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U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: REASSESSING

PRIORITIES AMID CONTINUED CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 6, 2018

Serial No. 115–110

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

TED S. YOHO, Florida, Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Seth Jones, Ph.D., Harold Brown Chair, director, Transnational Threats 

Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies ................................... 10

Mr. Jeff Smith, research fellow, South Asia, Heritage Foundation .................... 23

Mr. Munawar ‘‘Sufi’’ Laghari, executive director, Sindhi Foundation ................ 39

Aqil Shah, Ph.D., Wick Cary assistant professor of south asian politics, Department of International and Area Studies, University of Oklahoma ........... 49

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ted S. Yoho, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 4

Seth Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................. 12

Mr. Jeff Smith: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 25

Mr. Munawar ‘‘Sufi’’ Laghari: Prepared statement .............................................. 41

Aqil Shah, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ................................................................... 51

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 72

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 73

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 74

(1)

U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: REASSESSING 

PRIORITIES AMID CONTINUED CHALLENGES 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Yoho (chairman of 

the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, everybody, for being here. 

The U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges is an important topic. And on the Asia-Pacific 

Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs we look forward to addressing 

this, and we have invited you here because of your expertise. 

And you guys know how this works with the button in front of 

you. Make sure your microphone is turned on. You’ll have a green 

light. It goes yellow and red and then you’ll hear the gavel. 

We have votes that are going to come up between 2:30 and 3:00 

o’clock and typically what we do is we take a break. We ask if you 

can stay to hear your input when we come back and we will reconvene as quickly as we can. 

So, with that, we will go ahead and start with the opening statements. And, again, I thank you for being here. 

The United States has sought a cooperative relationship with 

Pakistan for nearly 20 years despite incompatible goals. Over the 

last year, this contradiction has come to an inevitable head. 

As we meet today, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is devolving. 

Faced with few good options in our fight to stabilize Afghanistan, 

the United States has spent about $33 billion on Pakistan since 

2001. 

For years now, U.S. expenditures for Pakistan has decreased as 

it becomes more and more evident that our priorities are just not 

in alignment. 

Over the last 6 months, the administration has taken steps to 

sharply accelerate this trend. Though it’s long overdue, the United 

States is finally facing the reality that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship needs to change. 

Counterterrorism cooperation has been central to this relationship but the reality is that Pakistan has never shared the United 

States commitment to eliminate terrorist activity in South Asia. 

We won’t soon forget that Osama bin Laden was hiding in plain 

sight in Pakistan or that Dr. Afridi remains in prison for the work 

2

that he did to help us capture Osama bin Laden. And this same 

attitude continues today. 

Pakistan wants a government in Kabul that it can control or no 

government at all. That is why Pakistan continues to give a pass 

to extremists who seek to destabilize Afghanistan or attack India. 

Many Members of Congress have argued for this dramatic recalibration of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. But as we move to 

the next stage, it’s essential that we get it right. 

No matter what, Pakistan will continue to be central to U.S. 

strategy in South Asia and is increasingly important to the administration’s emerging Indo-Pacific strategy. 

For decades, Pakistan and China have shared what they call an 

all-weather friendship and have drawn even closer in recent years. 

Pakistan has doubled down on its relationship with China as tensions with the United States have grown. 

The China-Pakistan economic corridor is a central component of 

China’s Belt and Road Initiative offering economic benefits for 

Pakistan in exchange for China’s direct access to the Arabian Sea. 

As many expected, this economic initiative has also begun to take 

on a military character. Last month, it was revealed that China 

will build its second overseas military facility in conjunction with 

a port at the Pakistani city of Gwadar. This is the second one in 

a short period of time with the other one being in Djibouti. 

Pakistan’s internal dynamics are also challenging to the continued partnership with the United States. Religious freedom and 

human rights concerns are longstanding and not improving. 

Now fundamentalists and extreme voices are taking on a new 

prominence in Pakistani politics. Further divergence between Pakistan and the United States on values and principles will make cooperation all the more difficult and widen the gaps between our 

strategic priorities. 

If 2017 laid the groundwork for a recalibration of U.S.-Pakistan 

relationships, 2018 will help decide its future course. The President 

and Congress will need to determine how we want to shape and 

fund this relationship, going forward, particularly with budget season approaching. 

So I look forward to hearing the panel’s thoughts today and hope 

their testimonies will inform a number of lingering questions as we 

work on the issues throughout the coming year. 

Are U.S. and Pakistani goals for South Asia fundamentally compatible? What elements of military and counterterrorism cooperation must be maintained and what—and which need to be reworked? 

How does Pakistan play in U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo 

Pacific in our larger competition with China? 

And finally, what is the future of Pakistan society and government, and is Pakistan becoming less tolerant and a less suitable 

partner for the United States of America? 

I thank the panel for joining us to share their expertise on these 

issues and any other member—any others that the members may 

wish to raise. 

And with that, members present will be permitted to submit 

written statements to be included in the official hearing record. 

3

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous material 

for the record to length limitations in the rules and the witnesses’ 

written statements will be entered into the hearing record. 

I now turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, for any remarks he may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yoho follows:]

4


28541e-1.eps

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continned Challenges 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Tuesday, February 6, 2017, 2:00p.m. 

Opening Statement of Chairman Ted Yoho 

The United States has sought a cooperative relationship with Pakistan for nearly 20 years, 

despite incompatible goals. Over the last year, this contradiction has come to an inevitable head. 

As we meet today, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship is devolving. Faced with few good options in 

our fight to stabilize Afghanistan, the United States has spent about $33 billion on Pakistan since 

2001. For years now, U.S. expenditures for Pakistan have decreased as it becomes more and 

more clear that our priorities are just not in alignment. 

Over the last 6 months, the administration has taken steps to sharply accelerate this trend. 

Though it's long overdue, the United States is finally facing the reality that the U.S.-Pakistan 

relationship needs to change. Counterterrorism cooperation has been central to the relationship, 

but the reality is that Pakistan has never shared the United States' commitment to eliminate 

terrorist activity in South Asia. We won't soon forget that Osama Bin Laden was hiding in plain 

sight in Pakistan, or that Dr. Afridi remains in prison. And this same attitude continues today. 

Pakistan wants a government in Kabul that it can control, or no government at all. This is why 

Pakistan continues to give a pass to extremists who seek to destabilize Afghanistan or attack 

India. 

Many Members of Congress have argued for this dramatic recalibration of the U.S.-Pal<istan 

relationship. But as we move to the next stage, it's essential that we get it right No matter what, 

Pakistan will continue to be central to U.S. strategy in South Asia, and is increasingly important 

to the administration's emerging Indo-Pacific strategy. 

For decades, Pakistan and China have shared what they call an "all weather friendship," and 

have drawn even closer in recent years. Pakistan has doubled down on its relationship with China 

as tensions with the United States have grown. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a 

central component of China's Belt and Road initiative, offering economic benefits for Pakistan in 

exchange for China's direct access to the Arabian Sea. As many expected, this economic 

initiative has also begun to take on a military character-last month it was revealed that China 

will build its second-ever overseas military facility in conjunction with a port at the Pakistani 

city ofGwadar. 

Pakistan's internal dynamics are also challenging to the continued partnership with the United 

States. Religious freedom and human rights concerns are longstanding and not improving. Now, 

fundamentalist and extremist voices are taking on a new prominence in Pakistani politics. 

Further divergence between Pakistan and the United States on values and principles will make 

cooperation all the more ditlicult, and widen the gaps between our strategic priorities. 
5


28541e-2.eps

lf2017laid the groundwork for a recalibration of U.S.-Pakistan relations, 2018 will help decide 

its future course. The President and Congress will need to detennine how we want to shape and 

fund this relationship going forward, particularly with budget season approaching. So, I look 

forward to hearing the panel's thoughts today, and hope their testimonies will inform a number 

oflingering questions as we work on these issues throughout the coming year: 

o Are U.S. and Pakistani goals for South Asia fundamentally compatible? 

o What elements of military and counterterrorism cooperation must be maintained, and 

which need to be reworked? 

o How does Pakistan play into U.S. strategic priorities in the Indo-Pacific, and our larger 

competition with China? 

o And finally, what is the future of Pakistan's society and government, and is Pakistan 

becoming less tolerant and a less suitable partner for the United States" 

I thank the panel for joining us to share their expertise on these issues and any others that 

Members may wish to raise. And with that, Members present will be permitted to submit written 

statements to be included in the official hearing record. Without objection, the hearing record 

will remain open for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous materials for 

the record subject to length limitation in the rules, and the witnesses' written statements will be 

entered into the hearing record. I now turn to the Ranking Member for any remarks he may have. 
6

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding 

this hearing. 

Pakistan is a highly consequential nuclear state. But all too 

often, we look at Pakistan as just a single inanimate entity. 

With these hearings, we can look inside Pakistan. We have witnesses that can give us an understanding of what’s going on in the 

country with its political, regional, and ethnic groups and the state 

of Pakistani democracy, such as it is. 

Since 2001, the United States has provided to Pakistan $11 billion in economic aid, and $8 billion in security aid. That’s $19 billion. 

In addition to that, we have paid $14 billion in coalition support 

funds which we are told the Pakistani military has used in antiterrorist efforts in support of our war in Afghanistan. 

On the one hand, we have seen small improvements in the economic and political developments in Pakistan. We have, at least 

nominally, a civilian government that was elected in 2008, then 

with elections also in 2013, and an election scheduled for later this 

year. 

Pakistan has a small but growing middle class, a semi-active 

civil society and press, and a judiciary that has at times confronted 

the state. 

And USAID projects have helped in areas of energy, agriculture, 

education, and health, including helping to provide 3,000 

megawatts of electric power generation to Pakistan’s national grid, 

management practices and technologies for 300,000 farmers, repair 

or build 1,300 schools, and train 2,700 teachers. 

Still, we have challenges. In the area of civil/military relations, 

the military appears to have the upper hand. It influences or controls Pakistani foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis Afghanistan and 

India, and also seems to play a outsized role even on domestic policy. 

On issues of federalism, the Pakistani state dominates the provinces of Sindh, Balochistan, and the Pashtun areas, often with little regard for the citizens in those areas. 

Most egregiously, even though thousands of Pakistanis have lost 

their lives in terrorist attacks in the past decade, Pakistani security and intelligence agencies have not been playing or often are 

not playing a constructive role with regard to terrorism. 

Instead, they provide safe haven to terrorist groups that attack 

Afghanistan and India and are linked to grave human rights violations in Sindh and other parts of Pakistan. 

The United Nations Human Rights Committee and the State Department’s report on human rights have noted serious concerns 

about hundreds of cases of extrajudicial killings and forced disappearance in Pakistan, particularly in Sindh. 

Among those hundreds of cases, we have with us a witness who 

has been directly affected. In November 2015, Sindhi leader Dr. 

Anwar Laghari, the brother of one of our witnesses, was brutally 

murdered in Pakistan. 

The Pakistani Government has not been very responsive to numerous inquiries made by the State Department at the request of 

myself and other Members of Congress. 

7

The reason for Dr. Laghari’s death and why his perpetrators 

have not been brought to justice, these are questions the Pakistani 

Government must still answer. 

And then to compound that tragedy, on October 30th last year, 

Dr. Anwar Laghari’s son, Asad Laghari, was found dead in suspicious circumstances and is suspected to be a victim of poisoning. 

I met Asad Laghari when he was in Washington. He was pursuing a Master’s degree here in the United States. He was preparing to help his country deal with water issues. 

On August 18th last year, I wrote to the State Department about 

these issues with six colleagues—three Democrats and three Republicans. I have also raised these issues on the House floor. 

We must focus on an end to extrajudicial killings and enforced 

disappearances in Sindh and elsewhere in Pakistan. We must place 

a high priority on advancing genuine human rights and democracy 

in Pakistan, not just for the people of Pakistan who would benefit 

from human rights and democracy but because a democratic Pakistan that respects the rule of law will be a true ally of the United 

States. 

As the chairman brought up, we are concerned still, of course 

about the compound that Osama bin Laden had. He wasn’t hiding 

in some nondescript apartment—a mile from the West Point of 

Pakistan, in a large protected compound. 

But those in the ISI who must have known bin Laden was there 

are still at high-ranking positions in the Pakistani Government. 

Whereas Dr. Afridi, who helped us capture and kill Osama bin 

Laden, is in prison. Kind of tells you which side is in control in 

Pakistan. 

The Trump administration has strongly condemned Pakistan for 

its safe havens for terrorist organizations including the Taliban. 

We could develop a political strategy to address Pakistan’s concerns 

about India and Afghanistan. 

We should consider officially recognizing the Durand Line as the 

international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan rather 

than just say that it is a matter to be discussed by the countries. 

And with the understanding that we gain here in these hearings, 

I hope that we develop a more effective policy toward Pakistan that 

understands its internal ethnic, religious, and political dynamics. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Thank you, Mr. 

Chair. 

Mr. YOHO. I’d like to thank the ranking member. 

Next we will turn to Mr. Chabot of Ohio, who, incidentally, used 

to be the chairman of this committee. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr.——

Mr. YOHO. And I aspire to be as talented as he is. [Laughter.] 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Our relationship with Pakistan continues to be marked with 

frustration, oftentimes a lack of cooperation, and then sometimes 

it seems that there is mutual agreement and engagement and 

things are looking positive. 

I want to give a tip of the hat to the gentleman from California 

here, Mr. Rohrabacher, who oftentimes has positions which I don’t 

always agree with and other members don’t always agree with. 

8

But in his defense of Dr. Afridi, I have to say he’s been relentless. He’s been committed. He’s never given up and he’s absolutely 

right. 

The treatment that Dr. Afridi got, a friend of this country who 

actually—information which led—you’ll have some folks, oh, we are 

not sure about this. But in everything that I’ve seen it led to the 

end of Osama bin Laden, who killed so many of our fellow citizens 

on that horrible day, and then to have him thrown in jail, and this 

is supposed to be a government that’s our friend and that we give 

pretty substantial amounts of aid to every year. 

And I’ve generally voted for that aid over the years because I do 

think that, you know, if we cut it off they are going to be even closer to China and there is going to be ramifications there and they 

have nuclear weapons and all the rest. 

So I understand we have to—we have to get along. We need to 

work together. But their treatment of Dr. Afridi is outrageous. It’s 

indefensible and it should change, and I would hope sooner rather 

than later. 

But I want to commend my colleague from California for never 

giving up on that and that’s in meetings, at Republican conferences, in the face of leadership and demanding why they are not 

doing more and why we are letting Pakistan just continue to keep 

this doctor in a dungeon. 

It’s despicable, and thank you, Dana. We appreciate it. Until you 

do something bad and then I’ll have to disagree with you. [Laughter.] 

Mr. YOHO. No, thank you for bringing that up because I have to 

echo that. I mean, Mr. Rohrabacher has been out there consistently, hammering that home pretty much every meeting we have 

and I thank you for that. 

Next, we will turn to Dr. Bera from California for an opening 

statement. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the ranking member. 

Obviously, there are a lot of complicated regions in the world, 

whether it’s the Middle East or the Korean Peninsula. 

But as someone who focuses on South Asia, I would argue that 

this is one of the most complicated regions in the world. 

You know, whether it’s our mission in Afghanistan, you know, 

you bring in India and Pakistan and, you know, it gets complicated. 

Whether it is the rise of India as a growing economy, as one 

that’s being welcomed into the League of Nations and leaders in 

the world and the amount of investment, you know, what does that 

portend to the India—Indo-Pak relationship as the economy—India 

becomes a stronger nation and garners more attention. 

The hope is that Pakistan takes notice of some of the economic 

reforms that are taking place, some of the civilian reforms and 

some of the anti-corruption events, and you try to find a resolution 

between India and Pakistan. 

You know, there are areas where I think the U.S., working with 

other nations, you know, to address Pakistan’s very concerning energy needs, their electrical grid, areas where you got to take baby 

steps. 

9

But how do you create some sort of, you know, small dialogue 

and trust? How do we support civilian government in Pakistan? 

How do we create those civilian institutions that will be necessary 

to create stability and a democracy? 

Again, none of these are easy answers. You know, what role does 

China play here? You know, does China and—you know, does Pakistan—as the U.S. relationship with Pakistan changes, does Pakistan run to China as a counterweight? 

I would argue that’s the wrong approach because China has 

shown a history of really China-centric involvement. 

That said, does China take a more responsible role in helping 

create stability as a global leader? So, again, none of these are easy 

answers and, you know, I think we all have to look at all of this 

together but from the interest of Pakistan, looking at their longterm stability, their long-term—you know, they have an educated 

population. 

They’ve got a diaspora here in the United States that’s very interested in looking for a path forward and resolving tensions and 

lowering tensions between India and Pakistan and hoping to see a 

more democratic Pakistan. 

So, again, I look forward to the witnesses and thank you for calling this hearing. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

And I want you guys to understand that when we have these 

hearings your input is so valuable. It goes into ideas that we come 

up with legislation to help strengthen our foreign policy that we 

send to the state or the administration. And so we really value you 

being here and we want to thank you for your time. 

What I want to do is just introduce all four of you and then we 

will start with you, Dr. Jones, and your statement. 

Dr. Seth Jones, Harold Brown chair and director Transnational 

Threats Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Mr. Jeff Smith, research fellow for South Asia at the Heritage 

Foundation; Mr. Munawar Sufi Laghari, executive director at the 

Sindhi Foundation; Dr. Shah, Wick Cary assistant professor of 

South Asian politics in the Department of International and Area 

Studies at the University of Oklahoma. 

Again, thank you for being here. Dr. Jones, your opening statement. 

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Chairman, if I could speak out of order for a 

second. 

Mr. YOHO. Please. 

Mr. CHABOT. We have got actually a whole bunch of chairs over 

here if the folks over there might want to sit down and——

Mr. YOHO. You know, and I appreciate you pointing that out because I also want everybody just to kind of glance around the room. 

See how packed this room is. 

People are interested about this topic, about our relationships 

with Pakistan, on both sides. And so that’s why this room is so 

crowded and over standing. 

But feel free to come across if you got a moment right now, and 

thank you for pointing that out. 

Dr. Jones, go ahead. 

10

STATEMENT OF SETH JONES, PH.D., HAROLD BROWN CHAIR, 

DIRECTOR, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT, CENTER 

FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee for allowing 

us to testify on this important subject that I think all of you that 

have spoken so far have indicated. 

I want to keep my remarks brief and focus on two issues. One 

is the security situation which is what I focused on, both in Pakistan and the region, and the second is just to lay out potential options for consideration. 

As I look at the security situation in Pakistan, what’s interesting 

as we looked at the data is actually there is been a dramatic drop 

in violence levels in Pakistan, especially over the past 4 years. 

