NOT YET 

IMAGINED 

A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

CHRISTOPHER GAINOR

NOT YET 

IMAGINED

NOT YET 

IMAGINED 

A STUDY OF 

HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE 

OPERATIONS

CHRISTOPHER GAINOR

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Office of Communications

NASA History Division

Washington, DC 20546

NASA SP-2020-4237
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Gainor, Christopher, author. | United States. NASA History Program Office, 

publisher.

Title: Not Yet Imagined : A study of Hubble Space Telescope Operations / Christopher 

Gainor.

Description: Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Office 

of Communications, NASA History Division, [2020] | Series: NASA history series ; 

sp-2020-4237 | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Dr. 

Christopher Gainor’s Not Yet Imagined documents the history of NASA’s Hubble 

Space Telescope (HST) from launch in 1990 through 2020. This is considered 

a follow-on book to Robert W. Smith’s The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, 

Science, Technology, and Politics, which recorded the development history of HST. 

Dr. Gainor’s book will be suitable for a general audience, while also being scholarly. 

Highly visible interactions among the general public, astronomers, engineers, government officials, and members of Congress about HST’s servicing missions by Space 

Shuttle crews is a central theme of this history book. Beyond the glare of public 

attention, the evolution of HST becoming a model of supranational cooperation 

amongst scientists is a second central theme. Third, the decision-making behind the 

changes in Hubble’s instrument packages on servicing missions is chronicled, along 

with HST’s contributions to our knowledge about our solar system, our galaxy, and 

our universe. A fifth theme of the book covers the impact of HST and the images it 

produces on the public’s appreciation for the universe.” Provided by publisher.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020014193 (print) | LCCN 2020014194 (e-book) | ISBN 

9781626830615 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781626830622 (e-book) 

Subjects: LCSH: Space Telescope History Project (U.S.) | Space telescopes—History. 

Classification: LCC QB500.268 .G35 2020 (print) | LCC QB500.268 (e-book) | 

DDC 522/.2919—dc23 

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020014193

LC e-book record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020014194

This publication is available as a free download at

http://www.nasa.gov/ebooks.

9 781626 830622

90000

ISBN 978-1-62683-062-2
v

CONTENTS

▲ The Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS) instrument aboard the Hubble Space Telescope captured this 

view of the Orion Nebula in 2006. (NASA/ESA/M. Robberto [STScI/ESI]/HST Orion Treasury Project Team: heic0601a)

Foreword by Charles F. Bolden, Jr. vii

Preface xi

PROLOGUE Launching the Hubble Space Telescope 1

CHAPTER ONE A Troubled History 9

CHAPTER TWO Spherical Aberration 53

CHAPTER THREE The Road to Recovery 77

CHAPTER FOUR The Power of the Image 117

CHAPTER FIVE New Instruments and New Directions 143

CHAPTER SIX The Universe Turned Inside Out 175

CHAPTER SEVEN The Fall and Rise of Hubble’s Last Servicing Mission 209

CHAPTER EIGHT Operating the Hubble Space Telescope 249

CHAPTER NINE Astronomy: A Science Transformed 287

CONCLUSION The World’s Most Famous Telescope 329

Appendices 343

Acronyms 359

Bibliography 361

Acknowledgments 381

The NASA History Series 389

Index 403

vii

FOREWORD

▲ Image of NGC 2174, the Monkey Head Nebula, taken by Hubble’s Wide Field Camera 3 in 2014. 

(NASA/ESA/Hubble Heritage Team [STScI/AURA]: heic1406a)

by Charles F. Bolden, Jr.

NASA Administrator, 2009–2017

One of the highlights of my career at 

NASA was helping deploy the Hubble 

Space Telescope (HST) from the payload bay of the Space Shuttle Discovery on 

25 April 1990, and watching Hubble begin its 

amazing decades exploring the universe from 

Earth orbit.

As pilot of the STS-31 mission, I spent 

much of that day at the aft station on 

Discovery’s flight deck. There, I helped mission commander Loren Shriver fly the Shuttle and helped remote manipulator 

system (RMS) operator Steve Hawley lift HST out of the payload bay. As I 

read out position numbers to Steve and monitored Hubble’s movements, Steve 

discovered that the robotic arm in space did not behave in the same way as the 

arm in the simulator on Earth. Steve had almost no room for error—there was 

barely enough room to fit my fist into the space between HST and the side of 

the payload bay—and so he had to spend nearly an hour more than expected 

slowly and gently moving the gigantic Hubble out of the payload bay by moving 

one joint of the RMS at a time.

Once HST was safely above the payload bay but still in the grasp of the 

robotic arm, we deployed Hubble’s two antennas and the first of its two large 

solar arrays. The second solar array failed to fully deploy, and we worried about 

the limited battery time on HST running out before the solar array could deploy. 

▲ Major General Charles F. 

Bolden, Jr., NASA Administrator 

2009–2017. (NASA: 200907290001HQ)
viii NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

The decision was made that our other two crewmembers, Kathy Sullivan and 

(the late) Bruce McCandless, should get into their spacesuits and get ready 

to go outside and help deploy the solar array. I immediately went down to the 

middeck to assist Bruce and Kathy donning their extravehicular mobility unit 

(EMU) spacesuits and move into the airlock.

As we depressurized the airlock, we got word from Mission Control of a 

possible solution to the solar array problem. The HST control team at Goddard 

Space Flight Center transmitted a command that bypassed a software module 

in the telescope designed to protect the arrays from excessive tension that could 

damage an array. When a new deploy command was sent, the array opened 

properly. Loren maneuvered Discovery into the proper deploy attitude, Steve 

released HST from the robotic arm, and Loren moved the Shuttle away from 

Hubble, completing the deployment as I photographed the scene.

The moment was bittersweet because Bruce and Kathy, who may have had 

more time with Hubble than any other people on the planet, were still inside 

the airlock and missed the historic moment of deployment. At that time, no one 

in the astronaut office had done more work to prepare for this moment than 

Bruce and Kathy. My two crewmates had also helped devise tools and procedures to deploy and service HST. They had seen to it that Hubble was fitted 

with handholds and grapple fixtures, and their work paid off years later when it 

came time to service and repair HST on future missions.

Most of our crew had been named to the HST deployment mission nearly 

five years before we actually flew, so we had plenty of time to prepare, think, 

and talk about Hubble. We all agreed that Hubble would revolutionize astronomy and astrophysics, but looking back, I now realize that none of us had any 

idea of what a game changer it would be. 

Our crew had even flown to England to visit the British Aerospace plant 

where HST’s solar arrays were being built, but we did not realize how useful 

that trip would be for our deployment mission. Although we had thought about 

contingencies we might face, we didn’t yet know how important Shuttle servicing missions would be to carrying on the work of the Hubble Space Telescope.

After we returned home from STS-31, I hoped to get another flight to HST. 

That didn’t happen, but more than two decades later, after I had flown twice 

more to space and then wrapped up my career in the U.S. Marine Corps, 

Hubble returned to my life.

That came in 2004, after the tragic loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and 

the crew of STS-107 caused NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe to cancel the 

fifth and final HST servicing mission. I was asked to join a high-level committee 

of the National Academies reviewing options for extending the life of HST. Our 
Forew

committee concluded that proposals to service HST using robotic spacecraft 

were not yet viable, and so we recommended that NASA permit another crewed 

servicing mission with additional safety measures.

That servicing mission (STS-125) ultimately flew in 2009, just weeks before 

I became Administrator of NASA. The mission’s outstanding success meant 

that I never had to make a difficult decision about Hubble, but I had the pleasure of taking part in celebrations of its 20th and 25th anniversaries on orbit. 

As HST reaches its 30th year in space with an amazing record of accomplishment, I thank all the people from all parts of NASA that have made these 

scientific achievements possible. That includes the people of Marshall Space 

Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, who supervised the building of HST; the 

people of Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, who control 

Hubble and created the tools and techniques to repair it; the people of Johnson 

Space Center in Houston, Texas, where astronauts like me prepared for Shuttle 

servicing missions and where those missions were controlled; and the people of 

Kennedy Space Center in Florida, where Shuttles and their cargos, including 

HST and its replacement instruments, were prepared for flight and launched.

Our partners in the European Space Agency (ESA) have played a major role 

in HST in the form of solar panels, the Faint Object Camera, and scientists who 

made outsized contributions to Hubble’s research findings. 

Many contractors helped make HST a reality, including the Space Telescope 

Science Institute, which organizes HST’s scientific work, and Lockheed 

Martin, which built Hubble and continues supporting the maintenance and 

control of HST.

Hubble’s reach extends around the world because observing time on the telescope and its archives are open to anyone on Earth. Scientists from every part 

of the world and even a few amateur astronomers have been granted observing 

time on the Hubble Space Telescope. Larger numbers of people have used data 

from HST for their research projects.

As I write these words, Hubble and its instruments continue to provide 

world-leading science to the astronomers and astrophysicists around the world. 

With its five instruments and its Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS) also providing observations, Hubble is far more than a telescope—it’s a fully equipped 

observatory.

Hubble has looked back most of the way to the early days of the universe, and 

we anticipate deeper views into the past with the James Webb Space Telescope.

This book, which examines HST’s first three decades of operation, fulfills 

another NASA commitment, this one to disseminate our findings as widely as 

possible. We have learned many lessons from Hubble that are best explained 
x NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

through histories such as this book. I hope it will help more people appreciate 

the phenomenal work done by the people of NASA, our partners at ESA, and 

our contractors, to make Hubble the gigantic success it has become.
xi

PREFACE

▲ The Bubble Nebula, or NGC 7635, was crafted from Wide Field Camera 3 images in 2016. 

(NASA/ESA/Hubble Heritage Team [STScI/AURA]: STScI-2016-13)

... the chief contribution of such a radically new and more powerful 

instrument would be, not to supplement our present ideas of the universe we 

live in, but rather to uncover new phenomena not yet imagined...

—Lyman Spitzer, Jr., 1946

The most important discoveries will provide answers to questions that we do 

not yet know how to ask and will concern objects we have not yet imagined.

—John N. Bahcall, 19901

T

he launch of the Hubble Space Telescope in 1990 began a lengthy period 

of scientific work in space that has reached 30 years and is continuing 

as this study is being completed. First and foremost, this book tells the 

story of HST operations during that time. That story is much bigger than HST 

itself. Hubble is a project of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

and the European Space Agency, and it also involves many private contractors, universities, and individuals. In addition to the space telescope itself, HST 

operations depended on NASA control centers on the ground, facilities where 

astronauts and others prepared deployment and servicing missions for HST 

using the Space Shuttle, a scientific institute that was created to serve scientists from many nations who have made observations with HST, and European 

Space Agency facilities. All of these facilities and institutions have evolved during HST’s time on orbit.

The Hubble Space Telescope is almost unique amongst NASA programs 

and spacecraft in terms of its longevity. Spacecraft such as the two Voyagers 

have operated longer than HST, but their primary missions were completed 
xii NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

roughly 12 years after they were launched. The Chandra Space Telescope was 

launched nine years after HST and is still operating. The International Space 

Station has been on orbit for more than 20 years. HST has been carrying out its 

primary mission for 30 years and counting, thanks to five maintenance, repair, 

and replacement missions involving the Shuttle and its astronauts that have 

increased Hubble’s capabilities over its lifespan. The last Shuttle servicing mission to Hubble took place in 2009, less than 20 years after HST was launched. 

Hubble has continued to operate without benefit of on-orbit servicing for more 

than a decade.

HST is still transmitting images and data to the ground for the use of scientists and, in some cases, the appreciation of the public, and there is a good 

prospect that it will continue to do so for years to come. Even after Hubble 

completes its final observation, it will still be far too early to properly assess the 

impact and importance of HST’s scientific bounty, since many of its observations are going straight to archives where they may remain for years before they 

are used and their importance realized. Because Hubble is still actively exploring the universe, this book should be considered an early draft of history that 

discusses some events that took place decades ago and some that occurred as 

research and writing was going on.

NASA has statutory responsibility to “provide for the widest practicable 

and appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the 

results thereof.”2 From its beginnings, NASA has included the study of history and historians within the meaning of this responsibility, centered in the 

NASA History Division at Headquarters. NASA has supported the creation 

of many quality books, monographs, and chronologies on its programs, and it 

maintains archives that relate to its work. NASA has assisted in historical work 

on HST that began long before it was launched in 1990, and the best-known 

product of this support was Robert W. Smith’s 1989 book on how HST was 

transformed from an idea to a fully built space telescope ready for launch into 

space, The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology, and Politics.

That book remains the outstanding study of how HST was created and is noteworthy for its exploration of the interplay between scientists, engineers, politicians, and industrialists that shaped the Hubble Space Telescope and brought 

it to the launch pad in 1990 as a prime example of what has become known as 

Big Science.3

In 2014, nearly a quarter century after HST was launched, Goddard Space 

Flight Center issued a request for proposals to create a history of HST operations, along with an archive of documents and interviews with program participants to support this and future historical studies. I began research work on 
Prefac

this book later that year. The idea behind starting this study while Hubble was 

still operating was the reality that many participants in the early phases of the 

program were leaving the scene and some source documents were becoming 

more difficult to find. My work on this book has benefitted from strong support from NASA personnel at Goddard and the NASA History Division, which 

has agreed to publish this study. The work that led to this book has also been 

assisted by personnel from other NASA Centers, the Space Telescope Science 

Institute, and other NASA contractors, along with scientists who have used 

observing time and data from HST.

To understand HST operations, chapter one examines the events that 

brought HST to the launch pad in 1990. It is important to look back to how 

the ideas of space exploration and space astronomy led both to the Hubble 

Space Telescope and to the Space Shuttle that carried HST into space and then 

was used to mount servicing missions to it. Not all astronomers embraced the 

idea of HST, and its promoters had to work hard to win approval for the space 

telescope in the straitened economic circumstances of the 1970s. The HST 

program was often under managerial and financial stress that underlaid the 

error that was introduced into HST’s main mirror while it was being ground and 

polished. The defect in the mirror forms the heart of the story of HST’s first 

four years on orbit, which is outlined in chapters two and three, as scientists 

and engineers learned and absorbed what had happened to the mirror and then 

created and implemented solutions to the defect, known as spherical aberration, that resulted from the mirror’s incorrect shape.

Once the mirror problem was overcome during the first Shuttle servicing 

mission in December 1993, HST quickly became one of NASA’s signature programs, thanks to the images it has obtained of objects as close as the Moon 

and as far away as galaxies billions of light-years distant. As HST began operations, millions of people equipped with newly created personal computers tied 

together on a newly expanded computer network known as the internet acquired 

new ways of collecting images and other data from HST. Scientists have also 

gained undreamed-of online access to Hubble data thanks to these new means 

of communications. Chapter four examines HST’s place in the advent of cyberspace and the power of its images in publicizing and promoting astronomy.

HST is unique among robotic spacecraft because it was serviced, repaired, 

and upgraded five times by Shuttle astronauts during its first 20 years on orbit. 

All of those servicing missions involved NASA’s Space Shuttle training and 

launch facilities, along with the contractors who built the instruments, tools, 

and other equipment needed for these flights. Scientists who use HST played 

a major role in selecting and creating the instruments that were installed on 
xiv NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Hubble during those servicing missions. Each of these servicing missions had 

its own goals and its own history, which are related in this book. The stories of 

the second, third, and fourth servicing missions are recounted in chapter five.

As an observatory using the most powerful telescope launched into space at 

that time and a variety of instruments to image, measure, and analyze distant 

objects, Hubble has made a major impact on our understanding of the universe. 

Chapter six takes a preliminary look at HST’s scientific output, starting with an 

examination of how teams of astronomers are using HST and other telescopes 

to determine the size and age of the universe with greater precision than ever 

before. These measurements led to the surprising discovery that the universe 

is expanding at an accelerating rate, which opened new questions about what 

the universe is made of. A series of “Hubble Deep Field” images has looked 

back to the early days of the universe. Other HST scientific advances include 

supermassive black holes in the centers of galaxies, views of the birth and death 

of stars, views of planets orbiting other stars, and tracking of weather on planets 

in our own solar system.

After the fourth Shuttle servicing mission visited HST in 2002, astronomers 

hoped to see Hubble’s life extended well beyond its originally planned 15 years 

with one more servicing mission and hopes for another. But less than a year 

later, the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew put the future of 

the Shuttle Program into question. By early 2004, NASA Administrator Sean 

O’Keefe had decided to cancel the fifth HST servicing mission, setting off an 

unexpectedly large controversy amongst astronomers and the public about the 

future of HST. Chapter seven outlines these events and the subsequent decision made by O’Keefe’s successor Michael Griffin to proceed with the mission, 

which turned out to be a great success that has added more than a decade of 

life to HST. 

Chapter eight focuses on the infrastructure back on Earth that supports 

HST and how it has evolved over the three decades of HST operations. The 

control facilities at Goddard and the scientific work of the Space Telescope 

Science Institute (STScI) began with preparations for Hubble’s observing work 

prior to its launch. As HST changed over its time on orbit, so did these crucial 

facilities. This chapter also examines the European Space Agency’s role in HST 

and the financial cost of the program.

As a unique and prominent astronomical facility with high demand for 

observing time and data, HST has driven change within astronomy as recounted 

in chapter nine. To obtain time on Hubble, astronomers have formed bigger 

research teams. The creation of STScI gave scientists a powerful voice in the 

running of HST, and the model has been adopted for similar facilities. NASA, 
Pref

for its part, has become the major force in funding astronomy in the United 

States. Both NASA and STScI have been involved in opening astronomy to 

female astronomers and also to scientists from visible minorities, but that effort 

has not always been easy. Where once observatories were private and data were 

the property of individual observers, HST as a public facility has opened data 

availability to the public.

While HST has long been known as an example of Big Science, this book 

will argue that it has also helped create what I call mass science by encouraging 

the creation of larger teams in astronomical studies and by making astronomical data available to the public. Hubble’s high profile has raised the prominence 

of astronomy at a time when the numbers of professional astronomers have 

been growing. NASA has fostered this growth by providing financial support to 

astronomers using HST and other space telescopes and by creating the infrastructure that supports these instruments. Thanks in part to its prominent status in the early years of the internet, HST has allowed large numbers of people 

who had never looked through a telescope to explore the heavens in the comfort 

of their own homes. The fact that the internet came into wide use in the early 

years of Hubble operations made HST an early star of the online world and had 

a major impact on HST’s relationship with astronomers and, more importantly, 

the public at large.

Hubble also was a key part of the Space Shuttle Program because of the six 

Shuttle missions that deployed and serviced it. Many of the techniques developed to help astronauts keep HST flying were applied to build the International 

Space Station (ISS). This book will discuss the evolution of HST servicing that 

started well before the first servicing mission. It will also explore the littleknown processes involved in choosing the instruments that were placed on 

board HST during those servicing missions. While those changes to Hubble 

have been well publicized, the infrastructure that supported it on the ground is 

not as well known, and so a major theme of this study is the evolution of that 

infrastructure, especially the control center at Goddard and the science center 

for Hubble at STScI.

HST is one of the most famous projects undertaken by any space agency. 

Although it is a robotic spacecraft, it was regularly visited and serviced by astronauts. It was not the first telescope to fly in space, but it was the first designed to 

meet public expectations of images of various objects populating our universe. 

Its main mission was to observe the universe in ways previously not possible, 

and the data it has returned have sharpened and expanded humanity’s view of 

the universe while raising new questions about its nature. Space telescopes that 

are following Hubble are taking different forms and have different purposes. 
xvi NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

We have already learned that the creation of HST held many lessons about 

large scientific programs, and its lengthy period of operations in space contains 

many more lessons about high-profile science that are recounted in the pages 

that follow.

ENDNOTES

1 Spitzer quotation from “Astronomical Advantages of an Extra-Terrestrial Observatory,” 

Project RAND, 30 July 1946. Bahcall was quoted in Timothy Ferris, “The Space Telescope: A Sign of Intelligent Life,” New York Times (29 April 1990): A1.

2 Section 203 (a)(3), National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law No. 85-568, 

72 Stat., p. 426. Signed by the President on 29 July 1958, Record Group 255, National 

Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC; available in NASA Historical Reference Collection, History Office, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC (hereafter “HRC”

3 Robert W. Smith, The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, Technology, and Politic

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Cambridge published a paperback 

edition of this book with additional material in 1993. This work uses the 1993 edition 

for reference.
1

PROLOGUE

Launching the

Hubble Space Telescope

▲ In December 2010, WFC3 recorded this view of the UGC 1810 galaxy within the constellation 

Andromeda. (NASA/ESA/Hubble Heritage Team [STScI/AURA]: heic1107a)

One of the most anticipated launches of the Space Shuttle era took place 

on Tuesday, 24 April 1990. After many delays, including one scrubbed 

launch attempt two weeks before, the Space Shuttle orbiter Discovery 

and its crew of five astronauts left Launch Complex 39B at John F. Kennedy 

Space Center in Florida at 51 seconds past 8:33 a.m. eastern daylight time atop 

a thundering pillar of brilliant flame, piercing a cloud as it rose through a generally clear sky.1 Soon the Shuttle tilted nearly due east en route to an orbit at a 

standard inclination of 28.45 degrees from the equator. Nearly 9 minutes after 

launch, the Shuttle engines stopped firing and Discovery cast off its fuel tank as 

it coasted up to what was then a record altitude for a Shuttle of 618 kilometers 

(384 statute miles), an orbit that was circularized at that altitude with a thruster 

firing three quarters of an hour after launch.2

The focus of excitement around the launch was Discovery’s payload, a huge 

satellite known as the Edwin P. Hubble Space Telescope (HST) that nearly filled 

the Shuttle’s payload bay. While a number of space telescopes had flown starting 

in the 1960s, many people inside and outside the astronomical community looked 

forward to the deployment of the HST, which would be much more powerful 

and versatile than any previous astronomy satellite. The National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration (NASA) began working in earnest on the space telescope in 1977, and it became an international project when the European Space 

Agency (ESA) signed on that year as a partner on the space telescope.3

As launch day approached, the news media provided lavish coverage of the 

Hubble Space Telescope, explaining that it weighed nearly 11,000 kilograms 
2 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

(24,000 pounds) and was 13.2 

meters (43 feet) long and 4.2 meters 

(14 feet) in diameter, comparable 

in size to a school bus or a railroad 

tank car. Hubble’s 2.4-meter (94-

inch) main mirror was designed to 

direct light to a 0.3-meter (12-inch)-

diameter secondary mirror that in 

turn reflected light to the telescope’s 

five science instruments and its 

three Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS). 

The space telescope was reported to 

cost $2.1 billion and was expected 

to operate for 15 years or more. 

Many media reports highlighted 

the accuracy and smoothness of the 

main mirror—quoting the statement of its maker that if the mirror 

were enlarged to the size of Earth, 

it was so smooth that its highest 

peak would only be five inches (127 

millimeters) tall.4

▲ The Space Shuttle Discovery carrying the 

Hubble Space Telescope into space on the 

STS-31 mission shortly after launch from 

Kennedy Space Center on 24 April 1990. 

(NASA: KSC-90PC-0633)

Some of the media accounts also 

tried to predict what the space telescope would discover as it looked 

at everything from nearby planets 

to objects at the fringes of the universe. The Washington Times said 

HST would tackle questions including: “How did the universe start? How will it end? Are there other worlds?”5

USA Today also speculated on Hubble’s ability to find planets orbiting other 

stars. Both the New York Times and Washington Post compared HST’s effect 

on astronomy to Galileo’s first glimpses of the heavens with the newly invented 

telescope back in 1609.6

Astronomers involved with the program also weighed in. “If we are disappointed, it’s not the telescope’s fault or our fault,” astrophysicist John N. Bahcall 

of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, told the New 

York Times magazine. “It will be because of a lack of imagination on the part 

of God.”7 Lennard A. Fisk, NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science, 
PROLOGUE . Launching T

said, “Hubble will be a turning point in humankind’s perception of itself and its 

place in the universe. Hubble represents the single biggest leap in astronomy 

since Galileo.”8

Amidst the superlatives, other accounts took a more critical stance, notably 

the Wall Street Journal, whose reporter Bob Davis called Hubble “an example 

of Big Science gone bad,” and a “case study of how science projects get out of 

hand.” The article detailed the telescope’s tangled history along with its politically motivated design compromises and shortcomings, comparing it to two 

other large and controversial science-related projects, NASA’s space station and 

the Energy Department’s superconducting supercollider.9 The Washington Post

noted that some “Hubble hype” had become overblown and quoted historian 

Robert W. Smith’s statement that HST “has become the single most expensive 

scientific instrument ever built.”10

▲ An IMAX camera in the rear of Discovery’s payload bay obtained this image of the Hubble 

Space Telescope moments after its release into space by the Space Shuttle Remote 

Manipulator System on 25 April 1990 during the STS-31 mission. (NASA: 9015550)
4 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS ◂ A “fish-eye” lens captured this view 

of the aft flight deck of Space Shuttle 

Discovery while crew members were 

looking out overhead windows at the 

Hubble Space Telescope during the 

telescope’s deployment. From front 

(foreground) to back are Loren J. 

Shriver, commander, along with Steven 

A. Hawley and Bruce McCandless II, both 

mission specialists. (NASA: S31-10-027)

▸ The mission insignia for NASA’s STS-31 mission features 

the Hubble Space Telescope against a background of 

the universe. (NASA: 8915493)

▲ The STS-31 crew posed in Discovery’s middeck for an in-flight portrait. Loren J. Shriver, 

mission commander, is at the lower left. Astronaut Charles F. Bolden, pilot, floats above. 

Others, left to right, are Kathryn D. Sullivan, Bruce McCandless II, and Steven A. Hawley 

(holding a model of the Hubble Space Telescope), all mission specialists. (NASA: S31-12-031)
PROLOGUE . Launching T

Although the mission was known officially as STS-31 under the Shuttle’s convoluted flight designation scheme, its importance to NASA was shown by the 

fact that the crew on board Discovery was made up entirely of veteran astronauts. Piloting the Shuttle were commander Loren J. Shriver and pilot Charles F. 

Bolden, who nearly 20 years later would become Administrator of NASA. Steven 

A. Hawley, who was educated as an astrophysicist, had responsibility for deploying 

HST using the Shuttle’s remote manipulator system, and two veteran spacewalkers, Bruce McCandless II and Kathryn D. Sullivan, had trained for an emergency 

spacewalk should the deployment of the space telescope run into problems.11

Discovery’s payload bay doors opened shortly after it entered orbit, and soon 

Hawley activated the Shuttle’s 15-meter (50-foot)-long Canadian-built robotic 

arm. When the crew powered up HST’s systems from the Shuttle four and a 

half hours into the mission, Hubble radioed its condition to the Space Telescope 

Operations Control Center at Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, 

Maryland. The next morning, Hawley grasped HST with the arm. Once the 

four latches holding HST inside the payload bay were released, the umbilical cord that fed electricity to Hubble from the Shuttle was unplugged and 

the telescope began operating under its own power. Veteran astronaut F. Story 

Musgrave in the mission control room in Houston gave Hawley the go-ahead to 

lift the space telescope out of the payload bay. Using the robotic arm, Hawley 

carefully lifted HST away from its tight fit inside the payload bay and turned 

the telescope around to its deployment position, although the operation took 

about 25 minutes longer than expected because the robotic arm’s movements 

of HST were slightly different from what was expected based on simulations. 

Because Hubble’s batteries could only power the spacecraft for six and a half 

hours without a charge from its two solar panels, the deployment of the solar 

panels had long been a matter of great concern, and this concern grew with 

the delay in moving HST out of the payload bay. The booms holding the panels 

unfolded from the body of the telescope, as did two high-gain antennas. The 

solar panels on the port side unfurled smoothly, but the starboard solar panels stalled and refused efforts by the crew and ground controllers to resume 

unfurling. McCandless and Sullivan donned their spacesuits, began to depressurize their airlock, and prepared to exit the Shuttle and manually unfurl the 

starboard solar panels. At the same time, engineers on the ground devised a 

procedure to bypass a sensor that had erroneously detected excessive tension 

on the panel and stopped the deployment. The fix worked, and the starboard 

panels unfurled without need of help from the astronauts.12

After Musgrave gave the “go for Hubble release” permission to the Shuttle 

crew, Hawley released the snares at the end of the robotic arm that held 
6 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Hubble and backed the arm away. HST’s first moment of free flight took place 

at 3:37:51 p.m. eastern daylight time (EDT) on 25 April over the Pacific Ocean, 

on Discovery’s 20th orbit, one orbit later than planned. Soon the Shuttle began 

to move 80 kilometers (50 miles) behind Hubble, where it remained for two 

days. A little more than five days after it was launched, Discovery landed on 

29 April as planned at Edwards Air Force Base in California, leaving behind 

the space telescope.13

Acclaim for Hubble started to pour in as soon as it was launched, from the 

floor of Congress to the editorial page of the New York Times, which called 

Hubble’s deployment “among NASA’s finest achievements,” adding that the telescope “may also constitute a triumph for Big Science.”14 That weekend, science 

writer Timothy Ferris noted that astronomy is rife with incidents where telescopes and their equipment fail, which meant that “nobody really knows” how 

well Hubble would work. The big question in the minds of optimistic scientists 

at the time concerned the surprising discoveries Hubble could make, Ferris 

wrote: “The launching of the Hubble Space Telescope lofts human thought 

into the realm of the unexplored.”15 HST was embarking on a journey where it 

would make good on its promise to challenge the imaginations of scientists. As 

hinted by Ferris, HST would also challenge the imaginations of the engineers, 

scientists, administrators, and politicians responsible for its operations, along 

with those of millions of people who would follow HST by new technological 

means not even created when the space telescope departed Earth.

ENDNOTES

1 Discovery lifted off 2 minutes 52 seconds after the scheduled time when a liquid-oxygen 

valve problem cropped up with just 31 seconds left in the countdown. STS-31’s first 

launch attempt two weeks earlier on 10 April had ended with 4 minutes left in the countdown when an auxiliary power unit on the Shuttle failed. STS-31 was the 35th launch of 

the Space Shuttle Program and the tenth since the loss of Challenger.

2 Joel W. Powell and Lee Robert Brandon-Cremer, Space Shuttle Almanac: A Comprehensive Overview of 40 Years of Space Shuttle Development and Operations (Calgary:

Microgravity Productions, and Sydney: Launch Pad Publishing, 2011), p. 256; Robert A. 

Adamcik, Voyages of Discovery: The Missions of the Space Shuttle Discovery (Burlington, 

Ontario: Apogee Books, 2012), pp. 51–54.

3 Joseph J. McRoberts, Space Telescope (Washington, DC: NASA, 1982)

4 NASA, “Space Shuttle Mission STS-31 Press Kit,” April 1990, pp. 14, 15. Both the New York 

Times and the Washington Post estimated HST’s cost at $2.1 billion, close to the $2 billion cost mentioned by Robert W. Smith, The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science,
PROLOGUE . Launching T

Technology and Politics, p. 371. See Kathy Sawyer, “Hunting the ‘Blueprint of Eternity,’ 

Long-Delayed $2.1 Billion Hubble Space Telescope Set for Launch,” Washington Post

(8 April 1990): A1; John Noble Wilford, “Telescope Is Set to Peer at Space and Time,” New

York Times (9 April 1990): A1.

 5 Jay Mallin, “Space Telescope Will Peek into Uncharted Frontiers,” Washington Times (10

April 1990): A4.

 6 Paul Hoversten, “Telescope Will Seek Planets of Other Suns,” USA Today (6 April 1990):

3A; Sawyer, “Hunting the Blueprint.” 

 7 John Noble Wilford, “The Search for the Beginning of Time,” New York Times Magazin

(11 February 1990): 59.

 8 Douglas Isbell, “Hubble Launch Starts Era of Great Space Observatories,” Space News 

(April 1990): 2–8.

 9 Bob Davis, “Hubble Space Telescope, Plagued by Problems, May Open the Heavens but 

Has Cost the Earth,” Wall Street Journal (5 April 1990): A20.

10 Sawyer, “Hunting the Blueprint.”

11 For most of the Shuttle Program, mission numbers were assigned early in the mission 

preparation process and did not change when the launch order of missions changed. 

“STS-31 Press Kit,” pp. 61–62. Sullivan became the first American woman to walk in 

space in 1984, the same year McCandless became the first human to walk in space without being tethered to a spacecraft.

12 Kathy Sawyer, “Hubble Telescope Spreads Its Wings,” Washington Post (26 April 1990):

A1; John Noble Wilford, “Telescope Is Orbited After a Tense Delay,” New York Time

(26  April 1990): B12; STS-31 Mission Highlights Resource Tape (Washington, DC: NASA,

1990), author’s collection; Steven A. Hawley, “How Launching Hubble Space Telescope 

Influenced Space Shuttle Mission Operations,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 51, no. 

2 (March–April 2014): 385–396; Kathryn D. Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble: An Astronaut’s 

Story of Invention (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2019), pp. 209–216; Kathryn D. Sullivan oral history interviews, Columbus, OH, by Jennifer Ross-Nazzal, 12 March 2008 and 

28 May 2009, Johnson Space Center Oral History Project; Charles Bolden, Oral History 

Interview by author, 31 October 2017, pp. 1–3; Rockwell International Office of Media 

Relations, “STS-31 Press Information” (pub 35–46, April 1990), pp. 15–20; Douglas Isbell, 

“Hubble Scheduled for Two-Day Checkout by Shuttle Crew,” Space News (April 1990): 

2–8; Roelof Schulling and Steven Young, “STS-31 Mission Report: A New Window on the

Universe,” Spaceflight 32, no. 6 (June 1990): 196–206.

13 Sawyer, “Hubble Spreads Its Wings”; Wilford, “Telescope Is Orbited”; STS-31 Missio

Highlights Resource Tape; Hawley, “How Launching HST Influenced Shuttle Operations,” 

p. 394; Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 216–219; Story Musgrave, oral history interview by author, 25 October 2016, pp. 12–13. 

14 “Harvesting the Universe,” New York Times (26 April 1990); John G. Rowland, “The Mirrors of the Hubble Space Telescope,” Congressional Record, (24 April 1990), available in 

NASA HRC, file 5982.

15 Timothy Ferris, “The Space Telescope: A Sign of Intelligent Life,” New York Times (29 April 

1990): A1. 

9

CHAPTER ONE

A Troubled History

▲ Composite image of the Small Magellanic Cloud prepared from data from the Hubble, Spitzer, 

and Chandra Space Telescopes in 2013. (NASA/CXC/JPL-Caltech/STScI: PIA16884)

When Discovery carried the Hubble Space Telescope into space on 

24 April 1990, there were many reminders of the history that had led 

to that event. One of the many spectators at the launch site was Lyman 

S. Spitzer, Jr., the physicist who was often credited with drawing up the first 

serious proposal in 1946 for a large space telescope and for advocating for it in 

the 44 years that followed. The crew of Discovery carried with them an eyepiece 

from the Mount Wilson Observatory in California that had been used by the 

telescope’s namesake, Edwin P. Hubble, to guide his observations in the 1920s.

The name most often mentioned that day other than Hubble was that of 

Galileo Galilei, the Italian astronomer, mathematician, and philosopher who 

is widely credited as the first person to point a telescope to the skies.1 Galileo 

used a small refracting telescope for his observations starting in 1609 that relied 

on lenses to gather more light than the human eye is capable of gathering. The 

telescopic observations he recorded of the Moon, the satellites of Jupiter, and 

the phases of Venus revolutionized humanity’s view of the universe and inspired 

many others to create telescopes of their own. In the 1660s, Isaac Newton in 

England and Laurent Cassegrain in France designed and built the first reflecting telescopes—telescopes that used concave curved mirrors instead of lenses 

to gather light. While both types of telescopes have remained in wide use to 

the present day, the reflecting telescope became the instrument of choice for 

professional astronomers in the 20th century due to the technical limitations 

presented by refractors beyond a certain size. The Hubble Space Telescope is an 

advanced version of Cassegrain’s design for a reflecting telescope.2
10 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Newton’s many contributions to the theory and practice of physics and 

astronomy also included the experimental observation that white light is made 

up of many colors that can be observed when the white light passes through a 

prism, and that the colors could be reassembled into white light when passed 

through another prism. Newton’s simple observation, which overturned the 

conventional wisdom of the time, led to further discoveries in the 19th century 

that the spectrum of light created by a prism could reveal the composition of the 

light source. Astronomers started to take photographs in 1840, and for much 

of the time since then, their medium of choice was black-and-white images 

on glass photographic plates. For astronomy, photography meant not only the 

ability to image objects in the sky, but also to preserve the spectra of the Sun, 

stars, and other celestial objects in the form of spectrograms. Spectra of stars 

and nebulae revealed their motion and, in time, also permitted astronomers to 

determine their temperature and composition.3

Physicists and astronomers picked up these new tools to learn more about 

the nature of the Sun, the planets in our solar system, and the stars and other 

bodies that lay beyond. As the 20th century began, most scientists believed 

that the Milky Way constituted the entire universe, but some began to wonder 

whether the universe extended far beyond our home galaxy. Funded mainly by 

philanthropists, larger telescopes were built in the 19th and early 20th centuries in the United States to gather more light from dim and distant objects. By 

the beginning of the 1920s, the largest telescope on Earth was the 100-inch 

(2.54-meter) Hooker reflector at Mount Wilson in California.4

It was at Mount Wilson in the early 1920s that Edwin Hubble, who was establishing himself as an astrophysicist, created the images that he used to confirm 

that our universe is populated with large numbers of other galaxies beyond our 

own. These findings vastly enlarged the size of the universe in the eyes of astronomers. He also found evidence that those galaxies are flying apart from one another, 

which convinced many astronomers that the universe is expanding. NASA named 

the Space Telescope after Hubble in 1983 because it had as one of its primary scientific goals refining Hubble’s findings on the size and expansion of the universe.5

Edwin Hubble was born in Marshfield, Missouri, in 1889 and studied mathematics and astronomy at the University of Chicago. After winning a Rhodes 

scholarship, Hubble bowed to his father’s wishes and studied law at Oxford 

University. After a year teaching high school, he returned to the study of astronomy at Yerkes Observatory and the University of Chicago, where he earned a 

Ph.D. in astronomy. After serving in the U.S. Army in World War I, Hubble 

joined the staff at Mount Wilson, where he did his groundbreaking work that 

will be discussed in detail in chapter six.6
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

Mount Wilson’s successor as the world’s largest telescope was the 200-inch 

(5.08-meter) Hale Telescope on Mount Palomar in California, which provided 

precedents for both the excitement and the problems that surrounded HST. 

After General Electric tried and failed to create a test mirror using a new type 

of glass that would avoid the shape changes caused by temperature fluctuations that afflicted the Mount Wilson telescope, Corning Glass succeeded in 

creating a full-sized mirror on its second try in 1934. Grinding and polishing the gigantic mirror took several years, including a long interruption while 

resources were diverted during World War II. Twenty years after work began 

on the project, the telescope was dedicated in a great public ceremony on 3 

June 1948, in front of 1,000 guests. Members of the press were shown Saturn 

through the 200-inch telescope that night, the quality of the image limited 

by “conditions of poor visibility.” By the end of the summer, the telescope and 

its dome had appeared on a United States postage stamp. But even before the 

dedication ceremony, observatory technicians knew that the instrument had 

a set of “bugs” that required it to be taken offline until October 1949. During 

that time, technicians made changes to the mount and the mirror supports and 

did final polishing to fine-tune the shape of the mirror. Edwin Hubble’s career 

at Mount Wilson had also been interrupted by service in World War II, and 

declining health permitted him to make only a handful of observations using 

the 200-inch telescope at Mount Palomar prior to his death in 1953. The Hale 

Telescope remained the world’s largest and best-known telescope for more than 

a quarter century after it went into operation.7

SURMOUNTING THE ATMOSPHERE

By the time the Hale telescope was dedicated, scientists were beginning to talk 

about sending telescopes into outer space. Astronomers already knew that turbulence in Earth’s atmosphere blurs celestial objects to observers on the ground, 

and more importantly, the atmosphere absorbs light in most spectral bands 

outside those visible to human eyes. Inspired by fictional accounts of space 

travel and the beginnings of powered flight by aircraft in 1903, enthusiasts in 

Russia, the United States, and several European countries began to think and 

write about humans flying into space. In 1919, a physics professor from Clark 

University in Massachusetts, Robert H. Goddard, published a paper containing theories and experimental results from his studies of rockets. In January 

1920, portions of that paper appeared in newspapers, including Goddard’s 

speculation that a rocket could fly to the Moon. The resulting publicity inspired 

a wave of enthusiasm for rocketry and space travel that extended to Europe 

and even the Soviet Union. In 1923, Hermann Oberth, a German-Romanian 
12 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

teacher, wrote that placing a telescope in 

Earth orbit would have many benefits for 

astronomers. Rocket enthusiasts in several countries, including Goddard himself, 

developed liquid-fueled rockets that proved 

much more powerful than the gunpowder 

rockets of the time. Just as Adolf Hitler 

came to power in Germany in 1933, the 

German Army began supporting the development of rocket weapons, culminating 

in the V-2, which showed the potential of 

long-range rockets for military and peaceful 

purposes.8 From 1946 to 1952, scientists 

used captured and reconstructed German 

V-2 rockets brought to the United States 

to launch scientific instruments to high 

altitudes, where they could study the Sun 

and the upper atmosphere, and to advance 

their own expertise with long-range ballistic missiles. While some results from these 

instruments tantalized scientists, problems 

with both rockets and instruments proved that rocket-borne scientific research 

was very difficult. As the supply of V-2s ran out, researchers turned to more 

reliable sounding rockets developed in the United States and stratospheric balloons to carry instruments to high altitudes.9

▲ Hermann J. Oberth (1894–1989) 

contributed many ideas to the 

development of rocketry and space 

exploration, including placing 

telescopes in space. (NASA)

Wartime advances in rocketry caused some experts to consider the possibilities of using rockets to carry artificial satellites into orbit around Earth. Project 

RAND, a think tank set up in 1946 to carry out research for the U.S. Army 

Air Forces, issued its very first report that year on the topic of such a satellite 

with contributions from many experts.10 Lyman Spitzer, an astronomer at Yale 

University who soon moved on to become director of the Princeton University 

Observatory, contributed a paper titled “Astronomical Advantages of an Extraterrestrial Observatory.” There, Spitzer proposed placing a small spectroscope 

in orbit to look at the Sun and Earth’s upper atmosphere in the ultraviolet part 

of the spectrum that is blocked by Earth’s atmosphere, along with a 10-inch 

(.254-meter) Reflecting Telescope to look at the Sun and other stars in ultraviolet wavelengths. He suggested that in the future, a large reflecting telescope 

as big as the 200-inch telescope then being built at Mount Palomar—or even 

larger, up to 600 inches (15.24 meters) in aperture—be put in space. While 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

building all these space telescopes would involve major technical hurdles, the 

advantages would be great—getting above the turbulence of Earth’s atmosphere 

that disrupts the view of what lies above it and opening up the full electromagnetic spectrum. “It should be emphasized,” Spitzer presciently wrote, “that 

the chief contribution of such a radically new and more powerful instrument 

would be, not to supplement our present ideas of the universe we live in, but 

rather to uncover new phenomena not 

yet imagined, and perhaps to modify profoundly our basic concepts of space and 

time.” Such a gigantic space telescope, 

he wrote, would help astronomers determine the extent of the universe, study 

the structures of galaxies and globular 

clusters, and learn about other planets in 

the solar system.11

▲ Astrophysicist Lyman S. Spitzer, Jr. 

(1914–1997) wrote the first detailed 

proposal to place a large telescope in 

space and championed what became 

the Hubble Space Telescope through 

the rest of his life. (Robert Matthews, 

Princeton University)

Spitzer’s paper was classified for several years, and many of his colleagues 

questioned the need for telescopes in 

space—questions that persisted well 

into the 1960s. Robert W. Smith, who 

chronicled the creation of HST in his 

masterful book The Space Telescope: A 

Study of NASA, Science, Technology and 

Politics, wrote that American astronomers were divided geographically. Those 

on the West Coast, who had access to 

large observatories in favorable locations 

such as Mount Wilson and Mount Palomar that they were using to make exciting discoveries such as quasars, were not enthusiastic about space telescopes. 

Astronomers from the East Coast, who had to get by with smaller telescopes and 

poor observing conditions, were more interested in the concept. Many astronomers opposed the space telescope because of the great cost and limited success 

of early rocket-borne and satellite science packages at a time when observations 

from ground-based observatories were advancing astronomical knowledge.12

While the wider 1946 RAND report on satellites initially collected dust, the 

deepening Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union drove 

interest in large rockets and artificial satellites. Both sides began military missile programs after World War II, and by the late 1950s, the superpowers began 
14 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

to build rockets that could deliver nuclear weapons anywhere on Earth. The 

same rockets, used as launch vehicles, could also carry payloads into Earth orbit 

and beyond. 

In the early 1950s, scientists began to discuss launching artificial satellites 

to provide data on the upper reaches of Earth’s atmosphere as part of a worldwide research effort to take place in 1957 and 1958 known as the International 

Geophysical Year (IGY). When the U.S. government announced in 1955 that 

it would orbit a satellite during IGY, the Soviet Union replied with a similar 

announcement. The Soviets used their intercontinental ballistic missile to 

launch the first artificial satellite of Earth, Sputnik, in 1957, and a surprised 

U.S. military scrambled to match the feat. Soon both superpowers began 

launching satellites, probes to the Moon and beyond, and the first humans into 

space in a Cold War competition, culminating in 1969 when the United States 

landed the first humans on the Moon.13

THE SPACE AGENCY

America’s first satellites, Explorer and Vanguard, quickly proved the scientific 

value of robotic spacecraft when they made important discoveries about Earth’s 

atmosphere and magnetic field. In the wake of Sputnik, the U.S. government 

established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1958 to run 

America’s civilian space program, including its scientific components. NASA 

was formed from the former National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 

which itself was made up of four different research and test facilities. The new 

agency also absorbed the U.S. Navy team that led the Vanguard satellite program and other scientists from the Naval Research Laboratory, which together 

formed the core of NASA’s Robert H. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), 

which began operations in 1959 in Greenbelt, Maryland. The Jet Propulsion 

Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California, which had been run by the California 

Institute of Technology for the U.S. Army, also came under NASA’s wing in 1959. 

In 1960, NASA absorbed much of the U.S. Army rocket team in Huntsville, 

Alabama, that had grown from the group of about 100 German rocket experts 

headed by Wernher von Braun, whom the Army had brought to the United 

States after World War II. This team formed the core of NASA’s George C. 

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), named after the great soldier and diplomat. The Marshall team initially was charged with building the Saturn rockets that boosted Apollo spacecraft toward the Moon. As the space race geared 

up in the 1960s, NASA established the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) 

in Florida next to U.S. Air Force launch facilities at Cape Canaveral. NASA’s 

human space programs were based in Houston, Texas, at what has been known 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

since 1973 as the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC). NASA also worked 

closely with large and small aerospace contractors to build its spacecraft. With 

its various Centers located around the United States, the new Agency was not 

a single entity but a “coalition of quite disparate groups,” a reality that would 

strongly impact the development of HST.14

Despite the fact that astronomy and other space sciences had to compete 

inside the Agency with the high-profile and well-funded human space program, 

NASA quickly began an astronomy program that supported many astronomical 

research efforts using sounding rockets, balloons, and satellites. The Agency 

moved quickly to build satellites such as the Orbiting Solar Observatories, which 

first flew in 1962; the Orbiting Geophysical Observatories; and the Orbiting 

Astronomical Observatories (OAO). The first OAO failed shortly after launch 

in April 1966, but OAO-2 and its set of instruments in ultraviolet wavelengths 

operated for more than four years after being launched in December 1968. The 

third OAO failed to reach orbit, but the fourth of the series, which was named 

Copernicus, operated successfully from its launch in August 1972 until 1981, 

and the instruments attached to its 32-inch (80-centimeter) telescope included 

an ultraviolet spectrometer that sent back a great deal of data. Spitzer, whose 

dream of telescopes in space first became reality with OAO, was a Principal 

Investigator on Copernicus.15

THE LARGE SPACE TELESCOPE

As America’s human space program expanded to meet President John F. 

Kennedy’s 1961 goal of landing astronauts on the Moon by the end of the 1960s, 

space scientists from various organizations gathered in Iowa City in the summer 

of 1962 with space scientist James Van Allen of the University of Iowa in the 

chair. The scientists formed a working group to discuss the future of scientific 

research in space, and its recommendations included what became known as 

the Large Space Telescope (LST) to be placed into Earth orbit, with an aperture of about 2.5 meters (100 inches). Not all astronomers supported the idea, 

and a proposal for a formal study by the National Academy of Sciences failed 

to win sufficient support. The academy changed its position and approved a 

study after a similar meeting of astronomers who supported the space telescope 

took place under NASA sponsorship in 1965 in Woods Hole, Massachusetts.16

Homer E. Newell, Jr., who directed space science at NASA Headquarters, told 

the American Astronomical Society (AAS) that the LST would require widespread support from astronomers to succeed. The academy formed an “Ad Hoc 

Committee on the Large Space Telescope” headed by Spitzer, and its membership included the head of astronomy at NASA Headquarters, Nancy Grace 
16 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Roman, who in the years to come became an important promoter of the space 

telescope. In 1969, the National Academy of Sciences approved the ad hoc 

committee’s proposal for a 120-inch (3-meter) space telescope.17

▲ Nancy Grace Roman (1925–2018), NASA’s first Chief of Astronomy, photographed at 

Goddard Space Flight Center in 1972. (NASA)

OAO and other science satellite programs in the 1960s and 1970s operated 

in the shadow of NASA’s human space programs. While astronomy did not 

figure prominently in the human flights of the time, astronauts did operate a 

small telescope on the lunar surface during Apollo 16 and a solar observatory 

aboard the Skylab space station in 1973 and 1974. During the 1960s, NASA 

and its contractors carried out several studies into large space telescopes, usually assuming that astronauts would operate the telescope. After NASA spending for Apollo peaked in 1966, NASA’s budget faced several years of reductions. 

This reflected U.S. government priorities that were shifting away from Cold War 

competition with the Soviet Union in space toward fighting the war in Vietnam 

and dealing with social problems at home. The administration of President 

Richard M. Nixon declined to approve NASA proposals for a space station in 

Earth orbit or more ambitious ideas for a return to the Moon or a human flight 

to Mars. Anxious to have a human space program to follow Apollo, NASA 

proposed a reusable winged vehicle called the Space Shuttle that could carry 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

astronauts and payloads to Earth orbit and back. By the time Nixon gave the 

go-ahead for the Shuttle Program in January 1972, NASA was studying space 

telescopes that could fly on board or be launched by the Shuttle.18

NASA began to gear up its work on the LST in 1970, establishing a committee to work on engineering the telescope and another to steer its scientific direction. During this time, NASA divided the spacecraft design into a 

Support Systems Module, an Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), and the scientific instruments. In 1972, the Agency decided that Marshall Space Flight 

Center, whose work of creating and building the launch vehicles for Apollo 

was effectively done, would have responsibility for building the space telescope. 

Goddard, which had been home for most of NASA’s space astronomy programs 

but was busy at the time with numerous space science programs, would also 

be involved in the program. The result was a troubled relationship between 

the two Centers. After protracted disputes over Goddard’s role in the program, 

the Centers agreed in 1977 that Goddard would get responsibility for scientific 

instruments on the LST, and it would also be the place from which the telescope 

was controlled once it was placed in orbit. Some of the differences between the 

two Centers continued to affect the space telescope program until Marshall 

transferred program responsibility to Goddard as planned after Hubble was 

launched and commissioned.19

The LST could not begin in earnest until it won approval by the U.S. 

Congress. As NASA proceeded to design the telescope and its scientific research 

program, it did so in the knowledge that Congress would be very sensitive to its 

cost. As a result, cuts were made to the program, including the cancellation of a 

prototype version of the space telescope. A major lobbying effort by astronomers 

and others who were interested in the telescope was needed to stave off a congressional decision to eliminate funding for the LST program. Memorably, the 

promotional work led to the Large Space Telescope making an appearance in a 

Superman comic book in 1972.20 Leading the lobbying effort in Congress were 

Spitzer; C. Robert O’Dell, the Space Telescope’s Project Scientist at NASA from 

1972 to 1982; and astrophysicist John N. Bahcall of the Institute for Advanced 

Study at Princeton, who went on to exercise a major influence on the space 

telescope science through its first 15 years of operation. LST supporters faced 

complications in 1972 when the high-level astronomy survey committee of the 

National Academy of Sciences issued its report setting out priority projects for 

astronomers. The report, Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1970s, the second 

in a series of decadal surveys that continue to the present day, placed the LST 

among the second-tier priorities. Bahcall and Spitzer had to persuade Congress 

that the LST had a higher priority among astronomers than the decadal survey 
18 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

report suggested, and in 1974 the lobbyists 

obtained a statement from the survey committee supporting the space telescope that 

bolstered their effort to win congressional 

support. Such a clear break from the recommendation of a decadal survey in astronomy 

has not occurred since that time.21

▲ Astrophysicist John N. Bahcall 

(1934–2005) championed the 

Hubble Space Telescope from its 

infancy to its ultimate scientific 

success. (STScI)

Smith wrote that “negotiation and compromise on the telescope’s design and the 

planned program to build it” were an integral part of assembling the coalitions that 

made HST politically feasible.22 As the U.S. 

Congress faced growing budget deficits 

and soaring inflation fueled in part by the 

energy crisis of the 1970s, it kept pressure 

on NASA to cut its own budgets. In 1974, 

NASA Administrator James C. Fletcher and 

even Spitzer, who had been spending a lot of 

time lobbying members of Congress, realized that the LST simply cost too much to 

gain approval from a majority in Congress. 

That fall, NASA and a working group of scientists looked at a number of ways 

to reduce costs while minimizing the amount of harm to the LST’s science 

program, including reducing the size of the main mirror from 3 meters to 2.4 

meters or even 1.8 meters. While there was pressure from Congress and within 

NASA to reduce the telescope to the smallest possible size, the working group 

concluded that support from astronomers for the LST would collapse if the 

LST’s aperture were reduced to 1.8 meters because many astronomers believed 

that such a telescope would be too small to meet its objectives. In the spring 

of 1975, NASA reduced the LST to a 2.4-meter aperture, but pressure to cut 

costs continued, especially when President Gerald R. Ford ordered governmentwide budget cuts that fall in an attempt to fight the budget deficit. In October, 

NASA Deputy Administrator George M. Low decided that the program would 

be known simply as the Space Telescope in an effort to make it more politically 

palatable to Congress. But Fletcher, Low, and other leaders of NASA decided 

that the program would face serious problems getting through Congress if 

NASA included it in the fiscal year (FY) 1977 budget, which would be debated 

in 1976, an election year. Astronomers and contractors aggressively lobbied 

Congress to include the Space Telescope in the FY 1977 budget but fell short. 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

Continued lobbying and support from both the outgoing Ford administration 

and the incoming administration of President Jimmy Carter caused Congress 

to approve the Space Telescope for the FY 1978 budget year, which began on 

1 October 1977.23

BUILDING THE TELESCOPE

▲ Technicians in a clean room at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center inspect the Orbiting 

Astronomical Observatory 2 before the mission’s 7 December 1968 launch. (NASA)

As NASA closed in on winning Congress’s backing for the Space Telescope in 

1977, it issued requests for proposals to build its Optical Telescope Assembly 

and Support Systems Module. In July, the Lockheed Missiles and Space 

Company won the competition for the Support Systems Module over Boeing 

and Martin Marietta, while the Perkin-Elmer Corporation was chosen for the 

OTA over a consortium of Eastman Kodak and Itek. Perkin-Elmer won because 

of the strength of its proposal for the telescope’s Fine Guidance System, a major 

technical challenge and vital to correctly pointing the telescope at its targets. 

While Grumman had built the OAOs, both Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer had a 
20 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

long heritage of working together on highly classified reconnaissance satellites 

for U.S. military and intelligence agencies. In the case of Lockheed, Smith 

wrote, its “methods, resources, institutional memory, and expertise had been 

shaped almost entirely by its work on satellites for various national security 

purposes.”24 Perkin-Elmer could be described in a similar way, although its 

background also included building astronomical telescopes. Because PerkinElmer and Lockheed were so heavily involved in national security programs, 

Marshall Space Flight Center was not permitted to exercise the same degree of 

oversight as it had traditionally done with contractors, an issue that was raised 

later when problems were found with HST’s main mirror.

Throughout HST’s lifetime, there has been speculation about its relationship 

to photoreconnaissance satellites, given the fact that both involved large optical 

systems and lead contractors that worked on national security programs. U.S. 

military and intelligence agencies began launching reconnaissance satellites in 

1959 to provide information on America’s Cold War adversaries. Soon, these 

satellites were possessed by both sides in the Cold War and, in time, became 

the most important means of verifying treaties aimed at controlling the spread 

of nuclear weapons. NASA has routinely cooperated with the Department of 

Defense to protect classified intelligence programs and to benefit NASA programs by sharing technology. In the case of HST, this cooperation went beyond 

NASA contracting with firms building classified spacecraft to encompass DOD 

agencies assisting NASA with HST work, such as helping fabricate the spacecraft’s high-gain antenna booms and testing its gyros. HST was quite different 

from reconnaissance satellites whose designs have been declassified, notably 

the Hexagon KH-9 satellites that flew as recently as 1984. Hexagon and its 

predecessors were different sizes from HST, and they used photographic film 

returned to Earth, while HST relied on digital imaging. Information about 

Hexagon’s successors, which are widely believed to rely on digital imaging like 

HST, remains classified.25 Speculation on HST’s links to reconnaissance satellites revived in 2012, when the National Reconnaissance Office donated two 

space telescope assemblies to NASA, which intends to use them for the upcoming Nancy Roman Space Telescope, formerly known as the Wide Field Infrared 

Survey Telescope (WFIRST). But the assemblies came from a canceled development program unrelated to the satellites that followed Hexagon.26

Hubble’s relationship with classified military programs is only one part of 

the wider relationship between the Cold War and space astronomy in general and HST in particular. The Cold War had begun in the months following 

World War II, when the wartime alliance between the United States and the 

Soviet Union broke down over ideological differences and Soviet imposition 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and support for communists elsewhere over the objections of the United States and its allies. The two sides 

in this conflict avoided direct war, but science and space exploration became 

two of the many arenas where the United States and the Soviet Union endeavored to outdo each other. Early Soviet successes in space inspired the United 

States to send astronauts to the Moon. After the Shuttle’s design, including 

the dimensions of the payload bay, were changed to gain political support from 

the U.S. Air Force, NASA created the Space Shuttle in the 1970s, and some 

of its missions supported military space efforts. Historians such as Smith have 

argued that the U.S. government supported space astronomy in part to establish 

American leadership in space. As part of President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic 

Defense Initiative in the 1980s, the U.S. military supported the development 

of technologies aimed at detecting Soviet missiles and warheads early in their 

flights, including the development of sensors that operated in certain wavelengths of ultraviolet radiation. This military research increased the availability 

of imagers for HST that operated in those ultraviolet wavelengths.27

▲ Artist’s conception of early Large Space Telescope design in 1973. (NASA: S G74-3105 [3])

NASA and astronomers involved with the program had agreed that the 

Space Telescope would carry five scientific instruments mounted in the 
22 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Support Systems Module behind the main mirror. Early in the design process, 

NASA decided that with a 15-year planned lifetime for the telescope, all the 

scientific instruments should be designed so that they could be changed out on 

the ground in case of failure or to permit their replacement by later-generation 

instruments, but by the mid-1970s NASA became more interested in designing 

the instruments so they could be changed out in orbit.28

When NASA issued a request for proposals (RFP) for scientific instruments 

and associated teams in March 1977, it identified a wide field camera and a 

faint object spectrograph as “particularly important.” That left at least two open 

spots for other instruments. The RFP reflected long discussions that had taken 

place among scientists preparing for the Space Telescope, including preliminary studies of ultraviolet spectrographs, high-resolution cameras, and photometers. Scientists formed teams headed by a Principal Investigator charged with 

designing an effective instrument and developing a scientific program for that 

instrument. Once selected, teams had to be prepared to work with contractors 

of their choice to build their instrument and work with NASA on related budgetary and technical issues.29 Thirteen teams submitted proposals for the four 

open instruments, and after they were assessed by engineers, scientists, and a 

“synthesis panel,” NASA chose a team led by James A. Westphal of Caltech 

for the Wide Field Camera; a group led by Richard Harms of the University 

of California, San Diego, for the Faint Object Spectrograph; a team headed by 

John C. Brandt of Goddard for the High Resolution Spectrograph; and Robert 

C. Bless’s group from the University of Wisconsin-Madison for the High-Speed 

Photometer.30

During the time when astronomers sought to win congressional support for 

the space telescope, politicians had demanded foreign involvement in the program to lower costs to U.S. taxpayers. European astronomers had suggested 

European participation in the LST program in 1973, and NASA began negotiations with the European Space Research Organization, which in 1975 became 

the European Space Agency (ESA). These talks resulted in an agreement in 

1977 in which the ESA agreed to provide one of the Space Telescope’s scientific 

instruments and the solar arrays to power the space telescope, along with 15 

full-time scientific staff involved in telescope operations, in return for a minimum 15 percent of observing time for European astronomers.31

The Europeans’ talks with NASA over their role in the Space Telescope 

program were lengthy, in part because of questions over what instrument the 

Europeans should build. As part of that process, NASA sent experts to Europe 

to verify that European industry was up to the job of building an instrument 

for the Space Telescope, which caused some resentment amongst some of the 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

Europeans. U.S. scientists and engineers had concerns about sharing technology new to the Space Telescope outside the United States and over ever-present 

security worries. Some American scientists also expressed concerns about putting the European instrument on board the Space Telescope without a competition. After NASA ruled out the idea of Europe contributing the high-priority 

Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS), the ESA and European scientists agreed 

with NASA on the Faint Object Camera (FOC) for the Space Telescope to 

image distant objects, but not before NASA demanded that the original design 

for the instrument be simplified. The FOC would be built by an industry team 

headed by Dornier in Germany and with ESA astronomer F. Duccio Macchetto 

as the Principal Investigator.32

In addition to the FOC and the four instruments chosen through the RFP 

process for the Space Telescope, its three Fine Guidance Sensors could also act 

as its sixth scientific instrument. In this role, the sensors, which were built by 

Perkin-Elmer, would be used for astrometry, following the apparent motion of 

closer stars caused by Earth’s motion around the Sun, as well as the motion of 

other stars and the changes in the brightness of variable stars. These measurements can in theory detect wobble in star movement that might suggest the 

presence of a planetary or stellar companion, measure stellar masses and the 

diameter of celestial objects, refine the positions and absolute magnitude of 

stars, and help refine measurements of the size of the universe.33

With the contracts set, the program in late 1977 moved into building the 

telescope, with launch scheduled for 1983. At the time NASA negotiated 

the contracts with Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer and set budgets for the scientific instruments, there was still a substantial reserve left in the program’s 

budget. Perkin-Elmer’s costs began to rise beyond that within months. After 

Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer further increased their cost estimates as they ran 

into technical problems in 1979, NASA Headquarters asked for a cost review 

of the Space Telescope program. Program officials also began considering various economy measures, including delaying the launch, removing the aperture 

door from the telescope, and not putting all instruments on board at launch. 

Congress, always concerned about costs, began asking questions about the status of the program.34

That year, NASA was also facing high-profile problems with the Space 

Shuttle that caused major cost overruns and delayed the first Shuttle flight until 

1981. By late 1980, NASA had decided to move the Space Telescope launch 

back to late 1984. But given positive reports on the changes made to the program and strong support from scientists and NASA engineers, outgoing NASA 

Administrator Robert A. Frosch agreed in late 1980 to make more money 
24 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

available for the Space Telescope. Within months of these decisions, program 

managers were faced with the first of another series of cost increases and schedule problems that came to a head in 1983. The program was still afflicted with 

technical challenges, funding problems, and management issues resulting from 

having two NASA Centers, Marshall and Goddard, and two main contractors, 

Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer, with leading roles in the program. These issues 

brought attention from the Space Telescope’s critics in Congress and elsewhere. 

As a result, NASA ordered changes in the management of the program early in 

Faint Object Camera (FOC)

Faint Object Camera

Load Carrying 

Structure

Incoming Optical Bench

Light

Optics Pathway

Photon Detector 

Assembly

Electronic Bay 

Assembly

Time on HST:

24 April 1990–7 March 2002

Contractor:

European Space Agency—

Dornier (Germany), Matra (France)

Principal Investigator:

Duccio Macchetto (STScI/ESA)

Weight: 320 kilograms 

(700 pounds) 

Axial Instrument

The FOC was one of the European Space Agency’s main contributions to the HST 

program. It used the full spatial-resolution capabilities of HST.

It operated in far ultraviolet and visible wavelengths, about 1,200 to 7,000 Angstroms. 

It contained two cameras—one operating at a focal length of f/48 and another at 

f/96. The f/48 camera was equipped with two filter wheels and the f/96 with four 

filter wheels, which permitted many filter combinations.

Unlike other cameras on HST that use CCDs to collect data, the FOC used two 

photon-counting detectors, which were similar to a television camera. The FOC produced highly magnified but narrow field images; it could also be used for photometry; and it could also produce spectrograms.
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

1984, including a stronger role for NASA Headquarters in directing the completion of what became known in 1983 as the Edwin P. Hubble Space Telescope, a 

name that won unanimous support from a NASA selection committee. Despite 

the financial, technical and schedule problems, most of the telescope’s components had been manufactured by 1984, but many issues lay ahead before HST 

could be launched.35

In flight, the f/48 camera developed problems that limited its usefulness. When the

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement) instrument was 

installed on Servicing Mission 1, correcting the spherical aberration to the FOC and 

other axial instruments in HST, it changed the focal ratio in the FOC’s two cameras 

to f/75.5 and f/151.a

During its lifetime, FOC was used to obtain close-ups of all classes of astronomical 

objects, from Pluto and its moons to stellar atmospheres and the cores of distant 

galaxies. FOC data resulted in several cosmological breakthroughs, including the 

first direct image of the surface of the red giant Betelgeuse, the first high-resolution 

image of the circumstellar ring from Supernova 1987A, the first detection of white 

dwarfs and stellar mass segregation in a globular cluster, and the first image of an 

“exposed” black hole. The FOC was retired from general use in late 1998, decommissioned in 1999, and returned to Earth by Servicing Mission 3B after nearly 12 years 

on orbit—the longest-serving of HST’s original instruments.b

At the time FOC was removed from HST, ESA project scientist for FOC Peter Jakobsen 

said: “Although the images obtained with the FOC have only rarely been as photogenic as the famous images from the Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2, FOC has

in my opinion served the astronomical community well and brought home its share 

of scientific ‘firsts.’”c

The FOC is now on display at the Dornier Museum in Friedrichshafen, Germany.

a European Space Agency, A Long Look Back: ESA’s Faint Object Camera (Paris: ESA BR-67, 

1990); Space Telescope Science Institute, Faint Object Camera Instrument Handbook, Version 7.0 (Baltimore: STScI, June 1996).

b Andrew Wilson, ESA Achievements: More Than 30 Years of Pioneering Space Activity, 3rd Edition (Noordwijk, the Netherlands: European Space Agency, 2005), pp. 128–133

c ESA, “European Faint Object Camera on Hubble Sets World Record—Celebrating the Successes of ESA’s Sharp-Sighted Camera,” news release HEIC0204, 7 March 2002
26 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

THE MAIN MIRROR

Shortly after work began on the telescope in October 1977, NASA commissioned the Corning glassworks in upstate New York to build two 2.4-meter 

mirror blanks for its main mirror, both made of low-expansion glass similar 

to space mirrors they had built for reconnaissance satellites. The two blanks 

were not made of solid glass; to save weight, they were made from many parts 

that were fused together somewhat like a sandwich: a facesheet at the top of 

the mirror that would be ground to a precision shape, a lightweight honeycomb 

core, a rear facesheet, an inner edgeband lining the hole in the center of the 

mirror where light would pass from the secondary mirror to the instruments 

below the main mirror, and the outer edgeband. As arranged by NASA, one 

of the blanks was sent to Perkin-Elmer to be precision-ground to the correct 

shape using an advanced computer-controlled grinding and polishing system 

and to have a special mount designed to simulate the microgravity environment 

of space. Corning sent the second mirror blank to Eastman Kodak for grinding 

and polishing using more traditional methods as a backup in case Perkin-Elmer 

ran into trouble with this essential task.36

The 2,000-pound mirror blank destined to fly on HST arrived at the PerkinElmer plant in Wilton, Connecticut, in December 1978 for rough grinding. The 

blank already had a minor flaw, caused when components of the mirror had 

fused incorrectly, that could have led to uneven stresses on the mirror. Corning 

workers removed the fused glass, delaying the mirror’s move to Perkin-Elmer. 

The defect further delayed grinding the mirror because Perkin-Elmer had further work to do to repair this problem. In the spring of 1979, an inspector found 

a cluster of fissures in the mirror shaped like a tiny teacup about a quarter of 

an inch (6 millimeters) across. Amid fears that the fissures could grow like a 

crack in a windshield, Perkin-Elmer halted grinding until its experts decided 

how to remove the affected area and then successfully completed the delicate 

task. The grinding of the mirror was supposed to take nine months; instead, it 

took twice as long, and the mirror wasn’t moved over to Perkin-Elmer’s plant in 

Danbury, Connecticut, for precision polishing until May 1980.37

As discussed above, the Space Telescope program was under severe budgetary pressure at this time. Congress was intent on keeping costs down, and both 

Perkin-Elmer and Lockheed saw their costs skyrocket as the optimistic projections of their contracts became the reality of bent metal and ground glass. As 

two reporters from the Hartford Courant wrote later in a Pulitzer Prize–winning 

series on the mirror problems, “From the start, Perkin-Elmer was operating 

without any flexibility because the company had underbid the telescope contract,” having bid $70 million to do the job, $35.5 million less than Kodak.38 In 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

the past, NASA had been able to make up funding shortfalls, but knowing the 

hostile reception that would greet cost increases in Congress, the Agency now 

turned down Perkin-Elmer’s requests for more money. As the mirror polishing 

began in the summer of 1980, the space telescope program was undergoing a 

major financial crisis. The result was that corners were cut at Perkin-Elmer, 

including on testing the mirrors and building prototypes, and managers and 

workers were rushed to complete their work. As well, the company had recently 

expanded into the highly competitive field of microchips, and after initial success in that area, new managers were brought in with a focus on immediate payoffs. These managers took a much bigger role in managing projects such as the 

HST mirror, while scientists, engineers, and other experts found themselves 

with diminished power.39

▲ The Hubble Space Telescope’s primary mirror being ground at the Perkin-Elmer 

Corporation’s large optics fabrication facility in Danbury, Connecticut, in 1979. (NASA: NIX 

MSFC-7995584)

Perkin-Elmer’s work on the space telescope also included building the secondary mirror and three sophisticated Fine Guidance Sensors to point the telescope, and the latter task proved to be highly complex and expensive. NASA was 

also cutting spending on quality control at the time, and because Perkin-Elmer 

also built equipment for highly classified reconnaissance satellites, Department 
28 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

of Defense officials persuaded NASA to limit the number of outsiders working 

within the Perkin-Elmer plants in the interests of maintaining security. In the 

case of Perkin-Elmer’s work on the main mirror, only three NASA employees 

provided oversight of this critical component. Perkin-Elmer managers responsible for testing the mirror restricted quality assurance inspectors from other 

parts of the company and NASA from optical testing areas, and the managers 

refused to discuss their work on the mirror outside their group in the interests 

of preserving commercial secrets. Moreover, NASA and Perkin-Elmer quality 

assurance officials were not trained in optics.40

As Designed Actual

Displacement of 

Metering Rod

Interferometer 

Objective Lens

Field Cap

1.3 mm

Metering Rod

▲ This chart from the Allen Report depicts the defect in the 

null corrector used to test the main mirror for the Hubble 

Space Telescope. The chart shows how a lens inside the 

device was displaced, causing incorrect measurements 

that led to the mirror being ground precisely to the wrong 

shape. (Allen, Lew, et al., The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure 

Report [Washington, DC: NASA TM-103443, 1990])

In spite of these problems, Perkin-Elmer took many measures to ensure that 

the mirror was ground and polished to the precise shape required. A computer 

system directed the grinding and polishing of the mirror, which was placed on 

a bed of 138 titanium rods to simulate the microgravity environment of space. 

After each polishing run, the mirror was moved on rails to an adjacent room, 

where it would be placed in a test stand similar in size to the telescope itself. High 

above the mirror was an optical testing device about the size of a barrel called 

a reflective null corrector made of two mirrors and a lens. This null corrector 

was specially designed 

and built for the Space 

Telescope’s main mirror. Light from a laser 

was passed through the 

null corrector, reflected 

off the space telescope 

mirror back into the null

corrector. The resulting

pattern of black and 

white lines on the mirror, known as an interference pattern, was photographed through the null 

corrector and analyzed 

until the correct pattern 

was verified at the time 

the mirror was precisely 

ground and polished to 

its final shape. This system was so sensitive that 

the tests were run only 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

in the middle of the night when large trucks were not rumbling by on a nearby 

highway. The air conditioning in the building was turned off, and speed bumps 

on the road just outside were removed to reduce vibrations. Parts of the null 

corrector were made of invar, a material that does not expand or contract with 

temperature changes.41

But under the pressures of time and money, an error was introduced into 

the null corrector. This meant that a tiny but critical error was also introduced 

into the grinding and polishing of the Space Telescope’s main mirror. The null 

corrector had been set up for a 60-inch (1.5-meter)–diameter test mirror and 

then readjusted for Space Telescope’s real main mirror. An invar measuring 

rod whose length had been thoroughly and precisely tested to match the exact 

distance between the lens and the mirrors inside the null corrector was placed 

inside the apparatus for a measurement test that was done with a laser. When 

technicians tested the measurement rod, they found it was 1.3 millimeters or 

1/20 of an inch lower than it should be. They did not know that the laser was 

bouncing off a cap that protected the top of the rod. While the top of the rod 

had been polished to reflect the light from the laser, the cap had been painted 

so that it would not reflect light. But because some of the paint had worn off 

the cap before the crucial tests on the main mirror, the laser reflected off the 

cap rather than the rod. Technicians could not move the lens in the null corrector to equal what they thought was the correct distance from the mirrors. So 

instead of calling the machine shop or even the designer of the null corrector for 

help, they got three ordinary household washers, flattened them, placed them 

inside the $1 million null corrector, and then moved the lens 1.3 millimeters 

lower than it should have been. The null corrector, with this error built into 

it, was then used to measure the shape of the Space Telescope’s main mirror. 

Relying on the erroneous measurements from the null corrector, the 2.4-meter 

main mirror of the Space Telescope was precisely ground to the wrong shape, 

a fraction of a millimeter too flat at its edges. The one NASA inspector who 

was aware of the change made to the null corrector accepted assurances from 

Perkin-Elmer staff that the change would not be a problem.42

In May 1981, the mirror was tested with another null corrector to determine its center of curvature. The interference patterns photographed with this 

instrument, known as a refractive null corrector, were quite different from the 

apparently perfect patterns seen using the main null corrector. Since the second null corrector was not as precise as the main null corrector, Perkin-Elmer 

personnel dismissed the findings, and the NASA personnel at the plant were 

not informed of these results. Higher-level Perkin-Elmer managers had passed 

up other opportunities to verify the shape of the mirror, including a proposal to 
30 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

use a null corrector that its competitor Eastman Kodak had developed to test 

the backup mirror it had ground and polished. They also turned down a call 

by Perkin-Elmer’s polishing team for a final review of the data at the time the 

mirror was coated with reflective aluminum in December 1981. The polishing 

team and a Perkin-Elmer technical audit called for a recertification of the main 

null corrector on several occasions, but no recertification took place. Indeed, a 

NASA Inspector General report found that a Perkin-Elmer document claimed 

that the null corrector had been recertified “when in fact the [null corrector] 

was never recertified.” The report also noted that Perkin-Elmer testing team 

members had concerns about the mirror, but “reports and briefings to NASA 

failed to report any of these concerns.”43

Perkin-Elmer decided to block a final review, officially because there was no 

need, but unhappy Perkin-Elmer employees believed that the real reason was to 

Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS)

Optical Bench

Enclosure

Photomultiplier 

Tubes (4)

Pinhole/Lens 

Assembly

Pickoff Mirror

Corrector 

Group

Star Selector 

Assembly

Interferometer 

Assembly

Fine Guidance Sensor

Time on HST:

24 April 1990–Present 

Contractors:

Perkin-Elmer and successors

Astrometry Principal Investigator:

Bill Jeffreys (University of Texas)

Weight: 218 kilograms (480 pounds)

Radial Instruments

Three HST Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS) were launched aboard the telescope in 

1990, and while their main function was to help guide HST and keep it locked on 

target, one was designated to act as a sixth science instrument for high-precision 

measurement of celestial object position, a science known as astrometry. These 

measurements detect wobble in star movement that would suggest the presence of 

a planetary or stellar companion, measure stellar masses and the diameter of celestial objects, refine the positions and absolute magnitude of stars, and help refine 

measurements of the size of the universe.a
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

save money. Despite the nagging doubts about the mirror among the small group 

of Perkin-Elmer employees directly involved with testing it, everyone else at the 

contractor, NASA, and the ranks of scientists who had reviewed the preparation 

of the telescope thought the mirror was the correct shape. Perkin-Elmer’s decision came as the launch of HST was delayed due to problems with the Shuttle. 

The defective mirror was integrated into the Optical Telescope Assembly in 

1982 and was not tested or reviewed again in the eight years that ultimately 

remained before launch. Perkin-Elmer had a great deal of difficult work to do 

to complete the assembly and the Fine Guidance Sensors after the main mirror 

was installed, and ironically it received much more money to complete its work 

on HST after the main mirror was finished. Perkin-Elmer’s continuing financial 

and business problems culminated in the December 1989 sale of its optical 

Three FGS units and one imaging instrument occupy the four radial instrument 

bays just behind HST’s main mirror and above the axial bays containing other HST 

instruments. 

Four FGS units had been built, including an engineering test article. After two of the 

FGS units began to show mechanical wear problems prior to the second servicing 

mission in 1997, NASA decided to replace FGS1 on that mission with the refurbished 

engineering test unit, which became known as FGS1r. The Fine Guidance Sensors 

also suffered some slight degradation in performance from the spherical aberration 

in HST’s main mirror, and while this could not be corrected for the original FGS units, 

the problem could be reduced with an articulating mirror assembly on the replacement unit in place of the original fixed mirror. In 1999, NASA designated FGS1r as the 

only FGS to be used for astrometric work on HST.

The original FGS1 was repaired and reinstalled on HST during Servicing Mission 3A 

in 1999 in place of FGS2. The newly installed FGS, which was called FGS2r, began 

showing problems in 2006, and it was replaced with the original FGS2, which had 

been refurbished, and once installed during Servicing Mission 4 in 2009, it has been 

known as FGS2r2.b

a NASA, “Space Shuttle Mission STS-82 Press Kit,” February 1997.

b STScI, Fine Guidance Sensor Instrument Handbook for Cycle 24, Version 23 (Baltimore, MD: 

Space Telescope Science Institute, January 2016), p. 9.
32 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

division, which was responsible for the HST work, to the Hughes Aircraft 

Company. At that time, it was renamed Hughes Danbury Optical Systems.44

PREPARING FOR LAUNCH

The series of schedule and budget problems in the early 1980s led to a shakeup 

of HST management early in 1984. The changes in the program encouraged 

Congress and NASA to free up more money for the program as telescope components came together. Its launch date by then was projected for the second 

half of 1986.45 The Space Shuttle Program had finally entered its flight phase in 

April 1981 with the first launch of the Shuttle Columbia, and the pace of flights 

began to pick up as Challenger entered the fleet in 1983, followed by Discovery 

in 1984 and Atlantis in 1985.

The Space Shuttle, officially known as the Space Transportation System, 

was designed to provide routine, timely, and low-cost access to low-Earth orbit 

for both astronauts and payloads. Astronauts on board the orbiters carried out 

experiments in space, delivered robotic spacecraft into orbit, and maintained 

and repaired spacecraft for NASA and a variety of clients, including commercial firms and the Department of Defense. NASA also wanted the Shuttle to act 

as a delivery vehicle to a space station in orbit around Earth, but a space station 

program was not even announced until 1984. The Space Shuttle that emerged 

from its development process in the 1970s included a reusable orbiter that was 

boosted into orbit with the assistance of two reusable solid rocket boosters and 

a disposable external tank that fed the orbiters’ engines as they carried the craft 

into orbit. After several days of operations in low-Earth orbit, the orbiter would 

reenter the atmosphere and, with the help of delta wings, glide to a landing 

much like an aircraft. Early in the Shuttle Program, it became clear that the 

Shuttle would not fly as frequently as had been hoped, and the cost of carrying 

astronauts and payloads into space remained stubbornly high.46

In 1984, NASA made important decisions about the relationship of HST 

to the Shuttle. When the Agency had issued its Request for Proposals for the 

Space Telescope in 1977, it stated that astronauts from the Shuttle would 

service the telescope on orbit and that the telescope would be periodically 

returned to Earth and then re-orbited after refurbishment. A large number of 

components were being designed for on-orbit servicing, but as costs mounted, 

program management decided in 1980 to remove the capability for on-orbit 

servicing from a number of components, including power control units and the 

solar arrays. In 1984, NASA decided that returning HST to Earth would be 

unnecessarily risky due to the great expenses involved, which would be similar to the cost of building a new space telescope, along with concerns about 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

▲ This Hubble Space Telescope with multilayer insulation, high-gain antenna, and solar 

arrays in a clean room at the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company facility in Sunnyvale, 

California. (NASA: 8663388)
34 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

contamination of instruments back on Earth and mechanical stresses during 

reentry and launch. Moreover, if HST were returned to Earth for refurbishment, there was always the danger that it might be kept there to save money. 

By then, NASA knew that the cost of each Shuttle mission was much higher 

than had been originally hoped. Telescope scientist Robert Bless said refurbishment on Earth would also require extensive maintenance facilities and would 

take much longer than the originally projected six months. “When it became 

apparent that the cost of ground-return refurbishment would approach the cost 

of building a second telescope...the idea was abandoned.”47 Instead, NASA 

Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC)

Calibration 

Module Articulating 

Fold Mirrors

Pyramid (Fixed)

Heat Pipe

Multilayer 

Insulation

Pick-off 

Mirror 

Mechanism

Electronics 

Compartment

Entrance 

Aperture

Radiator

Wide Field and Planetary Camera Time on HST:

24 April 1990–6 December 1993 

Contractor:

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Principal Investigator:

James A. Westphal

(California Institute of Technology)

Weight: 268 kilograms 

(590 pounds)

Radial Instrument

WF/PC was a pioneering instrument even before it got off the ground, since it involved

an early use of charge-coupled devices in an astronomical instrument. When it was

found that existing CCDs were not sensitive in ultraviolet wavelengths, Principal 

Investigator James Westphal tested CCDs coated with a substance called coronene

in the Hale Telescope at Mount Palomar successfully to deal with the problem. Later 

on during the development of WF/PC, a puzzling problem called quantum efficiency

hysteresis was found, in which the response of pixels in CCDs was affected by the previous image they had taken. Eventually, a light pipe was installed in HST’s aperture 

door to flood and “decontaminate” the CCDs with ultraviolet light between images.a
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

determined that the telescope would operate for up to 15 years in space with 

periodic visits by Shuttle astronauts. Edward J. Weiler, then project scientist for 

HST, argued that the ground repair option for the telescope and even for individual instruments “must be avoided as much as possible” because of its higher 

cost than space-based refurbishment, to ensure that the telescope operated “in 

the most cost effective manner possible.”48 As a result of this decision, the 

program’s managers increased the number of what became known as Orbital 

Replacement Units to 50 and introduced other features to HST designed to 

facilitate EVA servicing.

WF/PC was in effect two cameras, the f/12.9 Wide Field Camera and the f/3

Planetary Camera, and each used four different CCDs for a total of eight CCDs. When

light from HST’s mirrors entered WF/PC, it was directed to a pyramid that pointed the

light at the four CCDs in each mode. The pyramid would rotate 45 degrees to move 

from wide field mode to planetary mode. Images were assembled or mosaicked 

from the four CCDs in each image mode. The camera operated from wavelengths 

of 1,150 angstroms in the ultraviolet to 11,000 angstroms in the near infrared. The 

CCDs were made by Texas Instruments and produced images with dimensions of 

800 by 800 pixels. The instrument contained 12 filter wheels, each with four filters 

and a clear position.b

The quality of WF/PC’s images was strongly affected by spherical aberration in HST’s

main mirror. After HST’s scientific operations were updated to factor in the effects 

of spherical aberration, normal scientific operations began for WF/PC in 1991. Many

of its best-known images were of brighter objects such as Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn 

inside the solar system. Some images of these and other objects were repaired 

using image deconvolution during computer processing. WF/PC was replaced by

WFPC2 during Servicing Mission 1.

Much of WF/PC was recycled for use in WFC3, which was installed on HST in 2009

WF/PC’s optical channels have been put on display at the National Air and Space

Museum in Washington, DC.

a Smith, The Space Telescope, 250–251, 333–336.

b Space Telescope Science Institute, Wide Field—Planetary Camera Instrument Handbook, 

Version 3.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, April 1992).
36 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

By then, the first set of scientific instruments was being built for HST, all 

of them replaceable. The Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC), which was 

being built at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California, was considered particularly important because it would produce a major share of HST’s scientific 

output and have a high profile with the public because of the images it would 

produce. It was also the most expensive and complex instrument. The chargecoupled devices (CCDs) inside WF/PC that would record the light from HST’s 

distant targets were still a new technology that had only been created in 1969, 

and program managers and astronomers worked to deal with the shortcomings of early CCDs, including their limited size and wavelength sensitivity. 

Once WF/PC neared completion in 1983, NASA decided it would be wise to 

begin work on building a replacement wide field camera that could incorporate 

technological improvements as insurance against an early failure of the first 

instrument. The decision to get an early start on a replacement for HST’s main 

camera turned out to be unexpectedly prescient.49

HST reached a major manufacturing milestone in October 1984 when a Super 

Guppy aircraft moved the Optical Telescope Assembly from the Perkin-Elmer 

plant in Danbury, Connecticut, to Lockheed in Sunnyvale, California, where it 

was mated to the Support Systems Module the following February. Lockheed’s 

assembly and test program began to fall behind because of Hubble’s complex 

nature and Lockheed’s expectations that testing would proceed in a similar 

manner to that of the military reconnaissance satellites that Lockheed usually 

built. When Defense Department spacecraft were being tested, Lockheed only 

had to deal with a small group of people, whereas HST involved many stakeholders, including Goddard, Marshall, and various scientific teams. As a one-ofa-kind spacecraft, HST had many unique features that required more thorough 

verification. Testing was further delayed because the tightly funded program 

had not allowed for prototype systems that were available in Lockheed’s more 

generously financed national security satellite programs.50 Charles J. Pellerin, 

Director of Astrophysics at NASA Headquarters during much of this time, 

came to believe that having two major contractors and two NASA Centers with 

major responsibility for the HST program, all of them with different cultures, 

added greatly to the cost and time needed to complete the telescope.51

ESTABLISHING AN INSTITUTE 

When the Space Telescope program was established in 1977, NASA and outside astronomers had to come to an agreement on how the scientific work of the 

program would be managed. The two sides did not enjoy an easy relationship 

at the time. The strains between scientists and the space agency over the place 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

of science in NASA’s flagship Apollo program were well known to the public 

even in 1970 as the Agency struggled with declining budgets and with scientists questioning NASA’s long-range planning decisions.52 Astronomers were 

amongst those scientists who were suspicious of NASA, and as early as 1966, 

many of them urged that an outside body of experts direct science on the Space 

Telescope. Astronomers who worked for NASA at Goddard Space Flight Center 

expected to control the science program, but their hopes went against growing 

precedents in science in the United States. Starting in the 1950s, agencies of 

the U.S. government such as the National Science Foundation had begun to 

take a leading role in supporting new scientific facilities, including telescopes. 

A consortium of universities, the Association of Universities for Research in 

Astronomy (AURA), was created in 1957 to run the national observatory on Kitt 

Peak in Arizona. 

With NASA’s support, the National Academy of Sciences set up a committee in 1976 to examine how large space observatories should interact 

with their scientific users. The committee, which was headed by Donald F. 

Hornig, who had served as science advisor to President Lyndon B. Johnson 

in the 1960s, called for the creation of an independent science institute for 

the Space Telescope. During this time, Goddard opposed the institute, seeing it as limiting its own control over HST operations, while Marshall supported the concept. In 1978, NASA Administrator Frosch decided that NASA 

should authorize such an institute, and Noel W. Hinners, NASA’s Associate 

Administrator for Space Science and a supporter of the institute concept, 

announced that NASA would work with a science institute but retain operational control of the telescope in orbit. The Hornig Committee was called 

back to review NASA’s plans, and based on its recommendations, NASA put 

out a request for proposals for the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) 

in December 1979, with proposals due by the following March. Five university consortia sent proposals to a NASA Source Evaluation Board, and by 

September, only two proposals remained. AURA, which by then operated a 

number of other ground-based facilities in addition to Kitt Peak, proposed to 

set up the Institute on the Homewood Campus of Johns Hopkins University 

in Baltimore, Maryland. The other finalist was Associated Universities, Inc., 

which operated research facilities in several disciplines, including the National 

Radio Astronomy Observatory. It proposed to establish the Institute at 

Princeton University in New Jersey, the home of Lyman Spitzer. On 16 January 

1981, shortly before leaving office, Frosch announced that the AURA proposal had won. The Institute would go to Baltimore, which was less than an 

hour’s drive from Goddard. This meant that the Institute would be clearly 
38 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

separate from Goddard, yet close enough to allow close working relationships 

with the HST Mission Operations Team in Greenbelt.53 NASA Goddard and 

AURA signed a contract on 17 June 1981, establishing STScI at a ceremony 

attended by Center Director A. Thomas Young, acting STScI director Arthur 

D. Code, and Baltimore Mayor William Donald Schaefer, who predicted that 

Baltimore would become the “world capital of astronomy” over the two upcoming decades.54 The original cost-plus-negotiated-management-fee contract took 

effect 1 April 1981 and continued through the first two years after the launch 

of HST, with provisions for renewals.55

Not long after that, AURA made a controversial decision to select Riccardo 

Giacconi as STScI’s first director from a list of 60 candidates. Giacconi had 

moved to the United States from his native Italy in 1956 at age 25, and he 

began a groundbreaking career in x-ray astronomy that was later recognized 

with the 2002 Nobel Prize in Physics. He was also known for his organizational abilities. As an x-ray astronomer, Giacconi had once opposed the Large 

Space Telescope but years later changed his mind before applying to head the 

Institute. The new director was already known within NASA as a tenacious 

and often difficult negotiator, and his toughness was quickly put to the test, 

since many at NASA had a narrower concept of the Institute’s role in the 

Space Telescope program than did most scientists, including those at AURA. 

Despite its history of contracting out work, NASA was concerned about losing control of the already troubled and highly expensive program to this new 

entity that was not directly responsible—as NASA was—to higher government authorities and taxpayers. At that time, NASA saw the Institute’s role as 

simply serving astronomers who would use HST for their work, while Giacconi 

and other astronomers had a more expansive view, envisioning astronomers on 

staff at the Institute using the space telescope to do top-level science alongside 

astronomers from other institutions. Giacconi believed experience showed that 

“the best scientists gave the best service” to other scientists because they are 

more aware of the current state of knowledge in their field and because they 

were tied in better with the community of scientists with whom they would 

work with on HST observations.56

STScI’s work in the 1980s was strongly affected by the fact that HST had 

been designed—and many components, notably the telescope’s main mirror, 

had been built—before the Institute opened its doors. During the 1980s, STScI 

built up its staff and supported the engineering work for HST ground systems, 

particularly those related to the scientific instruments. Institute staff members 

also created and tested much of the software and systems needed to meet the 

mission requirements for HST science operations.57 During its first two years, 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

STScI operated out of temporary buildings at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore 

before moving to its permanent home on JHU’s Homewood Campus, which 

was named the Steven P. Muller Building in 1990 after the outgoing president 

of JHU. Almost from the beginning and despite expansion work, space was at a 

premium in the building, and some Institute staff were located in neighboring 

buildings. In the 1980s, these tight confines were seen as a physical expression of the differences between NASA Headquarters and the Institute over the 

scope of STScI’s role.58

Early in the 1980s, scientists working on the first set of HST instruments 

reported difficult relations with the Space Telescope team at Goddard, which 

the new Center Director, Noel Hinners, and Goddard’s new HST project 

manager, Frank Carr, worked to repair. Giacconi had tried and failed to get 

around NASA by taking the dispute between Goddard and STScI to President 

Reagan’s Science Advisor, George A. Keyworth. In 1984, a committee of the 

Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences was formed to 

review the Institute’s goals and objectives. While the committee’s carefully 

worded report in 1985 noted that STScI spending was close to the upper limit 

of comparable institutions, it also said that neither the Hornig Committee 

that formally proposed the creation of STScI, nor NASA, nor AURA had 

“correctly anticipated the magnitude of the effort that would be required 

to carry out” STScI’s functions. The report found “recent improvement” in 

the relationship between NASA and the Institute and urged the two sides 

to keep pursuing a better relationship.59 James C. Welch, head of the Space 

Telescope Development Division at NASA Headquarters from 1983 to 1987, 

cast a critical eye on many aspects of the space telescope program, and, in 

1986, prepared a report on STScI for the Subcommittee on Space Science 

and Applications of the U.S. House of Representatives. Welch’s report suggested: “[g]iven STScI performance and management problems, alternative 

approaches should be explored. A Science Institute with a more restricted 

project role would cut costs, while assuring a visible, formalized science 

presence.”60 The report praised STScI’s work in linking astronomers to the 

HST program but criticized its production of software systems for HST, particularly the Guide Star Selection System, which was running behind schedule and growing in scope, budget, and staff complement.61 While the report 

caused STScI to produce a 38-page refutation that noted that many systems 

changes had been requested by NASA,62 Robert Smith wrote that because 

“much of the passion in the debate on the Institute’s size had subsided” at 

the time of the National Academy report the year before, NASA “quickly disowned” the Welch report.63
40 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

▲ NASA’s Great Observatories—the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, Chandra X-Ray 

Observatory, Hubble Space Telescope, and Spitzer Space Telescope. (NASA)

GREAT OBSERVATORIES 

The early space observatories that came before HST had provided a taste to scientists of what could be found across the electromagnetic spectrum. Examining 

an object in just one narrow band of light told only part of the story. For example, collapsed stars near the end of their lives tend to emit most of their energy 

as x rays, while stars similar to the Sun emit more of their energy in visible 

light. As the first of a new generation of space observatories, HST covered visible wavelengths and, to a limited extent, ultraviolet and infrared light. As HST 

was awaiting launch in the 1980s, astronomers who concentrated on gamma 

rays were developing the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) for launch, following 

on earlier satellites such as NASA’s High Energy Astrophysical Observatories 

(HEAO). Gamma rays are associated with energetic and often mysterious processes in the universe, but most gamma rays are absorbed by Earth’s atmosphere. X-ray astronomers, whose number most famously included Giacconi, 

proposed their own larger-scale spacecraft, the Advanced X-ray Astrophysics 

Observatory (AXAF), to build on earlier observations of astronomical x-ray 

sources from satellites such as HEAO. Because of the wealth of objects that 

are visible in the infrared, astronomers were lobbying to create an infrared telescope mounted in the Shuttle payload bay that evolved into a free-flying space 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

observatory known as the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF). These 

ideas and others were promoted in a National Research Council study setting 

out priorities for astrophysics in the 1980s.64

Pellerin worked to promote these programs in 1984 to a Congress that was 

concentrating on tightening budgets to fight deficits. At the time, HST was well 

along in its development, the Gamma Ray Observatory was under way, and 

AXAF required approval from Congress to proceed. Pellerin thought it would 

make sense to sell AXAF in a package with SIRTF so that he could argue that 

they, along with HST and GRO, could allow astronomers to explore the whole 

spectrum from space. As Pellerin was directing the creation of a colorful brochure that explained the work of these space observatories in easy-to-understand 

terms, he discussed it with George B. Field, founding director of the HarvardSmithsonian Center for Astrophysics. Field, who chaired the 1980s decadal survey of astronomers and astrophysicists that recommended these space observatories, suggested they be called the Great Observatories, and Pellerin ran with 

the idea as he worked with contractors and astronomers who would be lobbying 

Congress and the Reagan administration. Their lengthy lobbying campaign for 

AXAF led to program approval, and SIRTF later was endorsed as well.65

The Great Observatories name stuck with the four spacecraft. GRO was 

launched in 1991 by the Shuttle Atlantis and was named after pioneering 

American physicist Arthur Holly Compton. It continued in low-Earth orbit until 

it was deliberately de-orbited on 4 June 2000, following the failure of one of its 

three gyroscopes. While it could have been refueled by the Space Shuttle, that 

option was never exercised. The Compton Gamma Ray Observatory has since 

been followed by other gamma-ray and high-energy observatory spacecraft. 

AXAF was renamed the Chandra X-ray Observatory after Indian American 

astrophysicist Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, who won the Nobel Prize for 

Physics in 1983. Chandra was launched into a highly elliptical orbit from the 

Shuttle Columbia on 23 July 1999. At this writing, it continues to operate after 

more than two decades of highly successful research. SIRTF was renamed the 

Spitzer Space Telescope in honor of astrophysicist Lyman Spitzer—who made 

the first formal proposal for what became HST—and was launched aboard a 

Delta II rocket from Cape Canaveral on 25 August 2003 into a heliocentric 

orbit trailing Earth. Spitzer ran out of helium coolant in 2009 and provided 

much data in what was known as the “Spitzer Warm Mission,” which ended in 

January 2020 when the spacecraft was turned off. Pellerin and Field’s idea of 

packaging the four spacecraft together as the Great Observatories has proven 

apt, as data from the four spacecraft have often been combined to provide a full 

scientific description of particular target objects and groups of objects.66
42 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

CHALLENGER

▲ The crew of the Space Shuttle Challenger that perished during the launch of mission 

STS-51L on 28 January 1986. Crew members are (left to right, front row) Michael J. Smith, 

Francis R. (Dick) Scobee, and Ronald E. McNair; (back row) Ellison S. Onizuka, Sharon 

Christa McAuliffe, Gregory Jarvis, and Judith A. Resnik. (NASA: S85-44253)

As the Great Observatory Concept was winning approval in the mid-1980s, 

HST was nearing its planned Shuttle launch that would make it the first of 

this new class of space telescope. The full Shuttle fleet of four orbiters was 

operational by 1985, and some 14 flights were scheduled for 1986, including 

the deployment of HST from the Shuttle Atlantis on a flight in October. In 

1985, NASA named an all-veteran crew of five astronauts headed by Chief 

Astronaut John W. Young to fly the HST deployment mission, then designated 

as STS-61J.67 The crew included Bruce McCandless and Kathryn J. Sullivan, 

who both had spacewalking experience and would be ready to don their spacesuits and go into the Shuttle’s payload bay to help deploy HST if necessary. 

In addition to preparing for their mission, they were mindful of the recent 

decision NASA had made to have Shuttle astronauts perform all servicing and 

repair work on HST. Sullivan wrote that “we had to do everything we could 

while Hubble was still on Earth to ensure that no future Hubble maintenance 

crew ever found themselves on a spacewalk with equipment that did not fit 

or work as needed.” Working with experts from JSC, MSFC, and Lockheed, 

McCandless and Sullivan went over HST in its clean room looking for changes 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

that could make the telescope easier for astronauts to service and repair, and 

they also worked to improve the tools astronauts would need for their work 

with HST.68

The Space Shuttle had proven to be much more complex and difficult to 

maintain than had been anticipated, and Shuttle launch delays became frequent events due to weather problems and mechanical issues. The 10th flight 

planned for 1985 was held up a month and instead flew in mid-January 1986. 

The first scheduled flight of the new year, a satellite deployment mission using 

the Shuttle Challenger, suffered postponements for a variety of reasons. Finally, 

on 28 January the 25th mission of the Shuttle program lifted off from Pad 39B 

at Kennedy Space Center, but 73 seconds later, the Shuttle stack broke apart, 

costing the lives of seven crew members, including the first schoolteacher to 

fly aboard the Shuttle, Christa McAuliffe. Investigators found that the disaster was caused by the failure of a rubber O-ring in one of the Shuttle’s solid 

rocket boosters. NASA managers had ignored previous problems with O-rings, 

which were sensitive to the temperature at the launch site, and opted to launch 

Challenger on an unusually cold day. The disaster forced NASA to reconsider 

many aspects of the Shuttle program, and as a result, military, commercial, and 

other payloads were removed from the Shuttle launch manifest.69

While NASA made changes to the Space Shuttle craft and procedures, there 

were no flights until 29 September 1988, when Discovery was launched on 

another satellite deployment mission. As its work of improving Shuttle safety 

and shuffling launch schedules continued, NASA postponed the launch of HST 

in a number of increments that continued until the launch date. On 17 March 

1988, NASA named the crew for the HST deployment mission, STS-31, with 

Loren Shriver replacing Young as commander, for a launch on Discovery. Crew 

training formally began in July 1989.70

While the public focused on the astronauts who lost their lives, the 

Challenger disaster also meant professional frustration for the astronomers who 

waited for their chance to use HST. The resulting delay increased costs for 

NASA because the team that maintained the telescope on the ground had to 

be kept together until the ultimate launch date. In early 1986, HST still faced 

important prelaunch work, notably a round of tests inside a vacuum chamber 

where it experienced the alternating heat and cold it would face in low-Earth 

orbit. The tests took place in May and June, and they showed that the telescope’s power system needed more preparation before flight. HST managers 

also found that the system designed to protect HST against unexpected equipment problems and even the system that would be used to schedule observations were in need of improvement. 
44 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Although it was not immediately apparent, HST benefited greatly from the 

delay caused by the Challenger disaster, and the work done during that lengthy 

period of postponement may well have saved Hubble from a set of problems 

that could have curtailed its operations early in flight. Further development 

work was done on HST’s computer software and scientific instruments. STScI 

completed the star catalog during this time. In addition, many of the smaller 

component parts were replaced and improved. People involved in controlling 

the telescope had more time to prepare for flight. Astronauts Sullivan and 

McCandless, NASA, and contractor experts took advantage of the time to propose more changes to HST and further improve tools to increase the possibilities for maintenance and repairs of HST on orbit.71

Perhaps most importantly, Hubble’s two European-built solar arrays were 

redesigned and rebuilt. Starting with the first Shuttle flight in 1981, experts 

found surprising amounts of damage to Shuttle thermal blankets from atomic 

oxygen in low-Earth orbit. During the STS-41D Shuttle mission in 1984, material samples exposed to the environment of space showed that atomic oxygen 

damaged some materials, including silver and kapton, a plastic film widely used 

in spacecraft, that had been incorporated into the original solar arrays built for 

HST. New arrays were built to avoid what would have been a serious failure. 

The new solar arrays were also designed to provide more power to the telescope, 

and the output of the batteries was increased.72

The loss of Challenger and its crew, followed by the revelations of poor 

management that were a primary cause of the disaster, put NASA under a 

shadow of suspicion. After sustaining the loss of many of its high-profile missions, including commercial payloads and national defense missions, the Space 

Shuttle Program returned to flight with the launch of Discovery in September 

1988. In the fall of 1989, the Berlin Wall was brought down, along with many 

Eastern European communist regimes, marking the end of the Cold War that 

had helped give birth to both the Space Shuttle and HST. The Shuttle and its 

astronauts performed well in the nine missions that followed Challenger and 

preceded the launch of HST. Nonetheless, the importance of the Hubble Space 

Telescope to the reputation of the space agency had grown during its extended 

stay on Earth in the late 1980s as other payloads and missions were taken away 

from the Shuttle. As a result, the expectations that surrounded HST were larger 

than ever in April 1990, when the crew of Discovery launched with HST and 

placed it in space to finally begin its mission of discovery. 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

ENDNOTES

 1 NASASpaceflight.com forums include Spitzer’s comments on launch day at https://

forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=31995.300 (accessed 16 September 2017). 

The STS-31 Mission Highlights Resource Tape includes a television broadcast from Flight 

Day 5 of STS-31 where Kathryn Sullivan shows the eyepiece that the crew was able to 

borrow thanks to the Smithsonian Institution and the American Astronomical Society.

 2 Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) was neither the first to build a telescope nor the only person to point a telescope at the skies at the time. The telescope emerged in Holland, 

and Thomas Harriot (1560–1621) recorded observations of the Moon and sunspots 

before Galileo but never published his observations. Galileo was the first to publish his 

telescopic observations of the Moon and Jupiter and its moons in his book Starry Messenger in 1610 just weeks after those observations, and of sunspots in a subsequent 

publication. For more on Galileo, see Michael Hoskin, ed., The Cambridge Concise History of Astronomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 111–119, 125; and 

J. L. Heilbron, Galileo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 147–164. Albert Van 

Helden, The Galileo Project, http://galileo.rice.edu, 1995, accessed 23 March 2016, also 

contains information on Galileo and Harriot.

 3 Michael Hoskin, The Cambridge Concise History of Astronomy (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1999), pp. 224–227, 235–295; Klaus Brasch, “A Short History of Astrophotography: Part 1,” Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada 111, no. 2 

(April 2017): 52–59.

 4 Hoskin, The Cambridge Concise History of Astronomy, pp. 235–295; Smith, The Space 

Telescope, pp. 5–10. The size of reflecting telescopes is commonly recorded according 

the aperture or diameter of the main mirror in the telescope.

 5 NASA News, “Space Telescope Renamed as Edwin P. Hubble Space Telescope,” Release 

No. 83–155, NASA Headquarters, 21 October 1983.

 6 Gale E. Christianson, Edwin Hubble: Mariner of the Nebulae (Bristol: Institute of Physics 

Publishing, 1995).

 7 William L. Laurence, “Largest Telescope Dedicated to Man’s Service at Palomar,” New

York Times (4 June 1948): A1; William L. Laurence, “Palomar Observers Dazzled in First

Use of 200-Inch Lens,” New York Times (5 June 1948): A1; W. K., “Time Out for the Giant

Telescope,” New York Times (16 January 1949): E11; “‘Big Eye’ Is Ready,” New York Times 

(18 December 1949): E9; Ronald Florence, The Perfect Machine: Building the Palomar 

Telescope (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 386–398; Christianson, Edwin Hubble, pp. 

273–359. Florence wrote on p. 416 that the problem afflicting HST’s mirror was of a far 

more serious order than the final touches made to the Hale Telescope mirror. 

 8 There are numerous sources about the early history of space exploration, including 

Walter A. McDougall, ...the Heavens and The Earth: A Political History of the Space Age

(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1985). For more on Goddard, see David A. Clary, Rocket 

Man: Robert H. Goddard and the Birth of the Space Age (New York: Hyperion, 2003). For 

more on the V-2, see Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemünde and the 

Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). Hermann 
46 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Oberth, The Rocket into Planetary Space (English edition, Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 

2014), p. 71.

 9 See David H. DeVorkin, Science with A Vengeance: How the Military Created the US Space 

Sciences After World War II (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1992).

10 In 1948, Project RAND became the RAND Corporation. See Martin Collins, Cold War 

Laboratory: RAND, the Air Force, and the American State, 1945–1950 (Washington, DC:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002). Project RAND, Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship (Santa Monica, CA: Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc., 2 May 

1946. Republished in 1996 by the RAND Corporation).

11 Lyman Spitzer, Jr., “Astronomical Advantages of an Extra-Terrestrial Observatory,” Project RAND, 30 July 1946, in John M. Logsdon, general editor, with Amy Paige Snyder, 

Roger D. Launius, Stephen J. Garber, and Regan Anne Newport, Exploring the Unknown: 

Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume V, Exploring the 

Cosmos (Washington, DC: NASA SP-2001-4407, 2001), pp. 546–552 (quotation on p. 551).

See also Nancy Grace Roman, “Exploring the Universe: Space-Based Astronomy and 

Astrophysics,” Exploring the Unknown, Volume V, Exploring the Cosmos, pp. 501–543. The 

brilliant but curmudgeonly Swiss astronomer Fritz Zwicky wrote a journal article in 1947 

that discussed the uses that rocket-borne telescopes could be put to in space. Fritz 

Zwicky, “Research with Rockets,” Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific

59, no. 347 (April 1947): 64–73.

12 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 46–48. For a biography of Spitzer, see George B. Field, 

“Lyman Spitzer, Jr. (1914–1997),” Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific 

110, no. 745 (March 1998): 215–222.

13 McDougall’s ...the Heavens and The Earth remains the best political history of the space 

race, although new information and new perspectives on this history have emerged 

since the end of the Cold War. See also Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 27–39

14 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 58–64. Coalition quote from Robert W. Smith, p. 59

15 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 39–44; Mikulski Archive for Space Telescopes, “About 

Copernicus,” http://archive.stsci.edu/copernicus/about.html (accessed 15 December 

2016).

16 “Space Research: Directions for the Future—Report of a Study by the Space Science 

Board,” in Exploring the Unknown, Volume V, ed. Logsdon et al., pp. 579–585; Smith, 

The Space Telescope, 1965, pp. 48–53; John E. Naugle, First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science Experiments (Washington, DC: NASA SP-4215), p. 111; Lyman

Spitzer, Jr., “History of the Space Telescope,” Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical 

Society 20 (1979): 29–36.

17 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 44–64. For more on Nancy Roman, see Nancy Grace 

Roman, “Nancy Roman: An Astronomer’s Life,” Astronomy Beat (Astronomical Society 

of the Pacific), no. 112, 11 June 2013). 

18 For more on the background of the Space Shuttle, see T. A. Heppenheimer, The Space 

Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a Reusable Space Vehicle (Washington, DC: NASA

SP-4221, 1999). See also Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 58–82. Skylabwas a short-term 

project built from Apollo hardware, and NASA hoped to win approval for a long-term 
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

space station for the Shuttle to visit. The space station did not win presidential or congressional approval until 1984. After being transformed into the International Space 

Station, its assembly in orbit finally began in 1998.

19 Roman, “Exploring the Universe,” p. 533; Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 67–85, 228–

232. See also Andrew J. Dunar and Stephen P. Waring, Power to Explore: A History of Marshall Space Flight Center 1960–1990 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Spac

Administration, 1999). Chapter twelve deals with the HST Program.

20 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 120–123. 

21 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 131–134; Astronomy Survey Committee, Astronomy and 

Astrophysics for the 1970s, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1972),

pp. 98–101; Joseph K. Alexander, Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, Partnership, Leadership (Washington, DC: NASA Monographs in Aerospace History, no. 57, 2017),

pp. 109–112. See also Scott D. Tremaine, John Norris Bahcall 1934–2005, A Biographical 

Memoir (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2011)

22 Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 388.

23 Ibid., pp. 116–186; see also Roman, “Exploring the Universe,” pp. 534–535; “James C. 

Fletcher, NASA Administrator, to James L. Mitchell, Office of Management and Budget,” 

and associated correspondence, in Logsdon et al., Exploring the Unknown, Volume V, pp. 

644–652; and Mark Damohn, Back Down to Earth: The Development of Space Policy for 

NASA During the Jimmy Carter Administration (San Jose, CA: Authors Choice Press, 2001), 

pp. 115, 261. 

24 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 221–225; quote on 224.

25 James E. David, Spies and Shuttles: NASA’s Secret Relationships with the DoD and CIA 

(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2015), pp. 178–186; J. Kelly Beatty, “HST and 

the Military Edge,” Sky & Telescope (April 1985): p. 302; Robert W. Smith, “The Making of

Space Astronomy: A Gift of the Cold War,” in Earth-Bound to Satellite: Telescopes, Skills and

Networks, ed. A. D. Morrison-Low, Sven Dupre, Stephen Johnston, and Georgio Strano 

(Leiden, Netherlands : Brill, 2011), pp. 235–249; Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 146–149. 

