Research Note 85-68

Soldier Performance

in Continuous Operations

Felix Kopstein and Arthur Siegel

Applied Psychological Services, !nc.

Joseph Conn, James Caviness, and Willamn Slifeor

ii4 Soldier Support.Center

o Halim Ozkaptan and Fred Dyer

Army Research Institue

Reproduced From

Best Available Copy

Submitted by

ARI Field Unit at Fort Benning, Georgia

Seward Smith, Chief

Training Research Laboratory

Harold F. O'Nel, Jr., Director

NOCT 16 '1938:4

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Thi-, dom~t ha3 qeen apLw July 1985

vi~mnic'd i 85 10. 15 116
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It. KEY WORDS (Continl, an rtoer.. wlde if nceaay ad Identify by block nmambor)

Stress Performance degradation Stress management

Continuous operations Unit effectiveness Human resources

Training Performance maintenance Endurance

Organizational development Work/rest planning

Human factors Stress control

2&. ASTRACT (Canthue la powwow aid N nmewomy mo Id-.n/f 6b block nim.w)

If any Army unit is to meet the demands of continuous operations, a systematic human resources conservation program must be planned and implemented.

The details of such a program are described. Without such a program, intolerable levels of performance degradation during continuous operations can be

projected.

Strategies for countering the anticipated degradation during continuous

operations include, leadership training, confidence building, (Continued)

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ARI Research Note 85-68

20. (Continued)

-organizing-for full communications, behavioral modeling, overtraining and

crosstraining, developing physical fitness, and development of performance supports.

Tactics for countering performance degradation during continuous operations include task rotation, task sharing, use of performance supports,

proper management of stress, and appropriate work/rest cycles.

The program for integrating these concepts into a unit developmental

program includes systematic steps along a time frame. The strategies are'

set in place during the preparatory stage, and these provide the foundation

for implementing the tactics during continuous operations.

i

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER I - CHALLENGES ............................................... 1

Section 1. General ...................................................

General .........................................................

Purposes 1

Soldier Resources Concept 2

Section 2. Future Warfare and the Combat Environment ................... 3

Continuous Operations ................................ ...... 3

Threat Forces' Intentions ............................................. 3

The U.S. Army View .............................................. 4

A Problem: Logistics .............................................. 4

Current U.S. Doctrine ............... ................ 4

Section'3. Combat Conditions and Soldier Performance .................... 5

Some Close-Ups of How Soldiers are Affected ......................... 5

Why Performance Degrades ......................................... 6

What Degrades Performance ........................................ 7

How Degradation Shows Itself ............................ o.......... 7

Degradation: How Far and How Fast ............................... 9

What the Projections Show ............................ ............. 9

Section 4. TheChallenge to Leaders ................... ................ 12

Degradation of Combat Capability .................................. 12

Maintaining Command Resources ....................................... 14

Developing a Continuous Operations Capability ...... .................. 14

CHAPTER II - STRATEGIES FOR SOLDIER RESOURCES CONSERVATION ....... 15

Section 1. General .................. .. .............................. 15

Remedies ....................................................... 15

Anticipating Demand ................................................. i1 

tCreating Reserves ................................................ 15

Building Up Soldier Resources ..................................... 15

Section 2. Leadership ................................................. 16

Leadership .............................. ............................ 16

High Standards .................................................... 17

Confidence ...................................................... 17

How to Build Confidence .......... ................................... 18

Communications ....................................................... 18

Serve as a Model ................................................. 19

Lii
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

Page

Section 3. Training ................................................... 20

Core of Preparation................................................. 20

Realism of Practice ................................................. 21

Realistic Performance Patterns ....................................... 2

Crosstraining ...................................................... 22

Overtraining....................................................... 23 llEconomy and EffiLienty in Training Operations ............. o........... 24

After Action Critique .......................................... .... 25

Section 4. Developing Coping Skills ........... o.......................... 26

Coping Techniques ............................................... 26 

*

Section 5. Physical Fitness......................................... 28

Resiliency (Bounce Back)........................................... 28,

Stamina (Endurance).... .......... ............................... 29

Strength (Muscle) .........................................30

Pacing Energy Expenditu-e.................. o....... .............30

Practice Pacing...... ... ......................... o................. 31

Push the Limits ......... .. ,................. ......... 31

Section 6. Dedication to Winn*ng.................... o.................... 31

I.Skills and Attitudes .............................................. t. 31

Competition.............. ........... ............................ 32

Fairness and Equity................................................ 33

Cohesion, Esprit, and Morale............ o........................... 3

Balance the Burdens ............................................ 34

Commitment......... ............................................. 3i5

Section 7. Resource Management .... .......................... ......... 35

S.Effective Use of Resources ... o.......... ...................35

Know Your Men ................ ... 10.................... ...36

System Modificaition .................. .............................. 38

Performance Supports .............................................. 38

Support Critical Abilities........................................... 4

Stimulate.Creative Ideas............................................. 40

CHAPTER III - TACTICS FOR SOLDIER RESOURCES CONSERVATION ......... 4i

Section 1. Tactics for Sustaining Performnance ............................ 41

Conserving Combat Capability ...................................... 41

iv

-~~~~~r JJ- I2s) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont4)

k Page

Section 2. Resource Management Tactics ...................... 41

Key Men, Not Man ...................................... ........... 41

Assign the Least Degraded ..................................... .... 43 Ta k R t to . . . . .. . . . . . . ... . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 4

Task RStatin...................................................... 43

Tas Shring .............................................. ...... 44

Adjusting Performance Demand....................................... 45

Increasingly Use Performance Supports ............................... 46

Section 3. Stress Management Tactics .................................. 46

Recognizing Serious Degradation: InOthers ............. .............. 46

Recognizing Serious Degradation: In Yourself ......................... 47

Recognizing Stress ................................................ 48

Coping With Stress and Degradation............................ 48

Section 4. Rest and Sleep ................ I............... 0............ 48

Priorities for Sleep/Rest.................................. 48

Dut vs Ret/Seep.......................................50

Duork/ Rest/Sleep................ ........................... 50

Work/Rest/Schles........................ ............ ......... 51

Wo k R s c e uls ..................... 5

Work/Rest Schedules and Wake/Sleep Cycles .......... ............ 52

Make the Most of 2re..s.................... ........................ 52

Recovery From Slecp Loss.......................................... 53

Task Interest and Complexity ............... ........................ 54

Section 5. Leadership Tactics .... 6...................................... 54

Shift Leadership Style .............................................. 54

Increase Communications an~d Cohesiveness........................... 55

Appeal to Commitment.............................................. 56

CHAPTER IV - ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATION ............ o.............. 57

Section 1. Developing a Continuous Operations Capability ..... ......... 57

Program Integrity ...................................... :............ 57

Time Frame .................... ....................... ............ 57

Section 2. Managing the Preparation........... ........................... 58

Infom............... ................................. ...... 5

Determine Critical Mission Elments.................................. 58

Know Your Men .... o................................................59q

Plan/Prepare ....................................... o..............59q

Implement the P-ogram ............................................. 60

Evaluat~e the Program............................................... 61
TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

4 4.. •Page

Conduct Continuous Operations Exercises .............................. 61

Assess Progress .................................... ....... 61

Revisme and Refine . ............... f .................................. 62

CHAPTER V - SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING

EFFECTIVENESS DEGRADATION ................................. 63

Section 1. Strategic Principles ........... ............................. 63

Section 2. Tactical Principles ........................................ 71

APPENDIX A - PERFORMANCE DECREMENT BY COMBAT ACTIVITY

CATEGORY ..................................................... 77

4

'i

*1

.4

vi
LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1.1 Effects of Prolonged Continuous Operations on Soldiers'

Performance .................................................. 8

3.1 The Signs of Stress .............................................. 49

LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 Projected performance degradation in continuous operations:

Mechanized Infantry and Armor ........... ..................... 10

1.2 Projected performance degradation in continuous operations:

Fire Support Teams (FIST) and Artillery .......................... 12

1.3 Performance decrement by combat activity category for

Mechanized Infantry .............................................. 13

ViA' .
CHAPTER I

CHALLENGES

Section 1. General

General This Manual deals with methods for sustaining

soldiers' performance durin~g continuous operations.

Battle in Central Eutrope against forces of the Warsaw

Pact has been called the most demanding mission that

the U. S. Army could be assigned, but anywhere in the

world a continuous mission may be required. In any

such conflict, combat operations are expected to continue around the clock at a constant high pace. Soldiers

N will be required to fight without let up for extended periods. Given these conditions, the soldiers' performance will suffer. The procedures for ensuring soldier

performance capability, and for conserving it in battle,

need to be well understood.

Purposes This Manual serves several purposes:

SPrinciples for countering and slowing the erosion of soldier resources are presented

' Methods are given for conditioning units for

continuous operations, and for preserving

their fighting, capabilities during continuous

combat

V Factors governing rates and degrees of progressive performance degradation are detailed

SDifferences in expected effectiveness for various types of combat activity over 120 continuous mission hours are illustrated

The information can be 'ased by leaders who plan and

manage soldier performance in extended, continuous

combat missions. In missions of this type, soldier resources can dwindle rapidly. This problem must be addressed early during initial planning stages. This manual contains the guidance for reducing the impacts of

adverse effects on soldiers' performance and for prolonging soldicrs' fighting effectiveness.

- W-W MU -1*
Soldier Resources Soldier resources mean personnel, and their

Concept ability and effectiveness to perform in a unit. All

units have certain resources or capabilities for completing their missions and for achieving the mission

goals. Some of these capabilities are supported by

weapons. Others are derived from logistics. Still

others may depend on the way a unit is organized.

Each is a factor that partly determines the achievement

of mission goals. However, one factor links them all:

the human dimension of soldier resources. So long as

their integrity is maintained, mission success can be

achieved; without soldier resources weapons and tactics become useless.

Military leaders have long been aware that their

soldier resources shrink in combat. However, they

hpve tended to view this decline purely in terms of the

number of soldiers no longer available for duty:

• Killed In Action (KIA)

• Wounded In Action (WIA)

• Noncombat Losses

• Illness

Soldier resources are further reduced when a

unit's personnel are not capable of performing their

tasks adequately:

Vigilance deteriorates

. Determinations become inaccurate

' Reports become faulty

• Decisions become slow and inaccurate

T Orders are misunderstood/forgotten

• Weapons are misused/.underexploited

Degradation of soldiers' performance means that they

retain only a proportion (percrntage) of their initial

effectiveness. Continuous unrelieved combat will degrade performance and erode soldier resources. Combat capability will be cut whether the unit is 50% strength,

or full strength with soldiers who are only 50% effective.

2

.,. . .
section 2. Future Warfare and the Combat Environment

Continuous Lontinuous land combat is an advanced warfare

Operations concept that io made possible by the almost complete

mechaniL;aion of land combat forces and by the technol

ogy that enables effective movement at night, in poor

weather, at.2 in other low visibility conditions. Combs

can and wilt continue around the clock at the same level

of high intensity for extended periods. Armies now h-L

* the potential to fight without let up. The reasons Lhat

have traditionally forced a pause- -darkness, fatigue,

resupply, regrouping- -have been largely overcome by

technological advances.

Threat I Forces' The Soviet view 'about future warfare is: • " "I ntentionsnihanda.,wtotetuutl

The offensive,.. will be conducted

night and day ... without let up until

the enemy is defeated.

In the case of an initial attack, US/NATO forceE

will be opposed'by the Warsaw Pact. Their approach

likely to determine the character of the initial battles.

Soviet doctrine is characterized by:

i Conducting warfare day and night, along a

broad front, in any weather, until the enemy

is defeated

Massing forces and solving attack problemin new ways; including chemical and nuclea

weapons in their scheme of attack

V Echeloning of forces to relieve own troops

and to maintain unremitting pressure on

the enemy

1 Maintaining a highly maneuverable, dynamic

offensive

. Waging the offensive on broad axes; troops

cannot mass on a narrow, solid front

• Expecting uiaven offensives; even the term

"front line" will not be used

3
V Using nuclear weapons and high troop mobility;

saturating the battlefield with tanks; expecting

wide contaminated zones, fires, and floods;

great losses of material, troops, and equipment.

The U.S. Army The U. S. Army's view has been expressed as

View follows in FM 100-5:

The United States could find itself in a short

intense war--the outcome dictated by results

of initial combat.

The confusion, extren 'ress, and lethality

of the modern battlefieiu ace a heavy burden

on human endurance, courage, perseverance

and ability or desire to perform combat duties

and skills.

Commanders on the modern battlefield can ill

afford to relinquish the initiative and not follow

up successes because troops are fatigued and

environmental conditions have changed.

A Problem: Because the line of communications may be long

Logistics and vulnerable, each unit of our fighting forces must be

prepared to accomplish its mission(s) with the resources

on hand. Combat will be harsh and savage. Opposing

forces will be greater in number and have their supply

sources nearby. The U. S. Army must prepare its units--

down to platoons and squads--to fight outnumbered, and

to win. Winning will require the best possible use of

material resources and sustaining a high level of soldier

performance inthe face of adversity. Therefore, maximum effectiveness and efficiency must be gained from

the available personnel.