Attacks have declined fairly significantly, probably in part a 

function of Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the country including in the tribal areas as well as 

against groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, or Pakistan 

Taliban. 

Fatality rates are actually down somewhat. Lethality rates 

against groups are actually down somewhat. They are still high in 

a few places, including Balochistan. 

But I think what we see is some successful efforts by the Pakistan state, in some areas quite lethal, including on human rights 

issues that I think are worth bringing up. But we have seen a decrease. 

In neighboring Afghanistan, obviously, the situation is different. 

We are seeing high levels of violence, Taliban control of somewhere 

between 10 to 12 percent of the Afghan population, depending on 

the numbers, and a pretty notable decrease in Afghan Government 

control of populated areas up through 2017, about 60 percent of the 

country, down from nearly 70 percent about 11⁄2 years. 

So the situation in Afghanistan is still quite violent and the situation in Pakistan, while violent, appears to be—indicators appear 

to be lessening. 

Let me talk about next steps, moving forward, and I’ll skip—the 

testimony talks about a whole range of issues including ChinaPakistan cooperation. Let me focus on three things in the remaining time. 

One is broader relations with Pakistan. As someone who works 

on security, I do focus a lot on the security relationship, both with 

Pakistan and the region. 

I do think it is important to remember that there are other areas 

of interest with Pakistan. It’s got the sixth largest population in 

the world. It’s got a GDP of about $300 billion, which is on par 

with South Africa and Colombia. It is a reasonable country and it 

has got a reasonable growth rate of about 51⁄2 percent. 

So there are areas—I think you talk to American companies that 

deal with iron and steel, agriculture machinery, aircraft that have 

an interest in trade, and then we get textiles, new apparel, leather 

products from Pakistan as well. So there’s an economic incentive to 

keep a relationship and to keep a trade relationship. 

There are also interests in targeting the Islamic State in 

Khorasan Province, which sits really on the Af-Pak border in 

11

Nangarhar Province, and that has conducted attacks including recently in Jalalabad. 

So there are areas, I would say, of some common interest. I also 

think there is probably worth noting that any political settlement 

in Afghanistan almost certainly has to involve Pakistan because of 

its relationship with the Afghan Taliban. 

So assuming there are efforts to improve and establish some kind 

of a peace deal, I think Pakistan is an important partner. But let 

me just say in general that we have a situation, I think, with Pakistan that I still find unacceptable. 

The U.S. is fighting a war in Afghanistan primarily against the 

Taliban and Haqqani Network. The leadership structure of both 

groups sits on the Pakistan side of the border. 

That is leader Haibatullah Akhunzada, his chief deputy, Siraj 

Haqqani and Mohammad Yaqub, a range of leaders—Abdul 

Qayyum Fakir, Ahmadullah Nanai, Abdul Latif Mansura—all located on the Pakistan side of the border and that has not stopped. 

If that does not stop, I think it’s worth considering a range of 

issues. I’d like to see a more transparent aggressive information 

campaign in the United States about who is sitting in Pakistan, 

roughly, where they are located, what their names are, because I 

think we have got a lot that we can disclose without getting into 

sources and methods. 

I think there are a range of issues from non-NATO ally status 

to multilateral financial lenders that I’ll save for the question and 

answer period. 

But I think it’s worth thinking very carefully about an escalatory 

latter with Pakistan if some of that does not change. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

12


28541a-1.eps

CENTER FOR STRI\TEGK & 

INTERNATIONAL STV!li£S 

Statement Before the 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

A Testimony by: 

Dr. Seth G .• Jones 

Harold Brown Chair and Director of the Transnational Threats Project 

Center tor Strategic and International Studies (CSlS) 

February 6, 2018 

2200 Rayburn House Office Building 
13


28541a-2.eps

Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 2 

Thank you, Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and distinguished members of 

the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify today at such an important hearing, "U.S.-Pakistan 

Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges." fu this testimony, I will argue 

that the United States needs to broaden its relationship with Islamabad beyond just security 

issues. But Washington also needs to be prepared for escalation if Pakistan refuses to adequately 

target militant groups that enjoy a sanctuary on Pakistan soil and are operating against the United 

States and its allies in Afghanistan. 

My testimony is divided into three sections. The first provides an overview of the 

security situation in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. The second highlights the evolution 

ofU.S.-Pakistan relations. And the third provides recommendations for U.S. policy. 

Overview of the Security Situation 

This section examines the security situation in Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan. 

While the U.S. relationship with Pakistan shouldn't be viewed primarily through an Afghan lens, 

the presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan makes it inevitable that U.S. dealings with 

Islamabad are, in part, tied to Afghanistan and broader regional developments. Moreover, 

Pakistan's security is tied, in part, to Afghanistan's security, since they share a border that is 

nearly as long as the U.S.-Mexican border.' 

Pakistan: Pakistan has made countless sacrifices in both blood and treasure in its 

struggle against militants. Thousands of Pakistan soldiers, police, intelligence professionals, and 

other government officials have died fighting militant groups. Tens of thousands of Pakistan 

civilians have died because of terrorist attacks in Lahore, Peshawar, Islamabad, Karachi, and 

other cities. As Figure 1 highlights, violence has occurred across the country over the past two 

decades- though it has been most heavily concentrated in such areas as Federally Administered 

Tribal Areas (FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Baluchistan, as well as in cities like Karachi, 

Islamabad, and Lahore. 

1 The U.S.-Mexican border is roughly 1.954 miles, while the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is roughly 1,510 miles. 
14


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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 3 

Figure 1: Terror Attacks in Pakistan, 1997-20162 

Despite these attacks, recent trends suggest that violence levels have notably declined, an 

indication that Pakistan security agencies have likely made progress against extremist groups. As 

Figure 2 shows, there was a significant decrease beginning in 2014. Pakistan has conducted a 

range of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations across the country, including in the 

FA TA, against groups like the Tehreek-e-Tali ban Pakistan-' In addition, fatality rates from 

terrorist attacks are at a near-ten-year low, and lethality rates also dropped dramatically from a 

20-year high of 5.4 deaths per attack in 2015 to 1.3 deaths per attack in 2016. 4 

'Source: Map b) CSIS Transnational Threats (TNT) Project; data from Universit) of Maryland Global Terrorism 

Database. Avail1ble at: 

https://transnationalthreatscsis.carto.com/builder/569674cb-2eca-4d3(J-9143-6e29D 15ae(J4/embed 3 See, for example, such Pakistan documents as the National Internal Security Policy (NISP), \Yhich was presented 

to parliament in May 201~. and the National Action Plan (NAP), wlrich was presented in December 20H. 1 Data from the University of Mary land Global Terrorism Database. 
15


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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 

Figure 2 Terror Attacks in Pakistan, 1997-20175 

According to data collected and analyzed by the Transnational Threats Project at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies, violence levels in 2017 were also relatively low. 

There were 249 recorded terror incidents in Pakistan, including Jammu and Kashmir6 Roughly 

73 of these terror attacks occurred in Baluchistan Province, accounting for 29 percent of all 

incidents. F ATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa together accounted for 40 percent of all incidents in 

Pakistan in 2017. 

5 Data from the University of Maryland GlobcJ1 Terrorism Database and Pakistan's National Counter-Terrorism 

Agency (NACTA). The NACTAiigure for 2017 includes all attacks as of September II, 2017. 0 This research did not include military-to-militant clashes. vdrich \VCrc accounted for in the NACTA estimates. 

4 
16


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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 

Figure 3: Terror Attacks in Pakistan, 20177 

Afghanistan: While violence levels are down in Pakistan, the security situation is more 

concerning in Afghanistan. There are several sets of indicators that provide a sense of the state of 

the Afghan war. The first are changes over time in population control, since that is a major goal 

of the Taliban and the Afghan government. According to U.S. Department of Defense data, there 

has been a slight increase in Tali ban control or influence of Afghanistan's population-from 9 

percent in August 2016 to roughly 10-12 percent in October 2017. There has also been a 

decrease in Afghan government control-from 69 percent in August 2016 to between 60 and 64 

- Map and dat<-J by CSIS TNT Project. The data include the contested areas of Jammu and Kashrnir bchveen India 

and Pakistfln. These numbers likely underestimate the total number of attacks. Map available at: 

https ://transnat.ionalthrcatscsis.carto.convbuildcr/all adb 12-0cO 1-4027 -82c4-afc5I80 3 b81f/cmbcd 
17


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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 6 

percent in October 2017. This leaves roughly a quarter of the Afghan population living in 

contested areas where neither side has significant control or influence." 

Yet the data also show that Tali ban gains have been almost entirely in rural areas of the 

country, where it enjoys some support among conservative Afghans that have become 

disillusioned with the Afghan government and who support the Taliban's religious zealotry. The 

Tali ban controls no major urban areas. After briefly seizing the northern city ofKunduz in 

September 2015, the Tali ban quickly lost control of it within days. In 2017, the Taliban failed to 

mount a sustained threat against any provincial capital and instead engaged in high-profile 

attacks in Kabul and other populated areas. Even in Helmand Province, where the Tali ban have 

made advances in rural areas, local commanders have so far failed to seize and hold such cities 

as Lashkar Gah and Gereshk. 

A second set of indicators includes changes over time in local support, since both the 

government and Tali ban need to mobilize support to hold and expand areas. The Taliban's 

ideology may be amenable to some Afghans, such as those living in conservative rural pockets of 

the south and east. But it is still too extreme for many Afghans who adhere to a much less 

conservative form of Islam that permits most modern technology, sports, elections, and some 

women's rights. The Tali ban and its ideology are deeply unpopular, even compared to the 

current government and its security forces. A nationwide poll in 2015, for example, found that 92 

percent of Afghans supported the Kabul government and only 4 percent favored the Taliban9 

While the Tali ban may be unpopular in many areas, several indicators suggest that Afghans are 

deeply unhappy with their government. Nearly two-thirds of Afghans say the country is moving 

in the wrong direction, compared to only one-third who believe it is moving in the right 

direction. 10 Afghans also believe their government is corrupt, a finding that is consistent with the 

assessments of international organizations. Afghanistan ranks 169 out of 176 countries on 

:o: Data from Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconslruction, Quarler~v Reporllo !he L"niled States 

Congress (Arlington, VA: Sl GAR. January :Hl, 20 I X): U.S. Department of Defense, Fnhancing S'ecurity and 

S'tahi!ity in Ajj;,hanisran: Report to ('ongress in rlccordance Wuh S'ectwn 1225 ofrhe Carl revin and Howard fl. 

.. Buck" JfcJ.:eon 1Vational Defense Authorizafion Act .for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L 11 3-291), as amended 

(Wasltinglon, DC: U.S. Department of Defense. December 2017). 

'ACSOR and D3 .• •1jghan Futures: .1 Natwnal Public Op111ton Sun·ev (Kabul: ACSOR and D3, January 29. 2015). 

Avaih1ble at: http://ncsor-surveys.comh.vp-conteiTt/uploads/2() 15/01/ Afghan-Futures-Wave-6-Analysis _FINALv2.pdf. 

1

'" The Asia Foundation. A Sun·ey ofihe A/khan People: Afkham;Um in 2017 (Kabul. Mghmtistan: The Asia 

Foundation, 20 17). 
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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 

Transparency International's Conuption Perception Index, and over three-quarters of Afghans 

say that corruption is a serious problem in the country. 11 

7 

These indicators suggest that the Afghan war is, at best, a draw. The Tali ban has slightly 

increased its control of populated areas, but it lacks a strong popular support base. The Afghan 

government has lost some rural areas, and Afghans harbor numerous grievances against their 

government. But most of the population would rather live under the government of Ashraf Ghani 

than under Tali ban leader Haibatullah Akhunzada. 

U.S.-Pakistan Relations 

In part because of the Afghan war, relations between Washington and Islamabad have 

soured over the past several months. fu July 2017, President Trump remarked that "Pakistan 

often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror." 12 On New Year's Day in 2018, 

President Trump went further, tweeting that the U.S. has "foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 

billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years" with little in return, promising "No more!"" Pakistan 

officials quicldy returned fire. Foreign Minister Khawaja Asif said that Mr. Trump is likely 

"disappointed at the U.S. defeat in Afghanistan and that is the only reason he is f1inging 

accusations at Pakistan." Mr. Asif also warned that Pakistan wouldn't budge. "We have already 

told the U.S. that we will not do more," he said, "so Trump's 'no more' does not hold any 

importance." 14 

There is a bit ofdejd 1'11 with this escalating war of words. Since 2001, the relationship 

between Washington and Islamabad has largely been transactional. Washington has needed 

Pakistan's help in targeting al-Qaeda and other terrorists operating on Pakistani soil, as well as 

moving supplies from port cities like Karachi to U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan, in tum, has 

used the billions of dollars in U.S. aid to support its economy. The United States and Pakistan 

have also cooperated in border operations against militant groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban 

11 Transparency Inten1ational, Hndging the Caps: Fnhancing the !}fectiveness o._(Afghanistan 's .~nti-Corruptirm 

.~gencies (Berlin, Gennany: Transparency Intemational, 2017). 

~ Donald Trump, '·Remarks by President Tnunp on the Slrategy in Afghanistan and South Asia,'' Arlington., VA. 

August21. 2017. 11 Quote came from President Tnunp·s Tt-vittcr account, ~?fxcalDonaldTnunp, on Jamtaf!' L 2018. The full T'vcct 

'\Vas: ·"The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than :n billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years. and 

they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists 

we hunt in Afghanistan, ·with little help. No more!'" 1

'

1 ·'Trump's 'No More· Holds No Importance, Says Pakistan," Dai(v Tunes (Pakistan), January 2, 2018. 
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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 

Pakistan, which have conducted terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Yet Washington and Islamabad 

have regularly clashed over issues like the Osama bin Laden raid, U.S. intelligence collection 

against militant groups in Pakistan, Pakistan aid to groups like the Afghan Tali ban and Haqqani 

Network, and skirmishes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. 

8 

What is ditferent today is how quickly relations plummeted. The Bush and Obama 

administrations generally had cooperative relations with Islamabad at tlrst, but eventually 

became frustrated. Trump administration oflicials had little patience from the beginning. 

Pakistan's Directorate oflnter-Services Intelligence, or lSI, still provides sanctuary and aid to 

groups like the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network that are fighting the United States and its 

allies in Afghanistan. Pakistan is engaged in a balance-of-power struggle with India, which has 

close relations with the Afghan government. Islamabad is also skeptical that the U.S. will remain 

in Afghanistan for the long run and fears a spiking civil war when U.S. forces eventually depart. 

Consequently, Pakistan uses proxies like the Afghan Tali ban as a tool of foreign policy. 

Moreover, Islamabad and Beijing have established increasingly close political, security, 

and economic relations. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the potential to 

bring valuable infrastructure and economic activity to Pakistan, including in Baluchistan 

Province. But recent attacks on convoys and train lines in Baluchistan have shown that China 

will also need to secure their infrastructure developments. China is already Pakistan's number 

one supplier of armaments and defense technology. 

Recommendations 

The United States is right to get tough with Pakistan. But Washington still needs to work 

with Pakistan in areas where they share a common interest. The combination of terrorism, 

nuclear weapons, and great power politics in South Asia make the region a huge potential 

flashpoint and important for U.S. national security. Moving forward, there should be several 

components of a revamped U.S. strategy toward Pakistan. 

1. Broaden Trade and Other Relations: The first is to emphasize that the U.S.-Pakistan 

relationship is multi-faceted and should include economic, diplomatic, and development 

components- not just security. Pakistan has the sixth largest population in the world at nearly 

200 million, a gross domestic product of nearly $300 billion (on par with South Africa and 
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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 9 

Colombia), and a respectable 2016 growth rate of 5.5 percent. 15 In 2016, the US. exported 

machinery, aircraft, cotton, iron and steel, and agricultural products to Pakistan, while the U.S. 

imported textiles, knit apparel, and leather products from Pakistan. 16 

There are other areas where the United States and Pakistan share common interests. One 

example is countering terrorist groups like the Islamic State-Khorasan Province, the regional 

Islamic State branch. The Islamic State has a foothold along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in 

Afghanistan's Nangarhar Province, as well as cells in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. 

Washington, Islamabad, and neighboring governments should continue to coordinate efforts to 

weaken and ultimately defeat the Islamic State in the region. Finally, Islamabad is building a 

fence along its border with Afghanistan, a move that the Trump Administration might support if 

it could be effectively negotiated with Kabul- including territory disputed by Afghanistan and 

Pakistan17 

2. Work Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan: A second component is to 

work with Pakistan toward a settlement in Afghanistan. The Afghan Tali ban is too weak to 

overthrow the Kabul government or even to seize and hold a major Afghan city. And the Afghan 

government is too weak to deteat the Tali ban on the battlefield. The result is a military draw, an 

important prerequisite tor a political settlement. Pakistan has long-term interests in a safe and 

stable Afghanistan, and Pakistan's relationship with the Afghan Tali ban makes it an important 

player in peace negotiations. It was unhelpful torUS. otlicials to publicly call oti peace 

negotiations, as the U.S. president did on January 30 after a series of high-protile bombings in 

Afghanistan. Peace efforts need to continue, and Pakistan will be essential in reaching a political 

resolution in Afghanistan. 

3. Be Prepared for Escalation: With the Trump Administration's decision to keep U.S. 

torces in Afghanistan tor the foreseeable future, Washington should continue to emphasize that it 

is in Islamabad's interest to work toward a peace settlement and end its sanctuary tor the Taliban 

and Haqqani Network The Trump Administration is already moving in this direction. The 

Afghan and Pakistani people have suffered far too long in violence that is supported on various 

15 Data from the World Bank, 2017. Available at: 

https://data.worldbankorg/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?ycar_high_dcsc~truc 

10 Data from ··u.S.-Pakistan Trade Facts'· at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Executive Office 

of the President. February 15, 2017. Available at: https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/south-central-asia/pakistan 

~' See, for example, Saeed Shalt "Palcistan Starts Building Fence Along Border With Afghmristan'' Wall S!reef 

Journal, March 26, 2017. 
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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 

sides by the United States, European countries, India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and China. 

Afghanistan, in particular, is the quintessential example of the historical "great game." 

