2021 UT App 111

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SIREESHA NAKKINA,

Appellee,

v.

PRODEEP KUMAR MAHANTHI,

Appellant.

Amended Opinion1

No. 20190750-CA

Filed October 21, 2021

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Barry G. Lawrence

No. 164903563

Eric K. Johnson, Attorney for Appellant

Kelli J. Larson, Attorney for Appellee

JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which JUDGES

MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DIANA HAGEN

concurred.

POHLMAN, Judge:

¶1 Prodeep Kumar Mahanthi and Sireesha Nakkina divorced 

in August 2019. Mahanthi appeals the trial court’s decree of 

divorce, challenging the court’s division of parent-time and its 

award of certain personal property and attorney fees to Nakkina. 

 

1. This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion in Case No. 

20190750-CA, issued on June 17, 2021. After our original opinion 

issued, Mahanthi filed a petition for rehearing, and we called for 

a response. We grant the petition for the limited purpose of 

adding footnote 7, but otherwise deny the petition.
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 2 2021 UT App 111

He also appeals the court’s denial of his motion to amend its

findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

¶2 We conclude that the court acted within its discretion in 

denying the motion to amend. But we conclude that the court 

exceeded its discretion in not dividing parent-time equally 

between Mahanthi and Nakkina. We also conclude that the court 

erred in its personal property determination and that its attorney 

fees award was not supported by sufficient findings.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate the 

attorney-fees award and award of certain personal property, and 

remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND2

¶3 Nakkina and Mahanthi married in India in December

2005. Shortly thereafter, the couple moved to the United States

for Mahanthi’s employment. The couple lived in Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for a few months before relocating to Atlanta, Georgia.

¶4 After becoming pregnant with their first child, Nakkina 

returned to India in 2006, where the child was born. Nakkina

eventually returned to the United States but again travelled to 

India in 2010 while pregnant with the couple’s second child. 

Nakkina took the first child with her, and she remained in India 

for two and a half years with the two children. Mahanthi 

occasionally visited Nakkina and the children during their time 

 

2. “On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the trial court’s findings, and therefore recite 

the facts consistent with that standard,” and “we present 

conflicting evidence to the extent necessary to clarify the issues 

raised on appeal.” Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT App 26, ¶ 2 n.1, 321 P.3d 

200 (cleaned up).
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 3 2021 UT App 111

in India but otherwise remained in the United States for his 

employment.

¶5 Nakkina returned to the United States with the children

in 2012 and joined Mahanthi who had moved back to Utah. The 

couple separated in 2016, and Nakkina filed for divorce shortly 

thereafter. From the time of their separation until the trial court

finalized the divorce decree—nearly three years—Nakkina 

exercised temporary primary physical custody of the children

while Mahanthi exercised his allotted statutory parent-time 

pursuant to Utah Code section 30-3-35.

¶6 At trial, Nakkina testified that Mahanthi’s employment 

prevented him from spending quality time with their children.

She explained that when the children were very young, 

Mahanthi regularly traveled for work and was away from home 

for days at a time. She further alleged that while she was in India 

with the children, Mahanthi’s visits were infrequent and he did 

not spend much time with the family even when he was present.

She also testified that she was the primary caregiver for the

children, performing tasks such as bathing and feeding them. In 

general, Nakkina claimed that Mahanthi was an absent father.

¶7 Mahanthi largely denied Nakkina’s allegations. He 

testified that although he used to travel a lot for his employment 

and would occasionally stay up late working to accommodate 

his employer’s operations overseas, he participated in raising the 

children, performing all the tasks Nakkina claimed she managed 

alone. Mahanthi further testified that he quit his travelling job 

several years prior and that his new job did not interfere with his 

parent-time.

¶8 Regarding the couple’s personal property, Nakkina 

testified about pieces of jewelry she claimed Mahanthi gave her 

as gifts during the marriage. She described a diamond necklace, 

a pair of earrings, and another necklace and set of earrings,
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 4 2021 UT App 111

which, according to Nakkina, have a combined estimated value 

of between $15,000 and $18,000.

3

¶9 Finally, Nakkina testified that she had borrowed about 

$61,000 from friends and family that she used, in part, to pay the

attorney fees she incurred in litigating the divorce. Nakkina 

admitted that there was no formal agreement to repay this 

money. However, she testified that her friends and family still 

expected to be repaid. In calculating her monthly expenses for 

alimony, Nakkina included $1,000 per month for payments 

associated with this debt.

