United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 20-2753

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Antonio Goodloe

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central

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 Submitted: June 14, 2021

Filed: July 16, 2021

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.
Antonio Goodloe pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). At sentencing, the district court1

calculated Goodloe’s Guidelines range as 77 to 96 months’ imprisonment. Relying

heavily on Goodloe’s extensive criminal history, the district court varied upward and

imposed the maximum sentence allowed by law, a 120-month sentence. Goodloe

appeals, arguing his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

The substantive reasonableness of a sentence imposed is reviewed under an

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In this

Circuit, a district court abuses its discretion if it “fails to consider a relevant factor

that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper

or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error

of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v. Leonard, 785 F.3d 303,

306–07 (8th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

Goodloe asserts the district court did not consider all of the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) factors and failed to provide sufficient support for its 24-month upward

variance. Goodloe argues the district court (1) should have considered the fact that

he pled guilty and saved the government the time and expense of a trial; (2) failed to

consider the sentencing disparity created by imposing a 120-month sentence; and (3)

erred in relying on his criminal history, as his Guidelines range already accounted for

it. Each of these arguments is without merit. 

Goodloe never asked the district court to consider the government resources

that were saved by his guilty plea. Even so, Goodloe’s Guidelines range reflected this

resource saving in the form of a three-point reduction in his offense level for

1The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Arkansas.

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acceptance of responsibility. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing

to sua sponte give more weight to Goodloe’s acceptance of responsibility.

A close review of the record demonstrates that Goodloe’s claim that the district

court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors is likewise flawed. The sentencing

record reflects the court considered the § 3553(a) factors, including sentencing

disparity. The district court acted within its discretion when it chose to give greater

weight to the § 3553(a) factors that it specifically noted were the basis for its upward

variance: “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics

of the defendant, the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of

the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment for the

offense, to afford adequate deterrence to other criminal conduct and to protect the

public from further crimes by the defendant.”2

Finally, while Goodloe is correct that his Guidelines range took into account

some of his criminal history, “factors that have already been taken into account in

calculating the advisory Guidelines range can nevertheless form the basis of a

variance.” United States v. David, 682 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir. 2012); see also

United States v. Donahue, 959 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2020) (district court may

“determin[e] that the weight the Guidelines assigned to a particular factor was

insufficient” (citation omitted)). Further, Goodloe’s Guidelines range did not actually

account for the entirety of his criminal history. A minimum score of 13 criminal

history points is required to place a defendant in criminal history category VI. 

Goodloe had 23 criminal history points, nearly twice the minimum required to be a

2While Goodloe provides us with information regarding the average sentence

in felon-in-possession cases, it is unhelpful, as it does not take into account

defendants’ criminal history categories. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (courts should

seek “to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”). 

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category VI offender. The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving greater

weight to this extensive criminal history. 

 Goodloe’s disagreement with the significant weight the district court gave his

extensive criminal history as well as the risk his criminality posed to the community

does not amount to an abuse of discretion. These are permissible sentencing factors

that are within the wide latitude district courts are afforded when determining the

appropriate sentence. Leonard, 785 F.3d at 307. We affirm the judgment of the

district court. 

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