10 

The entire leadership of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network, which the U.S. and its 

allies are tighting in Afghanistan, are situated on the Pakistan side of the border. Examples 

include the Tali ban's leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada; his deputies, Sirajuddin Haqqani and 

Mohammad Yaqub; and a range of senior leaders like Abdul Qayyum Zakir, Ahmadullah Nanai, 

Abdul Latif Mansur, and Noor Mohammad Saqib. All reside in Pakistan. While the bulk of 

Tali ban and Haqqani foot soldiers live in Afghanistan and tight a government they consider 

corrupt and incompetent, the United States cannot accept a situation where Islamabad covertly 

supports insurgents- some of which are targeting U.S. forces. This situation is a far cry from the 

1980s, where both Islamabad and Washington worked together and ran a covert campaign to 

support the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. li'Pakistan continues to harbor 

Tali ban and Haqqani leaders, and fails to support an Afghan peace process, the U.S. should 

consider several steps on an escalatory ladder: 

Provide more public transparency about Pakistan activities. This could include, for 

example, publicly disclosing the names of senior Tali ban and Haqqani leaders 

residing in Pakistan; 

Commit to aggressively pursue US. enemies wherever it finds them. The United 

States should be prepared to target the Tali ban, al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and other 

groups wherever it finds them- including in Pakistan; 

Continue to freeze or terminate most military aid to Pakistan; 

Consider suspending or terminating Pakistan's status as a non-NATO ally. This 

designation is given by the U.S. government to allies that have a strategic relationship 

with the United States, but are not members of NATO. Non-NATO ally status offers 

military and financial advantages that generally are not available to non-NATO 

countries; 

Consider making it more difficult for Islamabad to get access to multilateral financial 

lenders; 

Consider placing Pakistan on the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of 

terrorism. The U.S. military and intelligence agencies have collected an abundance of 

information over the years about lSI ties to terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan 

and India, from Lashkar-e-Taiba (or Jamaat-ud-Dawa) to the Afghan Tali ban and 

Haqqani Network. 

Washington should be prepared to carefully escalate if there is not an improvement in 

cooperation. It also needs to develop alternative routes to bring material to U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan, particularly through countries like Uzbekistan situated along Afghanistan's 
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Jones: Written Testimony, HF AC Asia and the Pacific 2/6/2018 

northern distribution lines. Pakistan oft1cials warn that the U.S. aid freeze is driving Islamabad 

toward China. But as already noted, this development is not new. Pakistan has long been 

developing close relations with China, including through CPEC. 

*************** 

11 

The U.S. decision to stay in Afghanistan should send a strong signal to Islamabad that 

Pakistan otlicials need not prepare for a post-American region, a rationale that Pakistan 

policymakers repeatedly used to justify their support to the Tali ban and other militant groups. 

With a long-term U.S. commitment to the region, Washington and Islamabad can focus on 

building a more constructive and enduring political, economic, and security relationship. A U.S. 

commitment should help allay Pakistan fears that the country will again face an Afghanistan to 

its west in chaos or an Afghanistan dominated by its rival, India. It may also provide renewed 

vigor to peace talks with the Taliban, particularly ifTaliban leaders increasingly recognize that 

they cannot win on the battlefield. 
23

Mr. YOHO. Thank you for your comments. 

Mr. Smith, if you would. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JEFF SMITH, RESEARCH FELLOW, SOUTH 

ASIA, HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Mr. SMITH. No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without 

Pakistan taking control of its border areas. That was the unfortunate inalienable truth revealed to the Senate Select Committee on 

Intelligence nearly one decade by then Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair. 

Sadly, it is as true today as it was then. Military strategists are 

in near universal agreement on this point. Nothing offers an insurgency greater vitality than the provision of support and safe haven 

across an international border in a neighboring country. 

It is the equivalent of counterinsurgency kryptonite. The United 

States has been pursuing a set of objectives in Afghanistan that, 

by its own admission, are likely to remain hopelessly out of reach, 

absent a fundamental change in Pakistan’s misguided strategic calculus. 

The reality is there is a glaring fundamental incongruity between 

American and Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan. 

Whereas Washington, Kabul, and most of the international community have strived to build a peaceful stable democratic Afghanistan, Pakistan’s ideal objective is an Afghan Government that is 

pliable, submissive, and hostile to India. 

Since the Afghan people, understandably bitter after over a decade of Pakistani malfeasance, are unlikely to elect such a government, Islamabad’s second order of priorities is to keep the country 

weak, unstable, and divided. 

It sees the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and their fellow travelers 

as the most effective means of doing so and of securing its secondary objectives and interests in Afghanistan. 

In 2009, the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan concluded that there 

was no chance that Pakistan would view any increase in aid as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these militant 

groups. 

The following year, the U.S. increased aid to Pakistan by 50 percent, from $3 billion to $41⁄2 billion. That was the year 2010, which 

was telling in two more ways. 

It was the year that U.S. aid to Pakistan reached an all-time 

high and the year that U.S. casualties in Afghanistan reached an 

all-time high. 

The Trump administration tried to signal early on that business 

as usual was coming to an end. This is a conditions-based approach 

and our relationship with Pakistan will also be conditions-based, 

based on whether they take action, Secretary Tillerson explained 

last year. 

As long-time Pakistan watchers predicted, the administration’s 

warnings fell on deaf ears. No, I have not seen any change yet in 

Pakistan’s behavior, General John Nicholson, our top military commander in Afghanistan, admitted in November. 

Instead, Pakistan returned to a familiar play book of deflection, 

denial, conspiracy, and outright threats. If President Trump wants 

24

Pakistan to become a graveyard for U.S. troops, let him do so, the 

chairman of Pakistan’s senate warned last August. 

In this context, President Trump’s January 1st announcement of 

a suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan was not only merited but long 

overdue. The time has come to rewrite the terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. 

For years, America and the international community have bemoaned the Pakistani military’s interference in the country’s politics. Yet, they convinced themselves that as the country’s real 

power brokers the military was the only institution capable of resolving Pakistan’s terrorism problem. 

That experiment has been a failure. The military and the ISI 

have consistently proven to be the source of Pakistan’s terrorism 

problem. 

As a result, the most effective points of pressure on Pakistan will 

be those targeting the military brass, particularly their considerable interests in and access to the West. 

Pakistani officials and experts regularly claim their country is 

prosecuting America’s war. Pakistan is not receiving aid from the 

U.S. It is receiving compensation for military operations conducted 

on America’s behalf. 

Nation states are obligated to ensure that their territory is not 

being used to launch attacks on other countries. That is their sovereign responsibility, not something they are entitled to receive 

compensation for. 

If Pakistan is incapable of or unwilling to exercise sovereignty 

over its territory and prevent cross-border attacks, it should not be 

surprised when others take action to defend themselves. 

I have several other conclusions and quite a bit on the PakistanChina relationship in my written testimony that I suspect we may 

get to in Q and A. 

But thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges 

A Belated Reckoning: 

U.S.-Pakistan Relations in the Trump Era 

Testimony before 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

U.S. House of Representatives 

February 6, 2018 

Jeff M. Smith 

Research Fellow 

The Heritage Foundation 

My name is Jeff M. Smith and 1 am a Research Fellow at The Heritage Fotmdation. The 

views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be construed as 

representing any official position of The Heritage Foundation. 

214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE • Washington, DC 20002 • (202) 546-4400 • heritage.org 
26


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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

When General David Petraeus was named commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2010 he 

asked his former boss, General Jack Keane (ret.), to assess accusations Pakistan was playing a 

"double game'' in Afghanistan. A retired four-star general and former vice-chief of Army staff who 

had served in Vietnam, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, Keane returned from a fact-finding trip 

with a dour conclusion: "The evidence is unequivocal that the government of Pakistan and the 

military leadership of Pakistan aids and abets [militant] sanctuaries. We have clear evidence to that 

fact. That's the reality. It's not a question of unable orunwilling." 1 

''Every day out of those sanctuaries," he added, "come forces that are killing our forces and 

maiming our soldiers and interfering with NATO's effort at large. That is the absolute facts of it. 

Some of them are-actually receive training from Pakistan forces'' 2 

One year earlier, then-Director of National Intelligence Admiral Dennis Blair delivered his own 

frustrating conclusion to Congress: "No improvement in Afghanistan is possible without Pakistan 

taking control of its border areas." 3 

The United States has been pursuing a set of objectives in Afghanistan that, by its own admission, 

are likely to remain hopelessly out of reach absent a fundamental change in Pakistan's misguided 

strategic calculus. Military strategists are in near universal agreement on this point: nothing offers an 

insurgency greater vitality than the provision of support and safe haven across an international 

border in a neighboring country. It is the equivalent of counterinsurgency kryptonite. 

Pakistan's supporters are quick to note the U.S and Afghan governments have made their own share 

of mistakes in Afghanistan. That is true. Yet, 1 would contend nothing has had as pernicious an 

impact on the war's trajectory as Pakistan's double game. Tn fact, it is debatable whether the most 

heroic efforts by the U.S. and Afghan governments could have produced a materially different 

outcome so long as Pakistan was playing for a different team. 

At risk of stating the obvious, a jihadist nexus with the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network at its 

core have for over one decade used Pakistani territory as a springboard for attacks on Afghanistan 

and the U.S. coalition there. By the account of every interested intelligence agency and objective 

analyst in the world, these groups have received varying levels of support and safe haven from the 

Pakistani military and its notorious spy service, the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (lSI). The 

latter is in the business of making distinctions between ''bad terrorists'' that target the Pakistani state 

and "good terrorists'' that target Afghanistan and India. 

Pakistan's support for the Haqqani Network, which former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Admiral Mike Mullen said "acts a veritable arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency,"·' 

has proven particularly destructive to U.S. interests. The group was almost certainly responsible for 

the December 30, 2009, bombing of aCTA agency outpost in Khost, Afghanistan, that killed seven 

officers-the single deadliest attack on the agency in its storied history. 

The Haqqani Network was also linked to the September 2011 attack on the US. embassy in Kabul 

that resulted in seven deaths and 15 injuries Most recently, a U.S. military spokesman said he was 

"very confident" the Haqqani Network was behind a January 28 attack on a hotel in Kabul that killed 

more than I 00 people, including several U.S. citizens 5 

2 
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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

This intolerable state of affairs is the product of a glaring, fundamental incongruity between 

American and Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan. Whereas Washington, Kabul, and most of the 

international community have strived to build a peaceful, stable, democratic Afghanistan, Pakistan's 

ideal objective is an Afghan government that is pliable, submissive, and hostile to India 

Since the Afghan people, understandably bitter after over a decade of Pakistani malfeasance, are 

highly unlikely to elect such a government, Islamabad's second order of priorities is to keep the 

country weak, unstable, and divided. It sees the Tali ban, Haqqani Network, and their fellow travelers 

as the most effective means of doing so, and of securing its secondary objectives and interests in 

Afghanistan. 

Two motivations drive these compulsions and Pakistan's double game more broadly: insecurity and 

narrow sel±:interest. 

Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment believe a unified and unfriendly Afghan 

government might be tempted to: (I) stir unrest among Pakistan· s restive Pashtun population; (2) 

invite a greater role for India, which Pakistan believes is determined to encircle and dismember it; 

and (3) challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that no 

Afghan government has recognized, including the Taliban government of the 1990s. 

Are all these concerns illegitimate? No. They are, however, either grossly inflated or problems that 

are exacerbated, not mitigated, by Pakistan's current strategy. The horri±ic campaign of violence 

facilitated by the Pakistani establishment against Afghanistan has generated tremendous hostility 

toward Islamabad, increasing the likelihood Afghanistan will seek closer ties to India or attempt to 

counter Pakistan's double game with asymmetric tactics of its own. 

Pakistan's paranoid obsession with India has proven particularly ruinous. Its expressed concerns 

about Indian encirclement and charges of Indian interference in Afghanistan remain wholly 

unsupported by evidence. Delhi is looking East, chasing double-digit growth, solidifying 

partnerships with the U S., Japan, and Australia, and contending with new challenges from China. 

India has moved on. 

Pakistan would be well-served by doing the same. But it will not move on because the second driver 

of Pakistan's double game is the narrow self-interest of the Pakistani military and intelligence 

establishment. They believe their popularity, legitimacy, and survival are dependent on keeping the 

Pakistani population consumed with fear and anxiety or intoxicated with anger and conspiracy. Only 

if Pakistan is under omnipresent threat from India, the U.S., Afghanistan, and other phantom 

menaces can the Pakistani military justify its generous budget and its tight grip on power. 

Aid to Nowhere 

In 2009 the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan concluded there was "no chance" that Pakistan would view 

any increase in aid "as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these [militant] groups." 6 

The following year the US. increased aid to Pakistan by 50 percent, from $3 billion to $4.5 billion. 

Indeed, the year 2010 was telling in two ways: 7 it was simultaneously the year U.S. aid to Pakistan 

reached an all-time high, and the year the US. casualties in Afghanistan reached their peak' 

3 
28


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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

The greatest trick Pakistan ever pulled was convincing America it faced a dichotomous choice: 

tolerate and bankroll its double game or risk a fundamental rupture in bilateral relations, stirring an 

unstable cocktail of lslamist extremism and weapons of mass destruction. In this preposterous 

narrative the mere specter of US pressure is threatening to the integrity of the Pakistani state, the 

million-man Pakistani anny is powerless to protect its nuclear arsenal, and the severing of bilateral 

relations would prove more costly to the US. than to Pakistan. 

This paradigm ensured the U.S. toolbox was brimming with over $30 billion in carrots but 

desperately lacking in sticks. Washington responded to each flagrant Pakistani provocation with 

lucrative aid and scholarly lectures about the unethical and counterproductive nature of its support 

for Islamist militants. Yet, from Pakistan's perspective, its strategy has been anything but 

counterproductive. 

For the past decade a formidable coalition of powers has been committed to a secure and stable 

Afghanistan free from Tali ban rule. The lone country pursuing a weak and divided Afghanistan 

ruled by the Taliban has is not only besting this coalition, it is forcing them to bankroll their own 

defeat 

Trying to alter Islamabad's cost-benetlt calculus without imposing costs was always a fool's errand. 

As former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. Husain Haqqani has argued, US. aid "makes hardliners 

in Pakistan believe they are too important to the U S , and they can do anything they please." 9 

Thankfully, some in Congress began to recognize this years ago and their frustration has been 

reflected in a steady decline of aid over the past three years. The request for appropriations and 

military reimbursements to Pakistan fell from $2.6 billion in 2013, to $1.6 billion in 2015, to roughly 

$350 million for fiscal year 2018. 

A New Sheriff 

While it was not the tlrst to do so, the Trump Administration signaled very early in its tenure that 

business as usual with Pakistan was coming to an end. "We're out to change [Pakistan's] behavior 

and do it very tlrrnly," Defense Secretary Mattis insisted last year. 10 "This is a conditions-based 

approach and our relationship with Pakistan will also be conditions-based; based on whether they 

take action," added Secretary Rex Tillerson. 11 

On the ground, the Administration authorized an increase in drone strikes in Pakistan, including a 

strike in Kohat that represents the "deepest that American drones have penetrated into Pakistan's 

airspace'' 12 It placed Pakistan on a Special Watch List for religious freedom violations. Its 

December 2017 National Security Strategy insists "no partnership can survive a country's support 

for militants and terrorists who target a partner's own service members and otlicials." 13 

As longtime Pakistan watchers predicted, the Administration's warnings fell on deaf ears. "No, l 

haven't seen any change yet in [Pakistan's] behavior,'' General John Nicholson, America's top 

military commander in Afghanistan, admitted in November 2017. Instead, Pakistan returned to a 

familiar playbook of deflection, denial, conspiracy, and outright military threats. 

If President Trump ··wants Pakistan to become a graveyard for US. troops, let him do so," the 

chairman of Pakistan's senate warned last August14 After U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley 

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insisted Pakistan's "game is not acceptable to this administration,·· a Pakistani military spokesman 

explained that Haley is of Indian origin and the "current misunderstanding between Pakistan and the 

U.S. is created by India." 15 

In this context, President Trump's January I announcement of a suspension of U.S. aid to Pakistan 

was not only merited but long overdue. The time has come to rewrite the terms of the U.S.-Pakistan 

relationship. 

Looking Ahead 

The contours of a more effective, equitable, and, where necessary, punitive Pakistan strategy have 

been evident for years. Such an approach was outlined in an excellent 2017 paper, "A New U.S. 

Approach to Pakistan Enforcing Aid Conditions Without Cutting Ties," co-authored by the Hudson 

Institute's Husain Haqqani and Lisa Curtis, then at The Heritage Foundation." Among their 

recommendations: 

Reducing U.S. aid; 

Prioritizing engagement with Pakistan's civilian leadership; 

Working with international partners to diplomatically isolate Pakistan; 

Increasing unilateral drone strikes inside Pakistan; 

Sanctioning Pakistani military and lSI officials known to have facilitated acts of terrorism, 

including travel bans; and 

Consideration of designating Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism and suspending Pakistan's 

non-NATO-ally status. 

The Trump Administration has already begun adopting some elements of this strategy, including 

increasing drone strikes, reducing U.S aid, and diplomatically isolating Pakistan. Moving forward it 

is important the Administration present a clear schedule of demands linked to specific timetables and 

a specific set of intensifying consequences should Pakistan fail to act on those demands. 

It's the Military, Stupid 

Some influential figures in Pakistan seem to be taking the Trump administration's threats seriously. 

Two days after the President's January I announcement, Nawaz Sharif, who resigned as prime 

minister in July, implored Pakistanis to "appraise our actions," "break this spell of self-deception," 

put Pakistan's "house in order," and "reflect on why the world holds negative opinions about us." 17 

Last September Pakistan's Foreign Minister declared: "Every Pakistani must ask whether the 

[militants] we nurtured during the past 30 or 40 years are still our [strategic] assets today."" 

There are likely many in the Pakistani government, and many rnore among the Pakistani public, that 

tinct Pakistan's double game lamentable. Unfortunately, lack the power and authority to change 

Pakistan's trajectory. That power resides exclusively with Pakistani military and intelligence 

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services, which have methodically neutered and eliminated any potential opposition or voices of 

dissent in Pakistan's political class, judiciary, or civil society 

For years America and the international community have bemoaned the Pakistani military's blatant 

interference in the country's politics. Yet they convinced themselves that, as the country's real 

power-brokers, the military was the only institution capable of resolving Pakistan's terrorism 

problem. That experiment has been a failure: The military and lSI have consistently proven to be the 

source of Pakistan's terrorism problem. As a result, the most effective points of pressure on Pakistan 

will be those targeting the military brass, particularly their considerable interests in, and access to, 

the West. 

Unilateral Action 

Pakistani officials and experts regularly claim their country is prosecuting America's war. Pakistan 

is not receiving aid from the US.; it is receiving compensation for military operations conducted on 

America's behalf 

Nation-states are obligated to ensure that their territory is not being used to launch attacks on other 

countries. That is their sovereign responsibility-not something thev are entitled to receive 

compensation for. If Pakistan is incapable of or unwilling to exercise sovereignty over its territory 

and prevent cross-border attacks, it should not be surprised when others take action to defend 

themselves. 