26 Warren Ferster, “Donated Space Telescopes Are Remnants of Failed NRO Program,”

Space News (8 June 2012). While the two donated space telescopes have mirrors with

the same aperture as HST’s main mirror, contractors different from the HST contractors 

built them starting in the late 1990s for a cancelled technology development program, 

so they are unrelated to HST.

27 Smith, “Making of Space Astronomy.”

28 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 104, 152–153.

29 “Announcement of Opportunity for Space Telescope,” 18 March 1977 (Washington,

DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration); Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 

240–254. 

30 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 245–258; Peter J. Westwick, Into the Black: JPL and the

American Space Program 1976–2004 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 

87–88. The High Resolution Spectrograph became known in 1987 as the Goddard High 

Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS).
48 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

31 Roman, “Exploring the Universe,” pp. 533–534. See Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 

135–141; R. J. Laurance, “The History of the Hubble Space Telescope and ESA’s Involvement,” ESA Bulletin no. 61 (February 1990): 9–11. See “Memorandum of Understanding Between the European Space Agency and the United States National Aeronautics 

and Space Administration,” Exploring the Unknown, Volume V, ed. Logsdon et al., pp. 

670–681, 7 October 1977; and Dr. Rudolf Albrecht, oral history interview (OHI) by author, 

9 November 2015.

32 See “MOU Between the ESA and NASA,” Exploring the Unknown, Volume V, ed. Logsdon 

et al., pp. 670–681; and Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 135–141, 245–246; Roger M. Bonnet and Vittorio Manno, International Cooperation in Space: The Example of the European Space Agency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 76.

33 “Announcement of Opportunity for Space Telescope,” Exploring the Unknown, Volume V, 

ed. Logsdon et al., pp. 664–670.

34 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 221–240.

35 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 259–313, 326; Dunar and Waring, Power to Explore, pp.

500–508; NASA News, “Space Telescope Renamed.” In Back Down to Earth, Damohn 

discusses the budget problems afflicting the telescope up through 1980, and T. A. 

Heppenheimer, The Development of the Space Shuttle 1972–1981 (Washington, DC:

Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002) provides an overview of the Shuttle Program 

leading up to the first launch in 1981, including a discussion of HST’s development, 

pp. 357–362. Charles J. Pellerin, oral history interview by author, 17 September 2015, 

pp. 5–7.

36 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 236–239; Lew Allen, et al., The Hubble Space Telescope 

Optical Systems Failure Report, chapter 3 (Washington, DC: NASA TM-103443, 1990)

37 Robert S. Capers and Eric Lipton, “Hubble Error: Time, Money and Millionths of an Inch,” 

Hartford Courant, (31 March 1991): A1; Perkin-Elmer News Release, “Space Telescope 

Primary Mirror Delivered to Perkin-Elmer, Advance Copy,” 10 November 1978, and other 

Perkin-Elmer Press Releases, Series 8, 38, “Perkin-Elmer Brochures, Press Releases, 

Articles, 1973–1984,” Space Telescope Institute Working Files, Hubble Space Telescope

Collection, 1962–1991, The Sheridan Libraries, Johns Hopkins University.

38 Capers and Lipton, “Hubble Error.”

39 Eric Lipton and Robert S. Capers, “Corporate Changes, NASA Cutbacks Hit Project,” 

Hartford Courant (1 April 1991); Allen et al., HST Optical Systems Failure Report, chap. 3.

40 Lipton and Capers, “Corporate Changes”; George A. Rodney, Hubble Space Telescope: 

SRM&QA Observations and Lessons Learned (Washington DC: NASA Office of Safety and

Mission Quality, 1990); NASA Office of the Inspector General, “NASA OIG Report of Investigation: Hubble Space Telescope, Hughes Danbury Optical Systems Inc.” (I-GO-90-259), 

8 January 1991; Document released to https://governmentattic.org on 24 March 2009 

in response to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act and posted on 

21 August 2009 on https://governmentattic.org.

41 Robert S. Capers and Eric Lipton, “The Looking Glass: How a Flaw Reflects Cracks in 

Space Science,” Hartford Courant (31 March and 1–3 April 1981); Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 236–240; Allen et al., HST Optical Systems Failure Report, chap. 4.
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

42 Capers and Lipton, “The Looking Glass”; Allen et al., HST Optical Systems Failure Report; 

NASA Inspector General, “Report of Investigation, Hubble Space Telescope,” p. 5.

43 NASA Inspector General, “Report of Investigation, Hubble Space Telescope,” p. 12; Robert S. Capers and Eric Lipton, “Clues to a Flaw, and Missed Opportunities to Fix It,” Hartford Courant (2 April 1991). The top NASA engineer at Perkin-Elmer testified that while he 

was made aware of the changes made to the null corrector, he was not informed about 

some tests performed with other devices. He said Perkin-Elmer gave him explanations 

that suggested that the change to the null corrector and some other “discordant” test 

results were normal (see Inspector General Report, p. 6).

44 Capers and Lipton, “The Looking Glass”; Allen et al., HST Optical Systems Failure Report; 

NASA Inspector General, “Report of Investigation, Hubble Space Telescope,” Pellerin 

OHI, pp. 5, 11–12; Nolan Walborn, “Personal Recollections of Institute and Hubble PreHistory,” Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter, 20, no. 1 (winter 2003): pp. 21–22;

Christopher Burrows and Holland Ford, “Spherical Aberration: From Disaster to Glory,” 

comments at an HST 25th Anniversary panel, Johns Hopkins University, 23 April 2015. 

Ford said, “There were two telescope scientists, Bill Fastie in this (Johns Hopkins astronomy) department, and Dan Schroeder, they were very good people, but they could not 

get into Perkin-Elmer and see how the testing was being done. It was classified. It was 

behind the veil of national security.”

45 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 314–329.

46 A large number of books deal with the history of the Space Shuttle Program. The most 

comprehensive history of the entire program is Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: Developing an Icon, 3 vols. (Forest Lake, MN: Specialty Press, 2016). David Hitt and Heather R. 

Smith, Bold They Rise: The Space Shuttle Early Years, 1972–1986 (Lincoln: University of 

Nebraska Press, 2014) and Rick Houston, Wheels Stop: The Tragedies and Triumphs of the 

Space Shuttle Program, 1986–2011 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2013) cover 

Space Shuttle operations. A book that attempts to place the Shuttle Program in context 

is Valerie Neal, Spaceflight in the Shuttle Era and Beyond: Redefining Humanity’s Purpose 

in Space (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).

47 Joe Rothenberg, oral history interview by author, 27 September 2016, pp. 6–7; Robert 

Bless, “Space Science: What’s Wrong at NASA,” in Issues in NASA Program and Projec

Management, ed. Francis T. Hoban (Washington, DC: NASA Scientific and Technical

Information Program, 1991), pp. 35–42 (quote, p. 36); Joseph F. Shea, chair, Report of the 

Task Force on the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission (Washington, DC: NASA, 21

May 1993), p. 3.

48 Edward J. Weiler, “Space Telescope Scientific Instruments Maintenance and Refurbishment,” memo, NASA Headquarters, 18 December 1983.

49 Weiler, “Space Telescope Instruments” memo; John Trauger, “Wide Field and Planetar

Camera 2: ‘The Camera that Saved Hubble,’” unpublished manuscript, 1997; Smith, The 

Space Telescope, pp. 314–336; Shea, Task Force Report, 3. 

50 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 360–367.

51 Pellerin OHI, pp. 5–7, 11. After Pellerin left NASA, his reflections about the causes of 

HST’s mirror problem and the work that led to its solution caused him to write a book 
50 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

and begin a new career as a management educator and consultant. See Charles J. Pellerin, How NASA Builds Teams: Mission Critical Soft Skills for Scientists, Engineers and Project Teams (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009)

52 For an account of science in Apollo, see Donald A. Beattie, Taking Science to the Moon: 

Lunar Experiments and the Apollo Program (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001).

53 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 187–220; Roman, “Exploring the Universe,” p. 536; 

“NASA Ad Hoc Science Advisory Committee, ‘Report to the Administrator,’ 15 August 

1966,” Exploring the Unknown, Volume V, pp. 586–592; “Institutional Arrangements for 

the Space Telescope: Report of a Study at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, July 19–30,

1976” (Washington, DC: National Academies of Science, 1976); Dunar & Waring, Powe

to Explore, pp. 485–488. For more on AURA, see Frank K. Edmondson, AURA and Its US 

National Observatories (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1997), and W.

Patrick McCray, Giant Telescopes: Astronomical Ambition and the Promise of Technology

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 38–42. In 1959, AURA had received 

funds to study the concept of an orbiting space telescope. See Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 44–45.

54 “Goddard, AURA Sign $40 Million Contract for Space Telescope Institute,” Goddard News

28, no. 3, (6 July 1981). Operations contracts covering the HST Mission Operations Team 

at Goddard are discussed in chapter eight.

55 NASA Office of Inspector General, “Space Telescope Science Institute, Goddard Space 

Flight Center, 19 June 1989.” Document released on 25 March 2010 in response to 

requests made under the Freedom of Information Act and posted on 21 August 2009 on 

https://governmentattic.org, p. 1.

56 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 340–348; Riccardo Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep: 

A Personal History of Modern Astronomy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 

2008), pp. 220–221.

57 NASA, The Role of the STScI in the HST Project: Prepared for the Subcommittee on Space 

Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology of the U.S. House 

of Representatives, undated but issued in 1986, STScI Archive, Box 1.4, file, “Director’s 

Office re Welch Report,” JHU Library Special Collections, pp. 8, 12. HST’s main mirror

had completed its manufacturing process early in 1981, before STScI began operations. 

58 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 337–348.

59 Space Telescope Science Institute Task Group, Space Science Board, National Research 

Council, Institutional Arrangements for the Space Telescope: A Mid-Term Review (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1985), pp. 8, 9; Smith, The Space Telescope, pp.

350–358.

60 NASA, The Role of STScI, p. 4. For more on the Welch report, see Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 325–326, 389–390.

61 NASA, The Role of STScI, pp. 17–23.

62 Space Telescope Science Institute, A Response to Report “The Role of the Space Telescope Science Institute in the Hubble Space Telescope Project,” prepared for the Space 

Telescope Institute Council, 21 March 1986, p. 1.
CHAPTER ONE . A Troubl

63 STScI, A Response, p. 4; Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 352.

64 Roman, “Exploring the Universe,” pp. 532–542; Wallace Tucker and Karen Tucker,

Revealing the Universe: The Making of the Chandra X-Ray Observatory, (Cambridge, MA: 

Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 39–45; Astronomy Survey Committee, National 

Research Council, Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1980’s, Volume 1: Report of the 

Astronomy Survey Committee (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1982);

Renee M. Rottner, Making the Invisible Visible: A History of the Spitzer Infrared Telescope 

Facility (1971–2003), Monographs in Aerospace History, no. 47 (Washington, DC: NASA

SP-2017-4547, 2017).

65 Pellerin OHI, pp. 19–20; Tucker and Tucker, Revealing the Universe, pp. 75–95; Astronomy 

Survey Committee, Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1980’s. The entire text of the brochure Pellerin produced with the help of Martin Harwit, then of Cornell University, and 

contractor Valerie Neal to help sell the Great Observatories is reproduced in Exploring 

the Unknown, Volume V, Exploring the Cosmos, pp. 703–730. See also Martin Harwit, In 

Search of the True Universe: The Tools, Shaping, and Cost of Cosmological Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 230–255.

66 Roman, “Exploring the Universe,” pp. 532–542; Tucker and Tucker, Revealing the Universe. For Compton, see NASA, “Space Shuttle Mission STS-37 Press Kit,” April 1991, 

pp. 13–16. Rottner, Making the Invisible Visible, tells the story of Spitzer. NASA, “Mission 

News: NASA’s Spitzer Telescope Warms Up to New Career,” 6 May 2009, http://www

nasa.gov/mission_pages/spitzer/news/spitzer-20090506.html (accessed 4 April 2016); 

Paul Hertz, memorandum to Director, NASA Astrophysics Division, “NASA Response to 

the 2016 Senior Review for Astrophysics Operating Missions,” 9 June 2016.

67 On 19 September 1985, NASA announced the crew of STS-61J for the HST deployment 

mission using the Shuttle Atlantis, then scheduled for August 1986. Crew commander 

Young was a veteran of Gemini, Apollo, and Shuttle flights. The other members of the 

crew were those who eventually flew on STS-31. After the loss of Challenger, the STS-61J 

crew was formally stood down, although the former STS-61J crewmembers continued 

to prepare for HST deployment and servicing. Hawley, “How HST Influenced Shuttle 

Operations,” p. 386; Bolden OHI, pp. 1–3. 

68 Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 95–131, quote on p. 118; Ron Sheffield, oral history 

interview by author, 30 September 2016, part 1, pp. 2–4. Their work is discussed in more 

depth in chapter three.

69 See Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 

(Washington, DC: June 1986). A number of books have been written about the Challenger disaster, including Allan J. McDonald and James R. Hansen, Truth, Lies and

O-Rings: Inside the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (Gainesville, FL: University Press 

of Florida, 2009) and Diane Vaughn, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, 

Culture, and Deviance at NASA (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

70 Bolden said that NASA considered flying the HST deployment mission as the Shuttle 

Return to Flight mission in 1988 before deciding to fly other missions first. “NASA’s 1986 

Launch Schedule,” Orlando Sentinel (29 January 1986); Hawley, “How HST Influenced 

Shuttle Operations,” p. 386; Bolden OHI, pp. 1–3. See Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report 

to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI, Baltimore, MD, 
52 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

March 1988), p. 1, for a discussion of STScI’s concerns about repeated postponements 

of the HST deployment flight.

71 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 369–371; Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 139–159.

72 European Space Agency, “How Hubble Got Its Wings,” http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities

Space_Engineering_Technology/How_Hubble_got_its_wings (accessed 25 January 

2015); Steven A. Hawley, “Hubble Space Telescope Solar Array Concerns and Consequences for Servicing Mission 2,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets vol. 53, no. 1 (January–February 2016): 16; S. B. Mende and G. R. Swenson, “Space Vehicle Glow Measurements on STS 41-D,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets vol. 23, no. 3 (March–April 1986): 

189–193; Theodore Gull, oral history interview by author, 12 May 2015; Pellerin OHI, pp. 

12–16; Rothenberg OHI, pp. 11–13. See also B. W. Henson, “ESA’s First In-Orbit-Replaceable Solar Array,” ESA Bulletin, no. 61 (February 1990): 13–19
53

CHAPTER TWO

Spherical Aberration

▲ This image of the Herbig-Haro Jet located in the Orion B molecular cloud complex is a composite 

of separate exposures acquired by the WFPC2 and WFC3/IR instruments in 2009 and 2014. 

(NASA/ESA/Hubble Heritage [STScI/AURA]/Hubble-Europe [ESA] Collaboration/D. Padgett ([GSFC]/T. Megeath [University 

of Toledo]/B. Reipurth [University of Hawaii])

A

s the Hubble Space Telescope flew free for the first time after its release 

from the Shuttle Discovery’s robotic arm on 25 April 1990, its first act was 

to seek out the Sun using its solar sensors. HST was already in radio contact with the ground, and it needed to know at all times where it was in relation 

to Earth’s closest star. The telescope’s optics could never be pointed at the Sun 

because direct exposure to the Sun’s overpowering light and radiation could ruin 

them. The newly unfurled solar arrays, on the other hand, were positioned for 

maximum exposure to the Sun to power Hubble’s systems. Once Discovery had 

moved away, Hubble began operations with an orbital verification program that 

NASA estimated would take 90 days to check out, calibrate, and prepare its systems for scientific work. Once these engineering verification checks were completed, scientists planned to carry out further tests of their own on the telescope 

and its five instruments before regular science operations would begin in the 

fall. In the words of a 1990 NASA press kit, “As an extremely complex, precise 

and sensitive spacecraft, the HST will require an extensive period of activation, 

adjustment, and checkout before it is turned over to the scientific community 

for their investigations.” All new spacecraft require a commissioning process as 

the systems work at their full capacity for the first time in the environment of 

space, and as one of the largest and most complicated robotic spacecraft ever 

built, HST’s commissioning period promised to be challenging.1

Hubble’s release into space also meant changes for many people on the 

ground. It marked the formal beginning of HST on-orbit mission operations 

for the HST mission operations team at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center 
54 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

in Greenbelt, Maryland, and the beginning of the end of work for those at 

Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, who built the telescope. 

The Goddard team, which included engineers, software developers, schedulers, 

and controllers, had prepared for years to take control of HST. Marshall experts 

worked in Greenbelt and Huntsville to oversee Hubble’s Orbital Verification 

Program during HST’s first days on orbit. Scientists and engineers based at the 

Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, Maryland, worked in coordination with the Goddard science and engineering teams to observe and assess the 

first tests of the telescope’s systems and instruments. Once HST’s systems were 

verified, Marshall’s HST program responsibilities would end, and Goddard and 

STScI engineering and scientific teams were due to begin Hubble’s science 

verification program.2

HST BASICS 

The heart of the giant spacecraft that is HST is a 2.4-meter (94-inch) f/24 

Ritchey-Chrétien Cassegrain reflecting telescope with a focal length of 57.6 

meters (189 feet).3 Light entering the telescope passes to the concave main 

mirror and is reflected back to the convex secondary mirror near the top of the 

telescope. The 0.3-meter (12-inch) secondary mirror in turn reflects the light 

a second time through a hole in the center of the main mirror and down into 

the five instruments located below. The telescope structure between the main 

and secondary mirrors is lined with baffles to reduce stray light entering off 

its main axis. Arrayed around the main mirror and lower part of the telescope 

tube are equipment bays containing electronic systems related to communications, power, data management, and pointing control of the spacecraft. Many 

HST systems and instruments were designed for astronauts from visiting Space 

Shuttles to service or replace them. Located on the exterior of the spacecraft are 

an aperture door at the top end of the telescope, attachment points for the two 

solar arrays and two high-gain antennas, and two grapple fixtures for the Shuttle 

arm to engage on in the forward shell of the telescope. The aft shroud surrounding the equipment below the main mirror carries access doors and handholds 

to support spacewalking astronauts, and on the aft bulkhead there are pins to 

attach HST to a flight-support structure in the Shuttle payload bay, plus attachments for electrical connectors to the Shuttle. Since Servicing Mission 4 in 

2009, HST has been equipped with the Soft Capture and Rendezvous System 

on its aft bulkhead to enable a future spacecraft to rendezvous and dock with 

Hubble for disposal into a controlled reentry or a higher orbit.4

Six gyroscopes on board HST precisely measure rates of motion when the 

telescope changes direction. Normally, three of the six gyroscopes are used for 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

pointing control, and the other working gyroscopes are spare units. In response 

to input from the gyroscopes, HST’s computer commands four reaction or 

momentum wheels to transfer their momentum to the spacecraft and turn it 

to any direction. HST is equipped with three Fine Guidance Sensors that lock 

onto two guide stars located in the periphery of HST’s field of view. Using its 

specially created catalog of stars, Hubble is able to point at and hold its targets 

steady with a degree of accuracy greater than any previous spacecraft or any 

telescope on the ground.5

▲ Cutaway drawing from 1985 of the Hubble Space Telescope with instruments. At the 

time of launch, HST’s instruments included the Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) as 

a radial instrument and four axial instruments: the Faint Object Camera (FOC), Goddard 

High Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS), Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS), and High Speed 

Photometer (HSP). (NASA: MSFC-4/85-ST 2821 C)

HST carries five dedicated scientific instruments on board at any given time, 

and the original five launched as part of the spacecraft on board Discovery in 

April 1990 included two imaging instruments, the Wide Field and Planetary 

Camera and the Faint Object Camera; two spectrographs, the Goddard High 

Resolution Spectrograph and the Faint Object Spectrograph; and the High 
56 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Speed Photometer (HSP). Three Fine Guidance Sensors on board also act as a 

sixth instrument. Because only two of the three sensors are needed to lock onto 

a target, the third sensor can make very fine measurements of the location of 

stars in its field of view. The astrometric measurements the sensors make are 

so accurate that the effect of Hubble’s movement around the Sun as it orbits 

Earth, known as parallax, can refine measurements of the distances to closer 

stars. Improving the accuracy of estimated distances to nearby stars is a crucial 

step to making better measurements of the size of the universe.6

The Wide Field and Planetary Camera, also known as WF/PC, operated 

in two modes—wide field mode and planetary. The wide field mode covered 

a wide field by HST standards, but not those of observatories on Earth—it 

would take 100 shots in this mode to photograph the full Moon. In its planetary mode, the camera could photograph objects about the apparent size of 

the planets in our solar system. WF/PC could image those near objects as well 

as distant galaxies in wavelengths from the far ultraviolet to the near infrared. 

This instrument was developed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, 

Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS)

Filter/Grating Wheel Polarizer

Entrance Aperture

Central Electronics 

Microprocessor

High Voltage Power Supply

Central Power Supply Power/Signal 

Connectors

Optical Bench

Entrance Ports

Forward 

Alignment 

Detent

Digicon Detectors

Communications Module

Analog Signal Processor

Faint Object Spectrograph

Time on HST:

24 April 1990–13 February 1997

Contractor:

Martin Marietta Corporation

Principal Investigators:

Richard Harms (University of 

California, San Diego)

Weight: 306 kilograms 

(675 pounds)

Axial Instrument

FOS was designed to measure the distribution of energy versus wavelength coming 

from faint objects, many of which are distant objects, to determine their makeup, 

physical characteristics, and dynamics. It operated in ultraviolet, visible, and 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

California, which had experience building similar instruments for spacecraft 

that have explored the solar system.7

The European Space Agency built the Faint Object Camera (FOC), along 

with the solar arrays, as one of its contributions to the HST program. FOC’s 

images covered even smaller areas than the planetary mode of WF/PC, but it 

could image very faint objects and operate at very high resolution. This powerful camera was designed to help determine the size of the universe and see 

objects that were impossible to view from the ground.

In a similar vein, the Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS) was designed to 

use spectroscopy to learn about the properties of extremely faint objects in 

the visible and ultraviolet parts of the spectrum. Built by the aerospace giant 

Martin Marietta, FOS was able to isolate individual objects from others that 

were nearby. The Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS) worked in 

a similar fashion to FOS, but it enabled higher spectral resolution and better 

separation of data of different colors, and it worked exclusively in ultraviolet 

wavelengths. This instrument, built by Ball Aerospace of Boulder, Colorado, 

near-infrared wavelengths and could study fainter objects than the GHRS, which 

flew on HST at the same time. 

It had two digicon detectors with independent optical paths, a blue detector that 

was sensitive to light from 1,150 to 5,400 angstroms and a red detector that operated on wavelengths from 1,620 to 8,500 angstroms. It operated in low-resolution 

and high-resolution modes. The installation of COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement) in late 1993 corrected the effects of spherical aberration on FOS, and it continued operation until it was removed from HST during 

Servicing Mission 2.a

FOS was used for many observations, some together with GHRS, of various objects. 

Among other things, spectrograms from FOS could measure the chemical composition and motion of interstellar clouds and of individual parts of nebulae and 

galaxies.b

FOS is now on display at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC.

a STScI, Faint Object Spectograph Instrument Handbook, Version 6.0 (Baltimore: STScI, June 

1995).

b ESA, “Greater Accuracy Deepens Understanding—Hubble’s Faint Object Spectrograph Recalibrated,” news release, 11 September 2001.
58 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

was designed to produce highly detailed spectrograms containing information 

about the chemical composition, motions, and physical structures of objects 

from distant quasars to nearby solar system planets.

Hubble’s fifth instrument, the High Speed Photometer, was a highly precise 

light meter that measured the brightness of the objects in space, along with 

the slightest variations in that brightness. Built by the University of Wisconsin 

Space Astronomy Laboratory, the HSP looked for light variations resulting from 

objects revolving around each other, or an object losing light and matter to a 

nearby black hole.8

The infrastructure required for HST consists of more than its instruments 

and systems and goes beyond the control center at Goddard. Data from Hubble’s 

instruments and systems pass through several steps between the telescope in 

space and the scientists on the ground. HST transmits its data first to one of 

three Tracking and Data Relay Satellites (TDRS) located in geosynchronous 

Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS)

D1 Preamplifier

D2 

Preamplifier

D2 Mirror

D1 Mirror

Electrical 

Connectors

Cross Disperser Gratings

D1 Detector

Entrance 

Aperture

Grating 

Carousel

D2 Detector

D2 High Voltage 

Power Supply

Optical Bench Structure

Collimator Mirror

Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph

Time on HST:

24 April 1990–13 February 1997 

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

Principal Investigators:

John C. Brandt and 

Sara Heap 

(NASA Goddard)

Weight: 315 kilograms 

(695 pounds)

Axial Instrument

The Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph was equipped with a large and a small 

science aperture and two digicon detectors. It operated between 1,150 and 3,200 

angstroms, providing access to ultraviolet wavelengths not available from Earth, 

and its location above the atmosphere permitted the use of high-resolution spectra 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

orbits, one over the Pacific Ocean, a second over the Atlantic, and the third 

acting as a spare. The TDRS satellites then beam the data down to a ground 

terminal at White Sands, New Mexico, where the data enter NASA’s communications network headquartered at Goddard. Other NASA spacecraft, including Space Shuttles, use the TDRS system, along with military satellites and 

weather satellites. Since the first components of the International Space Station 

were launched in 1998, it also has communicated through TDRS satellites. 

Once received on Earth, the HST data are then transferred to Goddard, home 

of the Space Telescope Operations Control Center (STOCC), which monitors 

the health of HST and controls its systems. After initial receipt at Goddard, 

scientific data are transferred to the STScI, which also organizes, processes, 

and archives the telescope’s observations. Data were also archived at ESA’s 

HST European Coordinating Facility at Garching, Germany, until 2012, when 

the ESA moved the European HST archive to the European Space Astronomy 

that are useful to study faint targets close to brighter stars and distinguish individual 

stars in crowded fields.a

While GHRS was not as strongly affected by HST’s spherical aberration as imaging instruments, the power supply for one side of the instrument suffered from

problems that were repaired during Servicing Mission 1 in 1993. GHRS failed and 

shut down a week before Servicing Mission 2, when it was due to be replaced by 

another instrument.

During its lifetime, GHRS performed studies of the interstellar medium, stellar winds, 

the abundance of various elements and the evolution of stars, quasars and galaxies, 

and studies of the atmospheres of bodies in our solar system.b

Much of GHRS was recycled for use in the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, which was 

installed on HST in 2009.

a STScI, Instrument Handbook for the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS, Version 

5.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, May 1994).

b J. C. Brandt et al., “The Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph: Instrument, Goals, and 

Science Results,” Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific 106, no. 702 (August 

1994): 890–908. See also John C. Brandt, Thomas B. Ake III, and Carolyn Collins Peterson, 

eds., The Scientific Impact of the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph (San Francisco, 

Astronomical Society of the Pacific Conference Series, Volume 143, 1998).
60 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Centre (ESAC) in Villanueva de la Cañada, Spain. HST data are also archived 

at the Canadian Astronomy Data Centre in Victoria, BC, Canada. Scientists 

can obtain Hubble data from any of the three locations.9

▲ This image illustrates the path that science and engineering information from the Hubble 

Space Telescope takes from space to Earth. After Hubble observes a target, it transmits 

the information to Tracking and Data Relay Satellites and the White Sands Complex, 

which relay the signals to NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. Once checked for quality, 

the data are sent on to the Space Telescope Science Institute for processing, storage, and 

distribution. (NASA/STScI)

SAFE MODES

After it deployed Hubble, Discovery remained within 80 kilometers (50 miles) 

of HST for two days while HST completed early systems tests and, most importantly, opened its aperture door and exposed the telescope’s optics to space for 

the first time. Even before the aperture door opened, controllers got a taste of 

problems that were in store. In order to prevent the spacecraft from harming 

itself or going out of control in emergency situations, HST was designed to go into 

varying degrees of what were called safe modes, from simply stopping motion to 

closing the aperture door and restricting operations and communications with 

the ground. Hubble went into safe mode for the first time on the second day 

after deployment when the topside high-gain antenna required too much force 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

to rotate and track a TDRS satellite. Using both photos of the antenna and a 

Tinkertoy model that replicated the antenna movements, Goddard engineers 

found that the problem was caused by a counterweight striking a cable. They 

solved the problem by imposing a small limit on where the antenna could move 

to avoid the cable. Controllers opened HST’s aperture door for the first time 

while they were still dealing with this safing event, and unexpected shaking 

caused by the aperture door opening caused Hubble to move into a deeper safe 

mode. Despite this latest safe mode, which was quickly explained, the successful aperture door opening allowed NASA to permit the Shuttle to move away 

from HST and prepare for its return home.10

In the early days of HST orbital verification, controllers noticed that the 

Fine Guidance Sensors on the telescope would lose their lock whenever HST 

passed between sunlight and darkness—something that happens twice in every 

95-minute orbit that Hubble makes around Earth. These oscillations, or jitters, 

were especially strong when Hubble passed from night to day, and they could 

last as long as 10 minutes, eating into limited observing time. The reason for 

these jitters was not immediately clear, other than the fact that it was related to 

the major temperature changes that accompanied moving in and out of Earth’s 

shadow. Soon expansion and contraction of the telescope body was eliminated 

as a possible cause, and the problem was traced to the two sets of solar panels 

attached to HST. The panels, built by British Aerospace with support from 

other European contractors, each covered 2.4 meters (8 feet) by 12.2 meters 

(40 feet) and together contained 48,800 individual solar cells that generated 

4,100 watts of electricity to run the telescope and charge its batteries. The jitters were related to the design of the bi-stems—stainless steel rods that pulled 

the panels out when the Shuttle deployed HST in orbit and then held the panels 

rigid during flight. The bi-stems would bend in sunlight because one side was 

in light and was therefore hot, and the other in darkness and cold. Although the 

solar arrays shook much more than the telescope did, the telescope’s extremely 

fine tolerances meant that the oscillations were enough to create problems for 

HST’s guidance sensors and instruments. Tension also built up inside the bistems that held the arrays, and it caused the arrays to move at unexpected 

times, further disrupting operations. While engineers and controllers were able 

to develop control measures to reduce jitter, ESA and British Aerospace began 

to design and build a new set of solar arrays to be deployed on the first Shuttle 

servicing mission. The new arrays included mechanical changes and bellows to 

cover the booms and reduce the temperature changes in each orbit.11

Once the aperture door was open and Discovery and its crew safely returned 

to Earth two days later on 29 April, the next event the media and the public 
62 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

awaited from HST was its first image. When HST was launched, NASA had 

promised a photograph of an open star cluster named NGC 3532 in the constellation of Carina a week after launch.12 But the safing events and the jitter 

problem set back the acquisition of the first image. By 15 May, the delays had 

attracted the attention of the popular Late Night with David Letterman show 

on the NBC television network, which included a “Top 10 Hubble Telescope 

Excuses” list. The excuses included “The guy at Sears promised it would work 

fine,” and “Ran out of quarters,” concluding with the top excuse: A “race of 

super-evolved galactic beings are screwing with us.”13

FIRST LIGHT

As late as Hubble’s originally scheduled launch date in 1990, NASA had 

no plan to release HST images to the public during the telescope’s commissioning process. This followed a disagreement between officials at the Space 

Telescope Science Institute who wanted to release images early to the public, and astronomers with observing time on HST who were concerned about 

possible problems with images being released before they were analyzed, a 

dispute that will be outlined in chapter four. HST managers had decided to 

have Hubble take its first image of the colorful NGC 3532 star cluster. Since 

all HST images are monochrome, which means that color images must be 

assembled from monochrome images shot using different filters, STScI Senior 

Scientist Eric Chaisson requested before the launch that HST shoot a series 

of images of the cluster that would allow a first image to be released in color. 

His request was turned down, which meant that the “First Light” image would 

be an unspectacular monochrome picture—which NASA was not planning to 

release. Astronomers’ expectations for the first images were not high because 

the optics of new telescopes need to be adjusted before use, particularly in 

a telescope subject to the forces of a launch into orbit. Al Boggess, the HST 

Project Scientist at Goddard, later recalled his response when a NASA official asked him what astronomers usually do with a first image from a groundbased telescope: “Well, it gets thrown in the wastebasket. It isn’t worth looking at.” Hubble was also the first space telescope that generated images in 

optical wavelengths, departing from previous space telescopes that produced 

spectroscopic observations or operated in different wavelengths. The relations 

between astronomers who worked with images and those who used spectra 

were not always friendly, Boggess explained.14

But NASA’s plans for the first image changed at a press briefing at Kennedy 

Space Center the day before HST’s scheduled launch on 10 April, when journalists repeatedly asked NASA Associate Administrator Lennard Fisk about the 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

Agency’s plans to release the first photos from 

Hubble. Fisk was unprepared for the questions from reporters who brought up the easy 

availability of images from the two Voyager 

spacecraft during their planetary encounters between 1979 and 1989, just months 

earlier. After a long and awkward exchange 

with the media, he reluctantly agreed in an 

offhand fashion to having reporters present when HST transmitted its first image to 

ground controllers.15

Finally, on Sunday, 20 May, at 11:12 a.m. 

EDT, WF/PC imaged a small portion of NGC 

3532 as planned for 1 second, and then 2 minutes later for 30 seconds. When the images 

were beamed to Earth that afternoon, journalists were permitted to witness and record their 

transmission to the Goddard control center 

while many scientists examined the images 

at STScI without the media present. Based 

on the released portion of the 30-second 

exposure centered on the 8.2-magnitude star 

HD96755, the New York Times reported that 

the telescope had “gazed with unexpected 

clarity” at its target. Newspaper accounts 

of the event contained exultant quotes from 

Hubble scientists, who were not expecting 

spectacular photos from the cluster, especially 

so early in HST’s commissioning process. 

“The images were at least twice, if not three 

times, better than expected,” Jim Westphal, 

Principal Investigator for WF/PC, told the 

New York Times. NASA released a portion of 

the first image alongside a similar image taken 

from a 2.54-meter (100-inch) telescope at the 

Las Campanas Observatory in Chile, and the 

stars in the HST image were clearly sharper, a 

fact that was noted in the accompanying press 

release from STScI and NASA.16

Ground-based image, Las Campanas 

Observatory, Carnegie Institute of 

Washington

Hubble Space Telescope Wide Field/

Planetary Camera

▲ On 20 May 1990, the “First 

Light” image from HST’s Wide 

Field/Planetary Camera was 

released, showing stars inside 

the open cluster NGC 3532 

in the constellation Carina 

(bottom). The same stars are 

shown in an image obtained 

with a 100-inch telescope in 

Las Campanas, Chile (top). 

(NASA/STScI: STScI Release 90-4)
64 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

GROWING CONCERNS

Despite the jubilation about the first images, a few scientists suspected immediately that something was not right with Hubble. When Charles Pellerin, 

NASA’s Director of Astrophysics, expressed concern about the image, a colleague reminded him that the secondary mirror was not in its proper place 

in anticipation of the telescope structure changing shape in reaction to the 

vacuum and temperatures of space. Roger Lynds, a member of the WF/PC 

team, said in a meeting the next day that something was wrong, and the problem could be spherical aberration. That meant that the light coming off HST’s 

main or secondary mirror was not meeting at the focus point as designed but 

was coming to a focus at different points. But with many possible and more 

benign explanations for the problems with the images—such as the solar panel 

jitter issue or the need to make final adjustments to the mirrors inside the telescope—this explanation was not widely believed at the time, and Lynds did not 

assert his belief. The existence of such a major flaw, especially in the highly 

touted main mirror of the telescope, was hard to believe, and many of the scientists and engineers working on HST had more trouble believing it than others. 

Christopher Burrows, a British physicist who was a member of the ESA staff 

at STScI with responsibility for optics on HST, worked with various computer 

models to try to determine what was wrong with the images. Burrows at first 

thought the problem was coma, which could be cured by adjusting the main 

mirror using actuators located behind it, and this idea became popular among 

the people trying to solve the problem.17

Lynds and other members of the WF/PC team would play key roles in 

bringing HST engineers and scientists to understanding the true nature of the 

problem with Hubble’s images. The WF/PC team members were not burdened 

like other people involved in the work of verifying HST’s systems by strong 

institutional bonds with Goddard, Marshall, or contractors such as Lockheed 

and Hughes Danbury, formerly Perkin-Elmer, or by their chains of command, 

according to Tod Lauer, an astronomer on the WF/PC team. “We were just a 

bunch of scientists from different places, and we had no institutional loyalties, 

so we could just sort of wander around and pick at whatever we wanted to pick 

at.” In the early days of HST operations, the WF/PC team based itself in offices 

at Bowie State University, a few minutes away from NASA Goddard, but they 

were often at Goddard working with other scientists.18

A leading member of the WF/PC team and one of America’s top astronomers, 

Sandra M. Faber of Lick Observatory in California, was away doing other work 

when the first images came in. When Faber returned late in the month to join 

the WF/PC team at Bowie State, she began a journal of the days that followed. 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

She heard many rumors and questions about the images. WF/PC images taken 

on 31 May of the NGC 188 star cluster in the constellation Cepheus exhibited what she later called a “kidney-shaped asymmetry” in the individual stars. 

By 4 June, Faber saw vignetting in an image, where light falls off gradually 

rather than sharply, and the next day another image showed the odd asymmetry 

Faber had noticed in the NGC 188 images. She began working with Burrows 

to develop a means of explaining the image problems, which some ascribed 

to roughness on the main mirror. Their analysis of the new images continued 

slowly, but by 8 June, Faber had recorded that the gravity of the problems with 

the telescope was finally sinking in amongst the engineers and astronomers 

working at Goddard and STScI. As Faber left that day for 10 days of work 

elsewhere in the country, she wrote Westphal with details about the situation. 

She had found “large amounts of spherical aberration and some defocus” in 

the images, and she added that while she had not shared her concerns on this 

point with anyone other than Lynds and her graduate student, Jon Holtzman, 

“it keeps me awake at night.”19 Before Faber left, STScI Hubble Operations 

Scientist Rodger Doxsey had ordered crucial imagery designed to diagnose the 

telescope’s problems. When Faber returned, many of her colleagues still hoped 

that adjustments to the telescope optics would solve the problem. Actuators on 

the main mirror could adjust its shape slightly, and the secondary mirror could 

also be moved, but moving the 

secondary mirror did not solve 

the problem.20

Ground-based image Nordic 

Optical Telescope

Faint Object Camera Hubble 

Space Telescope

▲ This “First Light” image from the European 

Space Agency’s Faint Object Camera on HST was 

released on 22 June 1990, showing stars inside 

the open cluster NGC 188 in the constellation 

Cepheus (left). It was released alongside an 

image of the same stars taken with a 101-inch 

Nordic Optical Telescope in the Canary Islands 

(right). (NASA/ESA/STScI: STScI Release 90-6)

On 17 June, HST was aimed 

again at NGC 188, and this time 

the ESA’s Faint Object Camera 

obtained its first images. The 

disquieting light patterns noted 

in the WF/PC images were 

also seen in the FOC images, 

which ruled out a defect in 

WF/PC as the cause of the 

image problems. The growing 

concerns about HST remained 

unknown to the public as ESA 

released an FOC image five 

days later alongside a much 

poorer image of the same stars 

shot from Earth with a release 
66 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

suggesting that HST’s problems were being solved. Some astronomers criticized 

the released FOC image as being manipulated.21 On 19 June, Bob Basedow of 

the mirror’s contractor, Hughes Danbury, said at a meeting that if an analysis 

presented to the meeting by Burrows was correct, which he did not accept, the 

actuators on the main mirror would not be able to correct the problem. To both 

Burrows and Faber, Basedow’s statement meant that HST’s image problem was 

beyond the easy solution that everyone was hoping for. “This is the moment we 

find out that we are doomed to failure!” Faber recorded in her notebook.22

▲ Sandra Faber and Tod Lauer of the WF/PC team photographed in 1988 during a test of the 

Wide Field/Planetary Camera at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. 

(Tod Lauer)

Later that day, a long-duration HST exposure showed Faber and her colleagues the effects of diffraction. Late that week, WF/PC produced a series 

of long-exposure images with the secondary mirror moved to various positions 

well out of focus that were useful for understanding the characteristics of the 

optics. By Saturday, 23 June, Faber found that one of the new images had a 

hollow center with a ring—it was called the smoke ring image, and as Faber 

recalled, “anybody with half a brain is getting to the fact that we have spherical aberration.” Her conclusion was reinforced when Holtzman produced computer simulations of HST’s spherical aberration. That day at Goddard, Faber 

showed experts from NASA, STScI, and Hughes Danbury how the smoke ring 

image suffered from the effects of spherical aberration. “You could hear a pin 

drop,” she recalled of the reaction from the Hughes Danbury engineers, who 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

had strongly rejected the idea of spherical aberration before that time. John 

Mangus, a NASA Goddard optical engineer, who was present at the meeting 

with the Hughes Danbury group, pulled out his own computer diagram of the 

same effects. He had not previously shown it to others, and when Faber asked 

why, he said, “Well, I was waiting for you to show up and explain it.”23

Holtzman presented his findings on spherical aberration on behalf of the 

WF/PC team to a weekly HST science team meeting on Monday, 25 June, 

the meeting Faber said was the event “when all doubt was erased.” Holtzman 

proved his point by showing a computer simulation of aberration based on his 

group’s estimate of the HST mirror defects alongside images from the real mirror. The matching images left the others at the meeting “pretty stunned,” as 

Faber recorded in her notes.24 David S. Leckrone, then the deputy senior project scientist at Goddard, remembered the anger in Burrows’s voice as he discussed the spherical aberration at the meeting, and later he heard Marshall scientists joking about drinking hemlock. Leckrone suggested that scotch might 

be a better drink, because “we’re going to need you to puzzle out this problem.”25

News of the spherical aberration spread to scientists assembling at Goddard for 

an HST science working group meeting. That day, Fisk returned to his office 

at NASA Headquarters following a successful negotiating trip to Europe and 

was confronted by Marshall experts with long faces and the news of Hubble’s 

spherical aberration.“Space science has just had its Challenger accident,” he 

recalled saying. “But I also remember saying that we were going to be judged 

not by what happened, but by how we recover from it.”26

THE BAD NEWS

Wednesday, 27 June 1990, was the day most people found out that the Hubble 

Space Telescope was seriously flawed. For many involved with HST, the day 

started out with a painful meeting of scientists, followed by a press conference 

where the news of Hubble’s defective main mirror went out to the world. One 

reporter’s question summed up the prospects for HST as they were seen that 

day by asking, “[H]ave we ended up with a situation where you’ve degraded science or cancelled science?”27

That morning, Marshall Deputy Project Manager Jean Olivier, Faber, and 

Burrows had laid out the grim facts of spherical aberration at a quarterly meeting of HST’s science working group at Goddard. In a discussion led by John 

Bahcall, glum instrument scientists who had spent years preparing to use the 

space telescope considered the impact of the defective mirror on their scientific 

plans. They also discussed ideas to repair the problem, including a proposal to 
68 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

have astronauts replace HST’s main camera, WF/PC, with a new instrument 

that would compensate for the mirror’s defect.28

The meeting later paused to watch the televised news conference broadcast from another building at Goddard featuring Fisk, HST Chief Scientist Ed 

Weiler, Olivier, Program Manager Doug Broome, and other officials explaining 

as best they could what the problem was with HST. The mirror was designed to 

put at least 70 percent of the energy from a star’s image in a circle with a radius 

of 1∕10 of an arc second, but Weiler explained that the defective mirror could 

only put about 15 percent of the energy there. “I guess the important question 

in light of all this is can we do important and unique science?” he said. “That’s 

the most important question and the answer is an emphatic yes.” He noted 

that much of the work planned for the two spectrographs on board HST could 

still be done as planned. Shocked reporters asked questions about the possible 

causes and costs of the defective mirror, and they did not appreciate Weiler’s 

High Speed Photometer (HSP)

Relay Mirrors Detectors

Aperture and 

Filter Plates

Electronic Bays Electrical 

Connectors

Entrance 

Aperture

Registration 

Fittings

Box Beam

Interior Bulkhead

Time on HST: High Speed Photometer

24 April 1990–7 December 1993 

Contractor:

University of Wisconsin Space

Astronomy Laboratory

Principal Investigator:

Robert C. Bless 

(University of Wisconsin

Weight: 270 kilograms 

(595 pounds)

Axial Instrument

The High Speed Photometer made photometric measurements over visual and 

ultraviolet wavelengths. It stood out from other instruments on HST because it 

had no moving parts. HSP contained five detectors, including four image dissector 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

attempt to put a positive light on the situation. Weiler responded that the science was only deferred, and he reminded the media that HST had 15 years to 

accomplish its mission. Backed up by Fisk, Weiler pointed out that WF/PC 

could be replaced and the focus problem corrected as early as the first Shuttle 

servicing mission scheduled for 1993.29

The measured words of the program officials at the 27 June press conference 

could not conceal the gigantic disappointment felt by astronomers. In newspaper interviews the following day, Sidney C. Wolff, director of the National 

Optical Astronomy Observatories, called the news “incredibly disappointing” 

and a “tragedy.” Astronomer Maarten Schmidt of Caltech said, “It’s a grim 

day for astronomy.” Two days after the press conference, NASA engineers at 

Cape Canaveral discovered a hydrogen leak in two Shuttle orbiters, forcing the 

Agency to ground the Shuttle fleet until October, raising more questions about 

NASA’s competence.30

tubes and one photomultiplier tube. Because this instrument was in space, it was 

able to measure stars at ultraviolet wavelengths, and its measurements were more 

accurate because there was no variable atmospheric absorption of light.a

As a highly precise light meter, HSP measured the brightness of objects it studied 

and found variations in the brightness of those objects, which could be caused by 

internal processes or by one object orbiting another. HSP was not strongly affected 

by HST’s mirror problems, and it was used to create highly accurate light curves for 

objects such as the pulsar in the Crab Nebula, investigate the structure of Saturn’s 

rings by measuring the light from stars passing behind the rings, and test theories 

of gravitational lensing.b

When a place was needed inside Hubble’s axial bay for the COSTAR instrument in

1993, HSP was selected for removal.

HSP is now on display at the University of Wisconsin’s Space Place in Madison, W

a Robert C. Bless et al., High Speed Photometer Instrument Handbook, Verson 3.0 (Baltimore, 

MD: STScI, April 1992). 

b James M. Lattis, A Hubble Instrument Comes Home: UW Madison’s High Speed Photometer, 2012, https://spacegrant.carthage.edu/ojs/index.php/wsc/article/download/27/27/1/

PB.pdf (accessed 18 February 2017).
70 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

The New York Times called the mirror problem a calamity for NASA and 

questioned the need for “big science projects” when smaller and less expensive projects could do the job better, and New Scientist also raised questions 

about large-scale scientific programs in general. In a subsequent editorial about 

NASA’s problems, the New York Times suggested that NASA cancel its Space 

Station and other human space programs and redirect the money to hightechnology development. A Washington Post front-page headline asked bluntly, 

“Can U.S. Get Things Right Anymore?” The 9 July issue of Newsweek carried 

an image of HST on its cover, calling it “NASA’s $1.5 Billion Blunder.” Space 

News noted that the mirror problem hit NASA just as Congress was considering 

killing President George H. W. Bush’s Space Exploration Initiative, an ambitious plan that included human exploration of the Moon and Mars. The initiative ultimately didn’t last the year. Comedians and cartoonists also weighed in, 

depicting NASA as an incompetent institution wasting taxpayers’ money. In the 

words of Chaisson, “the summer of 1990 amounted to a public-relations cruise 

through hell.”31 Hubble’s problems were immortalized in a scene in the 1991 

comedy film, The Naked Gun 2-1/2: The Smell of Fear, where a depressing bar 

full of unhappy people is lined with illustrations of major disasters, including 

the Titanic, the Hindenburg, the Ford Edsel, and HST.32

As the days went on, journalists and politicians raised more critical questions about Hubble. U.S. Senator Al Gore (D-TN), who had run for President 

in 1988, called a special congressional hearing on HST starting two days after 

NASA’s announcement. Gore said he was “extremely dismayed” at NASA’s decision 10 years earlier to “almost destroy” its quality control capabilities, which 

he also linked to the loss of Challenger. “This is the second time in five years 

that a major project has encountered serious disruption by an inherent flaw that 

was apparently built into the project as much as 10 years before launch and 

went undetected by NASA’s quality control procedures,” Gore told the hearing.33

After newspaper stories charged that NASA had decided to forgo a complete test 

of the assembled space telescope—a test unnamed military officials claimed 

was regularly performed on highly classified reconnaissance satellites—Gore 

also raised the matter in further Senate hearings in July, including one where 

former NASA Administrator James M. Beggs spoke about the same issue. At a 

House of Representatives hearing on Hubble’s woes, Representative Robert A. 

Roe of New Jersey, who had praised the program on the floor of the House when 

Hubble was launched, asked, “Is this thing a dud?”34 Senator Barbara Mikulski, 

the Maryland Democrat who had up to then been known as a strong supporter 

of HST, called it a “technoturkey,” and later said, “The discovery of a serious flaw 

in Hubble’s primary mirror has dealt a devastating blow to NASA’s credibility.”35
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

The continued unhappiness over the defective mirror extended to the astronomical community, starting with those who had not been convinced of the 

need to spend a massive amount of money on Hubble instead of on other astronomical facilities. Infuriated by the news of spherical aberration, others joined 

their ranks. James E. Gunn, the Deputy Principal Investigator for WF/PC, 

wrote a widely circulated letter castigating NASA and its “criminally infantile” 

quality control. “We have lost all control over our destiny,” Gunn wrote. “It was 

two billion of astronomy’s dollars that flushed down the drain.” He soon left the 

WF/PC team and moved on to spearhead the Sloan Digital Sky Survey. The 

continuing costs of operating the troubled space telescope added to the questions about its future.36

Those who continued to work on HST could not escape the negativity that 

summer, and a few HST managers faced personal problems as a result. Charles 

Pellerin sought relief that summer from the tense congressional hearings on the 

Hubble problems by attending a concert. When a microphone failed to work, a 

performer joked about HST. “We were the laughingstock of the country,” said 

Weiler, recalling how neighbors would speak of HST as a “national disaster.” 

He had told reporters, members of Congress, and anyone who would listen that 

Hubble’s problems could be at least partially solved. But “nobody believed us.”37

ENDNOTES

 1 “STS-31 Press Kit,” pp. 22–29, quotation 22; Kathy Sawyer, “Hubble Telescope Spreads 

Its Wings,” Washington Post (26 April 1990): A1; John Noble Wilford, “Telescope Is Orbite

After a Tense Delay,” New York Times (26 April 1990): B12.

 2 “STS-31 Press Kit,” pp. 22–29.

 3 Both the main and secondary mirrors in Ritchey-Chrétien telescopes have hyperbolic 

shapes, and they are modern types of Cassegrain reflecting telescopes, where the secondary mirror is curved instead of flat as in Newtonian reflecting telescopes. Many large 

optical telescopes today use the Ritchey-Chrétien configuration, which was invented 

early in the 20th century to reduce the possibilities of optical defects such as spherical 

aberration. 

 4 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 440–441; “STS-31 Press Kit,” pp. 14–16.

 5 Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, Inc., Hubble Space Telescope Media Reference 

Guide (Sunnyvale, CA: Lockheed Missiles & Space Company, 1990), pp. 2-11–2-14. HST 

was not equipped with thrusters to point itself because they would require regular refueling and leave deposits on the optics. NASA “STS-125 Press Kit,” May 2009, pp. 4–5.

 6 “STS-31 Press Kit,” pp. 14–16.
72 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

 7 Space Telescope Science Institute, Wide Field—Planetary Camera Instrument Handbook, Version 3.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, April 1992); Eric J. Chaisson, The Hubble Wars

(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1994), pp. 124–127.

 8 “STS-31 Press Kit,” pp. 22–29.

 9 “STS-31 Press Kit,” pp. 22–29; “Space Telescope European Coordinating Facility,” ESA 

Bulletin, no. 142 (May 2010): 4–5. The National Research Council of Canada operates the 

Canadian Astronomy Data Centre at the Dominion Astrophysical Observatory in Victoria, BC, Canada. See oral history interview by author with Dennis Crabtree, Daniel 

Durand, and Andrew Woodsworth, 18 August 2017

10 NASA, “Hubble Memorable Moments: The Tinkertoy Solution,” YouTube video, posted 

23 September 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZkoGnnjQlcM&t=13s (accessed 

8 January 2017).

11 European Space Agency, “How Hubble Got Its Wings,” http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities

Space_Engineering_Technology/How_Hubble_got_its_wings (accessed 15 August 

2015); Carleton Foster et al., The Solar Array-Induced Disturbance of the Hubble Space 

Telescope Pointing System: NASA Technical Paper 3556 (Huntsville, AL: Marshall Space 

Flight Center, May 1995); Carlton L. Foster, Michael L. Tinker, Gerald S. Nurre, and William A. Till, “Solar-Array-Induced Disturbance of the Hubble Space Telescope Pointing

System,” Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets 32, no. 4 (July–August 1995): 634–644; Larry 

Dunham, oral history interview by author, 19 September 2017, p. 8. 

12 Paul Hoversten, “‘New Era’ for Mankind Will Open Today,” USA Today (25 April 1990): A1.

13 “Top Ten List Archive for 1990: Top 10 Hubble Telescope Excuses,” Orlando Sentinel, 

http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1990-05-17/news/9005170447_1_david-lettermantelescope-hubble (accessed 11 October 2017); Rob Stein, Untitled United Press International Dispatch on Hubble Space Telescope problems, 21 May 1990, clippings file 

5982, NASA Historical Reference Collection, NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, 

Washington, DC (henceforth “NASA HRC”). The Top Ten List was presented most nights

on the Letterman show during its long run on NBC and later CBS from 1982 to 2015. 

Interestingly, this Letterman Top Ten List is the only one from 1990 through June 1993 

to feature the Hubble Space Telescope, although HST was occasionally mentioned in 

Top Ten Lists on other topics. Popular belief incorrectly holds that HST made the Top 

Ten List after spherical aberration was announced more than a month later.

14 Al Boggess, oral history interview by author, 21 September 2015, pp. 5–7; Chaisson, The 

Hubble Wars, pp. 97–120; Ray Villard, oral history interview by author, 30 October 2015, 

pp. 4–7. Although several statements made by Chaisson in his book have been questioned by other participants, the basic facts of the events leading up to the release of 

HST’s “First Light” image were confirmed by Villard.

15 The transcript of Fisk’s painful exchange with reporters is reproduced in Chaisson, pp. 

116–120. As noted in the prologue, the 10 April launch attempt was scrubbed late in the 

countdown, and HST was launched on the second attempt two weeks later.

16 Warren E. Leary, “Sky Clear, Space Telescope Starts to See Forever,” New York Time

(21  May 1990): B10; Kathy Sawyer, “Hubble Space Telescope Returns First Images,” 

Washington Post (21 May 1990): A4; Space Telescope Science Institute, “First Image 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

Taken by Hubble’s Wide Field Planetary Camera,” news release STScI-1990-004, 20 May

1990; Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, pp. 130–134.

17 Pellerin OHI, p. 26; Christopher Burrows, oral history interview by author, 15 February 

2017, pp. 8–11; Sandra Faber, oral history interview by author, 29 September 2016, pp. 

11–15; Tod Lauer, oral history interview by author, 15 August 2016, p. 6. Recollections 

vary of Lynds’s first reaction to the images. Burrows thought that Lynds was confused 

by the images at first, but Faber recalled that he spoke of spherical aberration. Lauer 

said Lynds “has great intuition, and he was dead-right, but he didn’t know how to support his conclusion.” Lauer compared Lynds to “Doc” Emmett Brown, a fictional eccentric scientist in the popular Back to the Future films of the 1980s, and said he had to deal 

with “suits” working on HST’s problems.

18 Lauer OHI, p. 6. Lauer was just beginning work at the National Optical Astronomy Observatory at Kitt Peak in 1990 after postdoctoral work at Princeton. His Ph.D. advisor had 

been Sandra Faber.

19 Letter, Sandra Faber to Jim Westphal, 8 June 1990. Copy supplied by Faber

20 Faber OHI, pp. 11–15; copy of Sandra Faber WF/PC team notebook from 1990 to 1993.

21 STScI, “ESA’s Faint Object Camera First Images,” news release STScI-1990-06, 22 June 

1990; Villard OHI, 30 October 2015, pp. 6–7; Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 407. In her 

notes in her copy of Chaisson’s book The Hubble Wars, p. 144, Faber stated her agreement with Chaisson’s criticism of the release image in The Hubble Wars. Villard later 

called the photo release “a little fast and loose” given that much of the light that landed 

improperly outside the proper place because of spherical aberration had been removed 

in processing. Duccio Macchetto, the Principal Investigator for FOC, responded to these 

criticisms by saying that the FOC image in the release was processed the same way as 

the WF/PC “First Light” image, and he said the ground image was the best available at

the time. Macchetto, e-mail to author, 11 October 2017.

22 Faber OHI, pp. 16–18; Burrows OHI, p. 11; Faber notebook; Burrows note of 19 June 

meeting. Hughes Aircraft had purchased Perkin-Elmer in 1989 and renamed it Hughes 

Danbury. See also William G. Crabb, oral history interview by author, 4 January 2018, pp.

3–5.

23 While Faber took Mangus’s decision to delay showing his computer printout as stemming from concerns for his job, it is possible that Mangus thought his findings might

not be accepted by Marshall experts because of the Center’s rivalry with Goddard, and 

he knew that others would soon announce that they had reached a similar conclusion. Faber OHI, pp. 16–17; Robert Smith, 13 May 2019, comments on draft of this book. 

H.  John Wood, “Some Personal Recollections About the Recovery of Hubble Space

Telescope Optical Performance 1990–1993,” undated manuscript, also talks about 

Mangus’s concerns. Lauer, in his OHI, p. 6, said, “Marshall had the keys to the telescope, 

and the people at Goddard were largely waiting for the Marshall people to finish up and 

go home.” See also Robert Zimmerman, The Universe in a Mirror (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 135–136. 

24 Faber OHI, pp. 17–18; Faber notebook.

25 David Leckrone, oral history interview with the author, 6 May 2015, pp. 9–10.
74 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

26 Lennard Fisk, comments at an HST 25th anniversary panel, “Spherical Aberration: From 

Disaster to Glory,” Johns Hopkins University, 23 April 2015.

27 Transcript, “Hubble Space Telescope Status Briefing,” 27 June 1990, NASA HRC.

28 Faber, notes of 27 June meeting. 

29 Transcript, “HST Status Briefing,” 27 June 1990; John Trauger, “Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2: ‘The Camera That Saved Hubble,’” undated memoir. Two people who

might otherwise have been at the briefing were away that day. STScI director Riccardo 

Giacconi was in Italy, and Charles Pellerin, NASA’s Director of Astrophysics, was returning from Japan and was informed while changing planes. He did not believe the news of 

spherical aberration until he saw a newspaper with the story. Pellerin OHI, pp. 27–28.

30 Warren E. Leary, “Hubble Telescope Loses Large Part of Optical Ability,” New York Time

(28 June 1990): A1; Bob Davis, “NASA Finds Hubble Mirror Is Defective,” Wall Street Journal (28 June 1990): A1; Tom Wicker, “Beyond Murphy’s Law,” New York Times (19 July

1990): A23.

31 “Calamities in Space,” New York Times (1 July 1990): I6; “The Trouble with Hubble,” New 

Scientist (7 July 1990): 18; “Rethink Space,” New York Times (20 July 1990): A20; John Burgess, “Can U.S. Get Things Right Anymore?” Washington Post (3 July 1990): A1; “NASA’s 

$1.5 Billion Blunder,” Newsweek (9 July 1990); “More to Fix Than Hubble,” Space News 

(July 2–8, 1990): 14; Thor Hogan, Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, August 2007),

pp. 120–122; Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, p. 192.

32 The Naked Gun 2-1/2: The Smell of Fear, directed by David Zucker (Paramount Pictures 

DVD, 1991). 

33 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Status of the Hubble Space Telescope. 

101st Cong., 2nd sess., 29 June 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, 1990). 

34 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, Hubble Space Telescope and the Space 

Shuttle Problems, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 10 July 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 199); U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Space Telescope Flaw: Hearing Before the Committee on

Science, Space, and Technology 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 13 July 1990, (Washington, DC:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), pp. 2, 8; “The Successful Launch of the Hubble 

Space Telescope,” Congressional Record—House of Representatives, 24 April 1990.

35 Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 414; Warren E. Leary, “NASA Was Curbed in Checking Mirror,” New York Times (19 July 1990): A1

36 “Heaven Can Wait,” Newsweek (9 July 1990): 51–53; Smith, The Space Telescope, pp.

415–416; “Hubble’s Troubles: Reflections from the Editor,” Sky & Telescope (October 

1990): 340–341; e-mail, Jill Knapp to Tod Lauer, 19 July 1990, no title, copy of letter from 

Jim Gunn, Princeton University, to Dr. J. N. Bahcall, Institute for Advanced Studies, 16 

July 1990, with attachment of letter from Jim Gunn to Garth Illingworth, 8 July 1990. 

Quotation is from 8 July letter. See also Ann K. Finkbeiner, A Grand and Bold Thing: An 
CHAPTER TWO . Spher

Extraordinary Map of the Universe Ushering In a New Era of Discovery (New York: Free 

Press, 2010), pp. 1–6. Ironically, years earlier Gunn had coaxed Westphal, who was wary

of NASA programs, into becoming Principal Investigator for WF/PC

37 Pellerin OHI, pp. 28–32; Edward Weiler, oral history interview with author, 24 October

2016, pp. 7–8. Weiler said some people “disappeared,” and Pellerin spoke of HST managers requiring help for drinking problems and blamed the 1992 death of HST Program

Manager Douglas Broome at age 55 on his despair over HST. Bill Crabb, an HST engineer 

and controller, remembers that a waitress “chewed me out” over HST when she found 

out he worked on HST. Crabb OHI, p. 15. 

77

CHAPTER THREE

The Road to Recovery

▲ This image of the Crab Nebula is the largest image ever taken with Hubble’s WFPC2 camera. It was 

assembled from 24 individual exposures in 2005. (NASA/ESA/Allison Loll/Jeff Hester [Arizona State University]. 

Acknowledgment: Davide De Martin [ESA/Hubble]: heic0515a)

F

or Hubble Space Telescope Chief Scientist Ed Weiler, 27 June 1990, was 

the Death Valley—the low point—of the many years he spent working on 

HST. The news of HST’s spherical aberration had come just two months 

after the figurative Mount Everest of HST’s 

launch in April. But even amidst the gloom 

of the scientific working group meeting 

that day at Goddard and the subsequent 

news conference, the first sign of Hubble’s 

turnaround also emerged. Weiler and other 

NASA leaders had very little success that 

day convincing reporters that HST could 

be repaired or that the long-promised great 

science would eventually be delivered. The 

massive disappointment that NASA and 

its contractors faced that summer made 

the challenge of actually restoring the 

telescope’s focus and its scientific potential look even larger. But NASA’s massive 

investment of money and work in HST 

was at stake, and before the fix could be 

effected to Hubble three and a half years 

later, the future of NASA itself would also 

be in play.1

▲ HST’s defective main mirror 

became the subject of many 

editorial cartoons, including this 

Herblock cartoon in the Washington 

Post, 11 July 1990. (A 1990 Herblock 

Cartoon, © The Herb Block Foundation)
78 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

A NEW CAMERA

Weiler faced the media with the knowledge that HST was designed to be regularly serviced by astronauts on board the Space Shuttle, which meant that 

unlike most spacecraft, several opportunities existed to repair Hubble. In particular, Weiler had long been aware that a new Wide Field/Planetary Camera 

(WF/PC) was being developed for installation on the first planned HST servicing mission, planned for June 1993. That was because Weiler himself had proposed the replacement instrument back in 1983. With spherical aberration now 

confirmed in HST’s main mirror, there were many questions to be answered 

before the work on correcting the defect could begin in earnest. At the science working group meeting that preceded the press conference, Weiler heard 

from John Trauger, an astrophysicist from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 

who was Principal Investigator 

for the replacement camera. 

Trauger believed it could restore 

HST’s eyesight, at least for that 

one instrument. The success 

of the camera was especially 

important to taxpayers since it 

was expected to produce most 

of the images from HST.2

▲ The spherical aberration in HST’s main mirror 

did not prevent the release of HST images 

that were better than those obtainable from 

observatories on Earth. This image of Saturn 

was obtained by WF/PC on 26 August 1990. (NASA/

STScI: STScI Release 90-11)

When he first proposed 

WFPC2 in 1983, Weiler was 

concerned about the effects of 

a possible failure of WF/PC on

both the science output of HST 

and public support for the telescope. “To maintain the tremendous public appeal of the 

ST [Space Telescope], we must 

ensure that the ST produces 

both excellent science and ‘pretty 

pictures’ of planets, star clusters, etc.,” he wrote. “As a spectroscopist myself, I 

feel uneasy saying this, but no matter how much good physics comes out of 

[HST’s spectrographs], the general public will consider the ST a loss if it does 

not produce early and continuing unique views of the universe.” Weiler said that 

work should begin then on a new WF/PC since having to bring WF/PC back to 

Earth for refurbishment and then return it on a subsequent Shuttle flight would 

be far more expensive and time consuming than building a replacement.3
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

By the time HST downlinked its first images in May 1990, WFPC2 was well 

along in fabrication at JPL. At a meeting that month in JPL’s WF/PC data analysis area, Trauger showed HST’s first blurry images to Aden and Marjorie Meinel, 

both distinguished astronomers who had collaborated on building many astronomical instruments on Earth and in space. The Meinels told Trauger that they 

thought the images were affected by spherical aberration, and Aden Meinel 

suggested that the problem could be fixed for WFPC2 if the new instrument’s 

internal optics were reworked before launch. Together with optical designer 

Norm Page, Trauger used JPL’s computer model of HST’s optical system to see 

what changes could be built into WFPC2 to overcome HST’s spherical aberration, even if it stemmed from errors in both the primary and secondary mirrors 

in the telescope. Trauger travelled to Goddard for the 27 June science working 

group meeting where the news of the spherical aberration was broken to the 

scientists, and Trauger presented the results of his research in a memorable 

fashion: “I held up a nickel to illustrate the size of the mirrors inside WFPC2 

on which the imaging correction could be made.” Weiler mentioned Trauger’s 

plan for WFPC2 at the press conference, but it was lost amidst the devastating 

news of the mirror defect.4

▲ Lew Allen, Jr. at the time he was Director of 

the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in the 1980s. 

(NASA/JPL-Caltech)

SEARCHING FOR CAUSES

When NASA Associate Administrator Lennard Fisk revealed the discovery of spherical aberration alongside Weiler, he also announced that 

the important work of determining 

its cause was being given to a 

review board headed by General 

Lew Allen, Jr., a former U.S. Air

Force Chief of Staff who was then 

the director of JPL. NASA formed 

the HST Optical Systems Board of 

Investigation on 2 July with Allen as 

chair.5 At the time, HST program 

officials didn’t know whether the 

problem resided in the telescope’s 

main or secondary mirror or both. 

The Allen Committee investigation 

quickly focused on the firm that had 

ground and completed both mirrors, 
80 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

the recently renamed Hughes Danbury Optical Systems Inc. Everything there 

pertaining to the HST mirrors was impounded by about 35 staff members from 

NASA and the contractor. At the committee’s second meeting in late July, the 

full board was able to inspect the null corrector and test stand used for HST’s 

main mirror, which fortunately had been left undisturbed in place since the 

mirror’s completion nine years earlier because there was no other use for it. 

At a public session during the committee’s third meeting in mid-August, the 

board was told that Hubble’s main mirror had been ground to the wrong shape 

because of a lens spacing error in the null corrector test apparatus. During its 

next meeting in September, the committee heard more on how the error had 

been introduced to the null corrector. In its report two months later, the Allen 

Committee also described tests performed on the mirror using other equipment 

that showed the error but had been ignored.6

The Allen Committee was not the only group examining HST’s mirror problem. NASA set up the Hubble Independent Optical Review Panel at Goddard 

to provide precise technical information on the shape and condition of the HST 

mirrors, which were not well understood at the time, to facilitate the creation of 

measures to counteract the errors. The panel was chaired by Duncan T. Moore, 

Director of the University of Rochester’s Institute of Optics, and included George 

N. Lawrence of Applied Optics Research, Daniel Schulte of the Lockheed 

Optical Systems Laboratory, Dietrich Korsch of Korsch Optics, and Marjorie 

and Aden Meinel from JPL. The panel began planning to hold just one session 

on 5 July, but Charles Jones of NASA Marshall Space Flight Center asked Moore 

to chair a formal panel. A number of people from NASA, Hughes Danbury, 

and elsewhere worked as advisors for the panel, including John D. Mangus and 

H. John Wood from NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and Christopher 

Burrows from ESA and STScI. The panel continued its work for more than a 

year. Its early meetings drew more than 200 people, but attendance fell off as 

the exact nature of the spherical aberration in HST’s main mirror became better 

understood. The panel was assigned to look into the possibility that HST’s secondary mirror was also defective, but they found that it met specification. The 

panel’s work included developing a full understanding of the shape of HST’s mirrors using recent measurements made on the HST primary and secondary mirrors in space, the so-called fossil measurements made a decade earlier when the 

mirror was being polished, and tests on the backup mirrors left on the ground. 

The panel’s highly technical final report contained many studies from experts in 

the field of optics and provided an accurate figure for the HST primary mirror’s 

conic constant, –1.0139. Knowing this figure, which describes the shape of the 

mirror, permitted the creation of new optics to counteract the mirror’s defect.7
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

NASA’s Office of Inspector General commenced an investigation in August 

into the question of whether the mirror’s contractor had followed proper procedures as it had certified. In September, Senator Barbara Mikulski asked the 

office to investigate and report to the Senate Committee on Appropriations. 

In a report on 8 January 1991, the Inspector General’s report found “apparent reckless disregard” by Perkin-Elmer managers on the veracity of information they provided on the quality of the mirror, and referred the matter to the 

Department of Justice for possible prosecution under the False Claims Act. 

The report estimated the cost of the defective mirror at $50 to $60 million, 

based on the idea that since a Shuttle servicing mission was already scheduled 

to fly to HST before the spherical aberration was discovered, the cost of the 

mirror problem would not include an additional Shuttle mission. The Justice 

Department decided to pursue the case, and on 4 October 1993, it announced 

that it had reached a settlement on behalf of NASA with both Perkin-Elmer 

and Hughes Danbury where the two contractors paid the U.S. government $25 

million, including $15 million in cash, $3.5 million in waived fees under the 

contract to build and maintain the telescope, and $6.5 million in costs that the 

contractors refunded to NASA for continuing work involving HST. In return, 

the government released the companies from further liabilities in the matter.8

STRATEGIES PANEL

The appearance of the spherical aberration problem in June 1990 took place at 

a difficult moment for NASA, just as Marshall was handing over responsibility 

for the Hubble project to Goddard. And at NASA Headquarters and Goddard, 

the initial response to the news was dismay in spite of brave words from those 

like Fisk. David Leckrone, then the deputy project scientist, described the reactions of his colleagues this way saying, “‘Well, what the hell are we going to do?’ 

And, ‘This is so embarrassing.’ And, ‘Let’s figure out what went wrong, so it 

won’t go wrong in the next project,’ and that sort of thing. There was no, ‘Let’s 

charge into battle. Let’s get rid of this problem.’” Fisk admitted later that NASA 

was looking for anyone who could figure out how to overcome HST’s newly 

discovered problem.9

Even while the inquiries into the causes of the mirror problem were beginning in July, NASA made management changes to point the Hubble program 

toward solutions to its problems. Joseph H. Rothenberg, whose résumé included 

experience with OAO and Solar Max and a stint as Operations Manager for 

HST from 1983 to 1987, returned to HST at Goddard after the discovery of its 

mirror problem. He was given two titles: HST Project Manager and Associate 

Director for Flight Projects, with responsibility for repairing Hubble. He and 
82 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Project Scientist Al Boggess soon decided on a plan that involved learning about 

the causes of HST’s problems, working to solve those problems, and continuing 

to develop second-generation instruments for Hubble.10

▲ Joseph Rothenberg, who was Hubble Program Manager during Servicing Mission 1, 

speaks in 2018. (NASA/W. Hrybyk)

Astronomers who had been looking forward to working with HST felt sure 

that replacing the defective mirror could not be done without bringing it back 

to Earth, which invited major technical and political problems. Some wondered 

whether politicians would continue to fund the troubled HST in any case, or 

whether scientists would continue to support Hubble as they had done while it 

was being built. It was not immediately clear whether the defects in the mirror 

could be accurately measured so that new instruments such as WFPC2 awaiting installation on upcoming Shuttle servicing missions could be modified to 

compensate for the mirror’s defects. Boggess said, “There was a group that said, 

‘Well, let’s get as much astronomy done as we can with what we’ve got, particularly since we don’t know how long the whole thing’s going to last, anyway.’”11

When Weiler’s promise that WFPC2 was already being built and could be modified was backed up with the news that the precise nature of the main mirror’s 

problem was understood, questions about the fate of the other four instruments 

on HST remained open. Early on, it appeared that these instruments would 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

have to work with HST’s aberrated main mirror, and that only the secondgeneration instruments that would replace them in servicing missions in 1996 

or even later could be modified to allow full use of their capabilities. This was 

not good news for the scientists who were starting to use the first-generation 

instruments on board HST, especially the European scientists who were working with ESA’s Faint Object Camera.12

All five instruments and the three Fine Guidance Sensors inside HST were 

designed for easy changeout by Shuttle astronauts. Four of the five instruments 

were known as axial instruments because they were mounted at the rear of the 

telescope along its optical axis. These instruments were shaped roughly like 

phone booths, and because of their location in the telescope, light from the telescope’s mirrors could enter them directly. WF/PC and the three Fine Guidance 

Sensors were radial instruments located between the axial instruments and the 

main mirror and to the side. These instruments were shaped like baby grand 

pianos, and because of their location, they were equipped with pickoff mirrors 

in the telescope’s optical path to redirect light into them.

The scientists whose work would suffer without a fix to all the HST instruments naturally expressed concerns about the fate of those instruments, and 

they were afraid that NASA would be satisfied with only installing WFPC2. 

At a staff meeting at the Space Telescope Science Institute the day after the 

spherical aberration was announced, Faint Object Spectrograph team member 

Holland C. Ford of Johns Hopkins suggested that STScI should form a group to 

develop solutions for the spherical aberration problem. STScI Director Riccardo 

Giacconi was away in Italy and no one else took up the idea, but Ford brought 

up the idea again at another meeting early in August, and this time, Giacconi 

was present and gave his assent. By then, Robert A. Brown, a staff astronomer at STScI, was also proposing an institute initiative. Giacconi appointed 

Brown and Ford as co-chairs of the HST Strategy Panel, which had many 

other high-powered members, including Christopher Burrows; James Crocker; 

Rodger Doxsey; Pierre-Yves Bely and Francesco Paresce from STScI; HST’s 

father figure Lyman Spitzer; Sandra Faber; newly retired NASA Astronaut 

Bruce McCandless; Jacques Beckers and Raymond Wilson from the European 

Southern Observatory; Piero Benvenuti from the ESA’s European Coordinating 

Facility for HST; Murk Bottema from Ball Aerospace; Edward Groth, like 

Spitzer, from Princeton University; and Shrinivas Kulkarni from Caltech.13

The problem the Strategy Panel faced was that while changes to the optics 

inside each of the five scientific instruments aboard HST could restore clear 

vision, it would not be possible to change all the instruments during the first 

or even the first and second Shuttle servicing missions. Starting with a “clean 
84 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

sheet of paper” at its first meeting on 17 and 18 August, the Strategy Panel 

brainstormed ideas and looked at 20 possible ways to change HST’s primary or 

secondary mirror to reduce or eliminate the spherical aberration and nine ideas 

to change the instruments to deal with the problem. The proposals included 

bending or coating the main mirror, replacing the secondary mirror, installing 

corrective mirrors or lenses, masking part of the main mirror, or even partially 

closing the aperture door to reduce the mirror problem.14 McCandless, who 

had flown on the mission that deployed HST, warned the panel at its first meeting that ideas involving astronauts going into the barrel of the telescope were 

too dangerous. Optical expert Murk Bottema suggested using specially shaped 

coin-size mirrors to reverse the spherical aberration in three other HST instruments, but his proposal did not spell out how to mount the mirrors inside the 

telescope. Brown remembered that Spitzer, then 76, took an active role in the 

panel’s work, conferring frequently with Bottema over optical questions.15

Strategy Panel members discussed Bottema’s idea during their second meeting on 3 and 4 September at the ESA’s European Coordinating Facility for HST 

near Munich in Garching, Germany. James Crocker, an electrical engineer who 

was head of the operations division at STScI, decided to clean up before dinner 

at the meeting, and he used a shower in his room that was of a design common 

in Europe but not in the United States at the time. He found the shower head 

attached to a pivot on a pipe which allowed the head to be moved up or down. 

As Crocker bent over to raise the shower head, he got an idea for a way to easily 

install Bottema’s small mirrors. “It all just kind of all clicked,” Crocker remembered. “It’s like, oh, if we took out an instrument, and put in a new package, and 

it had like this shower head thingy that would pop up and flip out, correcting 

instruments in front of the other apertures, this would work, because the astronauts could do that job. They were trained to do that job. They had the tools to 

swap out an instrument. But instead of an instrument, it would be a corrective 

optics package to flip over in front of the other instruments.”16

The next morning, Crocker went to the meeting armed with viewgraphs 

of his idea. Though he expected someone on the panel to knock it down, as 

had happened to so many other ideas that had been found wanting, his proposal survived the panel’s scrutiny. McCandless, with his viewpoint as an 

astronaut, approved of the idea. Crocker also made a Styrofoam model of the 

telescope’s focal plane to show where corrective mirrors could go. And even 

better, the panel was told that NASA already had a dummy axial instrument 

named STAR (Space Telescope Axial Replacement). STAR had been designed 

to be placed inside HST and maintain balance inside HST in case one of the 

instruments wasn’t ready to fly. Goddard had contracted with the University of 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

Wisconsin, which was building 

the High Speed Photometer, to 

also build STAR in case it was 

needed. There was discussion 

of modifying STAR by adding 

corrective mirrors and the small 

mechanical arms that would 

move them into the telescope’s 

light path as Crocker proposed, 

creating a new instrument 

called COSTAR or Corrective 

Optics Space Telescope Axial 

Replacement.17

▲ James Crocker, who played a major role 

in dealing with HST’s spherical aberration 

problem while at STScI in the early 1990s, 

photographed in 2015. (NASA/Joel Kowsky)

Because the new WFPC2, a 

radial instrument, would incorporate changes to compensate 

for spherical aberration, the 

remaining four instruments were 

axial instruments, and COSTAR 

could be used to correct the 

vision of axial instruments. But 

there was a downside to the idea. 

COSTAR would have to take 

the place of one of the four axial 

instruments. Two of them were 

spectrographs, which provide crucial information about the makeup of the stars 

and other objects, and another was the Faint Object Camera provided by the 

European Space Agency, a camera with seven times the resolution of WFPC2. 

The fourth axial instrument was the High Speed Photometer. The photometer was not used as much as the other instruments, so it quickly became the 

chosen candidate to give way for COSTAR. The photometer was far simpler 

and smaller than the other instruments, and its presence on HST was seen 

as something of an “experiment.” 18 The graceful acceptance of this decision 

by HSP’s Principal Investigator, Bob Bless of the University of Wisconsin, has 

been widely noted and praised by the astronomy community. HSP scientists 

also went the extra mile by making available calibration data about the apertures of other HST instruments that made it possible for COSTAR to align its 

own mirrors to the other instruments. Because HSP wasn’t an imaging instrument, the spherical aberration didn’t strongly affect its work, so observations 
86 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

using it were given priority before its removal. Nevertheless, the astronomers 

who used it felt the loss keenly.19

In addition to its recommendation for COSTAR, the strategy panel also 

examined NASA and ESA’s work on HST’s pointing problems resulting from 

jitter caused by the solar arrays, along with NASA’s work on WFPC2. The panel 

reported to Giacconi in October, and after he endorsed its report, the panel went 

to NASA Headquarters on October 26. NASA officials, including Director of 

Astrophysics Charles Pellerin at Headquarters and Joe Rothenberg at Goddard, 

studied the plan and authorized work to start on COSTAR in December, 

although it would take some time before the idea was officially endorsed.20

STARTING RESEARCH WORK

While NASA, STScI, and contractors worked on solutions to the mirror’s spherical aberration, astronomers began using HST for research. Even on the day 

NASA announced HST’s defect, STScI news chief Ray Villard spoke for those 

astronomers who remained optimistic when he said, “Everyone expects there 

will be a full scientific mission ahead. This problem is not likely to have a lasting 

impact on science.”21 STScI deputy director Peter Stockman told Congress in 

July that HST’s observations in ultraviolet wavelengths were still better than anything available before, and observations using spectrographic instruments and 

the High Speed Photometer were not as strongly affected as those observations 

involving imaging. Accordingly, the Institute began to rearrange HST’s observing program to reflect those realities. Stockman testified that 33 percent of the 

telescope’s original observation programs for its first observing cycle could be 

carried out as planned, while 56 percent were still viable. Distant observations 

requiring high resolution from WF/PC and FOC would have to be postponed. 

Limited imaging could still go ahead with the help of computer processing.22

Hopes that HST would return useful scientific data were rewarded quickly. 

An image WF/PC obtained on 3 August of a star-forming region, 30 Doradus in 

the Large Magellanic Cloud, showed far more stars than could be seen in any 

image taken from the ground. This image arrived almost by accident because 

astronomers were testing the HST instruments to learn how they worked, and 

this image was intended as a finding chart for another HST instrument, the 

Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph. After undergoing computer processing 

to ameliorate the effects of spherical aberration, the HST image clearly showed 

60 stars. The best ground-based images only showed eight fully resolved stars 

and suggested as many as 27. “We knew we were sitting on a pot of gold,” 

Goddard astrophysicist Sally Heap said. “We now have the finest family portrait 

of stars outside our galaxy.”23
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

As the weeks went on, NASA and STScI released more Hubble images that 

provided views superior to those possible from the ground-based telescopes of 

objects as close as Saturn and Pluto and as far away as the Orion Nebula, the 

remnants of a recently exploded supernova, and in a few cases, even distant 

galaxies. Hubble was able to resolve brighter objects, such as quasars, and John 

Bahcall reckoned that scientists could look for gravitational lensing related to 

quasars. Images of dimmer and more distant objects were strongly affected 

by the mirror problem, postponing work such as trying to determine the distances of distant galaxies to help determine the size and age of the universe. 

Computer processing known as image deconvolution could tease out details in 

aberrated images, particularly of relatively bright objects. Tod Lauer, a member 

of the WF/PC team, explained that image deconvolution was useful in some 

but not all situations, such as the 30 Doradus image and images tracking the 

evolution of a gigantic storm on Saturn. Despite the early trickle of good news 

stories about Hubble, many politicians and members of the public still saw an 

aura of failure around the program. But six weeks after the spherical aberration announcement, Hubble was no longer a major story—on 2 August, Iraqi 

troops under President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Military forces from 

the U.S. and allied countries responded by liberating Kuwait and invading Iraq 

in the Gulf War, which came to a climax the following February.24

While America’s attention was focused overseas in the final months of 1990, 

the Allen Board had found the cause of HST’s spherical aberration, scientists 

and engineers were well on the way to understanding the extent of the mirror’s problems, and experts at Goddard, JPL, and STScI were starting work on 

modifying WFPC2 and creating COSTAR to clear HST’s vision. Those experts 

worked in a welter of formal and informal committees to help the Independent 

Optical Review Panel in its work, discuss how to modify WFPC2 and secondgeneration instruments slated for installation in HST later in the decade, and 

starting in November, work on creating COSTAR.25 On 1 October, NASA officially transferred operational responsibility for HST from Marshall Space Flight 

Center, which had been responsible for Hubble’s construction, to Goddard 

Space Flight Center. After they completed their work on the orbital verification 

program for HST, the remaining members of the Marshall HST team returned 

home to Huntsville from the Space Telescope Operations Control Center in 

Greenbelt. NASA decided on 12 November that despite ongoing problems with 

HST, including the effects of the jitter from the solar arrays, the commissioning 

phase of HST operations was over.26

In November, Goddard Lead Optical Engineer and astrophysicist H. John 

Wood recorded in a set of journals he kept that the meetings he attended began 
88 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

to turn to the matter of the servicing mission that would carry out repairs to 

restore HST’s vision. His colleagues from NASA and STScI discussed how to 

ensure that COSTAR would actually fit inside the telescope and also fit within 

budgets for the repair work.27

READYING REPAIRS IN SPACE

By the time talk turned that fall to installing COSTAR during the first Shuttle 

servicing mission to HST, that mission had been under consideration for several years in various places around NASA. In one sense, work on the mission 

began shortly after NASA decided in 1984 against returning Hubble to Earth 

for refurbishing. The following year NASA named two spacewalkers to the HST 

deployment mission, who not only began to get ready for their own mission but 

also put a great deal of effort into preparations for future servicing missions 

that would involve what NASA called Extra-Vehicular Activity, or EVA. Both 

astronauts had performed groundbreaking EVAs in 1984—Bruce McCandless 

became the first astronaut to make an untethered free spacewalk using the 

Manned Maneuvering Unit (MMU), and Kathryn D. Sullivan became the first 

American woman to walk in space.

McCandless, Sullivan, and everyone else involved in human spaceflight 

knew that doing useful work in open space during EVAs was both difficult and 

dangerous. Spacewalking astronauts learned hard lessons about the need for 

preparation during Gemini flights in 1965 and 1966, and the knowledge gained 

led to successes later, notably dramatic repairs by spacewalking astronauts to 

the Skylab space station after it had been damaged during launch in 1973. 

The first spacewalk from a Shuttle took place on the STS-6 mission in April 

1983, when astronauts Donald Peterson and Story Musgrave tested the specially designed Shuttle Extravehicular Mobility Units (EMUs) in Challenger’s 

payload bay. Both McCandless and Musgrave had previously served on the 

backup crew for the first flight to Skylab, and both developed an interest in 

EVAs that carried into the Shuttle Program. Sullivan, who had been selected as 

an astronaut in 1978, volunteered to work with McCandless as he tested equipment for Shuttle spacewalks at the Marshall Space Flight Center in what was 

then NASA’s largest neutral buoyancy facility, a giant water tank equipped with 

structures simulating spacecraft.28

When Sullivan and McCandless began formally preparing in 1985 for their 

roles in the HST deployment mission, the flight was due to take place in 1986, 

and HST was nearing completion at Lockheed in California under the supervision of managers from NASA Marshall. Following the decision to service 

Hubble on orbit, engineers from Lockheed, Marshall, and the Johnson Space 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

Center worked to make that work as easy as possible. In early tests in the tank 

at Marshall, McCandless and Sullivan assessed worksites in and near the space 

telescope on a mockup of HST and proved that the existing foot restraints, 

which were vital because astronauts need a stable and easy-to-use platform 

from which to work, needed to be redesigned.29

When the Space Shuttle Program began, NASA put a priority on using 

the Shuttle for servicing satellites and other spacecraft. To that end, NASA 

built a few satellites in the 1970s with modular systems, including the Solar 

Maximum Mission, which was launched in 1980. Engineers from the Goddard 

Space Flight Center fitted the Solar Max spacecraft with a grapple fixture that 

would allow it to be grabbed by the Shuttle robotic arm and components that 

could be changed out. Solar Max suffered equipment failures a few months 

after launch, and in a major test of Shuttle-based satellite servicing, STS-41C 

astronauts flew aboard Challenger in April 1984 to attempt repair work on the 

troubled satellite. Astronauts George Nelson and James van Hoften used an 

MMU to catch the satellite, but when a capture tool they carried failed, Solar 

Max began to spin out of control. Two days later, controllers stabilized Solar 

Max, and the Shuttle robotic arm grappled it and placed it in a cradle for servicing. The next day Nelson and van Hoften successfully changed out one of Solar 

Max’s attitude control modules and replaced an electronics box. Despite its 

ultimate success, the flight underlined the difficulties of working in open space 

for astronauts and their trainers at JSC. On other flights in those years, Shuttle 

astronauts rescued and repaired wayward communications satellites and tested 

repair and construction techniques inside the Shuttle payload bay. Often, they 

found that the work was tougher than anticipated, usually when the equipment 

the astronauts took with them did not fit properly because it had not been tested 

on the actual spacecraft. The handling equipment had been based on engineering drawings.30

After the Challenger disaster and the cancellation of planned Shuttle flights 

including the HST deployment mission, McCandless was assigned to continue 

working on HST, while Sullivan did what she could to help amidst other assignments until the deployment crew was reformed in 1988. The long delays for that 

flight gave both astronauts plenty of time to learn about HST while it remained 

on the ground. They worked with a team from Lockheed headed by Ronald 

L. Sheffield, a retired Army helicopter pilot whose experience of three combat 

tours in Vietnam left him with what Sullivan described as the steely determination and easygoing temperament needed for his second career as Lockheed’s 

EVA Manager for the HST servicing missions. The Neutral Buoyancy Simulator 

at Marshall had been fitted with high fidelity training mockups, and Sullivan 
90 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

and McCandless were able to practice work that astronauts would do on HST 

and give NASA time estimates for this work. “The preliminary reliability assessments indicated that it would take at least four EVAs to accomplish all the 

tasks that were likely to be slated on a typical maintenance mission,” Sullivan 

wrote, twice as many as the Shuttle could support at the time.31 Together the 

astronauts and the maintenance and repair team did a top-to-bottom inspection 

of Hubble in its cleanroom at Lockheed in Sunnyvale, California, assessing 

HST systems in terms of whether they could be repaired or replaced by astronauts wearing spacesuits. Alterations included modest ideas, such as putting 

labels on connectors inside HST to assist astronauts, and a major change to the 

Power Control Unit at the heart of HST. The unit was attached to a wall and 

would be nearly impossible to access during a servicing mission. With great difficulty, Sullivan, McCandless, Sheffield, and their team persuaded managers at 

Lockheed and Marshall to attach the unit to an adapter plate to make replacing 

the unit merely difficult. As well, the two astronauts tested tools and procedures that would be needed to repair HST. Along with McCandless, Sullivan 

said she “took basically every single Hubble tool out to the flight vehicle” and 

tested “every single fastener and every single fitting.” These preparations for 

STS-31, including the creation of designs for the carrier pallets for replacement 

units for HST, handling aids, tools and toolbox designs, and a set of EVA procedures, marked the beginning of work on servicing HST. During the deployment 

mission on STS-31 in April 1990, the two astronauts almost put their preparations to work after problems developed when a solar array didn’t unfurl at first. 

After the mission, McCandless put his expertise on HST servicing to work on 

the Strategies Panel for HST, as noted above.32

The handover of responsibility for HST from Marshall to Goddard in 1990 

brought a group of people from Goddard fully into the preparations for the first 

servicing mission to HST, joining the staff already working on the problem 

from JSC and Lockheed and replacing the staff from Marshall. The Goddard 

group, which had long been interested in servicing satellites, was headed by 

Frank J. Cepollina, then a leading engineer in Goddard’s systems division. A 

native of northern California, Cepollina, known widely as Cepi, had joined 

NASA Goddard in 1963 and worked on the Orbiting Solar Observatory and 

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory programs. As NASA began organizing the 

Space Shuttle Program in 1969, many NASA managers hoped that a reusable 

spacecraft like the Shuttle could dramatically lower the cost of space travel. 

Satellites designed for easy replacement of components and systems by visiting 

astronauts appeared to be one way of saving money. While the concept did not 

win universal acceptance, Cepollina championed low cost robotic spacecraft 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

with systems built into modules for easy servicing. In 1975, 

Cepollina wrote about servicing satellites using the Space 

Shuttle Remote Manipulator 

System, the robotic arm then 

under development in Canada, 

along with equipment inside 

the Shuttle payload bay to store 

replacement modules for satellites, and a cradle to hold satellites while they were being serviced. Cepollina and his group 

had already been working on 

preparing HST’s instruments 

for changeout in servicing missions and building the Flight 

Support System where HST 

would sit in the payload bay 

during repairs.

▲ Frank Cepollina, who led NASA Goddard’s 

satellite servicing effort for 35 years, in 2018. 

(NASA/W. Hrybyk)

Preparations for Servicing 

Mission 1 (SM1) took on whole new dimensions once HST was launched, its 

unanticipated problems began to mount, and NASA grappled with the need 

for at least four EVAs on that flight. Besides the mirror, HST was also troubled 

by the solar array’s jitters, which reduced the time available for HST to make 

observations, and ate up computing capacity on the spacecraft due to the need 

for software designed to reduce the effects of the oscillations. Goddard and contractor managers debated options for replacing the solar arrays in 1990 and 1991. 

Although one option was purchasing fixed solar arrays from Lockheed, NASA 

and ESA opted to install new ESA-provided arrays from British Aerospace, the 

makers of the original set. There were other problems on Hubble too. One of 

HST’s six gyroscopes failed in December 1990 and a second failed the following 

June. One of the HST onboard computer’s six memory units failed in May 1991, 

and in July the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph developed a problem 

in its power supply. That summer, there was talk of splitting the work between 

two missions, with one flying early to deal with the more urgent problems. At a 

meeting at Goddard in August, tight budgets affecting NASA and HST raised 

fears that such an early mission would lead to temporary interruptions in HST 

operations or the loss of upcoming new instruments for the telescope.33
92 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Tight budgets had been a fact of life while HST was being built, and they 

would continue during Hubble’s operational life. One of the biggest stories of 

1990 in American politics was the federal budget. Concern was growing that 

year about the size of the budget deficit, and President George H. W. Bush was 

caught between his 1988 campaign pledge of “no new taxes” and a Democratic 

Congress that wanted to increase revenues to reduce the deficit. In late June, 

Bush got budget cuts in exchange for a tax increase in a deal with Congress. 

NASA’s budget was increased for the upcoming fiscal year, but significantly 

less than what the Bush administration had proposed. The Administration’s 

ambitious plans to return astronauts to the Moon and then on to Mars received 

no funds, but growing costs for the Space Station Program and the Shuttle, 

including the construction of the Shuttle Endeavour, meant funds remained 

tight elsewhere inside NASA.34

Wide Field Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2)

Invar 

Bulkheads

Actuated 

Fold Mirrors

Fixed Pyramid Mirror

Heat Pipe CCD Camera Head (1 of 4)

Actuated 

Pick-off 

Mirror

Entrance 

Aperture

Relay Optics and 

Light Baffle (1 of 4)

Selectable Optical 

Filter Assembly

External Radiator

Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2

Time on HST:

6 December 1993–14 May 2009 

Contractor:

Jet Propulsion Laboratory

Principal Investigator:

John Trauger (JPL)

Weight: 281 kilograms 

(619 pounds)

Radial Instrument

This instrument was originally intended to be a “clone” of the original Wide Field

Planetary Camera with improved components, but when HST’s main mirror was 

discovered to be defective, NASA decided to build and launch the second WFPC

with modified adjustable internal mirrors to correct spherical aberration. 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

BUILDING WFPC2

Scientists and engineers at JPL under Trauger and Project Manager Larry 

Simmons turned quickly to the task of modifying WFPC2 to counteract the 

effects of HST’s spherical aberration. Weiler had originally nicknamed WFPC2 

the “clone” to emphasize its planned similarity to WF/PC, but Weiler’s nickname went by the wayside because of the changes needed to correct HST’s mirror problem. WF/PC had eight CCDs—four for the wide field camera and four 

for the planetary camera—and that was the plan for its successor. But to bring 

WFPC2 in on time for the servicing mission and within budget, four of the 

CCDs were sacrificed in the fall of 1991. Three of the CCDs kept in WFPC2 

were f/12.9 wide field systems, while the fourth, covering a field less than one 

quarter the size of each of the other three CCDs but at greater resolution, was 

the f/28.3 planetary camera system. One result of this decision was the famous 

For a number of reasons, including complexity and cost issues, Hubble management decided to reduce the number of CCDs in WFPC2 to four from the eight that

were in WF/PC. This meant that only one of the four CCDs was a high-resolution f/28.3

planetary CCD with a narrow field of view, and the other three CCDs were wider field 

f/12.9 cameras. The four CCDs together produced the distinctive chevron shape of 

WFPC2 images. The fact that there are not separate planetary and wide field modes

as in the first WF/PC caused the slash to be removed from WFPC2’s acrony

The CCDs in the new instrument were 800 by 800-pixel Loral CCDs that had similar 

resolutions to their WF/PC predecessors but generally improved operating characteristics, including better efficiency. WFPC2 had 48 different filters in 12 filte

wheels.a Like its predecessor, WFPC2 images light in wavelengths of 1,150 to 10,500

angstroms, covering visible, ultraviolet, and near-infrared parts of the spectrum.

WFPC2 became the workhorse camera for HST for its early years on orbit, producing

iconic Hubble images such as the marks left by Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 on Jupiter, 

the “Pillars of Creation” image, the first “Hubble Deep Field,” and many others relating to important HST scientific discoveries.

WFPC2 is now on display at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, D

a STScI, Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2 Instrument Handbook, Version 10.0 (Baltimore, 

MD: STScI, August 2008).
94 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

L-shape to images that were created when all four of WFPC2’s CCDs were 

mosaicked to capture a single image. These images, whose shapes were frequently compared to a batwing, chevron, stair step, or stealth bomber, became 

an iconic symbol of HST. WFPC2 required new mirrors inside it, similar to the 

mirrors contained in COSTAR, to reverse the effects of the spherical aberration 

in HST’s main mirror. Because of the painstaking, precise, and highly complex 

optical prescriptions for these coin-sized mirrors, all of them were manufactured by a highly specialized company in the suburbs of San Francisco called 

Tinsley Laboratories. As a result of concerns about slight movements that had 

taken place inside the original WF/PC during flight, WFPC2 was equipped 

with adjustable mirrors. This feature had the added benefit of providing further assurance that HST’s extremely tight optical alignment tolerances could be 

met. The cost and added complexity of the actuators that made these mirrors 

adjustable was a major reason for the decision to reduce the CCD systems from 

eight to four. The mechanisms needed to make those mirror adjustments were 

created by JPL and Litton Itek Optical Systems.35

BUILDING COSTAR

After NASA management approved the concept of COSTAR, Ball Aerospace 

of Boulder, Colorado, began initial detailed design work, receiving a first contract in February 1991 and a final contract in October. Ball opted to build an 

all-new COSTAR because the STAR unit was thought to be more useful on 

the ground as a template for new instruments. Only the name derived from 

STAR lived on in COSTAR. There were several reasons why Ball won the job 

without a competition. Ball had a long relationship with Goddard going back 

to subcontracting work on Explorer 6 in 1959, and it built the GHRS as part of 

the original suite of instruments for Hubble. By 1990, Ball was also working on 

Hubble’s two second-generation spectroscopic instruments, the Space Telescope 

Imaging Spectrograph (STIS) and the Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 

Spectrometer (NICMOS), which were slated for installation during the second 

HST servicing mission in 1996 or 1997. Bottema, the Ball optical expert who 

had to come out of retirement to work on COSTAR, credited the fact that “I 

invented the optics” for Ball winning the job, along with Ball’s work on the new 

instruments and its possession of test facilities for HST instruments.36

The team at Ball, along with Principal Investigator Ford, STScI Team Leader 

Crocker, and Paul Geithner, the COSTAR Project Manager at Goddard, faced 

big challenges devising an instrument that would precisely place 10 mirrors 

varying in size between a dime and a quarter at precise positions along the five 

light paths between HST’s optics and three instruments: the Goddard High 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

Resolution Spectrograph, which received its light in one path, and the Faint 

Object Spectrograph and the Faint Object Camera, which each had two light 

paths from the main mirrors to accommodate different operational modes in 

each instrument. Once COSTAR was installed inside HST, COSTAR’s optical bench would extend and five beryllium arms would deploy with their mirrors in the very cramped space inside the telescope’s focal plane. The arms 

were designed to retract when instruments using COSTAR were changed 

out in future servicing missions. As with WFPC2, the tiny mirrors going into 

COSTAR were adjustable to meet the extremely tight optical tolerances of the 

instruments. Tinsley Laboratories did the highly specialized work of creating 

the tiny mirrors, which required a special coating for better performance in 

ultraviolet light. Getting COSTAR and its 5,300 moving parts ready involved 

long hours of work for the people at Ball, STScI, and NASA, who were challenged with problems such as the mirrors rubbing against each other during 

vibration testing and contamination from glue used to hold parts together.37

NASA didn’t publicize cost figures for WFPC2 because it was already in the 

HST budget before the HST mirror problem was discovered. NASA estimated 

the price of COSTAR at $50 million. Officially, this money was found by rearranging priorities within the HST budget, but Fisk later said most of that money 

was taken from another NASA science program.38

Given the high profile and cost of HST, NASA could not take chances with 

the repairs to the space telescope. Memories of the troubled repairs of Solar 

Max and other satellites caused by relying only on photos or plans to design 

repair tools were still fresh around NASA. As Cepollina put it: “We had to get 

it right. We couldn’t screw up Hubble.”39 To make sure that the new optics 

would work, JPL and Ball built simulators and test equipment to verify WFPC2 

and COSTAR. NASA also used virtual reality techniques to make sure the 

instruments and COSTAR’s deployable optics fit properly. Two simulators were 

built at Goddard to test the new instruments, including the Vehicle Electrical 

Test Facility (VEST), which was a full electrical representation of HST on the 

ground. Interface tests of all new instruments and other hardware were conducted on the VEST before servicing missions, and the facility has continued 

to operate throughout HST’s lifetime to help troubleshoot problems on HST 

and verify new software and procedures before they are put into use. NASA 

and Ball personnel created the High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator to ensure 

that WFPC2 and COSTAR would fit properly in Hubble, and it was also used 

to help familiarize astronauts with the work of installing these instruments.40

With progress in 1991 on developing both WFPC2 and COSTAR, Joe 

Rothenberg and other managers turned their attention in early 1992 to the 
96 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

servicing mission, which was then scheduled for November or December 1993. 

While Shuttle crews were usually named about a year before flight, Rothenberg 

put pressure on JSC management to name the servicing crew sooner. In March 

1992, JSC chose the first astronaut for the servicing mission, the person who 

would serve as payload commander with onboard responsibility for the EVAs. 

Story Musgrave had the most varied background of any member of the NASA 

astronaut corps, including experience in the U.S. Marines as a mechanic and 

electrician, thousands of hours flying time in many different types of aircraft, 

and work as a trauma surgeon. He earned degrees in mathematics and statistics, business administration, computer programming, chemistry, literature, 

medicine, and physiology. As an astronaut, Musgrave quickly specialized in 

EVAs, helping prepare the space walks on Skylab and then developing EVA 

equipment and procedures for Shuttle prior to his first flight and first EVA on 

STS-6. Prior to his assignment to SM1, Musgrave flew three further Shuttle 

Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR)

Fixed Optical Bench

Electrical Connector Panel

Enclosure

Manual Override

Optical Bench in 

Deployed Position A Fitting

Mirror Arms

Deployment 

Mechanism

Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement

Time on HST:

7 December 1993–16 May 2009

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

Principal Investigator:

Holland Ford 

(Johns Hopkins University)

Weight: 290 kilograms 

(640 pounds)

Axial Instrument

After HST’s main mirror was found in 1990 to be ground to the wrong shape, causing 

spherical aberration, NASA approved the proposal of the STScI Strategy Panel that 

the COSTAR be built with five arms reaching into the light path between HST’s optics 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

flights and served as spacecraft communicator on other flights, including STS31, the HST deployment flight. Shortly after Musgrave’s assignment to SM1, 

the Shuttle Endeavour launched on its first mission, STS-49, with the goal of 

retrieving the Intelsat VI communications satellite from low-Earth orbit and 

attaching it to a rocket motor that would loft it into its originally intended geosynchronous orbit. In problems eerily reminiscent of those encountered in the 

Solar Max repair mission and two other Shuttle missions in 1984 and 1985, 

astronaut Pierre Thuot repeatedly tried and failed during two space walks 

to capture Intelsat VI with a specially developed capture bar. Two days later, 

Thuot and two other astronauts grabbed the wayward satellite by hand and 

succeeded in attaching it to a rocket motor that sent it on its way to its proper 

orbit. The daring and unprecedented three-person EVA was chalked up in public as a triumph because the satellite rescue ultimately succeeded. But it was 

clear that NASA still faced big problems with EVAs. That message was driven 

and three other axial instruments. COSTAR could not work for the radial instruments 

such as WF/PC, WFPC2, or the Fine Guidance Sensors

Once COSTAR was installed inside HST on Servicing Mission 1, the five arms were 

extended, placing 10 coin-sized mirrors into the light paths leading to the Goddard 

High Resolution Spectrograph, the Faint Object Spectrograph, and the Faint Object 

Camera. As FOS and GHRS were removed during Servicing Mission 2 in 1997 and FOC 

in Servicing Mission 3B in 2002, the arms relating to each instrument were retracted. 

Newer instruments were engineered with internal mirrors to compensate for the 

defects in HST’s main mirror and hence did not require COSTAR.

No scientific work was carried out from COSTAR, though it enabled a large quantity 

of science to be done with the FOC, FOS, and GHRS, whose light input it corrected. 

After nine years of operation and nearly seven years of not being used, COSTAR was 

removed during Servicing Mission 4. 

COSTAR is now on display at the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC.

a NASA Facts, “Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR),” Goddard 

Space Flight Center, June 1993; Ball Corporation, Technology Update: Corrective Optics 

Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR), undated.
98 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

home during STS-49’s final spacewalk, when astronauts Kathryn C. Thornton 

and Thomas D. Akers ran into problems while testing techniques needed to 

assemble the Space Station.41

ENTER DAN GOLDIN

The spring of 1992 also saw major changes at the top level of NASA. The 

administration of President George H. W. Bush had grown dissatisfied the year 

before with NASA Administrator Admiral Richard H. Truly, a former astronaut, 

mainly over differences that led to the failure of the Administration’s Space 

Exploration Initiative. The problems with Hubble, continuing Shuttle issues, an 

embarrassing antenna problem that hobbled the Galileo spacecraft headed to 

Jupiter, and concerns about the Space Station Program all contributed to Truly’s 

resignation in February 1992 at the request of the President. By the time Truly 

left at the end of March, Congress had confirmed Bush’s selection of Daniel 

S. Goldin, an engineer who had worked for many years in classified space programs at TRW after a brief stint at NASA.42 During his confirmation hearings, 

he heard from senators such as Mikulski and, most memorably, from Ernest 

“Fritz” Hollings (D-North Carolina) who said, “Mr. Goldin, do you know that 

the Hubble is blind? The Galileo spacecraft is deaf, the Shuttle is grounded, 

the Space Station spent its whole budget and has no hardware to show for it? 

It’s not on orbit. The weather satellites, which are crucial to my state, are dead. 

We have no way of getting warning for hurricanes. NASA has no vision and it’s 

out of touch.”43

The new Administrator quickly shook up the leading personnel in the 

Agency. After Bush lost the 1992 election to the Democratic candidate, William 

J. Clinton, the new president opted to retain Goldin as NASA Administrator. 

Although Goldin had many issues to deal with, including major changes to the 

Space Station Program amidst growing opposition within Congress, he sent 

word to those working on HST at Goddard that his telephone line was open to 

them. “It must work,” he said of the repair plans.44

Goldin recalled later that he took personal responsibility for the success of 

the servicing mission and the safety of the crew, stating, “My operating style is 

to ask a lot of very difficult questions to cause people to think. And to bring in 

people who aren’t personally responsible for conducting the mission, if you will, 

red teams. The blue teams are the people that are on the mission. The red team 

doesn’t have personal responsibility for the mission, so they can ask whatever 

they want, and they don’t have to be defensive.”45 To that end, Goldin set up a 

task force looking into satellite rescue and repair, followed a few months later 

by another task force headed by former Apollo program manager Joseph Shea 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road T

to review plans for SM1. In 

the months leading up to the 

mission, other review groups 

proliferated at Johnson, including a team headed by engineer 

Richard Fitts and others involving former astronauts John W. 

Young and Joseph P. Allen. 

Another review team headed 

by former Gemini and Apollo 

astronaut General Thomas 

Stafford pressed JSC to quickly 

name the crew for SM1.46

▲ Daniel S. Goldin served as NASA’s ninth 

Administrator from 1 April 1992 to 17 November 

2001. (NASA: GPN-2002-000094)

In August, NASA responded 

by naming Akers and Thornton, 

fresh off spacewalks on STS49, and Jeffrey A. Hoffman, an 

astrophysicist and three-time 

Shuttle veteran with spacewalk experience, to the servicing mission, now designated 

as STS-61 on Endeavour. In 

December, the all-veteran crew 

was filled out with Richard O. 

Covey taking the commander’s 

seat, Kenneth D. Bowersox as 

pilot, and Swiss ESA astronaut and astrophysicist Claude Nicollier as mission 

specialist responsible for operating the Shuttle’s robotic arm after having done 

the job on a previous mission. The lead flight director for the mission, J. Milton 

Hefflin, was also experienced at that position. In a first for a Shuttle flight 

made at Goldin’s direction, the Agency named a Mission Director for STS61 with overall responsibility for mission success. Randy Brinkley, a former 

Marine Corps aviator, reported to NASA Headquarters but worked at Johnson 

Space Center.47

ELABORATE PREPARATIONS

Long before launch, Musgrave and his STS-61 colleagues became well known 

for their dedication to training. In May 1993, Musgrave was fully suited for a 

test inside a vacuum chamber at JSC set to the low temperatures that were 
100 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

expected to be encountered during HST repairs. While testing tools, Musgrave 

suffered from frostbite in eight fingers. He was flown to Alaska for treatment 

from specialists in frostbite injuries. On earlier spacewalks, Musgrave and other 

astronauts had faced cold temperatures in their gloves, but only for short periods. 

His painful lesson led to a number of improved servicing mission procedures, 

including redesigned gloves to maintain warmth, and changes to the orbiter 

attitude during EVAs to stabilize temperatures while preventing sunlight from 

entering the telescope while astronauts were working.48 Musgrave and the three 

other astronauts who performed spacewalks in the mission spent 738 hours 

training in the Neutral Buoyancy Simulator at Marshall and the Weightless 

Environment Training Facility (WETF) at JSC. They also trained on mechanical, computer and virtual reality simulators, vacuum chambers, the Manipulator 

Development Facility at 

JSC which included a 

realistic robotic arm and 

balloons in the shape 

and size of HST, and the 

High Fidelity Mechanical 

Simulator at Goddard, 

where they practiced 

moving instruments in 

and out of the telescope. 

Musgrave compared the 

work of the spacewalking 

astronauts and the robotic 

arm operator to a “ballet” that required a great 

deal of rehearsal time. 

The astronauts also came 

in contact with the actual 

hardware, which involved 

travel around the U.S. and 

even to England, where 

the new solar arrays were 

made. They even spent 

time inspecting the only 

full-scale mockup of HST, 

the former Structural 

Dynamic Test Vehicle, at 

▲ Astronauts prepare for the first Hubble Space 

Telescope servicing mission in Marshall Space Flight 

Center’s Neutral Buoyancy Simulator. Divers are on 

hand to provide assistance. (NASA: 9307457)
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

the National Air and Space Museum in Washington, DC. These rehearsals 

for the EVAs took place on top of the normal full-dress simulations of various 

phases of the flight that not only involved the astronauts but also the controllers 

from Johnson, along with staff from Goddard, STScI, and other contractors 

who would support the mission.49

Other preparations for the servicing mission had gone back to the mid1980s, including creating the equipment placed inside the Shuttle payload bay 

to hold HST in place and the instruments and tools the astronauts would use 

to make repairs. Located at the back of the cargo bay was the Flight Support 

System (FSS) maintenance platform, a U-shaped cradle topped with a circular 

berthing ring that attached to HST using three latches and an umbilical to 

provide Shuttle power to HST. The ring could rotate almost a full circle to turn 

the telescope toward the astronauts for easy access and could be pivoted as well. 

