public accounts.

The DHS officials who filed useless, problematic or even potentially illegal reports 

generally faced no sanction for their actions, according to documents and interviews. 

Supervisors spoke with them about their errors, but those problems were not noted on the 

reporting officials’ annual performance reviews, and did not influence managers’ decisions about 

 111 Memorandum from Charles E. Allen, “State and Local Fusion Center Plan” (3/16/2006), at 2, DHS-HSGAC-FC004031.

112 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 113 Subcommittee interview of former Senior Reports Officer (3/21/2012). 114 Id. Others also noted the frequency of substandard reporting. “It’s quite apparent when you look at some of the 

reporting that the HUMINT [human intelligence] skills aren’t there,” said one former Senior Reports Officer, who 

reviewed and edited HIRs from fusion centers. Subcommittee interview of Senior Reports Officer (3/1/2012). 
28

their salary raises, bonuses or career advancement, DHS officials told the Subcommittee. In fact, 

the Subcommittee investigation was able to identify only one case in which an official with a 

history of serious reporting issues faced any consequences for his mistakes – he was required to 

attend an extra week of reporting training.

The Subcommittee investigation also learned that DHS did not adequately train personnel 

it sent out to perform the extremely sensitive task of reporting information about U.S. persons – a 

job fraught with the possibility of running afoul of Privacy Act protections of individuals’ rights 

to associate, worship, speak, and protest without being spied on by their own government. 

In May 2009, DHS Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute required certain I&A reporting to be 

examined and approved by a thorough multi-office review process which required signoff from 

the Department’s Privacy and Civil Liberties experts. Following that policy, I&A officials 

submitted all DHS reporting from state and local fusion centers to the enhanced review 

process.115

The problems created by poor reporting and an onerous review process were 

compounded by insufficient staffing at the Reporting Branch, the DHS intelligence unit 

responsible for reviewing and finalizing drafts for publication. DHS officials said they relied on 

contract employees to perform these sensitive tasks, some of whom they believed to be undertrained or poor performers. And for most of its existence, the office lacked basic documentation

outlining its policies and practices, such as Standard Operating Procedures or a Concept of 

Operations, which should have clearly defined functions, roles and responsibilities in the 

reporting process.

While onerous, the enhanced review compensated for the difficulty DHS intelligence 

reporters had in consistently adhering to departmental guidelines and Federal law, and the 

difficulties DHS intelligence reviewers had in enforcing guidelines and law in the reporting 

process. Unfortunately, the offices involved in the review process also radically slowed down 

the reporting process. A lack of oversight from the highest levels of DHS allowed those delays 

to continue, slowing the publication and distribution of intelligence reports by several months, on 

average. Those delays affected the reporting process for the better part of almost three years. 

116

Moreover, DHS told the Subcommittee that until 2010 it could not routinely receive 

intelligence reporting from most fusion centers. DHS indicated that its procedures required all 

“raw” intelligence reporting originating from fusion centers to be filed with DHS by a DHS

official on-site at the fusion center.117 In 2009, DHS reported it had placed intelligence officers 

at only 32 of the 70 fusion centers which it claimed operated around the country.118

 115 Email correspondence from MGMTExecSec (4/17/2009), DHS-HSGAC-FC-047649; Email correspondence 

from Jonathan Wilham, “Subj: Vetting of DHS HIRs” (5/5/2009), DHS-HSGAC-FC-047651.

 That meant 

38 of the fusion centers had no DHS official and, thus, purportedly no way to file intelligence 

reports with DHS. Despite directing Federal funding to these 38 centers, DHS had not detailed 

116 See 3/2011 Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations, 

November 2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC-050770. 117 Some DHS officials told the Subcommittee that from 2006 to as recently as 2010, DHS allowed state and local 

officials to file reports; in fact, DHS officials trained them to do so, and accepted reporting from them. For more on 

this topic, see the Background section.

118“State and Local Fusion Center Program: Quarterly Report, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress, First Quarter,” 

(8/4/2009), at 2.
29

intelligence personnel to those centers, rendering them functionally disconnected from DHS’s 

intelligence reporting process.

Undersecretary Wagner disagreed that those fusion centers were unable to share 

intelligence with DHS in her interview with the Subcommittee. If a fusion center lacked an IO 

or RO, “they can pick up the phone or send us an email,” she said. Asked why ROs and IOs 

were necessary if telephones and email were sufficient to share information, Ms. Wagner said, “I 

wouldn’t say these are sufficient.”119

Since the period of review by the Subcommittee investigation, DHS told the 

Subcommittee it had expanded the number of detailees assigned to fusion centers. By May 

2012, DHS claimed it had placed intelligence officials at 66 fusion centers around the country.120

The Subcommittee investigation found that senior DHS officials knew about the 

problems with the Department’s fusion center intelligence reporting efforts, and with its broader 

intelligence reporting program. Yet the problems went unaddressed for months – sometimes 

years – and were largely unknown outside of the Department. Officials chose not to inform 

Congress or the public of the seriousness of these problems during that time, nor were they 

uncovered by any outside review until this investigation.

By the end of 2009, DHS I&A officials, led by Deputy Under Secretary for Operations 

James Chaparro, had identified a handful of what Mr. Chaparro termed “systemic problems”

contributing to the extreme delays.

121 Among them: Reports officers “do not always apply 

sufficient scrutiny” to the information they turn into an HIR, particularly from fusion centers.122

DHS officials involved in reporting intelligence needed more training, they said. Also, the 

Reporting Branch was understaffed.123

Mr. Chaparro left I&A on February 13, 2010, just two days after Ms. Wagner was 

confirmed as Undersecretary.124 Ms. Wagner told the Subcommittee that officials did not 

immediately share with her the conclusions of Mr. Chaparro and others, although in time she 

received briefings which highlighted the backlog in raw intelligence production.125

 119 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). 120 DHS Support to Fusion Centers (5/3/2012), PSI-DHS-56-0021. 121 Memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland Intelligence Reports,” (1/7/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-050742. 122 Id. 123 Id. 124 Mr. Chaparro left I&A on February 13, 2010. Subcommittee interview of James Chaparro (6/28/2012). The 

Senate confirmed Ms. Wagner to Undersecretary for I&A on February 11, 2010. Biography of Caryn Wagner, DHS 

web site, http://www.dhs.gov/caryn-wagner, accessed 9/18/2012. 125 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). Ms. Wagner said she was not only concerned with the 

quality of reporting DHS received from fusion centers, but the quality of reporting DHS pushed out to the centers. 

“We had to improve the information flowing out,” she said. “We weren’t providing very good products to the 

fusion centers, either.” Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). In 2010, the DHS Inspector General 

found that DHS reporting to fusion centers was often months old. “As a result, the information contained in the 

HIRs may no longer be relevant by the time it reaches the fusion centers,” the IG reported. DHS Office of Inspector 
30

According to one person interviewed by the Subcommittee, DHS officials who briefed 

Ms. Wagner discussed how her division was taking months to publish “raw” intelligence reports 

from fusion centers as well as from components of DHS like the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP).126 “I said, that’s not acceptable,” Ms. Wagner recalled. She requested 

a study on how her office received and published raw intelligence.127

Amy Kardell, a Ph.D. in Organizational Sociology, oversaw I&A’s efforts to coordinate 

intelligence activities among the Department’s many components. Ms. Kardell led the effort to 

examine the problems with I&A’s reporting and publication process, and propose solutions.

128

While it proved to be useful, the new study spent several months diagnosing some of the same 

problems which had already been identified by Mr. Chapparo and others, particularly the 

inadequacy of I&A’s reports officer training.129

In May 2010, at Ms. Wagner’s request, Ms. Kardell created the HIR Working Group 

(HIRWG). The group described the problems it would tackle:

Currently the HIR process from submission to dissemination is perceived as requiring 

excessive time to disseminate a HIR; suffering from implementation inconsistency from 

one Component to another; having little perceived value (clearance times render items 

obsolete) to include understanding the customer sets; dissemination responsibilities; and 

issues involving ingest to the IC [intelligence community].

130

The working group’s review took six months, and its findings were sharp. Ms. Kardell 

told the Subcommittee that when she examined the Reporting Branch, she found it “in a state of 

disrepair.”131 “The house was not in order,” as she described it to the Subcommittee, contrasting

the branch unfavorably to a well-ordered intelligence operation. “It was kind of like a MASH 

unit,” she said. “[They] used a lot of practices you wouldn’t use in a hospital.”132

The HIR Working Group found the Reporting Branch lacked basic documentation like 

Standard Operating Procedures, clear reporting thresholds, policy management, and a Concept of 

 

General, Report, “Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges 

Remain,” Report 11-04, http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-04_Oct10.pdf).

 It is unclear how much the process has improved since then. GAO reported in September 2012 that fusion 

centers said DHS reporting “was not always timely,” and that “sometimes . . . I&A information is already available 

through media outlets and other information sources.” Government Accountability Office, Report, 

“INFORMATION SHARING: DHS Has Demonstrated Leadership and Progress, but Additional Actions Could 

Help Sustain and Strengthen Efforts,” Report GAO-12-809, http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/648475.pdf). 126 Subcommittee interview of Amy Kardell (6/5/2012). 127 Subcommittee interviews of Amy Kardell (6/5/2012) and Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). 128 Subcommittee interview of Amy Kardell (6/5/2012).

129 Poor reporting training and its consequences had been flagged in an email conversation between I&A officials in 

April 2009, several months before Mr. Chaparro’s memorandum. Email from Barbara Alexander to James Chaparro, 

et al., “Subject: Open Source Requirements,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-059585. 130 “Terms of Reference for HSIC HIR Working Group,” (11/2010) DHS-HSGAC-FC-056566. 131 Subcommittee interview of Amy Kardell (6/5/2012). 132 Id. 
31

Operations.133 DHS officials who collected and reported information on U.S. persons were not 

required to meet any standard of competence, nor required to pass any test or certification.

134

While problematic and useless reporting was common, Ms. Kardell told the 

Subcommittee she discovered the unit had never conducted an audit or review to see why 

problems were so frequent, nor did it maintain records which would allow others to properly 

oversee the program. Ms. Kardell’s team also found that many believed the review process 

could be “arbitrary” and “inconsistent.” 135

Ms. Kardell’s review was completed in November 2010. In March 2011, five months

later, Undersecretary Wagner directed her staff to act on the group’s recommendations.

136 As of 

September 2012, more than two years after the initial study was completed, DHS had yet to fully 

implement several of the review’s key recommendations.137

B. Reporting from Fusion Centers was Often Flawed, 

Unrelated to Terrorism 

As noted, the Subcommittee investigation reviewed every raw DHS intelligence report 

drafted on information from state and local fusion centers from April 1, 2009, to April 30, 2010. 

The period corresponds to the first year I&A implemented its multi-office review process.

The Subcommittee investigation counted that, during that period, DHS intelligence 

officers at state and local fusion centers around the country filed 610 draft reports138 to DHS 

headquarters for dissemination.139 During that period, the draft HIRs came from fusion centers in 

just 31 states; fusion centers in 19 states generated no reports at all. In addition, the vast majority 

of the 574 unclassified draft reports filed came from DHS detailees assigned to fusion centers in 

just three states – Texas (186 drafts), California (141) and Arizona (89). Meanwhile, fusion 

centers in most other states produced little to no reporting.140

 133 The Reporting Branch assembled a document of Standard Operating Procedures in June 2010, during the period 

of the HIRWG review. It does not appear to reflect current practices.

134 “Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations,” (11/2010) 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-050770. 135 Id. 136 While Undersecretary Wagner made reference to the study and its recommendations in public testimony, she said 

her office did not share the report with Congress until the Subcommittee requested a copy as part of its investigation. 

Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). 137 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012); DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry, DHS-HSGACFC-059968. 138 Of those, 574 were unclassified, 36 were classified.

139 DHS disseminated HIRs to other fusion centers, although I&A personnel understood their primary consumers to 

be the Federal intelligence community – other DHS components, intelligence agencies, even the White House 

Situation Room. See, “Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production, v. 1.1,” 

(6/2010) at 6, DHS-HSGAC-FC-056483. (“[I]nformation. . . may be drafted and published as an HIR if it contains 

information of intelligence value to members of the IC.”)

140 This imbalance in reporting did not go unnoticed within the DHS Reporting Branch. Keith Jones, who headed the 

branch for part of 2009 and 2010, estimated that most reporting from fusion centers during his time came from a half 

dozen DHS officers. “In a couple cases there was a lot going on,” he told the Subcommittee. “In a couple of others 
32

Of the 574 unclassified draft reports field officers filed, the Subcommittee investigation 

counted 188 marked by DHS reviewers as cancelled, nearly a third. Reviewers recommending 

cancellation of drafts faulted the reports for lacking any useful information, for running afoul of 

departmental guidelines meant to guard against civil liberties or Privacy Act protections, or for 

having no connection to any of DHS’s many missions, among other reasons.

Of the 386 unclassified reports published, the Subcommittee investigation counted only 

94 which related in some way to potential terrorist activity, or the activities of a known or 

suspected terrorist. Of those 94 reports, most were published months after they were received; 

more than a quarter appeared to duplicate a faster intelligence-sharing process administered by 

the FBI; and some were based on information drawn from publicly available websites or dated 

public reports. In one case, DHS intelligence officials appear to have published a report which 

drew from or repeated information in a Department of Justice press release published months 

earlier. In short, the utility of many of the 94 terrorism-related reports was questionable.

The Subcommittee investigation found that fusion center reporting that attempted to 

share terrorism-related information was more likely to be cancelled than reporting on other 

topics. While the overall cancellation rate of draft intelligence reports from fusion centers during 

the period of review was around 30 percent, the cancellation rate for reports which alleged or 

indicated a possible connection to terrorism had a higher cancellation rate – over 45 percent.141

(1) Some Reports Had “Nothing of Value”

At DHS headquarters, Reports Officers who reviewed the draft HIRs from fusion centers 

before they were to be published found many of the reports useless. The officers shared those 

sentiments in the written comments they made recommending that particular draft HIR reports 

be cancelled. At times they expressed amazement at the poor quality of reporting. For instance, 

one draft intelligence report alerted would-be readers that a certain model of automobile had 

folding rear seats that provided access to the trunk without leaving the car, and opined the feature 

could be useful to human traffickers. One reviewer wrote, “This is common knowledge.”142 A 

folding rear seat “is featured on MANY different makes and models of vehicles,” the reviewer 

commented. “There is nothing of any intelligence value in this report[.]” The report was never 

published.143

“I see nothing to be gained by releasing this report,” one reviewer commented on several 

other intelligence drafts that were eventually cancelled. One reported an arrest for cocaine 

possession; another relayed information about the bust of a methamphetamine lab run by a 

person who had claimed affiliation with a white supremacist group; and one was on an Afghan-

 

they were looking for stuff [to report] so they could wave their flag.” Subcommittee interview of Keith Jones 

(4/2/2012).

141 Undersecretary Wagner said she believed “[HIRs] are not the premier process of reporting counterterrorism from 

fusion centers.” Asked what was, Ms. Wagner said, “daily ongoing collaborations,” which she defined as “phone 

calls” and “secure video teleconferences.” Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). 142 “Human smuggling vehicle concealment method,” draft HIR report, cancelled 7/6/09, DHS-HSGAC-FC-17078. 143 Id.
33

born former U.S. Army translator who had been a passenger in a car involved in an accident.

144

“This report does not provide the who, what, when, where, how,” went a comment on a 

different draft report that was cancelled.

Reviewers could see no apparent link to a homeland security mission for any of the reports.

145 That particular draft HIR, dated July 2009,

chronicled the experience of a Texas sheriff’s deputy who encountered a man standing beneath a 

bridge near the U.S.-Mexico border. When the deputy spoke with the man, the draft said the 

man identified himself as a former gang member. After they spoke, the man left, according to 

the draft report.146

The sheriff’s deputy saw “numerous human footprints nearby,” the draft stated. A 

records check on the man turned up numerous arrests, including some for drug smuggling, the 

draft noted. There was no record of any activity by the man’s alleged former gang in the area, 

according to the draft, and the officer saw no drugs at the site underneath the bridge. 

Nevertheless, the sheriff’s department believed the man “may have been awaiting a drug 

shipment at the time of the encounter,” the draft stated.

147

“There is no conclusive, reportable information in this HIR,” another commenter wrote 

on the draft. “I don’t feel this meets our reporting threshold or provides any benefit to the IC

[Intelligence Community].” In February 2010, seven months after the draft was filed, DHS I&A 

cancelled it.

“This is open-source information,” a DHS headquarters reviewer wrote to advocate 

cancelling another draft report, using the intelligence community’s term for public, nonclassified information such as news reports. The draft relayed a Mexican news report that a 

Mexican ambulance service allegedly declined to transport a Mexican victim of drug violence in 

Mexico. Another reviewer concurred, “This is open source news information and lacks any

valuable information for the IC.”148

“[D]oes not contain any actual intelligence,” went a comment on yet another draft. That 

draft recounted the experience of two state wildlife officials who spotted a pair of men in a bass 

boat “operating suspiciously” in a body of water on the U.S.-Mexico border.149

 144 “Narcotics and Currency Smuggler Arrested . . . ” draft HIR report, cancelled 4/30/2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC16967; “Police Discover Meth Lab Operated by Member of White Supremacist Group,” draft HIR report, cancelled 

4/23/2010, DHS-HSGAC-16971; “Woman Under Investigation. . . Relocates . . . to Work on Military Base,” draft 

HIR report, cancelled 4/30/2010, DHS-HSGAC-16975. When citing and quoting cancelled reporting in this report, 

the Subcommittee investigation has removed specific identifying details of individuals wherever possible, including 

names and locations, and represented those omissions with ellipses and/or bracketed text.

 “The bass boat, 

operating within Mexican waters, was travelling at a high rate of speed towards the international 

boundary,” the draft stated. “After the wardens responded by maneuvering their . . . boat in the 

145 “Possible . . . Gang Smuggling Activity Interrupted . . . ” draft HIR, 7/6/2009, DHS-HSGAC-FC-017130. 146 Id. 147 Id. 148 ‘Possible Refusal by Mexican Ambulance Services of Transporting Victims of Drug Trafficking Organizations 

(DTOs) to Mexican Hospitals,” draft HIR, cancelled 2/18/2010, INT-3135-09, DHS-HSGAC-FC-017279.

149 “Possible Drug Smuggling Activity. . .” draft HIR, 2/16/2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC-017375.
34

direction of the international boundary to investigate, the bass boat stopped abruptly just short of 

the boundary and the two occupants began fishing.” 150

When the wardens drove their boat closer, “the two individuals avoided eye contact, 

started their engine, and maneuvered the bass boat approximately 50 yards further away from the 

international border.” A comment by the draft’s author stated, “it is unusual to fish at that 

location based on the depth of the reservoir. Additionally, there were high winds and choppy 

waters at that time.” The commenter included the observation that the suspicious boat “was 

riding low in the water, as if it were laden with cargo.” 151

“The fact that some guys were hanging out in a boat where people normally do not fish 

MIGHT be an indicator of something abnormal, but does not reach the threshold of something 

that we should be reporting,” one reviewer stated. “I . . . think that this should never have been 

nominated for production, nor passed through three reviews.”152

“I am actually stunned this report got as far as it did,” went a comment from a reviewer 

asking to cancel another draft report, about local police arresting a foreigner with an expired visa 

and a record in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), a U.S. government 

database it calls its central repository of “known or appropriately suspected” terrorist 

identities.

153

“The subject of the report is a TIDE match. Okay, good start. But the entire total 

knowledge about the subject . . . is that he tried to steal a pair of shoes from Nieman Marcus. 

Everything else in the report is [commentary] . . . I have no idea what value this would be adding 

to the IC [Intelligence Community].”

 The foreigner was accused of shoplifting. 

154

“I actually am surprised that nobody recommended this for cancellation already,” a senior 

reports officer wrote on another draft that was eventually cancelled. That draft reported 

information about an individual with a record in the TIDE database who was arrested for 

speeding while driving his brother’s van. “As I see it, we have a report about a TIDE match that 

borrowed a van. That is it. From that I can see no reason why the IC would be interested,” the 

senior officer wrote.155

 150 Id. 151 Id. 152 Id. 153 TIDE’s custodian, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), defines it as containing “identities of 

individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been involved in activities constituting, in preparation 

for, in aid of, or related to terrorism, with the exception of purely domestic terrorism information.” TIDE Fact Sheet, 

NCTC.gov, http://www.nctc.gov/docs/Tide_Fact_Sheet.pdf. 154 “TERRORISM WATCHLIST: [State] Law Enforcement Officials (LEOs) Arrest an Overstay with Terrorist 

Related Records,” draft HIR, cancelled 2/18/2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC-16692. 155 “TERRORISM WATCHLIST – Encounter with a Jordanian-born U.S. Citizen with Terrorist Related Records,” 

INT-2611-09, DHS-HSGAC-FC-016740.
35

While reporting information on an individual who is listed in the TIDE database sounds 

significant, the Subcommittee found that DHS officials tended to be skeptical about the value of 

such reporting, because of concerns about the quality of data contained in TIDE.156

(2) If Published, Some Draft Reporting Could 

Have Violated the Privacy Act

Reporting information of little or no intelligence value may have been the most benign 

type of failure by DHS intelligence officers reporting from fusion centers. During the 13-month 

period of reporting the Subcommittee reviewed, DHS officials also nixed 40 reports filed by 

DHS personnel at fusion centers after reviewers raised concerns the documents potentially 

endangered the civil liberties or legal privacy protections of the U.S. persons they mentioned. 

The Constitutional obligations of I&A reports officers and officials at state and local 

fusion centers were summarized by the Office of General Counsel in a July 2008 memorandum

DHS provided to the Subcommittee. “You are prohibited from collecting or maintaining 

information on U.S. persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the U.S. 

Constitution, such as the First Amendment protected freedoms of religion, speech, press, and 

peaceful assembly and protest,” the memorandum stated.157

It continued, “[T]his does not mean you may never maintain or collect information with 

some connection to constitutionally protected activities; but the information regarding the 

 156 Although NCTC describes its TIDE database as holding information on the identities of known and suspected 

terrorists, DHS officials – who interacted with TIDE data on a daily basis, as they reviewed reporting not only from 

state and local law enforcement encounters but from encounters by DHS components – said they found otherwise.

“Not everything in TIDE is KST,” DHS privacy official Ken Hunt told the Subcommittee, using a shorthand term 

for “known or suspected terrorist.”

 “Would you buy a Ford?” one DHS Senior Reports Officer asked the Subcommittee staff during an interview, 

when he was asked how serious it was for someone to be a match to a TIDE record. “Ford Motor Company has a 

TIDE record.”

 Ole Broughton headed Intelligence Oversight at I&A from September 2007 to January 2012. In an interview 

with the Subcommittee, Mr. Broughton expressed the concern DHS intelligence officials felt working with TIDE 

data. In one instance, Mr. Broughton recalled he “saw an individual’s two-year-old son [identified] in an HIR. He 

had a TIDE record.” Mr. Broughton believed part of the problem was that intelligence officials had routinely put 

information on “associates” of known or suspected terrorists into TIDE, without determining that that person would 

qualify as a known or suspected terrorist. “We had a lot of discussion regarding ‘associates’ in TIDE,” Mr. 

Broughton said.

 Mark Collier, who served as a Senior Reports Officer and briefly as chief of the Reporting Branch, recalled 

another case. An HIR was drafted concerning an incident with a TIDE match, but the TIDE record was based on an 

FBI inquiry. Later on the FBI ended its inquiry and cleared the individual of any connection to terrorism – but 

because DHS had filed an HIR on the person, the individual’s record was kept active in TIDE. Subcommittee 

interviews of Ken Hunt (2/27/2012), former Senior Reports Officer (3/1/2012), Mark Collier (3/8/2012), and Ole 

Broughton (4/18/2012).

157 Memorandum from Matthew L. Kronisch to I&A Reports Officers and Fusion Center Representatives, “Subject: 

Roles & Functions” (7/29/2008), DHS-HSGAC-FC-047644.
36

protected activity may only be incidental to the authorized purpose for which you collected or 

maintained the information.” 158

The inappropriate reporting appears to have been a regular problem. An April 2009 

email from an alarmed senior I&A official stated: “[State and Local Fusion Center officials] are 

collecting open-source intelligence (OSINT) on U.S. persons (USPER), without proper vetting, 

and improperly reporting this information through homeland information reporting (HIR) 

channels,” wrote Barbara Alexander, then director of the Collection and Requirements Division, 

which oversaw HIR reporting. “The improper reporting of this information through HIR 

channels is likely a result of a lack of training on proper collection and reporting procedures . . . 

they are inadvertently causing problems.”159 In an interview with the Subcommittee, Ms. 

Alexander said she recalled being told the Reporting Branch was “flooded” with inappropriate 

reporting. “A lot of information was coming in inappropriately,” she remembered. “The 

information was not reportable.”160

Two years later, in 2011, Margo Schlanger, then the director of DHS’s Office for Civil 

Rights and Civil Liberties (CR/CL), gave a training presentation based on the “main issues 

coming up” for her office as it reviewed I&A’s reporting.161

Ms. Schlanger’s presentation, a copy of which DHS provided to the Subcommittee, 

indicated that areas in which DHS intelligence reporters had overstepped legal boundaries 

included: Reporting on First Amendment-protected activities lacking a nexus to violence or 

criminality; reporting on or improperly characterizing political, religious or ideological speech 

that is not explicitly violent or criminal; and attributing to an entire group the violent or criminal 

acts of one or a limited number of the group’s members.162

Examples of those errors were present in the Subcommittee’s review of HIRs drafted by 

DHS officials at fusion centers. To the credit of officials participating in the review process, 

these reports were for the most part cancelled before publication.163

One draft reported on a list of reading suggestions by a Muslim community group, “Ten 

Book Recommendations for Every Muslim.” The report noted that four of the titles were 

However, these reports 

should not have been drafted at all.

 158 Memorandum from Matthew L. Kronisch to I&A Reports Officers and Fusion Center Representatives, “Subject: 

Roles & Functions” (7/29/2008), DHS-HSGAC-FC-047644.

159 Email from Barbara Alexander to James Chaparro, et al., “Subject: Open Source Requirements” (4/1/2009) DHSHSGAC-FC-059585. 160 Subcommittee interview of Barbara Alexander (6/22/2012). 161 Subcommittee interview of Margo Schlanger (5/22/2012). 162 Principles for Respecting Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in Intelligence Products, Margo Schlanger (3/30/2011), 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-056639. 163 With the assistance of a former DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties official, the Subcommittee investigation 

identified two published reports from the period of review which may have included inappropriate information on 

identified individuals. Subcommittee interview of Timothy Skinner (3/14/2012); DHS-HSGAC-FC-013331, DHSHSGAC-FC-14519.
37

authored by individuals with records in a U.S. intelligence counterterrorism database, the 

Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE).164

“We cannot report on books and other writings of TIDE matches simply because they are 

TIDE matches,” wrote a CR/CL reviewer on that draft. “The writings themselves are protected 

by the First Amendment unless you can establish that something in the writing indicates planning 

or advocates violent or other criminal activity.”165 The report was not published.166

One draft HIR that CR/CL opposed publishing reported on a leaflet prepared by a chapter 

of the Mongols Motorcycle Club, a California-based biker gang. The organization, which has 

claimed it is persecuted by overly aggressive law enforcement, saw their notoriety boosted in 

2008, when a Federal investigation into many of its members culminated in the arrest and 

conviction of dozens of Mongols for crimes including murder, attempted murder, drug 

trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering.167

At first blush, the activities of this group would seem significant. The subject of the DHS 

intelligence official’s report, however, focused not on their illegal behavior, but on a leaflet the 

club produced entitled, “Checklist for the Club Members Who Are Stopped.” The document did 

not mention any illegal activities. To the contrary, the checklist directed members, if pulled over 

by police, to:

- Be “as courteous as possible”;

- Try to pull over in a lighted or busy area – “this can provide 

witnesses to any harassment”;

- “always carry a disposable camera”;

- document the “date, time and which type cop (police or sheriff) is 

harassing you,” including badge number, as well as “all 

threats/comments about this being their town, they will run you 

out, etc.”

- “STAY IN CONTROL OF YOUR EMOTIONS – Now is not the 

time to have problems in bars and public places. Watch each 

other[’]s backs and help one another with this”;

- “Clean up your vehicle – make sure it is completely legal –

current registration, all lights working – even a license plate light 

being out . . . is enough to have them pull you over”;

- “If possible, have a designated driver who will be alcohol and 

drug free. If not possible, taxis cost less than an attorney.”168

 164 For more on TIDE, see footnote 155. 165 “TERRORISM WATCHLIST: [Organization] Advertises Literature Produced by Persons with Records Related 

to Terrorism,” draft HIR, cancelled 2/26/2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC-16408. 166 Id. 167 See “Mongols motorcycle gang members arrested,” Associated Press, (10/21/2008), 

http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-10-21-mongols_N.htm; “U.S. targets bikers’ identity,” Los Angeles 

Times, Scott Glover (10/22/2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/22/local/me-mongols22. 168 “Mongols Motorcycle Club (MMC) Chapter . . . Issues Guidelines for Intelligence Collection During Police 

Encounters,” draft HIR, cancelled 2/17/2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC-16551.
38

“There is nothing illegal or even remotely objectionable [described] in this report,” wrote 

the CR/CL reviewer about the draft. “The advice given to the groups’ members is protected by 

the First Amendment. The organization does not advocate the violation of ANY laws – on the 

contrary, they tell their members to obey the law.”169

One DHS intelligence officer filed a draft HIR about a U.S. citizen who was appearing at 

a Muslim organization to deliver a day-long motivational talk and a lecture on positive parenting. 

“Intelligence personnel are not authorized to collect information regarding USPERs [U.S. 

persons] solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the U.S. Constitution,” the 

DHS Office of General Counsel wrote on the draft. It was cancelled.

The draft HIR was never published.

170

“Constitutionally protected activities; no nefarious activity,” wrote a reviewer 

recommending cancellation of a different draft HIR reporting about a Muslim organization 

hosting a daylong seminar on marriage.171

Another cancelled draft HIR reported on a U.S. citizen visiting and giving a lecture at a 

mosque. The draft contained no derogatory information on the speaker, or the mosque, although 

it noted that the speaker was once the head of a U.S. Islamic school that had a record in the TIDE 

database. “There is concern,” the drafting officer wrote in his initial submission, “that [the 

subject’s] visit . . . could be to strengthen ties with the . . . mosque as well as to conduct 

fundraising and recruiting for the sake of foreign terrorist organizations.”172

“The number of things that scare me about this report are almost too many to write into 

this [form],” one reviewer stated about the submission. He noted it was sourced to a fusion 

center on the other side of the country, as well as to open source information – which required it 

to go through a reporting team which specialized in open source information. “Secondly, the 

nature of this event is constitutionally protected activity (public speaking, freedom of assembly, 

freedom of religion).”

This assertion was 

not supported by evidence, however, and was removed from later drafts.

173

Markings on the drafts appear to indicate that half of the draft HIRs which appeared to 

overstep legal restrictions on government monitoring of protected activity came from one 

intelligence officer. DHS confirmed that officer “received informal counseling,” but faced no 

other penalty, reprimand, formal counseling or other consequence.

174

 169 Id. 170 “TERRORISM WATCHLIST—Individual with Terrorist-related Records Speaks at a Seminar . . .,” draft HIR, 

cancelled 7/16/2009, DHS-HSGAC-FC-16303. 171 “TERRORISM WATCHLIST: Naturalized U.S. Citizen with Records Related to Terrorism is Scheduled to a 

Lead Seminar [sic],”draft HIR, cancelled 1/11/10, DHS-HSGAC-FC-016339. 172 “TERRORISM WATCHLIST: U.S. Citizen with Terrorist-related Records Speaks at a Mosque . . . ” draft HIR, 

cancelled 2/17/2010, INT-2483-09, DHS-HSGAC-FC-016644. 173 Id. 174 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059967.
39

(3) Most Fusion Center Reporting Related to Drug Smuggling, 

Alien Smuggling, or Other Criminal Activity

Of the 386 unclassified HIRs that DHS eventually published over the 13-month period 

reviewed by the Subcommittee investigation, a review found close to 300 of them had no 

discernable connection to terrorists, terrorist plots or threats.

175

Most draft HIRs that were accepted by DHS headquarters for dissemination relayed 

information from arrests or encounters relating to drug trafficking and, to a lesser extent, alien 

smuggling. One typical report, based on information acquired in July 2009 and published five 

months later, reads as follows: 

On 05 July 2009 at 1704 hours, Texas DPS officers stopped a 2007 three 

door Ford F-150, bearing identified Arizona license plates, for speeding 

eastbound on Interstate 40 at milepost 56 in Potter County. The driver and 

passenger were nervous and told conflicting stories regarding their travel. 

A search of the vehicle resulted in the seizure of 5.23 kilograms of 

methamphetamine. The methamphetamine was hidden in a false 

compartment built in to the floor of the vehicle behind the front seats. The 

occupants were reportedly traveling from Phoenix, Arizona to Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma.

The driver and the passenger of the load vehicle were identified U.S. 

persons (USPER1 and USPER2, respectively). (SOURCE COMMENT: 

USPER2 was previous[ly] convicted for attempting to smuggle 41.9 

pounds of marijuana into the United States from Mexico on 29 December 

2003.)

The Tucson HIDTA [High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area] has noted an 

increase in the number of methamphetamine seizures from Mexico over the 

last six months . . . .176

Additionally, the Subcommittee reviewed redacted, unclassified versions of the 39 

classified HIRs published during the same the time period. About half appeared to contain no 

terrorism-related information. Those HIRs were published on average 142 days, or over four 

months, after the information was obtained by a DHS reporting official.

Though it may be relevant to broader departmental missions, the preponderance of nonterrorism related reporting raises concerns about DHS’s fusion center involvement. If reporting 

on drug running and human smuggling are not top priorities in DHS’s counterterrorism effort, it 

is unclear how the bulk of published reporting from fusion centers contributes to DHS’s 

antiterrorism mission. Conversely, if the most useful fusion center contributions come in these 

 175 The Subcommittee review of the 386 unclassified HIRs found only 94 had any discernible relationship to 

terrorism.

176 “HIR/AZ-0032-09 Law Enforcement Officers Seize Methamphetamine From a Vehicle’s Hidden Compartment,” 

published December 22, 2009, DHS-HSGAC-FC-013267.
40

areas, it is unclear why DHS does not describe fusion centers as essential to its counterdrug and 

anti-human-smuggling efforts, rather than to its counterterrorism mission.

177

C. Terrorism-Related Reporting was Often Outdated, 

Duplicative, and Uninformative

Of the 386 unclassified HIRs published by DHS during the 13-month period reviewed by 

the Subcommittee, only 94 HIRs, or less than one-third, appeared to have a connection to a 

suspected terrorist or terrorist supporter, suspicious behavior that could indicate terrorist intent,

or criminal activity that could indicate a potential terrorist plot, such as the theft of explosive 

material.

Those terrorism-related reports were published on average four months after they were 

first drafted. Some appeared to be based on previously published accounts. Some reports, which 

flagged activity by so-called “known or suspected terrorists,” appeared to duplicate information 

already being shared by a faster, more efficient system managed by the FBI-led Terrorist 

Screening Center.