¶10 Following trial, the court issued findings of fact and 

conclusions of law and ordered the parties to prepare a final 

decree for the court’s review. Invoking “rules 52 and 59 of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,” Mahanthi filed a motion to 

amend certain of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. The trial court denied Mahanthi’s motion, stating that it 

viewed the “Motion to Amend as a motion for the Court to 

reconsider its recent Findings, which the Court will not do.” It 

subsequently issued a Final Order and Decree.

¶11 In its Final Order and Decree, the trial court awarded the 

parties joint physical custody with a parent-time schedule close 

to equal time: Nakkina was awarded eight out of every fourteen 

days with the children and Mahanthi was awarded six out of 

every fourteen days (6/14 schedule). The court stated that the “6 

out of 14 schedule provides an equitable balance and adequately 

considers all of the facts and, ultimately, is in the best interest of 

 

3. Nakkina estimated that the jewelry was worth about $18,000 

and could be sold for “maybe” $15,000. Her estimation that the 

jewelry could be sold for $15,000 was struck for lack of 

foundation, but that is the value the court gave the jewelry in its 

final decree. Neither party challenges that valuation.
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 5 2021 UT App 111

the children.” While the court acknowledged that many factors 

supported “equal time, or close to equal time, for both parents,”

it reasoned that two related factors justified the less-than-equal

division of parent-time for Mahanthi: (1) that the “family unit 

relies heavily on [Mahanthi’s] income” and (2) that “the 

demands of [Mahanthi’s] job are, and will likely always be, 

greater than any of the demands of [Nakkina’s] job.”

¶12 Next, the trial court awarded the jewelry exclusively to 

Nakkina and “decline[d] to award [Mahanthi] anything for [it].”

Consistent with Nakkina’s testimony, the court found that 

Mahanthi had gifted the jewelry to her during the marriage and 

that it was worth “about $15,000.” The court further concluded 

that the jewelry “need not be divided” because “gifts given 

during the marriage are not marital property.”

¶13 Lastly, the trial court ordered Mahanthi to pay Nakkina 

her attorney fees in the amount of $40,600, crediting Mahanthi 

for his prior payments. The court rejected Nakkina’s $1,000 

monthly expense “in debt payments to family and friends for the 

alleged loan” for attorney fees because she presented no 

evidence that she was legally obligated to pay her friends and 

family back. Still, it justified awarding attorney fees in a 

subsequent order, stating,

[Nakkina] has a demonstrated monthly need that 

will be addressed, at least in part, by an award of 

child support and alimony. In calculating 

[Nakkina’s] need, the Court did not address her 

attorney’s fees, which were above and beyond her 

monthly expenses—which she is unable to meet. 

Accordingly, [Nakkina] has a demonstrated need 

associated with any and all fees she has incurred in 

this matter.

(Cleaned up.)
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 6 2021 UT App 111

¶14 Mahanthi now appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶15 On appeal, Mahanthi raises four issues. First, he contends 

that the trial court erred in not awarding him equal parent-time. 

We review a trial court’s parent-time determination for abuse of 

discretion. Blocker v. Blocker, 2019 UT App 82, ¶ 8, 444 P.3d 541. 

¶16 Second, Mahanthi contends that the trial court erred in 

awarding Nakkina the jewelry Mahanthi gave her as gifts during 

the marriage. “We will not disturb a property award unless we 

determine that there has been a misunderstanding or 

misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial 

error, the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings, or 

such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 

of discretion.” Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, ¶ 6, 203 P.3d 1020

(cleaned up).

¶17 Third, he contends that the trial court erred in awarding 

attorney fees to Nakkina. “We review a trial court’s attorney fees 

award in divorce proceedings for abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 7.