The FSS had been used for the first time on the STS-41C mission to service 

the Solar Maximum Mission. In front of the FSS was the Orbital Replacement 

Unit Carrier, a modified Spacelab pallet containing two Science Instrument 

Protective Enclosures, one each for COSTAR and WFPC2. The carrier also 

included boxes for other equipment being installed on HST, including Rate 

Sensor Units that contained new gyroscopes and replacement power and computer units. The Solar Array Carrier at the front end of Endeavour’s payload 

bay was designed to hold two solar arrays and their associated electronics and 

bring the old solar arrays back to Earth for analysis. Both of the carrier units 

were designed to protect their cargo from the buffeting of launch, and included 

fixtures to park instruments during the EVAs. A toolbox in the payload bay 

contained many of the more than 200 tools and crew aids created at Goddard, 

Marshall, and JSC that the four STS-61 spacewalkers would use during the 

mission. Some tools were stored inside the Shuttle cabin. The tools included 

well-known articles such as power ratchet tools and smaller powered screwdrivers and torque limiters. Crew aids included portable foot restraints, handles, 

storage brackets, clamps, and covers to protect instruments from impact or contamination. Many of these tools and aids were specifically designed for tasks 

peculiar to this servicing mission.50

To deal with budget problems facing the U.S. government in general and 

NASA in particular, the Agency took measures to absorb the costs of correcting Hubble’s vision problem. The Shuttle flight to HST had a price tag of $361 

million, but that mission was on the flight manifest before HST was launched, 

and as was customary, the money for all Shuttle flights involving HST came out 

of NASA’s budget for the Shuttle Program. NASA spent another $251 million 

in 1993 dollars on the mission for instrument preparations and HST ground 
102 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

operations. A NASA statement in 1993 said the Agency estimated that the correction of the optical problem cost an extra $86.3 million, and to meet most of 

that cost, NICMOS, which was being built for the 1997 servicing mission, was 

scaled back along with WFPC2, as mentioned above. STIS was delayed to the 

1997 servicing mission. Further savings were made through reductions to HST 

administration costs, and Goddard absorbed $3 million in other cutbacks.51

GROWING PRESSURES 

New problems developed on HST in 1992, increasing the demands on SM1. 

That November, a third gyro failed, leaving only three operating gyros, the 

minimum then allowed without reducing HST activities. At the same time, 

another memory unit in the flight computer failed, a power supply problem hit 

the Faint Object Camera, and two magnetometers developed problems. To say 

the least, this gave HST engineers nightmares—they had to increase the number of EVAs to the unprecedented number of five. Following a recommendation from the Stafford task force, astronaut and engineer Gregory J. Harbaugh 

was named as a backup crew member, something new in the Shuttle Program. 

Harbaugh got the job shortly after returning from Shuttle mission STS-54 in 

January 1993, where he and another astronaut practiced spacewalking procedures that would be required for the servicing mission. Other astronauts also 

tested EVA techniques and tools needed for SM1 during the flights of STS-57 

in June 1993 and STS-51 in September.52

The year 1993 turned out to be one of most difficult in the history of NASA, 

boosting the pressure on the servicing mission scheduled for December. The 

incoming Clinton administration critically examined the troubled Space Station 

Program as Goldin struggled to save it and decided in June to continue with 

the station in a reduced form. On 23 June, the House of Representatives came 

within one vote of cancelling the Space Station. To save the situation later that 

year, the administration brought Russia on board and rebranded the program as 

the International Space Station. But there were more embarrassing problems. 

Shuttle missions continued to experience delays and on 21 August, the highly 

anticipated Mars Observer spacecraft disappeared just 3 days before it was to go 

into orbit around the Red Planet. The same month, a newly launched weather 

satellite failed, and a remote sensing satellite failed to reach orbit in October.53

NASA was clearly in a jam—Goldin demanded more reviews and even an 

elaborate news management plan to promote the servicing mission. Months 

before the flight, Science magazine described the “high stakes” flight as a 

“drama of redemption” for the troubled space Agency.54 “NASA can’t afford 

another highly visible failure,” political scientist John Logsdon told the New 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

York Times shortly before launch day. “If the Hubble repair is a failure, we can 

write off space science for the foreseeable future,” warned John Bahcall, one 

of the people most responsible for making HST a reality.55 Media strained to 

emphasize the importance of the mission to NASA: “One small misstep by the 

Hubble repairmen could mean one giant leap backward for space agencykind,” 

said science writer Dennis Overbye.56 A USA Today headline described STS-61 

as “The Must-Win Mission.”57

In the weeks before launch, there were two anxious moments during the 

final preparations for SM1. In September, a test of WFPC2 suggested that the 

camera was seriously out of focus, but the finding was traced to a problem with 

the testing equipment and not WFPC2, which had been verified in other tests 

and one final review that followed. And on October 30, sand contamination 

from sandblasting operations near the launch pad was found inside the payload 

changeout room on Pad 39A, but thankfully the contaminants did not reach 

critical hardware.58

SERVICING MISSION ONE

After a one-day postponement due to poor weather conditions, STS-61 lifted off 

in predawn darkness at 4:27 a.m. EST from Pad 39B at Kennedy Space Center 

on Thursday, 2 December 1993. Over the next two days, Covey and Bowersox 

flew Endeavour and its crew of seven toward HST. Upon reaching the troubled 

telescope, Nicollier attached the Shuttle’s robotic arm to a fixture on HST and 

berthed the telescope on the FSS maintenance platform in Endeavour’s payload 

bay. For the five critical EVAs, the four spacewalkers were split into two teams: 

Musgrave and Hoffman were responsible for three spacewalks, and Akers and 

Thornton carried out two other EVAs. All four astronauts were trained to carry 

out every task, as was their backup, Harbaugh, who served as the spacecraft 

communicator in the Mission Control Center during the EVAs. The servicing 

work was organized to be done in order of importance, in case the mission had 

to be cut short. The gyroscopes, which were changed out on the first EVA, 

for example, were critical to pointing Hubble, and badly needed replacement. 

Thus, they got top priority. Although the EVAs took place in the late evening 

and overnight hours in North America, many people tuned in when cable systems around the U.S. carried NASA Select coverage of the mission.59

Musgrave and Hoffman emerged early for the first EVA on the evening of 

5 December and set to work replacing two Rate Sensing Units, each containing two gyroscopes, and two Electronic Control Units. Musgrave was able 

to fit inside the telescope to work on replacing the units, and the EVA went 

smoothly until the time came to close HST’s aft shroud doors, which needed 
104 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

▸ Astronaut Jeffrey A. Hoffman 

holds the Wide Field and Planetary 

Camera (WF/PC) after it was 

removed from HST in December 

1993 during the first Hubble 

servicing mission. Both WF/PC and 

its replacement, the Wide Field and 

Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2), were 

radial instruments on HST. 

(NASA: 9400368)

◂ The STS-61 crew insignia depicts the 

astronaut symbol superimposed 

against the sky with Earth underneath. 

Also seen are two circles representing 

the optical configuration of the Hubble 

Space Telescope. (NASA: 9311999)

▾ Servicing Mission 1 insignia 

created at the Goddard 

Space Flight Center. (NASA)

◂ With the Hubble Space Telescope berthed in 

Endeavour’s cargo bay, crew members for the 

STS-61 mission pause for a crew portrait on 

the flight deck. Left to right: F. Story Musgrave, 

Richard O. Covey, Claude Nicollier, Jeffrey A. 

Hoffman, Kenneth D. Bowersox, Kathryn C. 

Thornton, and Thomas D. Akers. (NASA: sts061-05-031)
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

to be secured for the telescope to work properly. The two doors refused to line 

up, so finally Mission Control allowed Musgrave to use brute force to close the 

doors with the help of what he called a “come along,” a device using belts and 

clamps on the door handles to bring the doors together. The fix worked.60

Replacing the two solar arrays was on the agenda for Akers and Thornton’s 

EVA the following day. When Endeavour first arrived at HST, the astronauts 

noted that one of the bi-stems spreading out the starboard solar array had a 

kink in it, and when controllers attempted to roll up the arrays after the first 

EVA, the starboard array would not roll up. Controllers decided to jettison 

the troubled array instead of bringing it home as planned. Akers detached the 

array while Thornton grasped it with a special handhold and held onto it until 

the designated moment of release just before sunrise. In one of the most dramatic moments of the mission, Thornton set the array free as Covey backed 

Endeavour away. The array shuddered like a prehistoric bird as the gases from 

the Shuttle’s thrusters blew it back and forth. The two astronauts then installed 

the replacement starboard array, stowed the port array for return to Earth, and 

installed its replacement.61

With the new gyroscopes and solar arrays in place, all attention turned to 

the two new instruments designed to correct Hubble’s spherical aberration. 

Astronauts on Shuttle flights were awoken each day with a specially selected 

song, and for flight day six, Mission Control chose Jackson Browne’s “Doctor 

My Eyes.” After suiting up, Musgrave and Hoffman began their second spacewalk by disconnecting and removing WF/PC from its position in HST’s radial 

instrument bay. When the two spacewalkers had stowed WF/PC on a temporary parking fixture, Hoffman, standing on the end of the Shuttle robotic arm, 

removed WFPC2 from its container. Musgrave carefully removed the cover 

protecting WFPC2’s fragile pickoff mirror, and then Hoffman maneuvered the 

new camera into position. The two astronauts then connected WFPC2 and 

prepared WF/PC for return to Earth. The process required use of specialized 

handholds and careful handling to move the two instruments. Musgrave and 

Hoffman then moved up to the top of the telescope and installed two new 

magnetometers. They discovered that covers on the old magnetometers were 

coming loose and required replacement, and soon crew members were put to 

work making new covers from extra insulation material onboard the Shuttle. 

The next day, 7 December, Thornton and Akers started their second EVA, 

disconnecting, removing, and later stowing the High Speed Photometer, and 

installing COSTAR in its place. When controllers confirmed that the new 

instrument was connected, the two astronauts repaired HST’s DF-224 computer by installing a new coprocessor based on the Intel 80386 chip. “We’ve got 
106 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

basically a new telescope up there,” Hoffman said shortly after the spacewalk. 

“It can be really exciting for the astronomical community, I guess, the whole 

world, to see what Hubble can really do with a good set of eyeballs.” Shortly 

after the EVA, Covey and Bowersox fired Endeavour’s forward thrusters for 61 

seconds to raise HST’s orbit to an altitude of 369 statute miles (593 kilometers). 

On 8 December, Musgrave and Hoffman installed new solar array drive electronics and a relay box for the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph’s erratic 

power supply, and they had to swing out a solar array that would not move from 

its stowed position. The spacewalk reached a high note when the two astronauts 

rode the robotic arm to the top of HST to install the new makeshift covers for 

the magnetometers. The fifth and final EVA of the mission ended after the new 

solar panels unrolled. Finally, on 9 December, Nicollier raised HST above the 

payload bay with the robotic arm and released it. Endeavour and its jubilant 

crew landed at KSC early on 13 December.62

▲ Astronaut Kathryn C. Thornton lifts the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial 

Replacement (COSTAR) prior to its installation into the Hubble Space Telescope 

during the STS-61 mission. Thornton is anchored to a foot restraint on the end of the 

Remote Manipulator System arm. Crewmate Thomas D. Akers, assisting in the COSTAR 

installation, is at the lower left. (NASA: sts061-47-014)
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

Even before the seven astronauts got back to Earth, political leaders including President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and many in Congress praised 

them, saying that their success breathed new life into the Space Station 

Program. “The restoration of confidence in NASA’s ability to plan and manage 

such tasks will make my job of lobbying for a stable space budget much easier,” 

proclaimed Representative George E. Brown (D-California), chair of the House 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Gore, who as a senator had 

been critical of NASA when the spherical aberration was discovered, called the servicing mission “a symbol of NASA on the way back.”63 The 

media joined in on the praise. The Washington 

Post called the mission a “spectacular” event that 

“showed American genius at work.” The New 

York Times said that the “near-flawless performance by the Endeavour astronauts in the most 

complex repair job yet attempted in orbit” has 

increased hope that astronauts “will be able to 

carry out the far more complex and arduous 

job of assembling a Space Station.”64 On top of 

the many honors that came their way, the crew 

of STS-61 soon appeared in an episode of one 

of the highest rated comedy shows of the day, 

Home Improvement.

65

Wide Field/Planetary Camera

Wide Field Planetary Camera 2

▲ Images of the nucleus of 

galaxy M100. The top image 

was taken by WF/PC in 

November 1993 before it 

was replaced by the WFPC2 

camera in December 1993. 

The bottom image was taken 

with WFPC2 on 31 December 

1993. WFPC2 was designed 

to compensate for the 

spherical aberration in HST’s 

main mirror. (NASA/STScI: STScI 

Release 94-01) 

Amidst the media praise that punctuated 

the completion of STS-61, the biggest question 

still lingered: had the repairs actually improved 

Hubble’s vision? For the astronomers who worked 

on the fixes, the answer began to emerge five 

days later. At about 1:00 a.m. on 18 December, 

a group of astronomers from NASA and STScI 

gathered around a monitor at the Institute to see 

the first image from WFPC2. The image showed 

a bright star named AGK+81°266 in clear focus 

without the artifacts of spherical aberration, and 

the astronomers cheered. Christopher Burrows 

didn’t stay to celebrate though. After shaking 

hands with Ed Weiler, Burrows went to his 

office and thoroughly analyzed the image before 

he too felt relief, saying, “We knew at that point 
108 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

it was pretty much fixed.”66 But there was still the matter of COSTAR, which 

was the “fix” for HST’s other three instruments. On 26 December, John Wood 

recorded in his notes, “COSTAR Moved OK!” The arms holding the COSTAR 

mirrors had moved correctly into place in the light paths of GHRS, FOS and 

FOC, and two days later, he recorded that observations had been successfully 

made using COSTAR and the two spectrographs inside HST.67

Ground image at 0.6 arcsec resolution WF/PC image (before servicing) WFPC2 image (after servicing)

▲ Images of Melnick 34 in the Large Magellanic Cloud in the star forming region 30 Doradus. 

The image at the left was taken with a ground-based telescope. The center image was 

taken by WF/PC and shows the effects of spherical aberration in HST’s main mirror. The 

image at right was taken by WFPC2, which compensates for the defect in HST’s mirror. 

(NASA/STScI: STScI Release 94-05)

Before COSTAR After COSTAR

▲ The COSTAR instrument cleared up the effects of 

spherical aberration for three other HST instruments. 

These before and after shots from the ESA Faint 

Object Camera released in January 1994 show the 

effects of COSTAR’s installation. (NASA/STScI/ESA: 

STScI Release 94-08)

At the time of the servicing mission, NASA had warned the media and the 

public that it could take up to 13 weeks to adjust the new instruments and 

verify the full function of HST after the mission. Important results of astronomical work are often announced at meetings of the American Astronomical 

Society, and a major AAS meeting was scheduled for mid-January in Arlington, 

Virginia, which was well 

inside the time that NASA 

expected to still be testing 

the new instruments. But 

the first images were so 

good, even with an unadjusted instrument and with 

the CCDs not cooled down, 

that NASA and members 

of the instrument teams 

decided to press after a 

short Christmas break for 

an early release of images 

using WFPC2, and FOC 
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

with an assist from COSTAR.68 The rapid restoration of HST was kept quiet 

until 12 January, when NASA announced a press conference for the next day 

at Goddard to coincide with the AAS meeting. The presence of Goldin at the 

press event telegraphed that the news was good. The next day, Goldin told a 

packed news conference that the HST was operating beyond original specifications. “We are a can-do Agency,” the exultant NASA administrator added. Said 

Weiler, who had delivered the bad news about HST in the same place three and 

a half years earlier, “It’s fixed beyond our wildest expectations.” NASA released 

dramatically clear images of the galaxy M100, complete with a blurry view taken 

before the repairs for comparison, along with sharp new images from inside the 

30 Doradus nebula, and Nova Cygni 1992. More images were released at the 

AAS meeting, including the Great Nebula in Orion, the Eta Carinae star system, and Supernova 1987A. Senator Barbara Mikulski, summed up the event 

saying, “The trouble with Hubble is over.”69

CONCLUSION

Fine tuning of Hubble’s optics and instruments continued into 1994, but the 

bottom line for astronomers was that HST had its vision restored and was producing images at the diffraction limit. The success of HST Servicing Mission 1 

and the new instruments installed in the telescope literally saved and advanced 

the art of satellite and spacecraft servicing in orbit. The mission showed the 

importance of thorough preparation for servicing Hubble, which involved far 

more complex work than had been previously done in space. For Johnson Space 

Center, which had responsibility for the Space Station Program, the mission 

was probably more important in terms of preparing its engineers and astronauts 

for the challenges of assembling the Station on orbit. The STS-61 Mission 

Director’s Post-Mission Report contained many recommendations for upcoming missions to the Station as well as future HST servicing missions. Many people involved with the mission, including Mission Director Randy Brinkley and 

lead Flight Director Milt Heflin, went on to work in the Space Station Program. 

As shown by media praise previously quoted, STS-61 restored confidence that 

NASA had the capability to carry off its ambitious plans for the station.70

The story of Servicing Mission 1, COSTAR, and WFPC2 has become an 

integral part of the lore around the Hubble Space Telescope. The creation of 

COSTAR proved irresistible for writers and documentary producers, many of 

whom emphasized the story of COSTAR at the expense of WFPC2. A 2015 

Public Broadcasting Service Nova documentary, “Invisible Universe Revealed,” 

drew a complaint from Weiler for not mentioning WFPC2. John Trauger, 

asserted that in spite of the scientific importance of restoring the Faint Object 
110 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Camera and the two spectrographs with COSTAR, it was WFPC2’s images 

that proved to the public that HST had been restored. He called WFPC2 “The 

Camera That Saved Hubble.”71 In the first two full observing cycles after the 

servicing mission, WFPC2 was used for roughly half the available time on HST, 

and the three other instruments reliant on COSTAR, especially FOS and GHRS, 

were used for the other half of the time.72 The fact of the matter was that HST 

needed both WFPC2 and COSTAR to restore both the confidence of taxpayers, 

who had been promised amazing images from HST’s cameras, and scientists, 

who needed both the images and data coming from HST’s other instruments 

to increase their knowledge of the universe. There was no single solution to 

HST’s spherical aberration problem, and it took both instruments installed during STS-61 to give the public and scientists the solutions they wanted.

No one at NASA or STScI who went through the experience of HST’s vision 

problems would care to repeat the experience. Before HST was launched, the 

relationship between NASA and the Institute was best described as troubled 

due to differences over the respective roles of the space Agency and the Space 

Telescope Science Institute in running HST. Thanks to the efforts of many 

people at NASA, STScI, and many other contractors big and small who had 

overcome difficult technical problems and hostility from angry politicians and 

taxpayers, HST was restored along with many working relationships within the 

program. By 1994, Hubble had a “badge-less team,” in the words of Ed Weiler, 

referring to the identification tags that distinguished people from various NASA 

Centers such as Goddard, Johnson, and NASA contractors said, “Everybody 

else was against you. You had to come together. And we came together.”73

ENDNOTES

 1 Weiler OHI, p. 4; Transcript, “Status Briefing,” 27 June 1990, NASA HRC

 2 Weiler OHI, p. 6; Transcript, “Status Briefing,” 27 June 1990”; NASA HRC; Faber notebook, p. 34

 3 Edward J. Weiler, “Space Telescope Scientific Instruments Maintenance and Refurbishment,” memo, NASA Headquarters, 18 December 1983

 4 John Trauger, “Wide Field and Planetary Camera 2: ‘The Camera that Saved Hubble,’”

undated memoir; John Trauger, oral history interview by author, 3 October 2016; William Harwood, “Fixing Hubble’s Blurry Vision,” Spaceflight Now (23 April 2015), https:/

spaceflightnow.com/2015/04/23/fixing-hubbles-blurry-vision (accessed 2 February 2017); 

Transcript, “HST, Status Briefing, June 27, 1990.” Aden Meinel had taken a prominent 

role in promoting large space telescopes back in the 1950s and 1960s. See Smith, The 

Space Telescope, pp. 53–54.
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

 5 The other members of the Board were Roger Angel, professor of astronomy at the University of Arizona; John D. Mangus, Head of the Optics Branch at Goddard Space Flight 

Center; George A. Rodney, NASA Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Quality; 

Robert R. Shannon, Director of the Optical Sciences Center at the University of Arizona; 

and Charles P. Spoelhof, a retired vice president of the Eastman Kodak Company.

 6 Lew Allen, ed., The Hubble Space Telescope Optical Systems Failure Report (Washington, DC: NASA TM-103443, 1990). See also Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 409–414. The

sequence of events that led to the error is described in chapter one.

 7 See Duncan T. Moore, ed., Final Report: Hubble Independent Optical Review Panel 

(Greenbelt, MD: Goddard Space Flight Center, P-442-0078, 1991). The mirror’s conic constant should have been -1.0023.

 8 NASA Office of Inspector General, “NASA OIG Report of Investigation: Hubble Space 

Telescope, Hughes Danbury Optical Systems Inc.” (I-GO-90-259, 8 January 1991); “U.S. 

Seeks Payment for Hubble Flaw,” Washington Post (19 October 1992): A7; U.S. Department of Justice News Release, “Settlement Reached Over Flaw in Hubble Space Telescope,” 4 October 1993, with attached draft settlement agreement.

 9 David Leckrone, oral history interview by author, 5 May 2015, p. 18; Fisk, comments at 

HST 25th anniversary panel.

10 Joseph Rothenberg, oral history interview by author, 27 September 2016, pp. 13–7; 

Joseph N. Tatarewicz, “The Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission,” chapter sixteen 

in Pamela E. Mack, ed., From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners (Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1998), p. 375

11 Boggess OHI, p. 8; Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 421–425.

12 “Heaven Can Wait,” Newsweek (9 July 1990): 51–53; Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 421

13 Holland Ford, oral history interview by author, 27 October 2015, pp. 6–10; Robert Brown, 

oral history interview by author, 14 December 2016, pp. 3–5; Robert A. Brown and Holland C. Ford, eds., Report of the Hubble Space Telescope Strategy Panel: A Strategy for 

Recovery: Results of a Special Study August—October 1990 (Baltimore, MD: Space Telescope Science Institute, 1991).

14 R. A. Brown and H. C. Ford, eds., Report of The HST Strategy Panel: A Strategy for Recovery, p. 2.

15 James Crocker, oral history interview by author, 21 September 2015, pp. 9–16; Brown, 

interview, p. 5; Robert Zimmerman, The Universe in a Mirror: The Saga of the Hubble 

Space Telescope and the Visionaries Who Built It (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 

2008), pp. 149–150.

16 Crocker OHI, pp. 12–13.

17 Crocker OHI, pp. 9–16; Joseph Rothenberg, e-mail to author, 22 February 2017; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” p. 376; John Troeltzsch, e-mail to author, 18 April 2017; 

Richard A. White and Elizabeth Austin, “Space Telescope Axial Replacement Procurement,” memo for record, Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, 14 March 1985

18 Leckrone OHI, pp. 14–16; Ford OHI, pp. 8–10; Crocker OHI, pp. 11–12; Tatarewicz, “HST 

Servicing Mission,” p. 365. 
112 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

19 Patricia “Padi” Boyd, oral history interview by author, 13 June 2016, pp. 3–5; Leckrone, 

OHI, pp. 14–16; James M. Lattis, A Hubble Instrument Comes Home: UW Madison’s High 

Speed Photometer, 2012, https://spacegrant.carthage.edu/ojs/index.php/wsc/article/

download/27/27/1/PB.pdf (downloaded 18 February 2017). David Leckrone credits 

astronomer Olivia Lupie, who later went on to become HST Instrument Systems Manager at GSFC, with sharing information obtained by the High Speed Photometer on the 

HST instrument apertures for use with COSTAR.

20 Brown and Ford, Report of the HST Strategy Panel, p. 2; Crocker OHI, pp. 15–16; Pellerin 

OHI, pp. 34–38; Rothenberg OHI, pp. 17–19. After overseeing a shakeup of HST management and facilitating NASA’s work on COSTAR and WFPC2, Pellerin moved to another

position at NASA.

21 Michael Ollove, “Institute Optimistic Despite Hubble Woes,” The Baltimore Sun (28 June

1990): A1.

22 Hubble Space Telescope and the Space Shuttle Problems, Senate hearing, 29 June 1990, 

p. 19; House hearing, 13 July 1990, pp. 113–116.

23 STScI, “Space Telescope Photographs Extragalactical Stellar Nursery,” news release 

STScI-1990-09, 13 August 1990; Kathy Sawyer, “Hubble Discovers Star Group,” Washington Post (14 August 1990): A3; Sally Heap, oral history interview by author, 22 May 

2015, pp. 7–10; Eliot M. Malumuth and Sara R. Heap, “UBV Stellar Photometry of the 30 

Doradus Region of the Large Magellanic Cloud With the Hubble Space Telescope,” The

Astronomical Journal, 107, no. 3 (March 1994): pp. 1054–1066. HST would image 30 Doradus, also known as the Tarantula Nebula, several times during its mission. 

24 Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, pp. 214–220; Ray Villard, oral history interview by author, 30 

October 2015, pp. 11–13; “Conversations: With John Bahcall,” Aerospace America (April

1998): pp. 12–13; Eric J. Lerner, “A Letter from Space Telescope Science Institute,” Aerospace America (February 1991): pp. 8–10; Tod Lauer, oral history interview by author, 15 

August 2016; Christopher Burrows, oral history interview by author, 15 February 2017; 

1990 STScI News Releases archived on https://hubblesite.org. For more on image deconvolution, see R. L. White and R. J. Allen, eds., The Restoration of HST Images and Spectr

(Baltimore, MD: STScI, 1990).

25 H. John Wood, notebooks on his work with HST 1990–1994, “Record 1,” 16 July–4 October 1990, and “Record II,” 5 October 1990–22 January 1991. The 12 notebooks that Dr.

Wood (1938–2014) made on his work on HST from July 1990 to post-servicing verification in 1994 were loaned to the author by his wife, cultural historian Dr. Maria J. Wood

The journals constitute a valuable eyewitness account of NASA’s work to repair Hubble. 

They have since been given to the GSFC archive.

26 Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” p. 377; Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, p. 328.

27 Wood notebooks, “Record II.

28 Kathryn D. Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 34–38, 56–74; Story Musgrave, oral history 

interview by author, 25 October 2016, pp. 2–4. Despite the importance of spacewalking, 

very little has appeared in the popular or historical literature about this work. One exception is Bob McDonald, Canadian Spacewalkers: Hadfield, MacLean and Williams Remember the Ultimate High Adventure (Madeira Park, BC: Douglas & McIntyre, 2014).
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

29 Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 101–130.

30 Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 56–59, 76–81; Cepollina, oral history interview, 8 

May 2015, pp. 2–6; Robert Zimmerman, “Mr. Fix It: Frank Cepollina Takes Repair Calls to 

New Heights,” Air & Space Smithsonian (May 2010); David S. F. Portree and Robert C. Treviño, eds., Walking to Olympus: An EVA Chronology (Washington, DC: NASA History Office,

Monographs in Aerospace History Series #7, October 1997). Particularly notable were 

problems during satellite rescue missions on STS-51A in November 1984 and STS-51I in 

August 1985.

31 Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, p. 167.

32 Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 139–154, 175–198. Ron Sheffield, oral history interview by author, 30 September 2016, pp. 3–6. Sullivan, oral history interview by Jennifer 

Ross-Nazzal, 12 March 2008 and 28 May 2009. Quote from 2008 interview, p. 62. After 

STS-31, Sullivan was assigned to a non-HST Shuttle mission.

33 Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 377–378; Joseph Rothenberg, “Hubble Space 

Telescope: Restoring the Image,” Optics & Photonics News (November 1993): pp. 10–16; 

Wood notebooks, “Record IV,” 6 June to 25 September 1991.

34 Thor Hogan, Mars Wars, pp. 120–124, discusses the NASA budget situation. Jon 

Meacham, Destiny and Power: The American Odyssey of George Herbert Walker Bush

(New York, NY: Random House, 2015), pp. 409–418, 443–449, addresses the budget deal, 

which emerged the same week HST’s spherical aberration was announced and has 

since been widely blamed for Bush’s defeat in the 1992 election.

35 Trauger, “The Camera That Saved Hubble”; Trauger OHI, pp. 2–3, 14–16; Weiler OHI, p. 11;

Jeff Hester, oral history interview by author, 20 March 2017, pp. 13–17; Arthur H. Vaughan 

and David H. Rodgers, “Development of the Second Generation Wide Field Planetary

Camera for HST,” Optics & Photonics News (November 1993): pp. 17–21; Fact Sheet: Wide 

Field and Planetary Camera-II, NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 2 November 1993; Kathy 

Sawyer, “Scientists Agree to Trim Hubble Part,” Washington Post (20 October 1991): A8. 

36 Launius and DeVorkin, Hubble’s Legacy, (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution

Scholarly Press), p. 60; “NASA Awards Contract to Complete ‘Costar,’ Designed to Fix 

Hubble Telescope Optics,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, (21 October 1991): 98; 

John Troeltzsch, e-mail to author, 18 April 2017; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” 

pp. 376–378; Todd Neff, From Jars to the Stars: How Ball Came to Build a Comet-Hunting 

Machine (Denver, CO: Earthview Media, 2010), pp. 59–64. For more on the history of Ball, 

see Dennis Baumgarten, ed., Ball Aerospace: The First Forty Years (Ball Aerospace and 

Technologies Corp., 1996).

37 James H. Crocker, “Engineering the COSTAR,” Optics & Photonics News (November 

1993): 22–26; Crocker OHI, pp. 16–17; John Troeltzsch, oral history interview by author, 

22 September 2015, pp. 5–10; Paul Lightsey, oral history interview by author, 22 September 2015, pp. 1–7; NASA Facts, Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR), Goddard Space Flight Center, June 1993; Ball Corporation, Technology 

Update: Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR), undated; “Corrective Optics to Star in Drama to Fix Telescope,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (24 

May 1993): 44–45; Mark A. Stein, “Obscure Firm Took Task to Focus Hubble,” Los Angeles 
114 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Times (8 December 1993). See also Harold J. Reitsema, “The Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement,” in Launius and DeVorkin, Hubble’s Legacy, pp. 54–60.

38 NASA Facts, “Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement (COSTAR),” Goddard Space Flight Center, NF-181, June 1993; Fisk, comments at HST 25th Anniversary 

panel. There, he said that the money had been taken from the International Solar Terrestrial Physics Program. See also Pellerin OHI, p. 35.

39 Cepollina, oral history interview, 8 May 2015.

40 Rothenberg, “HST: Restoring the Image,” pp. 15–16; Dennis Hancock, “‘Prototyping’ the 

Hubble Fix,” IEEE Spectrum (October 1993): 34–39; Larry Dunham, oral history interview 

by author, 19 September 2017, pp. 2–4; Jackson and Tull website, “Hubble Space Telescope Project,” http://www.jnt.com/hst.php (accessed 1 November 2017). VEST was originally set up in Building 29 at Goddard. VEST was proposed by various people before 

HST was launched, and was built by Jackson and Tull, a minority-owned contractor 

located near GSFC.

41 Rothenberg OHI, pp. 26–30; NASA Headquarters News Release, “Space Shuttle Crew 

Assignments Announced,” release 92-37, 16 March 1992; Musgrave OHI, pp. 2–8; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 378–380; Portree and Treviño, eds., Walking to Olympus, pp. 88–91; Wood diaries, “Record V,” notes on 20 February 1992, “Record VI,” notes

on 20 April 1992, project review.

42 Hogan, Mars Wars, pp. 130–135.

43 Daniel Goldin, oral history interview by author, p. 2, 8 August 2017.

44 Wood diaries, “Record VI,” project review, notes on 20 April 1992

45 Goldin OHI, p. 6.

46 The various reviews are discussed in Ronald L. Newman, STS-61 Mission Director’s PostMission Report: NASA Technical Memorandum 104803 (Houston, TX: NASA Johnson 

Space Center Space Station Program Office, January 1995). “Report of the Task Force 

on the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission,” (Washington, DC, 21 May 1993). See

also Rothenberg OHI, pp. 26–30.

47 NASA Headquarters News Releases, “Crew Assignments Announced for STS-58 and 

STS-61,” release 92-136, 27 August 1992; “NASA Announces Space Shuttle Crew Assignments,” release 92-218, 8 December 1992; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 380–

383; Goldin OHI, pp. 4–5.

48 Newman, Mission Director’s Report, pp. 11, 30, 31, 55; Musgrave OHI, pp. 18–20; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 384–385.

49 Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 384–387; ESA Press Release, “No. 5-1993: Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission Joint ESA/BAE UK Technical Briefing Wednesday

10 March 1993,” 17 February 1993. Musgrave quote from Musgrave OHI, pp. 17–18. 

50 Designing an Observatory for Maintenance in Orbit (Huntsville, AL: Space Telescope Project Office, Marshall Space Flight Center, 1986) pp. 11–13; NASA “Space Shuttle Mission 

STS-61 Press Kit,” 1993, pp. 21–41. The FSS berthing system for HST servicing mission 

was far more elaborate than the four latches that held HST in the payload bay before it 

was deployed on STS-31 in 1990.
CHAPTER THREE . The Road To

51 NASA Fact Sheet: HST Servicing Mission: Cost to Taxpayers, (Washington, DC: NASA

Headquarters, August 1993); Faye Flam, “NASA Stakes Its Reputation on Fix for Hubble 

Telescope,” Science, vol. 259 (12 February 1993): 887–889. For more on NASA’s budget, 

see Andrew Lawler, “Mikulski, Stokes Warn NASA Funds Will Shrink,” Space News, (8–1

November 1993).

52 Rothenberg, “HST: Restoring the Image,” pp. 14–16; Newman, Mission Director’s Report,

p. 48; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” p. 381; Portree and Treviño, eds., Walking to 

Olympus, pp. 93–98.

53 Piers Bizony, Island in the Sky: Building the International Space Station (London: Aurum 

Press, 1996), pp. 70–79; Michael Hanlon, The Worlds of Galileo: The Inside Story of NASA’s 

Mission to Jupiter (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), pp. 57–68; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 381, 388, 389.

54 Flam, “NASA Stakes Its Reputation,” Science; Newman, Mission Director’s Report, pp. 13–14.

55 John Noble Wilford, “Mission to Correct Hubble’s Flawed Vision Faces Many Pitfalls,”

New York Times (30 November 1993).

56 Dennis Overbye, “Hubble Jeopardy,” The New York Times Magazine (28 November 1993).

57 Frank Kuznik, “The Must-Win Mission,” USA Weekend (26–28 November 1993)

58 Kathy Sawyer, “NASA Reassured About Hubble Camera,” Washington Post (28 September 1993); Newman, Mission Director’s Report, p. 71.

59 James R. Asker, “Flight to Fix Hubble Pays Off,” Aviation Week and Space Technology 

(13/20 December 1993): 24–27; Goldin OHI, p. 4; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” p. 

367. The author watched live NASA Select coverage of STS-61 carried on his local cable 

service in Canada. Since video streaming on the internet was still in the future, the only 

other way to access the service would have been with a satellite dish.

60 Asker, “Flight to Fix Hubble”; Portree and Treviño, eds., Walking to Olympus, pp. 100–102; 

Musgrave, oral history interview, pp. 24–27. In May 2019, comments on a draft of this 

book, STS-21 astronaut Kathryn Sullivan said the problems closing the door could have 

been averted if Goddard experts had paid more attention to data gained during a predeployment ground test and documented in Lockheed’s photo database. Sullivan said, 

“Light pressure needed to be applied to a specific spot on the larger door in order to 

close it smoothly.”

61 Asker, “Flight to Fix Hubble”; Portree and Treviño, eds., Walking to Olympus, pp. 102–103; 

Hawley, “HST Solar Array Concerns,” pp. 16–17. The array burned up in Earth’s atmosphere a few months later.

62 Asker, “Flight to Fix Hubble”; Portree and Treviño, eds., Walking to Olympus, pp. 103–105; 

Musgrave, oral history interview, pp. 27–31; NASA Television, “STS-61 Flight Day Highlights,” 6 and 8 December 1991, author’s personal collection. The wakeup music the day 

after the WFPC2 installation was Jimmy Cliff’s “I Can See Clearly Now.

63 Kathy Sawyer, “NASA’s Orbital Success Helps Restore Credibility in the Political World,”

Washington Post (12 December 1993): A10.

64 “That Mesmerizing Space Mission,” Washington Post (12 December 1994): C6; “Virtuosos 

in Space,” The New York Times (11 December 1992): 22.
116 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

65 Home Improvement, Season 3, Episode 24, “Reality Bites.” Review of episode available 

at http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0603520/ (accessed 3 March 2017). Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission” discusses the awarding of the 1993 Robert J. Collier Trophy for achievements in aeronautics and astronautics to the HST Recovery Team.

66 Burrows OHI, p. 26; Hester OHI, pp. 24–26; David H. DeVorkin and Robert W. Smith, The

Hubble Cosmos: 25 Years of New Vistas in Space (Washington, DC: National Geographic

Society, 2015), pp. 51–53; Trauger, “WFPC2: ‘The Camera that Saved Hubble.’

67 Wood Diaries, “Record X,” notes from 20, 26, and 28 December 1993.

68 Goddard Space Flight Center, NASA Facts: HST Servicing Mission Observatory Verification, 

NF-194, June 1993; Hester, oral history interview, pp. 24–26.

69 John Noble Wilford, “Hubble Repair Called a Success, and NASA Says Pictures Show It,”

New York Times (14 January 1994): A1. See also John Noble Wilford, “Astronomers Say Hubble Repairs Were Successful,” New York Times (13 January 1994): A15; Kathy Sawyer, “Give

New Focus, Hubble Can Almost See Forever,” Washington Post (14 January 1994): A1.

70 Newman, Mission Director’s Report; Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 394–395.

71 Public Broadcasting Service, Nova, “Invisible Universe Revealed,” first broadcast 22 

April 2015; Weiler, OHI, p. 7. The author reviewed the DVD of the show Nova, which covers

HST’s first 25 years in space and found that it referred to the WFPC2 but doesn’t relate

its installation to overcoming spherical aberration. Trauger, “WFPC2: ‘The Camera that

Saved Hubble.’” Astronomer Jeff Hester, one of the investigators behind the famous 

“Pillars of Creation” image and a member of the WFPC2 team, complained in his oral

history interview with the author that he often hears the term “post-COSTAR WFPC2” in

spite of the fact that COSTAR has nothing to do with WFPC2’s images. Hester OHI, p. 23

72 See Cycle 5 statistics in STScI Newsletter, vol. 11, no. 2 (December 1994): 46–56 and Cycle 

6 statistics in STScI Newsletter, vol. 13, no. 1 (February 1996): 10–21. These two cycles 

took place after SM1 and before SM2 in 1997. In an e-mail to the author on 29 July 2019, 

STScI’s Neill Reid said, “Both GHRS and FOS received substantial interest and allocated 

time; FOC had less interest, but still a reasonable complement of programs. This isn’t 

surprising since all three of those instruments provided coverage at UV wavelengths 

(and spectra, as opposed to images) not possible with WFPC2.” Duccio Macchetto, Principal Investigator for FOC, reported that the instrument lost some ability to observe

faint objects and some angular coverage once COSTAR was installed (Duccio Macchetto, oral history interview with author, 9 May 2017, pp. 9–10).

73 Weiler OHI, p. 89
117

CHAPTER FOUR

The Power of the Image

▲ Hubble’s iconic image of the Eagle Nebula’s “Pillars of Creation” was retaken in 2014 by 

Wide Field Camera 3. (NASA/ESA/Hubble/Hubble Heritage Team: heic0501a)

A

lthough a flurry of impressive images in January 1994 established that 

the Hubble Space Telescope had been successfully fixed in Servicing 

Mission 1, HST was not yet fully redeemed in the eyes of many people. 

As STScI’s News Director Ray Villard explained, journalists still called HST 

the “repaired Hubble” in 1994. That impression was fostered because there 

were few new images from the telescope in the first months that followed those 

first post-repair images. Then in May, the flow began to pick up, with impressive 

images showing Pluto and its moon Charon, Jupiter and its moon Io, a supernova in the Whirlpool galaxy, and mysterious rings around Supernova 1987a. 

Most importantly, HST found evidence of a gigantic black hole in the giant 

galaxy known as M87, which led to the finding that nearly all galaxies have 

supermassive black holes at their centers.1

Hubble also imaged fragments of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 on their way to 

Jupiter. The fragments struck the largest planet in our solar system during the 

third week of July as the world marked the 25th anniversary of Apollo 11 landing 

the first humans on the Moon. HST and many telescopes on Earth were aimed 

at Jupiter that week, but scientists did not know what would happen when the 

cometary fragments hit Jupiter’s cloud decks. If the fragments did not leave a 

mark and HST found no change, some feared the public might conclude that 

HST still did not work properly. In spite of these fears, Villard and his counterpart from NASA Headquarters, Don Savage, organized a major media event that 

week at STScI featuring the comet’s co-discoverers, Eugene M. and Carolyn S. 

Shoemaker and David H. Levy. Starting with the first impact on July 16, the 
118 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

fragments left large marks 

on the planet that were visible even in the telescopes 

of amateur astronomers. 

But the first confirmation for most Americans 

came from an HST image 

shown live on CNN, the 

Cable News Network. 

Villard compared the press 

conferences that week to 

the large media gatherings at JPL between 1979 

and 1989 when the two 

Voyager spacecraft gave 

the world its first close-up 

views of the outer planets. 

And he called it a turning 

point in the media and 

public perception of HST, which henceforth was no longer called the “repaired 

Hubble” by the media. He stated, “After Shoemaker-Levy and all the daily pictures we put out from Hubble...nobody qualified it. They just said Hubble.”2

18 July 1994 23 July 1994

30 July 1994 24 August 1994

▲ HST produced many images of Jupiter after nuclei of 

Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 struck the planet in July 

1994. These are black-and-white images taken in 

near-ultraviolet wavelengths with WFPC2 showing how 

Jovian winds reshaped the impact features on Jupiter 

over time. (NASA/STScI)

Two more images released in the next 18 months sealed HST’s public reputation as Earth’s window on the universe. The first resulted from observations 

for a research team led by Arizona State University astronomers Jeff Hester 

and Paul Scowen that was examining the effects of radiation from very large 

stars on the gas and dust of nebulae in surrounding areas. Hester, a member 

of the WFPC2 team, and Scowen chose to image the Eagle Nebula, an object 

in the constellation Serpens that had made its way into 18th century French 

astronomer Charles Messier’s Catalogue of Nebulae and Star Clusters, and has 

since been a favorite target of both professional and amateur astronomers. On 

1 April 1995, WFPC2 obtained eight images through four filters in different 

wavelengths of a central region of the nebula known to contain what were variously described as “fingers” or “elephant trunks.” When the images first arrived, 

Scowen and then Hester were strongly impressed with the detail of the structures, which had never before been seen with such clarity. Moreover, they had 

aimed HST in such a way to have the structures that quickly became known as 

pillars to line up to fit inside the chevron shape of the WFPC2 images. Soon 

Hester was at an event at Goddard, where he showed the image to HST Chief 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

Scientist Ed Weiler, whose jaw dropped. Once Hester, Scowen, and their group 

had prepared a paper on their scientific findings, Weiler arranged for a televised NASA press conference on 2 November where the dramatic processed 

image was made public. A photo caption described the image as the “Pillars 

of Creation,” referring to the fact that it showed stars being formed. As Weiler 

anticipated when he first saw it, the image got strong press coverage.3

▲ The original 1995 Eagle Nebula “Pillars of Creation” image was created from three 

separate images taken through different filters on 1 April 1995 by WFPC2. This image 

shows WFPC2’s signature “stairstep” or “batwing” shape due to the smaller size of one 

of the four detectors in the camera. This photo shows a region in the nebula where new 

stars are formed. The nebula, also known as M16, is in the constellation Serpens and is 

about 6,500 light-years away from Earth. (NASA/STScI)

The “Pillars of Creation” remains the most famous image associated with 

HST, appearing on all manner of goods, including CD and book covers, postage 

stamps, and t-shirts. “The image was just one that people reacted to,” Hester 
120 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

recalled, noting that many people have approached him simply to talk about 

their impressions of the image.4 When he retired from astrophysics, Hester 

took his experiences with the “Pillars of Creation” and his work on WFPC2 in 

the wake of HST’s spherical aberration problem to a new occupation as a career 

coach, facilitator, and speaker. In 2016, Time magazine named it one of the 100 

Most Important Images of All Time. The ESA Herschel Space Observatory 

imaged the same area in the infrared in 2011, and NASA and STScI kicked off 

HST’s 25th anniversary year with the release of two wider-angle and sharper 

versions of the pillars taken with HST’s Wide Field Camera 3, one in visible 

light and the other in near-infrared light.5

Only two months after the public release of “Pillars of Creation,” NASA and 

STScI released the image known as the “Hubble Deep Field” at a meeting of 

the American Astronomical Society in San Antonio. The story of this image of 

distant galaxies, which represented humankind’s deepest view into space up 

to that time, is discussed in detail in chapter six. Like the “Pillars” image, the 

“Deep Field” further superseded Hubble’s early problems in the public memory. 

Hubble’s images of the Jupiter comet crash, the Eagle Nebula, and the Deep 

Field are also notable because they were among the first images accessed by 

large numbers of people using personal computers and the internet. The arrival 

of these new technologies radically altered the way both the public and scientists interacted with HST, and HST also played a notable part in popularizing 

these technologies in the 1990s. This study now turns to Hubble’s role as one of 

the first bright stars in cyberspace, focusing on its role as a public observatory.

DIGITAL IMAGING

HST stood at the nexus of traditional media and new ways of disseminating 

information that were just emerging at the time of its launch. HST’s design 

and prominence helped drive changes in how information was diffused to the 

public and also how astronomy was done as digital imaging and the internet 

became part of everyday life. As the first space telescope designed to produce 

high-definition images, HST’s catalytic role in astronomical imaging began with 

the basic question of how to move images taken by the telescope from space 

to Earth. 

When astronomers began serious discussions in the 1960s about a large 

space telescope, glass photographic plates remained the primary means of astronomical imaging for ground-based telescopes. But the digitization of astronomy 

was under way in the 1960s as astronomers long accustomed to gathering data 

by analog methods, including written notes, strip charts, and photographic 

plates and film, started to turn to digital recording in the 1950s and 1960s as 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

computers began to appear in observatories, along with other electronic means 

of recording data. The growth of radio astronomy contributed to this trend since 

data from radio telescopes were collected in electronic form.6 Color images in 

astronomy dated back to 1959, when William Miller, the staff photographer at 

the Mount Wilson and Palomar Observatories, produced color photos using new 

photographic films that could be exposed for the long periods of time required 

when imaging distant objects in space. Miller found it necessary to use filters to 

correct the new films’ varying sensitivities to different colors.7

The decisions about HST imaging did not take place in isolation from changes 

affecting how astronomy was done on Earth or imaging in space. Photographic 

film had many drawbacks, including the need to bring it back to Earth for development and the fact that its sensitivity to light was less than five percent. U.S. 

military reconnaissance satellites used photographic film for high definition 

black-and-white photographs and dispatched that film to Earth inside “buckets” that entered Earth’s atmosphere and parachuted to a designated pickup 

point, after which the film was processed. Even the most advanced of these 

film-based satellites, the Hexagon KH-9, had a limited lifetime because it carried only four reentry “buckets” on board.8 When astronomers were considering 

early concepts for the Large Space Telescope in 1965 at a meeting at Woods 

Hole, Massachusetts, they discussed using either photographic film or a type 

of electronic detector to catch photons from distant objects. By 1971, scientists working on the Space Telescope were pressing for some type of electronic 

retrieval of images. At that time, the most promising technology appeared to 

be a type of television tube called the SEC Vidicon, which had won financial 

research support from NASA. Similar vidicon detectors had been proposed as 

early as the late 1950s and flew on several robotic spacecraft, including early 

weather satellites, robotic spacecraft that traveled to the Moon and Mars, and 

the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory 2 in 1968. Vidicons, however, were not 

the only type of electronic detector available. A new type of detector called 

a Charge-Coupled Device (CCD) had been invented at Bell Laboratories in 

1969. These lightweight devices were solid state silicon chips that produced a 

charge replica of the light pattern falling on them, and they quickly drew commercial interest. During the 1970s, electronic manufacturers actively developed 

CCDs for use in television and still cameras. In the late 1970s, U.S. intelligence 

agencies began to transition to reconnaissance satellites that transmitted high 

definition digital images to ground stations. CCDs drew the interest of NASA 

for space telescopes and other spacecraft, but early CCDs had drawbacks of 

their own, among them their small image sizes and low sensitivity to ultraviolet 

light.9 Astronomers who were developing high-resolution cameras for the space 
122 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Colors assigned to 

black-and-white images

Bubble Nebula

Black-and-white images 

taken of filtered light

Colors assigned to 

black-and-white images

Ultraviolet Infrared Visible

Crab Nebula

Black-and-white images 

taken of filtered light

Final image after combining 

the color images

Final image after combining 

the color images

Ultraviolet Infrared Visible

Colors assigned to 

black-and-white images

Bubble Nebula

Black-and-white images 

taken of filtered light

Colors assigned to 

black-and-white images

Ultraviolet Infrared Visible

Crab Nebula

Black-and-white images 

taken of filtered light

Final image after combining 

the color images

Final image after combining 

the color images

Ultraviolet Infrared Visible ▲ Examples of multiple grayscale images shot through filters of different wavelengths for 

assembly into color images. One shows the Bubble Nebula, NGC 7635 in the constellation 

Cassiopeia, and the second the Crab Nebula, M1 in Taurus. (STScI)

telescope in the early 1970s began to give more serious consideration to CCDs. 

By 1976, the quality of new CCD detectors began to improve, while the capabilities of SEC Vidicon detectors remained limited. That year a CCD camera 

attached to a ground-based telescope produced a revealing image of Uranus, an 

event that caused planetary astronomers to support CCDs. A meeting of the 

Science Working Group for the Space Telescope in October 1976 decided that 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

the issue of the kind of detectors to be used in the Space Telescope should be 

left open when NASA asked astronomers for proposals for instruments, given 

the shifting perceptions of the two types of detectors.10

The design for the Space Telescope was coming together in 1977 with places 

for five instruments, two of which would be cameras. NASA had decided that 

there would be a place for a wide field camera, and as part of its contribution 

to the telescope the European Space Agency proposed a Faint Object Camera, 

which would use a photon counter combined with a television tube to produce images. When NASA issued its Announcement of Opportunity for the 

instruments in March 1977, the three proposals NASA received for the wide 

field camera all involved CCDs, reflecting the growing shift amongst astronomers in favor of CCDs. A proposal from Princeton, where NASA had supported research into SEC Vidicon detectors, incorporated both a vidicon and 

a CCD to image in the far red section of the spectrum, where the vidicon was 

weak. Competing proposals from Goddard, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 

and Caltech, were based on CCD detectors. Since a major goal of the Space 

Telescope was to obtain images in the ultraviolet, James A. Westphal, a Caltech 

astronomer who was Principal Investigator for the JPL/Caltech proposal, cast 

about for a solution to the CCD problem with ultraviolet light. As recounted by 

Robert Smith, Westphal found an idea in a book about ultraviolet spectroscopy. 

By coating the detector with a substance that fluoresces when struck by ultraviolet light, the problem could be solved. Westphal chose a substance called coronene, and when he tested a CCD coated with it in the 200-inch Hale Telescope 

on Mount Palomar, the idea worked. Westphal’s group designed their camera 

to operate in two modes—one for wide field images and the other with higher 

resolution for planetary images. Their design also overcame another problem 

with CCDs—their limited size—by “mosaicking” together four CCD chips to 

replicate the size of a larger CCD chip. Westphal’s team won the competition 

to build the wide field camera for the space telescope in 1977. When the NASA 

management of the Space Telescope chose the JPL/Caltech proposal for what 

became known as the Wide Field/Planetary Camera, the technology for the 

CCD detectors was still being created—NASA managers and officials were in 

fact counting on invention.11

By the time HST was launched in 1990, CCD imagers had proven themselves to be far more sensitive and easier to use than photographic film, and so 

CCDs replaced photographic plates and film in most professional astronomical 

observatories. Starting in the late 1990s, the almost exponential growth in computing power in personal computers, the arrival of the internet for private users, 

and falling prices and increasing quality of CCDs caused amateur astronomers 
124 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

to begin swapping photographic film for CCDs. This trend accelerated in the 

new century. Digital imaging also opened the door to more manipulation of 

images, and during this time there was a great deal of comment about the 

idea that images could no longer be trusted as photographs had been in the 

past. One high profile controversy centered on a 1982 cover image in National 

Geographic magazine where the pyramids had been moved. Adobe Photoshop, 

the program that has been most strongly associated with digital manipulation 

of images, was introduced in 1990, the year HST was launched, and version 3 

of the program released in 1994 contained advances such as layering that made 

it particularly useful for astronomical photography.12

RELEASING HST IMAGES 

Images have long been a powerful and direct way of imparting information to a 

wide audience, and Stanford University art historian Elizabeth A. Kessler has 

argued that astronomy has a special relationship with imaging. In Picturing 

the Cosmos Kessler wrote, “Astronomy often serves as the poster child for science by displaying the wonder and discovery in a nearly visceral manner and 

without the ethical conflicts that accompany scientific advances in other fields, 

such as genetics. In many ways, astronomy is about the pleasure of looking.”13

When NASA launched HST, public expectations were high for spectacular 

images from the cameras onboard the space telescope. Previous telescopes that 

had flown in space had produced spectrograms, non-imaging forms of data, 

or images in nonvisual wavelengths such as x rays. They therefore won little 

attention from the public. NASA and many astronomers had strongly promoted 

HST’s promise of colorful views of the universe, but until NASA reluctantly 

agreed just before launch to release HST’s “First Light” image, there had been 

no plan to release images during HST’s commissioning period. 

Most of the astronomers with authority over HST were unprepared for the 

public relations challenges that they would face when HST was launched, 

although STScI director Riccardo Giacconi was a prominent exception. When 

the Space Telescope Science Working Group, which included the Principal 

Investigators for HST instruments and other scientists with leading roles in 

the program, met in April 1986 at Goddard, a NASA public affairs official 

introduced the matter of communicating HST’s findings in a presentation that 

focused on procedures for press releases. During the discussion that followed, 

Giacconi said HST should obtain some images that could be given out to the 

public. If that isn’t done, he said, “we are crazy.”14 Giacconi, was keen to release 

images because of his own history with the Einstein X-ray Observatory. Shortly 

after Einstein was launched eight years earlier, Giacconi obtained four x-ray 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

images of “bright and splendid” objects and shared them with media, who “were 

so grateful that they judged the mission favorably even when it terminated prematurely.” The early image releases also gave the scientists breathing room 

to calibrate the satellite without media questioning.15 Although nothing was 

decided at the Science Working Group meeting, many of those present had different concerns that did not come up until later.

Two years later, the Science Working Group charged Eric J. Chaisson, 

STScI’s newly hired senior scientist and director of educational programs, to 

draw up a list of objects for the telescope to image for public release early in its 

flight. Chaisson later wrote that he thought these images would provide data 

for scientists to work with in case HST failed early in its flight and help create 

support for HST amongst a public primed to expect dramatic results. While 

Chaisson won support from Giacconi and other HST scientists, Westphal and 

John Bahcall, the leading astrophysicist whose lobbying work over the two 

previous decades was crucial in making Hubble possible, opposed his plan. 

Bahcall vociferously objected out of concern that early public release of longawaited images could negatively affect the work of scientists who had worked 

for years to make HST a reality but had not yet obtained astronomical data. The 

Institute, NASA, and scientists had agreed on rules where observers who used 

HST would have sole proprietary control of that data for a year, after which 

the data would be made available to other researchers and the public.16 A year 

before the launch, an article in the leading scientific periodical Nature reported 

that any images from HST released before scientific work started “must specifically not have any scientific interest,” leaving STScI with the dilemma of “producing first images which are both spectacular and uninteresting.”17

The concerns of Westphal and other astronomers about public release of 

images were crystallized by a controversy that followed the publication of dramatic and unprecedented images and other data from Jupiter and its moons 

obtained by the Voyager 1 spacecraft in 1979. One of Voyager 1’s biggest findings was that the moon Io had active volcanoes. All Voyager images were 

released in real time, although in those pre-internet days, anyone not at the JPL 

control center would have had difficulty accessing them. Bradford A. Smith, 

who led Voyager’s imaging team, told Westphal in a letter later that year that 

imaging team members were approached by more than a few outside colleagues 

who wanted to submit interpretive papers based on news-media releases. Most 

backed down after discussion, but Smith said one post-doctoral student wrote 

to a prominent journal with his interpretation of the incomplete data that had 

appeared in the media. Smith, who would later serve on the WF/PC science 

team with Westphal, warned that HST observers could be “competitive with 
126 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

any professionals of questionable integrity who happen to see your data in the 

Washington Post,” and his warning was reflected a decade later in Westphal and 

Bahcall’s reactions to Chaisson’s plan for early releases of HST images.18 At 

one heated meeting at STScI in 1989, Bahcall warned Chaisson, “If you look at 

those objects before I do, I’ll kill you.”19 Chaisson continued to try to find a list 

of objects, but at a meeting of the Scientific Working Group in January 1990, 

three months before the launch, the group blocked this final effort to obtain 

images for public release quickly after launch. The dispute over Chaisson’s 

image release plan became a central episode in the controversial 1994 book, 

The Hubble Wars, that Chaisson wrote after leaving the Institute in 1992.

20

The media was finally invited to view the arrival of a “First Light” image from 

HST nearly a month after launch, as was discussed in chapter two. That WF/

PC image on 20 May was released along with comparison images taken from 

the Las Campanas Observatory, followed a month later by the “First Light” 

image from the European Space Agency’s Faint Object Camera. On 27 June, 

NASA officials announced HST’s spherical aberration problem, and the matter 

of releasing images from the space telescope was off the table for the moment. 

By then, a public release policy for HST had been established to take effect on 

1 July that called for image release requests to originate with scientists before 

being routed through STScI’s Education and Public Affairs Office and NASA 

Public Affairs prior to release, roughly the policy that has existed through the 

life of HST since that time.21

While most effort at Goddard and the Institute turned to understanding 

the extent and causes of Hubble’s defective main mirror, the Science Working 

Group met again in August, and Bahcall again forcefully stated his objections to 

early image releases. This time, no one else supported him, since many people 

were more worried about the future of HST, and Bahcall stormed out of the 

meeting. Villard commented that spherical aberration meant that opposition 

to the idea of an early release program for images once HST was repaired “all 

went away.”22 The commissioning work on HST continued, and the flow of 

images from WF/PC and FOC began in August as the two instruments began 

to obtain quality images of star clusters, nebulae, galaxies, and solar system 

objects such as Saturn. While the images taken during that time were important for the scientific investigations, only a few had the visual appeal that had 

been hoped for before HST was launched. As was discussed in chapter three, 

astronomers used image deconvolution techniques to alleviate the effects of 

spherical aberration in some of these images. “The continuous coverage showed 

that Hubble was at least operating, and people liked the pictures,” Villard said 

of the time between the discovery of spherical aberration and the servicing 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

mission that repaired it. Moreover, scientists became accustomed to using HST 

and operating with policies such as those covering media releases.23 As the servicing mission approached in 1993, STScI prepared a plan under NASA direction and with the agreement of astronomers for an Early Release Observation 

Program for “targets with straightforward scientific interest and strong visual 

impact” and the creation of images suitable for reproduction in print media.24

No scientist ever attempted to publish a paper based on HST images taken from 

newspapers or magazines. According to Villard, opposition to the early releases 

seemed to have “evaporated” immediately after spherical aberration was found, 

and did not reappear.25

THE INTERNET

The first images released in January 1994 from WFPC2 and the Faint Object 

Camera corrected by COSTAR began what later became a flood of spectacular images from Hubble. Those images, like those from WFPC2 of Comet 

Shoemaker-Levy 9 at Jupiter, the “Pillars of Creation” and the “Hubble Deep 

Field,” were widely reproduced in books, magazines, and newspapers. They 

were also being accessed by growing numbers of people around the world in 

the digital format in which they were created. This became possible in the mid1990s because of a set of major technical advances that started in the late 1970s 

and the 1980s, when new devices called personal computers began to appear 

in large numbers in offices and homes. The very first personal computers had 

limited memory and processor power, and thus could not handle graphics, so 

for a time, more powerful computer systems such as Sun workstations were 

required to process or even view images. The popularity of personal computers and more powerful microprocessors helped drive advances in computing 

technology in the middle and late 1980s and early 1990s that made graphical 

user interfaces possible in devices such as the Apple Macintosh, which was 

introduced in 1984, and starting in 1992, equipment running the Microsoft 

Windows 3.1 operating system and its successors.26

Personal computers became more useful thanks to the ability to network 

with other computers, sharing files and running a general-purpose application that became known as e-mail. This was made possible due to technical 

advances developed by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) of the 

U.S. Department of Defense, which began the ARPANET computer network 

in 1969 using specially developed data transfer protocols. After classified and 

other military uses were spun off from ARPANET in the early 1980s, it was 

closed down in 1990, and the National Science Foundation took over support of the expanding internet. Amidst the spread of personal computers with 
128 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

greater capabilities and increasing bandwidth between networked computers in 

the early 1990s, the first web browsers with their easy-to-use interfaces to the 

World Wide Web made the internet easily accessible to millions of users. By 

1995, commercial users with their “dot.com” suffix dominated the internet.27

Along with other government and educational institutions, NASA and 

STScI had long been part of the internet offering e-mail and file transfers, but 

the new capabilities of the 1990s meant that they had to prepare for widespread 

public access. NASA was quick to establish a presence on the World Wide Web 

with the first NASA website. “As I recall, the first effort at a NASA-wide home 

page was published in 1992 or ‘93 out of Goddard in an effort to collect links 

to all those early NASA sites,” said NASA Headquarters Web Manager Brian 

Dunbar. The first formal NASA home page, containing original content and 

managed by the Office of Public Affairs at NASA Headquarters, went online 

in July 1994 at the time of the 25th anniversary of Apollo 11.28 STScI sought 

that year to promote use of the internet by “developing the public education 

potential” of HST and sharing Hubble data with the public.29

That July was also the time of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9, and some astronomers and well-equipped enthusiasts followed its impacts over the internet using 

electronic bulletin boards, a popular internet communications tool of the time, 

and early websites.30 A 1999 Institute report on HST’s public impact found that 

the January 1996 release of the “Hubble Deep Field” was particularly popular, 

with 4.46 million hits on the Institute website at a time of still limited internet 

use. Among space missions of the time, only the Mars Pathfinder spacecraft, 

which landed on Mars nearly 18 months later in 1997, outperformed HST, and 

then for only a brief period. Mars’ enduring popularity with the public was demonstrated when a Hubble image of the Red Planet taken during its close passage 

to Earth in 2003 brought down STScI’s servers.31

The Institute created a new public web portal, HubbleSite, for HST’s 10th 

anniversary in April 2000, and that year, it received 119 million hits in two 

million user sessions. Other sites delivered educational programs, including 

Amazing Space, which includes a website and other tools for educators. Hubble 

images and releases have also been available from NASA websites, including 

educational resources, that are more widely used than Institute websites, but 

figures for Hubble-related resources are not available. The European Space 

Agency, as a sponsoring agency for Hubble, has also actively promoted images 

and features on HST through its spacetelescope.org website.32

Nearly a decade later, the creation of social media and the arrival of smartphones with online capabilities again changed the online world. In common 

with other NASA projects, HST became available on Facebook and on other 
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social media, including Twitter, Instagram, Google+, Pinterest, photo sharing 

on Flickr, and video sharing on YouTube. HubbleSite soon offered an application to bring Hubble imagery to users of iPhones and other smartphones. 

The NASA Hubble Twitter account is the most popular account for an individual NASA program, with more than 6.5 million followers. NASA continues 

to exploit new opportunities to publicize HST with Facebook live events and 

coordinated campaigns.33

MORE HUBBLE IMAGES

▲ Longtime Imaging Group Lead Zolt Levay in the Office of Public Outreach at STScI. 

(Christopher Gainor)

When HST operations began in 1990, digital data for HST images went to 

STScI’s Astronomy Visualization Laboratory for digital processing. The lab, a 

“carryover from observatories” in the words of STScI Imaging Lead Zoltan Levay, 

was set up in 1985 and staffed by up to three people under the supervision of 

John Bedke, a former chief photographer from Carnegie Observatories. Once 

the image data were digitally processed, a photograph was taken of the image 

as displayed on the screen of a Sun workstation or a similar computer system of 

the time, and then reproduced in print, slide, transparency, and negative forms 

in the Institute’s darkroom and photo lab. Captions were printed on the back of 

prints using photocopying machines, and these images were given out at media 

conferences or mailed to the media. As time went on in the 1990s, images were 
130 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

digitally processed with various programs including Adobe Photoshop, and the 

digital images were put online. Finally, the photo lab closed in 2005, marking 

completion of the transition to digital imaging and animations.34

The impact of HST images, especially the “Pillars of Creation,” impressed 

many astronomers. “I came to realize, talking to people about this, just how 

intricately linked science and art really are,” Hester commented.35 Keith Noll, 

a planetary astronomer at STScI, was impressed by the reaction of his relatives 

to the “Pillars” image, and remembered how earlier images from Apollo and 

Voyager had inspired him when he was young. He talked with his Institute 

colleague Howard Bond about how HST’s cameras were used for scientific purposes, leaving few opportunities to obtain aesthetically pleasing images such as 

the “Pillars.” They then brought into the conversation two other STScI astronomers who also worked on public outreach, Anne Kinney and Carol Christian. 

Together they proposed the Hubble Heritage Project in 1997 to the outgoing 

director of STScI, Bob Williams. Their proposal listed many spectacular and 

well-known objects including the Ring Nebula, the Sombrero Nebula, and 

the Trifid Nebula, for which there was limited or no HST imagery. The proposal, which contemplated scientifically useful images that were also aesthetically pleasing, won financial support and some precious time on HST from 

Williams. With the addition of Jayanne English, Lisa Fratarre, and Zolt Levay 

to the group, Hubble Heritage released its first images in October 1998—showing Saturn, the Bubble Nebula, the Sagittarius Star Field, and a Seyfert galaxy. 

Hubble Heritage then released one image each month while it continued. The 

members of the Hubble Heritage Project searched in their free time for imagery 

from the HST data archive, obtained funding through NASA grants, and used 

small amounts of HST observing time to create images or add to images already 

in the archive. About half the data came from the archive, and the project used 

about 25 HST orbits a year—less than one percent of the available observing 

time. Levay said, “The basic idea was to augment existing observations that 

may have been incomplete in some sense, so if there’s a really nice target that 

they only got two filters, say, and a third filter would make a really nice, visually 

nice image. Or they needed another orientation or pointing or something of the 

telescope to fill out, and it would make it look much nicer.”36

Although members of the group did not originally propose to explain how 

they created their images from raw HST data, their first set of images came with 

explanations of how they were made. The Hubble Heritage team and the STScI 

news office explained how HST images are made on the Hubble Heritage website, in presentations to astronomers, and in articles in astronomical publications such as Sky & Telescope. Levay even made an appearance in 2002 on the 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

famous newsmagazine television show 60 Minutes. At the time, digital image 

processing was relatively new to professional astronomers and was still very new 

and controversial to the general public.37 The popularity of images from HST has 

inspired astronomers working at other observatories to follow Hubble Heritage’s 

example, including other NASA space observatories. In 1999, the Cerro Tololo 

Inter-American Observatory and the Kitt Peak National Observatory began 

producing images for the public, the Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope started 

a “Hawaiian Starlight” image program in 2002, and the Gemini Observatory 

followed suit two years later.38 After some of its leading members left STScI 

and grants from the director’s office had ended, Hubble Heritage stopped producing new images in 2012. Since that time, STScI’s public outreach office and 

the ESA have continued to produce colorful images as part of their HST public 

outreach work.39

Hubble images have become the subject of analysis and even some debate 

among scientists, other academics, and media commentators, primarily over the 

question of how representative HST images are of reality. To some extent, this 

discussion is moot since by definition, astronomical telescope images do not 

accurately depict what the human eye would see if it were in close proximity 

to most astronomical objects, especially nebulae and galaxies. The human eye 

takes images about thirty times a second, and it is very small. Large astronomical telescopes including HST have large mirrors that can gather thousands of 

times more light in a given period of time than the human eye is capable of 

doing. These telescopes can, and except for very bright or close objects, usually do take long exposures of minutes, hours, or more to gather as much light 

as possible. Coming closer to a given object such as a nebula does not make 

it brighter in the way a telescope can make it brighter with its light gathering 

power and long exposure times.40

The human eye has other limitations that also have to be taken into consideration. It can only perceive a limited range of light. Moreover, what eyes 

see varies amongst individuals. The retina contains varieties of cone cells that 

are sensitive to different wavelengths of light—these varieties are generally 

classified as blue, green, and red cones. The retina also contains rod cells that 

are highly sensitive to light but not to color. Hence, when people look through 

a telescope at distant objects such as galaxies or nebulae, the light is usually 

so dim that color is very difficult to perceive. Some bodies such as stars emit 

light, and others, such as planets and some nebulae, reflect light from elsewhere. In the words of Villard and Levay of STScI, “The question of true color 

becomes largely moot since we can’t perceive it in the first place.”41 As well, 

different photographic films and CCDs, not to mention other detectors, have 
132 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

their own sensitivities to different colors. What they have in common with the 

human eye is the fact that they usually record red, green, and blue separately. 

In the case of HST, its cameras shoot only black-and-white images, but many 

images are exposed through different color filters, and so every HST color 

image is assembled from two or three monochrome images exposed through 

different filters. Each astronomical object emits or reflects light at different 

wavelengths, and therefore the people who create color images from HST data 

must keep that in mind when choosing filters and composing photos. The filters are chosen for their scientific utility, and usually correspond to the light 

emitted or reflected by particular chemical elements, such as hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen.42

Each HST image that is released to the public is processed through special software, often including the well-known image-processing program Adobe 

Photoshop, to compress the range of light and compose colors. Each exposure 

used in an image must be calibrated to deal with sensitivity variations between 

individual pixels and to eliminate the effects of cosmic rays that strike the CCD 

detectors. Because HST operates outside the atmosphere, and its instruments 

can pick up wavelengths of light beyond normal human vision, HST image 

processors must choose what they call representative colors rather than real 

colors to better illustrate the scientific information being collected by images 

in different wavelengths. This was the case for the “Pillars of Creation” image 

in the Eagle Nebula because the two filters used for the original exposures 

were in similar wavelengths in the red part of the spectrum. A hydrogen filter 

was shown as green rather than red. This approach must be used in images 

taken with HST instruments such as NICMOS or some channels in Wide 

Field Camera 3 (WFC3), which imaged in the infrared or ultraviolet outside the 

range of optically visible light.43 “While the choices of color may be somewhat 

arbitrary, the results are a real image and represent real physical processes that 

are occurring in these objects,” Levay explained.44

HST images can be positioned in any orientation because there is no up or 

down for a telescope in space, but the dimensions and imaging areas of HST 

instruments place limitations on HST images. For example, the Wide Field/

Planetary Camera 2, which was the workhorse camera of HST from its installation in late 1993 to its removal in 2009, was made up of four CCDs arranged 

in the stairstep shape that most famously showed up in the original “Pillars of 

Creation” image. The processing of images from WFPC2 involved removing the 

seams that are located where the four CCDs overlap. In 2002, the Advanced 

Camera for Surveys (ACS) was installed on HST. Its two large CCDs have 

three times the sensitivity and higher resolution than WFPC2. Since the last 
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servicing mission in 2009, WFC3 has taken the place of WFPC2, and this 

instrument contained many imaging advances over HST’s previous capabilities 

in both ultraviolet and infrared wavelengths.45

HST’s cameras, most famously WFPC2 and FOC, were built to take highresolution images at high magnification, which means that they have very narrow fields of view. In the case of the “Pillars of Creation” image, WFPC2’s 

narrow field of view dictated that it showed just the pillars rather than the wider 

nebula that was more familiar to astronomers. As astronomers Travis A. Rector, 

Kimberley Kowal Arcand, and Megan Watzke explained in their book on astronomical imaging, tight cropping can create the perception that an object is 

gigantic, especially when it is unfamiliar, as many astronomical objects are. 

Cropping can also create the sense that an object is nearby. WFPC2’s limited 

field of view contributed mightily to 

the drama and allure of the “Pillars 

of Creation.”46

The work of the Hubble Heritage 

team and the outreach staff also drew 

criticism. Astronomers whose work is 

based on non-imaged data have sometimes complained that HST’s images 

are little more than “pretty pictures.” 

In 2003, the Los Angeles Times published an article by reporter Allison 

M. Heinrichs calling the HST 

images “exaggerated” and “a merger 

of science, art—and marketing.”47

Villard responded that he found the 

article unfair because he and Levay 

tried to fully explain their approach 

to processing images to the reporter 

as part of their effort to raise issues 

around image processing to the wider 

astronomical community.48

▲ STScI Public Information Manager Ray 

Villard. (Christopher Gainor)

Hubble images have also gained positive academic attention from outside 

the fields of astronomy and physics. Elizabeth A. Kessler, who has written a 

2012 book and several other works exploring the background and implications 

of HST’s images, has argued that Hubble images have characteristics that allow 

them to be considered as both science and art. She compared the “Pillars of 

Creation” image to an 1882 painting that hangs in the Smithsonian American 
134 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Art Museum, Thomas Moran’s “Cliffs of the Upper Colorado River, Wyoming 

Territory,” which came out of a scientific expedition to the area, and images 

produced by other landscape painters and famed American photographer Ansel 

Adams. “It seems that the Hubble images invite us not only to look outward but 

to reflect on the concepts we use to describe and categorize what we see,” she 

wrote.49 The paintings and photographs of the rugged territory of the American 

West helped lead in the middle of the 20th century to Chesley Bonestell’s paintings that went along with articles and books promoting space travel by Willy 

Ley and Wernher von Braun.50 Kessler noted that these images also brought up 

the concept of the frontier, a “consistent presence in the rhetoric that circulates 

around space exploration.”51

Kessler has argued that the experience of imagery with HST has heavily 

influenced representational conventions and an aesthetic style of astrophotography that favors “saturated color, high contrast, and rich detail as well as majestic 

compositions and dramatic lighting.” She said Hubble images in this style “now 

define how we visualize the cosmos.”52

Since its launch, Hubble has been joined in space by other space telescopes, 

including NASA Great Observatories such as the Chandra X-Ray Observatory 

launched in 1999 and the Spitzer Space Telescope, which imaged in the infrared between its launch in 2003 and retirement in 2020. HST imagery has been 

combined with images taken by these two other spacecraft for scientific reasons, such as in the Frontier Fields programs, where astronomers image massive 

clusters of galaxies with the three observatories and use gravitational lensing to 

find what lies beyond those clusters, as well as to study the dark matter within 

them.53 HST data are also being combined in images with telescopes based on 

Earth as the capabilities of those telescopes have improved. This work is assisted 

by the fact that these instruments also use digital equipment and common file 

formats such as FITS (Flexible Image Transport System). NASA released a 

good example of this kind of image in February 2017, a multi-wavelength image 

of Supernova 1987A using data from HST in visible light, submillimeter wavelengths from the Atacama Large Millimeter/submillimeter Array in Chile, and 

x-ray light imaged by Chandra.54 Images such as these bear little relationship to 

what can be seen by the human eye, but they help illustrate important scientific 

phenomena such as the structure of this supernova 30 years after its explosion.

THE UNIVERSE COMES TO EARTH

The quality of data from astronomical observatories on the ground had already 

began to improve in the late 1970s and the 1980s when governments and universities built more observatories in high altitude locations offering clear seeing 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

like the Chilean Andes and atop Mauna Kea in Hawaii. After astronomical 

observatories on Earth began publicizing the beautiful images they were producing with new digital technologies, amateur astronomers were equipping 

themselves with affordable commercial digital cameras and processing software, and started producing their own high quality images of celestial objects. 

Breakthroughs in optical and computing technologies made much larger 

ground-based optical telescopes possible. These advances include active optics 

that change the shape of main mirrors in gigantic new reflecting telescopes 

to halt deformations caused by mechanical stress, temperature and wind, and 

adaptive optics that compensate for the atmospheric turbulence that causes 

stars to twinkle and affects the quality of astronomical images. Adaptive optics 

marries deformable mirrors in telescopes, massive amounts of computing power, 

and the use of lasers to generate artificial reference stars. Detectors following 

a natural guide star or an artificial guide star generated by a laser provide data 

on changes in atmospheric conditions that are processed in computers to make 

rapid changes to deformable mirrors. Despite these advances, observatories on 

Earth equipped with active optics and adaptive optics are still far from seriously competing with HST, since Hubble can still obtain images at a far greater 

variety of wavelengths than even the best ground-based telescopes. Adaptive 

optics typically clearly resolve only bright starlike objects in small fields of view. 

While telescopes on the ground are superior for specialized kinds of research, 

they will still require major technological breakthroughs to approach the optical 

image performance of HST.55

As discussed above, HST imagery become part of the landscape of life by 

the beginning of the 21st century. HST images have even shown up in art museums, notably a 2008 show at the Walters Art Museum in Baltimore, “Mapping 

the Cosmos: Images from the Hubble Space Telescope.” Six years after Hubble 

was ridiculed in the movie, Naked Gun 2-1/2: The Smell of Fear, HST imagery 

of the Eagle Nebula appeared in the science fiction drama Contact, based on 

Carl Sagan’s novel of the same name. By HST’s 20th anniversary in 2010, a 

film in the large-screen IMAX format, Hubble, featured breathtaking animated 

sequences from HST images that take viewers on journeys through stellar nurseries in the Orion Nebula and near the Eagle Nebula, the Butterfly Nebula, 

and the Andromeda Galaxy.56

The “Pillars of Creation” and the products of the Hubble Heritage Project 

weren’t the only HST images that engaged the public. The “Hubble Deep Field” 

and the stream of HST images that astronomers used to unlock the mysteries 

of the universe also introduced many people to the wonders of the universe. 

The vast improvement offered by many HST images over previously available 
136 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

astronomical photos not only reflected Hubble’s unique capabilities as a large 

telescope located above Earth’s atmosphere, but also the fact that its images 

were produced with CCDs rather than photographic film, and delivered in digital formats over the internet. HST was far from the first telescope to use these 

technologies, but it was the first to distribute its imagery to such a wide audience.

ENDNOTES

 1 Ray Villard, oral history interview, 30 October 2015, p. 18; review of 1994 news releases 

on https://hubblesite.org, accessed 25 March 2017. 

 2 Villard OHI, pp. 15–18; film of the first image of the comet impact arriving at the STScI 

event can be seen on a short NASA film on YouTube, “NASA’s Hubble Memorable 

Moments: Comet Impact,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xEids4CQ0vE (accessed 

25 March 2017).

 3 Hester OHI, pp. 27–29; STScI, “Embryonic Stars Emerge from Interstellar ‘Eggs,’” 2 

November 1995, news release STScI-1995-44; J. Jeff Hester et al., “Hubble Space Telescope WFPC2 Imaging of M16: Photoevaporation and Emerging Young Stellar Objects,”

The Astronomical Journal, 111(6) (June 1996): 2349–2532; Ray Villard, oral history interview by author, 4 November 2016, pp. 1–5; DeVorkin and Smith, The Hubble Cosmos, pp. 

63, 65, 67. 

 4 Hester OHI, 27.

 5 Jeff Hester personal website Digital Photography Review, “TIME releases 100 most 

influential images of all time,” https://www.dpreview.com/news/9721929936/mostinfluential-images-of-all-time (accessed 17 November 2016); ESA-NASA Herschel website, “Revisiting the ‘Pillars of Creation,’” 18 January 2012, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/herschel/news/herschel20120118.html (all accessed 2 April 2017); NASA 

News Release, “Hubble Goes High-Definition to Revisit Iconic ‘Pillars of Creation,’” 

5 January 2015.

 6 W. Patrick McCray, “How Astronomers Digitized the Sky,” Technology and Culture 55, no.

4 (October 2014): 908–44.

 7 Travis A. Rector, Kimberley Kowal Arcand, and Megan Watzke, Coloring the Universe: An

Insider’s Look at Making Spectacular Images of Space (Fairbanks: University of Alaska 

Press, 2015), pp. 52–55; Klaus Brasch, “A Short History of Astrophotography: Part 1,” 

Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society of Canada 111, no. 2 (April 2017): 52–59. Color 

astrophotographs had limited circulation until photographer David Malin joined the 

Anglo-Australian Observatory near Sydney, Australia, in 1975 and began producing colorful astronomical images.

 8 Phil Pressel, “The Hexagon KH-9 Spy Satellite,” Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 24, no. 3 (2017): 13–23. For unclassified technical background on early U.S. reconnaissance satellites, see David Baker, US Spy Satellites, 1959 Onwards (All Missions, All 
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

Models), (Sparkford, U.K.: Haynes Publishing, 2016). Hexagon flew from 1971 to 1986 and 

was declassified in 2011.

 9 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 104–110; R. J. Davis, “Project Celescope: an Astrophysical Reconnaissance Satellite,” Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory Special Report 

#83 (1962); Wallace and Karen Tucker, Revealing the Universe: The Making of the Chandra

X-Ray Observatory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 46–52; Rector, 

Arcand, and Watzke, Coloring the Universe, pp. 55–56. Vidicon imagers were also used in

the Voyager spacecraft that were launched in 1977 to the outer planets, and the Einstein 

X-Ray Observatory and the International Ultraviolet Explorer, both launched in 1978.

10 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 241–244

11 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 245–253; Robert W. Smith and Joseph N. Tatarewicz

“Counting on Invention: Devices and Black Boxes in Very Big Science” Osiris 9 (1994): 

101–123, quotation from 123; Jeff Hester, oral history interview by author, 20 March 

2017, pp. 17–20; NASA, “Announcement of Opportunity for Space Telescope,” AO No. 

OSS-1-77, 18 March 1977.

12 Elizabeth A. Kessler, Picturing the Cosmos: Hubble Space Telescope Images and the 

Astronomical Sublime (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), pp. 131–137, 

153-157; Rector, Arcand, and Watzke, Coloring the Universe , pp. 55–56, 60. The AngloAustralian Observatory has been known as the Australian Astronomical Observatory

since 2010. Layering in Photoshop is useful to assemble black-and-white images shot 

with different filters into color images. The sales of digital cameras for personal use 

exceeded sales of photographic film cameras starting in 2001. At that time, digital cameras were coming into increasing use for amateur astrophotography, although they 

still had limitations at that time. See Terence Dickinson and Alan Dyer, The Backyard 

Astronomer’s Guide, Second Edition (Kingston, ON: Firefly Books, 2002), pp. 277, 306–319.

13 Kessler, Picturing the Cosmos, p. 8.

14 Minutes of HST Science Working Group, 35th meeting, 2–3 April 1986, Goddard Space

Flight Center, with presentation on the Office of Public Affairs by Jan Wolfe, with notes

by Robert W. Smith, in Johns Hopkins University, The Sheridan Libraries, Hubble Space

Telescope Collection #7, Series 5, Subseries 2, Space Telescope Science Working Group

meetings, Box 2, Folder 7, Space Telescope Science Working Group meeting #35, 2–3

April, 1986.

15 Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, p. 99. Einstein was also known as the High Energy Astronomical Observatory-2. For more on Einstein, see Tucker, Revealing the Universe, pp. 

46–52.

16 Ray Villard, oral history interview by author, 30 October 2015, pp. 5–6; Zimmerman, The 

Universe in a Mirror, pp. 121–124. See also Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, pp. 97–106.

17 David Lindley, “Space Telescope Ready at Last,” Nature 339 (16 March 1989): 199; Ed 

Weiler, personal communication with author, 3 April 2017; Neta Bahcall, oral history

interview by author, 1 September 2016, pp. 9–10.

18 Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, p. 102; Zimmerman, Universe in a Mirror, pp. 122–124; Letter, 

Bradford A. Smith to Prof. James A. Westphal, 7 August 1979, in Johns Hopkins University,

The Sheridan Libraries, Hubble Space Telescope Collection #7, Series 1, Goddard Space 
138 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Flight Center, Box 1, Folder 6, Chronological Correspondence, June–December 1979. 

Chaisson claimed in his book that the Voyager controversy arose because the initial discovery of Io’s volcanism was not made by scientists but by Linda Morabito, a navigation 

engineer working in the JPL control center. According to Chaisson, this caused embarrassment to the scientists responsible for that data. The author has been unable to find 

evidence to back up Chaisson’s claim of Morabito’s work causing embarrassment, and 

Morabito was not using data that had been released to the public. Policies covering public release of images and other data from robotic spacecraft continue to be a lively topic 

of controversy. See Emily Lakdawalla, “New Horizons: Awaiting the Data,” Planetary Society Blog, 19 July 2015, http://www.planetary.org/blogs/emily-lakdawalla/2015/07181721-

new-horizons-awaiting-the-data.html (accessed 10 January 2017).

19 Villard OHI, 2015, pp. 4–6; Zimmerman, Universe in a Mirror, p. 124; Chaisson, The Hubble 

Wars, p. 101.

20 Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, pp. 104–106. 

21 Section II Administrative, STScI, “II-I-2 Scientific Data Release to the General Public,” 

undated but before 1 July 1990, STScI Archive, Box 1.5, file “STIC, 7–8 Oct 1993,” JHU 

Library Special Collections.

22 Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, pp. 230–231. This account is verified by Sandra Faber in her 

annotations in her copy of the book; David Leckrone, oral history interview by author, 

6 November 2015, pp. 1–3; Villard OHI, 2015, p. 17.

23 Villard OHI, 2015, p. 12. While much of the media coverage of HST operations prior to

SM1 concentrated on efforts to deal with HST’s problems, HST’s scientific findings 

were also covered. See Kathy Sawyer, “Hubble Discovers Star Group,” Washington Post 

(4 August 1990): A3; and John Noble Wilford, “First Hubble Findings Bring Delight,” New

York Times (30 August 1990): B10. Villard also pointed to coverage of HST releases dealing with storms on Saturn in January 1991, and aurorae on Jupiter in April 1992.

24 Educational and Public Affairs Office, STScI, for NASA Goddard, “SC-06 Educational and 

Public Affairs Office Management Plan,” 4 August 1993, STScI Archive, Box 1.5, file “STIC, 

7–8 Oct 1993,” JHU Library Special Collections.

25 Villard OHI, 2015, p. 17.

26 Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, Second Edition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT 

Press, 2003), pp. 243–306.

27 Ceruzzi, History of Modern Computing, pp. 291–308; New Media Institute, “History of the 

Internet,” https://www.newmedia.org/history-of-the-internet (accessed 30 November 

2016).

28 “Web History,” undated form letter from NASA Public Affairs, supplied to author on

31 August 2016 by Stephen J. Garber, NASA Headquarters History Program Office.

29 AURA and STScI, proposal documents for “Hubble Access: Public and Educational Benefits from the Hubble Space Telescope,” 9 May 1994, STScI Archive, Box 4.3, file “STIC, 

7–8 Oct 1993,” JHU Library Special Collections. See also memo, Ray Villard to Robert 

Williams, “Strategic Plan STScI Public Affairs Activities: Preliminary Draft,” 8 April 1994,
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

STScI Archive, Box 1.5, file “Memos, policy documents, correspondence, e-mails etc., 

1991–2000,” JHU Library Special Collections.

30 John R. Spencer and Jacqueline Mitton, eds., The Great Comet Crash: The Collision of 

Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 and Jupiter (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 

1995), pp. 41–44.

31 C. A. Christian and A. Kinney, The Public Impact of Hubble Space Telescope: Office of Public Outreach Monograph Series, Number 102 STScI, February 1999; Villard OHI, 2016, p. 9. 

Although the release of the “Pillars of Creation” image doubtless was also popular on 

the internet, it was not mentioned in the report. The first HST image the author ever 

downloaded from a NASA or STScI website was the “Hubble Deep Field.” Like many 

other people, the author had purchased his first personal computer with color graphic 

capabilities in 1995. This report and many others from the 1990s and 2000 quoted in 

this article used “hits” to quantify usage of the web, but a hit on the web is different 

from a “page view,” “site visit” or “user session,” measurements that have become more 

commonly used since that time. The use of a single web page can involve several “hits” 

because each graphical feature on a web page is counted as a “hit.” Thus, looking at a 

web page with six images on it would count for six hits.

32 Space Telescope Science Institute, Annual Report 2000 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, April 2001): 

p. 42. See also Office of Public Outreach, STScI, “Implementing the 2002–2007 Strategic 

Plan for the Office of Public Outreach,” STScI Archive, Box 2.2, file “STScI Strategic Planning, 1995–2005,” JHU Library Special Collections. NASA website, “The Hubble Space 

Telescope Inspires Wonder: Education Resource Page,” https://www.nasa.gov/audience

foreducators/hubble-index.html (accessed 4 April 2017); ESA Hubble Space Telescope 

website, https://www.spacetelescope.org/about/ (accessed 9 October 2017). 

33 When the author checked Twitter accounts on 1 August 2019, the @NASAHubble Twitter account had 6.5 million followers, and the @MarsCuriosity account had 4 million

followers. The main @NASA Twitter feed had 32.1 million followers. See also “Get the 

Hubble Telescope on your iPhone, iPad—Download Free Hubblesite App,” http://news.

softpedia.com/news/Get-the-Hubble-Telescope-on-Your-iPhone-iPad-Download-FreeHubbleSite-App-184482.shtml (accessed 9 October 2017). For more on HST and the internet, see Christopher Gainor, “The Hubble Space Telescope in Cyberspace,” Quest: The 

History of Spaceflight Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2017): 4–12.

34 STScI records, “Scientific Data Release to General Public”; Zoltan Levay, oral history 

interview, pp. 6–10; Villard, e-mail communication with author, 9 October 2017; Levay, 

e-mail communication with author, 2 February 2018. Levay said Photoshop wasn’t the 

first program of its type used at STScI because it was not compatible with the FITS format used for HST images, but it began being used around 1994.

35 Hester OHI, 29.

36 Levay OHI, pp. 2–3; Keith Noll, oral history interview with author, 15 May 2017, part 1, 

pp. 2–3; Kessler, Picturing the Cosmos, pp. 112–125; Zoltan Levay, “Creating Hubble’s 

Imagery,” in Roger D. Launius and David H. DeVorkin, eds., Hubble’s Legacy (Washington,

DC: Smithsonian Institution Scholarly Press, 2014), pp. 112–119; Robert Williams, oral

history interview by author, 21 May 2015, part 2, p. 14; Draft proposal for the Hubble 

Heritage Project contained in e-mail “revised proposal” from Keith Noll to Anne Kinney, 
140 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Howard Bond, and Carol Christian, 28 February 1997. See also Elizabeth Kessler, “The 

Wonder of Outer Space,” in David DeVorkin and Robert W. Smith, eds., Hubble: Imagin

Space and Time (Washington, DC: National Geographic Society, 2008), pp. 138–144; and

Keith S. Noll, Principal Investigator, “Continuation of the Hubble Heritage Project,” Cycle 

11 Proposal for HST Time, STScI, 2002.

37 Elizabeth Kessler, “The Hubble’s Anniversary,” Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 2 (2010), pp. 34–43. The 60 Minutes story on HST first appeared on the 

CBS news show on 6 October 2002. See also Ray Villard and Zoltan Levay, “Creating 

Hubble’s Technicolor Universe,” Sky & Telescope (September 2002): 28–34; and Travis 

A. Rector et al., “Image Processing Techniques for the Creation of Presentation-Quality 

Astronomical Images,” The Astronomical Journal (February 2007): 133, 598–611.

38 Rector, Arcand, and Watzke, Coloring the Universe, p. 61

39 Hussein Jirdeh, e-mail to author, 26 October 2017; Zoltan Levay, e-mail to author, 

10 October 2017; Noll OHI part 1, pp. 7, 12–14. Levay, who continued to produce new 

images and animations at STScI until his retirement in 2018, said in 2017 that the Institute’s Office of Public Outreach, where he worked, continued to request time on HST for 

observations to support public outreach.

40 Rector, Arcand, and Watzke, Coloring the Universe, pp. 2–8

41 Villard and Levay, “Creating Hubble’s Technicolor Universe,” p. 30. Emphasis in original.

42 Villard and Levay, “Hubble’s Technicolor Universe,” pp. 28–34.

43 Villard and Levay, “Hubble’s Technicolor Universe.”

44 Levay, “Creating Hubble’s Imagery,” p. 116.

45 Villard and Levay, “Hubble’s Technicolor Universe”; Levay, “Creating Hubble’s Imagery”; 

Buddy Nelson, Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4 Media Guide (Lockheed Martin, 2009), pp. 4–3.

46 Rector, Arcand, and Watzke, Coloring the Universe. pp. 189–190; Hester OHI, pp. 27–28

47 Allison M. Heinrichs, “PR With Universal Appeal,” Los Angeles Times (5 September 2003):

A1.

48 Villard OHI, pp. 30–31.

49 Elizabeth A. Kessler, “Displaying the Beauty of the Truth: Hubble Images as Art and Science,” from Launius and DeVorkin, Hubble’s Legacy, pp. 120–130.

50 Elizabeth A. Kessler, Picturing the Cosmos, pp. 50–59. 

51 Ibid., p. 181.

52 Ibid., p. 4.

53 STScI, “NASA’s Great Observatories Begin Deepest Ever Probe of the Universe,” news 

release STScI-2013-44, 24 October 2013.

54 STScI, “The Dawn of a New Era for Supernova 1987A,” news release STScI-2017-08, 24 

February 2017. FITS is discussed in chapter nine.

55 W. Patrick McCray, Giant Telescopes: Astronomical Ambition and the Promise of Technology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 146–147, 153–159; Association
CHAPTER FOUR . The Power Of T

of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Space-based vs. Ground-based Telescopes 

with Adaptive Optics (AO), summary prepared by staff at STScI, 2010.

56 Contact, directed by Robert Zemeckis (Warner Brothers DVD, 1997); IMAX Hubble,

directed by Toni Myers (Warner Brothers DVD, 2010). The IMAX Hubble film is also shown

in 3D format.

143

CHAPTER FIVE

New Instruments and 

New Directions

▲ Hubble’s Wide Field Camera 3 captured this view of the Lagoon Nebula in February 2018. (NASA/ESA/

STScI: STSCI-H-p1821a)

T

he Hubble Space Telescope stands apart from other robotic spacecraft 

because of the many upgrades it underwent during its first two decades 

on orbit. Hubble’s design as part of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program permitted regular replacement of its suite of scientific instruments by improved 

new instruments with new characteristics. It also made possible the full set of 

repairs and modifications that took place in the first Hubble Servicing Mission 

in 1993 to overcome HST’s unexpected spherical aberration problem. Four more 

Shuttle servicing missions to HST followed, and this chapter will explore how 

HST evolved as an observatory and as a spacecraft through three of those servicing missions. Like the first servicing mission, the circumstances surrounding 

the final servicing mission in 2009 are so extraordinary that it requires its own 

chapter. Each of Hubble’s servicing missions has a distinct story, and together 

the HST servicing missions constitute the first serious effort to service, maintain, update, and repair a robotic spacecraft in its operating environment. The 

success of these missions also constitutes an important step in preparations to 

build the International Space Station and, in all probability, future spacecraft 

and space stations.

INFRARED ASTRONOMY MATURES

Even before the 1993 servicing mission that restored its focus and its future, 

HST was operating nearly full time obtaining scientific data using its original 

set of instruments—two spectrographs and two imaging instruments operating 

in ultraviolet, visible, and in near infrared wavelengths, along with a photometer 
144 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

and the astrometric measurement capability contained in HST’s Fine Guidance 

Sensors. The spectrograms and images in all wavelengths provided new information about the properties of celestial bodies of all types. A major reason for 

observatories and telescopes in space is to give scientists the ability to make 

observations in wavelengths that can’t be seen from Earth, such as the limited ultraviolet and infrared wavelengths that HST could detect. The Orbiting 

Astronomical Observatories and the International Ultraviolet Explorer helped 

establish ultraviolet astronomy.1 Growing numbers of astronomers expressed 

interest in infrared astronomy in the years that HST was being built because 

many objects that are concealed by dust in visible light are visible in the infrared. And light from distant objects shifts to the red part of the spectrum as 

the objects recede in relation to Earth. But infrared astronomy has proven difficult because telescopes must operate at extremely low temperatures so that 

heat radiating from the instrument does not interfere with infrared radiation 

from low-temperature objects. Telescopes like HST that operate on the fringes 

of Earth’s atmosphere are also affected by infrared radiation emitted from 

Earth, but they could make observations in some infrared wavelengths. The 

first promising results from infrared instruments came in 1971 from NASA’s 

Kuiper Airborne Observatory, which began taking infrared data from a telescope mounted in a converted Lockheed C-141 aircraft. Infrared astronomy 

received another boost in 1983 when the Infrared Astronomical Satellite operated for most of a year until its coolant ran out, but not before providing surprising results about the life cycles of stars and the nature of galaxies.2

The work that led to the first changes to HST’s lineup of instruments began 

six years before it was launched. As discussed in chapter three, a team at the 

Jet Propulsion Laboratory had begun work on the second Wide Field Planetary 

Camera in 1984 shortly after HST Program Scientist Ed Weiler proposed it. 

John Bahcall, one of the driving forces behind HST, had advocated strongly 

for an infrared capability for Hubble, but in the words of HST Project Scientist 

David Leckrone, the state of infrared detectors was “primitive” when NASA 

chose the first generation of HST instruments in 1977, two of which had capability in near infrared wavelengths. Indeed, panelists assessing proposals for 

those first-generation instruments rejected a proposal for an infrared instrument 

because the detector was not judged as being effective.3 In October 1984, NASA 

issued an Announcement of Opportunity for “three to six” second-generation 

science instruments for HST. While the announcement did not suggest what 

type of instruments might be proposed, it did highlight the fact that HST could 

accommodate a cryogenically cooled infrared instrument.4 A 16-member committee assessed the eight proposals for instruments that came in response to 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

the Announcement of Opportunity (AO) at a time when better detectors were 

becoming available. “They also provided unsolicited advice on the relative priorities of various classes of instruments,” Weiler wrote. “Although the team 

was primarily composed of ultraviolet and visible light experts, they rated an 

infrared camera/spectrometer as the number one priority,” reflecting the growing interest in infrared astronomy, and an ultraviolet/visible spectrograph second. In December 1985, NASA announced that two proposals for an infrared 

instrument would be considered for further study—the Near Infrared Camera 

and Multi-Object Spectrometer (NICMOS) proposed by Rodger Thompson of 

the University of Arizona, and the Hubble Imaging Michelson Spectrometer 

(HIMS) proposed by Donald Hall of the University of Hawaii. Also getting 

the nod for further study was the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS) proposed by Dr. Bruce Woodgate of the Goddard Space Flight Center, 

which featured advanced detectors and would satisfy the second priority for an 

ultraviolet instrument. Although NASA originally planned to allow NICMOS 

and HIMS to proceed through Phase A and Phase B studies before a choice 

was made, it decided in 1987 to accelerate the decision process when the two 

Principal Investigators thought enough progress had been made. Because of the 

very limited near infrared capability in the original set of HST instruments, scientists who reviewed the instrument proposals urged NASA to get an infrared 

instrument on HST as soon as possible.5 In 1988, a NASA peer review team 

chose NICMOS over HIMS because it saw NICMOS’ block of solid nitrogen 

as the best way to cool its detectors for infrared observations and because of the 

strength of its research team. The other instrument selected, STIS, was seen as 

a capable replacement for both the first-generation spectrographs, the Goddard 

High Resolution Spectrograph (GHRS) and the Faint Object Spectrograph 

(FOS). Replacing them both could free up an instrument bay inside HST. STIS 

also contained highly advanced Multi-Anode Microchannel Array (MAMA) 

digital detectors that had been under development since the early 1970s.6

SECOND-GENERATION INSTRUMENTS

When work commenced in 1989 to build NICMOS, both STIS and WFPC2 

were already being built, and NASA had penciled them in for installation on 

HST during the first Shuttle servicing mission to HST, with NICMOS likely following in the second servicing mission. But these plans were thrown into question when HST’s spherical aberration problem was discovered in June 1990.7

As outlined in chapter three, NASA quickly decided to modify WFPC2 to deal 

with spherical aberration, and that fall, COSTAR emerged as a means of compensating for the problem as it affected three other instruments. WFPC2 and 
146 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

COSTAR were installed on HST during SM1 in 1993. To stay within NASA’s 

tight budget, HST managers considered postponing STIS to the third servicing mission in 1999 and reducing NICMOS to a simple near infrared camera 

instrument. In the end, the spectrographic capabilities of NICMOS were simplified and reduced to stay within the smaller budget, but not so much that it 

required a name change. The capabilities of STIS were also reduced to save 

money when NASA opted to remove one of its detectors and reduce the sizes 

of the other three detectors. HST management put STIS and NICMOS on the 

Shuttle launch manifest for the second servicing mission in 1997.8

With new instruments chosen for installation on HST in SM2, scientists 

and NASA officials had to decide what instruments they would displace. 

Discussions between managers at the HST project science office at Goddard, 

the HST program office at NASA Headquarters, and STScI in 1994 had led to 

the tentative decision that the two first-generation spectrographs, GHRS and 

FOS, should be removed for NICMOS and STIS because STIS’ capabilities 

would replace both spectrographs. NASA and STScI also planned to replace 

the Faint Object Camera (FOC) with the Advanced Camera for Surveys during 

the third servicing mission in 1999. Leckrone told an HST Servicing Science 

Working Group meeting in February 1995 that electrical problems with FOC 

were causing scientists and program officials to reconsider their instrument 

replacement plans. If NASA changed them and removed FOC in 1997 instead 

of 1999, it could leave HST’s imaging capabilities dependent on a single instrument: WFPC2. As long as the FOC remained aboard HST, COSTAR would 

have to remain as well. He added that since FOC was part of Europe’s contribution to HST, any decision to remove it would be politically sensitive. NASA’s 

existing plan also had a downside: removing GHRS and FOS would leave STIS 

as the only spectroscopic instrument on HST, which could become a serious 

problem if STIS failed. Despite these concerns, the meeting supported the 

existing instrument replacement plans for the upcoming two servicing missions, 

and NASA decided that the second servicing mission would feature replacement of GHRS and FOS with STIS and NICMOS.9

These two new instruments were equipped with corrective optics to compensate for the spherical aberration in the main mirror. Both were manufactured by Ball Aerospace of Boulder, Colorado, which had already made GHRS 

and COSTAR for Hubble. STIS’s detectors had a two dimensional capability 

that meant they could record data from the entire length of a slit instead of a 

single point, giving them the ability to gather data on multiple objects simultaneously. This also meant they could collect about 30 times more spectral 

data and 500 times more spatial data than the simpler single point detectors 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

on GHRS and FOS. In addition to a CCD detector, STIS contained two of the 

sophisticated MAMA detectors that were specially designed to operate exclusively in space in ultraviolet wavelengths. With its powerful suite of detectors, 

STIS could search for massive black holes by examining the movement of stars 

and gas near the centers of galaxies, use its high sensitivity to study stars forming in distant galaxies, and perform spectroscopic mapping.10

NICMOS used three photodiode detectors to make images and spectrographic observations of astronomical targets and extend HST’s vision to the far 

reaches of the universe by giving astronomers their first high-definition data in 

near infrared wavelengths. Infrared instruments can detect very distant galaxies, which are moving away from us and thus their light is shifted toward the 

infrared. Because of their great distances these galaxies are also viewed as they 

were at an earlier time, and the most distant objects are therefore seen early 

in the existence of the universe. The infrared detectors in NICMOS operate 

at very low temperatures of about minus 355° F (minus 215° C), and were kept 

cold inside a cryogenic Dewar containing about 240 pounds of frozen nitrogen 

designed to last for about four and a half years, which was the planned lifetime 

for the instrument. NICMOS included three different cameras, each with its 

own field of view and resolution, and each equipped with filters and optical 

components that make NICMOS a spectrometer and a coronagraph, which 

allowed the instrument to image dim objects near bright objects.11

PREPARING FOR SM2

Another major goal of Servicing Mission 2 was to replace one of Hubble’s Fine 

Guidance Sensors (FGS). Three of these assemblies were launched aboard 

the telescope in 1990, and while their main function was to help guide HST 

and keep it locked on target, one was always designated to act as a sixth science instrument for high precision measurement of celestial object positions, 

or astrometry. The three Fine Guidance Sensors, which can be compared in 

shape and size to baby grand pianos, are positioned at 90 degrees to each other 

in the telescope’s radial bay just below the main mirror and alongside HST’s 

main camera—at the time WFPC2.12

Perkin-Elmer had built four FGS units, including an engineering test unit. 

When two of the FGS units on HST began to show mechanical wear problems 

in advance of the second servicing mission, NASA decided to replace FGS2 

with the engineering test unit, which had been refurbished by the contractor. In 

the final months before SM2, FGS1 began to appear to be closer to failing than 

FGS2, so NASA decided to replace FGS1 with the refurbished unit. The Fine 

Guidance Sensors also suffered some slight degradation in performance due to 
148 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

◂ Astronaut Mark C. Lee (top), on the end of the 

Remote Manipulator System (RMS) arm, performs 

a patch task on the worn insulation material of the 

Hubble Space Telescope (HST). Astronaut Steven L. 

Smith assists with the patch work. (NASA: sts082-325-034)

▸ The STS-82 crew poses following 

completion of five spacewalks 

to service the Hubble Space 

Telescope (HST) in February 1997. 

Pictured left to right are Joseph 

R. Tanner, Steven A. Hawley, Mark 

C. Lee, Kenneth D. Bowersox, 

Steven L. Smith, Scott J. Horowitz, 

and Gregory J. Harbaugh. Each 

astronaut is wearing a shirt 

bearing an image of a celestial 

body photographed by the giant 

observatory. (NASA: s82e5948)

▲ STS-82 crew insignia. (NASA)

▴ SM2 insignia from GSFC. (NASA)
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

the spherical aberration in HST’s main mirror, which caused a small misalignment of light inside each FGS unit. This problem was reduced by installing an 

articulating mirror assembly in each replacement unit. Once installed on HST, 

the refurbished unit became known as FGS1r and was the only FGS used for 

astrometric work on HST.13

The mission was also slated to replace one of HST’s three reel-to-reel engineering and science data recorders with a new solid-state recorder capable of 

recording 12 gigabits, ten times the capacity of the original recorders. Also to be 

replaced were one of HST’s four Reaction Wheel Assemblies, one of Hubble’s 

two solar array drive electronics units, and covers for HST’s magnetometers. 

The astronauts of the second servicing mission were provided with more than 

300 different tools and aids, including some developed based on the lessons 

of the previous mission, including a pistol grip tool that answered the STS-61 

crew’s call for a smaller more efficient tool for precision work during EVAs.14

Having learned the importance of advance preparation from the first servicing mission, NASA named the four spacewalking astronauts for the second 

HST servicing mission on 31 May 1995, nearly two years ahead of launch—

Marc C. Lee, Steven L. Smith, Joseph R. Tanner, and Gregory J. Harbaugh. 

All had flown in space before, and Lee and Harbaugh had spacewalking experience. Harbaugh had also served as the backup EVA astronaut for the first servicing mission. A few months later NASA filled out the crew with another three 

experienced astronauts: commander Ken Bowersox, a veteran of SM1, Scott J. 

Horowitz as pilot, and Shuttle robotic arm operator Steven A. Hawley, who had 

last flown on the mission that deployed HST in 1990. Hawley returned to flight 

status on SM2 from a stint in NASA management.

Like the first HST servicing crew, the EVA crew of STS-82 began long 

hours of training for their four scheduled EVAs in the water tanks at the 

Marshall Space Flight Center and the smaller Weightless Environment 

Training Facility at Johnson Space Center. With construction of the 

International Space Station due to begin in 1998, NASA decided earlier in 

the decade that the Marshall facility and the WETF were much too small to 

properly train crews for the ISS, and were even a tight fit for crews preparing 

for missions to HST. NASA built the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory at the 

Sonny Carter Training Facility near JSC, and the crew of STS-82 became the 

first to train inside its 6.2-million-gallon pool in the final weeks before flight. 

Hawley noted that the training he did for arm operations on STS-82 was 

much more realistic than for the HST deployment mission seven years earlier. 

Virtual reality training, which became even more important for training for 

the ISS, was used to prepare astronauts to handle large masses such as STIS, 
Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS) 

Slit Wheel Assembly

Collimation Mirror

Correction Mirror and Mechanism

Calibration Input Mechanism

Calibration 

Subsystem

Camera Mirror (5)

CCD Electronics Box

Echelle (4)

Mode Isolation Shutter

Corrector 

Mirror

Grating 

Wheel 

Assembly

Optical 

Bench

MAMA Detectors

Main Electronics 

Boxes

CCD Detector

CCD Shutter

Echelle Blocker

Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph

Time on HST:

13 February 1997–present 

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

Principal Investigator:

Bruce Woodgate (GSFC

Weight: 318 kilograms 

(700 pounds)

Axial Instrument

Work on the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph goes back to the 1970s, when

development began on Multi-Anode Microchannel Array (MAMA) digital detectors 

for use in spectrographs attached to space telescopes. STIS was originally slated 

to be installed on HST during the first servicing mission, but this was put back to 

SM2 as a result of the decisions to install WFPC2 and COSTAR on Hubble during SM1.

150 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

NICMOS, and the FGS. Ground trainers at Goddard and elsewhere were 

used to prepare astronauts for difficult tasks.15

AN UPGRADE MISSION

STS-82 built on the experience of its famous servicing predecessor mission, 

STS-61, but there was an important difference, as Hawley explained, “Whereas 

STS-61 was a repair mission, STS-82, Servicing Mission 2, was an upgrade 

mission.”16 The mission began at the scheduled date and time when the Shuttle 

Discovery departed Launch Complex 39A at Kennedy Space Center at 3:56 

a.m. EST on 11 February 1997. Two days later, Hawley grabbed HST with the 

robotic arm and berthed it in the Flight Support System fixture in Discovery’s 

payload bay. Hawley noticed that Hubble looked “weathered” since he had last 

seen it seven years earlier, with the solar arrays marked by impacts from micrometeoroids and orbital debris. The solar array damage was expected because 
STIS’s internal optics are designed to compensate for the effects of spherical aberration in HST’s main mirror.a

STIS is equipped with three 1,024 by 1,024 detectors operating from the ultraviolet 

to the near infrared, 1,150 to 10,300 angstroms. It is used for a variety of investigations, including galactic nuclei and galactic nebulae. One detector is a CCD, and 

two others are MAMA detectors operating in ultraviolet wavelengths, one in the near 

ultraviolet and the other in the far ultraviolet. While STIS can be used at the same

time as other instruments, only one of its detectors can be used at a time. STIS has 

15 spectroscopic modes for use in a variety of ultraviolet and visible wavelengths.b

STIS experienced a power supply failure in August 2004, and after nearly five years of 

suspended operations, it was repaired in May 2009 in Servicing Mission 4. Its detectors have operated well since that time.

STIS has imaged aurorae on solar system planets such as Jupiter, Saturn, and 

Uranus; obtained ultraviolet spectra of distant supernovae, galaxies and nebulae; 

and searched for evidence of black holes. 

a J. Gethyn Timothy, “Review of Multianode Microchannel Array Detector Systems,” Journal of 

Astronomical Telescopes, Instruments, and Systems 2 no. 3, 030901 (July–September 2016).

b Space Telescope Science Institute, Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph Instrument 

Handbook for Cycle 24, Version 15.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, January 2016).

CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

the solar array returned from the first servicing mission showed evidence of 

more than 80,000 particle impacts from its 43 months on orbit.17

The next day Hawley and Tanner were surprised while depressurizing 

Discovery’s new exterior airlock, which had been installed before the flight 

during a major upgrade. Air passing through an airlock vent pointing toward 

HST caused the solar arrays to rotate more than 90 degrees, but their fears 

that the arrays were damaged proved unfounded. The solar array rotation 

added to controllers’ and astronauts’ concerns about the flexible arrays, which 

like the original arrays, appeared susceptible to damage during EVAs and 

Shuttle maneuvers. Mission control decided to allow the first EVA to proceed. 