(1) Some Terrorism-Related Reports Were Based on 

Older Published Accounts

At times, it appears DHS reporting officials at fusion centers based their reporting not on 

sensitive intelligence and law enforcement information from state and local sources, but on 

previously-published accounts, including a press release and news articles.

Stolen Explosives. One particularly alarming HIR published in March 2010 described 

thefts in the Northwest of hundreds of pounds of explosives and explosive components, 

including 96 pounds of TNT; 27 pounds of deta-sheet, another type of explosive; 17 sticks of 

Dyno-Yello, yet another explosive; four 50-pound bags of “ammonium nitrate/fuel oil 

explosive”; 130 pounds of black powder; 14 bags of “rocket black powder”; 11 bags of 

KINEPAK, another explosive; 115 “small blasting cap boosters”; and hundreds of feet of 

detonation cord.178

The HIR had been drafted, however, in August 2009, seven months prior.179 The author 

acquired the information about the thefts on August 13, according to the report.180 The thefts 

occurred July 28, 2009, nearly two weeks before the report was apparently drafted.

181

 177 The investigation noted the potential for duplication between terrorism-related information sharing efforts by 

fusion centers and FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs), but did not address the issue in its inquiry. At the 

request of House and Senate Homeland Security Committees, the Government Accountability Office is currently 

reviewing fusion centers, JTTFs and other information-sharing entities for potential duplication. GAO expects to 

release its findings in 2013.

 And they 

were the subject of a press release at the time of the thefts: The U.S. Department of Justice’s 

178 “HIR/WA-0001-10 Theft of Explosives from Storage Bunker in Walla Walla, Washington,” (3/3/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-016082.

179 Id. 180 Id. 181 Id.
41

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), which led the joint investigation of the thefts, 

had issued a release to the media about the thefts on July 31, 2009, describing the missing 

materials in detail and asking the public for tips and leads.182

Blog Praising Fort Hood Shooting. In one HIR from November 2009, a DHS

intelligence officer stationed at a California fusion center reported information relating to the 

Fort Hood shooting, which had taken place just days earlier in Texas. Anwar Nassar Al-Awlaki, 

the U.S.-born radical Muslim cleric, praised the shootings on his public blog, the intelligence 

officer reported in his draft HIR.

183

On the same day the officer reported that news – November 9, 2009 – several news 

organizations, including the Los Angeles Times, ABC News and FOX News ran stories reporting 

the same information.184 On November 13, 2009 – four days after the Los Angeles Times and 

others reported the same information – DHS officials circulated their HIR about Al-Awlaki’s

blog to colleagues at the NSA, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, Special 

Operations Command (SOCOM), even the White House Situation Room.185

Surprisingly, a subsequent performance review for the HIR’s author cited this report as a 

signature accomplishment. The performance review gave the author an evaluation of “Achieved 

Excellence,” and recommended the official for a promotion to a leadership position “analyzing 

the most critical national security threats facing the Homeland.”186 “His outstanding analytical 

abilities would serve I&A well in any position,” the appraisal stated.187

Terrorist Threat to Tourists in North Africa. In March 2010, DHS published an HIR 

by a fusion center DHS detailee in California on alleged terrorist threats to tourists in North 

Africa.

188 The HIR repeated verbatim six paragraphs of information from a bulletin published by 

the non-governmental Institute of Terrorism Research and Response (ITRR) 11 months earlier, 

in April 2009.189

 182 “Theft of Explosives in Walla Walla” (7/31/2009), ATF Press Release, 

In the HIR version, the DHS reporter described “the veracity/reliability of the 

source and the information” as “unknown.” The reporter did not note that the initial ITRR 

http://www.atf.gov/press/releases/2009/07/073109-sea-walla-walla-explosives-theft.html. 183 “HIR/CA-0078-09 Imam Anwar Nassar Al-Awaki [sic] Praised Fort Hood,” (11/13/2009) DHS-HSGAC-FC014138.

184 “Fort Hood shooting suspect’s ties to mosque investigated,” Los Angeles Times, Josh Meyer (11/9/2009); 

(11/9/2009) “Tragedy at Fort Hood: What They Knew,” World News with Charlie Gibson, ABC News, Brian Ross 

(11/9/2009); “Details Emerge About Fort Hood Suspect's Past and His Communications,” Fox News, Catherine 

Herridge (11/9/2009).

185 To make matters worse, DHS published the report misspelling the Al Qaeda imam’s name in the report’s title, 

dubbing him “Al-Awaki.” 186 Performance review provided by DHS (10/26/2010). DHS-HSGAC-FC-004908 187 Id. 188 3/10/2010 “Private Security Firm Claims al-Qaida to Target Tourists in North Africa,” HIR/CA-0014-10, DHSHSGAC-FC-013566.

189 4/28/2009 “TAM-C ALERT: MODERATE: NORTH AFRICA,” Institute for Terrorism Research and Response, 

PSI-ITRR-01-0001.
42

bulletin stated the “timeline” for the threat was “through 3 June 2009,” indicating it was likely 

out of date by the time of its publication by DHS in March 2010.

190

(2) Many Terrorism-Related HIRs from Fusion Centers Appeared to 

Duplicate a Faster, More Efficient Information-Sharing Process

Some of the published terrorism-related intelligence reports filed from fusion centers 

during the period reviewed by the Subcommittee appear to have duplicated a faster, more 

efficient information-sharing process already in place between local police and the FBI-led 

Terrorist Screening Center (TSC).

Of the 94 published terrorism-related intelligence reports from DHS officials at fusion 

centers, 27 of them relayed information about encounters between local law enforcement and 

individuals whose identities were listed in the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), 

the Federal Government’s central repository for information on who it considers a known or 

suspected terrorist entity. TIDE is maintained by the National Counter Terrorism Center 

(NCTC), an entity under the direction of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 

(ODNI).191

These reports of so-called “TIDE matches” relayed information gathered in the course of 

routine law enforcement incidents, such as a traffic stop or a response to a 911 call, in which a

state or local law enforcement officer came into contact with an individual whose identity was 

listed in the TIDE database, identifying him or her as a “known or suspected terrorist” according 

to the U.S. government.192

DHS officials whose responsibilities included reviewing these draft HIRs for release 

explained that in most cases, they published reports of TIDE matches not because the incident 

itself appeared to indicate planning or preparation for a terrorist attack, or even suggested an 

intent to do so, but because the report could contain new biographical data that could be used to 

update the subject’s TIDE record.193 Such reports were supported by DHS guidance contained 

in a June 2010 handbook on HIR production that DHS produced to the Subcommittee.194

As the DHS I&A Reporting Branch stated in its 2010 Standard Operating Procedures, 

“DHS TIDE based HIRs are written primarily to update the TIDE record, provide a more 

detailed background of the subject, indicate travel patterns or associations, and to highlight a 

recent incident while providing appropriate background context to a subject’s importance for the 

 190 3/10/2010 “Private Security Firm Claims al-Qaida to Target Tourists in North Africa,” HIR/CA-0014-10, DHSHSGAC-FC-013566.

191 For more discussion of NCTC, please see the introduction.

192 Deficiencies in the TIDE database are described earlier. 

193 Subcommittee interview of Senior Reports Officer (3/20/2012). See also, “Standard Operating Procedure for 

Homeland Intelligence Report Production, v. 1.1,” (6/2010) DHS-HSGAC-FC-056483.

194 Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production, v. 1.1, DHS, 6/25/2010, DHSHSGAC-FC-056483.
43

IC. HIRs typically attempt to fill in the unkown backgrounds of some of these individuals or 

organization[s].”195

Such information could include a driver’s license number, automobile registration

information, information on the subject’s origin or destination of travel, even what was in their 

pockets or in the car’s backseat.

196 It could include any information lawfully collected by law 

enforcement during the encounter, officials from both DHS and the Department of Justice told 

the Subcommittee.

197

DHS did not require that the subject of such a report be suspected of or charged with 

violating any law or ordinance to report his or her information. For example, the Subcommittee 

reviewed a report on a TIDE match who was a passenger in a car whose driver was cited for a 

moving violation, and two on TIDE matches who were crime victims.

The DHS reporting official at the local fusion center learned of a local police officer’s 

interaction, possibly by reviewing an incident report.198 The DHS official then prepared a draft 

HIR and filed it with DHS headquarters in Washington, D.C.199

At headquarters, such a draft HIR would go through the four-office review process 

described earlier. After weeks or months spent in the review queue, the HIR would be approved 

by the four offices involved in the process, and DHS would release the report to the intelligence 

community. DHS officials said they would flag these HIRs for NCTC, which maintains TIDE,

suggesting it update its records on the entities named.

The result was that, several weeks or months after the incident with a possible TIDE 

match individual occurred, NCTC would receive a report from DHS with information to update 

its records.

However, as the Subcommittee learned from DHS’s senior representative at NCTC, the 

very same data in those reports likely made it to the center within a day of the incident via an 

FBI-run process, possibly making DHS’s reporting both untimely and duplicative.200

The FBI process occurs without the involvement of a fusion center or DHS: When a 

local police officer or state trooper encounters an individual in the field, for example in a traffic 

stop, he or she checks the person’s identification electronically against the National Crime 

 195 Id. 

196 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (4/16/2012). 

197 Subcommittee interviews of Rick Kopel, DHS/NCTC (4/11/2012), and Kimberly Smith, Branch Chief, CJIS 

Division, FBI (6/21/2012).

198 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (4/16/2012). 

199 Id. 200 Subcommittee interview of Rick Kopel, DHS/NCTC (4/11/2012).
44

Information Center (NCIC) database, an online criminal information clearinghouse that has been 

run by the FBI since 1967.201

The NCIC database contains a “known and suspected terrorist” identities list.202 It derives 

that list from the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB), more commonly known as the Terrorist 

Watchlist.203 The TSDB is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an FBI-led 

organization. TSC obtains the identities for TSDB from the National Counterterrorism Center’s 

TIDE database.204

When a local law enforcement officer checks an identity through NCIC, his or her 

computer will display a message if NCIC finds a possible match on its known or suspected 

terrorist list. The message instructs the officer to contact the TSC, which will rely on the 

officer’s help to confirm whether the individual matches the identity on the watchlist.205

When that officer contacts TSC, TSC personnel will ask the officer “to get all the 

information you can,” a Justice Department official told the Subcommittee. According to the 

procedure, the officer will gather the information, and share it with TSC personnel at the time of 

the stop.

206 TSC personnel immediately pass that information along to the NCTC, to update the 

individual’s record, officials explained to the Subcommittee.

207

According to Rick Kopel, DHS’s senior representative to NCTC, that sharing of 

information typically occurs on the same day of the local law enforcement official’s encounter. 

Mr. Kopel could think of no reason why TSC would fail to timely relay the information to 

NCTC, or which might justify DHS’s maintaining a second pathway to share the same 

information. “There’s no reason TSC would not report encounter data [to NCTC],” Mr. Kopel 

told the Subcommittee. “If that wasn’t happening, that would be a problem.” 208

These facts indicate DHS may be using fusion center HIRs to report to NCTC 

information about an encounter days, weeks, even months after NCTC already received the same 

information, from the same local source, through TSC.209

 201 Subcommittee interviews of Kimberly Smith, Branch Chief, CJIS Division, FBI (6/21/2012), Rick Kopel, 

DHS/NCTC (4/11/2012), Joel Cohen (4/16/2012); FBI.gov, “FBI-National Crime Information Center,” 

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ncic/. 202 Subcommittee interview of Kimberly Smith, Branch Chief, CJIS Division, FBI (6/21/2012). 203 Testimony of Timothy J. Healy before the House Judiciary Committee (3/24/10), 

http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/sharing-and-analyzing-information-to-prevent-terrorism. 204 Id.; Subcommittee interview of Kimberly Smith, Branch Chief, CJIS Division, FBI (6/21/2012). 205 Subcommittee interviews of Rick Kopel, DHS/NCTC (4/11/2012) and Kimberly Smith, Branch Chief, CJIS 

Division, FBI (6/21/2012). 206Id. 207Id. 208 Subcommittee interview of Rick Kopel, DHS/NCTC (4/11/2012). 

209 At least one DHS I&A official told the Subcommittee that he recalled this duplicative reporting was taking place. 

Mark Collier, a Senior Reports Officer and one-time reporting branch chief, told Subcommittee staff that NCTC at 

times “would get the same ‘encounter package’” report “through TSC before they got it from us.” Subcommittee 

interview of Mark Collier (3/8/2012).
45

Asked about this possible duplication, Undersecretary Wagner said if true, “it’s probably 

not the most efficient use of resources. . . . I would say we should write [intelligence reports] 

that don’t duplicate other reporting.”210

D. DHS Intelligence Reporting Officials Who Repeatedly 

Violated Guidelines Faced No Sanction

The Subcommittee investigation found that a very small number of DHS reporting 

officials appeared to be responsible for many of the problematic HIRs that DHS reviewers later 

cancelled.211

“I don’t recall noting poor reporting in an annual review. It never came up as a black 

mark against a guy,” said Mikael Johnston, who oversaw IOs as head of the State and Local 

Program Office from October 2009 to March 2012. Jonathan Wilham, deputy director of the 

Reporting Branch, also said that when assessing ROs, “we don’t use cancellation rates as a 

performance measure.”

 Just four reporting officials generated 108 of the 188 cancelled draft HIRs during 

the 13-month period reviewed by the Subcommittee, according to a tally of cancelled HIRs by 

the reporter codes which indicated authorship. Those reporters had higher cancellation rates than 

their peers, the tally showed. However, reporters’ cancellation rates were not considered when 

managers assessed their performance, according to DHS officials.

212 The Subcommittee also learned that those who repeatedly violated 

guidelines faced no apparent sanction for their transgressions.213

DHS detailees at fusion centers were not junior officials. Information provided by DHS 

indicates that detailees were typically GS-14s, near the highest end of the Federal workforce pay 

scale.

 

214 During the period of reporting reviewed by the Subcommittee, salaries for GS-14 

employees ranged from around $80,000 to over $100,000.215 Additionally, the Department

distributed over $500,000 to the detailees in the form of bonuses, performance awards, and 

recruitment and relocation incentives in 2009 and 2010.216

One reporter had 26 of his 35 draft reports cancelled during the April 2009-April 2010 

period. One former Senior Reports Officer said he knew the author and that he had a reputation 

as “a problem child” among Reporting Branch officials.217

“He didn’t like to be told what he was doing was not in the realm of the program,” the 

former official said, and stated he and others raised the officer’s performance with higher-ups. 

 210 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). 211 DHS provided the Subcommittee with limited unclassified biographical data on the reporting officials. As a result 

it was difficult for the Subcommittee investigation to discern whether particular reporting officials were Intelligence 

Officers (IOs) or Reports Officers (ROs).

212 Subcommittee interviews of Mikael Johnston (6/18/2012) and Jonathan Wilham (3/6/2012). 213 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059967. 214 DHS personnel spreadsheet, DHS-HSGAC-FC-7154. 215 General Schedule Salary Tables, 2009 and 2010, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 

http://www.opm.gov/oca/10tables/index.asp. 216 DHS personnel spreadsheet, DHS-HSGAC-FC-7154. 217 Subcommittee interview of Former Senior Reports Officer (3/21/2012). 
46

“It was a well-known fact that information coming out of [the officer’s area] was complete and 

utter crap.”

“I cancelled a lot of them,” said one Senior Reports Officer, when asked about that 

particular official’s many nixed draft reports. Noting that his reporting often raised concerns 

about violating their subjects’ civil liberties, she said, “I would say the person must not have 

understood what was reportable and what wasn’t . . . . You could see this was a pattern.”218

Another reporting official had 32 of his 84 reports – nearly 40 percent – cancelled by the 

Reporting Branch for various reasons. “That’s a pretty high cancellation rate,” said Mark

Collier, a Senior Reports Officer and one-time reporting branch chief, when asked his reaction to 

that track record. “If that was my reporting officer, we would have real talks.”

The

Subcommittee investigation reviewed the reporter’s 26 cancelled drafts, and found that reviewers 

explicitly noted civil liberties concerns when canceling at least 12, because they improperly 

reported on Constitutionally-protected activity. That intelligence officer was responsible for 

more than a quarter of all draft HIRs rejected for potentially breaching DHS guidelines meant to

keep reporters from violating Americans’ privacy and civil liberties.

219

Jonathan Wilham, a key DHS official overseeing the report review and release process, 

told the Subcommittee that reporters are not judged by how frequently their draft HIRs were 

cancelled. The reasons for cancellations were rarely similar, according to Mr. Wilham. “It was 

really case-by-case,” he said.

220 Mr. Wilham cited three criteria by which he believed a 

reporters’ products should be assessed; the reporter’s rate of cancellation was not one of them.221

Reporters generating high rates of problematic reporting were a headache for the 

Reporting Branch. “You would have some guys, the information you’d see from them, you’d 

scratch your head and say, ‘what planet are you from?’” one Senior Reports Officer recalled. 

“Some individuals [were] producing 50 percent garbage. That would add to the queue.” 222 Bad 

reporting was a concern, another former Senior Reports Officer recalled from the period. “We 

were heading down a path that wasn’t in the best interests of the Department,” he told the 

Subcommittee.223

Mr. Vandover said he recalled as many as five cases in which he went to SLPO officials 

to complain about the quality of reporting by their intelligence officers. “The people who 

repeatedly did this kind of thing were reported,” Mr. Vandover told the Subcommittee. “This 

went to Undersecretary levels, on these particular people.” 224

 218 Subcommittee interview of Senior Reports Officer (3/20/2012).

219 Subcommittee interview of Mark Collier (3/8/2012). 220 Subcommittee interview of Jonathan Wilham (3/6/2012). 221 Id. 222 Subcommittee interview of Former Senior Reports Officer (3/21/2012). 223 Subcommittee interview of Former Senior Reports Officer (3/1/2012). 224 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 
47

DHS officials interviewed could not identify a single official who faced significant 

consequences for shoddy reporting.225 In a written response to the Subcommittee, DHS said that 

“a number of individuals involved in the [reporting] process . . . received informal counseling on 

the need to improve the quality of their [reports] and work with headquarters constructively to 

resolve any issues that arose from the clearance process.”226

The problem of substandard reporting, according to former Deputy Undersecretary for 

I&A Jim Chaparro, was “systemic.” In a January 2010 memo, Mr. Chaparro reported:

[T]here have been cases where I&A state and local fusion center 

representatives have pushed ROs to submit reports which do not meet 

reporting criteria. Since most deployed ROs are contractors or junior 

personnel who are not in a position to speak authoritatively to the state 

and local representatives and as well, to avoid conflict, the CRD ROs 

have submitted reports which do not fall within the scope of these 

activities. This in turn creates a larger volume of reporting that goes 

into the review process only to be returned to the originator for failure 

to meet reporting criteria. It is important that a better understanding at 

the State and Local Fusion Center level be developed regarding what 

information is reportable under intelligence oversight standards.227

“I think that’s in the past,” said Undersecretary Wagner when asked about her officers’

reporting information that potentially violated privacy and civil liberties protections. “The HIR 

Working Group [recommendations] are designed to ensure we report on information that met 

reporting criteria, and were respectful of privacy and civil liberties protections.”228

E. DHS Did Not Sufficiently Train Its Fusion Center Detailees 

to Legally and Effectively Collect and Report Intelligence

Draft HIRs from IOs sometimes reported information that did not meet a DHS mission, 

improperly relayed information on Constitutionally-protected activity, or contained significant 

typographical errors, according to officials and internal documents. These problems were less 

likely to have occurred if reporting officials had received more extensive training and passed a 

rigorous certification process.

While the training process changed over time, the Subcommittee learned that DHS has 

never required more than five days of intelligence reporting training for DHS personnel assigned 

to fusion centers.

229

 225 Subcommittee interviews of Mikael Johnston (6/18/2012), Harold “Skip” Vandover (5/24/2012), Keith Jones 

(4/2/2012).

Moreover, DHS has not required its reporting officials to pass a test or 

exam, or demonstrate they met any formal standards before they went into the field to gather

226 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059967. 227 Memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs)” (1/7/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-050742. 228 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012).

229 In August 2012, the Department initiated a “pilot” three-week training course for reports officers, but it is a test 

and has not been instituted as a recurring course. Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (8/22/2012).
48

information, despite the fact that they often collect and report sensitive information on U.S. 

persons.

DHS intelligence reporting officials interviewed by the Subcommittee regarded their 

Department’s intelligence reporting training as inadequate. “You can barely teach people what 

the word [‘intelligence’] means” in a week, said Harold “Skip” Vandover, who was chief of the 

reporting branch from December 2009 to December 2011.230 “All the problems we saw – are all 

linked right straight back to training.”231

“I knew we needed to rework training, I knew it was a problem,” James Chaparro, I&A 

Deputy Under Secretary, told the Subcommittee in an interview.232 Indeed, Mr. Chaparro had 

identified the need for more extensive training in a January 2010 memorandum to Bart Johnson, 

then acting Undersecretary of I&A.233 Later in 2010, the HIR Working Group examined the 

issue and also noted weaknesses in intelligence reporter training and a lack of certification. In 

March 2011, I&A Undersecretary Caryn Wagner approved a recommendation to improve 

training and institute a certification process. As of September 2012, her office has conducted a 

pilot enhanced training course, but has yet to implement a new training program.

234

The Five-Day Course. Until it was discontinued in 2012,235

The 33-hour course spent one day on the background and basics of the job, including the 

history of DHS and the roles and responsibilities of a Reports Officer. One day was dedicated to 

intelligence requirements and thresholds; another day was spent on intelligence oversight issues, 

including privacy and civil liberties. The fourth day covered the HIR reporting format. The fifth 

day spent three hours on HIR writing practice, 90 minutes for review and questions, and a halfhour ceremony, at which participants received “graduation certificates” for their attendance at 

the training.

DHS’s training for reports 

officers had been a five-day series of classes known as the DHS Reports Officers Basic Course 

(ROBC). 

236

 230 Subcommittee interviews of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012); Timeline of Reporting Branch chiefs, DHSHSGAC-FC-050767. 231 Subcommittee interviews of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012, 5/24/2012). 232 Subcommittee interview of James Chaparro (6/28/2012). 233 Memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs)” (1/7/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-050742. 234 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012). “It’s a pilot, a proof of concept, to see if we can meet all 

the requirements,” Daylen Heil, a DHS official coordinating the training effort, told the Subcommittee in August, 

when the course was underway. At that point no further training courses had been scheduled, Mr. Heil said. 

Subcommittee interview with Daylen Heil (8/22/2012). 235 DHS is no longer teaching the course, and is piloting a new three-week training. Subcommittee interviews of 

Harold “Skip” Vandover (8/22/2012), Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012), DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry, DHSHSGAC-FC-059968. 236 “Unit 5.2 – Graduation” of the course student guide reads, “Congratulations! After you are briefed on the 

graduation process, a senior DHS official will offer closing remarks and distribute graduation certificates.” It lists 

“Topics Covered” during graduation to include “The importance of training to the success of the Intelligence 

Enterprise.” DHS Reports Officer Basic Course (ROBC) Student Guide, Rev. 0511, DHS-HSGAC-FC-057117.
49

Participants in that weeklong course received a total of two hours’ training on civil 

liberties issues and two hours on privacy issues, according to Ayn Crawley, who has headed 

training for the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties since 2008.237 Ms. Crawley told 

the Subcommittee she felt two hours was sufficient to train Intelligence Officers in what they 

needed to know to do their jobs while staying within the law and DHS guidelines. “I think it’s 

doing the job it should do.”238

Ms. Crawley confirmed that the trainers did not administer any final test or exam to the 

students, or assign a grade or score to their performance. Trainers did not even have the option 

of failing a student. Ms. Crawley said her belief in the adequacy of the training was based on 

first-hand observations by trainers. “I think what you’re looking for is true transfer of 

knowledge,” Ms. Crawley explained to the Subcommittee. “That interaction is a lot more 

powerful.”239

Some officials who engaged in reporting from state and local fusion centers had little 

intelligence reporting experience of any kind prior to joining DHS.240

“The [reporting] process is not as simple as ending your sentences with periods,” 

explained a former Senior Reports Officer at DHS who had spent nine years prior as an Army 

intelligence analyst. “There is a validation process, you fill intelligence gaps. I don’t think 

that’s something you can send someone to a weeklong training and expect them to understand 

it.”

For them, DHS’s training 

was clearly insufficient to educate them on even the basics of intelligence, officials told the 

Subcommittee.

241

The training program “probably wasn’t adequate for most people,” said another former 

DHS Senior Reports Officer (SRO). Before joining DHS, he had been an intelligence analyst in 

the Army, where he said he received six months of training, half of which was dedicated to 

report writing. The difference in depth and scope between his Army training and the DHS 

training, he said, was “night and day.”242

Like these two former officials, some DHS reporters had prior intelligence experience, 

but virtually none of them had experience reporting on U.S. citizens and legal residents within 

the United States. “Privacy, [protections for] U.S. person data – it is extremely difficult to get 

them to understand . . . those nuances,” Mr. Vandover said.243

 237 Subcommittee interview of Ayn Crawley (6/13/2012). 238 Id.

239 Id. 240 The Subcommittee reviewed resumes for DHS Intelligence Officers at fusion centers and found that most had 

years of intelligence experience, but few reflected experience collecting intelligence or drafting reports. Mikael 

Johnston, who oversaw IOs until March 2012, said he believed about a third of IOs had come to DHS with some 

experience or training in reporting. Subcommittee interview of Mikael Johnston (6/18/2012).

241 Subcommittee interview of former Senior Reports Officer (3/1/2012). 242 Subcommittee interview of former Senior Reports Officer (3/21/2012). 243 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 
50

“The reality is even if you came [to DHS] with extensive Intelligence Community 

experience, what we do is quite a bit different,” said Mark Collier, a DHS Senior Reports Officer

and one-time reporting branch chief. “You really need training.”244 Mr. Collier told the 

Subcommittee that the need to improve DHS’s training of reports officers was “obvious.”245

Internal documents between senior DHS officials show senior managers shared his view. 

In April 2009, an email from Barbara Alexander, then Director of I&A’s Collections and 

Requirements Division, wrote to other I&A officials warning that DHS reporters at fusion 

centers were filing reports “on U.S. persons (USPER), without proper vetting[.]” She wrote that 

one of the main reasons for this was “a lack of training on proper collection and reporting 

procedures[.]”246

In a January 2010 memorandum, addressed to Bart Johnson, then the Acting Under 

Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, former I&A Under Secretary for Operations James 

Chaparro stated that “the current quality of information in HIR reports is inconsistent,” in part 

because reports officers “do not always apply sufficient scrutiny to the data which they are asked 

to turn into an HIR[.]” Mr. Chaparro prescribed “enhanced training of the ROs” to fix the 

problem.247

Despite that recommendation, the training regimen has not yet substantially changed. A 

year later, at the end of 2010, the HIR Working Group helmed by Ms. Kardell again pinpointed 

the Department’s weak training of intelligence reporting officials as a serious problem.248 In its 

final report, Ms. Kardell’s group observed DHS had no standards or minimum qualifications that 

reporters had to meet before it sent them into the field to collect intelligence, largely information 

about U.S. persons. “Currently there are no formal [department-wide] standards or requirements 

for training or certification that must be met prior to an RO or SRO placement,” the Working 

Group’s final report stated. “The HIRWG unanimously felt that these standards and 

requirements should be established to ensure individuals engaged in HIR production, review, and 

control are trained and qualified in a uniform and satisfactory manner.”249 In March 2011, 

Undersecretary Wagner asked her office to act on the report’s recommendations, including

reform of the training program.

250

 244 Subcommittee interview of Mark Collier (3/8/2012). 245 Id. 246 Email from Barbara Alexander to James Chaparro, et al., “Subject: Open Source Requirements,” (4/1/2009) 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-059585. 247 Memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs)” (1/7/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-050742. 248 Subcommittee interview of Amy Kardell (6/5/2012). Ms. Kardell said the HIRWG report was complete before 

December 2010, but was delayed from being formally submitted to Undersecretary Wagner because of several 

factors, including Christmas vacation. Concerns from other offices about drafting the report’s cover memorandum 

delayed the report’s submission by two months, Ms. Kardell said. See also “Homeland Intelligence Report Working 

Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations,” (11/2010) DHS-HSGAC-FC-050770

249 “Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations, “ (11/2010) 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-050770, at 4. 250 “Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations,” (11/2010) 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-050770.
51

Incomplete Training Overhaul. By August 2012, more than a year after 

Undersecretary Wagner approved the group’s recommendation to develop and implement better 

training and requirements, no improvements have been institutionalized, although a new, longer 

training is being tested, according to documents and DHS officials.251

In August 2012, during the period of the Subcommittee’s investigation, I&A suspended 

the five-day reporter training classes252 Ms. Kardell’s group and others had found so lacking for 

years prior, and began to reform and expand the Reports Officer Basic Course. But even the new 

training course may be inadequate. Mr. Vandover, who is a subject matter expert for DHS’s 

effort, told the Subcommittee he recommended the course needed to be extended to six weeks.

253 

He said he was told DHS could only afford a three-week course. Mr. Vandover told the 

Subcommittee he believed three weeks was insufficient time for proper training.254

When asked about the pilot training course, Undersecretary Wagner disagreed that 

financial concerns spurred the decision to limit the course length to three weeks. “I don’t know 

about money [not being] available,” she said. Instead, Ms. Wagner said the issue was that the 

course was not mandatory, and if it was too long then DHS components would not use it. “I 

think the likelihood of components sending people to a 6-week course was pretty slim,” she told 

the Subcommittee. However if the course were to be voluntary, it would not fulfil the 

unanimous recommendation of the HIR Working Group, which stated: “Mandatory training will 

be required for all RO and SROs. . . . Components must require that their ROs and SROs receive 

this training prior to writing and releasing HIRs.”255

F. “Two Different Chains of Command”

Another problem involved the differences between IOs and ROs assigned to fusion 

centers. As of May 2012, DHS has assigned 66 IOs and 18 ROs to centers across the country. 

IOs are overseen by the SLPO, while ROs are overseen by the Reporting Branch. 

When Reporting Branch officials noticed an IO’s intelligence reporting was subpar, 

inappropriate, or potentially illegal, there was little the Reporting Branch could do but notify

SLPO officials, who oversaw those IOs but whose office had few rules or procedures for 

ensuring domestic intelligence collection activities were effective and appropriate. “You’re 

talking two different chains of command, I didn’t have control of those individuals,” explained 

Mr. Vandover, the former Reporting Branch chief.256

 251 Memorandum from Caryn Wagner to DHS Homeland Security Intelligence Council, “Subject: DHS Reports 

Officer Course (ROC)” (4/25/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059035. The “pilot” course is being conducted on a onetime basis with a class of 10 students. There are hopes to improve the training and offer it in 2013 and beyond, but 

those courses are not yet scheduled. Subcommittee interview of Daylen Heil (8/22/2012).

Thus the Reporting Branch, which was 

252 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry (9/21/2012), DHS-HSGAC-059968. 253 Memorandum for Brian Kelly, “SUBJECT: Development of the Reports Officer Course, (ROC)” (2/3/2012), 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-059023. 254 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (5/24/2012). 255 3/2011 Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations, 

November 2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC-050770. 256 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012).
52

responsible for the reviewing draft HIRs and preparing them for publication, did not have the 

authority to oversee or manage the individuals preparing many of those reports.

G. Short-Staffing and Reliance on Underqualified, Underperforming 

Contract Employees Hampered Reporting Efforts

Another problem with HIRs was that I&A was unable to hire sufficient numbers of 

sufficiently qualified personnel to staff its Reporting Branch, a problem that affected its efforts to 

receive and process intelligence originating at state and local fusion centers.

At times, Reporting Branch personnel were simply unable to handle the amount of 

reporting being drafted. In his January 2010 memo to Bart Johnson, Mr. Chaparro warned of 

staffing shortfalls affecting the reporting process from state and local fusion centers. “[T]here 

are too many HIRs being generated and not enough staff to review and edit the HIRs,” wrote the 

Deputy Under Secretary. “There is little logic to drafting large numbers of HIRs [if] we lack the 

bandwidth to publish and disseminate them.”257

As it did in other offices, DHS sometimes filled vacant spots in I&A’s Reporting Branch 

with personnel provided under contract from private companies, including General Dynamics 

and Booz Allen Hamilton.

258

DHS officials told the Subcommittee that contract employees were not always qualified 

or properly trained to do the work expected of them, and their productivity could be 

substandard.259

When Mr. Vandover arrived as chief of the Reporting Branch in December 2009, he 

found a “lack of proficiency” among contract employees at the branch, who at the time 

outnumbered the Federal employees under his direction, he recalled. “It’s difficult to run a 

branch like this when you’re so heavy on contractors,” he said.260

Mr. Vandover recalled that he quickly identified four contract employees out of roughly a 

dozen who he believed were not doing their job. “What I mean by, ‘not doing their job,’ is – not 

doing their job,” Mr. Vandover told the Subcommittee. He said he had them replaced.261

 257 Memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs)” (1/7/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-050742. 258 GAO Report, “Department of Homeland Security: Risk Assessment and Enhanced Oversight Needed to Manage 

Reliance on Contractors” (10/17/2007), GAO-08-14T, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08142t.pdf; Subcommittee 

interviews of Jonathan Wilham (3/6/2012) and Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012).

259 The Subcommittee notes that several DHS officials interviewed for the investigation first joined the Department 

as contract employees. Subcommittee interviews of former I&A Senior Reports Officer (3/1/2012), Jonathan 

Wilham (3/6/2012), former Senior Reports Officer (3/28/2012), former Senior Reports Officer (3/30/2012), and 

Keith Jones (4/2/2012).

260 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). Mr. Vandover told the Subcommittee that 

when he joined the branch in December 2009, it had 10 government employees and between 20 and 25 contractors. 261 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 
53

In his January 2010 memo, Mr. Chaparro explicitly noted concern about contractors 

drafting and reviewing intelligence reports. Mr. Chaparro stated he hoped to soon be “filling RO 

[reports officer] positions with government personnel versus contractors,” which he believed 

would “help I&A to build and sustain a professional cadre of ROs.”262

Still, the branch consisted mostly of contractors, and Mr. Vandover found himself 

managing his team not against the quality of their product but against contract deliverables. “If I 

have to tell you your deliverables, [I] have to be able to quantify. How many [reports] a day do 

you have to do?”263

The result was a quota system. Reports officers reviewing drafts “were tracked by the 

number [of reports] they produced, not by quality or evaluations they received,” recounted a 

former Senior Reports Officer, who worked for Mr. Vandover. “If you wanted to stay employed, 

you produced reports.”

 Instead of emphasizing the quality of the reporting, Mr. Vandover said, he 

had to emphasize minimum requirements of production.

264

One former Senior Reports Officer described how part of his job was to track production 

by the Reports Officers under him. “How many reports did we produce this month?” he 

remembered being asked. “[P]roduction numbers were extremely important.” The benchmark, 

he said, was producing more reports, not better reporting. “You had a good year if you put more 

reports out than the year before.”265 Those numbers were tracked on a regular basis via 

spreadsheets showing production for that time period versus the same period a year ago, 

according to Reporting Branch officials.266

Mr. Vandover confirmed that reporting quotas were a key measure of performance. He 

conceded it wasn’t a system that would generate good intelligence. “We had to give them an 

average – a daily quota,” Mr. Vandover said, “which is not the way you should do this.”267

The reliance on contractors also appears to have derailed earlier efforts to improve the 

Reporting Branch training course. In 2009, Senior Reports Officer and one-time reporting 

branch chief Mark Collier worked to revamp the training program,268

 262 Memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs)” (1/7/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-050742. Mr. Vandover noted that a Reports Officer in Phoenix, Arizona was a contract employee. 

Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012).

but he told the 

Subcommittee his superiors decided the new training could not go beyond a week in length, just 

like the old program. “I was told that if it was longer, the [reports officers] who were contractors 

couldn’t [participate] because their company was paying for it,” Mr. Collier explained. “The 

263 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 264 Subcommittee interview of former Senior Reports Officer (3/21/2012). 265 Id. 266 Subcommittee interviews of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012) and former Senior Reports Officer 

(3/21/2012).

267 Subcommittee interview of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/2012). 268 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry (9/14/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059877.
54

understanding was that contract employees were to come [to DHS] with the training they need, 

so other training shouldn’t be necessary.”269

H. Reporting Officials Aren’t Evaluated on the Quality of Their Reporting

As of July 2012, DHS relied on 66 Intelligence Officers and nine regional directors to 

identify reportable intelligence from fusion centers,

270 while only 18 Reports Officers were in the 

field.271 However, during the period of review, the State and Local Program Office, which 

oversees the IOs, did not evaluate IOs on the quality of their reporting.

272 The Reporting Branch 

did not have the authority or any mechanism to evaluate the performance of the IOs who draft 

HIRs at fusion centers. The Reporting Branch also did not evaluate the quality of the reporting 

filed by their own ROs, although materials provided by DHS suggest managers may take 

cancellation rates into account when reviewing RO performance.

273

Jonathan Wilham, a longtime DHS Reporting Branch official and deputy chief of the 

branch, has overseen day-to-day operations at the branch since April 2009.

274 Mr. Wilham 

confirmed to the Subcommittee that his office does not have a method to evaluate reporting 

officials on the quality of their reporting. “We’re still trying to figure out how we want to do 

it.”275

In her interview with the Subcommittee, Undersecretary Wagner contradicted Mr. 

Wilham’s statement. “Most ROs out there are evaluated by their reporting,” she said. When 

informed of Mr. Wilham’s statements, Ms. Wagner responded, “interesting.”276

 269 Subcommittee interview of Mark Collier (3/8/2012). 270 Email from DHS to Subcommittee staff, “Subj: Request from Wilham interview” (7/26/2012). 271 DHS Support to Fusion Centers (5/3/2012), PSI-DHS-56-0021. 272 “I don’t recall noting poor reporting in an annual review. It never came up as a black mark against a guy,” said 

Mikael Johnston, who was head of the SLPO in 2009 and 2010. Subcommittee interview of Mikael Johnston 

(6/18/2012).

273 DHS provided one personnel review document for a Reports Officer which cited the RO’s intelligence reporting 

reflected “an 80% acceptance rate and 85% error free.” “Employee Performance Plan and Appraisal Form for the 

period 10/1/2011-9/30/2012,” (produced 8/17/2012), at 3, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059577. 274Subcommittee interview of Jonathan Wilham (3/6/2012). 275 Mr. Wilham said he had at one time proposed three metrics for assessing the quality of reports officer production 

centered on whether the intelligence was used by others in the Intelligence Community: first, evaluations submitted 

by consumers of the reports informing DHS of their value; second, instances in which reports are cited within 

finished intelligence analysis; and third, instances in which readers have requested further information from the 

branch about the incident being reported. The branch has never instituted a formal review that incorporated these 

metrics. The Subcommittee requested and received from DHS a tally of reports which had been the subject of any 

such evaluation, cite or request for information. In all, 17 percent of published HIRs from fusion centers received 

any form of recognition identified by Mr. Wilham. Subcommittee Interview of Jonathan Wilham (3/6/2012).

276 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012).
55

I. A Hastily-Implemented and Poorly Coordinated Review Process 

Delayed Reporting by Months

The enhanced review process required by DHS Deputy Secretary Lute began in May 

2009. It was clearly necessary, given the poor quality of reporting. However, the new process

had the foreseeable consequence of also slowing the dissemination of completed HIRs. For 

reports published in June 2009, officials took on average 104 days, more than three months, from 

generating a draft HIR to releasing it, according to a Subcommittee analysis.

277

In the months that followed, the rate of publication came to almost a dead stop. From

August to December 2009, DHS published only five or fewer HIRs per month that came from 

fusion centers, according to DHS records supplied to the Subcommittee.

278

Meanwhile, DHS officials continued to portray fusion centers to the public as active and 

essential collaborators in the national counterterrorism intelligence effort. In a September 2009

hearing before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, in the 

middle of the five-month period when intelligence reporting from fusion centers had all but 

ground to a halt, DHS Secretary Napolitano testified that state and local fusion centers were “key 

tools for stakeholders at all levels of government to share information related to threats,” and 

“the primary way that DHS shares intelligence and analysis with our homeland security 

partners.”279

Although the new review process had clearly delayed DHS’s ability to timely “connect 

the dots” by sharing raw intelligence among all levels of government – one of the reasons 

Congress and the White House created the Department – only one official interviewed by the 

Subcommittee could recall the Deputy Secretary’s office inquiring about the problems the new 

policy had created, or what needed to be done to ensure it functioned more efficiently. Former 

Acting Under Secretary of I&A Bart Johnson said he remembered Deputy Secretary Lute asking 

how things were going. “Weeks, a month or so after the new guidance was issued, the Deputy 

Secretary asked basically, ‘how’s it going?’” Mr. Johnson told the Subcommittee. “I told her, 

Delays in reporting from fusion centers were not mentioned at the hearing.

 277 To obtain this average, the Subcommittee first identified all HIRs from fusion centers DHS published in June 

2009 during the 13-month period underview; and for each, calculated the number of days between its drafting and its 

date of publication; and then averaged the time periods. 

278 See 12/30/2009 Memorandum from Philip Groven to James Chaparro, “Subject: The Fiscal Year 2009 4th

Quarter Management Report,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-058860. The Reporting Branch has not been alone in delaying or 

temporarily halting intelligence reporting. Officials told the Subcommittee that at different times, reporting from 

certain DHS components, notably U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and the Transportation Security 

Administration, has halted or been severely restricted. Subcommittee interviews of Senior Reports Officer

(3/20/2012) and Amy Kardell (6/5/2012); HIR Working Group Notes, Meeting July 23, 2010, DHS-HSGAC-FC056573; Subcommittee interview of Chuck Robinson (7/18/2012).

In a written response to the Subcommittee, CIS stated that between 2008 and 2009 it filed fewer than 100 

reports, It noted that it had an I&A reports officer supporting its efforts during the period, whom they asked to be 

removed “due to poor performance.” CIS response to Subcommittee inquiry (9/14/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC059878. The Subcommittee received no response from TSA.

279 Prepared Testimony of Secretary Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, “Eight Years after 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland,” (9/30/2009) 

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2009/09/30/secretary-napolitanos-testimony-eight-years-after-911-confronting-terroristthreat, accessed 9/18/2012.
56

it’s creating some challenges, in terms of timelines.”280

DHS officials involved in the enhanced review process told the Subcommittee that the 

slowdown occurred in part because of problems at the Office of General Counsel (OGC).

 The Subcommittee invited a written 

response to these allegations from Ms. Lute’s office, and documents supporting her response, but

the Department provided neither.

281 An 

OGC representative told the Subcommittee that his office had workforce problems which 

“contributed” to the backlog. Specifically, he said that turnover at the junior attorney position 

responsible for reviewing HIRs “likely slow[ed] the process.”282

When asked who within OGC was held accountable for the problems, Matthew Kronisch, 

DHS Associate General Counsel for Intelligence, answered, “By the end of December 2009, the 

attorney responsible for representing [OGC] in the review process during the period in which the 

backlog developed was no longer employed at DHS.”283

At the Subcommittee’s request, OGC identified the departed official. In an interview 

with the Subcommittee, the official stated that he was the primary OGC employee who reviewed 

the draft HIRs during 2009, and the volume of reporting meant the task of reviewing the drafts 

overwhelmed his other responsibilities.284

The official said he made his superiors at OGC aware of the situation, but they did not 

appear concerned. He indicated that they assigned no additional resources to assist him. “My 

understanding was HIRs were not an immediate priority – not to be ignored, but not first on 

anybody’s list,” he recalled for the Subcommittee.285

The official said he did not believe the task could be done by a single person. “It was a 

setup for failure,” he said. He stated he was never reprimanded or counseled because of the 

delays in reviewing HIRs. He added that when he submitted his resignation, his superior, Mr.

 280 Subcommittee interview of Bart Johnson (7/11/2012). 281 Subcommittee interviews of Harold “Skip” Vandover (3/22/12), Timothy Skinner (3/14/12), and Jonathan 

Wilham (3/6/12). In addition, a December 2009 memorandum from Philip Groven to James Chaparro suggested a 

policy dispute between OGC and the Reporting Branch contributed to the virtual shutdown, although that policy 

dispute was not mentioned by the individuals interviewed. Memorandum from Philip Groven to James Chaparro, 

“Subject: The Fiscal Year 2009 4th Quarter Performance Management Report” (12/30/2009), DHS-HSGAC-FC058860.

282 “Responses to Questions Submitted to Matthew L. Kronisch,” (3/22/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-047634. 283 Id. Mr. Kronisch acknowledged that OGC and other review offices spent many hours reviewing and revising 

draft reports that the Reporting Branch had already concluded were the product of unauthorized intelligence efforts. 

“The reviewing offices expended significant effort attempting to perfect these noncompliant nominations, many of 

which could not be perfected,” Mr. Kronisch told the Subcommittee. At one point, he said, over 300 troubled drafts 

languished in the review process before most of them were eventually cancelled.

284 Subcommittee interview of Curt Heidtke (8/12/2012). 285 Id.
57

Kronisch, asked him to stay on another four months.286

Another problem may have also contributed to the delays. DHS officials interviewed 

who had been involved in the review process for the Privacy Office and CRCL were unable to 

identify formal written guidance from their offices on how to review HIRs, what to look for, or 

what thresholds to apply in determining what was acceptable or unacceptable.

 These OGC staffing problems were on 

top of inadequate staffing at the Reporting Branch, discussed earlier. 

287

J. Retaining Inappropriate Records is Contrary to DHS Policies 

and the Privacy Act

DHS personnel “are prohibited from collecting or maintaining information on U.S. 

persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected by the U.S. Constitution, such as 

the First Amendment protected freedoms of religion, speech, press, and peaceful assembly and 

protest,” as the Department’s Office of General Counsel reminded I&A employees in April 

2008.288

This reminder appears to reflect the statutory prohibitions contained in the Privacy Act of 

1974, which bars Federal agencies from improperly collecting and storing information on U.S. 

citizens and lawfully admitted aliens based solely on First Amendment-protected activities

without a valid reason to do so.

289

The Subcommittee investigation reviewed 40 cancelled draft HIRs from the period of 

April 2009 through April 2010, each of which DHS officials had cancelled after raising privacy 

or civil liberties concerns about their content.290

As noted above, the Privacy Act prohibits agencies from storing information on U.S. 

persons’ First Amendment-protected activities if they have no valid reason to do so. 

Additionally, DHS’s own intelligence oversight procedures allow the Department to retain 

information about U.S. persons for only 180 days, in order to determine if it can be properly 

retained. Once a determination is made that the document should not be retained, the “U.S. 

person identifying information is to be destroyed immediately.”291

 286 Id. Asked if Mr. Heidtke’s statements were accurate, DHS said it did not have further comment on the matter, 

and deferred to Mr. Heidtke’s version of events. Email from DHS to Subcommittee, “Subject: RE: Fusion Center 

questions” (9/7/2012). 287 Subcommittee interviews of Timothy Skinner (3/14/2012), Ken Hunt (2/27/2012), and Margo Schlanger 

(5/22/12).

288 Memorandum from Charles E. Allen and Matthew L. Kronisch to All Employees, Detailees, and Contractors 

Supporting the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, “SUBJECT: Interim Intelligence Oversight Procedures for the 

Office of Intelligence & Analysis,” (4/3/2008) DHS-HSGAC-FC-047637.

289 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(e)(7)

290 The HIRs were identified by DHS in September 2011, in response to a Subcommittee request for copies of draft 

HIRs that had been recommended for cancellation. These 40 were recommended for cancellation by the Privacy 

Office, the Civil Liberties office, or both; or they were cancelled by a reports officer who explicitly cited privacy or 

civil liberties concerns in his or her recommendation to cancel.

291 Memorandum from Charles E. Allen and Matthew L. Kronisch to All Employees, Detailees, and Contractors 

Supporting the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, “SUBJECT: Interim Intelligence Oversight Procedures for the 

Office of Intelligence & Analysis,” (4/3/2008) DHS-HSGAC-FC-047637.
58

The Subcommittee investigation found, however, that DHS had retained the cancelled 

draft HIRs for a year or more after the date of their cancellation, and appeared to have no process 

to purge such inappropriate reporting from their systems. It was not clear why, if DHS had 

determined that the reports were improper to disseminate, the reports were proper to store 

indefinitely.

Asked why it was legal for the Department to retain reports on U.S. persons that may 

improperly report on protected activities, DHS responded that “while a draft HIR or IIR may be 

cancelled based upon a determination that its publication would be outside the scope of I&A’s 

mission, and, by extension, I&A’s obligations under the Privacy Act, the cancelled document 

may be retained by I&A for administrative purposes such as audit and oversight.”292

While auditing and oversight may qualify as legitimate “administrative purposes,” 

several concerns arise regarding the Department’s assertion that they form a reasonable basis for 

retaining the cancelled HIRs.

First, as noted by CRS counsel who examined the issue on behalf of the Subcommittee, 

the Department’s own requirement to destroy inappropriate records appears to contradict its 

justification for retaining them.293 If the reports were considered inappropriate to disseminate 

due to civil liberties concerns, as the cancellation comments indicate, it is not clear how they are 

then appropriate to keep. “There also seems to be some inconsistency with the requirement for 

[DHS] document holders to destroy U.S. person information once he or she deems it to fall 

outside the guidelines; nothing in the guidelines explains how I&A personnel are to know which 

records are subject to audit rather than destruction or minimization, or what to do with records 

once it has been determined they should be held for audit.”294

Second, the Department’s intelligence oversight guidelines include a list of documents it 

considers proper for retention as “administrative information.” That list includes “personnel and 

training records, reference materials, contractor performance records, public and legislative 

affairs files, and correspondence files.” It does not include intelligence reports, nor does it 

mention auditing as an administrative purpose.295

Third, DHS has no policy or practice of auditing its HIR reports. The internal November 

2010 HIR Working Group (HIRWG) study concluded DHS had no formal auditing procedure for 

HIRs. “HIRWG found no record of any audits or studies of previous HIR releases, cancellations 

or tracking of substantive edits,” the report stated. “The HIRWG recommends establishing a 

post-release audit process whereby HIRs could be systematically evaluated . . . to ensure proper 

adherence to the reporting thresholds, legal requirements, reporting quality and timeliness.” 296 

 292 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry (6/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-57026.

293 CRS memorandum from Jennifer Elsea and Gina Stevens to the Subcommittee, “Subject: DHS’S Intelligence and 

Analysis Information Collection Practices,” (9/26/2012), at 8.

294 Id. 295 Id.

296 “Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations,” (11/2010), at 

2, DHS-HSGAC-FC-050770.
59

As of July 2012, it still lacked such a process. “I want to say next fiscal year, we will 

start that process,” Chuck Robinson, Deputy Director of I&A’s Collection and Requirements 

Division, told the Subcommittee. “There is a draft plan. It has not been approved yet.”297 With 

no policy or practice for auditing its intelligence reporting, DHS’s claim that it is retaining 

cancelled HIRs for auditing purposes is troubling.

In addition, when the Subcommittee requested copies of the cancelled draft HIRs as part 

of its oversight investigation, the Department initially sought to withhold the documents, 

explaining it was concerned about the effects of oversight on its reporting process:

For drafts and cancelled HIRs, it would be helpful if you could articulate 

why the committee needs this information to further its oversight . . . . We 

believe it is important to protect the integrity of the process by which those 

reports are reviewed and subjected to internal editorial, analytic, legal, and 

operational scrutiny prior to publication decisions, so as not to impede 

officers in the field from reporting appropriately on topics of interest and 

importance to homeland and national security. Moreover, this could have a 

significant chilling effect on the quality of the reporting that ultimately is 

published and, as a result, the agency decisions it is intended to inform.298

These concerns are puzzling, given DHS’s claim that the sole reason it is retaining the 

cancelled HIRs is for audit and oversight purposes. The apparent indefinite retention of 

cancelled intelligence reports that were determined to have raised privacy or civil liberties 

concerns appears contrary to DHS’s own policies and the Privacy Act.

K. Problems with DHS Reporting Acknowledged, But Unresolved

Despite multiple memoranda and internal reviews which identified problems and made 

recommendations to fix DHS’s intelligence reporting processes at fusion centers, 299 problems 

appear to remain. Some have been addressed. For instance, DHS officials have stated they no 

longer suffer from understaffing within the Reporting Branch, which slowed the process.300

Other issues remain. For example, DHS officials who report intelligence from fusion 

centers still do not appear to be evaluated on the quality of their reporting, a problem flagged by 

Mr. Chaparro in January 2010.

 In 

addition, the Department has shifted from using an ad hoc method involving Microsoft Word and 

unclassified email accounts to draft and share intelligence reports, to using a Department of 

Defense system and a secure network. 

301

 297 Subcommittee interview of Charles Robinson (7/18/2012).

 DHS also has not yet successfully instituted a more 

298 Email from DHS to the Subcommittee, “Subject: Fusion Centers,” (7/15/2011) PSI-DHS-72-000001.

299See “Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations, November 

2010,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-05770; 1/7/2010 memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland 

Intelligence Reports (HIRs),” DHS-HSGAC-FC-050742; Memorandum from Philip Groven to James Chaparro, 

“Subject: The Fiscal Year 2009 4th Quarter Management Report” (12/30/2009), DHS-HSGAC-FC-058860. 300 Subcommittee interview of Charles Robinson (7/18/2012). 301 Memorandum from James Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Subject: Homeland Intelligence Reports (HIRs)” 

(1/7/2010), DHS-HSGAC-FC-050742.
60

substantive training program or finalized a certification process for its reporting officials, an 

issue noted by Ms. Alexander in 2009, Mr. Chaparro in January 2010, and by Ms. Kardell’s 

group in November 2010, although a pilot training program is being tested. 

As of July 2012, more than 18 months after Ms. Kardell’s HIR Working Group made its 

recommendations (and more than a year after Undersecretary Wagner approved them), some of 

the most important, including the recommendation to improve training, remain incomplete. In 

addition, DHS has not yet finalized Standard Operating Procedures for the Reporting Branch to 

reflect procedures it currently follows, which Kardell’s group recommended.

302 DHS has also 

failed to institute a process to review or audit its own intelligence reporting,303 a problem which 

the HIR Working Group found “significantly complicates efforts to establish metrics for 

production, quality, cancellations, or reporting problems, and impedes the identification of best 

practices.” 304

 302 Subcommittee interview of Charles Robinson (7/18/2012). 303 Id. 304 “Homeland Intelligence Report Working Group (HIRWG) Phase 1 Report and Recommendations, November 

2010,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-05770, at 2.
61

V. DHS DOES NOT ADEQUATELY OVERSEE ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT 

FOR FUSION CENTERS 

• DHS does not know how much it has spent to support fusion centers.

• DHS does not exercise effective oversight of grant funds intended for fusion centers.

• FEMA monitoring visits do not confirm grant funds are used appropriately.

• Federally required A-133 audits are not useful to monitor grant spending.

• DHS grant requirements do not ensure states spend fusion center funds effectively.

• DHS cannot say whether its spending has improved fusion centers’ ability to participate 

meaningfully in the Federal counterterrorism mission.

A. Overview

For most of its history, DHS has largely been unable to account for its spending in 

support of state and local fusion centers. Its recent efforts to fix the problem have fallen short. 

DHS spending in support of fusion centers can be divided into two general categories: 

funds it spends on its own personnel and programs which interact with and provide operational 

support to fusion centers; and grant funds it awards to states and urban areas, with the intention 

that they will spend the money on their fusion centers. 

This year, for the first time, DHS estimated what it spent on the first category – $17.2 

million in 2011.305

In a series of estimates it provided the Subcommittee, DHS said it has awarded between 

$289 million and $1.4 billion in grant funding to states and cities to support fusion centers and 

related efforts between 2003 and 2010.

 However, DHS remains unable to provide an accurate accounting of 

spending in the second category. DHS cannot say with accuracy how much grant funding it has 

awarded to support fusion centers, how that money was spent, or whether any of it improved 

fusion centers’ ability to participate meaningfully in counterterrorism information-sharing with 

the Federal Government.

306

The Subcommittee investigation also reviewed expenditures by select state and local 

agencies on behalf of fusion centers around the country between 2006 and 2010. The review 

found that state and local agencies did not consistently spend Federal grant dollars on items that

would directly improve their ability to contribute to the Federal counterterrorism effort. Instead, 

they spent DHS funds intended for fusion centers on vehicles, surveillance equipment, and even 

significant overhead costs like rent, which did little to improve their core intelligence analysis 

 These estimates differ by more than $1 billion, 

making them of questionable use. The Subcommittee investigation also found weaknesses in the 

grant award process, grant monitoring, and DHS’s ability to assess the impact of those funds. 

 305 “2011 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory: Results” (6/2012), at 9. 306 Figures are based on FEMA estimates: “Fusion Center Funding Report,” Spreadsheet, 6/22/2012, DHS HSGAC 

FC 058336 and “Fusion Keyword Search Solution Area Funding Report,” Spreadsheet 2/24/2010, DHS HSGAC FC 

057017 at 2.
62

and sharing capabilities. Yet, all of those expenditures were allowable under the guidance which 

existed at the time, and would not have been questioned by DHS officials overseeing the grant 

program, officials told the Subcommittee. 

In 2011 and 2012, DHS attempted to tighten its oversight of funding for fusion centers by 

requiring states to document how they intended to use FEMA preparedness grant funds to 

improve fusion centers’ “must-have” information-sharing capabilities.

307

To assess the return on any program, one must know how much one has invested, how 

those funds were applied, and what goals the funding is intended to help achieve. However, 

DHS cannot identify how much it has spent intending to support fusion centers, nor has it 

examined how the bulk of that money has been used. As a result, DHS is unable to identify what 

value, if any, it has received from its outlays.

 DHS officials said

they expect that will help align its fusion center funding efforts, managed by FEMA, with its 

intelligence priorities for fusion centers, managed by its Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

(I&A). But as the Subcommittee investigation found, these new rules and processes do not fix 

the fundamental problems with how FEMA funds state and local fusion center efforts: they do 

not ensure states and cities spend the money wisely, nor do they significantly improve FEMA’s 

ability to track the amount of Federal funds actually spent on supporting fusion centers. 

B. DHS Does Not Know How Much It Has Spent 

to Support Fusion Centers

FEMA officials told the Subcommittee that they do not have a mechanism to accurately 

and reliably identify the total amount of DHS grant funding spent on supporting fusion 

centers,

308 despite increasingly identifying fusion centers as a departmental priority.309

FEMA has not deemed fusion centers to be a separate mandatory category for tracking 

the expenditures of Federal grant funds. Instead, it has required states to submit Biannual 

Strategy Implementation Reports (BSIR) which relay general updates of how the state is 

spending DHS funds, on fusion centers and other projects. 

FEMA officials told the Subcommittee that the only way to estimate grant funding 

directed towards fusion centers was to perform a keyword search using project descriptions 

found in the BSIRs.

310 As FEMA officials noted in a briefing to the Subcommittee, such a search 

relies on data that are self-reported by those agencies (known by FEMA as “State Administrative 

Agencies,” or SAAs), and changing the way in which search terms are applied can have a 

substantial impact on the results returned.311

 307 For a list of those capabilities, please see Appendix B of this Subcommittee report. 308 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (6/14/2012).

309 In 2009, DHS elevated fusion centers to “national priority” status in the grant program guidance; in 2010, 2011, 

and 2012, DHS identified fusion centers as one of its highest priorities. FEMA response to Subcommittee inquiry; 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-057115. 310 Subcommittee interview of FEMA (6/14/2012). 311 Id.; Briefing “FEMA Preparedness Grant Funding for Fusion Centers,” FEMA/Grants Program Directorate 

(6/14/2012).
63

Initially, FEMA officials conducted a broad search of the BSIR data, using terms like 

“fusion,” “information sharing” and “data collection,” that yielded an estimate $1.4 billion from 

2003-2010, including $719 million in grant funding for fiscal years 2007-2009.

312 FEMA 

subsequently conducted a more narrow, revised search using only the term “fusion center” of the 

same data and yielded an estimate of $222 million for the 2007-2009 period.313

In addition to requesting data from FEMA, in 2010, the Subcommittee requested 

information from every state and local fusion center on the amount of Federal funding, by 

source, each fusion center received for years 2007 through 2009.

 The two 

estimates of Federal funding of fusion centers from 2007 to 2009 differed by nearly half a billion 

dollars. 

314 Where possible, the 

Subcommittee compared the funding figures provided by fusion centers to those FEMA provided 

for the same centers. The Subcommittee found that the fusion centers’ responses differed 

significantly from both sets of data provided by FEMA.

315 For instance, the Vermont Fusion 

Center indicated that it received no Federal funding in 2007, 2008, or 2009, although data from 

FEMA identified between $1.2 and $1.6 million in funding for the same time period.316 The 

Minnesota Joint Analytical Center reported receiving $4.3 million in Federal funding, while 

FEMA reported between $2.3 and $7.3 million in funding.317

Because of a lack of specificity in FEMA’s data or differences in the survey responses 

provided by the fusion centers, the Subcommittee investigation was able to compare FEMA’s 

figures with those of only 29 fusion centers. It was unable to compare figures for fusion centers 

in states which had more than one center, since FEMA’s BSIR data contains estimates of 

aggregate spending on fusion centers in a given state, and not spending on specific fusion 

centers. Thus the Subcommittee’s analysis was limited to only those instances in which a state 

had only one recognized fusion center.

 These two examples show the 

FEMA figures could vary substantially from than the state estimates. The variability casts doubt 

on the accuracy and reliability of FEMA’s data.

Of that group, only a small number of centers identified a total funding amount within 

10% of FEMA’s estimates for the 2007-2009 time period. The remaining 30 fusion centers 

identified funding amounts that differed, in some cases significantly, from FEMA’s data. 

FEMA officials acknowledged the limitations of the keyword-search approach used to 

identify fusion center funding, stating that it likely did not accurately capture all of the DHS 

funding supporting fusion centers. FEMA officials also acknowledged that grants for broader 

information-sharing efforts by states and localities may also assist fusion centers, although those 

 312 “Fusion Keyword Search Solution Area Funding Report,” Spreadsheet 2/24/2010, DHS HSGAC FC 057017 at 2. 313 “Fusion Center Funding Report,” Spreadsheet, 6/22/2012, DHS HSGAC FC 058336. 314 At the time, DHS said it recognized 72 state and local fusion centers. 315 In some cases, centers’ responses did not consistently distinguish DHS funding from other Federal sources. 316 Comparison of June 2011 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report data; DHS HSGAC FC 05833-058340; 

“Information Sharing and Fusion Center Funding” (12/3/2010); and Vermont Fusion Center response to 

Subcommittee survey; Vermont Fusion Center 01-0001. 317 Comparison of June 2011 Biannual Strategy Implementation Report data; DHS HSGAC FC 05833-058340; 

“Information Sharing and Fusion Center Funding” (12/3/2010); and Minnesota Joint Analysis Center response to 

Subcommittee survey; PSI-Minnesota Joint Analysis Center 01-0001 at 2. 
64

items may not be identified in a keyword search, because they might not specifically contain 

“fusion center” or related terms in their descriptions.318 FEMA officials stated that they were 

planning to implement a change in the BSIR reporting process by which SAA’s will be asked to 

indicate with a “yes/no” response whether funding for a specific project is supporting a fusion 

center.319 While such a change may reduce FEMA’s reliance on performing a keyword search to 

identify grant funding to fusion centers, it remains dependent on self-reported information from 

the recipient agencies, which FEMA officials concede may not be accurate.320

C. DHS Does Not Exercise Effective Oversight of Grant Funds 

Intended for Fusion Centers 

In 2010, DHS told auditors from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) it “had 

plans to assess the costs of the fusion center network,” but it has yet to do such a comprehensive 

assessment.

321

While the Subcommittee investigation focused on grant funds intended to support state 

and local fusion centers, FEMA’s inability to effectively monitor state and local grant spending 

affects its oversight of all preparedness grant funding it distributes.

 Without an accurate tally of the amount of Federal funds supporting each fusion 

center, FEMA, I&A and DHS not only fail to accurately track Federal spending, but also remain 

unable to determine whether its investments are helping to meet the Federal mission in a costeffective manner.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General stated flatly in a June 2012 

report that, despite distributing over $800 million annually for state and local preparedness 

efforts: “FEMA did not have a system in place to determine the extent that Homeland Security 

Grant Program funds enhanced the states’ capabilities to prevent, deter, respond to, and recover 

from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”322

Although FEMA did not determine whether states and localities had effectively spent the 

FEMA grant funds they received, that did not relieve the agency of the statutory obligation to 

continue to distribute DHS grant funds to the states under a mandatory formula specifying 

minimum state grants for preparedness.323

 318 Subcommittee interview of FEMA (6/14/2012).

319 Id. 320 Id. 321 GAO, Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Helping Fusion Centers Build and Sustain Capabilities, and 

Protect Privacy, but Could Better Measure Results, GAO-10-972 (Washington D.C.: September 2010), at 14. In 

late 2011, DHS attempted to conduct a cost assessment of Federal support to fusion centers, however it was unable 

to include financial figures for FEMA grant funding to fusion centers, which, by FEMA estimates, is a greater 

Federal cost than the operational items (for example personnel, technology, security clearances and network 

connectivity) in the DHS 2011 cost assessment. 6/2012, “2011 Fusion Center Federal Cost Inventory: Results,” 

DHS; “Fusion Center Funding Report,” Spreadsheet, 6/22/2012, DHS HSGAC FC 058336 and “Fusion Keyword 

Search Solution Area Funding Report,” Spreadsheet 2/24/201, DHS HSGAC FC 057017 at 2. 322 “The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Requirements for Reporting Homeland Security Grant Program 

Achievements,”OIG-12-92 (6/2012), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-92_Jun12.pdf. 323 Id. at 9. 
65

To oversee grant spending, including spending on fusion centers, FEMA relies on two 

mechanisms. First are FEMA grant monitoring reports, which are biennial reviews based on site 

visits by FEMA officials.324 Second are grantee self-audits, known colloquially as “A-133s,” 

after the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circular requiring them. According to GAO, 

neither report is a sufficient tool for meaningful oversight.325

(1) FEMA Monitoring Reports

Currently, every two years, FEMA officials visit grant recipients and prepare monitoring 

reports based on those visits.

326 FEMA is required by law to conduct monitoring visits, but 

officials expressed a lack of faith in both the monitoring visits as well as the reports they 

produced. “I am not satisfied that our programmatic monitoring is as strong as it could be,” said 

Elizabeth Harman, the FEMA Assistant Administrator in charge of its grants programs.

327

Just because a FEMA official reports a milestone was achieved, “we are not viewing the 

capability” firsthand, Mr. Bowers said.

Until 

recently the monitoring visits were supposed to evaluate FEMA-funded projects against 

milestones the states promised to achieve with the money FEMA gave them. However, Matthew 

Bower, Branch Chief, Risk Analytics and Strategic Initiatives, FEMA/GPD/Preparedness Grants 

Division, noted that a FEMA monitoring visit likely would not involve the FEMA official 

physically confirming a state agency’s claim that it had achieved any specific milestone. 

328 Even if a FEMA official rated a project milestone at

100 percent, indicating it was fully achieved, he might not base that on having personally

verified the claim. “[That] may not mean we ‘kicked the tires’ on any of this stuff,” Mr. Bower 

told the Subcommittee.329 Despite that, Mr. Bower said the visits were important “to make sure 

projects are on track.” 330

Recently, the DHS Inspector General’s Office examined FEMA’s monitoring efforts. It 

reported that state officials told them FEMA’s monitoring visits “do not include reviewing the 

state’s progress in achieving annually identified investment project milestones.”331

The Subcommittee investigation noted one particular case in which a FEMA monitoring 

official rated a fusion center project as having made no progress – zero percent – for certain 

milestones, yet FEMA continued to award grant funds for the project.

332

 324 Subcommittee interview of Elizabeth Harman, Assistant Administrator, DHS Grants Program Directorate 

(8/2/2012).

Mr. Bower told the 

325 See “Testimony: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and Management Methods, But

Measuring Programs’ Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge” (3/11/2008), prepared by GAO, GAO08-488T; “Single Audit Improvements” (3/13/2009), prepared by GAO, GAO-09-307R. 326 The visits and reports have changed over time, and FEMA officials indicated they are preparing to make further 

changes. Subcommittee interviews of Elizabeth Harman (8/2/2012) and FEMA officials (7/19/2012). 327 Subcommittee interview of Elizabeth Harman (8/2/2012). 328 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (7/19/2012). 

329 Id. 330 Id. 331 “The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Requirements for Reporting Homeland Security Grant Program 

Achievements,”OIG-12-92 (6/27/2012). 332 “Philadelphia Urban Area FY 2009 Monitoring Report” (9/17/2009), FEMA; “Programmatic Monitoring Report, 

Pennsylvania – Philadelphia Area, HSGP/UASI,” (10/18/2011), FEMA, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059194.
66

Subcommittee that was possible because, among other reasons, FEMA had no “formal process” 

to review a recipient’s monitoring reports as part of its grant award process. Mr. Bower said that 

it was “common” for FEMA to continue to award funding to projects which showed no progress 

on previous years’ monitoring reports.

333 “Past performance does not affect future awards,” Mr. 

Bower explained at one point.

334

When asked how long a project must show no progress before FEMA questioned its 

funding, Bower said he would expect FEMA officials to raise questions if a project had received

funding for three consecutive years and showed zero percent progress on any milestone for that

three-year period.335

In its June 2012 report, the DHS IG criticized FEMA’s monitoring program and the 

reports it generated for producing dated information of little value. “Our review of monitoring 

reports supported that the reports were not a source for tracking milestone progress,” the IG 

stated. The IG said the visits were too rare, and reports filed too late, to be of any practical use.

“With monitoring visits scheduled every two years, and the monitoring reports not being 

completed for several months following the visit, the results of the visits were not timely or 

current for reviewing project activity accomplishments when annual applications for grant 

awards were being reviewed.”336

These findings echo what GAO found in 2008. “[FEMA] monitoring of grant 

expenditures does not provide a means to measure the achievement of desired program 

outcomes,” GAO reported then.337 Ms. Harman told the Subcommittee, four years after the 

GAO report, that her staff was currently researching how to improve the monitoring process for 

FEMA grants.

338 However, Ms. Harman noted, “As the Federal Government, it’s not our job to 

micromanage these funds,” she said. “We need to maintain a level of flexibility.”339

Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC). The Subcommittee investigation, in 

addition to reviewing FEMA mechanisms for tracking Federal grants funds spent on fusion 

centers generally, also examined FEMA monitoring reports for specific fusion centers. One that 

highlighted the weakness in the monitoring reports process involved a fusion center project in 

Philadelphia, known as the Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (DVIC) project.

The Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task Force (SEPARTF), the regional 

government coalition which manages the project, identified over $11 million in FEMA funding 

 333 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (7/19/2012). 334 Id. 335 Id. 336 “The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Requirements for Reporting Homeland Security Grant Program 

Achievements,”OIG-12-92, at 9, (6/27/2012), http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2012/OIG_12-92_Jun12.pdf. 337 DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ 

Impact on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge,” GAO-08-488T, at 5, 

http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/119323.pdf. 338Subcommittee interview of Elizabeth Harman (8/20/12).

339 Id.
67

that has been committed to the DVIC project since 2006.

340 According to SEPARTF, the DVIC 

will employ over 130 personnel in a 24-hour-a-day, 7-days-a-week operation.341

In September 2009, a FEMA grant officer visited SEPARTF to conduct a grant 

monitoring site visit.342

In 2009, the FEMA officer reviewed the promises the task force had made regarding the 

progress it would make on DVIC in 2008, when FEMA had awarded it $2.6 million.

 Despite FEMA’s multi-million-dollar obligations to the center over a 

three-year period, the FEMA officer did not visit the actual location of the DVIC as part of the 

site visit. FEMA could not conduct a site visit of the fusion center itself, because despite years 

of grant funding, the center did not physically exist.

343 The 

FEMA officer determined that no progress had been made on any of them – including what may 

have been the most fundamental: “Establish the DVIC facility and provide contractors and staff 

to operate the fusion center.”344

“Milestones shows [sic] zero progress,” the official noted in the 2009 monitoring report, 

but appeared to excuse the task force’s inaction. “When the monitoring was conducted it was 

very early in the Grant cycle and the Grantees and Sub-recipients were in the process of 

ob[l]igating funds and initiating projects.”

Three years and $11 million in obligations, yet the center did 

not exist.

345 Despite finding no progress in 2009, FEMA 

continued to direct funding to the project in 2010 and 2011.346

In October 2011, a FEMA official conducted the next site visit to Philadelphia.347 This 

monitoring visit took place five years after FEMA’s initial grant to DVIC in 2006. By that time, 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had frozen the FEMA grant funds it held that were intended 

for the center, because of concern that the local officials in charge of the project were planning to 

improperly spend millions in FEMA funding to refurbish and equip an old industrial building to 

house not only DVIC, but an even larger criminal intelligence center for the Philadelphia Police 

Department. FEMA grant guidance and Federal law prohibit the use of grant funds for 

construction.348 In addition, expenditures for non-fusion center needs would have gone against 

the task force’s promises to use the funds exclusively for the fusion center.

349

 340 DVIC Funding Overview, SEPARTF; PSI-PEMA-05-0090.

State officials were 

341 Response to Subcommittee questionnaire (7/23/2010), Delaware Valley Intelligence Center, PSI-Delaware 

Valley Intelligence Center-01-0001. 342 The task force is a subgrantee of the state of Pennsylvania; it receives, allots and spends FEMA grant funds for 

the Philadelphia region.

343 “Philadelphia Urban Area FY 2009 Monitoring Report” (9/17/2009), FEMA, at 21; DVIC Funding Overview, 

SEPARTF; PSI-PEMA-05-0090. 344 “Philadelphia Urban Area FY 2009 Monitoring Report” (9/17/2009), FEMA, at 21. 345 Id. 346 “Programmatic Monitoring Report, Pennsylvania – Philadelphia Area, HSGP/UASI” (10/18/2011), FEMA, 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-059194; Grant Agreement Between PEMA and SEPARTF for FEMA FFY 2010 UASI funds, 

(6/10/2011), at 37; “FY2011 HSGP Investment Justification: Fusion Center Addendum,” at 2. 347 “Programmatic Monitoring Report, Pennsylvania – Philadelphia Area, HSGP/UASI” (10/18/2011), FEMA, 

DHS-HSGAC-FC-059194. 348 6 U.S.C. § 609 (b)(4).

349 Correspondence from Christopher F. Wilson, Pennsylvania Governor’s Office of General Counsel, to Edward 

Atkins, Chair, Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task Force (9/15/2011), PSI-PEMA-05-0003. The 
68

so concerned they told SEPARTF that they would not reimburse any construction costs related to 

the DVIC until FEMA granted a waiver to do so.

FEMA officials were aware of these concerns at the time of the visit – indeed, according 

to state officials, FEMA shared their doubts.

350 Specifically, FEMA officials knew that project

officials planned to use FEMA grant funds to pay for building renovations, which was explicitly 

barred by FEMA grant guidelines.

351 Just a few weeks earlier, local officials had written FEMA 

asking for an “immediate and favorable” decision to waive that restriction so that the project 

“may proceed along its current promised timeline.”352

Despite local officials’ efforts to get around FEMA spending restrictions and allocate

millions of taxpayer dollars to disallowed construction and renovation costs, the FEMA 

monitoring report from the October 2011 visit contained no particular criticisms or sense of 

urgency regarding the fusion center. For instance, the report form asked: “During the course of 

the programmatic Site Visit, were there indicators of possible non-compliance with grant 

 

Subcommittee investigation discovered that a DHS official, Joseph Liciardello, served as one of the DVIC project’s 

managers, outside of his professional capacity as a DHS employee. (“I am the Co-Lead on the [DVIC] Project 

Management Team.” Email from Joseph Liciardello to ISC@DHS.gov, “Subject: Request for documents” 

(9/23/2010), DHS-HSGAC-FC-020104.) He assisted in crafting documents and providing advice for the project and 

seemed to be counseling the project on how to recharacterize construction costs they intended to cover using grant 

funds: (“I . . . am handling the lease negotiations for the DVIC for most of the week.” Email from Joseph 

Liciardello to Kurt Bittner, “Subject: RE: DVIC – Siemens Contact Information,” (10/11/10), DHS-HSGAC-FC022630; “We cannot reference construction so I added ‘or additional funding as necessary’ to . . . the enhanced lease 

payment clause.” Email from Joseph Liciardello to Evalyn Fisher, “Subject: FW: DVIC Lease” (10/5/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-024159; “As to the request for a change from SEPARTF ‘construction’ to ‘requirements[‘], it is 

necessary because of restrictions found in the grant guidance concerning allowable costs.” Email from Joseph 

Liciardello to Douglas Kubinski, “Subject: RE: DVIC Intergovernmental Cooperation Agreement between the City 

and Task Force” (2/17/2011), DHS-HSGAC-FC-023663).

 In interviews with the Subcommittee, Mr. Liciardello said he never referred to himself as a project lead for 

DVIC, and that his role was “administrative,” and “assistance.” He said he was versed in the lease process but only 

because he was a “referee” between the parties. Subcommittee interviews of Joseph Liciardello (10/31/11 and 

11/2/11).

 The Subcommittee was unable to confirm the extent of Mr. Liciardello’s role in the project, in part because 

DHS did not produce all emails from his account related to his extra-professional involvement the project. In a 

written explanation, the Department stated, “our technological representatives were unable to access” emails from 

May and June 2011. Response to Subcommittee inquiry (8/17/2012), DHS, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059294. 350 “Issues were first raised regarding the construction issue in late February 2011,” PEMA officials told the 

Subcommittee. “They rose to DHS’ level . . . we have an April 26, 2011 note from Dennis Donehoo [of FEMA] 

requiring a [construction] waiver.” Subcommittee interview of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency 

officials (11/14/2011). 

351 “The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has asked PEMA for the status of the 

construction/renovation waiver as Federal guidance requires such a waiver . . . . PEMA will be unable to reimburse 

the SEPARTF for any expenditure related to the DVIC until such a time that SEPARTF submits a 

construction/renovation waiver to PEMA and that waiver is consequently approved by FEMA[.]” Correspondence 

from Christopher F. Wilson, Chief Counsel, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to Ed Atkins, 

Chairperson, Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task Force (9/15/2011), PSI-050-0004. 352 Correspondence from Edward J. Atkins, Chairman, Southeastern Pennsylvania Regional Task Force, to Dennis 

Donehoo, Program Analyst, FEMA (9/26/2011), PSI-PEMA-05-0012. FEMA did not grant the waiver.
69

program requirements (e.g., unallowable expenditures) that should be brought to the financial 

analyst’s attention?” The FEMA officer wrote, “No.”353

As for progress, the official noted that work on the center was “not started,” except for a 

segment of funds from a 2008 grant, which the official noted were “used for a temporary facility 

while the perm[a]n[e]nt DVIC is under construction.” In that instance, the official recorded that 

“all investment activities” had been “completed.”354

In February 2012, SEPARTF informed FEMA that it expected to use 2000 square feet of 

office space “for pre-operational activities related to establishment of the DVIC.”355 In August

2012, Pennsylvania officials told the Subcommittee they understand that SEPARTF had yet to 

hire any intelligence analysts.356 To date, about $2.3 million of FEMA funds committed to the 

project have been spent.357 The remainder of the grant funds has expired, been redirected to 

other projects, or remain unspent.

358 DHS continues to list DVIC as one of its officially 

recognized fusion centers in reports to Congress and public documents, even though after six

years, the fusion center is not yet operational.

359

FEMA’s passivity in the face of years of questionable fusion center expenditures in 

Philadelphia is remarkable, but it is not exceptional. Fusion center grant recipients that have

earned reputations among FEMA grant officials for poor spending practices typically face few 

consequences. FEMA officials told the Subcommittee that while they sometimes find instances 

of misspending, lax recordkeeping or other poor performance by grant recipients – on fusion 

centers and other projects – they almost never withhold funds.

360 In fact, FEMA officials could 

name only a few instances in which DHS withheld grant money from any grant recipient in any 

DHS program. In 2007, FEMA withheld grant funds from American Samoa in response to a 

major investigation into the misuse of millions in DHS grant funds for tsunami preparedness by 

the protectorate.

361 FEMA officials also indicated that they temporarily withheld funds from 

Pennsylvania and Texas that were to be used to support fusion center activities, because the 

states did not provide enough information in their applications about how the funds were going 

to be used.362

 353 “Programmatic Monitoring Report, Pennsylvania – Philadelphia Area, HSGP/UASI,” FEMA, DHS-HSGAC-FC059194.

354 Id. at 18. 355 Letter from Edward J. Atkins, Chairman, SEPARTF to Dennis Donehoo, FEMA (2/23/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC05-0796. 356 Subcommittee interview of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency officials (8/1/2012). 357 PEMA Spreadsheet. (9/20/12) 358 DVIC Funding Overview, SEPARTF; PSI-PEMA-05-0090; Subcommittee interview of Pennsylvania Emergency 

Management Agency officials (8/1/2012).

359 See “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027. 360 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (6/14/2012). 361 See “Report: Tsunami warning funds squandered in American Samoa,” CNN.com, Drew Griffin and David 

Fitzpatrick (10/28/2009), 

http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/10/27/asamoa.tsunami.warningsystem/index.html. 362 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (6/14/2012). 
70

(2) A-133 Audits

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) requires state, local and tribal 

governments who expend more than $500,000 in Federal grant funds within a given fiscal year to 

audit their expenditure of those funds, as well as to conduct timely and effective oversight of any 

subgrantees’ financial activities, through actions such as site visits.363

The process has long been problematic, as GAO and the President’s Council on Integrity 

and Efficiency (PCIE) have reported.

364

The difficulties experienced by the Subcommittee in using A-133 audit reports is 

consistent with broader concerns raised by earlier reviews of A-133s. In 2007, PCIE reported

that nearly half of all A-133 audits were not adequate to meet the reporting requirements of the 

OMB circular – so much so that it considered them either wholly unacceptable or “limited in 

reliability.” The council also pointed out that there has been no single Federal entity responsible 

for monitoring compliance with the A-133 audit requirement, and agencies were not consistent in 

enforcing it.

The Subcommittee investigation reviewed A-133 audits

of FEMA grant funds awarded to California, Arizona and Pennsylvania, and determined the 

audit reports did not follow a uniform reporting format, and often did not distinguish 

expenditures for fusion centers from other programs, rendering them useless for effective 

financial oversight of how state and local agencies spend Federal grant dollars on fusion centers.

365

The A-133 audits conducted by California illustrate the problems. In 2009, the DHS 

Inspector General released its audit of the State of California’s management of its State 

Homeland Security Program (SHSP) grants from 2004 to 2006. Among other findings, the DHS 

IG found that the state had failed to conduct any monitoring of the spending by its subgrantees 

until late 2005, and when it did, the review efforts were inadequate to provide “sufficient 

oversight” of the subgrantees’ activities. Among other problems, nearly half of the subgrantees 

received no visits at all from state overseers, and the audits did not identify any procurementrelated problems, although the IG’s auditors found many. In fact, the IG found that “in an effort 

to improve operational efficiency,” the state did not require subgrantees to give them any 

receipts, invoices or other documentation before disbursing Federal grant funds to them.366

Among its recommendations, the DHS IG informed California it should strengthen its 

site visits to subgrantees, and improve its financial oversight measures to ensure the subgrantees 

were spending Federal grant funds “as intended.” The state agreed to do so.367

 363“OMB Circular A-133 Compliance Supplement 2011,” Part 1, 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/circulars/a133_compliance/2011/pt1.pdf. 364 See “Single Audit: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Single Audit Process and Oversight,” (3/13/2009), 

prepared by GAO, GAO-09-307R, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09307r.pdf. 365“Report on National Single Audit Sampling Project” (6/2007), President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, 

http://www.ignet.gov/pande/audit/NatSamProjRptFINAL2.pdf. 366“The State of California’s Management of State Homeland Security Program Grants Awarded During Fiscal 

Years 2004 through 2006,” prepared by DHS IG, (2/2009) OIG-09-33, 

http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-33_Feb09.pdf. 367 Id. 
71

In 2011, the DHS IG revisited the State of California’s grant operations, this time to 

review its management of Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants, another subset of 

FEMA’s preparedness grants program. In its report, the IG noted the state was required by OMB 

Circular A-133 to monitor subgrantee spending through site visits and other means. It noted it 

had found an absence of meaningful financial oversight by California two years earlier. It noted 

the state of California had promised to improve its monitoring, including boosting its site visits, 

to comply with Federal regulations.368

California officials told IG auditors they planned to initiate visits to subgrantees in three 

of the state’s six urban areas receiving UASI funds from 2006 and 2007. The IG pointed out that 

left subgrantees in the other three areas unaffected, and held little promise of ensuring fiscal 

discipline, since nearly all of the 2006 and 2007 grant funds would have been spent and 

reimbursed by then.369

The Subcommittee’s review of Arizona and Pennsylvania A-133 audits were equally 

troubling, indicating these self-audits do not provide effective financial oversight of Federal

funds spent on fusion centers. 

 

D. DHS Grant Requirements Do Not Ensure States Spend

Fusion Center Funds Effectively

In administering its grant programs, DHS, through FEMA, outlines broad requirements 

for the types of activities that can be funded and equipment that can purchased. However, for 

several years DHS made no attempt at ensuring state expenditures on fusion centers addressed 

gaps in the centers’ information-sharing capabilities. Recently, FEMA has made changes 

intended to make sure states and cities use FEMA grant dollars for fusion centers to improve 

these abilities, but those efforts still fall short of meaningful reform.

Before 2011, FEMA grant recipients faced few requirements on how they used grant 

funds for fusion center projects, beyond the general FEMA guidelines governing all 

preparedness grant projects. In 2011, FEMA and I&A instituted new procedures intended to 

better align FEMA grant funds with I&A priorities.370

To begin with, I&A initiated what are intended to be annual assessments of each fusion 

center, measuring each facility’s key capabilities, a list of attributes which includes having an 

 368 February 2011 “The State of California’s Management of Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded 

During Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008,” prepared by DHS IG, OIG-11-46, 

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets%5CMgmt%5COIG_11-46_Feb11.pdf. 369 “[T]here is no plan to visit the other three urban areas that received Urban Areas Security Initiative grant funds . . 

. . The FY 2010 visits would not be timely for the FYs 2006 and 2007 grants since nearly all of these funds would 

have been spent and reimbursed by the State.” “The State of California’s Management of Urban Areas Security 

Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2006 through 2008,” prepared by DHS IG, OIG-11-46, at 24, 

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets%5CMgmt%5COIG_11-46_Feb11.pdf (2/2011) 370 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (6/14/2012).
72

approved privacy policy, information-sharing policies, governance plans, analyst training, and 

more.371

In addition, beginning in 2011, FEMA required all states and cities to submit a project 

document known as an Investment Justification (IJ), in which they would describe how they 

planned to spend FEMA funds on their fusion centers.

372 FEMA asked recipients to use the IJ to 

show how they would use DHS grant money to address any weaknesses which had been noted 

by DHS assessments.373

When FEMA received the IJs from the states and cities, it shared them with officials at 

I&A.374 I&A officials reviewed the IJs for each fusion center against their assessment of that

center, to ensure that the recipient planned to use its grant funds to address the capability gaps 

I&A assessors had identified at the center.375

While this new procedure represents a significant improvement over past practice, the 

Subcommittee investigation identified three issues which weaken its effectiveness.

First, the new system does not ensure that Federal funds are spent on Federal priorities. 

While I&A reviews the submitted proposals to ensure FEMA recipients say they will use their 

funds to address identified weaknesses at each fusion center, DHS does not require that a 

significant portion of the Federal grant funds it awards for fusion centers be directed towards 

eliminating those weaknesses. In a hypothetical situation, a state could indicate it was spending 

$300,000 to address a particular weakness, and another $2 million to buy unrelated equipment 

such as emergency response vehicles or wiretapping devices, or even to defray overhead costs, 

without demonstrating steps to achieve the “must-have” capabilities required by DHS.

376

Allowing fusion center expenditures for unrelated purposes significantly weakens FEMA’s 

ability to ensure that Federal funds for fusion centers are devoted to achieving Federal priorities 

at those centers.377

Second, recipients of FEMA grant funds are under little obligation to follow through on 

commitments made in their Investment Justifications. FEMA gives preparedness grant recipients 

wide latitude to change their minds about spending priorities even after receiving grant funds. 

According to FEMA officials, recipients and their subgrantees are allowed to reprogram funds 

from one purpose to another without necessarily obtaining consent or notifying FEMA in 

 371 For a complete list of attributes used in the DHS 2011 assessment process, see Appendix B of this Subcommittee 

report. 372 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen, I&A (7/12/2012). 373 Subcommittee interview of FEMA (6/14/2012). 374 Id. 375 Subcommittee interviews of Joel Cohen, I&A (4/16/2012 and 7/12/2012). 376 Emergency response and covert surveillance are not key capabilities for fusion centers, as demonstrated in 

Appendix A and B of this Subcommittee report. 377 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen, I&A (7/12/2012). While Mr. Cohen stated, “I don’t know what fusion 

center needs response vehicles,” he confirmed that as long as some portion of the IJ addressed capability gaps, I&A 

and FEMA would allow the other expenditures as long as they were consistent with FEMA’s general guidelines. 

“Okay, so be it,” Mr. Cohen said.
73

advance.378

Third, no one at FEMA or I&A appears to be charged with ensuring that states and cities 

in fact, spend their fusion center funds on the commitments made in their IJs. When the 

Subcommittee asked FEMA officials who was in charge of checking to see if states were 

actually using funds as promised to address their identified weaknesses, FEMA said that the task 

fell to I&A.

This latitude makes it possible for states and cities to report intentions to shore up 

key weakness at a fusion center, but after receiving the funds, spend them on other purposes.

379 When asked what role it played in overseeing states’ and cities’ spending Federal

dollars on fusion centers, I&A officials told the Subcommittee that they conducted no such 

oversight. “[I&A has] no role whatsoever in oversight,” Joel Cohen, a senior I&A official, told 

Subcommittee. “It’s true across the board .... We do not monitor [spending]. We do not 

provide oversight, we do not provide monitoring.”380 He indicated that was FEMA’s 

responsibility, and added that FEMA coordinated its oversight efforts with I&A “all the time.”

381

To test the effectiveness of DHS and FEMA oversight practices, the Subcommittee 

reviewed spending by FEMA recipients and subgrantees at five fusion centers. At each, the 

Subcommittee investigation found significant instances in which state and local agencies spent 

Federal dollars meant to improve fusion center capabilities on items that did little to achieve 

those improvements or were not used by the centers at all. Although all of the cases occurred 

before FEMA and I&A had implemented the new 2011 IJ review process for fusion centers, 

FEMA indicated all of the expenditures listed below appeared to be allowable under current 

rules.

382

(1) Using Fusion Center Funds on Chevrolet Tahoes

In April 2008, the Arizona Department of Public Safety (AZDPS) bought a new 

Chevrolet Tahoe sport utility vehicle (SUV) using over $33,500 in DHS grant funds meant to 

enhance the capabilities of the Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), the 

state’s fusion center. Specifically, the funds were intended to support Arizona’s Terrorism 

Liaison Officers (TLO) Program, which is run by the ACTIC.383 TLOs are specially trained law 

enforcement officers whose role is to, among other things, “relay terrorism related information 

and intelligence efficiently and appropriately between the ACTIC and field resources.”384

 378 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (7/19/2012). 

379 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (6/14/2012). Specifically, when asked if I&A’s State and Local 

Program Office (SLPO) handled program monitoring of fusion centers, FEMA’s Matthew Bower replied, “That’s 

fair to say.” 

380 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (7/12/2012). 381 Id. 382 Subcommittee interviews of FEMA officials (6/14/2012 and 7/19/2012). 383 Invoice, Midway Chevrolet-Isuzu, April 14, 2008, PSI-AZDOHS-03-0587 and 2007 State of Arizona 

Department of Homeland Security, 2007 State Homeland Security Grant Program Project Detail Workbook, Project 

Justification. PSI-AZDOHS-03-0008. The State of Arizona provided the Subcommittee with the vehicle invoice in 

response to a request for detailed documentation on its use of homeland security grant funds.

384 2007 State of Arizona Department of Homeland Security, 2007 State Homeland Security Grant Program Project 

Detail Workbook, Project Justification. PSI-AZDOHS-03-0008.
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For a law enforcement terrorism prevention grant FEMA awarded AZDPS in October 

2007, the state indicated the funds would be used to purchase equipment, including a vehicle, for 

TLOs outside of the Phoenix area to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

explosive (CBRNE) incidents.385 In accordance with the grant, a few months later, AZDPS 

provided the vehicle to the Flagstaff Fire Department for use by a city fire official designated as 

a TLO, under an agreement to “enhance domestic preparedness [CBRNE] response services 

concerning the activities of terrorism[.]”386 DHS does not consider responding to CBRNE 

events, however, an essential fusion center capability.

387

Moreover, according to Arizona records for the truck, the vehicle does not appear to 

qualify as a satisfactory CBRNE response vehicle: it is not equipped to respond to a zone 

affected by most types of CBRNE incidents, despite the award of an additional $9,400 in fusion 

center grant funds the state spent to install aftermarket equipment on the truck.388 The state 

equipped the vehicle with lights, flashers, a siren and public address microphone, an anti-theft 

device, a notebook holder, computer mount, external cup holder, reinforced bumper, and a rear 

compartment partition, among other items.

389

The only specialized equipment related to CBRNE accompanying the vehicle was a 

radiation-detecting dosimeter. The device can identify exposure to radiation, but offers no 

protection against it. The city official to whom the vehicle was assigned told the Subcommittee 

he keeps the truck at his house and uses it primarily to commute between his home and the 

Flagstaff Fire Department.390

A year later, in October 2009, Arizona purchased and outfitted a second Chevrolet Tahoe

SUV with DHS funds that were likewise intended to support ACTIC, again claiming it to be a 

CBRNE response vehicle. The state used about $47,000 in Urban Area Security Initiative 

(UASI) funds, and gave the truck to the Arizona State University Police Department 

(ASUPD).391 The vehicle was assigned to a K-9 officer who was designated as a TLO. The 

vehicle was outfitted to serve as a police K-9 unit vehicle, with a kennel, heat alarm system, 

lights and sirens, radios, a patrol rifle, chemical protective gear, a gas mask, a GPS unit, a 

ballistic helmet and vest, and training equipment for the dog.392

 385 2007 State of Arizona Department of Homeland Security, 2007 State Homeland Security Grant Program Project 

Detail Workbook, Project Justification. PSI-AZDOHS-03-0008. 386 ACTIC, “Intergovernmental Agreement,” October 2, 2008, PSI-Flagstaff_Fire_Dept-01-0002. 387 For a list of fusion center capabilities used by DHS to assess fusion centers in 2011, please see Appendix B of 

this Subcommittee report. 388 1/30/2009 Invoice, Arizona Emergency Products, PSI-AZDOHS-03-0272.

389 Id. 

390 Subcommittee Interview of Dep. Chief Jerry Bills, Flagstaff Fire Department (2/3/2012). Mr. Bills told the 

Subcommittee he used the vehicle for his daily commute since receiving it at some point prior to October 2008; he 

lived 12 miles from his station; and the odometer presently read approximately 27,000 miles. He estimated 15,000 

of those miles were from commuting. He did not indicate the truck had ever been used to respond to a CBRNE 

attack, although he said may have used it to attend and host training sessions in HAZMAT response, terror response 

and other topics.

391 “Property Disposal Request and Authorization,” March 10, 2010, State of Arizona Surplus Property; also,

Midway Chevrolet Invoice, October 27, 2009 PSI-AZDOHS-03-0954. 

392 Subcommittee interview of Cpl. Parker Dunwoody, Arizona State University Police Department (2/2/2012). 
75

The dog is trained and equipped only to detect conventional explosives, according to his 

handler. The officer told the Subcommittee that he was trained and equipped to respond to 

several kinds of CBRNE incidents.

393

(2) Using Fusion Center Funds on Rent 

 While enhancing CBRNE response is a legitimate use of 

FEMA grant funds, CBRNE response is not a baseline capability DHS expects of state and local 

fusion centers.

From 2009 to 2011, Arizona used $1.98 million in FEMA grant funds to lease space for

the ACTIC fusion center.

394 That amount covered the entire cost of ACTIC’s lease from August 

2009 to August 2011, which ran roughly $80,000 a month.395

Before using FEMA funds to make payments on ACTIC’s lease, an Arizona official 

queried FEMA about the allowability of the expenditure. The official’s response indicates 

FEMA’s guidelines are not rigidly enforced.

 In interviews, FEMA stated that 

although its guidelines appear not to allow this use of DHS funds, it allowed the expenditures

anyway. Such spending did little, if anything, to help the Arizona center address significant 

weaknesses in its ability to receive, analyze and share terrorism threat-related information with 

the Federal Government. 

The Arizona official sent a February 2009 email to FEMA asking: “Can we reimburse 

rent for a fusion center?” A DHS official responded: “[A]llowable (M&A [Management and 

Administration]) costs can pay for the leasing or renting of space for newly hired personnel. 

And since new people will be hired during the period of this grant  you should have no 

problem with it.” 396

The Arizona official replied, noting that the expenses in question were not “M&A”

expenses which are normally confined to costs for administering FEMA grants within the state.

FEMA restricts grant recipients from using any but a very small portion of their funding on 

management and administration expenses, which might include overhead costs such as lease 

payments, office equipment, and administrative salaries.

397 “This would be under Organizational 

not M&A,” the Arizona official wrote. “M&A is only allowable to 3% [of the grant] and these 

funds are used to support the direct administration of all grants (funds the AZDOHS office).” 398

 393 Email from Cpl. Parker Dunwoody to the Subcommittee (10/1/2012).

394 Award letters from Arizona Dept. of Homeland Security (AZDHS) to Arizona Dept. of Public Safety (AZDPS), 

September 19, 2009, September 18, 2009 and August 6, 2010, PSI-ACTIC-02-0952, PSI-ACTIC-02-0967, PSIACTIC-02-0982.

395 AZDPS lease agreement for ACTIC, July 7, 2009, PSI-AZDOHS-05-0005.

396 Emails between David W. Nichols, DHS, and Lisa Hansen, AZDHS, February 5-6, 2009, PSI-AZDOHS-03-

1312. [Emphasis and emoticon in original.] 

397 For example, “Fiscal Year 2008 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit,” FEMA

(2/2008), at 23, B-3; “Fiscal Year 2009 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit,” FEMA

(11/2008), at 34, 65; “Fiscal Year 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit,” FEMA

(12/2009), at 35, 72. 398 Emails between David W. Nichols, DHS, and Lisa Hansen, AZDHS (2/5/2009 – 2/6/2009), PSI-AZDOHS-03-

1312.
76

“Organizational, yes,” the DHS official responded.399

Still apparently unsure, the Arizona official wrote again. “Thank you for your response, 

if I understand you correctly. AZDOHS [may] fund the fusion center rent with HSGP FY09 

funds in the category of Organizational and not impact M&A funds?” 400

“yes,” the DHS official responded.401

FEMA grant guidance for the period indicates that rent or lease payments are allowed as 

organizational expenses, if it is “for leasing or renting of space for newly hired personnel during 

the period of performance of the grant program.”402

Appearing to contradict their own guidelines, FEMA officials interviewed by the 

Subcommittee stated that they have approved using grant funds to cover fusion center lease 

payments several times. “There was a policy decision within our office, I know anecdotally 

we’ve allowed it many times in the past,” FEMA’s Matthew Bower told the Subcommittee.

As such, rent or lease payments for space 

not intended for new personnel would not be allowed. However, that is how Arizona applied the 

funds: to pay for not only some percentage of ACTIC’s lease to house new employees, but to 

cover ACTIC’s entire lease, a cost of nearly $1 million a year.

403 

FEMA provided the Subcommittee with a list of states it had allowed to use grant funds this way, 

but was unable to provide any documentation memorializing the policy decision to allow grant 

funds to reimburse lease costs, or informing other grant recipients of the change.404

When asked how and why FEMA allows Federal grant funds to cover such a basic cost as 

rent for a fusion center, Elizabeth Harman, FEMA’s grants chief, said she was “not well-versed 

on the rent issue.” Ms. Harman noted that FEMA has “given [recipients] a lot of flexibility in 

how these grant dollars are spent.”405 Allowing fusion centers to use DHS funds to cover rental 

expenses, which are often substantial, necessarily reduces the funds available to develop baseline 

counterterrorism capabilities. 

 399 Id. 400 Id. 401 Id. 402 “Fiscal Year 2009 Homeland Security Grant Program Guidance and Application Kit,” FEMA (11/2008), at 63. 403 Subcommittee interview of FEMA officials (7/19/2012). 404 DHS Response to the Subcommittee (8/1/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059232. The states who have been allowed 

to use grant funds to cover lease costs for fusion centers include California, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, 

Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi and Wisconsin; FEMA states it has also allowed fusion center rent costs for 

Puerto Rico and the city of Jacksonville.

405 Subcommittee interview of Elizabeth Harman (8/2/2012). 
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(3) Using Fusion Center Funds on Wiretap Room 

In 2009, AZDOHS awarded the state’s Department of Public Safety $105,112 under a 

DHS grant program for urban areas406 to support IT infrastructure at ACTIC.407 Officials from 

the fusion center told the Subcommittee and related documents indicate that roughly $64,000 of 

that total was used to purchase equipment for a surveillance monitoring room at the ACTIC 

fusion center.408

The money purchased software, a new laptop, two monitors and two 42” flat screen 

televisions.

409 Some of the funds were also used to send an employee to receive training related 

to surveillance technology, according to an Arizona official.410 The monitoring room, which 

ACTIC officials referred to as “the wire room,” is used for criminal investigations.411

As a state-run fusion center, it is the state of Arizona’s prerogative to house criminal 

investigative resources within the fusion center. However, Federal guidelines for fusion center 

key capabilities do not include covert or surreptitious intelligence gathering.412

In all three of these cases, the state of Arizona acted in accordance with FEMA rules and 

guidelines. The use of DHS grant funds to purchase CBRNE response vehicles, surveillance 

equipment, and to cover rent costs are allowable under the grant program. 

Indeed, fusion 

center capabilities used in DHS assessments relate to the ability to receive, analyze, and share 

information, not gather it. Nevertheless, FEMA approved the expenditures for ACTIC.

But DHS does not consider CBRNE response to be a baseline capability for fusion 

centers. Likewise, DHS does not consider surveillance to be a fusion center capability. Rental 

costs also do not address the counterterrorism baseline capabilities every fusion center is 

supposed to possess. The questioned purchases do not directly boost the center’s needed 

capabilities; and no DHS rule or guideline currently encourages Arizona to focus its spending on 

those counterterrorism information-sharing priorities. 

At the time these expenditures were made, ACTIC had a catalog of weaknesses inhibiting 

its participation in sharing terrorism threat information with the Federal Government. A 2010 

assessment of the center on behalf of DHS concluded the center had no system for gathering, 

processing, collating and storing information; it had no analytic production plan; it had no 

training plan for analysts “that adheres to nationally-recommended standards;” it had no staffing 

plan or continuity of operations plan; and at the time, it had no privacy policy nor a way to be 

sure all personnel received privacy training.413

 406 The program is known as the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).

 In the most recent Federal assessment of ACTIC

407 2009 Homeland Security Grant Program Award, Grant Agreement Number 555601-05. PSI-ACTIC-02-0907. 408 Wire room list of expenditures, PSI-AZDOHS-08-0047.

409 Id. 410 Email from Maj. Mike Orose, ACTIC, to Subcommittee (2/9/2012), PSI-AZDOHS-08-0001. 411 Id. 412 For the list of Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers (2008) and the Critical Operational Capabilities (2008) 

see Appendix A of this Subcommittee report. 413 “Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE (10/2010), DHSHSGAC-FC-007497.
78

in 2011, DHS found the center still lacked 14 out of 50 attributes needed to achieve minimal

functionality as a fusion center contributing to Federal counterterrorism efforts.

414

(4) Using Fusion Centers Funds on Computers for County

Medical Examiner 

Another example of questionable fusion center spending involved the procurement of 

specialized computers. In Cleveland, Ohio, officials used $15,848 in 2007 FEMA grant funds 

for the Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (NEORFC) to buy ruggedized Toughbook laptop 

computers.415 In response to a Subcommittee inquiry, County officials reported the laptops were 

not located at the fusion center, but at the county medical examiner’s office.416

When asked why laptops intended for the fusion center were located at the medical 

examiner’s office, a Cuyahoga County official responded the that laptops were for processing 

human remains in the aftermath of a mass casualty event in the Cleveland area. The official 

stated his region had not experienced such an event.417

When asked how the purchase of the computers would benefit the fusion center and could 

be portrayed as a fusion center expenditure, the official said he assumed that in the aftermath of a 

mass casualty event, information about the human remains would have “intelligence value.” He 

said he did not know whether the laptops were able to connect and securely transmit information 

to the fusion center.

In 2010, a capabilities assessment of NEORFC conducted on behalf of DHS concluded 

the center was all but completely incapable of functioning as a fusion center. “The center is 

lacking in its ability to process, collate, or disseminate information . . . . Based on [its] selfassessment, the Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center (NEORFC) appears to be struggling. 

[T]he center exhibits limited capability to support the intelligence cycle . . . . Limited personnel, 

few documented processes or plans . . . hinder the ability to achieve baseline capabilities . . . . 