“An award for attorney fees must be based on sufficient 

findings, and the failure to make such findings requires remand 

for more detailed findings by the trial court.” Leppert v. Leppert, 

2009 UT App 10, ¶ 25, 200 P.3d 223 (cleaned up).

¶18 Fourth, he contends that the trial court improperly 

refused to reconsider its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

“As long as the case has not been appealed and remanded, 

reconsideration of an issue before a final judgment is within the 

sound discretion of the district court.” Ross v. Short, 2018 UT 

App 178, ¶ 10, 436 P.3d 318 (cleaned up). Thus, we will reverse a 

trial court’s denial of a motion to reconsider “only if there is no 
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 7 2021 UT App 111

reasonable basis for the decision.” Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 

2007 UT 37, ¶ 16, 163 P.3d 615 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. Parent-Time

¶19 Mahanthi first contends that the trial court erred by 

awarding him less than equal parent-time. When determining 

what is in the children’s best interest regarding parent-time, the 

decision “turns on numerous factors, each of which may vary in 

importance according to the facts in the particular case.” See

Sanderson v. Tryon, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987). Generally,

parent-time should be awarded “at a level consistent with all 

parties’ interests.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-32(1) (LexisNexis 

2019). “Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real 

harm or substantiated potential harm to the child,” it is in the 

children’s best interest “to have frequent, meaningful, and 

continuing” time with each parent. Id. § 30-3-32(2)(b)(i). In 

addition, each parent is entitled to “frequent, meaningful, and 

continuing access” with the children. Id. § 30-3-32(2)(b)(ii). 

¶20 Even though we afford the trial court broad discretion 

when weighing these factors, a parent-time award “must be 

firmly anchored on findings of fact that (1) are sufficiently 

detailed, (2) include enough facts to disclose the process through 

which the ultimate conclusion is reached, (3) indicate the process 

is logical and properly supported, and (4) are not clearly 

erroneous.” See Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 203 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1987). “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it can be 

shown that they are against the clear weight of evidence or that 

they induce a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 

been made.” Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Utah Ct. 

App. 1989). Additionally, the trial court “cannot act arbitrarily, 

or on supposition or conjecture as to facts upon which to justify 
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 8 2021 UT App 111

its [parent-time] order.” See Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126, 1127 

(Utah 1974).

¶21 Mahanthi argues that the trial court’s order awarding him 

less-than-equal parent-time is not firmly anchored in the

findings of fact because it is based on speculation, conjecture, or 

supposition. He asserts that there is no evidence to support the 

trial court’s finding that he cannot simultaneously maintain his 

employment and exercise equal parent-time. In contrast, 

Nakkina argues that the trial court sufficiently articulated its 

findings, justifying the 6/14 schedule, and that such a decision 

was within the trial court’s discretion. We agree with Mahanthi.

Although we are mindful of the court’s discretion and appreciate 

the careful way it articulated its findings in support of a 6/14 

schedule, the court’s rationale is not supported by the evidence.

¶22 In addressing the statutory factors for determining 

parent-time in section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code, the trial court 

found that the factors “favorably support a joint arrangement 

giving each parent equal, or close to equal, time with the 

[children].” For example, the court found it was “important for 

both parents to have a relationship” with the children and there 

“was certainly nothing to suggest that maximum time with 

either parent would be harmful to . . . either of the children.” 

Also, the court concluded that the children “have good 

relationships with each of their parents” and “there is no 

legitimate argument that the [children] would be endangered by 

broadening [Mahanthi’s] parent time from 5 to 6 or 7 days every 

two weeks.”

¶23 But after highlighting the many reasons that justified an 

award of equal parent-time, the court ultimately rejected a 50/50 

split for two related reasons. First, the court explained, “the 

reality is that this family unit relies heavily on [Mahanthi’s] 

income. It is imperative that he continue with his work.” 

“Second, the demands of [Mahanthi’s] job are, and will likely 
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 9 2021 UT App 111

always be, greater than any of the demands of [Nakkina’s] job, 

whatever that may be.” Thus, the court awarded Mahanthi less 

than equal parent-time to “reduce [his] burden” and provide 

some “flexibility in his schedule to accommodate his work 

demands.” While the court meant well, its findings lack 

evidentiary support. 

¶24 The testimony at trial was that years ago, while the 

children were still very young, Mahanthi’s job required that he 

travel several nights every week and, occasionally, work late to 

accommodate his employer’s operations. But there was no 

evidence that Mahanthi’s work continued to be so demanding. 

Instead, he testified that his schedule did not interfere with his 

parent-time, and the court even expressed its lack of concern 

about Mahanthi’s “availability as a parent going forward.”

Further, although Nakkina opposed a 50/50 split for a variety of 

reasons, she made no complaints about his work schedule, and 

she expressed no concern over Mahanthi’s ability to 

accommodate both his job and his children.