Current U.S. Th2; basics of U.S. doctrine are the same at night

as duringthe day; some key features are:

• slow the enemy rate of movement

• begin attrition of the anemy well forward

engage the enemy at the most effective

range of direct fire weapons

4
keep the defense flexible and elastic

t 5estroy enemy forces

a These activities must be maintained at a high

level to assure an effective defense.

Section 3. Combat Conditions and Soldier Performance

Some Close-Ups Section 3 of this Chapter presents descriptions

of How Soldiers of the performance degradation that you can expect durare Affected ing continuous operations.' The conditions to be expected

on the future battlefield have never before been encountered by any army. Perhaps one parallel is the World

War II experience of the airborne division whose night

drop into Normandy preceded the Allied assault on the

beaches. They were elite troops, all volunteers, and

were exceedingly well trained. Nonetheless, their ability to cope was strained since they had not been prepared

for the conditions they encountered. The accounts below

are based on notes taken by a contemporary observer.

Initially, the parachute drops were made during

the night, zones were missed and many men landed in

a marsh.

Only the soldiers who had landed in the

marsh seemed relatively alert; soaked and

shivering, they had to keep moving for warmth.

It was different with the men who had landed

dry; some of them fell asleep standing, while

Ballard talked to them, then fell headlong. When

the formation pulled away from the assembly

area, then paused briefly, Ballard saw men fall

in their tracks and hit the ground with their eyes

closed.

Later "Item Company" was caught unawares by a

German divebombing and strafing attack. Overpressure

from exploding bombs affected virtually all personnel.

Lieutenant Robert G. Burns found he could

not keep his men awake no matter how he tried.

Some were in heavy sleep within two minutes

of the bombing. It confused Burns; he could not

5
I •

tell which were the sleepers and which were

the wounded and dying. He saw men who, having tumbled down the bank, lay still with their

bodies half in water. He went to them, thinking

they had been hit, then discovered they were

sleepers who had rolled down the bank and had

not awakened when they slipped into the frigid

marsh. Others lay there in their jump suits,

wet through and through, yet sleeping the tor -

pid sleep of utter exhaustion. Officers gave

over any attempt to rouse these men. Item

Company had become a cipher in the column.

After several days of continuous operations, without sleep, and under exceedingly adverse conditions:

They were dull-eyed, bodily worn and too

tired to think connectedly. Even a 30-minute

flop on the turf with the stars for a blanket

would have doubled the power of this body and

quickened the minds of its leaders to ideas on

which they had blanked out. But no one thought

to take that precaution. The United States Army

is indifferent toward common-sense rules by

which the energy of men may be conserved in

combat. These men had too little time to find

their positions and check their weapons. Said

Captain Patch of his people on the far right,

"They were so beat that they could not understand words even if an order was clearly expressed. I was too tired to talk straight. Nothing I heard made a firm impression on me. I

spoke jerkily in phrases/because I could not remember the thoughts which had preceded what

I said. "

The U. S. Army and its leadership at all levels cannot

allow this situation to be repeated in the future.

Why Performance Continuous combat depresses certain critical

Degrades human abilities. When these abilities are reduced,

performance of combat tasks is degraded. These tasks

are no longer performed as quickly or as well as required. After 48 hours, a total loss of sleep becomes

very damaging. Even during the first night of combat,

visibility is reduced and the normal wake/sleep cycles

are upset. Combat is also accompanied by stress,

threat to life, noise, and time pressure.

6
~t

Though essential for endurance, sheer determination alone cannot offset the combined, mounting

effects of these adverse factors. For example, as

well as perfecting their technique, boxers prepare to

cope with exhaustion and the effects of punishment

from their opponents to become champions in the ring.

Soldiers face far tougher challenges in a far larger ring.

What Degrades This Manual considers those adverse conditions

Performance that are most operant in continuous combat. Continuous combat forces the soldier to perform in the face of

these adverse conditions:

• Low Light Level. The amount of light avail-

*able for seeing landmarks, targets and maps

is greatly reduced at night. Twilight, too,

presents difficulties.

Factors Limiting Visibility. Smoke, fog, rain,

snow, ice, and glare make seeing difficult.

• Wake/Sleep Cycles. Ivery'person is used to

being awake or asleep during certain hours of

the day. Performance during normal sleeping

hours suffers from the disruption of the normal

schedule.

• Stress. Mental stress that results from having

to make decisions of serious consequence in too

little time, with too little information, in great

confusion, and exposed to danger.

Fatigue. Fighting without rest and sleep produces fatigue. Tired muscles can be made to

go on working. The brain, however, cannot

function adequately with too little sleep.

How Degradation As operations continue, every soldier will begin

Shows Itself to exhibit signs of decreasing effectiveness. Table 1. 1

summarizes the effects of the adverse conditions on significant aspects of soldiers' fighting performance. Because of such deficiencies, performance of combat tasks

degrades progressively. Determination to endure must

be supplemented by countering the adverse effects so as

to slow the rate of performance decline. Most likely,

7
.

Table 1. 1

Effects of Prolonged Continuous Operations on Soldiers' Performance

Decreased Vigilance. The soldier is less Slowed Responding. The soldier Is slow to

and less alert. For example, he fails to respond to events. For example, there is

detect the appearance of targets. a delay in translating a simple order into

action.

Reduced Attention. The soldier is slow

to notice changes of conditions or In the Increasing Omissions. The soldier begins overall environment. For example, he is to skip tasks. For example, he fails to

slow to notice hand signals or moving perform weapons checks.

"bushes."

Encoding/Decoding Difficulties. The soldier

Slowed Perception. The soldier is 'slow finds It difficult to transform data or to

in making sense out of things seen or process information. For example, map/. heard, and especially of patterns. For chart coordinates are encoded/decoded

example, he is slow to interpret the sig- slowly, and mistakes are made.

nificance of changes in enemy fire patterns. Fuzzy Reasoning. The soldier's thinking

or reasoning becomes slow and confused.

Inability to Concentrate. The soldier For example ,even simple tactical situations

cannot keep his mind on momentary cannot be assessed.

activity. For example, he cannot follow

complex directions or perform numeri- Communication Difficulties. Increasingly, cal calculations. He Is confused. the soldier has difficulty in deciding what

needs to be said, how to say it, or what

Faulty Memory. The soldier's short- was'said by someone else. For example,

term memory (for recent events) is the soldier cannot formulate a coherent

faulty. For example, recent target message and omits important information in

data elements cannot be recalled or Issuing spot, status, or damage reports.

are recalled incorrectly. Mood Changes. Significant changes in mood

Slowed Comprehension. The soldier normally accompany performance degradata es longer and longer to understand tion. These way include increased irritaoral, written, or coded information. bility, but will be mainly in the direction of

Fur example, he may take a long time depression and apathy.

to find a location on a map.

8
degradation will show itself inhighly erratic or unreli- f able task performance. Progressively, for any given

individual, team, or unit, it becomes uncertain whether

or not an assigned task will be accomplished.

Leaders need to recognize the appearance of

these signs in the behavior of their subordinates and in f themselves.

Degradation: How Projections have been made on the basis of cornFar and How Fast puter simulation of the rate at which various kinds of

combat performance will degrade. These projections

are supported by military research studies of the problem. 'The projections assume:

I V All adverse conditions present at all times

SNo preparation of troops in countering the

adverse effects

T No appreciable sleep

The projections shown in Figures 1. 1 and 1.2 are

ii based on selected, important tasks normally performed

by persons in the duty positions shown. Some duty positions are omitted, because their tasks are not judged as

vital to mission success and/or performance of these

tasks is not projected to degrade very much.

What the The first lesson that can be learned from Figure

Projections Show 1. 1 is that the performance in all duty positions does not

degrade in the same way. Performance on a duty position, where there is a heavier load of "mental" tasks (determining, calculating, thinking, decision making) degrades more rapidly than the duty performance in positions whose tasks are mainly physical (firing, running,

lifting, digging;. 1Infantry Squad Leaders, for example,

who mustrequest fire, integrate range cards, establish

positions, and coordinate squad tactics will show the effects of degradation more severely than their squads

(various "Maneuver Team Members"). On the other

hand, Tank Loaders, so long as they are mainly occupied with physical loading/unloading main gun rounds,

and operating the breech mechanism, will continue to

function better than the rest of the tank crew.

9
, t00 I

To-, 7-6

Mi. _ I-__ 

Z 0 ___

IZt to- ...,:,.MCHANIZE

0. 1LIN4'AN~h

4812

AFTER MISSION HOURS

10-Tank Loader Gnl

90 Tank ___________

01)~,k CI

_ _ _ _0

LL 0

24. 4074C t

A0E ISO OR

* 30

tot

100

g~t-v'- ;.,hv.-w: t'- '-yivwrrwvrg -r.~ -~r ~~SA ".rr y s rsrr~ a' s- u sra0t1i- . .~~P5
Differences in the rates and degrees of degradation for different FIST and artillery duty positions can be

seen in Figure 1.2. Again, the FIST Chief and Forward

Observers perform mentally demanding tasks. Their

ability to continue performing these tasks will degrade

severely over time. For example, adjusting multiple

missions will become exceedingly difficult, and firing

calculations are likely to be faulty as well as slow. By

ozontrast, the 155 mm Gun Crew Member. though very

tired, will manage to continue fuzirng projectiles, preparing propellant charges, andpreparing ammunition

for firing with some effectiveness.

*/

j Section 4. The Challenge to Leaders

Degradation of There can be no doubt that the adverse conditions

Combat Capability associated with a continuous mode of ground combat operations, or generated by it, will degrade the fighting performanceof individual soldiers, teams, and units. The

adverse factors are not respecters of military rank and

role. If commanders and staffs at all levels perform

continuously and withoutrest, they are likeLyto become

more degraded than their troops.

There is still another way of looking at degradation, i. e., from a command/ control point of view. This

point of view is shown in Figure 1. 3. The projected progressive decline in performance of Mechanized Infantry tsquads and platoons is shown. The types of combat activity shown in this graph were established through a

mathematical technique for examining the critical abilities

I requirad for combat tasks. Of course, types of combat

activity dihfer slightly for different types of units. Parallel graphs for other types of units can be found in Appendix

A.

As indicated in Figure 1. 3, the types of activity

most'dependent on reasoning, i. e., thinking, problem

solving, or decision making suffer most. Some examples

of combat tasks representative of each category are:

, Orientation to Friendly and Enemy Forces--

maintain knowledge of squad's location, maintain concealed disengagement, fire at areas.

11

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____________________________FP__

Core _u __C Cot

0d o T-l z _ _ _ _ _

so 24 72 0

'0 _ __ _ _ 1__ e _ _ _

U)__ _

IAJ

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I0S eAILER[

24 40?0. 10

W 12

a.-
SCoordination and !nformation Processing-~

*coordinate firing with other vehicles and

I dismounted elements, report vehicle readi -

I ness, communicate with company, etc.

* ~ Combat Activity- -fire from bounding vehicle, I check condition of weapons, observe terrain

for enemy pressure.

* '~ Force ]Preservation and Regrouping- -cover

disengaging squads, mark routes bety'een

locations, conduct reconnaissance.

VCommand and Control Activity -- direct relocation or repositioning, direct mounted

defense, assign fire zones and tarkets.

CA

zosW 0 _ _ _ _ _

A? ~ Eie 7, ZZ2 m6O p 7-o

W IV

U- ~ ~ K 404 2 6.2

313

__ _______________________________
4

Maintaining The effectiveness of an army in combat dependsu

Command Resources ultimately on the performance of every one of its mem -

bers. An army consists of soldiers and of leaders of

these soldiers. When leaders begin to fail, the organi-

,2 zation disintegrates because effective control and direction are disappearing. No fighting organization can en-

,"4 dure when its primary objectives are no longer being

coordinated. Therefore, it stands to reason that a priority for fighting units is to protect most what they can

least afford to lose: their leadership.

.e,

* When son,e leader is lost in combat, others will

take over the leadership functions and attempt to carry

them out effectively. Combat activities degrade rough!y

in proportion to their dependence on leadership guidance.

Certainly "Command & Control" constitutes the essence

of leadership, yet this is the type of activity projected

to degrade most rapidly. When all soldiers in a unit have

been in continuous operations for the same length of time,', 4they are likely to be degraded roughly to the same degree.

Relieving one leader, and replacing him with another does

not provide a solution to the problem. The true problem

is how to maintain leaders in a good enough condition so

that they can exercise their leadersnip functions effectively., While leadership must be protected most, the

effectiveness of others must also be protected. Just as

a body is useless without a brain, the brain cannot execut

its intentions without a body.

Developing a Leaders especially, but also every. soldier, team,

Continuous Operations or unit must develop a capability for effective sustained

Capability performance in continuous operations. As pointed out before, while it is an important ingredient, a determination

to endure does not assure effectiveness. Acquiring the

reqaired capability goes beyond a high level of proficienc:

in technical specialties and combat skills. It means

learning to identify and to cope with the adverse conditions of continuous operations, and overcoming their effects. It means learning how to slow down the rate of

performance degradation so as to maintain performance

effc:ctiveness.

Strategies and tactics exist for countering degradation, for developing the requisite capabilities in

soldiers, and for preparing units to fight antinuously.

Succeeding paiuts of this Manual describe these strategies

and tactics.