[T]here is limited capability to process or disseminate information collected.” 418

When asked about the computer purchase, FEMA’s Matthew Bower said, “[T]his would 

jump out to me as well. I can’t give you a full answer.” Mr. Bower noted that FEMA does not 

review purchases at the subgrantee level, rather relying on the state administrative agencies’ to 

do so, so the agency was likely unaware of the purchase.419

 414 DHS, “2011 Fusion Center Assessment Individual Report, Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center,” 

Revised March 2012, DHS-HSGAC-FC-047650. 415 “HSGP Equipment Inventory,” NEORFC (7/12/2011). 416 Id. 417 Subcommittee interview of Hugh Shannon, Administrator, Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office 

(12/15/2011). 

418 Northeast Ohio Regional Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment (October 2010), DHS-HSGAC-FC010416, at 8, 10.

419 Subcommittee interview of FEMA (7/19/2012). 
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(5) Using Fusion Center Funds for Surveillance Equipment, 

Computers, Televisions

In 2011, the San Diego area’s fusion center, known as the Law Enforcement 

Coordination Center (SD-LECC), spent $25,000 on high-tech surveillance equipment, most of 

which was so sophisticated it eventually returned it for simpler devices.420 This purchase was 

made, despite the fact that Federal guidelines for fusion center key capabilities do not include 

covert or surreptitious intelligence gathering.

421

SD-LECC used FEMA grant funds to make the following purchases:

• a covert, wireless audio/video recorder with a “shirt-button camera”;

• an ultra-low-light “pinhole” VGA camera; and 

• an ultra-low-light shirt-button camera “with interchangeable tops.”422

In a document provided to the Subcommittee, SD-LECC officials stated that the center returned 

some of the equipment after it was deemed “simply too complicated for our customers to use.”423

In their place, the fusion center received other undercover surveillance devices, including a 

camera hidden in a hat and one disguised as a water bottle.424

When asked if the surveillance equipment purchases, such as a shirt-button camera,

raised concerns for him, Mr. Bower, head of FEMA’s Risk Analytics and Strategic Initiatives 

Branch, told the Subcommittee he would “need to know the exact use of that equipment.”

It is unclear how the San Diego 

fusion center’s use of Federal grant funds to buy surveillance equipment assisted the primary 

mission of DHS’s fusion center effort. Nevertheless, the purchases were allowable under FEMA 

guidelines.

425 Mr. 

Bower noted that FEMA officials “don’t review every piece of equipment that’s purchased,” but 

that was actually a strength of the agency’s approach. “It’s on purpose,” Mr. Bower explained. 

“Asking for every single widget . . . isn’t furthering the success of these grantees.” 426

The San Diego fusion center also spent nearly $200,000 on 116 computers, monitors, and 

related equipment.427

 420 Correspondence from Lee Yoder, SD-LECC Director, to Subcommittee (12/14/2011), at 4, PSI-SDLECC-03-

0001; Invoice from ADS to Sherriff’s Department of San Diego (4/15/2011), PSI-SDLECC-03-0009.

Asked how 80 full-time employees used over 100 computers, SD-LECC 

officials told Subcommittee investigators that not all of the computers were for fusion center 

421 For a list of baseline capabilities for fusion centers, see Appendix A of this Subcommittee report. 422 Correspondence from Lee Yoder, SD-LECC Director, to Subcommittee (12/14/2011), at 4, PSI-SDLECC-03-

0001; Invoice from ADS to Sherriff’s Department of San Diego (4/15/2011), PSI-SDLECC-03-0009. 423 Memorandum from SD-LECC Director Lee Yoder to Subcommittee (12/14/2011). 424 Memorandum from ADS to HIDTA, Leo Marchand (10/21/2011), PSI-SDLECC-03-0010; Correspondence from 

Lee Yoder, SD-LECC Director, to Subcommittee (12/14/2011), PSI-SDLECC-03-0001. 425 Subcommittee interview of FEMA (7/19/2012). 426 Id. 427 Dell invoice XCN5467W2M, May 21, 2008, PSI-CalEMA-02-0485; Dell invoice XCNF2T747, May 30, 2008, 

PSI-CalEMA-02-0411; Dell invoice XCW1P97K1, September 9, 2008, PSI-CalEMA-02-0513; Dell invoice 

XCW418R32, September 11, 2008, PSI-CalEMA-02-0510; Dell invoice XDRFM3XK7, April 23, 2010, PSICalEMA-02-2234; Dell invoice XDRFN8T48, April 23, 2010, PSI-CalEMA-02-2231.
80

personnel; some were used by other law enforcement personnel to access the same network. The 

officials explained that some of the computers were not even located in the fusion center.428 To 

justify the purchases, officials told Subcommittee staff that the computers could be used to share 

“case data” and “statistical data” with the fusion center.429

The San Diego center also spent nearly $75,000 on 55 flat-screen televisions. However, 

the intelligence training program they were meant to facilitate was never purchased.

430 When 

asked what the televisions were being used for, officials said they displayed calendars, and were 

used for “open-source monitoring.” Asked to define “open-source monitoring,” SD-LECC 

officials said they meant “watching the news.”431

Officials responsible for the fusion center told the Subcommittee they now view the 

televisions as “a huge mistake,” and stated the former fusion center director who authorized the 

purchase was “relieved of his duties.”432

An October 2010 “baseline capabilities assessment” on behalf of DHS found a number of 

weaknesses at SD-LECC, ranking them below the national average in 9 of 12 capabilities.433

Among other weaknesses, assessors noted the absence of memoranda of understanding and/or 

non-disclosure agreements with agencies who participate in the center; the absence of “a 

procedure manual that outlines privacy, physical security, and information security policies;” the 

absence of a list of “data sources and repositories necessary to conduct analysis;” and the 

absence of “a mechanism to receive stakeholder feedback.”434

(6) Using Fusion Center Funds for Shifting Information 

Technology Needs 

In some cases, state or regional grant recipients may substantially revise their stated 

intentions to spend funds requested on behalf of fusion centers. Consider, for example, the 

shifting descriptions and justifications associated with one project managed by the Washington, 

D.C. Homeland Security and Emergency Management Agency (HSEMA), which oversees the 

city’s fusion center.

Early in 2008, the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department submitted an initial proposal to 

HSEMA requesting $725,000 for a project entitled, “Information Technology (Data Mining, 

Analytical Software).” The proposal provided no indication that the project was associated with 

a fusion center, nor did it identify any specific items that were to be purchased.435

 428 Subcommittee interview of SD-LECC officials (11/30/2011).

 

429 Id. 430 Id. 431 Id. 432 Id. 433 10/2010 “San Diego Law Enforcement Coordination Center – Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, DHSHSGAC-FC-007893. 434 Id. at 9-12. 435 1FASH8 Project Concept MPD-Data Mining, Analytical Software, 1, 4 and 5.
81

Subsequently, HSEMA included this project in a broader application to FEMA for grant 

funding in 2008. In its application materials, HSEMA told FEMA it wanted to use $2.7 million 

Homeland Security grant funds on an effort that would enhance the capabilities of the police 

department as well as “the information and intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities of the 

D.C. Intelligence Fusion Center.”436 Specifically, the effort was to include an upgraded 

electronic records management system, data mining software, and an Automated License Plate 

Recognition system (LPR system). The city’s description of how the data mining software was 

to be used noted that “installing improved analytical and data mining tools and training analysts 

to use them effectively will improve the quality of final intelligence products” and “will bolster 

the DC Intelligence Fusion Center analysts’ ability to identify trends, track patterns, and generate 

quality analytical products.”437

After receiving its allocation of grant funding from FEMA, D.C. HSEMA awarded a 

subgrant to the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in October 2008, worth $700,000 

for the project, referred to in the grant document as “Analytical & Data Mining Software –

Fusion Center.”

 

438 In addition, the project as described in the award agreement documentation 

had changed. It included a records management system upgrade at a cost of $100,000, and 

“analytical software” at a cost of $90,000. The LPR system was dropped, though it may have 

been included in another DHS subgrant. The project also added for the first time sophisticated 

cell phone tracking devices, and “handheld citation issuance units and accessories.” Those new 

items seem to be outside the scope of DHS-recognized key capabilities for a fusion center, yet 

their cost, $510,000, became the largest portion of the project.439

The grant award changes did not end there. In July 2010, the police department again 

altered the description, nearly two years after the subgrant was awarded. It updated the project 

plan to indicate that the records management system would now cost $376,070; the cell phone 

tracking tools and service would cost $266,000; and the remaining funds would now be used to 

purchase Closed Circuit television (CCTV) download kits for $12,250, and Liquid Crystal 

Display (LCD) “Status Boards” for $45,680.

 Also of significance is that 

none of the $700,000 in funds was designated for the D.C. fusion center; instead, the sole named

recipient was now the D.C. police department. 

440

By the time the grant funds were actually spent in 2010, purchase orders and invoices 

reviewed by the Subcommittee indicate further changes to the cost of some items, and to what 

was purchased. It bought the records management system for $409,818, and the cell phone 

tracking and surveillance system for $260,935. Rather than purchase the CCTV download kits 

or LCD status boards, the police department spent $11,958 to purchase two Panasonic laptops; 

$5,552 to purchase six Dell computer towers; and $11,735 to pay fees to cellular providers.

 

441

 436 FY 2008 DC HSGP Investment 1 Law Enforcement and Information Sharing, 1 and 4. At the time of its 

application, HSEMA did not know the total amount of funding FEMA would award. 

 

Again, none of the equipment was destined for the D.C. fusion center. 

437 Id. at 2, 3. 438 1FASH8 (8SHSP127-01) Award Letter Signed, 1.

439 Id. at 8. 440 1FASH8 Project Plan revised 07152010, 1 and 6. 441 1FASH8 Expenditures; PSI-DCHSEMA-02-0001. 
82

HSEMA officials told the Subcommittee on multiple occasions that the funding 

associated with this subgrant was not used to support the D.C. fusion center, despite the original 

written justification HSEMA provided to FEMA to support the grant.442 When asked about this 

series of events, Mr. Bower of FEMA noted that, as long as the equipment ultimately purchased 

using DHS grant funds is considered allowable under the grant guidelines, then states are 

allowed to purchase equipment that may differ from what is indicated in their initial Investment 

Justifications and may allocate it to an entity other than the one originally identified. 

Furthermore, states can exercise discretion in determining whether a proposed change merits 

requesting new approval from FEMA.443

When DHS and FEMA grant procedures allow grant recipients to change the identified 

subgrantee, the items to be purchased, the amounts to be spent, and the ultimate use of the 

purchased equipment, it is clearer why DHS and FEMA are unable to accurately track the 

taxpayer dollars actually awarded to or used by fusion centers. The loose rules render effective 

financial oversight of fusion center difficult, if not impossible. 

 442 Emails from HSEMA officials to the Subcommittee (6/4/2012). 443 Subcommittee interview of FEMA (7/19/2012). 
83

VI. FUSION CENTERS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MEANINGFULLY 

CONTRIBUTE TO FEDERAL COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

• Two Federal assessments found fusion centers lack basic counterterrorism capabilities.

• Despite promises, DHS has not assessed fusion center performance.

• Some DHS-recognized fusion centers do not exist.

• Many fusion centers do not prioritize counterterrorism efforts.

• DHS “Success Stories” do not demonstrate centers’ value to counterterrorism efforts.

• Fusion centers may have hindered, not aided, some Federal counterterrorism efforts.

A. Overview

The Department of Homeland Security has directed hundreds of millions of dollars to 

support and strengthen the capabilities of state and local fusion centers. DHS officials have 

spoken publicly about the centers’ key role in assisting Federal officials’ fight against terrorism. 

Yet the centers themselves have fallen short of developing the capabilities necessary to 

meaningfully contribute to the Federal counterterrorism mission.

“We have established programs that facilitate a strong, two-way flow of threat-related 

information, where SLTT [State, Local, Tribal and Territorial] officials communicate possible 

threat information to Federal officials, and vice-versa,” DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano said in 

testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in 

September 2010.444 “[P]re-operational activity – such as target selection, reconnaissance, and 

dry runs – occur over a very short time period, or in open and crowded places. Informing federal 

authorities . . . increase[es] the likelihood that an attack can be thwarted . . . . The nation’s fusion 

centers have been a hub of these efforts, combined with other initiatives DHS has instituted to 

better partner with SLTT law enforcement.” 445

DHS has struggled to identify a clear example in which a fusion center provided 

intelligence which helped disrupt a terrorist plot, even as local and Federal law enforcement have 

thwarted dozens of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and against U.S. interests in the past decade.446

In four success stories that DHS identified, the Subcommittee investigation was unable to 

confirm that the fusion centers’ contributions were as significant as DHS portrayed them; were 

unique to the intelligence and analytical work expected of fusion centers; or would not have 

occurred absent a fusion center.

In some cases, fusion centers’ analytical efforts have instead caused frustration and 

embarrassment for themselves and DHS.

 444 Testimony of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee, “Nine Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland” (9/22/2010). 445 Id. 446 “The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that there have been 53 homegrown violent jihadist plots 

or attacks in the United States since September 11, 2001 (9/11).“ 11/15/2011 “American Jihadist Terrorism: 

Combating a Complex Threat,” Jerome P. Bjelopera, Congressional Research Service. 
84

In addition, two recent national assessments conducted by and for DHS found fusion 

centers often lacked one or more basic capabilities necessary to do the work expected of them, to 

share information which could help detect and disrupt terrorist plots against the United States.

These assessments, conducted in 2010 and 2011, found weaknesses at most fusion centers they

examined, from having insufficiently trained intelligence personnel, to having inadequate 

physical security, to an inability to distribute alert and warning information to state and local 

agencies, and an inability to effectively share appropriate information with the Federal 

Government or local partners.

447

Each fusion center is different, and neither assessment indicated a sole reason the centers 

had not yet developed the necessary capabilities to contribute to the Federal counterterrorism 

mission. However, neither assessment found a center which had developed all of the basic 

necessary capabilities to participate in Federal counterterrorism intelligence efforts.

448

As noted earlier, some fusion centers have gone years without a physical presence and 

without filing any intelligence reports. Others have operated for years without having DHS 

personnel on site to report counterterrorism information, effectively cutting the centers off from 

the larger DHS terrorism-related intelligence efforts.

449 Still other fusion centers have had DHS

personnel on site, but have produced information of little value for Federal counterterrorism 

intelligence efforts.

450

Despite these challenges, senior DHS officials have continued to claim that state and 

local fusion centers have made significant contributions to its counterterrorism efforts, and cited 

specific “success stories” which they claim demonstrate the centers’ value. The Subcommittee 

examined four such cases in which DHS claimed fusion centers made important or “key” 

contributions to investigations of significant terrorist plots on U.S. soil. The Subcommittee

 As well, many of the fusion centers have not made counterterrorism an 

explicit priority, and some have de-emphasized counterterrorism in favor of more traditional 

public safety and anti-crime work. 

 447 See “2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, DHS-HSGAC-FC-007231; “2011 National Network of 

Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027. 448 Id. 

449 The need for DHS to gather locally-generated terrorism-related information from fusion centers is an open 

question. The FBI is the nation’s lead federal agency to investigate terrorism cases in the United States, and DHS 

expects fusion centers to share actual threat-related information immediately with the FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces (JTTFs). (“Domestic Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Era,” FBI.gov, 

http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2009/september/domterror_090709/, “Fusion Centers and Joint Terrorism Task 

Forces,” DHS.gov, http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1298911926746.shtm). The Department of Justice also 

leads the National SAR (Suspicious Activity Reporting) Initiative (NSI), which allows personnel at participating 

fusion centers to relay information about suspicious, potentially terror-linked activity that lacks a clear nexus to 

terrorism. (“Nationwide SAR Initiative,” NCIRC.gov, http://nsi.ncirc.gov/default.aspx). Thus, it is not clear what 

role exists for DHS to receive terrorism-related information from fusion centers, that is not already being received or 

coordinated by officials from the Department of Justice. When the Subcommittee asked Undersecretary Wagner 

what counterterrorism information DHS intelligence reporting at fusion centers shared which was not already being 

shared via NSI or the JTTFs, Ms. Wagner first suggested reporting on fraudulent documents which had a nexus to a 

suspected terrorist. Upon consideration, Ms. Wagner said a fusion center would probably share that information with 

the area JTTF. “There are numerous reasons why IIRs are important,” Ms. Wagner then said. “I wish I could come 

up with a better example.” Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012).

450 Memorandum from Jim Chaparro to Bart Johnson, “Homeland Intelligence Reports” (1/7/2010), at 2, DHSHSGAC-FC-050743; Email from Chaparro to Johnson, “HIR Backlog” (1/4/2010), DHS-HSGAC-FC-056637.
85

investigation found that the claims made by DHS did not always fit the facts, and in no case did a 

fusion center make a clear and unique intelligence contribution that helped apprehend a terrorist 

or disrupt a plot. Worse, three other incidents examined by the Subcommittee investigation

raised significant concerns about the utility of the fusion centers, and raised the possibility that 

some centers have actually hindered or sidetracked Federal counterterrorism efforts.

Federal officials have been well aware of these episodes, and the underlying weaknesses 

in fusion centers’ capabilities that likely contributed to them. But they have chosen not to 

highlight the considerable shortcomings of fusion centers in public appearances or in briefings to 

Congress. Instead they have chosen to portray fusion centers as “linchpins” of the Federal

Government’s fight to prevent terrorism, making “vital” contributions to the Federal 

Government’s efforts to keep the country safe from another terrorist attack. This portrayal is 

simply at odds with the actual counterterrorism records of the fusion centers.

B. Two Federal Assessments Found Fusion Centers Lack Basic 

Counterterrorism Capabilities

Two comprehensive assessments of fusion centers by or at the request of DHS, 

completed in 2010 and 2011, found widespread deficiencies in fusion centers’ basic capabilities

to properly collect, analyze, and share intelligence on homeland security threats.

451

(1) 2010 Assessment

In 2010, seven years after DHS had begun funding state and local fusion centers, the 

Department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) asked the Program Manager for the 

Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), a part of the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence (ODNI), to lead an interagency team in conducting a nationwide assessment of state 

and local fusion centers.

452

The assessment was carried out in two parts. First, PM-ISE asked fusion centers to 

complete a rigorous, 380-question self-assessment questionnaire. The questions were based on a 

set of eight “baseline capabilities” which had been identified by DHS, the Department of Justice, 

and a panel of fusion center experts. These eight baseline capabilities represented the “necessary 

capabilities required to support Federal counterterrorism mission requirements.”453

Second, teams of Federal intelligence experts fanned out across the nation to visit fusion 

centers and validate whether each possessed the capabilities their officials claimed in their selfassessment responses. PM-ISE reported that although DHS publicly claimed to recognize 72 

operational fusion centers at the time of the assessment, three were “not functional at a level to 

 451 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010) DHS-HSGAC-FC-007231; “2011 

National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027. 452 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010) at 5, DHS-HSGAC-FC-007241. 453 Id. at 4, DHS-HSGAC-FC-007231. In 2008, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security devised a list of 

12 “baseline capabilities” for fusion centers; in 2010, fusion center directors “distilled” that list to eight “National 

Network priorities.” (“Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” September 2008, 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/baselinecapabilitiesa.pdf; “National Network of Fusion Centers Fact Sheet,” 

DHS.gov, http://www.dhs.gov/national-network-fusion-centers-fact-sheet). 
86

receive a visit,” and one “was not operational” at all.454

The “baseline capabilities” the assessors examined were precisely that: basic, minimum 

standards of functionality necessary to effective intelligence sharing. As the officials who 

identified the capabilities in 2008 wrote, “By achieving this baseline level of capability, a fusion 

center will have the necessary structures, processes, and tools in place to support the gathering, 

processing, analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, and law enforcement 

information.”

On-site visits were, thus, made to 68 

fusion centers. 

455

The final 2010 assessment report was about 140 pages long. Supporting documents 

included an individual assessment of each of the 68 fusion centers then in operation. The final 

report found that a third of fusion centers had no defined procedures for sharing information 

gathered outside of their walls, one of the prime reasons for their existence. It found that more 

than half of all fusion centers lacked procedures for receiving and sharing with partner agencies 

information on threats received from DHS and other Federal agencies. And “most” fusion 

centers told the assessors that their intelligence and analytical responsibilities were designed to 

assist with response and recovery efforts after a major event or attack, 456

The 2010 assessment concluded that most fusion centers not only lacked the minimum 

capabilities to function effectively, they also lacked plans showing how they would develop

those capabilities. It also concluded that two-thirds of fusion centers had no way to assess the 

return on investment taxpayers received for funding their operations.

not to prevent one, 

inverting the notion of what many perceive to be the primary purpose of the fusion centers.

457

Finally, the 2010 assessment criticized the Federal government for failing to have

adequately “defined and articulated” the capabilities it expected of the fusion centers in order to 

support Federal missions, and for lacking a budget that detailed how it planned to fund fusion 

center efforts to “develop, deploy, and sustain these capabilities.”458

DHS did not make any of these findings public or share them with Congress. Moreover, 

when the Subcommittee requested access to the findings of the 2010 assessment, DHS initially

denied such a report existed. Then, after the assessment report was identified internally, DHS 

resisted turning it over to the Subcommittee. Some DHS officials contended that, although the 

Subcommittee had requested all fusion center analyses “produced within DHS,” technically the 

 454 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010) at 5, 8, DHS-HSGAC-FC-007231. 455 September 2008, “Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers,” http://

www.it.ojp.gov/documents/baselinecapabilitiesa.pdf. 456 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010) at 17, 18, 24, DHS-HSGAC-FC007231.

457 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010) at 18, 24, 37, DHS-HSGAC-FC007231 at 37.

458 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, (10/2010) at 3, DHS-HSGAC-FC-007231.
87

assessment had been conducted at the request of DHS by another Federal office, and therefore

had not been literally “produced within DHS.” 459

In June 2011, during the course of an interview, a senior DHS intelligence official 

presented a copy of the national 2010 assessment to the Subcommittee, unaware that the 

Department had maintained to the Subcommittee no such document could be located.

460 DHS 

officials at the interview declined to leave that copy of the report with the Subcommittee, saying 

they needed time to resolve their concerns about agreements of confidentiality allegedly made 

with fusion centers. Those agreements, the officials stated, prohibited the Department from 

sharing the report with Congress.

461

When the Subcommittee requested copies of those agreements, DHS responded that they 

were oral “assurances.”462

PM-ISE officials interviewed by the Subcommittee said they did not recall any such 

agreements. Upon review of its records, PM-ISE determined that it may have made certain 

assurances in 2009 during a pilot study that preceded the baseline assessment. “[I]t appears that, 

in conducting the pilot study in 2009, PM-ISE made this point and stated that information would 

be treated as sensitive and not further disseminated without further consultation,” PM-ISE stated. 

“It is not clear if similar assurances were given in 2010, but this appears likely as the same 

considerations . . . were present, and as a result, confidentiality was important to achieving the 

goals of the assessment.” 

When the Subcommittee asked who made the agreements, DHS said 

they were made by PM-ISE officials.

463

DHS eventually produced the “report cards” on individual fusion centers and the final 

2010 assessment report to the Subcommittee after obtaining “consent” from a private, nongovernmental organization, the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA), which supposedly 

had the authority to represent the 68 fusion centers subject to review. In a letter to the 

Subcommittee, NFCA explained it had “authorized” DHS to share the assessment information 

with Congress.

464

NFCA, a private organization led by a former senior DHS grants official, advocates for 

increased Federal funding for state and local fusion centers.

465 It is funded by corporations who 

seek to do business with fusion centers.

466

 459 8/24/2011 “Explanation of Why DHS Did Not Produce the Baseline Capabilities Assessment to Subcommittee 

Prior to June 24, 2011,” prepared by DHS, PSI-DHS-61-0002.

It is not a membership organization, but the group 

460 Subcommittee interview of Bart Johnson (6/24/2011). 461 Id. 462 Written response from DHS, DHS-HSGAC-FC-059296 (8/1/2012). 463 Subcommittee interview of PM-ISE officials (9/14/2012); PM-ISE response to Subcommittee inquiry 

(9/27/2012).

464 NFCA letter to the Subcommittee (7/1/2011), PSI-NFCA-01-0001. 465 “About NFCA,” http://www.nfcausa.org/; Statement of W. Ross Ashley III, Executive Director, NFCA, before 

the Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 

http://appropriations.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-112-ap15-rashley-20120307.pdf; Subcommittee interview of Ben 

Bawden, W. Ross Ashley III (8/21/2012). 

466 Subcommittee interview of Ben Bawden and W. Ross Ashley III (8/21/2012). According to Mr. Ashley, the 

group receives funds from Microsoft, ESRI, Thomson-Reuters and Mutualink, among other firms. “When you look 
88

purports to represent all DHS-recognized fusion centers, and invites them to help elect its board 

of directors.467

In an interview with the Subcommittee, the group’s director, W. Ross Ashley III, said he 

no longer stood by the language in his letter. “Maybe the term ‘authorized release’ wasn’t 

appropriate,” he said, calling his phrasing “a little boisterous on our part.”468

(2) 2011 Assessment

In 2011, DHS did not request PM-ISE to repeat its fusion center baseline capability 

assessment. Instead, DHS itself assumed responsibility for conducting a nationwide fusion 

center assessment. Deeming the 2010 assessment “too exhaustive” and “almost irrelevant,” DHS 

narrowed the assessment criteria to checking for 55 “attributes” which it believed composed the 

eight previously-defined capabilities, down from the 380 items examined in the 2010 

assessment.

469

Like the 2010 assessment, DHS asked fusion center directors to complete an online selfassessment, as well as provide data on staff, budget and operational costs.470

After that information was submitted, “validation teams” of personnel from DHS and 

other Federal agencies reviewed the self-assessment data to “identify submission errors and 

inconsistencies and to minimize data discrepancies.”471 DHS noted later that the centers 

“provided inconsistent levels of detail in their responses on the 2011 assessment and in some 

cases provided incomplete responses.”472

Unlike the 2010 assessment, the DHS teams did not visit the centers themselves to 

validate the answers were accurate, but instead conducted “structured telephone interviews” with 

fusion center officials.473 During these calls DHS says the teams discussed the “identified 

issues” and gathered additional information.474 After the data was “validated,” DHS prepared 

individual reports for each fusion center, scoring each center on the basis of how many attributes 

it possessed.475

 

at why a company’s giving money, it’s for access,” Mr. Ashley said. Mr. Bawden, the group’s lobbyist, later 

clarified that Mr. Ashley meant access to the group’s membership. “It’s for access to the association’s membership, 

just like any other professional association,” Mr. Bawden said. Email from Ben Bawden to the Subcommittee 

(10/1/2012). 467 Subcommittee interview of Ben Bawden and W. Ross Ashley III (8/21/2012). 468 Id. 

469 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (4/16/2012). 470 “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027, at 5-6. While 

72 fusion centers participated in the self-assessment, only 60 returned budget and operational cost information, and 

57 returned data on staff and their products, the report noted. 

471 Id. 472 Response to Questions for the Record, “Hearing: The Homeland Security Department’s Budget Submission for 

Fiscal Year 2013, March 21, 2012,” at 13 (received 6/26/2012).

473 “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027, at 5-6. 474 Id. 475 Id.
89

After DHS officials completed the scoring process, they realized that five of the 

minimum attributes they had defined related to having personnel who had attended trainings that 

DHS did not yet offer, including one training which was to be on a network portal that DHS had 

not yet created.

476 In other words, DHS’s lack of training and technology offerings was itself 

responsible for fusion centers’ inability to achieve five of the attributes DHS considered essential 

to have minimal operational capability.477 To remedy the situation, DHS cut those five attributes 

from its list.478

Even with its more limited review, DHS still found weaknesses at state and local fusion 

centers. More than half lacked a strategic plan, and nearly as many lacked a communications 

plan. Nearly a third had no analytic production plan.479 “For the National Network to fulfill its 

potential as a fully integrated participant in the National Information Sharing Environment . . . 

individual fusion centers must further develop and institutionalize their capabilities and facilitate 

interconnectivity,” the report concluded.480

Due to the new design of the 2011 DHS assessment, its findings were largely noncomparable to the 2010 assessment conducted by PM-ISE. Therefore, it was generally not 

possible to measure progress made between the PM-ISE’s 2010 findings and DHS’s 2011 

findings.481 Nevertheless, DHS concluded its report by stating that “fusion centers made notable 

progress in developing their capabilities.” However, it added, “significant work still remains.”482

C. Despite Promises, DHS Has Not Assessed Fusion Center Performance

DHS has repeatedly committed itself to assessing not only fusion centers’ capabilities, 

but also their performance. While the 2010 and 2011 assessments purported to examine what 

fusion centers were capable of, DHS committed to but has never attempted assessing fusion 

centers’ actual contributions.

In a presentation to Congressional oversight staff in October 2011, DHS stated it had 

been working since September 2010 to develop “a fusion center performance management 

program, called the Fusion Center Performance Program (FCPP).”483

 476 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (4/16/2012).

That program, the 

presentation claimed, would use “a single, integrated, data-driven process” to measure the 

477 Id. 478 Id.

479 “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027, at vii. 480 Id. at ix. 481 Subcommittee of Joel Cohen (4/16/2012). The 2011 report included a section that purported to describe the 

“maturity” of fusion centers nationwide. A diagram of the “maturity model” showed four stages – “Fundamental,” 

“Emerging,” “Enhanced,” and “Mature.” When 75 percent of fusion centers achieved certain capabilities in each 

section, according to the model, DHS would judge fusion centers overall at that level. However, the model was not 

developed until the assessment process was underway, and DHS could provide no objective basis for the thresholds 

upon which the model relied. “We want to tell a story about the maturity of the network,” said Joel Cohen, who 

developed the maturity model. Explaining how he came up with the 75 percent figure, he said, “We thought twothirds was too low, and higher than three-quarters was too high. You can have an intellectual debate to your heart’s 

content.” Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (7/12/2012).

482 “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027, at ix. 483 “National Network of Fusion Centers,” presentation, slide 12, (10/7/2011) DHS-HSGAC-FC-058772
90

performance of fusion centers; the national network of fusion centers; and Federal support for 

fusion centers. In February 2012, DHS I&A personnel went further, telling House and Senate 

staff that they were “implementing a Fusion Center Performance Program.”484

When the Subcommittee sought detailed information about the FCPP, however, DHS 

admitted that no such program currently exists. In a July 2012 interview with Joel Cohen, the 

DHS official who oversaw the 2011 fusion center assessment process, he identified himself as 

the DHS official in charge of the FCPP.

In the interview, Mr. Cohen first described the FCPP as “a variety of projects and 

initiatives.” 485 Asked to elaborate, Mr. Cohen stated that the assessment process was “the 

centerpiece.” 486 There was also “an exercise component,” he said, that would demonstrate 

whether fusion centers had the capabilities they claimed; and “all the survey stuff.” 487 The 

Department was also developing performance measures, Mr. Cohen said.

488

The Subcommittee requested a document outlining the FCPP. Mr. Cohen stated such a 

document did not exist. “A document is being developed,” Mr. Cohen told the Subcommittee. 

“We’re building the plane as we’re flying it,” he said.489

When asked about the performance measures he was developing, Mr. Cohen said that 

performance measures are “tough.” 490 When asked to elaborate on the exercise component, Mr. 

Cohen said, “There is no fully-developed exercise component.” 491 Mr. Cohen also told the 

Subcommittee that for the two years his office has purported to be working on the program, he 

has not had sufficient staff to make progress.492

D. Some DHS-Recognized Fusion Centers Do Not Exist

One of the ongoing troubling features of DHS’s fusion center efforts involves

nonfunctional fusion centers whose very existence is a matter of dispute. In its October 2010

report, the PM-ISE identified four fusion centers out of the 72 DHS counted that were “not 

functional at a level to receive a visit,” and one which “was not operational” at all.493

 484 “State and Local Program Office (SLPO) FY 2012 Semi-Annual Briefing,” DHS-HSGAC-FC-058809, slide 13 

(2/8/2012). 

 Despite 

that finding, DHS officials continued to publicly allege it was engaged with 72 fusion centers 

around the country. 

485 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (7/12/2012). 486 Id. 487 Id. 488 Id.

489 Id.

490 Id.

491 Id.

492 Id.

493 10/2010 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, at 8, DHS-HSGAC-FC-007231. PMISE officials identified the locations of the non-operational centers as Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, South Dakota and 

Wyoming. Subcommittee interview with PM-ISE officials (9/14/2012).
91

“Today, we have a national network of 72 recognized fusion centers – one in every state

and 22 in major urban areas – and, with Department of Homeland Security support, they are

being woven into the national and homeland security fabric of the United States,” thenUndersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis Bart Johnson wrote on the DHS website, in an 

October 25, 2010, essay entitled, “How Fusion Centers Help Keep America Safe.”494

“Today, there are 72 state- and locally-run fusion centers in operation across the nation,” 

DHS Secretary Napolitano told the House Homeland Security Committee in her February 2011 

testimony.495

“Today, 72 recognized fusion centers serve as focal points for the receipt, analysis, 

gathering, and sharing of threat-related information among the Federal Government and state, 

local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners,” Secretary Napolitano stated in separate 

testimony in September 2011 before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee.496

Asked why Secretary Napolitano and other DHS officials claimed the existence of four 

fusion centers its own assessment could not demonstrate, Undersecretary Wagner said, “My 

understanding was that they operated as virtual fusion centers.” When it was noted that PM-ISE 

found that they literally were non-functional – PM-ISE said three were “not functional at a level 

to receive a visit” and one was “not operational,” Ms. Wagner said, “There was no intent to 

obfuscate. It just took some of them [fusion centers] longer than others to get there.”497

The Subcommittee examined two fusion centers which DHS has alleged to exist and has 

said it officially recognized, but whose existence was disputed by local officials or 

documentation.

(1) Wyoming

Since 2009, DHS has counted among its officially recognized fusion centers an entity in 

Wyoming it has referred to as the Wyoming Fusion Center.498

 494 10/25/10 Johnson, Bart, “How Fusion Centers Help Keep America Safe,” 

http://www.dhs.gov/blog/2010/10/25/how-fusion-centers-help-keep-america-safe

In September 2009, DHS reported 

495 Testimony of Secretary Janet Napolitano before the House Committee on Homeland Security, "Understanding 

the Homeland Threat Landscape – Considerations for the 112th Congress" (2/9/2011), 

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/02/09/secretary-napolitanos-testimony-understanding-homeland-threat-landscape.

496 Testimony of DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 

Government Affairs, “Ten Years After 9/11: Are We Safer?” (9/12/2011), 

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/09/12/testimony-secretary-janet-napolitano-united-states-senate-committeehomeland. DHS has since recognized five more fusion centers, bringing the total of DHS-recognized fusion centers 

to 77. DHS web site, “Preventing Terrorism Results,” http://www.dhs.gov/topic/preventing-terrorism-results, 

accessed 9/25/2012.

