NO. 12-19-00168-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

LUIS HUMBERTO ESCOBEDO, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 87TH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Luis Humberto Escobedo appeals his sentence following the revocation of his community 

supervision. In one issue, Appellant argues that his sentence is disproportionate to the crime for 

which he was convicted. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with manufacture or delivery of a controlled 

substance in an amount more than one gram but less than four grams, a second degree felony.1

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded “guilty” to possession of a controlled substance, 

a third degree felony,2 and the trial court placed Appellant on deferred adjudication community 

supervision for eight years.

In March 2019, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision 

alleging that Appellant violated certain terms and conditions thereof. Those allegations included 

an assertion that Appellant committed a new crime. Appellant pleaded “true” to all but one of the 

allegations in the State’s motion. Appellant pleaded “not true” to the allegation that he committed 

a new criminal offense. Following a hearing, the trial court found the allegations to be “true,” 

 1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112(a), (c) (West 2017).

2 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(a), (c) (West 2017).
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revoked Appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced him to imprisonment for eight years. 

This appeal followed.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the eight-year sentence imposed by the trial court 

is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 

“To preserve for appellate review a complaint that a sentence is grossly disproportionate, 

constituting cruel and unusual punishment, a defendant must present to the trial court a timely 

request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling desired.” Kim v. State, 283 

S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see also Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 

113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (waiver of complaint of cruel and unusual punishment under the 

Texas Constitution because defendant presented his argument for first time on appeal); Curry v. 

State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (defendant waived complaint that statute 

violated his rights under the United States Constitution when raised for first time on appeal); Mays 

v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Preservation of error is a systemic 

requirement that a first-level appellate court should ordinarily review on its own motion[;] ... it [is] 

incumbent upon the [c]ourt itself to take up error preservation as a threshold issue.”); TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1. A review of the record shows that Appellant lodged no objection to the constitutionality 

of his sentence at the trial court level, and has, therefore, failed to preserve error for appellate 

review. See Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475; see also Rhoades, 934 S.W.2d at 120; Curry, 910 S.W.2d 

at 497; Mays, 285 S.W.3d at 889; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

However, despite Appellant’s failure to preserve error, we conclude his sentence does not 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 

States provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 

and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This provision was made 

applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meadoux v. 

State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 

666–667, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 1420–21, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962)).

The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See Davis 

v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d);see also Simmons v. State, 

944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that 
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punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or 

unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495 

S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664. Appellant was convicted of 

possession of a controlled substance in an amount of one gram or more but less than four grams, 

the punishment range for which is no less than two years but no more than ten years. See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (a), (c) (West 2017); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.34 

(West 2019). Thus, the sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the range set forth by the 

legislature. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se. See

Harris, 656 S.W.2d at 486; Jordan, 495 S.W.2d at 952; Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664.

Nevertheless, Appellant urges the court to perform the three-part test originally set forth in

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). Under this test, the 

proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the offense and the 

harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, and 

(3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Id., 463 U.S. 

at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has been modified by Texas courts 

and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Harmelin v. 

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) to require a threshold 

determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime before addressing the 

remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. 

denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also Jackson v. State, 989 

S.W.2d 842, 845–46 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.).

We are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estelle in making the threshold determination 

of whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate to his crime. 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 

1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court considered the proportionality 

claim of an appellant who received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas 

habitual offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. See id., 445 

U.S. at 266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. In that case, the appellant received a life sentence because he had 

two prior felony convictions—one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods 

or services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 265–

66, 100 S. Ct. at 1134–35. After recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as 

felonies and, further, considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court determined 
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that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Id., 

445 U.S. at 284–85, 100 S. Ct. at 1144–45.

In this case, the offense committed by Appellant—possession of a controlled substance—

is no less serious than the combination of offenses committed by the appellant in Rummel, while 

Appellant’s eight-year sentence is far less severe than the life sentence upheld by the Supreme 

Court in Rummel. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if the sentence in Rummel is not 

constitutionally disproportionate, neither is the sentence assessed against Appellant in this case.

In his brief, Appellant makes a conclusory statement that his eight-year sentence is grossly

disproportionate, stating that other sentences for “more serious possession of a controlled 

substance” convictions resulted in “significantly” less harsh sentences. However, he cites to no 

authority to support this contention. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“[t]he brief must contain a clear 

and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to the authorities...”). 

Because we do not conclude that Appellant’s sentence is disproportionate to his crime, we need 

not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JAMES T. WORTHEN

Chief Justice

Opinion delivered December 31, 2019.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

DECEMBER 31, 2019

NO. 12-19-00168-CR

LUIS HUMBERTO ESCOBEDO,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 87th District Court 

of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 87CR-15-32410)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below 

for observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.