In its first year in office the Tmmp Administration authorized drone strikes further into Pakistani 

teJTitory than any that had come before and increased the number of strikes inside Pakistan from the 

three launched in 2016 to between five and eight in 2017. 

This pales in comparison to the over 100 drone strikes launched in2010 That tempo may not be 

warranted at this time but if Pakistan continues to refuse to take action against militant groups 

operating inside its borders, the U.S. must be prepared to increase the quantity and potency of drone 

strikes moving forward. 

Human Rights and Religious Freedom 

For too long the US. has turned a blind eye to what is by all accounts a deeply troubling human 

rights situation in Pakistan. Women, Christians, Shi 'ites, ethnic minorities like the Baluch, the 

forgotten people ofGilgit-Baltistan, and Islamic sects like the Ahmadis, are regularly subjected to 

violence, persecution, discrimination, and state-supported repression. 

Journalists critical ofPakistan's military and intelligence services routinely "disappear." Nearly two 

dozen people are on death row as a result of Pakistan's draconian blasphemy laws and hundreds 

more have been convicted or killed simply for being accused of insulting the Prophet Muhammed or 

Islan1. As Amnesty International notes, in recent years Pakistan's security forces 

perpetrated human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests, torture and other ill-treatment, 

and extrajudicial executions. Security laws and practices, and the absence of any independent 

mechanisms to investigate the security forces and hold them accountable, allowed 

government forces to commit such violations with near-total impunity .... State and non-state 

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actors continue to harass, threaten, detain and kill human rights defenders, especial! y in 

Balochistan, FAT A and Karachi. 19 

Mohajirs, immigrants that migrated to Pakistan from India after the 1947 Partition, have also 

complained of mass-scale human rights violations at the hands ofPakistan's security forces as well 

as economic, politicaL and social injustices. Based mostly in Karachi, the Mohajirs are one of the 

few communities in Pakistan to publicly condemn the govemment's support for extremism and the 

Ialibanization of society-and in recent years have paid a heavy price for it. 

The era of excessive deference to Pakistan's sensitivities on the subject of human rights and 

religious freedom abuses should come to an end. 

Logistics 

Since the war began, America's dependence on Pakistan for its ground lines of communication 

(GLOCs) into Afghanistan has repeatedly emerged as the United States' Achilles heel. Defenders of 

the status quo have met every effort to increase pressure on Pakistan with reminders that America 

relies on Pakistani territory to supply its war effort in Afghanistan. 

That may be changing. In January a Pentagon spokesman explained: "While the U.S. favors shipping 

cargo via Pakistan because of cost, we have built flexibility and redundancy into our overall system 

of air, sea, and ground routes to transport cargo into and out of Afghanistan.""1 However, the U.S. 

military continues to rely on Pakistan's GLOCs to handle a considerable proportion of supplies 

bound for Afghanistan. 

The Trump administration should make every effort to reduce its dependence on Pakistan's GLOCs, 

including opening discussions "~th Russia and Central Asian countries on the revival of the 

Northern Distribution Network, as well as pursuing alternative options. There are early signs the 

Administration has begun such discussions and should be supported by Congress. 

Afghanistan has already begun doing so. A recent report suggests "Afghanistan has shifted 80% of 

its cargo traftic from Pakistan's Karachi seaport to Iran's Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports.'' 21 Last 

year India began operating a new air supply corridor to Afghanistan and has been active in building 

new road and rail links to Afghanistan's westem border through Iran. 

The China Factor 

Any further deterioration in U.S.-Pakistan relations is likely to incentivize Pakistan to draw even 

closer to its "all-weather friend,'' China. Whether Beijing wants the relationship to be any closer, and 

what opportunities and challenges that may present to the U.S., is a matter of open debate. 

Experts have long argued that China's considerable political and economic influence in Pakistan, as 

well as its relative popularity among the Pakistani elite and public, make it a potentially effective 

partner in persuading Pakistan to abandon its support for lslamist militants and advance a peaceful 

settlement in Afghanistan. 

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To date, however, Beijing has proven extremely averse to coordinating approaches \\ith the U.S. on 

Pakistan. Chinese officials often recoil at attempts to discuss Pakistan policy at even the most basic 

level. Could that change in the years ahead0 

On one hand, the already robust China-Pakistan relationship is positioned for considerable 

expansion under the banner of the over $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). 

Beijing has particularly ambitious plans for the Gwadar port in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. 

Reports suggest Chinese finns are planning a $500 million housing project there that could one day 

accommodate a half million Chinese citizens across 10 million square feet 22 

China and Pakistan are co-producing the $500 million JF-17 fighter aircraft and in 2015 China 

announced its largest-ever defense deal, the sale of eight Yuan-class submarines to Pakistan at a cost 

of roughly $5 billion23 Recent reports suggest China is now considering a full-t1edged military base 

in Pakistan, with rumors of Chinese interest in an o!Tshore naval base at Gwadar and/or a refurbished 

air and naval base at .liwani, 60 kilometers west of Gwadar24 

How dose is too close? Despite these developments, there are cracks emerging in the ChinaPakistan relationship in two separate arenas: (I) concerns over China's expanding economic 

footprint in Pakistan, and (2) ditferences over ten-orism and the war in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan surprised observers earlier this year when it announced it was rejecting a $14 billion 

proposed Chinese investment in the Diamer-Basha darn project. The conditions attached to the 

investment, which would have seen China assume ownership of the project, were "not doable and 

against our interests," declared the chairrnan of Pakistan's Water and Power Development 

Authority. 25 Similarly, Pakistan recently rejected a demand that the Chinese currency, the yuan, be 

used in the Gwadar Free Trade Zone 26 

Last November China announced it was suspending funding for three road projects under the CPEC 

banner27 The same month, Pakistan's senate was inforrned that 91 percent of the revenues generated 

by the Gwadar port would go to China for the next 40 years." Pakistani banks, another report noted, 

have only been involved in financing I 0 percent ofCPEC projects29 

Pakistan is now expected to repay China $90 billion for CPEC investments over the next three 

decades 3 ° Christopher Balding tlnds it "mathematically impossible for Sri Lanka and Pakistan to 

repay big yuan-denominated loans when they're running trade deficits with China.'' 31 Notably, since 

the two countries signed a currency swap agreement in 2011, Pakistan's trade deficit with China has 

tripled, reaching more than $12 billion in 2017. 12 

Terrorism. For years, China outsourced its foreign policy in Afghanistan to Pakistan. Its chief 

priority: that Afghanistan did not become a safe haven for Uighur militants that have opposed 

Chinese rule in its western province of Xinjiang. Since 2012, however, there have been signs of 

growing divergence on Afghanistan. 

China's ambitious plans to build westward connectivity networks via its Belt and Road Initiative has 

given it a greater stake in stability in Afghanistan. Some in Beijing appear increasingly frustrated by 

the lack of progress in Afghan peace talks and Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to bring the 

Tali ban to the negotiating table. As Andrew Small notes: 

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[China] strongly encouraged Pakistan to forge a peace deal between the Afghan 

government and the Tali ban, rather than backing its militant proteges. Chinese 

interests, from Xinjiang to the new Silk Road schemes, increasingly rely on broad 

stability in the region, rather than just a defense of narrow security and commercial 

goals, and it has tlnally started to bring its int1uence in Pakistan to bear in trying to 

achieve them.·13 

In one manifestation of this frustration, China no longer relies on Pakistan to serve as its principal 

interlocutor with Afghanistan. In September 2012, a trip to Kabul by Public Security Chief Zhou 

Yongkang marked the tlrst visit to Afghanistan by a member of the Politburo Standing Committee in 

decades34 The following year Beijing and Kabul signed a terrorist extradition treaty and agreed to 

intensify cooperation against transnational security threats. 35 

Beginning in 2013 Afghanistan's intelligence services began sharing detailed dossiers with Beijing 

on Uighur militants operating in the region, "laying out evidence tracing the militants back to 

Jslamist training camps inside Pakistan." 36 Meanwhile, Chinese economic aid to Afghanistan surged 

from less than $9 million per year between 200 I and 2013 to $80 million in 2014 and $240 million 

from 2016 through 2019 37 

When Ashraf Ghani was elected Afghanistan's president in 2014 he chose China for his tlrst visit 

abroad, finding Beijing more willing to discuss sensitive security issues than ever before. During the 

trip, Premier Li Keqiang called on Afghanistan's neighbors to respect its "sovereignty, independence 

and territorial integrity, [and] not interfere with its internal affairs."" 

Recent reports suggest China is in talks with Kabul over the construction of a military base in 

Afghanistan. The army camp will reportedly "be built in Afghanistan's remote and mountainous 

Wakhan Corridor, where witnesses have reported seeing Chinese and Afghan troops on joint 

patrols. "'-' 0 

An opening? Defenders of the status quo in Pakistan have long warned that U.S. attempts to 

pressure Islamabad risked pushing it into the arms of Beijing. A deterioration of US -Pakistan ties 

may well lead Islamabad to seek even deeper ties with, and solicit more aid from, Beijing. 

However, it is important to recognize the China-Pakistan relationship is already-indeed, exactlyas close as China wants it to be. To date, China has reaped all the strategic benetlts of its patronage 

toward Pakistan while allowing the U.S. to assume all the costs and responsibilities. 

Ultimately, most experts and officials in Beijing do not want to see a rupture in U.S.-Pakistan 

relations. They recognize that it could add new stress to their own relationship with Pakistan and 

further aggravate existing tensions. 

China's support for Pakistan is already a controversial subject both internally and internationally. In 

a 2014 Pew Survey Pakistan only 30% of the Chinese public viewed Pakistan favorably, the exact 

same favorability rating accorded to Chinese-rival India and far less than the 50% who viewed the 

U.S. favorably 4 ° China's shielding of Pakistani-based terrorists from sanctions at the United Nations 

has already cost it dearly in its relationship with India while generating tension with its broader 

counterterrorism policies and priorities. 

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The Trump administration must recognize the complexity of the triangular dynamic between the 

China, Pakistan, and the U.S. and prepare to spend greater political capital-wielding both positive 

and negative incentives-to encourage more cooperation with Beijing on the Pakistan challenge, 

much as it has attempted to do with North Korea. The stakes with Pakistan are arguably no less 

signitlcant and there is arguably a greater alignment of U.S. and Chinese interests in Afghanistan. 

Conclusion 

The U.S. should be under no illusions that a Pakistan strategy bearing more sticks will serve as a 

panacea for the myriad problems afflicting bilateral relations. Nor will it result in a swift or dramatic 

improvement in the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. In fact, the Trump administration must 

be prepared for at least a short-term deterioration on both fronts. 

Attacks in Afghanistan may increase as cooperation with Pakistan becomes even more challenging. 

American diplomats and journalists operating in Pakistan may be subject to increased harassment. 

Notably, Radio Mashaal, the Pashto-language service of Radio Free Europe, had its branch in 

Pakistan abruptly closed on January 19, accused by the Interior Ministry of working on behalf of 

"hostile foreign intelligence agencies " 41 

To date, however, Pakistan has avoided having to make a choice between a lucrative relationship 

with the U.S. and an addiction to Islamist militancy as an instrument of foreign policy. The Trump 

administration should muster all elements of American power to present and clarify that choice to 

Pakistan. One road leads to prosperity, peace, and modernity. The other to an escalating cycle of 

recrimination, hostility, and retribution. The choice is Pakistan's but it must be forced to choose. 

Biography 

Jeff M. Smith is a research fellow in Heritage's Asian Studies Center, focusing on South Asia. 

He formerly served as director of Asian Security Programs at the American Foreign Policy Council. 

Smith is the author of "Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the 21st Century," (Lexington Books, 

20 14), author and editor of the forthcoming "Asia's Quest for Balance: China's Rise and Balancing 

in the Indo-Pacific," (Rowman and Littlefield, 2018). Smith has contributed to multiple books on 

Asian Security issues, testified as an expert witness before multiple congressional committees, 

served in an advisory role for several presidential campaigns, and regularly briefs officials in the 

executive and legislative branches on matters of Asian security. 

His writing on Asian security issues has appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, 

Foreign Policy, USA Today, War on the Rocks, the Harvard International Review, Jane's 

Intelligence Review, the National Interest, and The Diplomat, among others. In recent years his 

expert commentary has been featured by The Economist, The New York Times, FOX News, The 

Washington Times, Reuters, NPR, and the BBC, among others. 

******************* 

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The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and educational organization recognized as 

exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It is privately supported and receives 

no funds from any government at any level, nor does it perform any government or other contract 

work 

The Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the United States. During 2016, 

it had hundreds of thousands of individual, foundation, and corporate supporters representing every 

state in the U.S. Its 2016 income came from the following sources: 

Individuals 75.3% 

Foundations 20.3% 

Corporations 1.8% 

Program revenue and other income 2.6% 

The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with 1.0% of its 2016 income. The 

Heritage Foundation's books are audited annually by the national accounting firm ofRSM US, LLP. 

1

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https:!/www.pbs.orglnewshour/amp/show/military-july-decl O-pakistan1_12-17 (accessed February 

5, 2018) (emphasis added). 2

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(accessed February 5, 2018). 3

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https :/ /www. theguardi an. com/war! d/20 I 0/nov /3 0/wikil eaks-us-ai d-pakistan-militants 7 As an aside, 20 I 0 was the same year the lSI was accused of"outing" the CIA station chief in 

Islamabad, forcing his departure. His successor, Mark Kelton, "began preaching 'Moscow 

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partner'' Pakistan's spy chief began referring to his as "the cadaver" and two months after the raid 

on the bin Laden compound in Abbottabad, Kelton fell abruptly, mysteriously, and violently ill, 

forcing his departure from Islamabad. 

9

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10M. K. Bhadrakumar, "James Mattis Warns Pakistan; 'Do Me' or Face Consequences," Global 

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(accessed February 5 2018) 14Pamela Constable, "Trump's New Afghanistan Policy Has Pakistan Angry and Alarmed," The 

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24Bill Gertz, "China Building Military Base in Pakistan," Washington Times, January 3, 2018, 

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5, 2014), pp. 16-19, https://jamestownorg/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/China Brief Vol 14 Issue 23 5.pdf'x87069 (accessed February 5, 2018) 36Matthew Rosenberg, "China's Uighur Unrest Is Opportunity for Afghans," The New York Times, 

November 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/20 14/ll/06/world/asia/chinas-uighur-unrest-isopportunity-for-afghans.htm1 (accessed February 5, 2018). 37Zhao Huasheng, "What ls Behind China's Growing Attention to Afghanistan?" Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace, March 8, 2015, http:l/camegieendowmentorg/2015/03/08/whatis-behind-china-s-growing-attention-to-afghanistan-pub-59286 (accessed February 5, 2018). 38Abubakar Siddique, "China Moves Toward Resolving Afghanistan's Peace Problem," Gandhara, 

November 12, 2014, https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/pakistan-afghaistan-china-/26686983.html 

(accessed February 5, 20 18). 39"China in Talks over Military Base in remote Afghanistan: Officials," Ti1e Straits Times, February 

2, 2018, 

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CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 

http://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/china-in-talks-over-military-base-in-remoteafghanistan-officials (accessed February 5, 2018). 40 Pew Research Center. "Chapter 4: How Asians View Each Other.'' July 14, 2014. 

http :1 /www. pewglobal.org/20 14/07/14/chapter -4-how-asians-vi ew-each-other/ 41 Press Release. "RFE/RL deplores closure of bureau in Pakistan," Broadcasting Board of 

Governors. January 19, 2018. https://www.bbg.gov/20 18/0 1/19/rt'erl-deplores-closure-bureaupakistan/ 

14 
39

Mr. YOHO. No, thank you for your intuition on that and, you 

know, pointing that out because those are things that we need to 

delve into. 

Mr. Laghari, if you would, please. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MUNAWAR ‘‘SUFI’’ LAGHARI, EXECUTIVE 

DIRECTOR, SINDHI FOUNDATION 

Mr. LAGHARI. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, and 

members of the committee, let me thank you all for inviting me to 

this important hearing on U.S.-Pakistan relations. My focus is 

mainly on Sindh Province. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is a topic of much media discussion. But 

there is little media and political discussion about the Sindhis, who 

comprises about 14 percent of Pakistan’s population of just over 

205 million people. 

Mr. Chairman, Sindhi people believed that becoming part of 

Pakistan would bring an end to religious wars and the prevalence 

of justice and rights. But hostility and tensions in the region have 

never ended. 

The United States can play a very important role in this region, 

particularly to bring about the eradication of terrorism and restoration of human rights. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan is a de facto military state run by its 

army, Islamic jihadi outfits, protected and promoted by the army 

as assets and as important Pakistani foreign and defence policy 

tools. 

Militant Islam is the most powerful weapon of the Pakistani 

army. Islamic religious organizations have been and will always be 

their assets. They not only use these religious organizations 

against India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, but also against the 

United States and Israel. 

Mr. Chairman, Sindh can be contrasted with Pakistan’s militarydominated state. Jihad, Islam, and the army have always been features of the Pakistani army—Pakistani state. 

Sindh’s identity has always been peace, progress, coexistence, 

culture, and democracy. Sindh has always been at the forefront of 

pro-democracy struggles against military dictators in Pakistan. 

Sindh played a leading role in the 1983 movement for the restoration of democracy. 

Mr. Chairman, Pakistan’s official language, Urdu, is the mother 

tongue of the Indian Muslim migrants. It is currently spoken by 

only 8 percent of the total population. The state of Pakistan imposed Urdu as a tool of cultural repression upon the rest of the 

population—Sindhis, Baloch, Pashtuns, Punjabis, Saraikis, and 

other native languages. 

This was one of the reasons for the separation of Bangladesh in 

1971. Injustice done to the indigenous languages has eroded the 

cultural identity of Sindh, replaced by the violence and extremism. 

The state has captured the interest of Punjabis and Muhajirs. 

Punjab has always been superior. Muhajirs have always been privileged. Meanwhile, Pashtuns, Sindhis, and Baloch have always suffered. 

40

Mr. Chairman, as long as you don’t understand these ground realities, you will not be able to align American interests and relations with those of Pakistan. 

Hundreds of Sindhis nationalists are missing in Sindh and thousands of Baloch nationalists are missing in Balochistan. Their enforced disappearances are part of the so-called ‘‘strategic depth’’ 

policy of Pakistan’s army and ISI because these activists are 

against the multi-billion-dollar CPEC. Young Sindhi, Hindu women 

are being forcefully converted to Islam and made sex slaves of Islamic extremists in Sindh. 