497 Subcommittee interview of Caryn Wagner (9/16/2012).

498 9/4/2009 “State and Local Fusion Center Program: Quarterly Update, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress, Third 

Quarter.”
92

to Congress that such a fusion center existed, and it intended to detail an intelligence official 

there.499

But just prior to that, in August 2009, FEMA officials issued an assessment of the state’s 

progress on meeting goals associated with establishing a fusion center at “zero,” or no progress, 

on any aspect of the effort.500

According to Wyoming state officials, their state has no fusion center and never intended 

to create one. “It confuses me,” said Kebin Haller, Deputy Director for the state’s Division of 

Criminal Investigation (DCI). They have a criminal intelligence center, he said, but “we’ve 

chosen not to refer to it as a fusion center.” Neither have state officials formally designated it as 

a fusion center for DHS to recognize; they have not accepted DHS grant funds for the center, or 

participated in any DHS assessment, he said.501

Asked about DHS’s claim to have placed a detailee at the center, Mr. Haller said, “We 

did have a DHS detailee, interestingly enough.” DHS hired away one of the center’s senior 

criminal analysts, Mr. Haller explained, “but they didn’t really have the office space” to house 

him. Mr. Haller said DHS asked if it could leave its new hire in his old office at the Wyoming 

DCI. “We said sure, as long as we don’t need that office space,” Mr. Haller recalled. He said 

his division eventually needed the desk back, and DHS moved their employee to another state. 

Wyoming has neither requested nor received another detailee, Mr. Haller said.502

(2) Philadelphia Fusion Center

DHS has also counted among its recognized fusion centers the Delaware Valley 

Information Center (DVIC), which it locates in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.503 The Department

has indicated plans to assign a detailee to the center; 504 and since 2006, DHS has awarded 

millions of dollars in grant funds in support of the project.505

In response to a 2010 survey from the Subcommittee, however, Philadelphia officials 

stated the center did not yet exist.506

 499 Id. 

They stated DVIC was to begin operations in December 

2010. Five months later, during a May 2011 interview, however, officials in charge of the DVIC 

500 “Wyoming FY 2009 Monitoring Report,” FEMA (8/18/2009). 501 Subcommittee interview of Kebin Haller, Deputy Director, Wyoming Division of Criminal Intelligence 

(9/7/2012).

502 Id. 503 “State and Local Fusion Center Program: Quarterly Update, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress, Second 

Quarter;” (9/4/2009) “State and Local Fusion Center Program: Quarterly Update, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to 

Congress, Third Quarter.” (8/4/2009).

504 “State and Local Fusion Center Program: Quarterly Update, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to Congress, Second 

Quarter,” (8/4/2009); “State and Local Fusion Center Program: Quarterly Update, Fiscal Year 2009 Report to 

Congress, Third Quarter;” (9/4/2009); “Fusion Center Locations and Contact Information,” DHS.gov, 

http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information, accessed September 27, 2012. 505 “Philadelphia Urban Area FY2009 Monitoring Report,” FEMA (9/17/2009); DVIC Funding Overview, 

SEPARTF; PSI-PEMA-05-0090. 506 Response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (7/23/10), at 2, PSI-Delaware 

Valley Intelligence Center-01-0001. 
93

project informed the Subcommittee the center had still not yet opened.507 Since then, the State of 

Pennsylvania has frozen DHS funds associated with the project.508 As of August 2012, the 

center still did not physically exist. Yet, in its most recent capability assessment report on fusion 

centers, DHS again lists DVIC as a recognized fusion center.509

DHS’s insistence on listing fusion centers with no physical presence is not only puzzling, 

but raises questions about its entire assessment process.

E. Many Fusion Centers Do Not Prioritize Counterterrorism Efforts

The White House, Congress and DHS itself have described fusion centers as key tools for 

gathering, analyzing, and sharing information to prevent terrorist attacks. Indeed, in 2007,

Congress indicated DHS should consider any fusion center’s commitment to doing 

counterterrorism work before detailing personnel to work there.

510

The 2010 Subcommittee survey found that 25 of 62 responsive fusion centers, or more 

than one-third, did not mention terrorism in their mission statements. And the trend appeared to 

be moving in that direction: at least five fusion centers reported recently revising their mission 

statements in ways that emphasized public safety and anti-crime efforts, and diminished or 

removed mentions of counterterrorism.

However, the Subcommittee 

investigation found some centers do not make terrorism a priority among their many efforts.

511

In an interview, a DHS official who helps oversee the Department’s support for and 

engagement with fusion centers acknowledged that some centers were not interested in focusing 

on counterterrorism. “We have trouble getting smaller, less mature fusion centers to pay 

attention to things like counterterrorism analysis,” said Joel Cohen, head of policy and planning 

for the DHS State and Local Program Office (SLPO). “They are more concerned with day-today crime.” 512

But the trend away from prioritizing counterterrorism efforts does not appear isolated to 

smaller, “less mature” fusion centers. Indeed, statewide fusion centers and fusion centers in 

major cities indicate that they emphasize anti-crime efforts and “all-hazards” missions over an 

explicit focus on counterterrorism.

 507 Subcommittee interview of DVIC officials Walt Smith, Tom Elsasser, and Joseph Liciardello (5/23/2011). Since 

that interview, Mr. Liciardello has maintained he is not a DVIC official. For more information on Mr. Liciardello’s 

role in the DVIC project, see Chapter V.

508 Subcommittee interviews of Pennsylvania Emergency Management agency (11/14/2011, 11/30/2011, 8/1/2012). 

509 “2011 National Network of Fusion Centers, Final Report, May 2012,” Appendix 5, DHS-HSGAC-FC-057027. 510 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 317, 

318-24 (2007). http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ53/pdf/PLAW-110publ53.pdf. 511 Subcommittee survey of state and local fusion centers (July 2010). 512 Subcommittee interview of Joel Cohen (4/16/2012).
94

For instance, The Michigan Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) changed its mission 

statement from the following:

The State of Michigan’s Intelligence Operations Center shall collect, 

evaluate, collate, and analyze information and intelligence and then, as 

appropriate, disseminate this information and intelligence to the proper 

public safety agencies so that any threat of terrorism or criminal activity 

will be successfully identified and addressed.513

to:

To promote public safety by operating in a public-private partnership 

that collects, evaluates, analyzes, and disseminates information and 

intelligence in a timely and secure manner while protecting the privacy 

rights of the public.514

Similarly, the Nevada Threat Analysis Center (NTAC) once defined its mission with a 

stated emphasis on preventing terror:

NTAC embraces a team effort of local, state, federal and tribal law 

enforcement, fire, health, and private sector stakeholders, in cooperation 

with the citizens of the state of Nevada, for the timely receipt, analysis, 

and dissemination of terrorism and criminal activity information relating 

to Nevada while ensuring the safety of its citizens and critical 

infrastructure.515

But as of August 2012, their mission statement read:

NTAC embraces a team effort of local, state, federal, and tribal law 

enforcement, fire, health, and private sector stakeholders, in cooperation 

with the citizens of Nevada, for the timely receipt, analysis, and 

dissemination of criminal information while ensuring the safety and 

privacy rights of our citizens and critical infrastructure.516

These revisions reflect a general shift towards a so-called “all-crimes, all-hazards” 

approach. That trend was noted in a 2008 Congressional Research Service report which found 

fusion centers were broadening their missions to encompass all crimes and all hazards as a way 

 513 Michigan Intelligence Operations Center questionnaire response, (7/26/2010) PSI-Michigan Intelligence 

Operations Center-01-0001. 514 Michigan Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) website, http://www.michigan.gov/mioc, accessed Sept. 10, 

2012.

515 Nevada Threat Analysis Center questionnaire response, (7/23/10) PSI-Nevada Threat Analysis Center-01-0001. 516 “Nevada Threat Analysis Center,” Nevada Department of Public Safety website, 

http://id.dps.nv.gov/programs/Nevada_Threat_Analysis_Center_%28NTAC%29/, accessed Sept. 10, 2012.
95

to encourage participation from local agencies, qualify for a wider array of grant programs, and 

because other centers were doing it.517

CRS noted that the “all-crimes” approach to counterterrorism was premised on an 

assumption that would-be terrorists would commit precursor crimes before attempting an attack. 

But CRS officials questioned whether that was a valid assumption, and whether the broad “allcrimes” approach diverted fusion center efforts towards working on criminal and other matters 

that bore no connection to terrorism.518

“[O]ne can reasonably question if sophisticated terrorists, those who have received 

formal terrorism training from established international groups and may be planning catastrophic 

attacks, engage in criminal activity prior to, and in support of, a terrorist attack. Will following 

all criminal leads and terrorism tips lead to the disruption of sophisticated terrorist plots?” CRS 

asked.519

In fact, some fusion center officials from major jurisdictions have championed a focus on 

traditional criminal activity over terrorist plots. “Our end state is to prevent terrorism, but in my 

own community, right across the bay from San Francisco where I work, the City of Oakland, 

they’ve had 740 shootings to date,” stated Ronald Brooks, director of the Northern California 

Regional Intelligence Center (NCRIC) in San Francisco, in a hearing before the Senate 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC) in October 2011. “That’s a 

city of 400,000. That’s terror right there in our own community. And that kind of terror is one 

that’s experienced in big cities and small towns across the country.”520

Like many other centers, Mr. Brooks’ center in Oakland makes no mention of terrorism 

in its mission statement. His “all-crimes” fusion center aims to “coordinate the exchange of 

criminal intelligence, threats, and hazards and facilitate regional communication among Northern 

California Law Enforcement, First Responders, Government and Private Sector Partners.”521An 

official with the Washington (D.C.) Regional Threat and Analysis Center (WRTAC), whose 

region includes some of the nation’s most inviting terrorist targets, sounded a similar note in a 

Subcommittee interview. The D.C. fusion center was focused on “crime, crime, crime,” the 

official said. “The last I checked, terrorism was still a crime.”522

WRTAC’s mission statement initially included a mention of terrorism, stating the center 

was “the focal point for collection, integration, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of 

intelligence relating to terrorism, criminal activity and catastrophic events[.]” A revised mission 

statement omits any specific mention of terrorism, and commits the center to enhancing its 

 517 John Rollins, “Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress,” (1/18/2008) CRS Report RL34070, at 21-22, 

87.

518 Id.

519 Id. at 68-69. 520 “Ten Years After 9/11: A Status Report on Information Sharing,” before the Senate Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee, testimony of Ronald Brooks (10/12/2011). 

521 NCRIC website, “About NCRIC,” 

https://ncric.org/default.aspx/MenuItemID/122/MenuGroup/NCRIC+Public+Contact.htm. 522 Subcommittee visit to WRTAC, March 16, 2010.
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partner agencies’ “ability to detect credible threats to the region from all hazards and all 

crimes.”523

Indeed, the PM-ISE’s 2010 Baseline Capabilities Assessment of fusion centers found that 

terrorism was a low priority for most of them. “Most [fusion] centers focus on the priority 

mission of the law enforcement agency that owns/manages them; primarily analytical case 

support to drug, gang, and violent crime investigations for the geographic area of responsibility,” 

the report stated. “As a result many centers struggle to build the necessary capabilities required 

to support Federal counterterrorism mission requirements, specifically in the areas of intelligence 

analysis and information sharing beyond their jurisdictions.”524

F. DHS “Success Stories” Do Not Demonstrate Centers’ 

Value to Counterterrorism Efforts

On its web site, DHS has devoted a page to fusion center “success stories.”525 On that 

page, DHS includes many events unrelated to terrorism in a long list of fusion center 

“successes.” DHS praises, for example, fusion center efforts that have helped to reduce 

automobile thefts, apprehend a man suspected of kidnapping and rape, and bust up a drug ring.

526

While those anticrime successes are notable, they do not advance the DHS 

counterterrorism mission; they do not fulfill the promise Federal officials made to Congress and 

the public that the significant taxpayer support directed to fusion centers would aid in the fight 

against terror; and they do not meet the expectations set by legislative and executive mandates 

which make clear both branches expected fusion centers to perform as conduits of terrorism 

information-sharing to and from the Federal Government.

To evaluate fusion centers’ contributions to Federal counterterrorism efforts, the 

Subcommittee asked DHS to provide its best examples of how fusion centers have made such 

contributions. In response, DHS provided a handful of examples, although only a few related to 

actual terrorist plots. The Subcommittee examined four of them. It was unable to confirm that 

the fusion centers contributions were as significant as DHS portrayed them; were unique to the 

intelligence and analytical work expected of fusion centers; or would not have occurred absent a 

fusion center.

(1) Najibullah Zazi Case – CIAC

On its website and in presentations to Congress, DHS has cited the contributions of the 

Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) to the investigation into Najibullah Zazi, an 

admitted terrorist. In 2009, the 25-year-old Afghan immigrant traveled from Colorado to New 

York City, where he has admitted that he planned to blow himself up on the subway around the 

 523 WRTAC Response to Subcommittee Questionnaire, (2/13/2012) PSI-WRTAC-02-0004 524 “2010 Fusion Center Baseline Capabilities Assessment,” PM-ISE, at 3, (10/2010) DHS-HSGAC-FC-007032. 525 “Fusion Center Success Stories,” DHS.gov, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-success-stories, accessed August 

21, 2012.

526 Id.
97

anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The FBI learned of his intention and arrested Mr. Zazi on 

September 19.

527

“[I]n the Zazi plot to bomb the New York subway, it was a fusion center near Denver that 

played the key role in ‘fusing’ the information that came from the public with evidence that came 

in following the suspect’s arrest by the FBI,” DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano stated in a 

September 2010 speech.528

The DHS website is more circumspect. “The CIAC provided analytic support to the 

Denver FBI and the Department of Homeland Security regarding the suspicious activity reported 

to the CIAC through the public website and 1-800 number,” DHS states on its site. “CIAC 

provided personnel to assist the Denver FBI in the investigation and support the field operations. 

CIAC analysts also assisted in the review and analysis of the evidence obtained during the 

execution of the search and arrest warrants.” The Department also notes that CIAC officials 

“addressed media inquiries” about the investigation and the threats it involved.529

When the Subcommittee asked CIAC itself for a more detailed explanation of its role in 

the Zazi case, the center provided a four-page summary.

 

530 CIAC did not claim to have “played 

the key role” in “fusing” evidence from the case with information from the public.

531 The center 

summarized its analytical contributions as “assisting in open source and law enforcement 

research” by checking databases. CIAC personnel also “assisted in the review of the information 

obtained through search warrants,” the center’s summary stated.532

In its summary, CIAC explained that most of its contributions to the case came from state 

troopers who were assigned to the center. Of the 605 hours CIAC states its personnel dedicated 

to assisting the FBI in the Zazi case between September 9 and September 16, 2009, only 60 of 

those hours came from its analysts. Troopers did the rest, including 145 hours of analytical work 

and 400 hours of operational work, including vehicle stops and augmenting the Colorado 

Governor’s security detail.

Additionally, the 

Subcommittee confirmed, the center responded to media inquiries.

533

 527 “Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in U.S.,” press 

release, Department of Justice, (2/22/2010); See also Sulzberger, A.G., and William K. Rashbaum, “Guilty Plea in 

Plot to Bomb New York Subway,” New York Times, (2/22/2010), 

 The trooper who accounted for CIAC’s largest contribution to the 

investigation – 120 hours in a one-week period – was a state trooper who was part of the 

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/nyregion/23terror.html; Sulzberger, A.G., “Imam Snared in Terror Plot Admits 

He Lied to FBI,” New York Times, March 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/05/nyregion/05terror.html. 528“Remarks as Prepared by Secretary Napolitano to New York City First Responders” (9/20/2010), DHS Website, 

http://www.dhs.gov/news/2010/09/10/remarks-prepared-secretary-napolitano-new-york-city-first-responders, 

accessed 9/18/2012. 

529 “Fusion Center Success Stories,” DHS.gov, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-success-stories, accessed August 

21, 2012.

530 “Najibullah Zazi Case,” April 2011, Colorado Information Analysis Center. 531 The CIAC summary notes, however, that two troopers received calls from citizens “reporting concerns and 

events in-which they deemed suspicious [sic] after the Zazi case became public.” The first news stories regarding 

the Zazi case appeared on Sept. 16, 2009.

532 “Najibullah Zazi Case,” April 2011, Colorado Information Analysis Center. 533 Id.
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troopers’ “CIAC unit,” but was also assigned to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 

which was handling the investigation, the center’s director explained to the Subcommittee.534

This examination does not diminish Colorado officials’ support of the FBI investigation 

into Najibullah Zazi. But it does indicate that much of the contribution attributed to CIAC came 

from state troopers, and could have – hopefully, would have – occurred absent a fusion center. 

(2) Faisal Shahzad Case – NYSIC 

On May 1, 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb in New York City’s 

Times Square. Mr. Shahzad’s attempt was foiled by alert street vendors, who noticed smoke 

coming from a parked vehicle and notified authorities. DHS Customs and Border Patrol agents 

apprehended Mr. Shahzad two days later on May 3, after he successfully boarded a commercial 

flight bound for Dubai, UAE. He eventually pled guilty to charges arising from the attempted 

attack.535

On its web site, DHS cites as a fusion center success the contributions made by the New 

York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) in Latham, New York, to the FBI’s Shahzad case.536

“In New York, an alert AAA employee filed a SAR [Suspicious Activity Report] with the 

New York State Intelligence Center [(NYSIC)] regarding a call on May 2, 2010 – when Shahzad 

called for assistance because he had locked his keys inside the vehicle,” DHS states on its web 

site.

The Department’s description omits a small detail, however, which has the effect of potentially 

mischaracterizing the value of the center’s contribution.

537 While that information may have been useful in building the case against the would-be 

bomber, it neither helped disrupt his plans nor hastened his capture. According to NYSIC, it 

received the information from AAA on May 4, the day after Mr. Shahzad’s dramatic airport 

arrest. The Department does not disclose that later date, allowing a reader to believe the 

information was shared by the fusion center on the same day as the call. NYSIC included the 

later date in a narrative it provided to the Subcommittee.538

NYSIC also noted that it assisted the FBI investigation by conducting database searches 

for vehicle identification numbers and Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) photographs.539

 534 Email from Capt. Steve Garcia, CIAC Director, to Subcommittee, “Subject: Follow-up inquiry from PSI” 

(8/33/2012), PSI-CIAC-03-0001.

 

The fusion center was uniquely able to provide DMV photographs because it is currently the 

only other entity with which the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles shares the 

535 “Faisal Shahzad Pleads Guilty in Manhattan Federal Court to 10 Federal Crimes Arising from Attempted Car 

Bombing in Times Square,” Press release, U.S. Department of Justice, June 21, 2010, 

http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-ag-721.html. 536 “Fusion Center Success Stories,” DHS.gov, http://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-success-stories, accessed August 

21, 2012.

537 Id. 538 Letter from NY State Police Capt. Douglas R Keyer Jr. to the Subcommittee, Mar. 29, 2011. NYSIC 

characterized the May 4 AAA call as “an important lead [for the FBI] regarding the second vehicle used by 

Shahzad.”

539 Letter from NY State Police Capt. Douglas R Keyer Jr. to the Subcommittee, Mar. 29, 2011. 
99

pictures, according to a NYSIC official.540 “New York is one of the few states that doesn’t make 

DMV photos readily available to law enforcement,” Mr. Timothy Parry of the New York State 

Police told the Subcommittee.541

In its recounting, NYSIC also noted it “sent out teletype messages nationwide on the 

National Crime Information Center (NCIC) network requesting all agencies to conduct [License 

Plate Reader] checks through their systems,” and send positive hits to NYSIC. However, the 

NCIC system is a Department of Justice network that predates fusion centers, and even DHS 

itself, and a NYSIC official told the Subcommittee the FBI may have been able to utilize NCIC 

on its own. “Could they do it? Yes. Is it as easily and quickly done? No. [We are] trying to 

make it more streamlined and efficient,” he said.542

(3) Faisal Shahzad Case – Florida Fusion Center 

In addition to the work performed by NYSIC, DHS cites on its webpage of fusion center 

successes efforts by the Florida Fusion Center (FFC) in the Shahzad case. DHS does not 

characterize the FFC’s work as making a significant contribution to the case, and the facts it cites 

are corroborated by the State of Florida’s own comments provided to the Subcommittee. 

Following the May 3 arrest of Faisal Shahzad, FFC personnel “immediately began to query state 

databases seeking any association with Shahzad,” according to FFC Director Robert LeFiles.543

The center identified two individuals having possible associations with Mr. Shahzad, and passed 

the information to the FBI JTTF pursuing the case. The information was used in a finished 

intelligence product, but nothing further was reported by either FFC or DHS about the leads.544

(4) Francis “Schaeffer” Cox Case – AKIAC 

 

The information does not appear to have played any key role in the Shahzad case. 

DHS also pointed to work by the Alaska Information Analysis Center (AKIAC) 

regarding Francis “Schaeffer” Cox, an Alaskan militia leader who was arrested in March 

2011,545 and convicted in June 2012 on charges stemming from a murder plot against Federal

officials.546

In September 2012, the Department asserted the Alaska center had played an important 

role in disrupting Mr. Cox’s plans. “From December 2010 through February 2011, the Alaska 

Information Analysis Center (AKIAC) provided consequential information that assisted an FBI 

Anchorage Field Office investigation that culminated in the arrest and conviction of a Sovereign 

Citizen/Militia Leader and two associates,” DHS told the Subcommittee.

 540 Subcommittee interview of Timothy Parry, senior investigator, New York State Police (9/6/2012). 541 Id. 542 Id. 543 Correspondence from FFC Director Robert LeFiles to the Subcommittee, March 24, 2011, Florida Fusion Center 

02-0001. 544 Id. 545 Press release, “Five Arrested for Conspiracy against Troopers, Judges,” Alaska State Troopers (3/10/2011), 

http://www.dps.state.ak.us/pio/docs/Press/2011/ConspiracyArrest_031111.pdf. 546 Press release, “Guilty Verdicts in USA v. Cox, Barney and Vernon,” U.S. Attorney for the District of Alaska, 

(6/19/2012) http://www.justice.gov/usao/ak/news/2012/June_2012/Francis%20Schaeffer%20Cox.html
100

Alaska officials may have provided useful information to the Federal investigation of Mr. 

Cox. In a September 2012 interview with the Subcommittee, Lt. Rex Leath, an Alaska State 

Trooper, said that in late 2010, state law enforcement officials collected information about Mr. 

Cox and his associates from several local law enforcement agencies around Alaska, and shared it 

all with the bureau. They learned Mr. Cox had been arrested for domestic assault, that he may 

have been booby-trapping his house in case law enforcement visited, that Mr. Cox’s associates 

were conducting surveillance of off-duty police officers, and that Mr. Cox had stationed armed 

guards around his house.547 “This dynamic started to develop, we would keep tabs on local law 

enforcement [information], and we would pass it on to the [FBI’s] JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task 

Force],” Lt. Leath said. Some of that information was later cited in testimony by an FBI agent at 

Mr. Cox’s trial.548

However, in his interview with the Subcommittee, Lt. Leath explained that that 

information-sharing was done not by officials at the fusion center, but by those at the state

troopers’ criminal intelligence unit, in conjunction with local law enforcement and the local 

JTTF. The trooper criminal intelligence unit had the lead on the case, Lt. Leath said.

Lt. Leath, who is the AKIAC director, told the Subcommittee that his fusion center put 

out a request for information from other states on Mr. Cox in early 2011, “around January.”549

Lt. Leath said the center learned of ties between Mr. Cox and other states, including Alabama, 

Michigan and Montana – ties Lt. Leath said indicated “funding, training, and verbal 

encouragement.” 550

The fusion center compiled the information into an intelligence report,551

However, the FBI had been actively investigating Mr. Cox for months prior, according to 

news accounts. The bureau’s Anchorage office reportedly began a preliminary investigation into 

Mr. Cox in February 2010.

and shared it 

with the FBI in Anchorage that January, Lt. Leath said. “As soon as we got that information, it 

got the attention of the local FBI office,” Lt. Leath said. “[T]hat’s when the FBI got involved.”

552 Agents utilized two confidential informants against Mr. Cox,553

one of whom was responsible for more than 100 hours of surreptitious recordings, including one 

of an “initiation ceremony” into Mr. Cox’s militia in August 2010.554

In an October 2012 letter to the Subcommittee, Lt. Leath stated that AKIAC itself had 

been gathering and documenting information about Mr. Cox for almost a year before it compiled 

 547 Subcommittee interview of Lex Leath (9/26/2012). 548 “Speeches put militia leader Schaeffer Cox on FBI radar,” Richard Mauer, Anchorage Daily News (5/30/2012).

549 Subcommittee interview of Lex Leath (9/26/2012). 550 Id. 551 “HIR/AK-0001-11, TERRORISM WATCHLIST—Alaska Militia Leader Continues Violent Rhetoric,” (1/2011), 

PSI-AKIAC-01-000001. 552 “Speeches put militia leader Schaeffer Cox on FBI radar,” Richard Mauer, Anchorage Daily News (5/30/2012), 

http://www.adn.com/2012/05/29/2484451/speeches-put-militia-leader-on.html. 553 “Informants aided FBI in militia probe, court documents show,” Associated Press, (3/29/2011), 

http://www.adn.com/2011/03/29/1781500/informants-aided-fbi-in-militia.html. 554 “Militia leader told volunteers to be ready to shoot to kill agents,” Richard Mauer, Anchorage Daily News 

(5/22/2012), http://www.adn.com/2012/05/21/2474525/militia-leader-told-his-squad.html. 
101

its January 2011 intelligence report. “[T]he AKIAC learned of these acts [by Mr. Cox] and 

began documenting them in early 2010,” Lt. Leath wrote.555

In this case, local, state and Federal officials appear to have engaged in useful 

information-sharing. Mr. Cox and his associates were arrested and convicted, and lives were 

possibly saved. However, it is not clear the role the state fusion center played in the process, or 

if it was as important or influential as DHS has alleged.556

G. Fusion Centers May Have Hindered, Not Aided, 

Federal Counterterrorism Efforts

Fusion centers have also made significant intelligence errors, with embarrassing results 

for themselves and the Department. Three examples of these errors – involving both faulty 

intelligence analysis and reporting – have led DHS to misinform decision-makers and prompt 

clarifications and apologies from fusion center officials.

(1) Russian “Cyberattack” in Illinois

On November 10, 2011, the Illinois Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center (STIC) 

published a report alerting officials that a hacker in Russia had stolen an unknown number of 

usernames and passwords to sensitive utility control systems, and used that information to hack 

into a local water district’s computerized control system. Once inside the system, the fusion 

center report alleged, the hacker sent commands which caused a water pump to burn out.557

“An information technology services and computer repair company . . . determined the 

system had been remotely hacked into from an Internet Provider (IP) address located in Russia,” 

the fusion center’s report stated. “It is believed the hackers had acquired unauthorized access to 

the software company’s database and retrieved the usernames and passwords of various [control] 

systems, including the water district’s system.”558

Although it may sound like a minor prank, the intrusion would have represented a 

significant and troubling event, had it been real. Earlier that year, U.S. Department of Defense 

officials stated that the United States could treat such cyberattacks, if they caused widespread 

casualties, as acts of war.559 The Illinois attack, which purportedly involved exercising remote 

control over a U.S. water system, would have been the first known attack of its kind on a U.S. 

facility, and was considered for a time to be “a major new development in cybersecurity.”560

 555 Letter from Lt. Rex Leath to the Subcommittee (10/1/2012) 556 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry (9/21/2012), DHS-HSGAC-FC-059981. 557 Subcommittee interview of DHS (12/13/2011). 558 Statewide Terrorism & Intelligence Center, “Daily Intelligence Notes,” November 10, 2011, PSI-Illinois State 

Police-01-0003.

559 “Cyberwar Plan Has New Focus On Deterrence,” Wall Street Journal, Julian E. Barnes and Siobhan Gorman 

(7/15/2011); “Cyber Combat: Act of War,” Wall Street Journal, Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes (5/30/2011) 560 “Foreign hackers targeted U.S. water plant in apparent malicious cyber attack, expert says,” Washington Post, 

Ellen Nakashima (11/18/2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/checkpoint-washington/post/foreignhackers-broke-into-illinois-water-plant-control-system-industry-expert-says/2011/11/18/gIQAgmTZYN_blog.html.
102

In truth, there was no intrusion, and DHS investigators eventually concluded as much.

561

The so-called “intrusion” from Russia was actually an incident of legitimate remote computer 

access by a U.S. network technician who was working while on a family vacation.562

“A quick and simple phone call to me right away would have defused the whole thing 

immediately,” the contractor told a reporter after the report had been discredited. “All I did was 

I logged on.”

 Making 

the intrusion allegations all the more perplexing, the contractor had logged on from Russia in 

June, five months before the pump broke; and although the access had been under his username 

and password, no one from the fusion center, the water utility or DHS had contacted him to find 

out if he had logged on from Russia.

563

In addition to the fusion center report, DHS intelligence officials issued their own 

intelligence report on the alleged hacking incident, publishing it five days after the Illinois fusion 

center published its own, on November 10, 2011.

564 Like the fusion center report, DHS stated

the allegations as fact, not as theory, claim or hunch – none of which are reportable under DHS 

reporting guidelines. The author, a DHS Senior Reports Officer with I&A’s Reporting Branch, 

drafted the bulletin.565 He wrote that his report was based on “first and secondhand knowledge 

of information . . . deemed reliable,” and used no language indicating the “attack” was a mixture 

of allegation and conjecture.566

“[T]he Springfield, Illinois Curran-Gardner Public Water District’s Supervisory Control 

and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system experienced a network intrusion from a Russian IP 

address,” the briefing slide stated. “The perpetrator used an authorized user account of an 

employee from an identified US business that developed and installed the SCADA system. 

System controls were manipulated resulting in a pump burnout.”567

Apparently aware of how important such an event could have been, had it been real, DHS 

intelligence officials included the false allegations – stated as fact – in a daily intelligence 

briefing that went to Congress and the intelligence community.

568

After receiving the Illinois center’s November 10 report, the FBI opened an investigation 

into the allegations. A week later, after receiving DHS’s own intelligence report on the hacking 

claims, the Department’s Cyber Emergency Response Team (CERT)569

 561 “Illinois Water Pump Failure Report,” DHS, ICSB-11-327-01, (11/23/2011) DHS-HSGAC-FC-019824.

also began investigating 

562 “Working on his vacation in Russia, contractor touches off false report of cyberattack,” Associated Press

(12/1/2011).

563 Id. 564 “NETWORK INTRUSION INTO A SPRINGFIELD, Illinois Public Water District’s SCADA system, originated 

in Russia, resulted in a pump burnout,” IIR-4-007-0104-12, Nov. 15, 2011, DHS-HSGAC-FC-019826. 

“HIRs[/IIRs] are not analytic products and should present factual information, rather than theories or conclusions.” 

Standard Operating Procedure for Homeland Intelligence Report Production, 6/25/10, DHS-FC-HSGAC-056474. 565 Subcommittee interview of Anne Wessel, Chuck Robinson (12/13/2011). 566 “NETWORK INTRUSION INTO A SPRINGFIELD, Illinois Public Water District’s SCADA system, originated 

in Russia, resulted in a pump burnout,” IIR-4-007-0104-12, Nov. 15, 2011, DHS-HSGAC-FC-019826. 567 Daily Intelligence Highlights, “Illinois: Water System Disrupted by Cyber Intrusion,” (11/15/2011) 568 DHS response to Subcommittee inquiry, (9/19/2012) DHS-HSGAC-FC-059955.

569 CERT is part of DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate, separate from I&A.
103

the incident. On November 23, 2011, CERT issued its own report with this finding: “After 

detailed analysis of all available data, ICS-CERT and the FBI found no evidence of a cyber 

intrusion into the SCADA system of the Curran-Gardner Public Water District in Springfield, 

Illinois.”570

“In addition,” CERT’s report continued, “there is no evidence to support claims made in 

the initial Illinois STIC report – which was based on raw, unconfirmed data and subsequently 

leaked to the media – that any credentials were stolen, or that the vendor was involved in any 

malicious activity that led to a pump failure at the water plant. In addition, DHS and the FBI 

have concluded that there was no malicious or unauthorized traffic from Russia or any foreign 

entities, as previously reported.” 571

Almost no part of the initial reports of the incident had been accurate – not the fusion 

center report, or DHS’s own intelligence report, or its intelligence briefing. The only fact they 

got right was that a water pump in a small Illinois water district had burned out.

DHS I&A did not subsequently issue a correction or notification of its erroneous 

reporting. In an interview with the Subcommittee, DHS officials responsible for the reporting 

incident said they believed there was no need to issue a correction for the faulty report or 

briefing slide, because “they are not finished intelligence.” 572 They agreed that the report did not 

include caveats for its reporting, and that it was “not typical” for such reports to state 

uncorroborated claims and hypotheses as fact. But “there is a premium for getting IIRs out,” one 

official explained. “Analytical judgements are saved.” Despite its inaccuracies and sloppy 

phrasing, DHS officials characterized the IIR as a success. “[It did] exactly what it’s supposed to 

do -- generate interest.” 573

(2) Shooting of Representative Giffords and 18 Others

A second recent example of flawed information issued by a fusion center involves the 

Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC) about a high-profile shooting. This 

example showed how a center’s weak analysis could actually hinder anti-terrorism and law 

enforcement efforts.

In January 2011, Jared Loughner opened fire at a public event in Tucson, Arizona. He 

shot and killed six people and wounded 13 others, including Arizona Representative Gabrielle 

Giffords.

574

 570 “ICS-CERT INFORMATION BULLETIN: ICSB-11-327-01—ILLINOIS WATER PUMP FAILURE 

REPORT,” Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), November 23, 2011, DHSHSGAC-FC-019824.

Fox News reported that an ACTIC document indicated that the center’s analysts had 

a “strong suspicion” that Mr. Loughner was connected to American Renaissance, which the 

571 Id. 572 Subcommittee interview of Anne Wessel, Chuck Robinson (12/13/2011). 573 Id. 574 “Jared Lee Laughner Pleads Guilty to Federal Charges in Tucson Shooting,” Department of Justice press release, 

(8/7/2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/August/12-crm-983.html; “Jared Loughner, Ariz. shooting suspect, 

pleads guilty to 19 counts,” CBSNews.com (8/7/2012) http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-57488644-

504083/jared-loughner-ariz-shooting-suspect-pleads-guilty-pleads-guilty-to-19-counts/. 
104

document termed an anti-Semitic, anti-government group.

575 The memo stated thenRepresentative Giffords was “the first Jewish female elected to such a high position in the US 

government,” suggesting that was a possible reason Mr. Loughner had targeted her.576

Closer scrutiny of the ACTIC document’s claims revealed that many were false. Ms. 

Giffords was not the first Jewish female elected to Congress; the alleged anti-government, antiSemitic, white supremacist group, American Renaissance, says it is neither anti-Semitic nor antigovernment, nor even a membership organization. American Renaissance was instead a 

newsletter, and its publishers quickly confirmed Mr. Loughner did not subscribe.577

In the wake of reports debunking the analysts’ assertions, the ACTIC director backed 

away from the document, characterizing it as a “quick summary” that “was never intended for 

public dissemination.”578

ACTIC “just didn’t have its facts straight,” concluded one news analysis, which went on 

to question why the fusion center was attempting to participate in a criminal investigation. 

“Presumably, law enforcement authorities in Tucson and from the FBI were on the case when the 

memo was written,” the analysis reasoned. “One wonders why the fusion center was involved at 

all, but clearly, it was operating out of its league.”579

(3) Missouri MIAC Militia Report

A third example of fusion center missteps took place in February 2009 when a 

problematic analysis issued by the Missouri Information Analysis Center (MIAC) provoked 

public outrage.

Deemed a “strategic report,” “The Modern Militia Movement” attempted to provide a 

summary analysis of the recent history of violent militia organizations in the United States.