Astronauts Lee and Smith installed STIS and NICMOS after removing GHRS 

and FOS. The next day, Harbaugh and Tanner changed out the troubled Fine 

Guidance Sensor 1 with the refurbished FGS test unit, and they installed an 

Optical Control Electronics Enhancement Kit to improve the operation of the 
152 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

new FGS. They also changed out an Engineering and Science Tape Recorder 

with a backup tape recorder. Before Harbaugh and Tanner ended their EVA, 

commander Bowersox and pilot Horowitz fired Discovery’s steering jets to raise 

HST’s altitude by 2 miles (3.2 kilometers) to compensate for drag on HST 

from the atmosphere even at that altitude. The two spacewalking astronauts 

remained in the Shuttle’s payload bay, tethered and holding on to a railing, in 

case the burn caused Hubble’s solar arrays to bend, which didn’t happen.18

During EVA three, Lee and Smith replaced a Data Interface Unit with an 

upgraded unit, an Engineering and Science Tape Recorder with a solid state 

recorder, and one of the four Reaction Wheel Assemblies that use spin momentum to move the telescope toward a target and maintain it in a stable position. 

The 7-hour, 11-minute spacewalk also included another burn to raise HST’s 

orbit, and time for the astronauts to inspect HST’s thermal insulation. After 

the EVA, Mission Control decided to add a fifth spacewalk to repair some of 

the multi-layered insulation that had degraded and cracked from exposure to 

the low-Earth orbit space environment. This included sunlight unfiltered by 

the atmosphere and the effects of atomic oxygen, which even at Hubble’s high 

altitude can damage many materials. The broken insulation raised concerns 

that pieces could enter the telescope and cause uneven heating of HST systems 

that could damage them.19

Harbaugh and Tanner replaced an electrical drive unit for one of the solar 

arrays and installed new thermal covers over the telescope’s magnetometers 

during the fourth spacewalk, replacing the jury-rigged covers that had been 

assembled and installed during the STS-61 mission. Before their STS-82 spacewalk ended, Harbaugh snapped a photo of Tanner with the Sun, Earth, and 

part of Discovery in the background, which became one of the better-known 

astronaut photos of the Shuttle Program. During that spacewalk, Horowitz and 

Lee assembled some insulation blankets of their own inside Discovery’s cabin, 

and during the fifth and final EVA of the mission, Lee and Smith attached 

the new blankets to three equipment compartments on Hubble. While HST 

was attached to Discovery, Bowersox and Horowitz fired the Shuttle’s thrusters a third time to raise its orbit and that of HST. Once the repairs were 

completed, Hawley released HST to fly free in its own orbit. Discovery and 

its crew returned to Kennedy Space Center on 21 February after 10 days in 

space.20 STS-82 added to NASA’s experience base for the ISS, which began 

operations late the following year. Tanner, who went on to carry out EVAs in 

two ISS construction missions, explained that during STS-82, both astronauts 

in each spacewalk stayed together during every task, while during his ISS 

spacewalks, NASA’s confidence had grown to the point where spacewalking 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

astronauts were allowed to carry out different work at different locations at 

the same time. “We probably could have done more tasks if we’d split, but we 

weren’t comfortable enough as an organization at that time to multitask on 

HST. We did it all the time on station later, but we were all more mature in 

our abilities by that time.”21

With its emphasis on installing new instruments and upgrading HST, STS82 lived up to the hopes NASA had for Hubble servicing missions. When the 

mission returned to Earth, the engineers and technicians who made it possible began preparations for the third servicing mission. Scientists calibrated 

the newly installed instruments, STIS and NICMOS, and began to obtain data 

using the new capabilities these instruments offered. After the three years 

of relatively smooth operation that marked the three years between the first 

and second servicing missions, the months that followed SM2 offered some 

unhappy surprises.

PROBLEMS AND PREPARATIONS

STIS and NICMOS both remained onboard Hubble for the rest of its operational life. STIS got off to a good start and remains operational at the time of 

writing, although power supply failures meant that it was shut off from 2004 

to 2009, when astronauts repaired it. STIS has been used for many research 

programs, including successful searches for black holes at the centers of galaxies, learning about the evolution of clouds of hydrogen gas in the areas between 

galaxies, making the first direct chemical analysis of the atmosphere of an 

exoplanet, and finding evidence for water in the Jovian moons Europa and 

Ganymede.22 NICMOS was a different story. When NICMOS began its longawaited observations in the infrared, it soon became clear that the instrument 

was suffering from a thermal short that had the effect of warming the frozen 

nitrogen at a faster rate than planned. This meant that the instrument would 

only be useful for about a year and a half. AURA organized an independent science review at NASA’s request in May 1997, and the review recommended that 

since early observations from NICMOS had already shown scientific promise, 

further NICMOS observations should be given priority while the frozen nitrogen supply was still available. Goddard engineers proposed that a new type of 

mechanical cooler known as a Reverse Brayton Cycle Cryocooler for NICMOS 

be tested and installed, an idea that was endorsed by the review because of 

the scientific value of NICMOS and the low estimated cost of the new system, 

about $6 million, compared to the money already spent on NICMOS, about 

$105 million. Based on those recommendations, NASA proceeded with work on 

a cryocooler for installation in an upcoming servicing mission.23
154 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

▲ The seven STS-95 crew members pose for their in-flight crew portrait. Astronaut Curtis L. 

Brown, Jr., commander, appears at right center in the pyramid. Others, clockwise from 

there, are Steven W. Lindsey, pilot; Stephen K. Robinson, mission specialist; Pedro Duque, 

mission specialist representing the European Space Agency (ESA); payload specialist 

Chiaki Mukai, who represents Japan’s National Space Development Agency (NASDA); 

Scott E. Parazynski, mission specialist; and United States Senator John H. Glenn, Jr. (DOH), payload specialist. (NASA: sts095-328-031) Inset: STS-95 crew insignia. (NASA: sts095-S-001)

To test the new cryocooler in the environment of low-Earth orbit along 

with other components destined for HST, Goddard’s HST Flight Systems and 

Servicing Project Manager Frank Cepollina suggested the creation of the HST 

Orbital Systems Test (HOST) platform. A team he assembled at Goddard 

worked long hours for 16 months preceding the launch of the Shuttle Discovery 

from pad 39B at KSC on 29 October 1998. The 10-day flight of STS-95 would 

have passed with little public notice if the crew had not included the first 

American to orbit Earth, Senator John H. Glenn, Jr. At age 77, Glenn became 

the oldest person to fly into space when he launched on Discovery 36 years after 

his first flight in the Mercury program, and he served as the subject of several 

life sciences experiments. Inside the HOST unit that was located in Discovery’s 

payload bay, the cryocooler passed its test in the harsh conditions of space and 

was cleared for installation on HST. HOST also flew a new computer based on 

Intel 80486 processor technology, with twice the memory and three times the 

speed of the Intel 80386 coprocessor installed on HST during the first servicing 

mission. That coprocessor had increased the available memory by 32 times and 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

processor speed 13 times over HST’s original DF-224 computer. While personal 

computers based on 486 chips were already passing out of fashion in the late 

1990s, the 486 was well known and well tested in the eyes of NASA. HST’s 

new computer passed a battery of tests on Earth and its test in space on HOST 

to verify that it would function properly in the radiation environment of Earth 

orbit. HOST also carried a solid-state recorder on board similar to the recorder 

installed on SM2, which had shown errors thought to be caused by high-energy 

protons that are present at HST altitudes in the South Atlantic Anomaly, where 

the inner Van Allen radiation belt comes closest to Earth. Although STS-95 

flew in a lower orbit than HST, the two radiation environments and their effect 

on the recorders could be compared, and the newer recorder was deemed to be 

fit for installation on HST.24

With the successful conclusion of the HOST mission late in 1998, NASA 

turned to preparations for the third Hubble servicing mission. Earlier that year in 

July, NASA announced that four astronauts were assigned to carry out a recordbreaking six EVAs during the STS-104 mission, which was scheduled for flight 

on Columbia in May 2000. Steven Smith, a veteran of SM2, was named payload 

commander. Other spacewalkers named for the mission were Michael C. Foale, 

who had recently completed a long-term flight on the Mir Space Station; ESA 

astronaut Claude Nicollier, who had operated the Shuttle’s robotic arm during 

the first HST servicing mission; and John M. Grunsfeld, an astronomer with two 

Shuttle flights to his credit. This assignment began Grunsfeld’s long association 

with HST as an astronaut, NASA official and astronomer. Plans for the mission 

included installing a new science instrument, the Advanced Camera for Surveys 

(ACS), on board HST in the place of the FOC, and installation of a refurbished 

Fine Guidance Sensor and new solar arrays, along with the equipment tested on 

the HOST unit.25 But as NASA prepared for SM3, a familiar but more urgent 

problem reared its head on board Hubble. The telescope’s six gyroscopes, which 

were needed for HST and its controllers to know which way it was pointing, were 

operating well at the time of SM2 in 1997. But one of the gyros failed later that 

year, followed by another in 1998. Early in 1999, a third gyroscope began acting 

abnormally. HST was not designed to operate properly with fewer than three 

gyroscopes. Each gyroscope contains a wheel that spins at 19,200 rpm enclosed 

inside a sealed cylinder floating inside a liquid with the thickness of motor oil. 

The wheel gets its power from extremely thin wires that pass through the fluid. 

In the failed gyroscopes, NASA engineers concluded that the fluid corroded the 

wires and caused them to break because the air used to force the fluid into the 

instrument cavity contained oxygen. By using nitrogen rather than air in the 

future, engineers hoped to avoid corrosion in newer gyroscopes flying on HST.26
156 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

On 10 March 1999, NASA announced that the work of the third servicing 

mission would be divided into two missions designated as servicing missions 3A 

and 3B, and that the first would fly to HST in 1999 to perform the most critical repairs such as replacing all six gyroscopes, a Fine Guidance Sensor, and 

HST’s computer. “When Hubble reached the point of having no backup gyros, 

our flight rules said we must look at what we term a ‘call-up mission’ to correct 

the situation,” said John H. Campbell, the HST program manager at NASA 

Goddard. Since preparations for a servicing mission were already well under 

way, he said HST managers decided that the best thing to do was to divide the 

next servicing mission into two missions, with one moved ahead on the schedule into 1999.27 NASA had created plans for what were also known as Launch 

on Need Shuttle missions, generally using the hardware from a mission being 

processed for the next regular mission for a special purpose. NASA developed 

four of these plans during the early days of the Shuttle Program, including two 

believed to be for national security needs involving the Shuttle. A third Launch 

on Need mission was designated to “restore the capability” of HST, and a fourth 

was planned for contingencies during space station missions.28 Two days after 

NASA announced the flight of Servicing Mission 3A, also designated as STS103, it named a flight crew for the mission, including the four EVA astronauts 

already in training for the next Hubble servicing mission. NASA also selected 

Curtis L. Brown, Jr., a veteran of five Shuttle missions, including the HOST 

mission, as mission commander, rookie Scott J. Kelly as pilot, and experienced 

ESA astronaut Jean-Francois Clervoy as arm operator.29

A SHUTTLE RESCUE MISSION

At the time it was announced, HST Servicing Mission 3A was scheduled to fly 

in October 1999, but this flight faced an unprecedented series of complications 

that started when inspectors discovered wiring problems inside Columbia after 

it had launched the Chandra X-Ray Observatory in late July, causing the entire 

Shuttle fleet to be grounded for months while the problems were investigated 

and fixed. The hurricane season that fall also complicated launch preparations 

for SM3A. By the time HST’s fourth gyroscope failed on 13 November, putting HST into safe mode and forcing a halt to HST science operations, the 

launch of STS-103 on Discovery had slipped to 6 December. With HST’s deteriorating condition, NASA was anxious to get this flight completed as soon as 

possible, and in the words of Scott Kelly, “It was mentally draining to keep 

working toward a date that slipped away, then bring our full energy to the next 

announced date.” The upcoming holiday season added a complication unlike 

any other: Because the year would roll over from 1999 to 2000, NASA had 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

◂ Space Shuttle 

Discovery, atop the 

mobile launcher 

platform and crawler 

transporter, nears the 

top of Launch Pad 39B 

after the trek from 

the Vehicle Assembly 

Building. (NASA: 

KSC-99pp1305)

▸ The seven astronauts of 

STS-103 during their flight 

to service HST in December 

1999. In front are, left to 

right, Claude Nicollier, 

Scott J. Kelly, and John M. 

Grunsfeld. Behind them are 

astronauts Steven L. Smith, 

C. Michael Foale, Curtis 

L. Brown, Jr., and JeanFrancois Clervoy. 

(NASA: sts103-397-035)

◂ SM3A insignia from GSFC. (NASA)

▸ STS-103 crew 

insignia. (NASA)
158 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

to deal with widespread concern in government and industry about computer 

program operations. Many computer programs used only two digits to designate 

the year, not anticipating the problems that could arise if a computer got the 

year 2000 mixed up with 1900. NASA decided that the Shuttle must not be flying or even be powered up when the year changed to avoid what was popularly 

known as the Y2K bug.30 While most Shuttle Program computers had been 

updated to protect against the Y2K bug, that did not include equipment at the 

backup Shuttle landing site at Edwards Air Force Base. SM3A was originally 

planned to include four spacewalks during a flight of 10 days duration. Further 

problems with Discovery’s wiring and propellant lines delayed the launch to 

18 December, and at that point NASA management cut the mission to eight 

days with only three EVAs to make sure it got home before the New Year. Due 

to a one-day weather delay that nearly caused NASA to postpone the mission to 

January, the mission of STS-103 didn’t launch from Pad 39B at KSC until 7:50 

p.m. EST on 19 December 1999.31

Two days later, Discovery and its crew caught up with the stricken Hubble, 

and Clervoy used the remote manipulator arm to berth the space telescope on 

the Flight Support System inside the Shuttle’s payload bay. Smith and Grunsfeld 

performed the first spacewalk the next day, successfully changing out the three 

Rate Sensor Units containing HST’s six gyroscopes. The two astronauts also 

installed six Voltage/Temperature Improvement Kits to prevent overcharging of 

HST’s six batteries, and then opened coolant valves on NICMOS to ensure that 

all of its nitrogen coolant was purged in preparation for work on the instrument 

during the next servicing mission. The EVA lasted eight hours rather than the 

scheduled six hours. “All along the way...we encountered various small problems with bolts that were frozen, boxes that didn’t fit right, and doors that were 

tough to close,” Grunsfeld explained. Despite problems with one of the retired 

Rate Sensor Units and the NICMOS valves, he and Smith met all their goals 

for the space walk.32

A day later on 23 December, Foale and Nicollier replaced HST’s late 1970s 

vintage DF-224 computer with the new and more powerful computer tested during the HOST mission. They then removed the balky Fine Guidance Sensor 2 

and replaced it with the original FGS1 that had been returned to Earth in 1997, 

refurbished and renamed FGS2r. The third and final EVA on Christmas Eve got 

off to a difficult start when Grunsfeld’s spacesuit developed a battery problem 

that required him to change into Foale’s spacesuit converted to Grunsfeld’s size. 

Then Grunsfeld and Smith installed the new solid state recorder in place of a 

reel-to-reel data recorder and a new S-band Single Access Transmitter. Since 

the transmitter was not designed to be replaced, the job required special tools. 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

The two astronauts wound up their work by installing new insulation materials 

on the two equipment bay doors. Using the robotic arm, Clervoy unberthed and 

released HST on Christmas Day. After the crew of STS-103 became the first 

Shuttle crew to mark that holiday on orbit, Discovery landed safely at Kennedy 

Space Center on the evening of 27 December, four days ahead of the dreaded 

Y2K bug.33 Servicing Mission 3A stood out from the other servicing missions 

because it installed no new scientific instruments on board HST. Underlined 

by the fact that the failure of four gyroscopes meant NASA had suspended 

HST’s science operations, STS-103 turned out to be a dramatic rescue mission 

that solved several urgent problems with Hubble’s systems. Other major tasks 

remained for Servicing Mission 3B.

Hubble’s new and repaired equipment checked out after the STS-103 crew 

returned home, and nearly a month later, NASA marked HST’s return to normal operations with dramatic new images of planetary nebula NGC 2392 and 

a massive cluster of galaxies known as Abell 2218. Three months later in April, 

NASA celebrated ten years of Hubble operations. During that decade, HST 

made 271,000 individual observations of 13,670 objects and returned 3.5 terabytes of data, resulting in more than 2,651 astronomical papers. The U.S. Postal 

Service marked the anniversary with five commemorative stamps featuring 

HST images of celestial objects.34

A NEW CAMERA AND NEW EQUIPMENT

On 28 September 2000, NASA named the first crew members for Servicing 

Mission 3B. To perform spacewalks during the STS-109 mission, then scheduled 

for late 2001, the agency named three veteran astronauts, including Grunsfeld 

as payload commander, James H. Newman and Richard M. Linnehan, along 

with first-time flyer Michael G. Massimino. The following March, the crew of 

STS-109 was filled out with commander Scott D. Altman, a two-time Shuttle 

veteran, first-time pilot Duane G. Carey, and arm operator Nancy J. Currie, 

who had extensive experience with the Shuttle robotic arm in her three previous flights. NASA charged the crew of the upcoming mission with installing 

the Advanced Camera for Surveys, fixing NICMOS, and replacing HST’s solar 

arrays and its power control unit.35

Scientists looked forward to the installation of the ACS in SM3B. Development 

of the instrument dated back to March 1992 when NASA Program Scientist Ed 

Weiler invited STScI to carry out a study with the astronomical community for 

an advanced camera to be installed during what was envisioned as the third full 

servicing mission in 1999. The study, which had support from the European 

Space Agency, led to a formal proposal in May 1993 for what became the ACS. 
The proposal looked in depth at scientific priorities and technical issues around 

the instrument. With WFPC2 likely to be aging at that point, “an adequate 

optical and ultraviolet imaging capability will not be assured in 1999.” The proposal also assumed that an advanced camera would be able to exploit advances 

in detector and computer technologies during the 1990s.36 When NASA issued 

an Announcement of Opportunity in 1993 for a new instrument, it received a 

proposal from a team led by Holland Ford of Johns Hopkins University, along 

with competing proposals from STScI, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, and the 

Goddard Space Flight Center. In December 1994, NASA chose the proposal 

for an advanced camera led by Ford and his team.37 ACS would take the place 

of the ESA’s FOC, the last original instrument on board the telescope. After 

having been used to obtain close-ups of all classes of astronomical objects from 

Pluto and its moons to stellar atmospheres and the cores of distant galaxies, 

FOC had been decommissioned in 1999 due to low demand.38

Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS)

M3 Fold 

Mechanism

HRC Corrector 

Mechanism M1

Calibration Door—

Coronagraph Mechanism

HRC/SBC 

Calibration 

Platform

HRC Detector

HRC Shutter 

Mechanism Enclosure

SBC 

Detector IM2 and M2 

Corrector 

Mirrors

WFC 

Detector

WFC Shutter 

Mechanism “Y” Fitting

Optical 

Bench

CEBs Electrical 

Interface 

Connectors

Advanced Camera for Surveys

Time on HST:

7 March 2002–present 

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

Principal Investigator:

Holland Ford 

(Johns Hopkins University)

Weight: 397 kilograms 

(875 pounds)

Axial Instrument

The Advanced Camera for Surveys is equipped with three channels: the Wide Field

Channel operating in wavelengths from visible to near-ultraviolet wavelengths 

of 3,500 to 11,000 angstroms, the High Resolution Channel for near ultraviolet to 

near infrared wavelengths of 1,700 to 11,000 angstroms, and a Solar Blind Channel 

160 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS
The Advanced Camera for Surveys was equipped with three channels, 

including a wide field channel that could be used to survey the sky in search 

of galaxies and galaxy clusters. This channel had the capability to detect red 

light coming from red-shifted objects in distant parts of the universe. A highresolution channel was designed to obtain detailed images of inner regions of 

galaxies and to take part in the search for exoplanets. The solar blind channel 

was sensitive to shorter wavelengths of light in the ultraviolet, but not to optical wavelengths where the Sun is brightest. The wide field and high-resolution 

channels each used a 4096 by 2048 pixel CCD operating in wavelengths from 

1,700 angstroms in the ultraviolet to 11,000 angstroms in the near infrared. 

The Solar Blind Channel used a 1024 by 1025 pixel MAMA detector operating 

in the ultraviolet that had been a flight spare for the MAMAs used in STIS. 

The CCDs on ACS provided a five-fold improvement in sensitivity and covered 

twice as much area per exposure as WFPC2.39

operating from 1,150 to 1,700 angstroms. In addition to imaging, the ACS is also 

capable of spectroscopy and polarimetry in all channels, and coronagraphy with 

the High Resolution Channel.

The Wide Field and High Resolution Channels use CCDs and the Solar Blind Channel

uses a Far Ultraviolet Multi-Anode Microchannel Array (MAMA) detector, which was 

originally a flight spare for STIS. The Wide Field and High Resolution channels share

two filter wheels and the Solar Blind Channel has its own filter wheel. The instrument’s internal optics are adapted to compensate for HST’s spherical aberration.

ACS experienced failures in its CCD electronics box and low voltage power supply in June 2006 and January 2007. Servicing Mission 4 astronauts installed new 

components in ACS in May 2009, which restored the Wide Field Channel but not

the High Resolution Channel. The Solar Blind Channel was not affected by the 

electrical problems.a

Because ACS has greater resolution and twice the field of view of WFPC2, it became

HST’s primary imaging instrument until WFPC2 was replaced in 2009 by WFC3. It ha

taken many memorable images of near and distant objects, including the “Hubble 

Ultra Deep Field” in 2003 and 2004.

a Space Telescope Science Institute, Advanced Camera for Surveys Instrument Handbook for 

Cycle 24, Version 15.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, January 2016).

CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments
162 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

▲ Payload processing workers in Kennedy Space Center’s Vertical Processing Facility (VPF) 

prepare to integrate the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS), suspended 

at center, into the Orbiter Replacement Unit (ORU) Carrier and Scientific Instrument 

Protective Enclosure (SIPE) for a flight on board STS-82 for installation on HST during 

Servicing Mission 2 in 1997. (NASA: 97e00003)

The STS-109 astronauts were also assigned to repair NICMOS, which had 

stopped operating prematurely on 3 January 1999 after nearly two years of operation when its supply of frozen nitrogen evaporated. Engineers and scientists 

at NASA Goddard in partnership with the contractor Creare Inc. devised the 

Reverse Brayton Cycle Cryocooler for NICMOS and tested it on HOST on 

STS-95. The new NICMOS Cooling System used neon gas in a closed loop and 

a compressor with a miniature turbine to cool NICMOS’ detectors to minus 

203 C or 70 K with minimal vibration, an important consideration on HST. 

Although the temperature was warmer than the minus 215 with the original 

cooler, the temperature was more constant. The STS-109 astronauts would 

install the new cooling system on NICMOS to restore its full function.40

Another high priority for SM3B was installing HST’s third set of solar arrays. 

The first two sets were silicon solar arrays made by British Aerospace as part 

of ESA’s contributions to Hubble. These flexible arrays were designed to unroll 

during HST deployment, and NASA and ESA planned that they could roll up 

and be stowed during EVAs and when the Shuttle boosted HST into higher 

orbits. The original solar arrays caused the jitter that afflicted HST and led to 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

▾ This photo of HST was taken from 

Columbia as its robotic arm lifted the 

observatory from the cargo bay for its 

release back into orbit on 9 March 2002. 

(NASA: s109E5873)

◂ On the Space Shuttle 

Columbia’s middeck, the 

crew members of the 

March 2002 HST servicing 

mission, STS-109, pose 

for the traditional in-flight 

portrait. From left to right 

(front row) are Nancy J. 

Currie, mission specialist; 

Scott D. Altman, mission 

commander; and Duane 

G. Carey, pilot. From left 

to right (back row) are 

payload commander John 

M. Grunsfeld, Richard 

M. Linnehan, James H. 

Newman, and Michael J. 

Massimino, all mission 

specialists. (NASA: s109e6032)

◂ STS-109 crew insignia. (NASA)

◂ SM3B insignia from GSFC. (NASA)
164 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

their removal during SM1 in 1993, during which one of the arrays would not 

roll up. Although there was discussion of installing a different type of array 

during SM1, the second set was similar to the first, with changes to eliminate 

the jitter, but they quickly exhibited a twisting motion that caused continued 

concern about possible problems during servicing EVAs and reboost maneuvers 

during servicing missions. Despite these problems, the arrays had worked for 

eight years, well beyond their five-year design lifetime.41

NASA Goddard arranged for new rigid gallium arsenide solar arrays for HST 

that were one third smaller than the first two sets of silicon arrays but produced 

20 percent more power. The new arrays used solar panels built in a Lockheed 

Martin production line for the fleet of first generation Iridium communications 

satellites. NASA Goddard personnel then attached the panels to lightweight 

aluminum-lithium wing structures they built for installation on HST. The new 

solar arrays’ smaller area reduced drag, decreasing the rate at which HST’s orbit 

would decay. ESA supplied new Solar Array Drive Mechanisms for the third 

set of arrays. The new solar arrays were due to be installed in tandem with a 

replacement for HST’s Power Control Unit, which controls the telescope’s electrical system. The unit needed to be replaced in anticipation of HST’s extended 

lifetime on orbit. This job promised to be particularly challenging because the 

unit was not designed to be replaced, and the job would involve powering HST 

off for the first time since its launch. Indeed, the job might have been impossible 

without the work of the STS-31 spacewalkers Bruce McCandless and Kathryn 

Sullivan, who years before had worked with Lockheed and Marshall engineers 

to change how and where the unit was attached to the HST structure.42

SERVICING MISSION 3B

For the first time, the original Shuttle to fly in space, Columbia, was used for 

a Hubble servicing mission. Coming off a lengthy refit, Columbia’s scheduled 

launch on STS-109 slipped from late 2001 into the following year. NASA 

decided on a final major postponement to 28 February when problems appeared 

with a Reaction Wheel Assembly on HST, and astronauts needed time to train 

for the additional task of replacing the assembly. Following an additional oneday delay due to weather, Columbia and its crew lifted off from KSC Pad 

39A in the predawn darkness at 6:22 a.m. EST on 1 March. Two days later, 

Currie grappled HST with the Shuttle’s robotic arm and parked it on the Flight 

Support System in the payload bay. In preparation for their replacement, both 

solar arrays rolled up on command.43

During the first EVA the next day, Grunsfeld and Linnehan removed the 

solar array on HST’s starboard side and replaced it with a new array. The two 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

astronauts had to arrange tools and other aids at the start of the spacewalk, 

and this task and the complex work of removing the old solar array and its 

electronics and installing the new one took nearly seven hours. The astronauts 

had spent long hours training in the Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory and virtual 

reality simulators to prepare to move the large and heavy new panels, which in 

common with everything else, retain their mass properties such as momentum 

in the conditions of microgravity. Massimino, who with Newman repeated the 

replacement operation with the port solar array in the second EVA the next day, 

compared the job to moving a king-sized mattress. Massimino was holding the 

array while standing on a platform at the end of Columbia’s robotic arm, and he 

considered the task of slowly rotating the array in the blackness of a night pass 

the toughest test he faced in the mission. “Inch by inch, I rotated the array until 

finally it was in the proper position. I felt the sweetest relief.” The solar array 

replacement went well, and Massimino and Newman also replaced Hubble’s 

troubled Reaction Wheel Assembly.44

During the third spacewalk, controllers took the unprecedented action of 

powering HST down completely in preparation to replace HST’s Power Control 

Unit. Mike Wenz of Lockheed Martin and other experts at the Space Telescope 

Operations Control Center at Goddard spent months preparing power down 

procedures and for restoring power to HST. The telescope’s time without power 

had to be minimized because of the cold of space during much of each orbit. 

The controllers had already begun the lengthy procedure, which was known as 

“Super Proc,” to power HST down when Grunsfeld announced from inside the 

Shuttle airlock that the life support unit in his spacesuit was leaking water and 

had to be exchanged for parts from another spacesuit before he and Linnehan 

could begin the spacewalk. The controllers halted the shutdown procedures 

and temporarily returned power to some equipment until the two astronauts 

were ready to pass through Columbia’s airlock and begin their work. Despite 

the two-hour delay, HST was powered down for the first time in 12 years on 

orbit, and Grunsfeld and Linnehan undertook the difficult and intricate work 

of swapping the old and new power units with their 36 electrical connection 

points, using specially designed tools for the job. Many of the connectors were 

difficult to see, but equipped with special tools, the two astronauts were able 

to complete the work. The fact that Grunsfeld was left handed and could use 

both hands for such complicated work helped him with this difficult job. Soon 

the Goddard controllers restored power to HST and verified that the new power 

control unit was properly installed.45

In EVA four, Newman and Massimino pulled the Faint Object Camera out 

of Hubble’s axial bay for stowage on the Shuttle and then installed ACS in 
166 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

its place. The two astronauts also began the work of installing an electronics module for the new NICMOS cryocooler, which, Linnehan and Grunsfeld 

installed the next day during the fifth EVA of the mission. During that spacewalk, the two astronauts installed the new Cryocooler on NICMOS and added 

a radiator for the new unit on the exterior of HST’s aft shroud, which was a 

difficult job due to misaligned latches. They completed the job by making electrical and plumbing connections between the cryocooler and radiator. With the 

repairs completed and verified, HST was released and Columbia and her crew 

returned to Earth after nearly 12 days in space.46 In an online commentary 

on STS-109’s final spacewalk, Grunsfeld said, “I gave Hubble a final small tap 

goodbye, and wished it well on its journey of discovery. It is likely I will never 

see the Hubble Space Telescope again, but I have been touched by its magic 

and changed forever.”47 Having made two visits to HST, Grunsfeld was moving 

on to management work after STS-109. He did not know then that the surprising turns taken by HST through its existence—and his personal contact with 

Hubble—were far from over.

▲ The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) returns to its normal observing routine after a week 

of servicing and upgrading by the STS-109 astronaut crew aboard the Space Shuttle 

Columbia in March 2002. Following that mission, HST was equipped with its third set of 

solar arrays, which are smaller than the first two sets. (NASA: STS109-331-010)
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

When Columbia landed at Kennedy Space Center at the end of SM3B, 

HST managers were already making preparations for the fifth servicing mission. WFPC2 was getting old and NASA was building another new camera 

for Hubble. With all the other instruments on HST equipped with their own 

corrective optics, COSTAR was no longer needed, and NASA, the University 

of Colorado, and Ball Aerospace experts were building a new instrument, the 

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), to take its place.

A NEW OBSERVATORY

After four servicing missions, HST concluded its twelfth year on orbit with a 

full suite of scientific instruments that were not there when it was launched. 

SM3B installed a new instrument, ACS, and restored NICMOS to good health. 

ACS has produced many important HST images in the years since its installation, including major contributions to the Hubble Ultra Deep Field, but it suffered an electrical short in 2007 that required repairs. The new cooling system 

in NICMOS worked as hoped, and NICMOS provided HST with important 

capabilities in the infrared until it failed in 2008. The instrument operated 

for eight years with both coolers, far longer than the four and a half years 

originally planned, allowing scientists to use the instrument for a wide range 

of observations.

HST Senior Project Scientist David Leckrone gave two Goddard experts 

credit for the successful NICMOS restoration with the new cryocooler. One 

was Ed Cheng, a physicist and engineer who played a major role in creating 

the new cryocooler when it was needed. Another was Frank Cepollina, who 

convinced NICMOS designers years before to add valves to NICMOS’ internal 

coolant lines in case someone wanted to restore NICMOS’ cooling function. 

The valves made possible the replacement of the cooling system.48 Cepollina 

and his group at Goddard made the three servicing missions outlined in this 

chapter possible, especially tasks that hadn’t been anticipated when HST was 

built, such as the NICMOS cryocooler and replacing the Power Control Unit in 

SM3B. The roles of both Cheng and Cepollina in HST were far from over when 

STS-109 completed its work on Hubble.

Hubble’s first four servicing missions took place while Daniel S. Goldin 

served as NASA Administrator from 1992 to 2001. While he was associated 

with the concept of “faster, better, cheaper” spacecraft, Goldin pointed out in 

an interview that the laws of physics sometimes demand that the spacecraft be 

bigger, such as Hubble or the James Webb Space Telescope. In a study of lowcost innovation at NASA during that time, Howard E. McCurdy wrote that the 

“faster, better, cheaper” approach was used for the Spitzer Space Telescope, the 
168 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

infrared Great Observatory that was launched in 2003 after the mission was 

redesigned and the spacecraft shrunk.49

▼ HST spectroscopy instruments

Faint Object 

Spectrograph

Goddard High 

Resolution 

Spectrograph

Space Telescope 

Imaging 

Spectrograph

Near Infrared 

Camera and 

Multi-Imaging 

Spectrometer

Cosmic Origins 

Spectrograph

Launch 1990 1990 1997 1997 2009

Return 1997 1997

Placement Axial Axial Axial Axial Axial

Detectors 2 digicon 

detectors

2 digicon 

detectors

1 CCD

2 MAMA*

3 HgCdTe 

detector arrays

1 photon 

counting 

detector 

1 MAMA

Wavelengths 1,150–8,500 

angstroms

1,150–3,200 

angstroms

1,150–10,300 

angstroms

8,000–25,000 

angstroms

1,150–3,000 

angstroms

Capabilities Used for 

observations of 

distant and faint 

objects

Used for 

spectroscopy in 

the ultraviolet

Used for both 

spectroscopy 

and imaging

Greatest 

sensitivity on 

HST in the 

infrared

Designed to 

complement the 

capabilities of 

STIS

▼ HST imaging instruments

Wide Field/

Planetary Camera

Wide Field 

Planetary 

Camera 2

Wide Field 

Camera 3

Faint Object 

Camera

Advanced Camera 

for Surveys

Launch 1990 1993 2009 1990 2002

Return 1993 2009 2002

Placement Radial Radial Radial Axial Axial

Detectors 8 CCDs 4 CCDs 2 CCDs 

1 IR detector

2 photon 

counters

3 CCDs

1 MAMA

Wavelengths 1,150–11,000 

angstroms

1,150–10,500 

angstroms

2,000–17,000 

angstroms

1,200–7,000 

angstroms

1,700–11,000 

angstroms

Capabilities Wide field and

narrower angle 

cameras

1 CCD higher 

resolution

Wider capability

in UV and IR

Used HST’s 

full resolution 

capabilities

Also capable of 

spectroscopy 

and polarimetry

* Multi-Anode Microchannel Array detector

With its new instruments, HST was far more capable than it was when it 

was first launched in 1990 and even more than it was after the 1993 repairs that 

overcame the flaw in its main mirror. In the words of Ken Sembach, STScI’s 

director starting in 2015, most people think of Hubble as a single observatory. 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

serviced. It’s a new observatory every time it’s been visited by humans.”50 The 

work and results of the servicing missions set HST apart from other space telescopes and other robotic spacecraft, but so was the scientific bounty of HST 

that was vastly enhanced by the work of the astronauts and the experts who 

backed them up.

ENDNOTES

 1 John K. Davies, Satellite Astronomy: The Principles and Practice of Astronomy from Space

(Chichester: Ellis Horwood Ltd., 1988), pp. 94–117.

 2 Davies, Satellite Astronomy, pp. 143–156; Edwin F. Erickson and Allan W. Meyer, NASA’s

Kuiper Airborne Observatory, 1971–1995: An Operations Retrospective With a View to 

SOFIA (Moffett Field, CA: NASA Ames Research Center, 2013).

 3 David Leckrone, oral history interview by author, 6 November 2015, part 2, pp. 3–4.

 4 NASA, “Announcement of Opportunity: Hubble Space Telescope,” 15 October 1984, 

OSSA-4-84, in Hubble Space Telescope Collection, Series 8, Box 1.1, file “Announcement 

of Opportunity, 1984,” JHU Library Special Collections. 

 5 E. J. Weiler, “Hubble Space Telescope Second Generation Instrument Selection,” Highlights of Astronomy, Vol. 8: As Presented at the XXth General Assembly of the International

Astronomical Union, 1988, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1989), pp. 441–442.

 6 Leckrone OHI, Ibid.; John Hutchings, oral history interview by author, 30 March 2015, p. 

12; Ted Gull, oral history interview by author, 12 May 2015, pp. 8–9; J. Gethyn Timothy, 

“Review of Multianode Microchannel Array Detector Systems,” Journal of Astronomical 

Telescopes, Instruments, and Systems 2(3), 030901 (July–September 2016).

 7 Timothy, “Review of MAMA Systems,” p. 6; Ed Weiler, personal communication with

author, 18 April 2017. Weiler added that most Shuttle manifests were subject to change

until launch was imminent.

 8 NASA Fact Sheet: HST Servicing Mission: Cost to Taxpayers, (Washington, DC: NASA Headquarters, August 1993); Timothy, “Review of MAMA systems,” p. 6; Leckrone OHI, pp.

5–6; Weiler, e-mail to author, 18 April 2017. See also STScI, “Report of the HST Science

Instrument Replacement Strategy Review, March 7, 1991,” STScI archive, Box 4.5, file 

“Attachment 1: Report of the HST Science Instrument Replacement Strategy Review,” 

JHU Library Special Collections. Brown and Ford, A Strategy for Recovery, p. 118, had 

WFPC2 flying in 1993, NICMOS in 1996, and STIS in 1999, but noted that this schedule

was then (early 1991) “under review.”

 9 “Minutes of the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Science Working Group, 15 February

1995,” Greenbelt, MD: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, STScI Archive, Box 1.14, file 

“Minutes of the HST Servicing Science Working Group, 15 Feb 1995,” “Statement of HST

Users Committee Concerning Development of COSTAR and the Advanced Scientific 
170 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Instruments of HST,” February 1991, Box 1.4, file “STIC, 11–12 Feb 1991,” JHU Library 

Special Collections.

10 NASA, “STS-82 Press Kit”; Timothy, “Review of MAMA systems.” 

11 NASA, “STS-82 Press Kit”; AURA, “Independent Science Review: NICMOS Cryocooler, 

September 10, 1997” STScI Archive, Box 1.10, file “American Astronomical Society (AAS), 

1994–1999,” JHU Library Special Collections.

12 NASA, “Space Shuttle Mission STS-82 Press Kit,” February 1997.

13 STScI, Fine Guidance Sensor Instrument Handbook for Cycle 24, Version 23, (Baltimore, 

MD: STScI, January 2016), p. 9. In 1989, Perkin-Elmer became known as Hughes Danbury 

Optical Systems after it was sold to Hughes Aircraft. Raytheon purchased the firm in 

1997 and sold it in 2002 to the Goodrich Corporation. It has been owned since 2012 by 

United Technologies Corporation.

14 NASA, “STS-82 Press Kit,” p. 18–21.

15 Joseph R. Tanner, oral history interview by author, 9 September 2015, pp. 4–5; Steven 

A. Hawley interviewed by Sandra Johnson, NASA Johnson Space Center Oral History 

Project, 14 January 2003, pp. 6–7; Sheffield OHI, part 1, pp. 5–6.

16 Stephen A. Hawley, “Foreword,” from David J. Shayler and David M. Harland, Enhancing 

Hubble’s Vision: Service Missions That Expanded Our View of the Universe (Chichester: 

Springer Praxis, 2016), p. xiii.

17 Hawley, “Foreword”; Hawley, “HST Solar Array Concerns,” p. 20.

18 Tanner OHI, pp. 9–16; NASA, “STS-82 Press Kit”; Johnson Space Center, STS-82 Mission 

Status Reports #9–#11, 15–16 February 1997; Hawley, “HST Solar Array Concerns,” pp. 

20–22. 

19 Tanner OHI, pp. 19–21; Johnson Space Center, STS-82 Mission Status Report #11, 16 

February 1997.

20 Tanner OHI, pp. 15–16, 19–21; Johnson Space Center, STS-82 Mission Status Report #13, 

17 February 1997. NASA JSC photo 82320029 is available at https://spaceflight.nasa.gov/

gallery/images/shuttle/sts-82/html/82320029.html.

21 Tanner OHI, pp. 14–15.

22 STScI, “The 20th Anniversary of the Hubble Space Telescope’s STIS Instrument,” news 

release STScI-2017-06, 28 February 2017; STScI, Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

Instrument Handbook for Cycle 24, Version 15.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, January 2016), p. 13.

23 STScI website, “Hubble Space Telescope NICMOS History,” http://www.stsci.edu/hst/

nicmos/design/history (accessed 19 April 2017); AURA, “Independent Science Review: 

NICMOS Cryocooler.”

24 NASA, “A Mission of Discovery: Space Shuttle Mission STS-95 Space Shuttle Press Kit,” 

October 1998; Ann Jenkins, “HOST Mission Accomplished!” Hubble Space Telescope 

Newsletter, Goddard Space Flight Center, 12, no. 9 (December 1998): 1–5; “Training 

Begins for Next Hubble Servicing Mission,” Goddard News 2 no. 31 (August 1998): 1; 

NASA, “Refining the Hubble Space Telescope’s View of the Universe,” Larry Dunham, 

e-mail to author, 13 February 2018; STS-103 “Space Shuttle Press Kit,” November 1999. 
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

The crew of STS-95 was made up of Curtis L. Brown, Jr., commander; Steven W. Lindsay,

pilot; and mission specialists Stephen K. Robinson, Scott E. Parazynski, Pedro Duque of 

the European Space Agency, Chiaki Mukai of the Japanese Space Agency, and Senator 

John H. Glenn. The mission ended on 7 November 1998 after nearly nine days in space.

25 “Training Begins for Next Hubble Servicing Mission,” Goddard News (August 1998); NASA 

News, “Training Begins for Crew of Next Hubble Space Telescope Mission,” release 

98-138, NASA Headquarters, 30 July 1998.

26 NASA, “STS-103 Press Kit.”

27 NASA News, “NASA Plans Early Servicing Mission to Hubble Space Telescope,” release 

99-38, NASA Headquarters, 10 March 1999. 

28 Dennis R. Jenkins, Space Shuttle: Developing an Icon, 1972–2013, Volume III—The Flight 

Campaign (South Forest Lake, MN: Specialty Press Inc., 2016), p. 339. The concept was 

modified after the Columbia accident in 2003, as will be discussed in chapter seven.

29 NASA News, “Shuttle Veterans Complete Hubble Servicing Crew,” release 99-41, NASA 

Headquarters, 12 March 1999.

30 Scott Kelly and Margaret Lazarus Dean, Endurance: A Year in Space, A Lifetime of Discovery (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2017), p. 217; NASA News, “Hubble Telescope Placed Into 

Safe Hold as Gyroscope Fails,” release 99-136, NASA Headquarters, 15 November 1999; 

Robin Suriano, “Hubble’s Wait Almost Over,” Florida Today (20 December 1999): 1. To get

a taste of the widespread nature of the concerns about the Y2K computer problem, see 

William J. Clinton, “Statement on Signing the Year 2000 Information and Readiness Disclosure Act,”19 October 1998, online at the American Presidency Project, http://www

presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55108 (accessed, 5 May 2017).

31 Kelly, Endurance, pp. 216–221; Suriano, “Hubble’s Wait Almost Over”; Lockheed Martin

Missiles and Space, Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 3A Media Reference Guide

(1999). The cancelled fourth EVA would have involved installation of insulation materials and protective covers on HST.

32 John Grunsfeld, Notes from Space: One Incredible Day, Dispatch #7 (Thursday December 

23), NASA Human Spaceflight website http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/archives/sts103/crew/grunsfeldreports/gr7.html (accessed 31 March 2016). 

33 Grunsfeld, Notes from Space; STS-103 Mission Control Center Status Reports; NASA, 

“STS-103 Press Kit.” STS-103 was the last of only three Shuttle missions in 1999.

34 NASA News, “Hubble Reopens Eye on the Universe,” NASA Headquarters, release 00-16, 

24 January 2000; “April 24 Marks a Triumphant Ten Years in Space for Hubble Telescope,” 

NASA Headquarters, release 00-59, 11 April 2000; “NASA, U.S. Postal Service Celebrate 

Hubble Space Telescope 10th Anniversary with Stamp Unveiling and Other Events,” 

NASA Headquarters, release N00-14, 4 April 2000.

35 NASA News, “Astronauts and Cosmonaut Named to Four Shuttle Missions in 2001,” 

NASA Headquarters, release 00-154, 28 September 2000; “Final Crew Members Named 

to Hubble Overhaul Mission,” NASA Headquarters, release 01-54, 26 March 2001.

36 Robert A. Brown, The Future of Space Imaging: Report of a Community-Based Study of an 

Advanced Camera for the Hubble Space Telescope (Baltimore: Space Telescope Science 
172 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Institute, 1993), p. viii. See also Holland Ford, oral history interview by author, 27 October 2015, pp. 15–18; Leckrone OHI, part 2, 14; Robert Brown, oral history interview by 

author, 14 December 2016, pp. 8–9.

37 Ed Weiler, personal communication with author, 3 May 2017; M. Clampin et al., “The

Advanced Camera for Surveys,” from P. Benvenuti, F. D. Macchetto, and E. J. Schreier, 

eds., Science with the Hubble Space Telescope—II (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 1996); letter 

from Wesley T. Huntress, Jr., NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science, to Holland Ford, JHU, 21 December 1994; News Release, “Hopkins, Space Telescope Scientists Design Advanced Hubble Camera,” Headlines@Hopkins, Johns Hopkins University, 30 December 1994.

38 STScI, “Space Telescope Users Committee Minutes of November 1997 Meeting,” 24 

November 1997. For more on FOC’s time on HST, see Andrew Wilson, ESA Achievements:

More than 30 Years of Pioneering SpaceActivity, 3rd Edition (Noordwijk: European Space 

Agency, 2005), pp. 128–133; and ESA News Release, “European Faint Object Camera on 

Hubble Sets World Record—Celebrating the Successes of ESA’s Sharp-Sighted Camera,” HEIC0204, 7 March 2002

39 NASA, “Rejuvenating the World’s Greatest Observatory, STS-109 Press Kit,” February

2001; STScI, Advanced Camera for Surveys Instrument Handbook for Cycle 24, Version 15.0

(Baltimore, MD: STScI, January 2016); Timothy, “Review of MAMA systems,” p. 17.

40 NASA, “STS-109 Press Kit,” pp. 34–35; STScI, Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 

Spectrometer Instrument Handbook for Cycle 17, Version 11.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, June 

2009), p. 7; STScI, Hubble Space Telescope NICMOS History, http://www.stsci.edu/hst/

nicmos/design/history (accessed 15 October 2017).

41 Wood notebooks, “Record IV,” 1 July 1991; Hawley, “HST Solar Array Concerns,” pp.

16–23.

42 NASA, “STS-109 Press Kit,” 32, 33, 36-38; Hawley, “HST Solar Array Concerns,” p. 23; ESA, 

“How Hubble Got Its Wings: 6. Hubble’s Second-Generation Arrays.” The second set of

arrays were each 39.67 by 9.75 feet, weighed 339 lbs., and generated 4600 Watts after six

years on orbit. The third set is 24.75 by eight feet, weighs 640 lbs., and was due to generate 5270  after six years on orbit. See Sullivan, Handprints on Hubble, pp. 142–149, on

the Power Control Unit.

43 Shayler and Harland, Expanding Hubble’s Vision, pp. 105–107; Mike Massimino, Spaceman: An Astronaut’s Unlikely Journey to Unlock the Secrets of the Universe (New York: 

Crown Archetype, 2016), pp. ix–xiv, 174–181. Massimino flew on two HST servicing missions and his book provides a candid view of his own career and the work done by 

astronauts on Hubble servicing missions.

44 Massimino, Spaceman, pp. 154–168, 181–198, quote 195; NASA, “STS-109 Press Kit,” pp. 

43–48.

45 John Grunsfeld, Notes from Space: STS-109 Report #4, NASA Human Spaceflight website, 

http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/list_2002.html (accessed 

27 April 2017); NASA Goddard, “Hubble’s Memorable Moments: Powering Down,” Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2yCvxEN9Nl4 (accessed 27 April 2017); NASA, 

“STS-109 Press Kit,” pp. 48–51; Grunsfeld e-mail to author, 29 October 2017.
CHAPTER FIVE . New Instruments

46 NASA, “STS-109 Press Kit,” pp. 49–52; John Grunsfeld, Notes from Space: STS-109 Report 

#5; Massimino, Spaceman, pp. 200–207; NASA Human Spaceflight, STS-109 Mission 

Archives http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/archives/sts-109.

html (accessed 1 April 2016). 

47 John Grunsfeld, Notes from Space: STS-109 Report #6.

48 David Leckrone OHI, 6 November 2015, part 2, pp. 8–9; NASA News Release,“Astronomers 

Find Elusive Planets in Decade-Old Hubble Data,” release 2011-315, 6 October 2011.

49 Goldin OHI, p. 10; Howard E. McCurdy, Faster Better Cheaper: Low-Cost Innovation in 

the U.S. Space Program (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), pp. 

142–144.

50 Ken Sembach, oral history interview by author, 25 May 2017, p. 15.

175

CHAPTER SIX

The Universe Turned 

Inside Out

▲ Hubble view of NGC 5033, located about 40 million light-years away in the constellation of Canes 

Venatici. (ESA/Hubble/NASA. Acknowledgment: Judy Schmidt: potw1843a)

T

hrough its images, the Hubble Space Telescope brought astronomical discovery to the masses. But Hubble was created to advance astrophysics as 

the first optical imaging telescope located outside Earth’s atmosphere. 

After three decades of HST operations, the universe looked very different to 

scientists than it did in the 1980s. “I think it’s fair to say that Hubble’s actually 

rewritten all the textbooks,” said Ken Carpenter, a NASA astrophysicist who 

has worked with HST throughout his career. “I don’t think you can pick up a 

textbook nowadays where a page hasn’t been changed because of one Hubble 

observation or another.” But the story of astrophysics in the lifetime of HST 

is far bigger than HST. More astronomers are working than ever, using bigger 

and more advanced instruments both on the ground and in space that observe 

in wavelengths ranging from gamma rays through to radio waves, with HST 

observing only a small range of wavelengths in the middle. In Carpenter’s words, 

Hubble has operated “in an era where we’ve gone to more multi-wavelength 

astrophysics.”1

By the time HST reached its 25th anniversary on orbit in 2015, it had circled 

Earth more than 130,000 times and made more than a million exposures of 

astronomical objects with its instruments. HST established itself as arguably 

the most productive scientific instrument ever built, with scientists writing 

more than 12,800 scientific articles using HST data during that quarter century, papers that had been cited more than 550,000 times. Observing time on 

HST was available to anyone willing to write a proposal for its use who could 

pass a peer review process involving competition with astronomers from around 
176 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

the world. The Space Telescope Science Institute allocated observing time in 

those 25 years in 22 observing cycles, during which more than 4,600 observing proposals were given time on HST, ranging from short “snapshots” of one 

orbit to treasury programs gathering massive amounts of data over hundreds of 

orbits. The archive of HST observations, open to all, has become an important 

resource for science. Eventually, more papers came from the archive than new 

observations; in 2015 for example, 327 papers relied on new HST observations, 

compared to 356 papers that used archival data, and 156 that relied on both 

new and archival data.2

Throughout history, the heavens have surprised astronomers when they first 

used new ways to observe it, most famously in the case of Galileo and his telescope. “The universe is wilder than we imagine: we keep underestimating how 

weird it really is,” Harvard astrophysicist Robert Kirshner wrote. “Astronomy 

is a science driven by discovery, since the objects we observe are stranger and 

more exotic than even the most unbridled speculators predict.”3 Even before 

HST was launched, astronomers anticipated pointing its cameras and spectrographs at a whole variety of targets, including planets, stars of varying kinds and 

points in their lives, quasars, black holes, star clusters, galaxies, and nebulae of 

many types, to name just a few. Today we know more about all of these objects, 

thanks to a large degree to HST. The large number of scientific papers based 

on HST data illustrates the variety of topics covered by the astronomers and 

physicists using it. 

THE TOP PRIORITY

HST’s scientific discoveries are so numerous and broad that only a few highlights can be discussed in this chapter. To better understand what Hubble has 

discovered, this account of HST’s scientific work begins with its early scientific 

plans and goals. As HST’s launch approached, scientists in the Space Telescope 

Advisory Council designated three “Key Projects” for the space telescope: 

determination of the distance scale of the universe to within an accuracy of 10 

percent; studying spectra of quasars to not only find out more about these bodies but also about the matter that lay between them and Earth; and obtaining 

lengthy exposures of apparently empty parts of the sky, to see if they contained 

any unexpected phenomena. Beyond those three projects, astronomers had a 

long list of objects they wanted to study with HST, ranging from the planet 

Mars to the most distant galaxies and the matter in between.4

The priority given to the first Key Project showed that scientists’ major hope 

for HST was that it would help them measure the size of the universe. For 

decades astronomers had worked to accurately measure the distances between 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

stars and between galaxies. Astronomers had devised many methods of measuring those distances, but the accuracy of all those methods was open to question before Hubble flew. More accurately measuring distances in the universe 

would, in turn, help answer many questions, notably the age of the universe. 

Astronomers had known since the 1920s that distant galaxies are moving away 

from one another, evidence that the universe is expanding, but they didn’t know 

precisely how fast those galaxies were moving. Many astronomers believed that 

the rate of that expansion was slowing down, but the question was still open in 

1990 when HST was launched.5 To understand HST’s work on this problem, we 

will look back nearly a century before its launch and some history where HST’s 

namesake Edwin Powell Hubble plays a prominent role.

▲ Henrietta Swan Leavitt. (American Institute of 

Physics, Emilio Segrè Visual Archives via Wikimedia)

For much of the 19th century and into the early years of the 20th century, the 

most popular astronomical theory doubted that there were galaxies beyond our 

own galaxy. Some astronomers disagreed with this view, suggesting that what 

were then known as spiral nebulae were not small bodies inside the Milky Way 

but rather island universes or galaxies of their own. Astronomers could not measure the size of our own galaxy, let alone the distances to prominent objects like 

the great spiral nebula in Andromeda, because stars come in various sizes and 

types that affect how much and what kind of light they give off. If the absolute 

brightness of an object is not known, it is highly difficult to deduce its distance 

without another piece of evidence. In 

1908, Henrietta Swan Leavitt of the 

Harvard College Observatory made 

a breakthrough in measuring distances in the universe while observing a type of star called Cepheids, or 

Cepheid variables, whose light varies 

over time. By observing a number of 

Cepheids about 200,000 light-years 

away in the Small Magellanic Cloud 

whose distances from Earth were 

roughly the same, she discovered a relationship between the period of light 

variation and the absolute amount of light given off by individual Cepheids. 

Astronomers were able to make rough estimates of the distance of Cepheids 

nearby in our own galaxy, and together with Leavitt’s finding of the relationship 

between their brightness and period, the door was open to using Cepheids as a 

“standard candle” for measuring distances around the universe. Other astronomers advanced Leavitt’s work on Cepheid variables and found other evidence 

supporting the idea that spiral nebulae were in fact separate from our Milky 
178 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Way galaxy. But the argument 

over the nature of the universe 

continued into the 1920s. 

▲ Edwin P. Hubble in 1931. (Johan Hagemeyer via Wikimedia)

The gigantic 100-inch (2.54-

meter) Hooker telescope on 

Mount Wilson in California 

opened in 1919, and among 

the staff was the 30-year-old 

Hubble, fresh from his wartime service. In October 1923, 

Hubble exposed a photographic 

plate of the Andromeda Nebula 

that showed what he determined to be a Cepheid variable 

star in that body. By comparing this image to other photographic plates of the nebula, 

Hubble was able to verify the 

period of the Cepheid variable 

and use that information to estimate the Andromeda Nebula’s 

distance from Earth at about 

900,000 light-years—placing 

it well outside the Milky Way. Hubble’s observations confirmed the growing 

consensus in favor of island universes, which vastly expanded the bounds of 

the universe and showed that the Andromeda Nebula was in fact a galaxy of 

its own.6

Observations by Vesto M. Slipher and other astronomers showed that galaxies were moving at high speed, and over time they saw that most galaxies were 

moving away from the Milky Way. Much like the Doppler effect produced in 

sound when a train or an aircraft passes near a listener, astronomers see that 

light shifts to the red end of the spectrum when an object is moving away, a 

redshift, and toward the blue end of the spectrum when an object is approaching. In 1929, Hubble, with help from his collaborator Milton L. Humason, built 

on Slipher’s work with redshifts, refined the distances of 24 galaxies, and noted 

a relationship between the redshifts and their distances. Hubble’s resulting 

paper showed that velocities of these galaxies equaled their distance multiplied 

by a constant. Hubble and Humason followed this up with another paper in 

1931 that showed this relationship extending to more distant galaxies. Starting 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

with the Belgian priest and astronomer Georges Lemaître, astronomers and 

physicists came to accept that there was a firm relationship between galaxies’ 

distances from us and their redshifts—that the farther a galaxy is from us, the 

faster it is moving. Over time, the insight of the expanding universe was credited to Hubble, and the terms Hubble’s law and the Hubble constant came into 

use in the 1950s. (In 2018, members of the International Astronomical Union 

voted to use the term Hubble-Lemaître law.)7

Early estimates of the Hubble constant were problematic because they set 

the age of the universe at less than the age of Earth as determined by radioactive decay methods. Those early measurements of the distance of objects 

like the Andromeda galaxy were still highly approximate. By improving their 

knowledge of Cepheids and taking greater account of gas and dust that could 

affect distance measurements, Hubble’s assistant and heir Allan Sandage and 

other astronomers used Mount Wilson and the 200-inch (5-meter) Mount 

Palomar telescope to revise their distance and time estimates upward. In the 

years that followed, governments and universities built new optical telescopes 

at sites with superior viewing conditions such as Mauna Kea in Hawaii and 

the Chilean Andes, their capabilities enhanced by new technologies. These 

observatories were complemented by radio telescopes and the first generation of 

space-based telescopes in the 1960s through the 1980s observing in a variety of 

wavelengths, such as the Orbiting Astronomical Observatory in the ultraviolet, 

Cos-B for gamma rays, Uhuru for x-ray astronomy, the High Energy Astronomy 

Observatory program, and the Infrared Astronomy Satellite. Astronomers and 

physicists learned a great deal about the universe, but many gaps remained 

in this body of knowledge that scientists hoped HST could fill. Before HST 

was launched, estimates for the Hubble constant varied between 50 and 100 

kilometers per second per megaparsec, and the age of the universe between 10 

and 20 billion years. Because of its great power and location outside Earth’s 

atmosphere, HST would be able to make precise observations of galaxies and 

stars, reducing the uncertainties surrounding the Hubble constant and thus the 

inferred size and age of the universe. 

The HST Key Project on the Extragalactic Distance Scale, headed by coPrincipal Investigators Wendy L. Freedman of the Carnegie Observatories, 

Robert C. Kennicutt, Jr. of the Steward Observatory at the University of 

Arizona, and Jeremy Mould of the Australian National Observatory, began 

measuring distances of nearby galaxies even before HST’s spherical aberration 

was corrected. They started with M81, whose distance was estimated in 1993 

at 11 million light-years with an uncertainty of 10 percent using WF/PC observations of Cepheid variables.8 When more observations were made after HST’s 
180 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

spherical aberration was corrected, the Key Project came up with a puzzling 

estimated value for the Hubble constant, which suggested that the universe was 

younger than its oldest stars. In the later 1990s, further announcements followed from the Key Project and other investigators about new measurements of 

more distant galaxies using HST. The Key Project used HST to look at Cepheids 

in 18 galaxies up to 65 million light-years distant, which was much farther than 

M81 but still relatively close to Earth. As the Key Project wound up its work 

in 1999, it announced a Hubble constant estimate of 70 kilometers per second 

per megaparsec, with an uncertainty of 10 percent. With this figure and other 

information, the age of the universe was estimated at 12 billion years.9 The Key 

Project’s work to determine the Hubble constant and the age of the universe 

was only the beginning of HST’s contributions to answering these questions.

▲ This diagram shows how HST has revolutionized the study of the distant, early universe. 

Before Hubble was launched, ground-based telescopes were able to observe up to 

a redshift of around 1, about halfway back through cosmic history. Hubble’s latest 

instrument, Wide Field Camera 3 has identified a candidate galaxy at a redshift of 10—

around 96 percent of the way back to the Big Bang. (NASA/ESA)

SEEKING OUT SUPERNOVAE 

Unfortunately, Cepheid variables are only useful as a distance indicator for 

nearby galaxies such as Andromeda and the galaxies examined as part of the 

Key Project. Over the years, astronomers developed a “cosmic distance ladder” 

of different ways to measure distances to galaxies farther out. The ladder starts 

at the bottom with Cepheid variables, and a popular method to measure far 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

greater distances is based on observations of a type of supernova, a stellar explosion bright enough to be seen even in distant reaches of the universe. In the 

1930s and early 1940s, Fritz Zwicky, Walter Baade, and Rudolph Minkowski 

showed that a specific type of supernova called type Ia could be used as a “standard candle” measurement for galactic distances. This type of supernova results 

when a white dwarf star orbiting another star accretes matter from that star and 

becomes unstable. Supernovae of this type are believed to be rare, however, and 

their brightness lasts only hours or days. But once these supernovae are identified by their spectral signatures, astronomers can deduce their distance from 

their apparent brightness. In the words of astronomer Laura Ferrarese: “Type 

Ia supernovae are the Ferrari of distance indicators: rare, expensive, finicky, 

but hard to beat when it comes to performance.”10 In 1985, teams of astronomers began searching for type Ia supernovae, mainly using ground-based telescopes, with the hope of determining the distances of more distant galaxies, 

and thus getting a better fix on the size, age, and expansion rate of the universe. 

The Supernova Cosmology Project (SCP) headed by Saul Perlmutter of the 

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California began its search in 1985 

and another group, the High-z Supernova Search Team, joined the search in 

1994. The High-z group, whose name comes from astronomical shorthand for 

redshift, was headed by Brian Schmidt of the Mount Stromlo Observatory in 

▲ Saul Perlmutter. (Roy Kaltschmidt, Lawrence 

Berkeley National Laboratory)

▲ Brian P. Schmidt in 2012. (Markus Pössel via 

Wikimedia)
182 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Australia and Nicholas Suntzeff of the Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory 

in Chile with the support of Kirshner, who had trained many of the group’s 

members. Both teams worked to find supernovae in distant galaxies near their 

maximum luminosities and then verify their types with spectrographic observations, mainly using ground-based facilities.11 The two teams then sought to 

determine the distances of the supernovae by observing their light curves after 

the explosions that created the supernovae. The rivalry between the two teams 

was illustrated when SCP team members believed that the High-z team was 

using methods they had developed. One observer wrote, “The tensions between 

the two teams were personal and emotional, but more importantly, they were 

philosophical: do you want fewer observations done more carefully or more 

observations done less carefully?”12

Because HST’s instruments have very narrow fields of view, they were not 

used to search for supernovae. HST was used instead for follow-up observations of supernovae in distant galaxies, where HST’s power and resolution 

allowed users to differentiate between the light emitted by supernovae and the 

galaxies they were located in. Despite the attractions of using HST for these 

observations, most could still be done from the ground, and the HST Time 

Allocation Committee rejected an initial application for HST observation time 

from Perlmutter’s team. Kirshner, for his part, believed that HST did not need 

to be used to observe supernovae light curves because this could be done from 

the ground—though other members of the High-z team disagreed with him. In 

January 1996, Perlmutter asked STScI director Robert Williams for director’s 

discretionary time, and after consideration, Williams offered both teams time 

on HST.13 Williams recalled that he wanted to provide HST time for this work 

because he believed HST provided superior data on the supernovae.14 Later, 

long after changing his mind, Kirshner recalled, “While our original motivation 

for using HST was the wonderful imaging that makes photometry more precise, 

we also benefited from the absence of weather and the fact that moonlight 

doesn’t light up the sky when you are above the atmosphere. The observations 

took place exactly as planned, which hardly ever happens on the ground, and 

we could time them in the optimum way to learn about the light-curve shape[s]” 

of the supernovae.15

While much existing data in the 1990s pointed to a slowing rate of expansion for the universe, a few scientists questioned this idea. As members of both 

supernova search teams began to compile their data, it took them in an unexpected direction: the supernovae were dimmer than expected at their redshifts 

and distances. The data led to conclusions that the universe was expanding, 

and surprisingly, that the expansion was accelerating, not decelerating. These 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

findings were so shocking that members of both teams held back on publication 

while they rechecked their figures and looked for another cause for this extraordinary result. Early in 1998, the teams announced their findings. The first paper 

came from the SCP team in January, with Perlmutter as the lead author, and 

was based on observations of 42 type Ia supernovae. Their data showed that the 

universe would expand forever. The High-z team based their February paper 

on a study of 16 type Ia supernovae. The lead author was Adam G. Riess, then 

a postdoctoral researcher at the University of California at Berkeley. Although 

this paper featured more data on fewer supernovae, the data were sufficient for 

the team to state that the universe’s expansion was accelerating. Since similar data came from two independent sources and attempts to find alternative 

explanations failed, the stunning idea of the accelerating universe won relatively quick acceptance from the scientific community. Subsequent studies of 

supernovae and research of other aspects of the nature of the universe have 

backed up this new view of the universe.16 By 2001, Riess was on the staff of 

the Space Telescope Science Institute, and it was there that he found archival 

data obtained by HST’s NICMOS instrument of Supernova 1997ff that confirmed that the universe was expanding at an accelerating rate.17

▲ Adam Riess speaks at the HST 25th anniversary event in 2015. (NASA/Joel Kowsky)

These findings, which mean that the universe will continue to expand 

indefinitely, overturned many prevailing models of the universe. The cause of 
184 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

the acceleration of the expansion of the universe remains unknown, and so 

the most popular explanation amongst physicists is that it is a mysterious force 

they call dark energy. Puzzled physicists are asking if the accelerating expansion means that Albert Einstein had been right when he postulated in 1917 

that there was a cosmological constant representing energy in the vacuum of 

space—an idea he later famously recanted. Sixty-eight percent of the massenergy content of the universe is accounted for by dark energy. The work on the 

expansion of the universe done by the High-z and SCP teams led to many prestigious awards, notably the 2011 Nobel Prize for physics, which was presented 

to Brian Schmidt and Adam Riess of the High-z team, and Saul Perlmutter of 

Near-Infrared Camera and Multi-Imaging Spectrometer (NICMOS)

Enclosure

Optics

Cryo Interface

Thermal Electric 

Cooling Inner 

Radiators

Electrical 

Interface

Main 

Electronics 

Compartment

Aperture

“A” Fitting

“C” Fitting

Dewar

Bench

Time on HST: Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer

13 February 1997–present

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

Principal Investigator:

Rodger I. Thompson 

(University of Arizona)

Weight: 347 kilograms 

(765 pounds) at launch, 

391 kilograms (851 pounds) 

after repairs in 2002

Axial Instrument

The Near-Infrared Camera and Multi-Imaging Spectrometer (NICMOS) provided HST 

with infrared imaging and spectroscopic capabilities in the near-infrared part of the 

spectrum. NICMOS is equipped with three cameras using non-CCD detectors that 

could operate simultaneously, each with its own resolution and field of view. Each 

camera has a set of filters and can obtain data in wavelengths between 0.8 and 

2.5 microns. These cameras could also operate as a spectrometer and polarimeter, 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

SCP. In addition to HST’s role in the work of both teams, the prize relates to 

HST in the form of Riess’ affiliation with STScI.18

DEEPENING MYSTERIES

While the idea that the universe is expanding at an accelerating rate remains 

unchallenged, results from other spacecraft have raised questions about the 

estimates of the universe’s size and age from HST and other optical telescopes. This started in 2003 when NASA released the first year results from 

the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) following its launch in 

2001. WMAP obtained imagery of the entire sky from early in the history of the 

and one could act as a coronagraph, blocking light from a bright object to observe 

a nearby dim object. NICMOS’s internal optics were designed to compensate for the 

effects of spherical aberration in HST’s main mirror. 

To operate in the infrared, NICMOS’, cameras must be cooled to very cold temperatures, about minus 355 degrees Fahrenheit or 58 degrees Kelvin. When it was

launched, NICMOS was equipped with a cryogenic dewar containing frozen nitrogen. Soon after it was installed on HST during Servicing Mission 2 in 1997, NICMOS 

began losing nitrogen coolant, which ran out in 1999. 

NICMOS was shut down while NASA developed a new mechanical cooling system 

that was installed by Shuttle astronauts during Servicing Mission 3B in 2002. The 

instrument regained its capabilities in the infrared when the new NICMOS Cooling 

System was installed, and it operated successfully until it failed to restart after a 

planned temporary shutdown in September 2008. Because of concerns about 

restarting the cryocooler and because WFC3 also had a strong infrared capability,

NASA decided that NICMOS should remain in hibernation.a

While it was operating, NICMOS provided imagery and other data from faraway galaxies, newly formed stars, and objects obscured by dust and gas. It was also used

to view objects in the solar system, and archival data from NICMOS were later reprocessed with new techniques to reveal extrasolar planets.b

a Space Telescope Science Institute, Near-Infrared Camera and Multi-Object Spectrometer 

Instrument Handbook for Cycle 17, Version 11.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, June 2009).

b NASA, “Astronomers Find Elusive Planets in Decade-Old Hubble Data,” news release 2011-

315, 6 October 2011.
186 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

universe in the afterglow of the Big Bang, called the cosmic microwave background, at higher definition than before. The European Space Agency’s Planck 

spacecraft obtained higher definition data on the early days of the universe 

following its launch in 2009. The findings from WMAP and Planck about the 

age of the universe did not match those obtained by astronomers using HST 

and other telescopes. Based on data from WMAP and Planck, the age of the 

universe is now thought to be close to 13.8 billion years.

Astronomers have continued using HST to refine the Hubble constant and 

our knowledge of the universe’s expansion rate. A group of astronomers headed 

by Riess that grew out of the High-z team formed the Supernovae H0 for the 

Equation of State (SH0ES) group in 2005 with the aim of reducing the uncertainty in estimates of the expansion rate. The group set about to refine our 

knowledge at the base of the cosmic distance ladder used to estimate distances 

in the universe by imaging Cepheid variables in the Large Magellanic Cloud 

and other nearby galaxies, using HST instruments to provide more accurate 

estimates of their distance than those obtained using less powerful telescopes 

on the ground. In 2019, Riess and SH0ES announced that they had reduced 

the uncertainty in the value of the Hubble constant to 1.9 percentage points 

around a figure of 74 kilometers per second per megaparsec, a figure meaning 

that for every 3.3 million light-years farther away a galaxy is from us, it appears 

to be moving 74 kilometers per second faster. This number indicates that the 

universe is expanding at a 9 percent faster rate than the prediction of 67 kilometers per second per megaparsec based on Planck’s observations of the early 

universe. “This is not just two experiments disagreeing,” Riess explained in a 

news release. “We are measuring something fundamentally different. One is 

a measurement of how fast the universe is expanding today, as we see it. The 

other is a prediction based on the physics of the early universe and on measurements of how fast it ought to be expanding. If these values don’t agree, there 

becomes a very strong likelihood that we’re missing something in the cosmological model that connects the two eras.”19

To add to the riddle of the different figures for the Hubble constant, a group 

headed by Wendy Freedman, who had moved to the University of Chicago 

since her work on the Hubble Key Project, published research in 2019 based 

on a different way of estimating the Hubble constant from Cepheid variables or 

supernovae. This method uses measurements of red giant stars, which are stars 

very late in their lives, to deduce their distances. Freedman’s team’s estimate 

of the Hubble constant was 69.8 km/sec/Mpc, in between the estimates from 

Riess’ team and Planck. “Naturally, questions arise as to whether the discrepancy is coming from some aspect that astronomers don’t yet understand about 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

the stars we’re measuring, or whether our cosmological model of the universe is 

still incomplete,” Freedman said. “Or maybe both need to be improved upon.”20

Astrophysicists will work in the years to come on problems such as the 

discrepancies between various ways of measuring the Hubble constants, and 

the larger and far more baffling questions surrounding the expansion of the 

universe and the concept of dark energy. The answers to these questions may 

involve revolutionary changes to present day beliefs about physics that some 

call a new physics, and this work will likely require the help of upcoming astronomical instruments, such as the James Webb Space Telescope and the Nancy 

Grace Roman Space Telescope.21

DARK MATTER, BLACK HOLES

It is important to note that dark energy, which is believed to be driving the 

expansion of the universe, is distinct from dark matter, a mysterious transparent form of matter. Astronomers, starting with Fritz Zwicky in the 1930s and 

most famously Vera Rubin in the 1970s, observed that the visible matter in the 

universe was not adequate to explain the motion of galaxies, stars, and other 

bodies. Zwicky and others proposed this mysterious form of matter as the explanation for this problem. Astronomers now estimate that dark energy accounts 

for 68 percent of the universe and about 27 percent of the universe is dark matter, leaving only about 5 percent of the universe as visible matter. Astronomers 

are continuing their quest to understand the nature of dark matter using HST 

and telescopes on Earth by looking for signs of dark matter’s effects on visible 

objects by mapping the locations of galaxies and galactic clusters and looking 

for gravitational lensing, where gravity is seen to bend light from more distant 

objects as predicted by Einstein’s theory of relativity. The degree of gravitational 

lensing can be compared to the presence of visible matter to deduce the presence of dark matter. HST images, such as a 2006 image of colliding galaxies in 

the Bullet Cluster, contain evidence of dark matter.22

In addition to the difficult questions relating to the age of the universe and 

the mysteries of dark matter, astronomers used HST together with other facilities to learn more about the details of every kind of body in the universe. Ken 

Carpenter, for example, started his scientific work on HST using the Goddard 

High Resolution Spectrograph to learn about the winds in the upper atmospheres 

of cool, evolved stars. GHRS was also used by other scientists to learn about the 

interstellar medium—the gas, dust and radiation that can be found between star 

systems—and much of that research moved to STIS when it replaced GHRS 

in 1997. Spectrographs attached to HST provided vital information about the 

composition and motion of celestial bodies throughout the universe.23
188 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

One of HST’s most significant findings concerns 

the relationship between 

galaxies and supermassive 

black holes. Black holes 

are typically formed during 

the deaths of massive stars 

and have masses of about 

20 times that of the Sun, 

but black holes found at 

the centers of galaxies have 

masses millions or even billions of times larger. One of 

HST’s three Key Projects 

when it began operations 

was focused on quasi-stellar 

objects or quasars, and it found that these brilliant objects are, in fact, supermassive black holes surrounded by gaseous accretion disks that are located 

inside galaxies that they vastly outshine. Observers using HST also found that 

the masses and motion of stars and other matter in the central bulges at the 

centers of galaxies pointed to the existence of supermassive black holes in virtually all of these galaxies, confirming suggestions from ground-based observations. These observations help explain many questions around the evolution of 

galaxies, including our own, tying the development of galaxies with that of the 

supermassive black holes that lie at their centers.24

▲ Hubble Operations Project Scientist Ken Carpenter in 

2018. (NASA/W. Hrybyk)

COSMIC CORE SAMPLES

Scientists looked to HST as a means of looking deep into the universe and long 

into its past because of the time needed for light to travel from distant reaches. 

One way to do that was with very lengthy exposures to view objects at extreme 

distances from Earth. While spacecraft such as the Cosmic Background 

Explorer (COBE), WMAP, and Planck gathered data outside optical wavelengths to map the cosmic background radiation that was created immediately 

after the Big Bang, astronomers hoped that by taking long exposures in parts of 

space that appear empty from the ground, HST would be able to image galaxies 

as they were forming early in the history of the universe.25 The third of HST’s 

original Key Projects was a Medium Deep Survey that was aimed at seeking out 

distant young galaxies.26 Other astronomers wanted to look longer and deeper 

into space, but this idea was not universally supported. In the month that HST 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

was launched, one of the world’s top astrophysicists, John Bahcall, cowrote a 

paper in Science predicting that long exposures with HST would not reveal 

galaxies in long exposures that could not be seen from the ground.27 Bahcall 

was not alone in his view. “Personally, I thought it was a dumb idea,” Robert 

Kirshner said of the plan for long exposures into what appeared to be empty 

space.28 Lyman Spitzer also opposed such a long observation.

▲ Robert Williams, second director of STScI. (STScI) 

Robert E. Williams, who became the second director of the Institute in 

1993, had originally found the calculations in Bahcall’s paper “quite sensible.” 

But Williams’ interest in a long, deep exposure grew when he saw the results 

from a series of lengthy exposures of a galactic cluster made in May and June 

of 1994 with the newly installed WFPC2. The exposures, which included one 

of 18 hours taken over 32 orbits, revealed what a news release called a “cosmic 

zoo.”29 A group of young STScI postdocs including Mark Dickinson had won 

approval for the images through HST’s peer review process. At the time, science staff at the Institute took part in daily morning “science coffee” sessions at 

the STScI library. Williams made it a point to attend as many of these discussions as he could, and when Dickinson made a presentation about his results, 

the director was “blown away by it.” Williams, who controlled the 10 percent 

of HST’s observing time that 

was designated as director’s 

discretionary time, began to 

consider using much of that 

time for a much longer set of 

exposures that would be made 

immediately available to everyone, instead of waiting for a 

proposal from observers that 

would go through the regular 

approval process. Those regular observations were subject to 

restrictions on publication during the first year after the data 

were downloaded. Williams 

convened a 12-member advisory committee to consider 

how to use the observing time. 

When the committee met on 31 

March 1995, its expert members differed on many details, 
190 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

including the number of fields, the number of filters to use, and whether to 

point at an empty field or one containing a cluster or a quasar. “And so I essentially made the decision to undertake the Deep Field, rather than the alternative” of awaiting a proposal from the community, Williams said.30

▲ The historic “Hubble Deep Field” image, based on 342 separate exposures taken of an 

area inside the constellation Ursa Major by WFPC2 between 18 and 28 December 1995, 

was released on 15 January 1996. (NASA/STScI)

Once the decision was made, Williams assembled a team of postdoctoral 

researchers to undertake a year of planning for the image, which became 

known as the “Hubble Deep Field.” Based on imagery obtained from Kitt Peak, 

the team chose what appeared to be an empty part of the sky near the handle 

of the Big Dipper in Ursa Major. This spot, whose dimensions were compared 

by STScI to the width of a dime held 75 feet (23 meters) away, is far from the 

plane of our own galaxy, so it is free of nearby stars or other objects, and it is 

located in HST’s continuous viewing zone, where the telescope can observe 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

without being blocked by Earth, the Sun, or the Moon. During 150 orbits from 

18 to 28 December 1995, WFPC2 took 342 separate images using different 

filters. Although there was strong interest in looking for galaxies with strong 

redshifts that by definition were distant, filters were chosen to provide a data 

set that could answer a number of questions relating to the evolution of galaxies 

at many distances and ages. Initial examination of the imagery showed 1,500 

galaxies at various stages of their evolution, going back to the earliest epoch in 

the history of the universe. In the 17 days that followed the end of the observations, the team worked around the clock to calibrate and process the data for 

public release on 15 January 1996, when the entire trove of data was made 

available to the world during a meeting of the American Astronomical Society 

in San Antonio, Texas.31

MORE DEEP FIELDS 

The “Hubble Deep Field” was an immediate hit with both the public and scientists, becoming an early phenomenon on the internet, as discussed in chapter 

four. “I believe that the HDF [“Hubble Deep Field”] changed the culture of 

astronomy,” Williams said.32 Others, such as University of Washington astronomer Julianne J. Dalcanton, agreed. “This coming together of the community to 

generate a shared, nonproprietary data set was essentially unprecedented but 

has since become the model for the majority of large astronomical projects,” 

she wrote later. “Almost all major astronomical surveys are now proposed with 

the expectation that the data and data products will be publicly released during 

the project, rather than held in perpetuity by those few who instigated the programme. This new mode of operating has democratized astronomy by opening 

astronomical research to scientists that are at relatively under-resourced institutions, allowing researchers at small colleges, or in poor countries, to have access 

to some of the finest data sets in the world.”33

Williams was also gratified by the successful careers of the postdocs who 

created the deep field. “The deep field showed the importance of giving an 

individual such as the institute director responsibility for a major portion of telescope time,” he said. “I think most people would agree that it would have been 

really unlikely that anything like the HDF could have gotten by a peer review 

committee involved in it. There was no guarantee of success.”34

The unprecedented release of such a large amount of data inspired others in 

the astronomical community to make spectroscopic observations of the distant 

galaxies shown in the HDF. A photometric redshift method that previously had 

been used only for nearby galaxies allowed relatively easy distance estimates 

for the galaxies shown in HDF imagery. The original data set obtained for the 
192 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

deep field was supplemented, starting with infrared imagery obtained in 1997 

and 1998 by the NICMOS instrument installed on HST in 1997. As previously 

noted, Adam Riess went to the STScI archive in 2001 and used HDF imagery 

and some of this NICMOS imagery to supplement earlier work done on supernovae by the High-z and SCP groups. With this data, Riess verified their findings on the acceleration of the expanding universe.35

▲ This “Hubble Ultra Deep Field” image is based on exposures taken from 2002 to 2012 of a 

small area in the constellation Fornax with HST’s Advanced Camera for Surveys and Wide 

Field Camera 3. (NASA/STScI/ESA)

The original “Hubble Deep Field” results led to further deep field observations. Another apparently empty area in the constellation Tucana was imaged in 

October 1998 using WFPC2, STIS, and NICMOS, with the resulting observations referred to as the “Hubble Deep Field South.” In 2003 and 2004, HST 

used its new Advanced Camera for Surveys to obtain the “Hubble Ultra Deep 

Field” in an area in the southern constellation Fornax. The HUDF represented 

humankind’s deepest view into the universe with optical wavelengths to that 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

date, nearly 95 percent of the way back to the Big Bang, showing the earliest 

and deepest galaxies visible in optical wavelengths. While the original HUDF 

included infrared imagery obtained by NICMOS, the vastly greater infrared 

capabilities of Wide Field Camera 3 led to the creation in 2009 of the “Hubble 

Ultra Deep Field–Infrared.” In 2012, astronomers combined HST imagery 

from “HUDF,” “HUDF–Infrared,” and other HST imagery of the area totaling 22 days of observing time to create humankind’s deepest view ever of the 

universe, the “Hubble eXtreme Deep Field,” or “XDF.” This massive data set 

was enhanced two years later with the addition of ultraviolet data from ACS 

and WFC3.36 The Hubble Deep Fields gave astronomers a new and surprising 

view of the evolution of the universe. Galaxies were found in these images to 

exist as far back as 500 million years after the Big Bang, and in the words of 

STScI astrophysicist Mario Livio, they “challenged ideas about how the first 

stars formed, heated and re-ionized the universe.”37 The deep field data also 

challenged previous ideas about the evolution of galaxies with evidence that 

young galaxies grew out of fragments—leading to a model of galaxy formation 

by continual merger and accretion of matter over time.38

Williams’ successors Steven Beckwith and Matt Mountain supported further 

deep field campaigns with director’s discretionary time, and in 2012, Mountain 

asked the Hubble Deep Fields Initiative committee to draw up a program for 

a new deep field initiative aimed at imaging galaxies at distances that went 

beyond the previous deep fields. The result was known as the Frontier Fields, 

and from 2013 to 2016, 840 orbits of HST time were dedicated to imaging six 

clusters of galaxies and more distant galaxies made visible by the effects of the 

massive gravity associated with those clusters, along with six nearby regions. By 

2017, Frontier Fields had grown to include imagery from the Chandra X-Ray 

Observatory and the Spitzer Space Telescope, which together with the HST 

data provided information about the physics of galaxy cluster mergers, and of 

the distant galaxies found by gravitational lensing, in preparation for observations at even greater distances (and deeper into the past) with the James Webb 

Space Telescope.39

TREASURY PROGRAMS

After HST’s fourth servicing mission in 2009, NASA and STScI began a new 

class of large-scale HST observations called Multi-Cycle Treasury Programs to 

focus on major scientific problems and create collections of data for astronomers 

to exploit well beyond Hubble’s lifetime. Out of 39 proposals received, a specially 

chosen peer review panel selected four, including two similar proposals that 

were merged into a single observing program. The three remaining programs 
194 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

were CANDELS, the Cosmic Assembly Near-infrared Deep Extragalactic 

Legacy Survey; CLASH, the Cluster Lensing and Supernova Survey; and 

PHAT, the Panchromatic Hubble Andromeda Treasury. CANDELS was the 

largest observing program in the history of HST, with 902 orbits using WFC3 

and ACS. The program surveyed galaxies and supernovae in the distant universe, giving astronomers glimpses of galaxies early in their evolution, and grew 

▲ This stunning image released in 2017 shows a cluster of hundreds of galaxies about 

4 billion light-years away in the constellation Cetus called Abell 370. About 100 galaxies 

in this image appear multiple times due to the effects of gravitational lensing, and remote 

galaxies that otherwise could not be seen, appear as distorted images due to the same 

cause. This Frontier Fields image in visible and near-infrared light was obtained by the 

Advanced Camera for Surveys and Wide Field Camera 3. (NASA/STScI/ESA)
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

out of earlier work in the Great Observatories Origins Deep Survey (GOODS) 

program that brought together data from the original Hubble Deep Fields with 

observations from other observatories including Chandra, Spitzer, ESA spacecraft Herschel and XMM-Newton, and ground-based observatories. CLASH 

aimed to examine the distribution of dark matter in massive galaxy clusters 

with greater precision than ever before. Imagery showing the effects of gravitational lensing is one means of detecting dark matter, and CLASH followed on 

earlier studies on HST and other instruments have focused on trying to gain a 

better understanding of dark matter. The PHAT team was awarded 834 orbits 

to image the northeast quadrant of M31, the Andromeda galaxy, with WFC3 

and ACS in a variety of wavelengths. Because M31 is the closest large spiral 

galaxy to the Milky Way, about two and a half million light-years away, it is a 

great place to examine galactic structure down to individual stars. Such studies 

are not possible in other galaxies that are farther away or even in our own galaxy, 

where gas and dust obscure large parts of our view.40

OUR DYNAMIC SOLAR SYSTEM

From its earliest days on orbit, the Hubble Space Telescope has also made 

important ongoing observations of the solar system we live in. Even before its 

spherical aberration problem was fixed, HST provided higher quality images 

and spectrographic data from the planets Jupiter, Saturn, and Mars than had 

been previously available. Prior to 1990, these planets had only been observed 

through Earth’s atmosphere or from visiting spacecraft. Early HST data from 

within the solar system showed that the space telescope could deliver quality science despite its mirror problem. But an event unprecedented in human 

memory proved to the world in 1994 that the repaired HST was operating as 

scientists had originally hoped. 

Astronomers Carolyn and Eugene Shoemaker and David Levy took a set of 

photographs on 24 March 1993 using the 46-centimeter (18-inch) Schmidt telescope at the Palomar Observatory as part of a survey of comets and asteroids, 

including one that revealed the ninth periodic comet that the trio had discovered. The comet had an unusual bar-like appearance, which was determined to 

be the result of multiple fragments at its heart instead of a core. As astronomers 

gathered more information about the comet’s path, they found that the comet 

was orbiting Jupiter rather than the Sun, and that when the comet passed very 

close to Jupiter in July 1992, it broke into fragments that were on a collision 

course with Jupiter. The fragments were projected to strike the giant planet 

from 16 to 20 July 1994, and astronomers around the world mobilized in hopes 

of seeing the effects of the impacts, which would take place behind Jupiter 
196 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

as seen from Earth. HST, 

equipped with its new 

WFPC2 camera, and the

Galileo spacecraft, then 

on its way to Jupiter, 

would also image the 

impact areas. During the 

months that preceded the 

impacts, HST and telescopes on Earth followed 

the comet fragments that 

were spreading out into a 

“string of pearls” heading 

to Jupiter.41

▲ Image of Mars from WFPC2 during its close passage to 

Earth on 27 August 2003, when the two planets were 

only 35 million miles apart. (NASA/STScI) 

On 16 July 1994, when 

the first fragment struck 

Jupiter, a large crowd of 

scientists and media gathered in the main auditorium at STScI to watch images come in from HST. HST’s images of the plume 

created by the fragment’s impact, which was visible on the limb of Jupiter, 

caused scientists to cheer and reporters to trumpet the success of HST’s new 

camera. Soon HST images showed a black cloud at the top of Jupiter’s cloud 

decks when the impact site rotated into view. During the week that followed, 

HST provided many more images and spectrographic data of the fragment 

impacts and the marks they left for a time on Jupiter. Members of the HST 

imaging team for SL-9 were at the control center making real-time calls about 

Hubble observations, a highly unusual event for HST. Hubble’s contribution to 

the trove of data collected at the time was especially important because it could 

record light in wavelengths not visible from Earth’s surface. The impact week 

turned into a major astronomical event as the impacts were visible to telescopes 

around the world, including small telescopes used by amateur astronomers. 

While observations of the impacts provided new information on the dynamics of large impacts and the structure of Jupiter’s atmosphere, the event drove 

home to scientists and lay people alike the importance of impacts in the history 

of our solar system. Fifteen years later, another object left a large dark spot 

on Jupiter.42 “Things hit other things,” explained planetary astronomer Heidi 

Hammel, who led the team that used HST to image the 1994 comet crash. “The 

solar system is a dynamic place.”43
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

▲ Wide Field Camera 3 image of Jupiter taken on 13 April 2017. (NASA/STScI)

Although several spacecraft visited Jupiter and Saturn during HST’s lifetime, the space telescope provided important backup by regularly tracking 

changes in the gas giants through images of the planets in their entirety, their 

rings and their moons. HST also helped prepare the way for spacecraft flying 

to the outer planets. Before HST was launched, two Pioneer and two Voyager 

spacecraft had obtained data on Jupiter from space during flybys in the 1970s. 

The Galileo spacecraft orbited the planet between 1995 and 2003, and the Juno 

orbiter arrived in 2016. Spacecraft such as Ulysses, Cassini, and New Horizons 

also obtained data from Jupiter during their Jovian flybys. HST imagery tracked 

the shrinkage of its Great Red Spot to its smallest recorded size. Other HST 

observations provided important information about Jupiter’s magnetic field and 

included ultraviolet images of aurorae on both Jupiter and Saturn. HST has 

also made regular observations of Jupiter’s moons, particularly the four Galilean 

moons. Hubble has followed volcanic activity on Io and found spectroscopic 
198 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

evidence of hydrogen and oxygen, the elements that together make water, in 

the atmosphere of Europa. Some of the best evidence for an underground saltwater ocean on Ganymede was found by HST observations. At Saturn, Hubble 

complemented findings from the short-lived explorations of Pioneer 11 and the 

two Voyagers, along with Cassini’s findings from 2004 to 2017, with studies of 

the changes in Saturn’s atmosphere and its famous rings. HST also discovered 

previously unseen moons orbiting Saturn and found that the orbit of the moon 

Prometheus had changed since it was first observed by Voyager 1. HST images 

of Saturn’s moon Titan helped prepare the way for the ESA Huygens probe that 

landed on Titan in 2005 after separating from Cassini.44

▲ Saturn as seen by Wide Field Camera 3 on 20 June 2019. (NASA/STScI/ESA: STScI-2019-43)

HST also obtained high-resolution images of Uranus and Neptune, which 

are difficult to image from the ground. Much of what astronomers previously 

knew about these two planets came from observations by Voyager 2, which flew 

by Uranus in 1986 and Neptune in 1989. Uranus had a very bland appearance 

in 1986, but when Hubble began imaging the planet as part of a study of its 

moons, Uranus exhibited bright clouds that showed up better in the infrared 

than in the visible wavelengths imaged by Voyager. HST later observed seasonal changes on Uranus, which is tipped over on its side, causing the poles to 

sometime point at the Sun. Neptune’s dark spot seen by Voyager 2 was gone 

when HST first viewed the planet, and after that the planet displayed a variety 

of dark spots, none as large as the one seen by Voyager.45 For all the outer planets, Hubble was able to monitor changes in their atmospheres over the years. 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

Building on already available HST data, the Outer Planet Atmospheres Legacy 

(OPAL) program began in 2014 to follow trends in winds and cloud activity on 

Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, and Neptune and better understand the dynamics of 

their atmospheres.46

Pluto, at the time of HST’s launch considered the ninth planet in the solar 

system, is the best example of how HST could enhance the work of another 

spacecraft. Pluto is so far away and so small that even the most powerful telescopes on Earth could not resolve surface features. Pluto was discovered in 

1930 by Clyde Tombaugh at the Lowell Observatory in Arizona, and its moon 

Charon, which has half the diameter of Pluto, was not discovered until 1978. 

In 1994, HST imaged Pluto and Charon, resolving them as round discs, and a 

set of Faint Object Camera images taken in March 1996 showed that Pluto’s 

surface had many high contrast features. The features could not be clearly 

resolved, however, and the images remained among the best of Pluto until the 

New Horizons spacecraft flew by on 14 July 2015. During the nearly 20 years 

between those images, astronomers using ground-based telescopes discovered 

other objects in the Kuiper Belt beyond Neptune, with some a similar size 

to Pluto. HST later imaged some of these bodies. In 2006, the International 

Astronomical Union created a new definition for planets, and reclassified Pluto 

as a dwarf planet along with bodies in the asteroid belt and the Kuiper belt. 

Once installed aboard HST, ACS, and WFC3 were used to image slightly 

better views of Pluto and discovered four small moons: Nix, Hydra, Styx, and 

Kerberos, and caused New Horizons mission planners to exercise great caution 

in charting the best course for the probe ahead of its flyby. Scientists planned to 

fly New Horizons past another Kuiper Belt body after it encountered Pluto, but 

when other telescopes failed to find a suitable target, New Horizons investigators obtained HST time in 2014. After Hubble found two suitable objects, New 

Horizons scientists decided in August 2015 to direct the spacecraft to an object 

called 2014 MU69 and later named Arrokoth. With the assistance of further 

HST observations to verify navigational estimates, New Horizons completed a 

successful flyby of this primordial object on 1 January 2019.47

As it does for the outer planets, HST also monitors the planet Mars and 

follows changes in its atmosphere. Hubble observations have also assisted 

spacecraft heading to the surface of the Red Planet by watching for storms. 

In order to avoid aiming itself at the Sun, HST never makes observations of 

Mercury, and only rare observations of Venus. HST has made only occasional 

observations of the Moon.48 Hubble also made a number of asteroid observations, most famously imaging an x-shaped debris field following an asteroid after 

a collision, and another with multiple dust trails. HST found comets dwelling 
200 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

beyond Neptune, answering questions about the source of short-period comets 

that take less than 200 years to orbit the Sun, including comets Encke and 

Giacobini-Zinner. In 2017, HST obtained images of the farthest active inbound 

comet ever seen. The comet, known as K2, was found by a survey camera in 

Hawaii and imaged using WFC3 while it was still outside Saturn’s orbit.49

STARS AND THEIR PLANETS

HST has helped astronomers tell the life stories of stars from their formations 

to their sometimes explosive deaths. The birth and death throes of stars have 

provided some of the most memorable and beautiful images from Hubble, such 

as those of stellar nurseries in the Orion Nebula, the Carina Nebula, and what 

have become known as the “Pillars of Creation” in the Eagle Nebula after the 

famous 1995 HST image discussed in chapter four. The image shows newly 

born stars emerging from colossal clouds of cold hydrogen gas that are being 

struck by a torrent of ultraviolet radiation from nearby young stars. This was 

just one of the mechanisms shown by HST to affect the lives of emerging stars. 

Other HST images showed bipolar jets from newly formed stars, and Hubble 

has even produced movies of these jets. Hubble showed that many stars form 

inside protoplanetary discs or “proplyds” of gas and dust that are quite visible 

and common in star forming regions. C. Robert O’Dell, who previously steered 

the space telescope through the shoals of political approvals and construction 

problems as Project Scientist from 1972 to 1982, made these important observations starting even before HST’s spherical aberration was corrected. Although 

astronomers were already imaging these structures before Hubble flew, they 

were not believed to be as common as the HST data has shown.50

At the other end of stellar lifespans, many of Hubble’s signature images show 

stars in their death throes. Many stars, including one day our own Sun, will die 

relatively gracefully by ejecting their outer gaseous layers, which are then lit up 

by the exposed core of the star. These bodies are known as planetary nebulae, 

and vary widely in form and shape. Famous planetary nebulae imaged by HST 

include the Ring Nebula, Helix Nebula, Cat’s Eye Nebula, and NGC 2392. 

Some stars much larger than our Sun end their existence exploding as supernovae. Astronomers’ interests in novae and supernovae go far beyond their utility 

as “standard candles” to measure distances between galaxies. HST’s research 

into the nature of supernovae was given a big assist by the fact that a supernova 

appeared in one of our neighboring galaxies, the Large Magellanic Cloud, on 

23 February 1987. HST, launched three years later, has been used to follow the 

evolution of Supernova 1987A, including the collision between a shockwave 

from the explosion and two previously existing lobes of gas around the star, 
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

creating an effect that resembles three rings. These data have also filled many 

of the gaps in our knowledge of the life cycles of galaxies and the universe.51

Many stars are now known to have their own planetary systems. These planets orbiting stars other than our Sun are known as exoplanets. At the time of 

HST’s launch, no planets had been found around stars other than our own. 

While there was media speculation that HST would be used to find them, 

there were no plans at the time to use HST for this purpose because its narrow 

field of view makes it unsuitable for surveys that would be necessary to find 

extrasolar planets. Distinguishing such planets optically is extremely difficult 

because reflected light from any planets is overwhelmed by light from their parent star, so indirect methods are therefore necessary to find them. In October 

1995, a Swiss team headed by Michel Mayor and Didier Queloz announced the 

first verified discovery of an exoplanet, a Jupiter-sized planet orbiting close to 

the star 51-Pegasi, using a telescope in France. Soon other Earthbound observers, most famously the American astronomers Geoffrey Marcy and Paul Butler, 

began discovering exoplanets. 

These discoveries were made using Doppler spectroscopy, which uses a spectrograph to find subtle changes in a star’s velocity caused by the gravitational 

pull of a planet orbiting it.52 Another method called transit photometry looks for 

the tiny reductions in light due to a planet passing in front of a star as seen from 

Earth. After Earth-based observations showed how this method could yield 

evidence efficiently, the Kepler spacecraft was launched by NASA in 2009 and 

the Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite or TESS in 2018 specifically to search 

photometrically for exoplanets. A third method, known as microlensing, uses 

the relativistic effects of massive objects to magnify the light from a star lying 

directly behind the massive object. While more than 4,000 exoplanet discoveries have been confirmed to 2020, many of them from Kepler, HST has concentrated on some of the more interesting cases.53 One claim in 1998 that HST had 

directly imaged an exoplanet was later disproven, and an object first imaged by 

HST in 2004 orbiting the prominent southern hemisphere star Fomalhaut has 

since disappeared from view.54

Though not involved in most initial discoveries of exoplanets, Hubble has 

made a major and pioneering contribution to the study of exoplanets by using 

its spectroscopic instruments to learn about the properties of these bodies, 

including the makeup of their atmospheres. In 2001, HST became the first 

observatory to directly detect the atmosphere of an extrasolar planet. When the 

planet passed in front of its star, HD 209458 in Pegasus, images obtained by 

STIS showed the presence of sodium in its atmosphere. Since then, HST and 

the Spitzer Telescope have examined the atmospheres of exoplanets when they 
202 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

transit stars, and HST has found clouds in some atmospheres and the presence 

of oxygen, carbon, hydrogen, carbon dioxide, methane, and water vapor.55

FIRST AMONG EQUALS

Almost every part of this survey of scientific discovery takes note of the fact 

that HST has worked in tandem with other instruments on Earth and in space 

to make discoveries. Although HST incorporates many unique capabilities 

and major advances in technologies, historian Robert Smith noted that it has 

not dominated observational astronomy in the way that the Hale Telescope on 

Mount Palomar did in the third quarter of the 20th century. “While we can 

argue that HST has assumed the leading role in observational astronomy, it is 

playing its part alongside a much stronger supporting cast than would have been 

the case even a decade earlier,” he said. This is shown by the use of other instruments to add to the data sets first created for the Hubble Deep Fields. Smith 

wrote that Hubble has contributed “in very significant ways to a remarkably 

wide range of astronomical problems.”56 Prominent astrophysicist and author 

Mario Livio summed up HST’s work in a similar way, saying, “Hubble’s greatness lies not so much in the singular discoveries that it has made as in confirming suggestive results from other observatories. As new details have become 

visible, astrophysicists have had to refine their theories about the universe.”57

Today our understanding of the universe is vastly different from what it 

was when HST first reached orbit. Many old beliefs have been contradicted 

in spectacular fashion, and new mysteries such as dark energy have emerged 

to confound observers. The universe is a bigger, more complicated, and more 

colorful place than what it appeared to be before HST was launched. The findings related in this chapter are far from the last word on HST’s scientific output, 

because Hubble is still producing high quality observations with its latest set 

of instruments. As will be discussed in chapter nine, many HST observations 

are already in archives waiting to be examined and analyzed, a process that will 

continue long after HST stops functioning. Hubble’s most important contributions to science may still lie in the future.
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

ENDNOTES

 1 Ken Carpenter, oral history interview by author, part 1, 30 April 2015, pp. 14–15.

 2 Livio, “Hubble’s Legacy;” STScI, “HST Publication Statistics,” https://archive.stsci.edu/

hst/bibliography/pubstat.html (accessed 20 October 2017).

 3 Robert P. Kirshner, The Extravagant Universe: Exploding Stars, Dark Energy and the Accelerating Cosmos (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 5–6.

 4 E J. Chaisson and R. Villard, “The Science Mission of the Hubble Space Telescope,” Vistas 

in Astronomy, vol. 33 (1990), pp. 105–141. 

 5 John Noble Wilford, “The Search for the Beginning of Time,” New York Times Magazin

(11 February 1990): 33, 56; NASA, “STS-31 Press Kit,” p. 33; Smith, The Space Telescope, 

pp. 18–21. See Kirshner, The Extravagant Universe.

 6 Robert W. Smith, The Expanding Universe: Astronomy’s “Great Debate,” 1900–1931. (New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 71–77, 111–118; Christianson, Edwin Hubble, 

pp. 152–162; Robert W. Smith, “Hubble’s Law,” in James Trefil, ed., Discoveries in Modern

Science: Exploration, Invention, Technology (Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference 

USA, 2014), pp. 511–522. For more on Leavitt, see Dava Sobel, The Glass Universe: How 

the Ladies of the Harvard Observatory Took the Measure of the Stars (New York: Penguin 

Books, 2016). Later work showed that the Andromeda Galaxy is more than twice as far 

from Earth as Hubble estimated. This does not affect the importance of establishing the 

nature of Andromeda and similar objects.

 7 Smith, “Hubble’s Law”; and Helge Kragh and Robert W. Smith, “Who Discovered th

Expanding Universe?” History of Science 41, no. 2 (2003): 141–162. Both papers discuss 

the context surrounding the adoption of the idea of the expansion of the universe. See 

also Edwin Hubble, “A Relation Between Distance and Radial Velocity Among ExtraGalactic Nebulae,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 15, no. 3 (1929): 

168–173; Edwin Hubble and Milton L. Humason, “The Velocity-Distance Relation Among 

Extra-Galactic Nebulae,” Astrophysical Journal 74 (1931): 43–79; Christianson, Edwin 

Hubble, pp. 203–359.

 8 STScI, “Hubble Takes Major Step in Determining the Age of the Universe,” news release 

STScI-1993-31, 9 June 1993.

 9 Wendy Freedman, oral history interview by author, 6 September 2017, pp. 3–4; STScI,

“Hubble Completes Eight-Year Effort to Measure Expanding Universe,” news release 

STScI-1999-19, 25 May 1999; Wendy L. Freedman et al., “Final Results from the Hubble

Space Telescope Key Project to Measure the Hubble Constant,” The Astrophysical Journal 553 (20 May 2001): 47–72. Freedman said the project also made use of observations 

from the Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope and Cerro Tololo. A parsec is equal to 3.26 

light-years, and a megaparsec is 3.26 million light-years.

10 Laura Ferrarese, “Measuring the Expansion Rate of the Universe,” in ed., David L. Goodstein, Adventures in Cosmology (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Ptc. Ltd.,

2011), pp. 193–240 (quote on p. 224); Panek, 4% Universe, pp. 85–87; Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, pp. 37–39, 139–141.
204 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

11 J. H. Elias et al., “Type I Supernovae in the Infrared and Their Use as Distance Indicators,” The Astrophysical Journal 296 (15 September 1985): 379–389; Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, pp. 198–208; Ted Anton, Bold Science: Seven Scientists Who Are Changing 

Our World (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 2000), pp. 114–120

12 Anton, Bold Science, p. 120.

13 Robert E. Williams, oral history interview by author, 21 May 21 2015, part 2, pp. 5–11;

Robert Williams, Sadanori Okamura, and Nao Suzuki, “Round Table Talk: Conversation with Robert Williams,” Kavli IPMU News, no. 35 (September 2016): 20–23; Nichola

Suntzeff, oral history interview by author, 8 June 2016, pp. 1–7; Robert Kirshner, oral history interview by author, 28 September 2016, pp. 1–4; Adam Riess, oral history interview 

by author, 20 May 2015, p. 2. See also Panek, 4% Universe, pp. 111–114.

14 Suntzeff OHI, p. 2; Williams OHI, part 2, 8.

15 Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, p. 206.

16 John Noble Wilford, “Wary Astronomers Ponder An Accelerating Universe,” New York Tim

(3 March 1998); John Noble Wilford, “In the Light of Dying Stars, Astronomers See Intimations of Cosmic Immortality,” New York Times (21 April 1998); The Royal Swedish Academy of

Science, Scientific Background on the Nobel Prize in Physics 2011: The Accelerating Universe, 

compiled by the Class for Physics of the Royal Swedish Academy of Science, 4 October 2011; 

Panek, 4% Universe, pp. 141–163; Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, pp. 203–233. See also the 

SCP paper: Saul S. Perlmutter et al., “Measurements of Omega and Lambda from 42 High 

Redshift Supernovae,” Astrophysical Journal 517, no. 6, (1999): 565–586; and the High-z 

paper: Adam G. Riess et. al., “Observational Evidence from Supernovae for an Accelerating 

Universe and a Cosmological Constant,” The Astronomical Journal 116, no. 3 (September 

1998): 1009–1038. The High-z paper made greater use of HST data than did the SCP paper.

17 Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, pp. 246–249; Panek, 4% Universe, pp. 176–180.

18 Royal Swedish Academy, Scientific Background; Panek, 4% Universe, pp. 164–180; Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, pp. 235–243.

19 NASA, “First Year Results on the Oldest Light in the Universe,” news release 03-064, 11 

February 2003; STScI, “Mystery of Universe’s Expansion Rate Widens With New Hubbl

Data,” news release STScI-PR19-25, 25 April 2019; Riess et al., “A 2.4% Determinant of the 

Local Value of the Hubble Constant,” The Astrophysical Journal 286, no. 1 (21 July 2016); 

Riess OHI, pp. 5–7.

20 STScI, “New Hubble Constant Measurement Adds to Mystery of Universe’s Expansion 

Rate,” news release STScI-PR-19-28, 16 July 2019.

21 NASA, “Improved Hubble Yardstick Gives Fresh Evidence for New Physics in the Universe,” news release 2018-12, 22 February 2018; release, “New Hubble Constant Measurement,” Ibid.

22 Gianfranco Bertone and Dan Hooper, A History of Dark Matter, Fermilab-Pub-16-157-A; 

Panek, 4% Universe, pp. 50–54, 189–192.

23 Carpenter OHI, part 1, pp. 6–9. See also J. C. Brandt, T. B. Ake III, and C. C. Petersen, eds., 

The Scientific Impact of the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph (Astronomical Society of the Pacific Conference Series, vol. 143, 1998).
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

24 Laura Ferrarese and Holland Ford, “Supermassive Black Holes in Galactic Nuclei: Past, 

Present and Future Research,” Space Science Reviews, Volume 116, Issue 3–4 (2005), pp. 

523–624; D. Richstone et al., “Supermassive Black Holes and the Evolution of Galaxies,” 

Nature 395 (1 October 1998): A14–A19; Julianne J. Dalcanton, “18 years of Science with 

the Hubble Space Telescope,” Nature 457 (1 January 2009): 45; Mario Livio, “Hubble’s 

Top Seven Science Discoveries,” Astronomy (April 2015): 32.

25 Robert E. Williams, oral history interview by author, 21 May 2015, part 1, pp. 6–9

26 For early results of the Medium Deep Survey, see R. E. Griffiths et al., “The Hubble Space 

Telescope Medium Deep Survey with the Wide Field and Planetary Camera. 1: Methodology and Results on the Field Near 3c 273,” The Astrophysical Journal 437 (10 December

1994): 67–82; STScI, “Hubble Space Telescope Sky Survey Reveals Embryonic Galaxies,” 

news release STScI-1992-19, 29 June 1992. See also STScI, “Hubble Completes EightYear Effort to Measure Expanding Universe,” news release STScI-1999-19, 25 May 1999.

27 John N. Bahcall, Puragra Guhathakurta, and Donald P. Schneider, “What the Longest

Exposures from the Hubble Space Telescope Will Reveal,” Science 248 (13 April 1990):

178–183.

28 Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, p. 243.

29 STScI, “Hubble Identifies Primeval Galaxies, Uncovers New Clues to the Universe’s Evolution,” news release STScI-1994-52, 6 December 1994; Williams OHI, part 1, 7; Williams

Okamura, and Suzuki, “Round Table Talk: Conversation with Robert Williams,” p. 26.

30 Williams OHI, part 1, p. 8; Richard Ellis, “The Hubble Deep Field: Introduction and Motivation,” in The Hubble Deep Field, M. Livio, S. M. Fall, and P. Madeu, eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 27; Williams, Okamura, and Suzuki, “Round Table Talk

Conversation with Robert Williams,” pp. 23–26

31 Robert E. Williams et al., “The Hubble Deep Field: Observations, Data Reduction, and

Galaxy Photometry,” The Astronomical Journal 112, no. 4 (October 1996): 1335–1389; 

Williams OHI; STScI, “Hubble’s Deepest View of the Universe Unveils Bewildering Galaxies across Billions of Years,” news release STScI-1996-01, 15 January 1996

32 Williams OHI, part 1, 9

33 Dalcanton, “18 Years of Science,” 48.

34 Robert E. Williams, oral history interview, 21 May 2015, part 2

35 Dalcanton, “18 Years of Science,” 41–50; Kirshner, Extravagant Universe, pp. 246–249; 

Panek, 4% Universe, pp. 176–180.

36 European Space Agency Hubble News, “The Hubble Deep Fields,” http://www.

spacetelescope.org/science/deep_fields/ (accessed 4 June 2017); STScI, “The Universe 

‘Down Under’ is the Latest Target for Hubble’s Latest Deep-View,” news release STScI1998-41, 3 November 1998; STScI, “Hubble Approaches the Final Frontier: The Dawn of 

Galaxies,” news release STScI-2004-28, 23 September 2004; STScI, “Hubble Goes to the 

eXtreme to Assemble Farthest Ever View of the Universe,” news release STScI-2012-37, 

25 September 2012; Steven V. W. Beckwith et al., “The Hubble Ultra Deep Field,” The

Astronomical Journal 132 (2006): 1729–1755.

37 Livio, “Hubble’s Legacy.”
206 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

38 Dalcanton, “18 Years of Science,” 46.

39 Space Telescope Science Institute, “Hubble Deep Fields Initiative 2012 Science Working

Group Report” (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 2012); “The Hubble Frontier Fields,” from Hubble 

24: Science Year in Review (Greenbelt, MD: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 2014) pp. 

77–92; Brandon Lawton, “Sharing the NASA Frontier Fields Story” (8 March 2017), https://

frontierfields.org/2017/03/08/sharing-the-nasa-frontier-fields-story/ (accessed 4 June 

2017).