14
CHAPTER II

STRATEGIES FOR SOLDIER RESOURCES CONSERVATION

Section 1. General

Remedies All expectations about future warfare point to

a challenge during the initial period. Continuous ground

combat operations will have to be sustained for an extended period. The conditions inherent in such corr-bat

progressively degrade soldier performance. Adverse

conditions depress soldier abilities that are critical to

effective performance. Accordingly, performance effectiveness declines. This decline adds to the erosion

of soldier resources from casualties and illness. Accordingly, the soldier resources available for attaining

each mission that might be assigned to any unit are reduced. Remedies exist for countering the effects of adverse conditions on performance, and for slowing the t rate of performance decline. These remedies cannot

be used haphazardly or selectively; their effectiveness

depends on a sound strategy for their application. The

strategies are long term remedies which must be introduced and developed in advance of the combat situation.

When coupled with tactics (Chapter III) they will mini-

| mize performance degradation during sustained operations.

Anticipating A iang The basic principle of creating a maximum of Demand reserves against extreme demands is common to all

* combat resource management strategy. Soldier resources are analogous to other important combat resources such as weapons, ammunition, fuel, and food

supplies. Along with all resources, soldier resource

demands must be anticipated. In continuous operations,

demands will increase.

Creating Reserves Inthe case of material resources, for example,

ammunition, the stockpiling of types and quantities that

match the anticipated target types is a recognized strategyfor meeting anticipated demands. Within-this strategy, there are considerations such as the type(s) of

ammunition that will be required, ease of resupplying

the fighting/using units, and security frorc, enemy detection. Soldier resources, however, are not material

resources and the means for "stockpiling" them are

very different. The considerations appropriate to their

creation and "storage" are also entirely different.

15

...... "_-----_
.1.

14 Building Up Remedies for illness are not confined solely to

Soldier Rescurces specific prescriptions against specific symptoms. Preventive strategies are often more effective for keeping

groups healthy and active. They include considerations

such as improvement or, at least, maintenance of good

physical condition, balanced nutrition, and building up

bodily resistance to disease through inoculations. Meet

the challenge of continuous operations, too, through anticipatory strategic measures. Embed these measures

witnin a carefully designed program to manage a unit's

soldier resources so as to achieve a maximum of reserves. Indeed, many specific tactics for countering

performance degradation presuppose a prior program

of preparation. Without preparation, tactics are not

available as options to be 2xercised in actual combat.

Section 2., Leadership

... . d..i .. s h k y tne;

Leadership Preparing for continuous or arations offers special

opportunities for exercising leader~qhip skills. Successful preparation for sustained oi:,erations will be highly dependent on this intangible. The leader must plan for the

well-being of the system, of the units within the system,

and of the individuals within the units. The Army, in

continuous operations, will be like a perpetual motion

machine. To keep the machine in mction, the leader has

the responsibility for eliciting the willing and bes4 efforts of his subordinates. The willing efforts are ensured !by early planning, effective two wa , communication

about planning, establishment of mutual coafidence, and full

professionalism within and a'.ross levels. The result

* . will 1e conditions in which each is willing to give his

best when called on.

Plan the objectives to be achieved in operations

and how to achieve them; communicate the objectives;

keep the objectives reasonable; assign roles and responsibilities; and, assure that the resources are available

to achieve these goals.

16

* ,.
lX":

High Standards Achieving mission success, given the exceedSingly difficul6 conditions of continuous operations, demands the highest standards of military professionalism. Such standards must be attaincd in training and

maintained in combat. These standards must apply to

leadership, to the personal conduct of every soldier,

and to the proficiency of performance in all tasks.

Each soldier must realize that the challenges

of continuous ground combat operations will tolerate

nothing short of top-standards. Their achievement

will be of benefit to the soldier himself, the unit, and

to the unit's mission in combat.

-4

, Confidence It is easier to withstand the adverse conditions

. of continuous operations when there is an optimistic,

.. .. ... ... ..

I confident feeling. Confidence is the deep seated belier

S of every soldier t~iat his unit can and will accomplish the

:! combat mission, no matter how unfavorable the odds may be. Military experience indicates that confident, cohesive units are able to withstand adverse conditions far

better than units without cohesion. Confidence is the

stronc-estbulwark against stress arnd performance de-

", i gradation."

onen Confidence cannot be Ordered. It must be develboe through aFpropriate experience that leads each so1'- det tObecome optimistic about himself, his equiprment," si unit ad he unit's leaers. These experiences

must be perceived as strong expectatwos which lead to successful achievement. These experiences come to

the soldier in the well-led unit in the course of training

and combat preparation.

17

- -7
I

How to Build While confidence cannot be .ompelled, its de- Confidence velopment can be fostered through planning and leadership action:

1. Set realistic goals for progressive development of individual,. team, and unit compe- tence I

2. Systematically test the achievement of these

goals I

3. Praise improvement and coach units toward

achieving higher competence I

4. Single out individuals and teams for recognition of competence

5. opportunity Support each soldier'snce a eery ouni n a eer

6. Present realistic and detailed expectations

about future combat conditions in continuous I

7. Point out that the enemy faces the same ad- [

verse conditions

8. Develop each soldier's confidence i: ev[

• self

• equipment[

•ou unit

• training • ,leadership

Communications Good communications--full and free flowof information--is one of the most important features of

competent leadership. u

18
In preparing for continuous operations, full

communication is essential. Everyone must be aware

of:.

T why each mission is necessary

what objectives are to be attained,

* how they will be attained

• when they must be reached

The practice of good communications goes beyond

the mere setting of goals.

• Keep everyone informed on how

well, or how nearly, the goals

are being reached

' Pass information about what

must be done (and how) to improve the unit's efforts

Over time, develop channels so that information

flows smoothly and reliably. Provide practice so that

these channels will function properly even when all of

the unit's personnel are in a seriously degraded condition. (Communication is a two way process).

In combat, knowledge of the situation and the

status of, both, enemy and friendly units sustains the

fighting soldier. Pass all security-free aspects of information as often and as quickly as possible. This

constitutes a vitally important part of building and

maintaining confidence. This procedure must be followed throughout the preparation period so that it will

carry over into the actual continuous combat situation.

Serve as a Model As noted, leadership consists in large part of

the kind of behavior that leaders display to their subordinates. Such a display serves two extremely important

purposes. It demonstrates:

• Genuine principles and standards

V How to behave

19
Soldiers inbattle, and in preparation for battle,

are required to conduct themselves in accordance wi.h

certain standards. In continuous operations, adherence

to these standards is a must. By your behavior, you

set the example for adhering to principles and maintaining standards. Anything less will demonstrate that

standards are false, and that they can be met by paying

them lip service.

Technical knowledge and proper tactical procedures can be explained in words. The explanation covers

the precise "how to" including the "do's" and don'ts." '

Self-control, coping with stress, overcoming fear, doing j

what is necessary though unpleasant, cannot be explained

adequate 'y through words. Such aspects of behavior require a model from which soldiers can learn how to be- i

have in various situations or in extreme circumstances.

Behavior modeled on good leaders will carry over to

actual combat in continuous operations.

I

Section 3. Training

I

Tra1~ng s he or stqtgy.....

~f pr p ti g .c~ ... t..o.......b

Core of Effective training expands and fixes performance

Preparation capability. When such a performance capability'has been

thoroughly established, it becomes highly resistant to the

impacts of adverse conditions in .continuous operations.

Training also creates or improves derivative capabilities

such as the capability for coping with stress, thinking

when exhausted, and maintaining self-control. Therefore, carefully designed training plans, repetitive and

comprehensive assessment of progress toward established objectives, and adjustments in training exercises

to meet measured requirements are the core of preparatory strategy.

As training progresses the gradual achievement

by the unit of extraordinary performance capabilities is

demonstrated to everyone. The training experience furnishes convincing evidence that the "impossible" can be

done. This experience supports each soldier's fighting

spirit. It shows him that he can and will win.

20
j Realism of For all but the simplest kinds of tasks, after.

Practice basic mastery has been achieved, simulate conditions

. which are like those under which soldiers wiUl actually I have to perform. Adequate performance under "easy,"

"convenient" conditions is no guarantee of adequate perJ formance tinder tough, adverse conditions.

V Train under all kinds of conditions:

l • easy/favorable

. intermediate

j • difficult/extremely unfavorable

• Practice important combat tasks under all

| sorts of circumstances, for example:

! •* orienting with map and. compass in

daylight/darkness . • orienting :n terrain that is familiar/

Unfamiliar .

* assigning fire zones and targets

i when rested/tired

• Meet ARTEP standards:

•* in dayligh~t and at night

*in good and in extremely inclement weather

* in spring/ summer and in fall/winter

* with well functioning and old, balking

equipment

When physically and mentally exhausted, each of the

steps and decisions in even smple kinds of mental tasks

are no longer "automatic" but will require a difficult,

conscious mental effort. Repeated experience with this

difficult mental effort makes it easier to carry it ut,

and it improves objective, decision making performance.

One feasible tactic for approximating exhaustion during

continuous operations is to begin tactical training exer- cises only after participants have been deprived of all

sleep for some 48 hours.

21

orietingwithmap nd. ompas i
" ' ' I

Realistic Further, practicing a task by itself is no guaranPertormance Patterns tee that it can be performed in context. Provide practice,

for example, in transitioning smoothly from one task to

the next, or in shifting back and forth between two activities (e. g., firing the CAL 50 MG while simultaneously controlling a tank formation On the move). Also, doing

a task alone does not guarantee coordinated performance

as part of a team (e. g., individual firing on an individual

target versus coordinated team firing on a group of approaching targets). In short, the pattern of practice, too,

must match the pattern or setting in which the task will

have to be performed.

pI

Crosstraining Crosstraining will benefit from being integrated

with overtraining (see below). Teaching how to perform

a task to another soldier benefits the trainer as much as

the trainee. Also, requiring the trainee to "teach back"

the task to the trainer is one very effective technique in

soldier-to-soldier instruction. Both techniques provide

motivational benefits as well.

In the "ideal" unit, every incumbent of every

duty position of the unit would be competent to perform

each and every task. This would help to assure, no

matter what the emergency, that there is someone available to perform some critical task or to help in its performance. Extensive crosstraining in a unit not only

provides flexibility, it also enables soldiers to exercise

initiative in the best and most constructive way. The

ideal is scarcely attainable, but it provides a goal.

How much crosstraining is possible depends on

practical considerations such as: available time, competing requirements, and individual learning abilities.

The problem in crosstraining is one of priorities,

emphasis, and logistics: who should be crosstrained for

which tasks, in what order, and how thoroughly? Tasks'

22
relative vulnerabilities to degrac ation constitute one

of the principal considerations. Performance of some

tasks degrades far more than that of others under the

impact of adverse factors. For example, two important combat tasks performed by a Mechanized Infantry

Gunner/Carrier Team Leader are:

V Establish revised target reference

points (TRPs) plus range cards

SFire CAL 50 MG at areas (Recon

by Fire)

The first of these tasks is projected to degrade to a

level of 25%-30% of initial effectiveness in continuous I operations (or to'be 70%-75% vulnerable). The second

task will barely degrade at all.

Crosstraining, 6f course, is routinely practiced

in all units. Though vulnerabilities of tasks should be

a principal determiner of priority for crosstraining, it

should not be the only one. Also consider the importance

of each task, or how critical it ma 1 be to achieving success for major types of combat missions.

I Overtraining Overtraining refers to training over and beyond

L basic mastery of a task whether under "easy" or under

"tough" conditions. Extended training beyond initial

I task mastery (overtraining), produces task performance

- that is:

• reliable

- •~ automatic

• rapid

- Reliable performance means that task performance will

be accomplished effectively and in a timely manner on

each occasion that it needs to be performed. Automatic

performance means that task performance requires no

23

.. ........................
conscious effort so that the soldier can do it correctly

even when half asleep. Rapid performance means that

the reaction to the need for task performance and the

performance are swift and without hesitation.

Any task, whether performed by an individual

soldier, or by a group (team, unit), may be basically f'mastered." This means, for example, that on at

least one occasion performance to ARTEP standards

has been demonstrated. However, ARTEP standards

represent only the minimum acceptable level of combat

performance and improvement beyond these standards

is desir-able.. Provide practice after this level of

performance has been achieved, so that forgetting (lack

of practice) will not cause performance to fall short of

the required winning standard.

Without' this kind of persistent training, performance in combat is likely to be inadequate. Also, performing to ARTEP standards in routine tactical training

is no guarantee that these standards of performance can

be maintained under the conditions of continuous operations. Overtraining requires practice over and over

again.

Economy and Efficiency Training economy or efficient training means

in Training Operations that the required ability level is achieved in the least

possible time for the least cost.

Training under conditions comparable to those

of continuous operations is not possible on a day-by-day

basis. When such exercises are conducted, and when

participating troops have reached a stage of exhaustion,

training must make the most of the available time. Spend

the time with economy, and extract the maximum of

training benefit from the opportunity. Efficient training

requires careful advance planning. Identify critical

tasks, and especially vulnerable ones, in advance. Determine likely opportunities for their practice during

the course of the exercise. Then design scenarios to

permit repetitive practice. For example, make plans

for repeating specific maneuvers or operations.

