Filed 5/16/13 Marriage of Roney CA2/3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re Marriage of SONIA and STEPHEN RONEY.

___________________ __________________ SONIA RONEY,
Respondent,

v.
STEPHEN RONEY,
Appellant. B233870
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BD443374)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Su perior Court of Los Angeles County, Frederick Shaller, Judge. Affirmed. Stephen Roney, in pr o. per., for Appellant. Rombro & Associates, S. Roger Rombro and Melinda A. Manley for Respondent.

_____________ ____________2 In this marital dissolution action, St ephen Roney (Husband), acting in propria persona, appeals from the judgment on reserved issues entere d after the dissolution of his marriage to Sonia Necochea Roney (Wif e). Husband challenges the court’s characterization of four parcels of real propert y that he claimed to have owned before the date of marriage or acquired with his separate property during the marriage. Husband’s principal contention on appeal is that but for rulings denying hi s request for a trial continuance and excluding recently discovered checking account registers, which he maintained Wife had withheld during discover y, he would have been able to establish through direct tracing that the four parcels of real property were his separate property. 1
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Husband is a certified public accountant and was licensed to practice from 1972 to approximately 2001. Husband and Wife married on December 28, 1988. Wife petitioned for dissolution of their marriage on April 3, 2006. Judgment of dissolution was entered on March 1, 2010, as to status only with juri sdiction reserved over all other issues. In phase one of the trial on reserved issues, the trial court determined the date of separation was March 30, 2006. The second phase of the trial on reserved issues addressed the characterization of property.
1. The Properties Before marriage, Husband ow ned four properties: (1) a shopping center referred to as “Imperial King Center” (IKC Property) in Norwalk, (2) a du plex commonly known as 463, 477 25th Street (25th Street Propert y) in Hermosa Beach, (3) real property commonly known as 2010 Blossom Lane in Redondo Beach (Blossom Lane Property), and (4) real property commonly known as 22 Hermosa Avenue in Hermosa Beach

1 Husband refers throughout his brief to “four pieces” of real property, but he does not further describe the property.

2 Our recitation of the facts is limited to matters in the record. We disregard facts not supported by record citations and attemp ts to reargue the facts as Husband would have them. ( In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.Ap p.4th 1507, 1531.)3 (Hermosa Avenue Property). The mortgages on the IKC Prop erty and the 25th Street Property were paid during the marriage. Three of these four properties have been so ld. The 25th Street Property was sold in 2008, after the date of separation, and the proceeds were held in a trust account. The Blossom Lane Property and the Hermosa Av enue Property were sold during the marriage.
Husband testified that he used the sale proceeds from the Hermosa Avenue Property to buy a Jack in the Box restaurant in Texas (Texas Property). He held title to the Texas Property and testified he paid off th e mortgage with his separate property. Husband and Wife held title as joint tenant s to a property commonly referred to as 1129 11th Street in Hermosa Beach (11th Street Property). Hu sband admitted the 11th Street Property was a community estate a sset, with the exceptio n of $102,000 of his separate property that he invested from the sa le proceeds of the Blossom Lane Property.
The trial court concluded Husband failed to meet his burden to directly trace his separate property interest in the properties. Based upon the evidence presented at trial, the community estate had a pro-tanto intere st in the IKC Property, the 25th Street Property sale proceeds, the Blossom Lane Pr operty, and the Hermosa Avenue Property as
stated in In re Marriage of Moore (1980) 28 Cal.3d 366, and In re Marriage of Marsden (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 426 ( Moore-Marsden formula ). The trial court characterized the Texas Property and the 11th Street Proper ty as community property, subject to reimbursement pursuant to Family Code sec tion 2640 for Husband’s separate property
contribution. Husband contends his failure of proof relates to a discovery dispute with Wife over missing checking account register s from his separate bank accounts that he needed to show he used his separate prope rty during the marriage to pay the mortgages on the properties.4 2. Ongoing Discovery Dispute Over Checking Account Registers Husband sought to continue the trial on the reserved issues for a number of reasons, including the parties’ ongoing discovery dispute ove r missing checking account registers. Both parties accused the other one of hiding or stea ling these documents. 3