40 “Hubble’s Multi-Cycle Treasury Programs,” Hubble 21: Science Year in Review (Greenbelt, 

MD: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 2014), pp. 85–101; Faber OHI, pp. 28–30; Julianne Dalcanton, oral history interview by author, 16 February 2017. See also Hubble 

Second Decade Committee, The Hubble Treasury Program: A New Class of Hubble Observations (Baltimore, MD: STScI, December 2000).

41 See John R. Spencer and Jacqueline Mitton, eds., The Great Comet Crash: The Collision 

of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 and Jupiter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

42 Spencer and Mitton, The Great Comet Crash, pp. 56, 102; Villard OHI; Malcolm W. Browne,

“Comet Crashes Into Jupiter in Dazzling, Galactic Show,” New York Times (17 July 1994): 

A12; Heidi Hammel, oral history interview by author, part one, 18 May 2017, pp. 5–9. 

Like many other people, the author viewed the marks left by the fragments on Jupiter 

through an 8-inch reflector telescope on his back deck.

43 Hammell OHI, part 1, 13.

44 Carol Collins Peterson and John C. Brandt, Hubble Vision: Further Adventures with the 

Hubble Space Telescope (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 41–51; 

NASA, Highlights of Hubble’s Exploration of the Universe (Baltimore, MD: Goddard Space 

Flight Center, NP-2016-9-491-GSFC, 2016); STScI and NASA, A Quarter-Century of Discovery with the Hubble Telescope (STScI and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 2015); 

STScI, “UA Scientist & Team Discover Surface Features Cover Titan,” news release STScI1994-55, 8 November 1994.

45 Heidi Hammel, oral history interview by author, part 2, 18 May 2017, pp. 1–8.

46 Peterson and Brandt, Hubble Vision, pp. 51–61; Amy Simon, Results from the Outer Planet 

Atmospheres Legacy (OPAL) Program, PowerPoint (Greenbelt, MD: Goddard Space Flight 

Center, 2016).

47 Peterson and Brandt, Hubble Vision, pp. 61–63; STScI, “NASA’s Hubble Telescope Finds 

Potential Kuiper Belt Targets for New Horizons Pluto Mission,” news release STScI-2014-

47, 15 October 2014; NASA Headquarters news release, “NASA’s New Horizons Team 

Selects Potential Kuiper Belt Flyby Target,” 28 August 2015; J. J. Kavelaars, “Exploring a 

New World at the End of the Solar System: The Ultima Thule Flyby,” presentation, Royal

B.C. Museum, 27 April 2019; NASA news release, “Far, Far Away in the Sky: New Horizons 

Kuiper Belt Flyby Object Officially Named ‘Arrokoth,’” 12 November 2019. The name 

comes from a term for “sky” in the Powhatan/Algonquian language. At the time of the 

flyby, the object was informally known as Ultima Thule.

48 STScI, “Scientists Track ‘Perfect Storm’ on Mars,” news release STScI-2001-31, 11 October 2001; “Hubble Finds Cloudy, Cold Weather Conditions for Mars-Bound Spacecraft,”

news release STScI-1997-15, 20 May 1997; “Hubble Monitors Weather on Neighboring
CHAPTER SIX . The Univrse

Planets,” news release STScI-1995-16, 21 March 1995; “NASA’s Hubble Looks For Possible Moon Resources,” news release STScI-2005-29, 19 October 2005. 

49 STScI and NASA, Quarter-Century of Discovery, p. 9; STScI, “Hubble Identifies a LongSought Population of Comets Beyond Neptune,” news release STScI-1995-26, 14 June 

1995; STScI, “NASA’s Hubble Observes the Farthest Active Inbound Comet Yet Seen,” 

news release STScI-2017-40, 28 September 2017.

50 Hester OHI, pp. 27–32; STScI, “Embryonic Stars Emerge from Interstellar ‘Eggs,’” news 

release STScI-1995-44, 2 November 1995; David DeVorkin and Robert W. Smith, The

Hubble Cosmos: 25 Years of New Vistas in Space (Washington, DC: National Geographic

Society, 2015), pp. 90–95; STScI, “Hubble Movies Provide Unprecedented View of Supersonic Jets from Young Stars,” news release STScI-2011-20, 31 August 2011.

51 Mario Livio, “Hubble’s Top 10,” Scientific American (July 2006): 47–48.

52 Anton, Bold Science, pp. 55–77.

53 STScI, “Telescopes Team Up to Find Distant Uranus-Sized Planet Through Microlensing,” news release STScI-2015-27, 30 July 2015; “Hubble Finds Hidden Exoplanet in Archival Data,” news release STScI-2009-15, 1 April 2009; “Astronomers Find Elusive Planets 

in Decade-Old Hubble Data,” news release STScI-2011-29, 6 October 2011.

54 DeVorkin and Smith, Hubble Cosmos, pp. 177–181; STScI, “Suspected Protoplanet May 

Really Be a Distant Star,” news release STScI-2000-13, 6 April 2000; Ray Villard OHI, 4 

November 2016, pp. 15–18; STScI, “Exoplanet Apparently Disappears in Hubble Observations,” news release STScI-PR20-09, 20 April 2020.

55 STScI, “Hubble Makes First Direct Measurements of Atmosphere on World Around

another Star,” news release STScI-2001-38, 27 November 2001; “Highlights of Hubble’s 

Exploration,” p. 3.

56 Robert W. Smith, “HST in Orbit: Ten Years and Counting,” Sky & Telescope (April 2000):

28–34. The emphasis is Smith’s.

57 Mario Livio, “Hubble’s Legacy.”

209

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Fall and Rise of Hubble’s 

Last Servicing Mission

▲ The WFC3 instrument aboard the HST snapped this image of the planetary nebula NGC 

6302, more popularly called the Bug Nebula or the Butterfly Nebula. (NASA/ESA/Hubble SM4 ERO 

Team: heic0910h)

When HST Servicing Mission 3B ended with Columbia’s touchdown 

at the Kennedy Space Center in the predawn darkness of 12 March 

2002, Sean O’Keefe greeted the crew of the first Shuttle mission flown 

since he had become Administrator of NASA a few months earlier. O’Keefe had 

inherited a Shuttle Program that was to all appearances running smoothly, but 

his three years in NASA’s top job would be remembered for a controversial decision he made about the upcoming servicing mission. As the Shuttle returned 

that morning, most HST engineers and scientists were already turning their 

attention to preparations for Servicing Mission 4, which promised the biggest 

set of improvements yet to HST’s imaging and spectrographic capabilities. SM4 

would ultimately redeem its promise, but the path to that success would be 

much longer and windier than anyone that day could have expected. Along the 

way, scientists and large numbers of the general public would show the high 

regard they felt for HST. This chapter will tell the story of Servicing Mission 4, 

which gave HST a new lease on life that has extended well past a decade. 

POST-HUBBLE PREPARATIONS

The work that led to SM4 began shortly before the launch of the first servicing 

mission in 1993 that restored Hubble’s vision. At the time, Hubble’s mission was 

due to last 15 years until 2005, and no decision had yet been made about what 

would follow HST. The Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, 

the parent body of STScI, set up an 18-member “HST and Beyond” committee in 1993 with NASA’s support. The committee, chaired by Alan Dressler of 
210 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

the Carnegie Observatories, was charged with recommending a path forward 

from HST to a successor observatory in space. When the committee reported 

in May 1996, it called for continuing HST operations beyond 2005, and for 

development of a new space observatory with an aperture of at least 4 meters to 

conduct imaging and spectroscopy in the infrared and near infrared.1

The idea for a giant infrared space telescope to follow HST was not new 

in 1996. It followed on the push for more space telescopes operating in the 

infrared that led to the installation of NICMOS on HST in 1997, which was 

discussed in chapter five. In the 1980s, a new generation of larger ground-based 

telescopes came into service, and astronomers at STScI took note of this fact 

and began drawing up proposals for a larger space telescope to follow HST. 

This idea drew wider notice in a 1988 report from the Space Science Board of 

the National Academy of Science. Among its recommendations for the period 

from 1995 to 2015 was an 8- to 16-meter space telescope with cooling for “maximum infrared performance” capable of delivering sharper images from deeper 

in the universe.2 A larger infrared instrument would be ideal to build on HST’s 

work of studying the formation of stars, galaxies and planetary systems very 

early in the history of the universe. Because early galaxies are moving away 

rapidly from us and thus are redshifted, a telescope operating in the infrared 

is required to see them. Even with instruments like NICMOS, HST does not 

operate far enough into the infrared to see these primeval galaxies, and the 

Spitzer Space Telescope, NASA’s Great Observatory that operated in the infrared, did not have a large enough aperture to study early galaxies in detail. In 

September 1989, STScI hosted a workshop on what was already known as the 

Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST), where participants proposed placing a 16-meter telescope on the Moon or a 10-meter telescope in a high orbit 

around Earth. Workshop participants hoped that NGST would be operating 

well before the expected end of HST operations.3 The 1991 decadal survey 

committee of the National Research Council led by John Bahcall discussed 

the major advances and growing interest in infrared astronomy, going so far as 

to proclaim the 1990s the “Decade of the Infrared,” and supporting work on 

what became the Spitzer Space Telescope. But the committee did not call for 

a larger telescope to succeed HST, possibly because of HST’s highly publicized 

spherical aberration problem, which had yet to be solved. Despite this setback 

for NGST, discussions and technical research into the idea continued in the 

early 1990s.4

By 1996 when the Dressler report recommended a minimum 4-meter NGST 

in deep space, three independent teams from NASA Goddard, Lockheed 

Martin, and TRW, Inc. found the concept feasible. As studies continued in 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of Hu

1998, NASA gave STScI responsibility for NGST’s science operations. By 2002, 

NGST had been named the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) after James 

E. Webb, who led NASA from 1961 to 1968 and is credited with the success 

of Apollo. That year, NASA named TRW, which in 2002 became Northrop 

Grumman Space Technology, as prime contractor for JWST. Ball Aerospace 

was given responsibility for the telescope’s optical element. Both the ESA and 

the Canadian Space Agency (CSA) became full participants in the JWST program, with each providing a scientific instrument, other equipment in the telescope, and scientific staff at STScI. Construction of the James Webb Space 

Telescope and its 6.5-meter segmented mirror began in 2004, and NASA and 

the ESA agreed in 2005 that it would be launched on an Ariane 5 rocket supplied by the ESA.5 At this writing, JWST is undergoing testing with a launch 

expected in 2021.

▲ An artist’s conception of the James Webb Space Telescope from 2015. (Northrop Grumman)

AN EXTENSION FOR HST

NASA endorsed the Dressler report’s call for HST to continue operating beyond 

2005. Because of its choice of a large infrared telescope to follow HST, the 

Dressler committee acknowledged that there would be no other large observatory with ultraviolet capability for some time other than HST. Its report 

recommended that Hubble, equipped with the Space Telescope Imaging 
212 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Spectrograph, the Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), and even newer instruments that could be installed in SM4, “should have excellent, unprecedented 

UV capability for imaging and spectroscopy, capabilities completely unavailable 

from the ground or from space with such a large collecting area.” The report 

also noted that HST has a valuable ability “to respond to transient or unforeseen developments,” and it suggested that HST could operate in “a much more 

economical style of operations beyond 2005” without the expense of further 

servicing missions.6

Within months of the Dressler report, NASA’s Office of Space Science 

(OSS) issued an Announcement of Opportunity in December 1996 for “one or 

two instrument proposals” to be considered for SM4, which was then planned 

for 2002. NASA set a tight budget for the instrument or instruments selected 

for this opportunity.7 The announcement drew many proposals, and in August 

1997, the OSS announced that it had selected the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph 

(COS), proposed by a team led by James C. Green of the University of Colorado 

in Boulder, for installation on HST in SM4. COS would take the place of the 

COSTAR instrument that had restored the vision of three other HST instruments when spherical aberration was discovered. Now that all three instruments had been replaced with newer instruments designed to compensate 

for the problem, COSTAR was no longer needed. NASA HST Senior Project 

Scientist David Leckrone described COS as being 15 to 20 times more sensitive in the far ultraviolet than STIS. HST management chose Ball Aerospace to 

build COS using some structural elements from the Goddard High Resolution 

Spectrograph (GHRS), which had been returned from orbit.8 COS was judged 

to be far superior to any of the competing proposals, but the peer review team 

that chose COS suggested that it could be upgraded for even better science 

at low cost. The COS instrument team responded by recommending a set of 

upgrades to COS including a near ultraviolet channel using a flight spare MultiAnode Microchannel Array (MAMA) detector originally built for STIS that 

would complement COS’s far ultraviolet capabilities. The use of recycled and 

spare instrument parts was part of promoting what Leckrone called “low-cost 

means to back up the primary instruments for UV-Optical imaging and UV 

spectroscopy, so that significant failures in one instrument will not leave HST 

blind or without the diagnostic tools of spectroscopy.” Another budget pressure 

affecting HST was NASA’s effort to create room in the budget to build JWST.9

After the peer review team chose only COS for installation on SM4, Leckrone 

and NASA Associate Administrator for Space Science Ed Weiler decided that 

there was still money for another instrument, and suggested building another 

imaging instrument to replace WFPC2. Personnel from the HST project, JPL, 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

Ball, STScI, and ESA studied the idea and proposed Wide Field Camera 3, 

which would be built using parts from the returned WF/PC instrument and 

flight spare components from ACS and WFPC2 to keep costs down, including 

a flight spare CCD from the ACS program. Instead of being sponsored by a traditional scientific team with a Principal Investigator, WFC3 would be a “facility instrument” developed by an HST project team supervised by the WFC3 

Science Oversight Committee.10 WFC3 was originally visualized as a “clone” 

of WFPC2, but members of the astronomical community pushed for a more 

capable instrument with an additional detector operating in the near infrared. 

The HST Second Decade Committee, formed in 1998 to devise a blueprint for 

HST’s second decade of operations, formally recommended the infrared capability. In spite of Weiler questioning the need for an infrared detector given its 

cost and complexity, WFC3 became a panchromatic camera that operated in 

ultraviolet, visible, and infrared wavelengths. Leckrone and others give credit to 

Edward Cheng, HST Project Scientist for Development at Goddard, for using 

his knowledge of digital devices and his contacts with the electronics industry 

to equip WFC3 with its cutting edge infrared detector. WFC3’s ultravioletvisible channel is far more powerful than the ultraviolet imaging channel on 

ACS, and its detectors with a wider field of view, sensitivity, and low noise represent a 15- to 20-time enhancement in capability over NICMOS.11 Funding 

for COS, including upgrades, came from $43.5 million budgeted for the instrument, and money for WFC3 came from HST science program reserve funds.

In 1997, the NASA Office of Space Sciences authorized the HST Project to 

budget on the assumption that its mission would continue beyond 2005, providing the final endorsement of the Dressler report’s recommendation. Leckrone 

advised astronomers that a “mission to bring HST back to Earth in 2010 is 

sketched into our long-term plan.” That coincided with a period of high solar 

activity, which would lower the orbit of HST, which was then projected to be 

near the end of its operational life eight years after the planned 2002 date for 

SM4, the final servicing mission.12 Since NGST was then planned for launch in 

2007, he expressed the hope for coordinated operations involving it and HST. 

Leckrone wrote that SM4: “will be the last in-orbit maintenance of HST. We 

will then be operating in a low-cost mode.”13 Four years before it was originally 

due to fly in 2002, Servicing Mission 4 was established as a major event in the 

Hubble program. Leckrone said these plans were designed to meet the goals of 

insuring that HST would “produce top-rank science until 2010” and maintain 

a flow of data “that continues to be both scientifically compelling and inspirational to the general public” at low cost.14 With the exception of the 2002 

launch date, NASA’s plans for SM4 remained intact through the changes that 
214 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

converted the third servicing mission into 

two missions, SM3A and SM3B.

▲ Sean O’Keefe was NASA 

Administrator from 21 December 

2001 to 11 February 2005. (NASA/

Bill Ingalls)

SEAN O’KEEFE

When O’Keefe welcomed the crew of SM3B 

back to Earth in March 2002, he was 46 and 

had already established himself as a strong 

financial administrator in the Pentagon 

under President George H. W. Bush, serving 

as Comptroller and Chief Financial Officer 

at the Department of Defense and then 

as Secretary of the Navy. When President 

George W. Bush took office in 2001, he 

appointed O’Keefe Deputy Director of the 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 

where one of the agencies whose budget he 

supervised was NASA. After Daniel Goldin 

stepped down as NASA Administrator late 

that year, the president tapped O’Keefe to head up the Agency with a mandate 

to deal with the budget problems in the International Space Station Program 

that he was already familiar with from his service at OMB.15

Mindful of the Challenger disaster years before and his own experiences in 

the Pentagon with plans and protocols for mishaps, O’Keefe made sure upon 

becoming Administrator that NASA updated its preparations for another disaster. By 2002, every Shuttle flight was dedicated to building and servicing the 

International Space Station, with two exceptions: the 16-day STS-107 science 

mission, featuring a suite of medical, material, and remote sensing experiments inside a Spacehab double module installed in Columbia’s cargo bay, and 

HST Servicing Mission 4, also on Columbia, by then slated for 2004. O’Keefe 

learned that these “stand-alone” Shuttle missions involved a higher degree of 

danger than missions to the ISS. HST’s orbit is inclined at 28.5 degrees to the 

equator and the Space Station at 51.6 degrees. Since changing orbital inclinations requires massive amounts of fuel, a crew on an HST servicing mission 

could not use the Station as a safe haven if their Shuttle could not safely return 

to Earth.16

A DISASTROUS RETURN 

Four Shuttle missions flew in 2002 to the ISS after SM3B’s return, and the 

oft-delayed STS-107 Spacehab mission finally launched on 16 January 2003.17
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of Hu

Aside from the fact that its crew included Israel’s first astronaut, STS-107 got 

little public notice during its time in space. Science missions like STS-107 had 

once been a staple of the Shuttle Program, but NASA was shifting scientific 

research to the ISS. STS-107 was seen as a transitional mission preparing astronauts and researchers for routine scientific work on board the Space Station.18

Tragically, Columbia broke up as it re-entered Earth’s atmosphere at the end of 

its mission on 1 February. A piece of foam insulation that had struck its wing at 

high speed during launch created a breach that compromised Columbia’s thermal protection system when it faced the heat of re-entry. Debris and the bodies 

of the seven astronauts were strewn over a wide area of east Texas.19

▲ The seven STS-107 crew members pose for their crew portrait prior to their launch in 

January 2003 on Columbia. Seated in front are astronauts (left to right) Rick D. Husband, 

mission commander; Kalpana Chawla, mission specialist; and William C. McCool, pilot. 

Standing are (left to right) astronauts David M. Brown, Laurel B. Clark, and Michael P. 

Anderson, all mission specialists; and Ilan Ramon, payload specialist representing the 

Israeli Space Agency. (NASA: STS107-S-002)

That morning O’Keefe stood alongside the Shuttle landing facility at KSC, 

awaiting Columbia, as he had done the year before with SM3B. When he got 

word that communications and radar contact had been lost with the Shuttle 

over Texas, O’Keefe contacted President Bush and other officials, then met 

with the families to offer his condolences. Videos of the descending debris soon 
216 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

appeared on television. The disaster marked the second loss of a Shuttle and its 

crew, raising questions about the future of the Shuttle Program. The Challenger 

accident in 1986 grounded the Shuttle fleet for 32 months and caused NASA 

to remove defense, commercial, and high-risk payloads from the Shuttle. When 

Weiler turned on his television that Saturday morning and learned of the 

destruction of Columbia, he immediately began to worry about the upcoming 

Hubble servicing mission.20

NASA suspended all Shuttle flights while an investigation took place. The 

report of the 13-member Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), issued 

seven months later, found that the causes of the disaster went well beyond 

the fact that a piece of foam insulation from the Shuttle’s external tank had 

breached Columbia’s thermal protection system during launch. The thermal 

protection system, it turned out, had suffered repeated breaches during many 

launches throughout the Shuttle Program. The loss of Columbia, in the view 

of the board, “was related in some degree to NASA’s budgets, history, and program culture, as well as to the politics, compromises, and changing priorities of 

the democratic process.”21 The board’s 29 recommendations included a call to 

establish inspection procedures for damage to the Shuttle thermal protection 

system once each Shuttle reached orbit. Astronauts could seek shelter on the 

ISS and await the launch of rescue vehicles if the Shuttle’s thermal protection system was breached. For Shuttle missions not involving the ISS, which 

meant only SM4, the CAIB report said NASA should “develop a comprehensive 

autonomous (independent of station) inspection and repair capability to cover 

the widest possible range of damage scenarios.”22

Looking beyond immediate safety issues to the future of the Shuttle Program, 

the CAIB recommended that if Shuttles were to continue flying beyond 2010, 

the three remaining Shuttle orbiters and all their systems, subsystems, and 

components should be recertified for flight. O’Keefe and officials at the White 

House began work that fall to develop a new policy that would address the 

future of the Space Shuttle Program.23

A SIXTH SERVICING MISSION?

The board’s vague language in relation to Servicing Mission 4 caused few people involved with Hubble to suspect that SM4 might never fly. Indeed, language 

in Congressional appropriations legislation passed in February 2003 shortly 

after the Columbia disaster directed NASA to form a panel of seven astronomers to study a sixth servicing mission, Servicing Mission 5. The panel, headed 

by David C. Black, President of the Universities Space Research Association, 

found in its April 2003 report that if SM4 was successful, HST “would continue 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of Hu

to provide the highest quality scientific return at and beyond the time of a 

proposed SM5.”24 Congress had asked if it would be worth flying SM5 without 

new instruments to install on HST, or with two new instruments that had been 

under study in 2002, a very wide field imager and an advanced coronagraph, 

that could search for Jupiter-sized planets around other stars. The appropriations language stated that funding for such missions would have to come from 

NASA’s Origins Program, which funded a number of other scientific spacecraft 

and telescopes. The panel questioned whether the proposed instruments would 

be ready in time for a servicing mission in 2007 or 2008, and declined to suggest whether Origins Program funds should be diverted to a servicing mission 

with or without the new instruments.25

▲ Edward Weiler, who held several high-level positions at NASA during the time of HST, 

photographed in 2018. (NASA/W. Hrybyk)

In the summer of 2003, NASA’s Office of Space Science convened another 

panel of six astronomers headed by John Bahcall to consider the transition from 

HST to the James Webb Space Telescope. When its report was submitted to 

NASA in August, the panel recommended as its top preferred option two servicing missions: SM4 in about 2005 and a possible SM5 in about 2010. The fate 

of this additional mission would be decided by a competition amongst scientists 

to determine if a new HST instrument could produce better science within 

budgetary and operational constraints than other space astrophysics proposals 
218 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

not involving HST. The fact that such an option was given top priority meant 

that many astronomers were still thinking about SM5, even when SM4 was at 

risk due to the Shuttle’s problems. The second option involved flying only SM4, 

which would involve installing COS and WFC3, repairing HST systems, and 

“attaching a device...that would make robotic de-orbiting easier,” and the third 

option was no servicing mission at all. The report suggested that if no further 

servicing missions were authorized, the two new HST instruments, WFC3 and 

COS, could instead be flown in a “stand-alone mission” involving a “2-meter 

class telescope” in geosynchronous orbit before JWST was launched.26

▲ John Grunsfeld, who flew in three HST servicing missions and also served as Associate 

Administrator for the Science Mission Directorate, photographed in 2018. (NASA/Joel Kowsky)

The panel also heard from astronaut John M. Grunsfeld, who said that he 

and his fellow astronauts were willing to risk their lives to service HST for more 

scientific work, but not to retrieve Hubble so it could be placed in a museum. 

The panel therefore recommended that the Shuttle be used to attach a propulsion module that could extend HST’s lifetime on orbit and then enable the end 

of its mission, although a robotic installation of such a module should also be 

considered. STScI and astronomers from elsewhere called for overlapping operations involving both HST and JWST to obtain optical and ultraviolet images 

from HST images in the infrared from JWST. While JWST was slated at the 

time for launch in 2011, the panel concluded that the JWST launch date “might 

be delayed substantially beyond 2011,” which is what happened. Possible delays 

to JWST and the desire for overlapping operations involving the two telescopes 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

pointed the panel to the need for SM5.27 The report generated controversy that 

fall amongst astronomers, who feared that the money spent for an SM5 mission 

or a robotic flight to attach a de-orbit module to HST would come at the expense 

of other space science missions.28 That fall, NASA Headquarters Astronomy 

and Physics Division Director Anne L. Kinney warned that missions in NASA’s 

Explorer and Discovery programs could be halted for roughly five years for budget reasons if Servicing Mission 5 was flown, something that would go against 

recent decadal studies of astronomy and astrophysics recommendations for scientific diversity in flight programs. Kinney called for completion of SM4, followed by de-orbiting of HST “after useful science ceases.”29 Inside NASA, the 

prospect of SM5 got little thought because the focus was turning to SM4 as the 

implications of the Shuttle’s problems became clear.

CANCELLATION

Weiler, the NASA Associate Administrator with responsibility for HST, recalled 

that he became more worried about the status of SM4 when he saw the Shuttle 

safety measures the Columbia Accident Investigation Board report called for 

when it reported in August 2003. To Weiler, the Bahcall panel’s public support for SM5 suggested that many astronomers were taking SM4 for granted. 

In October, Weiler submitted a budget to NASA budget officials that included 

SM4, paid for by cuts to other parts of NASA’s space science budget. “We will 

do this mission and we will pay for it even if it means taking it out of our own 

hides,” Weiler recalled of his plans at the time. On 7 November, Weiler briefed 

O’Keefe and other NASA leaders on various options, ranging from no servicing 

mission at all to flying SM4, at dates as early as June 2005 and as late as 2008. 

The direction of the discussion did not suggest to him that SM4 was in trouble. 

“I left that meeting...feeling like we were on the road to SM4.”30

Everyone at NASA knew from the experience of the Challenger disaster 

that returning the Shuttles to flight would take at least two years. They also 

knew that when flights resumed, the ISS, still in the midst of construction, 

would get top priority for Shuttle missions. Any servicing missions to Hubble 

could only be delayed so long because HST had only a limited lifetime without 

servicing. O’Keefe had authorized a Return to Flight Task Group and other 

preparations to return the remaining three Shuttle orbiters, Discovery, Atlantis, 

and Endeavour, to flight status even before the CAIB had completed its report. 

When O’Keefe saw the CAIB’s recommendations at the end of August 2003, 

he began to think that it would be difficult to mount HST Servicing Mission 4 

during HST’s lifetime. The Shuttle’s return-to-flight mission, which would go to 

the ISS, was slipping into 2005, and any Hubble servicing mission would take 
220 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

place well after that time. O’Keefe later said, “by the late fall, early winter it was 

pretty apparent that our likelihood of accomplishing all those objectives [set by 

the board] were becoming more and more remote.”31 NASA Comptroller Steve 

Isakowitz noted that SM4 costs would increase with the delay, with the money 

coming out of other NASA space science programs at a time when JWST costs 

were growing. In O’Keefe’s mind, the question increasingly was, would HST 

still be operating by the time the servicing mission could fly?32

Over the Thanksgiving weekend, O’Keefe worked on NASA’s 2005 budget 

submission with Isakowitz and others. O’Keefe called the working session a 

“prompting event,” a time to make a decision. Based on his growing conviction that the servicing mission could not be carried off as the CAIB had recommended, O’Keefe effectively cancelled it by not including money for SM4 

preparations in the 2005 budget.33 By the beginning of December, O’Keefe 

recalled, money for SM4 had been removed from the budget NASA sent to the 

White House, and the decision to cancel SM4 was secret pending presidential 

approval of the budget.34

Weiler learned that SM4 was out of the budget at a meeting of NASA 

Associate Administrators with O’Keefe and Isakowitz on 2 December. He said, 

“I was very shocked. I was surprised that people had the guts to make such 

a tough decision.” On 19 December, O’Keefe told President Bush about the 

cancellation of SM4, and Bush agreed with the decision since it would comply 

with the CAIB recommendations. O’Keefe was meeting the President that day 

to discuss Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, which would be announced less 

than a month later in January.35

John Grunsfeld had turned to preparatory work for SM4 following his return 

from the SM3B mission in 2002 up to the time he accepted O’Keefe’s appointment in September 2003 as NASA Chief Scientist at Headquarters. Grunsfeld 

saw that job as having a limited term, and he hoped to join the crew of SM4 

when it was named. One day in late November, Grunsfeld asked Isakowitz 

about the status of SM4, but misunderstood the Comptroller’s shake of the 

head and assumed the mission was still going ahead. On 6 January 2004, 

Grunsfeld was in Atlanta attending a meeting of the American Astronomical 

Society when he was summoned back to Washington for a meeting of top NASA 

officials including O’Keefe and Weiler. There he was shocked to learn that 

O’Keefe was cancelling the mission. Grunsfeld soon discovered that there was 

no formal safety analysis of SM4 to back up the decision, and he realized from 

the Administrator’s own words that his decision to cancel was a “gut call.”36

Grunsfeld considered leaving NASA over the issue. But when he called his 

friend and confidant John Bahcall to discuss the situation, Bahcall told him that 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

while everyone in the astronomy community would respect him if he left, “you’ll 

be able to do nothing to save Hubble.”37 Grunsfeld took Bahcall’s advice to 

stay. Thus fortified, Grunsfeld began the unenviable task that Weiler had given 

him of organizing the announcement of the cancellation. Grunsfeld planned 

the announcement for 28 January, well after President Bush unveiled his new 

Vision for Space Exploration but before the new NASA budget was published.38

On 14 January 2004, Bush visited NASA Headquarters and before a full 

house in the main floor auditorium, outlined his plans for the future of American 

space exploration, including completion of the ISS and retirement of the Shuttle 

in 2010, a new Crew Exploration Vehicle to replace the Space Shuttle, and a 

return to the Moon by astronauts no later than 2020.39 Although nothing was 

said about HST, the next day’s Washington Post story about Bush’s announcement contained the following paragraph: “There may also be slowed growth in 

the NASA space science budget, sources said, and a ‘refocusing’ of activities 

within the agency to support the central theme of returning to the Moon. There 

will be no further servicing missions to the Hubble Space Telescope. Though 

there is rampant speculation about closing NASA facilities and axing programs, 

there were few specifics.”40 The leak apparently originated with a White House 

staffer who spoke about SM4 in a briefing to a congressional committee. In the 

minds of many people, the Washington Post story appeared to tie the controversial SM4 cancellation to the President’s new space policy, something that could 

threaten congressional support for the policy.41

O’Keefe, surprised by the Washington Post revelation, called Senator Barbara 

Mikulski of Maryland—where GSFC and the STScI are based—to brief her 

on the SM4 decision, and with help from Weiler and Grunsfeld, organized 

a meeting for the next day at Goddard to explain the cancellation to those 

who worked on Hubble. O’Keefe spoke at the meeting for nearly 45 minutes 

without notes, stating that the decision was his alone. The Administrator and 

others also discussed ideas to prolong HST’s lifetime without a servicing mission. Weiler and Grunsfeld spoke in support of the Administrator’s decision in 

front of the unhappy crowd. Word quickly spread online, and Grunsfeld and 

Steven Beckwith, the director of the Space Telescope Science Institute, spoke 

to the media, with Grunsfeld referring to a “sad day” and Beckwith pronouncing 

astronomers as “devastated” by the news.42

PROLONGED CONTROVERSY

O’Keefe’s decision to cancel SM4 was immediately the subject of public controversy, and many people involved with HST remained angry about the decision years after it was made. Many Hubble supporters agreed with Weiler and 
222 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Beckwith when they stated in private that O’Keefe was not an engineer or scientist, and questioned his qualifications to make such a judgment. Beckwith 

and others seized on the lack of a formal risk analysis for SM4 to question 

the Administrator’s safety concerns. O’Keefe’s successor Michael Griffin suggested years later that ISS program officials opposed SM4 because it would 

delay construction of the Space Station, which was dependent on timely Shuttle 

missions, and he also said astronomers concerned about funding for non-HST 

programs did not support spending on SM4. Critics of O’Keefe’s SM4 decision 

suggested that he was poorly advised, but O’Keefe replied that he had no reason 

to question the advice he received from NASA officials on SM4.43

O’Keefe was acutely aware of the controversy caused by his cancellation of 

SM4, and shortly after he made that decision he asked NASA Chief Historian 

Steven J. Dick to report on how and why the decision was made, using relevant documents and oral history interviews with top NASA officials, including O’Keefe himself. The interviews and documents collected by Dick have 

informed this account of the decision, although the author interviewed most of 

the main participants in the controversy on his own.44 “Humans had a proven 

record of servicing [HST] with the Space Shuttle, but the Space Shuttle might 

not be able to make it in time,” Dick wrote late in 2004. “At the core of the matter was an assessment of the relative risk of a Shuttle HST mission compared 

with a Shuttle ISS mission.”45 Dick discussed issues related to the SM4 controversy that high-technology agencies like NASA often face, including whether 

American society in general and NASA in particular had become highly averse 

to risk in the time of the SM4 cancellation. Dick added that the SM4 cancellation decision also involved communication issues, given that many members of 

the media and the public believed that SM4 was cancelled to save money when 

the evidence showed that this was not the reason. The accidental release of the 

cancellation decision at nearly the same time as President Bush announced his 

Vision for Space Exploration caused many to believe that the two events were 

related when they were not.46

In explaining his decision years later, O’Keefe noted that HST in 2004 

was close to the end of its planned 15-year lifetime. He emphasized that the 

CAIB report and other knowledgeable people questioned NASA’s commitment 

to safety, making his response to the CAIB recommendations not only a matter of safety but of credibility for the whole Agency.47 O’Keefe stressed that he 

had committed to implement the recommendations of the CAIB report, saying, 

“[W]e needed to demonstrate that anything that we could possibly anticipate, 

diagnose, see as an anomaly, or witness as any variation of what is an appropriate 

standard, be not only explained, but corrected.”48 In the case of SM4, O’Keefe 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of Hu

believed that he would have to make an exception to his commitment if the servicing mission were to reach Hubble before it was forecast to stop operating.49

STRONG REACTIONS 

Once he announced the cancellation of SM4, O’Keefe and everyone who had 

anything to do with HST had to deal with the reactions to that decision. In the 

weeks that followed, support for 

HST poured into the hubblesite.org 

website and to Beckwith, O’Keefe, 

and members of Congress. Some 

writers offered to contribute money 

to save Hubble, while others suggested that Hubble be moved to 

the International Space Station 

for repairs—an impossibility given 

their vastly different orbits—or 

that soft drink companies help pay 

for Hubble repairs in return for 

logo placement on Hubble images. 

Other Hubble supporters created a savethehubble.com website. 

O’Keefe admitted that his “e-mail 

system is clogged up every day.” 

Many of the e-mails were sharply 

critical of his decision, and the 

NASA Administrator later said he 

was surprised by the level of “personal animus” directed at him by 

Hubble advocates.50 In February, 

two anonymous papers arguing in favor of SM4 circulated around NASA, and 

in March, NASA issued a paper explaining O’Keefe’s cancellation decision.51

▲ Steven Beckwith, third director of STScI. (STScI)

Encouraged by the public comments inside his inbox and the urgings of 

his associate director, Bruce Margon, Beckwith decided to fight for SM4, and 

started by answering all the e-mails he received supporting Hubble. While 

there were legal limits to what STScI employees could do in the political arena, 

they were not as constrained as NASA employees. Beckwith called on Bahcall, 

who faced no constraints and knew the ways of Congress from his work to get 

HST built in the first place. “He was instrumental in a lot of ways,” Beckwith 

said of Bahcall, who “[d]elivered a lot of things to politicians that I couldn’t 
224 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

do.”52 Beckwith said HST supporters had three “silver bullets”: First was the 

idea shared by many people that the safety reason for the cancellation was a 

“red herring” unsupported by a formal risk analysis, second was the strength of 

the science coming from HST and the potential offered by the new instruments 

scheduled for SM4, and third was the support of Senator Barbara Mikulski, the 

ranking Democrat on the Senate subcommittee that oversees NASA, who kept 

money flowing to the team preparing for SM4.53

▲ Senator Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) speaking at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in 2016. 

(NASA/Goddard/Rebecca Roth)

Mikulski acted within days of the cancellation announcement, writing 

O’Keefe on 21 January to ask for “an independent panel of outside experts to 

fully review and assess all of the issues surrounding another Hubble servicing mission” and an assurance that all work on SM4 continue until Congress 

had time to consider the matter. Although O’Keefe declined the request for a 

panel at first, he eventually asked Admiral Harold Gehman, who chaired the 

Columbia Accident Investigation Board, to review his decision. On 5 March, 

Gehman responded that the board was “split on the merits of flying this mission,” and therefore further study was required. Six days later, at a hearing 

of a Senate subcommittee, O’Keefe agreed under pressure from Mikulski and 

subcommittee chair Senator Christopher Bond (R-MO) to have the National 

Research Council of the National Academy of Science (NAS), along with the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), look into the costs, risks, and benefits of such a mission. Later that day, O’Keefe told reporters that he remained 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

strongly opposed to another Shuttle mission to Hubble. O’Keefe raised the idea 

of repairing HST with a robotic mission when he wrote the National Academy 

of Science, a notion that became part of the NAS’s study.54 Mikulski kept up 

pressure on O’Keefe by introducing a bipartisan Senate Resolution calling on 

NASA to continue preparations for SM4 while the NAS looked at the issue, 

and Representative Mark Udall (D-CO) introduced a similar resolution in the 

House of Representatives.55 Texas Republican Senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson 

wrote to the President, calling on NASA to repair the telescope and enclosed 

a petition signed by 26 retired U.S. astronauts urging the President to reinstitute SM4.56 Outright opposition was not the only reaction to the cancellation. 

“People began to think very creatively about how we could get the best science we could out of Hubble in whatever remaining time we had without being 

able to service it,” said Jennifer Wiseman, who had just become HST Program 

Scientist at NASA Headquarters. She came to believe that this work contributed to the scientific support for restoring SM4.57

ROBOTS TO THE RESCUE?

After the Columbia disaster, Frank Cepollina at Goddard “immediately started 

thinking about a robotic servicing mission” because he worried that SM4 was 

“on thin ice.” In the recollection of HST Program Manager Preston Burch, 

Cepollina worked quietly with his team and even astronauts to begin preparations for a robotic mission to Hubble. “So finally when O’Keefe came out and 

challenged us to a Hubble robotic mission, we already had in place a lot of 

the ideas and concepts for doing such a mission.”58 Neither O’Keefe nor Ed 

Weiler believed in February that there was much chance of a successful robotic 

repair mission. But when NASA Goddard requested ideas for such a mission on 

20 February, it got 26 responses from a variety of institutions and contractors, 

including robot proposals from the Johnson Space Center, the Canadian Space 

Agency, and the University of Maryland. Goddard experts produced a Mission 

Feasibility Study that called a robotic mission feasible but challenging. “It’s looking a lot more promising than I would have told you a few weeks back,” O’Keefe 

told a congressional hearing on April 21.59 In a speech on 1 June to astronomers 

gathered in Denver at an AAS meeting, O’Keefe compared the work on robotic 

missions to the “can-do spirit that propelled the first Hubble servicing mission,” 

and announced NASA would pursue the feasibility of robotic servicing by issuing a request for proposals for a robotic servicing mission to HST.60

While the responses to the request for proposals for a robotic mission 

encouraged O’Keefe, the confirmation that he was hoping for from the National 

Academy did not materialize. The NAS had appointed a 21-member committee 
226 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

headed by Louis J. Lanzerotti, a consultant with Bell Laboratories, and on 

13 July, it issued an interim report. It urged “that NASA commit to a servicing 

mission to the Hubble Space Telescope that accomplishes the objectives of the 

originally planned SM4 mission, including both the replacement of the present 

instruments with the two instruments already developed for flight—the Wide 

Field Camera 3 and the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph—and the engineering 

objectives, such as gyroscope and battery replacements.” While the committee supported NASA’s work on robotic missions, it said NASA should take no 

actions that would preclude SM4.61 Its final report, issued 8 December, made 

the same recommendations even more strongly, armed with critical input on 

the possibility of a robotic mission from the Aerospace Corporation and NASA’s 

Independent Program Assessment Office. “The likelihood of successful development of the HST robotic servicing mission within the baseline 39-month 

schedule is remote.”62 Turning to the safety requirements for SM4 laid down by 

CAIB, the committee found such a mission “viable” with a second Shuttle ready 

for launch to rescue the SM4 crew.63

O’Keefe did not react to the report, but five days later announced his resignation from NASA. His handwritten letter of resignation to the President made 

no reference to the decision on the Hubble servicing mission but spoke of his 

“commitment to family.”64 Even before the letter had been sent, media reported 

that O’Keefe was being considered for the chancellorship at Louisiana State 

University, a job he subsequently accepted. While critics of his SM4 decision 

suggest it caused him to step down, O’Keefe has always asserted that his resignation was not related to HST. In considering O’Keefe’s challenges at NASA, 

it should be remembered that he dealt with larger issues such as returning the 

Shuttle to flight, promoting the President’s Vision for Space Exploration, and 

dealing with the financial problems dogging the ISS. O’Keefe later explained 

that LSU had sounded him out for the chancellorship in the summer of 2004, 

but he refused to consider the offer until after the 2004 presidential election 

in November, which saw Bush win reelection. LSU renewed the offer after the 

election, a time when many agency and department heads consider their positions, and O’Keefe accepted the offer.65 In his study of O’Keefe’s time at NASA, 

political scientist W. Henry Lambright wrote that O’Keefe’s hopes of becoming 

secretary of defense in Bush’s second term were dashed when Donald Rumsfeld 

decided to remain in the post. After only three years at NASA, O’Keefe was 

tired, and the attacks he sustained because of his cancellation of SM4 had 

cost him some of the congressional support he had hoped to use to advance the 

President’s Vision for Space Exploration. The outgoing Administrator remained 

in place until February, and his plans for HST remained unchanged.66
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

The option of a robotic mission to HST faltered as O’Keefe departed NASA. 

Through the summer and fall of 2004 and the winter of 2005, NASA and contractors continued to develop the robotic option. A NASA procurement notice 

in June 2004 announced that Canadian space contractor MacDonald Dettwiler 

and Associates, Ltd. (MDA) would be the only company invited to bid on the 

robotic work because it was the only firm with equipment available that would 

meet the deadline for a robotic servicing mission. MDA’s MD Robotics Division 

in Brampton, Ontario, had built robotic systems for the Space Shuttle, the ISS, 

and the U.S. military, including the Dextre robot that MDA was building to 

perform ISS maintenance. NASA and MDA were considering using Dextre to 

perform servicing work on HST instead of on board the ISS. MDA began work 

in October on a 30-month, $154-million contract to provide a robotic system to 

service HST, and in December, MDA signed a contract with Lockheed Martin, 

which was designing a spacecraft to carry the MDA robot to rendezvous and 

dock with HST. The Canadian contractor announced on 5 January 2005 that 

its 30-month contract with NASA had been formally signed. But in March, 

the robotic servicing mission went by the wayside when NASA decided not 

to continue with the concept beyond the preliminary design phase. Instead, 

NASA decided to continue work on a robotic mission to attach a de-orbit module to HST.67

▲ President George W. Bush announces his Vision for Space Exploration policy at NASA 

Headquarters, 14 January 2004. (NASA)
228 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

When the President’s proposed 2006 budget for NASA was released on 

7 February 2005, it contained no funding for a Shuttle servicing mission. The 

budget also scaled back plans for robotic servicing, and instead proposed a 

simplified robotic mission to reach HST and de-orbit it safely over an ocean. 

O’Keefe, then in his final days as Administrator, said the NRC report findings 

on the robotic mission made it “incredibly difficult” for NASA to proceed with 

the idea. Senator Mikulski, for her part, promised to keep fighting for additional 

funding that would allow a servicing mission for HST. She also kept pressing 

NASA to continue work on SM4.68 Others in Congress also showed support 

for the HST servicing mission. A 2 February House Science Committee hearing on HST was told that the fate of SM4 might turn on how the costs of the 

Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3)

CCD Electronics 

Box Main Electronics 

Box 1

Instrument 

Enclosure

Radiator

Main Electronics Box 2

Optical Bench

Pickoff Mirror

Detector Electronics Box

Low Voltage Power Supply

Wide Field Camera 3

Time on HST:

14 May 2009–present

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

Science Oversight Committee 

Chair: Bob O’Connell 

(University of Virginia)

Weight: 404 kilograms 

(890 pounds)

Radial Instrument

Wide Field Camera 3 operates from the radial instrument bay in HST previously

occupied by the two Wide Field Planetary cameras. It also has near-infrared capabilities that expand on the work of NICMOS, as well as a wide field of view and high

sensitivity. In the absence of a proposal for a new camera for HST, NASA created 

an international community-based Science Oversight Committee in 1998 with 

responsibility for WFC3, and it was developed by NASA Goddard with STScI and Ball

Aerospace. The instrument uses many components from WF/PC, which flew on HST
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

Shuttle mission were charged. Witnesses including Beckwith and Princeton 

physicist (and Nobel laureate) Joseph Taylor told the committee that NASA 

usually charged the NASA science budget between $300 and $400 million for 

each servicing mission, with the balance of the cost being charged to NASA’s 

human spaceflight program. If the entire cost of such a mission, in excess of $1 

billion, came out of the science budget, the two witnesses warned that most scientists would oppose the mission because of the cuts that would then be made 

to other NASA science missions. The hearing also included discussions about 

the dangers of flying a servicing mission.69

Although the robotic mission plans had fallen by the wayside, the effort 

helped keep the HST servicing mission team together. Without O’Keefe’s 

from 1990 to 1993, including the external shell, radiator, and filter wheel. The optical 

bench is new, and WFC3’s internal optics compensate for the effects of spherical

aberration in HST’s main mirror.a

WFC3 is known as HST’s only “panchromatic” instrument because its two channels

cover wavelengths from the near ultraviolet to the near infrared. The UVIS channel 

covers near-ultraviolet and optical wavelengths, 2,000 to 10,000 angstroms, using 

two CCDs, each 4,096 by 2,098 pixels in size. The IR channel operates in the near 

infrared at 8,000 to 17,000 angstroms using a single mercury cadmium telluride 

detector of 1,096 pixels square and an innovative cooling system that makes cryogenic agents unnecessary to keep the detector cold as in NICMOS.b

Because of its great capabilities, WFC3 can be used in many studies, including those

focusing on the evolution of the universe, star populations in nearby galaxies, dark 

matter, and dark energy, often in tandem with ACS and other instruments. WFC3

has been used to take many well-known images since its installation, including the 

updated version in 2015 of the “Pillars of Creation” image, Mystic Mountain in the 

Carina Nebula, and an infrared view of the Horsehead Nebula.c

a Buddy Nelson, Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4 Media Guide (Lockheed Martin, 

2009).

b STScI, Wide Field Camera 3 Instrument Handbook for Cycle 25, Version 8.0 (Baltimore, MD: 

STScI, January 2016); John W. MacKenty, “Wide Field Camera 3: Design, Status, and Calibration Plans,” 2002 HST Calibration Workshop, eds., S. Arribas, A. Koekemoer, and B. Whitmore, 2002 HST Calibration Workshop (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 200

c Nelson, HST Servicing Mission 4 Media Guide.
230 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

agreement that allowed Cepollina and his team to keep working on the robotic 

servicing mission, Grunsfeld feared that Cepollina’s team would have been split 

up, and contracts for SM4 with firms such as Lockheed Martin would have 

been terminated. “And that’s what allowed the whole Hubble team—the people 

building the instruments and electronics and all the fixes for SM4 to continue 

working on SM4,” Grunsfeld explained.70 The robotic servicing mission concept 

bought Hubble supporters such as Grunsfeld and Weiler time to save Servicing 

Mission 4, and it allowed O’Keefe to avoid antagonizing powerful members 

of Congress while he tried to win support for the Bush administration’s space 

proposals. The work done on robotic servicing for HST stimulated interest in 

the technologies behind it. But the great expense of a robotic servicing mission, 

coupled with the limited time available to mount any servicing mission to HST, 

meant that the robotic solution to Hubble’s problems was not feasible.

A NEW ADMINISTRATOR

President Bush nominated Michael D. Griffin as the next Administrator of 

NASA on 14 March. Griffin, an engineer and physicist who was then working 

at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, had previously 

worked at NASA, the Strategic 

Defense Initiative Organization, 

and in the aerospace industry. Griffin came to his new 

post prepared to deal with the 

matter of HST’s servicing mission because he had conducted 

an unpublished independent 

assessment for NASA examining 

the feasibility of a robotic mission to HST. When he appeared 

before a friendly Senate confirmation hearing on 12 April and 

was questioned about HST, he 

ruled out a robotic servicing 

mission and promised to “reassess” his predecessor’s decision 

against a Shuttle servicing mission.71 Griffin was confirmed 

by the Senate the next day and 

quickly took office.72

▲ Dr. Michael Griffin served as NASA’s eleventh 

Administrator from 14 April 2005 to 20 January 

2009. (NASA)
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

The Space Shuttle was still grounded when the new Administrator moved 

into NASA Headquarters. Solutions to the immediate cause of Columbia’s 

loss—loose foam from the external tank striking and breaching the Shuttle’s 

thermal protection system—were prerequisites for Servicing Mission 4. NASA 

slated two missions to the ISS to test procedures for verifying the safety of the 

system, including close-up imaging from a boom attached to the Shuttle robotic 

arm and further images from the Space Station, to ensure that the Shuttle 

could return to regular flight operations. Nearly 30 months after Columbia’s 

loss, Discovery lifted off from the Kennedy Space Center on 26 July 2005. 

While the 14-day STS-114 mission successfully delivered equipment to the ISS 

and tested out the procedures to verify the integrity of the Shuttle’s thermal 

protection system, that system had again been endangered by a piece of foam 

from the external tank striking the Shuttle during launch. Later in the flight, 

an astronaut made a spacewalk to the underside of Discovery to adjust pieces 

of the thermal protection system. As a result of the foam problem, the second 

Shuttle test flight was postponed for several months while engineers worked to 

resolve the issue. Engineers found that air ramps on the external tank were the 

source of the loose foam on STS-114, and so they were removed from the external tank due to launch Discovery on its next mission, STS-121. The fix worked, 

and STS-121 completed a successful mission in July 2006 to deliver equipment 

and a crew member to the Space Station. Two months later, Atlantis on the 

STS-115 mission repeated the success of the second return-to-flight mission, 

and construction activity resumed at the ISS.73

SM4 REINSTATED

With two Shuttle flights successfully completed without thermal protection 

system problems, Griffin was ready to decide the fate of SM4 and HST. After 

briefings in the final days before he announced his decision, Griffin went to 

GSFC on 31 October 2006, and told employees that SM4 was back on the 

Shuttle launch manifest. Mikulski was among those on hand who applauded 

the decision. Griffin set the timing of the mission for the “spring to fall” of 

2008, with the needs of the ISS and the Shuttle launch schedule in mind. The 

special safety precautions for the servicing mission included a plan to have a 

Launch on Need Shuttle mission to rescue the crew of SM4 on orbit in case the 

Shuttle’s thermal protection system was breached during launch. This safety 

measure required that both Shuttle launch pads at Kennedy Space Center and 

two Shuttles be available to support both SM4 and the contingency flight. “We 

have conducted a detailed analysis of the performance and procedures necessary to carry out a successful Hubble repair mission over the course of the 
232 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

last three Shuttle missions. What we have learned has convinced us that we 

are able to conduct a safe and effective servicing mission to Hubble,” Griffin 

said. He also announced the crew for SM4: commander Scott D. Altman, pilot 

Gregory C. Johnson, veteran servicing mission spacewalkers John M. Grunsfeld 

(recently returned to the astronaut office from NASA Headquarters) and 

Michael J. Massimino, along with three rookie astronauts, spacewalkers Andrew 

J. Feustel and Michael T. Good, and arm operator K. Megan McArthur. At that 

point, SM4 was designated to install WFC3 and COS in place of WFPC2 and 

COSTAR, along with a refurbished fine guidance sensor and new gyroscopes. 

The crew was also slated to perform repairs on STIS, which had stopped operating in 2004.74

Even before he reinstated SM4, Griffin had decided against devoting all or 

part of a Shuttle mission to attaching a module with a reentry rocket to HST. 

He had already learned that Hubble’s orbit would not decay at a rate that would 

cause a reentry before the 2020s. If NASA judged later on that it needed to 

attach a reentry module to the telescope, Griffin said NASA could launch it 

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS)

Near Ultraviolet 

(NUV) Detector Aperture 

Mechanism

FUV Detector

Optics Select 

Mechanism 2

Calibration 

Lamp 

Platform Remote 

Interface Unit

Main Electronics Box

Far Ultraviolet 

(FUV) Detector 

Electronics Box

Optics Select 

Mechanism 1

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph

Time on HST:

16 May 2009–present

Contractor:

Ball Aerospace

Principal Investigator:

James Green 

(University of Colorado)

Weight: 385 kilograms 

(850 pounds) 

Axial Instrument

The Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS) contains two channels, the Far Ultraviolet 

channel covering wavelengths from 1,150 to 1,770 angstroms, and the Near 

Ultraviolet (NUV) channel for wavelengths from 1,750 to 3,000 angstroms. The NUV 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

on the Ares rocket, then under development for the Constellation program. “I 

didn’t see why I would put a reentry module on [HST]. That would just tempt 

people to use it,” Griffin explained later.75

Even though Hubble was still in a secure orbit when Griffin announced 

that SM4 was back on, the concerns O’Keefe and others had about HST’s limited working lifetime remained because HST was operating on just two of its 

six gyroscopes. HST had switched to two-gyro operations for the first time in 

August 2005 with engineers and scientists hoping that it could continue science work into the second half of 2008 when SM4 was due to fly. While the 

telescope was designed to operate on three or more gyros, the move to two gyros 

was extensively tested before the troubled but still operating third gyro was 

shut down. Hubble’s Advanced Camera for Surveys also stopped functioning 

in January 2007 when its backup power supply suffered a short circuit, which 

added another task to the repairs planned for the upcoming servicing mission. 

On a more positive note, the delays to the mission caused by O’Keefe’s cancellation decision had allowed engineers at Ball Aerospace and NASA to install 

channel uses a flight spare NUV Multi-Anode Microchannel Array (MAMA) from STIS.a

COS is designed for maximum efficiency with light, to better collect light from distant objects. It reused the optical bench from GHRS as a cost-saving measure.

The primary design goal of COS is to improve the sensitivity of HST to point sources 

in the far ultraviolet. With the installation of COS and the repair of STIS during

Servicing Mission 4, HST has two spectrographs with significant overlap in spectral 

range and resolving power. Each has unique capabilities, and the decision of which 

to use is driven by the science goals of the program and the nature of the target to 

be observed.b

A major goal of COS is to measure the structure and composition of matter in the 

universe, including the mysterious dark matter that constitutes most matter in 

the universe. COS’s internal optics were designed to compensate for the effects of 

spherical aberration in HST’s main mirror.

a J. Gethyn Timothy, “Review of Multianode Microchannel Array Detector Systems,” Journal 

of Astronomical Telescopes, Instruments, and Systems 2, no. 3, 030901 (July–September 

2016): 17.

b Space Telescope Science Institute, Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph Instrument 

Handbook for Cycle 24, Version 15.0 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, January 2016), p. 17.
234 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

better detectors on board the new WFC3 instrument than would have been the 

case had it flown as originally planned. In June 2007, NASA announced that 

SM4 would fly on the Shuttle Atlantis as mission STS-125, with a target launch 

date of 10 September 2008.76

NASA later postponed the launch date to 14 October. With Atlantis already 

standing on Pad 39A at KSC, HST’s main computer ordered the telescope’s payload computer and the science instruments to go into safe mode on the evening 

of Saturday 27 September. After 18 years of operation, one of two sides inside 

HST’s main data handling unit, the Science Instrument Command and Data 

Handling system, had failed. While controllers established that the second side 

of the unit could be pressed into service, the failure of the first side left Hubble 

operations vulnerable to single-point failures in this unit, something that could 

shorten HST’s lifetime. In a conference call later that weekend, Griffin decided 

to postpone the launch while HST engineers and managers decided whether 

SM4 should also include installation of a new data handling unit.77 Grunsfeld 

later called the event an “extraordinarily rare occasion of a large group of NASA 

engineers and administrators making a quick decision.”78 Atlantis was moved off 

the launch pad and returned to the Vehicle Assembly Building, while Goddard 

engineers took a backup data handling unit out of storage and began to test 

and refurbish it in anticipation of installing it in HST. At the end of October, 

NASA rescheduled STS-125 for launch the following May so that the backup 

unit could be installed.79

Testing and updating of the data handling unit, which included parts built 

in the 1980s by people who were long retired by 2008, proved to be a challenge 

for engineers at Goddard and KSC. And the people who prepared Atlantis and 

its crew for launch faced other challenges. They included coordinating SM4’s 

flight with complicated launch schedules that involved coordination with 

Shuttle flights to the ISS and also what turned out to be the only launch of the 

Ares rocket.80 Cepollina’s team at Goddard and engineers at Johnson Space 

Center had already created special tools and trained the crew to repair STIS 

and ACS, work that had never been contemplated in the early years of HST. 

“On paper,” said HST Deputy Project Scientist Mal Niedner, “it looked like the 

impossible mission.”81

SM4 FLIES 

After all the technical and political problems that delayed and nearly blocked 

the launch, the fifth and final servicing mission to HST lifted off as planned 

at 2:01 p.m. EDT on 11 May 2009, from KSC. As Atlantis roared into the 

afternoon sky from Pad 39A, Endeavour stood by on Pad 39B in case it was 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

needed to rescue the seven astronauts of STS-125. A four-member crew for the 

emergency mission, designated as STS-400, had been formed from the crew of 

the recent STS-126 mission: Christopher J. Ferguson, Eric A. Boe, Robert S. 

Kimbrough, and Stephen G. Bowen. If necessary, Endeavour would have rendezvoused with Atlantis and grappled it while the two Shuttles faced each others’ payload bays. The astronauts of STS-400 would have transferred the seven 

astronauts of STS-125 to Endeavour during three spacewalks. These measures 

were not necessary, however, and Endeavour was soon freed for preparations for 

its next mission to the ISS. 

On their second day on orbit, the crew of STS-125 spent seven hours conducting a close inspection of Atlantis’ thermal protection system and external 

surfaces with imaging equipment mounted on the orbital boom system attached 

to the Shuttle’s robotic arm. While the crew found some minor damage, engineers at Mission Control in Houston determined that the damage would not 

present a problem.82

Attention returned to the Hubble Space Telescope the next day when Altman 

and Johnson guided the Shuttle to a rendezvous with HST, and McArthur grappled it with Atlantis’ robotic arm and affixed it to the Shuttle’s flight support system with its mechanical and electrical connections. On day four, Grunsfeld and 

Feustel emerged from the Shuttle airlock and began removing WFPC2 from 

Hubble to replace it with the powerful new camera, WFC3. Feustel could not 

loosen a large bolt that held WFPC2 inside HST when he first attempted the 

task with the expected amount of torque. Amid serious fears that the bolt might 

break if he applied too much torque, which would have halted the replacement 

of the instrument, Feustel installed a torque limiter and tried again using more 

force but without success. In a risky procedure, he tried once more to loosen 

the bolt without the torque limiter, and finally freed the bolt and the instrument. “I can tell you I’m five years older now than I was when I came to work 

this morning,” Senior Project Scientist David Leckrone told journalists after 

the EVA.83 Ray Villard, the veteran STScI news director, called this the “scariest moment” of his long career with HST.84 After the two astronauts replaced 

WFPC2 with the new WFC3, they replaced the critical data handling unit that 

had caused the mission to be postponed. Finally, Grunsfeld went to the bottom 

of HST and installed a grapple fixture that could be used by future spacecraft 

to link up for HST de-orbit operations. The spacewalk ended after seven hours 

and 20 minutes.85

Massimino and Good replaced all three rate sensing units and a battery 

during the second EVA on day five. Each of the rate sensing units contained 

two gyroscopes, so all six of the space telescope’s gyroscopes were replaced, but 
236 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

the spacewalk lasted longer than planned because 

one of the new rate sensing units wouldn’t fit correctly into its place due 

to too much insulating 

material being stuffed 

into the unit. Ultimately, 

the astronauts installed a 

backup rate sensing unit 

in place of the unit that 

wouldn’t fit. Although 

the problem was barely 

noted in coverage of 

the spacewalk, it bears 

on the future of HST. 

Earlier versions of the 

gyroscopes, including the two installed in the backup rate sensing units and 

one of four contained in the new units, are subject to a problem that limits the 

life of gyroscopes. Wires that carry power through a thick fluid to the spinning 

wheel inside each of those gyros are subject to corrosion. The three newer gyroscopes installed during the spacewalk and two that couldn’t be installed were 

equipped with wires coated to resist corrosion. The three gyroscopes installed 

in SM4 without the coated wires had failed by 2018, leaving only three operating gyros to carry the full burden of keeping track of HST’s frequent changes 

in direction.86

▲ HST Senior Project Scientists David Leckrone and 

Jennifer Wiseman in the Flight Control Room at Johnson 

Space Center during Servicing Mission 4 in 2009. (NASA/

Michael Soluri)

On the sixth day of the mission, Feustel and Grunsfeld replaced COSTAR 

with the new Cosmic Origins Spectrograph, and Grunsfeld repaired the 

Advanced Camera for Surveys. Because ACS’s internal systems had not been 

designed to be repaired by astronauts, the success of this repair depended on 

specially developed tools, including a device that fit over the access panel covering four circuit boards that had to be replaced to restore power to ACS. It 

allowed Grunsfeld to remove and capture the 32 screws that held the panel in 

place without fear of the screws flying free inside the instrument.87

During the fourth EVA, Massimino and Good repaired STIS, and this time 

the work involved a specially designed plate to capture 107 of 111 screws on a 

cover plate that led to a failed power supply card. That difficult task went well, 

but only after Massimino stripped a bolt while removing a handrail. “I felt like 

I was living a nightmare,” Massimino said of his efforts to free the handrail 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

◂ Perched on the end 

of the Canadian-built 

Remote Manipulator 

System, astronaut 

Andrew Feustel, mission 

specialist, performs 

work on the Hubble 

Space Telescope during 

the first of five STS-125 

spacewalks, kicking off 

a week’s work on the 

orbiting observatory. 

(NASA)

◂ STS-125 crew members 

on the flight deck of the 

Shuttle Atlantis. Back 

row (left to right) mission 

specialists Michael Good, 

Mike Massimino, John 

Grunsfeld, and Andrew 

Feustel. Front row (left to 

right) commander Scott 

Altman, mission specialist 

Megan McArthur, and pilot 

Gregory C. Johnson. (NASA)

▾ STS-125 crew 

insignia. (NASA)

▴ SM4 insignia from GSFC. (NASA)

▴ Design for STS-400 

emergency rescue mission 

crew insignia. (NASA)
238 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

until a solution came from ground control.88 Since the handrail would never be 

needed after STS-125, Massimino broke it free, which allowed him and Good 

to proceed with the intricate repairs to STIS. Grunsfeld and Feustel began the 

fifth and final spacewalk of the mission on 18 May earlier than planned to make 

sure they had time to complete every task. They swapped out a second battery 

in HST for a fresh one, and replaced a fine guidance sensor with a refurbished 

unit. Finally, the two spacewalkers installed new thermal control blanket layers on three bays on the outside of the telescope. As the spacewalk wound up, 

Grunsfeld marked the end of his eight spacewalks to HST over three flights by 

paying tribute to the telescope: “Hubble is not just a satellite,” Grunsfeld said. 

“It’s a symbol of humanity’s quest for knowledge.”89

The next day, 19 May, McArthur lifted HST from its berth in the Shuttle 

payload bay, and at 8:57 a.m. EDT, released HST from the Shuttle for the last 

time. A half hour later Atlantis moved away from the telescope. The crew then 

had time to rest, enjoy the view from the Shuttle, and prepare for landing, 

including a final inspection of the thermal protection system. During this time 

the crew spoke with President Barack Obama and became the first people 

to give congressional testimony from space when they spoke to the Senate 

Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and 

Related Agencies, then chaired by Senator Mikulski. Rainy weather at the main 

Shuttle landing facility in Florida caused landing attempts on 22 and 23 May to 

be cancelled, and finally on Sunday, 24 May, Mission Control decided to have 

the STS-125 crew land Atlantis at Edwards Air Force Base in California. After 

Atlantis’ successful return that day, Weiler, NASA’s Associate Administrator for 

Space Science, recalled the day the servicing mission was cancelled in January 

2004. “If you’d have told me on that day I’d be sitting here five years later with 

a totally successful five-EVA mission, with a brand new Hubble once again that 

will probably operate well into the third decade of its life, I wouldn’t have bet 

you a penny,” Weiler said. “But Hubble is the great American comeback story, 

chapter two.”90

CELEBRATING SUCCESS

In a ceremony the following September at NASA Headquarters, astronomers and 

politicians proclaimed the work of SM4 a success. Senator Mikulski unveiled 

dramatic images, including the Butterfly Nebula and galactic clusters, from the 

four instruments installed or repaired on STS-125, and scientists said the new 

instruments, COS and WFC3, made HST a better observatory than ever. “I 

fought for the Hubble repair mission because Hubble is the people’s telescope,” 

Mikulski said, highlighting the contributions of experts from her home state 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

of Maryland.91 Michael Griffin’s decision to reverse O’Keefe’s cancellation of 

SM4 was widely praised, and even O’Keefe has expressed agreement with flying the mission, because HST lasted long enough that NASA was able to meet 

the safety criteria set by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board for SM4.92

The successful completion of SM4 left HST with five operational scientific 

instruments, including astrometry capability of the Fine Guidance Sensors. 

(NICMOS was no longer being used after 2008 because its cooling equipment 

had degraded, and many of its infrared capabilities were exceeded by ACS and 

WFC3.) The second- and third-generation instruments that HST carried represented a major increase in capability over those originally flown in 1990—a 

90-fold increase in power, according to veteran astronomer Sandra M. Faber.93

The Shuttle Program’s relationship with HST ended with the return of STS125, and the Shuttle’s remaining missions from that time were devoted to further assembly of the International Space Station. A little more than two years 

later on 21 July 2011, Atlantis closed out 30 years of Space Shuttle operations 

when it landed at the Kennedy Space Center at the end of the Shuttle Program’s 

135th mission. The flight was the Shuttle’s final visit to the ISS, which along 

with the Hubble Space Telescope, will be remembered as one of the Shuttle’s 

most important legacies. 

Starting with the first Shuttle flight on 12 April 1981, 355 individuals from 

16 countries flew 852 times aboard the Shuttle. The five Shuttles traveled more 

than 542 million miles (872 million kilometers) and hosted more than 2,000 

experiments in the fields of Earth, astronomical, biological, and materials sciences. Shuttles deployed 180 payloads, including satellites, returned 52 from 

space and retrieved, repaired and redeployed seven spacecraft. HST was the 

most famous deployment from the Shuttle, and its five servicing missions to 

HST are amongst the best-known Shuttle missions of the whole program.94

With HST reduced to two-gyro operation and with an ailing data handling 

unit and three malfunctioning instruments in 2007, it is likely that HST’s mission would have ended before its 20th anniversary in 2010 without Servicing 

Mission 4. Instead, the success of SM4 allowed astronomers to continue HST 

operations into a third and even a fourth decade, and plan joint operations 

involving both HST and JWST. The public reaction to Sean O’Keefe’s decision 

to cancel SM4 showed the depth of popularity HST enjoyed amongst astronomers and the public. Recalling the delays that amongst other things gave time to 

find better detectors for WFC3, Ken Sembach, STScI director starting in 2015, 

said, “The cancellation of SM4 in 2004 was a tremendous boon to science.”95

And the ultimate success of SM4 depended on more than determined and 

skilled astronauts—it also required engineers, technicians, and scientists from 
240 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

NASA and its contractors to create solutions to unanticipated problems such 

as the failures of ACS, STIS, and the data handling unit. SM4 was originally 

conceived as the opening of both the final phase of HST operations and the 

transition to Hubble’s successor, the James Webb Space Telescope. With HST 

and most of its instruments still going strong more than a decade later as the 

long-delayed launch of JWST draws near, SM4 has joined the dramatic first 

servicing mission as a high point in the story of the Hubble Space Telescope.

ENDNOTES

 1 Alan Dressler, ed., Exploration and the Search for Origins: A Vision for Ultraviolet 

Optical-Infrared Space Astronomy: A Report of the “HST & Beyond” Committee (Washington, DC: Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, 15 May 1996),

pp. 7–14, 35. The Dressler report also called for NASA to join the search for planets around other stars by developing the capacity for space interferometry, an idea 

that as of 2020 still has not moved ahead as the search for exoplanets continued 

using other methods. The committee included Robert A. Brown, Michael G. Hauser, 

and Peter Stockman of STScI, Arthur F. Davidsen of Johns Hopkins, Richard S. Ellis 

of Cambridge University, Wendy L. Freedman of Carnegie Observatories, Richard F.

Green of NOAO, Robert P. Kirshner of Harvard, Shrinivas Kulkarni of Caltech, Simon 

J. Lilly of the University of Toronto, Bruce H. Margon of the University of Washington,

Carolyn C. Porco of the University of Arizona, Douglas O. Richstone of the University 

of Michigan, Harley A. Thronson, Jr., of the University of Wyoming, John L. Tonry

of MIT, James Truran of the University of Chicago, and Edward J. Weiler of NASA

Headquarters.

 2 Space Science Board, National Research Council, Space Science in the Twenty-First Century: Imperatives for the Decades 1995 to 2015, Astronomy and Astrophysics (Washington,

DC: National Academy Press, 1988), p. 47.

 3 Pierre-Yves Bely, Christopher J. Burrows, and Garth D. Illingworth, eds., The Next Generation Space Telescope: Proceedings of a Workshop Jointly Sponsored by the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Space Telescope Science Institute Held at 

the Space Telescope Science Institute, Baltimore, Maryland, 13–15 September 1989 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 1989), p. 1.

 4 Astronomy and Astrophysics Survey Committee, Board on Physics and Astronomy, 

National Research Council, The Decade of Discovery in Astronomy and Astrophysics

(Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1991), pp. 10, 75–81. For an overview of early

efforts to promote the NGST up to the early 1990s, see Robert W. Smith and W. Patric

McCray, “Beyond the Hubble Space Telescope: Early Development of the Next Generation Space Telescope,” in H .A. Thronson et al., eds., Astrophysics in the Next Decade, 

Astrophysics and Space Science Proceedings (Springer Science+Business Media B. V., 

2009), pp. 31–50.
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

 5 STScI, “NASA Selects Home for Next Generation Space Telescope,” news release 1998-

20, 8 June 1998; “Webb Project History,” http://webbtelescope.org/article/History/

(accessed 18 June 2017).

 6 Dressler, ed., Exploration and the Search for Origins, pp. 22–23.

 7 NASA Announcement of Opportunity, “Hubble Space Telescope, Opportunity an Propose Flight Investigations for the 2002 Servicing Mission” (AO-96-OSS-03, 1 November 

1996), p. 3.

 8 David Leckrone, “The Second Decade of HST: Report from the HST Project Scientist,” 

Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter 15, no. 1 (January 1998): 20.

 9 David Leckrone, “Report from the HST Project Scientist,” Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter 15, no. 2 (April 1998): 12–13. James C. Green, oral history interview by 

author, 24 September 2015.

10 Leckrone, “Report from Project Scientist” (April 1998); David Leckrone, oral history 

interview by author, 6 November 2015, part 2, pp. 17–19; Harley Thronson, oral history 

interview by author, 12 May 2015, pp. 6–14.

11 John MacKenty, “Progress on WFC3,” Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter 19,

no. 2, pp. 9–10; David Leckrone, oral history interviews by author, 13 June 2016, pp. 1–5; 

Harley Thronson, 12 May 2015, pp. 3–4; Edward Cheng, 17 June 2016, pp. 6–9; Randy 

Kimble, 1 November 2016, pp. 8–14; and Mal Niedner, pp. 7–8, 13–16. Ed Weiler, personal

communication with author, 20 June 2017. For more on the Second Decade Committee, see “Slides for Presentation to Space Telescope Users Committee meeting, May 

17 and 18, 1988,” STScI Archive, Box 1.1, file “STUC Documents Sent, Spring 1998,” JHU 

Library Special Collections; and “STScI, “Space Telescope Users Committee Minutes 

of the May 1998 Meeting,” https://www.stsci.edu/files/live/sites/www/files/home/hst/

about/space-telescope-users-committee/committee-reports/_documents/stuc_may98_

report_and_minutes.pdf (accessed 26 July 2020); NASA Facts, “Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4 Wide Field Camera 3” (NASA, Goddard Space Flight Center,

FS-2006-10-084-GSFC).

12 Leckrone, “The Second Decade of HST,” January 1998. This was written before SM3 was 

split into two missions. SM4 remained in the plans, but at a later date.

13 Leckrone, “Report from the HST Project Scientist,” April 1998.

14 Leckrone, Ibid.

15 W. Henry Lambright, “Leadership and Change at NASA: Sean O’Keefe as Administrator,”

Public Administration Review, (March–April 2008), pp. 230–240; Sean O’Keefe, oral history interview by author, 5 June 2017, pp. 2–10.

16 O’Keefe OHI, pp. 2–3, 9; NASA, “Diverse Space Shuttle Flights to Set Records, Continue 

Challenges in 2002,” news release H01-256, 31 December 2001; Steven Beckwith, “Good 

Times,” Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter 19, no. 3 (2003): 4. 

17 Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2003), pp. 27–28

18 See chapter five of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (CAIB Report). 
242 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

19 See chapter two of the CAIB Report. 

20 Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, Comm Check... The Final Flight of Shuttle

Columbia (New York: Free Press, 2004), pp. 154–160; Dr. Edward J. Weiler interviewed by

Dr. Stephen J. Dick, Washington, DC, 2 February 2004, NASA Headquarters oral history

project, p. 2. Among the missions affected by Challenger’s loss were deployment missions from the Shuttle requiring the liquid-fueled Centaur rocket, which were shifted to 

lower-risk solid fuel boosters. Planned polar orbit missions launching out of California 

were also cancelled.

21 CAIB Report, p. 11. 

22 CAIB Report, pp. 173–174.

23 CAIB Report, pp. 208–209. For background on the development of this new space policy, 

see Glen R. Asner and Stephen J. Garber, Origins of 21st-Century Space Travel: A History 

of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team and the Vision for Space Exploration, 1999–2004 (Washington, DC: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA SP-2019-4415, 2019);

and Frank Sietzen, Jr. and Keith L. Cowing, New Moon Rising: The Making of America’s 

New Space Vision and the Remaking of NASA (Burlington, ON: Apogee Books, 2005).

24 Hubble Space Telescope Post-SM4 Scientific Review Panel, Final Report of the Hubble 

Space Telescope Post-SM4 Scientific Review Panel (Washington, DC: NASA, 25 April 2003),

posted at http://nicmosis.as.arizona.edu:8000/REPORTS/Post-SM4_Final_Report.pdf

(accessed 8 September 2015). The panel’s membership also included Alan Dressler of 

Carnegie Observatories; Robert C. Kennicutt and Glenn H. Schneider of the University 

of Arizona; George K. Miley of Leiden University; William R. Oegerle of NASA Goddard;

and J. Michael Shull of the University of Colorado.

25 Ibid.

26 John Bahcall et al., Report of the HST-JWST Transition Panel (Washington DC: NASA,

August 2003). Available at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/49151main_hst-jwst.pdf (accessed 

6 September 2015). The other members of this panel were Barry C. Barish of Caltech; 

Jacqueline N. Hewitt of MIT; Christopher F. McKee and Charles Townes of UC Berkeley; 

and Martin Rees of Cambridge University.

27 University of California Berkeley Press Release, “How and when to Bring the Hubble 

Space Telescope home,” 21 August, 2003. Posted at http://www.spaceref.com/news/

viewpr.html?pid=12370 (accessed 6 September 2015); John Grunsfeld interviewed by Dr. 

Stephen J. Dick, Washington, DC, 13 April 2004, NASA Headquarters oral history project,

pp. 6–7; John Grunsfeld, oral history interview by author, 2 November 2016, pp. 14–15; 

Bahcall, HST-JWST Transition Panel, p. 4, 6; Steven V. W. Beckwith, The Hubble-JWST

Transition: A Policy Synopsis (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 18 July 2003).

28 Kathy Sawyer, “Now in Their Sights, the Hubble’s Demise,” Washington Post (17 November 2003): A12.

29 Anne L. Kinney, HST Lifetime and End-of-Mission Scenarios, PowerPoint slides, 23 October 2003, NASA History Office, (file on SM4 report). The most recent Decadal Survey of 

Astronomy and Astrophysics of the U.S. National Research Council, released in 2000, 

had been chaired by Christopher McKee of the University of California and Joseph Taylor of Princeton University.
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

30 Weiler, 2 February 2004, pp. 4–6, 12–13; Edward J. Weiler, HST SM4 Options Briefin

with Mr. O’Keefe, PowerPoint slides, 7 November 2003, NASA History Office (file on SM4 

report). In an interview with the author on 24 October 2016, Weiler repeated his concerns in 2003 about the possibility of losing SM4 at a time when many scientists were

focused on lobbying for SM5. See also Return to Flight Task Group, Final Report of the 

Return to Flight Task Group (Washington, DC: NASA, July 2005). This report provides an

accounting of the many measures that NASA took to prepare the Shuttle fleet to fly to 

the ISS after the Columbia disaster.

31 Sean O’Keefe interviewed by Dr. Stephen J. Dick, Washington, DC, 22 April 2004, NASA

Headquarters oral history project, p. 2. 

32 Dr. Steve Isakowitz interviewed by Dr. Steven J. Dick, Washington, DC, 18 February 2004,

NASA Headquarters oral history project, pp. 9–11; O’Keefe OHI, 5 June 2017.

33 Sean O’Keefe interviewed by Dr. Steven J. Dick, Washington, DC, 29 October 2004, NASA

Headquarters oral history project, p. 3.

34 O’Keefe interview, 22 April 2004, p. 3.

35 Steven J. Dick, “Appendix: The Decision to Cancel the Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission 4 (and Its Reversal),” in Hubble’s Legacy, eds., Launius and DeVorkin; Weiler

interview, 2 February 2004, pp. 5–9; O’Keefe interview, 22 April 2004, pp. 4–5. 

36 Grunsfeld interview, 13 April 2004, p. 13.

37 Grunsfeld OHI, 2 November 2016, p. 4.

38 This paragraph is based on Steven Dick’s 2004 interview with Grunsfeld and the author’s 

2016 interview with Grunsfeld.

39 Sietzen and Cowing, New Moon Rising, pp. 160–166; Dick, “The Decision to Cancel,” pp. 

165–167.

40 Kathy Sawyer, “Visions of Liftoff, Grounded in Political Reality,” Washington Post (15 

January 2004): A1.

41 E-mails between NASA Chief Historian Steven J. Dick and Assistant Administrator for 

Legislative Affairs Lee Forsgren, “HST SM4,” 26 July 2004, printout in NASA Headquarters 

History oral history project file; Lambright, “Leadership and Change,” p. 237.

42 Dennis Overbye, “NASA Cancels Trip to Supply Hubble, Sealing Early Doom,” New York 

Times (17 January 2004): A1; Grunsfeld, Weiler, and O’Keefe 2004 interviews by Steven

Dick. 

43 Weiler OHI, pp. 19–20; Beckwith OHI, p. 25; Michael Griffin, oral history interview by author,

22 May 2017, pp. 3–4; Griffin comments during Hubble 25th Anniversary Panel, “SM4: The 

Last Servicing Mission to Hubble,” 23 April 2017, recorded on DVD (Baltimore, MD, STScI); 

O’Keefe OHI, 5 June 2017, p. 20. While Weiler was harshly critical of O’Keefe in his 201

interview, many others raised their criticisms in unrecorded conversations. Some have 

linked O’Keefe’s departure from NASA to an inquiry by the U.S. Government Accountability Office into the use of NASA passenger aircraft. While the report criticized the cost of

this service, it made no reference to O’Keefe’s use of NASA aircraft. See U.S. Government 

Accountability Office, NASA Travel: Passenger Aircraft Services Annually Cost Taxpayers Millions More Than Commercial Airlines (Washington, DC: GAO-05-818, August 2015)
244 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

44 The report was completed in December 2004, and it was published in 2014 with an 

additional section on the reversal of the cancellation decision. Many documents and 

interviews that Dr. Dick collected for this report have been used as references for this 

chapter. Dick, “Appendix: The Decision to Cancel,” note 1, p. 187.

45 Ibid., p. 180.

46 Ibid., pp. 180–183.

47 O’Keefe OHI, 5 June 2017, pp. 14–16.

48 Ibid., p. 14.

49 Ibid., p. 16.

50 Guy Gugliotta, “Doomed Hubble’s Fans Flood NASA with Ideas,” Washington Post (21 

March 2004): A1; O’Keefe interview, 22 April 2004, p. 11; Save the Hubble website, https://

web.archive.org/web/20170703025303/http://www.savethehubble.com/. (accessed 11 

July 2017). For more on opposition to the SM4 cancellation, see David Gaynes, Saving 

Hubble (American Ideal Pictures DVD, 2013).

51 Dennis Oberbye, “Engineer’s Papers Dispute Hubble Decision,” New York Times (7 February 2004): A4; Dwayne A. Day, “Shuttle safety and the Hubble Servicing Mission,” The 

Space Review (8 March 2004), http://www.thespacereview.com/article/111/1 (accessed 

30 September 2015); Michael Greenfield, Cancellation of the Fifth (SM-4) Hubble Servicing 

Mission, 11 March 2004, NASA History Division; Michael Greenfield interviewed by Steven 

Dick, 5 November 2004, NASA Headquarters oral history project.

52 Stephen Beckwith, oral history interview by author, 9 September 2016, p. 25.

53 Beckwith OHI, p. 26.

54 Barbara A. Mikulski to Sean O’Keefe, 21 January 2004; Sean O’Keefe to Barbara A. Mikulski, 26 January 2004 and 28 January 2004, NASA History Division; Andrew Lawler, “Academy, GAO to Study Possible Robotic Hubble Mission,” Science 303 (19 March 2004): 1745; 

Brian Berger, “Senate Resolution Introduced to Save Hubble Mission,” Spacenews (29 

March 2004): 8; Committee on the Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the 

Hubble Space Telescope, National Research Council, Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope (Washington, DC: The National Academies

Press, 2005), pp. 8–9. The GAO was known as the General Accounting Office until 7 July 

2004, while it was preparing its report on the HST servicing mission.

55 Brian Berger, “Senate Resolution Introduced to Save Hubble Mission,” Spacenews

(29 March 2004): 8; Congressional Record: SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS (Senate–25 

March 2004). The resolution was also sponsored by Kansas Republican Senator Sam 

Brownback.

56 SpaceRef.com, “Letter from Sen. Hutchinson to President Bush—Hubble Repair Petition from Former Astronauts,” 28 May 2004. Printout in NASA Headquarters History 

Office clipping collection.

57 Jennifer Wiseman comments during Hubble 25th Anniversary Panel, “SM4: The Last

Servicing Mission to Hubble,” 23 April 2017, recorded on DVD (Baltimore, MD, STScI).

58 Preston Burch, oral history interview by author, 9 November 2015, p. 21.
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

59 Guy Gugliotta, “NASA Weighs Robotic Mission to Aid Hubble,” Washington Post (10 May

2004): A1; Goddard Space Flight Center, Hubble Space Telescope Robotic Servicing Mission: Mission Feasibility Study for the WFC3 and COS Scientific Instrument Installation

(Greenbelt, MD: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, 6 April 2004); Brian Berger and 

Leonard David, “O’Keefe: Robotic Options for Saving Hubble Promising,” Spacenews (26 

April 2004): 7. 

60 NASA, “Remarks by Administrator O’Keefe, American Astronomical Society Annual 

Meeting, Denver Colorado,” 1 June 2004; NASA, “NASA Considering Robotic Servicing 

Mission to Hubble,” news release 04-173, 1 June 2004. The speech contained O’Keefe’s 

defense of his decision to cancel SM4 and is remembered for the distribution of STS-107 

Columbia pins to members of the audience. 

61 Louis J. Lanzerotti, chair, Committee on the Assessment of Options for Extending the 

Life of the Hubble Space Telescope, letter to Sean O’Keefe, 13 July 2004.

62 Committee on the Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of Hubble Space Telescope, National Research Council, Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the 

Hubble Space Telescope: Final Report (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press,

2004), pp. 69, 71.

63 Ibid., pp. 81–82.

64 Copy of O’Keefe letter of resignation to President George W. Bush posted on Spaceref

com, 13 December 2004; Bolden OHI, pp. 13–15, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.

html?pid=15664 (accessed 27 May 2016).

65 William Harwood, “Reports: NASA Chief Sean O’Keefe May Leave Agency,” Spaceflight Now and CBS News “Space Place,” posted 11 December 2004, http://www

spaceflightnow.com/news/n0412/11okeefe/; “Transcript of Press Briefing with NASA 

Administrator Sean O’Keefe, 17 December 2004,” Status Report from NASA Headquarters posted on spaceref.com, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=14828 

(both accessed 28 May 2016); Dick, “The Decision to Cancel,” p. 179; O’Keefe OHI, 5 

June 2017, p. 24.

66 Lambright, “Leadership and Change,” p. 238.

67 Associated Press, “Canadian Company Wins the Inside Track for Hubble Rescue Robot,”

Victoria Times Colonist (24 June 2004): B2; Guy Gugliotta, “Robot Helps NASA Refocus 

on Hubble,” Washington Post (12 November 2004): A3; Jack Kapica, “MDA Lands Hubble 

Rescue Contract,” The Globe and Mail (Toronto, Ontario, January 6, 2005); Brian Berger, 

“NASA Poised to Focus Hubble Work on Deorbit,” Space News (4 April 2005): 4. See also

John Ratti, oral history interview by author, 21 October 2015. Dextre was installed on 

the ISS in 2008.

68 Guy Gugliotta and Rick Weiss, “NASA Gets Increased Funding to Explore the Moon,

Mars,” Washington Post (8 February 2005): A21; Guy Gugliotta, “Hubble Decision a Blow 

To Goddard Engineers,” Washington Post (9 February 2005): A03; Spaceref.com, “Letter 

from Sen. Mikulski to Acting NASA Administrator Fred Gregory regarding Hubble servicing mission work,” 2 March 2005, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=15867

(accessed 8 July 2017).
246 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

69 Warren E. Leary, “Repair Costs for Hubble are Vexing to Scientists,” New York Times (3

February 2005); Brian Berger, “Hubble Hearing Opens Debate on a Hot Topic,” Space 

News (7 February 2005): 6. 

70 Grunsfeld, OHI, 2 November 2016, 6. In Weiler, OHI, 24 October 2016, 22, Weiler voice

similar sentiments. 

71 “Transcript of NASA Administrator Nominee Michael Griffin’s Confirmation Hearing 

12 April 2005,” posted 13 April 2005 on spaceref.com, http://www.spaceref.com/news/

viewsr.html?pid=16155 (accessed 28 May 2016). 

72 NASA, “Michael Griffin Takes Helm as NASA Administrator,” 14 April 2005, http://www.

nasa.gov/about/highlights/griffin_admin.html (accessed 28 May 2016). Griffin has discussed his role in the independent assessment of the robotic mission on several occasions, including his OHI with the author, pp. 1–2. There he said he was asked by Chris 

Scolese at GSFC and Ed Weiler to conduct the assessment while he worked at the

Applied Physics Laboratory before becoming NASA Administrator. The author could 

not obtain a copy of the report.

73 NASA, “NASA Celebrates Space Shuttle Discovery’s Homecoming,” news release 05-217, 

9 August 2005; NASA, “NASA Targets March for Next Space Shuttle Mission,” news 

release 05-230, 18 August 2005; NASA, “NASA Welcomes Space Shuttle Crew Back to

Earth,” news release 06-280, 17 July 2006; NASA, “NASA Welcomes Space Shuttle Crew

Back to Earth,” news release 06-321, 31 October 2006.

74 NASA, “NASA Approves Mission and Names Crew for Return to Hubble,” news release 

06-343, 31 October 2006; Marc Kaufman, “NASA Deciding Whether to Close a Windo

into Space,” Washington Post ( 29 October 2006): A3. For background on the crew selection, see Massimino, Spaceman, pp. 257–267.

75 Griffin OHI, 22 May 2017, p. 7; Keith Cowing, “Why There Won’t Be A Propulsion De-Orbi

Module For Hubble (it is ‘Idiotic’)”; NASA Watch, 31 October 2006, http://nasawatch.com

archives/2006/10/why-there-wont-be-a-propulsion-de-orbit-module-for-hubble-it-isidiotic.html#more (accessed 8 July 2017). 

76 NASA, “Hubble Space Telescope Begins ‘Two-Gyro’ Science Operations,” news release 

05-242, 31 August 2005; “STS-125 MCC Status Report #11,” 16 May 2009; NASA, “NASA 

Updates Target Launch Date for Hubble Mission,” news release 07-135, 7 June 2007; Kenneth Sembach, oral history interview with author, 25 May 2017, p. 6; Kimble OHI, pp. 

10–14. 

77 Transcription, Media Teleconference, “NASA to Discuss Hubble Anomaly and Servicing 

Mission Launch Delay” (Washington, DC: NASA Office of Public Affairs, 29 September

2008); Griffin comments during Hubble 25th Anniversary Panel, “SM4: The Last Servicing Mission to Hubble,” 23 April 2017, recorded on DVD (Baltimore, MD, STScI).

78 Grunsfeld comment during Hubble 25th Anniversary Panel on SM4, Ibid.

79 NASA, “NASA Managers Delay Hubble Servicing Mission,” news release 08-280, 30 October 2008; NASA, “NASA Sets Target Launch Date for Hubble Servicing Mission,” news 

release 08-320, 4 December 2008; Frank Morring, Jr. and Guy Norris, “Transition Worries,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (3 November 2008): 50; Dennis R. Jenkins, Jorge

R. Frank, Servicing the Hubble Space Telescope: Space Shuttle Atlantis—2009 (North 
CHAPTER SEVEN . The Fall And Rise Of H

Branch, MN: Specialty Press, 2009), pp. 52, 68–69; NASA Press Kit, Space Shuttle Mission 

STS-125: The Final Visit to Hubble (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 

2009), pp. 1–16. 

80 Frank Morring, Jr., “Delayed Certification,” Aviation Week & Space Technology (2 February 2009): 40. The Obama administration cancelled Ares in 2010.

81 Niedner OHI, p. 8.

82 Mission Control Center, Houston, TX, “STS-125 MCC Status Report #03,” 12 May 2009; 

“STS-125 MCC Status Report #04,” 13 May 2009; STS-125 Status Reports are archived at 

http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/shuttlemissions/sts125/news/; Jenkins and 

Frank, Servicing the Hubble Space Telescope, pp. 76–78; NASA Press Kit, Space Shuttle 

Mission 125, 1-16. When STS-125 was scheduled to fly in October 2008, the designated

crew for STS-400 was Dominic L. Gorie, Gregory H. Johnson, Robert L. Behnken, and 

Michael J. Foreman, who all had recently flown on the STS-123 mission.

83 William Harwood, “Spacewalk No. 1 Ends,” Spaceflight Now and CBS News “Space

Place,” posted 14 May 2009, http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/sts125/090514fd4/

index6.html (accessed 30 May 2016).

84 Villard OHI, 4 November 2016, p. 24.

85 Mission Control Center, Houston, TX, “STS-125 MCC Status Report #05,” 13 May 2009; 

“STS-125 MCC Status Report #07,” 14 May 2009; Harwood, “Spacewalk No. 1 ends;” NASA 

Press Kit, Space Shuttle Mission 125, pp. 73–76.

86 Mission Control Center, Houston, TX, “STS-125 MCC Status Report #09,” 15 May 2009; 

Patrick Crouse, oral history interviews by author, 17 June 2016, pp. 6–13; James Jeletic, 

19 May 2017, pp. 7–8; Jim Jeletic, “Long Live Hubble,” Air & Space Smithsonian 33, no. 6 

(December 2018/January 2019): 18, 20.

87 Mission Control Center, Houston, TX, “STS-125 MCC Status Report #11,” 16 May 2009. 

88 Massimino, Spaceman, p. 289.

89 Dennis Overbye, “As Tasks at Hubble End, No Tears, But it Was Close,” New York Times

(18 May 2009): A17; “STS-125 MCC Status Report #13,” 17 May 2009; Massimino, Spaceman, pp. 281–296; “STS-125 MCC Status Report #15,” 18 May 2009; “STS-125 MCC Status 

Report #17,” 19 May 2009; NASA Press Kit, Space Shuttle Mission 125, pp. 76–81; William

Harwood, “Stripped Bolt Trips Up Hubble Instrument Repair,” Spaceflight Now and 

CBS News ‘Space Place,’ posted 17 May 2009, http://www.spaceflightnow.com/shuttle/

sts125/090517fd7/index3.html (accessed 30 May 2016).

90 William Harwood, “Shuttle Atlantis Glides to Smooth California Landing,” CNET,

posted 24 May 2009, http://www.cnet.com/uk/news/shuttle-atlantis-glides-to-smoothcalifornia-landing/ (accessed 31 May 2016); “STS-125 MCC Status Report #17,” 19 May 

2009; “STS-125 MCC Status Report #21,” 21 May 2009; Jenkins and Frank, Servicing the 

Hubble Space Telescope, p. 114.

91 NASA, “Sen. Mikulski Unveils First Images from Rejuvenated Hubble,” news release 

09-205, 9 September 2009.

92 O’Keefe OHI, 5 June 2017, p. 19.
248 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

93 Frank Morring, Jr., “Hubble Endgame,” Aviation Week and Space Technology (14 January 

2008): 26; Marc Kaufman, “One Last Trip to Open Hubble’s Eyes Even Wider,” Washington

Post (7 July 2008): A5. 

94 NASA, “NASA’s Proud Space Shuttle Program Ends with Atlantis Landing,” news release 

11-240, 21 July 2011.

95 Sembach OHI, p. 6.
249

CHAPTER EIGHT

Operating the Hubble 

Space Telescope

▲ Visible-light data taken by Hubble’s ACS and near-infrared exposures taken by the WFC3 were 

combined to create this view of cluster Westerlund 2. (NASA/ESA/Hubble Heritage Team [STScI/AURA]/A. Nota 

[ESA/STScI]/Westerlund 2 Science Team: heic1509a)

T

he Hubble Space Telescope is much more than a spacecraft in Earth orbit. 

HST requires thousands of people and a vast infrastructure on Earth to 

direct, support, process and interpret its work. This infrastructure ultimately reaches around the world in the form of astronomers who propose, perform, and use HST observations through the Space Telescope Science Institute, 

and it extends into space through the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System 

(TDRSS) that keeps HST in touch with its control center at NASA’s Goddard 

Space Flight Center. This chapter turns to Hubble’s infrastructure on Earth, its 

role in HST operations, and the evolution of that infrastructure and the institutions that operated it, especially NASA Goddard and its contractors. HST is 

also a project of the European Space Agency, and this chapter will look at ESA’s 

role in HST operations. STScI holds an important place in the story of HST as 

the organization responsible for HST science program management and science 

operations, and as a model for scientific oversight of space-based observatories 

that have followed HST. This chapter will discuss STScI’s evolution as an institution, while the next chapter will cover its relationship to astronomy. Hubble’s 

great capabilities and the ability to maintain and upgrade them over more than 

three decades of operations comes at a cost, however, and this chapter begins 

with a discussion of the monetary costs for HST and its infrastructure on Earth. 

HST COSTS

The ongoing work of HST depends on money, most of it appropriated by 

Congress each year after it is debated and amended budgets have been drawn 
250 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

HST Funding Summary Since New Start (Science Only) 

in millions of real-year dollars

0

50

100

19751977197919811983198519871989199119931995199719992001200320052007200920112013201520172019

150

200

250

300

350

Millions of Dollars

Fiscal Year

HST Funding Summary Since New Start (Science Only) 

in millions of FY19 dollars

0

100

200

19751977197919811983198519871989199119931995199719992001200320052007200920112013201520172019

300

400

600

500

700

Millions of FY19 Dollars

Fiscal Year

Technology Development

Development

Ground Systems

Operations/Servicing Missions

Data Analysis/Research Grants

Servicing Missions

Operations

▲ Graph of HST funding since new start. Data are presented in appendix A. (Data courtesy of Craig 

Tupper, NASA Headquarters)
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

up by NASA and the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 

HST’s costs began with designing and developing HST and preparing it for 

launch. Historian Robert W. Smith estimated that by October 1986, NASA 

and ESA had spent $1.6 billion, and by the time Hubble was launched in 

1990, the costs totaled $2 billion, plus the approximately $250 million cost 

of its deployment mission. At the time of HST’s launch in 1990, news media 

commonly used a figure of $1.5 billion as Hubble’s cost up to that point. All 

these figures are in the money of the time, and come close to the popular 1990 

media estimates of HST’s cost, which ranged between $1.5 and $2.1 billion.1

After launch, operating costs and spending on new instruments for HST were 

charged to Hubble as part of NASA’s space science budget, but most of the 

costs of the Space Shuttle deployment flight and the five servicing missions that 

followed were charged to NASA’s human spaceflight budget.2 During HST’s 

first two decades, it required funding for both operations and development of 

new instruments and new equipment to go to HST during its five servicing missions. In the 1990s, HST annual spending for operations and instrument development (in 2019 dollars) was close to $500 million a year early in the decade 

and fell below $400 million near the end of the decade, likely as a result of 

various cost containment and efficiency measures, such as Vision 2000, which 

will be explained later in this chapter. HST spending continued to fall in the 

early 2000s to close to $300 million a year, again in 2019 dollars. Once the last 

servicing mission was completed in 2009, HST funding no longer included the 

costs of preparing instruments and repairs for servicing missions, and annual 

spending fell to reflect that fact. Since then, HST spending has come in close to 

$100 million a year. HST estimated spending in the 2019 fiscal year was $98.3 

million. In 2017, NASA Headquarters reported that spending on HST totaled 

$13.7 billion in 2017 dollars. Those figures include the cost of hardware for 

servicing missions, but not the costs of the six shuttle missions associated with 

HST.3 Various numbers have been advanced for the cost of Shuttle servicing 

missions, running from $450 million to $1.6 billion in 2010. If the cost of each 

of these missions is around $1 billion, that would add up to $6 billion for the six 

HST Shuttle missions, raising the total price tag for Hubble and its operations 

to nearly $20 billion as it neared its 30th anniversary on orbit.4

HST AND ESA

HST is not only a NASA program. It is also a program of the European Space 

Agency, a fact marked by the presence of the ESA logo next to the NASA logo 

atop HST. When NASA and ESA agreed in the 1970s to cooperate on the Space 

Telescope, the two agencies were also working together on the highly successful 
252 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

International Ultraviolet Explorer satellite. They had ambitious plans for further scientific cooperation, including a cometary mission and the International 

Solar Polar Mission, but NASA pulled out of the former and reduced the latter 

from two to one spacecraft due to its budgetary and technical problems with 

the Shuttle. As for the Shuttle, the ESA provided Spacelab laboratory modules 

that flew in the Shuttle’s payload bay, many of them crewed by ESA astronauts. 

While ESA faced budgetary problems of its own, it moved ahead using its own 

Ariane launch vehicles on ambitious missions, including the Giotto spacecraft 

that flew by Halley’s Comet in 1986. HST became the “only ESA/NASA cooperative project, with ESA as a junior partner.”5 For its part of the HST program, 

ESA supplied the Faint Object Camera and the first two sets of solar arrays, 

along with the solar array electronics and drive mechanisms that served them, 

which are discussed elsewhere in this book. ESA also supplied staff to STScI. 

In return, European astronomers were guaranteed a minimum of 15 percent of 

HST’s observing time.6 Europe’s participation in HST was also evident in the 

presence of ESA astronauts on two Shuttle servicing missions: Claude Nicollier 

on SM1, and Nicollier and Jean-François Clervoy on SM3A.

The guaranteed minimum of 15 percent of HST observing time agreed 

between NASA and ESA has not had to be invoked because European astronomers have regularly won an average of about 20 percent of Hubble observing 

time under the merit-based HST time allocation process. Before ESA staff 

was enlarged with the preparations for JWST, ESA was represented at STScI 

with 15 astronomers on staff, and many have made outsized contributions to 

STScI’s work. Duccio Macchetto was ESA Project Scientist for HST through its 

early years and Principal Investigator for the FOC through its time on HST. At 

STScI, he rose to be associate director. Antonella Nota’s career at the Institute 

began in the 1980s, and she became Associate Director at ESA and Head of the 

Science Mission at STScI. Helmut Jenkner joined STScI in 1983 and played 

a key role developing HST’s Guide Star Catalog. Since 2002, he has served as 

deputy head of the Hubble Mission Office at the Institute, continuing after 

he retired from ESA service in 2014 and shifted to the employ of AURA. As 

outlined earlier, ESA astronomer Christopher Burrows played a key role in diagnosing and overcoming HST’s spherical aberration problem.7

ESA teamed up with the European Southern Observatory to create the 

Space Telescope European Coordinating Facility (ST-ECF) at the ESO’s headquarters in Garching, near Munich, in 1984. The facility assisted European 

astronomers who were making observations with HST, a function that was 

especially important before computers connected to STScI through the internet became available. The facility contained Europe’s copy of the Hubble data 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

archive, and ESA staff worked with STScI to build up their archive and make 

use of new archival software. Improvements in computing power and networking over the years of HST operations meant that astronomers, including those 

based in Europe, required less assistance to prepare their observation proposals, so the facility changed its priorities to help astronomers better interpret 

their data. Astronomers at the facility also supported advances in the use of 

HST instruments, including creating “slitless spectroscopy” modes for Hubble 

instruments that allow analysis of fainter objects. In the 1990s, the facility 

exploited the rise of the internet and Hubble’s successes to begin producing 

outreach and HST public relations products of its own, focusing on the ESA’s 

spacetelescope.org website.8

▲ European Southern Observatory Headquarters, Garching, Germany, home of the 

ESA Space Telescope European Coordinating Facility, photographed in 1998. (European 

Southern Observatory)

ESA’s own budget issues have affected its participation in HST. The original 

15 ESA astronomers at STScI made up about 15 percent of the Institute staff 

in STScI’s early days, but ESA resisted calls to increase its staff complement as 

the STScI staff grew in the 1990s. In anticipation of the removal of ESA’s Faint 

Object Camera from HST in 2002, NASA and ESA set up a working group to 

discuss a new European instrument for HST. Early in the process, the group 

identified two possible ESA instruments—both three-dimensional spectrographs—but ESA backed away from the plan due to budget cuts that followed 

a reorientation of the European space program decided at the ESA Ministerial 

Conference in Toulouse in October 1995.9 When NASA Administrator Sean 
254 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

O’Keefe canceled Servicing Mission 4 in 2004, NASA did not consult ESA 

about the decision, but ESA officials worked “behind the scenes” to obtain the 

decision in 2006 from O’Keefe’s successor Michael Griffin to reinstate SM4.10

After 20 years of HST operations, ESA and the ESO closed the ST-ECF 

on 31 December 2010. Rudolf Albrecht, who earlier had directed the facility, 

called the closure a “hardnosed” budget decision, but noted that the ease of 

transferring large amounts of data anywhere on Earth meant that the original 

need for the facility had ended. In 2012, ESA moved the European HST archive 

to the European Space Astronomy Centre (ESAC) in Villanueva de la Cañada 

near Madrid, Spain, where ESA runs its solar system and astrophysics missions. 

In 2018, all the HST data products that are available from the MAST archive at 

STScI became available from the ESAC Data Centre as well as the Canadian 

Astronomy Data Centre.11

Even as ESA began to reduce its role in HST by not replacing FOC, it was 

preparing its contribution to the James Webb Space Telescope, which included 

providing one of JWST’s four instruments, the optical bench of another instrument, an Ariane 5 launch vehicle to launch JWST, and additional support personnel for the program at STScI. A joint report by American and European 

scientists in 1994 stated that while some European astronomers felt that NASA 

did not always present HST as a cooperative venture in its outreach efforts, 

“[t]he cooperation on HST between U.S. and European Astronomers has 

worked very well.”12 While Europe is participating in JWST, and the Canadian 

Space Agency has also decided to join the JWST partnership, it is possible those 

decisions may simply reflect the ESA’s and CSA’s desire to take part in the 

world-leading telescope project rather than good feelings about the partnership 

in HST. 

NASA GODDARD

Like all NASA programs, including those involving other countries, the ultimate responsibility for HST resides at NASA Headquarters in Washington, 

DC. As recounted in chapter one, NASA chose the Marshall Space Flight 

Center in Huntsville, Alabama, as lead Center while the space telescope was 

being built. Marshall had project management responsibility for building the 

spacecraft and supervising the prime contractors, Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer. 

The Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, Maryland, was handed responsibility for HST’s scientific instruments and science program, ground systems, 

mission operations, and data reduction, which meant that Goddard assumed 

full responsibility for HST shortly after it was launched. Goddard’s history goes 

back to May 1959, six months after NASA was created, starting with personnel 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

who had previously worked on the Vanguard satellite program for the Naval 

Research Laboratory, along with other laboratory personnel and Army Signal 

Corps researchers who were developing weather satellites. Goddard quickly 

grew into NASA’s major Center for building spacecraft and technologies to 

study Earth and for space sciences. By its 40th anniversary in 1999, 11,000 

people worked at Goddard, most of them contractor employees, and it was 

responsible for more than 200 scientific satellites covering every aspect of space 

science and Earth observation. From the beginning, Goddard was responsible 

for space physics and astronomy, and so it came to the job of controlling HST 

with a great deal of experience in the field.13

▲ Steven Muller Building, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, headquarters of 

STSci, photographed in 2015. (Christopher Gainor) 

The HST Operations Project at Goddard has maintained a team of civil 

servant and contractor senior engineers and managers with responsibility for 

day-to-day HST operations. The HST Operations Project was led from the 

beginning by Ann C. Merwarth until she retired in 1998. Many of the people who supported Hubble’s mission operations at Goddard worked under a 

contract with Lockheed Martin Space Systems. Personnel from other contractors and subcontractors also monitored HST systems, and also maintained and 

upgraded ground equipment used for Hubble operations. NASA and contractor 

employees were involved in the preparations for Hubble Servicing Missions, 

including preparing astronauts and equipment for the flights. Because the 
256 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

engineers from NASA, Lockheed Martin, and other contractors worked side by 

side smoothly at Goddard, the groups were “embedded” in each other’s work, 

according to Deputy Project Manager James Jeletic, working together efficiently 

as a single team.14

HST science operations work was contracted out by the Project Office to 

the Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, which operates the 

Space Telescope Science Institute in Baltimore, Maryland. While the HST 

Project Office oversees the work of the Institute under the terms of AURA’s 

contract with NASA, Goddard also has project scientists for HST on its own 

staff, representing the wider astronomical community inside NASA and providing scientific perspective to project management. The HST project scientists 

help maximize scientific return from Hubble and provide insight into the work 

done by the Institute. All of Goddard’s project scientists are working scientists who do their own research, and any observing time they get on HST goes 

through the time allocation process that all scientists must pass to obtain time 

on Hubble.15

Prior to launch, all science instruments bound for Hubble were processed 

and tested in the cleanrooms of Goddard. Before HST itself was launched, 

all the instruments and other equipment went from Goddard to be integrated 

into HST at Lockheed in Sunnyvale, California. Once HST was in space, new 

instruments went from Goddard for final launch processing at the Kennedy 

Space Center and placement inside the Shuttle for launch to HST on a servicing mission.16 Goddard was home to the HST Flight Systems and Servicing 

Project, which was run by Goddard engineer Frank Cepollina. This office developed many of the tools and procedures that were essential to the success of the 

Hubble Servicing Missions. Once its work with HST was completed in 2009, 

it shifted to satellite servicing work and became the Satellite Servicing Project 

Division in 2016, continuing to develop new methods of servicing and repairing satellites on orbit.17 Goddard also managed the Tracking and Data Relay 

Satellite System and its main ground station at the White Sands Complex in 

New Mexico and the Near Earth Network, a series of ground stations used by 

Hubble for emergency purposes.18 NASA’s Johnson Space Center and Kennedy 

Space Center were responsible for the preparation, launch, and operation of the 

Space Shuttle missions related to HST, including the STS-31 Hubble deployment mission in 1990, the five servicing missions that followed, and the STS95 HST Orbital Systems Test (HOST) mission that tested hardware built at 

Goddard for installation on HST in servicing missions 3A and 3B. 

Goddard’s preparations for HST operations began long before launch with 

the creation of the Space Telescope Operations Control Center (STOCC), and 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

a number of different contractors built the control center and its systems. Ford 

Aerospace built the STOCC and also built and maintained control systems 

there until Loral AeroSys took over the work in 1990 when Ford was sold to 

Loral. The new control center contained eight mainframe computers and associated software. The control center used Preliminary Operations Requirements 

and Test Support (PORTS) hardware and software that joined the control center 

to NASA communications networks and to STScI. The center used mainframe 

VAX computer systems and control stations built by the Digital Equipment 

Corporation (DEC) with full redundancy to protect against failures. Computer 

Sciences Corporation delivered HST mission planning and mission scheduling 

software. The completed STOCC was dedicated on 14 February 1984, at a 

time when HST was scheduled to be launched in 1986. Lockheed personnel 

staffed the original control center in Goddard’s Building 3 under the Mission 

Operations Contract it signed in 1980 with NASA. NASA upgraded the DEC 

computers and workstations of the PORTS systems in 1988. The Goddard HST 

team was led by Project Manager Frank Carr from 1983 until James V. Moore 

took over in 1988.19

▲ Image of the Space Telescope Operations Control Center (STOCC) at Goddard Space Flight 

Center in 1987. (NASA)
258 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

STAR CATALOG

STScI also had many responsibilities to fulfill before launch to make HST operations possible. One important task was preparing a catalog of guide stars to 

help accurately aim the telescope because no existing star catalog had sufficient 

numbers of faint stars. The Institute also had to establish usage schedules for 

the telescope. Since HST was in such a low orbit that targets would only be 

available for part of each 95-minute circuit of Earth, setting schedules became 

an intricate process involving both the Institute and the engineers and scientists at Goddard.20

▲ Riccardo Giacconi (1931–2018), the first 

director of STScI. (STScI)

When STScI astronomers first 

began to think about how to find 

guide stars to aim HST, they 

considered having a staff on the 

ground measure sky survey glass 

plates while preparing and scheduling individual observations for 

HST. They would then uplink 

the information on guide stars 

to HST. In the words of STScI 

Director Riccardo Giacconi, “this 

was a scheme doomed to failure.”21

The best star survey of the time, 

the Smithsonian Astrophysical 

Observatory (SAO) star catalog, 

included stars as dim as ninth 

magnitude and provided an average six stars per square degree 

of sky. Because the space telescope’s fine guidance sensors had 

very limited fields of view, they 

required 100 stars per square 

degree to point HST. Therefore, HST required a new star catalog that included 

15th magnitude stars, roughly 4,000 times dimmer than what can be seen with 

the naked eye (Stars with higher magnitudes are dimmer than other stars, and 

the brightest stars have negative magnitudes. For example, the brightest star 

in the sky, Sirius, has an apparent magnitude of –1.46.). The guide stars used 

for HST also had to be based on recent observations because most stars move 

relative to other stars as seen from Earth. While their movements are imperceptible to human observers, the tolerances of HST’s sensors were so fine that 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

the stellar movements would become a problem after just a few years. So STScI 

and Caltech began a new sky survey using two telescopes specially designed to 

image wide areas of the sky, the Samuel Oschin Schmidt Telescope at Mount 

Palomar and the UK Schmidt Telescope in Siding Spring, Australia. The telescopes were used to produce 1,477 sky survey plates covering the entire celestial sphere, and converting them into useful data for the catalog proved to be 

a daunting task involving both the latest in computing technology and what 

one participant called “astronomy on a production line basis.”22 Each photographic plate underwent a quality control inspection before being digitized in 

one of two modified Perkin-Elmer scanning microdensitometers, a process that 

took 12 hours per plate. Once the plates were available, scanning them all took 

three years. The digital information captured from each plate, about one gigabyte of data, approximately the equivalent of an hour of high-definition video, 

was then processed to verify, isolate and inventory each celestial object, assign 

coordinates, and separate stellar objects that could be used as guide stars from 

nonstellar objects such as galaxies. The resulting HST Guide Star Catalog contained 18,819,291 objects, including 3,649,418 nonstellar objects, providing 60 

times as many stars as in the SAO Star Catalog. In addition to the time needed 

to scan the photographic plates, writing 200,000 lines of computer code to 

create the catalog took another four years. In total, the project took eight years 

to complete. Giacconi wrote that had HST been launched in 1986, the catalog 

would have covered only part of the sky, but the launch delay allowed a “hurried” scan of all the plates.23

The new HST Guide Star Catalog was published in 1989, a time when digital 

technologies were coming to the fore, but the internet was still in extremely limited use and had very limited technical capacity. The catalog was made available 

on a pair of CD-ROMs (Compact Disc—Read Only Memory). STScI distributed the CD-ROMs to professional astronomy institutions and, with help from 

the Astronomical Society of the Pacific (ASP), sold them to amateur astronomers and anyone else who wanted the data. Images of all the plate scans were 

also digitized and made available to astronomers, and STScI created software 

to help astronomers using the catalog plan their observations.24 In 1994, the 

STScI and the ASP issued a 102-CD set called the Digitized Sky Survey (DSS). 