Mr. Chairman, it is high time that the United States reconsider 

the nature of their relationship with Pakistan, their military, and 

the ISI. The U.S. should also better its relationship with the pluralistic people of Sindh. 

I have many recommendations, which are already in my full testimony but I want to mention one recommendation. I want to read 

it here. 

The Pakistani military and ISI should be held accountable for 

fraud and abuse of U.S. resources, equipment, and money, which 

they use to hunt down anti-jihadi, Sindhi and Baloch dissidents instead of going against the jihadi and terrorist groups including the 

Hafiz Saeed and Haqqani Network. 

Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Laghari follows:]

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Testimony of Mr. Munawar "Sufi" Laghari 

Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee Asia and the Pacific, 

United States House of Representatives, 

Hearing on "U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued 

Challenges" 

February 6, 2018 

Chairman Y oho, Ranking Member Sherman, and members of the Committee 

Let me thank you all for inviting me to this important hearing on US-Pakistan 

relations. 

Pakistan is a topic of much media discussion, but the media does not discuss the 

realities I will inform you about today. There is little media and political discussion 

about Sindhis, who comprise about 14% of Pakistan's population of just over 205 

million people. 

The Sindhi people arc peaceful, pro-democracy, secular, and believers of mystic 

Sufism (mysticism). 

When Pakistan became independent, the Sindhi people believed that becoming part 

of Pakistan would bring about regional peace, end to religious wars, end to 

resentfulness, and prevalence of justice and rights. But hostility and tensions in the 

region have never ended; religious extremism and differences have increased; 

Pakistan fought three wars with India; and it has been involved in many regional 

conflicts that have resulted in increased terrorism. 

The United States can play a very important role in this region, particularly to 

bring about the eradication of terrorism and restoration of human rights. 

The Pakistani State and its Links to Terrorist Groups 

While American taxpayers help Pakistan, and Pakistan's authorities have at times 

informed their American counterparts about killing a few terrorists in Wana and 

Waziristan, Pakistan's security agencies also shelter the Taliban; Pakistan makes 

money from heroin and hashish trade through the Talib<m; and more than two 

million students are going to madrasahs (religious seminaries) where they could be 

radicalized. These students get free food, education, <md accommodation. They 

could be a threat to the whole world if they take control of nuclear weapons. None 

1 
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of this could be done without the help of the military. Cases against them should he 

pursued in international courts. 

Militant Islam is the most powerful weapon of the Pakistani Army. Islamic 

religious organizations have been, and ;,vill always be, their assets. They not only 

use these religious organizations against India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. but 

also against the United States and the whole world. They have created hatred 

against United States, India, and Israel. 

There are many extremist religious org<mizations in Pakistan, but two types are the 

most inf1uential: Fundamentalist Parties and Jihadi Organizations. Both are linked 

to Pakist<m's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). 

A Focus on Sindh 

Sindh can be contrasted with Pakistan's military-dominated state. Jihad, Islam, 

and the Army have always been features of the Pakistani state. Sindh's identity has 

always been peace, tolerance, coexistence, culture, and democracy. 

Sindh has always been at the forefront of pro-democracy struggles against military 

dictators in Pakistan. Sindh played a leading role in the 1983 Movement for the 

Restoration of Democracy, while a harsh military crackdown led to thousands of 

Sindhis facing bmtal torture, imprisonment, and death. 

Sindhis have always had Sufi and tolerant tendencies, but Islam is forcibly 

imposed on them. 

The percent of Urdu-speaking people has increased from four to eight percent, and 

this erodes Sindh's identity. We are losing om culture and language. Urdu has been 

imposed on us as a tool, and as long as you don't understand these ground realities, 

you will not be able to align American interests and relations with those of 

Pakistan. 

Pakistan is a de-facto military state nm by its army with total disregard to the 

country's civilian institutions. Islamic Jihadi outfits are protected and promoted by 

the army as assets and as an important Pakistani foreign and defense policy tool. 

The mullahs and military have been the dominant force in Pakistan for a long time, 

and the state has catered to the interests of Punjabis and Mohajirs. Punjab has 

always been superior; Mohajirs have always been privileged. Meanwhile, 

Pashtoons, Sindhis and Baloch have always suffered. 

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ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES OF SINDHI POLITICAL DISSIDENTS 

and NATIONALISTS 

Hundreds of political dissidents and Sindhi nationalist activists are missing in 

Sindh. They are kept incommunicado for months and even years as their 

whereabouts are not known to their families, friends, and party colleagues. No one 

is sure if they are currently dead or alive. They include political activists, writers, 

teachers, and publishers. 

Their enforced disappearance is part of the so-called "strategic depth" policy of 

Pakistan's army and ISI because these dissidents and nationalist activists are 

against the multi-billion dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being 

built by China via Pakistan. Sindhis and Baloch are opposing CPEC tooth and nail. 

So writing or speaking against the CPEC Project is considered high treason or 

blasphemy in the eyes of Pakistani authorities, the military, and the IS I. One of the 

very few credible news magazines in the country, Pakistan's monthly 'Herald,' 

mentions that "The intelligence agencies treat [the critics of CPEC] as their 

enemies," (quoting a Sindhi nationalist G.M. Bhagat who was a former missing 

person himself). "Those who even whisper against CPEC are either kidnapped or 

killed." 

Hidayatullah Lohar is a headmaster for an elementary school in Nasirabad, in the 

Larkana division of Sindh. On April 17, 2017, while teaching a class, he was 

whisked away by armed ISI agents in an unmarked car in front of his students and 

colleagues. Since then, he has been missing, and his daughter Sassui, who is a 

computer science graduate, is running a campaign for his and other missing 

persons' release. She and her brother regularly receive death threats. 

Nangar Chana (also known as Faiz Rasool) has translated twenty one books on 

world literature and history into the Sindhi language. He was taken away by the 

intelligence agency's men from the same town in August 2017. Nobody knows if 

he is dead or alive and no one knows his whereabouts. 

Sandhiya is a young girl who has recently graduated with a degree in civil 

engineering from Karachi's NED University of Engineering and Technology and 

has won a gold medal with distinction. She was sad along with her family on the 

day of her graduation because her father Inam Abbasi, who was the publisher of 

anti-jihadi books, was kidnapped by the Pakistani military and its intelligence 

agencies. He is still missing. 

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There are more than one hundred missing Sindhi political dissidents and nationalist 

activists. A culture of impunity prevails from the government towards their 

abducting agencies. Fear i~ established among people of Sindh as well as judges 

and lawyers who do not dare take their cases, except with few exceptions. So it is 

very difficult for people to talk against these enforced disappearances. However. I 

have been able to obtain a list of 54 missing persons (list is submitted hereto). 

Several victims of enforced disappearances were killed through torture. Their dead 

bodies were punctured with drill machines, bumt with cigarettes, and were finally 

discarded in desolate places with pieces of papers marking their names. Some had 

papers with "Jcay Sindh" ("long live Sindh") recovered from their pockets. 

The names of others who were forcedly kidnapped and killed are Raja Dahar 

Bhambhro, 26 year old Sarwech Pirzado, and Muzafar Bhutto. There are Sinclhi 

nationalist activists and leaders who were killed on the spot or burnt alive in their 

cars. For example, wheelchair-bound Sindhi nationalist leader Muneer Choliani 

was stopped while he was riding a car with his family members, talcen out of the 

car, and shot to death. Qurban Serai, Maqsood Qureshi, and their colleagues were 

burnt to death in their cars in separate incidents. Sindhi Nationalist leader Bashir 

Khan Qureshi was also killed. 

RISE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM & PATRONAGE OF HAFIZ SAEED 

AND DAESH [also known as ISIS]: 

It is interesting to note that Hafiz Saeed and his party goons roam freely and hold 

public rallies in Sindh, especially in the Thar area bordering India. 1l1ey have a 

huge network in Sinclh. They recruit Sinclhi youths for jihad in Kashmir. Daesh is 

infesting universities in Sindh and recruiting young women for war in Syria and 

Iraq or even as sex companions to the terrorists of Daesh. Twenty young girls are 

missing from their homes in Sinclh <md have joined the ranks of jihadis of Daesh 

abroad. One example is young girl, Norain Lagharl, who was arrested from 

Lahore while plotting suicide attacks. Norain was kept under military patronage 

and pardoned. While Sindhi nationalists are harassed, hunted, kidnapped, 

abducted, tortured, and killed because they are resisting and opposing jihadi 

terrorists groups being nurtured by Pakistani military and intelligence agencies; 

especially IST in Sindh. 

Secondly, the jihadi groups I mentioned are committed to destroying the pluralistic 

fabric of Sindhi society as they send suicide bombers to destroy Sufi shrines. Last 

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year, they attempted to destroy the shrine of the great saint Lal Shahbaz Qalandar 

at Sehwan, killing 60 men, women, and children. 

Hindu temples and Sufi shrines are their prime targets as well the Sindhi Hindu 

community. 

The Pakistani army ;.md intelligence agencies have never treated Sindhi Hindus as 

equal to Muslim citizens. "We want to convert their women to Islam, kill their 

men, and recmit Sindhi Muslim youths to fight against India,'' Hafiz Saeed 

delivered in his infamous sermon in Thar. 

In Milhi, the district headquarters of Tharparkar, Hafiz Saeed has illegally 

occupied, and allotted the land of a local girls college to construct a Madressah. 

Recently, and in the same town, two Hindu youths were gunned, down hut their 

killers have not yet been arrested. 

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER TARGETED 

The Pakistani military has now started targeting human rights defenders who call 

out human rights violations in Sindh. They took away Punhal Sario, the 

chairperson of Voice for Missing Persons of Sindh. 1 am thankful on the behalf of 

the Slndhi people to Congressmen Brad Sharman, Adam Schiff, and their staff for 

their efforts to release Mr. Sario. He was released apparently on the condition that 

he not open his mouth. Otherwise, they know how to silence him. 

As you are aware, they have also tried to silence me but to no avail. Over two years 

ago, the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies assassinated my only 

brother, Dr. Anwar Laghari, a law abiding, non-violent, political activist and social 

worker, after T wrote a letter to President Ohama while former Pakistan Army 

Chief General Raheel Sharif was visiting White House. This past October, my 

young nephew, Asad Lagharl, who was one of few water experts in the country, 

was found "dead under mysterious conditions" as stated by police. His murder 

mystery is an open secret as he was murdered by Pakistani military and 

intelligence agencies, believed to be in Sindh, because 1 was organizing a news 

conference and working with members of Congress on the release of Mr. Punhal 

Sario. No investigation was conducted, and no arrests were made in the murders of 

my brother and nephew. 

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FORCED CONVERSIONS OF YOUNG HINDU GIRLS TO ISLAM 

Young Hindu women are being forcibly converted to Islam and made sex slaves 

for Islamic extremist' with the help of local extremists, the so-called spiritual 

leaders of certain shrines and Mullahs in Sindh. Hindu women and girls, some as 

young as 12 and 13, are kidnapped and forcibly converted to Islam and married 

despite legislation against child maniages in Sindh. Judges are either silent or 

biased. Parental refusal to many their 12 or 13 year old daughters is ruled as 

blasphemy. As a result of social stigma and disgrace, the parents of girl victims 

have no other option but to migrate to other countries, preferably to India. Thus, 

Hindu communities in Sindh are reducing in number due to these forced marriages 

of their young girls. To be a Hindu parent of a young girl means to write off your 

daughter into forced conversion and forced marriage. It is a preplanned, national 

con,piracy that pro-jihad is call "purify the land of the pure of the Hindus". 

So-called pro-Isla mist jihadi spiritual leaders and mullahs, who are instrumental in 

forced conversions of young Hindu girls, are backed by the Pakistani military and 

the IST. Some of those spiritual leaders are responsible for distributing money to 

the families of jihadis killed in Kashmir and Afghanistan and others are known to 

be linked with dictators such as the late Gaddafi in Libya and Assad in Syria. 

So again, conditions in Sindh are very difficult for religious minorities, Sindhi 

political dissidents, and nationalist activists, and Slndh has seen an influx of 

tenorists and jihadists who have opened around 50,000 madresaahs along both 

banks of the Indus River and near national highways that connect traffic to 

Afghanistan. A few years ago, a caravan of trucks carrying logistics for US and 

NATO forces was attacked and burnt down in Shikarpur by the madressah's young 

goons and pro-Taliban JUl (Jamiat Ulema-e-lslam) mullal1s. Thousands of young 

Sindhi recruits are the strength of the jihadi organizations. 

It is high time that the United States recognizes the alarming situation and human 

rights violations in Sindh, and reconsiders the nature of their relationship with 

Pakistan, their military, and the ISI. The uS should also better its relationship with 

the pluralistic people of Sindh. 

US AID TO SINDH 

Honorable members of Congress, people of Sindh are delighted with recent steps 

to stop military aid to Pakistan. At the same time, the Sindhi people are happy to 

see US aid of several billion dollars over the past decade for health, education, 

women's empowerment, and women's health. An allocation of 19 million dollars 

is worth spending for three universities and for child education in Sindh. 

6 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: 

1. l11ere is critical need to enhance non-military and humanitarian aid in fields 

of educ8tion, health, women's empowerment, child protection, human rights, 

and democracy. 

2. There will never be a better time to permanently cut all military aid to the 

Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies in order to permanently end 

enforced disappearances of anti-jihadi, pluralistic, Sindhi political dhsidents, 

nationalist activists, writers, poets, publishers, journalists, civil society 

members, teachers, and translators. 

3. The Pakistani military and lSI should be held accountable for fraud and 

abuse of U.S. resources, equipment and money which they used to hunt 

down <mti-jihadi Sindhi and Baloch dissidents instead of going against the 

jihadis and terrorist groups including the Hafiz Saeed and Haqqani network. 

4. Declare the Pakistani Army and intelligence agencies as rogue forces that 

promote and protect inhuman and anti-US jihadi forces. They have become 

a tl1reat to the peace and security of South Asia and the civilized world. 

5. The children of the Pakistani military elite often come to the US to study. 

Their fees and expenses are paid with laundered money. Family members of 

the military elite should be sanctioned, and the sources of their funding 

should be aggressively investigated. 

6. Tolerance toward modern western values should be another test for 

receiving visas. One indicator of such tolerance could be competence in 

local languages other than Urdu, such as Sindhi and Balochi. Neglect of 

local, tolerant cultural traditions in Pakistan is typically seen upon the 

adoption of the dominant Urcl u language. 

7. Restrict exchange programs that allow Pakistani scholars to gain access to 

and insights into US thinking. Since 9111, Pakistan has gained significant 

sophistication in dealing with the US, while US has not benefitted in a 

similar way. These exchanges are not serving US interests. 

8. Restrict visas for Pakistani scholars whose primary qualification is their 

criticism of Pakistani policy. These visas are not serving any useful US 

7 
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28541c-8.eps

interest and are simply offering a convenient career path for some in 

Pakistan. 

9. Help empower Sindhis to assert their tolerant culture and identity. Recall 

that coastal Sindh and Balochistan are what allow otherwise landlocked 

Punjab to have global influence. The Sindhis and the Baloch do not share the 

aggressive, expansionist aspirations of Punjab. Their subjugation by the 

Punjab, wholly against the principles surrounding Pakistan's founding, give 

the Punjabi-dominated military access to a vast an10unt of resources, 

markets, cmd international waters. History !>hows that empowering Sindh and 

Balochistan would prevent their territory from being used to create chaos 

around the world. 

I O.Ask the Administration to raise its voice against human rights violations in 

Pakistan, especially of Sindhi and Baloch people, in appropriate 

international forums, including U.N. bodies. 

ll.Ask CRS to report on com1ption in Pakistan in general and especially in 

Sindh. This committee should also ask the US Ambassador in Islamabad and 

the Consulate in Karachi to meet the families of victims of enforced 

disappearances and extra-judicial killings. 

12.Ask the State Department to raise issues of Human Rights violations, 

especially enforced disappearances in Sindh, as a critical issue in bilateral 

relations with Pakistan. 

Thank you. 

8 
49

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. I appreciate your input. 

Dr. Shah. 

STATEMENT OF AQIL SHAH, PH.D., WICK CARY ASSISTANT 

PROFESSOR OF SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS, DEPARTMENT OF 

INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 

Mr. SHAH. Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding this very 

timely hearing on Pakistan and inviting me to testify. 

In my testimony, I am going to focus on two key issues—challenges to democratization in Pakistan and the repression of human 

rights and civil society by security services. 

Pakistan’s fragile democracy is facing a serious threat from the 

military once again. The military in Pakistan has repeatedly intervened to arrest the development of democracy in the country, ruling it directly for almost half the country’s existence and maintaining a firm grip on national security policy and politics for the rest 

of the time. 

As Pakistan nears a crucial parliamentary election later this 

year, the military’s intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence, is reportedly trying to engineer an outcome that will undercut the electoral prospects of the ruling Pakistan Muslim 

League of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, with the ultimate 

aim of creating a divided and hung Parliament. 

Mr. Sharif was ousted from office in July 2017 when the country’s Supreme Court disqualified him from holding public office in 

a corruption inquiry linked to the Panama Papers. 

But the probe that became the basis of the court’s decision was 

led by military intelligence officials and marred by serious accusations of partiality amid reports of witness intimidation and illegal 

wiretapping of the witnesses’ phones. 

But dishonesty is not the reason for Mr. Sharif’s or other Pakistani politicians’ predicament. Instead, it is their attempt to wrest 

authority from the military in matters of national security and foreign policy. 

Mr. Sharif has already been deposed twice in the past—in 1993 

by a military-backed Presidential decree and in 1999 by General 

Musharraf’s coup—mainly for seeking reconciliation with India and 

for asserting the civilian supremacy over the military. 

After resuming office for the third time in 2013, he ran afoul of 

the military once again for making peace overtures to India, for 

calling for an end to undue interference in Afghanistan, and his insistence that the ISI stop using a jihadi terrorist group like the 

Lashkar-e-Taiba as proxies to promote perceived national security 

goals which he believes has eroded Pakistan’s internal coherence 

and international credibility. 

But rather than acting against these violent extremists, the military has now sought to convert them into political parties. The aim 

is to shield these groups from international sanctions and to balance and counter politicians like Sharif and others. 

If parliamentary elections take place as planned in mid-2018, it 

will be Pakistan’s second transition from one elected government 

which has completed its term to another—a milestone in a country 

50

where all previous transitions to democracy were aborted by military coups or intervention. 

Pakistan achieved its first one in 2013. A second transition is 

more crucial because it would show that the country’s political 

leaders and parties are unconditionally committed to democracy 

even when they lose elections and signal to the military that Pakistanis have the right to democratically change their leaders. 