a. Wife’s Request for Produc tion and Motion to Compel In March 2008, Wife pr opounded discovery seeki ng documents to support Husband’s separate property claims to assets acquired before marriage, during marriage, or since separation to which Husband cont ended were not commingled with community property. Dissatisfied with Husband’s document pr oduction, Wife moved to compel. In opposition to the motion, the sworn decl aration of Husband’s counsel stated: “Respondent delivered to my office, all of the records in his possession related to his financial conditions. These records include, tax returns for 19 years, bank records, rental agreements, loan applications and other documents . . . . I allowed Petitioner, personally, to enter my office and to copy whatever records . . . she c hose.” Husband’s counsel also personally delivered two full boxes of busine ss records in response to the document request. The motion to compel was gr anted. The order states that if Husband seeks to augment discovery, he must provide discovery on or before 45 days from the date of trial. If husband augmented discovery, he was ordered to provide a statement under penalty of perjury explaining “why the documents soug ht to augment his responses were not provided in response” to the document request.

3 Husband has not prepared an adequate re cord. A party may choose to act as his own attorney. “ ‘[S]uch a party is to be tr eated like any other part y and is entitled to the same, but no greater considera tion than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, as is the cas e with attorneys, pro. per. litig ants must follow correct rules of procedure. [Citations.]” ( Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App. 4th 1229, 1247.)5 b. Husband’s Request for Produc tion and Motions to Compel In February 2010, Husband filed a moti on to compel produc tion of documents after propounding a request for missing checking account registers. In December 2009, Husband requested “[h]andwritte n check registers that were prepared by Stephen Roney for account numbers 00633-39 88 and 00639-05663 also k nown as Bank of America general account and Bank of Am erica Imperial King Center account for the period of January 1, 1989 through December 31, 2001.” Wife eventually resp onded to the request, stating: “Documents have been produced pursuant to requ est for production, set number two, and have been supplemented.” Husban d believed this response was incomplete. In June 2010, Husband filed a motion to compel and sought an evidentiary sanction precluding Wife from using the Bank of America checking account registers prepared for the period from 1989 through 2001. Husband ac cused Wife of taking these checking account registers from his locked car while he wa s out of the country. The record does not contain a ruling on this motion. 4

c. Trial Court Order Regarding Undisc losed Checking Account Registers
The court denied Husband’s motion to co ntinue the trial based upon the ongoing discovery dispute but addressed Husband’s c oncern that he believed Wife had withheld the checking account registers. The court’s or der states: “[I]f Pe titioner is calling an expert or party witness w ho relied upon Respondent’s check registers for Mr. Roney’s main operating account from 1989 through 1992, bank statements for two Cal Fed bank
accounts and bank statements fo r several bank accounts in Petitioner’s name at the time of separation, or any appraisals these documen ts are to be produced to Respondent in

4 The commissioner that heard the discovery motion apparently ordered the parties to bring this matter before a discovery refe ree to determine whether Wife had withheld documents. Husband represents in his open ing brief that there was not enough time to hire a discovery referee before trial, but he did not raise this point in his motion to continue the trial. During trial, Husband’s counsel also referred to evidentiary sanctions imposed on Wife. The trial court reviewed the file and could not find any sanctions order, nor has Husband presented any such order in the record on appeal.6 sufficient time for cross-exam ination of the expert and of Petitioner or testimony will not be permitted on these matters.”
3. Use of the Checking Account Registers at Trial

a. Wife’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Undisclosed Documents Wife filed a motion in limine to preclude the use of documents not previously disclosed or produced in discovery, includ ing summaries, lists, audits, and other similar compilations that may have been prepared fo r trial. The motion was based on Husband’s statement during a break in a mandatory settlem ent conference before trial that “ ‘[w]e
have found more documents.’ ” The trial court granted the motion to exclude any compilations “unless foundation is laid prior to testimony.”
b. Wife’s Schedules Based on Ch ecking Account Registers Husband had a separate bank account, a Bank of America account ending in 5663 (IKC Account), in which he paid the mortgage and expenses related to the IKC Property. Wife had no signing authority on the IKC Account. Husband also had a Bank of America account ending in 3988 (General Account). Wife testified she prepared a number of schedules for her expert using available
bank records. One of these schedules listed income earned in 1994 from a laundry business operated at the IKC Property. Wife testified that she obtained the financial
information from the IK C Account check registers that sh e found in boxes in the living room at the 11th Street Property. 5 Wife also testified that she made a copy of two pages of checking account registers, but she could not identify the account.