When training matches the expected conditions

of continuous operations, soldiers quickly learn to cope

with these adverse conditions. Therefore, use these

24
and similar techniques to simulate continuous operations

In FTXs and in other combat exercises:

" Demanding physical activity before

starting FTX

• No sleep (up to 48 hours) before FTX

• Around-the-clock FTXs

• Confusion and communications difficulties

SLogistics problems I Simulated equipment malfunctions

After Action Increase the efficiency and effectiveness of trainCritique ing by providing corrective guidance to every exercise

participant.

Though highly motivated to perform well, members of baseball or football teams require coaching.

They may know that something is wrong but they may not

know exactly what to do to improve their performance--

individually or as a team. Soldiers, teams, and units,

too, need guidance to reach peak performance effectiveness.

I Diagnostic findings have no practical value unless

they are converted to corrective guidance. Feed correcf tive guidance back to the deficient soldiers, teams, and

_ units. Monitor their response to this guidance. Make

the guidance clear and specific. Tell exactly how to

a-hieve better performance. Guidance of the try-harder"

variety is quite useless.

a

Some Examples

DO DON'T

Point out differences in... Tell soldier(s) to look

(e. g., weapon signatures) harder, or to take a betto be observed ter look

Demonstrate to soldier(s) Tell soldier(s) he (they)

the best position for oper- used the wrong position

ating the weapon

25
DO DON'T

Explain exact details of a Ask for a better report,

report to be provided or for more information

Specify clearly the way(s) Tell the team to "get your

in which the team is to act act together"

together

I

Section 41. Developing Coping Skills

• " '.~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~......,..,. ...... L... I...

Coping Techniques All members of any fighting unit, from its

lowest ranking soldier through its commander, must

learn to cope with the impacts of the adverse factors I

(especially sleep loss). Coping is a combat skill that

may well be-come even more important than the other

combat skills in continuous operations. Coping means

the ability to compensate for the increasing effects of

adverse .actors (sleep loss, wake/sleep cycle change,

stress).

Cat napping at every opportunity and even for

the briefest periods is the technique of greatest promise

for holding down the effects of lost sleep. Effective

cat napping requires that the soldier fall asleep as

quickly as possible, and that he can become awake and

be alert just as quickly when he is again needed. Falling asleep quickly and becoming awake quickly are

skills that will improve with practice. Because of their

nature, these skills cannot be learned from a .-ianual,

nor. can a "coach" be of much help. In effect, encourage each soldier to learn to coach himself. The relaxation techniques mentioned below require a great deal

of practice before each soldier can use them effectively.

The effects of mental stresstension, fear, frustration, and anxiety prevent the fatigued, sleepy soldier

from falling asleep quickly. Coping with stress means

26

4 n
i~ ""

i achieving some self-control over the stress process.

One or several techniques that can help the soldie r

gain some control over stress should be incorporated

into the, training.

V Relaxation Techniques. Relaxation techniques

are methods for calming the mind and the body.

The techniques provide a systematic method for

obtaining full relaxation and, as a result, lower

stress levels.

V Self-Suggestion. The self-suggestion technique

combines self-suggestion and exercise to reach

deep mental and physical relaxation. The technique produces feelings of. heaviness and warmth

that slow down the heart rate and make the heartbeat regular. There are four aspects to selfsuggestion. They deal with the repetition of different kinds of phrases: relaxation, warmth, imagery, and activation.

.1 • Meditation. Meditation employs aspects of the

relaxation and self-suggestion techniques. There

are several meditation techniques. In some, med -

itation is combined with breathing and physical

exercises. Meditation turns attention inward so

as to calm emotions and relax the body. All forms

of meditation require deep concentration and produce relaxation.

Inoculation. In stress inoculation, stressful situations are brought into mind and ways of handling them are reviewed. Mental practice in coping with the stressful situation carries over to

the time when the stress becomes real. The soldier will know how to tackle his problem. He will

be better able to master it.

These techniques are not difficult and can be mastered easily. However, they must be practiced until they

become automatic. The techniques must become so automatic that they do not need to be thought about when the

user wants to relax. When a soldier has reached that

point, he will be able to stop "butterflies" in his stomach.

slow down his heart rate, and lower his blood pressure.

Such abilities are extremely important in continuous operations.

27

I'z

, . ./
Section 5. Physical Fitness

Resiliency Develop physical fitness in all soldiers of the

(Bounce Back) unit so as to strengthen their ability for "bouncing

back" from exhaustion.

Develop aerobic fitness through such exercise

programs as:

V walking/jogging/running

• bicycling

V swimming

T skipping rope

• bench stepplng

• stair running

Develop muscular strength through such exer -

cise programs as:

• weight lifting

• calisthenics (pushups, situps,

chinups, etc.)

• isokinetics

~~ KEFP//16- FIT G/ 7/Fs TWE

-OLDIE A&L /T'7" 7 8o, c-, 

Ia BA' IPOAI EXW/ATIV

28

/ (- 
Isokin, ics is a physical exercise techniqu' in

which the movement of muscle groups is resisted over

their entire range. For example, another person opposes his muscles to those being exercised, or weights

put.drag on the movements being attempted.

Physical fitness Is the ability of the body to

stand up under prolonged extraordinary demands without harm. The fit soldier can call upon his mind and

body 0' perform strenuous activity for extended periI ods and bounce back to normal effectiveness after a

relatively short interval of rest. Whether moving

. heavy weapons, packing bulky loads on his back, or

digging in, the fit soldier can draw on his reserves of

strength or wind to bounce back with only the briefest f of rest. These reserves are maintained on a daily and

weekly bas'.0 through physical training and being in

shape (joggin g, calisthenics, swimming, weight lifting).

Stamina Develop aerobic fitness in all soldiers to in-

(Endurance) crease their work capacity and ability to withstand the

stresses of continuous operations.

For these purposes. fitness is primarily a

well-developed oxygen delivery system--strong heart

and lungs that efficiently deliver oxygen to the working

muscles. Aerobic fitness refers to the efficient conversion of food to muscle-energy by using this oxygen.

The connection between aerobic fitness and fighting

ability is a direct one. The soldier requires energy

to fight--energy created by burning fats and carbohydrates. This process takes oxygen. The tougher the

action, the more energy--and oxygen--are needed.

Muscles burn carbohydrate (sugar) or fat for

energy. The brain and the nervous system depend on

'- blood sugar for energy. Unfit individuals tend to use

more sugar for a given task than do the fit. As the

soldier trains for fitness, he becomes better able to

-, fuel working muscles with fat, thus conserving limited

sugar supplies for the brain. With more blood sugar

available, the soldier is less likely to tire. There are

more and better reserves for the muscles as well as

for the brain.

29

S /7 I|
Feelings of depression and moodiness usually

accompany extreme tiredness. These will affect the

aerobically fit soldier far less than the unfit one.

Aerobically fit soldiers stay fit mentally and stay

sharp as well.

Strength As combat operations continue and adverse

(Muscle) circumstances combine to present unusual situations, there will be some situations which require

brute strength. For example, disabled vehicles may

have to be off-loaded, or pulled out of mud or water.

Efforts of this type require upper body strength in

addition to aerobic fitness. While jogging, for instance, develops aerobic fitness, it does not build

strong arm muscles. Soldiers must develop upper

body strength in addition to aerobic fitness.

=..-.......,.....-.........,.--,-.-. - . ; . ,.. U . ... .. . ..; . .:. . .. . .. .. . . ' . k : k 

... . L

Pacing Energy Even the fittest soldier may begin to use enExpenditure ergy faster than his body can furnish it. Each sol-

- dier must be trained to pace himself so that he works

at maximum rate, but without indtu-ing degradation.

Proper pacing means learningto respond to

signals from the body so that a sustainable rate of

energy expenditure is maintained. The signals tell

the soldier: 'l can/cannot keep going at th rate."

Train each soldier to ircognize them through actual

experience and to use them to pace himself.

I,

- - 4 ' . a_.. . ..... ..... ....
1. eracticeP:tpper liits: and bevond].:

, Practice Pacing' Continuing to work at one's upper limit over

extended p.riods requires considerable mental determination. In learning to pace himself, the soldier

learns the signals that tell him where his upper limit

is. He also learns another meaning of these sgnals:

' that he can keep on going at this rate for Fz-jr time.

In fact, he learns cpproximately how long he can keep

going at various rates'of energy expenditure. Rather

than a single limit, there are several closely related

limits depending on the length of time for which effort

must be sustained.

I Push the Limits To extend these limits (either the rate of energy

expenditure, or the duration of this e7,penditure) the

soldier must set higher and higher goals, and he must

practice to achieve them. The last limit that was

reached must always become an achievement to be exceeded on the next try. Determination can extend

one's upper limits very considerably.

Sometimes, a situation requires an effort that

goes beyon wnat is thought to be humanly possible.

However, the body often is able to summon the necessary energy by drawing on "emergerzy reserver.."

Training soldiers to expand their limits also meani

that they learn that seemingly impossible efforts can

t" be made successfully with a brief, extra effort.

LSection 6. Dedication to Winning

Skills and Practice develops skills of all sorts. For exAttitudes ample, it develops combat skills. Practice also develops skills of a more subtle kind such as the ability to

pace oneself for sustained, top physical performance.

Any and all of these skills can be learned through effective training which creates those conditions that

are most favorable to learning.

31

'

| | |.1
Attitudes are also acq-ired cver time, but they

are not learned in quite the sar e way as skills. Attitudes have nothing to do witl '"',w to. " They are ways

of looking at events, and preJ s. ,sitions (willingness

or unwillingness) to act in ce .tFi.i ways. For example, I

one important attitude in cozabat is never to let one's

buddies, uriit, and country dc vu. Attitudes develop

over time in consequence of :xperiences. Desirable

attitudes develop when desirable experiences are encountered by the soldier.

Baseball, basketball, and football teams often

perfect all their athletic "game skills, " yet lose because they have not developed a winning attitude. Good

coaches know that honing skills is not enough to win

tough contests. The best coaches also inspire their

teams to win. They show in everything they say and

do--without a single exception--their own genuine dedication to winning. Like sports, combat is a kind of

contest in which winning depends on skill and on dedication. Especially in continuous operations, a gentuine

and single-minded dedication will give the soldier the

extra "push" needed to win.

'"D ..... n,~ i.d..d. als teM, dt U 6h

Competition A foundation !or a winning attitude in combat

can be laid during the initial planning stages. This

foundation is based on a spirit of friendly competition.

It requires that all performance be assessed (scored)

and thatrecords of performance be kept. Show respect, and give praise to the top performers. Pointedly

compare the sub-par performance with top performance,

but also furnish the necessary coaching and guidance

that makes improvement possible. Even more than

competition among soldiers, teams, and units, encourage self-competition. Suggest targets for improvement, i.e., "Can you top this?" Also, encourage

all subordinates to follow in this same sort of pattern.

32 fI
Recognize and reward consistent achievers in

anyway possible. At the same time, by work and example, show that dedication to achievement is considered even more important than achievement itself. For

example, consistent progress toward improved performance, even when achieved performance levels are short

of minimal standards, is a sign of genuine dedication

that deserves recognition and rewards.

Fairness and Equity Some soldiers may be entitled to a larger share

of any scarce resource for reasons directly related to

their combat mission. For example, soldiers performing exceptionally heavy physical labor should be entitled

to extra rations. By the same token, those who must

make decisions of serious consequence need extra rest

and sleep so as to be able to make the best possible decisions. Equity means a fair distribution adjusted for

real need.

Assure a balanced distribution of task burdens.

A balanced allocation of tasks (duties, responsibilities)

to positions is an important factor in conservation of

unit effectiveness. While the critical time for assuring

balanced task burdens is in actual continuous combat,

smooth adjustments require practice of this policy during

the preparation period.

Tasks differ in many ways. For example, they

differ in their relative importance to mission success.

Mission success is endangered if all important tasks

are concentrated in a single duty position. The soldier

filling the duty position might become a casualty and be

no longer available. Success is also endangered if that

soldier's performance capabilities deteriorate to a low

level. A low level of effectiveness equates with low dependability of performance. This means there is only

a small likelihood that each important task will be carried out adequately.

33

__ ~ 1W~ ~
Balance the The principle of assigning a balanced load of

Burdens tasks (duties, responsibilities) to participants in combat missions is an important one. While possibilities

for task allocations may be restricted by equipment,

special skills, and the like, efforts toward balanced

assignments should be made. In effect, the balanced

distribution of task loads is a part of mission planning.

In principle, it precedes the assignment of specific individuals to sets of tasks (jobs); in practice, these considerations may go on simultaneously.

Balancing the allocation of burdens, whether they

are task burdens or other adverse effects of continuous

combat operations, serves two important purposes.

First, it does not overburden any one soldier so that he

cannot sustain adequate performance. Second, it demonstrates -- again and again--the spirit of equity and fair -

ness. Therefore, it provides the incentive for every

soldier to accomplish his fair share of the common mission requirements.

Cohesion, Esprit, Especially "in the small unit, every soldier comes

and Morale to know and appreciate his peers and his leaders. He

recognizes how he. depends on afl. others in the unit, and

howv all others depend on him. With this recognition

comes a feeling of intimacy and a •strong sense of responsibility. Cohesion and esprit will develop as preparation

~for continuous operations progresses successfully, good

leadership is demonstrated, confidence in the unit's

competence grows, and morale is developed. Unit cohesion is a key source of strength for enduring the

stresses of continuous operations (morale).