¶25 In sum, the trial court has broad discretion in awarding 

parent-time. But limiting Mahanthi’s parent-time based on 

unsubstantiated concerns about his work demands “does not 

follow from the findings stated.” See Nebeker v. Orton, 2019 UT 

App 23, ¶ 39, 438 P.3d 1053. We therefore reverse the trial court’s 

award of parent-time with instructions to award equal parenttime.

II. Jewelry

¶26 Mahanthi next contends that the trial court erred in 

awarding Nakkina the jewelry Mahanthi gave her during the 

marriage. In distributing property in a divorce proceeding, 

“[t]he presumption is that marital property will be divided 

equally while separate property will not be divided at all.” 

Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 32, 392 P.3d 968. Thus, a 
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 10 2021 UT App 111

trial court “must identify the property in dispute and determine 

whether each item is marital or separate property.” Stonehocker v. 

Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, ¶ 15, 176 P.3d 476. Mahanthi 

contends that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to 

conclude that his gifts to Nakkina are not marital property 

subject to division. We agree.

¶27 Citing Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), the trial 

court concluded that “gifts given during the marriage are not 

marital property and need not be divided in the event of 

divorce.” But Burke involved an inheritance received by one 

spouse during the marriage, not a gift from one spouse to the 

other purchased with marital funds. See id. at 134–35. As a 

general rule, courts “award property acquired by one spouse by 

gift and inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in 

exchange thereof) to that spouse, together with any appreciation 

or enhancement of its value,” unless the property has been 

commingled or the other spouse has acquired an equitable 

interest in the property by contributing to its enhanced value.

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). Gifts and 

inheritance to an individual spouse are treated as separate 

property because they are “not acquired through the joint efforts 

of the parties.” See Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 

1982) (cleaned up); see also Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307 (explaining 

that “property which comes to either party by avenues other 

than as a consequence of their mutual efforts owes nothing to the 

marriage and is not intended to be shared” (cleaned up)).

¶28 But this rule applies only to gifts received during the 

marriage from an outside source. It does not apply when one 

spouse uses marital funds to purchase property, regardless of 

whether those purchases are designated as a “gift” from one 

spouse to another. See Morris v. Morris, 2005 UT App 435U, para. 

3 (holding that the district court acted within its discretion in 

valuing “gifts” from one spouse to another as marital property 

when one spouse “purchased the gifts during their marriage, 
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 11 2021 UT App 111

using marital funds to do so”). In such circumstances, both the 

gifting and receiving spouse have a pre-existing right of 

ownership in the marital assets used to acquire the property. A 

purchase financed with marital funds already belonging to both 

spouses is not a “gift” in the sense used in our case law.

¶29 In light of this precedent, it was error for the trial court to 

conclude, as a matter of law, that the jewelry Mahanthi gave 

Nakkina during the marriage was necessarily Nakkina’s 

separate property and not subject to division in the divorce. The 

property was acquired during the marriage, with marital funds, 

and as such was presumptively marital. See Lindsey, 2017 UT 

App 38, ¶ 31 (“Marital property ordinarily includes all property 

acquired during marriage, whenever obtained and from 

whatever source derived.” (cleaned up)). We therefore vacate the 

court’s award of the jewelry and remand to give the trial court 

the opportunity to reconsider its award and, if necessary, to 

amend its order awarding the jewelry in its entirety to Nakkina.4

III. Attorney Fees

¶30 Mahanthi next argues that the trial court erred in 

awarding Nakkina attorney fees. Pursuant to section 30-3-3(1) of 

the Utah Code, a party in a divorce proceeding may be required 

 

4. Nakkina invites us to affirm the trial court’s award on 

alternative grounds, arguing that even if the jewelry is “a marital 

asset eligible for division between the parties, the court still has 

broad discretion in making an award of the personal property 

and the court was well within its right to award the jewelry to 

[Nakkina].” We decline this invitation because it is not for us to 

exercise that discretion on behalf of the trial court. The court 

may determine it is appropriate, for another reason, to award the 

jewelry to Nakkina. But that is a decision for the trial court to 

make in the first instance.
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 12 2021 UT App 111

to pay the attorney fees “of the other party to enable the other 

party to prosecute or defend the action.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-

3(1) (LexisNexis 2019). The party to be awarded attorney fees 

under this section has the burden to prove (1) that the payee 

spouse has a financial need, (2) that the payor spouse has the

ability to pay, and (3) that the fees requested are reasonable. Dahl 

v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 168, 459 P.3d 276. On appeal, Mahanthi 

challenges only the first element of the test: whether Nakkina 

had a financial need for the award of attorney fees. “When 

determining the financial need of the requesting spouse, [courts]

generally look to the requesting spouse’s income, including 

alimony received as the result of a divorce decree; the property 

received via the property distribution award; and his or her 

expenses.” Id. ¶ 170 (cleaned up). 

