T he Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for th e 1 Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition b y consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 97-3353

___________ Pamela Clark, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, * Social Security Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: February 9, 1998

Filed: April 17, 1998

___________ Before McMILLIAN, WOLLMAN, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge. Pamela Clark appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of 1 her application for supplemental security income benefits. We affirm.-2- I.
Clark is a 33-year-old woman with a ninth grade education. Her past relevant work consisted of a three-month period during which she operated a staple gun at a cushion factory. She has not been employed since 1991. On June 28, 1993 , Clark filed
an appli cation for supplemental security income benefits, claiming that she wa s disabled and unable to work because of a seizure disorder and a nervous condition. The Social Security Administration denied Clark’s applica tion initially and again on reconsideration. Clark then requ ested a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ ). Following the hearing, Clark was evaluated by Dr. Russell Dixon, a psychologist

specializing in clinical neuropsychology. Dr. Dixon administered th e We chsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R), an I.Q. examination. Th e results of this exami nation indicated that Clark had a verbal I.Q. of 71, a performance I.Q. of 66, and a full scale I.Q. of 67. Dr. Dixon concluded that Clark suffered from mildm ental retardation and intermittent explosive disorder. Clark submitted Dr

. Dixon’s psychological evaluation and the accompanying I.Q. scores to the ALJ.
After receiving this additional evidence, the ALJ issued a decision concluding that Clar k was not disabled as defined by the provisions of the Social Security Act

. Pursuant to the five-step regul atory framework set forth at 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)-(f), the ALJ found that Clark had not engaged in substantia l gainful activity since 1991 and that she suffered from a severe impairment. However, the ALJ further concluded that Clark did not have an impairment or combination of impairments equivalent to a listed impairment and that her condition did not prevent her from performi ng her past relevant work. S ee Bowen v. Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing the five-step analysis). Moreover, after applying the principles enunciated in Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), the ALJ concluded that Clark’s allegations regarding the severity of her seizure condition were not credible.-3-

The appe als council denied Clark’s request for review, and the ALJ’s decision thereby became the final decision of the Commissioner. Clark appealed the decision to the dis trict court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The district court granted th e Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment.
II.
Our role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings ar e supported by sub stantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Spradling v. Chater , 126 F .3d 1072, 1073-74 (8th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is relevant evidenc e whic h a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner’ s conclusion. See Woolf v. Shalala , 3 F.3d 1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). In determining whether the existing e vidence is substantial, “we must consider evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] decision as well as evidenc e that supports it.” Id. We may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision merely because of the existence of substantial evidence that would have supported a contrary outcome. See Smith v. Shalala , 98 7 F.2d 1371, 1374 (8th Cir. 1993). Clark argues that the Commissioner’s f indings in the third step of the regulatory framework are not supported by substantial evidence. The thi rd step provides that “[i]f you have a n impairment(s) which meets the duration requirement and is listed i n appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we will find you disabled withou t considering your age, education, and work experience.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d)

. Amon g the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 is sectio n 12.05C , which deals with mental retardation. Section 12.05C provides that th e required level of severity for mental retardation is met when a claimant demonstrates “[a] valid v erbal, performance, or full scale I.Q. of 60 through 70 and a physical o r other mental impairment imposing add itional and significant work-related limitation of function.”-4-

Dr

. Dixon placed Clark’s performance I.Q. at 66 and her full scale I.Q. at 67

. Either of these scores, if valid, satisfies the first requirement under sec tion 12.05C. The ALJ, however, rejected thesescores, finding that they were not credible in light of the follo wing factors: (1) the scores were based on a one-time examination by a non

treating psychologist and were not entitled to controllin g weight; (2) no other physician had e ver found Clark retarded or suspected as much; (3) Clark was literate and ha d worked in the private sector; (4) Clark’s appeara nce and demeanor at the hearing were unremarkable; (5) there was no evidence that Clark’s daily activities were restricted; (6) Clar k exhibited no deficit in social functioning; (7) Clark demonstrated n o sig nificant

deficiency of concentration, persistence, or pace; and (8) there was n o evidence of deterioration or decompensation in work settings.