34

.. .... .. .
ad I

Commitment Commitment means that the soldier believes in

the reaons for doing his job and for being on the battlefield. He becomes personally convinced that these

reasons are good and valid. A soldier's personal reasons mayor may not correspond with reasons or ideals

of national policy. Nor, may the soldier' be able to state

his own and personal reasons clearly. Possibly his

strongest commitment is to his'own unit and to his fellow

soldiers in it. It is the efficient functioning of these

small units that usually wins in battle, and thereby insures attainment of the broad national goals.

Commitment cannot be compelled. Like confidence, trust in leadership, and cohesion, commitment

grows as a consequence of good soldier resource management. A strong commitment sustains the soldier in

combat.

Section 7. Resource Management

.ng M the........o.m.n.

Effective Use No matter what the quantity and quality of availof Resources able resources, using them to best advantage requires

advance planning. For example, each type of weapon

an" ammunition is most effective against certain types

of targets. Soldiers, too, are most effective in some

roles, and this effectiveness may further depend on

existing conditions. Potential roles within continuous

operations conditions need to be foreseen. Special requirements that are apt to arise in continuous operations

must be identified, and contingency plans established in

advance. Effective exploitation of any resource serves

as a force multiplier. Soldier resources are no exception to this rule.

35

•
Establish goals for each unit and individual. [

Task units and Individuals in terms of these priorities

and goals. Evaluate in terms of these tasks. Check

on Intermediate achievement and follow General Bruce

Clarke's advice that "A unit does well the things the

boss checks."

When you establish priorities, insure that they

are realistic and attainable. Of course, the resources

must be made available for achieving these requirements. Everything cannot be the number 1 priority

and after you have established priorities, be prepared

to accept the consequences for them. Expect subordinates to solve implementing problems as they arise,

but do not expect them to become scapegoats when failures occur.

Evaluation and goal setting depend on the best

professional judgment. How well were the goals achieved

in view of circumstances within the, unit, which reasonably affect the expectation of improved performance and

progress over time? Moreover, priorities will change

over time. When this occurs, the associated goals will

need to be modified.

Management marks off the progression towards goals in terms of meaningful tasks and evaluates pro- !

gress toward these goals.

[

your.~~ ............. ~~ ~~or~t~I

Know Your Men , To achieve the goals of sustaining performance

during continuous operations, it is necessary to know

your men.

Just as conditions and the requirements they impose vary, soldiers vary in their talent (qualifications) to

satisfy these requirements. For example, the ability

to orient--to identify one's location and to find one's way

over strange terrain--is known to differ among soldiers.

Some have a "good sense of direction,"and some have a "poor sense of direction."

36
Talent also means the soldiers who have the

sharpest eyes and ears in the unit (for spotting enemy

infiltration), soldiers who have some familiarity with

a Slavic language, or those who estimate range best.

Good resource management identifies such special talent early and earmarks these special resources against

the appropriate contingencies.

Systematically search for and identify special

talent. For some types of special abilities, such as

knowledge of Russian, Polish, or Ukrainian, the search

procedures are simple and self evident. For others,

such as the ability to detect infiltration attempts, plan

the training and tactical exercises so as to permit the

identification. For example, through coordination with

OPFORCE elements, repeated infiltration attempts can

be scheduled. Soldiers who consistently are among the

first to spot these attempts are thereby Identified as

those with the "sharpest eyes and ears."

Managing Reduced Figures 1. 1 through 1. 3 demonstrate the degrees

Performance Capability of progressive performance degradation that must be expected. To some extent, these effects can be offset by

twr complementary techniques:

• system modifications

V performance supports

For both purposes, examine the process in question.

Analyze it in detail so as to make every step explicit

together with the factors on which success depends.

Then, review f.Jr possible simplification, streamlining, or even just making one or more steps easier to

accomplish.

37

... .. l .M:

..... ... .. . .
!I

System System redesign or modification possibilities Modification fall into three categories:

• physical

• informational

• procedural

An example of physical system modification is

the pattern of storing various types of ammunition at I

a gun position. Even minor adjustments in location,

stacking, type of separation, etc., can decrease the

demand on the soldier resources for fuzing and loading

designated rounds. An informational modification might

be an Increase/decrease, or a rearr.igement of information arrayed in a single display (chart, CRT, status

board). Such changes reduce the mental demands when

someone using the display selects and processes relevant information. A procedural modification may involve moving some step (or sequence of steps) upstream

or downstream. Select tasks which must be performed

when the stress is high and schedule them so that they

are carried out when the stress is low.

~MA.'sz 00 e use erfra upots.: .... 

Performance A performance support helps the soldier to acSupports complish his task. A tired soldier may need a lever

to shift heavy equipment. The lever is a performance

support.

Many kinds of performance support already

exist and are in common use. Binoculars support distance vision. Telephones or radiotelephones support

distance communication. Many types of night vision

devices (NVDs)and ground surveillance radars (GSRs)

aid human vision in the dark. Laser target designators

(LTDs) and rangefinders support soldiers' judgments

in accurate range estimation. Computers, or merely

hand held calculators, support numerical operations

and human thinking (most degraded/vulnerable in continuous operations!).

38
*- A

• .; .Performance Support

" /:'. 'help the soIClier "

i-- ...

OC~ompli h;tas. " "V

-)U -

.CA

'i " y ~ -- - -,

High technology is not necessarily required for

performance support. Many types of performance supports are of a rudimentary nature: note pads, charts,

plexiglass overlays, and grease pencils. Other types

of support require only a moderate level of technology:

(micro-) cassette recorders, and optical filters for enhancing contrast or shifting colors.

Emphasize the use and' development of such supports for performance so as to enable each soldier to

accomplish tasks successfully when his initial performance capability is degraded.

39
s::n .::r Ce Ur s: i ..... I

Support Long before the acute need arises, prepare to Critical Abilities support critical abilities. ' When the need does arise,

the means for supports must be familiar., practiced,

and comfortable. Some of these supports are schemes

or procedures rather than physical objects. Support

of abilities underlying actual performance further helps I to sustain that performance.

' I

Support Lo~ng before the t eedarses, prpret

Critical bilities upport crtaaltie ~s. W e the b4nedosai,

Stimulate Better and easier ways to accomplish important 

Creative Ideas tasks in continuous operations are a leadership problem, I

brt it is everyoners job to find them. For instance, numbers and their mental manipulation becomrere and

more difficult with cumulative sleep loss. For many 

purposes, tables can be precalculated, or curves drawn,

or nomographs developed to aid the soldier. Similarly, 3ii

the ability to differentiate friendly and enemy equipment suffers with loss of sleep and other stress. Comparative drawings (or silhouettes) of friendly/enemy equipment, but with the differences-to-look-for emphasized, t

candhelp to make more reliable determinations. Other

examples of this type can be imagined. [

Enlist the aid of every member of your unit in

following up of the hints provided. As pointed out be -

fore, those who actively perform various types of activities are in the best position to recognize ways of

aiding performance and supporting the abilities involved.

Encourage, recognize, reward, and disseminate suggestions on how to facilitate performance and, especially,

performance while the soldier is in a degraded condition. [

40

7
CHAPTER III

I TACTICS FOR SOLDIER RESOURCES CONSERVATION

I

Section 1. Tactics for Sustaining Performance

Conserving The strategy of conserving the assets a unit

Combat Capability brings to active combat and of depleting the assets at

the slowest achievable rate is not specific to soldier

resources. Combat cannot be conducted without a

minimum of assets in certain essential resources.

The expendable resources include ammunition, fuel,

critical spare parts, and food; they also include the

J fighting soldiers' capabilties for continued performance of their combat functions. Battles may be won

or lost depending on successful budgeting of critical

resources. Soldiers' performance capability--its

endurance--is one of the critical resources whose

expenditure in combat must be carefully managed.

To make conservation work, effective tactics

in the application of various countermeasures to de- lgradation must be used. Virtually all of the tactical

options depend on advance preparation, planning, and

extensive practice. Failure to prepare conscientiously will deprive soldiers and their leaders of the vital

remedies that retaz-d exhaustion and sustain effective

fighting performance in continuous operations.

I_ Section 2. Resource Management Tactics

Key Men, Not Man In combat, requirements for critically important performance occur often; when these requirements

occur, assign the best available talent (previously idenA tified).

h atever the requirements of the combat situation (detection, orientation, muscle), assign a soldier

or unit of proven talent to that role. However, remember that such special talents are not confined to single

soldiers or units. Do not make the mistake of relying

'41

S .I
* on a single key man or unit. By being overburdened,

he may succomb to exhaustion. Rather, rely on the

several soldiers or units who represent the best avail-~

able talent for the given task.

W1' 

.7j

*a*''* Y ME

42
.. . . ..

Assign the Of course, fresh, or more rested soldiers

Least Degraded normally will show the least performance degradation.

However, even in a single unit, soldiers who have been

in combat for the same length of time and under the

same overall conditions will show differences. Even

on the same battlefield, conditions for all soldiers are

not absolutely identical, and some soldiers are able

bounce.back more than others. .to 

STask Rotation In many tasks, performance declines with prolonged execution of the task. This decline is additional

I to the degradation from fatigueand other adverse fac-

- tors. Tracking enemy targets with the MG or in an

optical sight are examples of such tasks. Both, time

i off-target and number of times off-target increase the

longer these tasks are performed.

shared In equally. exhausting Prolonged combat, task the performance burdens need is to abe

burden. It contributes to the degradation from overall fatigue and other adverse factors. It concentrates

-n the load on a single individual or unit. It may push

them 'lover the line" into total exhaustion. Frequent rotation provides relief and, at the same time, main-

- tains more effective performahce.

43

L. .. ... ... .. ..

y i M :. .............
.A....... n truous: o rton S:fnga, or ir

Task Sharing Soldiers derive mutual support from each other.

An important terhnique for counteracting the cumulative

effects of the degrading factors on military performance

during continuous operations is to share responsibilities

(tasks). Sharing does not mean reorganizing the lines

of responsibility, as specified by the TOE. Rather,

sharing means a rearrangement, either partial or full,

of certain task responsibilities. For some kinds of task

sharing, appreciable improvements in effectiveness

have been projected.

When degradation in the unit is substantial, assign two or more soldiers to any important task. If the

task is a physical one (e. g.. loading/ unloading supplies),

the task dei and on each of two soldiers is less than that

on a single soldier. If the task is a tedious, repetitive

one, the irteraction with another person serves to maintain alertness, interest, and reliability of performance.

If the task is of a vigilance type (e. g., sentry duty), the

presence of another soldier helps to ward off fatigue.

Also, though attention may lapse, it is less likely to

lapse at the same time in' two or more people.

:!i .: W ..... .. .... . ..... : .. ' ! .. .... . .: ! i :.... ' '&t. (tn b :::: :

Cross-Checking Leaders are subject to the same adverse factors

that affect all soldiers. Often self-control may overcome

hunger, physical fatigue, or even shake off an overpowering desire to sleep, but it can only go so far to slow the

degradation of "mental" performance. Leaders must

expect to become degraded and recognize the need to

compensate for their own progressive inadequacies. After 36 hours in continuous combat operations, crosscheck every significant determination, calculation, or

decision. While command or leadership responsibilities

cannot be delegated, the thinking involved can be checked

with others.

44

xJ
preparation period for continuu oeain.Drng

that earlier period, the "what if" question should be

asked for each ciritical combat task. "he answers £

"what if " should be irorked out in advance and practiced

thoroughly.

Increasingly Use The nature of performance supports was de -g Performa~nce Suppor..s scribed in Chapter HI. As degradation progresses,

* rely more and more on performance supports.

Section 3. Stress Management Tactics

'R~ecognizing .To select the least degraded soldier for some

Serious Degradation: important combat task, the signs of degradation must

In Others be observed. These signs will not be constantly observable. Rather they will show themselves intermittently.

The more of these signs a soldier shows, the more

frequently, and the mnore strongly they show themselves,.

the more degraded the soldier is likely to be.

Look for the signs A*n Table 1. 1 and these outward

signs of progressive degradation:

'Some Physical Signs

V~ Vacant stare--eyes seem to be fixced and

unfocusedI

SSkin pallor--skin is pale

SPostural i nstability- -sways while standing

up

46
F .Some Behavioral Signs

V Slowness of response--slow to respond to

signals, directions, events

T Lapses in attention--for moments the soldier

is "not there,' or seems asleep

Inability to grasp directions--has difficulty

in comprehending orders, may have to repeat

them to himself several times

• Difficulty with numbers--cannot keep numerical groups straight, cannot do simple arithmetic

V Difficulties in expression--has difficulty for-.

mulating verbal statements and messages

i Unclear speech--speech may be slurred

Decision problems--has difficulty in reaching

even the simplest kinds of decisions

[ Message garbling--incoherently relays messages, relay contains gaps and'may be partly repetitive

Recognizing Leadership task performance requires thinking,

Serious Degradation: judging, calculating, determining, recognizing or disIn Yourself

criminating (telling apart), and decision making. It

is these abilities which degrade most rapidly in continuous operations. Even the strongest wiUl to resist cannot change this. Leaders must face up to the likelihood of their early degradation and to the difficulties of recognizingtheir own degradation.

is Table 1.1 presents examples of how degradtion

actually shows itself. Leaders must be constantly alert

for these signs in themselves. However, self-observation can be unreliable. Either normal tendencies are

interpreted to be significant signs, or serious degradation is judged as not yet serious. The judgment of others

may be more reliable than your own.