580 

The report was poorly researched and written.581

For instance, the report alleged that “militia members most commonly associate with 3rd

party political groups,” including the Libertarian Party. It stated that “these [militia] members 

 It attempted to show connections between

certain Constitutionally protected, non-violent political activity and a tendency towards violent 

extremism.

 575 “DHS Memo Suggests Shooter May Be Linked to Racist Organization,” Jennifer Griffin, FoxNews.com 

(1/9/2011), http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/01/09/dhs-memo-suggests-shooter-may-be-linked-racistorganization. 576 “Jared Loughner’s supremacists tie debunked,” POLITICO, Kenneth Vogel (1/11/2011), 

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0111/47438.html. 577 Id. 578 Id..

579 Harris, Shane, “ANALYSIS: Intelligence File One Bad Apple,” Government Executive, Apr. 1, 2011, 

http://www.govexec.com/features/0411-01/0411-01adif.htm. 580 “The Modern Militia Movement, MIAC Strategic Report,” Missouri Intelligence Analysis Center (MIAC), 

(2/20/09), http://www.news-leader.com/assets/pdf/DO131242323.PDF, accessed 9/26/2012. 581 Among other errors, the document reportedly misspelled President Barack Obama’s first name, and contained 

sentences reproduced verbatim from other sources without attribution. See Livengood, Chad, “Top law officials 

defend embattled MIAC agency,” Springfield (Mo.) News-Leader, Sept. 10, 2009.
105

are usually supporters of . . . Ron Paul, Chuck Baldwin, and Bob Barr.” Further, it claimed 

militia members might display signs, cartoons or bumper stickers featuring “anti-government 

rhetoric,” as well as “anti-immigration, and anti-abortion” material. Most surprising to some, it 

identified as “the most common symbol displayed by militia members” the so-called “Gadsden 

Flag,” featuring a coiled snake and the words, “Don’t Tread on Me.”582

The report, which became public in March 2009, caused an avalanche of criticism of 

MIAC, as well as the Missouri Department of Public Safety, which oversaw the center. One 

former state government official said the report “looks like a Missouri State University fraternity 

brother wrote something and put it on state letterhead and sent it out.”

As the report properly 

noted, the flag was designed by a U.S. General, Christopher Gadsden, and first gained notice in 

the 1700s. And while it may hold significance to members of the militia movement, it is 

considered by many to be a symbol of American patriotism, and a popular symbol at Tea Party 

rallies.

583 The department’s chief 

issued public apologies to Mr. Paul, Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Barr, stating in letters to the men, “I 

regret that those comments were ultimately included in the final report[.]”584

These three examples of poor quality intelligence reports by fusion centers suggest some 

centers do not qualify as the counterterrorism successes portrayed by DHS. Fusion centers are 

controlled by state and local agencies, and staffed largely by state and local personnel. It should 

be no surprise, nor should it necessarily be a cause for concern, that they are primarily concerned 

with addressing state and local needs. 

The Federal government has also repeatedly stated, however, its expectation that fusion 

centers be capable of contributing to the Federal counterterrorism mission. It is that expectation 

that has been used to justify the Federal Government’s strong and growing support for fusion 

centers, from providing hundreds of millions of dollars in Federal grant funds and dispatching 

Federal personnel, to installing data connectivity, and supplying secure equipment and facilities 

capable of handling classified information.

Unfortunately, despite a significant investment of resources and time, fusion centers

today appear to be largely ineffective participants in the Federal counterterrorism mission. Much 

of the blame lies with DHS, which has failed to adequately implement a fusion center program 

that would produce the results it promised. But significant responsibility for these failures also 

lies with Congress, which has repeatedly chosen to support and praise fusion center efforts, 

without providing the oversight and direction necessary to make sure those efforts were cost 

effective and useful. 

 582 “The Modern Militia Movement, MIAC Strategic Report,” Missouri Intelligence Analysis Center (MIAC), 

(2/20/09), http://www.news-leader.com/assets/pdf/DO131242323.PDF, accessed 9/26/2012. 583 Livingood, Chad, “Agency apologizes for militia report on candidates,” Springfield (Mo.) News-Leader, March 

25, 2009.

584 Id.
106

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

• Congress should clarify the purpose of providing federal monetary and other

support for DHS’s fusion center efforts. The Subcommittee’s investigation could not 

verify that the statutory basis for DHS’s involvement in fusion centers – to strengthen 

federal counterterrorism efforts – was reflected in the department’s efforts. Congress 

should require DHS to conform its efforts to match its counterterrorism statutory purpose, 

or redefine DHS’s fusion center mission.

• DHS should reform its intelligence reporting efforts at state and local fusion centers

to eliminate duplication. DHS reporting from fusion centers duplicates – often poorly –

better intelligence-sharing processes undertaken by other agencies. The Joint Terrorism 

Task Forces receive threat-related information; the National SAR Initiative shares 

suspicious activity reports from state and locals; and the Terrorist Screening Center 

gathers information on state and local officials’ interactions with individuals in the 

National Counter Terrorism Center’s TIDE database.

• DHS should improve its training of intelligence reporters. DHS must ensure that any 

DHS personnel engaged in reporting intelligence information from within the United 

States be adequately trained and certified to prevent violations of U.S. law or DHS

guidelines, policy or regulations.

• DHS should strictly align fusion center grant funding to meet federal needs. When 

FEMA gives states and cities grant funds for a fusion center, it should not allow those 

dollars to be spent on items that do not directly contribute to improving the fusion 

center’s abilities to contribute to its federal mission of counterterrorism.

• DHS should track how much money it gives to each fusion center. FEMA should 

identify how much money it grants to states and urban areas for direct or indirect support 

of each individual fusion center, and report those amounts annually to Congress.

• PM-ISE should evaluate fusion center capabilities and performance. At the request 

of DHS, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) in the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence conducted a national assessment of fusion

center capabilities that produced useful findings, and PM-ISE should use that model to 

conduct future evaluations. In addition, it should begin to evaluate fusion centers’ 

performance as participants in federal counterterrorism information-sharing efforts.

• DHS should link funding of each fusion center to its value and performance.

Granting funds for state and local fusion center efforts year after year, without expecting 

or even examining the results received from previous grants, provides no mechanism to 

ensure federal taxpayers receive a return on their investments.

• DHS should timely disclose to Congress significant problems within its operations. 

Serious issues plagued DHS fusion center efforts for years, yet officials were reluctant to 

share them with Congress. Even when asked about these problems, DHS avoided
107

acknowledging the problems, initially withheld documents, and repeatedly resisted 

Subcommittee requests, which unnecessarily prolonged the Subcommittee investigation.

• DHS should align its practices and guidelines to protect civil liberties, so they adhere 

to the Constitution, federal law, and its statutory mission. DHS should strengthen its

protections to prevent DHS personnel from improperly collecting and retaining

intelligence on Constitutionally protected activity. It should not retain inappropriate and 

illegal reporting. It should strictly enforce policies, and hold all of its employees to the 

highest standards, including by promptly barring poorly performing personnel from 

issuing domestic intelligence reports involving Americans.

# # #
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 11

“Adhere to the National Criminal Intelligence 

Sharing Plan (NCISP) and other sector-specific 

information sharing plans, and perform all steps of 

the intelligence and fusion processes.”

Guideline 1, Fusion Center Guidelines.

The Fusion Process capabilities identify those capabilities and 

standards necessary to perform the steps of the Intelligence 

Process within a fusion center, including the gathering, 

analysis, and dissemination of information and intelligence. 

Though the steps and actions of the Fusion Process do not 

comprehensively mirror the steps of the Intelligence Process, 

the Intelligence Process provides the foundation to carry 

out the Fusion Process and assist in the identification of 

the capabilities needed to successfully complete the Fusion 

Process. 

Fusion Center Capability Areas

Fusion Process Capabilities

The Intelligence Process

The Intelligence Process is defined in the NCISP and 

incorporated into Guideline 1 of the Fusion Center 

Guidelines.

For purposes of baseline capabilities, the Fusion Process 

capability areas are modified to be: 

•	 Planning and Requirements Development

•	 Information Gathering/Collection and Recognition 

of Indicators and Warnings

•	 Processing and Collation of Information

•	 Intelligence Analysis and Production

•	 Intelligence/Information Dissemination

•	 Reevaluation

The following capabilities address the plans and their 

associated policies, standards, processes, and procedures 

(collectively “procedures”) needed to perform various 

aspects of the Fusion Process: the gathering, processing, 

analyzing, and disseminating of terrorism, homeland 

security, and law enforcement information. For these 

capabilities to be considered achieved or accomplished, 

the plans and procedures should be documented and 

provided to appropriate center personnel and partners. 

Though the types of plans and procedures are broken 

down by topic, they are in practice integrated aspects of 

the Fusion Process; therefore, many of these plans should 

be developed concurrently to the extent possible. In 

many cases, the resulting plans and procedures may not be 

separate documents but may be individual components of a 

larger document, such as a center’s Concept of Operations, 

Standard Operating Procedures, or Policies and Procedures 

Manual.

The following capabilities do not include capabilities 

that are otherwise addressed in Section II. Management 

and Administrative Capabilities (e.g., Information Privacy 

Protections, Security, Information Technology). 

I.
12 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

out the Fusion Process (gathering, 

processing, analyzing, and disseminating 

of terrorism, homeland security, and law 

enforcement information) on a statewide 

basis. 

a. Identify and incorporate local and tribal law 

enforcement, homeland security, or other 

discipline analytic centers that do not meet the 

definition of a fusion center but are within the 

fusion center’s geographic area of responsibility, 

and develop and maintain coordination 

procedures and communication methodologies.

b. The plan should address the further dissemination 

of federally generated alert, warning, and 

notification messages, bulletins, and situational 

reports, including the identification and 

establishment of a communications platform 

to support the timely dissemination of these 

products. 

c. The plan should clearly identify who is responsible 

for disseminating what types of products and to 

whom (which local, tribal, and federal authorities; 

the private sector; and the general public, as 

appropriate), in order to reduce duplicative 

dissemination to the extent possible. 

2. Risk Assessment—Fusion centers shall 

conduct or contribute to a statewide and/

or regional risk assessment that identifies 

and prioritizes threats, vulnerabilities, 

and consequences at regular intervals. 

a. Use available national and statewide risk 

assessments and other relevant products that 

identify patterns and trends reflective of emerging 

threats in the development of statewide and 

regional risk assessments.

b. Develop site-specific and topical risk assessments 

as appropriate. 

c. Provide the risk assessment or a summary 

and/or briefings on the risk assessment to law 

enforcement and homeland security officials with 

planning, resource allocation, and budgeting 

responsibilities, including appropriate elected 

officials from the executive and legislative 

branches. 

d. Maintain mechanisms to contribute information of 

value to other state, multistate, and national-level 

risk assessments.

A. Planning and 

Requirements 

Development

The Planning and Requirements Development 

stage “lays the foundation for the types of 

information that will be collected.”

—Guideline 1, Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 21.

1. Intrastate Coordination—In developing 

and implementing all Fusion Processrelated plans and procedures, the center 

shall coordinate with other fusion 

centers (the designated state fusion 

center and/or any UASI fusion center(s)) 

within its state to identify the roles and 

responsibilities of each center in carrying 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 13

3. Information Requirements—The 

information requirements for the fusion 

center shall be defined, documented, 

updated regularly, and consistent with 

the center’s goals and objectives as 

defined by the governance structure 

and reflect the risks identified in 

the statewide and/or regional risk 

assessment. 

a. Use the risk assessment to identify and prioritize 

the information requirements in order to 

address the risks (threats, vulnerabilities, and 

consequences) posed in the center’s geographic 

area of responsibility.

b. Create a formal process to define, communicate, 

and modify intelligence requirements and 

intelligence gathering. 

c. Establish goals and objectives for collecting, 

producing, and sharing information.

d. Review and consider including relevant 

requirements from the national intelligence 

requirements as provided by DHS and the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

e. Coordinate with the state and major urban 

area homeland security advisors and the 

DHS Protective Security Advisor(s) to ensure 

coordination and support of the National 

Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).

f. Coordinate information requirements with other 

interested agencies (local FBI Field Intelligence 

Group [FIG], Joint Terrorism Task Forces [JTTF], 

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA], etc.) 

as appropriate.

4. Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)—

Fusion centers shall develop, implement, 

and maintain a plan to support the 

establishment of a suspicious activity 

and incident reporting process for their 

geographic area of responsibility, in a 

manner consistent with the Findings 

and Recommendations of the Suspicious 

Activity Report (SAR) Support and 

Implementation Project.12 Specifically, 

12 The Major Cities Chiefs Association, Global, DOJ, and DHS 

supported the development of this report, which describes “the all-crimes 

approach to gathering, processing, reporting, analyzing, and sharing of 

suspicious activity by the local police agency.” 

centers shall have the ability to receive, 

process, document, analyze, and share 

SARs in a manner that complies with the 

ISE-SAR Functional Standard.13

a. Adhere to the state and local responsibilities for 

SARs outlined in Appendix 1 of the National 

Strategy for Information Sharing (page A1-6). 

b. The fusion center’s SAR process should 

complement and support the SAR processes 

established or being established by state or local 

law enforcement agencies within the fusion 

center’s geographic area of responsibility.

c. In cooperation with state or local law enforcement 

agencies within the fusion center’s geographic 

area of responsibility that have developed or are 

developing a SAR process, the fusion center shall 

support: 

i. Defining and documenting the process to be 

used by the originating agency to ensure that 

suspicious activity reporting is made available 

to fusion centers and local JTTFs in a timely 

manner. 

ii. Developing outreach material for first 

responders, public safety, and private sector 

partners and the public to educate them 

on recognizing and reporting behaviors 

and incidents indicative of criminal activity 

associated with international and domestic 

terrorism. 

d. The fusion center, in the absence of a specified 

threat or risk, should utilize SARs to analyze 

data trends and identify any potential terrorism 

linkage or activity (including precursor activity) 

and disseminate to the JTTF and other appropriate 

federal, state, and/or local entities.

e. The designated statewide fusion center shall 

coordinate an effort or support existing efforts to 

identify system requirements for the state’s 

designated shared space14 that will support 

13 For additional information regarding the ISE Functional Standard 

for SAR, visit http://www.ise.gov/pages/ctiss.html.

14 The ISE Shared Spaces concept is a key element of the ISE 

Enterprise Architecture Framework and helps resolve the information 

processing and usage problems identified by the 9/11 Commission. ISE 

Shared Spaces are networked data and information repositories used by 

ISE participants to make their standardized terrorism-related information, 

applications, and services accessible to other ISE participants. ISE Shared 

Spaces also provide an infrastructure solution for those ISE participants with 

national security system (NSS) network assets, historically sequestered with 

only other NSS systems, to interface with ISE participants having only civil 

network assets. Additionally, ISE Shared Spaces also provide the means for 

foreign partners to interface and share terrorism information with their U.S. 

counterparts. For more information about the ISE Shared Spaces concept, 

reference the ISE Enterprise Architecture Framework and the ISE Profile 

Architecture Implementation Strategy at www.ise.gov. 
14 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

statewide reporting, tracking, and accessing of 

SARs in a manner that ensures consistent use 

of data elements and collection procedures. 

(Refer to Section II.E. Information Technology/

Communications Infrastructure, Systems, 

Equipment, Facility, and Physical Infrastructure; 

the ISE-SAR Functional Standard; and the Findings 

and Recommendations of the Suspicious Activity 

Report (SAR) Support and Implementation Project.)

f. Fusion centers should support or develop training 

for law enforcement and nontraditional partners 

to identify and appropriately report suspicious 

activities, indicators, and warnings. 

5. Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications—

Fusion centers shall ensure that 

alerts, warnings, and notifications are 

disseminated, as appropriate, to state, 

local, and tribal authorities; the private 

sector; and the general public. 

a. Fusion centers shall develop and implement 

a written policy outlining standard operating 

procedures to govern the receipt of further 

dissemination of federally generated alert, 

warning, and notification messages, consistent 

with the intrastate coordination plan called for by 

Section I.A.1. 

b. In response to federally generated alert, warning, 

and notification messages and/or significant 

events, the fusion center shall support or facilitate 

the identification of actions that were taken by 

state, local, and tribal authorities and the private 

sector and report those back to the appropriate 

federal agency. 

c. Adhere to the state and local responsibilities 

for alerts, warnings, and notifications outlined 

in Appendix 1 of the National Strategy for 

Information Sharing (page A1-8). 

6. Situational Awareness Reporting—

Fusion centers shall develop processes 

to manage the reporting to key officials 

and the public of information regarding 

significant events (local, regional, 

national, and international) that 

may influence state or local security 

conditions. 

a. Fusion centers shall develop and implement 

a written policy outlining standard operating 

procedures to govern the receipt and further 

dissemination of federally generated information 

bulletins and other situational awareness messages, 

consistent with the intrastate coordination plan 

called for by Section I.A.1.

b. Adhere to the state and local responsibilities 

for situational awareness reporting outlined 

in Appendix 1 of the National Strategy for 

Information Sharing (page A1-9). 

7. Data Sources—Fusion centers shall 

identify and document data sources and 

repositories needed to conduct analysis 

based on the mission of the center, 

the findings of the Risk Assessment, 

and the center’s defined Information 

Requirements. 

a. Refer to Section II.E. Information Technology/

Communications Infrastructure, Systems, 

Equipment, Facility, and Physical Infrastructure to 

further develop plans for access to data sources 

based on the fusion center’s defined mission and 

core business processes. 

8. Coordination With Response and 

Recovery Officials—Fusion centers shall 

identify and coordinate with emergency 

managers and appropriate response 

and recovery personnel and operations 

centers to develop, implement, and 

maintain a plan and procedures to 

ensure a common understanding of roles 

and responsibilities and to ensure that 

intelligence and analysis capabilities 

can be leveraged to support emergency 

management operation activities, as 

appropriate, when events require such a 

response. 

a. Ensure that the center has identified its intelligence 

and analytical roles and responsibilities 

in accordance with the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS) and Incident 

Command System (ICS). 

b. The plan should identify roles, responsibilities, 

and protocols to govern the timely reporting of 

significant events occurring within state or local 

jurisdictions to federal authorities and, when 

appropriate, other states, localities, or regional 

entities.
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 15

c. Ensure that the plan addresses the contingency 

and continuity-of-operations (COOP) planning 

during an emergency. (See Section II.E.)

9. Coordination With Private Sector and 

Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 

(CIKR) Information Sharing—Fusion 

centers, in partnership with locally 

based federal authorities, shall develop, 

implement, and maintain a plan and 

procedures for sharing information with 

owners of CIKR and, in general, the 

private sector, in a coordinated manner. 

a. All centers shall include in the plan the procedures 

to disseminate alerts, warnings, and notifications 

and other relevant analytic reports to critical 

infrastructure sectors and/or private sector entities 

that are affected by the threat. 

b. The plan should document the decision of the 

center’s governance structure—based on the 

center’s mission, risk assessment, and information 

requirements—whether the center will establish 

a CIKR capability to integrate and analyze threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence data and enable 

and support state, local, and private sector 

decision making and activities to protect CIKR. 

Note: At a minimum, the baseline capabilities 

require fusion centers to have the capability to receive 

information from the private sector and disseminate 

critical information to members of the private 

sector. Beyond those baseline capabilities, some 

fusion centers are encouraged, but not required, to 

incorporate the needs of the CIKR protection activities 

into their Fusion Process. This option should be 

considered by the governance structure as a part of 

the mission development process. (See Section II.A.)

References: For those centers interested in 

incorporating the support of CIKR into their Fusion 

Process, an appendix to this document is being 

developed that will outline the fusion center 

capabilities for supporting CIKR protection activities. 

10. Exercises—Fusion centers should 

conduct or participate in another 

agency’s scenario-based tabletop and live 

training exercises to regularly assess their 

capabilities. 

a. Exercises should include simulations, games, 

tabletops, functional exercises, and full-scale field 

exercises. 

b. Exercises should involve all relevant center 

personnel and constituents and should contribute 

to understanding the value of the statewide Fusion 

Process, the center’s collection plan, the SAR 

process, analytical products, the center’s role in 

the Information Sharing Environment, and the 

center’s role in response and recovery activities in 

accordance with NIMS and ICS. 

c. Centers should use the exercises to validate center 

operations, policies and procedures, and training 

activities and develop action plans to mitigate any 

identified gaps. 
16 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

B. Information Gathering/

Collection and 

Recognition of Indicators 

and Warnings

“The stage in which the planning and 

requirements development stage becomes 

operational...information is collected from 

various sources, including law enforcement 

agencies, public safety agencies, and the private 

sector. This stage is essential for fusion centers 

to be effective.”—Guideline 1, Fusion Center 

Guidelines, p. 21.

1. Information-Gathering and -Reporting 

Strategy—Fusion centers shall develop, 

implement, and maintain an informationgathering and -reporting strategy that 

leverages existing capabilities and shall 

identify methods for communicating 

information requirements and the 

overall information-gathering strategy to 

partners, to include any applicable fusion 

liaison officers.

a. Clearly outline the collection process, including 

how the collectors of information are identified 

and tasked—or if the center lacks the authority 

to task, identify how such requests are made to 

partners.

b. Leverage and/or coordinate with the JTTF and 

other federal, state, local, tribal and private sector 

information sharing and counterterrorism efforts.

c. Clearly outline the processes that partner 

organizations—including law enforcement, public 

safety, private organizations, and the public—use 

to report information to the fusion center.

d. The strategy and associated processes shall be 

consistent with the governance structure’s defined, 

agreed-upon, and auditable privacy policy. 

(Reference Section II.B.) 

2. Feedback Mechanism—Fusion centers 

shall define and implement a feedback 

mechanism that: 

a. Provides the reporting entity an acknowledgement 

of the receipt of its information and, to the 

extent possible, provides feedback on the value 

of the information and actions taken with the 

information. 

b. Allows collectors to make suggestions to improve 

the strategy, plans, or processes, as well as seek 

clarification on information requirements.

c. Allows recipients of information or products to 

make suggestions to improve products.

3. Collection and Storage of Information—

Fusion centers shall define the policies 

and processes and establish a mechanism 

for receiving, cataloging, and retaining 

information provided to the center.

a. Ensure that policies, processes, and mechanisms 

comply with the center’s privacy policy—

particularly regarding data retention, purging, and 

redress. (Reference Section II.B.)

b. Fusion centers should reference the Commission 

on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies 

(CALEA) Standard 51.1.1 regarding intelligence 

collection and the types of information to collect, 

methods for purging out-of-date or incorrect 

information, and procedures for the utilization of 

intelligence personnel and techniques.15

c. Adhere to the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit 

(LEIU) Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines16

15 Additional information regarding CALEA Standard 51.1.1—

Criminal Intelligence is available at 

http://www.calea.org/online/newsletter/no79/criminalintelligence.htm.

16 LEIU Criminal Intelligence File Guidelines—

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/LEIU_Crim_Intell_File_Guidelines.pdf.
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 17

and the LEIU Audit Checklist for the Criminal 

Intelligence Function17 for the maintenance of 

criminal intelligence files. 

d. Adhere to the collection, storage, and retention 

requirements of 28 CFR Part 23.

e. Establish processes to routinely identify progress 

achieved against individual information 

requirements and the overall informationgathering strategy, and provide summary 

assessments to fusion center partners, 

management, and the governance body on a 

routine basis. 

f. The mechanism used to catalog and retain 

information shall enable timely retrieval by the 

center’s analysts. 

g. Develop protocols to ensure the archiving of all 

appropriate data, information, and intelligence to 

support future efforts. 

h. To the extent the processes and mechanisms are 

automated, adhere to the Information Technology/

Communications Infrastructure, Systems, 

Equipment, Facility, and Physical Infrastructure 

capabilities. (Section II.E.) 

C. Processing and Collation 

of Information

“Processing and collation involves evaluating 

the information’s validity and reliability. 

Collation entails sorting, combining, 

17 LEIU Audit Checklist for the Criminal Intelligence Function—

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/LEIU_audit_checklist.pdf.

categorizing, and arranging the data collected so 

relationships can be determined.”—Guideline 1, 

Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 20.

1. Information Collation—Fusion center 

analysts shall use the necessary and 

available tools to process and collate 

information and intelligence to assist 

with accurate and timely analysis.

a. Fusion center analysts should consider utilizing 

the appropriate tools identified in Global’s Analyst 

Toolbox to assist in the collation of information.

b. Fusion center analysts should reference IALEIA and 

Global’s Law Enforcement Analytic Standards when 

developing the processes for collating information.

c. Fusion centers should consider the development 

or utilization of an intelligence collection system 

that allows for the collection, processing, collation, 

and storage of information related to the mission 

of the center.

2. Levels of Confidence—Fusion centers 

shall liaise with partners to ensure that 

information collected is relevant, valid, 

and reliable.

a. Fusion center personnel should consider regular 

meetings with information providers to discuss 

information collection requirements.

b. Fusion center personnel should ensure that 

partners are aware of the various levels of 

confidence of information provided to the center.

i. 28 CFR Part 23 states, “Information shall be 

labeled to indicate levels of sensitivity, levels 

of confidence, and the identity of submitting 

agencies and officers.”

ii. Levels of confidence relate to reliability, 

validity, and relevancy.
18 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

D. Intelligence Analysis and 

Production

“Analysis transforms the raw data into products 

that are useful...the goal is to develop a report 

that connects information in a logical and 

meaningful manner to produce an intelligence 

report that contains valid judgments based on 

analyzed information. ...One of the goals of the 

fusion center during this stage is to identify 

trends or information that will prevent a 

terrorist attack or other criminal activity.”

—Guideline 1, Fusion Center Guidelines, 

pp. 20−21.

1. Analytic Products—Fusion centers shall 

develop, implement, and maintain 

a production plan that describes the 

types of analysis and products they 

intend to provide for their customers 

and partners (which, at a minimum, 

include Risk Assessments; Suspicious 

Activity Reporting; Alerts, Warnings, 

and Notifications; and Situational 

Awareness Reporting [see Sections 

I.A.2, 4, 5, and 6 for further details on 

these product types]), how often or in 

what circumstances the product will be 

produced, and how each product type 

will be disseminated. 

a. Adhere to the tenets in IALEIA and Global’s 

Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet,18

particularly Standards 17, 20, and 21, which 

address Analytic Product Content, Report, and 

Format standards. 

b. The production plan shall be prioritized based on 

the center’s mission, information requirements, 

and priority functions. 

c. Identify stakeholders and customer base for 

specific product lines and request feedback from 

customers to guide future products.

d. Ensure the production of value-added intelligence 

products that support the development of 

performance-driven, risk-based prevention, 

protection, response, and consequence 

management programs.

2. Fusion Process Management—An 

intelligence commander/manager should 

be designated to oversee the management 

of the Fusion Process (including the 

collection, collation, analytic function, 

dissemination, and reevaluation of 

information and intelligence) within the 

center.

a. The commander/manager should address the dayto-day intelligence management functions of the 

center.

b. The commander/manager should prioritize critical 

intelligence products and ensure that the critical 

outputs of the fusion center are accomplished.

c. The commander/manager should have the 

necessary skill sets to oversee the production of 

intelligence products that are effective, efficient, 

and permissible under state and federal laws and 

regulations.

d. The commander/manager should have previous 

experience and management training. 

i. Training should include the intelligence cycle, 

analytical training, intelligence management, 

the role of the fusion center, and legal issues.

18 IALEIA and Global’s Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet 

is available at 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf.
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 19

3. Enhancing Analyst Skills—The fusion 

center should develop and implement a 

Training and Professional Development 

Plan to enhance analysts’ critical 

thinking, research, writing, presentation, 

and reporting skills.

a. The supervisor of the analytic function should 

work with each analyst to draft a Training and 

Professional Development Plan. Components of 

the plan should include training and mentoring 

opportunities for learning new subject matter/

areas of expertise and exposure to new analytic 

techniques and technologies.

i. The initial training goal should be the 

completion of the Foundations of Intelligence 

Analysis Training program or its training 

equivalent and the certification of analysts. 

ii. Adhere to the tenets in IALEIA and Global’s 

Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet,19 

particularly Standards 1−7 for analysts.

iii. Utilize IALEIA and Global’s Law Enforcement 

Analytic Standards and the National Criminal 

Intelligence Sharing Plan in the development of 

the training plan.

b. Analysts should be provided routine opportunities 

to present their analytic findings and receive 

feedback on the quality of their written reports 

and oral presentations.

c. Performance evaluations should be conducted at 

least annually, and the Training and Professional 

Development Plan updated accordingly. 

4. Information Linking—Fusion centers 

shall ensure that analysts are able to 

understand and identify the links 

between terrorism-related intelligence 

and information related to traditional 

criminal activity so they can identify 

activities that are indicative of precursor 

behaviors, terrorist activities, and threats. 

(Guidelines 12, 13, 14, Fusion Center 

Guidelines)

a. Training regarding precursor activities of terrorists 

should be provided to analysts and relevant fusion 

center personnel following the standards outlined 

in the Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training 

19 IALEIA and Global’s Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet 

is available at 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf

Standards for Law Enforcement and Other Criminal 

Justice Agencies in the United States.

20 

b. Ensure that analysts receive training on the analytic 

process, analytical writing and briefing skills, and 

reporting skills. 

5. Strategic Analysis Services—Fusion 

centers shall develop the capability to 

provide strategic analysis services for 

the jurisdiction served. (Guideline 14,

Fusion Center Guidelines.) 

6. Open Source Analysis Capability—

Fusion centers shall establish an open 

source analysis capability utilizing the 

free training and tools provided by the 

federal government.

7. Analyst Specialization—Fusion centers 

should assign “accounts” or “specialties” 

to analysts based on the priorities of the 

fusion center, to allow the development 

of analytic depth.

8. Analytical Tools—Fusion centers shall 

provide the necessary tools to analysts 

for the analysis of information and data. 

(Guidelines 11 and 14, Fusion Center 

Guidelines)

a. Fusion centers should provide all tools outlined in 

Global’s Analyst Toolbox document. 

b. Training should be provided for the identified 

analytic tools so that relevant personnel are 

proficient in their use. 

c. Analysts shall be provided with routine 

mechanisms to communicate with other fusion 

center analysts within the state or region. 

(Examples include “chat rooms” available via 

Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence 

Community of Interest [HS SLIC] or other 

collaborative networks or regular phone calls.)

d. Analysts shall have access to and understanding of 

where to find information sources and available 

expertise to support the information priorities of 

the fusion center. 

20 The Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for Law 

Enforcement and Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States is 

accessible at http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/min_crim_intel_stand.pdf.
20 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

E. Intelligence/Information 

Dissemination

“The process of effectively distributing analyzed 

intelligence utilizing certain protocols in the 

most appropriate format to those in need of the 

information to facilitate their accomplishment 

of organizational goals”—Definition of 

Dissemination, Criminal Intelligence Glossary. 

1. Dissemination Plan—Fusion centers 

shall develop a high-level dissemination 

plan that documents the procedures 

and communication mechanisms for 

the timely dissemination of the center’s 

various products to the core and ad hoc 

customers. 

a. The plan should be consistent with the intrastate 

coordination plan. (See Section I.A.1.) 

b. Consider a variety of methods to distribute 

information, including Web site; 

e-mail; secure portal; regional and national 

information sharing systems such as Regional 

Information Sharing Systems (RISS), Homeland 

Security Information Network (HSIN), Law 

Enforcement Online (LEO), and HS SLIC; pager; 

fax; telephone; video teleconferencing system; 

and personal contact. (Reference Guideline 6, 

Fusion Center Guidelines, for further suggestions.)

2. Reporting of Information to Other 

Centers—Fusion centers shall develop 

the processes and protocols for ensuring 

that relevant and vetted priority 

information is reported to fusion centers 

in other states and localities to support 

regional trends analysis. (Guideline 7, 

Fusion Center Guidelines)

3. Reporting of Information to Federal 

Partners—Fusion centers shall 

develop the processes and protocols, 

in coordination with the FBI and DHS 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

(I&A), for ensuring that relevant and 

vetted priority information is reported to 

the JTTF and other appropriate federal 

agencies to support its inclusion into 

national patterns and trends analysis. 

a. In addition to the priority information processes 

(SAR; Alerts, Warnings, and Notifications; 

and Situational Awareness Reporting), share 

information to address national security and 

criminal investigations.

b. Ensure that information provided to the federal 

government is shared according to the fusion 

center’s privacy policy. (See Section II.B.)

c. Utilize the protocols established in the SAR report, 

National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), 

and Information Exchange Package Documents for 

information exchange.
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 21

F. Reevaluation

“Reevaluation assesses current and new 

information, assists in developing an awareness 

of possible weak areas as well as potential 

threats, and strives to eliminate previously 

identified weaknesses that have been hardened 

as a result of the Fusion Process. Overall, 

this step provides an opportunity to review 

the performance or effectiveness of the fusion 

center’s intelligence function.”—Guideline 1, 

Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 20.

1. Performance Evaluation—Fusion centers 

shall develop and implement a plan to 

reevaluate the center’s performance of 

the intelligence cycle on a regular basis. 

a. Develop mechanisms to receive stakeholder 

feedback on all parts of the intelligence cycle.

b. Incorporate feedback from training and exercises.

c. Update plans and procedures as appropriate.

2. Fusion Center Processes Review—Fusion 

centers shall establish a process to review 

and, as appropriate, update the center’s 

information requirements, collection 

plan, and analytic production strategy on 

a regular basis and any time one of the 

following is received:

a. New threat or vulnerability information;

b. New federal or state standing or ad hoc 

information requirements;

c. Federal or state alerts, warnings, or notifications or 

situational awareness bulletins; and/or

d. Updated risk assessment. 
22 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 23

Fusion Center Capability Areas

Management and 

Administrative Capabilities 

A. Management/Governance

“Fusion centers will have many demands 

placed on them, and it is important to have 

clear priorities.”—Guideline 2, Fusion Center 

Guidelines, p. 23.

“Establishing a governance structure creates a 

supported environment that frames the ability 

for the center to function and operate, assign 

tasks, allocate and manage resources, and 

develop and enforce policy.”—Guideline 3, 

Fusion Center Guidelines, p. 25.

1. Governance Structure—Fusion centers 

shall have a governance structure that 

provides appropriate representation 

for the jurisdictions and disciplines 

in the center’s area of responsibility. 

(Guidelines 3, 4, and 5, Fusion Center 

Guidelines)

a. Ensure that stakeholders have the opportunity 

to provide input into the establishment of 

the governance structure. (See Section II.A.3. 

regarding identifying stakeholders.)

b. The center’s governance body should include 

representatives from the state and local law 

enforcement and public safety disciplines.

i. If the mission of the center is primarily law 

enforcement-focused, the center should 

include representation from the public safety 

II.

“Examples of how to include the private 

sector in the governance structure: 

• Including representatives from the 

Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC), the 

Information Sharing and Analysis Centers 

(ISACs), or InfraGard. 

• Coordinating with an existing critical 

infrastructure or private sector advisory 

council that provides advice to the state 

or major urban area homeland security 

advisor, emergency manager, or law 

enforcement agency.