¶31 Mahanthi argues that the court erred in awarding 

Nakkina her attorney fees because those fees have already been 

paid. Nakkina argues that this is irrelevant because attorney fees 

may still be awarded based on need if a party borrowed funds to 

pay those fees. Nakkina has a point. Utah courts have 

recognized that “[p]arties to a divorce action often incur debt to 

retain counsel,” id., and that “the very existence of indebtedness 

to fund legal services may tend to show need,” Kimball v. 

Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ¶ 46, 217 P.3d 733. Likewise, Nakkina 

argues that she incurred debt to pay her fees, and that the 

friends and family who lent her funds “expected to be repaid 

eventually and it would detrimentally impact her relationships if 

she did not repay them.”

¶32 We acknowledge that indebtedness to friends and family, 

while not determinative, may tend to demonstrate a need 

sufficient to satisfy section 30-3-3(1). See id. (holding that it is the 

existence of indebtedness to fund legal services that tends to 

show need regardless of whether the debt is owed to an 

attorney, a bank, family, or a friend). This is true “especially if 

[the spouse] is expected to repay his [or her] family in due 
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 13 2021 UT App 111

course, even if the family members are disinclined to commence 

a collection action to enforce such repayment.” Id. ¶ 48. But it is 

unclear if Nakkina’s indebtedness, or something else, was the 

basis for the court’s finding that she had a need for assistance to 

pay her attorney fees. 

¶33 In finding that Nakkina had an unmet need, the court 

stated that she “has a demonstrated need associated with any 

and all fees she has incurred in this matter” and incorporated the 

need-related “findings made in [the court’s] principal set of 

[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law].” But in those 

findings, the only mention of Nakkina’s attorney fees was in the 

court’s expression of “concern[] with the reliability of some of” 

her claimed expenses. In particular, the court did not accept 

Nakkina’s claimed expense of $1,000 a month “in debt payments 

to family and friends for the alleged loans” used to pay her 

attorney fees. The court rejected Nakkina’s claim that she was 

“legally indebted to family members” because her testimony on 

the “topic was ambiguous” and because it was not supported by 

any “corroborating documents.”

¶34 Unfortunately, these findings do not reveal the steps the 

trial court took to find that Nakkina had demonstrated an unmet 

need. See Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, ¶ 18, 203 P.3d 1020 

(“When awarding attorney fees in divorce cases, the trial court is 

required to make explicit findings regarding the financial need 

of the receiving spouse . . . .” (cleaned up)). The court stated that 

Nakkina “is unable to meet” her attorney fees expenses, which 

“were above and beyond her monthly expenses,” but this 

finding does not appear to account for the fact that Nakkina’s 

fees had already been paid and that the court rejected Nakkina’s 

claims of indebtedness to her family and friends, at least for 

purposes of determining alimony. Accordingly, we vacate the 
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 14 2021 UT App 111

trial court’s attorney fees award and remand for reconsideration 

and entry of sufficient findings of fact thereon.

5

IV. Motion to Amend

¶35 Lastly, Mahanthi appeals the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to amend the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. Mahanthi contends that his motion was properly filed 

under rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and that the 

court erred in rejecting it as a motion to reconsider. We disagree.

¶36 “Motions to reconsider are not recognized by the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure,” and “trial courts are under no 

obligation to consider [them].” Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 

2007 UT 37, ¶ 15, 163 P.3d 615; see also A.S. v. R.S., 2017 UT 77, 

¶ 28, 416 P.3d 465. Although Mahanthi takes no issue with this 

general principle, he contends that the court erred in 

“recast[ing]” his motion to amend as a motion to reconsider. 

Mahanthi argues that his motion “was appropriately titled as a 

 

5. Mahanthi also complains that he is entitled to a credit for an 

alleged overpayment of attorney fees in the amount of $10,000. 