47
*" .

Require staff or subordinates to observe you

for signs of degradation. Require them to report their

observations to you in objective terms. Ask them to

state the exact incident and the observation(s) that led

them to judge that your performance shows signs of

degradation. Review what has been reported, and judge

whether or not it is valid. If valid, act on the indica-,

tion (see below).

I

.... r~'rS~ie ... .. peforan.......tio

Recognizing Stress Stress is not unique to continuous operations.

Sometimes stress is higher before combat, or wheni

active combat begins, than after some experienceI

with combat. However, fatigue, sleep loss, and disturbed wakef/sleep cycles lower resistance to stress.|

Therefore, the signs of stress in yourself and inI

3.1.rs must be recognized. They are shown in Table

Coping With Stress All soldiers under your control must be aware i

and Degradation of and exercise the stress coping skills at their disposal , ..

at every reasonable opportunity.

Coping ,techniques such as relaxation techniques5

self-suggestion, meditation, and inoculation must have

been practiced and mastered in order to be effective in

continuous combat operations. If soldiers have learned L

to implement the relaxation techniques, or other techniques of this type, they will be able to apply them to|

good effect. Even in periods as short as 2-3 minutes, [

beneficial effects can be obtained. Constant applica- , tion of these techniques will sustain performance.

Section Rest and .. Sleep

Recognizig Stress toesi cot iute toplcontins oeios

Priorities for Previously developed, unit-specific sleep/rest Sleep/Rest plans must be implemented. -

48
*l .

Table 3.1

The Signs of Stress

In Yourself In Others

Aggression Alcohol

Anxiety Denial

Apathy Drugs Depression Emotional Outbursts

Diarrhea Excitability

Dry Mouth Impulsive Behavior

Fatigue Inadequate Eating or Drinking Forgetfulness One Track Thinking "Freezing" Restlessness

Frustration Risk Taking

Guilt Smoking Hot and Cold Spells Speec h Disorder

Inability to Concentrate Trembling

Irritability

Loneliness

Low Self-Esteem

Moodiness

Nausea

Nervousness

Nightmares

Numbness/Tingling

Pounding Heart

Sweating

Tension

Urination

49
I

The most reliable remedy for loss of sleep is

sleep itself. Sleep loss and its consequences become

the dominant problem after the first 48 hours of continuous operations. Therefore, sleep discipline is of

prime importance. The following priorities are advisable: [

1. Leaders, on whose decisions mission success

and unit survival depend, must be given the

highest priority and the largest allocation of j

sleep. Military tradition to the contrary,. lead -

ers must have an "extra" share of sleep.

2. The next highest priority must go to soldiers

whose responsibilities require, them to perform

important calculations, make judgments, or

evaluate information.

3. A high priority must be given, also, to soldiers i

who must perform vigilance tasks such as sentries and radar operators. I

4. Among the remainder, opportunities for sleep

must be allocated as evenly as possible.

I ..................... giz th nee.....r ...

slepad for d~of

Duty vs.Leaders will face the dilemma of deciding beRest/Sleep tween action (e. g., modifying a battle position), and

allowing soldiers to rest/sleep. A modified position

may be easier to defend, but degraded soldiers will be

less able to defend it effectively. There are no rules

for making trade-offs. They depend on professional

judgment. In each specific case, leaders must evalu- [

ate whether additional work or sleep will contribute

most to mission success and unit effectiveness. [

5 0
The evaluation is compounded by the fact that,

as continuous operations lengthen, soldier resources

shrink, and the effort required to complete each task

increases. This applies particularly to leaders and

leadership functions. The longer the continuous operations, the greater the importance of recognizing the

need for sleep.

................... ... ~e f-pe~f .. .......... wo... 

Work/Rest/Sleep In combat, implementation of a unit-specific

work/rest/sleep discipline is essential for sustaining

effectiveness as long as possible. A plan must be

developed for duty rotation and shift-work which will

provide the management framework for imposition of

the discipline in combat. Test and refine your developed plans in order to assure effective implementation

in combat. Design your work/rest/sleep plans and

schedules in accordance with the considerations summarized below.

Work/Rest In continuous operations, demands for continuSchedules ous performance will exist not only for combat troops,

but also for combat support and even combat service

support units. While combat units may have virtually

no control over their work schedules, some degrees

of control may remain for the other types of units.

When such control can be exercised, adhere to the following guidance. Work schedules are here stated in

hours, i. e., "8 on-8 off" means eight hours of work

followed by eight hours of rest. "Rest" means principally sleep, or, at least, an absence of duties.

• For up to five days almost any work-rest

schedule (e. g. . 2 on-2 off, 4 on-4 off, 8

on-8 off) will sustain performance equally

well

51
For up to 30 days follow a 4 on-4 off, or

a 16 on-8 off schedule

• Avoid a 4 on-2 off schedule, if possible

Work/Rest Schedules When initiating demanding work schedules,

and Wake/Sleep Cycles it is also important to achieve adaptation of wake/

sleep cycles as quickly as possible. For example,

after eastbound flights, it is desirable to begin the

work phase immediately. This tends to assure that

the soldier will be sufficiently tired to sleep during

the off-duty phase. Adaptation will be enhanced, if

the individual can synchronize his sleep with the sleep

phase of the new schedule as quickly as possible. If

possible, establish the anticipated destination work/

rest schedule prior to departu~re. When no time shift

is involved, whenever possible, a prolonged work

period should be preceded by some 12 hours of sleep

and complete rest.

Make the Assure that all soldiers know how to make the

Most of Breaks most of their rest opportunities. Emphasize to your

soldiers that they waste no time in getting to sleep and

that they stay asleep.

Undisturbed and prolonged sleep is the most

desirable use of rest opportunities. When extended

sleep is not possible, even the briefest "cat nap" can

be useful. When cat napping is impractical, resort

to relaxation techniques. When there has been mainly

sleep loss, but little physical exertion (e. g. , manning

communications, operating radar), mild physical exercise such as walking around can help to maintain alertness.