• Leveraging the expertise of local sector 

associations or coalitions.”
24 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

discipline in at least an advisory capacity. This 

will enhance the center’s ability to perform key 

baseline capabilities, including: 

c. The center’s governance body should include 

representatives from the federal government in at 

least an advisory capacity. 

i. Include local representatives from the FBI (i.e., 

the JTTF and FIG) and appropriate components 

of DHS (i.e., Protective Security Advisor, 

U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency [FEMA], 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

[ICE], United States Secret Service [USSS], etc.).

ii. Also consider including or coordinating with 

the following efforts as appropriate to the 

center’s mission and location: HIDTAs and the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Anti-Terrorism Advisory 

Council (ATAC).

d. Consideration should be given to include 

the perspectives of the private sector, where 

appropriate, in at least an advisory capacity. 

e. Ensure that the governance body is composed of 

officials with decision-making authority, capable of 

committing resources and personnel to the center.

f. Ensure that bylaws for the operations of the 

governance structure are developed and adopted 

by the governance body. 

g. The governance body shall clearly define the 

management and command structure of the 

center. 

h. The governance body should develop and approve 

key fusion center policies, including the center’s 

privacy and security policies. (See Sections II.B. 

and C. for more information on Information 

Privacy Protections and Security capabilities).

i. The governance body shall receive at least annual 

reports on the center’s compliance with the 

defined privacy and security policies. 

j. Develop communication mechanisms to provide 

the governance body with feedback from center 

management and personnel, stakeholders, and 

recipients of information within the state or region. 

k. The governance body should include 

representation from and ensure that the fusion 

center management coordinates with other fusion 

centers within the state (the designated state 

fusion center and/or any UASI fusion center(s)), 

in order to identify the roles and responsibilities 

of each center in carrying out the Fusion 

Process (gathering, processing, analyzing, and 

disseminating of terrorism, homeland security, 

and law enforcement information) on a statewide 

basis. 

l. Review the governance structure and membership 

at regular intervals to determine whether 

additional organizations or disciplines should be 

included based on the current risk assessment and 

the fusion center’s mission. 

2. Mission Statement—Fusion centers 

shall have a defined mission statement 

that is clear and concise and conveys the 

purpose, priority, and roles of the center. 

(Guideline 2, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. The governance body shall develop and adopt the 

mission statement, unless it has been predefined 

by law or executive order. 

b. In defining the mission statement, consideration 

should be given to the risks identified in the 

center’s geographic area of responsibility. 

c. In defining the mission statement, the governance 

body should consider using an all-crimes approach 

and/or an all-hazards approach (see Glossary 

for definition of these terms), recognizing that 

precursor crimes or incidents may have national 

security implications. 

i. If the governance body determines that the 

center will incorporate certain public safety 

disciplines into the fusion center’s mission 

and/or determines the center will use an allhazards approach, centers shall adhere to the 

forthcoming appendices to this document, 

which will outline the baseline capabilities for 

incorporating the following disciplines into the 

center:

a) Fire Service

b) Public Health

c) Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 

ii. If the fusion center utilizes an all-crimes 

approach, the center should liaise with 

applicable agency and multijurisdictional task 

forces and intelligence units, including:

a) Receiving tips from and disseminating 

alerts, warnings, notifications, and 

relevant analytic products to public safety 

organizations; and 

b) Supporting emergency management, 

response, and recovery planning activities 

based on likely threat scenarios and at-risk 

targets.
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 25

a) Gang task forces and intelligence units, 

as well as the National Gang Intelligence 

Center (NGIC)21

b) Narcotic-related task forces and intelligence 

units, as well as the National Drug 

Intelligence Center (NDIC)

c) Violent crime/fugitive task forces and 

intelligence units

d) Economic crime task forces and intelligence 

units

d. The governance body shall provide oversight to 

ensure that the mission statement, the most recent 

risk assessment, and the identified customer 

needs inform the Planning and Requirements 

Development process. (See Section I.A., 

particularly the prioritizing of fusion center 

functions and tasks.)

3. Collaborative Environment—Fusion 

centers shall identify the organizations 

that represent their core (permanent) 

and ad hoc stakeholders and the roles 

and responsibilities of each stakeholder 

and develop mechanisms and processes 

to facilitate a collaborative environment 

with these stakeholders. (Guidelines 4 

and 5, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Review the most recent risk assessment, if 

available, and identify relevant stakeholders 

that should be included to address the highest 

identified risks. 

b. Include the identification of entities and 

individuals responsible for planning, developing, 

and implementing prevention, protection, 

response, and consequence-management efforts 

at the state, local, and tribal levels. 

c. When identifying the roles and responsibilities 

of core and ad hoc stakeholders, identify their 

needs as a customer of the center, as well as their 

contributions to the center (for example: providing 

resources such as funding, personnel, and access 

to expertise or providing access to information or 

databases).

d. After a governance structure has been established 

and a mission statement approved, review 

the identified stakeholders and their roles and 

responsibilities to determine whether any 

21 Those fusion centers utilizing an all-crimes approach that includes 

gang-related criminal intelligence are encouraged to consult Global’s 

Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Gang Intelligence Units and Task 

Forces to assist in the coordination and/or implementation of their efforts.

additional organizations should be included or 

whether roles and responsibilities need to be 

revised based on the center’s defined mission. 

e. Develop standard processes and mechanisms 

to facilitate communication between the 

stakeholders and center personnel, to include inperson meetings and briefings on operational and 

administrative matters, as needed.

f. Develop and implement a Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) or Agreement (MOA) 

and, if needed, nondisclosure agreements (NDA) 

between the center and each stakeholder who 

intends to participate in or partner with the fusion 

center. (Review Guideline 5 for further details.)

g. Ensure that appropriate legal authorities review the 

agreements before signature. 

h. Identify the organizations with executive and 

legislative oversight and funding responsibilities, 

and provide routine briefings on the establishment 

and operations of the center. 

Recommended Resources 

• Refer to Appendix C: 

Functional Categories, Fusion 

Center Guidelines, for a list 

of organizations, disciplines, 

and functions to consider 

including as stakeholders. 

• See Guidelines 4 and 5, Fusion 

Center Guidelines, for issues 

to consider when developing 

MOUs, MOAs, and NDAs. 
26 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

4. Policies and Procedures Manual—Fusion 

centers shall develop a policies and 

procedures manual for center operations. 

(Guideline 15, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Include the center’s mission, goals, policies, 

procedures, rules, and regulations. 

b. Include the center’s privacy policy and its 

physical and information security policies within 

the manual, which should include guidance on 

the use of information specifically for criminal 

investigations and compliance with local and 

state confidentiality laws and how to safeguard 

information. 

c. Outline the roles and responsibilities of all entities 

involved in the center and their function. 

d. Outline the day-to-day management and 

command structure of the center. 

e. Include in the manual the relevant processes 

developed in accordance with the Planning and 

Requirements Development capabilities (Section 

I.A.), to include outlining how and from whom 

intelligence requirements are developed. 

f. Implement an annual review of center directives, 

and purge or revise outdated policies and 

procedures. 

5. Center Performance—Fusion 

centers shall define expectations, 

measure performance, and determine 

effectiveness of their operations. 

(Guideline 16, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Develop outputs and outcomes that measure 

expected performance of identified mission, goals, 

and objectives.

b. Coordinate the development and review of 

measures and performance with participating 

agencies. 

c. Create internal measures pertaining to 

administrative matters and external measures to 

evaluate the performance of the intelligence cycle. 

(See Section I.F., Reevaluation.)

d. Utilize participation in a regular cycle of exercises 

to evaluate capabilities and assess performance. 

(See Section I.A.10.)

e. To the extent possible, leverage systems and 

databases to statistically capture, store, and report 

performance. 

f. Publicize performance to the public, policymakers, 

and customers.

6. Outreach—Fusion centers shall establish 

a policy to govern official outreach 

and communications with leaders and 

policymakers, the public sector, the 

private sector, the media, and citizens 

and develop a plan to enhance awareness 

of the fusion center’s purpose, mission, 

and functions. (Guidelines 12 and 13, 

Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Outreach efforts should include information about 

the center’s privacy policy, the Fusion Process, and 

the types of information that should be reported 

to law enforcement or the fusion center and how 

to do so. 

b. If there is more than one fusion center operating 

within the state, the centers should jointly 

determine how to communicate the value, 

roles, and responsibilities of each of the centers, 

consistent with the plan required by Section I.A.1.

c. Develop a process to liaise with and educate 

elected officials and community leadership to 

promote awareness of center operations.

d. Train personnel on communications policy.
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 27

B. Information Privacy 

Protections22

“Develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and 

civil liberties policy.”—Guideline 8, Fusion 

Center Guidelines.

“Protecting the rights of Americans is a core 

facet of our information sharing efforts. While 

we must zealously protect our Nation from 

the real and continuing threat of terrorist 

attacks, we must just as zealously protect the 

information privacy rights and other legal rights 

of Americans. With proper planning we can 

have both enhanced privacy protections and 

increased information sharing—and in fact, 

we must achieve this balance at all levels of 

government, in order to maintain the trust of 

the American people.”—National Strategy for 

Information Sharing, p. 27.

22 These capabilities were developed to ensure that the privacy 

policies that fusion centers develop are at least as comprehensive as the ISE 

Privacy Guidelines (see the Methodology section for further background). 

The achievement of these capabilities will result in a fusion center privacy 

protection policy that meets the Section 12.d. requirement of the ISE 

Privacy Guidelines. 

1. Privacy Official—Fusion centers shall 

designate an individual to serve as 

the privacy official and/or establish a 

privacy committee to be responsible 

for coordinating the development, 

implementation, maintenance, and 

oversight of the privacy protection 

policies and procedures. (ISE Privacy 

Guidelines—Section 12) 

a. If the privacy official is not an attorney, the 

fusion center shall have access to legal counsel to 

help clarify laws, rules, regulations, and statutes 

governing the collection, maintenance, and 

dissemination of information and assist with the 

development of policies, procedures, guidelines, 

and operation manuals. 

b. The privacy official or committee should review 

all other fusion center policies and procedures to 

ensure consistency with the privacy policy.

c. The privacy official or committee shall coordinate 

with the center’s designated security officer to 

ensure that security measures provide the proper 

protection to information in compliance with all 

applicable laws and the center’s privacy policy 

protection policies.

d. Identify stakeholders to include nongovernment 

organizations, advocates, the media, and others 

that are essential to the development and 

implementation of the privacy policy.

i. To the extent possible, fusion centers should 

use existing outreach mechanisms, such as a 

state or local government’s privacy advisory 

committee, or outreach conducted by the state 

or local law enforcement or homeland security 

organizations to facilitate engagement with the 

community and privacy advocacy groups. 

2. Privacy Policy Development—In 

developing the privacy policy, fusion 

centers shall:

a. Develop guidance statements that include the 

vision, mission, values statements, goals, and 

objectives for the creation of the privacy policy. 

(ISE Privacy Guidelines—Section 3)

b. Develop a project charter that will include an 

introduction, background, membership, and the 

previously drafted guidance statements.

c. Analyze the flow of information and the legal 

environment for the protection of privacy
28 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

use of information) are conducted in 

a manner that protects the privacy, 

civil liberties, and other legal rights 

of individuals protected by applicable 

law, while ensuring the security of the 

information shared. The policy shall 

cover all center activities and shall 

be at least as comprehensive as the 

requirements set forth in the Information 

Sharing Environment Privacy Guidelines 

and consistent with 28 CFR Part 23 

and DOJ’s Global Privacy and Civil 

Liberties Policy Development Guide and 

Implementation Templates. 

a. The privacy protection policy shall include 

procedures to ensure data quality. (ISE Privacy 

Guidelines—Section 5)

i. Establish accuracy procedures to ensure that 

information is accurate, and prevent, identify, 

and correct errors regarding (1) protected 

information and (2) any erroneous sharing of 

information in the ISE. 

ii. Establish and implement a process to provide 

written error notice of any potential error 

or deficiency to the privacy official of the 

source agency when it is determined that 

the protected information received may 

be erroneous, includes incorrectly merged 

information, or lacks adequate context such 

that the rights of the individual may be 

affected.

iii. Adopt and implement the ISE policies and 

procedures for merger of information, 

investigation, and correction/deletion/nonuse 

of erroneous or deficient information, and 

retain only information that is relevant and 

timely for its appropriate use.

b. Establish criteria for types of information that 

partners can submit to the center.

c. Include provisions for the use of privately held 

data systems information and commercially 

obtained data.

d. Review the center’s security policies and ensure 

that they are sufficient for providing appropriate 

physical, technical, and administrative measures 

to safeguard protected information. (See Section 

II.C. and ISE Privacy Guidelines—Section 6.)

i. Ensure that the center’s privacy and civil 

liberties policy articulates a process for 

to identify what gaps exist between existing 

technological and legal requirements.

i. Information flow analysis helps determine what 

personally identifiable information the agency 

collects, uses, maintains, and disseminates. (ISE 

Privacy Guidelines—Section 4)

a) Identify the fusion center’s data holdings 

and establish mechanisms to ensure their 

review before protected information is 

shared through the ISE.

b) Establish mechanisms to identify the 

nature of protected information so it can 

be handled in accordance with applicable 

legal requirements.

ii. All policies and procedures are compliant with 

the U.S. Constitution, the state’s constitution, 

applicable laws, and executive orders. (ISE 

Privacy Guidelines—Section 2)

a) Conduct a rules assessment and adopt 

policies and procedures requiring the fusion 

center to seek, receive, or retain only the 

protected information which it is legally 

permitted to seek, receive, or retain and 

which was lawfully obtained.

b) Establish a process to allow for the ongoing 

identification and assessment of new and/or 

revised laws, court decisions, and policies 

that impact issues related to privacy, civil 

rights, and civil liberties.

c) If an issue posing a significant risk to privacy 

is identified, develop policy and procedural 

protections.

d. Perform a gap analysis to identify legal and 

technological gaps.

e. Vet the privacy protection policy internally and 

externally during its development by soliciting 

commentary and buy-in from stakeholders and 

agency constituents prior to finalizing the policy.

f. Formally adopt a privacy protection policy to 

guide the collection, use, maintenance, and 

dissemination of personal information. (ISE Privacy 

Guidelines—Section 12.d.)

i. Obtain formal adoption of the policy by the 

project team, privacy and civil liberties officer, 

the fusion center’s governance structure and, if 

applicable, any legislative body.

3. Privacy Protections—Fusion centers 

shall develop and implement a privacy 

protection policy that ensures that the 

center’s activities (collection/gathering, 

analysis, dissemination, storage, and 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 29

iii. An overview of sanctions or enforcement 

mechanisms for failure to comply with the 

privacy policy. 

c. Consider and implement appropriate privacyenhancing technologies.

d. Fusion centers shall facilitate public awareness 

of their privacy protection policy by making it 

available to the public or otherwise facilitating 

appropriate public awareness. (ISE Privacy 

Guidelines—Section 10)

5. Privacy Policy Accountability—Fusion 

centers shall ensure accountability 

with regard to the privacy protection 

policy and identify evaluation methods 

for auditing and monitoring the 

implementation of the privacy policy and 

processes to permit individual redress 

and incorporate revisions and updates 

identified through the evaluation and 

monitoring as well as redress processes. 

(ISE Privacy Guidelines—Section 7)

a. Fusion centers shall develop or modify policies, 

procedures, and mechanisms for accountability, 

enforcement, and auditing of the center’s privacy 

protection. (ISE Privacy Guidelines—Section 7)

i. Require reporting, investigating, and 

responding to violations of the center’s privacy 

protection policy.

ii. Encourage cooperation with audits and 

reviews. 

iii. Provide for receipt of error reports by the 

agency privacy official or committee. (See 

Section B.2., above.)

iv. Implement adequate review and audit 

mechanisms to verify the center’s compliance 

with its privacy protection policy.

v. Incorporate the core elements of the 

ISE Privacy Guidelines’ Accountability, 

Enforcement, and Audit guidance into the 

fusion center ISE privacy policy.

b. Fusion centers shall develop internal procedures 

for redress—particularly to address complaints 

from protected persons regarding personally 

identifiable information about them under fusion 

center control. (ISE Privacy Guidelines—Section 8)

i. Incorporate the core elements of the ISE 

Privacy Guidelines Redress guidance into the 

fusion center ISE privacy protection policy.

responding to and addressing security 

breaches, in coordination with the center’s 

designated security officer. (See Section II.C.2.) 

e. The privacy protection policy shall include 

documentation on how the policies and 

procedures meet the following ISE Privacy 

Guidelines requirements (ISE Privacy Guidelines—

Section 12):

i. Fusion centers shall adopt policies and 

procedures limiting the sharing of information 

through the ISE to terrorism, homeland 

security, and law enforcement (terrorismrelated) information, as defined for the ISE (see 

Glossary) and ensure that access to and use of 

protected information23 are consistent with the 

authorized purpose of the ISE.24 (ISE Privacy 

Guidelines—Section 3)

ii. Fusion centers shall identify protected 

information to be shared through the ISE.

4. Privacy Policy Outreach—Fusion 

centers shall implement necessary 

outreach and training for the execution, 

training, and technology aspects of the 

privacy protection policy. (ISE Privacy 

Guidelines—Section 9)

a. Ensure that privacy protections are implemented 

through training, business process changes, and 

system designs.

b. Provide ongoing training to center personnel and 

any other liaison partners on the fusion center’s 

privacy policies and procedures. Training should 

be tailored to the audience (management, 

analysts, collectors, consumers of center products, 

etc.) but, at a minimum, should include:

i. An overview of the policies and procedures 

for collection, use, disclosure of protected 

information, data quality, accountability, 

enforcement, auditing, and redress. 

ii. How to report violations of the privacy policy.

23 The term “protected information” is defined in the ISE Privacy 

Guidelines, Section 1.b., for both non-intelligence agencies and members of 

the Intelligence Community. For both federal non-intelligence agencies and 

SLT agencies, it means, at a minimum, personally identifiable information 

about U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. States are free to 

extend this definition to other classes of persons or to all persons (including 

organizations).

24 The authorized purpose of the ISE is to share terrorism-related 

information in a lawful manner that protects the privacy and other legal 

rights of Americans between and among authorized recipients of such 

information. (ISE Privacy Guidelines—Section 3)
30 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

c. Fusion centers should utilize the LEIU Audit 

Checklist for the Criminal Intelligence Function

when reviewing their “criminal intelligence 

function to demonstrate their commitment to 

protecting the constitutional rights and the privacy 

of individuals, while ensuring the operational 

effectiveness of their criminal intelligence 

function.”25

C. Security

“Ensure appropriate security measures are in 

place for the facility, data, and personnel.”

—Guideline 9, Fusion Center Guidelines.

1. Security Measures—Fusion centers shall 

establish appropriate security measures, 

policies, and procedures for the center’s 

facility (physical security), information, 

systems, and personnel and visitors 

and document them in a security plan 

consistent with the NCISP, the Fusion 

Center Guidelines, Global’s Applying 

Security Practices to Justice Information 

Sharing document, and 28 CFR Part 23. 

(Guidelines 8, 9, and 10, Fusion Center 

Guidelines)

25 LEIU Audit Checklist for the Criminal Intelligence Function, p. i.

2. Security Officer—Fusion centers 

shall designate an individual to serve 

as the security officer responsible 

for coordinating the development, 

implementation, maintenance, and 

oversight of the security plan. (Guideline 

9, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. For fusion centers colocated with other 

organizations (e.g., HIDTA, FBI), the fusion 

center can opt to use the other organization’s 

security officer, provided that the officer is 

willing to perform the capabilities required of 

the fusion center security officer. If a colocated 

organization’s security officer cannot or will not 

perform all of the functions, the fusion center 

should designate an individual to partner with the 

other organization’s security officer to ensure that 

each of the baseline capabilities for security is met. 

b. Ensure that the designated security officer has 

at least some exposure to or experience with 

physical, information, systems, and/or personnel 

security. 

c. Ensure that the security officer receives routine 

training in the areas of physical, information, 

systems, and personnel security, to include the 

relevant DHS- or FBI-required training if the fusion 

center intends to establish and maintain a certified 

storage environment at the Secret level. 

d. The security officer should:

i. Conduct security training and awareness on the 

center’s overall security plan and the center’s 

security measures, policies, and procedures. 

ii. Provide regular updates to the center’s 

management and the governance body on 

compliance with the security plan.

iii. Coordinate with federal security officials to the 

extent needed for facilitating federal security 

clearances for personnel, facility security 

certifications, and access to federal information 

systems. (Reference Section II.E. regarding 

security clearances for personnel.)

iv. Establish and coordinate the processes 

used to conduct background checks on all 

center personnel prior to commencement of 

duties. (Reference Section II.D.2.) 

v. Receive, document, and investigate reports 

of security violations according to the center’s 

security policies. 
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 31

3. Securing Information—Fusion centers’ 

security policies shall address the ability 

to collect, store, and share classified, 

controlled unclassified, and unclassified 

information to address homeland 

security and criminal investigations. 

(Guidelines 7 and 14, Fusion Center 

Guidelines)

a. In coordination with the appropriate federal 

security official, develop a process to receive, 

handle, store, and disseminate Secret-level 

information, to include establishing and 

maintaining a certified storage environment26 if 

one is not readily available.27

b. Fusion centers shall follow the regulations and 

processes for security management of the certified 

storage environment, as required by the federal 

security manager (i.e., DHS or FBI), to include, but 

not limited to:

i. Certification of computers and other electronic 

devices for classified information.

ii. Storage of both paper and electronic media 

containing classified information.

iii. Level of security clearance required to access 

the facility without escort.

iv. Processes for certifying the security clearances 

of individuals assigned to or visiting the facility.

v. Rules for access with escort for individuals 

not holding the requisite level of security 

clearance.

vi. Processes for derivative classification and 

marking of classified information created 

within the facility.

vii. Processes for dealing with any security 

incidents or violations that may take place. 

c. In coordination with the appropriate federal 

agencies, establish a policy to receive, handle, 

store, and disseminate federal information that 

is provided under the Controlled Unclassified 

Information Framework. (See Glossary.) 

26 Certified storage environments will either be DHS-certified Open 

Storage Secret or the equivalent FBI-certified closed storage environment.

NOTE: The Open Storage authorization granted by DHS applies only to 

computer systems and not to document storage. 

27 DHS and the FBI have agreed to allocate the responsibilities 

for the following support to fusion centers to minimize redundancy: 

establishing operating classified work environments, getting personnel 

cleared to be able to access classified information, providing ways to 

communicate with the federal government, and other technical assistance. 

See the most recent version of the Federal Coordinated Support Plan for 

further information regarding these efforts. 

d. Ensure that security policies allow for timely 

distribution of the center’s intelligence products to 

the center’s constituency base, which may include 

daily, weekly, and monthly analysis reports and 

assessments; advisories; alerts; warnings; executive 

reports; briefings; etc.

e. If a fusion center has chosen to incorporate the 

CIKR discipline, it shall have the ability to collect, 

store, and share Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability 

Information (CVI) (in accordance with 6 CFR 

Part 27), Safeguards Information (SGI), Sensitive 

Security Information (SSI) (in accordance with 

49 CFR Part 1520), and Protected Critical 

Infrastructure Information (PCII) in accordance 

with the PCII Final Rule.

f. Consider whether a state law for security and 

confidentiality of public and private sector data is 

needed. 

g. Adopt established, accredited models for 

secure horizontal and vertical information and 

intelligence sharing (e.g., RISS, LEO, HSIN, 

OneDOJ). 

h. Ensure that controls and safeguards for data access 

to all appropriate systems are in place. 

D. Personnel and Training

“Achieve a diversified representation of 

personnel based on the needs and functions 

of the center.”—Guideline 11, Fusion Center 

Guidelines.

1. Staffing Plan—Fusion center managers 

should develop a staffing plan based 

on the center’s mission and goals and 

update as needed based on the current 
32 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

information requirements, collection 

strategy, and analytic production plan. 

(Guideline 11, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Managers should determine which positions 

require access to classified national security 

information based on the roles and responsibilities 

of the position and, through the center’s security 

officer, make the request for national security 

clearances to the federal security manager.28

b. Where appropriate, make clear when employment 

is contingent upon the applicant’s ability to meet 

the requirements necessary for receiving national 

security clearances. 

c. Adhere to the education and hiring standards for 

analysts in IALEIA and Global’s Law Enforcement 

Analytic Standards booklet.29

d. The staffing plan should address the following 

support of functions: administration, information 

technology, communications, graphics, designated 

security officer (Section II.C.), and designated 

privacy official (Section II.B.).

e. The staffing plan should address the center’s 

requirements to access legal counsel to help clarify 

laws, rules, regulations, and statutes governing 

the collection, maintenance, and dissemination 

of information and liaison with the development 

of policies, procedures, guidelines, and operation 

manuals. (Also required by Section II.B.2.a.)

2. Background Checks—Ensure that 

background checks are conducted on 

center personnel (whether private or 

public) prior to the commencement of 

duties. (NCISP Recommendation 27 and 

Guideline 9, Fusion Center Guidelines) 

3. Training Plan—Fusion centers shall 

develop and document a training plan 

to ensure that personnel and partners 

understand the intelligence process and 

the fusion center’s mission, functions, 

plans, and procedures. The plan shall 

identify the basic training needs of all 

center personnel and identify specialized 

28 See Footnote 21.

29 IALEIA and Global’s Law Enforcement Analytic Standards booklet 

is available at 

http://www.it.ojp.gov/documents/law_enforcement_analytic_standards.pdf.

training needed to address the center’s 

mission and current information 

requirements. (Guidelines 12 and 13, 

Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Reference each capability grouping for further 

details on minimum training requirements 

for particular capabilities (e.g., Analysis and 

Production, Management and Governance, 

Information Privacy Protections, and Security).

b. At a minimum, all center personnel should be 

trained on:

i. The intelligence process and types of 

intelligence, crime-specific training, and how 

these factors contribute to implementation 

of the center’s collection plan, through the 

use of the NCISP training objectives and 

the Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training 

Standards for Law Enforcement and Other 

Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States.

ii. Roles and responsibilities of intelligence and 

analytical functions in accordance with NIMS 

and ICS. 

iii. The center’s privacy and security policies and 

protocols. 

c. Training should be provided to all fusion center 

personnel upon assignment to the center and 

include regular retraining. 

i. All fusion center personnel—including analysts, 

intelligence officers, and non-law enforcement 

personnel assigned to the center (corrections, 

fire services, public health, private sector, and 

others)—assigned both full-time, part-time, and 

on an “as needed” basis should be included in 

the training plan.

d. See Guidelines 12 and 13, Fusion Center 

Guidelines, for additional information.
Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 33

E. Information Technology/

Communications 

Infrastructure, Systems, 

Equipment, Facility, and 

Physical Infrastructure

“Integrate technology, systems, and people.”

—Guideline 10, Fusion Center Guidelines.

1. Business Processes Relating to 

Information Technology—Fusion 

centers shall identify and define their 

business processes prior to purchasing 

or developing information technology, 

communications infrastructure, systems, 

or equipment to handle those processes. 

a. Utilize the methodology and templates for 

analyzing the fusion center’s business architecture 

provided by the Global document Fusion Center 

Business Architecture.

2. Information Exchange within the 

Center—Fusion centers shall establish 

an environment in which center 

personnel and partners can seamlessly 

communicate—effectively and efficiently 

exchanging information in a manner 

consistent with the business processes 

and policies of the fusion center. 

(Guidelines 6, 7, and 10, Fusion Center 

Guidelines)

a. Ensure that appropriate personnel are colocated 

and/or virtually integrated within the center. 

b. Leverage databases, systems, and networks 

available from participating entities to maximize 

information sharing, and plan for future 

connectivity to other federal, state, local, and tribal 

systems under development.

c. Utilize the latest version of NIEM for information 

exchange.

d. Maintain a repository of information to be made 

available to the Information Sharing Environment, 

which will be a component of ISE Shared Spaces.30

3. Communications Plan—Fusion centers 

shall have a plan to ensure safe, 

secure, and reliable communications, 

including policies and audit capabilities. 

(Guideline 18, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Identify how fusion center partners will 

communicate during an incident or emergency. 

Ensure that existing communications capabilities 

are interoperable.

b. Incorporate current communications plans utilized 

by law enforcement and emergency services.

c. Ensure that redundancy is incorporated into the 

plan. 

d. Test the communications plan on a routine basis 

to ensure operability and maintenance of current 

contact information for fusion center participants.

e. See Guideline 18 for recommended aspects of the 

communications plan. 

4. Contingency and Continuity-ofOperations Plans—Fusion centers shall 

have contingency and continuity-ofoperations plans to ensure sustained 

execution of mission-critical processes 

and information technology systems 

during an event that causes these systems 

to fail and, if necessary, to ensure 

performance of essential functions at an 

alternate location during an emergency. 

(Guidelines 9, 10, and 18, Fusion Center 

Guidelines)

30 See Footnote 14 or the Glossary for more information on the ISE 

Shared Spaces concept. 
34 Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers

a. Conduct a threat/vulnerability assessment to 

determine risk to the facility, data, and personnel. 

b. Develop the plans in coordination with emergency 

managers and other appropriate response and 

recovery officials. (See Section I.A.8.)

c. Clearly define personnel roles and responsibilities 

during emergency situations. 

d. Ensure that contact information for the 

constituency is up to date. 

e. Ensure redundancy of infrastructure, resources, 

personnel, communications, and systems. 

f. Establish an emergency power source. 

g. Conduct continuity-of-operations exercises to 

ensure the operational resiliency of the center.

h. Reference Guidelines 9, 10, and 18 for 

recommended aspects for developing contingency 

and continuity-of-operations plans. 

F. Funding

“Establish and maintain the center based on 

funding availability and sustainability.”

—Guideline 17, Fusion Center Guidelines.

1. Investment Strategy—Fusion centers 

shall develop an investment strategy to 

achieve and sustain baseline capabilities 

for the center’s operations, including a 

delineation of current and recommended 

future federal versus nonfederal costs. 

(Guideline 17, Fusion Center Guidelines)

a. Base funding on center priorities identified by 

center leadership.

b. Identify capability gaps and develop an investment 

strategy and resource plan to achieve the baseline 

capabilities. 

c. Establish an operational budget. 

d. Leverage existing resources/funding from 

participating entities and identify supplemental 

funding sources. 

e. Ensure that resource commitment of participating 

entities is addressed in the MOU. 

f. Identify return on investment for fusion center 

partners.

g. Engage executive and legislative officials who have 

oversight and funding responsibilities, and provide 

routine briefings on the establishment, operations, 

and budgetary needs of the center. 

h. Ensure that the investment strategy is 

communicated to and coordinated with the 

state homeland security advisor (HSA) and 

State Administrative Agency (SAA) to ensure 

coordination and support of the state’s homeland 

security strategy and any respective state and/or 

urban area grant program investment justifications.
2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 45

Appendix 1

2011 Assessment Attributes

and Scoring

Individual fusion center scores are calculated using the validated Assessment data from 50 attributes aligned to 

the four Critical Operational Capabilities (COC) and four Enabling Capabilities (EC). Each COC is worth 20 points, 

and the ECs combined are worth 20 points (i.e., 5 points each) for a total of 100 points. Since attributes are not 

equally distributed across the COCs and ECs, the value of each attribute between capabilities varies. Each attribute 

is worth a specific value, and an individual fusion center is credited the value once it has successfully achieved 

an attribute. Out of 50 attributes, 30 attributes are aligned to the COCs, and 20 attributes are aligned to the ECs. 

Below is a list of attributes organized according to COCs and ECs. 

COC 1: Receive 5 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or standard operating procedures (SOP) for the receipt of federally 

generated threat information

2. Fusion center has a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses the receipt and handling of National Terrorism 

Advisory System (NTAS) alerts

3. Fusion center staff with a need to access classified information are cleared to at least the Secret level

4. Fusion center has access to sensitive but unclassified information systems (e.g., Homeland Security 

Information Network [HSIN], Law Enforcement Online [LEO], Homeland Security State and Local Community 

of Interest [HS SLIC])

5. Fusion center has access to the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN) and/or the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation Network (FBINet) (i.e., within fusion center or on-site)
46 / 2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report

COC 2: Analyze 11 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or SOPs for assessing the local implications of time-sensitive and 

emerging threat information

2. Fusion center has a documented analytic production plan

3. Fusion center has access to multidisciplinary subject matter experts (SME) within its area of responsibility 

(AOR) to inform analytic production

4. Fusion center has access to multidisciplinary SMEs outside of its state to inform analytic production, as 

required

5. Fusion center has a process to provide the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with information 

and/or intelligence that offers a local context to threat information in the event of an NTAS-related alert

6. Fusion center conducts threat assessments within its AOR

7. Fusion center contributes to or conducts a statewide risk assessment (threat, vulnerability, and consequence 

analysis)

8. Fusion center contributes to national-level risk assessments 

9. Fusion center has a customer satisfaction mechanism for its analytic products

10. Fusion center evaluates the effectiveness of the customer feedback mechanism on an annual basis

11. All fusion center analysts have received at least 20 hours of issue-specific training in the past 12 months

COC 3: Disseminate 6 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has approved plans, policies, or SOPs governing the procedures for the timely dissemination of 

products to customers within its AOR

2. Fusion center has a dissemination matrix

3. Fusion center has a primary sensitive but unclassified mechanism to disseminate time-sensitive information 

and products

4. Fusion center has a plan, policy, or SOP that addresses dissemination of NTAS alerts to stakeholders within its 

AOR

5. Fusion center has a mechanism to disseminate NTAS alerts

6. Fusion center has a process for verifying the delivery of products to intended customers
2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report / 47

COC 4: Gather 8 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has an approved Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) site plan or an 

approved plan, policy, or SOP governing the gathering of locally generated information

2. Fusion center has a tips and leads process

3. Fusion center has a process for identifying and managing information needs

4. Fusion center has a process for managing the gathering of locally generated information to satisfy the fusion 

center’s information needs

5. Fusion center has approved Standing Information Needs (SIN)

6. Fusion center has an annual process to review and refresh SINs

7. Fusion center has a request for information (RFI) management process

8. Fusion center has a process to inform DHS of protective measures implemented within its AOR in response to 

an NTAS alert

EC 1: Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (P/CRCL) Protections 6 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has a privacy policy determined by DHS to be at least as comprehensive as the Information 

Sharing Environment (ISE) Privacy Guidelines

2. Fusion center provides formal and standardized training to all personnel on the fusion center’s privacy policy 

annually

3. Fusion center’s policies, processes, and mechanisms for receiving, cataloging, and retaining information 

(provided to the center) comply with 28 CFR Part 23

4. Fusion center trains all personnel who access criminal intelligence systems in 28 CFR Part 23

5. Fusion center has identified a P/CRCL Officer for the center

6. Fusion center has a privacy policy outreach plan
48 / 2011 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report

EC 2: Sustainment Strategy 5 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has an approved strategic plan

2. Fusion center conducts an annual financial audit

3. Fusion center completes an annual operational cost assessment

4. Fusion center participates in an exercise at least once a year

5. Fusion center measures its performance and determines the effectiveness of its operations relative to 

expectations it or its governing entity has defined

EC 3: Communications and Outreach 3 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has a designated Public Information Officer or Public Affairs Officer

2. Fusion center has an approved communications plan

3. Fusion center has a process for capturing success stories

EC 4: Security 6 Attributes

Fusion Center Attributes

1. Fusion center has an approved security plan that addresses personnel, physical, and information security

2. Fusion center trains all personnel on the fusion center’s security plan

3. Fusion center has a designated Security Liaison

4. Fusion center’s Security Liaison (or other organization’s Security Liaison) completes annual training

5. Fusion center has access to the Central Verification System (CVS)

6. Fusion center’s Security Liaison (or other organization’s Security Liaison) is trained on how to use CVS