Elections, obviously, do not equal democracy. But regular elections can help solidify democracy by habituating politically significant groups such as political parties, the military, and civil society 

to the fact that democratic procedures and norms are the only 

game in town. 

The experience of other military-dominated parties in Latin 

America and Asia shows that the certainty of the electoral process 

can empower democratically-elected leaders to successfully roll 

back the institutional prerogatives of the military. 

Besides, violent extremists are less likely to find easy refuge in 

a democratic Pakistan. The stronger that Pakistan’s democratic institutions become, the less room the Pakistan military and its ISI 

will have to use jihadi proxies both for domestic and foreign adventures. 

Coming to the repression of human rights, the human rights situation in Pakistan is, obviously, dismal. The Pakistan military’s 

continued institutional power and entrenched assumptions of impunity mean that human rights are likely to continue to deteriorate 

in the coming year. 

Particularly alarming is the issue of enforced disappearances of 

Baloch and Sindhi dissidents, social workers, peace activists, and 

journalists. 

There are official mechanisms that can address these human 

rights violations including the National Commission for Human 

Rights and the Official Commission of Inquiry on forced disappearances. 

But their authority is limited by constraints both budgetary and 

the fact that they are unable to prosecute military officers. 

For too long the United States has focused narrowly on security 

in Pakistan, which has invariably meant a military-centric relationship at the expense of civilian democratic governance. 

I would recommend that Congress ensure that U.S. election monitors such as NDI and IRI coordinate their efforts with international observers for the next elections to closely assess and monitor the electoral process. Congress should also review the composition of aid to Pakistan and, lastly, the U.S. should work with its 

allies to urge Pakistan to strengthen the Commission on Forced 

Disappearance, the National Human Rights Commission, and to 

urgently ratify the International Convention for the Protection of 

all Persons from Enforced Disappearances. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shah follows:]

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US-Pakistan Relations: Assessing Priorities Amid Continuing Challenges 

Testimony of Aqil Shah 

Wick Cary Assistant Professor of South Asian Politics 

Department of International & Area Studies 

University of Oklahoma 

Before the Committee on Foreign Atl'airs 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Tuesday, February 6, 2018 

Chairman Yoho, Ranking Member Shennan, and distinguished members of the committee, thank 

you for holding this timely hearing on Pakistan and for inviting me to testify. 

Pakistan's nascent democracy is facing a serious threat from the military, which has repeatedly 

intervened to arrest the development of democracy in the country, ruling it directly for almost 

half the country's existence and maintaining a firm grip on national security policy and politics 

for the rest of the time. As Pakistan nears parliamentary elections later this year, the military's 

intelligence arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (lSI), is reportedly trying to engineer 

an outcome that would undercut the electoral prospects of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League of 

former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif [Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)] with the 

ultimate aim of creating a hung parliament Sharif was ousted from office in July 2017 when the 

country's Supreme Court disqualified him from holding public office, in a corruption inquiry 

linked to the Panama Papers, not on the basis of proof but a technicality, with the judgement 

resting on an insidious constitutional requirement of "honesty,'' inserted by a previous military 

dictator and used to oust dissenting members of parliament The probe that became the basis for 

the court's decision was, moreover, led by military intelligence otlicials and marred by serious 

accusations of partiality amid reports of witness intimidation, and illegal wiretapping of the 

witnesses' phones. 1 

Military Manipulations 

Dishonesty is not the reason for Mr. Sharif s predicament. Instead, it is his attempts to wrest 

authority trom the military in matters of national security and foreign policy. He has already 

been deposed twice in the past-in 1993 by a military-backed presidential decree and in 1999 by 

General Pervez Musharars coup-for seeking reconciliation with lndia and for asserting civilian 

supremacy over the military2 After assuming office for the third time in 2013, he ran afoul of the 

1 "ITT Accused of Tapping Phones of Witnesses," Dawn, January 18, 2017. 

https :/ /www. dawn. com/news/ 13 400 55 /j it -accused -of-tapping -phones-of-witnesses 2 Aqil Shah, "Pakistan Court Sets Dangerous Precedent," New York limes, July 28, 2017. 

https:/ /www.nytimes. com/20 I 7/07/28/ opinion!why-ousting-nawaz-sharif-sets-a -dangerousprecedent-for-pakistan.html 
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military once again for making peace overtures to India, calling for an end to undue Pakistani 

interference in Afghanistan, and his insistence that the Inter-Services Intelligence stop using 

jihadi tenurist groups. like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), as proxies to promote perceived national 

securitv goals, which has eroded Pakistan's international credibility3 

Rather than acting against these violent extremists, the military has also sought to "mainstream" 

them by recasting them as political parties. The aim is to shield these groups from international 

sanctions, and to balance politicians like Sharif.4 Barely two weeks after Sharif was ousted, the 

LeT front organization, Jamaatud Dawa, reinvented itself as a political party to compete against 

Sharifs wife in the bye-election held to fill the seat vacated by him. Another violent extremist 

group, the Tehrik-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP), inspired by the police guard Mumtaz Qadri who 

murdered Punjab governor Salman Taseer over his criticism of Pakistan's blasphemy laws in 

2011, also fielded a candidate in the contest. While they did not win the contest, the two parties 

secured 11% of the vote by cutting into the conservative vote bank in Sharifs home town. 

Fmboldened by their performance, other jihadi groups too have vowed to establish their own 

political parties. The milita1y's attempts to undermine the PML-N government were also clearly 

visible in the role it played in the TLP's three week long anti-government "sit-in" that blocked 

the main highway into the capita11slamabad to force the resignation of the law minister accused 

of committing blasphemy. The military refused to come to the aid of the PML-N government 

against the protestors and the protests ended only after the government was forced to accept their 

demands in an agreement brokered by the military 5 

The military's anti-democratic policies are part of a long-standing pattern. Every time democracy 

starts to find a footing in Pakistan or a democratically elected leader challenges the military's 

domination, it either directly or indirectly tries to subvert the democratic process, for instance, by 

deploying political proxies such as the Taliban-sympathizing opposition leader, lmran Khan, and 

the Islamic cleric, Tahirih Qadri, a dual Pakistani-Canadian national, to stage protests in order to 

destabilize the civilian government. The military also uses intimidation and blackmail to 

undennine the government. lt reportedly engineered a no-confidence vote by PIVIL-N dissidents 

against Sharifs Balochistan chief minister Sanaullah Zehri who was forced to resign from his 

post and replaced by a pro-military leader, weeks before crucial Senate elections in which the 

3 Cyril Almeida, "Act against Militants or Face Isolation, Civilians tell Military" Dawn, October 

6, 2016. https://www.dawn.com/news/1288350. "Factions of Army and Judiciary Sabotage 

Democracy in Pakistan: Nawaz Sharif' Jixpress 1f'ibune, February 2, 2018. 

hltps:/ /tribune. com .plJ storyO 62466!/l-factions-arm;d_udiciary -sabotage-democracv -pakistanE?,WI!d. "Sharif Threatens to Spill the Beans," ~'xpress l'ribune, January 3, 2018. 

https://tribune. com.pk/ story/ 159973 8/1-tradition-implanting-blue-eyed-boy -poll-engineeringmust-stop-sharif/ 

4 "Pakistan Anny Pushed Political Role for Militant Linked Groups," Reuters, September 15, 

2017. 

JlQJlllial.::!Qiliill:::!IWlllill'l:LillJ~!.::g]:WULWlm~l'li!il:'~t. Zahid Hussain, "IVlaiiistr·earnirig the 

Militants," Dawn, October 29, 2017. https://www.dawn.com/news/1366753 5 "Faizabad Sit-In Ends as Army Brokers Deal," Dawn, November 28, 2017. 

https://www.dawn.com/news/1373274 

2 
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PJ\1L-N was assured of a majority, which would have strengthened its ability to expand civilian 

space after the general elections. 6 

If parliamentary elections take place as planned in mid-2018, it would be Pakistan's second 

transition from one elected government, which had completed its term to another, a milestone in 

a country where all previous transitions to democracy were aborted by military coups or 

interventions. Pakistan achieved its first one in 2013, when former Prime minister Benazir 

Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP), now represented by her widower, left office and handed 

over power to the PJ\1L-N, which carried enormous symbolic significance. But a second 

transition is crucial because it would show that the country's political leaders and parties are 

unconditionally committed to democracy even when they lose elections, and signal to the 

military that Pakistanis have the tight to democratically change their leaders7 

Elections do not equal democracy. But regular elections can help solidify democracy by 

habituating politically significant groups, such as political parties, the military, and civil society, 

to the fact that democratic procedures and nonns are the "only game in town."" The experience 

of other military dominated polities in Latin America and Asia shows that the certainty of 

electoral competition can empower democratically elected leaders to successfully roll back the 

institutional prerogatives of the military9 As the democratic process gains traction over time, the 

institutional costs to the military of subverting democracy will inevitably outweigh its benefits. 

Violent extremists are also less likely to find easy refuge in a democratic Pakistan. The stronger 

Pakistan's democratic institutions become, the less room the Pakistani military and its 

intelligence agencies, including lSI, will have to use jihadi proxies both for domestic and foreign 

adventures. Pakistan's people have always aspired to democratic government, and it is 

obviously for them to determine who governs them. But it is in the interest of both Pakistan and 

the United States that the election results accurately reflect the preferences of Pakistani voters. 

Repression of Human Rights 

The transition from authoritarian rule to democracy is usually associated with improvements in 

the protection of human rights, and democratizing states are more likely than other types of 

regimes to make commitments to international human rights treaties and institutions because of 

the incentive to demonstrate their democratic intentions to international audiences, including the 

6 "Baloch MPs told me about pressure from [Intelligence] Agencies: PM," Nation, January 11, 

2018. https://nation.com. pk/ 11-Jan-20 18/baloch-mpas-told-me-about-pressure-from-agencies-pm 7 Samuel Huntington, The Third WaPe: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Centwy (Norman: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), p. 267. 

"Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 

~·urope, South America, and Post-Communist Lurope (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 1996), p. 5. 9 See Zoltan Barany, 1he Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, 

Asia, Europe, and the Americas (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013); Narcis Serra, 

!he Military 1/·ansition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces, trans. Peter Bush (New York: 

Cambridge University Press, 2010); Wendy Hunter, Eroding Miliimy Influence in Brazil (Chapel 

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). 
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28541d-4.eps

protection of human rights. 10 But the Pakistani military's continued institutional power and 

entrenched presumptions of impunity mean that human rights are likely to continue to deteriorate 

in the coming years. 

Pakistani intelligence services have long been accused of "disappearing" Baloch and Sindhi 

dissidents and suspected anti-military militants. But in recent years, they have broadened their 

crack down to include social media and other political activists, rights defenders, and reporters. 

ln 2016 alone, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reported that 728 people were forcibly 

"disappeared" the highest number in six years 11 Pakistan's otlicial Commission on Inquiry on 

Enforced Disappearances received nearly 300 cases of enforced disappearances from August to 

October 2017, the highest since its creation in 2011. 12 

In January 2017, suspected intelligence agents abducted and tortured at least four activists who 

had mocked the military's political role on social media for three weeks13 In December of last 

year, Raza Khan, an activist working for peace between Pakistan and India, went missing in the 

city of Lahore after attending a meeting that strongly condemned the TLP sit-in.'" Even a judge 

of the Islamabad High Court who was holding hearings on the protests admitted that he might go 

missing or be killed for questioning the military's enabling role in the standoff between 

protestors and the government." On January 10, the investigative journalist and well-known 

critic of the military, Talha Siddiqi, barely escaped a kidnapping attempt in Islamabad. 

The military has also committed flagrant violations of human rights against Baloch nationalists 

who have been fighting an insurgency against the Pakistani state since 2006. The insurgency was 

sparked by the military's brutal killing ofNawab Akbar Bugti, a respected Baloch political 

leader, but is more deeply rooted in Baloch grievances over the lack of provincial autonomy and 

the denial of their fair share in the distribution of resources (such as the low share of revenue the 

province receives from the federal government for natural gas that is produced in Baluchistan). 

According to human rights organizations, thousands of Baloch nationalists have been missing, 

while hundreds have been abducted, tortured, killed and their bodies dumped by the roadside. 

10 Emilie Heffner Burton, Edward Mansfield and John C. Pevehouse, "Human Rights 

Institutions, Sovereignty Costs and Democratization," British Journal(){ Political Science 

(2013), pp. 1-27 11 "2016 Saw Highest Number of Disappearances, HRCP Report Finds," Dawn, May 11,2017. 

See Commission on Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances. httn:L/coio~:d.pki 

13 "Four Rights Activists Gone Missing This Week," Dawn, January 8, 2917. 

https://www.dawn.com/news/1307195. "Pakistani Blogger Asim Saeed Says He was Tortured," 

BBC, October 25, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41662595 14 "Raza Khan: Fears over Missing Activist in Pakistan," BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-42249090. 

""IHC Judge Comes Down Hard on Army, Govermnent over Faizabad Agreement," Pakistan 

Today, November 27, 2017. https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/11/27/who-is-the-army-toadopt -mediators-role/ 

4 
55


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Despite civil society protests against these crimes, exposure in the media, and appeals for action 

from human rights organizations, 16 "state agencies" (a euphemism for the lSl) continue to 

operate without facing any consequences. 

There are otlicial mechanisms that can address human rights violations, including enforced 

disappearances. The govermnent established a National Commission for Human Rights in 2012 

for the protection and promotion of human rights. However, its functioning has been marred by 

institutional problems such as lack of autonomy, shortage of trained personnel, budgetary 

constraints, a limited mandate over the armed forces, and the fact that it has no authority to 

investigate intelligence agencies. The official Commission of Inquiry on Enforced 

Disappearances, established in 20 II, has the authority to fix responsibility and file police reports 

against those involved in the disappearance of an individual. But it has not brought anyone to 

justice for these crimes. 

U.S. Policy Options for Supporting Democratization and Human Rights in Pakistan 

Last week, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson finnly expressed the U.S. commitment to what he 

called the three pillars of diplomatic engagement: economic growth, security, and democratic 

governance. 17 For too long, the United States has focused narrowly on security in Pakistan which 

has invariably meant a military-centric relationship at the expense of civilian democratic 

governance and economic development. For instance, the U.S. has provided over $33 billion 

dollars in aid to Pakistan since 2002, of which almost $23 billion were security-related. Pakistan 

is unlikely to become a stable or secure state committed to fighting terrorism and to end its 

support for jihadi proxies such as the LeT or denying Afghan terror groups like the Haqqani 

Network sanctuaries on its soil as long as the military retains its undue power over national 

politics and policies in Pakistan. 

The options outlined below can help Congress achieve the important goals of supporting 

democratic governance and protecting human rights in Pakistan: 

Democratic Progress: 

1. Congress should actively support and publicly demand a free and fair vote in Pakistan in 

which all political parties and leaders have a level playing field; and strongly condemn 

any attempts by the intelligence or security services to undermine the democratic process, 

which will send a strong signal that the U.S. is firrnly committed to the continuation of 

the democratic process in Pakistan. 

16 See, for instance, Amnesty International, "Pakistan: End Enforced Disappearances Now," 

Nov. 17, 2017. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2017/ll/pakistan-end-enforceddisappearances-now/ 

17 Press Statement, Austin, Texas, February I, 2018. 

https:/ /www. state.gov/ secretary /remarks/20 18/02/277840 .htm 
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28541d-6.eps

2. More specifically, Congress should ensure that U.S. election monitors, such as the 

National Democratic Institute, and the International Republic Institute, coordinate their 

efforts with other international observers, to closely assess and monitor the electoral 

process before, during and after the election. 

-'· Congress should review the composition of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, which has 

historically been heavily tilted towards security assistance. U.S. aid should instead 

prioritize the strengthening of democratic institutions such as political parties, the 

parliament and the Election Commission; and building partnerships with civil society 

organizations, the media, and universities. 

4. Beyond democratic procedures, the U.S. should tal<e a long view and invest in the future 

of Pal<istan, for instance, by working with its European and other allies to help Pakistan 

reform its education system and provide economic opportunities to Pakistanis through 

enhanced trade ties. 

5. Pakistan's moderate, centrist political parties, including the PML-N and the PPP, and 

civil society want the country to become a modem, democratic state at peace with its 

neighbors. In the short run, it is important that the U.S. help them succeed by supporting 

the crucial upcoming electoral transition. But Congress should also clearly articulate a 

long-term, unconditional commitment to democracy in Pakistan. Ultimately, a strong, 

stable and prosperous democracy in Pakistan would be the international community's 

most natural partner in fighting terrorism. 

Human Rights 

1. Congress should unequivocally condemn human rights violations in Pakistan, and call for 

the immediate release of those believed to be in the illegal captivity of Pakistani 

intelligence services 

2. Congress should strongly urge Pakistani authorities publicly and privately to ensure the 

effective investigation and prosecution of those responsible. 

3. Congress should hold frequent hearings on human rights violations in Pakistan to keep up 

the pressure on the state agencies that perpetrate these crimes. Congressional hearings may 

not readily alter their behavior, but regularly bringing rights abuses into the spotlight can 

certainly impact their cost-benefits calculations and act as a deterrent, while at the same 

time, assuring activists and journalists in Pakistan that the U.S. is firmly standing by them 

rather than displaying silent complicity in the violation of their human rights. 

4. The U.S. should work with its allies to urge Pakistan to strengthen the Commission on 

Enforced Disappearances, and the National Human Rights Commission, and to urgently 

ratify the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 

Disappearances. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members, for your attention and consideration. 

6 
57

Mr. YOHO. Thank everybody for being on time with your statements and your passion. I appreciate that. 

This is something, as you guys have all pointed out, that we have 

seen. 

Dr. Jones, I believe you were talking about how the attacks are 

down in Pakistan, are they down because the attacks in Afghanistan are going up? Are they just shifting? 

And then, Mr. Smith, I think it was you talking about the foreign 

aid—that we have had areas or times where we have had a lot of 

foreign aid going into Pakistan, we have had times where there 

was none going into Pakistan, and then we had moderate amounts. 

But yet, the situation hasn’t changed. 

So it kind of makes me think foreign aid is not the answer to this 

to get people to come to the table, and we have seen the response 

of Pakistan. 

How should Congress interpret Pakistan’s move to double down 

on its relationship with China as tensions with the United States 

rise? 

We will go with you, Mr. Smith, first. 

Mr. SMITH. It’s a great question and, you know, I think China 

has often been looked at as one of the few potentially effective avenues or mechanisms to effect in real change in Pakistan because 

they do have a great deal of influence. They do give a great deal 

of money, like the U.S. But unlike the U.S., they are popular in 

Pakistan among the elite and the public. 