c. Husband’s Compilations Ba sed Upon Recently Disc overed and Undisclosed Checking Account Registers for the IKC and General Accounts Husband prepared compilations using checking account regi sters that had not been produced. He found them about three weeks before trial in a box of records at the 11th

5 Husband’s brief cites to testimony and th en improperly attempts to refute that testimony. For example, in response to this testimony, Husband states: “This is a lie because she actually found them in the BMW car that was lo cked up in the garage at 1129 11 th Street.” As noted, we do not co nsider matters outside the record.7 Street Property. The missi ng checking account registers are for the period from 1993 to 2000 for the General Account, and from 1991 to 2000 for the IKC Account. The compilations were for the 1993 General Acco unt (Exhibit 414), and for the IKC Account from 1991 through 1995 (Exhibits 415, 416). Husband did not find all of the missing checking account registers. During argument following an objection to the admission of these compilations, Husband attempted to persuade the court that Wife had withheld the checking account registers during discovery. To support his position, Husband pointed to Wife’s admission into evidence of the two-page copy of checking account registers. He told the court that the first page was a copy of the 1991-1992 registers from the General Account, which were still missing. Husband believed that this showed Wife had access to all the checking account registers. Husband’s compilations (Exhibits 414, 415, and 416) were excluded from evidence. The trial court noted that upon di scovery of the checking account registers, Husband should have copied the documents a nd delivered them to Wife before trial, offered to pay the damages caused by th e delay in production, and moved for a continuance. Instead, Husban d waited until the fifth day of trial to disclose these documents when Wife almost had completed her case. Thereafter, Husband traced his separate pr operty with numerous schedules that he prepared using receipts and di sbursements from the IKC Acco unt and General Account.
d. Statement of Decision, Judgment, and Appeal Citing Pate v. Channel Lumber Co. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1 447 in its statement of decision, the trial court rejected Husband’s po sition that he had been unfairly prejudiced by the exclusion of his compilations (Exhibits 414-416) prepared using the checking account registers. The court no ted that Husband’s assertion as to what the lost evidence would show, if found, or who was responsib le for the loss was “pure speculation.”
The court also concluded Husband’s sche dules were untrustwo rthy. They were created from guesswork and not supported by verifiable source documents.8 As for Husband’s contention that Wife withheld documents, the statement of decision reads: “Although Mr. Roney tried to blame Petitioner for the misappropriation and unavailability of records n ecessary to prove his case, he proved nothing more than that Mrs. Roney had the opportunity to take so me of the records that Mr. Roney left in an unsecured common area in the parties’ home – not that she took or destroyed them. Mr. Roney is a certified public accountant with sp ecialized knowledge regarding how to set up accounts, keep records, and maintain records.” The court awarded Wife $385,502 in attorney fees and costs, stating “much of the
conduct mentioned in the Stat ement of Decision which gave rise to the protracted litigation indicates that respondent violated Family Code secti on 271 by his litigation
conduct.” Husband timely appealed from the judgm ent entered following the second phase
of the court trial on reserved i ssues (second partial judgment).
DISCUSSION
1. Appellate Jurisdiction and Requ est to Dismiss the Appeal As a preliminary matter, we address whethe r we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and whether the appeal should be dismissed pursuant to the disentitlement
doctrine or because Husband has failed to fo llow appellate rules a nd procedures. We have jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and deny the request for dismissal.