The survey contained, in a slightly compressed form, the scanned images used 

to create the original Guide Star Catalog covering the entire sky. A compressed 

version on eight CD-ROMS known as RealSky became available in 1996.25

The original HST Guide Star Catalog was only a first draft. Because of the 

stellar motions noted previously, more than 10 percent of guide star acquisitions 

would fail due to stars moving out of position within HST’s estimated 15-year 
260 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

lifetime. So in 1989, STScI began scanning National Geographic SocietyPalomar Observatory Sky Survey plates from the 1950s to provide information on the proper motions of catalog stars when compared with the data from 

the first HST Guide Star Catalog. The sky was rephotographed from Palomar 

and the Anglo-Australian Observatory in Australia. The result was Guide Star 

Catalog II, which included stars as dim as 19th magnitude, this time in color, 

providing more information. The new catalog contained data on nearly half a 

billion stars—20 times as many as the original HST catalog—and was released 

in 2001. It was dedicated to the memory of Barry M. Lasker, who was one of 

the founding scientists of STScI and had led the Guide Star Catalog and Digital 

Sky Survey projects prior to his death in 1999. Conrad R. Sturch and Brian J. 

McLean of STScI also played leading roles in creating these projects. An augmented version of the catalog with nearly a billion objects was issued in 2007. 

This latest release, which required seven years of work that included digitizing 

4,400 plates, was carried out by astronomers at STScI and the Osservatorio 

Astronomico di Torino in Italy.26

EXTRA TIME TO PREPARE

The Challenger disaster in 1986 bought valuable time for NASA, STScI, and 

other contractors to deal with various problems with Hubble and prepare for 

operations after the postponed HST launch. This was underlined in an STScI 

report in 1987, which said that had HST operations begun with the planned 

launch in October 1986, “we would have done so with a great many restrictions, 

both in terms of efficiency and functional capability imposed by the limitations 

of the ground system.”27 The launch delays gave the Institute time to deal with 

ongoing problems with HST’s Science Operations Ground System (SOGS). 

NASA had let a contract with TRW in 1981 to create this system while STScI 

was just getting started. From its earliest days, STScI expressed many concerns 

with the system, and the Institute found major problems with SOGS, including 

inadequate ability to track planets. An Institute team led by astronomer Rodger 

Doxsey worked with contractor and NASA personnel in the late 1980s to make 

the system usable.28

During the extra time before launch, Hubble’s control systems underwent a 

number of tests, including prelaunch simulations of HST operations with the 

spacecraft located where it was built at Lockheed in Sunnyvale, California, 

and its controllers in their places in the STOCC at Goddard. A major test in 

the summer of 1986 with Hubble in a vacuum chamber showed that HST’s 

power system needed upgrading, particularly its solar cells and batteries. The 

Ground System 4 test in June 1988 included ground systems connected to HST 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

in its clean room at Lockheed to simulate nearly a full week of HST operations. 

Although HST’s science computer went into a safe mode during the fourth 

day of operations, the test was considered a success because controllers were 

able to bring HST out of safe mode. Other tests involved the STOCC showing 

that it could support mission operations and STScI demonstrating its capability 

to support science operations using HST’s scientific instruments.29 A team of 

NASA and contractor experts worked to reduce problems HST’s Fine Guidance 

Sensors had acquiring guide stars. Further tests of HST and its ground systems 

in 1988 and 1989 raised confidence in both the spacecraft and its onboard systems and identified problems to be solved before launch.30

The fact that more time was needed to make HST’s Guide Star Catalog, 

Science Operations Ground System, and many systems on board the spacecraft 

ready for flight shows that NASA had underestimated the complexity of operating the Hubble Space Telescope, which was much bigger and far more complicated than any previous space telescope. STScI represented a new way of conducting scientific operations for NASA, based on the belief of many scientists 

that they needed to operate outside of the direct control NASA had exercised 

on previous missions. NASA’s differences with STScI during the 1980s could 

also be explained by the tight budgets and challenging schedules that the space 

Agency had to live with. As explained in chapter one, Goddard and STScI disagreed over the size and role of the Institute. These disagreements cropped up 

one more time in 1989 when a NASA Inspector General audit report examining 

the impacts of Shuttle launch delays found that the Institute had maintained 

its staff levels during the delays to prevent losing highly qualified employees, 

and Goddard increased its oversight of STScI’s performance in response to the 

report’s recommendations. Although this increased oversight didn’t sit well with 

the Institute, by the time HST was launched, Goddard and STScI had largely 

agreed on their respective roles.31

By then, it was clear that the Institute itself had to be much bigger than earlier thought to do its job serving astronomers using HST and also as a research 

institute in its own right. As HST operations began in 1990, STScI had a budget of about $29.4 million and a staff of 390 people, representing major growth 

over the previous years and much bigger than the launch time staff of 89 people projected by the 1976 Hornig report, considered the founding document 

of the Space Telescope Science Institute. The Hornig report had called for a 

skilled institute staff of astronomers to perform service functions for the space 

telescope and those using it, a staff that would carry out its own “first rate 

research,” and explained that a permanent scientific staff whose members used 

HST would be “highly motivated” to ensure that the instruments would be well 
262 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

maintained and as powerful and efficient as possible.32 The role of the scientific 

staff at STScI could be compared to academics at universities who combine 

their research with teaching. Generally, scientific staff at STScI spend 80 percent of their time on functional tasks and 20 percent on research, but some 

higher ranking scientists divide their research and functional work on a 50-50 

basis. Others were specialists charged with engineering Hubble’s instruments 

or maintaining and designing the computer systems necessary for HST’s work. 

Public affairs and education specialists brought Hubble’s work to the public and 

to students. Administrative staff supported the Institute’s programs. When the 

launch of HST approached, STScI had to reorganize to prepare for operations. 

Those changes began in 1988, when the launch was anticipated to take place in 

1989. That year the observing proposals for the first cycle of observations went 

through the first Time Allocation Process for HST, which will be covered in 

detail in the next chapter.33

HST OPERATIONS BEGIN 

When HST was finally activated in Discovery’s payload bay during the April 

1990 deployment mission, it came under the control of the STOCC at NASA 

Goddard. In the early months of operations, Marshall and Goddard engineers 

worked together to commission the spacecraft. On 1 October, Goddard took 

full operational responsibility for Hubble, and the remaining Marshall personnel returned to Huntsville and new assignments. In the early months, Lockheed 

personnel from Sunnyvale also took active roles in monitoring HST and troubleshooting problems.34

For regular Hubble operations, the Flight Operations Team in the STOCC 

at Goddard issues all the commands to HST, including the pointing and 

instrument commands developed at STScI. The Institute develops weekly 

schedules for observations that allow for safe and efficient operation of the 

telescope, including selection of guide stars. In the early days of flight, personnel in the STOCC coordinated scientific and engineering schedules before 

translating them into detailed instructions for HST and its instruments, but 

this function was later shifted to the Institute. The uplinks include daily command loads from the STOCC to HST’s main onboard computer through the 

TDRSS ground terminal at White Sands, New Mexico. Science data are stored 

on recorders aboard HST and then downlinked to Goddard through TDRSS 

along with data on the health of HST systems. The science data are then sent 

to STScI for processing and calibration before being released to the scientists 

who have requested the observations, as well as being deposited in the HST 

data archive.
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

▲ Vehicle Electrical Systems Test (VEST) facility at Goddard Space Flight Center. (NASA/Pat Izzo)

Like other control centers at NASA, the STOCC is far more than a single 

room. Goddard’s HST operations team monitors telemetry sent by Hubble for 

performance of spacecraft systems and subsystems, examines it for changes or 

anomalies, and addresses problems as necessary. When HST operations began, 

the STOCC included the Mission Operations Room, System Engineering and 

Evaluation Room, Mission Support Room, and Engineering Support System. In 

the early years of HST operations, the STOCC operated every day around the 

clock, and the Data Operations Control (DOC) room downstairs from the main 

Mission Operations Room contained computers, communication equipment, 

and human operators until automation and miniaturization led to changes. The 

Mission Operations Room contained the displays and workstations needed to 

follow spacecraft operations and send commands to HST. Prior to the first servicing mission, the Servicing Mission Operations Room was added for simulations and other preparations for servicing missions, and was also available for 

use during routine HST operations and for the diagnosis of in-orbit anomalies. 

The original operations rooms also included Observation Support System (OSS) 

consoles staffed by STScI personnel. The System Engineering and Evaluation 

Room could be used both for routine operations and to run simulated subsystem and software tests. Further support work was done in the Mission Support 

Room and with the help of the Engineering Support System. Johnson Space 
264 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Center flight controllers often referred to the STOCC as the HST Payload 

Operations Control Center (POCC) during servicing missions.35

The Flight Software team prepared software for use on board HST’s computer, and this software was tested in the Vehicle Electrical System Test (VEST) 

facility, which replicated the electrical and computer systems on board HST. 

VEST was built at the beginning of HST’s mission in 1990, played a key role in 

preparations for the servicing missions, and has continued to operate. For the 

first two decades of HST’s mission, the VEST was located in Goddard’s large 

cleanroom because flight hardware was tested in VEST before going to HST on 

a servicing mission. It was later moved to another location at Goddard.36

HST requires regular daily contact with the ground through the TDRSS 

satellites to relay data in both directions. Some of the controllers’ work included 

uplinking command loads daily for science mission schedules, a daily uplink 

to the spacecraft computer, and regular payload commands. Science data are 

“dumped” from recorders onboard HST through TDRSS to the ground each 

day, along with a daily “dump” of engineering data. There are also operations 

performed weekly, such as processing science operations schedules and updating network schedule changes. Other control operations include software 

updates, testing those updates, and maintaining and reconditioning equipment 

such as the gyroscopes, tape recorders, and computers.37

The controllers and engineers at Goddard were often challenged during 

HST’s early months on orbit with problems such as the solar array jitters outlined in chapter two and frequent safing events when HST would halt operations while controllers dealt with malfunctions in HST’s computers, electrical systems, and instruments caused by cosmic ray strikes or by high energy 

particles in a region of the Van Allen radiation belts known as the South 

Atlantic Anomaly. While this problem was anticipated before HST’s launch, 

particles from the anomaly caused spurious memory changes in HST’s Fine 

Guidance Sensors. Conditions in the South Atlantic Anomaly required controllers to develop special procedures, software changes and reduced HST operations when it flew through this area. In the early days, HST also had problems 

acquiring guide stars, and controllers had to work to understand and manage 

the many quirks of the systems in the highly complex spacecraft. While these 

problems became better understood and more manageable as HST spent more 

time on orbit, other problems such as the deterioration of HST’s gyroscopes and 

other systems have continued to challenge controllers.38

Hubble’s on-board computer was updated during its time on orbit, starting in 

1993 when Servicing Mission 1 astronauts installed an 80386 co-processor on 

HST’s DF-224 computer. Prior to that mission, Loral installed new and much 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

▲ Diagram/floor chart of Space Telescope Operations Control Center at Goddard in 2019. 

(NASA Goddard)

faster DEC computer systems in the STOCC in what was known as PRS or the 

PORTS Refurbishment System, which took advantage of advances in computers and also worked better with the upgraded HST computer. When an Intel 

i486 computer was installed on HST in 1999 in Servicing Mission 3A, the HST 

Project created a laboratory known as the 486 Lab to prepare and test uploads to 

the new HST computer. Another change in HST operations at NASA Goddard 

once HST began operations involved NASA’s contractual relationship with 

Lockheed. NASA and Lockheed signed the first Mission Operations Software 

and Engineering Support (MOSES) contract that took effect in 1992. MOSES 

brought together the Lockheed team members who had worked at Goddard 
266 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

from the beginning of HST with Lockheed employees who had worked at 

Sunnyvale and transferred to Goddard after HST operations began.39

OPERATIONS AT STSCI

The long delayed launch of HST and the completion of the commissioning period for Hubble meant big changes in the relationship between NASA 

Goddard and the Space Telescope Science Institute. Goddard and STScI began 

to get along better simply because HST was finally operating, and the myriad 

problems that afflicted HST in its early months on orbit compelled everyone 

involved to focus on solving those problems. On the Goddard side, when Joe 

Rothenberg became HST Program Manager and Associate Director for HST in 

1990 to oversee NASA’s response to spherical aberration, he set out to improve 

Goddard’s relationship with STScI. Goddard’s assumption of full responsibility 

for HST on the NASA side when Marshall left the program, simplified relationships with Institute personnel, and contributed to better relations. On the 

Institute side, the early 1990s were a period of transition as its work moved from 

preparing systems for operations to actually using them. Astronomers at STScI 

were able to use HST for their work as they had long hoped to do, albeit with 

the limitations imposed by the telescope’s spherical aberration. The improvement in relations between NASA and STScI was symbolized by the contract 

between NASA and the Institute’s parent body, AURA. NASA’s initial contract 

for STScI with AURA ran through the first two years after HST’s launch. Early 

in 1991, NASA and AURA began talks to renew the contract for five years and 

successfully reached agreement the following year.40

Communications between scientists at STScI and engineers at Goddard 

involved many channels outside of the project scientists and managers at 

Goddard, and leaders of the Institute. Like elsewhere in the scientific world 

and academia, HST scientists serve on many committees, including the Space 

Telescope Advisory Committee (STAC), which advises both NASA and STScI, 

and many Institute committees, including the Space Telescope User Committee 

and the Space Telescope Institute Council, help direct the Institute and its 

work on HST. Under the terms of its contract with NASA, AURA established 

the Space Telescope Institute Visiting Committee made up of experts with no 

direct connection to AURA to provide a “peer review” of STScI, although the 

committee is known to advocate for the Institute.41

In 1992, there was a major change at the top of STScI. Riccardo Giacconi, 

the Institute’s founding director, had agreed in 1991 to remain for a third fiveyear term, but he and his wife were dealing with the loss of their son in an 

automobile accident in Baltimore around that time. Giacconi came to realize 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

that the passion he had for his job “had been reduced to cinders,”42 and so when 

he was approached to take the top job at the European Southern Observatory, 

he accepted the offer and left STScI at the end of 1992. As the director who got 

STScI through its tumultuous first decade, Giacconi has remained a revered figure at the Institute. While many at NASA did not share that sentiment, David 

Leckrone, the longtime NASA HST Senior Project Scientist who had opposed 

Giaconni’s appointment and frequently differed with him while Giacconi 

sought to enlarge STScI’s powers, came to see Giacconi’s virtues, especially his 

work rallying Institute staff to help NASA solve the spherical aberration problem rather than to seek scapegoats.43

Peter Stockman served as acting Institute director until August 1993, when 

Robert E. Williams, who moved to the Institute from his job as director of the 

Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory in Chile, took over. The new director 

was a known quantity to AURA since it also operated Cerro Tololo. Although 

Williams said he had a “collaborative style,” the new director showed that he 

was not afraid to make tough calls, such as the “Hubble Deep Field.”44 Williams 

became director shortly before the first HST servicing mission that so dramatically improved HST operations, but he soon had to deal with a series of NASA 

budget cuts. STScI’s staff and budget had grown noticeably since 1990, and to 

deal with the budget cuts, the Institute underwent a strategic planning exercise 

and reorganization as part of an effort to streamline its work and take advantage of the changes that came with HST being in full operational mode. As the 

Hubble Program, STScI, and NASA in general coped with budgetary restraint 

in the early and mid-1990s, Williams was faced with cutting about 60 Institute 

staff out of 450, along with the services they delivered. Funds used to support 

observers were also reduced.45

NASA and STScI have faced continual budget issues through HST’s lifetime as the federal government has struggled with one set of budget problems 

after another. This issue was hardly new because tight federal budgets had also 

strongly affected Hubble’s development process before launch.46 Politicians in 

Washington had cut back many government programs to deal with public concern over the growing federal deficit in the 1980s and much of the1990s, and 

the end of the Cold War in 1989 led to reductions in defense and other government spending.47 Even after the success of SM1, Hubble’s high profile made 

it an irresistible target for budget cutters at the Office of Management and 

Budget and NASA as the Agency faced budget reductions and growing monetary demands to maintain the Space Station Program. Daniel Goldin, NASA’s 

Administrator through much of the 1990s, chafed at the cost of HST even as 

he reveled in its successes. HST had a powerful protector in Congress during its 
268 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

first quarter century of operations in the person of Senator Barbara Mikulski of 

Maryland. Scientists belonging to STScI’s Institute Visiting Committee warned 

in 1995 amidst the budget cuts that hit the Institute that these budget and staff 

cuts reflected “the only moderately developed ability of the political establishment to evaluate the importance of basic research for the long-range health of 

the nation,” which it said, “have induced major threats to this most successful 

program.”48 The committee’s dramatic language probably also reflected the scientists’ concerns about events that took place outside the Hubble Program. In 

1993, Congress decided to cancel the Superconducting Super Collider in Texas, 

a flagship project for particle physics, after $2 billion had already been invested 

in it. The same year, Congress came within one vote of cancelling NASA’s 

Space Station Program, the Agency’s major human spaceflight program of the 

time alongside the Shuttle.49

INCREASING EFFICIENCIES 

▲ HST Program Manager John Campbell. 

(NASA)

Both Goddard and STScI responded to the budget reductions by making 

HST operations more efficient. Shortly after the success of SM1, Rothenberg 

moved on to higher positions in NASA, including Director of the Goddard 

Space Flight Center and Associate 

Administrator for Space Flight, and 

later, work in the private sector. John 

H. Campbell succeeded him as HST 

Program Manager after having served 

as deputy manager, and he worked to 

increase efficiency with help from 

managers like Frank Cepollina and 

Ann Merwarth. Campbell recalled 

that although all his spending had 

to be justified, “[w]e were never 

shortchanged.”50 In 1995, Goddard 

launched a five-year effort known 

as Vision 2000, which was aimed at 

reducing maintenance and operations 

costs by modernizing and automating 

the ground system activities related 

to HST, including observation planning, instrument operation, and data processing. Vision 2000 was spearheaded 

by the HST Operations Project team at Goddard led by Ann Merwarth and 

Preston Burch with strong support from STScI, which had already launched 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

a continuous process improvement initiative for user support and observation scheduling called the Project to Re-Engineer Space Telescope Observing 

(PRESTO). These efforts built on advances in computer equipment and software on the ground that led to the installation of the Control Center System 

facilities and procedures into the Goddard control facilities and test facilities. 

This work started in 1997 with servers made first by Silicon Graphics Inc., then 

Sun and later Oracle, along with personal computer workstations. The more 

powerful 486 computer installed on HST in 1999 also required the HST control team to rewrite HST’s computer code, which was a major effort that also 

affected ground-based computing and computing systems.51

▲ Hubble Program Manager Preston Burch, speaks during a press conference in 2009. (NASA/

Paul. E. Alers: 200904230003HQ)

HST project staff at Goddard also worked with Institute staff to raise HST’s 

observing efficiency, which allowed more observations to be made in a given 

time. Early on, HST had a low observing efficiency rate, but in 1993, its controllers at Goddard and STScI increased observing efficiency from 33 to 42 

percent. Observing time on Hubble was limited by a number of factors, starting with the fact that HST was in a low-Earth orbit that usually but not always 

meant that Earth passed between the target object and HST for roughly half 

of each 95-minute orbit. Some targets near the south and north poles of HST’s 

orbits lie in what is known as the Continuous Viewing Zone and were thus 

within sight of HST for entire orbits. The best-known observation that made 

use of this zone was the area in Ursa Major chosen for the Hubble Deep Field 
270 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

observations in late 1995. HST could not make observations when it passed 

through the South Atlantic Anomaly. PRESTO and Vision 2000 improvements 

reduced time lost due to scheduling problems involving movement of the telescope from one target to another, or calibrations and instrument preparations 

that can tie up telescope time. By 1995, some quarter years saw efficiency rise 

above 50 percent. STScI reckoned in 1998 that the average observing efficiency for a single instrument was about 55 percent. Two other measures have 

increased HST’s efficiency: the use of parallel observations, using more than 

one instrument at the same time; and snapshot observations that make use of 

short periods of time between longer observations.52

CONTROLLING CHANGES

In 2000, Campbell moved from HST to be Director of Flight Programs and 

Projects at Goddard, and later became manager of the NASA Wallops Flight 

Facility. Dave Scheve served as interim program manager until Preston Burch 

became HST Program Manager in 2001. Burch was an engineer and manager 

who had worked in private industry on the Apollo Lunar Module, the Orbiting 

Astronomical Observatories, and the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory before 

joining NASA Goddard, where he first served as Deputy Project Manager for 

HST Operations and in 1998 became Project Manager for operations.53

One major but temporary change in the control setup for HST took place 

starting in October 2000, when HST flight operations moved from the STOCC 

to a new control room in STScI in Baltimore. Control remained there until 

2006 when it was returned to Goddard. This shift originated when NASA tried 

to cut costs by streamlining its tracking and communications operations across 

the Agency into a single organization, the Space Operations and Management 

Office (SOMO) based at Johnson Space Center, along with a single Consolidated 

Space Operations Contract (CSOC), which was awarded to Lockheed Martin 

in 1998. NASA’s ambitious plans for SOMO and CSOC ended with SOMO 

being disbanded in 2001, and in 2004 CSOC was not renewed. Hubble project management at Goddard concluded that bringing HST operations under 

SOMO, complete with a major budget reduction, would do serious harm to 

Hubble. Since tracking and control operations run by academic institutions 

such as the Institute were exempt from SOMO, the HST project moved HST 

control operations to STScI, where NASA arranged to build a new control 

room. Burch said that while there were benefits to having HST control functions located at STScI, this also divided controllers from the engineers who 

worked on HST at Goddard. Security became a larger concern after the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, and Goddard was 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

more secure than STScI. When SOMO and CSOC came to an end, the HST 

Project returned the control functions for HST to their traditional home in the 

STOCC at Goddard on 6 February 2006.54

A new set of changes wasn’t long in coming to the STOCC, however. The 

completion of SM4 in 2009 meant that HST had become like most robotic 

spacecraft in that there was no longer a means to physically repair malfunctioning or failing systems. Ground controllers and their computers and simulators 

became the only means of dealing with any problems that might arise. At the 

time, the Flight Operations Team working in the STOCC worked on a rotating shift schedule covering operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Four 

Observatory Controllers worked on HST operations each shift while another 

two controllers in the Data Operations Center monitored ground system health 

and status, including more than 100 separate hardware components. Well 

before SM4 in late 2006, budget projections showed that the servicing mission 

would be followed by major staff reductions that would go beyond the loss of 

people who prepared for servicing missions to include those who operated HST 

and maintained its ground support. The HST Project set up a team to prepare 

for operations using fewer spacecraft engineers and ground system personnel by 

automating HST operations to a far greater degree than before.55

The result of the team’s work was the biggest permanent change to the 

STOCC in HST’s lifetime with the installation of a new automated ground 

system that began operating on 13 June 2011. The new system meant that 

HST began performing essentially all routine functions autonomously, and the 

STOCC from that point on was regularly staffed only from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., 

five days a week, reducing the number of controllers from 21 to seven. When an 

anomaly occurred, STOCC personnel were alerted through their smartphones, 

and if necessary, they could come in to the STOCC to address problems since 

commands could not be issued from remote locations. New equipment such as 

the Automated Command Engine uplinked commands to HST, played back 

science data, and alerted members of the operations team of any problems. 

The Key Monitor System followed more than 4,000 telemetry items and alerted 

spacecraft engineers of problems. Many of the personnel reductions related 

to the new system were met through attrition, and those who remained found 

that their jobs became more fulfilling because they could concentrate more 

on solving problems, according to Larry Dunham, one of the top engineers 

working on HST at Goddard. “I think the flight ops people who were worried about being pulled from their consoles actually enjoyed becoming mission 

engineers and being able to spend time looking at data to help analyze them.”56

The remote capabilities of the HST ground system proved useful when the 
272 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

COVID-19 pandemic struck the United States. Along with other NASA, government and other facilities, mandatory telework from home was put in place 

starting in March 2020 for personnel at Goddard, including HST controllers, 

during the pandemic.57

▲ Space Telescope Operations Control Center during STS-125 servicing mission on 13 May 

2009. (NASA/Pat Izzo)

NASA made other changes to the control center to reflect the fact that no 

more servicing missions would take place. The STOCC henceforth consisted 

of the Mission Operations Room, which continued as the main control room 

for HST, and the Operations Support Room, where personnel supported operations and worked with simulators to test updates and configuration changes. 

The changes also affected program management. After having overseen the 

HST Program during the final two servicing missions, Burch stepped down 

as HST Program Manager in 2010 and became the Program Manager of the 

NASA Joint Polar Satellite System. Up to that time, the HST Program Manager 

supervised the operations group, which included the control functions, and the 

hardware group, which was responsible for developing new instruments and 

preparing for servicing missions. With the end of servicing missions in 2009, 

the HST Project Office encompassed only the operations group as the hardware group separated from HST and became the Satellite Servicing Office. 

The head of the operations group, Mansoor Ahmed, moved to be Associate 

Director of Goddard’s Astrophysics Projects Division, and Patrick Crouse, who 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

had long experience at Goddard working in space mission operations, became 

HST Operations Project Manager.58

After the last servicing mission in 2009, mechanical problems that cropped 

up on HST had to be solved without the ability to make physical changes to the 

spacecraft. Engineers and scientists at Goddard and STScI worked together to 

deal with specific problems that cropped up during that time, such as HST’s 

gyros. While Hubble was originally designed to operate with a minimum of 

three of its six gyroscopes, the HST Project at Goddard set up a Two Gyro 

Science Mode Operations Working Group to draw up procedures, flight software, and ground software using new control system algorithms to ensure that 

HST would continue to deliver scientific returns with only two operating gyros, 

which HST had done when gyros failed before SM4 in 2009. The HST Project 

had already began a Life Extension Initiatives program to extend HST’s mission 

life and increase its efficiency to maximize its scientific output in 2004 when 

SM4 had been cancelled. This program continued preparations for two-gyro 

operation of HST and even for operations with only one gyro operating. In that 

case, HST would not be able to follow moving targets such as solar system 

objects. The program also developed procedures for other HST systems that 

showed indications that they might fail, have limited lifetimes, or develop an 

anomalous condition, such as the Fine Guidance Sensors, solar panels, onboard 

computers and memory, recorders, and transmitters.59

SPINOFFS 

Like many other NASA programs, the work of building and maintaining HST 

has advanced technologies that could be applied to other purposes, often involving new products and processes. Probably HST’s most important role in advancing technology involved its early adoption of the charge-coupled device for use 

in astrophotography, which helped drive a technology that has revolutionized 

astronomy.60 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, STScI made the Guide Star 

Catalog used with HST’s Fine Guidance Sensors available in digital form for 

use by professional and amateur astronomers. The catalog is now packaged with 

software used widely by amateur astronomers to plan and control their observations.61 HST’s advances to CCDs have also helped advance medical imaging 

including mammography.62 Computer software developed to streamline NASA 

Goddard control functions for HST as part of Vision 2000 was incorporated into 

the Globalstar satellite telephone system.63 An algorithm used by HST to track 

and compare star fields with its own databases has been used by biologists to 

follow the movements of whale sharks.64 HST imaging and software advances 

have also been applied in health care. For example, a member of the team 
274 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

that developed scheduling software for HST created software called On-Cue 

to help hospitals deal with their ever-changing scheduling challenges.65 NASA 

also worked to facilitate commercial use of technologies such as the precision 

power tools that astronauts used to repair HST, and NASA Goddard signed a 

patent license with an engineering firm to manufacture a high-speed data processor known as SpaceCube developed for use in SM4.66

STORMS IN BALTIMORE 

Through the first seven years of HST operations, the future of STScI had been 

tied to HST. Its cooperation with Goddard had helped make the first two HST 

servicing missions a success, and the Institute received high marks in its annual 

contract assessments from NASA. In 1997, NASA renewed its contract with 

STScI for the second time for five years into 2002.67 But the Institute’s successes didn’t obscure the fact that HST was entering the second half of its 

planned 15-year lifetime, causing the leaders of STScI to become increasingly 

preoccupied with the Institute’s future beyond Hubble. In June 1998, NASA 

designated STScI as the science and operations center for the Next Generation 

Space Telescope, later renamed the James Webb Space Telescope. The Institute 

Visiting Committee wrote that this decision caused a “significant improvement 

in the future prospects of the Institute,” giving STScI “a new avenue for intellectual growth, in essence one that will forestall institutional stagnation.”68 This 

need for new projects was felt acutely at STScI, since a strengthening U.S. 

economy at the time meant the Institute faced challenges competing for skilled 

staff, amidst continued pressure from NASA to reduce HST’s operational costs. 

By the time STScI won its role with JWST, the Institute was in the midst of 

a leadership transition. Although he had been offered a second term as STScI 

director, Robert Williams decided to step down so that he could focus on his 

own scientific research. AURA named Steven V. W. Beckwith as the Institute’s 

third director, effective 1 September 1998. He was an astronomer educated at 

Cornell and Caltech, and in 1997 he was director of the Max-Planck-Institut für 

Astronomie in Heidelberg, Germany. Beckwith reorganized STScI in 1999 to 

better support operating two major missions. On 3 January 2000, the Institute’s 

new structure came into effect, complete with a Missions Directorate containing a Hubble Division, another division for JWST, and a third for the Institute 

archive, which was growing in size and importance.69

Although the early years of Hubble’s second decade on orbit went well 

in terms of scientific production, public image and upgrading HST’s instruments, tension grew between the Institute and NASA. The Visiting Committee 

reported in 2003 that STScI’s parent institution, AURA, and NASA “differ in 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

their expectations for the level of community leadership that they want the 

Institute to exert on the scientific capabilities of the HST and JWST missions.” 

This difference may have contributed to a “frayed” relationship between STScI 

and NASA and difficulties during negotiations over the terms of the Institute’s 

role in JWST. Five months after NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe cancelled 

Servicing Mission 4, the committee reported that while STScI’s relationship 

with NASA Goddard was “fine,” relations between the Institute director’s office 

and NASA Headquarters were “very strained.” The servicing mission cancellation “has caused a nearly complete breakdown in communications between 

Headquarters and the Institute which may be difficult to repair.”70 Concerns 

about the possible premature loss of HST were lowering staff morale, but the 

committee noted that other managerial issues were also involved. And it stated 

that the Institute leadership’s uncompromising approach to saving SM4 “is of 

great concern” to STScI staff and the visiting committee, forcing “a very confrontational situation” with NASA and causing a loss of confidence in the director’s office.71

A few weeks later in July 2004, Beckwith announced that he would serve 

just one more year as director and leave STScI in September 2005. When 

Beckwith announced his departure, the fate of SM4 and HST were still very 

much in play, and he linked his decision to the high profile he had gained from 

his efforts to save HST. “This advocacy gave me a high level of visibility that 

could jeopardize what I can achieve for the community in the future,” Beckwith 

said in a prepared statement.72 By the time Beckwith left the following year, 

NASA had a new Administrator who promised to reconsider O’Keefe’s decision 

to cancel the servicing mission. While Beckwith’s poor relationship with NASA 

Headquarters clearly caused him to leave, the critical visiting committee report 

also hinted that Beckwith’s departure from STScI was hastened by growing 

morale problems inside the Institute. One was the disquiet amongst women 

working at STScI about the work environment there, which will be discussed 

in the next chapter. Beckwith also made unpopular decisions, denying tenure 

to some astronomers at STScI. While he felt that he had a mandate to keep 

academic standards very high at STScI, he later admitted that the controversial 

tenure decisions “weakened” his position.73

PREPARING FOR JWST

Mattias (Matt) Mountain, a physicist and astronomer trained at the Imperial 

College of Science and Technology of the University of London, became STScI 

director after having served as director of the Gemini Observatory, where he 

had supervised the building of the two Gemini telescopes. Mountain also 
276 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

served as a member of the JWST Science Working Group since 2002, and 

so he arrived at the Institute knowing JWST well but not HST.74 He recalled 

getting a crash course in HST while he prepared for Servicing Mission 4 from 

many Institute staff. Most important was Rodger E. Doxsey, who had started 

at STScI in 1981 and became so famous there for his thorough knowledge of 

HST’s inner workings that he was the natural choice for Hubble Mission Head. 

Doxsey, whose name has been linked to innovations such as snapshot observations and operating with only two gyroscopes, died at age 62 a few months after 

SM4 in 2009. Despite this setback, HST continued to operate well through 

Mountain’s decade at the helm of STScI. Mountain introduced a matrix organization scheme to recognize that STScI had become a “multi-mission organization” that gives many people a role in HST, JWST, and STScI’s growing 

multi-mission data archive, which will also be discussed in the next chapter.75

▲ Hubble Project Manager Patrick Crouse in 

2016. (Christopher Gainor)

Kenneth R. Sembach, who had a long background with STScI and HST, 

including work as interim deputy director, Hubble Project Scientist and 

Doxsey’s successor as Hubble Mission Head, became STScI’s fifth director in 

October 2015 after Mountain was 

named president of AURA. He 

had also been a Hubble Fellow 

at MIT and worked at Johns 

Hopkins University on the Far 

Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer 

mission.76 Sembach became 

director as JWST moved toward 

to a scheduled launch date in 

2018 that was later postponed to 

2021. The approach of the JWST 

launch has affected his approach 

to Hubble. With strong support 

from Sembach, NASA, and STScI 

announced that JWST’s early data 

would be made available immediately to the whole astronomical 

community to familiarize it with 

the new telescope’s abilities. In an 

interview in 2017, he said that he 

expected that some observations 

would lead astronomers to ask for 

Hubble observations of the same 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

object, and was planning for that eventuality. He also said that as HST nears 

the end of its mission, he was looking to dedicate more of its time to large-scale 

observing programs “that will have really longer-lasting value, and will be useful 

for multiple scientific purposes, that will really enhance the archival value of 

the mission as it goes on.”77

In the years since HST was last restored in Servicing Mission 4, HST has 

been subject to NASA’s Senior Review process that ensures that its spacecraft 

continue to deliver the best science possible at the lowest cost. Hubble has 

undergone the Senior Review Process in 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2019. Under the 

review process, HST was assessed by a committee of top scientists who looked 

at HST’s latest scientific mission objectives and its effectiveness in meeting 

previous sets of objectives, its efficiency and the quality of its management. 

The 2019 review found that HST “continues to excel in scientific productivity and remains a key element in the achievement of NASA’s strategic goals, 

and is continuing to meet the aspirations of the worldwide astronomy community.” It added that “The Project has taken a proactive stance on mitigating the 

likely failure modes and degradation in the telescope and instrumentation.”78

The HST Project Office has undertaken studies of HST end of life issues, but 

Project Manager Patrick Crouse explained that no definite decisions had been 

made while HST remains highly productive and in good operating condition.79

CHANGING ASTRONOMY

The success of HST operations involved control functions centered at NASA’s 

Goddard Space Flight Center. Just as HST has changed over its time in space, 

so have its controlling institutions. Goddard’s control center for HST underwent many changes as computing and other electronic technologies became 

more powerful during the nearly three decades since HST began operations. 

Goddard also created a group of engineers dedicated to supporting HST servicing missions, a group that has moved on to prepare for future satellite servicing 

work. The Space Telescope Science Institute was originally founded to carry 

out HST science operations, and its story was intimately tied to that of HST, 

even as it took on responsibility for operating HST’s successor telescope, JWST. 

The European Space Agency also created infrastructure for HST, but its own 

budget issues and the revolution in networking that arose in the 1990s caused 

ESA to reduce its role in the HST program. In discussing HST and its infrastructure, it is also important to talk about the major impact they have had on 

astronomy and how it is done. It is this story to which this study now turns for 

its final chapter. 
278 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

ENDNOTES

 1 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 371–372. With these costs, Smith called HST “the most

expensive scientific instrument ever built.” The $2 billion price tag in 1990 would equal 

$3.9 billion in 2019. The Large Hadron Collider, which began operation in 2008, cost 

more than $5 billion, adjusted for inflation. Media cost estimates for HST at the time of 

HST’s launch varied from $1.5 billion in USA Today and $1.54 billion in the Wall Street 

Journal to $2.1 billion in the Washington Post and the New York Times. The New York 

Times stated that the original $1.5 billion cost for HST came before the 1986 Challenger 

disaster, which added $300 million in storage and servicing costs and another $300 million for operating and testing costs. See Paul Hoversten, “‘New Era’ for Mankind Will

Open Today,” USA Today (25 April 1990): A1; Kathy Sawyer, “Hunting the ‘Blueprint of 

Eternity,’ Long-Delayed $2.1 Billion Hubble Space Telescope Set for Launch,” Washington Post (April 1990): A1; John Noble Wilford, “Telescope is Set to Peer at Space and

Time,” New York Times (9 April 1990): A1; Bob Davis, “Hubble Space Telescope, Plagued 

by Problems, May Open the Heavens But Has Cost the Earth,” Wall Street Journal (5 

April 1990). For information on the Higgs Boson, see Alex Knapp, “How Much Does 

It Cost to Find a Higgs Boson?” Forbes (5 July 2012) https://www.forbes.com/sites/

alexknapp/2012/07/05/how-much-does-it-cost-to-find-a-higgs-boson/#5f0604263948

(accessed 12 August 2019).

 2 This topic was raised at a 2005 congressional hearing when a House Committee discussed the costs of Servicing Mission 4 and a possible robotic repair mission with witnesses from the scientific community, including STScI Director Steve Beckwith. The 

scientists, including Beckwith warned that their support for HST would waver if the 

SM4 costs were shifted from the human spaceflight budget to the space science budget, which would endanger other science missions. See Warren E. Leary, “Repair Costs

for Hubble Are Vexing to Scientists,” New York Times, (3 February 2005); Brian Berger, 

“Hubble Hearing Opens Debate on a Hot Topic,” Space News (7 February 2005): 6. 

 3 “HST History for GSFC,” Excel spreadsheet supplied to author with explanatory notes 

from Craig Tupper, NASA, 3 October 2017; James F. Jeletic, e-mail to author, “Cost of 

Hubble,” 27 October 2016.

 4 A NASA website last updated in 2017 estimated the average cost of an individual Shuttle 

mission at $450 million, which would add up to $2.7 billion for the six HST Shuttle missions. The same number appeared in the website after a 2015 update and appears to 

predate that time, which would mean that the figure should be noticeably higher in 2019 

dollars. NASA Kennedy Space Center, “Space Shuttle and International Space Station,” 

updated 3 August 2017, https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/information/

shuttle_faq.html#10 (accessed 12 August 2019). In 2006, Space News quoted a cost of 

$900 million for Servicing Mission 4, and in 2009 on the eve of the mission, Space.com 

quoted Ed Weiler as putting a price tag of $1.1 billion on the mission. In both cases, those

estimates in dollars of the time included the cost of equipment for HST and expenses 

for the years that the Satellite Servicing Team was kept together at GSFC. “Editorial: Five 

More Years,” Space News (8 November 2006); Andrea Thompson, “Hubble FAQ: Inside 

the Last Space Telescope Repair Mission,” Space.com, 1 May 2009. When the Shuttle

program was about to end in 2011, a Space.com article divided an estimated cost for 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

the entire Shuttle program of $209 billion in 2010 dollars by the 135 Shuttle flights to 

arrive at a rough cost of $1.6 billion per flight. Mike Wall, “The Shuttle Program, Wa

It Worth It?” Space.com, 5 July 2011. The ESA declined to disclose how much it spent

on HST.

 5 J. Krige, A. Russo, and L. Sebesta, A History of the European Space Agency 1958–1987, 

Volume II, The Story of ESA, 1973 to 1987 (Noodwijk, The Netherlands: ESA Publications 

Division, 2005), p. 175. See also John Krige, Angelina Long Callahan, and Ashok Maharaj, 

NASA in the World: Fifty Years of International Collaboration in Space (New York: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2013).

 6 See chapter one and “MOU between the ESA and NASA,” in Exploring the Unknown, Vol. 

5, pp. 670–681. See also F. Macchetto, “European Astronomy and the Space Telescope: 

The Space Telescope European Coordinating Facility,” in Donald N. B. Hall, The Space 

Telescope Observatory: Special Session of Commission 44, IAU, August 1982 (STScI, NASA 

Scientific and Technical Information Branch, 1982. NASA CP-2244), pp. 16–19.

 7 Antonella Nota, Mark McCaughrean, Bob Fosbury, Colleen Sharkey, and Carl Walker,

“Seeing with Hubble Vision,” ESA Bulletin, no. 142 (May 2010): 3–11; Duccio Macchetto, 

oral history interviews by author, 9 May 2017; Antonella Nota, 17 May 2017; Helmut Jenkner, 19 May 2015; Christopher Burrows, 15 February 2017; Rudolf Albrecht, 9 November 

2015. Although the 15 ESA employees at STScI represented about 15 percent of its early 

staff, the number did not increase as STScI’s staff grew.

 8 “Space Telescope European Coordinating Facility,” ESA Bulletin, no. 142 (May 2010): 4–5; 

Albrecht OHI, pp. 12–21.

 9 Macchetto OHI, pp. 12–13; Committee on International Space Programs, National 

Research Council, and European Space Science Committee, U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1998), p. 47; Daniel

Fischer and Hilmar Duerbeck, Hubble Revisited: New Images from the Discovery Machine 

(New York: Springer-Verlag, 1998), p. 196.

10 Duccio Macchetto, e-mail to author, 14 August 2019. Macchetto said the SM4 cancellation decision upset the ESA Director General Jean-Jacques Dordain. Macchetto added 

that after the cancellation “There were both open and confidential contacts with the 

US political and scientific communities and a reminder that ESA was a partner not just 

a contractor.” The newsletter of the European Coordinating Facility for HST was silent 

about ESA input in the cancellation and reinstatement decisions except for the following statement at the time of the cancellation decision: “There is little we Europeans 

can do directly to change NASA’s decision which, apparently, is final.” Eric Ensellem and 

Monica Tosi, “Cancellation of Hubble Servicing Missions: An Open Letter from the Two 

European Members of the Space Telescope Users Committee,” ST-ECF Newsletter (January 2004): p. 3. 

11 Albrecht OHI, 20; Robert Fosbury, “Closure of the ST-ECF,” ST-ECF Newsletter, No. 48 

(December 2010): p. 2; European Space Agency, “European Hubble Archive Moves to 

Spain,” 22 June 2012, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/Space_Science/European_

Hubble_archive_moves_to_Spain (accessed 30 July 2017); European Space Agency, “A 

new Hubble Archive Mirror in Europe,” 17 December 2018, https://spacetelescope.org/

forscientists/announcements/sci18006/ (accessed 22 April 2019).
280 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

12 Committee on International Space Programs, U.S.-European Collaboration in Space Science, p. 47.

13 See Lane E. Wallace, Dreams, Hopes, Realities: NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center, The

First Forty Years (Washington, DC: NASA History Office, SP-4312, 1999)

14 James Jeletic, oral history interview by author, 19 May 2017, p. 18; Patrick Crouse, 

oral history interview by author, 17 June 2016, pp. 5–6. Lockheed merged with Martin 

Marietta on 15 March 1995, to form Lockheed Martin. See also Lockheed Martin News 

Release, “Space Foundation Honors Hubble Servicing Mission Team That Extended Life 

Of The Orbiting Observatory,” 13 April 2010, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/news/

press-releases/2010/april/SpaceFoundationHonorsHubb.html (accessed 26 July 2017).

15 Ken Carpenter, oral history interview by author, 30 April 2015, pp. 7–10; Jennifer Wiseman, oral history interview by author, 8 May 2015, pp. 1–3. In 2015, there were four HST

Project Scientists on staff at Goddard. AURA also operates the Gemini telescopes, the 

National Optical Astronomy Observatory and National Solar Observatory.

16 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 354–361.

17 “About SSPD,” https://sspd.gsfc.nasa.gov/about.html (accessed 15 July 2017).

18 NASA Facts, Three Newly Designed Tracking and Data Relay Satellites To Help Replenish 

Existing On-orbit Fleet (NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, FS 2001-9-025-GSFC, September 2001). For more on NASA’s tracking networks, see Sunny Tsiao, “Read You Loud 

and Clear!” The Story of NASA’s Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network (Washington, DC:

NASA, SP-2007-4232, 2008).

19 Ford Aerospace, “Phase I Final Report Preliminary Operations Requirements and Test 

Support (PORTS) Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) for the Space Telescope,” 

Ford Aerospace, FACC-TR38009, November 1981; Larry Dunham, “HST ground system” 

e-mail to author, 21 September 2017; “Goddard dedicates Space Telescope Control 

Center,” Goddard News, 1, no. 2 (15 February 1984): 1; Albert Sehlstedt, Jr., “Control 

center for space telescope is dedicated,” Baltimore Sun (15 February 1984); Smith, The 

Space Telescope, pp. 357–362. 

20 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 337–340, 348–353. 

21 Riccardo Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 2008), p. 227. 

22 Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, p. 228; Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 338; Ray Villard, “The World’s Biggest Star Catalogue,” Sky & Telescope (December 1989): 583–589.

23 Villard, “Biggest Star Catalogue”; Helmut Jenkner, oral history interview, 19 May 2015. 

The development of the catalog has also been extensively canvassed in STScI Annual 

Reports.

24 Villard, “Biggest Star Catalogue.”

25 Barry Lasker, “Digitized Optical Sky Surveys at STScI,” STScI Newsletter 11, no. 2 (December 1994): 39; STScI, “The Original National Geographic Society—Palomar Observatory 

Sky Survey Now Available on 8 CD ROMs,” news release STScI-1996-20, 30 April 1996.

26 Villard, “Biggest Star Catalogue”; STScI “Bigger, Better Catalog Unveils Half a Billion 

Celestial Objects,” news release STScI-2001-18, 4 June 2001; Barry M. Lasker et al., “The 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

Second-Generation Guide Star Catalog: Description and Properties,” The Astronomical 

Journal 136 (August 2008): 735–766; STScI, “NASA Recognizes HST Star Catalog Developers,” news release STScI-1993-07, 2 April 1993. The original National Geographic—

Palomar Sky Survey in the 1950s served a similar purpose for the 200” Palomar telescope as the HST Guide Star sky surveys have done. See Florence, The Perfect Machine, 

p. 397.

27 Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science 

Institute (STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1987), p. 1. 

28 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 348–352; Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to AURA 

Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI, Baltimore, MD, April 1986), 

pp. 7, 27–31, 38; Giacconi, STScI Annual Report, 1987, p. 4; Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary 

Deep, pp. 229–232; Edward Ruitberg, oral history interviews by author, 16 May 2017, pp. 

4–5; and Robert Brown, 14 December 2016, p. 2. Archiving and calibration functions of 

the ground system are discussed in chapter nine.

29 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 369–370; Michael Braukus, “NASA Calls HST Ground 

Test a Success,” Goddard News 34, no. 7, July 1988; “Primary Objectives for ST SCI April 

1, 1988 Through September 30, 1988,” Appendix to Audit Report, NASA Office of Inspector General, “Space Telescope Science Institute, Goddard Space Flight Center, 19 June 

1989,” A17–A21.

30 Ed Ruitberg OHI, part 1, pp. 10–11; Larry Dunham, comments on chapter draft, 7 September 2017; Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1989), pp. 32–33.

31 NASA Office of Inspector General, “Space Telescope Science Institute, Goddard Space 

Flight Center, 19 Jun 1989,” pp. 1–3, 7–13; Giaconni, STScI 1990 Annual Report, 2.

32 Space Science Board, The National Research Council, Institutional Arrangements for 

the Space Telescope: Report of a Study at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, July 19–30, 1976

(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1976), pp. 8–15, 27–28; Giacconi, STScI

1991 Annual Report, pp. 38–39.

33 Space Telescope Science Institute, MA-03 Technical Management Plan Final Version, 

June 1995 (Baltimore, MD: STScI), pp. 31–34. 

34 Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” p. 377; Dunham OHI, pp. 8–9; Chaisson, The Hubble 

Wars, p. 328.

35 NASA Fact Sheet, “The Hubble Space Telescope Second Servicing Mission (SM-2): Hubble Space Telescope Operations Control Center,” February 1997, NASA Goddard Space 

Flight Center, FS-97(01)-001-GSFC; Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc., “Hubble 

Space Telescope: Media Reference Guide,” 1990, 4-1–4-16; Larry Dunham, “STOCC questions updated,” e-mail to author, 3 November 2017. See also James E. Reis, oral history 

interview by John Ruley, 11 December 2017.

36 NASA Facts Sheet, “Hubble Space Telescope–High Fidelity Simulator,” NASA Goddard 

Space Flight Center, 2015, FS-2015-9-339-GSFC. VEST is also discussed in chapter three.

37 NASA Goddard slide presentation, “Goddard Space Flight Center Hubble Space Telescope Facility Tour,” 2015, pp. 4–6; Richard Burley, et al., “Automation of Hubble Space 
282 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Telescope Mission Operations,” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 

2012, p. 3.

38 Larry Dunham, comments on chapter draft, 7 September 2017; Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, 

pp. 73–75, 160–163; Dunham OHI, pp. 8–9; Rothenberg OHI, p. 13; Crabb OHI, pp. 4–6.

39 Larry Dunham, e-mail to author, 21 September 2017; Larry Dunham, comments on 

chapter draft, 7 September 2017; Dunham OHI, pp. 11, 17. 

40 Giacconi, 1991 STScI Annual Report, 2-3; Giacconi, 1992 STScI Annual Report, 10-1.

41 STScI, MA-03 Technical Management Plan Final Version, June 1995, pp. 7–8.

42 Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, p. 275.

43 Leckrone, OHI, 6 May 2015, p. 18.

44 Robert Williams, oral history interview by author, 21 May 2015, part 1, 6; H. S. Stockman,

Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute, (STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1993), pp. 1–3.

45 1993 Space Telescope Science Institute Visiting Committee Report, pp. 4–6; Williams, 1994

STScI Annual Report, pp. 1–3. Robert Williams, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1995), p. 2; Robert

Williams, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institut

(STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1996), pp. 1–2. See also Williams OHI, part 1, 2. Staff grew

to 450 in 1993 and fell to 350 in 1994, according to STScI’s 1997 Annual Report (4).

46 Smith, The Space Telescope, discusses HST’s 1970s and 1980s budget problems in 

detail. The budgetary and political environment surrounding NASA during the administrations of George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush is discussed in Glen R

Asner and Stephen J. Garber, Origins of 21st-Century Space Travel: A History of NASA’s 

Decadal Planning Team and the Vision for Space Exploration, 1999–2004 (Washington,

DC: NASA, SP-2019-4415, 2019).

47 The national debt tripled during the Reagan years to $3 trillion, and another $1 trillion 

was added during the George H. W. Bush administration, while annual deficits ranged

between $128 billion and nearly $300 billion, mainly due to tax cuts, increased military 

spending and maintenance of social programs. Michael Schaller, Right Turn: American 

Life in the Reagan-Bush Era 1980–1992 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 

116–117. Dealing with the federal deficit was a major theme of much of Bill Clinton’s 

presidency. See Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York:

Simon & Schuster, 1994) and Bill Clinton, My Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), pp. 

621–622, 745, 870–871. Deficit fighting was a key part of Clinton’s economic plan and 

budget programs as president. In the 1994 congressional elections, Republicans took 

control of Congress with the help of their Contract with America, which contained more 

aggressive efforts to combat the deficit. One promise, to introduce a constitutional 

amendment mandating balanced budgets, fell just short of passing Congress. The federal budget was balanced by 1999, but fell out of balance later due to further tax cuts, 

economic problems, and military actions that followed the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Since NASA accounted for only one percent or less of federal spending 

during this time, its budget did not figure in the larger budget debates, except amongst 

those concerned with space spending. 
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

48 1995 Space Telescope Science Institute Visiting Committee Report, 1995, Baltimore MD, 

3; Burch OHI, 7 June 2017, pp. 1–2. See Daniel S. Goldin, “NASA in the Next Millennium,” 

speech at the 187th American Astronomical Society Meeting in San Antonio, TX, 17 January 1996. For figures on NASA spending, see the Guardian datablog, “NASA Budgets: US 

Spending on Space Travel Since 1958 UPDATED,” the Guardian, undated, https://www.

theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/feb/01/nasa-budgets-us-spending-space-travel

(accessed 30 July 2016). NASA spending in FY 1994 fell to $13.695 billion from $14.305 

billion the year before, a figure that was also lower than the 1991 and 1992 budgets. The 

1995 budget was even lower at $13.378 billion. All numbers unadjusted for inflation.

49 Michelle Mittelstadt, “Congress Officially Kills Collider Project,” Sun Journal (Lewiston, 

MN, 22 October 1993): 7; Piers Bizony, Island in the Sky: Building the International Space 

Station (London: Aurum Press, 1996), pp. 70–71. A similar but more recent concern 

about Congress and science is raised in Steven Weinberg, “The Crisis of Big Science,”

The New York Review of Books (10 May 2012). 

50 John C. Campbell, oral history interview by author, 22 May 2017, p. 9. Campbell credited 

Ed Weiler with protecting HST’s budget at NASA Headquarters

51 Williams, 1996 STScI Annual Report, pp. 16–20; 1995 IVC Report, pp. 4–6; Williams, 199

STScI Annual Report, pp. 20–24; “Operations and Ground Systems, Code 441,” Hubble 

Space Telescope Newsletter, GSFC 5, no. 5 (May 1995): 2–3; Dunham, comments on chapter draft; Larry Dunham, “HST ground system,” e-mail to author, 20 September 2017; 

NASA Goddard slide presentation, “Goddard Space Flight Center Hubble Space Telescope Facility Tour,” 2015, 25–32; Crabb OHI, pp. 11–12.

52 Williams, 1994 STScI Annual Report, p. 3; Williams, 1996 STScI Annual Report, pp. 17–18

Space Telescope Science Institute, Annual Report 1998 (1999) p. 6; Neill Reid, oral history interview by author, 2 November 2016, p. 3; “HST Primer for Cycle 25: 2.2 Orbital 

Constraints,” STScI, http://documents.stsci.edu/hst/proposing/documents/pri_cy25/

Ch_2_Systemoverview3.html (accessed 23 July 2017). 

53 See Campbell OHI and Preston Burch, oral history interview by author, 9 November 2015.

54 Preston Burch, oral history interview by author, 7 June 2017; Tsiao, Read You Loud and 

Clear! pp. 321–326; Space Telescope Science Institute, Annual Report 2000 (Baltimore, 

MD: STScI, 2001), p. 20; GSFC Hubble Project PowerPoint, Operational Readiness Review: 

FOT STScI to GSFC Relocation, 9 February 2006; James Reis OHI, pp. 6–11.

55 Burley et al., “Automation of HST Operations,” pp. 2–3.

56 Dunham OHI, p. 21; Burley et al., “Automation of HST Operations,” pp. 1–2; James Reis 

OHI, pp. 11–14.

57 Status Report from NASA Headquarters, “Message from the NASA Administrator: March 

24 Update on Agency Response to Coronavirus,” 24 March 2020.

58 NASA Facts Sheet, “Hubble Space Telescope–Mission Operations,” 2015, NASA Goddard 

Space Flight Center, FS-2015-3-267-GSFC; NASA, “Hubble: An Overview of the Space 

Telescope,” 2013, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, NP-2013-07-032-GSFC, pp. 39–44; 

NASA Goddard slide presentation, “Goddard Space Flight Center Hubble Space Telescope Facility Tour,” 2015, p. 5; Patrick Crouse, oral history interview with author, 17 

June 2016. HST was organized with a HST Program Office (Code 440) and two projects: 
284 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

(1) HST Operations Project (Code 441), and (2) HST Flight Development and Servicing 

Project (Code 442). The HST Program Office, Code 440, was reorganized into the Astrophysics Projects Division. Code 440, containing multiple projects, including Code 441, 

the HST Operations Project.

59 STScI Plan for Implementation of Two Gyro Mode, STScI, 13 November 2004, STScI 

Archive, Box file “HST Operations Papers, various 1995–2005,” JHU Library Special 

Collections; NASA Goddard slide presentation, “Goddard Space Flight Center Hubble 

Space Telescope Facility Tour,” 2015, pp. 19–22.

60 Smith, “HST in Orbit: Ten Years and Counting,” p. 34. This issue is discussed extensively 

in chapter four. 

61 NASA Office of Aerospace Technology, Commercial Technology Division, “Astronomy 

Software,” Spinoff 2002 (Washington, DC: NASA, 2002) 81; Villard, “Biggest Star Catalog.

62 NASA Headquarters, Spinoff 1994, NP-214, pp. 46–47; NASA Headquarters, “Health and 

Medicine Spinoffs,” NP-2009-06-488-HQ, 2009. While this work to apply advances in

CCD technology to medical imaging succeeded, an earlier effort in the 1990s to apply 

image deconvolution techniques developed for HST to analyze mammograms did not 

succeed. Lauer OHI, pp. 17–18.

63 NASA Goddard, “Hubble Technology Benefits New Satellite Phone System,” news 

release 99-3, 14 January 1999.

64 NASA Innovative Partnerships Program, “Star Tracking Tools Enable Tracking of Endangered Animals,” Spinoff 2009 (Washington, DC: NASA, 20029) pp. 90–91

65 NASA, “Hubble systems Optimize Busy Hospital Schedules,” Spinoff 2009, 44.

66 NASA, Technology Opportunity: A Computer-Controlled Power Tool, NASA Office of Technology Transfer, NASA Goddard, 2006; Jarrett Cohen, NASA High End Computing Program, “Simulations Enable Successful Hubble Navigation Experiment,” 28 July 2009; 

NASA Goddard, “NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center Licenses Advanced Hybrid Processor Technology to Genesis Engineering Solutions Inc,” news release 17-11, 4 April 

2017. See also NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Hubble Technology Transfer, NP-2018-

1-157-GSFC, 2018.

67 Robert E. Williams, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science

Institute, (STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1997), pp. 1–2; Robert E. Williams, Annual Report

to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute, (STScI, Baltimore, MD, 

March 1998), pp. 1–2.

68 Report of the Institute Visiting Committee for the Space Telescope Science Institute, (Baltimore, MD, May 1999), pp. 5–6; STScI, STScI 1998 Annual Report, pp. 9, 16.

69 STScI, “Space Telescope Science Institute Gets New Director,” Report of the 1998 Interim 

Institute Visiting Committee, news release STScI-PR98-09, 27 January 1998; Report of the 

1998 Interim Institute Visiting Committee, (STScI, Baltimore, MD, April 1998); IVC Report, 

1999, p. 6; STScI, STScI 1998 Annual Report, p. 5; STScI, STScI 1999 Annual Report, pp. 16, 

22–30. The archive will be discussed in chapter nine.

70 Report of the Institute Visiting Committee for the Space Telescope Science Institute, June 

2004, Baltimore MD, pp. 2–3.
CHAPTER EIGHT . Operatin Th

71 Ibid, pp. 2–4. The report also includes a response from STScI management.

72 Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Inc., News Release, “Steven Beckwith to Conclude Appointment as Director of Space Telescope Institute,” 16 July 2004, 

http://www.aura-astronomy.org/news/archive/newsArchiveResult.asp?nuid=78 (accessed 

18 July 2016). See also “Hubble Advocate Quits Institute,” Baltimore Sun, 17 July 2004.

73 Beckwith OHI, 26 September 2016, p. 19.

74 STScI, “New Director Appointed at Space Telescope,” news release STScI 2005-08, 13 

June 2005. 

75 Matt Mountain, oral history interview by author, 4 November 2016, pp. 17, 21–22; Dennis 

Overbye, “Rodger Doxsey, Astronomer Who Worked on the Hubble, Dies at 62,” New Yor

Times (18 October 2009).

76 STScI, “AURA Appoints New STScI Director,” news release STScI-2015-41, 30 October 

2015. 

77 Kenneth R. Sembach, oral history interview by author, 25 May 2017, p. 10; NASA news 

release, “NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope Early Science Observations Revealed,”

13 November 2017.

78 NASA, 2019 Astrophysics Senior Review–Hubble Report (Washington, DC: 8–10 May 2019)

79 Crouse OHI, pp. 15–20. 

287

CHAPTER NINE

Astronomy: 

A Science Transformed

▲ This infrared view of the Horsehead Nebula, otherwise known as Barnard 33, was released 

in 2013. (NASA/ESA/Hubble Heritage Team [AURA/STScI]: heic1307a)

A

stronomy and the way it was done changed in many ways during the 

Hubble Space Telescope’s operational lifetime, and HST played no small 

part in facilitating those changes. Where once astronomy was a solitary 

pursuit, it has become a team activity. Today more astronomical research than 

ever takes place at data archives. For those who want to make observations 

with Hubble, the Space Telescope Science Institute has set up a complicated 

process to ensure that the highest quality observing programs are chosen. Along 

the way, NASA and the Institute have worked to open HST in particular and 

astronomy in general to more women and to more groups who have not traditionally been involved in astronomy at the top level. This chapter will examine 

the changes to astronomy that were already in motion when HST began its 

work in space in April 1990, the changes that followed, and Hubble’s role in 

facilitating those changes. These changes encompass how astronomy is done 

and who does it.

Even before it was launched, Robert W. Smith wrote extensively about 

HST as an example of Big Science. Hubble brought together multiple institutions of many kinds, along with several groups and numerous individuals, in 

all cases many more than had ever come together for any individual astronomy 

program. Similarly, HST required a quantum leap in money and political support to become reality.1 Once it began operations, HST moved to the center of 

NASA’s astronomy programs at a time when NASA became the largest funder 

of astronomy in the United States, and so HST became the most influential 

telescope of its time.
288 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

At the same time that HST began operating, astronomical observatories on 

the ground were also becoming more complex, with larger and more expensive 

instruments that required large teams of experts to operate and process the 

data they produce. Historian W. Patrick McCray later noted the propensity of 

many astronomers to compare their large telescopes to another prime example 

of Big Science, particle accelerators.2 Larger teams from multiple institutions 

became necessary to draw scientific meaning from the data, as was the case for 

the teams discussed in chapter six that found that the universe is expanding at 

an accelerating rate. The digitization of data has made it much easier for large 

teams of astronomers operating at far-flung locations to share data and work 

together. Astronomy was already a growing field attracting larger numbers of 

people than ever before.

Another big change in astronomy involved the nature of data, which was 

moving to digital form. Although this shift was already well underway when 

Hubble was launched, HST’s high profile role in astronomy meant that it accelerated some of the changes that digital data brought to astronomy. The ease of 

moving data also made it possible to create large depositories of data, and HST 

catalyzed the creation of major new astronomical archives. Because HST and 

the Institute first created to run its science operations produced an influential archive that habituated many astronomers to using archived data, Hubble’s 

influence will long outlast the lifetime of the observatory itself. 

NEW KINDS OF OBSERVATORIES

HST began operations in the last decade of a century that had already seen 

major transformations in astronomy. Early in the 20th century, visionaries like 

George Ellery Hale were backed by philanthropists such as Andrew Carnegie 

who made possible the construction of large telescopes around the United 

States, notably the Mount Wilson and Palomar observatories in California. 

Access to those telescopes was restricted to small observing staffs including 

people like Edwin Hubble, working under powerful and influential observatory 

directors. The role of weapons-related science during the Second World War 

and the Cold War that followed drove massively increased government funding 

for scientific research. In turn, this produced increasing interest and opportunities in the sciences, which led universities to create and expand astronomy 

programs, and in turn produced growing demand for observing time. The postwar years also saw astronomers make use of rocket-borne instruments, radio 

telescopes, and other new technologies.3

Observatories and their sponsoring institutions began to cooperate after 

World War II to build facilities that could compete with existing observatories 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

and take advantage of newly available government funding for science. The 

Association of Universities in Research for Astronomy was created in 1957 with 

seven founding universities and encouragement from the National Science 

Foundation (NSF), a federal funding agency created in 1950. By the late 1950s, 

AURA was building the National Optical Astronomy Observatory on Kitt Peak 

in Arizona with government support from NSF, and its expansion continued in 

the years that followed with observatories elsewhere in the United States and 

in Chile. AURA was not unique—another consortium, Associated Universities, 

Inc., created the National Radio Astronomy Observatory with NSF support in 

1956. NASA’s entrance into astronomy and space science soon after its creation 

in 1958 opened another source of federal support for astronomy.4

The creation of new observatories starting in the 1950s, managed by multiple universities with government funding, meant that astronomical observing 

opportunities expanded vastly beyond the traditional small and facility-specific 

observing staffs that were the norm in the first half of the century. Although 

the old practices of giving staff astronomers pride of place continued at observatories like Palomar, astronomers could obtain observing time at places like 

Kitt Peak by simply applying for it. Technological advances simplified observing 

work and allowed astronomers to move from observing cages inside telescopes 

to more comfortable control rooms nearby. Kitt Peak astronomers made the first 

remote telescope observation in 1968.

5 As discussed in chapter four, observatories began to move from photography on glass plates and photographic film 

to digital formats in the 1970s and 1980s, which made it much easier to store 

and share images and other data when computing and networking technologies 

advanced in the 1990s. 

With information moving to digital form, many astronomers saw the need 

for a common format with which to share data, and this movement was particularly strong at observatories in the United States supported by the NSF. 

Astronomers working at Kitt Peak, the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, 

and those involved with HST and the Very Large Array, then both under development, worked to develop a common format to share astronomical data. In 

1979, they created the Flexible Image Transport System (FITS), which not only 

is used for images but also for other data such as spectra, tables, and data cubes. 

FITS proved itself with otherwise incompatible computer systems and, more 

importantly, with astronomers in various fields and locations. The International 

Astronomical Union adopted FITS in 1982, and today it remains a standard format for sharing astronomical data. The creation of this format greatly benefitted 

the work of the Hubble Space Telescope and helped transform astronomy by 

fostering collaboration amongst astronomers in different locations. “After 1965 
290 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

the telescope gradually merged with the computer, the software program, and 

the database into a hybrid instrument,” McCray wrote. “But computer chips 

and digital data alone did not remake astronomy; astronomers pursued these 

new tools to fulfill their desires for increased research ability and the ability 

to share data more easily.” In September 1989, the last photographic plate was 

exposed on the 200-inch Hale Telescope at Mount Palomar. After years of trials, the best-known telescope on Earth was converted from photographic plates 

to CCDs.6

Another reason astronomers wanted better ways to share data was simply 

because there were more astronomers than ever. At the dawn of the century, a 

few hundred scientists worked as astronomers worldwide. Their numbers grew 

rapidly after World War II to an estimated 15,000 by the year 2000. In the 

United States, the membership of the American Astronomical Society stood 

at 2,619 in 1970. By 1990, the year HST was launched, AAS membership had 

doubled to 5,297.7 This growth was fueled by the growth in observing opportunities at the new observatories and more universities offering undergraduate 

and graduate degrees in physics and astronomy, much of this underwritten by 

increased government funding.8 These technical, organizational, and demographic changes came to play a major role in the design of HST operations, and 

HST would make its own impact on how astronomy was done. 

Number of Professional Astronomers Over Time

192019251930193519401945195019551960196519701975198019851990199520002005201020152020

Year

Number of Members

International Astronomical Union 

American Astronomical 

Society

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

▲ Graph of total number of professional astronomers. (Data from International Astronomical Union and 

American Astronomical Society)
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

Before considering HST’s place in astronomy, it is important to note that 

astronomers got their first exposure to the potential of space-based astronomy 

long before Hubble through spacecraft such as the Orbiting Astronomical 

Observatories (OAO), the Einstein X-ray Observatory, and the International 

Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE). OAO-3, also known as Copernicus, which operated 

from 1972 to 1981, carried 

an ultraviolet telescope 

that was accessible to guest 

observers in addition to 

the team that created the 

instrument. When Einstein 

was launched in 1978, scientists who had not been 

involved in developing the 

program were encouraged 

to propose observations 

using the spacecraft.9 IUE 

was a cooperative program 

involving NASA, ESA, and 

the UK Science and Engineering Research Council 

that proved to be an important forerunner to HST. 

The IUE spacecraft was 

launched on 26 January 1978 and was still operating when HST joined it in 

space. Because it was located in a geosynchronous orbit, IUE could operate 

around the clock without interruption, avoiding the complications of low-Earth 

orbits used by OAO and later by HST. IUE was much more user-friendly than 

the OAO spacecraft and was more available to ultraviolet astronomers. Any 

astronomer, regardless of where they came from, could use IUE if they made a 

proposal that passed a peer review process. Observers at the IUE control centers could follow their observations in real time and change them on the spot if 

they wanted. Albert Boggess, who became Project Scientist for HST at Goddard 

after directing IUE’s scientific work, said IUE “had [an] important influence in 

convincing many astronomers that doing work with satellites was rewarding.”10

IUE was especially relevant to HST because a major part of Hubble’s work was 

in the ultraviolet, and as Boggess’ statement suggested, many astronomers prepared for HST and remained busy during HST’s delays in the 1980s by making 

observations on IUE.

▲ Launched in 1978, the International Ultraviolet 

Explorer was designed to analyze ultraviolet spectra. 

It was a joint project between ESA, the UK Science 

Research Council, and NASA. (Laura Danly/C. Elise Albert/Kip D. 

Kuntz/NASA/ESA/STScI/U.S. Naval Academy)
292 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

HST OBSERVING TIME

As NASA and STScI prepared in the 1980s for HST operations, time allocation 

based on peer review was already established practice on the ground in national 

observatories and in space with the first space telescopes. As the first major 

astronomical telescope to be placed in space, HST presented new challenges 

for those who had to decide who would get to use it. HST’s institutional infrastructure and its time allocation processes would help drive further changes in 

how astronomy was done. 

The Hornig Report of 1976 that is considered the blueprint for STScI recommended establishing an institute that would operate in a similar fashion to 

national observatories like Kitt Peak that were already dedicated to use by guest 

investigators. Following this reasoning, the Hornig Report said the institute 

should facilitate “vigorous and scientifically productive participation” by visiting 

observers. “The Institute should solicit observing proposals from the scientific 

community, provide technical information and advice to potential users, and 

evaluate the scientific merits and engineering feasibility of the proposals, the 

former by an appropriate version of disinterested peer review. The Institute 

should establish a roster of accepted and priority-rated proposals that will be 

scheduled for telescope time, with due regard to seasonal, orbital, and other 

operational factors.”11 In the original 1977 Announcement of Opportunity for 

the Space Telescope’s instruments, NASA stipulated that about 30 percent of 

observation time during the first 30 months of flight would be allocated to 

about 90 Guaranteed Time Observers (GTOs), astronomers on the six instrument teams and scientists who had already spent considerable time designing 

the Space Telescope and preparing it for operations.12

The Hornig Report also specifically called for the Institute to maintain a 

library of “all preprocessed data and all output of standard production processing” from the Space Telescope for access by the scientific community, and also 

support processing, analysis, and publication of that data using the latest computing technology. This proposal came as observatories such as Kitt Peak and 

the National Radio Astronomy Observatory were moving to digital data, which 

made it easier to share and store data.13

When STScI opened in 1981, NASA’s Office of Space Science and 

Applications established policy guidelines for the new Institute that reflected 

the Hornig Report recommendations, including policies covering the use of the 

Space Telescope and the archiving of its data at STScI and elsewhere. NASA 

stipulated that outside observers from anywhere, known as General Observers 

(GOs), would be eligible to make observations once their proposals were 

selected under a peer review process. They and Archival Researchers making 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

use of HST archived data could request funding support from NASA for the 

“acquisition, calibration, analysis, and publication” of HST data. Another NASA 

policy stipulated that HST data obtained as part of a peer-reviewed proposal 

was subject to a one-year “proprietary” period, after which it would be made 

available to the scientific community and the public.14 The policies providing 

NASA funding for observers and setting proprietary periods for data weren’t 

new. Astronomers working in ground observatories requiring peer review for 

observing time and producing digital data had already been granted a one-year 

proprietary period for data, after which that data were made available to anyone 

who wanted it. In the IUE program, NASA was already funding United States 

observers for travel, publication, and data analysis costs, and principal investigators had exclusive rights to IUE data for six months, after which the data 

became available to all astronomers.15 Ed Weiler, the HST Program Scientist 

at NASA Headquarters, worked with Neta Bahcall from STScI and others in 

the mid-1980s on a report that called for money to be set aside for GOs. Weiler 

believed strongly that the funding for IUE observers was inadequate, and so 

he worked to develop a realistic estimate of the money required for United 

States observers to process and analyze HST images and other data. He then 

persuaded Charles Pellerin, NASA’s director of astrophysics, to put the money 

in the long-term HST budget.16

Another big question in the years leading to HST’s launch concerned the 

amount of demand there would be for observing time on Hubble. To fulfill its 

responsibility to work with astronomers to get the most and the best science possible from HST, the Institute established a General Observer Support Branch 

in 1984. The branch’s head, Neta Bahcall, consulted with various ground-based 

observatories about how they decided who got observing time. But the question 

of how much demand there would be for HST time remained unanswered, so 

Bahcall and her branch members decided to conduct a survey of the worldwide astronomical community in 1984 and 1985 that received 3,030 replies 

out of 7,500 questionnaires sent to members of the AAS and the International 

Astronomical Union. Of those who responded, 2,300 respondents planned to 

submit HST observing proposals to STScI, which suggested that the available 

telescope time would be oversubscribed by a factor of 15, compared to three 

to one for available observing time at Kitt Peak and the European Southern 

Observatory, or 2.5 to one for IUE. More than four-fifths intended to analyze 

their data at STScI, and 55 percent said they intended to use the Institute’s 

data archive, with most of the rest expressing interest in the archive. While the 

grants attached to HST observations must have generated interest amongst the 

United States observers who were eligible for them, the survey demonstrated 
294 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

that non-American observers who were not eligible for the grants were also 

highly interested in receiving HST observing time.17

The Institute, acting on the findings of the survey and recommendations 

from the Space Telescope Advisory Committee, set guidelines in 1985 aimed 

at “optimizing the scientific program on HST” to deal with the promised high 

demand for HST time. The guidelines included the granting of equal amounts 

of HST observing time to projects in each of three size categories, from small 

(one to 10 hours), medium (10 to 50 hours), and large projects, the latter defined 

as involving more than 100 hours of observing time. The following larger projects included what the STAC designated as Key Projects that were identified 

by the astronomical community and are discussed in chapter six: determining 

the distance scale of the universe, studying spectra of quasars, and obtaining 

lengthy exposures of empty parts of the universe.18 Neta Bahcall said there was 

concern that larger questions would get lost if peer review committees tried to 

satisfy the largest number of astronomers by giving a large number of them small 

amounts of time. To encourage larger proposals with larger teams, Bahcall and 

other Institute officials publicized their expectation that HST would be massively oversubscribed. While she didn’t want to force different groups to work 

together, Bahcall did want people to think seriously about working in teams. 

“You know there may be two, three competing proposals, but I didn’t want to 

get 20 competing proposals on the same topic. And the community bought 

into that remarkably well.” The decision to split available time between small, 

medium, and large proposals has been widely adopted by other observatories in 

space and on the ground.19

TIME ALLOCATION PROCESS 

STScI created a peer review system for the observing proposals, which was more 

complicated than the simple peer review committees at Kitt Peak and other 

observatories. The STScI time allocation process included six panels, each typically made up of nine to 11 expert members from a number of astronomical 

disciplines to review and rank proposals within each discipline. At the beginning 

of HST operations, these disciplines included quasars and active galactic nuclei, 

galaxies and clusters, interstellar medium, stellar populations, stellar astrophysics, and solar system astronomy, but they changed over time. The rankings from 

these panels then went to the Time Allocation Committee (TAC) for decisions 

on which proposals most deserved observing time on HST. The TAC was made 

up of the TAC chair, the panel chairs and two or three members-at-large. The 

STScI director made the final allocations based on the TAC recommendations. 

The time allocation process is often called that TAC process.20
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

In a typical year, 3,500 orbits were available for observations, although the 

observing time available at first was about half of that figure.21 Time on HST 

was allocated by observing “cycles” that were each supposed to last a year, 

although there were situations where the length of a cycle could be lengthened or shortened to accommodate the timing of a servicing mission that would 

affect the availability of instruments on board HST. Therefore, the TAC committee and its associated panels would meet annually in advance of the start of 

the cycle whose time was being allocated, but meeting dates could change if 

the length of the current cycle changed. Because of occasional slips in starting 

dates for observing cycles, HST Cycle 27 began in 2019 during the 30th year of 

HST operations. Observing proposals for Cycle 27 were due in April 2019 and 

the TAC meetings took place the following June. 

In October 1985, when HST’s launch was thought to be less than a year 

away, STScI sent out its first solicitation for General Observer proposals in 

Cycle 1. When NASA postponed the launch after the Challenger disaster, the 

due date for proposals was also pushed back, first to October 1986 and again as 

NASA delayed HST’s launch date. 

By the time the final deadline for Cycle 1 observing proposals was reached 

two years later, 1,500 astronomers from 30 countries and more than 400 institutions had submitted nearly 600 proposals. After initial processing by Institute 

staff, 556 proposals were sent to the members of the six panels set up for that 

time allocation process. The proposals added up to ten times the 1,230 hours 

of available HST observation time. From 24 to 27 April 1989, the panels met 

at STScI and ranked the proposals. Then the TAC met on 28 April to make a 

final allocation, taking into account the need to balance the various disciplines 

represented in the panels. The Institute Visiting Committee stated shortly after 

the TAC meeting that “the reviews were fair, and a successful effort was made 

to hold conflicts of interest to an acceptable (minimal) level.”22 A later review 

of the 165 accepted proposals identified some overlap between the accepted 

proposals and the observing plans of the Guaranteed Time Observers. This 

required adjustments to observations and policies since GTOs had priority over 

the other observers.23

When HST was finally launched and its spherical aberration problem was 

discovered in June 1990, STScI worked with General Observers and GTOs to 

reassess and reorganize the first cycle observations to take into account Hubble’s 

diminished capabilities, which affected some instruments, such as the cameras, more than others, such as the spectrographs. The TAC was reconstituted 

and convened in February 1991 to reallocate observing time. Ten of the original 

165 approved observing programs were withdrawn, while another 10 observers 
296 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

requested significantly increased observing time, and a “relatively large fraction 

of the originally allocated programs could be retained for Cycle 1.”24 NASA 

decided to create a new policy to deal with the problems that most Guaranteed 

Time Observers would face when trying to make observations with instruments 

affected by spherical aberration before Servicing Mission 1. After “much negotiation among many scientists,” NASA promulgated a compromise policy that 

allowed GTOs to postpone a limited number of observations to the period following SM1 and propose additional observations after SM1 that were subject 

to peer review.25

Unique Investigators by Cycle

123456789

1011121314151617181920212223242526

27

Cycle

Unique Investigators

Submitted

Approved

0

1,000

500

1,500

2,000

1,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

▲ Graph of unique investigators on HST by cycle. (Data from STScI)

HST observers faced new complications in September 1991 when part of 

the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph failed. GHRS observations, which 

had not been greatly affected by spherical aberration, were put on hold until the 

following January. Cycle 2 observing proposals had been submitted in July and 

August of 1991, and the disciplinary panels and the TAC committee considered the new proposals in December, more than two-and-a-half years after the 

Cycle 1 proposals.26 During the time that HST was affected by spherical aberration, demand for HST time fell off to 483 proposals for Cycle 2 in 1991 and 422 

for the shortened (five-month) Cycle 3 in 1992. With SM1 in sight and observations set for the repaired HST, Cycle 4 received 501 proposals by the deadline 

in 1993, and the numbers continued to rise after the mission restored HST’s 

vision. Cycle 4 was lengthened to 15 months to accommodate SM1 in 1993, 

and its time allocations reflected the changed instruments on board HST after 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy : A

that mission. Once normal operations began on HST in 1994, routine annual 

observation cycles for HST were established, punctuated by servicing missions 

in 1997, 1999, 2002, and 2009. Since the first servicing mission, STScI has 

received five or more times the number of observing proposals it can accept, 

accounting for between six to nine times the number of available HST orbits.27

Although astronomers found many aspects of life with HST complicated, 

one change to astronomers’ lives that came with Hubble was an unambiguous 

success. The NASA grant program for HST became so popular that it extended 

to other NASA observatories such as Chandra and Spitzer, and it accelerated 

a trend established in the 1980s where NASA replaced the National Science 

Foundation as the primary supplier of grants for astronomical research. These 

NASA grants for American observers and archival researchers using HST 

marked an advance over the previous model for independent observers, who 

had to apply for telescope time at a ground observatory or a space telescope 

like IUE, and then apply separately for funding from the 

National Science Foundation. 

By combining the telescope time 

and the grant, the HST process 

avoided what STScI Director Ken 

Sembach called the “double jeopardy” of the traditional observing 

and grant process.28 By 2000, 

the year of a National Research 

Council study into astronomy 

research funding, NASA supplied 72 percent of individual 

grants, and the HST grants program alone accounted for about 

25 percent of all individual funding for astronomers in the United 

States. The study report also 

contained the following warning: 

“If a centerpiece astronomical 

research mission in space were 

to fail at a time when follow-on 

missions were far in the future, the impacts would include not only the loss of 

a major observational tool, but also the premature termination of the stream of 

research data and the flow of funds to analyze the data.”29

▲ Kenneth R. Sembach, fifth director of STScI. 

(STScI)
298 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

NASA’s financial support for astronomers went well beyond individual 

grants to observers. In 1990, with NASA’s support, STScI launched the Hubble 

Fellowship Program. STScI selected Hubble fellows for three-year independent postdoctoral research programs relating to HST at institutions chosen by 

the fellows. NASA also embraced the concept, awarding Einstein and Sagan 

Fellowships starting in 2009. The Hubble, Einstein, and Sagan Fellowships 

were rolled into the NASA Hubble Fellowship Program starting in 2018 where 

the three fellowships are awarded in broad subcategories of scientific research. 

In addition to its involvement with grants awarded for HST observers and archival researchers, STScI operates academic programs such as a full library, visiting scientist, postdoctoral and graduate student programs, regular seminars, 

and scientific advisory committees that advised the director on recruitment, 

renewal, and promotion of its scientific staff.30

CULTURE SHOCK

Outside of the small group of astronomers who had become familiar with HST 

during its development, many early users in the 1990s were unprepared for 

the demands of this new observatory. Journalist Stephen Cole described HST 

causing “a major culture shock” for astronomers accustomed to ground-based 

observatories, where last-minute changes were commonplace. “On the ground 

you have a lot of flexibility,” STScI astronomer Keith Noll said in 1992. “You 

can go up and change your mind at the last minute. And that’s just not the case 

here.”31 In the opinion of astronomer Robert Kirshner: “The paperwork associated with HST observing is somewhere on the scale of personal inconvenience 

between doing your tax return and enduring a root canal.”32

Requests for time on HST always began with Phase I proposals focused 

on scientific justifications for evaluation by the review panels and the Time 

Allocation Committee. Approved proposals moved to Phase II where investigators provided complete details on their proposed observations, which allowed 

STScI to review each proposal for technical feasibility and schedule time for 

observation by specific instruments. Unites States investigators were eligible 

for funding by NASA, and observers requesting funding were required to submit a budget, although starting with Cycle 5, the budget was required only for 

successful proposals.33

HST’s observing schedule takes into account HST’s location in low-Earth 

orbit. There is only a limited time in each orbit to view a particular target because 

Earth blocks much of HST’s field of view. The telescope, when it slews from 

one direction to another, moves slowly, only six degrees per minute or roughly 

the same speed as a minute hand on a clock. So time is saved if observations 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

can be sequenced to minimize orientation changes. Unlike ground-based 

observatories, most HST observations are scheduled up to a month in advance 

and carried out automatically, often when the spacecraft is not in contact with 

the control center. It is possible to make an observation with HST requiring 

real-time aiming, usually when there are questions about the exact coordinates 

needed for an observation—for example, atmospheric phenomena on Jupiter or 

one of its moons—but these cases have been rare. STScI can schedule HST 

observations on short notice of less than a week when time is of the essence, as 

in the cases of Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9 and supernovae.34

The process of requesting time on HST was especially burdensome in the 

early 1990s, before online forms and other electronic aids became widely available. In a 1992 article describing how astronomers worked with HST, Cole 

wrote that astronomers preparing proposals for Hubble were required to study 

manuals on HST operations and assemble evidence from other observations 

or simulations to demonstrate that the proposed project was feasible, required 

HST’s unique features, and would advance scientific knowledge. “I can write a 

proposal for Kitt Peak [National Observatory] in an afternoon that’s one page 

long,” one observer complained to Cole. “Hubble requires four to five pages of 

text describing the program plus 10 pages of justification of why you want to 

use this scope and this instrument.” Another said, “I was surprised at how long 

it took to prepare a proposal for Hubble.”35 An average observing proposal for 

HST involved a team of four scientists spending more than two person-years of 

effort, from the proposal through the observation and assessment of the data 

and publication of findings, Cole estimated. Once a proposal was submitted 

to the Institute and accepted, usually as part of the time allocation process, 

observers were assigned a technical assistant to help deal with the complicated 

problems involved with HST observations, such as being aware of instrument 

limitations or understanding the software used by HST. As part of their efforts 

with Goddard to streamline HST operations, STScI began work in 1999 on 

the Astronomer’s Proposal Tool, which exploited advances in computing software to help astronomers better understand during the application process how 

HST’s operations might affect their observing plans. The tool came into use 

during Cycle 12 in 2003, and it simplified and shortened the proposal process 

for astronomers.36

Despite these new administrative tools for observers, the process of getting 

observing time on HST meant sometimes unwelcome changes for astronomers 

used to more flexible observing styles at ground-based observatories. University 

of Colorado astronomer Thomas Ayres compared the ease of changing IUE 

observations on the spot in real time with the lengthy process to get an HST 
300 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

observation and the small likelihood of a second chance if the HST proposal 

contained an error, such as incorrect coordinates or exposure times. “It’s very 

hands-off. You have to make sure everything is right at the beginning, and 

then...hope for the best. But that hope has to be really tempered with a lot 

of upfront work.”37 STScI astronomer Holland Ford saw the other side of the 

change, noting that the HST scheduling system used experienced operators 

who knew the instruments better than investigators who might be using HST 

for the first time. Many projects required optimum or special conditions, and the 

Institute’s queue scheduling system could better accommodate such requests. 

Ford added that more observing projects involved large numbers of astronomers 

who would have to leave the actual job of making the observations to an expert 

in any case.38 No doubt as time went on, more astronomers became accustomed 

to the system used at STScI and increasingly by other observatories to organize 

observations from various astronomers.

Data downloaded from HST have always undergone initial processing at the 

Institute, but additional processing by the users was also required. Inexperienced 

observers were advised to complete the processing of their data at the Institute, 

where expert assistance was available. In 1992, observers were sent their data 

on magnetic tape, and as technologies advanced, data were made available on 

optical discs and then compact discs and DVDs. In later years, astronomers 

were informed by e-mail when their data were available, and then they would 

download it from the Hubble data archive.39

AMATEUR ASTRONOMERS 

While HST was being built, a number of people at NASA, Congress, and 

STScI discussed giving HST observing time to amateur astronomers. STScI 

Director Riccardo Giacconi, whose earlier scientific work on the Einstein X-ray 

Observatory had benefitted from observations made by amateurs of bright x-ray 

objects, was clearly a driving force behind the idea, and in December 1985, 

he invited leaders from seven national amateur astronomy organizations to 

the Institute. The seven leaders formed the Hubble Space Telescope Amateur 

Astronomers Working Group and created a plan that they presented to Giacconi. 

On 7 August 1986, at the Astronomical League meeting in Baltimore, Giacconi 

announced that the plan would go ahead, with up to 20 hours of observing time 

in HST’s first observing cycle coming out of Giacconi’s director’s discretionary 

time. “I expect that amateur astronomers will use the Hubble Space Telescope 

to ask refreshingly new questions and that your findings will, as they always 

have, make a real contribution to the advancement of astronomy. Rather than 

emphasize the differences between professionals and amateurs in a field such 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy : A

as astronomy where the distinction is so thin, let us emphasize instead our common thirst for knowledge, our love of nature, and our appreciation of the beauty 

and mystery of the universe,” Giacconi told the meeting.40

▲ Amateur astronomers chosen for HST observations in the second amateur cycle in 1993. 

Front row: James Secosky, Rukmini Sichitiu, George Lewycky, and Nancy Cox. Middle row: 

Lewis Thomas and STScI Director Riccardo Giacconi. Back row: Benjamin Weiss, Winslow 

Burleson, Karl Hricko, Harald Schenk, and Joseph Mitterando. (STScI)

The working group evaluated the amateurs’ proposals based on scientific 

and educational merit, technical feasibility, the need for the unique capabilities 

of HST, and time demands on HST, and then passed them to Giacconi for final 

time allocation. Each successful principal investigator would be funded to visit 

STScI as their observations were conducted and would be entitled to assistance 

from Institute scientists. They would have proprietary rights to their data for one 

year and would be expected to write a paper on their results for a peer-reviewed 

journal in a similar manner to professional astronomers.41 In 1989, Giacconi 

announced that five amateur proposals would be given time on HST. The five 

selected amateur astronomers included a computer scientist, an engineer, a high 
302 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

school science teacher, a homemaker, and a museum volunteer. Their proposals ranged from seeking massive proto-planets using HST, to observing galactic 

arcs, Jupiter’s moon Io, a nova, and magnetic fields around peculiar stars. One 

of the five was cancelled because of HST’s spherical aberration problem, and 

the other four proposals were carried out in 1992. In September 1992, STScI 

announced that another group of five amateur astronomers would get telescope 

time, and a third round followed later.42

Eric J. Chaisson, who as head of the Institute’s Public Affairs Office promoted the program, reported that some of the 200 amateur applications for the 

first round showed original thinking, while a few were best described as “ludicrous.” The program met resistance from some professional astronomers who 

were concerned about limited time availability on HST, he said, and NASA took 

some time to warm to it. “In return, the chosen amateur astronomers became 

among the best ambassadors for the Hubble project.”43 One amateur, Ana M. 

Larson of Seattle, was taking astronomy courses after having worked in business and then raising her children. She won time on HST for an ambitious 

proposal to search for evidence of planets around other stars. Despite the fact 

that HST’s spherical aberration prevented her from making the observations, 

she was so inspired by her Hubble experience, including a visit to STScI, that 

it served as a “kickstarter” for a career in astronomy. Larson went on to earn 

a Ph.D. in astronomy from the University of Victoria and became a lecturer in 

astronomy at the University of Washington.44

But the program’s low cost and public relations value weren’t enough to save 

it. On 6 November 1995, Giacconi’s successor as director, Robert Williams, 

cancelled the program, effective with the completion of three observing proposals from the third round of applications, which took place in 1996 and 1997. 

The amateur program saw a total of 12 observing proposals from amateurs carried out on HST. The cancellation of the program kept its total cost at $31,000. 

Williams claimed that staff cuts at the Institute in 1995 and additional work 

needed to support the upcoming second Shuttle servicing mission meant “that 

we no longer have the staff” to be able to support amateurs “both before and 

after the observations.”45 Given that the money involved was a miniscule fraction of STScI’s budget, the reason for the cancellation may have had more to 

do with the low interest amongst amateurs in HST time, or the new director’s 

lack of interest in the program. Sky and Telescope magazine noted that out of 

the estimated 300,000 amateur astronomers in the United States at the time, 

the 200 proposals from 500 amateur astronomers for the first round was not 

a large number. The second round saw only 30 proposals and the third round 

six. Stephen J. Edberg, chair of the working group, blamed a lack of publicity 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

for these low numbers, along with the large amount of work required for each 

proposal. Despite their good ideas, Edberg asked, “Was it realistic to expect 

that amateurs could use a professional instrument without outside help? The 

answer is no!”46

CONTINUOUS CHANGES

HST time allocations were changed several times over the years to reflect special circumstances, including problems with instruments or final observations 

for instruments about to go out of service. For example, most HST observations in late 1996 were dedicated to observers using FOS and GHRS before 

those instruments were replaced with STIS and NICMOS during Servicing 

Mission 2 in early 1997. Similarly, when it was discovered later in 1997 that the 

cryogen required to cool NICMOS was depleting much faster than expected, 

more time was granted to NICMOS investigators while work began on a new 

cooling system for the instrument. Because HST has unique capabilities in 

ultraviolet frequencies that won’t be available when it ends operations, the 

Ultraviolet Initiative began with Cycle 21 in 2013 and has increased the share 

of HST time dedicated to UV observations.47

Hubble’s time allocation process also changed throughout its history for 

a number of other reasons, including changing observing interests amongst 

astronomers, alterations to HST itself, continued pressure for HST observing time, and the creation of complementary instruments in space and on the 

ground. STScI astronomer Neill Reid, head of STScI’s Mission Office, said 

time allocation processes changed in response to input from users, panel and 

TAC members, and other Institute committees, especially the Space Telescope 

User Committee. The time allocation process for HST also benefited from the 

experiences of time allocation processes in other observatories, he said. TAC 

panel and committee memberships are changed each cycle with only about 10 

to 15 percent of their memberships overlapping from one cycle to another. Most 

GTO observations were made early in HST’s time on orbit, although new GTO 

Observations were granted when new instruments were launched on servicing 

missions to people who had worked to make the instruments possible. 

Through the life of HST, STScI introduced changes to the variety of available observation times. In 1991, STScI introduced SNAP, or snapshot proposals, to HST’s observing menu. These observations had to be completed within 

one orbit and could be scheduled for unused orbits between other observations. 

The Institute adjusted boundaries between large, medium, and small proposals 

several times over the years, mainly because of concerns about a lack of proposals for large observing programs. The large programs suffered because of the 
304 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

narrow focus of early TAC panels, and the problem was resolved with a number of changes to the TAC process, including specifically allocating time for 

large programs and having the TAC committee review large proposals instead 

of panels. In Cycle 5, STScI changed observing allocations from spacecraft 

hours to orbits, where each orbit corresponded to 50 to 55 minutes, increasing the accuracy of resource-use estimates for proposals, and set the boundary 

between large and small proposals at 100 orbits, without medium proposals.48

(See appendix B.)

In 2000, STScI created the Hubble Second Decade Committee to make 

recommendations to optimize HST science. It recommended that HST pursue multicycle Treasury programs to address “widely recognized scientific 

issues,” produce large data sets for archival research, and achieve economies 

of scale. The committee said HST had already made large-scale observations 

in the forms of its three Key Projects and the Hubble Deep Fields, both of 

which made “outstanding contributions” to HST Science. The report also 

noted that there were many theories about the low numbers of large observing programs up to that time, but said “a major proactive step” was needed to 

encourage them.49 STScI introduced Treasury Programs in Cycle 11 in 2002 

that required between 100 and 300 orbits of observing time over several observing cycles. Data from Treasury Programs became immediately available to all. 

After Servicing Mission 4 in 2009, the Institute began to authorize even larger 

Treasury Programs due to growing demand from the astronomical community. 

Demand was also growing for observations that encompassed all wavelengths available from telescopes on Earth and in space. So starting in 2000 

with Cycle 9, scientists could submit joint observing proposals involving HST 

and other observatories, including the National Optical Astronomy Observatory, 

National Radio Astronomy Observatory, Chandra X-Ray Observatory, Spitzer 

Space Telescope, and XMM-Newton X-Ray Telescope. Beginning in 2015, 

some orbits were set aside for General Observers to apply for small amounts of 

time to address scientific questions that required observations sooner than the 

next full call for proposals, enabling a faster turnaround for rapidly evolving or 

new science questions.50

The Institute changed the structure of the panels in the TAC process over 

the years as scientific interests evolved and in order to minimize opportunities for conflicts of interest. When the panels for Cycle 24 met in June 2016, 

there were 15 panels, including one for the solar system, two for planets and 

planet formation, three for stellar physics, two for stellar populations, three for 

galaxies, two for black holes and their host galaxies, and two for intergalactic 

medium. The broad subject areas with multiple panels reduced the chances for 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

investigators to be on a panel judging their own proposals. By that cycle, paper 

had been almost eliminated from the TAC process, and all information was 

transmitted electronically to panel and committee members. Because of the 

large number of proposals, panel members considered proposals well before the 

formal meetings, issuing preliminary grades and eliminating weaker proposals 

so that the meetings could concentrate on fewer proposals.51

The TAC process involved many measures to prevent conflict of interest 

and reduce bias. Rules prevented panel members from voting on or taking part 

in decisions affecting their own proposals and those involving co-investigators, 

current or former advisors and students, relatives, competing proposals, or those 

with institutional or other ties. Personal identification on proposals going to 

panel and committee members was sharply reduced as one of several measures to combat bias against female and minority principal investigators. Panel 

and committee members were selected to ensure female and minority representation, and starting with Cycle 21, annual TAC meetings began with a 

talk on reducing bias in the process. All TAC panels and committee meetings 

were open to observers from NASA and ESA. Despite these measures, the 

Institute still found differences in the success rates of proposals led by male 

and female principal investigators. “We don’t know the cause, but unconscious/

implicit bias may play a role,” STScI Director Ken Sembach said at the Cycle 24 

TAC meetings.52

An expert on issues of unconscious bias, Stephanie Johnson of the University 

of Colorado, sat in on the TAC process for Cycle 25 in 2017, which also produced higher success rates for proposals led by men than those led by women. 

She recommended that STScI implement a fully blind application process for 

HST time where the identities of all applicants and reviewers are kept anonymous. A working group and the Space Telescope User Committee approved the 

recommendation, and the dual-anonymous proposal system took effect for the 

first time in Cycle 26 in 2018. The results showed that proposals from male 

and female investigators had almost identical acceptance rates. Johnson noted 

that the discussions at the Cycle 26 TAC process had a different flavor from 

those in Cycle 25. After the success of the dual-anonymous proposal system of 

Cycle 26 was repeated in Cycle 27 in 2019, NASA decided to use this system 

for all NASA astrophysics observation programs.53

DIVERSITY AND HST 

HST’s high profile among scientists and the public meant that both STScI and 

NASA were motivated to encourage diversity in their workplaces. STScI’s work 

to remove biases against women astronomers in the Hubble time allocation 
306 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

process was just part of a wider effort on the part of NASA, its contractors and 

other astronomical institutions to make astronomy more welcoming for women 

and minorities. The Institute, which had a particularly high profile in the effort 

to foster diversity, found that making workplaces welcoming for women and 

minority scientists is an ongoing process that requires continuing attention.

Even before HST was launched, STScI staff raised questions about the 

place of women and minorities at the Institute. In 1988, the Institute Visiting 

Committee called for an affirmative action program at STScI that was met with 

the response from STScI management that one was in place in accordance 

with the law. The following year, the committee noted, “The percentage of 

women in the organization is approximately 33 percent of the total complement, but among the science staff the ratio is much lower.” Because one of the 

only two female scientists then at STScI was leaving that year, the committee 

called for a search for qualified women or minority candidates for open positions.54 While STScI awarded three of 15 Hubble Fellowships to women and 

made a major effort to hire women in professional positions, including offering positions to three of four shortlisted women, only one woman accepted. 

The 1990 Visiting Committee report highlighted the issue of accommodating 

couples where both were professionals, and reported that the “lack of arrangements for day care, or for parental leave, might deter women from accepting 

jobs at STScI.”55 Although the Institute made progress on child care in 1991, 

the Visiting Committee complained that “there continue to be problems in successfully recruiting women and persons of color.” Women represented only six 

percent of research astronomers at STScI, and women, and persons of color 

were under-represented in the ranks of senior management. This compared to 

a 1992 survey that found that 12 percent of working astronomers in the United 

States with Ph.D.’s were women.56

STScI responded to pressures from AURA, the Institute Visiting Committee, 

and its own staff with a number of affirmative action measures, including more 

aggressive hiring policies and training programs to combat sexual harassment.57

Its best-remembered action was a meeting held at the Institute on 8 and 9 

September 1992 that arose from suggestions from staff at the STScI and from 

Goetz Ortel, then the President of AURA. “Women at Work: A Meeting on the 

Status of Women in Astronomy,” featured papers on the past and present of 

women in science and was sponsored by STScI, NASA, AURA, the Maryland 

Space Grant Consortium, and the Computer Sciences Corporation, whose 

employees staffed some functions at STScI. The meeting built on work by the 

American Astronomical Society, which had established a working group in 1972 

that grew into a permanent Committee on the Status of Women in Astronomy.58
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy : A

▲ Group photo of participants in Women at Work: A Meeting on the Status of Women in 

Astronomy, September 1992, at STScI in Baltimore, Maryland. (STScI)

The 160 participants at the meeting considered different topics when they 

were divided into 18 working groups, and the resulting ideas were then further 

discussed at the meeting’s final session. After the meeting, STScI astronomers 

Meg Urry, Laura Danly, and Institute Associate Director Ethan Schreier, with 

the help of writer and educator Sheila Tobias, worked the recommendations 

into what is now known as the Baltimore Charter. (See appendix C.) The charter criticized existing recruitment and training systems and called for “a scientific culture within which both women and men can work effectively and 

within which all can have satisfying and rewarding careers.” The charter promoted the idea that diversity contributes to excellence in science and called for 

actions to improve the place of women in astronomy and to promote minorities that are “even more disenfranchised.” The document laid out steps to promote affirmative action and concluded, “Women want and deserve the same 

opportunity as their male colleagues to achieve excellence in astronomy.”59 The 

charter was signed by the participants in the 1992 meeting, endorsed by the 

board of AURA, and presented to the 1993 AAS meeting in Berkeley. Soon the 

Baltimore Charter became known as a landmark event in the history of women 

in astronomy in the United States, and a copy of the Charter was put on permanent display near the Institute’s main entrance.60

The progress made on affirmative action in the 1990s and the general good 

feeling at STScI generated by the success of HST appeared to lower the profile of concerns about affirmative action until 2001. That year the Institute 

Visiting Committee pointed to a large number of women leaving the Institute 

and suggested that STScI pay closer attention to the issue. As a result of these 

concerns, AURA’s board of directors requested an external review of the status 

of women at STScI. The external panel given the job visited the Institute in 

2002 and interviewed men and women who had left STScI or turned down a 
308 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

job offer there. While women made up 15 percent of the Ph.D. staff at STScI 

in 1992, the number had fallen to 10.4 percent a decade later. Women scientists from outside STScI received a greater proportion of director’s discretionary funds than their numbers might suggest, but were underrepresented 

in terms of awards given by the Institute and AURA. Women staff members 

were less satisfied than men and more likely to find the climate of the Institute 

unfriendly. When questioned about issues of gender bias, the attitude of STScI 

management “could be described as dismissive of both the issue itself and the 

concern of staff to these matters.” The report said STScI had once been a leader 

in advancing women scientists, stating, “It is our conclusion that the Institute 

has substantially changed its character. Our extensive interviews revealed that 

a surprising proportion of STScI staff found the current scientific and working 

environment to be inhospitable to women.” The report, which included critical 

references to director Steven Beckwith, blamed the problem on STScI leadership changing their focus from science to management.61 AURA supported the 

measures suggested by the panel, and Beckwith worked to improve the working 

climate at the Institute. Beckwith later recalled that male scientists had often 

used strong language to express differences of opinion over scientific matters, 

which made many women uncomfortable, and he tried to make meetings more 

civil. At the time of the panel’s report, STScI was entering a period of turbulence that saw troubled relations with NASA Headquarters due to the cancellation of Servicing Mission 4. Beckwith, who had tried to account for women’s 

concerns at the Institute but admitted that he didn’t handle them “particularly 

well,” stepped down as director of STScI in 2005.62

His successor, Matt Mountain, saw the combative nature of traditional scientific debate as lying at the heart of the problem. “The pursuit of excellence 

was somehow associated with a ‘harsh environment’ as a natural by-product, or 

phrases such as ‘survival of the fittest’ were often used.” While the competition 

involved in science must continue, Mountain emphasized in his communications to his staff that the harsh environment was excluding women and other 

people, and that henceforth, all groups and individuals must feel empowered. 

“So we basically started to change the culture over the course of four or five 

years. And today [in 2016], as you look at the Institute, half the recruits on the 

science staff are women. We have a better reputation, in fact.”63

Mountain set up a committee on the workplace and took care to listen 

to and act on its advice. He said that while STScI had many family-friendly 

policies, they were rarely used and not well known. Fathers never took family 

leave even though they were allowed to do so. Part of rectifying that problem 

involved having senior staff set good examples. “For example, I never attend 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy : A

afternoon or evening meetings on 

Halloween, or travel on my kids’ 

birthdays.” Mountain said that above 

all, scientific leaders have a responsibility to change how science is done 

to make it more inclusive.64 While a 

woman has yet to be named director 

of STScI, Deputy Director Kathryn 

Flanagan served as interim director in 2015 between the time that 

Mountain moved on to AURA and 

Ken Sembach became director later 

that year.65

▲ Matt Mountain, fourth director of STScI. 

(STScI)

▲ Kathryn Flanagan, interim director of 

STScI, 2015. (STScI)

Many scientists who work on 

HST and other space telescopes are 

located at NASA’s Goddard Space 

Flight Center. In 2009, Goddard 

hosted the third major conference 

on women in astronomy, following 

the 1992 meeting at STScI, and a 

second meeting at Caltech in 2003. 

Ed Weiler, then NASA’s Associate 

Administrator for Science, welcomed 

participants by noting that he was 

hired by Nancy Roman, NASA’s first 

Chief of Astronomy who has become 

known as the Mother of the Hubble 

Space Telescope. In turn, Weiler was 

able to hire and promote many women 

and minority scientists, and stressed 

the importance of supporting public 

outreach work with NASA’s scientific missions. “One of the main goals 

of our outreach efforts is to inspire 

young people to think about getting 

into these fields where they may 

someday make huge contributions,” 

he said. Anne Kinney, then director of the Solar System Exploration 
310 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Division at Goddard and one of the conference organizers, told the meeting 

that more work needed to be done on issues facing gay, lesbian, bisexual, and 

transgender scientists, as well as and persons with disabilities. And while 

women scientists were present in large numbers at junior levels, they remained 

poorly represented at higher levels at Goddard. Nicholas White, director of the 

Sciences and Exploration Directorate at Goddard in 2007, explained that he 

was responding to a large number of retirements by ensuring that diversity was 

a priority in hiring their replacements. Of the 58 scientists hired in the preceding 18 months, 34 percent were women. Four of the new hires were African 

American—about seven percent. White said, “We have a problem: the pool is 

not big enough in the underrepresented groups. And so my second priority is 

making sure the pipelines of people coming into the work force are there for us 

to hire from.” White added that the environment at Goddard must enable these 

new hires to excel.66

THE HST ARCHIVE

HST was created at a time when astronomical data were moving from photographic glass plates and film to electronic and digital formats, and these new 

technologies were already revolutionizing how astronomical data were obtained 

and distributed. Just as the change to digital files made data easier to share, 

the shift that started roughly two decades earlier from private observatories to 

larger facilities funded by taxpayers and open to large numbers of astronomers 

raised demand for astronomical data. Due to its expense, location and high 

profile, HST became the ultimate public observatory of its time. HST’s high 

profile guaranteed that its data would be sought by large numbers of scientists. 

The rise of the internet that coincided with the early days of HST increased 

the portability of data far beyond the imagination of the people who first began 

building Hubble in the 1970s.

Computers and digital data were coming into increasing use early in the 

1960s as particle physicists began to require them to deal with increasing 

amounts of data generated by accelerators and other instruments. Astronomers 

soon followed with their own observations using telescopes and spectrographs. 

Even before HST was designed, NASA began working to gather and preserve 

scientific data collected by early satellites. In 1966, NASA set up the National 

Space Science Data Center at Goddard to archive both astrophysics and other 

space science data. Eleven years later, NASA set up the Astronomical Data 

Center with a mandate to collect and distribute astronomical catalogs, beginning the expansion of NASA’s archival facilities as it launched more space science missions.67 The coming flood of data from space missions including HST 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

raised questions about how to handle it, and so in 1978 the Space Science 

Board of the National Academy of Science formed the Committee on Data 

Management and Science. When the committee reported in 1982, its recommendations included scientific control of data management and an emphasis on 

making data available to scientists not involved in gathering that data.68

NASA decided that the archive for Hubble should be established at STScI 

rather than at the Agency’s own National Space Science Data Center. Data 

archiving for HST also became a prime area of cooperation between NASA 

and the European Space Agency. The 1977 Memorandum of Understanding 

between ESA and NASA on the Space Telescope stipulated that a copy of the 

HST archive be set up at ESA’s Space Telescope European Coordinating Facility 

(ST-ECF) near Munich, Germany, to make this data available to European 

astronomers. NASA also contemplated other archives for HST data in other 

locations outside the United States.69

The work to create an HST data archive began before Hubble was launched, 

when NASA Goddard contracted Loral AeroSys to build the Data Archive and 

Distribution Service (DADS). When development problems with DADS delayed 

its activation to 1992, STScI developed an interim archive system, the Data 

Management Facility, with help from European astronomers at the ST-ECF 

and from the newly established Canadian Astronomy Data Centre (CADC) 

at the Dominion Astrophysical Observatory in Victoria, B.C. The relationship 

between STScI, ST-ECF, and CADC on the HST archive continued, with the 

Europeans and Canadians assessing new storage media and developing new 

interfaces between the data and data catalogues using the internet, although 

ESA’s active participation in archival development ended in 2010 with the closure of ST-ECF.70

Sharing and handling digital data was much different in the early 1990s than 

it was even a decade later. Observations were recorded, processed, and shared 

on optical discs, magnetic tape, and large mainframe computers. Soon better 

computers and more portable discs became available for these purposes. With 

these tools, which were cutting edge for their time, the work of storing, processing, indexing retrieving, and sharing the data was complicated and difficult. 

After some delays, DADS became fully operational and open to outside users in 

October 1994 after 880 gigabytes of data representing all of the HST data contained in the Data Management Facility were converted to data formats compatible with the FITS format and transferred on optical discs to the DADS system.71

STScI’s first Director, Riccardo Giacconi, recalled that a major priority for 

him was ensuring that HST data provided to all observers were properly calibrated, a process that includes removing signatures from instruments on the 
312 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

data, such as noise or defective pixels; correcting data to account for measuring 

instrument behavior at different temperatures or electronic gain; and flagging 

suspect data. To make calibration work, HST routinely makes calibration observations, which provide information on how HST and the individual detectors 

on its instruments leave their marks on data, how those effects change in different conditions faced by HST in space, and how those effects change over 

time. Giacconi argued that the calibration work done by STScI, though controversial at first, constituted a “paradigm shift in observational astronomy” that 

made data from HST available to many more scientists than was the case when 

investigators were responsible for calibrating their own data in their own ways. 

“The data from Hubble could then be used by different scientists for different 

purposes,” Giacconi explained.72 Calibrating all data from HST had the effect 

of speeding the diffusion and application of that data, and it simplified the comparison of the findings and interpretations arising from that data.