He argues that Nakkina’s lawyer was paid $64,000 in fees, but 

because the court awarded Nakkina only $54,600, he should 

receive a credit for some of the fees he already paid. Mahanthi 

has not demonstrated that he preserved this issue for appeal, 

and we reject it on that basis. See Allen v. Allen, 2021 UT App 20, 

¶¶ 37–38, 483 P.3d 730, petition for cert. filed, May 21, 2021 (No. 

20210355). But even if the issue had been preserved, it does not 

appear that any amount would be due Mahanthi. The trial court 

found that Nakkina reasonably incurred $54,600 in attorney fees, 

and it ordered Mahanthi to pay $40,600 after crediting him 

$14,000 for fees he already paid. The fact that Nakkina may have 

paid her attorney more than $54,600 does not entitle Mahanthi to 

a credit.
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 15 2021 UT App 111

Rule 59 motion to amend and contained all the elements 

required by the rule.” (Cleaned up.) But Mahanthi’s motion was 

not a rule 59 motion simply because he labeled it as such.

¶37 Rule 59 allows a party to seek to alter or amend a 

judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend 

the judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of 

the judgment.”); see also Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 

650, 653 (Utah 1994) (“Rule 59, according to its plain language, 

applies only to motions for new trials or amendments of 

judgments.”). Mahanthi’s motion did not seek to amend a 

judgment; rather, Mahanthi sought to amend the court’s prejudgment findings of fact and conclusions of law.6 Thus, because 

Mahanthi’s motion preceded the judgment, the court did not err 

in construing it as a motion to reconsider, and Mahanthi has not 

shown that the court abused its discretion in denying it as such.7

 

6. Mahanthi expressed some confusion about whether the court’s 

findings and conclusions constituted its final judgment in the 

case. But the court’s order directed Mahanthi’s counsel to draft a 

“Final Order and Decree in accordance with these findings and 

conclusions.” Further, subsequent proceedings made clear that 

the court expected to enter a decree to effectuate its findings and 

conclusions, and the court later entered a Final Order and 

Decree.

7. Mahanthi argues that this determination conflicts with our 

decision in Hudema v. Carpenter, where we held that a rule 59 

motion filed before the entry of judgment “was timely in the 

jurisdictional sense and thus extended the period in which 

[Hudema] could file her notice of appeal.” 1999 UT App 290, 

¶ 19, 989 P.2d 491. But we are not holding that a rule 59 motion 

made before the entry of judgment is untimely for purposes of 

tolling the appeal period. Rather, we hold that the court acted 

(continued...)
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 16 2021 UT App 111

V. Fees on Appeal

¶38 Nakkina requests an award of her attorney fees incurred 

in defending this appeal. “In divorce actions where the trial 

court has awarded attorney fees and the receiving spouse 

prevails on the main issues, we generally award fees on appeal.” 

Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 17, 257 P.3d 478 (cleaned 

up). Although Nakkina was awarded fees by the trial court, we 

have vacated that award and remanded for reconsideration. 

Further, even if that award is ultimately sustained by the trial 

court, because Nakkina has prevailed only on the motion to 

amend issue and not the others, she is not entitled to an award of 

attorney fees on appeal. 

CONCLUSION

¶39 The trial court erred by not awarding equal parent-time 

because the award was not firmly anchored on findings of fact. 

Thus, we reverse the ruling, and we order the court to award 

equal parent-time. The court also erred by awarding Nakkina 

the jewelry based on a misunderstanding of the law. We 

therefore vacate the award and remand with instructions to 

divide the jewelry using the appropriate standard. Next, the 

court erred by awarding Nakkina attorney fees because it failed 

 

(...continued)

within its discretion to construe Mahanthi’s motion as a motion 

to reconsider when Mahanthi sought reconsideration of the 

court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed it before 

the court entered its final decree. See Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, 

¶ 7 n.2, 135 P.3d 861 (“Arguably, the plantiffs’ [purported rule 

59] motion could not even be construed as a postjudgment 

motion to amend under our prior case law because the plaintiffs 

filed it before the entry of a final judgment.”).
Nakkina v. Mahanthi

20190750-CA 17 2021 UT App 111

to make adequate findings regarding her need related to 

receiving attorney fees. Thus, we vacate the attorney fees award 

and remand for reconsideration and entry of sufficient findings 

of fact thereon. Lastly, the court did not err by dismissing 

Mahanthi’s motion to amend because when his motion was filed 

there was no final order or judgment to be reviewed under rule 

59. We therefore affirm the court on this issue.