a. Appealability Appealability of the second partial judgmen t “ ‘goes to our jurisdiction, [leaving us] dutybound to consider it on our own motion’ [Citation.] . . . .” ( In re Marriage of
Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216.) Although there is no dispute as to appealability, jurisdiction cannot be conferred. ( Ibid .) The parties view the second partial judgm ent as an exception to the one final judgment rule. The “final judgment rule” applies to ci vil cases and provides that unresolved issues prevent a judgment from bei ng final for purposes of appellate review. ( Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697.) Under the final9 judgment rule, an appeal lies only from a fina l judgment, one that effectively terminates the litigation. ( Ibid .) The one final judgment rule does not always apply in family law cases because of the practice of bifurcating issues for separate trials. “ ‘All issues incident to marital termination need not be tried in a single fami ly law proceeding. The court may . . . order
the trial bifurcated , allowing early dispos ition of the dissolution issue and subsequent litigation of the property, support and custody issues (or any other co mbination of issues and trials). [Citations.]’ ” ( In re Marriage of Wolfe (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 889, 894; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.390.) When the trial court bifurcates the issue of the dissolution of the status of marriage and rese rves jurisdiction over the other issues, the judgment of dissolution is immediately appealable. ( In re Marriage of Fink (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 360-366.) Post-judgment orders affecting the judg ment in some way or relating to its
enforcement that involve issues other than those decided by the judgment, are appealable
under Code of Civil Procedure s ection 904.1, subdiv ision (a)(2). ( In re Marriage of
Wilcox (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 4 92, 497; see Hogoboom and King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 16:274, p. 16–83.) The second partial judgment was entered following the judgment of dissolution, but in order to be appealable it must be fi nal, that is, not simply preliminary to a proceeding and judgment. ( In re Marriage of Ellis (2002) 101 Cal.Ap p.4th 400, 403.) Unlike the post-judgment order at issue in In re Marriage of Ellis , in which the court’s order was merely preliminary to an anticipated final order evaluating and dividing the asset, here the trial court made a final determ ination on the real property division. Our only concern relates to language in the sec ond partial judgment addressing the reserved issues. The second partial judgment states with respect to the IKC Property, the proceeds from the 25th Street Property, and the Texas Pr operty: “Jurisdiction is expressly reserved over this property and any rents, income and profits that were not distributed proportionally to the parties to effect the Court’s division.” We read this language as a10 final determination on the characterization of the subject properties, and a reservation of jurisdiction to enforce the court’s order. Thus, the second partial judgment is appealable.
b. Disentitlement Doctrine an d Violation of Appellate Rules and Procedures
Wife seeks a dismissal of th is appeal pursuant to the disentitlement doctrine, or alternatively, dismissal for numerous viola tions of appellate rules and procedures. Husband’s litigation conduct does not warrant the sanction of dismissal. Under the disentitlement doctrine, “[a] reviewing court has inherent power to dismiss an appeal when the appealing party ha s refused to comply w ith the orders of the trial court. [Citation.]” ( In re Z.K . (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 51, 63.) The doctrine
“extends to conduct that . . . frustrates the ab ility of another party to obtain information it needs to protect its own legal rights.” ( In re C.C. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 76, 85.) “Appellate disentitlement ‘is not a jurisdicti onal doctrine, but a discretionary tool that may be applied when the balance of the equ itable concerns make it a proper sanction.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Z.K ., supra , at p. 63.) The rule applie s even if there is no formal adjudication of contempt. ( TMS, Inc. v. Aihara (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 377, 379.) The disentitlement doctrine “is particularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises out of the very order (or orders) the party has dis obeyed.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutte r Group 2012) ¶ 2:340, p. 2-172 (rev. #1, 2012).)
Wife contends dismissal of the appeal under the disentitlement doctrine is an appropriate sanction because Husband violated a court or der by waiting until trial to disclose his discovery of the missing checking account registers. Wife also points out
that Husband has violated othe r court orders in this proceed ing, requiring her to initiate contempt proceedings. With respect to the discovery order, Husband represented to the court that he did not find the checking acc ount registers until about three weeks before trial, making it impossible to obey the court’ s discovery order. The trial court sanctioned Husband by excluding the evidence. No further sanction is warranted.
Wife also seeks dismissal of this a ppeal based upon Husband’s numerous violations of appellate rules and procedures . Husband violated the California Rules of11 Court by failing to include the most basic documents in his appendix, such as the judgment and the notice of appeal. (Cal. Ru les of Court, rule 8.124(b)(1)(A), (B).) We acknowledge a self-represented litigant’s unders tanding of the rules on appeal is, as a practical matter, more limited than an expe rienced appellate atto rney’s. Whenever possible, we do not strictly a pply technical rules of procedur e in a manner that deprives litigants of a hearing. When, however, that apparent lack of understanding results in our inability to conduct a meaningful review of the trial court’s decision, we cannot ignore