As discussed in chapter four, the internet arose in the 1990s along with new 

and more powerful computer software and hardware, combined with growing 

bandwidth available to computer users around the world.73 STScI sought to 

exploit these improvements to assist astronomers using HST through initiatives 

such as the Project to Re-Engineer Space Telescope Observing (PRESTO) and 

Goddard’s Vision 2000 program. On the archival side, STScI began HARP, the 

Hubble Archive Re-Engineering Project, in 1996 with the goal of streamlining archive operations, improving online access, and reducing costs by moving 

to lower cost storage media. The Institute’s annual report for 1998 said that 

by the end of that year, the average data retrieval rate from the archive was 

two to three times the rate of data entry. The report contended that the HST 

Data Archive began a departure from the historical practice of using science 

data from telescopes just once, marking a change from the time when previous 

research findings had not been catalogued or made available in an easily accessible form. It should be noted that other observatories were also developing 

digital archives of their own at the time.74

The digitization of data and the arrival of the internet made data sharing 

amongst astronomers much easier than in the past. The fact that much new 

data remained proprietary to investigators for a year after observations were 

made did slow the sharing of data. Robert Williams’ decision in 1995 to make 

the entire data set associated with the first Hubble Deep Field observations 

available to everyone immediately after it had been processed was a landmark 

decision in making astronomical data available to all. Increasing amounts of 

data obtained by HST and other observatories have become available upon 

receipt and processing. 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

All HST data became available online starting in 1998, and the STScI 

archive expanded to cover astronomical observations from other sources including the IUE, the Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, digitized sky surveys, and radio 

data from the Very Large Array in New Mexico. As a result, the archive became 

known that year as the Multi-mission Archive at STScI (MAST). By 2002, the 

archive grew to 12 terabytes of data from 17 different missions and surveys.75

In 2012, STScI renamed the archive the Barbara A. Mikulski Archive for Space 

Telescopes, in honor of the Maryland senator who strongly supported HST. By 

the end of HST’s 25th anniversary year in 2015, MAST held more than 236 terabytes of data, with 116 TB of data from Hubble alone. The majority of papers 

written using HST data starting in 2007 were based on archival data and did 

not originate with the teams that submitted the original observing proposals.76

A study of 6,703 HST papers in refereed journals from 1998 to 2008 showed 

that publication rates for archival data from HST increased steadily over that 

period. The study’s authors argued that this growth in the use of the archive 

“is consistent with the hypothesis that an archive’s productivity is proportional 

to the total data storage.” The study’s authors also argued that the archive has 

doubled the scientific productivity of HST.77 Hubble archival data retrievals 

doubled after SM4 in 2009, and archival and partly archival articles exceeded 

GO articles from that point on. In 2016, the archive had more than 12,000 

registered archive users from all 50 states and 85 countries. They had access to 

about 100 terabytes of HST data based on 1.2 million observations.78

MAST expanded the reach of HST by allowing researchers to access data 

from individual astronomical objects at various wavelengths obtained by different instruments. This helped researchers keep track of the full range of 

observations on celestial objects, and helped classify objects in sky surveys. 

The growth of the Hubble archive, the larger MAST incorporating other data 

sources, and similar archives, opened the door to virtual surveys for rare objects. 

These archives offered large amounts of data acquired under reliable conditions, which was important for researchers trying to compare data sets.79

In the early 21st century, astronomy was exploiting the exponential growth 

in computing power and sensor capabilities to move into an era of large surveys 

based on observations by spacecraft and instruments on the ground. Exploiting 

its experience that began with HST, in 2016 the MAST at STScI became the 

home of the public science archive for the Panoramic Survey Telescope and 

Rapid Response System (Pan-STARRS), a large ground-based survey of large 

areas of the sky, and was preparing for the massive amounts of data that expected 

to stream from numerous new spacecraft including JWST, TESS (Transiting 

Exoplanet Survey Satellite), and the Nancy Roman Space Telescope. TESS was 
314 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Published Papers Based on HST Data

Archival

General Observers

Part General Observers/Part Archival

Programs Not Assigned

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

199119931995199719992001200320052007200920112013201520172019

Year

Number of Papers ▲ Published papers based on HST data. Data are presented in appendix D.

WFPC2

WF/PC

WFC3

STIS

NICMOS

ACS HSP

COS

FGS

FOC

FOS

GHIRS

Published Papers by Instrument

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

199119931995199719992001200320052007200920112013201520172019

Year

Number of Papers

▲ Published papers by instrument. Data are presented in appendix D.
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

launched in 2018 to continue the search for exoplanets, and the Roman Space 

Telescope is planned to fly after JWST and perform wide-area infrared surveys of the sky to address the accelerating expansion of the universe and, using 

microlensing, to search for exoplanets.80

ANOTHER OBSERVATORY

The Hubble data archive in effect became an observatory of its own that will 

continue to be used long after HST itself has ceased to function. Data are available in both raw and calibrated form, with the calibrations continually updated 

to reflect the latest technological advances and data analysis techniques. The 

universe changes over time, and the archive is a place where astronomers can 

go to follow those changes as seen in Hubble observations. “Because it’s a stable 

platform, it’s been there a long time, and has exquisite spatial resolution, you 

can see things change,” explained Canadian astronomer John Hutchings. “The 

supernova in 1987 in the [Large Magellanic Cloud], you can actually see the 

expanding nebulae around it. Novae that go off in the local galaxy, you can 

see the nebulae expanding. You can see planetary nebulae changing by taking 

pictures year after year and watching how it’s actually changed.”81 Advances 

in image processing allowed images gathered for one reason to be taken from 

the archive, reprocessed, and used for another purpose. For example in 2009, 

University of Toronto astronomer David Lafreniere used new processing techniques on NICMOS images taken in 1998 to identify an exoplanet that had 

gone undiscovered when the data were originally obtained. The exoplanet 

was discovered in 2007 and 2008 by the Keck and Gemini telescopes, and 

the reprocessed NICMOS images from a decade earlier increased astronomers’ 

knowledge of the planet. “The Space Telescope data is so homogeneous, and 

always taken under the same conditions, and the calibration is so good, that the 

archive has become a tremendous resource,” said Robert Kirshner. “So, lots of 

data that was taken for one purpose has been used again for another purpose.”82

Astronomer Sandra Faber said that HST, along with the Sloan Digital Sky 

Survey, has “brought the archive concept to full maturity.”83

As time went on during the lifetime of HST, astronomers have come to 

recognize the importance of the archive. Thomas Ayres, for example, proposed 

and won what he called “no regrets” observing programs on STIS to ensure 

that certain types of ultraviolet observations were available in the HST archive 

for analysis when HST and STIS or an equivalent are no longer be available 

to make such observations.84 As pointed out above, HST’s Treasury Programs 

have the goal of broadening the Hubble archive and preparing for the day when 

HST is no longer operating. The result of these HST observations is a massive 
316 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

archive of data that will require decades of analysis. The fact that astronomers 

worked to make data from HST and other observatories available in common 

formats such as FITS vastly simplifies the task of scientists and even enthusiastic members of the public to use and understand the data, and to combine data 

from multiple observatories. The creation of massive astronomical data archives 

has resulted in astronomers never going to a telescope but instead becoming 

data miners.85

The HST archive has reopened HST to amateur astronomers. The STScI’s 

website, Hubblesite.org, includes a page to assist amateur image processors making use of HST image data.86 Astrophotographer Robert Gendler, a physician by 

profession, took HST imagery of the M106 spiral galaxy and combined it with 

images he and fellow astrophotographer Jay GaBany obtained of the galaxy to 

create an image in 2013 with help from Institute personnel.87 Large numbers of 

astronomy enthusiasts helped astronomers involved in the Panchromatic Hubble 

Andromeda Treasury (PHAT) search for star clusters in a series of images that 

resolved more than 100 million stars in the Andromeda galaxy. The PHAT images 

were obtained during two months of observations using HST’s Advanced Camera 

for Surveys and Wide Field Camera 3. Julianne Dalcanton of the University of 

Washington, who leads the PHAT program, said her group had mixed results 

using students to search for and classify star cluster in the PHAT images. Chris 

Lintott, the Oxford astrophysicist, host of the BBC television show Sky at Night, 

urged the PHAT team to crowdsource this work through Zooniverse, an organization he founded dedicated to promoting citizen science. More than 10,000 

volunteers helped out in the first round of image classifications and 5,000 in the 

second round. “People did such an amazing job,” Dalcanton said.88 This effort 

was just one of many citizen science projects facilitated by Zooniverse. Other 

citizen science projects related to HST included the Galaxy Zoo project, and the 

Hubble Hot Stars project, which both involved members of the public in classifying objects from HST and other observatories.89

CHANGING ASTRONOMY

Many scientists accustomed to traditional astronomy see HST and other spacebased observatories as causing “a major transformation in their practice of 

astronomy,” according to historian W. Patrick McCray. “Scientific discoveries 

aside, astronomers saw Hubble affecting their field sociologically and culturally, 

particularly in the funding area.” The funding model NASA first applied for 

Hubble eased the process of getting telescope time and funding by combining 

both needs into one transaction, which led to NASA supplanting NSF as the 

prime source of funding for United States astronomy.90
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

The changes that HST has brought to astronomy have struck astronomers in 

different ways. Harley Thronson, who enjoyed his time alone with a telescope 

under chilly skies early in his career, found himself “underwhelmed” by the 

experience of HST despite its much higher efficiency and its unique capabilities. “But there is no romance, no emotion. I find it drier. Intellectually more 

exciting, because you get better data, but emotionally less fulfilling.”91 While 

many astronomers of Thronson’s generation agree, others appreciate the rise 

of teamwork in astronomy. Sandra Faber did not have such fond memories of 

being on her own in the observatory, and she began working to build research 

groups of astronomers even before HST flew. “I have found it extremely fun 

and interesting to work with large groups of people.”92 Indeed, HST and similar 

telescopes are attractive to astronomers who orient their careers to being part 

of teams. Randy Kimble, an HST Instrument Scientist at Goddard who helped 

develop WFC3, said project scientists have the opportunity to enable science. 

“I never would have been able to conceive of this instrument independently, 

or write the compelling proposal that got 200 orbits of Hubble time to be the 

lead of the Deep Field investigation. But as a part of this team of talented 

people, I could make a definite contribution to creating this instrument that 

does all this great stuff.”93 The evidence that astronomy on HST is a team effort 

came quickly in the form of a study of highly cited papers based on HST data 

that appeared in The Astrophysical Journal between 1995 and 1998. The study 

showed that these papers had an average of 9.7 authors, 2.7 times more than 

the average of 3.6 authors for other papers from that time. “In many cases the 

team members represented many different institutions from many countries.”94

The creation of massive archives such as MAST and those related to the 

great astronomical surveys means that growing numbers of astronomers are 

doing their work without reference to observatories or their own observations, 

as in the past. McCray has written about the larger groups of astronomers that 

have become involved in each discovery and each published paper, and how the 

shift of astronomical work from telescopes to archives has changed the nature of 

astronomy itself, making it more reliant on gigantic instruments and databases 

much like particle physics. Anthropologist Götz Hoeppe has written about how 

astronomers have shifted to laptop computers connected to the internet and 

away from observatories, and how astronomers use algorithms to help calibrate 

data but rely on their own knowledge gained from their own observations and 

experiences to verify data before reaching research conclusions.95

The fact that STScI experts do most of the work between the time proposals 

are approved by the TAC process and the time the data are made available to 

investigators “removes the need to be a black belt” astronomer, explained Matt 
318 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Mountain. “So, the only requirement to get time on the Hubble is that you have 

a credible science idea, which is picked by peer review, and the complexity of 

the telescope and the data processing is hidden from you by this institution. As 

a result, you have a very large community that is now able to use the Hubble.”96

Mountain also credited Giacconi with creating the “science systems engineering approach” that has opened astronomy up to the nonexpert and increases 

the scientific return from the very expensive facilities paid for by the public. 

Both Mountain and Giacconi compared this approach in astronomy to author 

Thomas L. Friedman’s claim that the world is being changed or “flattened” due 

to the growing ability of individuals with internet connections to participate in 

many activities previously closed to them. “In astronomy, we are creating a similar paradigm, where anyone with an internet connection can get access to fully 

calibrated data taken with the Hubble Space Telescope.” However, Mountain 

did share the concerns expressed by Giacconi and others about the growing 

separation between builders and users in astronomy.97

For those involved with HST, even those who have had differences at times 

with the Institute, the scientific organization for HST has won praise. “Hubble 

is a superb observatory because it’s been run like an observatory, and you have 

thousands of astronomers from all around the world competing every year for 

who has the best ideas,” said David Leckrone, the longtime HST Senior Project 

Scientist. Speaking as HST marked 26 years in space, he said, “The demand for 

Hubble is still very high, and that means that for every one great idea, there are 

five that get rejected, and they’re still potentially great ideas. And so opening 

up the observatory to the world-wide community, and letting this be a marketplace of the best ideas, I think has gone a long way toward its success and the 

innovative science that’s come out of it, and continues to come out of it.” NASA 

adopted a model similar to STScI for the Chandra X-ray Observatory with the 

Chandra X-ray Center in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and the Spitzer Space 

Telescope with the Spitzer Science Center in Pasadena, California.98

HST has been a leading force in causing changes in astronomy such as 

the shift to teamwork, the need for proposals for obtaining observing time, 

and the rise of data archives, but it wasn’t the only source of these changes. 

Observatories back on Earth are also instituting similar systems out of necessity. Even before 1990, radio astronomers had become familiar with receiving 

data obtained by others after waiting in a queue, and even some ground-based 

optical observatories were instituting such systems. When the two 8.19-meter 

Gemini telescopes in Hawaii and Chile began operations in 2000, they used 

queue systems and service observing, and these practices have spread to other 

observatories. McCray argued many of these changes were already underway 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy : A

at ground observatories due to technological changes such as the digitization of 

data, and due to the need for greater efficiency as demand for telescope time 

grew.99 HST Senior Project Scientist Jennifer Wiseman has argued that HST 

accelerated this movement in other observatories, saying, “Hubble was one of 

the pioneering facilities that by necessity forced astronomers to think about 

proposing and carrying out observations without actually, themselves, personally being there.”100

The ranks of astronomers have grown around the world in the decades since 

HST was created, and many of the scientific problems that astronomers, physicists, and other scientists investigate have grown in complexity. Astronomy, a science that was once seen as a solitary pursuit, has become a team and in some cases 

even a mass pursuit. This change has been strongly facilitated by the creation of 

the internet, but as has been discussed here, HST’s time allocation procedures 

encouraged many investigators to work together to reach their research goals. 

NASA funding for American astronomers working with HST and other space 

telescopes has fostered the growth of the science in the United States. NASA’s 

decision to make HST observing time available to anyone regardless of where 

they live and subject only to the merit of their proposals confirmed the move to 

public observatories in astronomy. Even more importantly, the data obtained by 

HST are open for use by anyone who wishes to access it, much of it immediately 

after it has been obtained and processed, and this openness has spread to other 

observatories and institutions. The openness fostered by NASA and STScI with 

HST may ultimately be Hubble’s most important contribution to science.

ENDNOTES

 1 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 375–388; Robert W. Smith, “The Biggest Kind of Big Science: Astronomers and the Space Telescope,” in Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale

Research, eds., Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly (Stanford, CT: Stanford University Press, 

1992), pp. 184–211.

 2 McCray, Giant Telescopes, pp. 290–294.

 3 Edmondson, AURA and Its US National Observatories, pp. xxvii–xxviii, and McCray, Giant 

Telescopes, pp. 34–42; Alexander MacDonald, The Long Space Age: The Economic Origins 

of Space Exploration from Colonial America to the Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017).

 4 Edmondson, AURA and Its US National Observatories; McCray, Giant Telescopes; Allan A. 

Needell, “Lloyd Berkner, Merle Tuve, and the Federal Role in Radio Astronomy,” Osiris 3 

(1987): 261–288.
320 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

 5 McCray, Giant Telescopes, pp. 267–268; Edmondson, AURA and Its US National Observatories, pp. 178–180. 

 6 McCray, “How Astronomers Digitized the Sky,” pp. 928–938 (quote from p. 937); Donald 

C. Wells, “The FITS Experience: Lessons Learned,” in Information Handling in Astronomy—Historical Vistas, ed., Andre Heck (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2011),

pp. 65–72.

 7 John Krige and Dominique Pestre, eds., Science in the Twentieth Century (London: Rutledge, 2014), p. 637; Helmut A. Abt, “Is the Astronomical Literature Still Expanding Exponentially?” Publications of the Astronomical Society of the Pacific 110, no. 744 (February 

1998): 210–213; American Astronomical Society, “What Is the AAS?” https://aas.org

about/what-aas (accessed 29 August 2017).

 8 According the American Institute of Physics report, Starr Nicholson and Patrick J. Mulvey, “Roster of Astronomy Departments with Enrollment and Degree Data, 2015,” there 

were 79 degree-granting astronomy departments in the US that year, about half of 

them stand-alone astronomy departments and the remainder astronomy and physics 

departments. See also Susan R. Trammell, “Astronomy Education in the United States,” 

in International Symposium on Astrophysics Research and Science Education, ed., C. D. 

Impey, Vatican Observatory, 1999, pp. 85–89.

 9 T. P. Snow, “A Guide for Guest Investigators Using the Princeton Telescope on the Satellite Copernicus,” second edition, April 1975. Posted in the Mikulski Archive for Space 

Telescopes, http://archive.stsci.edu/copernicus/gi_guide/guide.html (accessed 7 August 

2017); Smith, The Space Telescope, p. 343.

10 Albert Boggess, oral history interview by author, 21 September 2015, p. 1; Theodore 

Gull, oral history interview by author, 12 May 2015, pp. 2–4; Freeman Dyson, From Eros to 

Gaia (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), p. 5; Yoji Kondo et al., “Astrophysical Contributions of the International Ultraviolet Explorer,” Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysics, 1989 27, pp. 397–420. IUE continued operations until it was shut down on 30 

September 1996; Thomas Ayres, oral history interview by author, 23 September 2015, 

pp. 11–12.

11 Space Science Board, The National Research Council, Institutional Arrangements for 

the Space Telescope: Report of a Study at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, July 19–30, 1976

(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1976), pp. 8, 11, 12

12 NASA, Announcement of Opportunity for Space Telescope, 18 March 1977, AO No. OSS-1-

77, 7-9.

13 Kitt Peak began developing the Interactive Data Reduction and Analysis Facility in 1981 

for reduction and analysis of astronomical data. Space Science Board, Institutional 

Arrangements for the Space Telescope, 20; F. Valdes, “The Interactive Data Reduction 

and Analysis Facility (IRAF),” 164th AAS Meeting, Baltimore, MD, 25.07, 1984; George H. 

Jacoby and Doug Tody, “The Use of the IRAF System at NOAO,” in Heck, Information Handling in Astronomy, pp. 73–92. See also McCray, “How Astronomers Digitized the Sky.”

14 NASA HST policy guidelines 1, 2, and 3 for STScI attached to letter from W. R. Lucas,

Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, to Dr. Noel W. Hinners, Director, Goddard Space

Flight Center, 3 July 1984. Archival Research would only be funded after going through 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

a peer review process. See also STScI, SO-20 Policies and Guidelines for the Use of the 

Hubble Space Telescope, May 1993, SC193259A, in STScI Archive, Box 2.3, file “SO-20 Policies and Guidelines for the Use of the Hubble Space Telescope, May 1993,” JHU Library 

Special Collections

15 McCray, “How Astronomers Digitized the Sky,” p. 935; NASA, International Ultraviolet 

Explorer Proposal Instruction Package for the Fifteenth Episode of the NASA IUE Guest 

Observer Program, NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, September 1991, 14; Yoji Kondo 

and W. Wamsteker, eds., Exploring the Universe with the IUE Satellite. (Dordrecht: Kluwer

1987), p. 27; Jeffrey S. Newmark et al., “A Summary of IUE Project Policies,” IUE Observing 

Guide, IUE Observatory and Computer Sciences Corporation, May 1992, http://archive.

stsci.edu/iue/instrument/obs_guide/node49.html#SECTION001000000000000000000

(accessed 8 August 2017). 

16 Ed Weiler, “Question on the Origin of Grants to General Observers,” e-mail to author,

16  August 2017; Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, pp. 236–237; Neta Bahcall, oral history interview by author, 31 August 2016, pp. 7–8.

17 Riccardo Giacconi, “Notes for the CSAA Task Group for STScI,” 10 December 1984, from 

STScI Library, pp. 8–9. See also Neta Bahcall, OHI, 31 August 2016, pp. 2–3.

18 Neta A. Bahcall, “The Hubble Space Telescope,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 470 (1986): 336. 

19 Neta Bahcall OHI, pp. 4–5. See also Giacconi, “Notes for the CSAA Task Group,” pp. 8–10.

20 Bahcall, “Hubble Space Telescope”; Neta Bahcall, slides for Institute Visiting Committee Meeting, 10 May 1989; Neill Reid, “The Evolution of the Hubble TAC Process,” STScI 

Newsletter 30, no. 1 (2013), pp. 6–11.

21 The figure of 3,500 orbits differs from the 1,230 hours available in Cycle 1 because of the 

higher efficiency of HST over time and the difference in observing time between an orbit 

and an hour.

22 Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to the AURA Board of Directors, Space Telescope Science Institute, April 1986 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 1986), p. 13; Giacconi, STScI 1989 Annual 

Report, pp. 19–21; Neta Bahcall, presentation to Space Telescope Institute Visiting Committee, 11 May 1989, in documents of 1989 Institute Visiting Committee; Report of the 

Space Telescope Institute Visiting Committee, Seventh Annual Meeting, 17 May 1989. A 

search of meeting minutes and correspondence from that time did not turn up complaints of conflicts of interest arising from this process.

23 Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science 

Institute, (Baltimore, MD: STScI, March 1990), pp. 10–11; Judy A. Rumerman, NASA Historical Data Book, Volume V (Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 1999), p. 523. See

Glenn E. Miller and Mark D. Johnston, “A Case Study of Hubble Space Telescope Proposal Processing, Planning and Long-Range Scheduling,” 8th Computing in Aerospace 

Conference, Computers in Aerospace Conference, American Institute of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics, 1991. 

24 Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science 

Institute, (Baltimore, MD: STScI, March 1991), p. 10–11. Ken Carpenter communication 

with author, 12 October 2016, “I descoped my own GHRS GTO program, removing some 
322 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

targets to get more observing time for the remaining ones to make up for the lower 

transmission of the GHRS slits.”

25 “Policy 14: Revision of Guaranteed Time Observer (GTO) Award Due to Spherical Aberration,” in STScI, SO-20 Policies and Guidelines for the Use of the Hubble Space Telescope; 

e-mail from Al Boggess to Peter Stockman, “Policy 14,” 3 December 1990.

26 Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science 

Institute, (STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1992), pp. 10–11.

27 Robert E. Williams, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science

Institute, (STScI, Baltimore, MD), March 1994, p. 13; “Cycle 2 peer review underway,” 

Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter, (November 1991), p. 19; “Cycle 3 proposal 

review completed,” Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter, (October 1992), p. 17; 

“Cycle 4 proposal review completed,” Space Telescope Science Institute Newsletter, (September 1993), p. 15; Reid, “The Evolution of the Hubble TAC Process.”

28 Jennifer Wiseman, oral history interview by author, 8 May 2015, p. 8; Ken Sembach, oral

history interview by author, 25 May 2017, p. 14.

29 Committee on Astronomy and Astrophysics, National Research Council, Federal Funding of Astronomical Research (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2000) quote

on p. 2; Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, p. 237. For more recent figures, see also 

Astronomy and Astrophysics Advisory Committee, “Completed Grant Success Rates in 

US Astronomy and Astrophysics,” 15 March 2016.

30 Riccardo Giacconi, STScI Annual Report 1992 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 1992) pp. 29–36; 

NASA news release, “NASA Announces New Hubble Fellows Selected for 2018,” 3 April 

2018; Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, pp. 234–236; NASA, “NASA’s Carl Sagan Fellows to Study Extraterrestrial Worlds,” news release 08-218, 3 September 2008; “Einstein Postdoctoral Fellowship Program: 2009 Call for Proposals,” August 2008, http:/

cxc.harvard.edu/fellows/CfPfellow.2009.html (accessed 19 August 2019); Patricia “Padi” 

Boyd, oral history interview by author, 13 June 2016, pp. 12–13. The Einstein Fellowships were first awarded in 2009 and took the place of previously awarded Chandra and 

Fermi Fellowships.

31 Stephen Cole, “Astronomy on the Edge: Using the Hubble Space Telescope,” Sky and 

Telescope, October 1992, 386–394. Quotes 386.

32 Kirshner, The Extravagant Universe, p. 203. 

33 Cole, “Astronomy on the Edge,” p. 391. Before Cycle 5, budgets had to be submitted with 

Phase I proposals.

34 Ibid., p. 391; Kirshner, The Extravagant Universe, pp. 203–206. Kirshner discussed the 

additional complications of obtaining HST observations on short notice, noting that 

Tuesday was the best day of the week to make such a last-minute request to fit in 

STScI’s scheduling cycle for HST. 

35 Cole, “Astronomy on the Edge,” p. 391.

36 Tony Krueger, “Astronomer’s Proposal Tools (APT) Project Management Plan,” STScI, 6 

June 2000, http://apst.stsci.edu/apt/documents/documentation/apt-project-plan-word.

html (accessed 30 August 2017); Duccio Macchetto, Robert Williams, and Brett Blacker,
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

“HST Cycle 12 Proposal Peer Review,” STScI Newsletter 20, issue 3 (Summer 2003): 1, 3, 4; 

Thomas Ayres, OHI, p. 13; Cole, “Astronomy on the Edge,” p. 391.

37 Thomas Ayres, OHI, p. 13.

38 Holland Ford, oral history interview by author, 27 October 2015, p. 21.

39 Cole, “Astronomy on the Edge,” p. 394; STScI, “HST Data Handbook for WFPC2: Chapter

1: Getting HST Data,” http://www.stsci.edu/instruments/wfpc2/Wfpc2_dhb/intro_ch1.

html (accessed 12 August 2017).

40 STScI, “History of the Project to Allocate Hubble Space Telescope Observing Time 

to Amateur Astronomers,” undated but probably 1986, in STScI Archive, Box 2.8, file 

“Press Releases/Fact Sheets, n.d., 1984-1991,” JHU Library Special Collections; STScI, 

“Amateur Astronomers to Have Observing Time on Hubble Space Telescope,” news 

release 86-03, 7 August 1986; Riccardo Giacconi, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute, (STScI, Baltimore, MD, March 1987), p. 42; Wallace Tucker, “The Space Telescope Science Institute,” Sky and Telescope, April 1985, pp.

295–299. The seven leaders were Janet A. Mattei, director of the American Association 

of Variable Star Observers; John E. Westfall, acting director of the Association of Lunar

and Planetary Observers; George Ellis, president of the Astronomical League; Jesse 

E. Eichenlaub, president of the Independent Space Research Group; Gerald Persha of 

International Amateur-Professional Photoelectric Photometry; David W. Dunham, president of the International Occultation Timing Association; and Stephen J. Edberg, president of the Western Amateur Astronomers, who also chaired the Amateur Astronomer

Working Group.

41 STScI, Hubble Space Telescope Handbook for Amateur Astronomers, (Baltimore, MD: 

STScI, October 1986), p. 14.

42 STScI, “Amateur Astronomers Selected for Observing Time on NASA’s Hubble Space 

Telescope,” draft news release 89-05, undated. in STScI Archive, Box 2.8, file “Press 

Releases/Fact Sheets, n.d., 1984–1991,” JHU Library Special Collections; STScI, “Amateur Astronomers Will Use NASA’s Hubble Space Telescope,” news release 1992-23,

10 September 1992; STScI memorandum from A. Kinney to R. Williams, “Recommendation for the Final Cycle of Observations for Amateur Astronomers,” 29 September 1995,

and STScI memorandum from Peg Stanley and Anne Kinney, “HST Amateur Astronomer 

Program Recommendations,” 3 November 1995, in STScI Archive, Box 1.3, file “DO Office 

Public Outreach, 1994–1996,” JHU Library Special Collections; Max Mutchler and Harald 

Schenk, “Amateur Astronomers and the Hubble Space Telescope,” 188th Meeting of the 

American Astronomical Society (AAS) in Madison, WI, 13 June 1996, and the 190th AAS

Meeting in Winston-Salem, NC, 10 June 1997, http://georgenet.net/hubble/bio/amateur

html (accessed 19 July 2016). 

43 Chaisson, The Hubble Wars, pp. 82–85.

44 Ana Larson, oral history interview by author, 28 November 2017, quote on 5.

45 Robert Williams e-mail to Stephen J. Edberg, “Amateur Program,” 5 January 1996,

in reply to letter, Stephen J. Edberg, Hubble Space Telescope Amateur Astronomers 

Working Group, to Robert Williams, 30 December 1995, both in STScI Archive, Box 1.3

file “DO Office Public Outreach, 1994–1996,” JHU Library Special Collections; Williams
324 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

notation on Stanley and Kinney, “Amateur Astronomer Program Recommendations”; 

and Mutchler and Schenk, “Amateur Astronomers and HST.”

46 Stephen James O’Meara, “The Demise of the HST Amateur Program,” Sky and Telescope,

June 1997, 97–104. Quote on 102.

47 Williams, 1997 STScI Annual Report, p. 1; STScI, Hubble Space Telescope Call for Proposals

for Cycle 24 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, January 2016), pp. 58–59; Thomas Ayres, OHI, pp. 9–10.

48 STScI, “NASA Hubble Space Telescope ‘Snapshots’ Probe the Early Universe,” news 

release STScI-1992-03, 13 January 1992; Reid, “The Evolution of the Hubble TAC Process;” STScI, Hubble Space Telescope Cycle 5 Call for Proposals (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 

June 1994) 2. 

49 Hubble Second Decade Committee, The Hubble Treasury Program: A New Class of Hubble Observations (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 2000).

50 Reid, “The Evolution of the Hubble TAC Process;” Space Telescope Science Institute, Hubble Space Telescope Call for Proposals for Cycle 24, (Baltimore, MD: STScI, January 2016), 

pp.10–38, 56–60.

51 Claus Leitherer, Cycle 24 Orientation (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 5 June 2016); TAC Review 

Committee, Review of HST Telescope Allocation Committee (TAC) Actions and Procedures 

Being Coordinated by STScI (Baltimore, MD: STScI, June 2002).

52 Ken Sembach, HST Proposal Review June 5–10, 2016, PowerPoint presentation. Leitherer, 

Cycle 24 Orientation; Karoline Gilbert, Achieving a True Meritocracy: Reducing Bias in the 

Peer Review Process, slides for presentation to TAC panelists and committee members, 

5 June 2016. The author attended the meetings of the Cycle 24 TAC panels and committee meetings at STScI in June 2016 as an observer.

53 The Cycle 26 TAC Process for HST took place later in 2018 and with a different focus than 

in previous years due to a plan to hold the first JWST TAC process earlier in the year,

hence the caution about crediting the anonymous review process for the changes in 

acceptance rates. N. Reid, “Hubble Cycle 26 TAC and Anonymous Peer Review,” STScI 

Newsletter 35, no. 4 (2018); and N. Reid, “Dual-Anonymous Proposal Workshop,” STScI

Newsletter 37, no. 1 (2020). See also Marina Koren, “Who Gets to Look Out to the Edge of

the Universe?” 20 December 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com. 

54 T. M. Donahue, Report of the Space Telescope Institute Visiting Committee, Seventh 

Annual Meeting, May 17, 1989 (Baltimore, MD: STScI), p. 16; T. M. Donahue, Report of the 

Space Telescope Institute Visiting Committee, May 31, 1988 (Baltimore, MD: STScI), p. 10.

55 1990 Institute Visiting Committee Meeting (Baltimore, MD, 9 May 1990), pp. 5–6. See also 

reply from STScI appended to report.

56 H. Spinrad, 1991 Institute Visiting Committee Meeting (Baltimore, MD, 20–22 May 1991), 

pp. 6–7; Ethan J. Schreier, “A Snapshot Survey of Women in Astronomy,” in Women at

Work: A Workshop on the Status of Women in Astronomy, eds., C. Megan Urry, Laura Danly, 

Lisa E. Sherbert, and Shireen Gonzaga (Baltimore, MD: Space Telescope Science Institute, 1993), pp. 57–62.

57 Riccardo Giacconi, memorandum addressed to all staff, 11 July 1991; Giacconi, 

memorandum, “Sexual Harassment Complaint Procedure,” 30 March 1992; Meg Urry, 
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

“Workshop on Women in Astronomy,” 30 July 1992, in STScI Archives, Box 2.7, file

“Memoranda , 1991,” “Memoranda 1992,” JHU Library Special Collections.

58 Peter B. Boyce, “Some Statistics on Women in Astronomy,” in Urry et al., Women at Work,

pp. 65–70. The publication is available online with other information at http://www.stsci.

edu/institute/conference/wia/index_html#Preface (accessed 21 July 2016). The preface 

to the report notes that a decision was made to address the issue of women in astronomy and not the issue of persons of color because the organizers thought that the issues 

surrounding racial minorities were different from those involving women and would be 

best addressed in another forum. The meeting report is an excellent resource on the 

topic of women in astronomy and science up to that time. The AAS Committee on the 

Status of Women in Astronomy can be accessed at http://www.aas.org/cswa/#about.

See also 1992 Institute Visiting Committee Report, 5–8 May 1992, (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 

8 May 1992), pp. 8–10; H. S. Stockman, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space 

Telescope Science Institute (Baltimore, MD: STScI, March 1993), pp. 2, 56. See also Riccardo Giacconi’s opening remarks in Women at Work, pp. 3–4.

59 STScI, “The Baltimore Charter: An Initiative to Improve the Status of Women in Astronomy,” news release 1993-12, 8 June 1993

60 News Release, “The Baltimore Charter.”

61 Panel to Review the Status of Women at STScI, Review of the Status of Women at STScI,

24 October 2002 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, pp. 2, 14). 

62 Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy, Status of Women at STScI: AURA 

Response to the Report of the Independent Review, undated—probably late 2003; Report 

of the Institute Visiting Committee for the Space Telescope Science Institute, June 2003, 

Baltimore, MD, 16-1;.Beckwith OHI, p. 21.

63 Matt Mountain, oral history interview with author, 4 November 2016, pp. 16–17.

64 Mountain remarks in Anne L. Kinney, Diana Khachadourian, Pamela S. Millar, and Colleen N. Hartman, eds., Meeting the Challenges of an Increasingly Diverse Workforce: 

Women in Astronomy and Space Science, Proceedings from the Conference Held at The 

Inn and Conference Center, University of Maryland, University College, October 21–23, 

2009 (NASA, Goddard Space Flight Center, 2010), pp. 77–78. See chapters seven and 

eight for more on STScI during the 2000–2005 time period. 

65 STScI, “Dr. Kathryn Flanagan,” http://www.stsci.edu/~flanagan/ (accessed 31 August 2017).

66 Weiler remarks in Kinney, Khachadourian, Millar, and Hartman, Meeting the Challenges,

pp. 13–21; Kinney remarks at 5-10; White remarks at 205-207. For a tribute to HST and

NASA’s efforts to hire African American and Hispanic American astronomers, see Dean 

Tapia, director, Hubble’s Diverse Universe, DVD, Boag’s Productions, 2010.

67 Cynthia Cheung and David Leisawitz, “New Frontiers in NASA Data Management,” in 

Information Handling in Astronomy, ed., Heck, pp. 45–63; McCray, Giant Telescopes, 

pp. 292–294. NASA Goddard today maintains an extensive archive setup for all its space 

missions in the NASA Space Science Data Coordinated Archive. 

68 See “Data Management and Computation; Volume 1—Issues and Recommendations,” 

Committee on Data Management and Computation, Space Science Board, Assembly 
326 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

of Mathematical and Physical Processes, National Research Council, published by 

National Academy Press, 1982.

69 Hubble Second Decade Committee, “The Hubble Data Archive: Toward the Ultimate 

Union Archive of Astronomy” (Baltimore, MD: STScI, December 2000), pp. 6–8; NASA 

HST policy guidelines 3, “Foreign Data Coordinating Facilities,” attached to letter from 

W. R. Lucas, Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, to Dr. Noel W. Hinners, Director, Goddard Space Flight Center, 3 July 198

70 The contract to build DADS had originated with Ford Aerospace, which was sold to Loral 

in 1990. Giacconi, 1991 STScI Annual Report, pp. 2, 22–24; 1992 Institute Visiting Committee Report, 4; Second Decade Committee, “The Hubble Data Archive,” pp. 8–10; Albrecht 

OHI, pp. 14–16; Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, p. 234; Dennis Crabtree, Daniel 

Durand, and Andrew Woodsworth, oral history interview by author, 17 August 2017

71 Robert E. Williams, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science

Institute (Baltimore, MD: STScI, March 1995), pp. 1, 33. All of the HST data available in 

1994 could fit in the hard drive of the personal computer used by the author to write this 

book two decades later. 

72 Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, pp. 232–234; STScI, HST Call for Proposals for Cycle 

24, p. 17; Ethan J. Schreier, “HST Calibration,” ESO Conference and Workshop Proceedings, 2–28 April 1995, Garching, Germany

73 See Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, Second Edition (Cambridge, MA: 

The MIT Press, 2003), and Christopher Gainor, “The Hubble Space Telescope in Cyberspace,” Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly 24, no. 2 (2017): 4–12.

74 Space Telescope Science Institute, Annual Report 1998 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 1999), p. 7; 

Robert E. Williams, Annual Report to AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science

Institute (Baltimore, MD: STScI, March 1996), p. 16; Robert E. Williams, Annual Report to

AURA Board of Directors: Space Telescope Science Institute (Baltimore, MD: STScI, March 

1997), pp. 10, 15.

75 STScI, Annual Report 1998, p. 34; Space Telescope Science Institute, Annual Report 2001 

(Baltimore, MD: STScI, 2002), pp. 48–49. 

76 Space Telescope Science Institute, Annual Report 2012 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 2013); 

Space Telescope Science Institute, Annual Report 2015 (Baltimore, MD: STScI, 2016), p. 7. 

77 Daniel Apai et al., “Lessons from a High-Impact Observatory: The Hubble Space Telescope’s Science Productivity between 1998 and 2008,” Publications of the Astronomical 

Society of the Pacific 122, no. 893 (July 2010): 808–826. Quote from p. 824.

78 John W. MacKenty, Hubble Space Telescope Status: Cycle 24 TAC Presentation, STScI, 5

June 2016.

79 Hubble Second Decade Committee, “The Hubble Data Archive,” pp. 13–21.

80 Space Telescope Science Institute, Big Data @ STScI: Enhancing STScI’s Astronomical 

Data Science Capabilities over the Next Five Years (Baltimore MD: STScI, 15 March 2016). 

See also Peter Tyson, “Astronomy & Big Data,” Sky and Telescope (September 2016): 

14–21. The Roman Space Telescope was previously known as the Wide Field Infrared

Survey Telescope (WFIRST)
CHAPTER NINE . Astronomy: A

81 John Hutchings, oral history interview by author, 30 March 2015, pp. 26–27.

82 Robert Kirshner, oral history interview by author, 28 September 2016, p. 21; STScI, “Hubble Finds Hidden Exoplanet in Archival Data,” news release STScI-2009-15, 1 April 2009.

83 Faber OHI, p. 32,

84 Thomas Ayres OHI, p. 5–7.

85 John Wenz, “How Stargazing Became a Numbers Game,” The Atlantic, 21 May 2015

86 Hubblesite, “Hubble Image Processors,” http://hubblesite.org/get_involved/hubble_

image_processors/ (accessed 19 July 2016).

87 STScI, “Amateur and Professional Astronomers Team Up to Create a Cosmological Masterpiece,” news release 2013-06, 5 February 2013; Wenz, “How Stargazing Became a

Numbers Game.” 

88 Dalcanton, OHI, p. 18; Elizabeth Howell, “Your Help Needed to Study Andromeda Galaxy,” 10 December 2012, Space.com, http://www.space.com/18818-andromeda-galaxycrowdsource-study.html (accessed 19 July 2016); The Andromeda Project, “Round 2 is 

Complete!” 30 October 2013, and “Round 2: Welcome Back,” 13 October 2013, https:/

blog.andromedaproject.org (accessed 19 July 2016); Wenz, “How Stargazing Became a

Numbers Game.”

89 Zooniverse Projects, https://www.zooniverse.org/projects?discipline=astronomy&page=

1&status=live (accessed 1 September 2017).

90 W. Patrick McCray, Giant Telescopes, p. 268

91 Thronson, who later became HST Program Scientist at NASA Headquarters, remembered winter observing in the early 1970s at the Yerkes Observatory in Wisconsin,

wearing overalls equipped with electrical heating elements to combat the cold. On an 

Arizona observing run, his plans were defeated by a display of Northern Lights followed 

by clouds. Observing, he recalled, involved “brewing coffee for the night, making sandwiches for the evening.” Thronson OHI, pp. 19–22.

92 Faber, OHI, p. 33.

93 Randy Kimble, oral history interview by author, 1 November 2016.

94 Helmut A. Abt and Sarah Stevens-Rayburn, “Publication Statistics for Recent Papers 

from the Hubble Space Telescope,” Bulletin of the American Astronomical Society, 34 

(2001): 935–937.

95 McCray, Giant Telescopes, pp. 290–295; Götz Hoeppe, “Astronomers at the Observatory: 

Place, Visual Practice, Traces.” Anthropological Quarterly 85 (4) (2012): 1141–1160; Götz 

Hoeppe, “Working Data Together: The Accountability and Reflexivity of Digital Astronomical Practice.” Social Studies of Science 44 (2) (2014): 243–270.

96 Mountain, OHI, p. 4. 

97 Matt Mountain, “Flattening the Astronomy World,” Physics Today (February 2014): 8–9.

See also Thomas Friedman, The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century

(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005); Giacconi, Secrets of the Hoary Deep, p. 234.

98 David Leckrone OHI, 13 June 2016, pp. 33–34; STScI, 2001 Annual Report (Baltimore, MD: 

STScI, 2002), p. 2.
328 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

99 McCray, Giant Telescopes, pp. 268–272.

100 Wiseman OHI, p. 8
329

CONCLUSION

The World’s Most Famous

Telescope

▲ ACS’s view of Cone Nebula (in NGC 2264) was taken in April 2002. (NASA/Holland Ford [JHU]/ACS 

Science Team/ESA: heic0206c)

T

his book was completed with the final chapter of the Hubble Space 

Telescope’s operational career still unwritten. Instead, this account ends 

as HST was completing its third decade on orbit, twice the original plan 

to fly Hubble for 15 years. HST is late in its life but still operating at a high level. 

Large numbers of astronomers are still seeking HST observing time through 

HST’s time allocation process in the hope of making further observations with 

the aim of refining and broadening our knowledge of the universe. HST is being 

used to obtain a more precise value for the Hubble constant, trace the evolution of dark energy, study galactic clusters to learn more about dark matter, and 

exploit gravitational lensing using these clusters to peer even deeper into space. 

HST continues to follow the evolution of galaxies and black holes, measuring 

stellar populations and intergalactic matter, and searching for the ingredients of 

life in atmospheres of exoplanets. Closer to home, Hubble is following changes 

in the outer planets of our solar system. HST is also gathering ultraviolet observations and other data for deposit in archives. It is working with Chandra and 

other observatories both in space and on Earth, and a major goal for HST 

remains to operate simultaneously with the James Webb Space Telescope for at 

least a year once JWST is launched.1

Since the completion of Servicing Mission 4 in 2009, HST has been totally 

dependent on the continued healthy operation of its systems for its survival. 

Before SM4, Hubble had never gone more than seven years without a servicing 

mission, and this mark was exceeded following SM4 starting in 2016. HST’s 

systems have generally operated well in the decade since SM4, but substantial 
330 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

failures will afflict HST in the future. One of HST’s six gyroscopes failed in 

2011, and two more failed in 2018. The remaining three gyroscopes were built 

with features designed to enhance their lifetimes, but these instruments will 

not last indefinitely. NASA developed and tested improved algorithms and other 

measures when previous gyroscopes had failed before SM4 to allow continued 

if limited operation even with a single gyroscope, and these measures can be 

used after further gyroscopes fail. Hubble’s three Fine Guidance Sensors are 

showing signs of degradation, notably the one that has been on board since HST 

was launched in 1990. One instrument, the Near Infrared Camera and MultiObject Spectrometer,  has not operated fully since 2008, and the Advanced 

Camera for Surveys and the Wide Field Camera 3 experienced service interruptions in 2019.

2 Detectors on HST instruments will become less effective 

with time as they wear out with more exposure to light. Radiation exposure will 

also cause HST components to degrade. Hubble suffers wear from temperature 

swings as it passes between the harsh daylight and shadow conditions on every 

orbit of Earth.3

▲ Replica of Galileo’s telescope in the flight deck of Atlantis during Servicing Mission 4 to 

the Hubble Space Telescope in 2009. (John Grunsfeld)

NASA Goddard estimated in 2016 that without measures to control HST’s 

reentry into Earth’s atmosphere, its most probable reentry time would be 2036, 

with 2028 as the worst case. When HST approaches the time of a major system failure or reentry, NASA will be required under United States government 
CONCLUSION . The World’s M

policy to ensure that it does not make an uncontrolled entry into Earth’s atmosphere that could possibly endanger people on Earth. This means that NASA 

will be obliged to prepare a robotic vehicle to launch into orbit, rendezvous with 

the telescope, and then attach to the docking fixture affixed during SM4. The 

robotic vehicle will then either send HST hurtling to destruction at a predetermined point and time above an isolated part of an ocean, or boost HST into a 

higher orbit.

4

▲ Field of view “footprints” of HST instruments since Servicing Mission 4 in 2009. 

Instruments include Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS), the Near Infrared Camera and MultiObject Spectrometer (NICMOS), the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph (STIS), the 

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), and Advanced Camera 

for Surveys (ACS), which includes the Solar Blind Channel (SBC). (NASA/STScI)

While these options preclude bringing HST itself back to Earth for display 

in a museum, its instruments such as the Faint Object Spectrograph, the Wide 

Field Planetary Camera 2 that took many of its most famous images, and the 

COSTAR that was part of the fix to HST’s spherical aberration, were returned 

to Earth during servicing missions and are now on display in the National Air 

and Space Museum in Washington, DC. The unused backup main mirror for 

HST and Hubble’s Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle are also on display at the 
332 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Air and Space Museum. ESA’s Faint Object Camera can be seen at the Dornier 

Museum in Friedrichshafen, Germany, and the High Speed Photometer is on 

show at the University of Wisconsin’s Space Place in Madison, Wisconsin.5

Even after HST no longer operates and has fallen out of orbit, its mission 

will continue in the form of the data it has returned to Earth and is stored in 

archives located at STScI and elsewhere. Many HST observations that have 

not yet been examined by scientists have the potential of yielding important 

discoveries about the universe. 

Hubble’s three decades of operations have made major impacts on astronomy, space exploration, and the public. This study will conclude with some 

thoughts on these legacies, starting with space exploration. Because the life of 

HST has not concluded, there will be further events and more scientific findings to consider in the years to come.

HST AND THE SPACE SHUTTLE

The history of the Hubble Space Telescope is intertwined with that of the 

Space Shuttle. The Shuttle became the centerpiece of NASA’s space programs 

when President Richard Nixon and Congress formally approved it in 1972, and 

soon it became the launch vehicle for the Space Telescope. While HST was 

being built, the availability of the Space Shuttle encouraged its designers to 

make it serviceable in orbit. In the words of Robert W. Smith, “The Shuttle, at 

least on the surface, had to a considerable degree merged the interests of the 

astronomers and NASA—the Shuttle provided the astronomers the capability 

to service the telescope in orbit, and for the Agency, the telescope provided a 

solid justification for, and added some much needed scientific legitimacy to, 

the Shuttle.” The Shuttle’s precipitously rising costs resulted in what Smith 

called in 1987 an “absurd situation” where the costs of the Shuttle servicing 

missions could have covered another space telescope.6 In the event, most of the 

financial costs of Shuttle missions to HST were charged to NASA human space 

programs rather than to HST, easing the financial impact on NASA’s science 

budget and raising the question of whether that money could ever have been 

redirected to other science programs.

HST’s ties to the Shuttle have imposed other costs. HST flew in an orbit 

that could be reached by the Shuttle, just 600 kilometers above Earth. Because 

of this low orbit, Earth blocked astronomical targets for roughly half of each 

95-minute orbit on average, and HST’s orbit often ran through the South 

Atlantic Anomaly, a dip in the inner Van Allen radiation belt that further limits 

the time during which HST’s sensitive detectors can operate. The low orbit 

also placed extra demands on HST’s pointing and control systems. As has been 
CONCLUSION . The World’s M

noted, the thermal shock of passing in and out of darkness and solar illumination in each orbit stresses the telescope’s thermal controls and outer skin.

The symbiotic relationship between HST and the Shuttle was epitomized 

by the five servicing missions that restored Hubble’s failing systems and transformed it to a more powerful and effective telescope with new instruments. 

Thanks to the ingenuity of engineers and scientists, the first servicing mission 

to Hubble in 1993 installed fixes that overcame the spherical aberration inadvertently built into HST’s main mirror. While only certain parts of the telescope 

were meant to be serviced, astronauts and NASA engineers proved that they 

could make repairs to HST that were not contemplated when the telescope was 

built. Their ingenuity was key to extending Hubble’s lifetime long beyond the 

original plan for a 15-year mission.

Almost all spacecraft up to the present day can be classified as either human 

spacecraft or robotic. HST can be said to occupy a middle ground between 

the two, since it relied on five Shuttle servicing missions to keep operating 

after its deployment on another Shuttle mission. In one of his historic articles 

advocating spaceflight in Collier’s magazine in 1952, Wernher von Braun envisioned a robotic space telescope dependent on human assistance in the form 

of astronauts changing its photographic film. Spaceflight advocates have since 

proposed many similar spacecraft, many but not all of them involving telescopes, that came to be called “man tended” and now “human tended.”7 During 

the Shuttle Program, astronauts repaired several robotic satellites on single 

visits, but Shuttle crews serviced only HST on a regular and recurring basis. 

The Space Shuttle Program turned away from deploying and servicing satellites, starting with the Challenger disaster and concluding with the Columbia 

disaster, when the remaining Shuttle flights were dedicated to the International 

Space Station with the exception of HST Servicing Mission 4. Therefore, at the 

time of writing Hubble has remained the sole spacecraft that could be called 

human tended.

HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT OPERATIONS

HST’s link to NASA’s human space program means that Hubble has benefited 

from the glamor and human interest that comes with having astronauts involved 

with its operations. Astronauts like Story Musgrave, John Grunsfeld, and Mike 

Massimino have gained a measure of fame because of their work on HST servicing missions. Between his second and third missions to Hubble, Grunsfeld 

played a key role in overturning the decision to cancel SM4. Astronaut crews 

routinely visited Goddard and STScI as part of their work on servicing missions, 

and some of that work involved raising morale of workers on the ground before 
334 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

and after the missions. Some astronauts became public ambassadors for HST, 

and years after the servicing missions concluded, astronauts still play prominent 

roles in anniversary celebrations for HST. Assignments to HST flights were coveted in the astronaut corps, especially for spacewalkers. One astronaut who did 

not fly to HST was quoted as saying, “Hubble guys are the Jedi. The coolest.” 

HST missions were also challenging for pilot astronauts, who had to fly the 

Shuttle to an orbital altitude greater than 600 kilometers, as high as the Shuttle 

could go, rendezvous with HST, and assist with the ambitious spacewalks.8

Hubble had an outsized impact on the course and perception of the Space 

Shuttle Program. The first Hubble servicing mission was critical for the continuation of the Shuttle Program and for restoring the Shuttle’s tattered reputation. 

It followed troubled satellite repair missions by Shuttle crews in 1984, 1985, 

and 1992 that showed the need for attention to detail and thorough preparation 

when servicing satellites. HST Servicing Mission 1 came at the end of 1993, 

a particularly troubling year for NASA. As outlined in chapter three, NASA’s 

difficulties included problems that delayed Shuttle missions, and ongoing questions about NASA’s long-awaited Space Station Program that brought it to the 

brink of cancellation. There was speculation in the media that another failure 

in space with the high-profile Hubble servicing mission could threaten the existence of NASA itself.9 The resounding success of SM1 allowed the Shuttle and 

Hubble programs to continue, and gave the Clinton administration breathing 

room to reorganize the Space Station effort into the International Space Station 

Program with Russia and other international partners.10

Thanks to a great deal of preparatory work the HST servicing missions validated the spacewalking techniques and tools created to repair Hubble. The 

lessons of the first HST servicing mission not only led to successes in the subsequent servicing missions but also in the far larger job of using spacewalking 

astronauts and robotic devices to construct the ISS.11 NASA astronauts and 

Johnson Space Center have maintained their expertise in building and servicing the ISS to the present day, and Goddard’s HST repair program has continued since the last HST servicing mission in the form of the Satellite Servicing 

Projects Division. 

Starting with President George W. Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration in 

2004 that followed the Columbia disaster the year before, NASA has been 

reorienting its human space program toward exploration beyond low-Earth 

orbit. To make this change possible within NASA’s budget, NASA brought the 

Space Shuttle’s 30-year run to an end in 2011. The ISS’s future beyond 2024 

is not decided, and NASA does not have serious plans for a successor space 

station in Earth orbit. NASA and private contractors are now building a new 
CONCLUSION . The World’s M

generation of human spacecraft that resemble the relatively small Apollo spacecraft that preceded the Shuttle. The future of missions that involve astronauts 

servicing satellites or constructing space stations remains open to conjecture, 

and with it the ultimate value of Hubble’s contribution to satellite servicing. 

HST AND SCIENCE

Most of HST’s signature contributions to science have come in concert with 

other instruments on the ground and in space, as discussed in chapter six. In the 

most famous example, the bulk of the observations involved in the historic and 

surprising finding that the universe is expanding at an accelerating rate came 

from observatories on the ground, with HST data providing the final precise 

observations of supernovae needed to fine-tune the estimates on the size and 

age of the universe. HST data alone made possible the famous Hubble Deep 

Field observations, but now this set of observations and its successors have 

been complemented with data from other observatories in space and on the 

ground. HST was not used to discover exoplanets but it has provided important 

follow-up observations. As Robert Smith wrote in 2000, HST’s main role “has 

been to contribute (sometimes with the aid of observations made by or in support of other telescopes) in very significant ways to a remarkably wide range of 

astronomical problems.” He also noted that HST is only one of many telescopes 

playing important roles in astronomy today.12 This study of HST’s operations 

endorses these conclusions, but with a caveat. In the years in the third quarter 

of the 20th century when the great telescope on Mount Palomar dominated 

astronomy, the field was much smaller than it became by the time HST was 

launched. Due to the larger number of astronomers in the time of the Hubble 

Space Telescope, and the information technologies that came into use during 

that time, many more astronomers dealing with more different astronomical 

questions can use HST in their work than the small group of astronomers who 

were granted access to the Palomar telescope. While the larger number of other 

observatories might limit HST’s influence over astronomy today, this is counterbalanced by the far greater availability of HST data, coupled with HST’s 

unique capabilities that cannot be matched by observatories on Earth or even 

by upcoming space telescopes such as JWST. 

As the end of HST operations approaches, astronomers are making observations in ultraviolet wavelengths that will no longer be available when HST 

ceases to observe. Other astronomers will miss having a telescope above the 

atmosphere that operates in visible light at the theoretical diffraction limit. 

JWST will work only in infrared wavelengths, and there are no firm plans at 

present to build a space telescope that would operate in the visible and ultraviolet 
336 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

wavelengths accessible by HST. Telescopes on the ground fitted with adaptive 

optics that compensate for atmospheric turbulence can only view small parts of 

the sky and are restricted to the limited wavelengths of light not blocked by the 

atmosphere. The end of HST will be a loss for many astronomers.

▲ Observable wavelengths for HST instruments since Servicing Mission 4 in 2009. 

Instruments on board HST are the Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS), the Near Infrared Camera 

and Multi-Object Spectrometer (NICMOS), the Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS), the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), and Advanced 

Camera for Surveys (ACS), which includes the Solar Blind Channel (SBC). (NASA/STScI)

What made HST unique was not that it was the first telescope to operate 

in space. A number of telescopes had flown before it, though none had gained 

wide public awareness. Hubble’s popularity and importance stem from the fact 

that it was the first large telescope in orbit that could image in a wide range of 

wavelengths, from ultraviolet through visible and into the infrared. This capability allowed it to captivate the public, and it also changed the way scientists 

understood astronomical objects. The famous “Pillars of Creation” image, for 

example, was one of many HST images that have increased astronomers’ understanding of how stars are born. Thanks to Hubble, solar system astronomers 

have been able to keep track of changes taking place on the outer planets and 

many other objects in the solar system. And HST’s longevity has allowed it to 

follow changes in the wider universe, the best-known example being the 2014 

image of the Eagle Nebula, which revealed changes that had occurred since the 

original “Pillars of Creation” image 19 years earlier.13 In a more general sense, 
CONCLUSION . Th World ’s M

Hubble gave many astronomers their first clear view of the universe. In the 

words of HST Senior Project Scientist Jennifer Wiseman, Hubble “transformed 

the scale of the kinds of questions that astronomers could expect to address, 

because Hubble had such a profound improvement on an angular resolution 

and sensitivity from the previous telescopes, that it enabled different kinds of 

questions to be asked and addressed through observation.”14

HST has become famous for its scientific productivity. By 2019, more than 

16,000 papers in refereed scientific journals relied directly on Hubble data, 

with roughly 800 new refereed papers appearing each year in journals. About 

one in five papers in major astronomical journals in recent years have been 

based on or have been influenced by HST observations, and one quarter of 

astronomy and astrophysics Ph.D.’s awarded each year rely on Hubble data for 

at least part of their conclusions. Papers using Hubble data have been cited 

more than 800,000 times.15

▲ Two images from the Wide Field Camera 3 of the “Pillars of Creation,” in M16, the Eagle 

Nebula, taken in 2014, one in visible wavelengths, the other in infrared. These images, 

released in 2015 to celebrate HST’s 25th anniversary, show changes from the original 1995 

image of this area. (NASA/STScI/ESA)
338 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

HST’s scientific successes have helped astronomers build political support 

for new telescopes on the ground and in space, especially the James Webb 

Space Telescope. HST’s success not only maintained support for new projects 

within the American astronomical community but amongst astronomers the 

world over, all of whom were welcome to submit proposals for observing time 

on HST and make use of data from Hubble’s archives. The international dimension of HST was symbolized in the European Space Agency’s sponsorship of 

Hubble alongside NASA, and ESA’s contributions to building, repairing, and 

maintaining HST and analyzing, curating, and publicizing its findings. HST has 

contributed to the growing multinational flavor of astronomy. 

One of the most frequently invoked superlatives used to describe HST was 

most eloquently expressed when the crew of STS-125 serviced Hubble for the 

final time. The astronauts carried with them a replica of Galileo Galilei’s historic 

telescope, and the presence of the replica on board their Shuttle Atlantis implied 

that HST represented a leap in viewing power and scientific potential comparable to the first telescope used to record scientific observations of the heavens.16

The span of four centuries between Galileo and HST makes any comparison 

problematic, however. One of the many major differences between the two time 

periods is that only a handful of people did any serious work on astronomy and 

physics in Galileo’s time, while tens of thousands of people backed up by major 

intellectual, institutional, and financial resources are exploring and thinking 

about the universe in the time of HST. The scope of astronomy has expanded 

from visible light four centuries ago to the full electromagnetic spectrum today. 

The relationship between HST and Galileo resembles more a branch on a tree 

than a step on a ladder. HST sees the universe in optical and part of the infrared 

and ultraviolet parts of that spectrum, and its findings are being combined with 

other data obtained using observatories observing radio waves and high-energy 

wavelengths including x rays, gamma rays, and neutrinos. In 2017, physicists 

using specially built detectors widened the field of observation when they got the 

first views of gravitational waves generated by the merger of two neutron stars.17

Observations in various wavelengths have all led to important discoveries, but 

scientists can obtain a more complete idea of physical processes by observing in 

as many wavelengths as possible. While astronomy in various wavelengths outside of visible light began well before HST was launched, Hubble’s prominent 

role in advancing and popularizing digital detectors, and encouraging collaboration amongst astronomers, catalyzed studies involving multiple wavelengths. 

The turn to coordinating observations of objects using instruments operating in 

different wavelengths is another example of how HST has played a major role 

in encouraging teamwork in astronomy and changed how astronomy is done.
CONCLUSION . The World’s M

The fact that HST is still returning data from space, and that many of its 

findings remain to be analyzed by scientists, leaves open the possibility that 

HST’s most important discoveries are yet to come. The astronomers and the 

instruments that follow HST may build on Hubble’s findings or overturn them, 

along with our view of the heavens. Some of the data upcoming instruments 

and investigators generate will no doubt be combined with Hubble data. 

Historians of science have been strongly influenced in recent decades by the 

ideas of Thomas Kuhn, who argued that change comes to scientific beliefs in 

the form of paradigm shifts, as in the case of the shift from Newtonian physics 

to Einsteinian physics. Astronomers have answered many puzzling questions 

using HST and other instruments in the last 30 years, but newer questions have 

taken the place of the old ones, notably the two distinct problems of dark matter 

and dark energy.18 The answers that arise to those problems, and the timing, 

nature, and sources of those answers, will likely decide HST’s place in the history of astronomy. In the meantime, it is difficult to dispute that in its first three 

decades of operation, HST has helped transform humankind’s knowledge of the 

universe. The universe now appears more colorful, complicated, and stranger to 

humankind than it did when HST first took to the skies.

HST AND THE PUBLIC

The explosion in computing power and the arrival of the internet in the 1990s 

opened up HST and its archive to astronomers everywhere, and HST images 

became a staple of the internet starting from its early days to the present. Once 

it began producing high-quality images following the first servicing mission, 

and made them all easily accessible on home computers and then smartphones, 

HST caught the public imagination unlike any previous astronomical instrument. Telescopes that had come before, notably the Mount Wilson and Mount 

Palomar telescopes, became famous because of their sizes, and later on, the 

discoveries they facilitated. But the fame of those telescopes did not match that 

of HST. Neither telescope produced the bounty of images associated with them 

in the public mind in the same way HST has. 

The discovery of spherical aberration early in its flight in 1990 caused Hubble 

to become a byword for failure. Less than four years later, after the first Shuttle 

servicing mission, NASA revealed the first photos that met HST’s promise of 

stunning views of the universe. Soon the “Pillars of Creation” image and the 

“Hubble Deep Field” cemented HST’s public reputation as humanity’s window 

on the universe. Although many HST images speak for themselves, NASA, ESA, 

and STScI have also worked hard to promote the work of Hubble with extensive 

public outreach and education efforts. Hubble’s passage through the wilderness 
340 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

of public disapproval in the time of its spherical aberration also curbed the reluctance of many astronomers to share their discoveries with the public.

Ken Carpenter, a longtime HST Operations Project Scientist at Goddard, 

who lived through the dark days of spherical aberration as a member of the 

first-generation GHRS Instrument Definition Team, has learned in his many 

public appearances that people love HST. “It’s become, in a sense, the people’s 

telescope,” he said, echoing Senator Barbara Mikulski, a powerful supporter 

of HST.19 Hubble’s images have become a ubiquitous part of modern life. “It’s 

been in dance; it’s been on music albums; we’ve seen things like people have 

their guitars painted with Hubble imagery; you can buy clothing now, leotards 

and dresses and blouses come emblazoned with full-resolution HST images. It’s 

just, literally, everywhere.”20

In 2004, when NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe cancelled Servicing 

Mission 4, a move that heralded the end of HST, “there was a lot of pressure 

from the public, as well as from the astronomical community,” Carpenter 

said.21 Many members of the public made known their displeasure by e-mailing 

NASA officials and members of Congress. Many supporters of the Hubble 

Space Telescope became known as “Hubble Huggers.”22 Eventually, this public pressure and Shuttle safety measures allowed O’Keefe’s successor, Michael 

Griffin, to restore the servicing mission, vastly extending HST’s lifespan. “I 

think Hubble really changed the public’s perception, made many more people 

aware of astronomy, interested in astronomy, excited by astronomy, fascinated 

by the images that were coming down,” said astronomer Wendy Freedman.23

Through most of its operational lifetime, the Hubble Space Telescope has 

operated in a shower of superlatives, starting with those expressed in expectation before its launch and followed later by the praise that followed its amazing 

images and surprising discoveries. Even the criticisms leveled at HST and its 

builders before its vision was corrected had an outsize quality to them.

Before HST was launched, many of its supporters predicted that it would challenge the imaginations of scientists with surprising findings about our universe. 

Nearly 30 years of HST operations have validated those predictions. The universe 

looks much different today as a result of HST’s findings, and even members of the 

public unfamiliar with cosmology and space science have been deeply impressed 

with Hubble’s trove of spectacular images. On the way to delivering its scientific 

bounty, HST challenged the imaginations of those who built it when a serious flaw 

in its main mirror was overcome by sheer force of human ingenuity. Hubble’s longevity has exceeded the hopes of those who supported it when a political judgment 

that nearly cut short its operational life was overturned by popular reaction unprecedented for a robotic vehicle. And HST may not yet be finished surprising us.
CONCLUSION . The World’s M

ENDNOTES

 1 NASA, 2016 Hubble Space Telescope Senior Review (Washington, DC: 8–10 March 2016);

NASA, 2019 Astrophysics Senior Review—Hubble Report (6–9 May 2019).

 2 Jim Jeletic, “Long Live Hubble,” Air & Space Smithsonian 33, no. 6 (December 2018/January 2019): 18, 20; NASA news release “Hubble’s Wide Field Camera 3 Recovered, Collecting Science Data,” 17 January 2019; NASA news release, “Hubble’s Advanced Camera for

Surveys Resumes Operations,” 6 March 2019.

 3 John W. MacKenty, “Hubble Space Telescope Status: Cycle 24 TAC Presentation,” STScI,

5 June 2016.

 4 NASA, Hubble Space Telescope Disposal Study (Washington, DC: November 2012)

 5 See David H. DeVorkin, “Epilogue: Exhibiting the Hubble Space Telescope,” in Launius 

and DeVorkin, Hubble’s Legacy, pp. 131–150. Much of the original Wide Field/Planetary Camera was recycled for use in WFC3, but its optical channels are located at th

National Air and Space Museum. Much of the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph 

was recycled for use in the Cosmic Origins Spectrograph.

 6 Smith, The Space Telescope, pp. 393–395.

 7 Dr. Wernher von Braun, “Crossing the Last Frontier,” Collier’s, (22 March 1952): 24–29,

72–74. Robert Smith discusses “man-tended” telescopes in The Space Telescope, pp. 

45, 63–73. Roger D. Launius, and Howard E. McCurdy in Robots in Space: Technology, 

Evolution and Interplanetary Travel (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 

2008), p. 12, discuss HST and the Space Shuttle in the context of cooperation between 

humans and robots in space. During the early years of the U.S. Space Station Program 

that led to the International Space Station, a number of free flyer robotic spacecraft 

were proposed and abandoned, such as the ESA’s Columbus Man-Tended Free Flyer, 

which ultimately led to the Columbus module on the ISS.

 8 Mike Massimino, in his book about his two HST missions, quoted astronaut Robert Curbeam about HST crews. Massimino, Spaceman, p. 151. Massimino and Musgrave have 

developed post-astronaut careers speaking about their experiences in space. Kathryn 

Sullivan, who flew on the HST deployment mission in 1990, has written a memoir centered on her work with HST, Handprints on Hubble. While researching this book, the

author has seen former astronauts who flew on HST missions take prominent roles at 

anniversary and other events at Goddard and STScI. 

 9 Dennis Overbye, “Hubble Jeopardy,” New York Times Magazine (28 November 1993); 

Frank Kuznik, “The Must-Win Mission,” USA Weekend (26–28 November 1993)

10 Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 388–389; Robert W. Smith, “Ten Years and

Counting: HST in Orbit,” Sky & Telescope (April 1990): 28–34. 

11 Tatarewicz, “HST Servicing Mission,” pp. 380–381, 394.

12 Smith, “Ten Years and Counting,” p. 34.

13 Hammel OHI, part 2, pp. 5–8; STScI, “Hubble Goes High Def to Revisit the Iconic ‘Pillars 

of Creation,’” news release STScI-2015-01, 5 January 2015.

14 Wiseman OHI, p. 8.
342 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

15 “HST Reports,” https://archive.stsci.edu/hst/bibliography/pubstat.html (accessed 24 

August 2019).

16 IYA2009 Updates, “Galileo’s Telescope Back from Space: STS-125 Mission Astronauts on 

Visit to Florence, December 18,” 25 November 2009, https://www.astronomy2009.org/

news/updates/list/49/index.html; See also this NASA/STScI website, which makes the 

comparison between Galileo and HST in terms of leaps in resolving power: Hubblesite, “Resolution 101,” http://hubblesite.org/the_telescope/nuts_.and._bolts/res101.php

(both accessed 5 September 2017).

17 Calla Cofield, “How Gravitational Waves and ‘Multi-Messenger Research’ Will Chang

Astronomy,” 17 October 2017, https://www.space.com. The gravity wave observations of 

the neutron star merger took place simultaneously with astronomical observations of 

the event in a variety of wavelengths of light.

18 Thomas Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 

Press, 1970); Martin Harwit, Cosmic Discovery: The Search, Scope and Heritage of Astronomy (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1981), p. 57; James A. Marcum, “The Revolutionary 

Ideas of Thomas Kuhn,” Times Literary Supplement (17 January 2018).

19 Kenneth Carpenter, oral history interview, 30 April 2015, part 1, 12; NASA, “Sen. Mikulski Unveils First Images from Rejuvenated Hubble,” news release 09-205, 9 September 

2009.

20 Carpenter OHI, part 1, 14.

21 Ibid.

22 David H. DeVorkin and Robert W. Smith, The Hubble Cosmos: 25 Years of New Vistas in

Space (Washington, DC: National Geographic, 2015), p. 14

23 Wendy Freedman, oral history interview by author, 6 September 2017
343

APPENDICES

▲ Hubble image of the Keyhole Nebula within the Carina Nebula (NGC 3372) taken in 1999. 

(NASA/ESA, and The Hubble Heritage Team [AURA/STScI]: opo0006a)

APPENDIX A

HST FUNDING SUMMARY

The Hubble Space Telescope received formal approval from the administration 

and Congress to start in Fiscal Year 1978. Funding categories for HST changed 

in FY 1989 in anticipation of its launch, which took place during that fiscal year, 

and in FY 2006. Allocations for Shuttle servicing missions ended in FY 2009, 

the year of the final servicing mission to HST. The funding data were supplied 

by NASA Headquarters.
344 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

▼ HST funding summary since new start, science only (in millions of real year dollars).

Technology

DevelopmentGround 

Systems

Operations/

Servicing 

Missions

Data 

Analysis/

Research

Servicing 

Missions Operations TOTAL

FY 75 3.0 3.0

FY 76 7.0 7.0

FY 77

FY 78 36.0 36.0

FY 79 79.2 79.2

FY 80 112.7 1.8 114.5

FY 81 120.8 6.7 127.5

FY 82 121.5 13.2 134.7

FY 83 184.6 29.8 214.4

FY 84 203.1 34.0 237.1

FY 85 215.6 54.1 269.7

FY 86 153.9 55.8 209.7

FY 87 151.6 41.7 193.3

FY 88 144.3 48.0 192.3

FY 89 104.9 88.5 9.8 203.2

FY 90 81.8 139.1 13.3 234.2

FY 91 186.0 35.9 221.9

FY 92 207.7 36.0 243.7

FY 93 216.7 42.4 259.1

FY 94 215.2 38.5 253.7

FY 95 236.7 37.7 274.4

FY 96 190.7 43.5 234.2

FY 97 213.7 40.9 254.6

FY 98 180.4 39.5 219.9

FY 99 196.1 33.7 229.8

FY 00 185.6 68.4 254.0

FY 01 181.0 75.4 256.4

FY 02 175.2 80.7 255.9

FY 03 145.5 83.1 228.6

FY 04 155.6 87.0 242.6

FY 05 220.2 76.5 296.7

FY 06 183.6 78.6 262.2

FY 07 191.5 86.0 277.5

FY 08 153.7 83.4 237.1

FY 09 135.9 67.2 203.1

FY 10 100.7 100.7

FY 11 91.6 91.6

FY 12 98.3 98.3

FY 13 93.3 93.3

FY 14 98.3 98.3

FY 15 98.6 98.6

FY 16 98.3 98.3

FY 17 97.3 97.3

FY 18 98.3 98.3

FY 19 98.3 98.3

TOTAL 10.0 1,710.0 285.1 3,133.8 842.3 664.8 1,288.2 7,934.1
Appen

▼ HST funding summary since new start, science only (in millions of FY 2019 dollars).

Technology

DevelopmentGround 

Systems

Operations/

Servicing 

Missions

Data 

Analysis/

Research

Servicing 

Missions Operations TOTAL

FY 75 14.3 14.3

FY 76 31.4 31.4

FY 77

FY 78 141.1 141.1

FY 79 278.8 278.8

FY 80 349.4 5.6 355.0

FY 81 339.4 18.8 358.3

FY 82 322.0 35.0 357.0

FY 83 474.4 76.6 551.0

FY 84 499.6 83.6 583.3

FY 85 513.1 128.8 641.9

FY 86 358.6 130.0 488.6

FY 87 341.1 93.8 434.9

FY 88 311.7 103.7 415.4

FY 89 216.1 182.3 20.2 418.6

FY 90 160.3 272.5 26.1 458.9

FY 91 349.7 67.5 417.2

FY 92 378.0 65.5 443.5

FY 93 383.5 75.0 458.6

FY 94 372.3 66.6 438.9

FY 95 397.7 63.3 461.0

FY 96 310.8 70.9 381.7

FY 97 339.8 65.0 404.8

FY 98 283.2 62.0 345.2

FY 99 300.0 51.6 351.6

FY 00 274.7 101.2 375.9

FY 01 260.6 108.6 369.3

FY 02 248.8 114.6 363.4

FY 03 202.2 115.5 317.8

FY 04 210.1 117.4 327.5

FY 05 288.4 100.2 388.6

FY 06 233.2 99.8 333.0

FY 07 235.6 105.8 341.4

FY 08 182.9 99.2 282.1

FY 09 161.7 80.0 241.6

FY 10 117.9 117.9

FY 11 104.5 104.5

FY 12 109.1 109.1

FY 13 102.6 102.6

FY 14 106.2 106.2

FY 15 106.5 106.5

FY 16 105.2 105.2

FY 17 101.2 101.2

FY 18 98.3 98.3

FY 19 98.3 98.3

TOTAL 45.7 4,305.7 675.9 5,054.8 1,291.3 813.4 1,434.4 13,621.2

Appen

APPENDIX B

EVOLUTION OF PROPOSAL RATE AND ACCEPTANCE RATE FOR 

HST OBSERVING PROPOSALS

Submitted vs. Approved Proposals

0

200

400

1234567

7N+AR

89

101112131415161718192021222324252627

MCT

600

800

1000

1200

1400

0

4,000

8,000

12,000

16,000

20,000

24,000

28,000

Number of Proposals

Number of Orbits

Cycle

Proposals Submitted

Proposals Approved

Orbits Submitted

Orbits Approved

▲ Graph showing the number of submitted proposals versus approved proposals, as well as 

the number of orbits submitted in HST-observing proposals versus approved proposals 

for Cycles 1–27. Data are shown on the following page. Information provided by the STSci.

Notes: MCT was the call for very large multi-cycle treasury (MCT) proposals that STScI issued 

after Servicing Mission 4 in 2009. 7N and 7AR were special calls for NICMOS observing and 

archival proposals after an instrument fault was identified that limited the time that it would be 

available before its coolant ran out. In Cycles 25 and 26, STScI adjusted the allocations for those 

two cycles since it expected to be hosting the JWST Cycle 1 TAC in June 2018. The Cycle 25 

Call also allocated time in Cycle 26 for small proposals. As a result, the Cycle 26 Call was only 

for medium and large proposals.
348 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

▼ Number of proposals for Hubble Space Telescope time submitted and approved for 

Cycles 1–27. Information provided by STSci.

Cycle

Approved 

proposals Submitted

Approved 

orbits

Submitted 

orbits

1 112 556 1,346 10,732

2 141 483 1,380 8,169

3 173 424 1,455 6,303

4 216 501 2,835 8,289

5 352 863 4,574 14,272

6 496 1,025 4,600 13,543

7 424 1,298 4,400 21,734

7N+AR 119 617 1,041 6,473

8 295 1,053 3,300 14,005

9 212 914 2,866 17,690

10 193 906 2,920 16,236

11 198 1,078 3,130 24,667

12 242 1,046 3,150 19,674

13 209 949 4,036 17,257

14 209 727 2,948 14,190

15 203 733 3,223 14,581

Cycle

Approved 

proposals Submitted

Approved 

orbits

Submitted 

orbits

16 203 821 3,164 16,078

17 228 960 3,411 20,630

18 196 1,050 2,578 23,096

19 199 1,007 2,554 18,659

20 231 1,085 2,802 16,681

21 248 1,094 3,308 19,742

22 263 1,135 3,707 19,900

23 261 1,115 3,563 19,301

24 245 1,094 3,560 25,611

25 340 1,205 4,900 23,365

26 40 489 2,077 25,775

27 182 1,019 2,686 24,454

MCT 4 39 2,262 26,801

7N 75 448

7AR 44 169

TOTAL 6,434 25,286 87,776 507,908

▼ Proposals by continent/region. Information provided by STSci.

Continent/Region Proposals

United States of America 19,097

Canada and Mexico 409

North America 19,506

Europe 3,430

South America 186

Africa 24

Australia 247

Middle East 102

Asia 1,731
▼ Proposals: HST time by country. Information provided by STSci.

Country

Total 

Submitted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7N 8 9

Sum 

10–16 16S 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Argentina 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1

Armenia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Australia 243 3 2 3 10 12 14 5 12 16 60 3 11 15 12 14 12 15 13 5 3 3

Austria 44 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 9 0 1 2 1 5 5 10 1 3

Belgium 66 4 1 1 1 2 2 3 0 1 0 18 2 6 4 3 4 3 2 2 1 2 4

Brazil 31 1 1 2 2 2 4 2 8 0 2 2 2 1 1 1

Canada 361 8 4 9 24 26 31 9 19 18 81 2 15 15 12 13 8 12 15 14 11 6 9

Chile 143 2 2 2 2 1 4 0 24 4 4 7 9 12 14 15 12 10 10 3 6

China 57 1 0 0 2 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 4 1 4 7 10 8 8 7

Columbia 1 1

Czech Republic 17 1 3 2 1 1 4 3 2

Denmark 67 1 0 2 1 2 4 6 4 0 6 6 4 3 5 5 5 6 2 5

Finland 24 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 1 2 2 1 1 2 2

France 569 22 19 9 23 26 33 37 13 37 22 123 5 19 16 23 25 22 24 25 20 11 5 10

Germany 969 25 20 16 18 42 46 78 31 52 46 198 8 32 38 33 33 44 37 41 42 46 11 32

Greece 9 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 0 1 1

Hungary 1 1

Iceland 1 1

India 26 1 1 0 2 2 0 2 1 11 0 2 1 1 1 1

Ireland 32 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 13 5 2 2 4 1 1 1

Israel 101 1 1 1 6 3 7 3 8 4 16 1 2 5 5 7 5 3 8 4 6 1 4

Italy 586 19 17 18 9 20 25 33 11 25 20 130 7 16 28 19 23 16 34 23 22 30 11 30

continued ▾

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▼ Proposals: HST time by country. (continued)

Country

Total 

Submitted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 7N 8 9

Sum 

10–16 16S 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Japan 114 2 1 1 4 4 3 3 9 1 5 5 10 9 9 10 12 10 6 10

Kazakhstan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

Korea 34 0 0 0 0 3 0 7 1 0 4 4 5 4 4 1 1

Mexico 48 1 1 1 3 4 4 2 0 1 8 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 3 1 5

New Zealand 4 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0

Norway 11 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Poland 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 1 2

Portugal 7 2 2 1 2

Russia 39 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 7 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 3 4 2Serbia 1 1South Africa 24 3 1 4 2 3 0 1 0 1 1 0 6 2Spain 262 2 4 2 2 10 18 6 8 13 66 8 19 11 14 11 11 10 13 7 11 4 12

Sweden 182 3 4 2 1 5 4 13 3 14 8 36 3 4 6 6 6 5 9 11 11 12 6 10

Switzerland 172 3 3 2 2 6 5 4 2 3 4 26 1 7 6 2 6 8 11 11 13 19 10 18

Taiwan 6 1 2 1 2The Netherlands 355 7 5 7 10 18 13 23 10 18 11 63 4 10 11 16 20 17 12 13 19 25 8 15

Turkey 1 1Ukraine 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 1 2

United Kingdom 1,494 16 15 21 21 58 79 105 39 70 57 316 14 51 65 58 65 59 72 74 74 86 28 51

United States 19,097 377 374 333 340 627 747 911 306 760 676 5,002 213 758 788 761 817 835 842 803 796 881 376 774

Uruguay 3 1 1 1Venezuela 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1Yugoslavia 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0TOTAL 25,230 481 483 423 447 863 1,025 1,298 449 1,053 914 6,259 277 958 1,050 1,007 1,090 1,094 1,134 1,115 1,094 1,208 489 1,019

350 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS
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APPENDIX C

THE BALTIMORE CHARTER FOR WOMEN IN ASTRONOMY

The Baltimore Charter for Women

in Astronomy

“Women Hold up Half the Sky” —Chinese saying

Preamble

We hold as fundamental that:

• Women and men are equally capable of doing excellent science.

• Diversity contributes to, rather than conflicts with, excellence in science.

• Current recruitment, training, evaluation and award systems often prevent the equal participation of women.

• Formal and informal mechanisms that are effectively discriminatory are 

unlikely to change by themselves. Both thought and action are necessary 

to ensure equal participation for all.

• Increasing the number of women in astronomy will improve the professional environment and improving the environment will increase the 

number of women.

This Charter addresses the need to develop a scientific culture within which 

both women and men can work effectively and within which all can have satisfying and rewarding careers. Our focus is on women but actions taken to 

improve the situation of women in astronomy should be applied aggressively to 

those minorities even more disenfranchised.

Rationale

Astronomy has a long and honorable tradition of participation by women, who 

have made many significant and highly creative contributions to the field. 

Approximately 15% of astronomers worldwide are women but there is wide geographical diversity, with some countries having none and others having more 

than 50%. This shows that scientific careers are strongly affected by social and 

cultural factors, and are not determined solely by ability.

The search for excellence which unites all scientists can be maintained and 

enhanced by increasing the diversity of its practitioners. Great discoveries have 

always occurred in times of cross-cultural enrichment: along trade routes, in 
352 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

periods of geographical exploration, among immigrants and multinationals. 

The introduction of new approaches frequently results in new breakthroughs. 

Achieving such diversity requires revised, not lesser, criteria for judging excellence, free of culturally-based perceptions of talent and promise.

A review of available information on the relative numbers and career histories of women and men in science reveals extensive discrimination. Access to 

the profession—graduate education, hiring, promotion, funding—is not always 

independent of gender. Unequal treatment of women in the laboratory, the lecture hall and the observatory, more subtle but at least as important as overt discrimination, creates a chilly climate which discourages and distresses women, 

alienates them from the field, and ultimately damages the profession.

Existing inequities can be eliminated only partially by legal stricture or they 

would not continue today. Improving the situation requires awareness of the 

very real barriers women currently face, including sexual stereotyping, opportunity and pay differentials, inappropriate time limits on advancement, overcritical scrutiny and sexual harassment. Sexual harassment, ranging from an 

uncomfortable work environment to unwanted sexual attention to overt extortion of sexual favors, can force confrontation between junior astronomers and 

older, better established colleagues who can strongly influence career advancement; it diverts attention from science to sex, places an undue burden on the 

harassed, and damages their self-esteem.

The entire profession must assume the immediate and ongoing responsibility for implementing strategies that will enable women to succeed within the 

existing structures of astronomy and allow the desired acceptance of diversity 

to develop fully.

Recommendations

1. Significant advances for women have been made possible by affirmative action. Affirmative action involves the establishment of serious goals, 

not rigid quotas, for achieving diversity in all aspects of the profession, 

including hiring, invited talks, committees, and awards.

a. Standards for candidates should be established and publicized in 

advance. Criteria that are culturally based or otherwise extraneous 

to performance or the pursuit of scientific excellence should not 

be applied.

b. Women should participate in the selection process. If insufficient 

numbers of women are available at particular institutions, outside scientists can be invited to assist. Men must share fully the 
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responsibility for implementing affirmative action, as they hold the 

majority of leadership positions.

c. The selection of women should reflect on average their numbers in 

the appropriate pool of candidates and normally at least one woman 

should be on the short list for any position, paid or honorific. When 

women are underrepresented in the pool, their numbers should be 

increased by active and energetic recruitment.

d. Demographic information for each astronomical organization should 

be widely publicized. If the goals for affirmative action are not 

achieved, the reasons must be determined.

2. The criteria used in hiring, assignment, promotion and awards should 

be broadened in recognition of different pacing of careers, care of older 

and younger family members, and demands of dual-career households. 

Provision for day care facilities, family leave, time off and re-entry will 

instantly improve women’s access to an astronomical career and is of 

equal benefit to men.

3. Strong action must be taken to end sexual harassment. Education and 

awareness programs are standard in U.S. government and industry and 

should be adopted by the astronomical community. Each institution 

should appoint one or more women to receive complaints about sexual 

harassment and to participate in the formal review process. Action against 

those who perpetrate sexual harassment should be swift and substantial.

4. Gender-neutral language and illustrations are important in the formation 

of expectations, both by those in power and those seeking entrance to 

the profession. Documents and discussions should be sensitive to bias 

that favors any one gender, race, sexual orientation, life style, or work 

style. Those who represent astronomy to the public should be particularly aware of the power of language and images which, intentionally or 

unintentionally, reflect on astronomy as a profession.

5. Physical safety is of concern to all astronomers and of particular significance to women, who often feel more vulnerable when working alone on 

campus or in observatories. This issue must be addressed by those in a 

position to affect security, making it possible for everyone to work at any 

hour, in any place, as necessary.
354 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Call to Action

Improving the situation of women in astronomy will benefit, and is the responsibility of, astronomers at all levels. Department heads, observatory directors, 

policy committee chairs, and funding agency officials have a particular responsibility to facilitate the full participation of women: to nurture new talent, to 

ensure the effectiveness of teaching, and to examine and correct patterns of 

inequity. The profession should be responsible for regular review and assessment 

of the status of women in astronomy, in pursuit of equality and fairness for all.

A rational and collegial environment which allows full expression of intellectual style is necessary for achieving excellence in scientific research. Women 

should not have to be clones of male astronomers in order to participate in 

the mainstream of astronomical research. Women want and deserve the same 

opportunity as their male colleagues to achieve excellence in astronomy.

Signatories

Elise Albert, Ron Allen, Martha Anderson, Martina Belz Arndt, Neta Bahcall, 

Nancyjane Bailey, Suchitra Balachandran, Vicki Balzano, Stefi Baum, Barbara 

Becker, Lynne Billard, Karen S. Bjorkman, Cindy Blaha, Elizabeth Bonar, 

Peter Boyce, Susan W. Boynton, Mimi Bredeson, Margaret Burbidge, Claude 

Canizares, Nancy Chanover, Grace Chen, Jennifer Christensen, Frederick 

R. Chromey, Geoffrey C. Clayton, France A. Cordova, Anne Cowley, Laura 

Danly, Doris Daou, Doug Duncan, Joann Eisberg, Debra Elmegreen, Bruce 

Elmegreen, Michael Eracleous, Sheryl Falgout, Deborah C. Fort, Pru Foster, 

Diane L. Fowlkes, Linda French, Riccardo Giacconi, Diane Gilmore, Sherri D. 

Godlin, Daniel Golombek, Anne Gonnella, Shireen Gonzaga, Eva K. Grebel, 

Noreen Grice, Elizabeth Griffin, Heidi B. Hammel, Robert J. Hanisch, Helen 

M. Hart, Hashima Hasan, Isabel Hawkins, Tim Heckman, Charlene Heisler, 

Lori K. Herold, James E. Hesser, Susan Hoban, Jane Holmquist, Nancy Houk, 

Sethanne Howard, Svetlana Hubrig, Roberta Humphreys, Todd Hurt, Judith 

A. Irwin, Deepa R. Iyengar, Vera Izvekova, Helmut Jenkner, Inger Joergensen, 

Jennifer Johnson, Liana Johnson, Debora M. Katz-Stone, Laura Kay, Anne 

Kinney, Denise V. Kitson, Anuradha Koratkar, Ira Kostiuk, Susan Lamb, 

Adair Lane, Krista Lawrance, Robin Lerner, Janet Levine, Stephen Levine, 

Karen Lezon, Omar Lopez-Cruz, James Lowenthal, Olivia L. Lupie, Julie 

Lutz, Duccio Macchetto, Sue Madden, Bianca Mancinelli, Cathy Mansperger, 

Nathalie Martimbeau, Melissa McGrath, Jaylee Mead, Kathy Mead, Mike 

Meakes, Karen J. Meech, Windsor A. Morgan, Jr., Lauretta M. Nagel, Susan 

Neff, Joy Nichols-Bohlin, Goetz Oertel, Sally Oey, Angela V. Olinto, Nancy 

Oliversen, Samantha Osmer, Nino Panagia, Pat Parker, Judith Perry, Joanna 
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Rankin, Luisa Rebull, Patty Reeves, Peter Reppert, Mercedes T. Richards, 

Carmelle Robert, Claudia A. Robinson, Elizabeth Roettger, Vera Rubin, 

Laura Ann Ruocco, Penny D. Sackett, Maitrayee Sahi, Londa Schiebinger, 

Regina E. Schulte-Ladbeck, Ethan Schreier, Andrea Schweitzer, Anouk A. 

Shambrook, Lea Shanley, Robin Shelton, Debra Shepherd, Lisa E. Sherbert, 

Angela Silverstein, Linda (Dix) Skidmore, Tatiana Smirnova, Ulysses J. Sofia, 

Emily Sterner, Sarah Stevens-Rayburn, Peter Stockman, Susan Stolovy, Alex 

Storrs, Svetlana Suleymanova, Cindy Taylor, Sheila Tobias, Eline Tolstoy, 

Andrea Tuffli, Meg Urry, Paul Vanden Bout, Fabienne van de Rydt, Liese van 

Zee, Frances Verter, Stefanie Wachter, William J. Wagner, Nolan R. Walborn, 

William H. Waller, Harold A. Weaver, Rachel Webster, Alycia Weinberger, Daryl 

Weinstein, Barbara Whitney, Reva K. Williams, Lance Wobus, Sidney Wolff, 

James P. Wright, Katharine C. Wright, Eric W. Wyckoff, Emily Xanthopoulos, 

Sophie Yancopoulos

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APPENDIX D

PUBLISHED PAPER COUNTS

Published Papers Based on HST Data

STSci data available at http://archive.stsci.edu/hst/bibliography/pubstat.html.

▼ HST paper counts.

This table lists the number of papers in academic journals using Hubble Space Telescope data by year, 

and broken down according to whether the authors are General Observers who obtained HST observing 

time through the Time Allocation process, or whether they used HST data obtained from the archive. 

Some papers used data from both sources, and in others, the source isn’t known. Year Total Papers Part GO Part Archival Archival General Observers Programs Not Assigned

1991 42 1 9 31 1

1992 58 4 18 34 2

1993 112 8 29 72 3

1994 178 14 39 122 3

1995 244 20 59 162 3

1996 307 35 84 177 11

1997 378 43 118 213 4

1998 509 41 164 278 26

1999 502 53 174 237 38

2000 537 66 183 247 41

2001 559 72 181 262 44

2002 602 99 202 241 60

2003 607 108 274 216 9

2004 611 98 248 238 27

2005 686 120 267 248 51

YearTotal PapersPart GO Part ArchivalArchivalGeneral ObserversPrograms Not Assigned

2006 715 114 295 227 79

2007 728 87 318 267 56

2008 704 81 324 236 63

2009 679 88 306 265 20

2010 734 107 356 259 12

2011 788 112 385 269 22

2012 847 135 361 309 42

2013 785 119 314 279 73

2014 818 142 357 301 18

2015 853 159 353 329 12

2016 883 160 370 333 20

2017 912 175 373 342 22

2018 968 172 397 368 31

2019 1,014 168 457 369 20
Published Papers by HST Instrument

Data is available at http://archive.stsci.edu/hst/bibliography/pubstat.html.

▼ HST paper counts by instrument.

This table lists academic papers in academic journals using Hubble Space Telescope data, broken down 

by instruments used for the observations.

Year ACS COS FGS FOC FOS GHRS HSP NICMOS STIS WFC3 WF/PC WFPC2

1991 0 0 2 11 4 13 0 0 0 0 10 0

1992 0 0 3 14 9 9 0 0 0 0 22 0

1993 0 0 2 24 21 25 4 0 0 0 39 1

1994 0 0 3 29 38 39 4 0 0 0 53 15

1995 0 0 1 32 54 59 5 0 0 0 48 55

1996 0 0 2 23 58 45 4 0 0 0 30 147

1997 0 0 7 35 56 75 1 2 1 0 25 177

1998 0 0 5 15 83 88 2 25 20 0 18 258

1999 0 0 8 20 53 62 2 63 29 0 4 246

2000 0 0 7 2 35 47 1 89 83 0 7 279

2001 0 0 4 12 32 38 3 86 112 0 3 294

2002 1 0 6 10 37 25 0 64 160 0 5 319

2003 26 0 7 10 36 25 1 93 165 0 9 338

2004 122 0 9 12 29 26 2 60 175 0 5 306

2005 205 0 8 4 35 21 0 105 192 0 6 303

2006 297 0 4 12 28 28 1 116 163 0 8 274

2007 379 0 10 7 25 22 0 107 130 0 5 262

2008 405 0 5 5 14 10 0 111 98 0 6 260

2009 425 1 5 3 19 3 0 121 81 1 4 233

2010 410 18 4 7 20 18 1 117 95 48 8 245

2011 433 48 9 8 23 10 0 113 106 99 10 223

2012 452 44 3 3 14 15 0 93 113 186 3 231

2013 411 53 5 3 24 10 0 83 108 234 5 177

2014 417 69 7 3 20 11 1 67 108 311 4 181

2015 449 77 4 3 23 12 0 55 103 370 3 156

2016 457 83 3 6 25 11 0 70 114 374 1 141

2017 457 76 7 2 18 5 1 41 103 439 7 145

2018 440 93 8 4 16 13 0 47 131 501 3 156

2019 478 89 7 2 18 10 0 41 124 529 4 137

ACS	 Advanced Camera for Surveys (2002–present)

COS	 Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (2009–present)

FGS	 Fine Guidance Sensor (1990–present)

FOC	 Faint Object Camera (1990–2002)

FOS	 Faint Object Spectrograph (1990–1997)

GHRS	 Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph (1990–1997)

HSP	 High Speed Photometer (1990–1993)

NICMOS	Near Infrared Camera & Multi-Imaging Spectrometer (1997–present)

STIS	 SpaceTelescopeImaging Spectrograph (1997–present)

WFC3	 WideField Camera 3 (2009–present)

WF/PC	 WideField/Planetary Camera (1990–1993)

WFPC2	 WideField Planetary Camera 2 (1993–2009)

358 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS
359

ACRONYMS

▲ ACS image of NGC 346 in the small Megellanic cloud. (NASA, ESA, and A. Nota [STScI/ESA]: heic0502a)

AAS American Astronomical Society

ACS Advanced Camera for Surveys

AO Announcement of Opportunity

ASP Astronomical Society of the Pacific

AURA Association of Universities for 

Research in Astronomy

CADC Canadian Astronomy Data Centre

CAIB Columbia Accident Investigation 

Board

CANDELS Cosmic Assembly Near-infrared Deep 

Extragalactic Legacy Survey

CCD Charge-Coupled Device

CD-ROM Compact Disc-Read Only Memory

CLASH Cluster Lensing and Supernova 

Survey

COBE Cosmic Background Explorer

COSTAR Corrective Optics Space Telescope 

Axial Replacement

COS Cosmic Origins Spectrograph

CSA Canadian Space Agency

CSOC Consolidated Space Operations 

Contract

DADS Data Archive and Distribution Service

DEC Digital Equipment Corporation

DOC Data Operations Control

DSS Digitized Sky Survey

EMU Extravehicular Mobility Unit

ESA European Space Agency

ESAC European Space Astronomy Centre

EVA Extra Vehicular Activity

FGS Fine Guidance Sensor

FITS Flexible Image Transport System

FOC Faint Object Camera

FOS Faint Object Spectrograph

FSS Flight Support System

FY Fiscal Year

GAO Government Accountability Office

GO General Observer

GOODS Great Observatories Origins Deep 

Survey

GSFC Goddard Space Flight Center

GHRS Goddard High Resolution 

Spectrograph

GTO Guaranteed Time Observer

HARP Hubble Archive Re-Engineering 

Project

HDF Hubble Deep Field

HIMS Hubble Imaging Michelson 

Spectrometer

HOST HST Orbital Systems Test

HSP High Speed Photometer

HST Hubble Space Telescope

ISS International Space Station

IUE International Ultraviolet Observatory

JSC Johnson Space Center

JPL Jet Propulsion Laboratory

JWST James Webb Space Telescop

KSC Kennedy Space Center

LST Large Space Telescope
360 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

MAMA Multi-Anode Microchannel Array

MAST Mikulski Archive for Space Telescopes

MDA MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates, 

Ltd.

MMU Manned Maneuvering Unit

MSC Marshall Space Center

MOSES Mission Operations Software and 

Engineering Support

NAS National Academy of Science

NASA National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration

NGST Next Generation Space Telescope 

(later JWST

NICMOS Near Infrared Camera and MultiObject Spectrometer

NSF National Science Foundation

OAO Orbiting Astronomical Observatory

OSS Observation Support System

OSS NASA Office of Space Science

OTA Optical Telescope Assembly

PHAT Panchromatic Hubble Andromeda 

Treasury

POCC Payload Operations Control Center

PORTS Preliminary Operations Requirements 

and Test Support

PRESTO Project to Re-Engineer Space 

Telescope Observing

PRS PORTS Refurbishment System

RFP Request for Proposals

SAO Smithsonian Astrophysical 

Observatory

SCP Supernova Cosmology Project

SH0ES Supernovae H0 for the Equation of 

State

SOGS Science Operations Ground System

SOMO Space Operations and Management 

Office

STAC Space Telescope Advisory Committee

STAR Space Telescope Axial Replacement

ST-ECF Space Telescope-European Coordinating Facility

STIC Space Telescope Institute Council

STIS Space Telescope Imaging 

Spectrograph

STOCC Space Telescope Operations Control 

Center

STS Space Transportation System

STScI Space Telescope Science Institute

STUC Space Telescope User Committee

TAC Time Allocation Committee

TDRS Tracking and Data Relay Satellite

TESS Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite

VEST Vehicle Electrical System Test

WETF Weightless Environment Training

Facility 

WFC3 Wide Field Camera 

WFIRST Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope

(later Nancy Roman Space Telescope)

WF/PC Wide Field Planetary Camer

WFPC2 Wide Field Planetary Camera 

WMAP Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy

Probe
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

▲ Hubble image released in 2019 of a spiral galaxy called NGC 3717 in the constellation Hydra. 

(ESA/Hubble/NASA/D. Rosario: potw1940a)

T

his book began when scientists and engineers at NASA’s Goddard Space 

Flight Center decided that a history of Hubble Space Telescope operations should be written. This new historical work would complement 

Robert W. Smith’s classic study, The Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, 

Technology and Politics, which chronicled the lengthy process that brought HST 

to the point of launch. With support from historians at the NASA History Office 

and the Smithsonian Institution’s National Air and Space Museum, NASA 

Goddard issued Request for Proposal NNG14500087Q in April 2014 for an 

academic quality history of HST operations and an archive of historical materials for future historians to draw on when creating future histories of HST.

I was encouraged that spring to compete for this contract by astronomer 

friends at the Dominion Astrophysical Observatory located near my home in 

Victoria, B.C., Canada, but I knew that it would require more than a single person to complete. I was soon contacted by John D. Ruley of Modesto, California, 

whom I did not know but who had recently completed the master’s program in 

space studies from the University of North Dakota (UND), a program I had 

completed years before. Dr. Stephen B. Johnson, who had taught us both at 

UND, recommended John and I to each other. John was interested in creating 

the archive for this project, and he was also associated with Foresight Science 

& Technology, Inc., a technology commercialization and consulting company 

that specializes in accelerating the transition to market  of technologies and 

in providing commercial evaluation and assistance for technologies supported 

by federal and state government agencies and laboratories. 

I worked with John and Foresight on our successful bid for the competition, 

and Foresight signed a contract for our team with NASA Goddard in November 

2014 to develop the book and the archive. Throughout the term of the contract, I worked closely with John, who developed an excellent online archive of 
382 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

interviews and documents based on my research. John helped with many of the 

interviews I conducted while researching this book, and he also reviewed my 

drafts, provided valued advice, and joined me for some research trips. We both 

worked closely with Daniel M. Satinsky, Foresight’s Vice President for Business 

Development, who ensured that our contract with NASA ran smoothly. We 

were also assisted by Phyl Speser, Norton Kaplan, and Arendt Speser of 

Foresight. Thanks are also due to our transcriptionist, Jane Dillingham of 

Transcription Professionals.

The archive was developed using the Omeka platform from George Mason 

University, and grew to include more than 22,000 scanned document pages, 

audio interviews (and in selected cases, high definition video) with some 80 

interviewees, and over 150 still images. In total, 115 gigabytes of searchable 

data covering the history of the Hubble project from the telescope launch in 

1990 through 2017 when the archive was delivered to NASA. This collection is 

now housed at NASA Headquarters, in the NASA History Division’s archives, 

and is accessible to historians and other researchers. 

At Goddard, James F. Jeletic, Deputy Project Manager for Hubble Space 

Telescope Operations, worked hard to make this book and the archive a reality. I would also like to recognize HST Project Manager Patrick L. Crouse and 

Jeannine A. Kashif, their Project Support Specialist, who provided invaluable 

help to both John and me. Kenneth G. Carpenter, HST Operations Project 

Scientist, was always available to assist us, and so was HST Senior Project 

Scientist Jennifer J. Wiseman. I received a great deal of help, advice, and support from Goddard Emeritus Astrophysicist Theodore R. Gull, Deputy HST 

Project Scientist for Operations Patricia T. (Padi) Boyd, Tod R. Lauer of the 

National Optical Astronomy Observatory, and former NASA Headquarters HST 

Program Scientist Harley A. Thronson. I interviewed many people at NASA 

Goddard, and I would like to express special thanks to David S. Leckrone, HST 

Senior Project Scientist from 1992 to 2009, whose three interviews covering his 

lengthy work with HST were especially valuable to my work. 

James Reis, HST Grounds Systems Manager at Goddard, worked with John 

on creating the online archive. Holly A. Mcintyre, Goddard’s Archivist, provided valuable assistance to both of us in retrieving documents, along with 

Michael J. Chesnes, Heather Johnson, Jessica Deibert, Katrina Jackson, Jim 

White, and Amber N. Straughn. I called on Craig Neelands and Richard Dancy 

for advice on archival work.

The staff of the NASA History Division at NASA Headquarters in 

Washington, DC, also played crucial roles in the creation of this book. Stephen 

J. Garber reviewed drafts of this book, helped find information sources around 
Acknow

NASA, and was our main contact with the history office. Thanks are also due 

to NASA Chief Historian William P. Barry for his assistance and advice, and 

his predecessor Steven J. Dick, who generously shared the interviews and documents he gathered while researching his paper on NASA Administrator Sean 

O’Keefe’s decision to cancel HST Servicing Mission 4. Thanks also to Nadine 

Andreassen for her invaluable assistance. John and I worked with the late NASA 

Chief Archivist Jane H. Odom before her retirement, her successor Robyn 

Rodgers, and archivists John Hargenrader, Elizabeth Suckow, and Colin Fries, 

along with Gwen Pitman in the Headquarters Photo Library. Craig Tupper in 

the Science Mission Directorate supplied useful budget information on HST.

Many thanks to the exemplary production team in the Communications 

Support Services Center (CSSC). Shawna Byrd, Anne Factor, and Lisa Jirousek 

expertly copyedited the manuscript; Michele Ostovar did a wonderful job laying 

out the design; Tun Hla skillfully oversaw the printing and the entire production team. Additional thanks to Kristin Harley, who did an outstanding job of 

preparing the index. Thank you all for your skill, professionalism, and customerfriendly attitudes in bringing this book to fruition.

Throughout the development of this book and archive, we enjoyed full cooperation from everyone we dealt with at the Space Telescope Science Institute in 

Baltimore, Maryland, including Directors C. M. “Matt” Mountain and Kenneth 

R. Sembach. Hussein Jirdeh, Head of Communications and Public Outreach, 

and his staff were unfailingly helpful. Helmut Jenkner helped introduce me to 

the inner workings of the Institute, and Neill Reid was always available to educate me in the workings of the time allocation process for HST. I had known 

STScI’s longtime News Chief and Public Information Manager, Ray Villard, for 

20 years before I started on this book, and Ray’s insights and friendship were 

invaluable for my work. STScI Chief Librarian Jill Lagerstrom was always eager 

to help me find important documents, and her successor Jenny Novacescu 

picked up where Jill left off. Roslyn Baxter, Ann Jenkins, Cheryl Gundy, Sherita 

Hanna, and Martha Devaud also helped. Many Institute scientists past and 

present are on the list of people who granted interviews. 

Historians at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian 

Institution provided me with invaluable assistance. David H. DeVorkin, who 

has coauthored several books on HST, provided vital critical commentary on 

my drafts and a great deal of helpful advice. I would also like to thank Roger 

D. Launius, Michael J. Neufeld, Paul E. Ceruzzi, Valerie Neal, Margaret 

Weitekamp, and James E. David for their advice and assistance. 

Historian Erik M. Conway and archivist Julie A. Cooper made our visit 

to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in California profitable. Rosalyn H. Brown 
384 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

facilitated my interviews at Ball Aerospace in Boulder, Colorado, as did Lynne 

Vanin at MDA in Brampton, Ontario, and Patricia Alvarez at Lockheed Martin 

in Littleton, Colorado. I interviewed several astronauts for this book, and I also 

profited from unrecorded discussions with astronauts Kathryn D. Sullivan and 

Steven L. Smith. Dr. Sullivan made an even bigger contribution to my work 

with many helpful comments on a draft of this book and by sharing the galleys 

of her own excellent book on her experiences with HST, Handprints on Hubble: 

An Astronaut’s Story of Invention.

An important source of documents for this book and the archive was 

the Rare Books and Manuscripts Department of the Milton S. Eisenhower 

Library at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. Senior Reference 

Archivist James Stimpert and his staff were always ready to help when I needed 

to consult the Space Telescope Collection there that was assembled by Robert 

W. Smith while writing The Space Telescope, and the Space Telescope Science 

Institute Collection that was assembled by Daniel Golombek while he worked 

at STScI. Golombek, who worked at the American Institute of Physics while I 

researched this book, was also helpful, and the AIP proved to be a useful source 

for information in my work.

I am most grateful to Maria J. Wood, who lent me the journals and other 

materials created by her late husband, H. John Wood, while he worked to overcome HST’s spherical aberration problem during his career at NASA Goddard. 

Lick Observatory astrophysicist Sandra M. Faber made available the diaries 

she kept while she and other members of the WF/PC team first encountered 

and flushed out the spherical aberration that afflicted HST. Elizabeth Kessler 

of Stanford University provided documents related to the Hubble Heritage 

Program. Rick Fienberg, the Press Officer of the American Astronomical 

Society, helped me keep up to date with astronomical news. I also consulted 

with John M. Logsdon and Scott Pace of the Space Policy Institute at George 

Washington University, Dwayne A. Day of the National Research Council, and 

Joanne Leung at MDA.

Throughout my work on this project I have received encouragement and 

a great deal of useful advice from my friends at the Dominion Astrophysical 

Observatory. James E. Hesser served for many years as DAO director and is a 

valued friend along with his wife Betty. John B. Hutchings shared his extensive knowledge of HST, supplemented by records of meetings at STScI. Laura 

Ferrarese, whose many accomplishments include a Hubble Fellowship, was 

always available to answer my questions about cosmology. Dennis Crabtree 

introduced me to the Canadian Astronomy Data Centre and its trove of HST 
Acknow

data long before I started on this book. I have also been assisted by Patrick Côté 

and James Di Francesco.

In addition to the libraries and archives mentioned above, I called on the 

resources of the Library of Congress and libraries at the University of Victoria, 

University of Washington, University of British Columbia, and the University 

of Alberta.

I want to extend a special thanks to Professor Robert W. Smith of the 

University of Alberta. In addition to being the author of The Space Telescope 

and many other works on HST, he was my faculty advisor during my Ph.D. 

studies, and he has been a constant source of advice and encouragement since 

that time, especially for this book, which has also benefitted from his critical 

reading of a draft manuscript. I also want to thank other anonymous reviewers 

of my manuscript, who all have made it better. Remaining deficiencies in this 

work are the responsibility of the author.

In the 1990s, the late Barry Shanko introduced me to people like Ray Villard 

at STScI and Dennis Crabtree at the DAO, and he reintroduced me to the 

Royal Astronomical Society of Canada. He has also helped out with this book 

by sharing books and media guides I otherwise wouldn’t have found.

I also wish to thank Paul Fjeld, Randy Attwood, Randall Rosenfeld, Scott 

Sacknoff, David Baker, Ken Harman, Matt Nelson, Margaret Panton, Will 

Offley, Rolf Maurer, Steve Pacholuk, Steve Shallhorn, Marcus Gee, Kate 

Andrew, Sue Birge, Shawn Strandberg, Martha Starr, Forrest McCluer, Charity 

Weeden, Brian Weeden, Rob Cottingham, and Bob Hupfer.

None of my work would have possible without the support of my wife Audrey 

McClellan. 