But what I think often gets lost in that discussion is that, and 

Andrew Small, I think, put it best when he said the PakistanChina relationship is exactly as close as China wants it to be. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. SMITH. I don’t know that Beijing is eager to see a fundamental rupture in U.S.-Pakistan relations and for it to assume responsibility as the sole patron of Pakistan and their commitments 

and responsibilities that come with that. 

Its support for Pakistan has already cost it in its relationship 

with India. It has cost it in the international community in some 

regards and it cost a great deal financially in some regards. 

And I think another thing often lost is that the Chinese public 

views Pakistan just about as favorably as they view India, which 

is a historic rival of China, and far less favorably than they view 

the U.S. 

So there is popular opinion in China to a degree that influences 

elite opinion as well, even if it’s not a democracy. 

So I think in some ways a rupture in U.S.-Pakistan relationships 

that pushes Pakistan further toward China could actually expose 

some tensions in that relationship and may make China a more 

willing cooperator or collaborator. 

Mr. YOHO. And you brought up a good point. They’ve got such 

an influence that they can, and I think what they will find out in 

Pakistan and other countries with this One Belt One Road, it’s a 

one-way street that heads toward China for China’s benefit. 

Although they can do great things with that, I think it’s something that we should point out. The Gwadar Port shows that there 

is a close link to the Chinese military ambitions. 

58

You know, I remember sitting with the Chinese Ambassador 

talking about the Spratly Islands. He said it was strictly for peaceful navigational purposes. We know that’s not true and we have 

seen that repeated over and over again. 

Let me see. This will be for Dr. Shah. Is the U.S.-Pakistan relationship at the point of no return and do you believe that it’s still 

accurate to call Pakistan an ally, given its history of the two-faced 

dealings on the war on terror? 

Mr. SHAH. That’s a tough question. 

So Pakistan, as you are all aware, has kind of been, as some people call it, a friend and an enemy, or a frenemy. So it has, you 

know, willingly cracked down on terrorists and militants that attacked the Pakistani state while keeping, protecting, and sponsoring other groups like the Haqqani Network that hurt Indian and 

Afghanistan. 

U.S.-Pakistan relations have seen a kind of rise and fall throughout history. But I would imagine that it’s not a breaking point yet 

that the U.S. could still do things that might turn the kind of direction of the Pakistani state around, especially as I emphasized by 

promoting democracy, which has been missing from U.S. assistance 

to Pakistan for quite some time. 

There was a short period that the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Enhanced Partnership Act that was emphasized for 5 years. 

But I think the real key is to have a long-term commitment, an 

unconditional commitment to democratization in Pakistan and to 

build relationships with civilian leaders and civil society. 

Mr. YOHO. I hope we can come back to that question there. 

And I want to go to Dr. Jones. What would be the implications 

of stripping Pakistan of its status as a major non-NATO ally, which 

it acquired in 2004, thus ending its preferential access to American 

weapons and technologies? 

Mr. JONES. Well, look, I think if that—the step of suspending or 

even terminating Pakistan status as a non-NATO ally was part of 

a series of escalatory steps and that went further, if it made no difference, Pakistan is not on the U.S. State Department list of state 

sponsors of terrorism. But we know. 

I was in the U.S. Government. I mean, there is a lot of evidence 

to suggest that they do support Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Taliban, the 

Haqqani Network. 

So my answer to you is I don’t know that it would have an immediate step of revoking it. I think it would; Pakistan could get that 

assistance potentially elsewhere, including from the Chinese. 

But if it’s part of a process that is politically isolating Pakistan, 

I don’t think that would be in their interest, over the long run. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree with you, and thank you. 

We will next turn to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Two thousand years ago, the greatest imperial 

power was Rome and all roads led to Rome. Today, all roads and 

belts lead to Beijing. 

In most places the country has an army. In Pakistan’s case, the 

army has a country. 

I am concerned with the efforts of elites in Islamabad to compel 

the use of the Urdu language nationwide. They tried that on what 

59

was then called East Pakistan. It is no longer referred to as East 

Pakistan. 

Last year, seven Members of Congress signed a letter condemning human rights violations in Sindh, especially regarding 

forced disappearances, missing persons, and religious extremist attacks on minorities. 

Mr. Laghari, what can the U.S. do to help improve human rights 

in Sindh? 

Mr. LAGHARI. I think one great effort is already done for the first 

time ever after the British. The U.S. Consulate of Karachi Web site 

in Sindhi, credit goes to this committee or Congressman Brad Sherman and Adam Schiff and Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, who 

signed those letters. 

I think that they still need authorization from the Appropriations 

Committee about the Voice of America program in Sindhi. 

That is needed because there is no voice for the Sindhi peoples 

and I really highly recommend it and this committee can try to ask 

the State Department or the Voice of America that we start a 

Sindhi program in Voice of America. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I would point out that we have reduced our cost 

of foreign aid to Pakistan by many hundreds of millions or billions 

of dollars a year. 

In my work on this, I have seen a need for maybe $11⁄2 million 

to communicate with 30 million-plus Sindhi speakers. Should we 

also have a Baloch radio service as well? I’ll ask Mr. Laghari and 

also Mr.—Dr. Shah. 

Mr. SHAH. I mean, I don’t think it’ll hurt to have such programming. But the problem in Balochistan is, obviously, deeply rooted 

in the Pakistani state’s repression of legitimate Baloch demands for 

autonomy and a share of the resources. 

This is a province that now produces I think, if I am not wrong, 

about 36 percent of Pakistan’s natural gas. But it receives a tiny—

a pittance in revenues from Islamabad. 

And the military systematically abuses human rights in 

Balochistan. Baloch dissidents have been kidnapped, tortured, and 

then dumped on the roadside, and in some cases their bodies had 

engraved on them ‘‘Pakistan zindabad’’ or, you know, ‘‘long live 

Pakistan.’’

So Baloch alienation, you know, is growing and this is a middle 

class insurgency, by the way. The doctors, engineers, and professionals have taken up arms against the Pakistani state. 

And so, first of all, I think there is a need to outrightly condemn 

human rights violations in Balochistan, the rest of Pakistan, and 

to pressure Pakistan to at least respect its obligations to the international community in terms of following—in terms of adhering to 

the norm of human rights protection. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The Punjabi represent about 53 percent of the 

country. Do they represent a disproportionate percentage of the 

army, the ISI, and especially the officer corps? 

Mr. SHAH. Historically, that has been the case. The army does 

not release the ethnic composition of its officer corps. 

But estimates have ranged from 70 to 80 percent Punjabis and 

then Pashtuns form about 15 percent, and the last 5 percent would 

be some Sindhi and Baloch and Muhajirs, I believe. 

60

Mr. SHERMAN. I’ll go down the row. Does anyone here think that 

over 10 percent of the officer corps is made up of persons other 

than Pashtun and Punjabi? 

Dr. Shah, you said——

Mr. SHAH. No. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No? For the record, Mr. Laghari says no. Mr. 

Smith? Dr. Jones? 

So you have certain ethnic groups controlling the army and then 

the army controls the country, and then you sometimes call it a democracy. 

I believe my time has expired. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

We will next go to Mr. Rohrabacher from California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

President Trump has sent a message, a long overdue message, to 

the clique that rules the day in Pakistan, and now, today, the 

United States Congress, from this committee, is sending the same 

message. 

The clique that is ruling in Pakistan, this clique of Punjabis, rule 

with an iron fist. They are terrorists to their own people and they 

are corrupt. 

They are not a legitimate government and should not be treated 

as a legitimate government but instead, a pariah that is not in the 

interests of its own people and certainly not in the interests of the 

United States. 

We have, over the years, given to them every benefit of the doubt 

we could. When I arrived here three decades ago, many people believed I was Pakistan’s best friend on the Hill. 

I was. We were deeply involved in Afghanistan and I spent a lot 

of time and effort on that particular issue. But over the years it 

has become very clear to me that Pakistan is the root of the problem in Afghanistan. 

The ISI and the Pakistani Government, which are synonymous 

in so many ways, have been at fault for keeping this conflict going 

and going and going. 

So we are talking about thousands and thousands of lives lost. 

We mentioned Dr. Afridi today. Dr. Afridi is symbolic of all of this. 

If you have a group of gangsters who have taken someone like 

a doctor and put him in prison, in a dungeon, because he helped 

discover and helped disclose the murderers of 3,000 Americans, 

well, what does that indicate to you about the people who put him 

in that dungeon? 

It is time for us to side with the people who are repressed by 

this, what I say, clique that rules—the regime that rule Pakistan. 

We need to side with the Baloch, who have their young men and 

women grabbed, murdered, and then dumped on their front lawn. 

We have got a group in Karachi, the MQM movement, that’s basically a group of people that wanted to live with enterprise and 

have a zone where they could deal with the world in a commercial 

way and they are finding their people murdered. 

They are finding their lives repressed by a small group of 

Punjabis who are—basically, many of them don’t even pay taxes in 

their country. 

61

We have spent $33 billion for Pakistan since 9/11—$33 billion—

and they, with $33 billion, could not even get themselves—couldn’t 

get themselves to help us destroy the poppy crops—the opium that 

is grown on the Pakistan-Afghan border. 

Now, this has been a travesty. Our policy has been a travesty of 

cowardice or ignorance, on the part of the United States, that we 

are supporting such a regime. And I would hope that instead that 

we send a message to the Sindhis, to the Baloch, to the MQM and 

others in Pakistan—and there are small minorities of other faiths 

that are there that are being murdered all the time. Christians 

have been murdered in Pakistan at will and there’s never anybody 

arrested for it. 

So with this thought, Mr. Chairman, I’d just like to ask the 

panel—I got 1 minute left so it’s going to have to be yes or no—

do you think the United States should drop its, how do you say, 

official relationship with Pakistan and begin dealing with those elements in Pakistan that believe in democracy and represent the people of their country—the Baloch, the Sindhis, the MQM, et cetera? 

Yes or no? You have 30 seconds. Go ahead. 

Mr. JONES. I mean, I think the U.S. should—would work at those 

levels, work with the—need to talk to the government but needs to 

also talk with the——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I agree, because I don’t believe that those 

people have power in Pakistan or the government. In the United 

States we believe government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed and that’s not what you have in Pakistan. You 

have people who are being terrorized by that clique. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I would second the comments of my honorable colleague. 

Mr. LAGHARI. I agree with you, except it’s difficult because they 

are so involved in terrorism and tortures in the Sindh Province. 

But I have no problem with the Muhajirs, the common Muhajirs, 

the identities, the main issues, this is my stand—and I think the 

United States also must play very importantly in the relationship. 

We don’t want to see another Taliban or the Rohingya type in 

Karachi or those things. This is my concern. And thanks, I agree 

with you. So we have to cut off the official relationship. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. We see the Taliban emerging in Karachi. You 

can guess who’s really behind it. One last——

Mr. SHAH. I wanted to add to your concerns. Pashtuns in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas have also been subjected to 

systematic human rights violations. 

As we speak, thousands of Pashtuns gathered in the capital of 

Islamabad seeking justice for a young man who was killed 

extrajudicially, partly because his name sounds—his name is the 

same as the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Mehsud. 

And so in Karachi these human rights violations have been carried out by the security services against Pashtuns as well. 

I don’t think we should sever our relationship with Pakistan but 

I think there is a need to seriously think about shifting our focus 

to dealing with and building our partnerships with civilian and political leaders, civil society, the media, professional associations, 

other NGOs like the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. 

62

Mr. YOHO. We’ll come back to that. We need to move on. 

Next, we will go to Mr. Suozzi from New York. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to get a little bit of more information from each of you. 

So I have three areas that I want to explore. One is you talk 

about, you know, we should continue to try and work with the government. 

But there is a big difference in the government between the military and the civilian government. So I wanted you just to expand 

a little bit between the difference between the civilian and the military government. 

Number two is, you know, we want to do a lot—want to see them 

do a lot better job of policing their borders between Pakistan and 

Afghanistan. 

Now, we have been having a hard time with our borders in the 

United States of America and there is a very long border in Pakistan as well. What can be done—what should the Pakistan Government be doing more effectively to secure their long border with Afghanistan. 

And I’ll ask you, Dr. Jones, first and then I am going to ask another question afterwards if I still have more time. 

Mr. JONES. Sure. On the civilian and military, I think the U.S. 

has traditionally had a much closer relationship with the civilian 

side in general. 

Problems with the military have particularly been the ISI, the 

Inter-Services Intelligence director, which has——

Mr. SUOZZI. The U.S. has always had a very close relationship 

with the military as well. 

Mr. JONES. Well, with some parts of the military. But I think 

when it comes to military intelligence that’s where the biggest 

source of friction have been on support to groups operating in Afghanistan, Haqqani’s Taliban itself. 

That’s been a breaking point, I think, and continues to be a 

source of significant friction. 

Mr. SUOZZI. So think of other relationships that were built during the war in Afghanistan with the Russians and, you know, Pakistan supporting the mujahideen and the relationships that were 

built. Those relationships still exist. How do they undo those relationships and get rid of the people that we are having a hard time 

with? 

Mr. JONES. Well, look, there is a strategic rationale for why Pakistan continues to support these groups. They are pursuing Pakistan’s foreign policy interests in Afghanistan as they are in India 

with Lashkar-e-Taiba. 

There could be a strategic rationale to change that kind of support. It is undermining U.S. interests in Afghanistan. It is undermining Afghan interests. It’s undermining regional interests. 

That’s a strategic decision I think that goes well beyond any kind 

of historical ties. 

Mr. SUOZZI. And what about the practical questions related to securing the border? What would you like to see happen more that’s 

not happening? 

63

Mr. JONES. I’d like to see Pakistan conduct intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance to Taliban Haqqani members crossing the 

border. 

They have the capability to do that. They haven’t done it. They 

are also trying to build a wall right now. You know, it may be 

worth looking closely at, but it has to be on a conjunction with Afghanistan. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. I think in some ways it gets to the question of what 

is the military’s cost-benefit calculation, and to date they have not 

borne significant costs for their policy of using Islamist militant as 

an extension of foreign policy. 

They have gotten benefits from that strategy but they haven’t 

borne costs. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Do we think that’s a policy that is promoted more 

by the military than by the civilian government? 

Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

Mr. SUOZZI. And then how about securing the border? Do you 

want to add anything to that? 

Mr. SMITH. I have nothing to add. But I am sure U.S. military 

commanders have a lot of suggestions for how Pakistan could better secure that border. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Mr. Laghari? 

Mr. LAGHARI. I think—even if you keep the relationship with civilians but the control is with the Pakistani military and even in 

the military, the ISI is in control of the military. So it’s very difficult to control this ISI. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Is there a big tension between the civilian and the 

military government in Pakistan? 

Mr. LAGHARI. In the last 70 years, if you see any one single election, fair election happen in Pakistan, that time in 1970 and Pakistan breakup. 

There is no fair—after even it is controlled by the Pakistani interests—if you can control through the ISI then you can maybe say 

that we can build a good relationship with the Pakistani military 

or ISI. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Dr. Shah. 

Mr. SHAH. Let me clarify that the ISI is actually part of the military’s chain of command. It’s not a rogue agency. Its head is a 

three-star general who goes back to the regular military. 

And, you know, in terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relations, I mean, 

there hasn’t been a Pakistani dictator that the United States hasn’t 

been in love with and the relationship has been completely military-centric. 

That’s my one point, and there are deep tensions between the civilians and the military. 

On the border, I think there is a question also of willingness. It’s 

not just a matter of capabilities. Does Pakistan really want to 

achieve those objectives that you identify to stop and prevent the 

Haqqani Network. 

I think it’s the opposite. They actually facilitate their insertion 

into Afghanistan. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Who are two or three people—do I have a few more 

seconds, Mr. Chairman? 

64

Mr. YOHO. Yes. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Who are two or three people that you think are the 

best people for—if a Congressperson was to go visit Pakistan, who 

are the two or three best civilian people that you think we should 

talk to? 

Go ahead, Dr. Shah. 

Mr. SHAH. I would suggest not focusing on individuals but institutions to build relations with the Pakistani National Assembly, 

their politicians who—in both the Pakistan Muslim League and 

Pakistan People’s Party or former Prime Minister, late Benazir 

Bhutto, who understand the urgency of ridding Pakistan of extremism who want to have a peaceful relationship with India, want 

to end interference in Afghanistan. 

So I think it’s a matter of building ties with institutions more 

than individuals. 

Mr. SUOZZI. Do you want to add anything, Dr. Jones or Mr. 

Smith or Mr. Laghari? 

Mr. JONES. No, strongly agree institutions and strongly agree 

with organizations like the Senate. 

Mr. LAGHARI. I also agree about the judiciary, too. 

Mr. SUOZZI. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you. 

We will next go to Ms. Wagner from Missouri. 

Ms. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this 

hearing and I appreciate your continued attention to our—what I’ll 

call changing relationship with Pakistan. 

Mr. Smith, you recently wrote that you foresaw stronger IndoU.S. and Sino-Pakistan ties as the balance of power in Asia shifts. 

We can already see that China is investing staggering amounts 

of money—over $50 billion—in Pakistan and has been especially 

active in the port town of Gwadar. 

What kind of game is China playing with Gwadar? Is it an attempt to isolate India or is China laying the groundwork for longterm competition with the United States? 

Mr. SMITH. I think China has both commercial and military interests in the port of Gwadar. You know, going back a decade, a 

lot of Indian strategists were concerned about and publically complaining about the possibility China would build a string of 

pearls—port facilities and logistics facilities—along the Indian 

Ocean rim and those concerns were sort of downplayed at the time. 

But I think they may have just come a decade too early because 

what we have seen in recent years is that China does have plans 

for military facilities and installations. 

Ms. WAGNER. I should say so. President Trump has advocated for 

a 350-ship navy. Given that China seems to have designated 

Gwadar a future PLA naval base, are we doing enough to prepare 

for China’s creep westward? 

Mr. SMITH. Well, one of the things we should be doing and we 

are doing—I would commend the Trump administration on this—

is strengthening our partnership with India across all the services 

political, civilian, military—that in some ways we see India as a 

net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and that partnership 

has made really dramatic progress over the past 10 years. 

65

And I think we have a unique situation with Prime Minister 

Modi in India and this Trump administration very bullish on the 

India relationship, to move that forward. That, more than anything—a strong U.S.-India partnership, will secure our interests in 

the Indian Ocean. 

Ms. WAGNER. I have several more questions. 

Last fall, Pakistan refused to capitulate to China’s demand that 

it accept Chinese currency within the Gwadar free zone. 

Dr. Shah, do you see Beijing’s funding conditions for the ChinaPakistan economic corridor becoming a wedge issue that inhibits 

cooperation between the two countries? 