the fundamental rules of appellate practice. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984-985; Nwosu v. Uba , supra , 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 1247.) Husband’s numerous rule violations are significant, but we do not deny him the ri ght to a hearing. Husband, however, has forfeited issues where the rule vi olations prevent our meaningful review.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Di scretion in Denying the Continuance Husband appears to contend that becaus e the trial court made an accommodation to alter the order of proof and set a later date to permit him to call hi s expert witness, the
court also should have con tinued the trial to permit him to use the newly discovered checking account registers. Husband did not seek a con tinuance based on the newly discovered checking account registers. The trial court’s denial of a request for a continuance lies within its discretion. ( Lazarus v. Titmus (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.) “ ‘An abus e of discretion occurs “where, considering all the relevant circumstan ces, the court has exce eded the bounds of reason or it can fairly be said that no judge would reasonably make the same order under the same circumstances.” ’ ” ( In re Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893, 898- 899, quoting In re Marriage of Olson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1, 7.) All parties must generally regard the date set for trial as certai n, and continuances
of trials are disfavored. The trial court ma y grant a continuance only on an affirmative showing of good cause. (C al. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(a), (c).) Among the circumstances that may indicate good cause is a “party’s excuse d inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other mate rial evidence despite diligent efforts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(c)(6).)12 Here, there was no showing of good cause. The declar ation in support of the
continuance refers to the two-year-old discovery dis pute, not that Husband had discovered some of the missing checking acco unt registers, or that Husband needed additional time to resolve the discovery dis pute by engaging the services of a discovery referee. Under these circumstances, the tria l court’s denial of a continuance did not exceed the bounds of reason. ( In re Marriage of Olson , supra , 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Di scretion in its Evidentiary Rulings
Husband contends the trial court comm itted prejudicial error when it excluded from evidence his compilations (Exhibits 414-416). Husba nd maintains that had these compilations been introduced into evidence, he would have met his burden of proof to trace his separate property. This is pure speculation and not supported by the record. The trial court’s order excluding Husband’s compilations (and any use of the newly discovered checki ng account registers) was an ev identiary sanction for discovery
abuse. The trial court has broad discretion in determining whether to impose sanctions. ( R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496.) The trial
court’s determination is reversible only for an abuse of discretion. ( Ibid .) While
Husband contends that the trial court’s evid entiary sanction impaired his ability to trace his separate property, our focu s is whether the imposition of th is sanction was an abuse of discretion. On this record, we find no abuse of discretion. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, sanc tions for a particular misuse of the discovery process are available upon notice and hearing to establish the disobedience of an order to compel. There are exceptions , however, where the discovery misuse comes
so late that an evid entiary sanction is “virtually the only viable option available” to ensure a fair trial. ( Pate v. Channel Lumber Co ., supra , 51 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1454- 1455.) Exclusion of Husband’s compilations (E xhibits 414-416), along with the newly discovered checking account regist ers, was necessary to ensure a fair trial. Wife did not
learn that Husband had obtaine d the missing checking account registers until after she almost had presented her entire case. Wife ’s expert prepared reports and testified13 regarding the existing universe of documents , which contained significant gaps in the couples’ financial history. Husband “ambus hed” Wife at trial by attempting to fill the gaps with newly discovered financial documents that were not made available to Wife or her expert. The only effectiv e way to remedy Husband’s discovery abuse was to impose an evidentiary sanction. In the event of trial court error, Husban d has not shown prejudice. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; see also Evid. Code, § 354.) Husband was not precluded from using other
available financial documents to trace his se parate property interest. These financial documents, however, were in disarray and inco mplete. Husband relied on his memory to patch together the couple’s financial history. As a CPA, Husband was at fault for the poor record keeping. Husband also inco rrectly assumes that the checking account registers would have conclusively established that the real pr operty at issue here was his separate property. The excluded compila tions (Exhibits 414-416), however, only included information from the checking account registers and were not supported by account statements, canceled chec ks, documents regarding the identity of expenses, and proof of separate property account balances on the date that each mortgage payment was made. And, even if the co mpilations (Exhibits 414-416) and newly discovered checking account registers had been admitted at trial, they were incomplete because several years were still missing. Thus, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
Husband would have been reached abse nt any perceived trial court error.