INTERVIEWS

Albrecht, Rudolf 11/09/2015

Ayres, Thomas R. 09/23/2015

Bahcall, Neta A. 08/31/2016

Bahcall, Neta A. 09/01/2016

Beckwith, Steven V. W. 09/26/2016

Boggess, Albert 09/21/2015

Bolden, Jr., Charles F. 10/31/2017

Boyd, Patricia T. (Padi) 06/13/2016

Brown, Robert A. 12/14/2016

Burch, Preston M. 11/09/2015

Burch, Preston M. 06/07/2017

Burrows, Christopher J. 02/15/2017
386 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Campbell, John H. 05/22/2017

Carpenter, Kenneth G. 04/30/2015

Cepollina, Frank J. 05/08/2015

Cheng, Edward S. 06/17/2017

Coffman, Phil 04/10/2015 (Interview by John Ruley)

Crabb, William G. 01/04/2018

Crabtree, Dennis; Durand, Daniel; 

and Woodsworth, Andrew 08/17/2017

Crocker, James H. 09/21/2015

Crouse, Patrick L. 06/17/2016

Dalcanton, Julianne 02/16/2017

Dunham, Larry 09/19/2017

Ebbetts, Dennis 09/22/2015

Ebbetts, Dennis; LaPole, Mark; 

Lightsey, Paul; and Sullivan, Joseph F. 09/22/2015

Faber, Sandra M. 09/29/2016

Ford, Holland C. 10/31/2015

Freedman, Wendy L. 09/06/2017

Goldin, Daniel S. 08/07/2017

Green, James C. and Michael Shull 09/24/2015

Griffin, Michael D. 05/22/2017

Grunsfeld, John M. 11/02/2016

Gull, Theodore R. 05/22/2015

Hammel, Heidi B. 05/18/2017

Haskins, David N. 06/15/2016

Heap, Sara R. (Sally) 05/22/2015

Hester, John J. (Jeff) 03/20/2017

Hiltz, Michael 10/21/2015

Hutchings, John B. 03/30/2015

Jeletic, James F. 05/19/2017

Jenkner, Helmut 05/19/2015

Kimble, Randy A. 11/01/2016

Kirshner, Robert P. 09/28/2016

LaPole, Mark 09/22/2015

Larson, Ana M. 11/28/2017

Lauer, Tod R. 08/15/2016

Leckrone, David S. 05/06/2015

Leckrone, David S. 11/06/2015

Leckrone, David S. 06/13/2016
Acknow

Levay, Zoltan G. 06/08/2016

Lightsey, Paul A. 09/22/2015

Linsky, Jeffrey L. 09/18/2015

Livio, Mario 05/19/2015

Livio, Mario 05/20/2015

Macchetto, F. Duccio 05/09/2017

Mountain, C. M. (Matt) 11/04/2016

Musgrave, F. Story 10/25/2015

Niedner, Malcolm B., Jr. 11/10/2015

Noll, Keith S. 05/15/2017

Nota, Antonella 05/17/2017

O’Keefe, Sean C. 06/05/2017

Pellerin, Charles J. 09/17/2017

Polidan, Ronald S. 08/18/2016

Ratti, John 10/21/2015

Reid, I. Neill 11/02/2016

Reis, James 12/11/2017 (Interview by John Ruley)

Riess, Adam G. 05/20/2015

Rothenberg, Joseph H. 09/27/2016

Ruitberg, Edward O. 05/16/2017

Sembach, Kenneth R. 05/25/2017

Sheffield, Ronald 09/30/2016

Suntzeff, Nicholas B. 06/07/2016

Tanner, Joseph R. 09/20/2015

Thronson, Harley A. 05/12/2015

Trauger, John T. 10/03/2016

Troeltzch, John R. 09/22/2015

Villard, Ray 10/30/2015

Villard, Ray 11/04/2016

Weiler, Edward J. 10/24/2016

Williams, Robert E. 05/21/2015

Wiseman, Jennifer J. 05/08/2015

389

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NASA SP-2006-4110, 2006.

Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People: Hot Days of the Cold War, Volume III. 

NASA SP-2009-4110, 2009.

Chertok, Boris. Rockets and People: The Moon Race, Volume IV. NASA 

SP-2011-4110, 2011.

Laufer, Alexander, Todd Post, and Edward Hoffman. Shared Voyage: Learning 

and Unlearning from Remarkable Projects. NASA SP-2005-4111, 2005.

Dawson, Virginia P., and Mark D. Bowles. Realizing the Dream of Flight: 

Biographical Essays in Honor of the Centennial of Flight, 1903–2003. NASA 

SP-2005-4112, 2005.

Mudgway, Douglas J. William H. Pickering: America’s Deep Space Pioneer. 

NASA SP-2008-4113, 2008.

Wright, Rebecca, Sandra Johnson, and Steven J. Dick. NASA at 50: Interviews 

with NASA’s Senior Leadership. NASA SP-2012-4114, 2012.

PROJECT HISTORIES, NASA SP-4200

Swenson, Loyd S., Jr., James M. Grimwood, and Charles C. Alexander. 

This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury. NASA SP-4201, 1966; 

rep. ed. 1999.
The NASA Histo

Green, Constance McLaughlin, and Milton Lomask. Vanguard: A History. 

NASA SP-4202, 1970; rep. ed. Smithsonian Institution Press, 1971.

Hacker, Barton C., and James M. Grimwood. On the Shoulders of Titans: A 

History of Project Gemini. NASA SP-4203, 1977; rep. ed. 2002.

Benson, Charles D., and William Barnaby Faherty. Moonport: A History of 

Apollo Launch Facilities and Operations. NASA SP-4204, 1978.

Brooks, Courtney G., James M. Grimwood, and Loyd S. Swenson, Jr. Chariots 

for Apollo: A History of Manned Lunar Spacecraft. NASA SP-4205, 1979.

Bilstein, Roger E. Stages to Saturn: A Technological History of the Apollo/

Saturn Launch Vehicles. NASA SP-4206, 1980 and 1996.

No SP-4207.

Compton, W. David, and Charles D. Benson. Living and Working in Space: A 

History of Skylab. NASA SP-4208, 1983.

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. The Partnership: A History 

of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project. NASA SP-4209, 1978.

Hall, R. Cargill. Lunar Impact: A History of Project Ranger. NASA SP-4210, 

1977.

Newell, Homer E. Beyond the Atmosphere: Early Years of Space Science. NASA 

SP-4211, 1980.

Ezell, Edward Clinton, and Linda Neuman Ezell. On Mars: Exploration of the 

Red Planet, 1958–1978. NASA SP-4212, 1984.

Pitts, John A. The Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program 

to 1980. NASA SP-4213, 1985.

Compton, W. David. Where No Man Has Gone Before: A History of Apollo 

Lunar Exploration Missions. NASA SP-4214, 1989.

Naugle, John E. First Among Equals: The Selection of NASA Space Science 

Experiments. NASA SP-4215, 1991.

Wallace, Lane E. Airborne Trailblazer: Two Decades with NASA Langley’s 737 

Flying Laboratory. NASA SP-4216, 1994.

Butrica, Andrew J., ed. Beyond the Ionosphere: Fifty Years of Satellite 

Communications. NASA SP-4217, 1997.

Butrica, Andrew J. To See the Unseen: A History of Planetary Radar Astronomy. 

NASA SP-4218, 1996.

Mack, Pamela E., ed. From Engineering Science to Big Science: The NACA 

and NASA Collier Trophy Research Project Winners. NASA SP-4219, 1998.

Reed, R. Dale. Wingless Flight: The Lifting Body Story. NASA SP-4220, 1998.

Heppenheimer, T. A. The Space Shuttle Decision: NASA’s Search for a 

Reusable Space Vehicle. NASA SP-4221, 1999.
394 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Hunley, J. D., ed. Toward Mach 2: The Douglas D-558 Program. NASA 

SP-4222, 1999.

Swanson, Glen E., ed. “Before This Decade Is Out...” Personal Reflections on 

the Apollo Program. NASA SP-4223, 1999.

Tomayko, James E. Computers Take Flight: A History of NASA’s Pioneering 

Digital Fly-By-Wire Project. NASA SP-4224, 2000.

Morgan, Clay. Shuttle-Mir: The United States and Russia Share History’s 

Highest Stage. NASA SP-2001-4225, 2001.

Leary, William M. “We Freeze to Please”: A History of NASA’s Icing Research 

Tunnel and the Quest for Safety. NASA SP-2002-4226, 2002.

Mudgway, Douglas J. Uplink-Downlink: A History of the Deep Space Network, 

1957–1997. NASA SP-2001-4227, 2001.

No SP-4228 or SP-4229.

Dawson, Virginia P., and Mark D. Bowles. Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The 

Centaur Upper Stage Rocket, 1958–2002. NASA SP-2004-4230, 2004.

Meltzer, Michael. Mission to Jupiter: A History of the Galileo Project. NASA 

SP-2007-4231, 2007.

Heppenheimer, T. A. Facing the Heat Barrier: A History of Hypersonics. NASA 

SP-2007-4232, 2007.

Tsiao, Sunny. “Read You Loud and Clear!” The Story of NASA’s Spaceflight 

Tracking and Data Network. NASA SP-2007-4233, 2007.

Meltzer, Michael. When Biospheres Collide: A History of NASA’s Planetary 

Protection Programs. NASA SP-2011-4234, 2011.

Gainor, Christopher. Not Yet Imagined: A Study of Hubble Space Telescope 

Operations. NASA SP-2020-4237, 2020.

CENTER HISTORIES, NASA SP-4300

Rosenthal, Alfred. Venture into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight 

Center. NASA SP-4301, 1985.

Hartman, Edwin P. Adventures in Research: A History of Ames Research Center, 

1940–1965. NASA SP-4302, 1970.

Hallion, Richard P. On the Frontier: Flight Research at Dryden, 1946–1981. 

NASA SP-4303, 1984.

Muenger, Elizabeth A. Searching the Horizon: A History of Ames Research 

Center, 1940–1976. NASA SP-4304, 1985.

Hansen, James R. Engineer in Charge: A History of the Langley Aeronautical 

Laboratory, 1917–1958. NASA SP-4305, 1987.

Dawson, Virginia P. Engines and Innovation: Lewis Laboratory and American 

Propulsion Technology. NASA SP-4306, 1991.
The NASA Histo

Dethloff, Henry C. “Suddenly Tomorrow Came...”: A History of the Johnson 

Space Center, 1957–1990. NASA SP-4307, 1993.

Hansen, James R. Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from 

Sputnik to Apollo. NASA SP-4308, 1995.

Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: An Illustrated History of the Dryden 

Flight Research Center. NASA SP-4309, 1996.

Herring, Mack R. Way Station to Space: A History of the John C. Stennis Space 

Center. NASA SP-4310, 1997.

Wallace, Harold D., Jr. Wallops Station and the Creation of an American Space 

Program. NASA SP-4311, 1997.

Wallace, Lane E. Dreams, Hopes, Realities. NASA’s Goddard Space Flight 

Center: The First Forty Years. NASA SP-4312, 1999.

Dunar, Andrew J., and Stephen P. Waring. Power to Explore: A History of 

Marshall Space Flight Center, 1960–1990. NASA SP-4313, 1999.

Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Sixty Years at the NASA Ames 

Research Center. NASA SP-2000-4314, 2000.

Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Seventy Years at the NASA Ames 

Research Center. NASA SP-2010-4314, 2010. Revised version of NASA 

SP-2000-4314.

Bugos, Glenn E. Atmosphere of Freedom: Seventy Five Years at the NASA Ames 

Research Center. NASA SP-2014-4314, 2014. Revised version of NASA 

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No SP-4315.

Schultz, James. Crafting Flight: Aircraft Pioneers and the Contributions of the 

Men and Women of NASA Langley Research Center. NASA SP-2003-4316, 

2003.

Bowles, Mark D. Science in Flux: NASA’s Nuclear Program at Plum Brook 

Station, 1955–2005. NASA SP-2006-4317, 2006.

Wallace, Lane E. Flights of Discovery: An Illustrated History of the Dryden 

Flight Research Center. NASA SP-2007-4318, 2007. Revised version of 

NASA SP-4309.

Arrighi, Robert S. Revolutionary Atmosphere: The Story of the Altitude Wind 

Tunnel and the Space Power Chambers. NASA SP-2010-4319, 2010.

GENERAL HISTORIES, NASA SP-4400

Corliss, William R. NASA Sounding Rockets, 1958–1968: A Historical 

Summary. NASA SP-4401, 1971.

Wells, Helen T., Susan H. Whiteley, and Carrie Karegeannes. Origins of 

NASA Names. NASA SP-4402, 1976.
396 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Anderson, Frank W., Jr. Orders of Magnitude: A History of NACA and NASA, 

1915–1980. NASA SP-4403, 1981.

Sloop, John L. Liquid Hydrogen as a Propulsion Fuel, 1945–1959. NASA 

SP-4404, 1978.

Roland, Alex. A Spacefaring People: Perspectives on Early Spaceflight. NASA 

SP-4405, 1985.

Bilstein, Roger E. Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 

1915–1990. NASA SP-4406, 1989.

Logsdon, John M., ed., with Linda J. Lear, Jannelle Warren Findley, Ray 

A. Williamson, and Dwayne A. Day. Exploring the Unknown: Selected 

Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume I: 

Organizing for Exploration. NASA SP-4407, 1995.

Logsdon, John M., ed., with Dwayne A. Day and Roger D. Launius. Exploring 

the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space 

Program, Volume II: External Relationships. NASA SP-4407, 1996.

Logsdon, John M., ed., with Roger D. Launius, David H. Onkst, and Stephen 

J. Garber. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the 

U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume III: Using Space. NASA SP-4407, 1998.

Logsdon, John M., ed., with Ray A. Williamson, Roger D. Launius, Russell 

J. Acker, Stephen J. Garber, and Jonathan L. Friedman. Exploring the 

Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space 

Program, Volume IV: Accessing Space. NASA SP-4407, 1999.

Logsdon, John M., ed., with Amy Paige Snyder, Roger D. Launius, Stephen 

J. Garber, and Regan Anne Newport. Exploring the Unknown: Selected 

Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume V: 

Exploring the Cosmos. NASA SP-2001-4407, 2001.

Logsdon, John M., ed., with Stephen J. Garber, Roger D. Launius, and Ray A. 

Williamson. Exploring the Unknown: Selected Documents in the History of 

the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume VI: Space and Earth Science. NASA 

SP-2004-4407, 2004.

Logsdon, John M., ed., with Roger D. Launius. Exploring the Unknown: 

Selected Documents in the History of the U.S. Civil Space Program, Volume 

VII: Human Spaceflight: Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. NASA 

SP-2008-4407, 2008.

Siddiqi, Asif A., Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 

1945–1974. NASA SP-2000-4408, 2000.

Hansen, James R., ed. The Wind and Beyond: Journey into the History of 

Aerodynamics in America, Volume 1: The Ascent of the Airplane. NASA 

SP-2003-4409, 2003.
The NASA Histo

Hansen, James R., ed. The Wind and Beyond: Journey into the History of 

Aerodynamics in America, Volume 2: Reinventing the Airplane. NASA 

SP-2007-4409, 2007.

Hogan, Thor. Mars Wars: The Rise and Fall of the Space Exploration Initiative. 

NASA SP-2007-4410, 2007.

Vakoch, Douglas A., ed. Psychology of Space Exploration: Contemporary 

Research in Historical Perspective. NASA SP-2011-4411, 2011.

Ferguson, Robert G. NASA’s First A: Aeronautics from 1958 to 2008. NASA 

SP-2012-4412, 2013.

Vakoch, Douglas A., ed. Archaeology, Anthropology, and Interstellar 

Communication. NASA SP-2013-4413, 2014.

Asner, Glen R., and Stephen J. Garber. Origins of 21st-Century Space Travel: 

A History of NASA’s Decadal Planning Team and the Vision for Space 

Exploration, 1999–2004. NASA SP-2019-4415, 2019.

MONOGRAPHS IN AEROSPACE HISTORY, NASA SP-4500

Launius, Roger D., and Aaron K. Gillette, comps. Toward a History of the 

Space Shuttle: An Annotated Bibliography. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 1, 1992.

Launius, Roger D., and J. D. Hunley, comps. An Annotated Bibliography of the 

Apollo Program. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 2, 1994.

Launius, Roger D. Apollo: A Retrospective Analysis. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 3, 1994.

Hansen, James R. Enchanted Rendezvous: John C. Houbolt and the Genesis of 

the Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept. Monographs in Aerospace History, 

No. 4, 1995.

Gorn, Michael H. Hugh L. Dryden’s Career in Aviation and Space. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 5, 1996.

Powers, Sheryll Goecke. Women in Flight Research at NASA Dryden Flight 

Research Center from 1946 to 1995. Monographs in Aerospace History, 

No. 6, 1997.

Portree, David S. F., and Robert C. Trevino. Walking to Olympus: An EVA 

Chronology. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 7, 1997.

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Legislative Origins of the National Aeronautics 

and Space Act of 1958: Proceedings of an Oral History Workshop. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 8, 1998.

Rumerman, Judy A., comp. U.S. Human Spaceflight: A Record of Achievement, 

1961–1998. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 9, 1998.
398 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Portree, David S. F. NASA’s Origins and the Dawn of the Space Age. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 10, 1998.

Logsdon, John M. Together in Orbit: The Origins of International Cooperation 

in the Space Station. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 11, 1998.

Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey in Aeronautical Research: A Career at NASA 

Langley Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 12, 1998.

Braslow, Albert L. A History of Suction-Type Laminar-Flow Control with 

Emphasis on Flight Research. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 13, 

1999.

Logsdon, John M., moderator. Managing the Moon Program: Lessons Learned 

from Apollo. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 14, 1999.

Perminov, V. G. The Difficult Road to Mars: A Brief History of Mars 

Exploration in the Soviet Union. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 15, 

1999.

Tucker, Tom. Touchdown: The Development of Propulsion Controlled Aircraft 

at NASA Dryden. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 16, 1999.

Maisel, Martin, Demo J. Giulanetti, and Daniel C. Dugan. The History of the 

XV-15 Tilt Rotor Research Aircraft: From Concept to Flight. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 17, 2000. NASA SP-2000-4517.

Jenkins, Dennis R. Hypersonics Before the Shuttle: A Concise History of the 

X-15 Research Airplane. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 18, 2000. 

NASA SP-2000-4518.

Chambers, Joseph R. Partners in Freedom: Contributions of the Langley 

Research Center to U.S. Military Aircraft of the 1990s. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 19, 2000. NASA SP-2000-4519.

Waltman, Gene L. Black Magic and Gremlins: Analog Flight Simulations at 

NASA’s Flight Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 20, 

2000. NASA SP-2000-4520.

Portree, David S. F. Humans to Mars: Fifty Years of Mission Planning, 

1950–2000. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 21, 2001. NASA 

SP-2001-4521.

Thompson, Milton O., with J. D. Hunley. Flight Research: Problems 

Encountered and What They Should Teach Us. Monographs in Aerospace 

History, No. 22, 2001. NASA SP-2001-4522.

Tucker, Tom. The Eclipse Project. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 23, 

2001. NASA SP-2001-4523.

Siddiqi, Asif A. Deep Space Chronicle: A Chronology of Deep Space and 

Planetary Probes, 1958–2000. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 24, 

2002. NASA SP-2002-4524.
The NASA Histo

Merlin, Peter W. Mach 3+: NASA/USAF YF-12 Flight Research, 1969–1979. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 25, 2001. NASA SP-2001-4525.

Anderson, Seth B. Memoirs of an Aeronautical Engineer: Flight Tests at Ames 

Research Center: 1940–1970. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 26, 

2002. NASA SP-2002-4526.

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A Bibliography 

Commemorating the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered Flight 

on December 17, 1903. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 27, 2002. 

NASA SP-2002-4527.

No monograph 28.

Chambers, Joseph R. Concept to Reality: Contributions of the NASA Langley 

Research Center to U.S. Civil Aircraft of the 1990s. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 29, 2003. NASA SP-2003-4529.

Peebles, Curtis, ed. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Dryden History, The 

Early Years. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 30, 2003. NASA 

SP-2003-4530.

Jenkins, Dennis R., Tony Landis, and Jay Miller. American X-Vehicles: An 

Inventory—X-1 to X-50. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 31, 2003. 

NASA SP-2003-4531.

Renstrom, Arthur G. Wilbur and Orville Wright: A Chronology 

Commemorating the One-Hundredth Anniversary of the First Powered Flight 

on December 17, 1903. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 32, 2003. 

NASA SP-2003-4532.

Bowles, Mark D., and Robert S. Arrighi. NASA’s Nuclear Frontier: The Plum 

Brook Research Reactor. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 33, 2004. 

NASA SP-2004-4533.

Wallace, Lane, and Christian Gelzer. Nose Up: High Angle-of-Attack and 

Thrust Vectoring Research at NASA Dryden, 1979–2001. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 34, 2009. NASA SP-2009-4534.

Matranga, Gene J., C. Wayne Ottinger, Calvin R. Jarvis, and D. Christian 

Gelzer. Unconventional, Contrary, and Ugly: The Lunar Landing Research 

Vehicle. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 35, 2006. NASA 

SP-2004-4535.

McCurdy, Howard E. Low-Cost Innovation in Spaceflight: The History of 

the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) Mission. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 36, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4536.

Seamans, Robert C., Jr. Project Apollo: The Tough Decisions. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 37, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4537.
400 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Lambright, W. Henry. NASA and the Environment: The Case of Ozone 

Depletion. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 38, 2005. NASA 

SP-2005-4538.

Chambers, Joseph R. Innovation in Flight: Research of the NASA Langley 

Research Center on Revolutionary Advanced Concepts for Aeronautics. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 39, 2005. NASA SP-2005-4539.

Phillips, W. Hewitt. Journey into Space Research: Continuation of a Career at 

NASA Langley Research Center. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 40, 

2005. NASA SP-2005-4540.

Rumerman, Judy A., Chris Gamble, and Gabriel Okolski, comps. U.S. 

Human Spaceflight: A Record of Achievement, 1961–2006. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 41, 2007. NASA SP-2007-4541.

Peebles, Curtis. The Spoken Word: Recollections of Dryden History Beyond 

the Sky. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 42, 2011. NASA 

SP-2011-4542.

Dick, Steven J., Stephen J. Garber, and Jane H. Odom. Research in NASA 

History. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 43, 2009. NASA 

SP-2009-4543.

Merlin, Peter W. Ikhana: Unmanned Aircraft System Western States Fire 

Missions. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 44, 2009. NASA 

SP-2009-4544.

Fisher, Steven C., and Shamim A. Rahman. Remembering the Giants: Apollo 

Rocket Propulsion Development. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 45, 

2009. NASA SP-2009-4545.

Gelzer, Christian. Fairing Well: From Shoebox to Bat Truck and Beyond, 

Aerodynamic Truck Research at NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 46, 2011. NASA SP-2011-4546.

Renee M. Rottner. Making the Invisible Visible: A History of the Spitzer Infrared 

Telescope Facility (1971–2003). Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 47, 

2017. NASA SP-2017-4547.

Arrighi, Robert. Pursuit of Power: NASA’s Propulsion Systems Laboratory 

No. 1 and 2. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 48, 2012. NASA 

SP-2012-4548.

Goodrich, Malinda K., Alice R. Buchalter, and Patrick M. Miller, comps. 

Toward a History of the Space Shuttle: An Annotated Bibliography, Part 2 

(1992–2011). Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 49, 2012. NASA 

SP-2012-4549.
The NASA Histo

Ta, Julie B., and Robert C. Treviño. Walking to Olympus: An EVA Chronology, 

1997–2011, Vol. 2. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 50, 2016. NASA 

SP-2016-4550.

Gelzer, Christian. The Spoken Word III: Recollections of Dryden History; The 

Shuttle Years. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 52, 2013. NASA 

SP-2013-4552.

Ross, James C. NASA Photo One. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 53, 

2013. NASA SP-2013-4553.

Launius, Roger D. Historical Analogs for the Stimulation of Space Commerce. 

Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 54, 2014. NASA SP-2014-4554.

Buchalter, Alice R., and Patrick M. Miller, comps. The National Advisory 

Committee for Aeronautics: An Annotated Bibliography. Monographs in 

Aerospace History, No. 55, 2014. NASA SP-2014-4555.

Chambers, Joseph R., and Mark A. Chambers. Emblems of Exploration: Logos 

of the NACA and NASA. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 56, 2015. 

NASA SP-2015-4556.

Alexander, Joseph K. Science Advice to NASA: Conflict, Consensus, 

Partnership, Leadership. Monographs in Aerospace History, No. 57, 2017. 

NASA SP-2017-4557.

ELECTRONIC MEDIA, NASA SP-4600

Remembering Apollo 11: The 30th Anniversary Data Archive CD-ROM. NASA 

SP-4601, 1999.

Remembering Apollo 11: The 35th Anniversary Data Archive CD-ROM. NASA 

SP-2004-4601, 2004. This is an update of the 1999 edition.

The Mission Transcript Collection: U.S. Human Spaceflight Missions from 

Mercury Redstone 3 to Apollo 17. NASA SP-2000-4602, 2001.

Shuttle-Mir: The United States and Russia Share History’s Highest Stage. NASA 

SP-2001-4603, 2002.

U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission Presents Born of Dreams—Inspired by 

Freedom. NASA SP-2004-4604, 2004.

Of Ashes and Atoms: A Documentary on the NASA Plum Brook Reactor 

Facility. NASA SP-2005-4605, 2005.

Taming Liquid Hydrogen: The Centaur Upper Stage Rocket Interactive 

CD-ROM. NASA SP-2004-4606, 2004.

Fueling Space Exploration: The History of NASA’s Rocket Engine Test Facility 

DVD. NASA SP-2005-4607, 2005.

Altitude Wind Tunnel at NASA Glenn Research Center: An Interactive History 

CD-ROM. NASA SP-2008-4608, 2008.
402 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

A Tunnel Through Time: The History of NASA’s Altitude Wind Tunnel. NASA 

SP-2010-4609, 2010.

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, NASA SP-4700

Dick, Steven J., and Keith Cowing, eds. Risk and Exploration: Earth, Sea and 

the Stars. NASA SP-2005-4701, 2005.

Dick, Steven J., and Roger D. Launius. Critical Issues in the History of 

Spaceflight. NASA SP-2006-4702, 2006.

Dick, Steven J., ed. Remembering the Space Age: Proceedings of the 50th 

Anniversary Conference. NASA SP-2008-4703, 2008.

Dick, Steven J., ed. NASA’s First 50 Years: Historical Perspectives. NASA 

SP-2010-4704, 2010.

SOCIETAL IMPACT, NASA SP-4800

Dick, Steven J., and Roger D. Launius. Societal Impact of Spaceflight. NASA 

SP-2007-4801, 2007.

Dick, Steven J., and Mark L. Lupisella. Cosmos and Culture: Cultural 

Evolution in a Cosmic Context. NASA SP-2009-4802, 2009.

Dick, Steven J. Historical Studies in the Societal Impact of Spaceflight. NASA 

SP-2015-4803, 2015.
403

INDEX

▲ Hubble’s ACS produced this image of the Whirlpool Galaxy (M51) in 2005. (NASA/ESA/S. Beckwith 

[STScI]/The Hubble Heritage Team [STScI/AURA]: heic0506a)

Page numbers in bold indicate pages with images. 

A reference to an endnote is indicated with an “n” after an entry’s page number.

60 Minutes, 131

A

Adams, Ansel, 134

Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(ARPA), 127

Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Observatory 

(AXAF), 40–41

Aerospace Corporation, 226

Ahmed, Mansoor, 272

Air Force, U.S., 21

Allen, Lew, 79

Edwards Air Force Base, 6, 150, 158, 238

launch facilities, 14

Space Shuttle, 21

Akers, Thomas D., 98–99, 103–106, 104, 

106

Albrecht, Rudolf, 48n31, 254

Allen, Joseph P., 99

Allen, Lew, 79, 79

Altman, Scott D., 159, 163, 232, 235, 237

American Astronomical Society (AAS), 15, 

108–109, 120, 191–220, 290, 320n7

women, 306–307, 325n58

Anderson, Michael P., 215

Angel, Roger, 111n5

Anglo-Australian Observatory, 136n7, 

137n12, 260

Apollo program, 14–17, 36–37, 46n18, 

50n52, 51n67, 98, 117, 130

Arcand, Kimberley Kowal, 133

Ares program, 233–234, 247n80

Army, U.S., 10, 12, 89 

rocket team, 14

Signal Corps, 255

Army Air Forces, U.S., 12

artificial satellites. See satellites

Associated Universities, Inc., 37, 289

Association of Universities for Research 

in Astronomy (AURA), 37–39, 209, 

252, 256, 266–267, 274–276, 289

Gemini telescopes, 280n15

rivalries, 153, 274–275

Sembach, Ken, 309

women, 306–308

Astronomical League, 300, 323n40

astronomy, 1–2, 15, 191, 277, 287–288, 

316–319, 320n8

Apollo program, 16–17

astronomers, professional, 290

changes in, 316–319, 335–340

Cold War, the, 21

data, 317–319

data archive, 287–288

digital images, 120–121, 310–311

Giacconi, Riccardo, 38–40, 318

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 2–3, 6, 

82, 85, 133, 202, 291, 316–319, 

335–340

unique investigations, 296

images, 124

infrared, 144–145, 210
404 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

internet, the, 317

light (electromagnetic radiation), 

338–339

minorities, 325n58

NASA, 16–18, 219

Newton, Isaac, 10

Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 

Spectrometer (NICMOS), 315

photography, 10, 136n7

radio, 121

ultraviolet, 144

unique investigators, 296

women, 287, 305–308, 325n58

x-ray, 38, 179

Astrophysical Journal, The, 317

Atacama Large Millimeter/submillimeter 

Array, 134

Australia, 136n7, 179, 182, 259–260

Australian National Observatory, 179

Ayres, Thomas, 299–300, 315

B

Baade, Walter, 181

Back to the Future, 73n17

Bahcall, John N., 2, 18, 87, 210, 217

Grunsfeld, John M., 220–221

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

images, 125–126

infrared capabilities, 144

long exposures, 189–192

SM4, 223–224

SM5, 218–219

spherical aberration, 67, 103

James Webb Space Telescope, 217

Large Space Telescope (LST), 17–18

Spitzer Space Telescope, 210

Bahcall, Neta A., 293–294

Ball Aerospace, 57, 83, 146, 167, 211–213, 

232–233

Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), 

132, 146, 155, 159–160

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), 

167, 212, 232–234

Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS), 23, 

55–57

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement), 

85–88, 94–97

Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph 

(GHRS), 57–58, 212

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 

211

Near-Infrared Camera and Multi-Imaging 

Spectrometer (NICMOS), 184

Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS), 150

Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), 213, 228

balloons, 12, 15, 100

Basedow, Bob, 66

Beckers, Jacques, 83

Beckwith, Steven, 193, 221–224, 223, 

229, 274–275, 278n2

women, 308

Bedke, John, 129

Beggs, James M., 70

Behnken, Robert L., 247n82

Bell Laboratories, 121, 226

Bely, Pierre-Yves, 83

Black, David C., 216

Bless, Robert C., 22, 34, 68, 85

Block, Herbert L. (Herblock), 77

Boe, Eric A., 235

Boeing, 19

Boggess, Albert, 62, 82, 291

Bolden, Jr., Charles F., vii, 4, 5

Bond, Christopher, 224

Bond, Howard, 130

Bonestell, Chesley, 134

Bottema, Murk, 83–84, 94

Bowen, Stephen G., 235

Bowersox, Kenneth D., 99, 103–106, 104, 

148, 149–152

Brandt, John C., 22, 58

Brinkley, Randy, 99, 109

British Aerospace, 61, 91, 162

Broome, Doug, 68, 75n37

Brown, Curtis L., Jr., 154, 156, 157, 170n24

Brown, David M., 215

Brown, Emmett, 73n17

Brown, George E., 107

Brown, Robert A., 83–84, 240n1

Burch, Preston, 225, 268–272, 269

Burleson, Winslow, 301

Burrows, Christopher, 64–67, 73n17, 80, 

83, 252

AGK+81°266 Hubble image, 107–108

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Strategy 

Panel, 83

Bush, George H. W., 70, 92, 98–99, 

113n34, 214, 282n47
Index

Bush, George W., 214–215, 220–222, 

225–230, 227

Vision for Space Exploration, 227, 334 

Butler, Paul, 201

C

Campbell, John H., 156, 268, 268, 270

Canada, 60, 91, 112n28, 115n59, 131, 

203n9, 211, 225, 227

Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope, 131, 

203n9

Canadian Space Agency (CSA), 211, 225, 

254

Canadian Spacewalkers: Hadfield, MacLean 

and Williams Remember the Ultimate 

High Adventure, 112n28

Cape Canaveral, 14, 41, 69

Carey, Duane G., 159, 163

Carnegie, Andrew, 288

Carnegie Observatories, 129, 179, 210

Carpenter, Ken, 175, 187–188, 188, 

321n24, 340

Carr, Frank, 39, 257

Carter, Jimmy, 19

Cassegrain, Laurent, 9

Cepollina, Frank J., 90–91, 91, 256

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

efficiencies, 268

fixes, 95, 154, 167

robotic mission, 225, 230

SM4, 234

Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory, 

131, 182, 203n9, 267

Chaisson, Eric J., 62, 70, 72n14, 72n15

astronomers, amateur, 302

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) images, 

125–126

Hubble Wars, The, 73n21, 126, 137n18, 

138n20

Chandra X-Ray Observatory, 40, 41, 134, 

156, 193, 195, 297, 304, 329

Chandra X-ray Center, 318

Small Magellanic Cloud, 9

Chandrasekhar, Subrahmanyan, 41

Chawla, Kalpana, 215

Cheng, Edward, 167, 213

Chile, 63, 134–135, 179, 182, 267, 289, 

318

Christian, Carol, 130

Clark, Laurel B., 215

Clervoy, Jean-Francois, 156–159, 157, 252

Clinton, William J., 98, 102, 107, 282n46, 

282n47, 334

CNN (Cable News Network), 118

Code, Arthur D., 38

Cold War, the, 13–14, 16, 20, 44, 267, 288

Cole, Stephen, 298–299

Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9, 93, 117–118, 

118, 120, 127–128, 136n2, 195–

196, 299

Compton, Arthur Holly, 41, 88

Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, 40, 

41, 270

Computer Sciences Corporation, 273, 306

Congress, U.S., 98, 282n47

Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Observatory 

(AXAF), 41

astronomers, amateur, 300

Atlantis crew testimony, 238

Great Observatories program, 41

House Subcommittee on Space Science 

and Applications, 39

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

funding, 249–251

SM4, 223–231

SM5, 216–217

spherical aberration, 70–71

successes, 86, 107

support, 267–268, 340

infrared observing capabilities, 41

International Space Station, 98, 102

Large Space Telescope (LST), 17–19, 

23, 26

NASA budgets, 26–27, 32, 92

NASA space station, 268

Senate Committee on Appropriations, 81

Space Exploration Initiative, 70

Space Shuttle program, 332

Contact, 135

Copernicus, 15, 291

Corning Glass, 11, 26

Cos-B observatory, 179

Covey, Richard O., 99, 103–106, 104

COVID-19 pandemic, 272

Cox, Nancy, 301

Crabb, William “Bill,” G., 73n22, 75n37

Crocker, James, 83–85, 85, 94

Crouse, Patrick, 272–273, 276, 277

Curbeam, Robert, 341n8

Currie, Nancy J., 159, 163, 164
406 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

D

Dalcanton, Julianne J., 191, 316

Danly, Laura, 307

Davidsen, Arthur F., 240n1

Davis, Bob, 3

Department of Defense, 214

ARPANET, 127

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA), 20

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, 27–28

Space Shuttle, 32

spacecraft, 36

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 21, 

230

Department of Energy, 3

Department of Justice, 81

Dick, Steven J., 222, 244n44

Dickinson, Mark, 189

Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), 

257

Dordain, Jean-Jacques, 279n10

Dornier GmbH

Dornier Museum, 25, 332

Faint Object Camera (FOC), 24

Doxsey, Rodger, 65, 83, 260, 276

Dressler, Alan, 209–210, 242n24

Dressler report, 211–213

Dunbar, Brian, 128

Dunham, David W., 323n40

Dunham, Larry, 271

Duque, Pedro, 154, 170n24

E

Earth, 134, 136, 140, 152, 190, 255

atmosphere, 12–14, 40, 58, 121, 144, 

175, 179, 195–196

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

images, 20, 63, 65–66, 120–121, 176

infrastructure, 249

mirror (main), 2

orbit, 56, 60–61, 175, 258, 269, 298

preparations, 42, 44, 155

repairs, 32, 34, 78–79, 82, 88, 105

magnetic field, 14

as observing obstacle, 11–14, 40, 128, 

144, 191, 332–333

orbit, 41

telescope, largest/powerful, 10, 199, 290

Eastman Kodak, 19, 26, 30

Edberg, Stephen J., 302–303, 323n40

Edwin P. Hubble Space Telescope. See

Hubble Space Telescope (HST)

Eichenlaub, Jesse E., 323n40

Einstein, Albert, 184, 187, 298, 339

Einstein X-ray Observatory, 124–125, 

137n9, 137n15, 291

astronomers, amateur, 300

Ellis, George, 323n40

Ellis, Richard S., 240n1

England, 9, 100

English, Jayanne, 130

Europe

communism, 21, 44

European Space Research Organization, 

22

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) solar 

arrays, 44

space travel, 11

European Southern Observatory (ESO), 

83, 252, 253, 267, 293

European Space Agency (ESA)

Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), 

159

astronauts, 99, 252

astronomers, 252–253

astronomy, 277

budget cuts, 253–254

Burrows, Christopher, 64

Duque, Pedro, 154, 170n24

European Space Astronomy Centre 

(ESAC), 59–60, 254

Faint Object Camera (FOC), 23–25, 24, 

65–66, 83, 85, 108–110, 123, 126, 

252–254

displayed, 332

Herschel Space Observatory, 120

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 1, 

251–254, 277, 338

data, 59–60

data archive, 311

European Coordinating Facility, 59, 83

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Faint 

Object Camera (FOC), 57

images, 131

Independent Optical Review Panel, 80

SM4 cancellation, 279n10

solar arrays, 61, 91

Strategy Panel, 84

Huygens probe, 198

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 211
Index

Large Space Telescope (LST), 22–23

Nicollier, Claude, 99, 155

Planck spacecraft, 186

robotic spacecraft, 341n7

Space Telescope, 251–252

Space Telescope European Coordinating 

Facility (ST-ECF), 59, 83–84, 252, 

253, 279n10, 311

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI), 64

spacetelescope.org, 128

staff, 279n7

Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), 213

extravehicular activities (EVAs), 5, 42, 54, 

155

astronauts, 104, 106, 148

difficulties of, 88–89, 99–100

equipment, 96, 100

Gemini program, 88

history of, 112n28

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 

89–90

NASA confidence in, 152–153

problems, 97–98, 235–236

simulated, 99–100, 149–150

three-person, 97

untethered, 7n11, 88

women, 4–5, 7n11, 42–44, 88–90, 

112n28, 164. See also individual 

astronaut names

Extreme Ultraviolet Explorer, 312–313

F

Faber, Sandra M., 64–67, 66, 73n17, 

73n18, 73n21, 73n23, 138n22, 315

astronomy, changes in, 317

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) observing power, 239

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Strategy 

Panel, 83

Far Ultraviolet Spectroscopic Explorer mission, 276

Fastie, Bill, 49n44

Ferguson, Christopher J., 235

Ferrarese, Laura, 181

Ferris, Timothy, 6

Feustel, Andrew J., 232, 235–238, 236, 

237

Field, George B., 41

Fisk, Lennard A., 2–3, 62–63, 79

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) spherical aberration, 67–69, 72n15, 81

NASA budgets, 95, 114n38

Fitts, Richard, 99

Flanagan, Kathryn, 309, 309

Fletcher, James C., Large Space Telescope 

(LST), 18

Foale, Michael C., 155, 157, 158

Ford, Gerald R., 18–19

Ford, Holland C., 83, 94, 160, 300

Foreman, Michael J., 247n82

France, 9, 131, 201, 253

Faint Object Camera (FOC), 24

Fratarre, Lisa, 130

Freedman, Wendy L., 179, 186–187, 

203n9, 240n1, 340

Friedman, Thomas L., 318

Frosch, Robert A., 23–24, 37

G

GaBany, Jay, 316

galaxies, 10, 13, 87, 126, 130–131, 

176–178, 194–195, 304

Abell 370, 194

Abell 2218, 159

Andromeda, 1, 135, 177–180, 195, 

203n6, 316

black holes, 153, 188

Bullet Cluster, 187

clusters, 194, 238, 294, 329

cores, 25

distances to, 178–181, 186

early formation, 188

Faint Object Camera (FOC), 160

Hubble Deep Field (HDF), 93, 120, 

127, 188–191, 190

Hubble Ultra Deep Field (HUDF), 

192–193

hydrogen clouds, 153

Infrared Astronomical Satellite, 144

intergalactic medium, 304, 329

Large Magellanic Cloud, 86, 108, 186, 

200, 315

Milky Way galaxy, the, 10, 177–178, 195

M16, 337

M31 (Andromeda), 1, 135, 177–180, 

195, 203n6, 316

M81, 179

M87, 117

M100, 107, 109
408 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

M106, 316

NGC 188, 65

NGC 346, 359

NGC 2014, 361

NGC 2020, 361

NGC 2174, vii

NGC 2264, 329

NGC 2392, 159, 200

NGC 3372, 343

NGC 3532, 62–63, 63

NGC 3717, 381

NGC 5033, 175

NGC 6302, 209

NGC 7635, xi, 122

nuclei, 294

redshifted, 177–178, 180, 191–192, 210

Seyfert, 130

Small Magellanic Cloud, 9, 177

UGC 1810 galaxy, 1

Whirlpool galaxy, 117, 403

Galaxy Zoo, 316

Galileo (Galileo Galilei), 2–3, 9, 45n2

telescope, 176, 338, 342n16

telescope replica, 330

Galileo spacecraft, 98, 196–197

Gehman, Harold, 224

Geithner, Paul, 94

Gemini Observatory, 131, 275

Gemini program, 51n67, 88, 99

Gemini telescopes, 275, 280n15, 315, 318

Gendler, Robert, 316

General Electric, 11

Germany, 12, 59, 252–253, 274, 311, 332

Dornier, 24

Dornier Museum, 25

Faint Object Camera (FOC), 24

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

European Coordinating Facility, 59

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Strategy 

Panel, 84

Large Space Telescope (LST), 23

Giacconi, Riccardo, 38–40, 74n29, 83, 86, 

124–125, 258–259, 258, 266–267, 

301

astronomers, amateur, 300–302

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) data, 

311–312, 318

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI) director, 301

Glenn, Jr., John H., 154, 154, 170n24

Goddard, Robert H., 11–12, 17

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), 14, 

16, 60–61, 269

African Americans, 310

astronomers, 37

Ball Aerospace, 94

bias at, 309–310

Boggess, Al, 62

budget cuts, 102

Cepollina, Frank J., 90, 256

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement), 87

Data Archive and Distribution Service 

(DADS), 311

data path, 58–60, 60, 63

Explorer 6, 94

High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator, 100

High Resolution Spectrograph, 86, 91

history of, 254–257

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 36, 

53–54, 58, 90

data, 59–60, 115n59

efficiencies, 269–270

fixes, 110

Independent Optical Review Panel, 80

infrared capabilities, 143–147

lifetime, 330–331

observing cycles, 258

Payload Operations Control Center 

(POCC), 264

replacement camera (WFPC2), 79

robotic mission, 225

Science Instrument Command and 

Data Handling system, 234

SM3A and 3B, 256

solar arrays, 91, 164

spherical aberration, 66–68, 77, 79, 

126–127

Independent Optical Review Panel, 87

Kimble, Randy, 317

Large Space Telescope (LST), 17, 

22–24, 37

LGBT staff, 310

NASA communications network center, 

59

National Space Science Data Center, 

310–311

Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 

Spectrometer (NICMOS) repair, 

167
Index

partnerships, 64, 94, 265–266, 274

Reverse Brayton Cycle Cryocooler, 153

rivalries, 73n23, 274–275

roles and responsibilities, 24, 37, 81, 87, 

254–257, 258, 262

Satellite Servicing Projects Division, 334

Satellite Servicing Team, 278n4

satellites servicing, 90

Servicing Mission 1 (SM1), 100–101

Servicing Mission Operations Room, 263

simulators, 95

Solar Maximum, 89

Space Telescope, 39

Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS), 145–147

Space Telescope Operations Control 

Center (STOCC), 5, 59, 256–257, 

257, 260, 262–266, 265, 270–

271, 271, 273–274

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI), 37–38, 54, 64–66

STAR (Space Telescope Axial 

Replacement), 84–85

Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 

(TDRS), 256

Vehicle Electrical Systems Test (VEST) 

Facility, 95, 114n40, 263, 264

Vision 2000, 251, 268–270, 273, 312

Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), 213, 228

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 

(WFPC2), 87, 213

Goldin, Dan, 98–99, 99, 102, 109, 167, 

214, 267–268

Good, Michael T., 232, 235–238, 237

Gore, Al, 70, 107

Gorie, Dominic L., 247n82

Great Observatories Origin Deep Survey 

(GOODS), 195

Great Observatories program, 40–41, 40, 

51n65, 134, 168, 195

Green, James C., 212, 232

Green, Richard F., 240n1

Griffin, Michael D., 222, 230–234, 230, 

238, 246n72, 254, 340

Groth, Edward, 83

Grumman, 20, 211

Grunsfeld, John M., 155, 157, 158–159, 

163, 164–166, 218, 237, 333

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), significance of, 238

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) SM4, 

218, 220–222, 230, 232, 234–238

Gulf War, the, 87

Gunn, James E., 71, 74n36

H

Hale, George Ellery, 288

Hale Telescope, 11, 34, 45n7, 121, 123, 

202, 290

Haley’s Comet, 252

Hall, Donald, 145

Hammel, Heidi, 196

Handprints on Hubble, 341n8

Harbaugh, Gregory J., 102–103, 148, 

149–152

Harms, Richard, 22, 56

Hartford Courant, 26

Harvard College Observatory, 177

Hauser, Michael G., 240n1

Hawley, Steven A., 4, 5, 148, 149–152

Heap, Sara (Sally), 58, 86

Hefflin, J. Milton, 99, 109

Heinrichs, Allison M., 133

Herschel Space Observatory, 120, 195

Hester, Jeff, 116n71, 118–120, 130

High Energy Astrophysical Observatories 

(HEAO), 179

Hinners, Noel W., 37, 39

Hitler, Adolf, 12

Hoeppe, Götz, 317

Hoffman, Jeffrey A., 99, 103–106, 104

Hollings, Ernest, 98

Holtzman, Jon, 65–67

Home Improvement, 107

Hooker reflector telescope, 10, 178–179

Hornig, Donald F., 37

Horowitz, Scott J., 148, 149, 151–152

Hricko, Karl, 301

Hubble, 135, 141n56

Hubble, Edwin P., 9–11, 177–179, 178, 288

Hubble constant, 179–180, 186–187, 329

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 1–3, 3, 

10–11, 40, 60, 81, 104, 154, 163, 

166, 191, 237, 304, 335–340

30 Doradus, 86–87

Abell 370 galaxy cluster, 194

Abell 2218 galaxy, 159

accuracy, 2, 55–56, 69, 80, 176–177, 

186, 258

activated, 53, 262–264
410 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), 

132–133, 155, 159–161, 165–166, 

192–195, 199, 212, 316

Abell 370 image, 194

Cone Nebula image, 329

details, 160–161, 168

field of view, 331

Hubble Deep Field image, 192

NGC 346, 359

observable wavelengths, 336

Orion Nebula image, v

repair, 233–234, 236–239

service interruption, 330

Westerlund 2 cluster image, 249

Whirlpool galaxy, 403

AGK+81°266 Hubble image, 107–108

Allen Committee (Optical Systems 

Board), 79–80, 87

Allen Committee Report, 28

Allen Report, 28

Amateur Astronomers Working Group, 

300–303

anniversary, 114n38, 120, 159, 175, 183, 

239, 337

Arrokoth, 199, 206n47

asteroids, 199

astronauts, 32, 78, 91–107, 96–98, 104, 

106

astronauts (EVA), 5, 42–43, 54, 88, 100, 

148

astronomers, 39, 43, 62, 64–65, 69, 

71, 82, 86, 175–177, 276–277, 

292–304, 329, 335–336

amateur, 300–303, 301, 316, 323n40

responses to, 316–319

astronomy, 287–288, 291, 316–319, 

335–340

astronomy, bias in, 305–310

Atlantis Space Shuttle, 42

axial instruments, 82–85

Bahcall, John N., 18

Barbara A. Mikulski Archive for Space 

Telescopes (MAST), 313, 317

Big Science, 287–288

black holes, 304, 329

budget, 91–92, 95, 113n34

budget cuts, 32, 267–268

Bug/Butterfly Nebula, 135, 209, 238

Carina Nebula, 229

Challenger, loss of, 67, 278n1

Chandra X-Ray Observatory, 329

Charge-Coupled Devices (CCD) detectors, 

123–124, 136, 147, 273, 284n62

Cold War, the, 20–21

Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9, 117–118, 118, 

120, 127–128, 136n2, 195–196

comets, 199–200

commissioning, 17, 62–63, 87, 124

computer, 91, 102, 105, 154–156, 

264–265, 269, 273–274

Cone Nebula, 329

configuration, 54, 55

construction, 26, 33, 87

controlled reentry, 330–331

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), 

218, 226, 232–234, 236–238

details, 168, 232–233

field of view, 331

installation, 341n5

observable wavelengths, 336

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement), 

25, 69, 85–87, 94–98, 105–108, 

106, 107, 116n71, 116n72, 127, 

145–146, 150–151

details, 96–97

displayed, 331

image, 108

obsolescence, 167

replacement, 212, 232, 236

costs, 2–3, 32, 36, 43, 91–94, 101–102, 

249, 251, 278n1

criticism of, 3, 39, 77, 98, 133, 135

data, 85–86, 130, 134, 297, 300, 304, 

310–319

data, availability of, 335, 335–340

data, published papers on, 314, 337

data archive, 252–254, 262, 287–288, 

300, 310–317, 326n71, 332, 338

Data Archive and Distribution Service 

(DADS), 311–312

Data Interface Unit, 152

data path, 58–60, 60, 262, 300

data quality, 146–147, 179

delays, 31, 36, 43–44, 62, 89, 91, 156, 

233–234, 260, 295

Department of Defense, 20

deployment, 3, 5–6, 9, 17, 44, 53, 

60–62, 60, 84, 88–90, 114n50, 

163, 256, 262
Index

described, 249

design, 33, 55

development, 13, 15, 41

diffraction, 66

dimensions, 1–2

Discovery Space Shuttle, 44, 60–62

Dressler report, the, 209–213

Eagle Nebula, 116n71, 117, 118, 119, 

127, 130, 132–134, 135, 139n31, 

200, 229, 336–339, 337

efficiencies, 268–270, 321n21

electromagnetic spectrum, 40–41

Engineering and Science Tape Recorder, 

152

European Space Agency (ESA), 

249–251, 251–254

exoplanets, 201–202, 217, 335

Faint Object Camera (FOC), 23–25, 24, 

55–57, 55, 65, 73n21, 83, 85, 95, 

102, 108, 116n72, 126–127, 133, 

199

details, 168

displayed, 332

image, 108, 109–110

replacement, 146, 155, 160, 165–166, 

303

Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS), 55–57, 

55, 95, 108–110, 116n72, 145, 151

details, 56–57, 168

displayed, 331

replacement, 146, 331

Fellowships, 298, 306

Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS), 2, 19, 23, 

27, 55–56, 61, 83, 97, 144, 147, 

149–158, 264, 273

degradation, 330

details, 30, 30–31

field of view, 331

FGS1r, 31, 149, 151

observable wavelengths, 336

replacement, 147, 155–158, 158

“First Light,” 62–66, 72n14, 73n21, 79

media release, 62–66, 124–126

fixes, 5, 32, 34–35, 77, 81–110

free flight, 6, 53

Frontier Fields, 193–194

funding, 249–251, 250

future of, 329–332

galaxies, 117, 126, 130–131, 135, 153, 182, 

194, 238, 294, 304, 316, 329, 381

redshifted, 180, 210

Galaxy Zoo, 316

Giacconi, Riccardo, 38

Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph 

(GHRS), 55–58, 55, 86, 94–95, 

108–110, 116n72, 151, 187

details, 58–59

failure, 47n30, 91, 106, 296

GTO program, 321n24

replacement, 145, 146, 303, 341n5

Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), 

39, 58, 309

versus ground-based observatories, 

298–300

Guaranteed Time Observers (GTOs), 

292, 295–296

Guide Star Catalog, 252, 258–261, 273, 

280n26

Guide Star Selection System, 39

gyroscopes, 54–55, 91, 102–103, 103, 

105, 155–156, 158, 226, 232–236, 

273, 330

HD96755 star, 63

Herbig-Haro Jet, 53

Heritage Project, 130–131, 133, 135

High Speed Photometer (HSP), 55–57, 

55, 85–86, 86, 105

details, 68–69

displayed, 332

Horsehead Nebula, 287

Hot Stars project, 316

HST successor, 210–213

Hubble constant, 179–180, 186–187, 

329

Hubble Deep Field (HDF), 93, 120, 

127–128, 135, 139n31, 188–195, 

190, 192, 267, 269–270, 304, 

317, 335, 339

Hubble Deep Field South, 192

Hubble Ultra Deep Field (HUDF), 192, 

192

Hubble Wars, The, 73n21

Hubble-Lemaître law, 178–180

HubbleSite, 128–129

image quality, 62, 93–94, 118–120, 

135–136

images, 34–35, 56–57, 65–66, 93, 

93–94, 117–120, 124–127, 127, 

129–134, 131–132

as art, 133–134, 135
412 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

media release, 124–127

public release, 128

imaging (digital), 120–124, 127, 129, 

134, 136

imaging instruments, 168

Imaging Michelson Spectrometer 

(HIMS), 145

improvements, 43–44

Independent Optical Review Panel, 80, 

87

infrared observing capabilities, 143–145, 

287

innovations, 273–274, 289

instrument replacement, 147, 149–158

instruments, 168

published papers by, 314

intergalactic medium, 304, 329

International Solar Terrestrial Physics 

Program, 114n38

versus International Ultraviolet Explorer 

(IUE), 299–300

internet, the, 127–129, 136, 139n31, 

312

Io, 302

iPhones, 129

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 

329, 335, 338

journalists, 63

Jupiter, 118, 197

Key Projects, 176–202, 294, 304

Keyhole Nebula, 343

Large Magellanic Cloud, 86, 108, 315

Late Night with David Letterman, 62, 

72n13

launch, 38, 62, 72n15, 77, 91, 124, 147, 

200

costs, 278n1

schedule, 31, 32, 42–43, 62, 72n15

legacy, 6, 183, 332, 335–340

lifetime, 210–212, 217, 219, 233, 238, 

273–274, 277, 288, 329–332, 

335–340

light (electromagnetic radiation) observable wavelengths, 336

long exposures, 294

management, 24–25, 32, 277

Mars, 196

Marshall to Goddard handover, 90

media responses to, 2–3, 6, 62–63, 

67–70, 74n29, 77–79, 102–103, 

107–108, 117–120, 124–131, 191, 

251, 278n1, 298, 335–340

Melnick 34, 108

milestones, 36, 62

military programs, 20–21

mirror (backup), 331–332

mirror (main), 2, 20, 26–32, 27, 35, 38, 

47n26, 54, 55, 64–65, 78–84

masking, 84

mirror (secondary), 2, 26–27, 54, 55, 

64–65, 79–80, 84

replacement, 84

mirror defects, 28, 35, 49n51, 64–71, 

72n13, 73n17, 74n29, 77–83, 77, 

91–94, 126, 179–180, 339–340

effects, 108

mirrors (pickoff), 83

mission time estimates, 90

model, 4

Moon, the, 199

moons, 117, 153, 302

Mountain, Mattias, 275–276

MU69 (Arrokoth), 199, 206n47

Multi-Cycle Treasury Programs, 193–195

Mystic Mountain, 229

NASA Office of Inspector General, 81

Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 

Spectrometer (NICMOS), 94, 

102, 132, 145–147, 150, 153, 158, 

210, 213, 228, 303

degradation, 330

details, 168, 184–185

discontinued, 239

field of view, 331

long exposures, 192–193

observable wavelengths, 336

repair, 162, 166

nebulae, 118–119, 126, 130–131, 200, 

229, 315

new start, 250

NGC 188 star cluster, 65–66, 65

NGC 346, 359

NGC 2014, 361

NGC 2020, 361

NGC 2264, 329

NGC 2392 Nebula, 159, 200

NGC 3372, 343

NGC 3532 star cluster (“First Light”), 

62–63, 63

NGC 3717, 381
Index

NGC 5033, 175

NGC 6302, 209

NGC 7635, xi, 122

novae, 302, 315

observing cycles, 175–176, 258, 269–

270, 292–299, 296, 304–306, 

321n21, 322n34

observing time allocation, 294–304, 

320n14, 329, 335–336

operations, 270–271

Operations Project, 255–256

Optical Control Electronics 

Enhancement Kit, 151–152

orbit, 60–61, 166, 214, 223, 232–233, 

258, 269, 295, 298, 321n21, 

332–334

Orbital Systems Test (HOST) platform, 

154–156, 162, 256

organization, 283n58

versus other robotic spacecraft, 143

Panchromatic Hubble Andromeda 

Treasury (PHAT), 316

partnerships, 304–305

“Pillars of Creation” image, 116n71, 117, 

119–120, 119, 127, 130, 132–134, 

135, 139n31, 200, 229, 336–339, 

337

planets, 117, 118, 120, 125, 126, 130, 

151, 195–200, 304

popularity of, 339–340

postal stamp, 159

potential loss of, 275

Power Control Unit, 90, 164

power down, 165

precedents, 11, 15, 40–41, 291

preparations for deployment, 88–90

problems, 5, 25–30, 28, 32, 44, 49n51, 

60–61, 64–71, 65, 77–83, 91, 

102–103, 153–156, 233–234, 260, 

329–330

quasars, 294

Reaction Wheel Assembly, 165

versus reconnaissance satellites, 20

reflecting telescope, 9

refurbishing, 32, 34–35

Remote Manipulator System (RMS), 

106, 237

replacement camera (WFPC2), 78–79

Ritchey-Chrétien Cassegrain reflecting 

telescope, 54

robotic missions, 225–230, 278n2

robotic orbit boost, 331

roles and responsibilities, 37, 335

Roman, Nancy Grace, 309

Rothenberg, Joseph H., 81–82, 82

safe mode, 60–62, 156

Saturn, 78, 198

Science Instrument Command and Data 

Handling system, 234

Science Operations Ground System 

(SOGS), 260–261

Second Decade Committee, 304

Servicing Mission 1 (SM1), 91, 91–110, 

104, 117, 126–127, 149–150, 

164, 209, 264–265, 267–268

and observing, 296

simulation, 100

Servicing Mission 2 (SM2), 146–155, 

148, 162, 302–303

preparation, 162

Servicing Mission 3 (SM3), 155–159

Servicing Mission 3A (SM3A), 156, 213, 

252, 265

Servicing Mission 3B (SM3B), 159–167, 

171n31, 209, 213, 220

Servicing Mission 4 (SM4), 54, 151, 

167, 193, 209–214, 217–240, 271, 

273–275, 275–277, 304, 329–331, 

338

cancellation, 219–226, 233, 253–254, 

275, 279n10

costs, 278n2, 278n4

Galileo’s telescope replica, 330

installations, 336

Servicing Mission 5 (SM5), 216–219, 

218

servicing missions, 35, 54, 61, 69, 78, 

82–83, 87–90, 143

costs, 332

danger of, 214, 229

end of, 239, 329–330

halt of, 221–223

lessons learned, 334

partnerships, 255–256

simulated, 100

success of, 332

Servicing Science Working Group, 146

simulated Hubble, 100

Small Magellanic Cloud, 9

smartphones, 129
414 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

social media, 128–129, 223

Soft Capture and Rendezvous System, 54

solar arrays, 8, 38, 48, 53, 61, 64, 86–87, 

91, 105–106, 155, 162–165, 166, 

172n42, 264

damaged, 150–152

Solar Blind Channel (SBC), 331, 336

solar system, the, 195–200

Space Shuttle, relationship, 332–335

Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, 

Science, Technology and Politics, 13

Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS), 94, 145–147, 153, 162, 

211–212, 303

details, 150–151, 168

field of view, 331

observable wavelengths, 336

repair, 236

Space Telescope Operations Control 

Center (STOCC), 5, 59, 256–257, 

257, 260, 271, 273–274

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI), 38, 59–60, 62–63, 83

SpaceCube, 274

spacewalkers, 5, 42, 54, 88

spectrographs, 55

spectroscopy instruments, 168

stakeholders, 36

STAR (Space Telescope Axial 

Replacement), 84–85, 94

stars, 117, 134, 151, 153, 200–202, 304

stellar magnetic fields, 302

stellar populations, 329

Strategy Panel, 83–86

Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle, 100, 

331–332

successes, 18, 78, 86–87, 106–110, 

167–169, 175–177, 183, 202, 

239–240, 253, 277, 297, 318, 

335–340

successor, 210–213, 217, 240

Sun, the, 199

sunset mission, 210–213, 217–219, 221

Supernova 1987A, 134, 200–201

supernovae, 181–183, 315, 335

Support Systems Module, 36

testing, 36, 43, 70, 260–261

Time Allocation Process, 262

Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 

(TDRS), 55, 58–61, 60, 249

Treasury programs, 304, 316

UGC 1810 galaxy, 1

Ultima Thule. See Arrokoth

Ultra Deep Field, 167

ultraviolet capabilities, 40, 133, 144–

145, 303, 329, 335

ultraviolet wavelengths, 21, 86

unique investigators, 296

universe, the, 332

Ursa Major, 269–270

website, 316

Westerlund 2 cluster, 249

Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), 120, 

132–133, 180, 192–200, 232–235, 

316

Abell 370 image, 194

details, 168, 228–229

Bubble Nebula, xi

Bug/Butterfly Nebula, 135, 209, 238

developed, 317

field of view, 331

Herbig-Haro Jet image, 53

Hubble Deep Field image, 192

installation, 218, 226, 239

Jupiter image, 197

NGC 2174, vii

NGC 6302 (Bug/Butterfly Nebula), 209

observable wavelengths, 336

Saturn image, 198

service interruption, 330

UCG 1810 galaxy image, 1

Westerlund 2 cluster image, 249

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 (WFPC2), 

55, 78–79, 82–83, 85–87, 100, 

104, 105, 115n62, 132–133, 

144–147, 150–151, 189–192, 196

building of, 93–95

details, 92–93, 168

displayed, 331

Eta Carinae image, 389

Herbig-Haro Jet image, 53

images, 109–110, 116n71, 117–120

Jupiter image, 118

M100 image, 107

Mars image, 196

Melnick 134 image, 108

NCG 2174, vii

replacement, 160, 167, 212–213, 232, 

341n5

team, 116n71
Index

Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC), 

34–36, 34, 35, 55–57, 63–71, 

73n21, 78–79, 83, 86, 92–94, 

104, 105, 126–127

details, 168

M100 image, 107

Melnick 34 image, 108

team, 64–67, 66, 71, 87

women, 307

Zooniverse, 316

Hubble Wars, The, 126

Hughes Aircraft Company, 32, 73n22, 

170n13

Hughes Danbury, 64, 66–67, 72n22, 80–81

Optical Systems Inc., 80–81, 170n13

Humason, Milton L., 178

Husband, Rick D., 215

Hussein, Saddam, 87

Hutchings, John, 315

Hutchinson, Kay Bailey, 225

I

Infrared Astronomical Satellite, 144, 179

International Astronomical Union, 179, 

199, 289, 293

International Solar Polar Mission, 252

International Space Station, 3, 59, 70, 102, 

107, 341n7. See also NASA space 

station

Columbus module, 341n7

completion, 221–222

construction, 98, 47n18, 143, 149, 219, 

231

costs, 92, 214

criticism of, 98

Dextre robot, 227, 245n67

future of, 334

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) SM4, 

222–223, 234–235

maintenance, 227

orbit, 214, 223

priority, 219, 334

problems, 98, 102, 226

robotic spacecraft servicing, 341n7

servicing missions, 214, 231

end of, 239

Space Shuttle safe haven, 214, 216, 231, 

243n30

successes, 109

successor to, 334

International Ultraviolet Explorer (IUE), 

137n9, 144, 252, 291, 291, 293, 

297, 312. See also NASA Space 

Station

versus Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 

299–300

shut down, 320n10

Isakowitz, Steve, 220

Israeli Space Agency, 215

Italy, 38, 83, 260, 

J

Jackson and Tull, 114n40

Jakobsen, Peter, 25

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 167, 

187, 193, 210–212, 274–275, 313, 

315

artist’s conception, 211

astronomers, 276–277

costs, 220

data, 276

development, 275–277

European Space Agency (ESA), 

252–254

infrared observing capabilities, 335

partnership with Hubble, 329, 335

successor to Hubble, 210–212, 217–

218, 240

support for, 338

Japan, 154, 170n24

Jarvis, Gregory, 42

Jeffreys, Bill, 30

Jeletic, James, 256

Jenkner, Helmut, 252

Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 14, 87, 95

Allen, Lew, 79

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) data, 79

Morabito, Linda, 137n18

Trauger, John, 78

Voyager images, 125

Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC), 

36, 56–57

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 

(WFPC2), 92–94, 144, 212–213

Johnson, Gregory C., 232, 235, 237

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 

(WFPC2) replacement, 235

Johnson, Gregory H., 247n82

Johnson, Lyndon B., 37

Johnson, Stephanie, 305
416 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Johnson Space Center (JSC), 15, 88–89, 

99, 236, 256

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

fixes, 110, 234, 235

Payload Operations Control Center 

(POCC), 263–264

robotic mission, 225

SM4, 234, 236

International Space Station, 109, 334

Manipulator Development Facility, 100

NASA Space Station, 109

rivalries, 110

robotic spacecraft, 225

Servicing Mission 1 (SM1), 96, 99–101

Space Operations and Management 

Office (SOMO), 270

Weightless Environment Training Facility 

(WETF), 100, 149–150

Jones, Charles, 80

Jupiter, 9, 35, 117, 118, 125, 136n2, 

138n23, 151, 153, 195–199, 197, 

299

Comet Shoemaker-Levy, 93, 117, 118, 

120, 127

Europa, 153, 198

Galileo (Galileo Galilei), 45n2, 98

Ganymede, 153, 198

Io, 117, 125, 137n18, 197, 302

moons, 45n2, 117, 125, 153, 197, 299, 

302. See also individual moon names

Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS), 151

K

Keck telescope, 315

Kelly, Scott J., 156, 157

Kennedy, John F., 15

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-2 

(OAO-2), 19

Kennedy Space Center (KSC), 1–2, 14, 19, 

43, 62, 103, 106, 150, 152, 231, 256

Atlantis Space Shuttle, 239

Columbia Space Shuttle, 167, 209

Discovery Space Shuttle, 159, 231

Vertical Processing Facility (VPF), 162

Kennicutt, Jr., Robert C., 179, 242n24

Kessler, Elizabeth A., 124, 133–134

Keyworth, George A., 39

Kimble, Randy, 317

Kimbrough, Robert S., 235

Kinney, Anne L., 130, 139n 36, 218–219, 

309–310

Kirshner, Robert P., 176, 182, 189, 240n1, 

298, 315, 322n34

Kitt Peak National Observatory, 37, 73n18, 

131, 190, 289, 292–294, 299

Interactive Data Reduction and Analysis 

Facility, 320n13

Korsch, Dietrich, 80

Kuhn, Thomas, 339

Kuiper Airborne Observatory, 144

Kuiper Belt, the, 199, 206n47 

Kulkarni, Shrinivas, 83, 240n1

L

Lafreniere, David, 315

Lambright, W. Henry, 226

Lanzerotti, Louis J., 226

Large Space Telescope (LST), 15–44, 21, 

121. See also Space Telescope

approved, 19

artists’ conception, 21

astronomers’ lobby, 17–19, 22, 120–121

budget cuts, 17–19

construction, 19–25

design, 21, 22

funding, 18

Giacconi, Riccardo, 38

name change, 18

reductions, 18

ultraviolet spectrographs, 22

Larson, Ana M., 302

Las Campanas Observatory, 126

NGC 3532 star cluster, 63

Lasker, Barry M., 260

Late Night with David Letterman, 62

Lauer, Tod, 64, 66, 73n17, 73n18, 73n23, 

87

Lawrence, George N., 80

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, 181

Leavitt, Henrietta Swan, 177, 177

Leckrone, David S., 67, 81, 112n19, 144, 

146, 167, 236

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), 

212–213

Giacconi, Riccardo, 267

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) SM4, 

235

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) successes, 318
Index

Lee, Mark C., 148, 149, 151–152

Lemaître, Georges, 178

Levay, Zoltan, 129–133, 129, 133, 139n34, 

140n39

Levy, David H., 117, 195

Lewycky, George, 301

Ley, Willy, 134

Lick Observatory, 64

light (electromagnetic radiation), 12, 36, 124

Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), 

160–161, 193, 195, 212–213, 229, 

239, 336

astronomers, 10, 40–41, 62, 144, 147, 

175–181, 198–200, 290, 319, 

329–340

astronomers, amateur, 118, 123, 126, 

135, 196, 300

diffraction, 66

diffraction limit, 109, 335

electromagnetic spectrum, 10, 13, 

40–41, 338

Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS), 336

gamma rays, 40–41, 175, 179, 338

gravitational lensing, 87, 134, 187, 193, 

329

gravity waves, 342n17, 338

Great Observatories program, 41

HD96755 star, 63

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

accuracy, 69

Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS) 

details, 56–57

“First Light,” 62–63

image quality, 135

instruments observable wavelengths, 

336

mirror, 35

mirror laser, 28–29

Hubble versus Las Campanas images, 63

Hubble versus Nordic Optical images, 65

infrared, 40–41, 120, 123, 143–145

interference pattern, 28–29

Near Infrared Camera and Multi-Object 

Spectrometer (NICMOS), 336

neutrinos, 338

NGC 3532 star cluster, 62–63

Ritchey-Chrétien Cassegrain reflecting 

telescope, 54

Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS), 336

spectra, 10–13, 62, 86, 116n72, 124, 

176, 181, 289, 294

stellar magnitude, 23, 30, 258–260

ultraviolet, 12, 15, 21, 68–69, 86, 123, 

179

ultraviolet decontamination, 34

ultraviolet Faint Object Camera (FOC), 

24, 336

vignetting, 65

visible, 11, 24, 40, 56–57, 62, 68, 93, 

120, 131–134, 144–145, 151, 160, 

187, 193–194, 198, 213, 335–338

Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), 336

x rays, 40, 124–125, 179, 300, 338

Lilly, Simon J., 240n1

Lindsey, Steven W., 154

Linnehan, Richard M., 159, 163, 164–166

Lintott, Chris, 316

Litton Itek Optical Systems, 19, 94 

Livio, Mario, 193, 202

Lockheed Martin, 227, 230, 265–266

Consolidated Space Operations Contract 

(CSOC), 270–271

Space Systems, 255–256

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 

19–20, 23–26, 33, 165

extravehicular activities (EVAs) rehearsals, 89–90

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

construction, 33, 88

data, 115n59

servicing missions, 88–89

Optical Systems Laboratory, 80

Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), 36

partnerships, 64

roles and responsibilities, 24

Logsdon, John, 102–103

Loral AeroSys, 93, 257, 264–265, 311, 

326n70

Los Angeles Times, the, 133

Low, George M., 18

Lowell Observatory, 199

Lupie, Olivia, 112n19

Lynds, Roger, 64–65, 73n17

M

Macchetto, F. Duccio, 23–24, 73n21, 

116n72, 252

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) SM4 

cancellation, 279n10
418 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates, Ltd., 

227

Malin, David, 136n7

Mangus, John D., 67, 73n23, 80, 111n5

Marcy, Geoffrey, 201

Margon, Bruce H., 223, 240n1

Marines, U.S., 96, 99

Mars, 35, 102, 176, 195, 196, 199

space travel, 16, 70, 92, 121, 128

Mars Observer, 102

Mars Pathfinder, 128

Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), 14

extravehicular activities (EVAs) rehearsals, 89–90, 100, 149–150

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 36, 54

construction, 87, 254

handover to Goddard, 90

Independent Optical Review Panel, 80

servicing missions, 42, 88–89

spherical aberration, 67

Jones, Charles, 80

Large Space Telescope (LST), 17, 24, 37

Neutral Buoyancy Simulator, 100, 100, 

149, 165

partnerships, 64

rivalries, 73n23

roles and responsibilities, 20, 24, 81, 87, 

254

Martin Marietta Corporation, 19, 56–57, 

280n14

Maryland Space Grant Consortium, 

306–307

Massimino, Michael G., 159, 163, 

165–166, 172n43, 237, 341n8

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) SM4, 

232, 235–238, 333

Mattei, Janet A., 323n40

Mauna Kea observatory, 131, 134–135, 179

Mayor, Michel, 201

McArthur, K. Megan, 232, 235, 237, 238

McAuliffe, Sharon Christa, 42, 43

McCandless II, Bruce, 4

EVAs, 5, 7n11, 88–90

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) deployment, 42–44, 90, 164

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Strategy 

Panel, 83–84, 90

McCool, William C., 215

McCray, W. Patrick, 288, 290, 316–319

McCurdy, Howard E., 167

McDonald, Robert, 112n28

McLean, Brian J., 260

McNair, Ronald E., 42

Meinel, Aden, 79–80, 100n4

Meinel, Marjorie, 79–80

Mercury, 199

Mercury program, 154

Merwarth, Ann C., 255, 268

Messier, Charles, 119

Mikulski, Barbara A., 81, 98, 109, 224

Archive for Space Telescopes, 313

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) SM4, 

221, 224–226, 228, 231, 238–239

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) support, 

70, 267–268, 340

Miley, George K., 242n24

Milky Way galaxy, the, 10, 177–178, 195 

Miller, William, 121

Minkowski, Rudolph, 181

missile programs, 13–14

Mitterando, Joseph, 301

Moon, the, 9, 14, 56, 182, 190–191, 199, 

210

Apollo 16, 16

Galileo (Galileo Galilei), 45n2

Moon landing, 14–16, 21, 92, 117, 221

Space Exploration Initiative, 70

space travel, 11, 14, 21, 70, 121

telescope on, 210

moons, 125, 196–198

Charon, 25, 117, 199

Europa, 153, 198

Galileo (Galileo Galilei), 45n2

Ganymede, 153, 198

Hydra, 199

Io, 117, 125, 137n18, 197, 302

Jupiter’s, 45n2, 117, 125, 153, 197, 299, 

302

Kerberos, 199

Nix, 199

Pluto’s, 25, 117, 160, 199

Prometheus, 198

Saturn, 197–198

Styx, 199

Titan, 198

Uranus’s, 198

Moore, Duncan T., 80

Moore, James V., 257

Morabito, Linda, 137n18

Moran, Thomas, 134
Index

Mould, Jeremy, 179

Mount Palomar Observatory, 11–13, 

34, 121, 123, 179, 195, 202, 259, 

280n26, 288–290, 335

Guide Star Catalog II, 260

popularity of, 339

Mount Stromlo Observatory, 181–182

Mount Wilson Observatory, 9–11, 13, 121, 

178–179, 288, 339

Mountain, Mattias, 193, 275–276, 

308–309, 309, 317–318

Mukai, Chiaki, 154, 170n24

Muller, Steven P., 38–39

Musgrave, F. Story, 5, 88, 96–97, 99–100, 

103–106, 104, 333, 341n8

N

Naked Gun 2 1/2: The Smell of Fear, 70, 

135

Nancy Grace Roman Space Telescope, 

20, 187, 313, 315, 326n80. See also

Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope 

(WFIRST)

NASA Select, 103, 115n59

National Academy of Sciences (NAS)

Astronomy and Astrophysics for the 1970s

report, 17

Committee on Data Management and 

Science, 311

Hornig committee, 37

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

robotic mission, 225–226

SM4, 224–225

successor, 210

Large Space Telescope (LST), 15–16

roles and responsibilities, 37, 39, 224

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI) report, 39

National Advisory Committee for 

Aeronautics (NACA), 14

National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA)

African Americans, 310, 325n66

Allen Committee (Optical Systems 

Board), 79–80

Apollo program, 14–17, 36–37, 46n18, 

51n67, 98, 117, 130

Association of Universities for Research 

in Astronomy (AURA), 37–39, 

153, 256, 266–267, 274

astronomers, 37, 319

amateur, 300–303

astronomy, 287–289, 297–300

changes in, 316–317

bias at, 305–310

Bolden, Charles F., 5

budget, human spaceflight, 251

budget cuts, 18, 26–27, 37, 228, 

267–270, 282n47, 283n48

budgets, 91–92, 95, 101–102, 113n34, 

218–221, 229, 249–251, 278n2, 

332

Challenger, loss of, 43–44, 70

Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

(CAIB), 216, 218–222, 224–226, 

238–239

Comet Shoemaker-Levy 9, 136n2

communications network center, 59

Constellation program, 233

Cosmic Origins Spectrograph (COS), 

167, 212

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement), 

88, 95

criticism of, 98, 102–103, 107

Data Archive and Distribution Service 

(DADS), 311

delays, 156–158

Department of Defense, 20

Dressler report, the, 210–213, 240n1

Early Release Observation, 127

established, 14

European Space Agency (ESA), 22–23

collaboration, 251–254

extravehicular activities (EVAs), 97–98

“faster, better, cheaper” policy, 167

fellowships, 298, 306

Gemini program, 51n67, 88, 99

grants, 297–298

Great Observatories program, 40, 134

Guaranteed Time Observers (GTOs), 

292, 295–296

High Energy Astrophysical Observatories 

(HEAO), 40

High Fidelity Mechanical Simulator, 95

Hispanic Americans, 325n66

Hornig committee, 37, 39

Hornig report, 292

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 1, 25, 

338
420 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

data, 319

“First Light,” 62–64

fixes, 108–110

images, 62, 107, 108, 125

Independent Optical Review Panel, 80

infrared capabilities, 143–147

lifetime, 330–331

mission time estimates, 90

observing cycles, 287, 305–310

Optical Systems Board, 79

Orbital Verification Program, 53–54

robotic mission, 225–230

servicing missions, danger of, 229

SM4, 223–240

SM4 cancellation, 279n10

spherical aberration, 66–67, 77, 81, 

86, 126

successes, 107

Hubble-Shuttle relationship, 32, 43

human space programs, 16, 268, 332, 

334

fate of, 334–335

Inspector General report, 30

International Space Station, 46n18, 59, 

70, 334

internet, the, 128, 139n31

iPhones, 139n33

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 

210–211

Large Space Telescope (LST), 15–44, 

22, 25

Launch on Need missions, 156, 171n28

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 

23

management, 44

media responses to, 69–70, 102–103, 

107–108

Mercury program, 154

military programs, 20–21

minorities, 305–310, 325n58, 325n66

Mission Operations Software and 

Engineering Support (MOSES), 

265–266

NASA Select, 103, 115n59

National Reconnaissance Office, 20

National Space Science Data Center, 

310–311

Near Infrared Camera and MultiObject Spectrometer (NICMOS), 

145–147

Neutral Buoyancy Simulator, 149

Next Generation Space Telescope 

(NGST), 210

Office of Inspector General, 81

Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), 17, 31

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-2 

(OAO-2), 19

organizational culture, 69–70, 81

Origins Program, 217

partnerships, 265–266

Pellerin, Charles J., 112n20

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, 23

personnel, 162, 257

problems, 102

programs, 15

Public Affairs Office, 126

quality control, 27–29, 49n43, 70–71

rivalries, 274–275

roles and responsibilities, 24–25, 28–31, 

37–38, 37–39, 254, 316

Senior Review Process, 277

simulators, 95

Skylab, 16, 46n18

smartphones, 139n33

social media, 129, 139n33

space observatories, 131

Space Operations and Management 

Office (SOMO), 270–271

Space Shuttle, 16–17, 23

costs, 278n4

hydrogen leaks, 69

program, 332

space station, 3, 32, 46n18, 268, 334. 

See also International Space Station

Space Telescope, 251–252

Space Telescope Development Division, 

39

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI), 37–39, 80, 274, 318

policy guidelines, 292–293

report, 39

space telescopes, 15–17

STS-61 Mission Director’s Post-Mission 

Report, 109

Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 

(TDRS), 59

unique investigators, 296

Vehicle Electrical Systems Test (VEST) 

Facility, 95

virtual reality, 95, 100, 149
Index

Vision 2000, 251, 268–270

Vision for Space Exploration (Bush), 

220–221, 226–227

Welch report, 39

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 

(WFPC2), 86, 92

Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC), 

36

Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe 

(WMAP), 185–186

women, 305–310, 307, 325n58

Y2K concerns, 156–159

National Air and Space Museum, 35, 57, 

93, 97, 101, 331–332, 341n5

Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle, 

100–101

National Geographic, 124

National Geographic Society, 260, 280n26

National Optical Astronomy Observatories, 

69, 73n18, 280n15, 289, 304

National Radio Astronomy Observatory, 37, 

289, 292, 304

National Research Council, 41, 72n9, 210, 

224, 242n29, 297

National Science Foundation (NSF), 127, 

289, 297

roles and responsibilities, 37, 316

National Space Development Agency 

(NASDA), 154

Navy, U.S., 14, 214

Naval Research Laboratory, 14, 255

Nelson, George, 89

Neptune, 198–200

New Scientist, 70

New York Times, the, 2, 6, 63, 70, 102–103, 

107, 278n1

Newell, Jr., Homer E., 15

Newman, James H., 159, 163, 165–166

Newsweek, 70

Newton, Isaac, 9–10, 71n3, 339

Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST), 

210–213, 274

Nicollier, Claude, 99, 103–106, 104, 155, 

157, 158, 252

Niedner, Mal, 234

Nixon, Richard M., 16–17, 332

Noll, Keith, 130, 139n36, 298

Nordic Optical Telescope, 65

Nota, Antonella, 252

Nova, 109, 116n71

O

Obama, Barack, 238, 247n80

Oberth, Hermann, 11–12, 12

observatories, 37, 40–41, 195. See also

telescopes; individual observatory 

and telescope names

astronomers, 287–292, 290

Charge-Coupled Devices (CCD) detectors, 121–124

computers, 120–121

data, 134–135, 318–319

differences between, 13

digital images, 288–290

film-based, 289–290, 310

ground-based, 319, 336

ground-based versus Hubble Space 

Telescope (HST), 298–300

Hawaii, 131, 134–135, 318

Hubble Heritage, 131, 135

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

images, 78, 135

precedent, 318–319

relationship, 335

image quality, 136n7

imaging (digital), 135, 137n12

versus internet, 317

observing time, 293

Osservatorio Astronomico di Torino, 260

photographic plates, 123–124, 310

redshifted galaxies, 180

rise of, 288–289

Skylab, 16

space, 144

STScI’s Astronomy Visualization 

Laboratory, 129

wide field mode, 56

O’Connell, Robert, 228

O’Dell, C. Robert, 17, 200

Oegerle, William R., 242n24

O’Keefe, Sean, 209, 214–230, 214, 

238–239, 279n10

cancellation of SM4, 219–226, 233, 

245n60, 253–254, 275, 340

Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

(CAIB), 222–226

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) robotic 

mission, 225–226

Weiler, Edward J. criticism, 243n43

Olivier, Jean, 67–68

Onizuka, Ellison S., 42
422 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), 17, 19, 

31, 36

Oracle, 269

Orbiting Astronomical Observatories 

(OAO), 15–16, 81, 144, 179, 270

astronomy, 291

Cepollina, Frank J., 90

Grumman, 20

orbit, 291

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-2 

(OAO-2), 15, 19, 121

Orbiting Astronomical Observatory-3 

(OAO-3), 291

Orbiting Geophysical Observatories, 15

Orbiting Solar Observatories, 15, 90

Ortel, Goetz, 306

Osservatorio Astronomico di Torino, 260

Overbye, Dennis, 103

P

Page, Norm, 79

Panoramic Survey Telescope and Rapid 

Response System (Pan-STARRS), 313

Parazynski, Scott E., 154, 170n24

Paresce, Francesco, 83

Pellerin, Charles J., 36, 41, 49n51, 51n65, 

64, 71, 86

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement), 86, 

112n20

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) budgets, 

293

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) spherical aberration, 74n29, 75n37

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 

(WFPC2), 112n20

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, 19–20, 23–24, 

30, 64, 73n22, 170n13

budget shortfalls, 26–27

costs, 23, 30–31

Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS), 19, 23, 

30, 147

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

Fine Guidance Sensors, 30, 31

mirror, 26–31

mirror defects, 30–31, 49n43, 49n44, 81

microdensitometers, 259

Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), 36

optics fabrication facility, 27

partnerships, 64

quality control, 28–31, 49n43, 49n44

roles and responsibilities, 24, 27, 254

sale to Hughes Aircraft Company, 31–32, 

170n13

Perlmutter, Saul, 181–185, 181

Persha, Gerald, 323n40

Peterson, Donald, 88

Picturing the Cosmos, 124

Pioneer spacecraft, 196–198

planets, 13, 23, 30. See also individual 

planet names; individual planet 

moons; solar system, the

Charon (Pluto’s moon), 177, 199

electronic images, 121–122

Europa (Jupiter’s moon), 153, 198

exoplanets, 201–202, 217, 240n1, 315, 

335

formation, 304

Ganymede (Jupiter’s moon), 153, 198

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) images, 

117, 118, 120

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

Planetary Camera, 35

Io (Jupiter’s moon), 117, 125, 137n18, 

197, 302

Jupiter, 9, 35, 45n2, 98, 117, 118, 

125, 136n2, 138n23, 151, 153, 

195–199, 197, 299

Jupiter’s moon, moons, 45n2, 117, 125, 

153, 197, 299, 302

Mars, 16, 35, 70, 92, 102, 121, 128, 

176, 195, 196, 199

Mercury, 199

Moon, the, 9, 14–16, 21, 45n2, 56, 

70, 92, 117, 121, 210, 221, 182, 

190–191, 199, 210

Neptune, 198–200

Pluto, 25, 87, 117, 160, 199

Saturn, 11, 35, 69, 78, 87, 126, 130, 

151, 195–200

Uranus, 122, 151, 198–199

Venus, 9, 199

Pluto, 25, 87, 117, 160, 199

Charon, 177, 199

Porco, Carolyn C., 240n1

Postal Service, U.S., 159

Project RAND, 12–13

Project to Re-Engineer Space Telescope 

Observing (PRESTO), 269–270, 312

Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 109
Index

Q

quasars, 13, 58–59, 87, 176, 188, 294

Queloz, Didier, 201

R

Ramon, Ilan, 215

Raytheon, 170n13

Reagan, Ronald, 21, 39, 41, 282n47

Rector, Travis A., 133

Reid, Neill, 116n72, 303

Resnik, Judith A., 42

Richstone, Douglas O., 240n1

Riess, Adam G., 183–186, 183, 192

Ritchey-Chrétien Cassegrain reflecting 

telescope, 54, 71n3

Robinson, Stephen K., 154, 170n24

rockets, 11–15, 41, 46n11

Rodney, George A., 111n5

Roe, Robert A., 70

Roman, Nancy Grace, 15–16, 16, 309, 315

Roman Space Telescope. 20, 187, 313, 

315, 326n80

Rothenberg, Joseph H., 81, 82, 86, 95–96, 

266, 268

Rubin, Vera, 187

Rumsfeld, Donald, 226

Russia, 11, 102, 334

Russia (Soviet Union, the)

Cold War, the, 13, 16, 20–21, 44

space travel, 11

Sputnik, 14

S

Sagan, Carl, 135, 298

Samuel Oschin Schmidt Telescope, 195, 259

Sandage, Allan, 179

satellites, 16

artificial, 12–14

Cold War, the, 20–21

communications, 89, 97

development, 12–14

electronic images, 121–122

Explorer, 14

Explorer 6, 94

film-based, 121

first, 14

Globalstar telephone system, 273

Hexagon KH-9, 20, 121

Intelsat VI, 97

International Geophysical Year (IGY), 14

International Space Station, 46n18, 59

military, 20, 59

NASA, 15

photoreconaissance, 20

problems, 102

reconnaissance, 20, 26–27, 70

remote sensing, 102

replacement modules, 91

servicing missions, 89, 91, 113n30

Skylab, 16, 46n18, 88

Solar Maximum, 81, 89, 95, 97, 101

Space Shuttle, 89

spectroscope, 12

Sputnik, 14

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 21, 

230

Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 

(TDRS), 58–61, 60, 249

Uhuru, 179

Vanguard, 14

weather, 59, 98, 102, 121, 255

Saturn, 11, 35, 78, 87, 126, 130, 195–200

rings, 69

Space Telescope Imaging Spectrograph 

(STIS), 151

Saturn (rocket), 14

Savage, Don, 117–118

Schaefer, William Donald, 38

Schenk, Harald, 301

Scheve, Dave, 270

Schmidt, Brian P., 181, 181, 184

Schmidt, Maarten, 69

Schmidt telescope, 195, 259

Schneider, Glenn H., 242n24

Schreier, Ethan, 307

Schroeder, Dan, 49n44

Schulte, Daniel, 80

Science, 102, 189

Science and Engineering Research 

Council, 291

Scobee, Francis R., 42

Scolese, Chris, 246n72

Scowen, Paul, 118–119

Secosky, James, 301

Sembach, Kenneth R., 168–169, 239–240, 

276, 297, 297, 305, 309

Shannon, Robert R., 111n5

Shea, Joseph, 98–99

Sheffield, Ronald L., 89–90

Shoemaker, Carolyn S., 117, 195
424 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Shoemaker, Eugene M., 117, 195

Shriver, Loren J., 4, 5, 43

Shull, J. Michael, 242n24

Sichitiu, Rukmini, 301

Silicon Graphics Inc., 269

Simmons, Larry, 93

Sky & Telescope, 130, 302

Sky at Night, 316

Skylab, 16, 46n28, 88, 96

Slipher, Vesto M., 178

Sloan Digital Sky Survey, 71, 260, 315

Smith, Bradford A., 125

Smith, Michael J., 42

Smith, Robert W., 3, 13, 18, 20–21, 39, 

123, 158–159

Big Science, 287

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 18, 202, 

335

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) costs, 

251, 278n1

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 

20

Space Shuttle program, 332

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI), 39

Smith, Steven L., 148, 149, 151–152, 155, 

157, 158

Smithsonian American Art Museum, 

133–134

Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 

(SAO), 258–259

Smithsonian National Air and Space 

Museum, 35, 57, 93, 97, 101, 

331–332, 341n5

Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle, 100–101

solar system, the, 13, 35, 117, 126, 

195–200, 294. See also planets; 

individual planet names; individual 

moon names

Galileo (Galileo Galilei), 45n2

Space Exploration Initiative, 70, 98–99

Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF), 

40–41

Space News, 70, 278n4

Space Place, 332

Space Race, the, 13–14, 332

Space Shuttle, 21, 44, 51n57

astronauts, 32, 35, 43

Atlantis, 41–42, 217, 231, 234–239

crew, 237

flight deck, 330, 338

payload bay, 42, 114n50, 235, 238

budgets, 101

Challenger, 32, 88–89

crew, 42, 44

loss of, 6n1, 43–44, 44, 51n67, 67, 70, 

89, 219, 242n20, 260, 295

loss of (costs), 278n1

Columbia, 32, 41, 44, 155, 156, 163, 

214

crew, 215

loss of, 214–216, 225, 231, 243n30, 

245n60, 334

SM3B, 164

SM4, 214

Columbia Accident Investigation Board 

(CAIB), 216, 218–222

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement), 101

costs, 32, 34, 92, 101, 251, 278n4, 332

damage, 44

delays, 23, 43, 156–158, 214–215, 234

described, 32

Discovery, 1–3, 5–6, 6n1, 9, 32, 43, 44, 

53, 150–159, 217, 231

crew, 4

HST launch, 55

HST service, 156–159, 157

payload bay, 3, 262

Endeavour, 92, 97, 99, 101, 103–107, 

217

payload bay, 235

standby, 234–235

ending of, 278n4, 334

Flight Support System (FSS), 91, 101, 

103, 114n50, 150

history of service, 239

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 1–6, 3, 

4, 9, 54, 143

aperture door, 61

deployment, 60–61

Fine Guidance Sensors, 83

launch, 42

relationship, 332–335

servicing missions, 35, 54, 61, 69, 78, 

81–83, 88–110

servicing missions, end of, 239

hydrogen leaks, 69

improvements, 44

infrared observing capabilities, 40–41
Index

ISS servicing missions, end of, 239

launch, 1–3

launch delays, 6n1

Launch on Need missions, 231

manifests, 169n7

milestones, 154, 159, 215

military programs, 21

mission numbers, 7n11

Musgrave, Story, 96–97

Nixon, Richard M., 17

Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), 17, 

19

Orbital Replacement Units, 35, 101

payload bay, 1, 3, 21, 40, 54, 89, 91, 

101, 151–152

payloads, 32, 44, 162

problems, 31, 43, 98, 156–158, 212–218

proposed, 16–17

Remote Manipulator System (RMS), 3, 

91, 99, 103–106, 148, 149–150, 

155–159, 165, 235

retirement, 221

robotic systems, 227

Servicing Mission 1 (SM1), 143

Servicing Mission 2 (SM2), 302

servicing missions, 89

Solar Array Carrier, 101

Solar Maximum, 89

Space Infrared Telescope Facility 

(SIRTF), 40–41

Space Telescope main mirror, 22

space telescopes, 17

spacewalkers, 88

STS-6, 88, 96

STS-21, 115n59

STS-31 (Hubble deployment mission), 3, 

4, 5–6, 6n1, 43, 45n1, 51n67, 90, 

97, 113n32, 114n50, 164, 256

STS-41C, 89, 101

STS-41D, 44

STS-49, 97–99

STS-51, 102

STS-51A, 113n30

STS-51I, 113n30

STS-51L, 42

STS-54, 102

STS-57, 102

STS-61 (SM1), 99–110, 104, 115n59, 

152

STS-61J, 51n67

STS-82 (SM2), 148, 149–153, 162

STS-95 crew, 154, 170n24

STS-103 (SM3A), 156–159, 157, 

171n33

STS-104, 155

STS-107 (Spacehab/Columbia), 

214–216, 245n60

STS-109 (SM3B), 159–167

STS-114, 231

STS-115, 231

STS-121, 231

STS-125 (SM4), 234–239, 272, 338

STS-126, 235

STS-400 (standby rescue mission), 

234–235

Support Systems Module, 17, 19, 22

Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 

(TDRS), 59

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 

(WFPC2), 82, 101–103

Y2K concerns, 156–159

Young, John W., 51n67

Space Telescope, 18–44, 36, 78, 251–252. 

See also Large Space Telescope (LST)

astronomers, 292

astronomers’ lobby, 22, 37–38, 120–123

Charge-Coupled Devices (CCD) detectors, 123

Congress, U.S., 25

costs, 18, 23–24, 26–27

criticism of, 25

delays, 23

design, 22

electronic images, 121–122

European Space Agency (ESA), 22–23

Fine Guidance System, 19, 23

funding, 23–24

history of, 260–262

launch schedule, 23

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 

23

mirror (main), 26–30

observing time, 292

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, 23

problems, 25

reductions, 23, 26

Request for Proposals (RFPs), 22, 32

roles and responsibilities, 37

Science Working Group, 122–126

security, 23
426 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

Space Telescope Development Division, 

39

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI), 37–38

support for, 23–24

ultraviolet spectrographs, 22

ultraviolet wavelengths, 123

Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC), 

123

Space Telescope: A Study of NASA, Science, 

Technology and Politics, 13

Space Telescope Advisory Council, 176,

Space Telescope Advisory Committee 

(STAC), 266, 294

Space Telescope European Coordinating 

Facility (ST-ECF), 83–84, 252–253, 

253, 279n10, 311

Space Telescope Institute Council, 266

Space Telescope Operations Control 

Center (STOCC), 5, 59, 256–257, 

257, 260–266, 265, 270–273, 271

Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) 

Association of Universities for Research 

in Astronomy (AURA), 38–39, 

252, 266–267, 274, 276, 306–309

astronomers, 65, 249, 292–300

astronomers, amateur, 300–303

Astronomy Visualization Laboratory, 129

Barbara A. Mikulski Archive for Space 

Telescopes, 313

bias at, 305

budget cuts, 267–268

Burrows, Christopher, 64, 80

Chaisson, Eric J., 62

COSTAR (Corrective Optics Space 

Telescope Axial Replacement), 88, 

94–95

costs, 274

created, 37–39, 260–261, 277

criticism of, 39

Crocker, James, 94

data archive, 287–288, 292–293

Early Release Observation, 127

Education and Public Affairs Office, 

126–127

European Space Agency (ESA), 252–254

European Space Agency (ESA) collaboration, 252

General Observer Support Branch, 293

Giacconi, Riccardo, 38, 74n29, 83

Guaranteed Time Observers (GTOs), 

292, 295–296

Guide Star Catalog, 260, 273

headquarters, 255

Hornig committee, 37, 39

Hornig report, 261, 292

HST and Beyond committee, 209–210

Hubble Archive Re-Engineering Project 

(HARP), 312

Hubble Deep Field (HDF), 304

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) 

data, 319

data archive, 311–316

data path, 59–60, 60, 300

efficiencies, 269–270

“First Light,” 62–65

fixes, 110

images, 125–126, 131

observing cycles, 176, 258, 287, 292, 

322n34

observing time allocation, 294–304

power down, 165

Second Decade Committee, 303

Servicing Mission 4 (SM4), 275

spherical aberration, 65–66, 126–127

star catalog, 44

Strategy Panel, 83–88

verification, 54

HubbleSite, 128–129, 316

imaging (digital), 129, 139n34

internet, the, 128, 139n31

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), 

210–211, 274

Macchetto, Duccio, 24

management, 39

minorities, 305–310

Multi-mission Archive (MAST), 313

Next Generation Space Telescope 

(NGST), 274

Office of Public Outreach, 129, 140n39

Panoramic Survey Telescope and Rapid 

Response System (Pan-STARRS), 

313

Partnerships, 266, 274

Project to Re-Engineer Space Telescope 

Observing (PRESTO), 312

rivalries, 274–275

roles and responsibilities, 254–260, 262, 

275

Servicing Mission 1 (SM1), 101
Index

Servicing Mission 4 (SM4) cancellation, 

308

Sloan Digital Sky Survey, 71, 260, 315

staff, 267, 279n7

staff cuts, 302

successes, 274

Supernova 1997ff, 183

Time Allocation Committee (TAC), 

294–296, 303–305, 317–318

Wide Field Camera 3 (WFC3), 213, 228

women, 305–310

Women at Work: a Meeting on the 

Status of Women in Astronomy, 

307

Space.com, 278n4

spacecraft, 15, 44, 57

Advanced X-ray Astrophysics Observatory 

(AXAF), 40–41

Apollo, 14, 130, 270

Apollo program, 334

Cassini, 196–198

classified, 20

commissioning, 53

Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE), 

188

data, 125–126

Department of Defense, 20, 36

future of, 334

Galileo, 98, 196–197

Gemini program, 51n67, 88, 99

Giotto, 252

Great Observatories program, 41

Huygens probe, 198

Juno, 196

Kepler, 201

Mars Pathfinder, 128

Mercury program, 154

New Horizons, 196, 199

Pioneer spacecraft, 196–198

Planck, 186, 188

robotic, 14, 32, 53, 90–91, 121, 143, 

227, 341n7

servicing missions, 32, 78, 89

simulated, 88, 95

Solar Maximum, 81, 89, 95, 97, 101

Titan, 198

Tracking and Data Relay Satellites 

(TDRS), 59

Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite 

(TESS), 201

Ulysses, 196

untethered EVAs, 7n11

Voyager I spacecraft, 125

Voyager spacecraft, 63, 118, 125, 130, 

137n9, 137n18, 196–198

Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe 

(WMAP), 185–186, 188

Spaceman: An Astronaut’s Unlikely Journey 

to Unlock the Secrets of the Universe, 

172n43, 341n8

spacewalking, 5, 42, 54

astronauts, 148

difficulties of, 88–89, 99–100

equipment, 96, 100

Gemini program, 88

history of, 112n28

International Space Station, 152

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 

89–90

NASA confidence in, 152–153

problems, 97–98

simulated, 99–100

STS-82 (SM2) crew, 148

three-person, 97

untethered, 7n11, 88

women, 4–5, 7n11, 42–44, 88–90, 

112n28, 164. See also individual 

astronaut names

Spain, 59–60, 254

Spitzer, Jr., Lyman S., 9, 12–13, 13, 41

Copernicus satellite, 15

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) long 

exposures, 189

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Strategy 

Panel, 83–84

Large Space Telescope (LST), 15, 17–18

Space Telescope Science Institute 

(STScI), 37

Spitzer Space Telescope, 9, 40, 41, 134, 

193, 195, 297, 304

exoplanets, 201–202

“faster, better, cheaper” policy, 167

galaxies, redshifted, 210

Small Magellanic Cloud, 9

Spitzer Science Center, 318

“Spitzer Warm Mission,” 41

Spoelhof, Charles P., 111n5

Stafford, Thomas, 99, 102

Starry Messenger, 45n2

stars, 23, 40, 176
428 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

30 Doradus, 86–87, 108, 109, 112n23

AGK+81°266, 107

artificial reference stars, 135

atmosphere, 25

balloons, 153

Betelgeuse, 25

Big Dipper, 190

black holes, 25, 117, 151, 176, 187–188, 

304

Bubble Nebula, xi, 122, 130

Bug/Butterfly Nebula, 135, 209, 238

Canes constellation, 175

Carina constellation, 62

Carina Nebula, 200, 229

Cassiopeia constellation, 122

Catalogue of Nebulae and Star Clusters, 

119

Cat’s Eye Nebula, 200

Cepheid variables, 177–180, 186

Cephus constellation, 65–66

Cetus constellation, 194

Cone Nebula, 329

Crab Nebula, 69, 77, 122

distances between, 176–177

Eagle Nebula, 116n71, 117, 118–120, 

119, 120, 127, 135, 337

Eta Carinae star system, 109, 389

globular clusters, 13, 25

Great Nebula in Orion, 109

Guide Star Catalog II, 260

guide stars, 258–260

HD209458, 201

HD96755, 63

Helix Nebula, 200

Herbig-Haro Jet, 53

Horsehead Nebula, 229, 287

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) distance 

measurements, 56

Hydra constellation (NGC 3717), 381

Infrared Astronomical Satellite, 144

interstellar medium, 294

Keyhole Nebula, 343

Large Magellanic Cloud, 86, 108, 186, 

200, 315

M1, 122

M16, 119

magnitude, 30, 258

masses, 30

Melnick 34, 108

Monkey Head Nebula (NCG 2174), vii

motion, 23, 30

movement, 258–259

nebulae, 10, 53, 118–119, 122, 126, 

151, 176–177, 315

neutron stars, 338, 342n17

NGC 188 star cluster, 65–66

NGC 2174, vii

NGC 2264, 329

NGC 2392 Nebula, 159, 200

NGC 3532 star cluster, 62–63, 63

NGC 7635, xi, 122

Nova Cygni 1992, 109

novae, 302, 315

Orion Nebula, v, 87, 109, 200

Pegasus constellation, 201

“Pillars of Creation” image, 116n71, 117, 

118–120, 119, 127, 337

planets, 201

quasars, 294

Ring Nebula, 130, 200

Sagittarius Star Field, 130

Saturn’s rings, 69

Serpens constellation, 119

Sirius, 258

Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory 

(SAO), 258

Sombrero Nebula, 130

spectra, 10, 12

star catalog, 44, 252, 258–260

star clusters, 126, 176

star field comparison, 273

stellar astrophysics, 294

stellar magnetic fields, 302

stellar populations, 294, 304, 329

Supernova 1987A, 25, 109, 117, 134, 

200–201

Supernova 1997ff, 183

supernovae, 87, 117, 151, 181–182, 

194–195, 299, 315, 335

Supernoval Cosmology Project (SCP), 

181

Tarantula Nebula, 86–87, 108, 109, 

112n23

Taurus constellation, 122

Trifid Nebula, 130

Tucana constellation, 192

ultraviolet, 12

Ursa Major, 190, 269–270

variable stars, 23

Westerlund 2 cluster, 249
Index

white dwarves, 25

Steward Observatory, 179

Stockman, Peter, 86, 240n1, 267

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 21, 230

Sturch, Conrad R., 260

Sullivan, Kathryn D., 4, 45n1, 113n32

EVAs, 5, 7n11, 42, 88–90, 112n28

Handprints on Hubble, 341n8

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) deployment, 42–44, 45n1, 164, 341n8

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) servicing 

missions, 115n59

Sun (company), 269

Sun, the, 10, 23, 190

Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), 

161

black holes, 188

Galileo (Galileo Galilei), 45n2

Hubble Space Telescope (HST), 53

movement around, 56

orbit, 41

spectra, 12, 40

Suntzeff, Nicholas, 182

Superman (comic book), 17

T

Tanner, Joseph R., 148, 149–153

Taylor, Joseph, 229, 242n29

telescopes, 65, 131, 134. See also observatories; individual observatory and 

telescope names

Apollo 16, 16

astronauts, 16

astronomers, 4, 5–6, 13, 16, 37, 

287–292

amateur, 118, 123–124, 135, 137n12

professional, 290

astronomers’ lobby, 41

astronomical, 20

Chandra X-Ray Observatory, 40

Charge-Coupled Devices (CCD) detectors, 290

Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, 40

computers, 135

data, 41, 134, 318–319

development, 9–11, 11–12, 37

differences between, 135

film-based, 289–290

fixes, 11

Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO), 40–41

Gemini telescopes, 280n15

Great Observatories program, 40–42, 40

ground-based, 135, 210, 290, 293, 336

Hawaii, 131, 134–135, 318

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) relationship, 335

image quality, 135

infrared observing capabilities, 210

invented, 9

Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 

20

mirrors, 9, 26, 71n3

Moon-based, 210

National Reconnaissance Office, 20

optical, 71n3, 135, 175

Perkin-Elmer Corporation, 20

radio, 288

reflecting, 9, 11, 12

refracting, 9

remote observation, 289

space, 9, 11–15, 46n11, 144, 291, 336

Space Shuttle, 16–17

space telescopes, 42, 175, 210

space travel, 124

spacecraft, 218

spectrograms, 124

temperature, 11, 29, 61, 64, 135, 144

ultraviolet, 291

ultraviolet observing capabilities, 

335–336

ultraviolet spectrometer, 15

visible light, 335–336

Texas Instruments, 35

Thomas, Lewis, 301

Thompson, Rodger I., 145, 184

Thornton, Kathryn C., 98–99, 103–105, 

104, 106

Thronson, Harley A., 240n1, 317, 327n91

Thuot, Peter, 97

Time, 120

Tinsley Laboratories, 94–95

Tobias, Sheila, 307

Tombaugh, Clyde, 199

Tonry, John L., 240n1

Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite 

(TESS), 201, 313, 315

Trauger, John, 78–79, 92–93, 109–110

Truly, Richard H., 98–99

Truran, James, 240n1

TRW, Inc., 98, 210–211, 260
430 NOT YET IMAGINED: A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

U

Udall, Mark, 225

Uhuru satellite, 179

UK Schmidt Telescope, 259

UK Science and Engineering Research 

Council, 291

United Kingdom, 259, 291

United Technologies Corporation, 170n13

universe, the, 2–3, 9–10, 13, 40, 78, 147, 

175–202, 233, 294, 304, 332

age of, 87, 177–181, 185–187, 335

Big Bang, the, 180, 186, 188, 193

dark energy, 329, 339

dark matter, 187, 329, 339

early formation, 180

expanding, 10, 177–179, 182–192, 

203n7, 288, 315, 335

Milky Way galaxy, the, 10, 177–178, 195 

size of, 23, 30, 56–57, 87, 181, 294, 335

University of Wisconsin Space Place, 69

Uranus, 122, 151, 198–199

Urry, Meg, 307

USA Today, 2, 103, 278n1

V

Van Allen, James, 15

Van Allen radiation belt, 155, 264, 332–333

South Atlantic Anomaly, 115, 264, 270, 

332

van Hoften, James, 89

Venus, 9, 199

Very Large Array, 289, 312–313

Villard, Ray, 72n14, 73n21, 86, 117–118, 

126–127, 131, 133, 133, 235

von Braun, Wernher, 14, 134, 333

Voyager spacecraft, 63, 118, 125, 130, 

137n9, 137n18, 196–198

W

Wall Street Journal, the, 3, 278n1

Walters Art Museum, 135

Washington Post, the, 2–3, 70, 107, 126, 

221 

Block, Herbert L. (Herblock), 77

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) costs, 

6n4, 278n1

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) mirror 

defects (cartoon), 77

Washington Times, the, 2

Watzke, Megan, 133

Weiler, Edward J., 35, 68–69, 71, 75n37, 

77–79, 107, 119, 217, 246n72, 309

Advanced Camera for Surveys (ACS), 

159

astronomers, 293

Columbia, loss of, 216, 219

Dressler report, the, 240n1

Hubble Space Telescope (HST)

fixes, 109, 216, 218, 238

General Observers (GOs), 293

robotic mission, 225

Servicing Mission 4 (SM4), 219–222, 

230, 238, 243n30, 243n43, 

246n70, 278n4

minorities, 309

NASA budgets, 283n50, 293

O’Keefe, Sean, 243n43

rivalries, 110

Space Shuttle manifests, 169n7

Wide Field/Planetary Camera 2 

(WFPC2), 82, 93, 119, 144–145

replacement, 212–213

women, 309

Weiss, Benjamin, 301

Welch, James C., 39

Wenz, Michael, 165

Westfall, John E., 323n40

Westphal, James A., 125–126

Charge-Couple Device (CCD), 123

Hubble Space Telescope (HST) images, 

63, 65, 125–126

Space Telescope, 22, 123

Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC), 

34, 63, 74n36

White, Nicholas, 310

Wide Field Infrared Survey Telescope 

(WFIRST), 20, 187, 313, 315, 

326n80. See also Nancy Roman 

Space Telescope

Williams, Robert E., 130, 182, 189–193, 

189, 267, 274, 302, 312

Wilson, Raymond, 83

Wiseman, Jennifer, 225, 236, 319, 337

Wolff, Sidney C., 69

women, 7n11, 88, 275, 287, 305, 325n58, 

351–355

Women at Work: A Meeting on the Status 

of Women in Astronomy, 307

Wood, H. John, 80, 87–88, 108

Woodgate, Bruce, 145, 150
Index

X

XMM-Newton Observatory/X-Ray 

Telescope, 195, 304

Y

Yerkes Observatory, 10, 327n91

Young, A. Thomas, 38

Young, John W., 42–43, 51n67, 99

Z

Zooniverse, 316

Zwicky, Fritz, 46n11, 181, 187

NOT YET 

IMAGINED 

A STUDY OF HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE OPERATIONS

The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) is the most famous astronomical instrument of its time and one of 

the best-known robotic vehicles ever put into space. Its launch and deployment into low-Earth orbit 

from the Space Shuttle Discovery in April 1990 appeared to fulfill the plans and dreams of astronomers 

since the beginnings of space exploration to place a telescope beyond the distorting effects of Earth’s 

atmosphere. 

The first images from Hubble contained a stunning surprise—the space telescope’s main mirror had 

been precisely ground to the wrong shape. Although HST’s images were still superior to anything available from ground-based telescopes, the Hubble Telescope instantly became a byword for incompetence. 

With the future of NASA on the line, scientists and engineers devised fixes for the spherical aberration afflicting Hubble, and astronauts flying on the first of five servicing missions to HST installed new 

instruments that restored the Space Telescope’s capabilities to those promised when it was launched. 

Within weeks, HST produced the breathtaking images and other data that astronomers and the public 

had long anticipated, and soon Hubble shed its former image as it became a symbol of American technological and scientific prowess. 

Not Yet Imagined documents the history of HST from its launch through its first 30 years of operation in space. It focuses on the interactions among the general public, astronomers, engineers, government officials, and members of Congress during that time. The decision-making behind the changes in 

Hubble’s instrument packages on servicing missions that made HST a model of supranational cooperation amongst scientists is chronicled, along with HST’s contributions to our knowledge about our 

solar system, our galaxy, and our universe. This book also covers the impact of HST and the images it 

produces on the public’s appreciation for the universe, and how HST has changed the ways astronomy 

is done.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christopher J. Gainor is the editor of Quest: The History of Spaceflight Quarterly. His books include The 

Bomb and America’s Missile Age (2018), To a Distant Day: The Rocket Pioneers (2008), and Arrows to the 

Moon: Avro’s Engineers and the Space Race (2001). His research interests include aircraft, missile, and 

space programs in the years following World War II. He has served as President of the Royal Astronomical 

Society of Canada, and he has a doctoral degree in the history of technology from the University of 

Alberta, a master of science degree in space studies from the University of North Dakota, and a bachelor 

of arts degree in history from the University of British Columbia. 

FRONT COVER: Hubble image of the Lagoon Nebula 

(Credit: NASA, ESA, and STScI); The Hubble Space Telescope in May 2009 (Credit: NASA)

BACK COVER: Hubble image of the Bubble Nebula 

(Credit: NASA, ESA, and the Hubble Heritage Team [STScI/AURA])
...the chief contribution of such a radically new 

and more powerful instrument would be, 

not to supplement our present ideas of the 

universe we live in, but rather to uncover 

new phenomena not yet imagined...

Lyman Spitzer, Jr., 1946

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Office of Communications 

NASA History Division

Washington, DC 20546

www.nasa.gov

NASA SP-2020-4237

9 781626 830622

90000

ISBN 978-1-62683-062-2