Mr. SHAH. There have been reports of rising tensions. Pakistan 

also refused Bhasha Dam. I think the Chinese helped in that because the conditions were too stringent. 

Pakistan’s ministry for shipping told the Senate that 90 percent 

of the revenue from Gwadar will go to China. So I think Pakistani 

officials are beginning to realize that this is really not about Pakistan’s economic development per se but it’s about Chinese commercial economic interests. 

And so there is tension also amongst the smaller provinces because they feel like, again, this project has been hijacked by the 

Punjab and left them out of the loop. So there is domestic tension 

but there is also frictions with China on certain issues including 

the currency issue. 

Ms. WAGNER. I’ve got several more questions to whomever can 

best answer. Would you recommend that Congress spell out specific 

conditions on our funding to Pakistan in the upcoming appropriations process? Mr. Laghari. 

Mr. LAGHARI. I think especially about the human rights situations. They should put the condition on that one. And the Sindhi 

and Baloch disappearance issues is very critical. 

Ms. WAGNER. Sir, as you well know, the systematic human rights 

abuses perpetuated by the Pakistani military, I mean, I am interested in reforming our IMET military education program to better 

train participating officers from Pakistan and around the world on 

human rights. 

What steps does the Pakistani military need to do to respect the 

fundamental rights? 

Mr. LAGHARI. I haven’t seen any delegation from the U.S., even 

the Karachi Consulate or the Islamabad Ambassador. They have to 

meet at least the disappeared person’s families or the extrajudicial 

victim’s families. 

That will go to the message to the Pakistani Army that the U.S. 

is really concerned about the human rights situation and whatever 

equipments and training the U.S. is giving to the Pakistani military or the police and the law enforcement agencies. 

Ms. WAGNER. I appreciate it. I’d be interested in all of your perspectives on this. But let me just get this last question in. 

Just 2 days ago, the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for 

a suicide attack that killed 11 soldiers in the Swat Valley. 

Dr. Jones, a few years back, you wrote that Pakistan had used 

proxy warfare to try to inspire regime change in Afghanistan. Is it 

still doing so and do you think the U.S.’s new positioning could encourage Pakistani counterterrorism efforts? 

66

Mr. JONES. I think Pakistan does continue to use proxy organizations, particularly in Afghanistan and India. Pakistan has shown 

a willingness to conduct counterterrorism operations against 

groups that threaten the state—groups like the Pakistan Taliban—

but not against groups that they use as tools. 

So they differentiate between terrorist groups. I think the challenge for the U.S. is to try to get them to stop supporting groups 

undermining U.S. interests. 

Ms. WAGNER. Here, here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you for letting me go over. I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. Absolutely, and I appreciate your input and I thought 

those were great questions. 

You know, what we have seen is—and I think it was Mr. 

Laghari, you brought up one of the shortfalls of our foreign policy 

and most grave is us not understanding the local cultures, tribe 

mentality, or the power structures that we don’t have here and we 

have seen this repeated in Afghanistan. 

We have seen it repeated all over the Middle East, and you 

would think, you know, one of the things that would bring us all 

together would be to have a common goal in stomping out radicalism in any shape and form—that we’d all come together and we 

could agree on that and then move beyond that and focus on economies and trade and cultural exchanges. 

But I don’t see that happening and what we have around the 

world is people have hijacked religions or bastardized them. 

We have seen what the radicals have taken with Islam. But we 

have also seen them do that with democracies, and both of them 

have gotten a bad name. 

You know, we heard in other meetings that democracy is a failing structure and China is promoting that. Yet, what we see 

around the world in so many countries is not a true democracy, you 

know, where the people are empowered. 

What we see in so many countries is the government is still in 

power but they want to call it a democracy and when it doesn’t 

work they blame democracy instead of their small thinking and 

they don’t empower their people. 

And what I’ve seen is people—governments are afraid to empower people that haven’t formed a government like ours from the 

bottom up, and we are just so blessed in this country that we have 

empowered our people and we give people the right to have the 

control of the government. And it’s just such a foreign concept to 

so many countries. 

Moving forward, I didn’t have a question with that. That was 

more just of a statement, in case we ran out of time. 

But what I want to ask all four of you, if you will, is what are 

your thoughts about Pakistan, you know, knowing Dr. A. Q. Khan 

and the work he’s done and the laxity of what’s going on in there 

and not knowing who the power structure is—we know it’s in the 

hands of the military. But we see one of the groups growing as one 

of extremists as a candidate. 

What are your thoughts about the nuclear arsenal being passed 

off to the wrong hands and what can the U.S. do about it? 

We will—go ahead. We will start with you, Mr. Laghari. 

67

Mr. LAGHARI. Yes. This is a very interesting question for me. I 

think if you look at it, we are talking about Iran and North Korea. 

But who gave the nuclear—all those things from Pakistan? 

Mr. YOHO. Exactly. 

Mr. LAGHARI. And this is not—I don’t think that just A.Q. Khan 

definitely is involved but also the Pakistani military and ISI. Without their permission they can’t even transfer their things from the 

airport or anything—their taking the bags and those things. 

And one more threat I think would be if that nuclear arsenal is 

controlled by the Taliban or by the extremists or the Islamic fundamentalist groups, then it will be very, very dangerous and horrible for the whole world. 

And instead of that, if you look at when these nuclear tests in 

1998 that happened, even the chief minister from the Balochistan, 

the Pakistani Government haven’t asked from them that we are 

doing this one. 

So imagine that democracy or how they are treating the people 

in Sindh or Balochistan or a similar province. My suggestion, focus 

on the common people’s educations and human rights. But nuclear 

things is a very, very dangerous thing. If it is not controlled——

Mr. YOHO. Right. Let me ask, does anybody else want to weigh 

in on that? 

Mr. SMITH. Brief remark. This has, obviously, been a sort of omnipresent concern for a long time. Our military and intelligence 

folks here seem to think that the Pakistanis have reasonable confidence in the processes and procedures to control the nuclear 

weapons. 

But were the country ever to descend into chaos, you know, all 

bets are off. One thing I would note is that China continues to supply Pakistan with nuclear reactors, what many believe is in contravention of its commitments to the Nuclear Supplier Group, 

which it joined in 2004 and it continues to block India’s bid to join 

the Nuclear Suppliers Group, insisting that Pakistan should be 

given a chance, too. 

And of course, Pakistan’s record on nonproliferation suggests 

that it should not be given consideration. 

Mr. YOHO. Yes. Go ahead, Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Just briefly, I mean, my understanding, even during 

my time in the U.S. Department of Defense, is that Pakistan had 

reasonable oversight over its nuclear capabilities. 

However, look, if the U.S.-Pakistan relationship deteriorates, as 

it may, I think it had to be made very clear to Islamabad that the 

proliferation of material—nuclear material or dual-use technology 

that gets out of Pakistan will be dealt with harshly. 

Mr. YOHO. Harshly. 

Mr. JONES. Harshly. And that needs to be made, I think, clear, 

publicly. 

Mr. YOHO. Unfortunately, that is one of those weapons that we 

wish we could uninvent but we can’t. We are here and we have got 

to deal with it and we have to have the safeguards in place. 

If you guys will bear with us, we are going to go to Mr. Sherman 

now for another round. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Are the major political parties in Pakistan dedicated enough to democracy to work together for democracy? Or are 

68

any one of the major parties willing to team up with the military 

if they can just get a piece of power? 

I’ll ask Dr. Shah. 

Mr. SHAH. Well, I think that the Pakistan Muslim League, which 

is the ruling party—the Pakistan People’s Party which was, until 

recently, the other major party—I think are sufficiently committed 

to the process of democracy and have come to the consensus that 

a military intervention would be unacceptable. So at times——

Mr. SHERMAN. So either one of them would prefer the other one 

be in power than that the military be in power and they could be 

kind of junior partners to the military? 

Mr. SHAH. Absolutely. I think those two parties are committed to 

that. But there is a third force in politics now where the cricketer 

Imran Khan, who, you know, empathizes with the Taliban and—

he has been teaming up with the military to undermine elected 

governments and every time, you know, the military and civilian 

frictions rise, he starts questioning the very legitimacy of the democratic process, the elections being unfair. 

So yes, the major parties are committed but there are problems 

with his party called the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, or Pakistan 

Movement for Justice. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But not so much justice as—is he motivated by 

Muslim extremism or is it just a cozy relationship he has with the 

military? 

Mr. SHAH. I don’t think he’s driven by Islamic extremism but 

he’s expressed views in the past that are troubling. For instance, 

he’s said that the Taliban are justified in carrying out jihad in Afghanistan. 

So, you know, but——

Mr. SHERMAN. I might add that if somebody said that in the 

United States we’d call it Muslim extremism. 

But let me go to Mr. Laghari. 

Mr. LAGHARI. There is—the democracy in Pakistan is very 

unique. If you see recently, just currently, their chief minister in 

Balochistan he received only 450 votes and only one seat and he 

became chief minister—450 votes. This is very rare. 

And the second thing, not many religious parties in the parliament—not many religious means the Jamaat-e-Islami or those 

organizations. 

But two other factors are very impactable in democracy. One is 

corruption. Now it is the Pakistani former President Asif Zardari. 

He collect lots of money through corruption. And also Nawaz 

Sharif. I also suggest they be researched on the corruption in Pakistan——

Mr. SHERMAN. The choice between an undemocratic military and 

the two leading political factions involved seem to be involved in 

corruption. 

I’ll be meeting at 4:45, and any member of the committee is welcome to join me, with Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. So I’ll ask Mr. Smith 

and Dr. Jones what should I know about this gentleman and what 

questions should I ask. 

Mr. SMITH. There actually is an interesting story about——

Mr. SHERMAN. I mean, here his mother is killed. His father was 

in jail. 

69

Mr. SMITH. Yeah. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Gee, and sometimes I think being a politician in 

the United States is tough. Go on. 

Mr. SMITH. Well, back in 2008, President Zardari issued an order 

that would have brought the ISI—shifted control of the ISI from 

the prime minister’s office, where it ostensibly resides today, to the 

interior ministry, which many interpreted as an attempt by the civilian government—a rare attempt by the civilian government 

maybe to exert some authority over the ISI. 

Within 24 hours, he received a letter from the military essentially telling him absolutely not—rescind your order today, and he 

did. He did. 

There have, since then, as far as I know, been no attempts by 

the civilian governments or the political parties to unite in an attempt to present a united front against the military. That simply 

has not happened. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Yes. I mean, I think it’s worth asking and trying to 

get the pulse of this year’s elections. I mean, they are coming up. 

Is his assessment likely to be we are going to see competitive, free, 

and fair elections? What are going to be the obstacles? 

I mean, he’s had a long—that family has had a long historical—

both has been victorious and also felt the brunt of the Pakistan political system. So I would ask about the elections this year. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Laghari, Dr. Shah, anything to add? 

Mr. SHAH. He has made the right statements recently both in 

favor of the democratic process, minority rights, and as well as—

I forget now. Sorry, my mind has blanked out. I apologize. 

So he’s made the right noises about democracy, human rights, 

minority rights, freedom of the press, which has historically been 

the Pakistan People Party’s kind of trend to support human rights 

because it used to be quite left of the center but is now a centrist 

moderate force. 

I would ask him about the performance of the Sindh government 

because there are serious concerns about the—the PPP is in power 

in Sindh but there are serious concerns about poor governance and 

corruption. 

So I would—I would probably raise that, too. 

Mr. LAGHARI. I want to add two things. One is the government 

in Sindh is PPP and there is no single statement from the—neither 

from Bilawal Bhutto nor from the chief minister about the disappearances. 

And the water issue is very serious. The poison kind of in the 

whole Sindh, and even from the judiciary they are asking but there 

is no progress about that one. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Gotcha. Disappearances and water. And I might 

add I’ve been working to try to get broadcasting into Pakistan 24 

hours in all the major languages and I’ve been told, oh, it’s so expensive—it could cost over a $11⁄2 million. 

Not per language, not per year—you know, per year per language—and that’s—I think that’s rounding error on the foreign aid 

and military aid. So something we can certainly afford to do, and 

I have a feeling I’d rather have a good relationship with the Pakistani people than with the folks that have put Dr. Afridi in jail. 

70

And with that, I yield back. 

Mr. YOHO. No, those are some good points and ideally, that’s 

what we’d like to accomplish is have a vibrant democracy over 

there in the form that fits their country best to empower their people the best so it brings stability around the region, around the 

world. 

And I just know that what we are doing we have got to change 

to continue down this path. We are not getting the results that we 

are looking for and, you know, it just leads to destabilization 

around the region if not the world. 

And so our recommendations will come out of this meeting. 

Hopefully, you’ll be able to see them, and we just want to let you 

know how much we appreciate the panelists—the witnesses, you 

guys being here with your input. 

We value it very much. We value your time, and so thank you. 

And with that, this meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON. DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific 

Ted Yoho (R-IlL), Chairman 

January 31.2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You arc respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by 

the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific in Room2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on 

the Committee \Vebsite at ~·.nv\v.Fon;ignAft~Jirs.hou:;t;.~): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday. Febmal) 6. 2018 

2:00p.m. 

U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Reassessing Priorities Amid Continued Challenges 

Seth Jones, Ph.D. 

Hmo1d Brmvn Chair 

Director, Transnational Threats Project 

Center for Strategic and International Studies 

Mr. Jeff Smith 

Research Fellow 

South Asia 

Heritage Foundation 

Mr. Munawar ""Sufi'' Laghari 

Executive Director 

Sindlri Foundation 

Aqil Shah. Ph.D 

\Vick Cary Assistant Professor of South Asian Politics 

Department of International and Area Studies 

Uniycrsity ofOk11homa 

By Direction of the Chairman 
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ________ A_•_ii_1 _

111_111_11_'"_P_11_:"ifl:_1

_" _______ HEARING 

Duy __ T_t_te_s_rl~aJ'-'--Date Febt'lf(IIJ' 6, 2018 Roum. ___ -'2"'2"'0-'0 ___ _ 

Starting Time ----"-2,_,:0,_,8,_,!"'""'"'----Ending Time 3:26pm 

Recesse.< ~--~ L_to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ )( __ to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to __ ) 

Presiding Memher(s) 

Rep. Tf!d Yolw 

Check rt/1 ojtilejo/lowing that lt]JJI~I': 

Open Session 0 Executive {ili>sed) Session D Televised D 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Elcctmni<ally Rccord£l!ltapcd) D 

Stenogmphic Record U 

U.S. Pakistan Relations: Reasse.<sing Pl'iorities Amid Continued Challenges 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Rep. Dana Rohmbacher, Rep. Steve Chabot, Rep. Ann Wagner, Rep. Scott PenJ• 

Rep. Bmd Sltermrm, Rep. Ami Bel'!l, Rep. Gel'!lld Connolly 

NON-SURCOMMJTTKF. MEMRRRS PRRSENT: (lvfark with 1m • if IIIey are not members of(it!l eon11uiflee,) 

Rep. Tftonws Suozti 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [I] No 0 

(If "no", please lisr be loll' and include title, agency, deparfmenf, or organizalfon) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (Lis I any slaleme11/s submilledfor the record,) 

Cmmol/y - SFll 

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TIME ADJOURNED __ 3_:2_6..:Jc..11_n_ 
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Statement for the Record 

Submitted by Mr. Connolly of Virginia 

The U.S. faces immense ditliculties in our bilateral relationship with Pakistan that are inextricably 

linked to our interests in regional stability in South Asia. To realize the advantages ofU.S.-Pakistan 

relations, the United States must set guideposts for our long-term goals- both incentives and 

punitive measures that clearly communicate that the U.S. will not make great sacrifices for narrow 

shared interests. However, such nuanced diplomacy is lost on a Trump Administration that ignores 

the value of foreign assistance and resorts to kinetic options over diplomatic engagement at every 

tum. 

In early January, Trump suspended all security assistance to Pakistan, which atiects approximately 

$2.15 billion in total, pending a reassessment later this year, but did not outline any steps Pakistan 

should take to release the funds. Fallowing the suspension, Kabul has experienced a string of 

terrorist attacks that have killed more than 130 people, including multiple Americans. The Tali ban 

and the Islamic State have each claimed responsibility for some of the attacks, and Afghan officials 

have also cast blame on the Haqqani Network, whose leadership is suspected to reside in Pakistan. 

Pakistan's military has long been suspected of half-hearted prosecution of, if not outright collusion 

with, insurgent groups. But for the Trump Administration's move to be etiective, it needs to 

enumerate clear metrics for cooperation against what should be shared enemies. 

Last August, President Trump announced his administration's new South Asia strategy, including a 

"renewed focus" on Pakistan, which contained lofty rhetoric but little substance. His plan purports 

to end "nation-building," and instead focuses on eliminating the terrorist threat in the region But he 

failed to recognize that it is our aid and reconstruction etiorts that will eliminate terrorists' 

sanctuaries in Afghanistan and Pakistan, not a permanent U.S. military presence. 

Promoting cooperation with Pakistan is an essential component to a broader strategy. Afghanistan 

shares a 1,600 mile border with Pakistan, and it is in the mountainous border regions of both 

countries that Al-Qaeda and the Tali ban have taken refuge. In his speech, the President pressured 

Pakistan to eliminate terrorist safe havens within its borders. Then last week, the White House said 

that "President Trump's conditions-based South Asia Strategy provides commanders with the 

authority and resources needed to deny terrorists the safe haven they seek in Afghanistan and 

Pakistan." Directing battlefield commanders to operate in Pakistan is a far cry from pressuring 

Pakistan's government to crack down on terrorist networks inside the country. 

Despite Pakistan's transition from military rule to an electoral democracy, basic human rights and 

democratic freedoms continue to elude many Pakistanis. According to the State Department's 2016 

Human Rights Report for Pakistan, "the most serious human rights problems were extrajudicial and 

targeted killings; disappearances; torture; lack of rule oflaw .. , gender inequality; violence against 

gender and sexual minorities; and sectarian violence." Rampant persecution and violence continues 

against religious minorities, including Christians, Sutis, Hindus, and Ahmadi Muslims. And 
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Pakistan's Interior Ministry recently closed the Pashto-language service Radio Mashaal, which 

Congress created as an alternative to the Islamic extremist radio stations in the border regions by 

Afghanistan. Such free and open news sources are a rare and critical tool to counter extremist 

propaganda in the region, and the Trump Administration should offer vehement support for them. 

The Trump Administration's degradation of U.S. diplomatic and development efforts and lack of a 

clear South Asia strategy raise serious questions about the preservation of U.S. national security 

interests in Pakistan. I hope our witnesses can clearly articulate the guideposts tbat would 

incentivize a more productive alliance with Pakistan. 

2