4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Disc retion in Awarding Attorney’s Fees Husband does not challenge Wife’s right to recover attorney fees, only the
amounted awarded. Husband claims the award of $385,502 was “outrageous” and unreasonable, pointing out excessive spending on trial exhibits, unnecessary expert witness costs, and unnecessary questioning duri ng trial that delayed the proceedings. “[A] motion for attorney fees and costs in a dissolution pr oceeding is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citations .] In the absence of a clear showing of abuse, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal. [Citations.] ‘[T]he trial court’s order will be overturned only if, considering all the eviden ce viewed most favorably in14 support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made.’ ” ( In re Marriage of Sullivan (1984) 37 Cal.3d 762, 768-769.) The tr ial court’s broad di scretion is guided by statute. Family Code section 2032 permits an award of attorney fees and costs if it is “just and reasonable under the relative circ umstances of the respective parties.” (Fam. Code, § 2032, subd. (a).) In determini ng what is just and reasonable, “the court
shall take into consideration th e need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party’s case adequately . . . .” (Fam. C ode, § 2032, subd. (b).) The court considers, to the extent relevant, the circumstances that it would c onsider in determining spousal support. (Fam. Code, §§ 2032, subd. (b), 4320.) “ ‘The major factors to be considered by a court in fixing a reasonable attorney’s fee [include] “the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required and the skill employed in handling the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s efforts, his le arning, his age, and his experien ce in the particular type of work demanded [citation]; the intricacies and importance of the litigation, the labor and the necessity for skilled legal training an d ability in trying the cause, and the time consumed. [Citations.]” [C itations.]’ [Citation.]” ( In re Marriage of Keech (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 860, 870.) The record re flects consideration of these issues. The trial court fixed a reasonable attorney fee. Contrary to Husband’s contention that no records exist, the record on appeal th at Wife prepared includes billing statements detailing attorney fees incurred du ring the course of five years of litigation. As the court stated, the protracted litigati on was a result of Husband’s in tentional delay in resolving
this case “in a concerted effort to shut out Pe titioner from a fair resolution of their marital property and support issues after a long-t erm marriage.” The co urt also noted that Husband’s litigation conduct warranted attorney fees as a sanction under Family Code section 271. Considering the record, th e court’s findings on the additional factors
enunciated in In re Marriage of Keech , supra , 75 Cal.App.4th 860, along with the court’s knowledge having presided over the trial in this case, we c onclude the trial court did not
abuse its discretion.15 5. The Trial Court Had Authority to Appoint an Expert Husband appears to contend that the tr ial court should not have reserved jurisdiction over certain bank accounts that he maintained were his separate property.
The trial court concluded these accounts we re “mixed account[ s],” cont aining both community estate and separate property asse ts. Because the court required additional tracing evidence, it appointed a forensic accountant. Under Evidence Code section 730, trial courts regularly appoint experts to investigate and prepare reports concer ning marriage dissolution matters. (See Lester v.
Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 545.) To the extent Husband challenges the trial court’s determination of the community estate ’s interest, he has forfeited the issue by failing to present reasoned argument a nd citations to legal authority. ( Mansell v. Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545-546.)
6. Husband has Forfeited his Remaining Cha llenges to the Second Partial Judgment Without reasoned argument and citations to authority, Husband refers to errors in the second partial judgment, including the court’s directive to execute interspousal
transfer deeds for the IKC Pr operty and the Texas Property, and to reimburse Wife for her portion of the 2005 federal income tax re fund. Husband also no tes the second partial judgment miscalculated his separate property in terest in the 25th Street Property. These
issues are forfeited. Husband has not provided an adequate reco rd for our proper consideration of his contentions regarding the court’s directives in the second partial j udgment. The record contains a minute order stating that Husban d objected to the proposed judgment, but the objections are not in the record. We cannot assume the errors in the second partial judgment now before us were actually raised in the tria l court. Thus, Husband has forfeited any claim of error. ( Mundy v. Lenc (2012) 203 Cal.App. 4th 1401, 1406.) With respect to the 25th Street Propert y calculation, Husband also has failed to provide an adequate record. The trial court noted that before signing the judgment it had interlineated the proportionate separate prope rty and community estate interest in the proceeds from the sale of the 25th Stre et Property and recalculated using the Moore-16 Marsden formula. The court retained jurisdicti on over the modified calculation for “60 days should either party wish to submit furthe r or additional calculations.” There is no
indication that Husband asked the court to re consider the calculation that he now claims as error. Thus, the issue has been forfeited. ( Mundy v. Lenc , supra , 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1406.)17 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Wife shall recover costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

ALDRICH, J.
We concur:

CROSKEY, Acting P. J.

KITCHING, J.