In Cook v. Bowen , 797 F.2d 687 (8th Cir. 1986), we held that the claimant’ s I.Q. scores, which were apparently accepted as valid, when coupled with his othe r impa irment entitled claimant to benefits under section 12.05C. The Commissioner is not required to accept a claimant’s I.Q. scores, however, a nd may reject scores that are inconsistent with the record. See Mackey v. Shalala , 47 F.3 d 951, 953 (8th Cir. 1995). Indeed, test results of this sort should be examined “to assure consistency with daily activities and behavior. ” Popp v. Heckler , 779 F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (per
cur iam). It was therefore proper for the ALJ to examine the record in assessing th e reliability of Clark’s scores. For p urposes of our review, then, the question is whether the d ecision to disregard Clark’s scores as unreliable is supported by substantia l evidence on the record as a whole. If we find such evidence, we must affirm. Se e Ma ckey , 47 F.3d at 953 (“Nothing in [claimant’s] prior work history or educationa l backgr ound, and nothing in the medical evidence before the ALJ, supports an I.Q. so low as to reflect mild mental retardation”); Popp , 779 F.2d at 1499-1500 (I.Q. scores properly discredited where inconsistent with claimant’s college record an d work history
as an algebra teacher); Muse v. Sullivan , 925 F.2d 785, 789-90 (5th Cir. 1991) (I.Q. results questionable in light of claimant’s work experience, education, and demeanor at the hearing); but cf. Brown v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv. , 948 F.2d 268,-5-

270 (6t h Cir. 1991) (claimant’s modest functional abilities not inconsistent with lo w I.Q. score).

We conclude that there is substantial evidence in the record to support th e Commis sioner’s decision. First, as the district court pointed out, Clark’s low I.Q

. scor es are the product of her first and only meeting with Dr. Dixon. A one-tim e evalua tionby a non-treating psychologist is not entitled to controlling weight. Se e Loving v. Department of Health & Human Serv. , 16 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1994)

. Second, the record rev eals that Clark’s low I.Q. scores are inconsistent with her daily functional abilities and her prior medical record. Clark is not significantly restricted in her daily activities because of anymental impairment. She is able to read and to write and to co unt money. She has a driver’s license and does the majority of the cooking, cleaning, and shopping for her household. She is the primary caretaker for her young daug hter. Furthermore, Clark’s other medical records make no mention of an y suspected intellectual impa irment. See Popp , 779 F.2d at 1500 (“The ALJ is required to examine the results in conjunction with other medical evidence and the claimant’s daily activities and behavior”).
Moreover , the introductory language of section 12.05 states that “[m]enta l retardat ionrefers to a significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning wit h defic its in adaptive behavior initially manifested during the developmental perio d (before age 22).” At the time of her examination by Dr. Dixon, Clark was 29 years old. Nothing in her extensive medical records indicates that she was ever s uspected of being mildl y mentally retarded prior to this date. Although this fact does not necessaril y mean that Clark’s intellectual shortcomings were not manifested before age 22, we find itsign ificant in gauging the reliability of Clark’s current scores. See Williams v

. Sulliva n , 970 F.2d 1178, 1185 (3d Cir. 1992) (evidence insufficient to establish a mental impairment existing prior to age twenty-two where earlier physician’s reports
were silen t with respect to claimant’s intellectual capacity); but cf. Luckey v

. Department of Health & Human Serv. , 890 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1989) (absent-6-

evidence of a change in claimant’s intellectual functioning, it is assumed claimant’s I.Q. remained relatively constant). We therefore conclude that the Commis sioner’s decision t o disregard Clark’s I.Q. results was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and that summary judgment was properly granted by the district court. The judgment is affirmed. A true copy.
Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.