52

~~~~~u W.-*~
. U , ILA.

. ., . . .*- 

,,.E .T .NM ixepN 

" " ,7Lo 5rvDrgEDeT./..A/1

EXI•I., l' CA/Nf AELP I41///'IdAL.4, 1, VZC r .

Recovery from Use the following guidelines for 'judging the

Sleep Loss time required for complete recovery from the effects

of extended loss of sleep:

V As much as 120 hours sleep or rest following 96 or more hours of complete

sleep loss

12 hours sleep-rest after 36-48 hours

of complete sleep loss with light to moderate workload (subjective fatigue may

linger for three days)

V 24 hours sleep-rest after 36-48 hours

sleep loss with high workload (12-16

hours per day)

• Two to three days time off after 72

hours or more acute sleep loss

• Three to five days to initiate biological adaptation and return to normal

day/night cycle from night shift work

• Three to four weeks for full aidaptation

of biological rhythms to atypical workrest schedules (as in night shift work).

53

A# - . T- .. , ,, ,A . o : .. -, .. -- ... . ...
Task Interest Interest in the activity determines to a considerand Complexity able degree the extent to which sleep loss will affect

performance.

Monotonous tasks, such as searching for t rgets

on a radar scope over several hours, often show performance decrements greater than 50 percent of initial

levels. Interest can be raised, for example, by requiring frequent and moderately complicated verbal status

reports. Responses to such reports (e. g., requiring

clarification, comments on success of performance)

also add to interest. Increasing the complexity, in the

sense of difficulty (wider sector scan, more screens

to watch), reduces performance effectiveness and must

be avoided.

Section 5. Leadership Tactics

Shift Shift your leadership style progressively as

Leadership Style continuous operations are prolonged and progressive

degradation affects every soldier.

Keep in mind exactly how degradation progressively affects each and eiery soldier. Adjust your

leadership style to the conditions of these men. As

adverse factors continue to impact, and as sleep loss

mounts,' soldiers must cope with the effects of degradation (Table 1. 1).

1. G,"e only simple directions. Soldiers will

have difficulty in understanding complicated

directions. Their ability to pay attention

and to make sense ouit of what is meant is

reduced. If the directions consists of several parts, some are likely to be forgotten.

2. Give complete, clear, and precise orders.

Leave no room for interpretation. The degraded soldier has great difficulty in reasoning. He cannot "fill in" anything that has

not been said explicitly. He cannot interpret

the intent of the order, when that intent is

not clearly and completely stated.

54

at Nt T& ",

M ! :XM- 
I

3. Repeat all orders and directions. Also, have

soldiers repeat the orders given them. Memory for new information will be faulty. Orders

or parts of orders are likely to be forgotten

almost as soon as given. Therefore, soldiers

should write them down. When writing down

the order is impractical, have the recipients

repeat the order several times.

4. Doublecheck others and yourself. Orders given

and acknowledged may not be carried out correctly/ completely. Therefore, it is necessary

to doublecheck constantly on whether or not orders have been executed as intended. Also,

leaders themselves will suffer degradation and

should arrange a doublecheck on their own activities.

5. Reassure the soldier. The soldier whose performance has lost its initial effectiveness needs

reassurance rather than pressure. He needs

firm--sometimes very firm--but patient prodding, but not pressure. He needs to be reassured that he can cope, that he can keep on going, and that he can do what is being asked of

him.

Increase Fatigued soldiers in combat gain reassurance from

and Cohesiveness frequent contacts with their leaders and with their fellow

_ a Csoldiers.

Make contact with as many of your subordinates

as often as possible. When personal contact is impractical, make voice contact over available communication

channels. On these occasions pass whatever encouraging information can be passed. Also, encourage and

praise the soldier as an individual; reassure him.

55
4. ? . ,~ .- \

/icmit t Th t mmtmn cn ep imt

. . " I ." t.. .. " - ' " "

Commitment Alaysolresr theer sodier thatie epeisunt

his-commitment. Tha commitme..nt ' can hel hi t

on him just as he depends on them. Winning depends

on ail soldiers together performing beyond what each

believes possible until the mission has been accomplished.

56

_, ____: - ., .. v. .

2 . ; - .. . . • ,- /

.t1
CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION AND PREPARATION

j Section 1. Developing a Continuous Operations Capability

'Program Integrity In order to explain the strategies and tactics

for reducing the impacts of adverse conditions in continuous operations, they were introduced separately. However, the development of a genuine capability for

sustained, effective perforrmaance depends on maintaining the integrity of the entire program. The program is not a menu from which appealing items can

be chosen, because the strategies and the tactics are

interdependent. For instance, task rotation is possible only when crosstraining has taken place. The

degradation countermeasures are, also, mutually reinforcing. Cohesion, esprit, and commitment develop in a consistent program of training and preparation.

Only an integrated program will develop the sustained

effective performance required in continuous operaIt tions.

Time Frame The tactics discussed in Chapter III flow di- .rectly from and depend on the strategies pre'sented in

Chapter I. A time frame exists for the devebpment

of effective performance in continuous operatiois.

Each of the strategies and tactical measures fit,; into

a particular portion of this time frame. Conscientious and effective preparation are required.

L There is also a larger time frame. In this

time frame, the initial objective is to build the capaI' bility for long-lasting combat effectiveness to the highest level that can be achieved. Months are required

to develop solutions and to prepare units for their use.

During a brief mobilization period, the objective becomes one of honing the developed counterdegradation

tactics to a fine edge. Once the continuous battle is

imminent or actually begins, the objective 'rhanges

again to conserving soldiers' performance capabilities and to expending them as slowly as possible. This

is the time to apply the counterdegra'ation tactics.

57

- *- , i, 
Section 2. Managing the Preparation

Inform Make clear to every soldier in your unit the

purposes of continuous operations training and the objectives to be achieved. Soldiers must be led to understand clearly the nature of the continuous operations

challenge and why the training preparation for it is necessary, i. e., how achievement of the continuous operations capability will benefit them on the battlefield.

A genuine unit capability for sustaining effective

performance cannot be developed without the active cooperation of the individual soldier. To cooperate fully,

he must be aware of all requirements and he must appreciate their importance. He must become committed

to the purposes of preparation, and this depends upon

an understanding of the necessity for it.,

Therefore, explain the expected conditions in

continuous operations, the adverse effects on soldiers'

performance, and how the prospective training will

help to sustain performance. Do not expect immediate

comprehension and acceptance. Repeat the explanations as progressive training permits the soldiers to

relate them to their own experiences.

etermine Critical Strive for the highest sustained capability for

Mission Elements the critical elements of your unit's most important

missions. All missions your unit may be assigned are

not of equal importance and within each mission, all

elements are not of equal importance. Sustained effective performance in highly critical tasks is of greater

importance than performance in tasks, on which mission

success(es) depend(s) to a lesser degree. Prepare for

a peak of sustained effectiveness in the most critical

tasks in the combat missions of your unit.

Systematically list the i )ortant combat missions

your unit is likely to be assigneL. Within each type of

mission, determine the tasks (ard the duty positions

who carry out these tasks) on which mission success

primarily depends. Verifyyour initial judgment by

systematically considering for each task the consequences of failure, or of inadequate performance (e. g.,

insufficient accuracy, failure to detect some proportion

58

..
of targets). Refine your list. Primarily focus preparation for continuous operations on the missions,

tasks, and personnel judged most important on your

final, refined list.

Know Your Men "Inventory" your soldier assets and liabilities

(weak links) relative to the major missions and their

critical tasks.

When you have determined the critical missions

and tasks, take stock of your assets for accomplishing

them. Identify personnel with special talents relevant

to particular, critical mission elements. Also identify

those who constitute liabilities (e. g., easily disoriented,

slow to spot targets) so that critical roles will not be

assigned to them and if possible, so that they can be

trained to overcome these liabilities.

Also, take stock of the current level of performance capability in your unit. Compare the current level

of performance by each soldier or team to that which

will be required for sustained unit effectiveness in continuous operations. Discrepancies will become the

basis for your preparation/training program.

There are several ways in which soldier assets

can be determined efficiently. Existing records (e. g.

personnel files) can be reviewed. This information

canbe refined and supplemented through interviews

with soldiers, their team mates, and with their immediate supervisors. Best of all is direct, objective

observation of critical task performance. Such observations are most useful when records are kept so

that trends of imprcvement can be plotted.

Pin/Prepare Now plan the training 4 nd other preparation required to bring existing perfornance capability into

balance with requirements for critical combat tasks.

In Chapter II, the strategies for reducing these discrepancies were described:

. Leadership

STraining

'_ Physical Conditioning

SDedication and Commitment..

/ Resource Management.

59 I-

/
Fit these strategies to the specific requirement's of

your unit. Remember that these strategies were designed to develop the tactical options described in

Chapter III for sustaining performance in continuous

operations:

• Task Restructuring.

V Task Rotation

' Work/Rest Cycles

Sleep Discipline

• Performance Supports

• Stress Management,

• Leadership Style

Use these tactics as guide marks in planning your unit's

preparation.

Implement Implement the unit preparation and training

the Program program as a series of increasing challenges.

While a sudden, full-scale continuous FTX

would graphically demonstrate the resulting performance degradation and may convince skeptics of. the

necessity for the training, this approach to trainir:g is

not recommended. Soldiers are not yet prepared to

cope with extreme adverse effects and might Lome to

doubt their potential capability for continuous opertj1ons.

Physical conditioning provides the stanuna needed to endure the tough demands of continuous opera-ions.

Physical conditioning can be implemented kimmed iat ely

since it does not require any prior technical skills.

Along with leadership and commitment, physical conditioning builds the foundation for continuous operations training.

Each soldier must learn to resist stress--to

control it and to redu ce it when it threatens to over -

whelm him. In continuous combat operations, or even

in continuous FTXs, stress control techniques can be

used. However, these techniques must be practiced

repeatedly to become automatic for each soldier, and

to produce the desired effect quickly. Provide opportunities for such practice and encourage it.

60

. %
/

.* .•

Evaluate the • Evaluate the preparation plans and the training

Program program throughout their implementation.

A rigid adherence to an initial program design

is likely to be neither effective nor efficient. It is advisable to evaluate the prograrr, as it is introduced,

and to assess its shortcomings as well its effectiveness. Determine the features of the program that work

well, those that can be improved, and those in need

of revision.

Conduct frequent after action critiques not only

for the benefit of teams and soldiers, but also to determine program shortcomings and to solicit recommendations for improvements. Adjust and readjust the program to fit the unit more precisely, and to increase

efficiency.

Use the information from preceding evaluations,

observations, and suggestions to adjust and refine the

program. In particular, adjust unit procedures so that

they work smoothly In difficult training exercises when

the performance of all soldiers in the unit has become

degraded.

Conduct Continuous Provide practice for the unit in increasingly f Operations Exercises realistic continuous operations.

Begin continuous operations training with exercises of moderate duration (24h-48h) and with some, but

not all, adverse conditionspreserit. Concentrate training and practice on the previously identified critical

I_ mission elements. Where possible, repeat selected

segments of continuous exercises so as to afford participants the maximum of practice on their most criticE-l tasks. As each soldier in the unit learns to cope

with the adverse conditions and to stay effective, increase the severity of the conditions.

Ultimately, train as you expect to fight. Train

for the worst conditions the unit may encounter in combat. Progress to this stage as proficiency grows.

Assess Progress Monitor progress of the unit toward its continuous operations capability; also, verify that achieved

capabilities are maintained.

61
Apply ARTEP standards to unit performance

in continuous FTXs. Eventually, assess the unit's

performance in the worst combination of adverse circumstances you can achieve. When effective performance can be sustained over extended pericds, the

objectives of continuous operations preparation!training have been achieved. However, continued mom tor -

ing and continued training will be necessary to maintain the capability at the achieved level. Replacement

personnel will require special attention to bring them

"up to speed."

Revise Continue to revise and refine the unit's program,

and Refine and strive for greater and greater capability.

Programs of preparation, strategies, and tactics to counter degradation of performance in continuous operations can vastly improve performance. However, human psychophysiological limits will prevent

any unit from ever being prepared to cope totally with

the worst sustained combat conditions it might encounter.

Constantly search for ways to improve the capability of

your unit for effective performance to a higher level and

for longer periods. This is a responsibility for all levels of leadership in the unit.

62
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING

EFFECTIVENESS DEGRADATION

The strategies and tactics for countering effectiveness degradation

may be summarized in terms of a set of principles. This chapter presents

these principles in summary forms.

Section 1. Strategic Principles

Show, by example, how every soldier'

in the unit must conduct himself; at all

times demonstrate leadership of the

highest order

Beginning with the preparation and training to develop

a genuine continuous operations capability, every soldier is called on to draw on every resource at his

command. Continuous operations and the training for

it are the most demanding missions any soldier can

be assigned. The requirements go beyond physical

endurance. They test each soldier's will to push himself beyond the utmost limits of his endurance, and to

perform his duties even when he no longer believes it

possible to go on. The strength to continue feeds on

the leadership the soldier has learned to expect and

on his own devotion to the standards that have been

consistently demonstrated to him.

Concentrate soldier resources' preparation

on tasks that are important to combat missions.

All tasks, even combat tasks, are not equally important to successful mission accomplishment. Mission

success depends most on effective performance of

certain tasks. Emphasize these in training and crosstraining.

63

S*. -..- , \-l-
". • ,

Analyze required effort(s) accurately and in

detail; effective planning and efficient soldier

resources management depend on It.

When soldier resources become a ci ,

requirements need to be examined a ., -

fined. What sort of personnel is requLr '

must each duty position perform? With exp+ '-

gradation of effectiveness, will critical combat tasks

be performed adequately? Prepare for continuous

operations.

I

Know your unit, the strengths and weaknesses

of everyone in It, and the true status of current

capabilities.

With an accurate picture of the unit and of its performance capabilities, effective planning and matching of

requirements are possible. Assess capabilities. Assess individuals and teams, and know what they can

do when pushed to their limits as well as when rested. I

Identify the weak (soldier and task) links, and 1

strengthen them.

Creating a highly proficient unit that remains effective I

long into continuous operations calls for constant diagnosis of strengths and weaknesses in its personnel.

Whether the weakest link is a task or a soldier carrying out the task, identify it and implement constructive,

strengthening action. The fewer the number of weak

links and the less the weakness of any one link, the

longer is a unit able to function usefully (with, at least,

some effectiveness).

Identify key personnel for key roles in various

types of missions.

Soldiers differ in all important characteristics: skills,

competence, speed, and various mental abilities. In

anticipation of various requirements in continuous combat operations, the best qualified soldiers need to be

identified. Use personnel files to furnish information L

64
q*

about special skills and unusual competence. Use

tactical training exercises to evaluate Important capabilities (for example, target detection, terrain orientation) and to preselect personnel for potential key roles.

Also identify the soldiers who are least suited for these

f roles.

Do not rely on the performance capability of

only a few key individuals. Such a policy is

dangerous, and impractical. In continuous

operations, it must be possible to rely on everyone to perform as required.

In combat, any soldier may become a casualty. However, even if he does not become a casualty, his per- fformance may degrade below even minimal adequacy.

In either case, fatigue may prevent him from contributing the required skills. Especially in continuous oper- jations, a back-up performance capability is essential.

Therefore, do not rely on a policy of maintaining the

best man for the job at all times.

Use performance records to form a basis for

guiding soldiers and teams to high proficiency.

The expected conditions of continuous combat operations demand the utmost capability and endurance from

every unit, team, and soldier. ARTEP evaluations

set only minimum acceptable performance standards.

Performance files document current levels of competence, permit the setting of goals for improvement,

and verify trends of improvement (or lack of it). ]performance records are also diagnostic tools for pinpointing individual or team deficiencies.

Make the unit's goals clear to every soldier

in the 'unit, and relate his own goals to them.

Guide and relate personal performance goals to unit

performance. Make each soldier understand how his

performance and his goals relate to his unit's goals.

This understanding contributes not only to effectiveness but also to cohesion. Achievements become personally meaningful when they are seen in relation to

common objectives. Loyalty to close associates and

pride in a soldier's unit are strong incentives to

achieve excellence.

65
* . .'

Develop effectiye leadership authority.

Leadership is one of the most important factors for

maintaining effective combat performance. It is especially important under stressful conditions such as

during continuous operations. Formal leadership

authority is established by military rank and assigned

role. Informal leadership authority comes from repeated demonstrations to subordinates that the leader

best knows what to do at all times. Rank does not I

automatically confer informal leadership authority.

Truly effective leadership authority combines formal

and informal leadership. The leader who has established his authority is recognized as best able to

make decisions, and as willing to enforce them.

Encourage soldiers in the unit to examine

their commitment to its goals and to their

fellow soldiers in the unit.

Allegiance to his unit, commitment to its purposes,

and loyalty to his fellow soldiers can exist even when

a soldier is not aware of them. Remind each soldier

in the unit that all others depend on him to do his part

just as he depends on all others to do theirs.

Open channels for upward, downward,

and lateral flow of information.

Once a unit is in active and continuous combat operations, deficiencies can no longer be corrected nor weaknesses shored up. For effective leadership in combat

and for estimating what can be done and for how long,

full and unvarnished information is required. The leader must ktiow the true state of affairs and in precise

detail. Often informal channels provide such information.

66

a MXAW I
Develop a program of physical conditioning

for the unit that is designed to create the

strength and the physical stamina that are

needed in continuous operations.

In continuous combat, many different, extraordinary

physical demands will be made on every soldier. His

body must be fit to meet the demands. Jogging and

certain calisthenics, for example, help to develop

stamina (endurance), but not necessarily the strength

to lift, dig, or push. Any or all of these capabilities

may be needed. Aerobic fitness helps to ward off the

moodiness that comes with physical exhaustion, and

helps soldiers to stay fit mentally. Build up to a

peak of fitness for every conceivable purpose.

Develop and implement a stress

management program.

Stress, as it impacts on the soldier and on his performance, can be counteracted. , The means for

counteraction, for the most part, must be developed.

These developments cannot take place on the spur

of the moment ir battle. They must be prepared

well in advance. Overall stress and counterdegradation discipline requires practice until it becomes

second nature.

Plan and implement a realistic, long term

program of continuous operations training

exercises.

High and reliable combat performance depends on

thorough prior training. Performing any task when

rested and under favorable conditions differs greatly

from performing it when fatigued (especially, with

loss of sleep) and under adverse conditions. Practice

all important tasks in environments and conditions

as close to continuous combat operations as possible.

67

____ ____ ____ ____ ___J1.
Review task performance vulnerabilities as a

key for training, and especially crosstraining

priorities.

Time and'resources are always limited. Within

these constraints, place the highest coreinuous operations training priorities on those tasks which are most

critical and are expected to degrade most. These are

the combat activities for. which it is most important

to slow the rate of decline in effectiveness.

Use FTXs to diagnose factors needing leadership

attention; evaluation is not an end in itself.

Give leaders and evaluators at all levels wide latitude

and encouragement to ensure that the long range goals

of continuous operations training (i. e., performance

in combat) are attended to as well as the specific "indicators"'designed to quantify readiness. Random

selection of personnel, tasks, and vehicles, as well

as the use of a large number of personnel from a

similar unit as evaluators constitute a step in this

direction. Develop adequate evaluation tools.

Use ARTEP based evaluations to diagnose deficiencies for combat operations rather

than as performance criteria in themselves.

Viewing the performance standards published in

ARTEP outlines as the "desirable" level is dangerous.

The consequences of such a policy will become clear

only in actual continuous combat operations--when it

is too late. ARTEP performance standards must be

achieved and maintained, also, under continuous operations conditions. Make evaluations diagnostic for subsequent, further improvement. View ARTEP standards

as suggesting minimum acceptable proficiency, but not

peak or desirable proficiency.

68
Accept.mistakes, but do not permit them to

be repeated.

Establish policies which offer incentives leading toward unit effectiveness rather than toward individual

benefit (no deficiencies admitted). Subordinates should

understand that the ability to learn from mistakes is

valued. However, they must also understand that immediate corrective action is required. Openness about

mistakes and a spirit of constructive criticism support

unit morale.

Emphasize the importance of soldiers teaching

soldiers how to achieve a peak of proficiency.

By virtue of their rank and position, senior NCO's have

many administrative and supervisory responsibilities.

They also possess a responsibility for teaching others.

Prior to combat, experienced personnel are most constructively utilized in training less experienced soldiers

t in the fine points of comoat skills. In general, soldiers

canbe effective instructors of their fellow soldiers.

I

Train .leader positions at all levels.

The management and conservation of soldier resources

represent crucial problems for all levels of leadership.

Accordingly, leaders must be fully knowledgeable about

human performance, its degradation, and how to control

it. Informal development of this knowledge cannot be'

relied on. This training is essential for every level of

leadership. The human factors that must be considered

in mission planning and execution must be thoroughly

understood before such training can be accomplished.

Usa constructive, purposeful, and combat

relevant training activity to build morale.

Morale, motivation, cohesion, and leadership sustain

soldiers in combat and bolster their performance. So

long as the objectives of training are well understood

by every soldier in a unit, the training serves the same

69

-
*0

purposes. Wholehearted participation by the trainees

makes for very effective performance. Participation

toward a common accepted purpose, especially with

progressive achievements, builds morale and strengthens unit cohesion. The cohesion itself then becomes

an incentive to achieve excellent performance. I

Plan training exercises carefully, because

practice does not always make perfect.

Mere repetition of task performance does not guarantee

improvement. Diagnostic guidance on how to improve--

what is wrong and how to correct it--is required. Emphasize in practice: (a) what has not yet been mastered

sufficiently, and (b) what may be fading due to disuse

(forgetting). Make practice progress from the "easiest"

to the most "difficult" circumstances of task and mission

performance. Design training to include as many aspects

of combat performance as possible and include practice

under realistic circumstances.. For example, realistically simulated potential conditions (masks, protective

gear, decontamination, etc. ) must form partof the practice.

Overtrain on all combat tasks, because it will

pay dividends in continuous operations.

Training beyond basic, initial task mastery produces

automatic, rapid, and reliable performance. When a

soldier can perform a task "with his eyes closed" and

"with one arm tied behind him, " he will be able to do

it when conditions force him to perform in just such

ways. When performing each task of his job has become "second nature" to him, the soldier's performance becomes extremely resistant to degradation. His

performance under diffucult conditions (while extremely

fatigued, and in the stress of battle) stays effective for

a longer time than it would with a lesser amount of

practice.

70
* .*

Emphasize extensive crosstraining.

If each soldier were crosstrained with every other

soldier in a unit, rotation and echeloning would present no problem. Crosstraining provides insurance

that someone is available to perform each critical

task at each critical time. Crosstraining is accomplished efficiently through the peer (soldier-to-soldier)

instruction technique. "Teach back" is an effective

technique in crosstraining. It means that after the

trainee has grasped the task, he explains and demonstrates the task to the instructor. Feedback of information about correct and incorrect aspects of performance,

praise, and recognition of individual achievement also

help learning. After substantial crosstraining has taken

place, arrange for routine rotation of roles (switching

of duty responsibilities) during exercises.

Section 2. Tactical Principles

Remember that mental fatigue is the critical

problem in continuous operations.

Mental fatigue is the result of sleep loss, disturbed

waking/sleeping cycles, and combat stress (noise,

cold, fear, uncertaintly, conflict). Unlik, physical

fatigue, mental fatigue progressively exhausts the resources for resisting it. Sleep is the only effective

remedy for its prolonged loss. Sleep is also an absolute necessity for the brain (nervous system). When

a soldier is deprived of sleep, his mental functioning

deteriorates, and all mental processes dependent on

that functioning also deteriorate.

Consider physical fatigue, but only as a

secondary problem in any extended operations.

Physical fatigue is primarily an exhaustion of muscles.

There is almost ao limit to the physical fatigue that can

be endured by physically conditioned soldiers; the body

constantly adjusts, recuperates, and recovers strength.

Even with very little rest, a fair level of physical (motor)

performance can be maintained almost indefinitely.

71

I Ent
,. 9.

Sleep (up to 12 h) before the start of continuous

operatiQns.

If soldiers have just finished sleeping when they begin

continuous operations, the onset of serious sleep loss

effects will be delayed. There may be few, if any, effects over the first 24 hours. Thereafter, performance

will be maintained at a higher level and for a longer time

than when soldiers begin continuous operations after

having been awake for 8-10'hours.

Synchronize, wake/sleep cycles with the combat

zone's local time as early as possible.

* Relocation from CONUS to a battle area (across a number of meridians) causes the normal wake/sleep cycles

to be out of phase with local time. Soldiers will be at

their personal, biological "low" in the early and middle

part Of theday. This will aggravate sleep loss effects

and further diminish effectiveness. Therefore, try to

-adopt wake/ sleep cycles matching the battle zone time

as early as possible so as to achieve biological adaptation as soon as possible.

Look for unreliability or unevenness of performance

as well as declining effectiveness.

Some of the performance variability after sleep loss

is somewhat predictable. Morale, stamina, and the will

to keep going are lowest between 0200 and 0600, though,

at other times, too, sleep loss has a negative effect on

soldiers' moods; soldiers become depressed, irritable,

unreasonable. Other kinds of variability are unpredictable. Differences in the ability to maintain effectiveness after sleep loss are unrelated to intelligence or

personality. The effectiveness of a given soldier in a

given task at any time is the most unpredictable. Generally, fatigued and pressured soldiers will try to maintain performance on their primary task at the expense

of secondary tasks--performance of a secondary task

is omitted or is perfunctory. Fundamentally, "waves

of fatigue impact on each soldier and his performance

varies accordingly. For example; a fatigued soldier

posted to detect enemy infiltrations remains alert only

some of the time. The proportion of alert time shrinks

72

T• , . W P!P

7 Pr... If .... 
with increasing fatigue; the increasing fatigue and the

incidence of the lapses cannot be predicted. Posting

men in pairs raises the probability of detection, be- *cause the lapses of the two soldiers are not likely to

coincide. Mild physical activity (walking around) helps

to, keep men awake and increases alertness. t

Keep leaders as clearheaded as possible, success

i and survival in continuous operations depends on them.

During continuous operations every moment that can

possibly be spared should be used for sleep for anyone

and everyone, and, if possible, for undisturbed sleep.

However, leaders who must do the thinking and decision making, need the largest allotment of sleep. Unit

effectiveness and survival are unlikely without effective

leadership. Possibly the most important part of leader- I ship preparation for continuous operations is to preplan

arrangements that will allow leaders to rest and sleep

in combat.

I Mix (more) rested with Unrested men in continuous operations; echelon partially when

whole unit replacement is not feasible.

Although preferable in principle, unit replacement may

* not be possible in continuous operations. Rested, or

I partially rsted soldiers can substantially improve the

effectiveness of a degraded unit. Crosstraining bears

on this possibility.

Make orders clear; repeat them.

Leaders not only formulate plans, but also guide their

execution. Their orders must be clear, concise, and

Kcomplete. _ Fatigued soldiers are no longer able to

interpret, or even understand, orders intelligently.

After 36 to 48 hours of continuous combat, orders

. need to be very simple, concise, and leave no discretion to recipients. Leadership style must shift in the

direction of patient, but firm, authoritative directions

as fatigue makes soldiers numb, passive, and reluctant

to act. Leaders themselves should be aware that the

73

-N
time needed to comminicate inforioation increases.

Parts of a message may be misscd and tie orrissions

may not be noticed. Therefore, 7: -. eat : J verbal messages, have another soldier listen )n. :nd require repetition of the message from the rec4: :-'nt(s).

Leaders must rest!

Leaders often regard themselves x. least vulnerable

to sleep deprivation and to the other adverse effects

of continuous operations. In Iact, the ta.-ks they perform are the most vulnerable. The fatigue from loss

of sleep most depresses the ability to think clearly,

solve problemu, assess the consequences of a course

of action, and make good decisions., It also depresses

the ability to make sense out of things that are secn

or heard, or % relate separEte items of irformation.

Once fatigued, leaders cannot react quickly to unexpected events or cope with complex situations. Therefore, proble .a and solutions need to be anticipated.

Allow leaders, who must keepa clear head, all 'the

sleep that they can possibly get.

Soldiers should rest!

While leaders must rest, soldiers should rest and cat

napat every opportunity. Remember to give the priority to those who must perform calculations, make judgments, or evaluate information. Give a high priority,

also, to soldiers required to remain vigilant -uch as

sentries and radar operators. Allocate sleep to all

others as evenly as possible.

Make all statements with assurance and authority.

The way in which facts are stated can be as critical as the facts themselves. An authoritative statement made in a tone of voice that carries conviction

leaves noroom for doubt. A display Of self-assured

leadership reassur-s the soldier. It sustains his will

to keep going.

74

- _77 - - '--~ M .bg% 

/~-u, - ~ ~ ' ,--.-
"Accentuate the positive." I-•

Strive for positive, hopeful ways of expressing yourself as a leader. To the maximum extent possible,

use words and phrases with an active, constructive

connotation. Maintain an atmosphere that signals

determination to succeed. Choice of words as well

as tone of voice carry a vitally important message

for the, soldier at the edge of exhaustion.

Pass as much information as possible through the ranks.

I Pass on down through the ranks, to every foot soldier,

all security-free items of information reaching you.

Soldiers take comfort from knowing what is happening.

They are ableto see their role and their contribution

in relation to them. Also, frequent communications

maintain their sense of community with the unit and

with its leadership. Both effects help to sustain a soldier's determination to persist and to succeed.

Exhort and encourage at every opportunity.

Continually spur on every soldier in your unit to make

the extra effort that will lead to mission accomplishment. Reassure soldiers that the mission will be suc-

,1 cessful. Express your belief in their ability to achieve

success. Tell them they are doing well and emphasize

achievements so far. Sustain a winning spirit.

75
(PAGE INTENTIONALL Y LEFT BLANK)

76
APPENDIX A

PERFORMANCE DECREMENT BY COMBAT ACTIVITY CATEGORY

77
(?AGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK)

78
The types of combat activity shown in the graphs which follow were Iestablished through a mathematical technique for examining the critical abilities required for important combat tasks.

Degradation of Types The following graph shows the projected decline in the

of Combat Activity for performance of Armor Units.

Army Units

100

into aIf toi CSO_~in nomtonrcsig

0 Ca t- 5 0 _ _ _ _0ert

7 0 ______pons 0______ Ing_____ 

2~~ __4 ___ _

40 #.*- __'(Ind

0

Z 0

$ 24J

AFEWISO OR

i* Pefrac e Rn ycma ciiyctgr o ro

wetfostudie ofecoemntuousmlitaytperformane.oyfrro*

79
Highly practiced and purely physical activities suffer

least. Some examples of combat tasks representative

of each category are:

-Coordination and Information Processing--

coordinate With ARTY FO, report enemy

sightings, control driver actions when moving

Preparation and Operation of Weapons--

fire main gun, load COAX MvG, operate

breech mechanism

Decision Makingand Planning--select firing positionsfor tanks, supervise defensive preparations, issue spot reports

• Command and Control Activity--prepare

platoon fire plan, control formations on

the move, issue fragmentary orders

• Target Designation and Tracking- -acquire

targets, operate laser range finder, track

targets.

Degradation of Types of The following graph shows the projected decline in the

Combat Activity for FIST performance of Fire Support Teams (FIST).

too

90 Planning a L

> 70,

141

-- ,° /-- z re

-ro

24 48 72 96 320

L -AFTER D- MISSION HOURS

Performance decrement by combat activity category for Fire Support Teamns (FIST)*.

* Projections based on computer simulation, and found to agree

with studies of continuous military performance.

8O

WL
Some examples of combat-tasks representative of each

category are:

V Fire Planning and Allocation--receive orders

and plans from TM CDR, approve FO calls

* for fire, redirect FO calls for fire

Y Target Data Acquisition--operate laser locator/designator, determine range of target,

determine direction of target

, Information Relay and Processing--relay

. calls for fire, receive plans and orders

from FIST chief, operate field telephone

• Orientation to Friendly and Enemy Troops--

select observation posts, orient for direction, determine exact position on the ground

• Fire Control--adjust various types of fire,

engage targets of opportunity, determine

when to request end of mission.

Degradation of Types of. 'The following graph shows the projected decline in perCombat Activity for Artillery formance for 155 mm Artillery units.

I aoc0 -O.2. r ie n n Peaation ; Ii

co

70 W

z

* z

2U 0

24Y ARFTER 

24 48 72 96 120

AFTER MISSION HOURS

Performance decrement by combat activity category for Artillery*.

*Projections based on computer simulation, and found to agree

with studies of continuous military performance.

81
Some 'examples of tasks reprcsentative of each category I

are:

Y Orientation and Preparation--lay the weapon, I

refer the piece, orient a map with a compass

T Safety and Precautionary Measures--ensure

that weapon is properly emplaced, select aiming points for gunner, order when to boresight

• Quality Assurance--ensure sections store,

segregate, and protect ammunition, ensure

that weapon is ready for action, identify fuzes

and fuze wrenches by type

V Communication and Ammunition Logistics--

lay communications wire to FDC, store armmu- I

nition at a cannon position, prepare propellant

charge

Y Command and Fire Control--control fire of the

battery, order azimuths marked, measure and

report site to the crest. I

8

I

I

L

I

L

82